Anger (Mis)Management? Racial Differences in the Emotional

Foundations of Political Action

by

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Dedication

This is for Uncle Ro.

You left me big shoes.

I'm still trying to fill them.

Go Knicks.

Acknowledgements

A Letter to myself at the beginning to the journey, written from me the end of the journey.

It's harder than you'll think it will be, this journey you're beginning. You need to know that. You'll be stretched beyond what you thought were your limits. You'll have to think bigger, and think more precisely. You'll need to speak and write with more clarity, more purpose, more imagination.

You'll try to dig deeper into yourself, to extract some idea, some knowledge, some skill set buried deep within yourself, just waiting to be uncovered by you in a grand, isolated act of introspection. The tortured genius who thinks alone at night.

This will be a foolish move. God makes Michigan your wilderness moment. This is where you learn to endure. To persevere to the end. To walk along a path not guided by a road map or compass, but by faith alone, looking to God each morning for the sustaining bread of life until you finally reach the end of the journey. You've got to trek through the wilderness.

But you won't walk it alone. Look out for the following people. Listen to them. Respond to them. Care for them. Cherish them. Thank God for them. They're your manna from Heaven, giving you sustenance when you've lost your strength. They're drinks of water replenishing you under the desert sun. They're the pillars you lean on to help you along the path.

It starts here, with the faculty in the department and the Ford School, people modeling for you the commitment to diligence, excellence, and grace needed to excel in the field. Mary Corcoran. She will be your biggest cheerleader, from the moment she calls you at home in Virginia to let you know you've been accepted into the program. Her course on poverty will shape your thinking for years to come. Rick Hall. An early and consistent advocate of your work. You'll marvel at his casual genius in both thinking through complex, abstract models of Congressional behavior, and his smooth ability to

make them concrete and graspable for his audience. Take notes. Ann Lin. She will challenge you to extend the limits of how rigorously you think. She'll also push you to consider the question—and the means to answer it—from more angles than you did before. She will bring her unique brand of expertise to bear on your committee and leave an indelible mark on your dissertation. Nancy Burns. She will provide affirmation of your dissertation work when you are in most need of it. She's going to challenge you, as well, to better integrate what you're saying to what has already been said, to more effectively situate what you're saying as a continuation of an ongoing scholarly discourse—one to which she has made such vital contributions. Ted Brader. He will have an unrivaled impact on your graduate education, exposing you in class to many of the ideas and lines of inquiry that will shape your research agenda for the next decade. He will cultivate your development as a rigorous scholar, employing helpful critiques to sharpen your toolset, and slowly weeding out the cheekiness in you. He will also send out the occasional life raft check-in email, ensuring you don't drift too far away from the island. Vince Hutchings. Your advisor, most influential mentor, and model of how a black man can thrive in the academy by staying one step ahead (at least) of the critics and naysayers— all while seeming to actually enjoy the life. It's going to matter a ton for you to see this. He will be your toughest critic and your most ardent champion. Both of these are critically important, but you'll only be able to appreciate both when you look back at the end. He's playing the role of the skeptic to make you stronger. To keep you one step ahead. He's invaluable. Thank him by paying it forward. And enjoy the basketball talk.

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Maxwell, Xinyan Mitchell, Deepali Stark, and especially Carmen McCallum and Noor Ali. When your graduate journey begins to drift asunder, and you are most in need help to bring you ashore, it is these folks you will credit for extending the life raft. None more so than Adrienne Dessel. From the your drive to Brooklyn, Michigan for the training retreat, all the way through the post-defense celebratory lunch, Adrienne will be a valued confidant, excellent model of teaching, and wonderful mentor and advocate for you. She leaves a uniquely remarkable impact on you at a most critical time in your development as a scholar and person.

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cherished friends. In Matt Alemu you'll find someone with whom you can reflect on the shared experience of being raised by a single mother, the limitations and opportunities offered by the academic life, and the merits of the triangle versus motion offenses. You'll spend countless hours in the janitor's closet-converted-GSI office frantically preparing for discussion sections and getting to know Nathan Kalmoe. Nathan will grow to be someone you both admire as a scholar and appreciate as a close friend, confidant, and source of inspiration and ideas. His sincerity and commitment to his values will constantly move you. Chinbo Chong will be someone whose spiritual fortitude, faith and grace will inspire you to remain true to your own convictions. Nam Kim will be the rare friend that you can share just about all of your favorite hobbies with—from watching Will Ferrell and comic book movies to watching NBA games to playing NBA 2K13. Cherish this while it lasts, because you won't find this in anyone else. Every minute of laughter, b-ball, and dining on low-responsibility, high satisfaction food with Nam will make up for every minute spent agonizing over coursework and prelims. Keep the controllers PS3 charged and keep the BBQ wings thawed. Vanessa Cruz will become a valued friend almost from the moment she enters the program. Her effervescence, boldness, diligence and passion for serving others will motivate you and draw out your best. You'll especially appreciate her prayers and spiritual support, all the way through the day of your defense. Finally, Spencer Piston will evolve from a research collaborator to a hilarious storyteller, fellow movie critic (and recommender of great films), dutiful soldier in the battle against Chimera in Endurance (or Resistance, or whatever that game is called), and unbeatable conference hotel suitemate. Most of all, he becomes a valued confidant and truly loyal friend.

You will form bonds with a handful of graduate students that cross the bounds of friendship and become familial. You'll look one to another for the sustenance to survive the journey during the dark turns. That's why this collective will be labeled *We All We Got*. LaToya Branch, Jen Maddox, and Shayla Griffin will give you plenty of moments worth celebrating. Kyla McMullen may be the funniest person you'll meet. She'll also bring such creativity and ingenuity into your life, from staging friend-terventions to leading "Beat It" choreography sessions to being a creative force behind *Grad School*

Musical. Andrea Benjamin will bring authenticity, humor and good musical tastes to every interaction—ideal qualities for a friend. Mark your calendar for any event hosted or coordinated by Ashley Reid-Brown. She's got an amazing skill for transforming another ordinary Ann Arbor evening into an unforgettable experience. In Menna Demessie you will encounter a friend with limitless capacity to do awe inspiring things. She excels at so much with a heart full of humility and love—scholarship, policy advocacy, artistic expression, stand-up routines—she's a true renaissance woman who brings such joy and flavor into your life. Some of your deepest, most meaningful, most illuminating interactions will take place with Maria Johnson. You forge a bond with her that runs deep, and the ways you connect run with her run the gamut from navigating family life in the south to carving out space to make valuable contributions to the collective well-being of black folk, to teasing out the deeper meaning in the original Spider-man movies. Finally, Kenyatha Loftis. Someone who constantly touches your mind, your heart and your soul. She gives you the space to be your true self in her presence, while simultaneously empowering you to be better than you thought your best self could be. You'll hope to be able to repay her a fraction of the kindness, love and support she's shows you over the years.

There are three people from this collective who enter the political science program right alongside you. Together you'll name yourselves the *Fantastic Four*, and over the years you'll forge an unbreakable bond over sleepless nights spent in the CAP lab frantically completing problem sets, hours of band practice via Guitar Hero, and countless lunch breaks spent searching in vain for $6 burgers. Tonya Rice, LaFleur Stephens and Keith Veal will be better than the siblings you could've hoped for. Tonya will always draw from a wellspring of enthusiasm and ambition that is infectious. She manages to keep the two of you in good spirits even as you find yourselves driving across eastern Michigan as part of an ill-conceived ballot project. She is and forever will be your friend, teammate, and undisputed reigning Scene-It co-champion. LaFleur will be your model of how to get by in the joint program. She will display a grace and adeptness at navigating the system, even as she cries "down with" it. Often times you will rely on her and only her for a shared perspective on the ridiculousness the two of you encounter. The

two of you will provide mutual assurances that yes, indeed everyone around you two has lost their minds; and no, the two of you haven't also lost yours…at least not yet. She will be the much needed gravity that keeps you from losing your standing and floating off into the ether, again and again. She'll also be your partner for Nas concerts and closely contested Pistons games (during the blessedly short period before the Pistons fall off the map). Keith will be your number one partner in crime, accompanying you on spontaneous trips for orange chicken and buy 2, get 1 free movie & game deals. Much of the pent up stress and anxiety cultivated in your traversal of the department will only fuel your epic video game campaigns with Keith. Whether ripping through hairpin turns in an Aston Martin (he'll know the color) narrowly evading the cops in hot pursuit, forming an ultimate alliance as Thor and Spidey to save the world from its greatest villains, or pairing up as heroes in a half shell to play a game of stick ball, some of your greatest pleasures in Michigan will come right next to Keith on the couch. And some of your most incredulous laughs will come from his random texts. Long live the Fantastic Four. 4ever.

There are more than a few organizations that will serve as your entryway to special people with special impacts on your life. Before grad school even begins, it starts with the Ralph Bunche Summer Institute. Your fellow "Bunchees" and graduate teaching assistants will all help foment your initial passion and aptitude for social science scholarship. Paula McClain in particular will be an absolutely vital early influence, as well as an opener of doors for you. Once you enter grad school, you'll have the Summer Institute, where you get to know members of the Fantastic Four and WAWG, as well as good friends such as Jude Yew, and Damon Young, Ashley Evans Taylor, Sarah Jackson and Teresa Granillo, better known as AST-D^2. It will feel nice to hang with the cool kids.

Your experiences serving the community through SCOR will be altogether rewarding, frustrating and humbling. The experience will teach you the kind of fortitude, humility and heart you need to truly have an impact for your people, and the people with whom you stand in solidarity. Along the way you will learn much from the effective leadership styles of Brighid Dwyer, Sharon Lee and Courtney Cogburn. You will also find that the bulk of responsibility for your success as president falls on the shoulders of your executive board, particularly April Patterson, the definition of a go-getter, Ramon

Stern, whose intellect and work ethic is exceeded only by his compassion and sincerity, and Jennifer Yim, an incredibly effective thinker who makes every endeavor of which she's a part an unqualified success. Finally, SCOR will connect you to an array of people who inspire with their brightness, move with their kindness, and motivate you with their passion. There's too many to list, but pay special attention to Fernando Rodriguez and Annie Ro. The two of them will come to mean very much to you as friends due to their outpouring of love, fellowship and support, especially as you prepare for the transition from Ann Arbor to Irvine. Fern and Annie also connect you to a real life-changer, but more on that later.

The organization with the most dynamic and substantive impact on you is simply a group of guys who gather in a meeting room on campus every Tuesday evening. Men of Valor. Men with an understanding of the times, who know what ought to be done. Men who will come together to read the word, pray and fellowship together. Men who will teach you the true meaning of brotherhood. You will thank God every day for them, for more than anyone else, they constantly remind you that you are not traveling this journey alone. When the terrain gets especially rough, and when the burden feels too heavy to carry, these are the brothers on which you lean.

Jamaal Matthews had the vision to plant this group. I bet he couldn't have imagined the force for good it's been in the lives of the men who have truly invested in it. Jamaal manages to be diligent and somber in his commitment to leadership and spiritual discipleship, while still managing to showcase a wry, observational humor that makes him relatable to you. You'll admire him without feeling distant from him, allowing you to forge a friendship with him that is nourishing and edifying. In your two-man-team time with Chris Shults, you'll get to know a man who models commitment to God, family and excellence above all else. His open sharing from his own experiences will teach you so much in those sessions that you couldn't learn anywhere else. Travis Tatum will disarm you with an unparalleled sincerity and challenge you with his unique perspective. Gary Woulard will be living proof that one can be ambitious and career minded without sacrificing devotion to God or family. Michael Logue, who will enter his program in 2005 right alongside you, will model the kind of perseverance and never say die attitude

that you'll need to cultivate in your own right to get through the program—just as he did his, in spite of the pitfalls. And he'll provide no shortage of good conversation. Memie Ezike will be a tried and true friend. He has an undeniable taste for adventure and exploration, which leads to some of your most memorable Michigan moments. But what truly sets him apart is his authenticity and his passion for being a difference maker. He wears his heart on his sleeve. Jeremy Brown is the definition of a stand-up guy, an understated and incredibly valuable quality in a friend. He's dependable and good humored, and he makes a perfect pairing with the aforementioned Ashley. Brandon Pitts has an enthusiastic compassion and positive demeanor that is on full display in every interaction you'll have with him. Michael Alexander is an unbelievably faithful friend, whose gentle demeanor (and *always* fresh cut) belies a true fire burning inside him. Coach Mike does great things and will do continue to do great things, because he accepts nothing less than greatness form himself. When you're in his presence, you can't help but up your effort. Finally, Olubenga Olumolade. Your presence in Ann Arbor will become so entwined with Gbenga's that whenever people see one of you on your own, the first thing they ask is where the other one is. This will frustrate you both to no end. But it is reflective of how close the two of you become on this journey. From traversing downtown Ann Arbor in complementary blazers (NOT *matching*—just complementary), to overselling dance moves to crowds all too eager to reenact a "House Party" moment, to engaging in deep conversation late into the night at Denny's, to arguing over everything from hashtag activism and the utility of black public intellectuals to "The Decision" by LeBron James, you and Gbenga definitely run tight. He holds a special position as a brother to you within the Brotherhood. The two of you become each other's cross bearers. You share in the afflictions. You share in the heartache. You share in the triumphs, few and far between as they seem to come. And you share incredulous laughs at the randomness taking place in Trotter, on ESPN's talking head shows, or in your own lives. As you near the end of your journey through grad school, you anticipate with faith and thanksgiving his coming to a near end as well. Dust off the old blazer.

