Over or Under? The Motivational Implications of an Underdog Image

by

Samir Nurmohamed

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(Business Administration)
in the University of Michigan
2014

Doctoral Committee:

Assistant Professor David M. Mayer, Chair
Assistant Professor D. Scott DeRue
Professor Jane E. Dutton
Professor Adam M. Grant, University of Pennsylvania
Assistant Professor Brent J. McFerran

Dedication

To my parents, Nasir and Asmita:

My love for you continues to stretch beyond the universe.

Acknowledgements

The irony of my dissertation is that my work is not the product of being perceived as an underdog. In fact, it's the opposite: the people around me have always had the highest expectations for me. I am extremely grateful for their support, as it has made completing a PhD intellectually stimulating and fun.

I would like to thank my advisor, David Mayer. My only regret about working with Dave is that he arrived at Michigan in my second year rather than my first. From the beginning, Dave has always encouraged me to pursue my curiosity, and I credit him for helping me find my passion in research. He has taught me that research is largely the product of persistent hard work and dedication to the science and craft, but at the same time, Dave has the innate ability to make research fun. Dave has equipped me with the tools to not only conduct research, but also to envision and build a research program, brick-by-brick. His input has provided me a solid foundation for what I seek to construct, and I now recognize what is possible. Dave is an exemplar of what I strive to become as a researcher, teacher, mentor and colleague. I feel incredibly lucky to have him as my advisor, and more importantly, as a close friend. Thank you, Dave.

I am fortunate to have Scott DeRue as a mentor. Scott's mentoring mirrors how he taught me how to wakeboard: showing me the basics, letting me try and experiment, and then reflecting with me on how to improve before having me try it again. With his guidance, I have learned that it is not about your performance out of the gate that matters, but how you develop and grow as a doctoral student. Furthermore, I have appreciated

Scott's advice and candor over the years, and I am grateful for all of the insights that he has shared with me. I know that I can continue to count on his advice in the future.

What do I say about Jane Dutton that others have not already stated over the years? Her contributions to the field are enormous, her wisdom is held in high regard, and her perspective provides an alternative way of seeing the world that is a gift to those who have the chance to interact with her. She has always encouraged me to go bigger and strive for impact beyond my immediate surroundings. But I respect and admire Jane not simply as a scholar, but also as a person. She has stuck her neck out for me, and I will never forget what she has contributed to both my research and outlook.

Brent McFerran has been a valuable member of my dissertation committee. He has provided his insights on how to develop my experiments, and has always been quick to lend a helping hand. In addition, he has provided me positive encouragement during this entire process, enabling me to focus on the strengths of my research, and how to address some of its flaws. Brent is further proof that you can always count on a Canadian to deliver, and I hope that in the future, I will continue to remain a member of his "entourage."

I feel incredibly privileged to have been a beneficiary of Adam Grant's mentoring and wisdom. Adam is a living embodiment of what he studies. He has always been giving of his time, and he has made a lasting impact on my life without ever expecting anything in return. Adam was willing to work with me during my first days in graduate school, and has been invaluable in developing my research on underdogs. Moreover, Adam has been a champion of my research to others, and there is no way that I could have accomplished my goals without him. As I enter my new job at Wharton, I am thankful that Adam will

be only a few doors away. I hope that I can start giving back what I have taken from Adam.

I would also like to recognize the impact of a number of other mentors who have helped me along this journey. Sue Ashford was willing to invest in me from my first day in the program, opening my eyes to research and providing feedback on my earliest ideas in this field. Jeffrey Sanchez-Burks was a strong proponent of my research on underdogs in its earliest phase, and has taught me a great deal about conducting parsimonious experiments. Lance Sandelands was the first person I ever spoke to at Michigan, and has shown me the value of playing with my ideas in both research and teaching. Jerry Davis has remarkably made me laugh in every conversation I have ever had with him, regardless of whether it was about how to apply organizational theory or how to get Rick Ross to pony up money for naming the Ross School of Business in his honour. Leigh Plunkett Tost has provided me incredible support on my research, presentations and navigating the job market, and I am delighted that she arrived at Michigan before I finished. I am also thankful to Karl Aquino, Wayne Baker, Shirli Kopelman, Gretchen Spreitzer, Kathie Sutcliffe, Maxim Sytch and many other colleagues in the Management and Organizations group and POS Research Center for their advice, insights and feedback over my time in graduate school. Also, I want to thank my new colleagues at Wharton, especially Sigal Barsade, Adam Cobb and Nancy Rothbard, for their feedback and support.

As well, I am very appreciative for the help from many other individuals who helped me collect data and execute this research. In particular, I would like to thank Adam, Craig and Liz at the organization where I collected data for this research. I would

like to express my gratitude to Lillian Chen and Michael Payne for the countless hours they spent helping me. Also, I would like to thank Adam Oxman, Saeed El Saghir, Cassandra Mills and Sarah Sachse for their research assistance.

A number of friends have made my time in graduate school more enjoyable than I could have ever imagined. I am privileged to have Laura Rees as my cohort mate and close friend as she has cheered for me at every step of my journey, continually exemplifying that our success is a joint rather than distributive outcome. Daniel Weagley, Rob Smith, Sarwar Záhid and Stefanos Delikouras have made my time in graduate school fun (how many PhD students can say that?) by allowing me to crash their tailgates, parties, dinners, and houses on numerous occasions without ever requiring an invite. Jason Stornelli, Beatriz Pereira, Heeyon Kim, Adi Pattabhiramaiah and Megan Witmer have comprised the greatest cohort of all-time, and I look forward to celebrating their numerous achievements in the years to come. The students in the MO group at Michigan—especially Ashley Hardin, Brent Rosso, Chris Myers, Kathryn Dekas, Kristina Workman and Ned Wellman—have provided me incredible advice and emotional support over the years (and hot white chocolate breaks when I needed it most). Back in Canada, Matthew Unruh, Prabh Chandhoke and Gur Chandhoke have remained my closest friends, and we will continue to strive for success together.

There is no way I could have ever completed this research without the undying love and support of my family. My brother, Lateef, has always pushed me to reach my potential even when I have doubted myself (and he serves as an exemplar of exceeding your potential by marrying Annabelle, who I am so lucky to now have as my sister). As we grow older, I know that our bond will only continue to flourish. I am also thankful to

have Zula (Papa), Farida, Nadir and Laila in my life as they have always treated me as a member of their immediate family by providing me a spot at their dinner table, a bedroom in their house, and a toothbrush for the many nights I stayed over. They exemplify kindness, humility and goodness in this world.

And last—but definitely not least—to my parents, Nasir and Asmita: you have given me everything. Ten years ago you said to me, "Remember, every opportunity lost is gone forever, never to return. Time never turns back." Your sacrifices have given me the opportunities that you were never afforded, and I am blessed that you have provided me the freedom to chase my aspirations. You are what I strive to become—a contribution to those you love. You mean everything to me. I love you.

Table of Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

Abstract

Underdogs are pervasive in competitive and organizational settings, but their theoretical understanding is limited. I build on several fragmented and disparate literatures to understand how being perceived as an underdog impacts employee motivation. Whereas existing research suggests that the low expectations of others are threatening, I contribute to existing theory and research by suggesting that an underdog image has the potential to motivate employees through the desire to prove others wrong and prove oneself right. However, I suggest that whether each of these motives is experienced depends on the characteristics of an underdog image, constituents and competitors. This perspective offers insights into how and why people may be motivated from being perceived as an underdog by others, and considers its consequences for employees. I discuss theoretical implications for research on expectations, motivation, competition, and self-verification.

Chapter I
Introduction

The success of underdogs permeates society. From biblical times, there is the account of the young, smaller David defeating the giant Goliath, the great Philistine Warrior. In politics, President Harry Truman was expected to lose against Republican challenger Thomas Dewey by pundits, but it was Truman who ended up being victorious for a second term. Sports are filled with countless examples of underdogs who were successful, including the 1980 "Miracle on Ice" in which the US amateur hockey team upset the professional team from the Soviet Union. Lastly, there are many stories of successful underdogs in business. For instance, Steve Jobs returned to Apple and led the company to new heights after many believed that such a turnaround was not possible. Indeed, the triumphs of underdogs are well documented, and offer powerful narratives of values and archetypes that are held by a given society.

Yet current theory and research suggests that being perceived as unlikely to succeed has negative ramifications for motivation. Research on theories of expectations and stereotype threat suggest that when a person is not expected to perform successfully by others, it is detrimental to their effort and performance. Numerous studies in a variety of settings including management, education and the military suggest that it is important for others to hold high expectations for subordinates to increase their motivation, effort and help them reach their potential. Therefore, despite some accounts of successful underdogs, research has largely suggested that when others hold low expectations, it is

harmful to individual motivation, effort and performance. My dissertation seeks to understand the motivational implications of being perceived as an underdog by others, providing a social and relational lens on how the low expectations of others can be potentially motivating.

Organization of this Dissertation

My dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter II, I review the broader literature on the topic of underdogs, and differentiates the concept of an underdog image from other related constructs in the literature. In Chapter III, I present a theory of the motivational effects of an underdog image. I explore how, why and when an underdog image is motivating from a social and relational perspective. In Chapter IV, I use three experiments that investigate the motivational effects of an underdog image, and specifies the mediating mechanisms and boundary conditions of its effects on effort and performance. In Chapter V, I present the results of a field experiment that investigates the effects of an underdog image in an organizational context where competition is salient. Lastly, I offer my concluding thoughts and present future directions of my research program on underdogs in Chapter VI.

Chapter II
Review of the Literature on Underdogs

An underdog is defined as a party who is believed to have little chance of winning a contest or conflict (Random House Dictionary, 2012). David Barker, a lawyer who was also a writer and poet, is credited for bringing the term underdog into everyday vernacular. His poem "The Under Dog in the Fight" was originally published in 1859. At his death, the New York Times remarked in an obituary to Barker that his poem had been 'extensively copied' and 'frequently quoted' by others (New York Times, 1874, p. 4). Interestingly, Barker (1876, p. 103) noted support for the underdog in his poem as he wrote, "I shall always go for the weaker dog, For the under dog in the fight…For my heart will beat, while it beats at all, For the under dog in the fight" (sic). Nowadays, the term underdog is frequently applied to historical examples of parties overcoming great odds to be successful. For example, the biblical story of David versus Goliath discusses how David, with only a sling and stones in hand, was able to defeat Goliath, a great Philistine warrior. Similarly, the term underdog is used to describe political candidates or sports teams who are unlikely to win compared to others. Underdogs are also mentioned in a variety of academic domains. Although the term has received some attention in the fields of political science, social psychology, marketing and economics, its definition and focus of study has differed. I review the ways in which underdogs have been studied in each of these domains below.

Political Science

Herb Simon (1954) coined the underdog effect in relation to people having a great propensity towards voting for a political candidate when they expect (s)he is more likely to lose than to win. Similarly, research in political science has also revealed the "going for the underdog" effect—that is, voters moving from their initial position to a candidate being depicted as non-dominant—in research on the impact of attitude polls on polling behavior (Ceci & Kain, 1982). By showing participants false polling data, Ceci and Kain (1982) demonstrated that voters were more likely to shift their support to other candidates when one candidate held a substantial lead in the polls. However, this does not mean that voters necessarily back the underdog. Using exit poll data collected in three general elections in Britain, McAllister and Studlar (1991) wondered about whether sympathy for the minority view would lead voters to adopt the minority opinion. However, they found no evidence of an underdog effect whereby voters decided to adopt the minority opinion after finding out about the majority opinion. Although the political science literature has a few studies investigating the likelihood of third-parties—more specifically, voters—supporting underdogs, the psychological mechanisms behind why they do so remain unexplored (Fleitas, 1971; Laponce, 1966; McAllister & Studlar, 1991; Palfrey, 2009).

Social Psychology

Recent research in social psychology has provided an insight into how third parties (i.e., audiences, observers) evaluate underdogs. Social psychologists have defined underdogs as individuals or groups that are at a disadvantage and expected to lose (Allison & Burnette, 2010; Goldschmied & Vandello, 2009; Vandello, Goldschmied, & Richards, 2007). Studies examining underdogs have used social identity theory and attribution theory (Kelley & Michela, 1980; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Tajfel & Turner,

1979), along with system justification theory (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004), to explain why third parties often view underdogs in a favorable light. For instance, Kim and colleagues (2008) suggest that people sympathized and identified more with underdogs since it satisfies their need for fairness and uniqueness. Similarly, observers attributed more effort to underdogs than other teams, resulting in greater support (Vandello et al., 2007). At the same time, there are boundary conditions to support for underdogs; participants were more likely to abandon their support for underdogs when their own interests were at stake (Kim et al., 2008). Furthermore, whereas Vandello et al. (2007) found that people attribute more effort to underdogs, Kim et al. (2008) found that the performance of underdogs was evaluated more critically by observers. Although research on underdog parties has started to garner attention, it neglects the motivational implications of being perceived as an underdog from a first-person perspective.

Marketing

In the consumer choice literature, "underdog brand biographies" have been linked to whether an individual chooses to support a product or not. Underdog brand biographies refer to narratives produced by firms emphasizing humble origins, lack of resources and a determined struggle against the odds (Paharia, Keinan, Avery, & Schor, 2011). Two dimensions underlie underdog brand biographies: external disadvantage, and passion and determination. By crafting narratives that highlight these two qualities, companies can spur support for their products. Furthermore, the authors propose that consumers are more likely to associate with underdog brands when they also self-identify as underdogs. Indeed, they find that consumers who perceive an external disadvantage and believe that they hold a passion and determination to succeed in their own lives are more likely to

prefer brands with an underdog biography. Although the authors introduce a first-person lens on underdogs, it is largely conceptualized as a narrative. Thus, the underdog disposition used by the authors is confounded with some of its psychological effects; in particular, whether viewing oneself at a disadvantage leads to a person putting forth greater effort or not.

Economics

In the economics and rational choice literatures, underdogs have been examined in the context of two-person theoretical game models in which contestants expend effort to win a prize. Dixit (1987) proposed that an underdog—defined as a player who has a less than one-half chance of victory at the Nash equilibrium—is less likely to overcommit effort. Moreover, from a rational choice perspective, Dixit's (1987) two-person theoretical model suggests that, "The underdog on the other hand, is 'under no pressure, and is just going to enjoy the occasion.' There is some objective truth to these assertions, but to a considerable extent, the pressure on a favorite is of his own making, as is the relaxed mood of an underdog" (Dixit, 1987, p. 896). Extending this work, Baik and Shogren (1992, p. 359) illustrated that an underdog's optimal strategy, "is not to wait, but to make the first move, throwing the first punch." The rationale behind a first-move strategy for an underdog is that chance may make it possible for an underdog to floor a favorite, but at the same time, the underdog will not commit too many resources to such a strategy because the underdog is aware that the favorite will react in proportion to his effort. They note that in political campaigns, underdogs are more likely to start early on the campaign trail before the powerful incumbent begins campaigning. Moreover, Shogren and Baik (1992) demonstrate in a lab experiment that the strategic behavior of

underdogs was not always optimal as they often bid higher than the response which would maximize their expected return, implying that underdogs may apply a "nothing to lose" principle when competing against other parties. Thus, from a rational choice perspective, underdogs may exert effort and resources differently than parties who have a higher chance of winning. However, this literature does not give an insight into the psychological effects of being viewed as an underdog, and its consequences for the self and behavior.

Distinguishing an Underdog Image from Related Constructs

In the following chapters, I will define an underdog image as an expectation by constituents that an individual or group of individuals is less likely to succeed relative to others. As part of my conceptual development of an underdog image, it is important to distinguish it from related—but different—constructs, such as self-efficacy, public expectancies, overconfidence, rivalry, status, negative feedback and upward social comparisons.

First, an underdog image is regarded as conceptually distinct from self-efficacy. Self-efficacy is a person's belief about whether she is capable of performing a specific task (Bandura, 1977, 1982; Gist, 1987; Gist & Mitchell, 1992). Similarly, the Galatea effect is a form of private expectancy, referring to when high self-expectations lead to high performance (Eden & Kinnar, 1991; McNatt & Judge, 2004). Although both self-efficacy and an underdog image involve beliefs about the capacity to perform, an underdog image relates to the expectations of other individuals, whereas self-efficacy refers to self-expectations.

Second, public expectancies of success are related to but different from an underdog image. Indeed, public expectations have received attention with relation to the Pygmalion effect, which occurs when high supervisory expectations for an individual result in higher performance (Brophy, 1983; Merton, 1948; Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968b). Similarly, the Golem effect refers to the negative effect of low supervisory expectations on effort and performance. Although there are similarities between low expectations and an underdog image, an underdog image is a particular type of low expectations in that it emphasizes relative performance (e.g., in competition) as opposed to absolute performance (e.g., achieving a goal in isolation).

Third, overconfidence is distinct from an underdog image. Despite both implying that an individual has a relatively positive self-perception, the reference point in the constructs of overconfidence and an underdog image differ. Research in the overconfidence tradition compares individual self-perceptions versus objective, operational criteria (e.g., task performance and test scores), as opposed to the expectations from others (Anderson & Brion, 2010; Moore & Healy, 2008). For example, individuals who are overconfident may believe that their sales performance ranks in the 95th percentile when they actually rank in the 40th percentile. Although objective, operational criteria may feed into an underdog image via the expectations of others, an underdog image focuses on others' expectations rather than self-expectations. Anderson and Brion (2010, p. 8) succinctly state that the overconfidence tradition aims to measure, "whether individuals believe their skills to be better than they actually are – rather than, say, better than others' perceptions of them."

Fourth, rivalry is conceptualized, "as a subjective competitive relationship that an act has with another actor that entails increased psychological involvement and perceived stakes of competition for the focal actor, independent of the objective characteristics of the situation" (Kilduff, Elfenbein, & Staw, 2010, p. 945). Similar to rivalry, an underdog image is driven not only by objective conditions, but rather, it is subjective and constructed by individuals and those around them. Furthermore, an underdog image, like rivalry, may increase individual effort and performance (Kilduff et al., 2010; Malhotra, 2010). Yet while an underdog image shares similarities with rivalry, it remains conceptually distinct. First, rivalries are conceptualized at the dyad level, whereas an underdog image is applied to an individual or group of individuals. Moreover, an underdog image may be present in the absence of a rivalry; that is, a rivalry between competitors does not have to exist for someone to be perceived as an underdog.

Fifth, status concerns the amount of prominence, respect and admiration that a person holds in a domain whereas I am looking at a specific type of low expectation that is held by constituents. While there may be a correlation between being perceived as an underdog and low status, there are also numerous instances in which people may have high status but are perceived as underdogs (e.g., presidential elections). Moreover, people perceived as an underdog may garner respect from others by admirably participating in a competitive environment even when their chances for success are low.

Sixth, although there are some similarities between negative feedback and an underdog image, the important difference is that negative feedback is post-hoc while an underdog image is formed a priori. An underdog image may emerge out of prior

performances, but it relates to the expectations of constituents, rather than a post-hoc evaluation of how someone performed.

Lastly, an underdog image is distinct from upward social comparisons. An upward social comparison involves comparing oneself to someone who is better off on a given attribute (Wood, 1996). Theories of social comparison reveal that individuals are driven by a desire for self-evaluation, and compare themselves to others to ascertain where they stand (Buunk & Gibbons, 2007; Festinger, 1954). Similar to upward social comparisons, an underdog image may be constructed in relation to others who are seen as superior in a person's environment. Nevertheless, an upward social comparison is more likely to serve as a potential *consequence* of an underdog image since such an image is likely to feed into how a person perceives oneself relative to others. Consequently, an underdog image differs from an upward social comparison.

Chapter III
A Theory of an Underdog Image

Organizational life is rife with competition (Deutsch, 1949; Kilduff et al., 2010; Stanne, Johnson, & Johnson, 1999; Triplett, 1898). Employees compete for scarce opportunities, recognition and resources such as jobs, promotions, bonuses, money and awards. But in competitive environments, not all participants are expected to be successful. Some participants may enter with substantial financial backing, whereas others are not endowed with similar resources. Similarly, some are likely to have a prior history of performing well, leading others to believe that they are likely to be successful. As such, competitive environments will inevitably feature some participants who are expected to be victorious, and others who are not expected to win: underdogs.

Despite the ubiquity of underdogs in various competitive domains including sports, politics, markets, and organizations, scholars have paid little attention to the motivational and performance implications of being perceived as an underdog. However, management scholars have long argued that the expectations of others have significant effects on employees' motivation, effort and performance (Brophy, 1983; Chen & Klimoski, 2003; Eden, 2003; Feather, 1969; Jussim & Harber, 2005; McNatt, 2000; Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968b; Tierney & Farmer, 2004). Indeed, the Pygmalion effect—demonstrated over years of empirical research—has documented that when supervisors hold high expectations for employees, employees are likely to perform better as they internalize these high expectations (Eden, 1990a; Eden & Shani, 1982; McNatt & Judge,

2004; Rosenthal, 2002; Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968a). Conversely, researchers have argued that when supervisors hold low performance expectations for their employees, employee motivation and performance suffer (Davidson & Eden, 2000; Oz & Eden, 1994; Reynolds, 2007). Furthermore, stereotype threat theory also notes how the potential of confirming a negative image of one's group leads a person to lower their own performance expectations, thereby reducing performance (Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky, 2001; Schmader, 2010; Steele, 1997; Steele & Aronson, 1995). The common denominator across these research domains is others' expectations are intertwined with self-expectations in ways that suggest that being perceived as an underdog would contribute to lower motivation and performance.

At the same time, there is scattered evidence that the low expectations of others may sometimes affect performance in the opposite direction. For example, individuals in competitive settings who held relatively high self-expectations for performance performed better when others' expectations were low rather than high since the latter led individuals to "choke under pressure" (Baumeister, Hamilton, & Tice, 1985; Baumeister & Steinhilber, 1984). In addition, emerging research in other academic domains suggests that being perceived as an underdog can have advantages. A handful of studies in social psychology suggest that underdogs are evaluated more favorably by third parties, enabling them to receive greater support and sympathy from others (Paharia et al., 2011; Simon, 1954; Vandello et al., 2007). Furthermore, stories of underdogs permeate religions and cultures from biblical times to the modern day, and in many of these situations, the underdog has performed successfully (McGinnis & Gentry, 2009). Yet little is known about the first-hand experience of being perceived as an underdog by

constituents in organizational environments, and its associated effects on motivation and performance. Individuals may find motivation in being seen as an underdog, but research has yet to indicate when, why and how this occurs.