 1 Peter 2:17. *Honor all men. Love the brotherhood.* Men like these are easy to honor. Brothers like these are easy to love.

Now pay extra attention to this part. November 2008 will change your life. Not because of the election, although that *is* a big deal. This month will change your life because at Café Habana on a typical autumn evening in Ann Arbor, you'll meet Adriana Aldana. The woman who will eventually make you thank God every morning you get to wake up beside her. The woman with whom you'll spend the rest of your life.

After a few weeks of hanging out, you'll laugh when you ask what she wants to do with her life and she replies without missing a beat "just keep doin' what I do." You'll be charmed and a bit taken back by the raw confidence she exudes. But the moment lingers with you. Hold on. Soon enough you'll want to devote everything you've got to supporting her as she does what she do, so to speak.

It may sound like a bit much right now, but the moment will come when Adri becomes essential—indeed vital—to your completion of this graduate journey. Foremost, she models the diligence, perseverance and humility needed to endure the dissertation process, and she does it with a grace at which you can only marvel. When you find yourself in the 11th hour, staring at a white computer screen scrambling to make sense of that mediating effect from the experiment data, you'll say a prayer and think of how Adri got through it. Be grateful that she allowed you to share in her journey. In so many ways, it paved the way for you to complete yours.

But she gives you so much more than that. She opens you up to new experiences and tastes. She dares you to challenge yourself. She encourages you to give more of yourself. Simply put, she extracts the best out of you. And you reap so many of the benefits. The sushi. The transformative IGR experience. Broadening your circle of close friends to include the group affectionately known as *The Townies*—Mina & Ari, Nicole, Shayna, Charles and Laura, Adrienne and Janelle, and Becca and Bel. And then there's Nena. I say with conviction that only Adriana Aldana could make you a dog person.

Adriana is the gateway that connects you to some of your favorite things, favorite people, and your favorite qualities about yourself. As if that's not enough, she is legitimately hilarious. Absolutely beautiful. Ridiculously smart. A culinary genius. And a little off-kilter…in a sometimes charming, sometimes super-sweet, sometimes mysterious kind of way. These things become evident early on in your first few dates (which she

remains adamant weren't *really* dates, but hold firm; you're right on this. Just maybe don't spend too much time working on choreographed dance moves with your friends). And as you spend more time with her, you'll become aware that with Adri, the whole adds up to something even greater than the sum of its incredible parts.

You'll count yourself richly blessed and highly favored of God to ultimately bring Adriana into your family upon the conclusion of your Michigan journey. In a way, this brings things full circle, because your journey ultimately begins with family. With the love, adoration and chastisement of your godparents, Mrs. Gloria and Mr. Smith, who have been positive forces in your life from year 1. The warmth and affection of your Auntie Ann, and your cousins Gina and Neete. The auspices of Grandma and the example set by your Uncle Ro, who both continue to look down on you from Heaven. The shepherding in your youth by Pastors Jeff and Carol at The Agape House. The continued shepherding into your adulthood by Bishop Fransisco and Pastor Nat at C3. The Christ-like care and affection shown by Mother Naomi, and the valued friendship of Nicole Francisco.

And finally, there's mom. You already know that God smiled on you when He entrusted you to her. And you'll continue to feel His smile and her presence as you endure the journey. For this Michigan journey began long before you enrolled in the program. This journey began with you and her. When she cradled you in your lap and taught you to read at 3. When she rose every morning before the sun, put on her fatigues and put in sweat equity for Uncle Sam so you would never be in lack. When she imposed a strict no-TV policy (with the exception of Knick games) during your senior year in high school, so you would devote time to applying for college and scholarships. When she first comes to visit in Michigan and the two of you spend the entire time in Target and Home Goods, so she can redecorate your studio apartment to make it feel more like home. And when she threatens, on numerous occasions, to fly down to Michigan and personally kick somebody's butt whenever you vented about your struggles. Time and again throughout your journey, she'll prove herself to be the absolute, unequivocal best. As I stand on the other side of this journey today, I can only think of a fitting Dark Knight quote for her

(that's an amazing movie that comes out in 2008—yet another great thing happening in 08). She isn't always the mom you deserve, but she's always the one you need.

Everyone I list here—and a few not listed here but not far from my heart—is a part of your journey, and owns a piece of this accomplishment. You will forever be in their debt.

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Abstract

Messaging that communicates policy threats—that is, signals of developments in the political environment that will restrict or deny a valued political good—are a constant element of American discourse. The understanding shared by practitioners and scholars alike is that these policy threat messages will propel people to take up political action by making them "mad as hell" over the prospect of the relevant loss. This notion makes intuitive sense, and it is supported by a myriad of political studies.

But I argue that policy threat cues are not effective at stimulating political action across all groups. Existing work exploring the linkage of emotion and behavior has not fully contended with the influential role played by race in determining how individuals respond to cues of policy threat in the political environment. This project aims to fill what I argue is a gap in the literature. I use affective intelligence and cognitive appraisal theories as frameworks for understanding how receipt of varying cues can engender distinct affective and behavioral responses. Integrating this literature with the work on black attitudes, I theorize that the respective interpretative lenses employed by blacks and whites to inform their broader perceptions of the political system—and their respective roles within it—inform and constrain their emotional responses to cues of policy threat in a systematically distinct manner.

Informed by the tenets of American liberalism, the modal ideological worldview of white Americans breeds a sense of personal agency and belief that the political system

is responsive to citizen input. From this broader disposition arises the immediate appraisal of policy threat cues that engenders anger. This anger consequently propels whites to take political action in response to the threat. In contrast, the black ideological narratives shaping the general worldview of African Americans breed an overarching skepticism regarding the responsiveness of the system to the collective demands of blacks.

I conceptualize this skepticism as racial resignation, and argue it has the potential to constrain the response of blacks to policy cues in one of two ways. One, racial resignation can be primed by the threat cue and suppress anger from being aroused among blacks in the first place. Alternately, resignation can be activated after anger has already been aroused. Once activated, this resignation overrides the mobilizing effects of anger by signaling to the threat cue recipient the ineffectiveness of his potential action. Whether racial resignation inhibits the emergence of anger among blacks or its positive effect on action post-emergence, the subsequent effect is the same. African Americans will not take up greater action in response to the policy threat, leading to a critical participation disparity relative to whites. In essence, anger has been mismanaged as a mobilizing force for African Americans in the policy sphere. Going further, I argue the same racialized ideological worldview that causes anger to be mismanaged among African Americans also make blacks more responsive to cues of policy opportunity relative to whites.

I conduct two studies exploring whether racial differences emerge in individuals' responsiveness to cues of policy threat and opportunity. Of particular note is how anger is operating differently for each group. Neither study allows for tests of the precise

mechanism through which black and white Americans register varying responses to policy threat and opportunity messages. Nevertheless, they uncover compelling trends that raise critical questions informing future inquiry, and furthering the development of the theory introduced here.

Study 1 consists of analysis of American National Election Studies (ANES) data between the years 1980 and 2008. Analyzing a sample of white and black self-identified Democrats under a climate of policy threat, I find strong evidence of an anger deficit on the part of the black Democratic respondents. Despite expressing more pessimistic assessments of the national economy and greater disapproval of incumbents during these threat years, black Democrats are significantly *less likely* than their white Democratic counterparts to express anger toward the incumbent. Black Democrats also exhibit a positive hope differential relative to white Democrats, but such expressions of hope do not translate to political activity nearly as effectively as do expressions of anger—for either group. Overall, this study produces evidence consistent with the notion that blacks' worldview inhibits the arousal of anger in response to policy threat cues.

Study 2 is a survey experiment conducted in the Detroit metro area from May 2013 to May 2014. The data from the experiment revealed black subjects were just as likely as white subjects to express anger when exposed to the threat condition, if not more so. Yet, black subjects' anger exhibited a null effect on their political action across most model specifications. In contrast, anger engendered among white subjects was a strong motivator of their participation. Finally, black subjects were most effectively mobilized by feelings of satisfaction, which produced a null effect on the participation of white

subjects. Overall, the experiment yielded evidence suggestive of race differences emerging not in the arousal of anger, but in its mobilizing effects on action.

In sum, the studies suggest more than one pathway through which race constrains the translation of emotional responses—particularly anger—to political action in response to cues of policy change. Together, they serve as key building blocks in the construction of a theory of racialized emotional and behavioral responses to policy cues. This theory provides critical illumination of the manner in which the narratives attached to relevant social group identifications such as one's race influence how individuals navigate their political environment.

This project offers valuable contributions to a number of scholarly fields. It adds to an ongoing discourse in the emotions field regarding of how both immediate and longstanding cognitive perceptions of the environment intersect with affect to govern people's emotional and behavioral responses to policy cues. It highlights how race influences political behavior, not by serving as a proxy for resource disparities, but rather by acting as a heuristic tool actively communicating signals to individuals about the utility of their action. Finally, this work adds meaningfully to political communications literature by exploring the means through which two groups can have dramatically different responses to the same messaging.

More broadly, this project has something of note to contribute to the exploration of American politics both empirically and normatively. The mismanagement of anger as a mobilizing force among African Americans constitutes a potential barrier to participation in precisely the times during which black Americans may be most

vulnerable. Finding ways to eradicate this barrier, through identifying either the conditions in which anger consistently animates black action, or the alternative emotions that mobilize African Americans, is a critical step in alleviating racial participation disparities in key policy domains. Scholars and practitioners alike who are concerned with the challenge of mobilizing members of politically vulnerable groups to advance their interests in the polity should find value in the insight yielded by this project.

Chapter 1

Introduction

"I'm mad as hell and I'm not going to take this anymore!" This quote from the classic 1976 satire film *Network* continues to hold iconic status in mainstream American discourse. While often invoked in tongue-in-cheek fashion, it undeniably primes an image that resonates within the American narrative—one of everyday people, fueled by indignation stemming from failed expectations, rising up to challenge a system plagued by injustice and bureaucratic inefficiency.

This image of the American body politic being stirred to action by a sense of indignation also resonates with an emergent body of empirical work in political behavior. Responding to Campbell's (2003, p. 29) charge that "issue motivation deserves greater attention" in studies of citizen participation, numerous scholars have begun examining the relationship between people's perceptions of the political environment, their feelings about prospective changes to that environment, and their subsequent patterns of behavior. The findings from these studies appear to reach a consensus that when people are angered by perceived threats in the political environment, they will be motivated to take up political action to counteract the threat. This work suggests, therefore, that getting people "mad as hell" over a political issue is an effective means of mobilizing them for political action.

A number of empirical works have revealed a linkage between facing a threat of material or political loss and increased political action. Examining longitudinal trends

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in the volume of letters written by senior citizens to Congress, Campbell (2003) finds that public Congressional deliberations of cuts to Social Security are consistently met with surges in letters. Miller and Krosnick (2004) conduct an experiment in which they alter the content of letters soliciting donations and volunteer time from Ohio-area members of NARAL. Members receiving letters highlighting the threat of undesirable policy change on reproductive rights made financial contributions to NARAL at significantly higher rates than did those who received letters highlighting opportunities for desirable policy changes. Finally, work by Valentino, Gregorowicz and Groenendyk (2009) and Valentino, Brader, Groenendyk, Gregorowicz, and Hutchings (2011) provides evidence that anger is the emotional state translating perception of threat to increased political action. Among people facing the prospect of the un-favored partisan winning the presidential election, those who respond with anger are generally more likely to take up political action than those who express other emotions—notably fear.

These studies employ various operationalizations of the threats in the political environment that motivate increased citizen action. But a common theme can be discerned in their underlying conceptualization of the threat. Whether the threat under examination is the prospect of loss of social security benefits, restrictions on reproductive rights, or more broadly a four-year period during which the national political climate is adverse to the individual's policy preferences, it carries the risk of loss of something currently (or formerly possessed) by the individual that he values, feels entitled to, and believes is conferred or denied by the political system.

These *political goods* relate to individuals' material, physiological and mental well-being. Thus, people take seriously the prospect of these goods being diminished or

removed at the hands of key actors and institutions within the political environment. Indeed, much of the policy output from all levels of government can be conceptualized as either preserving, expanding or restricting access to such political goods for various factions of the populace.

I conceptualize as *policy threats* the prospect of changes to the policy environment that carry the risk of restricting or denying a valued political good to a relevant population. Policy threats are to be distinguished from other types of threats—particularly threats to life and limb. The risk of suffering physical harm at the hands of an entity (regardless of whether that entity is sanctioned by or affiliated with the state, i.e. police and military officers, or outside the bounds of the state, i.e. terrorism) carries a different type of visceral resonance and set of calculations than the risk of suffering loss to a political good (see Gadarian 2010 for examination of how terror threat influences citizen political thinking).

The imposition of threat to one's physical well-being is generally expected to engender fear among people. Their enhanced sense of vulnerability precludes them from engaging in most forms of political action (Gadarian 2010; Marcus, Neuman and Mackeun 2000). In contrast, policy threats, which emphasize the potential loss of political goods, carry the potential to motivate people to take up political action. It is policy threats that are most commonly found in political discourse.

Examples of such communications are highlighted in the three figures below. Each image is intended to mobilize political action among the target audience by: (1) highlighting a relevant threat to them, (2) identifying or implying the actor within the

policy environment who is the source of the threat, and (3) suggesting the proper course of action for counteracting the threat.

Figure 1.1

The mailer shown in Figure 1.1 above has an intended audience of Republican identifiers. It highlights the threat of a policy landscape dominated by Democratic members of Congress—one in which the interests of Republicans are so subjugated they cannot even recognize their own country. While certainly dramatic, this threat indeed carries resonance for partisans in a political environment increasingly characterized by inter-party hostility and zero-sum competition for influence. Finally, the mailer suggests the course of action to stave off the threat it invokes—registering to vote in the upcoming election.

Figure 1.2 below invokes a more specific threat while pinpointing an individual political actor as the source of the threat. But the intent—mobilizing political action—is the same.

Figure 1.2

The intended audience for this campaign advertisement is senior citizens in Ohio. This message highlights the threat to their healthcare that emanates from the policy agenda of Congressional Representative John Boccieri (a Democrat who supported President Obama's Affordable Care Act). The flyer raises the specter of higher premiums, loss of coverage, and longer wait times—all amounting to serious diminishment in the quality of care seniors value and feel entitled to receive. The implied course of action to get the trajectory of health care back on its proper track is to vote Boccieri out of office in the next election.

As Figure 1.3 on the following page illustrates, the tactic of threatening people with the prospect of loss or reduction of key political good as a means of mobilization is not limited to either political party or ideology; nor is it limited to the realm of electoral and campaign politics.

This Occupy Atlanta poster is aimed at disaffected out-of-work locals. It emphasizes the persistent and particularly dire employment situation in Atlanta compared to the rest of the country. Unlike the other communications I highlighted, this flyer identified the loss of a political good—in this case, employment security—but did not attribute it to a particular actor or institution. This lack of attribution is consistent with the overarching nebulousness of the Occupy movement, which broadly targeted the capitalist infrastructure and political and financial ecosystems, and was often criticized for failing to articulate a coherent set of concrete goals of the movement (Stewart 2011).

Figure 1.3

Why Occupy Atlanta?
According to a recent report from the Census Bureau, Atlanta has the highest household income inequality of any city over 100,000 in the United States. According to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Atlanta lost more jobs last year than any other metro area. Georgia's unemployment rate has been higher than the national average for 49 consecutive months. It currently stands at 10.3% Things are bad everywhere. They are worse here

DON'T CRY. OCCUPY!
OCCUPYATLANTA.ORG @OWSATLANTA

Despite this alleged lack of clarity or focus, the movement engaged in a concerted effort to mobilize people by making them feel threatened with the prospects of prolonged joblessness, poverty, and lack of opportunities for upward mobility. Further, implicit in the "don't cry, occupy!" pitch on the flyer is a call for Atlanta residents to respond to the economic threat not with despondency, but rather, anger. This reflects a

pragmatic knowledge on the part of mobilizers of the idea for which Valentino and colleagues find empirical evidence—that the key to getting people to take up political action in the face of policy threats to valued political goods is to make them angry.

Indeed, the concept of people being "mad as hell" and rising up to "not take it anymore" is one that resonates both in scholarly examinations of citizen motivation and political behavior and in the on-the-ground realm of political messaging and organizing.

But what if not everyone in the body republic is getting mad as hell when threatened with the loss of valued political goods? What if history points to instances of a specific sub-group within that body *not* being mobilized by policy threats as predicted by scholars and practitioners?

Anger MISmanagement among African Americans?

A number of historical and contemporary examples point to African Americans generally not responding to relevant policy threats with increased political action—even in instances in which whites are apparently being mobilized by the imposition of the same threat. For example, Williams (2003) chronicles the neglect on the part of civil rights and poverty advocate organizations to coordinate any major mobilization effort in response to Congressional deliberations over welfare reform in the mid-1990s.

The negotiations between a Republican-held Congress and President Clinton, which led to the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in 1996, focused on punitive measures such as denying eligibility for federal assistance to unwed mothers under 18, imposing two-year limits on receipt of aid, and cutting the federal funding for programs such as food stamps. As Williams (p. 252) notes using previously unpublished data from a Hart-Teeter poll,

substantially higher proportions of blacks than whites believed these measures

represented policy steps in the wrong direction, with racial divides in opinion, ranging

from 21 to 30 percentage points. Further, Williams (p. 221) notes that then-candidate

Bill Clinton's pledge on the campaign trail to 'end welfare as we know it' "was viewed

by many African Americans as a race-coded message that the Democrats were breaking

from supporting programs and policies that could be seen as beneficial to them."

The conflation of race with the notion of the *underserving poor* has been

inextricably linked to national discourses on poverty throughout American history (see

Gilens 1999). The public deliberations on welfare reform in the 1990s conformed to this

norm:

> Despite the fact that children composed roughly three of every four
> welfare beneficiaries and that blacks composed fewer welfare beneficiaries in
> 1993 than at any time since 1960, the stereotypical image of a welfare recipient
> continued to be that of a poor black woman living in a big city, abusing drugs,
> and spawning a criminal class (Williams 2003, p. 248).

If African Americans generally both opposed the policy direction being outlined

in national deliberations on welfare reform, and felt unfairly portrayed in the national

discourse on the issue as being irresponsible freeloaders abusing the system, prevailing

scholarship predicts there would be concerted efforts mounted or led by African

Americans to oppose the impending legislation, or at least hold accountable those

championing it. For an analogous example of people taking up political action in

opposition to the prospect of an unfavorable major policy change, one need look no

further than the conservative opposition to the Affordable Care Act. Derisively labeled

"Obamacare" by detractors, opposition to Obama's landmark health care reform

legislation has spawned fierce political and electoral activism, through outlets such as the Tea Party movement.

Yet, Williams observes a Congressional Black Caucus that at the time was rendered virtually powerless by a combination of organizational incapacity and disunity of interests, thus leaving it incapable of either mounting an effective legislative challenge to the PRWORA or rallying sympathetic opinion against it. Further, she asserts prominent activist organizations working on behalf of minorities and women had "little to no visibility in the welfare reform debate" (p. 262). It is worth contrasting this state of inactivity in the policy domain of welfare reform with the successful mobilization of hundreds of thousands of black men gathered in Washington for the Million Man March.

That Nation of Islam leader Louis Farrakhan engaged in such an effective mass mobilization of black men during this very time period only emphasizes the readiness of rank and file blacks to be activated and positioned to take up collective action. Yet, on welfare reform—a policy domain in which a majority of blacks opposed the direction of the impending legislation, and felt targeted by the discourse surrounding it—no such action-induction took place. Was this lack of action in response to the policy threat solely attributable to a failure of black or liberal leadership? This would be too simple an interpretation of events, especially in light of the fact that this instance of black inaction in the face of a relevant policy threat is not a unique phenomenon.

The entire period characterizing President George. W. Bush's presidency can be characterized as one rife with relevant policy threats for African Americans.[1]

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[1] Although to be fair, this statement may generally hold true for the majority of black Americans under any Republican administration over the course of the past 35 years.

Dawson (2011, p. 7) summarizes the ways in which the political climate since the

turn of the century has been inimical to black interests:

> *In the first several years of the 21st century, African Americans became increasingly despondent about the potential for achieving racial justice in the nation as they saw their views on the country's central issues—such as the 2000 presidential election, the Iraq War, the legitimacy of anti-war protest, and their evaluation of the Katrina disaster—overwhelmingly rejected, ridiculed and demonized by white Americans.*

Dawson describes an almost uninterrupted string of severe political defeats

for African Americans, beginning with the hotly contested 2000 Presidential

election outcome—viewed by many blacks as illegitimate (Avery 2007; Dawson

2011)—and perhaps culminating with the substantial loss of black life and

property in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina—viewed by a majority of blacks as

being exacerbated by a governmental response clouded by racial bias (White,

Philpot, Wylie, and McGowan 2007).

Again, prevailing scholarship predicts that the general collective response of

blacks to the deluge of policy threats in this period would be greater mobilization and

activism. Yet, Dawson (2011) notes that self-reports by African Americans of

membership in organizations working on black issues declined by a substantial amount

between 2005 and 2008. In fact, the percentage decline during this four-year period was

a greater magnitude than the percentage decline in the entire decade between 1990 and

2000.

Taking a closer look at the political action among blacks in the post-recession

period beginning in 2009 paints a more finely tuned image of African Americans

responding to relevant policy threats in a manner distinct from their white counterparts.

For many rank and file citizens, frustrations with a stagnant economy, rampant unemployment, and rising income inequality seemed to reach their breaking point. During this time. If any one group was to lead the charge of people *mad as hell* about the present economic and political system, one might expect it to be African Americans.

There is no shortage of indicators that in the aftermath of the recession and housing collapse, African Americans generally faced a uniquely threatening economic outlook, relative both to whites during this time, and to African Americans in the time period preceding the collapse. For example, from 2005 to 2009, the median net worth of black households decreased by more than half, from $12,124 to $5,677. Meanwhile, the decline in white median wealth during this same time period was only from $134,992 to $113,149. During this year the percentage of blacks living under the federal poverty line was 25.8%, compared to just 9.4% of non-Hispanic whites. Additionally, the percentage of blacks without health insurance reached 21% in 2009, whereas the percentage of whites without health insurance reached only 12% (Kochhar, Fry and Taylor 2011). Finally, during the summer of 2011—just before the Occupy movement began—the black unemployment rate reached 16.1%, double the white unemployment rate of 8% (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011).

Yet, despite being disproportionately vulnerable to potential loss of political goods such as job security and sufficient income, African Americans were not leading the charge to rail against the economic and political system that rendered them vulnerable. To the contrary, blacks were virtually absent from many of the public domains of activism responding to the economic climate. This absence is perhaps most

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dramatized by the Occupy Movement. Despite comprising about 12% of the population, blacks only made up 1.6% of the Occupy ranks nationally (Patton 2011).

To dismiss the Occupy movement as "too white" to serve as a viable outlet through which blacks could voice their frustration with the system overlooks the fact that a range of prominent voices among the black elite attempted to rally blacks to join the movement. Civil Rights trailblazer Rep. John Lewis hailed the movement as "grassroots democracy at its best" (Walsh 2011). Additionally, hip hop mogul Russell Simmons engaged rap impresario Sean "Jay-Z" Carter in a public debate about the merit of the movement, touting its accomplishments and crediting it for opening up a critical national conversation on economic inequality in America (Lopez 2012).

Further, both rank and file black citizens and black indigenous institutions attempted to cultivate black-specific strands of the occupy movement. This includes "Occupy the Hood," spearheaded by two black Occupy Wall Street participants from New York and Detroit (Ross 2011). Additionally, "Occupy the Dream" was the name given to a partnership between Occupy Movement national leaders and a number of black churches and civic organizations, brought together under the leadership of Benjamin Chavez, former Executive Director of both the NAACP and the Million Man March (Carmichael 2011).

These grassroots movements represented attempts by blacks to expand the space created by the initial Occupy movement to allow for inclusion of more uniquely black perspectives. This method of expanding existing political mobilization spaces to better integrate black interests is not uncommon. One need only think of the partnership between hip hop record label executives and the NAACP to create the "rap the vote"

campaign as a complement to the "rock the vote" campaign intended to mobilize youth

voters. Indeed, when Congressional Black Caucus Chair Emanuel Cleaver bemoaned the

lack of black activism in the post-recession period, claiming that if a white President had

been in office rather than Obama during such high black unemployment figures, blacks

would "probably be marching on the White House" (Cohn 2011), he could have pointed to

any number of these black indigenous movements providing black with opportunities to

raise their voices alongside the majority-white Occupy protestors.