Given that numerous situations arise in competitive and organizational contexts in which individuals are perceived as underdogs, it is important to enhance our understanding of its effects on motivation and performance. In this paper, I present a theoretical model of an *underdog image*—defined as an expectation by constituents that an individual is less likely to succeed relative to others. My core premise is that when employees are perceived as an underdog by others, it has the potential to enhance or hinder their motivation. Although prior work presumes that the low expectations of others is threatening and has detrimental effects on motivation and performance (Brophy, 1983; Eden, 2003; Eden & Kinnar, 1991; McNatt, 2000; Merton, 1948), I argue that an underdog image also has the potential to stimulate employee motivation through two motives—the desire to prove others wrong and the desire to prove oneself right. When an underdog image motivates constructively, it activates the twin motives of proving others wrong and proving oneself right, leading to greater effort and discovery of novel task strategies that enable employee performance. Conversely, when an underdog image is seen as self-verifying, it debilitates employee motivation as it does not activate these dual motives. In addition, I underscore the nature of others' expectations by outlining how the characteristics of constituents and competitors shape the effects of an underdog image on proving others wrong and oneself right, along with task effort and strategies. Therefore, my theoretical model highlights how and when an underdog image can stimulate versus debilitate employee motivation.

My purpose in this article is to recast existing research on the low expectations of others, and unpack our understanding of how being perceived as an underdog influences employee motivation, task strategies and outcomes. From a theoretical perspective, it is important to understand the motivational implications of being perceived as an underdog because it deepens our understanding of how the expectations of others impacts motivation and performance. Current theory assumes that the low expectations of others are debilitating, but does not consider when and why others' low expectations can actually be motivating. Theoretically, my model offers a social (e.g., Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978; Triplett, 1898; Zajonc, 1965) and relational (e.g., Gelfand, Major, Raver, Nishii, & O'Brien, 2006; Grant, 2007) lens on motivation by aiming to reveal novel and useful avenues for understanding the nature of others' expectations at the workplace on employee motivation and performance. Consistent with a social perspective on how motivation may arise from the expectations of others, I outline how the source of an underdog image shapes its effects. Prior research on others' expectations largely focused on the expectations of supervisors (McNatt, 2000). My theoretical model expands this research to consider how expectations from various constituents at the workplace may heighten or diminish the effect of an underdog image on motivation and performance.

In line with a relational perspective on motivation, I also consider how other competitors shape the effects of an underdog image on motivation and task content and strategies. My main suggestion is that being perceived as an underdog can be either more or less motivating depending on whom a person is competing against, thereby impacting the task effort, persistence, exploration and risk-taking that a person employs. Consequently, a relational perspective offers fresh insights into the role of competitors

when understanding the effects of others' expectations on the self. Therefore, my theoretical model provides a social and relational perspective on motivation, enhancing our understanding of what happens when an employee is perceived as an underdog.

The Origins of an Underdog Image

Before turning to my theoretical model, I first briefly review the literature on the broader topic of underdogs. An underdog refers to a person who is believed to have little chance of winning a contest or conflict (Random House Dictionary, 2012). The term underdog first appeared in the Oxford English Dictionary in 1887, but originated in dog fighting contests (McFedries, 2008). In these contests, the losing dog would often roll onto its back in submission, resulting in the losing dog literally being under the other dog standing over him (Goldschmied & Vandello, 2012). While the underdog was established *after* the fight, the term eventually shifted towards being used to denote a newcomer, or a dog with an unimpressive record (Cryer, 2010).

Despite the dearth of research on underdogs in the organizational sciences, underdogs have been defined in various ways in several academic domains (Table 1 provides an overview of how the various scholarly fields have defined and studied underdogs). Across the fields of political science, marketing, and social psychology, underdogs have been studied primarily from a third-party (i.e., observer) rather than a first-hand (i.e., actor) perspective. However, my contention is that being perceived as an underdog has important motivational implications, especially in organizational settings. Below, I build on these academic domains to define an underdog image.

Defining an Underdog Image

I define an underdog image as an expectation by constituents that an individual or group of individuals is less likely to succeed relative to others. There are several noteworthy components to this definition. First, this definition notes that an underdog image can apply to an individual or group of individuals. At the same time, there remains an inherently *relational* and *social* component to its formation since it is defined both relative to and observed by others in the environment. My definition of an underdog image is consistent with existing work on underdogs in other domains since underdogs are defined from the perspective of the audience (Kim et al., 2008; Vandello et al., 2007). For example, underdogs are constructed by others who see them as likely to lose (Vandello et al., 2007) or unlikely to succeed against implicitly or explicitly advantaged opponents (Kim et al., 2008). As such, an underdog image is socially constructed as it is comprised of the beliefs that constituents hold of an individual's likelihood of performing successfully. In competitions, key constituents may include the audience or observers; in organizations, key constituents may include supervisors, coworkers, customers or clients.

The Motivational Effects of an Underdog Image

In this section, I introduce a theory of the motivational implications of being perceived as an underdog by others. I begin from the premise that an underdog image is constructed in an environment by constituents. The basic rationale is that when an underdog image of an individual is formed, the awareness of this image has the potential to motivate constructively through a relational-focused mechanism (i.e., proving others wrong) and self-focused mechanism (i.e., proving oneself right). Each mechanism is aimed at altering others' perceptions of themselves into a self-view that is consistent with their own. However, whether each of these motivations is actually experienced depends

on the dimensions of the underdog image—its consistency, credibility and mutability. Below, I detail the desire to prove others wrong and prove oneself right, and then proceed to address how each dimension of an underdog image shapes these dual motives.

Proving Others Wrong and Proving Oneself Right

Proving others wrong (POW) refers to employees' desire to demonstrate to others that the views they hold are inaccurate. A growing body of organizational research emphasizes the role of interpersonal relationships in enhancing employees' motivation (Gelfand et al., 2006; Grant, 2007; Ibarra & Andrews, 1993; Leana & Rousseau, 2000). Similarly, much research has demonstrated that supervisors, peers and clients have strong effects on employees' effort and performance on the job, and employees care a large deal about what others think of them (Bolino, 1999; Chiaburu & Harrison, 2008; Grant & Mayer, 2009).

POW represents a negatively valenced desire since it is aimed at demonstrating to others that their expectations are incorrect. Indeed, prior research has documented how negatively valenced events have stronger implications for the self than positively valenced events (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001). Self-verification theory argues that when individuals perceive a discrepancy between their own view of themselves and how they perceive others see them, they are motivated to act to bring these images together (Swann, 1987; Swann, Rentfrow, & Guinn, 2003). Accordingly, individuals have a strong need to self-verify, and ensure there is an accurate portrayal of themselves to others for both epistemic (i.e., to maintain psychological coherence) and pragmatic (i.e., to ensure that evaluations are accurate) reasons (Cable & Kay, 2012). Furthermore, Swann (1987) notes that individuals are more likely to attempt to bring

others' images into alignment with their own, as opposed to altering their own self-views to fit those of others.

Although self-verification theory suggests that individuals are motivated to bridge this discrepancy together for the purposes of self-coherence, POW serves as a relational motive that is targeted at others rather than the self. Beyond traditional discussions of self-verification, a POW motive suggests that employees will not resolve this image discrepancy only for themselves; rather, they will also do it for relational purposes: to outwardly demonstrate that constituents' expectations are incorrect. In this manner, a POW motive is similar to both performance—prove and learning goals as individuals who want to POW care about others' evaluations of themselves (Brett & VandeWalle, 1999; Dweck & Leggett, 1988). At the same time, a POW motive also shares semblance with a learning goal as individuals who hold the motive believe that personal attributes, including ability, are malleable and can be developed through greater effort. Furthermore, POW, though serving as an approach goal, differs from a performance prove goal since it is focused on changing others' perceptions of oneself, as opposed to establishing one's credentials as above those of others (Porath & Bateman, 2006).

A related—but different—motivational effect of an underdog image is the desire to *prove oneself right (POR)*. POR refers to individuals' desire to demonstrate that their own self-views are accurate. An underdog image triggers a desire to POR since people want to protect their self-worth, and establish that their own expectations hold validity in their social environment. This notion is consistent with theories of self-affirmation as individuals strive to maintain and protect their own self-integrity (Sherman & Cohen, 2006; Steele, 1988). However, the desire to POR suggests that employees will not simply

dismiss others' expectations of themselves, which is traditionally the focus of discussions on self-affirmation (Koole, Smeets, Van Knippenberg, & Dijksterhuis, 1999; Reed & Aspinwall, 1998; Steele & Liu, 1983). Instead, they will want to demonstrate and verify that their own expectations are correct. Thus, POR shares similarities with POW as both motives embody a desire for verification in a social environment. By doing so, they are able to maintain not only their self-worth and self-esteem, but also their worth and esteem in the eyes of others (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). However, POR is focused inwards toward affirming that self-views are accurate (i.e., a positive valence), whereas POW is focused outward towards changing the views of others (i.e., a negative valence). For instance, a newcomer who is not expected to complete a project by her peers may not be focused on demonstrating to her peers' that their expectations are incorrect; rather, the newcomer may want to only demonstrate that her own expectations are accurate.

Having outlined the POW and POR motives, I draw on prior research on image (e.g., Ibarra, 1999; Roberts, 2005) to highlight three key dimensions—consistency, credibility and mutability—of an underdog image that are likely to shape its motivational effects on POW and POR. The first dimension, *consistency*, describes the degree to which an underdog image is seen as congruent with an employee's self-image. As previously indicated, an underdog image is a perception held by constituents regarding an individual's likelihood of being successful, but individuals also hold self-expectations about their likelihood of success. For example, constituents may perceive an employee as an underdog, and an employee may perceive herself as the same, evoking consistency between her own expectations for performing effectively and those of constituents in her environment. On the other hand, an underdog image and an employee's self-image may

be discrepant because an employee's self-expectations exceed those of others, resulting in an inconsistent underdog image.

In reference to consistency, I argue that when an underdog image is ascribed to an individual, it triggers a desire to POW and POR when individuals view the underdog image as inconsistent with their own expectations. Through the need for self-verification (Swann, 1987), the low expectations of constituents result in a misalignment between how individuals perceive themselves and how they are perceived by others when they hold relatively high self-expectations. Because of this, employees perceive themselves as underestimated by others. Indeed, prior research has demonstrated that when individuals hold high self-expectations in the face of setbacks, they are unlikely to experience threat (Berger & Pope, 2011). In competitive settings, this effect may be amplified further as research demonstrates that competition can activate approach-based goals, thereby evoking challenge-based cognitions, affect and behaviors (Murayama & Elliot, 2012).

Similarly, the inconsistency of an underdog image is likely to lead individuals to interpret the low expectations of others as a challenge as opposed to a threat, thereby leading to a greater desire to POW and POR. For example, a client may not believe that a newly hired consultant has the necessary skills to perform an assignment compared to others, but the newcomer may believe that she does, resulting in an inconsistent underdog image. Because of this inconsistency in expectations, POW and POR motives are likely to arise since the newcomer will want to demonstrate to the client that he is wrong and her own expectations are correct. An inconsistent underdog image is likely to be viewed as a challenge rather than a threat since people still carry high self-expectations in the face of others' low expectations when this occurs. There is evidence that framing a

situation as a challenge rather than threat can be motivating as people view the situation as one that can be overcome with requisite effort (Lazarus, 1991; Skinner & Brewer, 2002). As such, individuals direct their energy and attention towards POW and POR. In contrast, when an underdog image is consistent with employees' self-expectations, individuals are likely to view it as threatening since their low self-expectations lead them to believe that the low expectations cannot be overcome. When self-expectations are low, an underdog image is viewed as self-verifying, and unlikely to evoke the desire to POW and POR. As a result, a consistent underdog image—an underdog image coupled with low self-expectations—does not activate the twin desires of POW and POR. Therefore, when an underdog image is inconsistent with employees' self-expectations, individuals view the underdog image as an opportunity to demonstrate that the expectations constituents hold are incorrect, and their own self-expectations are accurate, heightening both the motive to POW and POR.

Proposition 1a: The less consistent an underdog image is perceived by the employee, the stronger the employee's desire to prove others wrong and prove oneself right.

The second dimension of an underdog image is its *credibility*—the degree to which an underdog image is seen as believable (Cable & Yu, 2006). Determinants of credibility include trust, expertise and liking of the source (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953; Ilgen, Fisher, & Taylor, 1979). In the context of an underdog image, additional factors may impact its credibility. For example, when a person has no performance history in a domain, has never been observed by others or is facing an opponent in a contest for the first time, an underdog image holds less credibility since judgments about employees' likelihood of performing effectively are more uncertain. Furthermore, the

credibility of an underdog image may also depend on the characteristics of the other competitors. If an individual is facing competitors with a history of success against them, an underdog image is likely to be characterized by greater credibility since the superiority of competitors is documented by prior evidence.

Similarly, I propose that when an underdog image is less credible, it evokes the desire to POW and POR. This idea is supported in the feedback literature, which suggests that the more credible the feedback, the more likely it will be accepted by employees since they perceive the feedback as more likely to be accurate (Ilgen et al., 1979; Podsakoff & Farh, 1989). When job applicants received negative feedback that was credible, they became less interested in working for the organization to which they had applied (Ilgen et al., 1979). Consistent with this idea, I propose that when an underdog image holds greater credibility, it is less likely evoke a desire to POW and POR and motivate employees. Employees are more likely to endure the underdog image because they believe constituents' expectations are accurate. Conversely, when an underdog image holds less credibility, employees hold a stronger desire to POW and POR since they believe that these expectations are inaccurate. For example, if constituents are speculating that an individual is unlikely to perform effectively relative to others, but they have never observed the individual in the performance domain or compete against her competitors, an underdog image is less likely to hold credibility. Because of this, an underdog image will be viewed as an opportunity to POW and POR as they believe the low expectations of others are illegitimate. Consequently, a less credible underdog image is more likely to activate the desire to POW and POR.

Proposition 1b: The less credible an underdog image is perceived by the employee, the stronger the employee's desire to prove others wrong and prove oneself right.

The third dimension is the *mutability* of an underdog image—the degree to which an underdog image is perceived as stable and fixed over time. Some images may be more mutable than others as individuals may have the potential to transform others' images of themselves (Ibarra, 1999). For instance, during periods of career transition, individuals are likely to find it easier to change others' perceptions of themselves. Ibarra (1999) found that newcomers in organizations often experiment with how they are seen by others, and during times of transition, employees are likely to find it more feasible to change their images in the eyes of others. Consequently, in some situations, an underdog image may be easier to change.

When an underdog image is mutable, it is more likely to evoke a stronger desire to POW and POR. The potential of altering others' image of oneself influences employees' motivation (Roberts, 2005). If people believe they are unable to potentially change others' image of themselves, they often decide it is not worth responding to image threats (Major, Quinton, McCoy, & Schmader, 2000; Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 2002). For example, in meritocratic organizational environments, an underdog image is less likely to be rigid since employees' standing in the organization is likely to depend on their performance, providing them an opportunity to alter others' expectations of themselves, along with affirming their own expectations. Moreover, research on status has suggested that individuals view their situation as a challenge—as opposed to a threat—when status differences are unstable (Scheepers, 2009). Conversely, in organizational environments where employees have little chance to demonstrate that they

are capable performers, employees are likely to believe that they have a lower likelihood of altering the expectations of others, resulting in a lower desire to POW and POR. Therefore, I propose that the mutability of an underdog image is likely to shape its effects on the desire to POW and POR:

Proposition 1c: The more mutable an underdog image is perceived by the employee, the stronger the employee's desire to prove others wrong and prove oneself right.

The Profile of Constituents

Thus far, I have focused on the motivational effects of being perceived as an underdog, and argued that when the consistency, credibility and immutability of an underdog image are lower, it has the potential to motivate by evoking a stronger desire to POW and POR. However, consistent with a social perspective on employee motivation, the source of an underdog image may also shape whether an underdog image motivates constructively or not. While earlier research on the Pygmalion and Golem effects has underscored how the expectations of teachers and supervisors impact the performance of students and employees respectively, expectations may also emanate from a broader array of constituents in employees' environment. In organizational settings, expectations may arise from a variety of constituents such as supervisors, coworkers, customers, clients and investors. Just as some audiences may react differently to the behaviors of employees (Flynn & Staw, 2004; Grant & Patil, 2012), I argue that employees may react differently to being perceived as an underdog depending on *who* holds the underdog image of an employee. Thus, I contend that the source of an underdog image is likely to shape whether it motivates constructively or not. The *profile of constituents* refers to the characteristics of constituents who perceive the employee as an underdog. Below, I

outline three characteristics of constituents—their group membership, status and openness—that are likely to shape the effects of an underdog image on the desire to POW and POR.

Group Membership of Constituents. The first characteristic is the *group membership* of constituents, which refers to whether constituents who hold the underdog image belong to the same group as the focal employee (e.g., supervisor, coworkers or team members) or an external constituency (e.g., customers, clients or opposing team members). Theories of social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorization (Hogg & Terry, 2000; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) discuss how individuals pay considerable attention to group membership as it is a key driver of how the self is defined. The group membership of others shapes the work motivation of employees as employees may be more or less receptive to messages from members inside or outside of their immediate work groups (Ellemers, De Gilder, & Haslam, 2004; Haslam, Powell, & Turner, 2000; Van Knippenberg, 2000). Research on homophily and similarity-attraction demonstrates that employees are more influenced by messages from those they perceive as similar to themselves (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Gino, Ayal, & Ariely, 2009; Ibarra, 1992).

Consistent with the research above, when members from inside employees' work group ascribe an underdog image, it is less likely to evoke the desire to POW and POR. An underdog image emanating from workgroup members is likely to hold more validity as these expectations come from individuals who are similar to them, leading people to believe that these expectations are more likely to be accurate. Moreover, employees who are perceived as underdogs will likely have fewer opportunities to potentially change the

expectations of others, reducing their desire to POW and POR. Status characteristics theory (e.g., Berger, Cohen, & Zelditch Jr, 1972; Bunderson, 2003) contends that high performance expectations for a group member lend these individuals more opportunities to make decisions since others believe they can achieve the goals of the group. Extending this idea, when a person is perceived as an underdog, they are likely to have fewer opportunities to demonstrate their capacity to others. Consequently, an underdog image emanating from group members is likely to have a weaker effect on the desire to POW and POR as individuals are likely to believe that they will have opportunities to POW and POR.

On the other hand, when an underdog image emanates from external group members, employees are likely to have a stronger desire to POW and POR. An underdog image from those outside one's group is likely to be interpreted as challenging and motivating. Kelley's (1971) discounting principle asserts that individuals attach less importance to a person's opinion if other potential causes are also present. Applying this principle, an underdog image emerging from members outside of an individual's group may be interpreted as having ulterior motives as opposed to an accurate reflection of how an individual is expected to perform. Indeed, research has demonstrated that when a person's group is viewed as relatively inferior in comparison to an out-group, it heightens individuals activation, such as leading towards individuals to strive for social change (Ellemers, 1993; Scheepers & Ellemers, 2005). Furthermore, an underdog image from external group members is also less likely to hold legitimacy. Compared to members of an individual's work group, out-group members are likely to have less familiarity with the strengths and weaknesses of group members. Research on attitude change and

accountability indicates that when the views of others are seen as illegitimate, people are less likely to adopt the views of others, and it may even lead them to assert their own beliefs more forcefully (Baer, Hinkle, Smith, & Fenton, 1980; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). Because of this, an underdog image from external group members is more likely to lead individuals perceived as an underdog to believe that they can POW and POR. Taken together, I propose that when those inside employees' group ascribe an underdog image, it is less likely to evoke the desire to POW and POR than when an underdog image is ascribed by constituents from outside the group.

Proposition 2a: Constituents' group membership moderates the effects of an underdog image on the desire to POW and POR such that the positive effect is stronger when the underdog image is held by constituents outside of an individual's group than when it is held by constituents inside an individual's group.

Status of Constituents. The second characteristic is the *status* of constituents—the amount of prestige, respect and esteem that individuals hold in the eyes of others (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009; Blader & Chen, 2012; Fiske, 2010). Those who enjoy high status are likely to hold views that are highly valued by others, and individuals will aim to gain their respect for various reasons. For example, although power and status are distinct (Blader & Chen, 2012; Magee & Galinsky, 2008), people who hold high status often enjoy high power as they have control over valued resources. Constituents who have high status may wield influence in the domain, facilitating access to economic and socioemotional resources that may enable others to reach desired outcomes. Research on status indicates that the status of coactors can influence performance on tasks. Flynn and Amanatullah (2010) found that when individuals performed alongside individuals who

held higher status than themselves, they performed better since it inspired them to elevate their performance by psyching them up.

The status of constituents is likely to influence whether an underdog image evokes a desire to POW and POR. When constituents holding the underdog image carry high status, it is likely to stimulate a greater desire to POW and POR since the expectations of these individuals hold greater importance in the domain. Individuals are likely to see an underdog image as an opportunity to establish themselves and build their reputation. In contrast, when low status constituents perceive an employee as an underdog, an underdog image is less likely to motivate constructively as their expectations matter less to the focal employee. Because low status constituents possess lower levels of admiration and respect, employees who are perceived as an underdog by low status constituents will have a weaker desire to POW and POR since these constituents likely have lower influence in the domain, and gaining their respect is unlikely hold as much value.

Proposition 2b: Constituents' status moderates the effects of an underdog image on the desire to POW and POR such that the positive effect is stronger when the underdog image is held by constituents with a high status than those with a low status.

Openness of constituents. Constituents may be more or less receptive to changes in expectations than others. Openness reflects a person's tendency towards being broad-minded and intellectually flexible, and is an underlying dimension of personality (Barrick & Mount, 1991). Scholars have suggested that audiences higher in openness are likely to be more receptive to advocacy efforts by those who are challenging the views of the group (Grant & Patil, 2012). Similarly, leaders who signal openness are perceived as

more receptive to ideas and suggestions as they are willing to change their views and opinions (Ashford, Rothbard, Piderit, & Dutton, 1998; Grant, Gino, & Hofmann, 2011).

Building on these insights, the openness of constituents is proposed to amplify the positive impact of an underdog image on the desire to POW and POR. When constituents exhibit greater openness, they are more likely to embrace changes in their views and expectations. Open-minded constituents are willing to acknowledge when their views are incorrect, and are willing to change their ideas in response to evidence to the contrary. POW and POR can be realized in the face of an underdog image since constituents high in openness are willing to change their expectations and views. Consequently, an underdog image is likely to stimulate a greater desire to POW and POR.