Lest one mistakenly believe that the post-recession period (or the decade of the

2000s generally) was simply a time marked by black political dormancy, consider that

among whites, blacks, Hispanics and Asians, African Americans were the only racial or

ethnic group to *increase* its turnout rate from the 2006 to 2010 midterm elections (Lopez

2011). Once again, we observe blacks exhibiting heightened political activity during the

time period under which they find valued political goods under duress. Yet, generally

blacks appear to be absent from the domains of action directly countering the policy threat.

What is the significance of these instances of apparent black inaction during times

in which when relevant political goods are threatened by the policy landscape? These

instances become especially striking when contrasted with instances of intensified black

activism when the distinct threat of loss of black life and limb is made salient (evidenced

by the "Black Lives Matter" movement in response to police violence in the fall of 2014,

and national marches and sit-ins in response to the Trayvon Martin slaying in 2012). The

apparent dichotomy between the extensive history of African Americans political activism

across a range of activities (see McAdam 1982; Dawson 2001; Lee 2002) and their

reticence to mobilize in direct response to policy threats raises questions that challenge the

broad applicability of conventional wisdom on the motivating impact of policy threats on citizen behavior.

The body of work establishing policy threat as an effective mobilizer of political action considered neither theoretically nor empirically the potential racial differences in how people respond to such threats. This project, therefore, asks the question, do African Americans generally exhibit distinct participation patterns from whites when made angry by the imposition of policy threats? Or alternatively, is it the case that policy threats fail to make blacks *mad as hell* as effectively as they make whites?

The following passage, taken from a 2011 commentary by Stacy Patton of *The Washington Post* titled "Why Blacks Aren't Embracing Occupy Wall Street," provides an indication of how African Americans may be responding to policy threats very differently from whites:

> *Blacks have historically suffered the income inequality and job scarcity that the Wall Street protesters are now railing against. Perhaps black America's absence is sending a message to the Occupiers: "We told you so! Nothing will change. We've been here already. It's hopeless.*

This passage invokes a narrative familiar to African Americans, one that emphasizes the historical unresponsiveness of the political environment to black demands. The entrenched vulnerability of blacks to a myriad of political and economic forces throughout U.S. history has conditioned them to view impending threats to their political goods not as temporary departures from a satisfactory norm, but rather, as the norm itself. Thus, calls to action to defend such goods against the latest threat to them emanating from the policy environment are likely to be ignored by many African Americans, even as they stimulate many whites to action. Whereas the response of white participants to the types of messaging displayed in the images found above can be

described as "I'm mad as hell, and I'm not going to take this anymore!" the response of

black non-participants is largely a collective sigh, and the refrain "same old song."

Understanding the Relationship between Race and Affective Responses to Policy Cues

A new theoretical framework is necessary to explain the distinct factors that

condition the responses of whites and blacks to policy threats in their environment. This

dissertation begins the construction of that framework. This project also employs two

studies that provide evidence indicating policy threat cues effectively mobilizing action

among whites are *not* increasing political activity among blacks. Expanding on existing

frameworks for understanding how people respond emotionally to cues of change in their

policy environment[2], I consider the influence of individuals' socialized racial experiences

and beliefs about their roles in the political system on their emotional and behavioral

responses to cues of policy change.

The respective racialized perspectives of whites and blacks condition them to

perceive threats to their political goods in systematically distinct ways. From these

distinct perceptions come distinct emotional responses to the threat. These divergent

emotional responses in turn lead whites and blacks to take distinct participatory responses

to the threat. The general affective response of whites to policy threat cues is anger,

which motivates them to take up action.

But the response of African Americans is either an emotion other than anger, *or* a

type of anger with a diminished influence on their subsequent political activity. As I

argue, key to both what emotion emerges among black Americans in response to threat

[2] Specifically, Marcus, Neuman and Mackuen's (2000) affective intelligence theory and Lerner and
Keltner's (2000) cognitive appraisal theory

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cues and the impact of that response on their political behavior is the persistent sense of resignation that characterizes blacks' interaction with the political system. This resignation effectively causes anger to be *mismanaged* as an effective tool of mobilizing black action in the domain of policy threats, by either impeding the arousal of anger in response to the threat, or impeding the translation of anger to political action.

In addition to offering a new framework for understanding racial differences in individuals' affective and behavioral responses to policy threats, this dissertation provides a new framework for understanding racial differences in the responses to policy opportunity. Reviewing the history of black political activism in the U.S.—from the incubation and election of a small class of black elites during Reconstruction to the student-organized sit-ins and economic boycotts throughout the Jim Crow-era south, to the electoral mobilization around the Jackson and Obama presidential campaigns—there is an unmistakable current of hope and optimism undergirding the efforts of blacks throughout these periods.

These historical and contemporary examples potentially serve as indicators of the motivating impact of cues of opportunity in the policy environment on the behavior of African Americans. Thus, I explore the potential both that policy threats fail to mobilize blacks as effectively as whites, *and* that policy opportunities mobilize blacks more effectively than they do whites. Ultimately, the dissertation's exploration of these race differences provides a more refined and comprehensive account of issue motivation and political behavior.

Contributions of the Dissertation

This project is notable for incorporating a diverse range of literatures, each of which holds a significant place in the social science field, but does not often engage the others. I integrate insights from areas within psychology (such as social identity theory and literature on affect) with insights from scholarship on black attitudes and behavior that spans fields ranging from political science to cognitive sociology. Culling from a wide range of literatures results in the development of a theoretically rich account detailing the critical interaction of race, attitudes, affect and behavior in response to changes in the political environment. From this account emerge novel means of thinking about familiar concepts such as ideology. These new ways of thinking about such concepts advances scholarly understanding of unique contours of black thought and behavior, allowing for more accurate predictive models for this relevant political sub-constituency.

This project also adds a new layer to the resource and civic voluntarism models (see Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995) to add further clarity to our understanding of the conditions under which citizens are more or less likely to engage in conventional forms of participation. Such models allow us to pinpoint the individual-level factors that foster or inhibit participation. Complementing those models, I demonstrate how individual's emotional responses to their political environment can be operationalized as an additional resource that may either boost or hinder participation.

By taking into consideration the motivational impacts of various emotional states alongside the traditional resource and engagement variables in participation

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models, we can better pinpoint and understand why individuals who possess the resources associated with political action nonetheless may choose *not* to take up political action. Additionally, by paying theoretical and empirical attention to the policy environment in which individuals are making political decisions, I account for context in a meaningful way, paving the way ultimately for scholars to make more nuanced and stronger predictions of the conditions under which individuals will and will not take up political action, based not only on what they have, but also what they hear, what they perceive, and what they feel about the policy environment.

Finally, this project yields insights significant insight both to scholars and practitioners. Insights from this inquiry can aid the work of individuals and groups charged with mobilizing diverse community groups around relevant political issues. By increasing their understanding of how the framing of their political messaging can systematically mobilize some communities while simultaneously turning others off from politics, these groups can more effectively tailor their messaging to motivate all communities to take action on matters of importance to them.

Understanding differences in how people process and respond to cues of policy change has both practical and normative implications. It is important to understand how the policy cues constantly swirling about in the political environment can inadvertently create motivational barriers that hinder members of marginalized groups from entering the political playing. Further, it is important to identify the means to remove those barriers, as a modal state of inaction in the face of policy threat only leads to perpetuation

of policies that further marginalize the material and immaterial well-being of those group members.

Order of Dissertation

Chapter Two reviews and integrates the relevant literature in order to develop a new theoretical framework for understanding the impact of race on individuals' emotional and participatory responses to policy threats and opportunities. The chapter begins with review of the extant models for understanding how cues of threat or opportunity translate to affective states, which result in varying courses of action. I then explore literature on the political attitudes and beliefs of African Americans to explore how African American's distinct political dispositions affect their cognitive and affective responses to cues of threat and opportunity. I create models illustrating the possible pathways through which *racial ideological narratives* influence African Americans' emotional and behavioral responses to cues of policy threat and opportunity. These models account for how the broader perceptions of the political system possessed by whites and blacks respectively condition them to respond to cues of policy threat and opportunity in systematically distinct manners.

Chapter Three presents testable hypotheses arising from the theoretical models established in Chapter Two. The hypotheses are tested via empirical analyses of data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) data. The existence of both an *anger deficit* and a *positive hope differential* are found among black respondents relative to their white counterparts. This and other significant findings from the analyses are discussed in terms of their relation to the hypotheses and their broader implications for the model of racialized responses to cues of policy threat and opportunity.

Chapter Four describes the design and administration of a survey experiment created by me to further explore key tenets of the racial ideology pathway models. This chapter describes the treatments and the content of the pre and post-test questionnaire, as well as the unique characteristics of the sample collected. Additionally, this chapter lays out the expectations of analyses of the experiment data.

Chapter Five presents the major findings from the experiment. Proposed structural equation models reveal significant differences in how emotions associate with actions for black and white subjects The emotion that drives action most consistently for whites subjects is very distinct for the emotion producing the most consistent mobilizing effects for black subjects. This chapter explores the implications of the key findings, while also addressing limitations of the experiment, and lingering and arising questions from the empirical examinations.

Chapter Six concludes the dissertation with a discussion of how the findings from the project better inform our understanding of the current political environment. Against the backdrop of the Black Lives Matter movement, I discuss the troubling implications of black inaction in the domain of policy threat, which often leads to black action in response to crises emanating from the unfavored policy.

Chapter 2

Literature Review and Theory

In the pages that follow, I build upon and revise the current scholarship on affect, emotion and behavior to consider the role played by race in shaping individuals' emotional responses to cues of change in the political environment. In this chapter, I connect literatures from diverse fields in order to build a theoretical model illustrating the distinct manner in which emotional responses to cues of both policy threat and policy opportunity are generated among blacks and whites, respectively. This model also reveals the implications for participation of these race-moderated emotional responses.

The aims of this model are twofold. One, it provides a more comprehensive framework than what is currently available for understanding the interaction of micro- and macro-level factors that influence how individuals process and generate emotional responses to cues of prospective change in their political environment. Whether an individual responds to a prospective policy threat with anger, fear, sadness or another emotion is not predicated solely on her immediate calculation of the threat—i.e. its likelihood of becoming a reality, its potential impact on her well-being, and the means at her disposal to counter it. That reaction is also founded on her long-run assessment of her role and agency in the broader political sphere—i.e. her beliefs about her value to the polity and her capacity to change to political environment.

Whites and blacks differ systematically in the conclusions they draw from both these immediate and long-run calculations. How they view the impact of prospective

policy changes on their well-being, the resources at their disposal to respond to them, and their relationship to the political system writ large will translate to differences in the emotional and participatory—responses of whites and blacks to cues of these changes. The model I present here illustrates both the translation of these micro- and macro-level considerations to emotional responses, and the translation of affect to differing behavioral responses. It therefore provides an accurate lens through which to view the critical influence of racial identity and its accompanying socialized norms on individuals' emotional and behavioral responses to cues of changes in the political environment.

Additionally, the model presented here lays the groundwork for development of testable hypotheses that examine its central tenets. The empirical tests presented in this dissertation cannot test all of key components of this new model. But they provide support for many of the expected "outputs" of the model, by uncovering evidence of substantial racial differences in both the emotional responses of whites and blacks to policy change cues, and the translation of their expressed emotions to participation.

The studies also raise many questions and reveal elements of the model in need of revision. Viewed as pilot explorations of the interaction of race, emotion and behavior, these studies effectively lay groundwork for further development of the burgeoning theory of racialized responses to cues of policy threat and opportunity. This theory integrates and builds upon scholarship on race, affect, social identity, motivation and participation to further our understanding of the intangible factors that systematically encourage or inhibit participation among various key groups in U.S. politics.

This chapter begins with in-depth integration of the relevant literatures on the role of emotions in political behavior, and the motivational effects of policy change cues on

individual action. The focus of this section is identifying both the individual-level and broader social forces underpinning peoples' sense of motivation when they process cues of prospective political changes. I provide visual models illustrating what conventional literature contends is the processes by which cues of policy threat and opportunity translate to particular emotional and participatory responses.

I then turn to literature on black political attitudes and behavior to highlight the unique ideological forces driving the perceptions and responses of African Americans to cues of prospective political change. I contrast the salient ideological narratives of American liberalism drawn upon by whites when they interact with their political environment to the black ideological narratives accessed by African Americans. These black ideological narratives are rooted in African Americans' historic and current senses of personal and collective standing within the American system. They provide schema that facilitate blacks' chronicling and contextualizing of the critical incidents that have characterized the black experience. These narratives are indicative of a broader black-specific worldview that influences how African Americans process cues from the political environment. This worldview distinguishes itself in many ways from the American liberalist that worldview generally influences whites' interpretation of cues in their political environment.

From critical examination of this contrast in the respective worldviews and ideological narratives of blacks and whites emerges the distinct racialized patterns of response to cues of policy threat and opportunity. I provide visual models illustrating these racial patterns, and highlight their departure from the patterns as laid out by extant

understanding. The new visual models provide the basis for empirical analyses carried out in the two subsequent studies.

Translating Cues of Policy Change to Emotion and Action

Both threat and opportunity imply potential change to an individual's given state. Either, therefore, can move an individual from a state of inaction to one of action. Yet, psychological and neurological studies indicate that the motivation to avert threat is stronger than the motivation to make good on a potential opportunity. For example, Kahneman and Tversky (1979, p. 288) assert that when observing people deciding between prospects involving risk, "[they] expect outcomes to be coded as gains or losses relative to a neutral reference point, and losses to loom larger than gains." Additionally, Darwinian evolutionary theory posits that the human brain has developed a mechanism for detecting and automatically responding to threatening stimuli (Gray 1990). This work implies that conditions of threat carry a visceral resonance for people, motivating them to exert extra effort to stave off the threat. This notion is consistent with the aforementioned findings of Valentino et al (2009), Miller and Krosnick (2004), and Campbell (2003) that indicate cues of policy threat are effective mobilizers of political action. Connecting this work to the literature examining the impact of emotions on behavior provides an understanding of how conditions of prospective threat or opportunity translate to different types of actions.

The initial wave of research into how emotion states translate to action was influenced by affective intelligence (AI) theory, which posits that people employ distinct cognitive strategies in response to different affective states (Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen 2000; MacKuen, Marcus, Neuman & Keele 2007).

AI posits that positive affective states such as hope and pride are regulated by the brain's disposition system. This system breeds automaticity and routine. (MacKuen, Marcus, Neuman & Keele 2007; Brader, Valentino and Suhay 2008). Positive feelings of enthusiasm, deriving from either satisfaction with politics or anticipation of positive impending change, reinforce an individual's existing behavioral patterns and attitudes. Feeling enthused, these individuals maintain their existing course of political activity, in order to ensure the rewards of participation continue to be reaped. According to this line of reasoning then, cues of policy opportunity should elicit no significant increase in political activity among cue recipients. The translation of receipt of opportunity cues to affect to action is represented visually in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1: AI Model—Receipt of Positive Cue to Affect to Behavior

This process laid out by affective intelligence theory is simple. Receiving a cue that positive change is on the political horizon produces an emotional state of enthusiasm. This enthusiasm makes people feel more secure about their current role in politics, giving them more confidence in both their existing political beliefs and values, and their current course of action. As a result, the participatory response emanating from this enthused state is maintenance of the status quo—people neither dampen nor accelerate their political efforts, as they feel assured their current activity level is producing satisfactory results. This entire process is governed by the brain's disposition system.

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In contrast, negative emotions such as anger and fear are regulated by the surveillance system, which alerts the individual to an unsettling change in the environment and conditions her to act accordingly. Grouped under the umbrella term of *anxiety*, these negative affective states prompt people to become less reliant on their predispositions and pay heightened attention to their political environment (MacKuen, Marcus, Neuman & Keele 2007; Brader 2006). Thus, receipt of cues of policy threat is expected to elicit more action along the lines of information seeking and evaluation. This process is illustrated in Figure 2.2.

Figure 2.2: AI Model—Receipt of Negative Cue to Affect to Behavior

The negative cue activates the surveillance system, which prompts feeling of unease over the prospect of an unfavorable change to the political environment. These feelings of anxiety compel people to question the veracity of what they know and believe about politics. This uncertainty prompts them to seek information and resources that provide them with clarity and support.

In sum, the AI conception of affect is that it generally falls into the categorization of either a positive state that breeds routine or a negative state that triggers changes in routine. This perspective of affect can inform expectations regarding how blacks and whites may differ in formulating emotional responses to policy threats. If black Americans employ a racialized lens to interpret political phenomena, the same

policy threat cues that activate the surveillance system and induce anxiety among whites may be registered by blacks as simply the latest reinforcement of a long-running narrative in which African Americans are marginalized within the political system. Thus, rather than triggering the surveillance system, these threat cues are governed by blacks' disposition system, resulting in no behavioral departure from blacks' status quo.

As an example, I point to Dawson's (2011, p. xv) examination of the dissimilar reactions of blacks and whites to Hurricane Katrina, which highlights the divergent narratives drawn upon by white and blacks in making sense of political and cultural phenomena:

> *Was it a tragic event in which a large number of citizens proved unexpectedly vulnerable to a freak accident? Or was this business as usual? That is to say, proof, once again that some Americans count for more than others, and that skin color provides a brutally direct indication of who does count and who does not.*

If the racialized norms adhered to by African Americans predisposition them to view policy threats not truly as threats (which AI posits would trigger automatic responses), but rather as "business as usual," then they should be expected refrain from increased action. This refrain should stand in stark contrast to whites, for whom the surveillance system is activated, and who are consequently compelled to take up some form of action.

Subsequent studies of negative affect states produce conclusions that depart from those drawn from affective intelligence theory. Exploring these approaches uncover additional ways in which black and white Americans' emotional and behavioral responses to policy change cues could vary systematically. Cognitive appraisal theory (hereafter CAT; see Lerner and Keltner 2000; 2001), further explores the translation of cues of negative prospective change to states of affect. This approach distinguishes itself

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from AI by emphasizing the deliberative process of evaluating and acting upon one's emotional state. This paradigmatic approach departs from the notion that distinct emotional states trigger automatic behavioral patterns. Instead, the focus is on the distinct environmental origins of various emotions, and the manner in which individuals cognitively process those emotions in a way that informs their subsequent course of action.

The essential premise of CAT is articulated by Scherer (2003, in Spezio and Adolphs p. 82): "people evaluate events in terms of the perceived relevance for their current needs and goals, including their ability to cope with consequences and the compatibility of the underlying actions with social norms and self-ideals." This synopsis emphasizes the interaction of micro and macro-level forces that influence how an individual perceives prospective changes to her environment. She interprets the significance of the prospective change by assessing both its immediate potential impact on her well-being and its fundamental relation to what she believes and values about her role in the environment.

The evaluative process suggested by Scherer is itself influenced by the socialized norms and expectations attached to one's racial identity, as these factors shape the values, goals and limitations that constitute one's sense of self. As Allen (2001, p. 46) states, "awareness of self—what constitutes humanness, the 'shoulds' of how one feels, acts and finds happiness and success, what constitutes failure, and what is valuable or is not—is intimately related to the particular cultural, historical and institutional contexts within which we live." Implicit, therefore, in the cognitive appraisal framework for understanding emotional responses to threat is an acknowledgement that the process of

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evaluating the threat and the environment in which it originates may look unique across various social group distinctions. Racial identity in particular should impact individuals' processing in predictably distinct ways.

CAT emphasizes the interaction of cognitive and affective processing, be it conscious or subconscious (Just, Crigler and Belt 2007). Prior to one's emotional response to an impending threat is an assessment of the potential effect of the threat on one's ability to achieve desired outcomes, and the resources at one's disposal to prevent it. This perspective is consistent with the contention made in Ladd and Lenz's (2008) critique of AI that reactions to people and events begin in the cognitive area of the brain before moving to the emotions-related area.

The abundant evidence of stark divides in opinion and attitudes between whites and blacks (see for example Kinder and Sanders 1996; White, Philpot, Wylie and McGowen 2007; Hutchings 2009; Dawson 2011) indicates the existence of systematic differences in how members of each racial group cognitively process prospective changes to their emotional environment. Although African Americans have been empirically demonstrated to *not* suffer from lower senses of self-esteem or self-worth despite their marginalized status in the U.S. (see Rosenberg 1979; Crocker and Major 1989), they nonetheless exhibit lower levels of efficacy and political trust relative to whites (see Aberbach and Walker 1970, Pierce and Carey Jr. 1971). These disparities reflect blacks' general perceptions that they have fewer resources at their disposal to respond to changes in the policy environment, and less agency to influence the political environment generally. These differences in perception should produce different emotional reactions from blacks relative to whites.

CAT draws a clear line of demarcation between the negative emotion states of anger and anxiety. According to CAT, the two major determinants of whether one's cognitive assessment of a threatening environment triggers an affective response of anger or anxiety are *attribution* and *control*. If an individual can attribute the threat of an undesirable outcome to a particular source, and feels able to exert control over the situation to counteract the source, then the emotional state elicited by the threat is anger. If, however, the individual cannot identify the source of harm or feels little capacity to change the environment in her favor, she will respond with anxiety (Lerner and Keltner 2000).

CAT indicates anxiety works in the same manner as that suggested by AI. Defined as a state of nervousness or unease over an uncertain prospective outcome, this affective state makes people more likely to engage in behaviors aimed at coping (i.e. talking about their anxieties with friends and family) and information seeking (Marcus et al 2000; Huddy, Feldman and Cassese 2007). Whereas anxiety does not lead to inaction *per se*, it does not translate to political activism. Anger, in contrast, is expected to serve as a short term mobilizing force in the face of threat, transferring people from a modal state of inaction into one of activity.

Two key components of anger distinguish it conceptually from other negative emotions. One, anger is a strong feeling of displeasure or belligerence. Two, this feeling is aroused by a perceived wrong or slight. Thus, anger is distinct from affective states such as frustration, which may either be a mild expression or may not be tied to a sense of injustice. Anger is also distinct from disappointment, which is more closely tied to an affective state of sadness over unintended and un-favored outcomes.

When in a state of anger, people possess a clear sense of agency regarding how to deal with the source frustrating one's desired ends. Further, in a state of anger, people will rely less on acquired information in determining their preferred course of action, going so far as to downplay the risks associated with those actions (Huddy, Feldman and Cassese 2007). For these reasons, anger is believed to be a state of action. Indeed the work of Valentino et al (2009, 2011) presents empirical evidence that expressing feelings of anger is positively correlated with taking political action for people threatened with an unfavorable policy outcome.

Models illustrating the CAT approach to how threat translates to distinct emotion and action states are presented in Figures 2.3 and 2.4 below.

Figure 2.3: CAT—Threat Cue to Anger to Behavior

Figure 2.4—Threat Cue to Anxiety to Behavior

The significant addition that distinguishes these models from the AI models is the cognitive component, as people assess whether they can identify the source of the threat and if they can exert control over it.

Following the framework of CAT, anger is the necessary ingredient linking receipt of a cue of policy threat to increased political activity to counteract it. The

emotional state of anger emanates from a cognitive assessment of the environment that provides the individual with a sense of control within the political environment. Therefore, racial differences in how people respond emotionally and behaviorally to cues of policy threat must originate in differences in their cognitive assessments of the environment and their agency within it. Whereas whites generally view the political environment through interpretive lenses that augment their sense of control, blacks draw view the environment through lenses that emphasize their incapacity to affect change.

By identifying the distinct ideological narratives drawn upon by whites and blacks to interpret their political environment and their respective roles within it, I acknowledge the influential role played by individuals' macro-level views regarding the political system's responsiveness and fairness when processing cues of policy change. By failing to account for the impact of these worldviews on individuals' reactions to potential policy changes, current scholarship cannot provide an accurate framework for understanding how African Americans face a unique set of considerations and calculations when facing the prospect of threat or opportunity in their policy environment. Engaging the literatures on group identity and ideology formation among black Americans illuminates the way that African Americans' emotional and behavioral responses to cues of policy change result from their unique perspectives of self, society and strategy—perspectives collectively cultivated in the private and public spheres of black life.

Race, Attitudes and Ideology: Informing Interactions with the Political Environment

The wide gulf separating the opinions of blacks and whites across the full spectrum of political issues is no artifact of past generations divided by segregation. Nor is it attributable simply to partisan differences. As Hutchings (2009) demonstrates, significant rifts in opinion are present even among black and white liberals, as well as among blacks and whites from the millennial age cohort.

The significant divide in black-white opinion reflects fundamental differences in how blacks and whites perceive their sociopolitical environment. For instance, Dawson (2011) argues whites and blacks have cultivated distinct worldviews that flow from divergent patterns of interpreting events in the world around them. As evidence, he points to black and white perceptions of the contested 2000 Presidential election. A strong majority of African Americans acknowledged cases of voter suppression in Florida, and believed it was a "big deal." In contrast, a majority of whites claimed that reports of voter suppression were either no big deal, or an outright fabrication.

The respective placement of whites and blacks in the sociopolitical environment consequently shapes the meaning both groups attach to significant political phenomena. This constitutes a fundamental premise of cognitive sociology, as stated by Zerubavel (1997; in Young 2004, p. 134); "not only does our social environment affect how we perceive the world; it also helps determine what actually 'enters' our minds in the first place."