Conversely, if constituents exhibit low openness, they are less likely to change their opinions of other individuals. Research on employee voice indicates that feelings of futility—the feeling that speaking up is not worth the effort and does not make a difference—as one reason why people do not speak up (Milliken, Morrison, & Hewlin, 2003). People may not believe that speaking up is worth it because of personal characteristics of the audience (Detert & Treviño, 2010). Drawing on these ideas, when constituents hold low openness, an underdog image is proposed to have a weaker impact on the desire to POW and POR since individuals perceived as an underdog are unlikely to believe that constituents' views about them can be changed. Consequently, they will view the potential to change an underdog image as futile since constituents who have low openness are more inclined to cling to their firmly held beliefs.

Proposition 2c: Constituents' openness moderates the effects of an underdog image on the desire to POW and POR such that the positive effect is stronger when constituents are high in openness than low in openness.

Task Content and Strategies of an Underdog Image

Beyond proving others wrong and proving oneself right, an underdog image is argued to also lead individuals to engage in particular task content and strategies. Task content refers to the level at which effort, diligence and energy is dedicated towards the task, whereas task strategies refer to the methods and procedures that employees use in order to achieve task objectives (Campbell, 1991; Earley, Connolly, & Ekegren, 1989; Thompson, Payne, Horner, & Morey, 2011). Task strategies include attentional processes and the development of plans for executing the task (Mitchell & Silver, 1990). Research on goal setting has suggested that when employees are highly motivated, it facilitates the development of effective and novel task strategies (Locke & Latham, 1990, 2002). Given that the twin motives of POW and POR are forms of performance-approach goals, employees who are perceived as an underdog are likely to engage in task content and strategies that involve striving for advancement and accomplishment, as opposed to vigilance strategies that are aimed at meeting minimal standards of performance and focused on accuracy (Brett & VandeWalle, 1999; Elliot & Church, 1997; Lanaj, Chang, & Johnson, 2012). As such, I examine how the desire to POW and POR facilitates approach-based task content (i.e., effort and persistence) and strategies (i.e., exploration and risk taking) for employees who are perceived as underdogs by others.

Effort and Persistence

Effort refers to how much energy a person devotes to selecting and executing action to complete a given task (Staw, 1984). Expectancy theory notes that effort emerges from the valence of outcomes—the degree to which the outcomes are important or valued (Vroom, 1964). Similarly, persistence involves the amount of time individuals are willing to dedicate to a task. Both effort and persistence are proposed to emerge from an underdog image through the desire to POW and POR. The rationale for this hypothesis is that when employees value these dual motives, they are more willing to work hard and invest energy and time into their tasks. POW and POR are both approach-oriented motives, indicating that employees who hold and value these desires believe that by allocating greater effort and persistence towards the task, they will attain desired outcomes. Thus, the desire to POW and POR is proposed to lead towards greater task effort and persistence.

Proposition 3a: The desire to prove others wrong and prove oneself right increases task effort and persistence.

Exploration

Beyond increased task content, an underdog image is likely to stimulate task strategies. Campbell (1991) indicates that individuals will often generate task strategies that require the least cognitive effort, but upon more reflective and deeper thought, they will produce a wider plethora of strategies that are useful for completing the task. By challenging one's own self-expectations, an underdog image is likely to trigger a wider array of task strategies as employees are likely to wonder about why such expectations were formed, and the ways in which they can achieve their twin motives. One such strategy is task exploration, which refers to behaviors such as search, variation,

experimentation, and discovery (March, 1991; Spreitzer, Sutcliffe, Dutton, Sonenshein, & Grant, 2005). Task exploration can be self-guided through the emerging problems and interests encountered as individuals seek to take control and responsibility for their own learning (Debowski, Wood, & Bandura, 2001; Wood, Kakebeeke, Debowski, & Frese, 2001). Indeed, task exploration is often coupled with a positive framing of the situations as a prerequisite for engaging in task exploration involves expecting and learning from mistakes, rather than viewing these events as an indication of not having the necessary capabilities (Debowski et al., 2001). Examples of task exploration in organizational settings include searching for new ideas, applying new work methods, and investigating and securing resources (Scott & Bruce, 1994).

By being ascribed an underdog image and eliciting the desire to POW and POR—dual approach motives—employees are likely to search for new ways to achieve task goals. Regulatory focus theory (e.g., Higgins, 1998) indicates that people who hold approach goals are likely to engage in eagerness—rather than vigilance—strategies that orient people towards seeking out new ways for doing their work. Similarly, research suggests that when employees encounter unfavorable circumstances such as failure, they are more likely to recognize gaps in their knowledge, leading them to search for new solutions and experiment with new strategies (Lee, Edmondson, Thomke, & Worline, 2004). Indeed, individuals are motivated to understand and gain control of challenging situations (Turner & Johnson, 2003; White, 1959). Consistent with these ideas, the desire to POW and POR is likely to result in greater task exploration as employees realize they must find new ways to reach task objectives. These dual motives are likely to lead

employees to search for solutions that give them control and responsibility over the situations in which they find themselves, resulting in greater task exploration.

Proposition 3b: The desire to prove others wrong and prove oneself right increases task exploration.

Risk Taking

The desire to prove others wrong and prove oneself right is also proposed to result in greater risk taking. Task risk taking concerns individuals' decisions to commit to actions that carry uncertain outcomes (Shipp, Edwards, & Lambert, 2009; Stewart & Roth, 2001). Prior research on decision-making suggests that specific, challenging goals increase the willingness to take risks (Berger & Pope, 2011; Larrick, Heath, & Wu, 2009). Similarly, research has shown that an excessive focus on goals triggers risk-taking behaviors (Ordóñez, Schweitzer, Galinsky, & Bazerman, 2009). Beyond cognitive reasons for increasing risk taking (i.e., cold processes), there are also motivational accounts (i.e., hot processes) for why an underdog image may stimulate risky behavior. Indeed, the desire to protect the self and demonstrate that one is competent in a domain can drive risk taking as a state of loss increases risky behaviors, especially when taking risky choices offers the possibility of eliminating losses (Larrick, 1993; Scholer, Zou, Fujita, Stroessner, & Higgins, 2010).

When individuals are ascribed an underdog image, they are expected to do worse relative to others, evoking the desire to POW and POR. POW and POR is likely to encourage individuals to pursue risks and gains in an effort to approach positive outcomes as an underdog image leads them to perceive lower levels of risk and believe that they have nothing to lose. Scheepers et al (2006) found that low-status groups were

more likely to challenge others more openly and aggressively for this very reason since they realized that their situation was unlikely to change unless they took drastic action. Together, these arguments suggest that by highly focusing on the desire to POW and POR, individuals with an underdog image are likely to engage in greater risk taking strategies.

Proposition 3c: The desire to (a) prove others wrong and (b) prove oneself right increases task risk taking.

The Profile of Competitors

As discussed previously, constituents shape the impact of an underdog image on the twin motives of POW and POR. Another group of individuals who are likely to influence the motivation of those perceived as an underdog are individuals who are vying for similar goals. Recall that an underdog image is relational; that is, it is constructed *relative to others* in the employee's environment. Moreover, an underdog image is often situated in competitive environments. According to social interdependence theory (Deutsch, 1949), a situation is structured competitively when individuals' goal achievements are negatively correlated so that when one competitor attains his or her goals, others perceive that they cannot achieve their goals. For instance, an employee applying for a promotion may be up against other employees who have more work experience or a professor going up for tenure may be compared to other professors who have earned tenure with more publications or higher teaching ratings. Social comparison theory suggests that the presence of other individuals has an impact on motivation and behavior (Festinger, 1954; Garcia, Tor, & Gonzalez, 2006; Tesser, 1988). Furthermore, research on competition suggests that the competitors whom individuals are facing have

an influence on their decisions and actions, and they go to different lengths towards understanding their opponents' strengths and weaknesses (Moore & Cain, 2007; Moore, Oesch, & Zietsma, 2007; Radzevick & Moore, 2008).

Given that an underdog image is relational as it is constructed relative to other individuals striving for similar goals in the environment, it is important to understand how they influence the motivation and task strategies of those perceived as an underdog. I use the term the *profile of competitors* to refer to the characteristics of competitors who are vying for the same goals as employees. Below, I describe how three characteristics of competitors—their expectations, rival status and ranking—influence the impact of an underdog image on the desire to POW and POR, along with task strategies.

***Expectations of competitors*.** Competitors' own expectations can shape the desire to POW and POR of those perceived as an underdog. Competitors may publicly share their expectations with others, either by discussing their own chances or the chances of others to perform successfully. For instance, competitors may directly express high confidence to others regarding their chances of succeeding. Alternatively, they may indirectly proclaim their confidence by publicly dismissing the chances of the person perceived as an underdog from winning the competition.

Here, I suggest that when competitors express high expectations for themselves over others, it may be interpreted as a form of contempt as it conveys the superior standing of the competitor, and disregard for the individual who is perceived as an underdog (Melwani, Mueller, & Overbeck, 2012; Morris & Keltner, 2000). Extant research has shown that contemptuous feedback from opponents increased levels of activation and feelings of returned contempt, thereby increasing task performance and

interpersonal aggressiveness (Melwani & Barsade, 2011). When competitors declare that they believe they will perform successfully over others, the impact of an underdog image on the desire to POW and POR is likely to be magnified. A person perceived as an underdog is likely to interpret competitors' high expectations contemptuously as it is a sign that their competitors underestimate them. As such, an underdog image is likely to boost the desire to POW and POR. Conversely, when competitors do not declare their own high expectations for performance, it suggests that they respect their opponents, including the person perceived as an underdog. Consequently, an underdog image is less likely to activate the desire to POW and POR.

Proposition 4a: Competitors' public expectations moderate the effects of an underdog image on the desire to POW and POR such that the higher competitors' own public expectations, the stronger the effects.

Rival. The second characteristic is whether competitors are *rivals*—individuals who have an existing relationship with the focal employee with increased psychological involvement and are competing for the same outcomes (Kilduff et al., 2010; Malhotra, 2010). Research on rivalry has indicated that individuals reliably identify other individuals in their environments as rivals due to the nature of the relationships they have with these individuals (Kilduff et al., 2010). When pitted against rivals, individuals are more inclined to sacrifice absolute outcomes in order to defeat rivals. For example, an employee may be willing to give up a higher bonus for herself if it means that a rival employee is not awarded a bonus. Moreover, rivalries often involve a historical relationship between two parties that goes beyond a conflict over a prize, which often captures the attention of constituents. Indeed, constituents often pay greater attention to

situations involving rivalry as it makes their social identities salient. For instance, the rivalry between Apple and Microsoft over the years has demarcated consumers of computers into two camps: either a supporter of Apple or Microsoft.

When competitors are rivals to the individual perceived as an underdog, it is likely to magnify the desire to POW and POR. A rivalry between two parties is likely to magnify the attention paid to the competition by constituents, thereby heightening its stakes for competitors. With greater attention, the desire to POW becomes more salient as it provides an even greater opportunity for those perceived as an underdog to accomplish these dual motives. Furthermore, given that rivalries are likely to demarcate the allegiances of constituents to one side or the other, those perceived as an underdog are likely to believe they have an even greater responsibility to work towards POW and POR since they are valued by constituents. Indeed, research has shown that when individuals believe that their actions are appreciated by others, their motivation increases (Grant, 2008; Leary & Baumeister, 2000). As a result, an underdog image is likely to boost the desire to POW and POR when their competitors are rivals. In contrast, when individuals perceived as an underdog are not competing against rivals, they are likely to attract less attention from constituents, thereby experiencing less responsibility. As a result, an underdog image is less likely to impact the desire to POW and POR when there is no rivalry between competitors.

Proposition 4b: Competitors' rivalry status moderates the effects of an underdog image on the desire to POW and POR such that when competitors are rivals, the stronger the effects.

Rankings of Competitors. Beyond the desire to POW and POR, the profile of competitors may also shape the task strategies of individuals holding an underdog image. Rankings permeate many competitive settings, including organizations, as a way to motivate employees, appraise employee performance, and determine promotions and bonuses (Pfeffer & Sutton, 2006). When competitors are ranked higher from the person perceived as an underdog, it is likely to change the task content and strategies used by those perceived as an underdog. With respect to task effort and persistence, the desire to POW and POR is less likely to translate into higher effort when the rankings of competitors are further away. In these instances, individuals perceived as an underdog are less likely to believe that higher task effort will fulfill their two motives as effort is less likely to overcome the gap in the performance between themselves and their competitors. In contrast, when a competitor is ranked slightly higher than an individual perceived as an underdog, the desire to POW and POR is more likely to translate in greater effort. Drawing on the principle of diminishing sensitivity (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), Berger and Pope (2011) found that teams slightly behind their opponents were more likely to exert extra effort than those who were far behind since they are relatively closer to their goal. Similarly, a competitor who is ranked only slightly ahead of a person perceived as an underdog is likely to foster a belief that the desire to POW and POR can be accomplished through greater task effort and persistence.

Proposition 5a: Competitors' rankings moderate the effects of the desire to POW and POR on task effort and persistence such that as competitors ranking increases upwards away from the person perceived as an underdog, the stronger the effects.

In addition to task effort and persistence, the rankings of competitors are also likely to shape the impact of the desire to POW and POR on risk taking. As previously suggested, the desire to POW and POR are approach-based goals, which are likely to lead individuals to become less cautious in their task strategies, thereby increasing risk taking. As the ranking of competitors increase in an upward direction, an individual perceived as an underdog is less likely to believe they can POW and POR. Research has documented that lower efficacy in accomplishing task objectives drive more extreme forms of action (Ransford, 1968; Tausch et al., 2011). For instance, by preventing the opportunity to climb from a disadvantaged group to an advantaged group, individuals were more likely to choose "nonnormative actions" as they lost a sense of hope (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). With respect to risk taking, the desire to POW and POR is even more likely to lead individuals perceiving that they have nothing to lose as the ranking of their competitors increases upward. As a result, individuals are more likely to engage in task risk taking as competitors' ranking increases above them.

Proposition 5b: Competitors' rankings moderate the effects of the desire to POW and POR on risk taking strategies such that as competitors' rankings increase upwards away from the person perceived as an underdog, the stronger the effects.

Consequences of an Underdog Image

Being perceived as an underdog has consequences beyond employees' motivation, task content and task strategies; it also has the potential to impact important employee outcomes at the workplace. In the section below, I explore three downstream consequences of an underdog image: creativity, escalation of commitment and unethical conduct. By focusing on these three outcomes, I suggest that low expectations of others

have an impact beyond the effort and performance of employees, which has been the primary focus of existing research on others' expectations (McNatt, 2000). Instead, an underdog image may reap both beneficial and deleterious consequences for employees and their organizations.

Creativity

An underdog image is proposed to enhance employee creativity. As previously mentioned, the desire to POW and POR is likely to foster greater effort and persistence on tasks, along with increasing task exploration and risk taking. Each of these behaviors serves as ingredients for individual creativity. Creativity can be understood in numerous ways, such as the production of novel and useful of ideas or development of solutions to problems (Amabile, Barsade, Mueller, & Staw, 2005; Mainemelis & Ronson, 2006). Prior research has demonstrated that affect and mood serve as major drivers of creativity. For example, when individuals are in situations that demand creativity, holding a negative mood is more likely to cultivate creative solutions than a positive mood (George & Zhou, 2002). Similarly, the activation of negative moods such as anger leads to more creative ideas and originality than deactivating moods such as serenity (De Dreu, Baas, & Nijstad, 2008). Furthermore, they demonstrated that negative affect, through higher persistence, also contributed to more creative ideas being generated. At the same time, positive affect can also contribute to greater creativity through larger cognitive flexibility (De Dreu et al., 2008). Positive affect has been shown as an antecedent of creative thought as it leads people to develop new associations between ideas that are disconnected (Amabile et al., 2005).

By fostering both positive and negatively valenced motives (i.e., POW and POR), an underdog image is likely to positively impact creativity. As a negatively valenced desire, POW is likely to foster greater task content as people put forth greater effort and persistence, leading to the generation of more novel ideas. By placing greater effort and persistence towards the task, employees generate a greater number of creative ideas (De Dreu et al., 2008). Furthermore, POR, as a positively valenced motive, is likely to cultivate greater cognitive flexibility and lead employees to think in a divergent manner. As previously mentioned, POR is likely to foster greater task exploration and risk taking. Each of these task strategies is likely to foster greater creativity. For example, task exploration is likely to lead employees to learn from their errors and enhance domain-relevant skills, which contributes to creativity (Mainemelis & Ronson, 2006). Therefore, the desire to POW and POR, along with task exploration and risk-taking are proposed to increase employee creativity.

Proposition 6a: The desire to (a) prove others wrong and (b) prove oneself right increases creativity through task effort, persistence, exploration and risk-taking.

Escalation of commitment

Escalation of commitment refers to a situation in which prior investments increase the propensity of individuals to invest additional resources towards a potentially failing course of action (Brockner, 1992; Sleesman, Conlon, McNamara, & Miles, 2012; Staw, 1981, 1984; Staw & Ross, 1987). Staw and Ross (1989) indicate that when individuals believe they can turn around their fortunes, they are likely to invest new resources towards a course of action. Moreover, drawing on self-presentation theory, research has shown that when individuals are observed by other constituents, they are more likely to

escalate their commitment in order to manage others' impressions of themselves and save face (Brockner, Rubin, & Lang, 1981; Sleesman et al., 2012)

I argue that an underdog image can lead employees into escalating their commitment towards a course of action via task exploration and risk taking behavior. By stimulating the desire to POW and POR, an underdog image leads employees to engage in task strategies of exploration and risk taking. By engaging in greater task exploration and being more willing to take risks, employees who are perceived as underdogs believe that they have the tools to perform effectively. Employees engaging in greater task exploration are more likely to search for ways to accomplish task goals. As such, they are more willing to try and experiment with new ways of attaining performance objectives, and neglect the information that may suggest that they should not continue with a course of action. Furthermore, research has shown that when individuals focus on gains as opposed to losses, they are likely to have lower risk perceptions, thereby heightening their escalation of commitment (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992; Staw & Ross, 1989). Moreover, by focusing on gaining the approval of others through POW and POR, individuals seen as underdogs are likely to escalate their commitment towards potential losing courses of action.

Proposition 6b: The desire to (a) prove others wrong and (b) prove oneself right increases escalation of commitment through task effort, persistence, exploration and risk-taking.

Unethical Conduct

In addition to enhanced creativity and an increased escalation of commitment, an underdog image can also elicit unethical conduct by fostering a focus on POW. Existing research documents how an individual's desire to demonstrate one's competence and

gain favorable judgments from others can not only be motivating, but also lead to unethical behavior (Ordóñez et al., 2009). Through its focus on demonstrating to constituents that their opinions are incorrect, POW is proposed to foster greater unethical conduct. POW may narrowly focus individuals' attention towards demonstrating that others' views are incorrect, and away from the broader consequences of their actions. Indeed, when goals are strongly desired, people may do whatever it takes to accomplish their objectives. For example, research has found that individuals are more likely to misrepresent their levels of performance in the face of specific, challenging goals (Schweitzer, Ordonez, & Douma, 2004). Moreover, performance goals amplify cognitive loads that attune individuals' cognitive resources towards goal attainment, and away from moral standards (Barsky, 2008; Welsh & Ordonez, forthcoming). Indeed, performance—prove goals in particular are likely to decrease individuals' propensity to categorize morally ambiguous situations as unethical (Barsky, 2008).

Furthermore, the task strategies accompanying an underdog image and the desire to POW may heighten the likelihood of engaging in unethical behavior. Greater task exploration and risk taking is likely to open employees' eyes to unconventional methods that could be unethical. Divergent and unconventional thinking lead individuals to behave more dishonestly by increasing their ability to justify their immoral actions (Gino & Ariely, 2012). Moreover, heightened risk taking is linked to engaging in unethical conduct. Therefore, by fostering a desire to POW and greater task exploration and risk-taking, an underdog image is proposed to increase the likelihood of individuals' engaging in unethical conduct.

Proposition 6c: The desire to prove others wrong increases the likelihood of engaging in unethical conduct through task exploration and risk-taking.

Discussion

Although underdogs are pervasive in many domains of competition and organizational life, researchers have largely neglected the motivational and performance effects of being perceived as an underdog by others. Whereas existing theory and research has documented the threat of others' low expectations on the self (Brophy, 1983; Eden, 2003; Steele, 1997), I have argued that an underdog image has the potential to stimulate motivation. When others perceive an employee as an underdog, it has the potential to activate the dual motives of proving others wrong and proving oneself right. My theoretical model outlines how three dimensions of an underdog image—its consistency, credibility and mutability—shape whether an underdog image motivates constructively or not. Moreover, consistent with a social and relational approach to understanding employee motivation, I suggest how the *source* of an underdog image (i.e., profile of constituents) and its construction relative to other competitors (i.e., profile of competitors) affect whether an underdog image boosts the desire to POW and POR. Furthermore, I proposed that the twin motives of proving others wrong and proving oneself right encourage approach-based task content (i.e., effort and persistence) and strategies (i.e., exploration and risk taking), thereby influencing employee outcomes beyond performance. Consequently, I suggest that being perceived as an underdog can foster creativity, an escalation of commitment, and unethical conduct. With these insights, I expand existing knowledge about the motivational and performance effects of being perceived as an underdog by others. As such, I offer fresh and valuable

contributions to theories and literatures on expectations, employee motivation, self-verification, and competition.

Expectations

Scholarly understanding of the effect of others' expectations on the self has stagnated in recent years since decades of research has firmly established the significant impact of supervisory expectations on employee motivation and performance (Chen & Klimoski, 2003; Eden, 2003; McNatt, 2000; McNatt & Judge, 2004). Although this research has been incredibly useful and powerful, much of the research on expectations presumes that self-expectations and the expectations of others are consistent in situations, and do not diverge from one another. By introducing different dimensions of an underdog image, I have argued that the perceived consistency of an underdog image—that is, whether others' expectations are in line with those of the self—shape whether it motivates constructively or not. In addition, I argue that it is important to consider the perceived credibility and mutability of an underdog image as both of these dimensions are likely to shape whether the desire to POW and POR is activated or not.

Furthermore, much research in organizational settings has considered only the effects of supervisory expectations when expectations can emanate from a much larger group of constituents. Whereas low supervisory expectations are likely to be demotivating (Eden, 2003; McNatt, 2000; McNatt & Judge, 2004), I contend that the low expectations from other sources may motivate employees differently. Indeed, scholars have recently called for theory and research into the subjective experiences of employees in organizational life (Amabile, 1983; Weiss & Rupp, 2011). By considering the profile of constituents, I suggest that the motivational effects of an underdog image depend on

who holds the underdog image. Therefore, my theoretical model offers a social perspective on the motivation of employees as I suggest that it is important to consider the constituents who perceive a person as an underdog rather than simply its psychological effects.

Motivation

Also, my research on an underdog image lies at the intersection on research on the interplay between image and motivation, and in particular, the motivational implications of being seen as less likely to succeed. My research suggests that motivation can grow from the images that others hold of employees, along with the relationships they have with others in their environment. Recent research has highlighted how incorporating employees' relationships with others at the workplace enhance our understanding of their motivation (Grant, 2007; Grant & Parker, 2009; Humphrey, Nahrgang, & Morgeson, 2007). As such, motivation may not stem only from the cognitions and affect of individuals or the structures of organizational systems; it may also emanate from social sources and the relationships that individuals hold with others. Further, my research suggests that people will not simply use impression management tactics to reduce the image discrepancies that others have of themselves (Roberts, 2005), but they will instead exert effort and employ a variety of task strategies to accomplish their image goals. As such, people can experience motivation from the images that others hold of them even when these images are not favorable.

Self-Verification

I also advance existing work on self-verification theory (Swann, 1987; Swann & Bosson, 2008). Prior theory and research on self-verification has suggested that people

prefer others to see them as they see themselves. However, whereas existing work has focused on the benefits of self-verification for the purposes of satiating coherence and consistency for the self, less work has considered how relational motives shape this process. In this paper, I have considered the role of proving others wrong as a central mechanism of explaining the consequences of an underdog image on the task content, strategies, and behaviors of employees. My perspective builds on research suggesting that people want to be viewed accurately by others, and may employ a variety of task content and strategies to influence how they are seen in the eyes of others (Baumeister, 1982; Baumeister & Newman, 1994). Thus, my theoretical model shows how constituents influence the process of self-verification, providing a relational perspective on an important self-focused theory.

Competition

In addition to enhancing our understanding of theories of expectations and self-verification, my theoretical model deepens our understanding of competitive environments. Since Deutsch (1949) seminal research on competition over five decades ago, organizational researchers have examined the effects of interpersonal competition on performance. Emerging research on rivalry and competition suggests how the motivation and performance of individuals is influenced by structural and environmental competition (Kilduff et al., 2010). My theoretical model uncovers questions about how constituents' expectations influence individuals in competitive environments by suggesting that the effects of competitive settings on competitors may not be equal; rather, competitors may respond to the features of competitive environments based on the expectations placed on them. Moreover, I examine how the standing of other competitors shapes the

motivational effects of an underdog image. These insights are important because it suggests that the ways in which competitions are designed to boost motivation and performance may not have the same implications for all competitors. For example, competitors may respond differently to the ranking of competitors, depending on whether they are perceived as underdogs or not.

Directions for Future Research

The theoretical framework presented offers numerous directions for future research. Although I have proposed numerous hypotheses regarding the consequences of an underdog image, researchers should take steps to empirically test these relationships in both the lab and field. In addition, there are numerous other mechanisms that may play into the effects of an underdog image on task strategies and outcomes. For example, individuals perceived as an underdog may experience a sense of pressure from the expectations of others. Similarly, they may encounter wide range of emotions from anger to doubt, and it may have consequences for both the self and the self in relation to constituents in the environment. Moreover, I have presented a theory regarding the consequences of an underdog image, but future work should also examine its antecedents. There is promising work that is developing in the realm of theories of social comparison that may contribute to whether individuals are perceived as an underdog (Buunk & Gibbons, 2007; Wood, 1996). Similarly, unit and organizational level factors may factor into whether a person is perceived as an underdog. For example, a shortage of financial resources may underlie why a unit is perceived as an underdog. Each of these antecedents may not only contribute to the emergence of an underdog image, but also shape whether an underdog image motivates individuals or not.

Future research should also examine an underdog image at the unit or organizational level. Indeed, some of the most common examples of an underdog image are in reference to teams or organizations that are underestimated by external stakeholders, such as journalists, audiences or industry experts. My theoretical model of an underdog image can serve as a guide to how an underdog image can be motivating for a group. At the same time, it may also be that an underdog image is experienced differently at a group level as it can cultivate a sense of shared identity, which has the potential to energize, direct and sustain group members (Ellemers et al., 2004; Hinds & Mortensen, 2005; Rousseau & Van Der Veen, 2005). Furthermore, affective and motivational processes such as emotional and goal contagion (Aarts, Gollwitzer, & Hassin, 2004; Barsade, 2002) may lead the desire to POW to spread among group members, providing them a common cause for which to fight. Furthermore, leaders may be able to use an underdog image to help foster a shared image among followers, thereby inspiring greater commitment and developing stronger interpersonal relationships between group members. A deeper understanding of how an underdog image is experienced at a collective level will help advance theoretical integration across levels of analyses.

In addition to examining social and relational factors, empirical research should examine the boundary conditions of an underdog image as individual and cultural differences are likely to shape whether an underdog image boosts or reduces employee motivation. Indeed, individuals' orientations towards challenge and threat and generalized self-efficacy are likely to play an additional role in shaping the effects of an underdog image. Cultural differences are also likely to shape whether an underdog image

enhances or debilitates motivation. I have largely portrayed the self as independent and holding a sense of personal agency. However, research has also construed the self as more relational and interdependent. Western cultures are less likely to permit criticism of groups that occupy lower power and status, and thus, individuals in these societies may be likely to react against the low expectations of others (Joireman, Kamdar, Daniels, & Duell, 2006). Narratives of underdogs being successful are abundant in many Western societies, and motivation may grow only for individuals in these cultures.

Lastly, much of this paper has focused on the conditions under which an underdog image is likely to boost or inhibit motivation, and has focused on the role of constituents, competitors and time horizons in shaping these effects. Another line of future inquiry should consider when the effects of an underdog image are likely to be nonmonotonic and resemble U-shaped effects. Researchers have called for more attention to understanding the inflection points of phenomena, and learning more about when their effects turn in the opposite direction, whether it be positive or negative (Grant & Schwartz, 2011). Just as I have outlined the conditions under which an underdog image is likely to enhance or hinder POW and POR, it is possible that at very high levels, the desire to POW and POR may be maladaptive. For instance, high levels of POW and POR could distract employees away from task, and potentially be maladaptive for performance (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989). This harkens back to earlier research on optimal arousal as too much mental arousal can inhibit performance (Broadhurst, 1957; Yerkes & Dodson, 1908). Researchers should seek to explore when the benefits of an underdog image and the dual motives of POW and POR can potentially turn destructive.

Practical Implications of an Underdog Image

Research on self-fulfilling prophecy theory has provided a wealth of evidence suggesting that when people are expected to succeed, they perform better (Brophy, 1983; Chen & Klimoski, 2003; Eden, 2003; McNatt, 2000; McNatt & Judge, 2004; Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968a; Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968b). My perspective in this article is not intended to suggest that leaders and organizations should place low expectations on employees at work. Instead, I aim to build on existing research to suggest that there are specific situations in which an underdog image can be used to foster motivation and enhance effort. Introducing employees to this image may be beneficial in these instances, but managers should pay particular attention to how and why an underdog image may arise among employees, closely examine its long-term consequences, and ensure that employees are equipped to situations in which they are perceived as an underdog.

Conclusion

H. Jackson Brown (St. Peter, 2010, p. 640) once suggested, "I never expect to lose. Even when I'm the underdog, I still prepare a victory speech." Whereas existing research focuses on the threat invoked by the low expectations of others, I have introduced and presented a theoretical framework for understanding the effects of an underdog image, contending that it has the potential to enhance employee motivation through proving others wrong and proving oneself right, and thereby impacting their task content, strategies and workplace outcomes. This perspective calls attention to current ideas in theory, research and practice about the agency of employees at work, along with advancing the idea that individuals may be motivated by being perceived as underdogs by others. Furthermore, I cast a theory that considers the role of constituents in shaping an underdog image, and how the standing of competitors may shape motivation, task content

and task strategies of individuals when they are perceived as an underdog. Thus, I enrich existing theory and research about expectations by contending that an underdog image may not always have deleterious effects on motivation; rather, it depends on who perceives them as an underdog and whom they are competing against.

Table 1 - Overview of Underdogs in Other Academic Domains

Field	Definition	Focus	Theories/Literatures	Primary Outcomes
Social Psychology	Individuals or groups at a disadvantage and are expected to lose	Third-party (individuals) evaluating underdogs (nations, political candidates)	Social identity theory, deservingness theory, system justification theory	Support, performance assessment
Economics	Player whose chance at victory is less than one-half at the Nash equilibrium	Underdog player in a 2 or n-person games	Nash equilibrium, game theory (Stackelberg)	Effort, strategic behavior
Political Science	Individual who is more likely to lose than win	Third-party (voters) evaluating underdogs (political candidates)	Voter decision making, attitude shifts	Voting behavior, intentions
Marketing	Tendency to view oneself as facing an external disadvantage and holding passion and determination	Third-party (consumers) evaluating underdogs (firms)	Branding theory, identity	Identification with brand, purchase intentions

Figure 1 - Theoretical Framework of the Motivation of an Underdog Image



Chapter IV
Effects of an Underdog Image on Effort and Performance

Scholars have long argued that the expectations of others have strong effects on individuals' motivation, effort and performance (Brophy, 1983; Jussim, 1986; Merton, 1948). Since the first experimental demonstration of the Pygmalion effect over 45 years ago (Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968a), extensive theory and research has demonstrated that when individuals are expected to perform well by their supervisors, they are more likely to fulfill such expectations (Chen & Klimoski, 2003; Eden, 1990a; Eden & Shani, 1982; Kierein & Gold, 2000; McNatt, 2000; McNatt & Judge, 2004; Rosenthal, 2002). Building on this insight, researchers have also coined the Golem effect, suggesting that employees' effort and performance suffer when supervisors hold low expectations for their performance (Davidson & Eden, 2000; Eden, 2003; Reynolds, 2007). Similarly, research on stereotype threat has demonstrated the repercussions of low performance expectations as the potential of conforming to a negative societal stereotype inhibits performance (Nguyen & Ryan, 2008; Schmader, 2010; Steele & Aronson, 1995). Accordingly, these findings imply that if others hold low expectations for individuals, it hurts their effort and performance (Eden, 1990b, 2003; Eden & Ravid, 1982; Jamieson, Lydon, Stewart, & Zanna, 1987; McNatt & Judge, 2004).

Although research has contended that low expectations are detrimental to effort and performance, scholars have yet to directly examine this idea. Research on the Golem effect has focused on averting the threat of low expectations, rather than testing the direct impact of low expectations on effort and performance (Davidson & Eden, 2000; McNatt,

2000; Reynolds, 2007). As such, research on the Golem effect has not specifically examined the motivational implications of others' low expectations. In addition, research on both the Pygmalion and Golem effects have made substantial contributions to both theory and research, but both of these versions of the self-fulfilling prophecy are focused on the expectations of people in positions of influence over others, such as supervisors or teachers (Eden, 2003; Reynolds, 2007). However, in organizational settings, expectations emanate from a broader array of individuals beyond a person's immediate supervisor, including colleagues, customers, clients and observers. Lastly, research in the areas of the self-fulfilling prophecy and stereotype threat has often focused on the impact of expectations on impressionable people, such as new hires or students in the classroom, domains in which self-expectations are malleable (McNatt, 2000). Yet theory and research highlights that individuals carry positive self-evaluations, and employees work towards achieving and maintaining positive self-evaluations at the workplace (Dutton, Roberts, & Bednar, 2010; Moore et al., 2007; Sedikides & Strube, 1997). As such, there are reasons to believe that in many organizational settings, self-evaluations are not as malleable, and people exert effort to create and maintain positive self-expectations.

To advance theory and research on the effects of performance expectations, it is critical to understand how the low expectations of others directly impact effort and performance. In this paper, I introduce the *underdog image*, defined as an expectation held by others of an individual who is perceived as less likely to succeed relative to competitors. Although the perspectives introduced earlier suggest that others' low expectations are detrimental to effort and performance, I argue that when an individual is perceived as an underdog, it can *enhance* effort and performance. Drawing on theories of

expectations (Bandura, 1977; Eden, 2003; McNatt, 2000), self-enhancement (Steele, 1988; Tesser, 1988) and self-verification (Cable & Kay, 2012; Swann et al., 2003), I argue that being perceived as an underdog motivates constructively in competitive environments, leading to greater effort and performance through the twin desires of proving others wrong and proving oneself right. To provide a more explicit test of the role of self-expectations and decouple it from the expectations of others, I test for the moderating role of relative task self-expectations in shaping the effects of an underdog image on proving others wrong and proving oneself right. Thus, I examine the effects, mediating mechanisms and boundary conditions of an underdog image on effort and performance (Figure 2 illustrates my theoretical model).

In testing my theoretical model, I aim to make several contributions to theories of expectations, motivation and self-evaluation. First, I consider the important but overlooked situation of being perceived as an underdog, which advances the expectations literature beyond its focus on others' high expectations (Chen & Klimoski, 2003; Eden, 2003; McNatt & Judge, 2004). Existing research assumes that self-expectations rise and fall to the level of others' expectations in a given situation, but many situations arise at the workplace in which these two sets of expectations may diverge (Baumeister et al., 1985). Second, I develop a social perspective on motivation to argue that an underdog image cultivates effort and performance through the twin motives of proving others wrong and proving oneself right. This theoretical amendment is important because it suggests that individuals do not necessarily yield to others' views of themselves, and may be motivated from the low expectations of others, resulting in greater effort and performance. Indeed, research on self-enhancement theory demonstrates that people see

themselves in a positive manner, suggesting that they may strive to achieve and maintain positive evaluations (Steele, 1988). Lastly, I bridge theories of self-enhancement (Sedikides & Strube, 1997) and self-verification (Swann, Johnson, & Bosson, 2009)—two perspectives often seen as conflicting and different (Chen, Chen, & Shaw, 2004; Kwang & Swann, 2010)—together to offer fresh insights into the interplay of expectations of the self and others on effort and performance.

Theoretical Development and Hypotheses

Early research highlighted the significant impact of others' expectations on individual performance. Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968) conducted the first experimental study on the Pygmalion effect in a classroom setting, documenting how the high expectations of teachers led to their students performing better since students internalized the teachers' high expectations, thereby becoming more motivated to meet the expectations of their teachers and subsequently performing better. For example, teachers who have high expectations for their students may offer these students a more supportive climate, teach them more difficult material, provide more time to answer their questions, and offer more verbal and nonverbal feedback regarding their performance (Cooper, 1979; McNatt, 2000; Weinstein, Marshall, Sharp, & Botkin, 1987). Likewise, research in organizational settings has demonstrated that the high expectations of supervisors increase effort and performance (McNatt, 2000). Whereas the Pygmalion effect refers to the effect of supervisors' high expectations on subordinates' performance, researchers have also proposed the Golem effect: supervisors' low expectations negatively impact subordinates' performance (Babad, Inbar, & Rosenthal, 1982). Some research has indirectly examined the Golem effect by having supervisors reinterpret subordinates' low

scores on ability tests so that subordinates would avert forming low self-expectations, resulting in greater improvement than those in the control condition (Davidson & Eden, 2000; Oz & Eden, 1994).

Similarly, research on stereotype threat suggests that the activation of negative, self-relevant stereotypes in a performance domain leads to lower performance (Nguyen & Ryan, 2008; Steele, 1997; Steele & Aronson, 1995). The fear of being stereotyped in the performance domain by others can cultivate lowered performance expectations, thereby reducing individuals' performance (Nguyen & Ryan, 2008; Schmader, 2010). Indeed, much like theories of expectations, stereotype threat researchers have begun to examine the ways in which individuals can reduce its harmful effects. For example, researchers have noted that to cope with low performance expectations, those experiencing stereotype threat can try to reframe the task or situationally disengage from the domain to deflect the threat and maintain their motivation (Nussbaum & Steele, 2007). However, these strategies, like the ones used by supervisors to help employees cope with the Golem effect, suggest that individuals can only ameliorate the decline—rather than experiencing a boost—in motivation and effort that results from the low expectations of others.

Although prior research has implied that others' low expectations reduce self-expectations, self-expectations may not be intertwined with others' expectations in many competitive settings. The self-fulfilling prophecy literature is largely about impressionable people in which others' expectations are strongly linked to self-expectations (Eden, 2003; McNatt, 2000). It is important to note that research on the Pygmalion effect has focused on supervisors whom have direct control over the behaviors and outcomes of employees. However, in organizational settings, self-expectations may

not fluctuate with the expectations of others as expectations arise from a broader array of people beyond supervisors. For example, employees in a different department may not expect an experienced salesperson to succeed in a competition, but these employees do not determine whether the salesperson gets to contact high profile clients in the same way that a supervisor can. Accordingly, an underdog image is likely to impact effort and performance, but may be less detrimental since the individuals who hold the image often do not control the behaviors and outcomes in the domain.

Also, self-expectations are elevated in competitive environments. Research on competition has documented how competitive environments heighten myopic biases, leading people to become overconfident about their abilities to perform effectively (Moore & Cain, 2007; Moore et al., 2007; Radzevick & Moore, 2008). Moreover, self-expectations are less malleable in competitive settings. In these settings, people may be less likely to internalize the expectations of others since the mere manner of entering a competition means that they still have a chance of performing successfully, and the configuration of particular competitors' skills and strategies may matter just as much as absolute capabilities in performing effectively. Indeed, in competitive settings in which there are other competitors, performance is measured in a relative fashion, so that absolute capabilities do not necessarily determine who is victorious; that is, performing effectively depends on a person's relative performance.

In addition, existing research does not examine what happens when individuals are perceived as an underdog by others; that is, when other individuals do not expect a person to be successful relative to competitors. Indeed, there are numerous situations at work in which employees may be perceived as underdogs. For example, an employee

applying for a promotion may not be expected to earn it since she has been in the organization for a shorter period of time compared to other employees. Similarly, a supervisor's unit may not be expected to win a sales competition against rival units since their client base has declined over the prior year. Both of these examples convey the idea that others may not expect a person to perform effectively, resulting in an underdog image. However, despite the pervasiveness of the low expectations of others, existing theory and research does not address its effects on effort and performance.

The Influence of an Underdog Image on Effort-Based Performance

Given that my focus is on the motivational implications of an underdog image, I examine the relationship between an underdog image on effort-based performance. Effort refers to how much energy a person devotes to selecting and executing action to complete a given task (Mitchell & Daniels, 2003; Staw, 1984). Performance is the effectiveness of individuals' efforts in achieving personal and organizational work goals (Campbell, 1990). Effort-based performance—a behavioral measure of motivation (Kilduff et al., 2010)—comprises an important aspect of performance since the amount of effort a person puts forth helps determine the extent to which they fulfill work goals.

Self-enhancement theory suggests that people have a fundamental need to view themselves positively, leading them to maintain or increase the positivity—or alternatively, reduce the negativity—of their own self-concept, self-esteem and self-evaluations (Allport, 1937; Leary, 2007). Indeed, research has demonstrated that people engage in self-serving attributions to enhance their own self-concept, and believe they are "better than average" as they view themselves more positively than objective information warrants or third-party observers view them (Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak, &

Vredenburg, 1995; Chambers, Windschitl, & Suls, 2003). As such, self-enhancement theory contends that people value, hold and prefer positive self-evaluations. At the same time, theories of self-enhancement—such as self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988) and the self-evaluation maintenance model (Tesser, 1988)—assume that when people are confronted with negative evaluations of the self by others, they aim to protect their self-concept by engaging in cognitive and behavioral tactics to reduce this threat to the self and maintain a positive self-concept (Sherman & Cohen, 2006; Steele, 1988). As a result, self-enhancement theories would suggest an underdog image would be less likely to impact the self since people aim to protect their own self-concept and self-esteem.

However, there are reasons to believe that people would not simply dismiss an underdog image in such a fashion. Self-verification theory asserts that individuals prefer that others confirm their self-images, and care about the images that others hold of them (Swann, 1987; Swann et al., 2003). Indeed, existing research has demonstrated that individuals want others to validate their own views, rather than bending to the views of others (Baumeister & Newman, 1994; Swann, 1987; Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982). Thus, self-verification theory suggests that images that are inconsistent with individuals' self-evaluations are likely to result in individuals taking actions to ensure that they are viewed accurately in the eyes of others.

Recently, research has highlighted the stark differences between theories of self-enhancement and self-verification (Chen et al., 2004; Kwang & Swann, 2010). Although prior discussions contend that the theories offer conflicting predictions, I draw on both of these perspectives to suggest that an underdog image enhances effort-based performance. Given that people hold and strive to achieve positive self-evaluations, but at the same

time, they care about others' images about themselves and seek self-verification, an underdog image is proposed to activate two motives: the desire to prove others wrong and the desire to prove oneself right.

Proving others wrong (POW) refers to individuals' desire to demonstrate to others that the views they hold are incorrect. POW serves as a relational motive that focuses outwards on other people in a person's environment. For example, others may perceive an employee who is applying for a promotion to be an unlikely candidate. Out of a desire to maintain a positive self-evaluation and achieve self-verification, POW suggests that the employee may strive to demonstrate that the expectations are not only wrong to achieve verification for the self, but instead, they will outwardly demonstrate to others that their images are inaccurate in an effort to achieve consistent positive self-evaluations. Therefore, a POW motive moves beyond traditional discussions of social-psychological theories of the self by suggesting that people will strive to achieve consistency in the eyes of others, rather than only for the self.

Similarly, the desire to *prove oneself right (POR)* is a related—but different—motive that is pertinent for individuals perceived as an underdog. POR refers to individuals' desire to demonstrate that their own self-views are accurate. Consistent with research on self-affirmation that suggests people strive to maintain and protect their own self-concept (Steele, 1988), an underdog image is proposed to elicit the POR motive since individuals seek to establish that their own self-evaluations hold validity in their social environment. But given that self-verification theory suggests that individuals do not plainly dismiss the images that others hold of them, an underdog image will not lead people to simply dismiss others' opinions; rather, being perceived as an underdog will

lead people to want to demonstrate and verify that their positive self-evaluations are correct to protect their own self-concept. Although POR is closely related to POW, POR is focused inwards toward affirming self-evaluations are correct, whereas POW is focused outward towards rejecting others' evaluations of the self. Thus, POW is focused on changing others' negative evaluations, whereas POR is focused on affirming positive self-evaluations.