When viewing political phenomena that are disproportionately detrimental to minority populations, whites tend to perceive the events as abnormal deviations from

a system that normally operates justly. They by and large attribute little to no significance to racial factors. In contrast, blacks view these same phenomena as further evidence of racial bias in the political system. Blacks generally view these events not as deviations, but rather as continuations of a systemic pattern of racial subjugation.

In other words, when blacks see these phenomena, the concept of race as a means to order groups in society and systematically disadvantage blacks enters their minds "first," thus shaping their interpretation. Evidence of these racialized patterns of interpretation is abundant in Gallup surveys, which consistently reveal significantly higher proportions of black respondents than white respondents attributing racial disparities in employment, income and housing to discriminatory treatment.

The respective racialized lenses of interpretation employed by whites and blacks reflect the broader set of conceptions and beliefs about American democracy to which each group adheres. The lenses are not an abstraction; rather they reflect back to the people employing them a personal and collective sense of meaning, values and strategy. As people align their own self-perceptions and behaviors with the prototypical norms of the group with which they identify, the group-centric worldview exerts a constraining influence on how the individual interacts with her environment (Terry and Hogg 2000). The ideological narratives emanating from these worldviews can be viewed as heuristic schema, both informing people of how the cue they encounter aligns with their ideological belief structure, and constraining their response to the cue in conformity with that structure (Harris-Lacewell 2004).

There is much scholarly skepticism regarding the capacity of rank and file individuals to possess true ideologies, defined as a tightly organized set of deductive beliefs that uniformly and consistently exert constraints on one's attitudes and preferences (see Lane 1962, Converse 1964, Kinder 1983, Zaller 1992). People are expected to possess a constellation of belief systems, defined by Converse (1964, p. 207) as "a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence." Race-based stratification is a driving force shaping the belief systems of various racial groups in the U.S. (see Carmines and Stimson 1989, Kinder and Sanders 1996), forcing scholars to consider whether belief systems shaped by one's social identity group are equivalent to or deviate from what scholars consider true ideological thinking.

Dawson (2001, p. 65) explicitly relates the concept of group thinking on the part of blacks—wherein they connect their personal lived experiences with the prototypical experience of blacks as subjugated minorities in the American racial order—to Converse's concept of ideological thinking: "[t]o use Converse's language, there are a number of linking mechanism between blacks' social locations, their racial identities, and various (generally unsatisfactory) aspects of their social, economic, cultural and political worlds." According to this view, blacks are not only engaging in ideological thinking when they rely on the prototypical norms and expectations of the collective black identity to ascribe meaning to their experiences; they are actively engaged in the construction of black ideologies that flow independently and in opposition to the dominant ideologies of white-led mainstream society. Exploring the black narratives that inform these oppositional ideologies is critical to understanding

the systematic differences in the motivation of African Americans to respond emotionally and behaviorally to cues of policy change in their environment.

Harris-Lacewell's (2004) exploration of how the political beliefs of African Americans are shaped by their everyday discourse with one another is premised on the notion that black ideological narratives have long permeated discourses in black spaces, from historically black campuses and universities (HBCUs) to churches to black-owned salons and barbershops. Following in the tradition of Mansbridge (1999) and Putnam (2000), she explores these black narratives as a means of uncovering the distinct ideological belief systems and strategic frameworks adhered to by African Americans as political actors, asserting "black people use their interactions with one another in the black counterpublic to develop collective understanding of their political interests" (Harris-Lacewell 2004, p. xxi).

Harris-Lacewell's work provides a helpful framework for exploring the black ideological narratives that inform the decisions and motivations of African Americans in the political environment. I will highlight how adherence to various black narratives influences blacks to adopt differing sets of political calculations, which in turn should produce distinct emotional and behavioral responses to policy cues. But first I discuss how the black ideological belief structure primed by these narratives differs systematically from the ideological belief structure generally adopted by whites in the political environment.

When whites view the political environment through interpretive lenses that de-emphasize (or ignore outright) the determinant role of race in shaping one's sociopolitical outcomes, they adopt a view of the world largely consistent with the

perspective of American liberalism. The core foundations of this philosophy include belief in the existence of unalienable individual rights, and the concept of cultural nationalism—the conferral of the rights and privileges of citizenship not bound to any particular race, ethnicity or religion (Walzer 1990). Dawson (2001, p. 33) concisely summarizes the major tenants of the American liberal tradition as "usually defined in such a way as to privilege the autonomy and liberty of the individual, skepticism of central state power, and the sanctity of private property." From this tradition emerge the historic narratives that individuals and institutions draw upon to justify the hierarchical ordering of groups in U.S. society, including the individualist work ethos and manifest destiny.

The scholarship on symbolic racism (Kinder and Sears 1981, Kinder and Sanders 1996) provides an example of how the narratives of American liberalism are employed to justify racial stratification in the U.S. This body of work empirically links white antipathy for blacks to the belief that blacks do not work hard enough to take full advantage of the opportunities for advancement in America. Implicit in this belief is adherence to the idea that racial barriers to advancement are an artifact of the past and no longer the reason for persistent racial disparities in education, employment, housing and legal spheres. Further, the belief that blacks are not meeting the standards of individual effort and advancement is correlated with more conservative views on social redistributive policies. Thus, subscription to the worldview of American liberalism—which emphasizes the capacity for individual triumph and full respect for and responsiveness to all across lines of social categorization—is entangled with the

racial order in the U.S., leading to policy preferences among whites that limit structural intervention to equalize outcomes for racial minorities.

By privileging the individual over the collective (including, potentially, the state), and mythologizing the capacity for individual enterprise and advancement, the American liberal worldview provides a solid fit with the extant understanding of how individuals should respond to prospective policy changes. To the extent that whites generally adhere (consciously or subconsciously) to the American liberal worldview, this worldview imparts to them through the narratives of individualism and manifest destiny a sense of personal agency and capacity to exert influence over their political environment. These longstanding senses of agency and human potential engender among whites an immediate sense of control when processing emergent threats, as well as an immediate sense of confidence when processing emergent opportunities.

As noted by Dawson (2001), however, the black ideologies developed in the exclusively black intellectual and deliberative spaces that began to take shape in the post-Reconstruction era are largely critical of or inimical to the American liberal worldview. In contrast to the prioritization of the individual over the collective, Dawson (2001, p. 11) observes the emergence of "an African-American worldview in which the moral, spiritual and material development of the community is at least as important as the development of the individual." Additionally, Dawson points out that the black ideological strand most resembling American liberalism actually values a strong central government, as this is viewed as the most effective means of enacting and enforcing racial equality. Finally, whereas American liberalism largely asserts that with few notable exceptions cultural pluralism has been achieved and maintained (see

Walzer 1990), virtually all sets of black ideologies maintain that the polity is systematically biased along lines of race.[3]

These are some of the key ways in which the most prominent black ideological spheres depart from the prominent ideological sphere largely informing the decision making of whites. But what are the major tenets of these black ideologies? I have identified three narratives emanating from the black ideological sphere that regularly inform and are invoked by black discourse (both among everyday citizens and black elites) and are instrumental in shaping how blacks interact with their political environment. I discuss each of these black ideological narratives—of *subjugation*, of *resilience* and of *salvation*—and describe and illustrate how these narratives inform and constrain the emotional and behavioral responses of African Americans to cues of policy threat and opportunity.

Black Ideological Narratives and the Black Response to Cues of Policy Change

The first black ideological narrative, the account of blacks as systematically *subjugated* by the American political system, so permeates the collective understanding of the black American experience that it is tempting to overlook it or presume its influence without fully engaging it. But the narrative of African Americans as an oppressed group is fundamentally tied to the development of collective and personal identity among blacks. African Americans' historical navigation of a sociopolitical landscape that simultaneously espouses values of equality and tolerance and denies application of these values to blacks has forced them to cultivate a unique sense of identity and relation to the state. W.E.B. Du Bois [1903] (2007) articulated the burden

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[3] Dawson would exempt only the ideology of black conservatism from this categorization.

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of "double consciousness" that blacks must bear as they confront a barrage of potential

detriments to both their life outcomes and their sense of self-worth:

> *It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his two-ness—an American, a Negro—two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings, two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder. The history of the American Negro is the history of this strife—this longing to attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer self.*

In this passage, Du Bois envisions black people engaging in a conscious effort to

maintain a positive personal lens through which to view themselves, in spite of their

perception that they are viewed as inferior through the dominant societal lens. Du Bois'

vision continues to have reverberations in contemporary contexts, as blacks persist in

observing indicators that their collective needs, desires and demands are not valued

equally by society writ large. As blacks perceive each successive instance of racial bias

in the political sphere, be it the 2000 Presidential election, the government response to

Hurricane Katrina or the housing crisis and subsequent economic downturn in 2009,

these incidents are added to a constantly evolving, easily accessible script in the minds

of blacks. This script is often disseminated in the messaging exchanged across blacks,

captured in the common phrases such as *blacks have to work twice as hard to get half as

far*, and *when whites catch a cold, blacks get a fever*.

What such messaging signifies is an inherent conviction among blacks that

ceteris paribus, American society does not treat blacks fairly. This internalized

conviction plays multiple functions for blacks. It increases the salience of blacks' racial

identity as the primary means by which they define themselves. Additionally, this

conviction moves blacks to seek collective remedies to combat what they perceive to be structural barriers to equal treatment of the group.

This process of linking one's personal experiences of racial discrimination (or ego-deprivation) to the more abstract concept of systematic discrimination that hinders the capacity of one's group (fraternal deprivation) is formally described by relative deprivation theory (Runciman 1966, Aberbach & Walker 1970, Crosby 1976, Feagin 1991, Mummendey, Kessler, Klink and Mielke 1999, Gurin, Miller & Gurin 1980, Gurin, Hatchett & Jackson, 1989). This linkage politicizes African Americans' racial identity, making them rely more heavily on the prototypical norms and strategies of the racial group to inform their interactions with the political environment (Dawson 1994).

I identify the narrative of black subjugation, therefore, as a critical root force in the development of black consciousness among African Americans. Not surprisingly, blacks have been routinely shown to exhibit heightened levels of group consciousness and closeness compared to other groups in the U.S. (see Matthews and Prothro 1966; Verba and Nie 1972; Gurin et al 1980; Tate 1993; Dawson 1994). Defined by McClain, Johnson, Walton, Jr. and Watts (2009, p. 476), group consciousness is:

> *in-group identification* politicized *by a set of ideological beliefs about one's group's social standing, as well as a view that collective action is the best means by which the group can improve its status and realize its interests [italics in original]*

An outgrowth of examinations of heightened black consciousness (see Chong and Rogers 2005 for review) is exploration of the tenets and contours of the ideological sphere of Black Nationalism. Davis and Brown (2002, p. 240) provide a summary of the black nationalist belief system:

> *At its core, a belief in a black nationalist ideology acknowledges the hegemonic position of a dominant culture in American society which*

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imposes unjust limitations on African-American actualization and self-realization; and it recognizes that for African Americans to survive in American society, they need institutions that provide greater control over their destinies and resources, even if it is associated with the disaffection toward other groups—particularly members of the dominant culture.

Embedded in this definition of Black Nationalism is the narrative of black subjugation, as well as a strategic framework for overcoming subjugation.

Additional explorations of Black Nationalist ideology yield further insights into how adherents view their sociopolitical environment. Aberbach and Walker (1970) conclude that as blacks' adherence to Black Nationalist ideology increased, so did both their mistrust and their willingness to adopt a "by any means necessary" ethos. Additionally, the authors observe that when politically distrustful people are confronted with governmental decisions they find unsatisfactory, they not only question the decision and particular decision makers, but also the legitimacy of the entire governing institution itself.

In their search for distinct dimensions of nationalism, Brown and Shaw (2002) find that adherents to what they term "separatist nationalism" distinguish themselves from "community nationalists" by seeking to cultivate political and economic autonomy outside of existing mainstream institutions and arrangements. Davis and Brown (2002) contend that the distinction between community and separatist nationalism made by Brown and Shaw (2002) is better conceptualized as a distinction between blacks who simply possess high levels of in-group identification and blacks who strongly adhere to Black Nationalist ideology.

Regardless of how tightly or loosely one defines Black Nationalism, it is evident from examinations of its impact on black political strategizing that heightened politicized

racial consciousness among blacks governs interactions with their environment in a manner that is discernibly distinct from whites. So how would these African Americans respond to cues of prospective policy threat?

The belief in an American anti-black hegemonic system, coupled with strong skepticism regarding the democratic responsiveness of the state to black demands, should influence politically conscious blacks to reject participation in virtually all forms of conventional political action to address potential policy threats. Highly conscious blacks largely perceive themselves to be closed off to the benefits reaped by engagement with the mainstream sociopolitical system. Consequently, in the presence of policy threat, they possess neither agency nor confidence in their ability to influence their political environment through conventional political action.