Given that people strive to achieve and maintain positive self-evaluations but also achieve verification of the images they hold, I argue that an underdog image triggers a desire to POW and POR, thereby influencing effort-based performance. When individuals are ascribed an underdog image by others, they view it as inconsistent towards their desire to achieve and hold positive self-evaluations. Rather than ignoring the low expectations of others, an underdog image evokes a desire to strive to achieve a positive self-evaluation, triggering a desire to POW and POR. As a result, an underdog image is likely to elicit the dual motives of POW and POR, motivating individuals to invest greater energy into their work to resolve the low expectations of others for both the self and relational reasons. Therefore, I propose the following:

Hypothesis 1: An underdog image increases effort-based performance.

Hypothesis 2: Increases in the desire to (a) prove others wrong and (b) prove oneself right mediate the positive effects of an underdog image on effort-based performance.

The Moderating Role of Relative Task Self Expectations

Having described how an underdog image fosters effort-based performance through the dual motives of POW and POR, I turn to a boundary condition that is likely to shape the positive relationship between an underdog image and these dual motives:

relative task self-expectations. Babad and colleagues (1982) coined the Galatea effect, describing the situation in which high self-expectations lead to higher performance. Indeed, the role of self-expectations harkens back to self-efficacy theory as individuals' own judgments about their ability to perform tasks influence their effort and persistence, thereby influencing their performance (Bandura, 1982). Accordingly, both the literature on expectations and self-efficacy suggest that high self-expectations heighten effort and performance.

Relative task self-expectations refer to individuals' beliefs about whether they can perform activities with the necessary skills better than others (Gist, 1987). Relative task self-expectations resemble self-efficacy, but also highlight individuals' beliefs about their capacity to perform in relation to other individuals in the domain. For example, an employee in a sales competition may believe that he has the necessary skills to reach a sales target, but relative task self-expectations also highlights that the employee believes she can reach the target and perform better than other employees in the competition. As such, relative task self-expectations do not simply reflect individuals' absolute expectations; it also considers the role of self-expectations relative to others. Prior research has underscored the role of self-expectations in leading to higher effort and performance (Chen & Klimoski, 2003; McNatt & Judge, 2004).

Whereas prior research has noted that self-expectations serve as a mediating mechanism through which others' expectations impact employees' effort and performance, I argue that relative task self-expectations moderate the positive effects of an underdog image on POW and POR. When individuals hold high self-expectations, they are likely to believe that they have the requisite skills to perform effectively. These

individuals are more likely to experience a discrepancy between others' expectations and their own self-expectations when they are ascribed an underdog image, resulting in a greater desire to POW and POR. Accordingly, an underdog image is likely to heighten the desire to POW and POR for those with high self-expectations. In contrast, those with low self-expectations are likely to experience less of a discrepancy between their own expectations and the expectations of others when an underdog image is ascribed. Consequently, individuals with low self-expectations should experience less of a desire to POW and POR when they are seen as an underdog in comparison to those who are perceived as an underdogs and hold have high self-expectations. Therefore, I predict the following:

Hypothesis 3: The desire to (a) POW and (b) POR mediates the positive interactive effects of an underdog image on performance, such that the positive relationship between an underdog image on (a) POW and (b) POR will be stronger for those with high relative task self-expectations than low relative task self-expectations.

Overview of the Present Research

To test my hypotheses, I conducted three studies in both the lab and field using different manipulations of an underdog image, along with distinct tasks and measures of performance. Study 1 examines the effect of an underdog image on effort-based performance in a laboratory experiment in which participants are informed that they are either expected to lose (underdog image condition) or are evenly matched against a competitor via false feedback. Study 2 builds on the findings of Study 1 by moving to the field and using a situated experiment (Greenberg & Tomlinson, 2004) to examine the performance effects of being ascribed an underdog image compared to those who are

perceived as evenly matched and those who are perceived as a favorite. Study 3 returns to the lab to use a controlled experiment with a negotiations task and tests my full theoretical model, including the mediating role of proving others wrong and proving oneself right, along with testing for the moderating effects of relative task self-expectations. By using multiple contexts, tasks, dependent variables and operationalizations of an underdog image, I aim to constructively replicate my results across three studies to enhance the understanding of the motivational implications of an underdog image (Lykken, 1968; Singleton & Straits, 1999).

Study 1 Method

Participants and Design

83 undergraduates in the core, introductory management course at a large Midwestern university participated in the experiment. Participants were an average of 20.7 years of age, 72.0% female, and 69.5% Caucasian. Using a between-subjects design, participants were randomly assigned into one of two conditions. Participants in the underdog image condition (n = 41) were given false feedback indicating that they were expected to lose in a competition, whereas participants in the control condition (n = 42) were told they were evenly matched in the competition. Participants then proceeded to complete a Droodle task so that I could measure their performance. Droodles are ambiguous, riddle pictures, and involve having participants generate descriptive captions for them (Leung et al., 2012; Price & Lovka, 2000). I chose Droodles as an appropriate task because my central hypotheses relate to effort-based performance, which can be objectively measured in this context by the number of captions that participants generate.

Figure 3 depicts a sample Droodle; a corresponding caption for this Droodle would be "a rock concert."

Procedures

At the beginning of the study, the experimenter told participants that the task involved a competition against another individual. They were then instructed that in order to appropriately create this context, they would be asked to respond to a list of items to determine their potential of succeeding on the task against their assigned opponent. Although participants had no knowledge of the impending Droodle task at this point, the items were constructed so that they were loosely related to the skills used in a Droodle task to enhance the believability of the measure as an indicator of effective performance when they started the next task (e.g., "In my spare time, I like doing puzzles;" "I regularly work on puzzles"). After completing the measure, participants were taken to a computer animated loading screen on a seven-second delay that stated, "Please wait while the computer compiles the results of your score." Once seven seconds elapsed, I then manipulated an underdog image on the next screen.

Manipulation: underdog image. I adapted a false feedback procedure used in prior organizational research (e.g., Cianci, Klein, & Seijts, 2010) to manipulate an underdog image. Participants randomly assigned to the underdog image condition read the following: "We now have all the scores on the prior assessment. Based on your score, you are not expected to be successful against your opponent." In contrast, participants in the evenly matched condition read the following: "We now have all the scores on the prior assessment. Based on your score, you are evenly matched against your opponent." I used this type of comparison condition to reduce alternative explanations for my

observed effects since prior research has demonstrated that invoking elements of competition in participants' minds can boost effort and performance (Kilduff et al., 2010; Murayama & Elliot, 2012).

After receiving the manipulation, participants were then instructed to complete a manipulation check. Participants then moved on to a Droodle task. In this task, I gave participants a set of three Droodles, and for each Droodle, they were asked to generate their own captions.

Measures

Dependent variable: effort-based performance. To measure effort-based performance, I had an independent coder blind to the hypotheses count the total number of captions that participants generated across the three Droodles, and used the average number of captions generated per Droodle as a measure of effort-based performance. The average number of captions generated across the Droodles serves as an appropriate measure of effort-based performance since it can be objectively measured, and reflects the energy that participants put into the task.

Manipulation check: underdog image. After receiving the experimental manipulation, participants completed a two-item manipulation check aimed at testing whether they experienced an underdog image or not: "I am viewed as an underdog in the upcoming task," and "I am seen as an underdog in the upcoming task" ($\alpha = .95$).

Results and Discussion

I started by examining whether an underdog image manipulation was effective using a between-subjects ANOVA. Participants in the underdog image condition ($M = 5.01$, $SD = 1.18$) indicated that they were viewed as an underdog in the upcoming task

more than participants in the control condition (M = 3.15, SD = 1.27), $F(1,79) = 46.72$, $p < .001$. To test Hypothesis 1, I conducted a between-subjects ANOVA. Participants in the underdog image condition (M = 2.67, SD = 1.18) generated significantly more captions than participants in the control condition (M = 2.04, SD = .95), $F(1,79) = 7.25$, $p < .01$, d = .59, supporting Hypothesis 1.

Study 1 provides initial support for the hypothesis that an underdog image increases performance. By using a false feedback manipulation, I made an underdog image in a competitive context salient. Participants who were told that they were not expected to be successful against their opponent performed better than those who were told that they were evenly matched against their opponent. My results offer initial causal evidence for the effects of an underdog image on performance. Yet my results are subject to the same limitations of ecological validity as other laboratory experiments, and raise interest about whether my results hold among working employees. Furthermore, while I tested the effects of an underdog image on performance against those who are perceived as evenly matched, I extend my study to examine the performance effects of a third condition: employees who are expected to succeed by others—a favorite condition—in Study 2.

In Study 2, I use a situated experiment in a field setting of workers (Greenberg & Tomlinson, 2004) to examine the performance effects of an underdog image in comparison to a favorite image and evenly matched image. Situated experiments are useful since they optimize the strengths and mitigate the weaknesses of both laboratory and field experiments. Unlike laboratory experiments, situated experiments reduce participants' awareness of participation in research and the artificiality of the research

setting. Moreover, situated experiments, unlike field experiments, still provide opportunities for random assignment, precise control over manipulations, and high control over extraneous variables. In addition, given the prolific rise of crowd sourcing among both scholars and practitioners (Barger, Behrend, Sharek, & Sinar, 2011; Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Howe, 2006; Terwiesch & Ulrich, 2009), it is important to study the productivity of workers in this understudied labor market. Indeed, employees on crowd sourcing platforms such as Amazon MTurk reflect a growing trend of workers who seek compensation not in terms of simply monetary reward, but they also seek satisfaction, recognition and freedom when doing tasks (Barger et al., 2011). Furthermore, research has suggested that participant pools such as Amazon MTurk should be valued and encouraged because typical participant pools at universities are not a perfect representation of the general population, so it is important to study workers in this domain (for a discussion, see Barger et al., 2011; Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010).

Study 2 Method

Participants and Design

I recruited 122 workers on MTurk in the USA to ask them for their suggestions on how to improve a website for a department at a large public university in the Midwest U.S. Workers were an average of 38.4 years of age, 56.9% female, 78.5% Caucasian, and 66.9% had completed a college degree. Furthermore, 82.3% were currently employed, 80.0% had at least six years of work experience, and worked in a variety of industries including professional, scientific and technical services, educational services and information.

Using a between-subjects design, I randomly assigned participants to one of three conditions: an underdog image (n = 41), a favorite image (n = 44) or evenly matched image (n = 37). After receiving the manipulation, participants proceeded to view the department's current website, and provide their feedback in terms of what they would do to improve it. I chose this task since it closely resembles other tasks listed on MTurk, leading participants to believe they were not completing the study for research purposes.

Procedure

Before the task began, I introduced participants to some recent research in the academic community. Participants across all conditions read the following:

> Recently, researchers in the academic community are debating the quality of workers on Amazon MTurk versus other Internet marketplaces. Many researchers currently use workers on MTurk to do many different tasks. There is a big debate about whether using data provided by MTurk workers is better or worse than data provided by workers on other Internet marketplaces. Researchers may be more or less likely to use data from MTurk in the future.

Manipulation: underdog image. After reading the above paragraph, I gave participants one of three manipulations via random assignment. An underdog image is manipulated similarly to Study 1 in that I told participants that they were expected to perform worse than others. Specifically, I had participants in the underdog image condition read the following:

> Most researchers in the academic community have recently argued that workers like yourself on MTurk are inferior. They expect you to perform worse than workers from other online marketplaces, making you an underdog.

In the favorite condition, I had participants read the following:

> Most researchers in the academic community have recently argued that workers like yourself on MTurk are superior. They expect you to perform

> better than workers from other online marketplaces, making you a favorite.

In the evenly matched condition, I had participants read the following:

> Most researchers in the academic community have recently argued that workers like yourself on MTurk are equally effective. They expect you to perform at the same level as others from other Internet marketplaces.

I chose these three manipulations since they closely resemble recent debates in management and organizational psychology about whether researchers should use workers on MTurk in research studies (Buhrmester et al., 2011; Mason & Suri, 2012), enhancing the realism of the manipulation. After giving participants one of the three manipulations, I had participants proceed to the task. I told participants that the university department "is considering revamping its website. We would like your feedback on the current website. Please visit the website by clicking the following link." I provided a link to the real website for the university department. After viewing the website, I asked participants to provide their suggestions for improving the website, and after completing the task, I had them complete a manipulation check.

Measures

Dependent variable: effort-based performance. As in Study 1, I measured effort-based performance using an objective measure: the number of suggestions that respondents provided for improving the website. I focused on the quantity of suggestions, rather than the quality of suggestions, for several reasons. First, the quantity of suggestions can be objectively measured. Second, the number of suggestions is a valid measure of effort-based performance as it partially reflects the amount of effort participants put towards the task. Third, participants were told that the website was to be

revamped, meaning that the number of suggestions they had towards this objective was important.

Manipulation check: underdog image. To ensure the effectiveness of the manipulation, workers completed a two-item manipulation check (i.e., "I am considered an underdog by most academic researchers," and "Most academic researchers expected me to perform tasks better than workers on other Internet marketplaces" (reverse-scored); $\alpha = .93$).

Results and Discussion

A between-subjects ANOVA revealed that participants in the underdog image condition ($M = 6.50$, $SD = .53$) indicated that they were perceived as underdogs by academic researchers more than participants in the evenly matched ($M = 3.73$, $SD = 1.28$) and favorite conditions ($M = 1.97$, $SD = .90$), $F(2,119) = 247.29$, $p < .001$. To test Hypothesis 1, I conducted a between-subjects ANOVA. Participants in the underdog image condition ($M = 3.26$, $SD = 1.41$) generated more suggestions than participants in the evenly matched ($M = 2.62$, $SD = 1.35$) and favorite ($M = 2.59$, $SD = 1.28$) conditions, $F(2,119) = 3.29$, $p < .05$. Comparing the underdog image condition to the evenly matched condition, participants in the underdog image condition performed better, $F(1,76) = 4.21$, $p < .05$, $d = .46$. Similarly, participants in the underdog image condition generated more suggestions than those in the favorite condition, $F(1,83) = 5.36$, $p < .05$, $d = .50$.

Studies 1 and 2 provide support for the positive effects of an underdog image on effort-based performance, above those who are perceived as evenly matched and favorites. Although Study 2 replicated the results of Study 1 with a different sample and operationalization of an underdog image, there are a number of potential explanations for

my findings as I did not measure the proposed mediating mechanisms of the desire to POW and POR. Furthermore, although I found support for the positive effects of an underdog image on effort-based performance, I was unable to test for the effects of an underdog image on *actual* performance given the nature of my tasks.

To address these issues, I returned to the lab to conduct Study 3. Unlike Studies 1 and 2 in which I used an independent performance task, I designed an interpersonal task for Study 3 in which negotiators are competing against one another, which may be closer to contexts in which an underdog image may arise. Also, my experimental design allows me to test for my central mediators of POW and POR, along with the role of task self-expectations, to shed an insight into the process by which an underdog image affects performance. Lastly, given the nature of my task—a two-party negotiation with integrative potential—I am able to measure actual performance in this study.

Study 3 Method

Participants and Design

156 participants (resulting in 78 negotiation dyads) in the core, introductory management course at a large Midwestern university participated in the experiment. Participants were an average of 19.4 years of age, 62.0% female, and 69.6% Caucasian. Using a between-subjects design, I randomly assigned one participant in each dyad to one of three conditions: an underdog image (n = 25), favorite (n = 27) or evenly matched condition (n = 26). Participants in the underdog image condition were given false feedback indicating that they were not expected to perform better than others in the negotiation, whereas participants in the favorite condition were instructed that they were expected to be successful, and those in the evenly matched condition were told they were

expected to be as successful as others in the negotiation. I had participants then prepare for a virtual negotiation using an integrative negotiations case from the Dispute Resolution Research Center entitled *Kukui Nuts* (2012) written by Shirli Kopelman and Georg Berkel. After preparing for the negotiation, participants engaged in a virtual negotiation with their counterpart over an instant messaging platform. At the end of the negotiation, I had participants complete measures of proving others wrong, proving oneself right and relative task self-expectations.

Procedures

At the beginning of the study, I randomly assigned participants to one of two rooms (room A or B). In room A, participants were then randomly assigned to either the underdog image, favorite or evenly matched conditions whereas participants randomly assigned to room B did not receive any of the three manipulations as they served as counterparts in the negotiation to participants in room A. Accordingly, all negotiators whom were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions in room A would engage in a negotiation with another person in room B who did not receive any of the manipulations to ensure that the counterpart for each focal negotiator was consistent. Furthermore, I assigned participants in each room to the same negotiating role; that is, participants in room A always negotiated on behalf of pharmaceutical firm *Felix & Company*, and participants in room B were always assigned to negotiate on behalf of pharmaceutical firm *Sabrine*.

At the beginning of the study, the experimenter told participants that they would engage in a virtual negotiation with another individual who is located in a different room.

Before preparing for the negotiation, participants in room A were informed of the following on their computer:

> "A group of researchers have developed a set of questions on the next page to help determine who is likely to perform successfully on negotiations tasks. They claim that their questions are a predictor of who is expected to perform well in various types of negotiations, including ones that involve competition and/or cooperation between negotiators. They contend that those who score poorly on their set of questions have typically performed worse in negotiations."

Participants in room A then completed the 12 item propensity to initiate negotiations measure (Bowles, Babcock, & Lai, 2007; Small, Gelfand, Babcock, & Gettman, 2007), which ostensibly served as the researchers' measure of who is expected to perform effectively on negotiations (e.g., items include "Most things are negotiable," "I think situations should be changed to fit my desires," and "It always takes me a long time to work up the courage to ask for things I want"). Participants were instructed to take their time responding to the items and that when they were finished, it would take the computer a few moments to compile the results. Moreover, to enhance the social nature of the expectations, participants were told that they might meet with the researchers later to discuss their results. Similar to Study 1, after completing the measure, participants saw a computer animated loading screen on a seven-second delay with accompanying text that stated, "Please wait while the computer compiles the results of your score." Once seven seconds elapsed, I then manipulated an underdog image on the next screen.

Manipulation: underdog image. I adapted the false feedback procedure used in Study 1 to manipulate an underdog image. After the seven-second delay, all participants in room A read the following information: "We have now computed your score on the prior assessment." Participants randomly assigned to the underdog image condition read

the following: “Based on your score, researchers do not expect you to perform better than other negotiators, and they suggest that you are an underdog in the upcoming negotiation.” In contrast, participants in the favorite image condition were informed: “Based on your score, researchers expect you to perform better than other negotiators, and they suggest that you are a favorite in the upcoming negotiation.” Finally, participants in the evenly matched condition were told: “Based on your score, researchers expect you to perform equally as well as other negotiators, and they suggest that you are evenly matched in the upcoming negotiation.”

After receiving the manipulation, I had participants complete a manipulation check. Participants then moved on, and I gave them seven minutes to prepare for the virtual negotiation using a two-party, single-issue negotiation with integrative potential negotiations case (Kopelman & Berkel, 2012). This exercise resembles the story by Mary Parker Follett (1940) about two sisters fighting over an orange without realizing that they each need a different part of the fruit, and is based on Len Greenhalgh’s case on the “Tahitian Grapefruit.” In this case, the integrative solution is for each party to realize that they each need different parts of the kukui nuts, enabling them to share all 3,000 nuts between the two of them, but many negotiators fail to find the integrative potential and assume that they must split the resource. There are several reasons why I chose this case over others. First, the case is set in a competitive context as two pharmaceutical companies are negotiating over a single resource, which is appropriate given that being perceived as an underdog, favorite or evenly matched often arises in competitive settings. Second, given that I am primarily focused on performance based on effort, a case with integrative potential is useful since greater preparation and effort during the negotiation

contributes to whether negotiators realize that there is integrative potential through the exchange of information. Third, performance is easy to measure in this negotiation as it is represented by a binary outcome—whether participants realize the integrative solution or not—resembling the type of outcomes witnessed in competitive settings as participants are either considered successful or not. Lastly, given that all participants had taken a negotiations lesson that used a multi-issue negotiation with both distributive and integrative characteristics in their core management class, it was more effective to use a negotiation case structure that they had never seen before.

After preparing for the negotiation, participants used an instant messaging platform to negotiate with the other party over the distribution of the kukui nuts. At the end of the allotted 15 minutes, I had participants complete measures of proving others wrong, proving oneself right and relative task self-expectations.

Measures

Dependent variable: performance. To measure performance, I examined a binary outcome: whether participants reached the integrative solution or not. As mentioned, reaching an integrative solution is the most appropriate measure of performance since it represents the optimal solution in this negotiation.

Mediators: proving others wrong and proving oneself right. To measure proving others wrong, I created two items using a 7-point Likert-type scale (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree). Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed/disagreed with each of the following statements: "I wanted to prove researchers wrong," and "I wanted researchers to know that their expectations of me were wrong" (α = .97). Similarly, to measure proving oneself right, I created two items using a 7-point

scale: “I wanted to prove to myself that I could perform better than others,” and “I wanted to know that I could outperform researchers’ expectations of me” (α = .88).

Moderator: relative task self-expectations. To measure relative task self-expectations, I adapted three items from Spreitzer (1995). Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed/disagreed with each of the following statements: “I believed that I would perform better than my counterpart on this task,” “I was self-assured about my capabilities to outperform my counterpart on this task,” and “I was confident about my ability to perform better than my counterpart on this task” (α = .94).

Manipulation check: underdog image. After receiving the experimental manipulation, I had participants complete a manipulation check aimed at testing whether they were perceived as underdogs or not using three items: “I am considered an underdog by researchers in the upcoming negotiation,” “In the upcoming negotiation, researchers expect me to perform worse than other negotiators,” and “Researchers favor me to perform better than other negotiators in the upcoming negotiation” (reverse-scored) (α = .88).

Results and Discussion

Means and standard deviations for each of the three conditions are presented in Table 2. In the negotiations exercise, 24.6% of participants reached the integrative solution. An examination of the means indicates that, on average, negotiators in the underdog image condition (*M* = .40, *SD* = .50) reached the integrative solution more than those in the favorite (*M* = .15, *SD* = .36) and evenly matched (*M* = .19, *SD* = .40) conditions (illustrated in Figure 4). Furthermore, Table 2 indicates that relative task self-expectations did not vary greatly across the three conditions, suggesting that despite

being ascribed different sets of expectations by researchers, negotiators still held fairly even self-expectations across conditions. This provides support for the idea that self-expectations do not necessarily mirror the expectations of others.

I started by examining whether an underdog image manipulation was effective using a between-subjects ANOVA. Participants in the underdog image condition (M = 5.57, SD = 1.24) indicated that they were viewed as an underdog in the upcoming negotiation more than participants in the favorite condition (M = 1.93, SD = .85), $F(1,50) = 155.51$, $p < .001$. Similarly, participants in the underdog image condition indicated that they were perceived as an underdog by researchers more than those in the evenly matched condition (M = 3.33, SD = .69), $F(1,49) = 64.53$, $p < .001$.

To determine whether participants in the underdog image condition performed better than those in the favorite and evenly matched conditions, I used logistic regression since my dependent variable was a binary outcome. Using the favorite condition as the comparison group, I created two binary variables for the underdog image and evenly matched conditions to use as predictors, and standardized each variable. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, an underdog image ($\beta = 1.34$, $p < .05$) increased the performance of negotiators. I examined my mediating mechanisms of POW and POR simultaneously using bootstrapped procedures (Edwards & Lambert, 2007; MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002; Preacher & Hayes, 2008). Table 3 shows the results. I found a positive effect for an underdog image on POW ($\beta = 2.42$, $p < .01$), and for POW on performance ($\beta = .43$, $p < .05$). To test for the mediating role of POW and POR, I conducted mediation analyses using 5,000 bootstrap samples to generate 95% bias corrected confidence intervals. Mediation analyses showed that the indirect effect of an

underdog image on performance through POW is significant as the 95% confidence interval does not contain zero (β = .93, p = .07, 95% CI [.036, 2.25]). Moreover, by including the mediating mechanism of POW, the direct effect of an underdog image is no longer statistically significant (β = .41, p > .10). In addition, I found that an underdog image has a positive effect on POR (β = .90, p < .05), and marginal support for a positive effect of POR on performance (β = .32, p = .10). The bootstrap confidence interval for the conditional indirect effect of an underdog image on performance through POR contained zero (β = .223, p > .10, 95% CI [-1.10, .94]). Therefore, I found support for Hypothesis 2a but not 2b.

To assess the moderating role of relative task self-expectations, I conducted hierarchical regression analysis predicting POW and POR. In the first step, I included the mean-centered evenly matched control variable. In the second step, I entered underdog image and task self-expectations as predictors after mean centering the variables (Aiken & West, 1991). In the third step, I computed the interaction between an underdog image and task self-expectations, and entered the interaction variable into the regression. Table 4 shows the findings. The product term between an underdog image and task self-expectations is marginally statistically significant (β = .61, p = .059). Figure 5 depicts the results. At high levels of task self-expectations (1 standard deviation above the mean), the effect of an underdog image on performance is strongly positive (β = 3.13, p < .001), and at low levels of task self-expectations (1 standard deviation below the mean), the effect of an underdog image on performance is also positive (β = 2.08, p < .001). I followed the procedures recommended by Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes (2007) to test for moderated mediation using 5,000 bootstrap samples to generate bootstrap confidence intervals.

Results showed that at both high (β = 1.20, 95% CI [.13, 2.89]) and low (β = .79, 95% CI [.08, 2.07]) levels of task self-expectations, the conditional indirect effect of an underdog image on performance is statistically significant as the confidence intervals did not contain zero, providing support for Hypothesis 3a. On the other hand, I did not find support for the conditional indirect effect of an underdog image on performance through POR at high (β = .32, 95% CI [-.14, 1.32]) and low (β = .32, 95% CI [-.12, 1.00]) levels of task self-expectations.

General Discussion

What are the motivational implications of an underdog image on effort and performance? Across three studies, I found that when individuals were perceived as an underdog by others, it contributed to greater effort-based performance than those who were viewed as evenly matched or favorites in the competitive setting. When individuals were perceived as an underdog, I proposed that two motives were activated—the desire to prove others wrong and prove oneself right. My results reveal that proving others wrong—but not proving oneself right—serves as the mediating mechanism between an underdog image and performance. Moreover, to provide a stronger test of the role of expectations on effort and performance, along with decoupling the role of others' expectations from self-expectations, I showed that relative task self-expectations amplify the positive effect of an underdog image on proving others wrong as those with high self-expectations have a stronger desire to prove others wrong when they are ascribed an underdog image. My findings offer valuable theoretical contributions to the literatures on expectations, self-enhancement and self-verification.

Theoretical Contributions

My primary theoretical contribution in this study is to the literature on expectations. Self-fulfilling prophecy theory suggests that others' expectations impact the self, and the Pygmalion effect explicitly demonstrates that when supervisors expect a subordinate to perform effectively, the subordinate is likely to engage in more effort and perform better. Similarly, research on self-efficacy theory and the Galatea effect discusses how high self-expectations contribute to effort and performance. My research decouples the role of others' expectations from self-expectations to examine the effect of situations in which people are not expected to perform successfully by others—an underdog image—on motivation, effort and performance. Also, it raises questions about whether the source of the low expectations of others matters. In my research, I focused on social expectations, but these individuals did not have an influence over the individuals' outcomes. Much of the prior research on expectations has focused on the role of supervisors and teachers in influencing and shaping impressionable people (e.g., newcomers, students), but expectations may also stem from a broader group of people, many of whom are not directly involved in the setting of employees or competitors. My research takes a step in filling this gap by focusing on how constituents who are not involved in a competitive setting impact motivation, and suggests that expectations may drive motivation without requiring that others are directly in the same domain as individuals.

Furthermore, I show how relative task self-expectations shape the relationship between an underdog image and the desire to prove others wrong, suggesting that task self-expectations may not always be impacted by the expectations of others and may serve as a boundary condition of its motivational effects. Although my theory and results

run counter to prior theory and research suggesting that others' low expectations are detrimental to motivation, effort and performance, my findings reconcile with prior research on theories of self-fulfilling prophecy (e.g., Pygmalion and Galatea effects) and self-efficacy since it suggests that people must hold requisite levels of self-expectations for others' expectations to positively influence effort and performance.

In addition, my research offers a relational perspective on motivation as it demonstrates how individuals care about the views that others hold of them. My findings demonstrate that individuals neither internalize nor do they ignore the low expectations of others; rather, an underdog image leads to greater effort and performance since it motivates people to prove others wrong. The motive to prove others wrong complements and builds on a relational lens on motivation (e.g., Grant, 2007) by documenting that people are motivated by the images that others hold of them. Thus, it moves organizational theories of motivation beyond focusing on the organizational factors that impact motivation, and readjusts existing theory to consider how the views of others impact employee motivation.

Finally, my theory and findings are at the intersection of research on motivation and image, and integrate theories of self-enhancement (e.g., self-affirmation and self-evaluation maintenance models) with self-verification theory. Although recent research has highlighted the major differences between these two perspectives (Chen et al., 2004; Kwang & Swann, 2010), my research suggests that the differential predictions of each theory can be reconciled. Theories of self-enhancement suggest that individuals hold positive self-evaluations, and strive to achieve and maintain positivity surrounding their self-concepts. Although theories of self-enhancement such as self-affirmation theory and

the self-evaluation maintenance model assert that people will ignore others' low evaluations to protect the self-concept, self-verification theory indicates individuals strive to be viewed consistently by others. My research harmonizes these differing perspectives by suggesting that individuals aim to hold positive self-evaluations, but it is not enough to cling onto these evaluations in isolation by dismissing others' images of the self. Instead, people work towards maintaining a positive self-evaluation, and want others to validate their own positive self-views. Accordingly, individuals seek to prove others wrong when they are perceived as an underdog to maintain a positive self-view and ensure that others view them in a positive manner.

Limitations and Future Directions

My results are subject to a number of limitations that suggest directions for future research. The use of controlled experiments begs questions about the effects of an underdog image in field settings. I used controlled experiments for two reasons. First, unlike prior research, I aimed to isolate the effects of low expectations on effort and performance. Prior studies have often confounded low expectations with other factors such as ability, which has made it difficult to isolate the effects of expectations from other factors. Second, I used controlled experiments because it enabled the decoupling of others' expectations from self-expectations. Future research should examine how naturally occurring underdog images in organizational settings impact effort and performance as there are likely to be boundary conditions for when an underdog image is likely to be motivating, and when it is likely to impact self-expectations.

One may also be concerned about the relatively short time frames for the tasks that were used, and may wonder about having expectations come from constituents that

participants have never met before. Interestingly, the relatively short time frames for the task may suppress the relationships between my focal variables. For example, in a field setting, negotiators may have a longer period of time to prepare, thereby enabling effort to have an even greater effect on performance. Also, in field settings, expectations often emanate from people who competitors or participants do not know personally such as a broader base of shareholders, journalists or outside observers. While in Study 2 participants were exposed to research that suggested their likelihood of performing effectively from people they had never met before, Study 3 negotiators were told that they may actually meet researchers afterwards to highlight the possibility of future interaction. This may account for why proving others wrong—but not proving oneself right—was found as a mediating mechanism since participants would have the opportunity to demonstrate to researchers that their expectations were incorrect. Future studies should examine how different groups and relationships with constituents shape the effects of an underdog image on performance.

Furthermore, I found that POW mediated the positive effect of an underdog image on performance even for those with low task self-expectations in Study 3. This result seems to suggest that a POW motive may even be present for those who are less likely to experience a self-verification motive (i.e., individuals with lower self-expectations). At the same time, in my research, self-expectations were measured, but not manipulated. Given that my focus was on competitive environments, self-expectations remained somewhat high even for those with relatively low levels in my study. As previously mentioned, this result is not atypical in competitive settings as individuals participating in these environments are often myopic since they tend to focus on their strengths and

neglect their competitors (Moore & Cain, 2007; Radzevick & Moore, 2008). Moreover, research has found that people tend to overestimate their competence in unfamiliar domains (Kruger & Dunning, 1999). Future work should investigate the effects of an underdog image in other domains, such as ones in which may involve cooperation and/or are more familiar to participants to ascertain whether these effects hold in the same manner.

Lastly, although this study focused on the effects of an underdog image on effort-based performance, questions remain as to how an underdog image impacts performance. For example, do individuals who are ascribed an underdog image simply work harder or do they also engage in more novel task strategies? I focused primarily on effort because I was interested in the motivational implications of an underdog image, and effort serves as a behavioral manifestation of motivation. Nevertheless, an underdog image may lead participants to engage in different behaviors that allow them to perform successfully, and future research should examine the different pathways by which an underdog image impacts performance.

Practical Implications

Managers and practitioners should interpret my findings cautiously. Obviously, my research does not suggest that managers should start perceiving their employees as unlikely to succeed. However, my findings do hint at the nuances of expectations, and how being ascribed an underdog image may sometimes heighten motivation. There may be naturally occurring underdog images in organizational settings that managers and groups can harness to cultivate motivation among employees. However, if individuals decide to employ and activate such images, it must be done carefully as individuals must

have requisite levels of self-expectations, believe that others' images of themselves can be changed, and effort contributes to outcomes.

Conclusion

Building on the literature on expectations, self-enhancement and self-verification, my research suggests that the low expectations of others may actually motivate constructively and boost effort and performance. This work thereby provides a first step towards understanding how an underdog image impacts the effort and performance of individuals, and begins to unpack the relational and self-based mechanisms for why it can boost motivation. As such, an underdog image may contribute to the energy that individuals are willing to put into their work when they believe in themselves, and underscores the importance of understanding the nuances of the role of expectations in motivating employees.

Table 2 - Study 3 Means and Standard Deviations of Key Variables

Condition	Performance (Integrative Solution)	POW	POR	Task Self-Expectations	Underdog Image Manipulation Check
Underdog Image (*n* = 25)	.40 (.50)	4.68 (1.68)	5.10 (1.47)	5.18 (.96)	5.57 (1.24)
Favorite Image (*n* = 27)	.15 (.36)	2.26 (.91)	4.20 (1.55)	5.37 (1.05)	1.93 (.85)
Evenly Matched Image (*n* = 26)	.19 (.40)	3.98 (1.50)	4.67 (1.50)	5.40 (.77)	3.33 (.69)

Standard deviations in parentheses. *n* is the number of participants in each condition, and also represents the total number of dyads.

Table 3 - Study 3 Results of the Mediating Role of Proving Others Wrong

Variables	B	*SE*
Path Analyses		
UD-POW (a path)	2.42***	.39
POW-Performance (b path)	.43***	.17
Total Effect (c path)	1.34**	.67
UD-Performance (c' path)	.41	.87
Bootstrapping		
Indirect Effect (ab path)	.93	.52
95% CI	[.040, 2.11]	
Cox & Snell R^2	.10	

Note: UD = underdog image (independent variable); POW = proving others wrong (mediator); Performance = integrative solution reached (dependent variable – binary). In regressions with underdog image variable, the evenly matched image binary variable is entered as a control variable (favorite image is reference group). *$p \leq .10$, **$p \leq .05$, ***$p \leq .01$. 95% CI means bias corrected 95% confidence interval. Bootstrapped results are based on 5,000 bootstrap samples.

Table 4 - Study 3 Results of Moderated Mediation Model

	Mediator Model (POW)			Dependent Variable Model (Performance)		
Variables	B	*SE*	*t*	B	*SE*	Z
EM	1.75***	.34	5.19	-.39	.86	-.46
UD	2.61***	.34	7.68	.41	.87	.47
TSE	.67***	.15	4.39			
UD Image x TSE	.62*	.32	1.94			
POW				.38*	.20	1.90
95% confidence interval for conditional indirect effects of UD Image-Performance						
95% C.I. (1 s.d. below mean – task self-expectations)				[.02, 2.00]		
95% C.I. (1 s.d. below mean – task self-expectations)				[.03, 2.80]		

Note: UD = underdog image (independent variable); POW =proving others wrong (mediator); TSE = task self-expectations (moderator); EM = evenly matched image (control variable, favorite image is reference group); Performance = integrative solution reached (dependent variable – binary). *$p \leq .10$, **$p \leq .05$, ***$p \leq .01$. Bootstrapped results are based on 5,000 bootstrap samples.

Figure 2 - Theoretical Model of the Effects of an Underdog Image



Figure 3 - A Sample Droodle



"A rock concert"

Figure 4 - Study 3 Results for an Underdog Image



Figure 5 - Study 3 Results for Relative Task Self-Expectations as a Moderator



Chapter V
An Underdog Image in the Field

To gain a deeper understanding of the practical importance of an underdog image in organizational settings, I conducted a field study of an underdog image. Given that competitive environments are pervasive in organizations, I sought to investigate how being perceived as an underdog can affect the effort and performance of employees. This chapter has three goals. First, I aim to test some of the hypotheses in the prior chapter to enhance research on the impact of an underdog image in organizations. Second, providing an empirical test of my hypotheses in an organizational setting can help ascertain whether being perceived as an underdog has a lasting effect on motivation over time. Third, understanding the impact of an underdog image in the field is especially challenging due to ethical considerations. As prior research on the Golem effect has indicated, it is difficult to directly test for the effects of negative expectations due to ethical and operational considerations (Reynolds, 2007). My field experiment aims to balance these ethical considerations in the context of the workplace with the need to understand how being perceived as an underdog can impact performance.

Method

Participants and Design

41 callers in a fundraising organization for a university in the Midwestern United States participated in the study. Callers were an average of 21.9 years of age, 52.5% female, and 44.7% Caucasian. To test the hypothesis of an underdog image as having a positive effect of effort and performance, I used a randomized, controlled field

experiment. I varied the expectations of callers across two conditions—underdog image and favorite—by using different versions of a cover letter that were presented to each caller. One of the challenges of manipulating an underdog image in the field is the nature of how low expectations are portrayed to employees due to its ethical challenges (Oz & Eden, 1994). For example, prior studies have been unable to manipulate low supervisory expectations and directly test the Golem effect since it may lead to employees internalizing low expectations, thereby damaging their self-esteem, motivation and effort on the job (Reynolds, 2007). To resolve these challenges, when examining an underdog image in the field, I sought to develop a manipulation that was not based on callers' competence or expertise, but rather, based on the type of project employees were working on, and the other callers that employees would be competing against.

Callers in each condition received a cover letter indicating that the call center had partnered with researchers to learn more about callers in the organization. As part of this project, callers were told that they had been randomly assigned to a group of callers, and researchers would compare their performance to the other callers in their assigned group. I provided callers this information for two primary reasons. First, it provided more transparency about the involvement of researchers in the project, which is an important consideration when designing field experiments (Grant & Wall, 2009). Second, it helped explain why two people working on the same project in the call center could be perceived as an underdog or favorite by others; namely, whether they were perceived as an underdog depended on which callers had been randomly assigned to their group. Given that there may be contagion or leakage between the two experimental conditions as callers assigned to different conditions would work in the same room, it was important to

provide callers a compelling reason for why two callers working on the same project could be seen differently.

In the underdog image condition, callers were told that the project they were working on had historically received fewer donations than the projects of other callers in their assigned group, making them an underdog in comparison to the other callers in their assigned group. In contrast, callers in the favorite condition were told that the project they were working had historically received greater donations than the projects of other callers in their assigned group, making them a favorite in comparison to the other callers in their group. By crafting the manipulations in this manner, I aimed to minimize the effects of an underdog image on the self-esteem of callers, but ensure that it remained consistent with the definition of an underdog image to help build causal inferences. Each cover letter then included a closing statement saying that we hoped that callers would, "put forth best their best effort and raise as many dollars as they could."

Measures

Consistent with prior research on call centers, I used the number of dollars raised by callers in the week after the intervention as a measure of objective job performance (Grant et al., 2007). In addition to the number of dollars raised, I also collected additional measures of caller performance such as the number of pledges received, and the number of credit card dollars raised because managers at the call center indicated that these were additional performance metrics that were emphasized to callers.

Results

Table 5 shows the means and standard deviations for the three metrics of performance by condition. Callers did not differ in terms of hours worked across

conditions. To examine the effects of an underdog image on performance, I conducted cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses to determine whether callers in the underdog image condition performed better than those in the favorite condition.

After the intervention took place, a between-subjects ANOVA revealed that the two conditions did not statistically differ in all three measures of performance: pledge count $F(1, 39) = 2.04$, $p = .16$; dollars raised $F(1, 39) = .00$, $p = 1.00$; credit card dollars raised $F(1, 39) = 1.53$, $p = .22$. In addition, I conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA to test whether performance differed in the week prior to and after the intervention. My analyses indicated a marginally significant interaction between time and condition on the number of pledges $F(1, 38) = 3.10$, $p = .09$, but not on dollars raised $F(1, 38) = .33$, $p = .57$ and credit card dollars raised $F(1, 38) = .67$, $p = .42$.

Discussion

My field experiment provides an initial test of how being perceived as an underdog can impact performance at the workplace. By informing callers that they were either an underdog or favorite on the project they were working on compared to other callers, I aimed to see whether being perceived as an underdog could increase performance at the workplace. Doing so marginally increased the number of pledges raised by callers from the week prior to the week after the intervention in the underdog image condition. However, caller performance in terms of the number of dollars and credit card dollars raised did not significantly increase.

Limitations and Future Directions

My field experiment is subject to a number of limitations. First, the nature of the manipulation of an underdog image may have been ineffective since the intervention was

not very strong. I had decided to use the cover letter intervention since it best suited my definition of an underdog image, allowed me to use random assignment, ensured standardization, and was easier to conduct logistically. In retrospect, I wonder if a different type of intervention would have been more effective. For example, I had considered having leaders directly express to employees that they were underdogs, sharing stories of prior callers who were perceived as underdogs or having employees reflect on why they would be perceived as an underdog by others as other potential interventions. These interventions may have increased the likelihood of employees recalling an underdog image and internalizing others' low expectations.

Another limitation of my field experiment is statistical power. It is hard to ascertain whether the lack of significant findings in my field experiment is the result of an ineffective intervention or the relatively low number of participants. I believe that my lack of findings is likely attributable to both of these causes. Initially, I had hoped that there would be more callers who would be able to participate in the field experiment, but when I had conducted this version of the study, many employees had already began leaving the call center. Moreover, given that this was the first intervention of an underdog image in the field and my uncertainty about its potential consequences, I did not want to launch it in an organization with too many employees since it would be more difficult to retain control over the study. Furthermore, researchers have noted that small sample sizes, although flawed, "may open new areas of theory and show the way for future researchers to conduct the kind of large-sample research studies that all psychologists agree are needed…" (Peterson, Smith, & Martorana, 2006). At the same time, some have noted that it is always important to use larger sample sizes since small sample sizes make

it more difficult to generate valid statistical inferences (Hollenbeck, DeRue, & Mannor, 2006). In future studies, I plan on using a larger sample size to ensure that my lack of findings is not attributable to low statistical power.

Moving forward, I would be inclined to try a stronger intervention in the field even if it means relinquishing some of the benefits of having experimental control, especially since I now have greater confidence in how an underdog image can be used to boost performance. One possibility would be to use an existing tournament in which employees are paired up against each other, and ascribing each of them either an underdog or favorite image. This format may be effective since employees would already be entered into the competition, suggesting that they would likely hold requisite levels of self-efficacy otherwise they would not have signed up for the tournament. In this context, employees would already identify with the task domain, have expectations that are pertinent to the task at hand, evoke social comparisons, and the competition would involve some degree of psychological and financial stakes for each of them. Given the configuration of these parameters, I would expect that an underdog image would be more likely to have a positive effect on effort and performance.

Table 5 - Means and Standard Deviations for Key Variables

Condition	Pledge Count		Dollars Raised		Credit Card Dollars	
	Pre	Post	Pre	Post	Pre	Post
Underdog Image	4.63	9.88	56.51	58.70	163.44	340.59
(*n* = 17)	(4.49)	(4.56)	(55.62)	(31.55)	(232.92)	(281.85)
Favorite Image	5.33	7.63	46.56	58.70	147.08	231.25
(*n* = 24)	(4.57)	(5.24)	(42.00)	(71.02)	(208.04)	(276.48)

Standard deviations in parentheses. *n* is the number of callers in each condition.