The perspective of conscious blacks here is starkly opposed to that of whites who are informed by the narratives of American liberalism. Whites perceive the policy threat to be an anomaly—a temporary glitch in a typically fair and legitimate system. In contrast, politically conscious blacks view the threat as the latest addition to the script— further confirmation of the marginalized status of African Americans and another chapter in the long-running narrative on the subjugation of blacks in America.

A CAT framework suggests that in the absence of anger, these African Americans will feel anxiety. But there are certainly additional affective states that can be engendered among people in the face of threat. One may expect highly conscious blacks to feel emotions that convey their sense of powerlessness in relation to the state, such as sadness or shame. Or this subset may feel emotions that reflect their broader disdain for a system

from which they feel detached, such as contempt or disgust (see Fischer, Mosquera, van Vianen and Manstead 2004 for review of powerful and powerless emotions).

Finally, the response of African Americans to such threat cues may be no truly discernible change in their emotion state. If the policy threat in question simply represents for African Americans another line in the long-running script of black subjugation, perhaps the most plausible expected response is a virtual non-response. The absence of an emotional shift could reflect an ingrained sense of resignation on the part of blacks, who have come to expect such threats as a facet of life in a racially stratified society. I will return to this concept of resignation in greater detail shortly.

But I must first address an alternate account of how the emotional response of blacks to emergent policy threats may differ from that of whites. Blacks may ultimately prove no less likely than whites to express anger over the policy threat; yet the anger manifest among African Americans may not translate to action. Anger arising over policy threats could fail to mobilize action for blacks the way it does for whites because blacks' anger is targeted more broadly at a system over which they feel they have little control, rather than a specific target (such as a particular policy or political actor). Black Americans consequently do not have the same obvious outlet for their anger as whites, whose anger propels them to take up conventional political acts they believe will preempt the threat. Addressing the second black ideological narrative allows me to flesh out this point.

Running concurrent to the stream of cues blacks constantly receive about their subjugated status is a narrative of *resilience* that prevents blacks from translating the marginalized collective status of the group to personalized feelings of helplessness.

Adherence to the narrative of resilience, then, keeps blacks from responding to policy threats with powerless emotions such as despondence and anxiety. This narrative works in tandem with the narrative of subjugation to constrain the responses of blacks to policy threats to relatively muted emotion states.

The narrative of resilience invokes the prototypical image of African Americans as durable and resolute in the face of cultural, institutional and structural barriers to their advancement. This narrative champions those who have overcome these barriers, and casts a disapproving gaze on those perceived to succumb to them. This continuous effort to highlight the steely determination of the black American as she navigates an unjust state is intended to bolster blacks' collective image of self in the face of detriments to that image, thus linking it to Du Bois' notion of double consciousness.

Throughout history, the leaders of black intellectual, deliberative and political spaces have often used the narrative of resilience to propose and shape the strategic frameworks adopted by blacks to counter their collective subjugation. For instance, Du Bois (1903) delineated the role of the talented tenth, the one in ten Negroes who would be able to take advantage of the opportunity to acquire classical education and become public intellectuals and advocates for black advancement. Embedded in Du Bois' description of the talented tenth is both a shrewd critique of a society in which only a small percentage of the black community would have access to advanced education, and a defiant resolve that black people can work collectively within those limitations to produce change.

More recently, in a 2011 address to the Congressional Black Caucus, Barack Obama invoked the narrative of resilience to rally black support for his platform and

upcoming re-election race. Obama's remarks first acknowledge blacks' dissatisfaction with the lack of progress creating jobs for a disproportionately out-of-work black populace, while subtly connecting blacks' current state of socioeconomic disrepair with their historical marginalized status—thus, invoking the narrative of subjugation:

> [W]e've needed faith over these last couple years. Times have been hard. It's been three years since we faced down a crisis that began on Wall Street and then spread to Main Street, and hammered working families, and hammered an already hard-hit black community. The unemployment rate for black folks went up to nearly 17 percent — the highest it's been in almost three decades; 40 percent, almost, of African American children living in poverty; fewer than half convinced that they can achieve Dr. King's dream. You've got to be a little crazy to have faith during such hard times.

Obama also invoked the history of the black American struggle for advancement—specifically the Civil Rights movement. He emphasizes the hard-won path to black advancement, and that African Americans earned concessions from the polity only after grueling, persistent efforts. He uses this invocation to implore blacks to demonstrate the same endurance and diligence:

> Throughout our history, change has often come slowly. Progress often takes time. We take a step forward, sometimes we take two steps back. Sometimes we get two steps forward and one step back. But it's never a straight line. It's never easy. And I never promised easy. Easy has never been promised to us. But we've had faith. We have had faith. We've had that good kind of crazy that says, you can't stop marching.
>
> Even when folks are hitting you over the head, you can't stop marching. Even when they're turning the hoses on you, you can't stop. Even when somebody fires you for speaking out, you can't stop. Even when it looks like there's no way, you find a way — you can't stop. Through the mud and the muck and the driving rain, we don't stop. Because we know the rightness of our cause — widening the circle of opportunity, standing up for everybody's opportunities, increasing each other's prosperity.

Finally, Obama explicitly urges blacks to stop bemoaning the lack of progress made toward alleviating the dire economic condition of the group. He invites them to display a resolve to do something about it. He has framed the narrative of subjugation as a modal reality with which blacks must contend, while simultaneously dismissing this reality as a legitimate reason for African Americans to linger in feelings of powerlessness and vulnerability:

> *I expect all of you to march with me and press on. Take off your bedroom slippers, put on your marching shoes. Shake it off. Stop complaining, stop grumbling, stop crying. We are going to press on. We've got work to do, CBC (transcript from thegrio.com).*

The narrative of resilience is also communicated in everyday discourse among blacks. This narrative is apparent in the conversations between black church parishioners recounted by Harris-Lacewell (2004) over the best means to deal with a white supervisor in the workplace perceived to be racially biased. When fellow church members counsel the parishioner to treat her boss with kindness and fulfill her work responsibilities with excellence, they are drawing upon their interpretation of bible verses that indicate it is her Christian duty to do so. But additionally, they draw upon the longstanding narrative of blacks as having both the capacity and responsibility to endure racial hardship with grace—to serve as a model of strength to other black people and help feed the positive collective self-image of the group.

The general adherence of blacks to the belief that they possess both the ability and obligation to exhibit resilience in the face of racial discrimination is likely the driving force behind empirical studies revealing surprising trends in the impact of race-related stress on whites and blacks. According to a study by Williams, Yu, Jackson and

Anderson (1997), blacks report encountering stressors at a higher rate than whites. But race-related stress exerts a greater adverse impact on *whites* than on blacks. Further, examinations by Mabry and Kiecolt (2005) reveal no differences in frequency, means of expression or intensity of anger between whites and blacks. Further, the authors find the most mistrustful blacks in the sample to be considerably *less* angry than the most mistrustful whites.

Informed by the narrative of resilience, African Americans have expended considerable effort cultivating support systems that provide them with outlets for expressing their anguish over racial discrimination. In these spaces, blacks receive commiseration and affirmation that their personal experiences tie into the collective racial struggle. Additionally, they receive encouragement and strategic paradigms for encountering racism in a manner that preserves their positive sense of self-worth and lessens their feelings of vulnerability.

The mechanisms blacks develop to alleviate feelings of vulnerability and distress in the face of duress prevent them from feeling emotions conveying powerless when encountering policy threats. Thus, the affective response of blacks will generally neither be anxiety, as predicted by the CAT model, nor feelings such as sadness.

If the narrative of resilience insulates African Americans from feelings of powerlessness in response to policy threat, why does it not embolden African Americans to feel a sense of action-inducing anger in response? After all, in the aforementioned address by Obama, the narrative of resilience was invoked as a call to action.

Although it is true Obama asked the black audience to take action, he undoubtedly drew a very tenuous historical connection between black action to demand concession

from government and satisfactory governmental responses. His invoking of the imagery of one step forward, two steps back is less a triumphant affirmation of a steady Hegelian march toward equality and more an acknowledgement of the entrenched (and often effective) historical resistance of the state to demands made by African Americans for justice.

This is the intersection point of the narratives of resilience and subjugation. Blacks are confident in their capacity to effectively meet the challenges to their personal and collective senses of self-worth that come from a racially stratified sociopolitical system. Yet when threatened, they remain skeptical about their capacity to mount effective challenges to that political system itself. Given the prevalence of policy threats to African Americans in the political environment, they constantly weigh the choice between maintaining a level of detachment from the political system, so as to preserve a positive self-concept, or taking on political action that they are conditioned to believe carries a high risk of failure to meet its achieved objectives. The risk for blacks extends beyond failure to achieve the desired action; they risk diminishing their self-concept.

Crocker and Knight (2005, p. 200) assert "people want to believe that they are worthy and valuable human beings, and this desire drives their behavior." If blacks' interactions with the political environment consistently serve as a reminder of their marginalized status within the state, then for the sake of their sense of personal worth, they will ultimately choose a course of refraining from further interaction. The narratives of black ideological thought even provide them with both the language and justification to employ for their inaction. *Black man can't make it in a white man's world. No use playing the game; it's rigged.*

African Americans face a wholly different calculation than whites when assessing their options in a political environment shaped by an emergent policy threat. For blacks, failure to translate political participation to the desired outcome carries both personal disappointment and a sense that the lens of inferiority through which the individuals' racial group is viewed was confirmed, albeit only temporarily, by the failure. The burden of double consciousness weighs heavy in a threat-abundant environment, as blacks must balance their sense of desire and obligation to be positive agents within the group with their desire to shield themselves from duress at the hands of an unresponsive sociopolitical system.

The means of resolving these conflicting pulls on the psyche and behavior of African Americans is to exercise extreme selectivity in deciding which cues in the policy environment necessitate action; they pick their battles, so to speak, very carefully. By and large, many of the relevant policy threats that emerge in blacks' political environment—including those detailed in the introduction—are simply added to their long-running script on the subjugation of black interests. These threats are consistent with African Americans' internalized beliefs about what they must contend with as members of a marginalized group in the U.S. They represent not what blacks must face in the environment, but more fundamentally what it means to be black in said environment.

Black Americans' cognitive contextualization of the policy threat as part of the cost of being black causes whatever initial unconscious affective response arises in response to the policy threat cue—be it fear, anger or sadness—to ultimately be tempered and diluted in its impact on behavior at the point it becomes consciously felt. The constraint exerted by blacks' unique ideological worldview on both the emergence of

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emotions in response to policy threats and their influence on behavior is the means by which anger is mismanaged as a mobilizing force for African Americans. Either the anger will fail to materialize among blacks, who feel a muted response to the emergent policy threat. Or, anger will materialize but does not boost their likelihood of taking up political action, because the anger cannot overcome the longstanding belief about the ineffectiveness of black action.

I conceptualize this longstanding belief as racial resignation. Resignation is defined as acceptance of something perceived to be both undesirable and inevitable. I view the group-centric form of resignation unique to blacks not as an affective state itself, but rather as a longstanding cognitive predisposition that encompasses both the sense of fatalism provoked by the narrative of subjugation and the sense of forbearance stipulated by the narrative of resilience.

When employing the interpretive lens of the black ideological worldview, blacks' appraisals of emergent policy threats primes this resignation, which in turn dampens the emotion state generated in response to the threat. If African Americans' response is indeed anger, racial resignation should prevent this emotion from mobilizing increased action to counteract the threat, as resignation signals to the individual the ineffectiveness of action to achieve responsiveness from a racially stratified political system.

I have laid out three possible ways through race influences the emotional and behavioral responses of African Americans to policy threats. The first and simplest pathway follows an AI framework. It indicates African Americans will not exhibit any discernible affective or participatory change in response to policy threats, because such threats are simply not sufficient to activate the surveillance system that triggers a change

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in feeling and behavior. Rather than represent a potential deviation from black Americans' navigation of the routine political environment, policy threats are par for the course, representing the familiar rocky terrain that blacks must navigate as a politically marginalized group. Figure 2.5 below illustrates this first pathway.

Figure 2.5: AI Pathway—African Americans' Distinctive Affective and Behavioral Response to Threat Cues

As Figure 2.5 illustrates, the policy threat cue fails to activate the surveillance system. Rather, the disposition system maintains an uninterrupted governance over African Americans' affective response. As a result, there is no discernible change in affect, leading to no change in African Americans' behavior is in response to the threat.

The second and third pathways illustrate the influence of African Americans' racial ideological worldviews on their formation of emotional and behavioral responses to cues of policy threat. These pathways broaden the framework of CAT by exploring the interaction of immediate cognitive assessments of the resources available in the present environment and the longstanding perceptions of capacity and effectiveness in the environment—perceptions I argue are governed by group identity cues.