Chapter VI
Conclusion

My dissertation seeks to understand how being viewed as an underdog impacts motivation and performance. Chapter II reviewed the literature on underdogs in other academic disciplines, and suggested how an underdog image differs from other constructs in the literature. Chapter III offered a relational and social theory of an underdog image by suggesting that being perceived as an underdog may either enhance or hinder employee motivation—through the desire to prove others wrong and prove oneself right—depending on the characteristics of constituents and competitors, thereby impacting task content, strategies and behaviors. Chapter IV explored the mechanisms and boundary conditions of an underdog image on effort and performance using three experiments. Lastly, Chapter V tested the effects of an underdog image on performance in an organizational setting. Together, my dissertation recasts existing theory and research on one of the oldest and most central topics of motivation in organizational behavior—the role of expectations—by demonstrating that employees neither neglect nor internalize the threat of others' low expectations; rather, an underdog image has the potential to stimulate motivation at the workplace.

Future Directions

Moving forward, I have developed three streams of research related to underdogs. The first examines how being perceived as an underdog impacts employees at the workplace. I am currently testing many of the propositions in my theory paper, primarily focusing on how the status and group membership of constituents either help or hurt

employee performance, along with impacting task strategies. In addition, I am collecting survey data in the field to see the effects of an underdog image among newcomers entering organizations. Initial results point towards a positive effect of an underdog image on subsequent performance (as rated by supervisors). Also, I intend to continue examining the effects of an underdog image using field experiments using what I have learned from my initial attempts to test for its effects (as described in Chapter V).

Second, I am interested in third-party reactions to underdogs. At the workplace, people may be perceived as underdogs, and I have become interested in understanding the impact of people who work with them. Coworkers and supervisors can serve as champions of an underdog in promotion or hiring contexts. At the same time, research has demonstrated that people are more willing to associate with winners (e.g., basking in reflected glory), suggesting that people would be less inclined to support underdogs (Cialdini et al., 1976). Furthermore, people may react differently to underdogs depending on the reasons why the person is perceived as an underdog. A person may be viewed as less likely to succeed relative to others for a number of reasons such as a lack of competence, effort, resources or experience. The reasons why a person is an underdog may matter for how we evaluate underdogs since some factors are within the control of the employee (e.g., effort) whereas others may be outside of their control (e.g., experience or resources). In the future, I hope to examine questions such as why we evaluate some underdogs more favorably than others, why people may or may not help underdogs, and how the success or failure of underdogs can inspire or demotivate others.

If being perceived as an underdog can facilitate performance through increased motivation and the favorable reactions of third parties, it leads us to wonder whether

individuals can portray themselves as underdogs for strategic purposes. A group may present themselves as an underdog to external constituents in order to gain support and acquire resources. Moreover, individuals may perceive themselves as an underdog to help decrease the pressure they experience. Indeed, thinking of oneself as an underdog may be used as a form of self-handicapping in order to diminish the pressure that one faces in a stressful situation. In addition, it is interesting how many successful people and companies often portray themselves as underdogs to others. For instance, Bill Gates has mentioned that, "It's fun to be an underdog in some ways and we think we can do a lot of innovative work" (Rusli, 2008) Similarly, Michael Jordan is renowned for still suggesting to others that he was an underdog since he was cut by his high school basketball coach. What is interesting in Jordan's case is that he was actually not cut, but instead made the junior varsity team (Lake, 2012). However, perhaps Jordan used this situation as a way of crafting himself as an underdog as he wanted to derive motivation from proving people wrong, even when many believe he is the greatest basketball player to ever play the game. In my future research, I hope to understand why people may frame themselves as an underdog to others, and how it can be used strategically in organizational contexts to acquire resources.

References

Aarts, H., Gollwitzer, P. M., & Hassin, R. R. 2004. Goal contagion: Perceiving is for pursuing. ***Journal of personality and social psychology***, 87: 23-37.

Alicke, M. D., Klotz, M. L., Breitenbecher, D. L., Yurak, T. J., & Vredenburg, D. S. 1995. Personal contact, individuation, and the better-than-average effect. ***Journal of personality and social psychology***, 68(5): 804-825.

Allison, S. T., & Burnette, J. L. 2010. Fairness and preference for Underdogs and Top Dogs. In R. M. Kramer, A. E. Tenbrunsel, & M. H. Bazerman (Eds.), ***Social Decision Making***: 291-314. New York: Routledge.

Allport, G. W. 1937. ***Personality: A psychological interpretation***. Oxford, England: Holt.

Amabile, T. M. 1983. The social psychology of creativity: A componential conceptualization. ***Journal of personality and social psychology***, 45(2): 357-376.

Amabile, T. M., Barsade, S. G., Mueller, J. S., & Staw, B. M. 2005. Affect and creativity at work. ***Administrative science quarterly***, 50(3): 367-403.

Anderson, C., & Brion, S. 2010. Overconfidence and the Attainment of Status in Groups. ***Working Paper***.

Anderson, C., & Kilduff, G. J. 2009. Why do dominant personalities attain influence in face-to-face groups? The competence-signaling effects of trait dominance. ***Journal of personality and social psychology***, 96(2): 491-503.

Ashford, S. J., Rothbard, N. P., Piderit, S. K., & Dutton, J. E. 1998. Out on a limb: The role of context and impression management in selling gender-equity issues. ***Administrative science quarterly***: 23-57.

Babad, E. Y., Inbar, J., & Rosenthal, R. 1982. Pygmalion, Galatea, and the Golem: Investigations of biased and unbiased teachers. ***Journal of Educational Psychology***, 74(4): 459-474.

Baer, R., Hinkle, S., Smith, K., & Fenton, M. 1980. Reactance as a function of actual versus projected autonomy. ***Journal of personality and social psychology***, 38(3): 416-422.

Baik, K. H., & Shogren, J. F. 1992. Strategic behavior in contests: comment. ***The American Economic Review***, 82(1): 359-362.

Bandura, A. 1977. Self-efficacy: toward a unifying theory of behavioral change. ***Psychological review***, 84(2): 191-215.

Bandura, A. 1982. Self-efficacy mechanism in human agency. ***American psychologist***, 37(2): 122-147.

Barger, P., Behrend, T. S., Sharek, D. J., & Sinar, E. F. 2011. IO and the Crowd: Frequently Asked Questions About Using Mechanical Turk for Research. ***The Industrial-Organizational Psychologist***, 49(2): 11-19.

Barker, D. 1876. ***Poems by David Barker***. Bangor: Press of S. S. Smith.

Barrick, M. R., & Mount, M. K. 1991. The big five personality dimensions and job performance: a meta-analysis. ***Personnel psychology***, 44(1): 1-26.

Barsade, S. G. 2002. The ripple effect: Emotional contagion and its influence on group behavior. ***Administrative Science Quarterly***, 47(4): 644-675.

Barsky, A. 2008. Understanding the ethical cost of organizational goal-setting: A review and theory development. ***Journal of Business Ethics***, 81(1): 63-81.

Baumeister, R. F. 1982. A self-presentational view of social phenomena. ***Psychological Bulletin***, 91(1): 3-26.

Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E., Finkenauer, C., & Vohs, K. D. 2001. Bad is stronger than good. ***Review of general psychology***, 5(4): 323-370.

Baumeister, R. F., Hamilton, J. C., & Tice, D. M. 1985. Public versus private expectancy of success: Confidence booster or performance pressure? ***Journal of personality and social psychology***, 48(6): 1447-1457.

Baumeister, R. F., & Newman, L. S. 1994. How stories make sense of personal experiences: Motives that shape autobiographical narratives. ***Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin***, 20(6): 676-690.

Baumeister, R. F., & Steinhilber, A. 1984. Paradoxical effects of supportive audiences on performance under pressure: The home field disadvantage in sports championships. ***Journal of personality and social psychology***, 47(1): 85-93.

Berger, J., Cohen, B. P., & Zelditch Jr, M. 1972. Status characteristics and social interaction. ***American Sociological Review***: 241-255.

Berger, J., & Pope, D. 2011. Can Losing Lead to Winning? ***Management science***, 57(5): 817-827.

Blader, S. L., & Chen, Y. R. 2012. Differentiating the effects of status and power: A justice perspective. ***Journal of personality and social psychology***, 102(5): 994-1014.

Bolino, M. C. 1999. Citizenship and impression management: Good soldiers or good actors? ***Academy of Management Review***: 82-98.

Bowles, H. R., Babcock, L., & Lai, L. 2007. Social incentives for gender differences in the propensity to initiate negotiations: Sometimes it does hurt to ask. ***Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes***, 103(1): 84-103.

Brett, J. F., & VandeWalle, D. 1999. Goal orientation and goal content as predictors of performance in a training program. ***Journal of Applied Psychology***, 84(6): 863-873.

Broadhurst, P. L. 1957. Emotionality and the Yerkes-Dodson law. ***Journal of Experimental Psychology***, 54(5): 345-352.

Brockner, J. 1992. The escalation of commitment to a failing course of action: Toward theoretical progress. ***Academy of Management Review***: 39-61.

Brockner, J., Rubin, J. Z., & Lang, E. 1981. Face-saving and entrapment. ***Journal of Experimental Social Psychology***, 17(1): 68-79.

Brophy, J. E. 1983. Research on the self-fulfilling prophecy and teacher expectations. ***Journal of Educational Psychology***, 75(5): 631-661.

Buhrmester, M., Kwang, T., & Gosling, S. D. 2011. Amazon's Mechanical Turk A New Source of Inexpensive, Yet High-Quality, Data? ***Perspectives on Psychological Science***, 6(1): 3-5.

Bunderson, J. S. 2003. Recognizing and utilizing expertise in work groups: A status characteristics perspective. ***Administrative science quarterly***, 48(4): 557-591.

Buunk, A. P., & Gibbons, F. X. 2007. Social comparison: The end of a theory and the emergence of a field. ***Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes***, 102(1): 3-21.

Cable, D. M., & Kay, V. S. 2012. Striving for Self Verification during Organizational Entry. ***Academy of Management Journal***, 55: 360-380.

Cable, D. M., & Yu, K. Y. T. 2006. Managing job seekers' organizational image beliefs: The role of media richness and media credibility. ***Journal of Applied Psychology***, 91(4): 828-840.

Campbell, D. K. 1991. Goal levels, complex tasks, and strategy development: A review and analysis. ***Human Performance***, 4(1): 1-31.

Campbell, J. P. 1990. Modeling the performance prediction problem in industrial and organizational psychology. In M. D. Dunnette, & L. M. Hough (Eds.), ***Handbook of industrial and organizational psychology***, Vol. 1: 687-732. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.

Ceci, S. J., & Kain, E. L. 1982. Jumping on the bandwagon with the underdog: The impact of attitude polls on polling behavior. ***Public Opinion Quarterly***, 46(2): 228-242.

Chambers, J. R., Windschitl, P. D., & Suls, J. 2003. Egocentrism, event frequency, and comparative optimism: When what happens frequently is "more likely to happen to me". ***Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin***, 29(11): 1343-1356.

Chen, G., & Klimoski, R. J. 2003. The impact of expectations on newcomer performance in teams as mediated by work characteristics, social exchanges, and empowerment. ***Academy of Management Journal***, 46(5): 591-607.

Chen, S., Chen, K. Y., & Shaw, L. 2004. Self-verification motives at the collective level of self-definition. ***Journal of personality and social psychology***, 86(1): 77-94.

Chiaburu, D. S., & Harrison, D. A. 2008. Do peers make the place? Conceptual synthesis and meta-analysis of coworker effects on perceptions, attitudes, OCBs, and performance. ***Journal of Applied Psychology***, 93(5): 1082-1103.

Cialdini, R. B., Borden, R. J., Thorne, A., Walker, M. R., Freeman, S., & Sloan, L. R. 1976. Basking in reflected glory: Three (football) field studies. ***Journal of personality and social psychology***, 34(3): 366-375.

Cialdini, R. B., & Goldstein, N. J. 2004. Social influence: Compliance and conformity. ***Annual Review of Psychology***, 55: 591-621.

Cianci, A. M., Klein, H. J., & Seijts, G. H. 2010. The effect of negative feedback on tension and subsequent performance: The main and interactive effects of goal content and conscientiousness. ***Journal of Applied Psychology***, 95(4): 618-630.

Cooper, H. M. 1979. Pygmalion grows up: A model for teacher expectation communication and performance influence. ***Review of Educational Research***, 49(3): 389-410.

Cryer, M. 2010. ***Who Said That First?: The Curious Origins of Common Words and Phrases***. Titirangi: Exisle Publishing.

Davidson, O. B., & Eden, D. 2000. Remedial self-fulfilling prophecy: Two field experiments to prevent Golem effects among disadvantaged women. ***Journal of Applied Psychology***, 85(3): 386-398.

De Dreu, C. K. W., Baas, M., & Nijstad, B. A. 2008. Hedonic tone and activation level in the mood-creativity link: Toward a dual pathway to creativity model. ***Journal of personality and social psychology***, 94(5): 739-756.

Debowski, S., Wood, R. E., & Bandura, A. 2001. Impact of guided exploration and enactive exploration on self-regulatory mechanisms and information acquisition through electronic search. ***Journal of Applied Psychology***, 86(6): 1129-1141.

Detert, J. R., & Treviño, L. K. 2010. Speaking up to higher-ups: How supervisors and skip-level leaders influence employee voice. ***Organization Science***, 21(1): 249-270.

Deutsch, M. 1949. A theory of cooperation and competition. ***Human Relations***, 2: 129-152.

Dixit, A. 1987. Strategic behavior in contests. ***The American Economic Review***: 891-898.

Dutton, J. E., Roberts, L. M., & Bednar, J. 2010. Pathways for positive identity construction at work: Four types of positive identity and the building of social resources. ***Academy of Management Review***, 35(2): 265-293.

Dweck, C. S., & Leggett, E. L. 1988. A social-cognitive approach to motivation and personality. ***Psychological Review***, 95(2): 256-273.

Earley, P. C., Connolly, T., & Ekegren, G. 1989. Goals, strategy development, and task performance: Some limits on the efficacy of goal setting. ***Journal of Applied Psychology***, 74(1): 24-33.

Eden, D. 1990a. ***Pygmalion in management: Productivity as a self-fulfilling prophecy***. Lexington: Lexington Books.

Eden, D. 1990b. Pygmalion without interpersonal contrast effects: Whole groups gain from raising manager expectations. ***Journal of Applied Psychology***, 75(4): 394-398.

Eden, D. 2003. Self-fulfilling prophecies in organizations. In J. Greenberg (Ed.), ***Organizational behavior: The state of the science***: 91-122.

Eden, D., & Kinnar, J. 1991. Modeling Galatea: Boosting self-efficacy to increase volunteering. ***Journal of Applied Psychology***, 76(6): 770-780.

Eden, D., & Ravid, G. 1982. Pygmalion versus self-expectancy: Effects of instructor-and self-expectancy on trainee performance. ***Organizational Behavior and Human Performance***, 30(3): 351-364.

Eden, D., & Shani, A. B. 1982. Pygmalion goes to boot camp: Expectancy, leadership, and trainee performance. ***Journal of Applied Psychology***, 67(2): 194-199.

Edwards, J. R., & Lambert, L. S. 2007. Methods for integrating moderation and mediation: a general analytical framework using moderated path analysis. ***Psychological methods***, 12(1): 1-22.

Ellemers, N. 1993. The influence of socio-structural variables on identity management strategies. ***European review of social psychology***, 4(1): 27-57.

Ellemers, N., De Gilder, D., & Haslam, S. A. 2004. Motivating individuals and groups at work: A social identity perspective on leadership and group performance. ***Academy of Management Review***, 29: 459-478.

Elliot, A. J., & Church, M. A. 1997. A hierarchical model of approach and avoidance achievement motivation. ***Journal of personality and social psychology***, 72(1): 218-232.

Feather, N. T. 1969. Attribution of responsibility and valence of success and failure in relation to initial confidence and task performance. ***Journal of personality and social psychology***, 13(2): 129-144.

Festinger, L. 1954. A theory of social comparison processes. ***Human Relations***, 1: 117-140.

Fiske, S. T. 2010. Interpersonal stratification: Status, power, and subordination. In S. T. Fiske, G. Lindzey, & D. T. Gilbert (Eds.), ***Handbook of social psychology***: 678-692. New York: Wiley Online Library.

Fleitas, D. W. 1971. Bandwagon and underdog effects in minimal-information elections. ***The American Political Science Review***, 65(2): 434-438.

Flynn, F. J., & Amanatullah, E. T. 2010. Psyched up or psyched out? The influence of coactor status on individual performance. ***Organization Science***, 23(2): 402-415.

Flynn, F. J., & Staw, B. M. 2004. Lend me your wallets: The effect of charismatic leadership on external support for an organization. ***Strategic Management Journal***, 25(4): 309-330.

Garcia, S. M., Tor, A., & Gonzalez, R. 2006. Ranks and rivals: A theory of competition. ***Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin***, 32(7): 970-982.

Gelfand, M. J., Major, V. S., Raver, J. L., Nishii, L. H., & O'Brien, K. 2006. Negotiating relationally: The dynamics of the relational self in negotiations. ***Academy of Management Review***, 31(2): 427-451.

George, J. M., & Zhou, J. 2002. Understanding when bad moods foster creativity and good ones don't: The role of context and clarity of feelings. ***Journal of Applied Psychology***, 87(4): 687-697.

Gino, F., & Ariely, D. 2012. The dark side of creativity: Original thinkers can be more dishonest. ***Journal of personality and social psychology***, 102(3): 445-459.

Gino, F., Ayal, S., & Ariely, D. 2009. Contagion and Differentiation in Unethical Behavior The Effect of One Bad Apple on the Barrel. ***Psychological Science***, 20(3): 393-398.

Gist, M. E. 1987. Self-efficacy: Implications for organizational behavior and human resource management. ***Academy of Management Review***: 472-485.

Gist, M. E., & Mitchell, T. R. 1992. Self-efficacy: A theoretical analysis of its determinants and malleability. ***Academy of Management Review***: 183-211.

Goldschmied, N., & Vandello, J. A. 2009. The Advantage of Disadvantage: Underdogs in the Political Arena. ***Basic and Applied Social Psychology***, 31(1): 24-31.

Goldschmied, N. P., & Vandello, J. A. 2012. The Future is Bright: The Underdog Label, Availability, and Optimism. ***Basic and Applied Social Psychology***, 34(1): 34-43.

Grant, A., & Patil, S. 2012. Challenging the Norm of Self-Interest: Minority Influence and Transitions to Helping Norms in Work Units. ***Academy of Management Review***: 547-568.

Grant, A. M. 2007. Relational job design and the motivation to make a prosocial difference. ***Academy of Management Review***, 32(2): 393-417.

Grant, A. M. 2008. The significance of task significance: Job performance effects, relational mechanisms, and boundary conditions. ***Journal of Applied Psychology***, 93(1): 108-124.

Grant, A. M., Campbell, E. M., Chen, G., Cottone, K., Lapedis, D., & Lee, K. 2007. Impact and the art of motivation maintenance: The effects of contact with beneficiaries on persistence behavior. ***Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes***, 103(1): 53-67.

Grant, A. M., Gino, F., & Hofmann, D. A. 2011. Reversing the extraverted leadership advantage: The role of employee proactivity. ***Academy of Management Journal***, 54(3): 528-550.

Grant, A. M., & Mayer, D. M. 2009. Good soldiers and good actors: Prosocial and impression management motives as interactive predictors of affiliative citizenship behaviors. ***Journal of Applied Psychology***, 94(4): 900-912.

Grant, A. M., & Parker, S. K. 2009. 7 Redesigning Work Design Theories: The Rise of Relational and Proactive Perspectives. ***The Academy of Management Annals***, 3(1): 317-375.

Grant, A. M., & Schwartz, B. 2011. Too Much of a Good Thing The Challenge and Opportunity of the Inverted U. ***Perspectives on Psychological Science***, 6(1): 61-76.

Grant, A. M., & Wall, T. D. 2009. The Neglected Science and Art of Quasi-Experimentation. ***Organizational Research Methods***, 12(4): 653-686.

Greenberg, J., & Tomlinson, E. C. 2004. Situated experiments in organizations: Transplanting the lab to the field. ***Journal of Management***, 30(5): 703-724.

Haslam, S. A., Powell, C., & Turner, J. 2000. Social Identity, Self-categorization, and Work Motivation: Rethinking the Contribution of the Group to Positive and Sustainable Organisational Outcomes. ***Applied psychology***, 49(3): 319-339.

Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., & Norenzayan, A. 2010. Most people are not WEIRD. ***Nature***, 466(7302): 29.

Higgins, E. T. 1998. Promotion and prevention: Regulatory focus as a motivational principle. ***Advances in experimental social psychology***, 30: 1-46.

Hinds, P. J., & Mortensen, M. 2005. Understanding conflict in geographically distributed teams: The moderating effects of shared identity, shared context, and spontaneous communication. ***Organization Science***: 290-307.

Hogg, M. A., & Terry, D. J. 2000. Social identity and self-categorization processes in organizational contexts. ***Academy of Management Review***: 121-140.

Hollenbeck, J. R., DeRue, D. S., & Mannor, M. 2006. Statistical power and parameter stability when subjects are few and tests are many: Comment on Peterson, Smith, Martorana, and Owens (2003). ***Journal of applied psychology***, 91(1): 1.

Hovland, C. I., Janis, I. L., & Kelley, H. H. 1953. ***Communication and persuasion: Psychological studies of opinion change***: Yale University Press New Haven, CT.

Howe, J. 2006. The rise of crowdsourcing. ***Wired magazine***, 14(6): 1-4.

Humphrey, S. E., Nahrgang, J. D., & Morgeson, F. P. 2007. Integrating motivational, social, and contextual work design features: a meta-analytic summary and theoretical extension of the work design literature. ***Journal of Applied Psychology***, 92(5): 1332-1356.

Ibarra, H. 1992. Homophily and differential returns: Sex differences in network structure and access in an advertising firm. ***Administrative Science Quarterly***, 37: 422-447.

Ibarra, H. 1999. Provisional selves: Experimenting with image and identity in professional adaptation. ***Administrative Science Quarterly***, 44(4): 764-791.

Ibarra, H., & Andrews, S. B. 1993. Power, social influence, and sense making: Effects of network centrality and proximity on employee perceptions. ***Administrative Science Quarterly***: 277-303.

Ilgen, D. R., Fisher, C. D., & Taylor, M. S. 1979. Consequences of individual feedback on behavior in organizations. ***Journal of Applied Psychology***, 64(4): 349-371.

Jamieson, D. W., Lydon, J. E., Stewart, G., & Zanna, M. P. 1987. Pygmalion revisited: New evidence for student expectancy effects in the classroom. ***Journal of Educational Psychology***, 79(4): 461-466.

Joireman, J., Kamdar, D., Daniels, D., & Duell, B. 2006. Good citizens to the end? It depends: empathy and concern with future consequences moderate the impact of a short-term time horizon on organizational citizenship behaviors. ***Journal of Applied Psychology***, 91(6): 1307-1320.

Jost, J. T., Banaji, M. R., & Nosek, B. A. 2004. A decade of system justification theory: Accumulated evidence of conscious and unconscious bolstering of the status quo. ***Political Psychology***, 25(6): 881-919.

Jussim, L. 1986. Self-fulfilling prophecies: A theoretical and integrative review. ***Psychological review***, 93(4): 429-445.

Jussim, L., & Harber, K. D. 2005. Teacher expectations and self-fulfilling prophecies: Knowns and unknowns, resolved and unresolved controversies. ***Personality and Social Psychology Review***, 9(2): 131-155.

Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. 1979. Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. ***Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society***: 263-291.

Kanfer, R., & Ackerman, P. L. 1989. Motivation and cognitive abilities: An integrative/aptitude-treatment interaction approach to skill acquisition. ***Journal of Applied Psychology***, 74(4): 657-690.

Kelley, H. H. 1971. Attribution in social interaction. In E. E. Jones (Ed.), ***Attribution: Perceiving the causes of behavior***. Morristown: General Learning Press.

Kelley, H. H., & Michela, J. L. 1980. Attribution theory and research. ***Annual Review of Psychology***, 31(1): 457-501.

Kierein, N. M., & Gold, M. A. 2000. Pygmalion in work organizations: a meta□analysis. ***Journal of Organizational Behavior***, 21(8): 913-928.

Kilduff, G. J., Elfenbein, H. A., & Staw, B. M. 2010. The psychology of rivalry: A relationally dependent analysis of competition. ***Academy of Management Journal***, 53(5): 943-969.

Kim, J. H., Allison, S. T., Eylon, D., Goethals, G. R., Markus, M. J., Hindle, S. M., & McGuire, H. A. 2008. Rooting for (and then abandoning) the underdog. ***Journal of Applied Social Psychology***, 38(10): 2550-2573.

Koole, S. L., Smeets, K., Van Knippenberg, A., & Dijksterhuis, A. 1999. The cessation of rumination through self-affirmation. ***Journal of personality and social psychology***, 77(1): 111-125.

Kopelman, S., & Berkel, G. 2012. Kukui Nuts, ***Dispute Resolution Center***.

Kray, L. J., Thompson, L., & Galinsky, A. 2001. Battle of the sexes: Gender stereotype confirmation and reactance in negotiations. ***Journal of personality and social psychology***, 80(6): 942-958.

Kruger, J., & Dunning, D. 1999. Unskilled and unaware of it: how difficulties in recognizing one's own incompetence lead to inflated self-assessments. ***Journal of Personality and Social Psychology***, 77(6): 1121-1134.

Kwang, T., & Swann, W. B. 2010. Do people embrace praise even when they feel unworthy? A review of critical tests of self-enhancement versus self-verification. ***Personality and Social Psychology Review***, 14(3): 263-280.

Lake, T. 2012. Did this man really cut Michael Jordan?, ***Sports Illustrated***, Vol. 2012.

Lanaj, K., Chang, C. H., & Johnson, R. E. 2012. Regulatory Focus and Work-Related Outcomes: A Review and Meta-Analysis. ***Psychological Bulletin***: 998-1034.

Laponce, J. A. 1966. An experimental method to measure the tendency to equibalance in a political system. ***The American Political Science Review***, 60(4): 982-993.

Larrick, R. P. 1993. Motivational factors in decision theories: The role of self-protection. ***Psychological Bulletin***, 113(3): 440.

Larrick, R. P., Heath, C., & Wu, G. 2009. Goal-induced risk taking in negotiation and decision making. ***Social Cognition***, 27(3): 342-364.

Lazarus, R. S. 1991. Progress on a cognitive-motivational-relational theory of emotion. ***American psychologist***, 46(8): 819-834.

Leana, C., & Rousseau, D. 2000. Relational Wealth. ***New York, NY: Oxford***.

Leary, M. R. 2007. Motivational and emotional aspects of the self. ***Annual Review of Psychology***, 58: 317-344.

Leary, M. R., & Baumeister, R. F. 2000. The nature and function of self-esteem: Sociometer theory. ***Advances in experimental social psychology***, 32: 1-62.

Lee, F., Edmondson, A. C., Thomke, S., & Worline, M. 2004. The mixed effects of inconsistency on experimentation in organizations. ***Organization Science***, 15(3): 310-326.

Lerner, J. S., & Tetlock, P. E. 1999. Accounting for the effects of accountability. ***Psychological Bulletin***, 125(2): 255-275.

Leung, A. K.-y., Kim, S., Polman, E., Ong, L. S., Qiu, L., Goncalo, J. A., & Sanchez-Burks, J. 2012. Embodied Metaphors and Creative "Acts". ***Psychological Science***, 23(5): 502-509.

Locke, E. A., & Latham, G. P. 1990. ***A theory of goal setting & task performance***. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc.

Locke, E. A., & Latham, G. P. 2002. Building a practically useful theory of goal setting and task motivation: A 35-year odyssey. ***American psychologist***, 57(9): 705-717.

Lykken, D. T. 1968. Statistical significance in psychological research. ***Psychological Bulletin***, 70(3p1): 151-159.

MacKinnon, D. P., Lockwood, C. M., Hoffman, J. M., West, S. G., & Sheets, V. 2002. A comparison of methods to test mediation and other intervening variable effects. ***Psychological methods***, 7(1): 83-104.

Magee, J. C., & Galinsky, A. D. 2008. Social Hierarchy: The Self-Reinforcing Nature of Power and Status. ***The Academy of Management Annals***, 2(1): 351-398.

Mainemelis, C., & Ronson, S. 2006. Ideas are born in fields of play: Towards a theory of play and creativity in organizational settings. ***Research in Organizational Behavior***, 27: 81-131.

Major, B., Quinton, W. J., McCoy, S. K., & Schmader, T. 2000. Reducing prejudice: The target's perspective. In S. Oskamp (Ed.), ***Reducing prejudice and discrimination***: 211-237. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers.

Malhotra, D. 2010. The desire to win: The effects of competitive arousal on motivation and behavior. ***Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes***, 111(2): 139-146.

March, J. G. 1991. Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning. ***Organization Science***, 2(1): 71-87.

Mason, W., & Suri, S. 2012. Conducting behavioral research on Amazon's Mechanical Turk. ***Behavior research methods***, 44(1): 1-23.

McAllister, I., & Studlar, D. T. 1991. Bandwagon, underdog, or projection? Opinion polls and electoral choice in Britain, 1979–1987. ***The Journal of Politics***, 53(03): 720-741.

McFedries, P. 2008. ***The Complete Idiot's Guide to Weird Word Origins***. New York, NY: Penguin Publishing.

McGinnis, L. P., & Gentry, J. W. 2009. Underdog consumption: An exploration into meanings and motives. ***Journal of Business Research***, 62(2): 191-199.

McNatt, D. B. 2000. Ancient Pygmalion joins contemporary management: A meta-analysis of the result. ***Journal of Applied Psychology***, 85(2): 314-322.

McNatt, D. B., & Judge, T. A. 2004. Boundary conditions of the Galatea effect: A field experiment and constructive replication. ***The Academy of Management Journal***: 550-565.

Melwani, S., & Barsade, S. G. 2011. Held in contempt: The psychological, interpersonal, and performance consequences of contempt in a work context. ***Journal of personality and social psychology***, 101(3): 503-520.

Melwani, S., Mueller, J. S., & Overbeck, J. R. 2012. Looking down: The influence of contempt and compassion on emergent leadership categorizations. ***Journal of Applied Psychology***, 97(6): 1171-1185.

Merton, R. K. 1948. The self-fulfilling prophecy. ***The Antioch Review***, 8(2): 193-210.

Metcalf, H. C., & Urwick, L. (Eds.). 1940. ***Dynamic administration: The collected papers of M.P. Follett***. New York: Harper and Brothers.

Milliken, F. J., Morrison, E. W., & Hewlin, P. F. 2003. An Exploratory Study of Employee Silence: Issues that Employees Don't Communicate Upward and Why*. ***Journal of Management Studies***, 40(6): 1453-1476.

Mitchell, T. R., & Daniels, D. 2003. Motivation. In W. C. Borman, D. R. Ilgen, & R. J. Klimoski (Eds.), ***Handbook of psychology, Vol. 12: Industrial and organizational psychology***: 225-254. New York: John Wiley.

Mitchell, T. R., & Silver, W. S. 1990. Individual and group goals when workers are interdependent: Effects on task strategies and performance. ***Journal of applied psychology***, 75(2): 185-193.

Moore, D. A., & Cain, D. M. 2007. Overconfidence and underconfidence: When and why people underestimate (and overestimate) the competition. ***Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes***, 103(2): 197-213.

Moore, D. A., & Healy, P. J. 2008. The trouble with overconfidence. ***Psychological review***, 115(2): 502-517.

Moore, D. A., Oesch, J. M., & Zietsma, C. 2007. What competition? Myopic self-focus in market-entry decisions. ***Organization Science***, 18(3): 440-454.

Morris, M. W., & Keltner, D. 2000. How emotions work: The social functions of emotional expression in negotiations. ***Research in organizational behavior***, 22(1): 1-50.

Murayama, K., & Elliot, A. J. 2012. The competition-performance relation: A meta-analytic review and test of the opposing processes model of competition and performance. ***Psychological Bulletin***, 138(6): 1035-1070.

Nguyen, H. H. D., & Ryan, A. M. 2008. Does stereotype threat affect test performance of minorities and women? A meta-analysis of experimental evidence. ***Journal of Applied Psychology***, 93(6): 1314-1334.

Nussbaum, A. D., & Steele, C. M. 2007. Situational disengagement and persistence in the face of adversity. ***Journal of Experimental Social Psychology***, 43(1): 127-134.

Ordóñez, L. D., Schweitzer, M. E., Galinsky, A. D., & Bazerman, M. H. 2009. Goals gone wild: The systematic side effects of overprescribing goal setting. ***The Academy of Management Perspectives***, 23(1): 6-16.

Oz, S., & Eden, D. 1994. Restraining the Golem: Boosting performance by changing the interpretation of low scores. ***Journal of Applied Psychology***, 79(5): 744-754.

Paharia, N., Keinan, A., Avery, J., & Schor, J. B. 2011. The underdog effect: The marketing of disadvantage and determination through brand biography. ***Journal of Consumer Research***, 37(5): 775-790.

Palfrey, T. R. 2009. Laboratory experiments in political economy. ***Annual Review of Political Science***, 12: 379-388.

Peterson, R. S., Smith, D. B., & Martorana, P. V. 2006. Choosing between a rock and a hard place when data are scarce and the questions important: Reply to Hollenbeck, Derue, and Mannor (2006). ***Journal of Applied Psychology***, 91(1): 6.

Pfeffer, J., & Sutton, R. I. 2006. Evidence-based management. ***Harvard Business Review***, 84(1): 62-75.

Podsakoff, P. M., & Farh, J. L. 1989. Effects of feedback sign and credibility on goal setting and task performance. ***Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes***, 44(1): 45-67.

Porath, C. L., & Bateman, T. S. 2006. Self-regulation: from goal orientation to job performance. ***Journal of Applied Psychology***, 91(1): 185-192.

Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. 2008. Asymptotic and resampling strategies for assessing and comparing indirect effects in multiple mediator models. ***Behavior research methods***, 40(3): 879-891.

Price, R., & Lovka, B. 2000. ***Droodles: The classic collection***: Tallfellow Press.

Radzevick, J. R., & Moore, D. A. 2008. Myopic biases in competitions. ***Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes***, 107(2): 206-218.

Ransford, H. E. 1968. Isolation, powerlessness, and violence: A study of attitudes and participation in the Watts riot. ***American Journal of Sociology***: 581-591.

Reed, M. B., & Aspinwall, L. G. 1998. Self-affirmation reduces biased processing of health-risk information. ***Motivation and Emotion***, 22(2): 99-132.

Reynolds, D. 2007. Restraining Golem and harnessing Pygmalion in the classroom: A laboratory study of managerial expectations and task design. ***Academy of Management Learning & Education***, 6(4): 475-483.

Roberts, L. M. 2005. Changing faces: Professional image construction in diverse organizational settings. ***The Academy of Management Review***: 685-711.

Rosenthal, R. 2002. The Pygmalion effect and its mediating mechanisms. ***Improving academic achievement: Impact of psychological factors on education***: 25-36.

Rosenthal, R., & Jacobson, L. 1968a. Pygmalion in the classroom. ***The Urban Review***, 3(1): 16-20.

Rosenthal, R., & Jacobson, L. F. 1968b. Teacher expectations for the disadvantaged. ***Scientific American***, 218(4): 19-23.

Rousseau, D., & Van Der Veen, A. M. 2005. The Emergence of a Shared Identity. ***Journal of Conflict Resolution***, 49(5): 686-712.

Rusli, E. 2008. Gates: Great to be an underdog, ***Forbes.com***, Vol. 2013.

Salancik, G. R., & Pfeffer, J. 1978. A social information processing approach to job attitudes and task design. ***Administrative science quarterly***: 224-253.

Scheepers, D. 2009. Turning social identity threat into challenge: Status stability and cardiovascular reactivity during inter-group competition. ***Journal of Experimental Social Psychology***, 45(1): 228-233.

Scheepers, D., & Ellemers, N. 2005. When the pressure is up: The assessment of social identity threat in low and high status groups. ***Journal of Experimental Social Psychology***, 41(2): 192-200.

Scheepers, D., Spears, R., Doosje, B., & Manstead, A. S. 2006. Diversity in in-group bias: structural factors, situational features, and social functions. ***Journal of personality and social psychology***, 90(6): 944-960.

Schmader, T. 2010. Stereotype threat deconstructed. ***Current Directions in Psychological Science***, 19(1): 14-18.

Scholer, A. A., Zou, X., Fujita, K., Stroessner, S. J., & Higgins, E. T. 2010. When risk seeking becomes a motivational necessity. ***Journal of personality and social psychology***, 99(2): 215-231.

Schweitzer, M. E., Ordonez, L., & Douma, B. 2004. Goal Setting as a Motivator of Unethical Behavior. ***Academy of Management Journal***, 47(3): 422-432.

Scott, S. G., & Bruce, R. A. 1994. Determinants of innovative behavior: A path model of individual innovation in the workplace. ***Academy of Management Journal***, 37(3): 580-607.

Sedikides, C., & Strube, M. J. 1997. Self-evaluation: To thine own self be good, to thine own self be sure, to thine own self be true, and to thine own self be better. ***Advances in experimental social psychology***, 29: 209-269.

Sherman, D. K., & Cohen, G. L. 2006. The psychology of self-defense: Self-affirmation theory. ***Advances in experimental social psychology***, 38: 183-242.

Shipp, A. J., Edwards, J. R., & Lambert, L. S. 2009. Conceptualization and measurement of temporal focus: The subjective experience of the past, present, and future. ***Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes***, 110(1): 1-22.

Shogren, J. F., & Baik, K. H. 1992. Favorites and underdogs: Strategic behavior in an experimental contest. ***Public Choice***, 74(2): 191-205.

Simon, H. A. 1954. Bandwagon and underdog effects and the possibility of election predictions. ***Public Opinion Quarterly***, 18(3): 245-253.

Singleton, R., & Straits, B. 1999. ***Approaches to Social Research***. New York: Oxford Press.

Sitkin, S. B., & Pablo, A. L. 1992. Reconceptualizing the determinants of risk behavior. ***Academy of Management Review***: 9-38.

Skinner, N., & Brewer, N. 2002. The dynamics of threat and challenge appraisals prior to stressful achievement events. ***Journal of personality and social psychology***, 83(3): 678-692.

Sleesman, D. J., Conlon, D. E., McNamara, G., & Miles, J. E. 2012. Cleaning Up the Big Muddy: A Meta-Analytic Review of the Determinants of Escalation of Commitment. ***Academy of Management Journal***, 55(3): 541-562.

Small, D. A., Gelfand, M., Babcock, L., & Gettman, H. 2007. Who goes to the bargaining table? The influence of gender and framing on the initiation of negotiation. ***Journal of personality and social psychology***, 93(4): 600-613.

Spreitzer, G., Sutcliffe, K., Dutton, J., Sonenshein, S., & Grant, A. M. 2005. A socially embedded model of thriving at work. ***Organization Science***: 537-549.

St. Peter, A. 2010. ***The greatest quotations of all-time***: Xlibris, Corp.

Stanne, M. B., Johnson, D. W., & Johnson, R. T. 1999. Does competition enhance or inhibit motor performance: A meta-analysis. ***Psychological Bulletin***, 125(1): 133-154.

Staw, B. M. 1981. The escalation of commitment to a course of action. ***Academy of Management Review***: 577-587.

Staw, B. M. 1984. Organizational behavior: A review and reformulation of the field's outcome variables. ***Annual Review of Psychology***, 35(1): 627-666.

Staw, B. M., & Ross, J. 1987. Behavior in escalation situations: Antecedents, prototypes, and solutions. ***Research in organizational behavior***: 39-78.

Staw, B. M., & Ross, J. 1989. Understanding behavior in escalation situations. ***Science***, 246(4927): 216-220.

Steele, C. M. 1988. The psychology of self-affirmation: Sustaining the integrity of the self. ***Advances in experimental social psychology***, 21: 261-302.

Steele, C. M. 1997. A threat in the air: How stereotypes shape intellectual identity and performance. ***American psychologist***, 52(6): 613-629.

Steele, C. M., & Aronson, J. 1995. Stereotype threat and the intellectual test performance of African Americans. ***Journal of Personality and Social Psychology***, 69(5): 797-811.

Steele, C. M., & Liu, T. J. 1983. Dissonance processes as self-affirmation. ***Journal of personality and social psychology***, 45(1): 5-19.

Steele, C. M., Spencer, S. J., & Aronson, J. 2002. Contending with group image: The psychology of stereotype and social identity threat. ***Advances in experimental social psychology***, 34: 379-440.

Stewart, W. H., & Roth, P. L. 2001. Risk propensity differences between entrepreneurs and managers: A meta-analytic review. ***Journal of Applied Psychology***, 86(1): 145-153.

Swann, W. B. 1987. Identity negotiation: Where two roads meet. ***Journal of Personality and Social Psychology***, 53(6): 1038-1051.

Swann, W. B., & Bosson, J. K. 2008. Identity negotiation: A theory of self and social interaction. In O. P. John, R. W. Robins, & L. A. Pervin (Eds.), ***Handbook of personality: Theory and research (3rd ed.)***: 448-471. New York, NY: Guilford Press.

Swann, W. B., Johnson, R. E., & Bosson, J. K. 2009. Identity negotiation at work. ***Research in Organizational Behavior***, 29: 81-109.

Swann, W. B., Rentfrow, P. J., & Guinn, J. S. 2003. Self-verification: The search for coherence. ***Handbook of self and identity***: 367-383.

Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. 1986. The social identity theory of inter-group behavior. In S. Worchel (Ed.), ***Psychology of intergroup relations***. Chicago: Nelson Hall.

Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. 1979. An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin, & S. Worschel (Eds.), ***The social psychology of intergroup relations***: 33-47.

Tausch, N., Becker, J. C., Spears, R., Christ, O., Saab, R., Singh, P., & Siddiqui, R. N. 2011. Explaining radical group behavior: Developing emotion and efficacy routes to normative and nonnormative collective action. ***Journal of personality and social psychology***, 101(1): 129-148.

Terwiesch, C., & Ulrich, K. T. 2009. ***Innovation tournaments: Creating and selecting exceptional opportunities***. Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press.

Tesser, A. 1988. Toward a self-evaluation maintenance model of social behavior. ***Advances in experimental social psychology***, 21: 181-228.

Thompson, R. J., Payne, S. C., Horner, M. T., & Morey, L. C. 2011. Why borderline personality features adversely affect job performance: The role of task strategies. ***Personality and Individual Differences***.

Tierney, P., & Farmer, S. M. 2004. The Pygmalion process and employee creativity. ***Journal of Management***, 30(3): 413-432.

Triplett, N. 1898. The dynamogenic factors in pacemaking and competition. ***American journal of psychology***, 9(4): 507-533.

Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D., & Wetherell, M. S. 1987. ***Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory***: Basil Blackwell.

Turner, L. A., & Johnson, B. 2003. A model of mastery motivation for at-risk preschoolers. ***Journal of Educational Psychology***, 95(3): 495-505.

Van Knippenberg, D. 2000. Work motivation and performance: A social identity perspective. ***Applied psychology***, 49(3): 357-371.

Vandello, J. A., Goldschmied, N. P., & Richards, D. A. R. 2007. The appeal of the underdog. ***Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin***, 33(12): 1603-1616.

Vroom, V. H. 1964. ***Work and motivation***. Oxford: Wiley.

Weinstein, R. S., Marshall, H. H., Sharp, L., & Botkin, M. 1987. Pygmalion and the student: Age and classroom differences in children's awareness of teacher expectations. ***Child development***: 1079-1093.

Weiss, H. M., & Rupp, D. E. 2011. Experiencing Work: An Essay on a Person□Centric Work Psychology. ***Industrial and Organizational Psychology***, 4(1): 83-97.

Welsh, D., & Ordonez, L. forthcoming. Conscience without cognition: The effects of subconscious priming on ethical behavior. ***Academy of Management Journal***.

White, R. W. 1959. Motivation reconsidered: The concept of competence. ***Psychological Review***, 66(5): 297-333.

Wicklund, R. A., & Gollwitzer, P. M. 1982. ***Symbolic self-completion***: L. Erlbaum Associates.

Wood, J. V. 1996. What is social comparison and how should we study it? ***Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin***, 22(5): 520-537.

Wood, R., Kakebeeke, B., Debowski, S., & Frese, M. 2001. The impact of enactive exploration on intrinsic motivation, strategy, and performance in electronic search. ***Applied psychology***, 49(2): 263-283.

Wright, S. C., Taylor, D. M., & Moghaddam, F. M. 1990. Responding to membership in a disadvantaged group: From acceptance to collective protest. ***Journal of personality and social psychology***, 58(6): 994-1003.

Yerkes, R. M., & Dodson, J. D. 1908. The relation of strength of stimulus to rapidity of habit-formation. ***Journal of Comparative Neurology and Psychology***, 18(5): 459-482.

Zajonc, R. B. 1965. Social facilitation. ***Science***, 149(3681): 269-274.