Figure 2.6 below illustrates the pathway whereby the heuristic of the black ideological narratives conditions individual blacks' appraisal of the policy threat cue, mitigating their emotional response to the cue.

Figure 2.6: CAT Pathway—Black Ideological Narratives Constraining Emotional Response of Blacks to Threat Cue

Employing the set of lenses offered by the narratives of subjugation and resilience causes blacks to perceive the threat as further evidence of a racially stratified political system that is not responsive to black demands. The individual's sense of efficacy is tied not to her possession of resources critical for participation, but rather, to her perception of the collective capacity of the racial group to mount an effective challenge to the threat. The narrative of subjugation signals this capacity is limited, thus leaving the individual feeling inefficacious.

Consideration of the group's incapacity to effectively counter political threats primes African Americans' sense of racial resignation. This resignation breeds a sense of detachment from the political system as a means of protecting the black individual from

suffering a blow to her self-concept. This protective mechanism helps to alleviate the incumbent feelings of vulnerability brought upon by the threat.

This process ultimately produces a demonstrably muted emotional response to the threat. Rather than an action-inducing anger or a fear that prompts information seeking, the emotional response most closely resembles an indifference. Such indifference should not be taken as indication of African Americans' apathy in the face of policy threat. On the contrary, it should be viewed as the rational response of individuals' who seek to preserve a vulnerable psyche under constant barrage.

This second proposed pathway ultimately arrives at the same outcome as the first—a muted emotional response to the policy threat cue. But they arrive at this outcome through very different means. The pathway rooted in the AI model is essentially a non-conscious process. This pathway, however, relies on cognitive processing that likely takes place at both conscious and unconscious levels and draws upon group cues and longstanding predispositions held by the individual.

As I noted earlier, the pathway rooted in the CAT framework could lead to another outcome—a strong emotional response, namely anger, which does *not* translate to action in the manner expected by conventional literature. Figure 2.7 displays this final pathway below.

Figure 2.7: CAT Pathway—Black Ideological Narratives Inhibiting Effect of Anger on Action

The second pathway envisions the black ideological narratives influencing African Americans before their emotional response to the threat cue is engendered, thus conditioning the response that is ultimately registered. In contrast, this pathway envisions the narratives exerting influence *after* the emotion has already been engendered, subsequently conditioning the impact of that emotion on black participation.

I focus specifically here on anger, as this is the most action ready emotion state. Adherence to a black ideological worldview may inhibit this action-readiness for African Americans by priming racial resignation right alongside the emotion state. Even if anger arises as an automatic affective response to the policy threat, the primed sense of resignation causes African Americans to consciously wrestle with—and ultimately be skeptical of—what utility any political action they feel immediately motivated to take will ultimately have. This act of second thinking disrupts the automatic translation of anger to action, thus preventing anger from exerting a mobilizing effect on black action

as posited by current work. In this pathway then, the heuristic of racial ideology subdues the initial thrust toward action by making black individuals conscious of their limited collective political efficacy, even after they have expressed anger over the policy threat.

These figures model the possible pathways through which African Americans will respond to cues of policy threat in manners that are distinct from whites, and depart from conventional scholarly expectation. The empirical studies presented in this dissertation yield findings that can be interpreted to support all three of the pathways. These studies do not provide definitive word on which pathway is the most accurate. But they do reveal intriguing racial differences that corroborate the broad strokes of the theory presented here. Further, they affirm the need for and inform future work exploring the precise mechanisms through which blacks develop distinct emotional and behavioral response to policy threat cues than whites.

What affects how whites and blacks respond to cues of policy opportunity? Unlike the diametrically opposed racial differences in responses to threat, the racial difference in responses to opportunity is a matter of degree. I expect whites to follow the model laid out by affective intelligence theory (recall Figure 2.1). I expect African Americans, however, to respond to cues of policy opportunity with a greater motivation to take up action. Thus, for blacks but not whites, there should be a discernible *increase* in likelihood of taking up action in response to prospective opportunity. The black ideological narrative of *salvation* is the driving force for blacks' motivated response to opportunity cues.

The religious connotation signified by the narrative of salvation is apropos given the historical intertwining of black political identity and the black church. The narrative

itself, which articulates a vision of black Americans as an oppressed people who will ultimately be delivered into a promised land of racial justice, is inextricably linked to the black Protestant tradition. But it has been transmitted both inside and outside of black religious spaces.

The narrative is evident among African slaves in America who embraced the Old Testament story of Moses. They viewed the tale of his leading the Israelite exodus out of Egypt as an analogy for their own current plight and future deliverance from bondage (Feiler 2010). The narrative is also evident in Reverend Dr. King's "I Have a Dream" speech, particularly as he shares "a dream that one day this nation will rise up and live out the true meaning of its creed: 'We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal'". Finally, the salvation narrative is evident in remarks by a newly elected President Obama in 2008, as he describes the election of a black American man as the partial culmination of a centuries-long struggle for the nation to reach its ideals:

> *If there is anyone out there who still doubts that America is a place where all things are possible, who still wonders if the dream of our founders is alive in our time, who still questions the power of our democracy, tonight is your answer…It's been a long time coming, but tonight, because of what we did on this date in this election at this defining moment change has come to America.*

Whereas the narratives of subjugation and resilience place emphasis on the past and present, the salvation narrative shifts African Americans' gaze toward the future. This shift can exert significant influences on the attitudes and political calculations of blacks. By engendering African Americans with hope that there may be improvement to their normally suboptimal material circumstances, this narrative can create substantial motivation for blacks to take up political action to act on prospective opportunity in the policy sphere.

Hope is defined as a desire and expectation for a particular outcome to materialize. Similar to anger, hope is perceived to be a concrete emotional state attached to a specific object. Yet hope constitutes a future oriented affect (Just, Crigler and Belt 2007). Frijda, Kuipers and ter Schure (1989) find that in a context of uncertainty, the existence of hope that a favorable outcome will materialize alters perception of one's environment—specifically, by diminishing the role of self-agency in her assessment. This finding is complemented by the work of Uslaner (1998), who notes that feelings of optimism are rooted not in assessments of how one presently fares, but rather one's long-run expectations.

This is critical for African Americans, whose group-informed sense of agency in the political environment is typically low. If the presence of hope-inducing cues is sufficient to temporarily override blacks' characteristic sense of collective inefficacy, these cues should provide an impetus for black political action. By shifting blacks' focus away from their present suboptimal state, and toward a future in which they have faith they can shape for their benefit, salvation narratives provide blacks will effective motivation to act on potential opportunity in their environment.

Research by Just, Crigler and Belt (2007) reveals when people feel hopeful, they engage in biased information seeking, searching for confirmatory evidence that the object of their hope will be realized. Transmission of the salvation narrative helps pay the cost of this information seeking by: (1) affirming black recipients' capacity to take advantage of singular opportunities to advance black interests (evidenced by both the Jackson and Obama presidential campaigns' usage of *yes we can*) and (2) assuring blacks that their

prospects for the future remain bright despite the presence of obstacles from the past or present.

The subjugation and resilience narratives influence blacks to contextualize emergent policy threats as additions to the long-running script chronicling blacks' marginalized sociopolitical status. In contrast, the salvation narrative influences blacks to view emergent policy opportunities as constituting the next chapter in the story of exceptional moments of black breakthrough. Particularly for racially conscious blacks, this potential taps into both the desire for racial equity and the sense of obligation to utilize the resources at one's disposal to advance the interests of the race. Consequently, it compels blacks to take up political action to make good on the opportunity presented.

Figure 2.8 below presents the expected response of blacks to emergent policy opportunity in the political environment.

Figure 2.8: Proposed Pathway Translating Opportunity Cues to Behavior among African Americans

Faced with what they likely perceive to be a rarely occurring policy opportunity, blacks draw upon the cues offered by the salvation narrative to determine their response. These cues prime a collective belief in the concept of racial deliverance. They also emphasize the responsibility of individual blacks to work toward bringing that future to pass. Together, these cues imbue individual blacks with a sense of optimism and assurance that the effort they put into acting on the opportunity can both yield individual gain and reap broader benefit to the community. Feeling that their *steps are ordered by God*—to borrow the language of the church—blacks feel hopeful in response to the opportunity. This hope mobilizes them to take up political action to bring the opportunity to fruition.

Summary

This chapter laid out why African Americans should not be expected to respond to cues of either policy threat or opportunity with the same emotional and behavioral responses as whites. The ideological worldview of American liberalism to which whites generally adhere provides a perception of the political system as equitable and responsive to the demands of capable individuals. From this worldview spring the senses of efficacy and control that lead to white responses of anger to threats. This generally positive orientation to the political system also prevents policy opportunities from animating strong emotional responses among whites, leaving their level of political activity at the status quo.

The black ideological narratives of *subjugation* and *resilience* communicate to African Americans a vision of the political system as being racially biased and unresponsive to their demands. This perspective breeds a sense of vulnerability and

detachment from the political system. As a result, blacks respond with resignation and inaction to policy threats. But the black ideological narrative of *salvation* encourages blacks to make good on potential opportunities for the betterment of the race, thus engendering among blacks a sense of hopefulness that mobilizes them to take action in response to opportunity cues.

Integrating an account of how individuals' broader racial ideological views affect their immediate processing of changes to the political environment provides a more comprehensive and accurate framework for understanding citizen motivation to participate in politics. In the chapters that follow, empirical tests of the broad strokes of theoretical account are made. The empirical tests provide more groundwork for establishing a cogent theory of the relationship between racial group identification, affect, and motivation to take action in response to changes in the political environment.

Chapter 3

Study 1: ANES Data

In this chapter, I explore whether findings from a national data set conform to one or more of the models presented earlier predicting the influence of race on individuals' emotional and participatory responses to cues of both policy threat and opportunity. Extensive scholarship has made effective use of survey data to examine linkages between emotion and participation (e.g. Valentino et al 2009; Valentino et al 2011; Banks and Valentino 2012). I build upon the foundation laid by this work to test hypotheses related to my claims. From analyses of nationally representative survey data, I uncover distinct racialized patterns in how people respond emotionally to different policy environments. These patterns are generalizable, consistent across multiple time intervals, and have varying impacts on political participation. The findings from this round of analyses provide some support for the first and second pathway models (see Figures 2.5 and 2.6). Whites and blacks in the data set differ in the extent to which they report anger under conditions of policy threat and hope under conditions of opportunity.

The main takeaway from this set of analyses is the discovery of a *black anger deficit*. Under conditions of policy threat common to a sample of blacks and whites, blacks generally express greater dissatisfaction than whites; yet reports of anger dome from significantly fewer blacks relative to whites. The combination of blacks' increased levels of dissatisfaction and their relative lack of anger in these threat climates

constitutes the anger deficit. And this deficit proves robust to various specifications of the model and alternate possible explanations.

The analyses also provide suggestive evidence that blacks are more likely than whites to express *hope* when faced with the prospect of policy opportunity. Hope, however, is revealed to be a considerably weaker motivator of political action relative to anger—which significantly animates political action among both race groups. Thus, the racial anger deficit seems to portend more regarding the participation of blacks relative to whites does the racial hope differential.

I begin the chapter with a discussion of the data before moving to a set of empirical analyses testing hypotheses related to race, anger and policy threat. I then lay out and test hypotheses related to race, hope and policy opportunity. I close with discussion of the findings from both sets of analyses, and the initial implications and lingering questions that emerge from them.

Data

The cumulative American National Election Studies (ANES) data set offers a number of distinct advantages that make it well suited for tests of my hypotheses, such as adequately large samples of black respondents across years, a multitude of political attitude measures, and since 1980, a battery of questions gauging whether presidential incumbents and candidates have made respondents feel a variety of emotions (anger, fear, pride and hope).[4]

The first challenge is to determine how to operationalize policy threats in the data set. In their ANES analyses, Valentino et al. (2009, p. 312) operationalize policy

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[4] Full text of ANES emotion question: Has [name of incumbent]—because of the kind of person he is, or because of something he has done—made you feel [ANGRY; AFRAID; HOPEFUL; PROUD]?

threat simply as "the likelihood of unwanted policy change if the opposing candidate were elected." I adapt and refine this approach to provide a stronger operationalization of policy threat. If the prospect of the opposed candidate winning the Presidency is threatening, then people currently under the regime of the opposed party should perceive being in a constant state of policy threat. Thus, I limit my sample to partisan identifiers under an incumbent President of the opposing party.

Admittedly, this is a blunt instrument of operationalization, which cannot account for the myriad factors other than the partisanship of the incumbent President that affect individuals' assessments of their policy environment, such as fluctuations in the economy. Nevertheless, as will be demonstrated shortly, there is empirical evidence that the presence of Republican incumbents influences more negative assessments of the policy environment among Democratic identifiers. So while imprecise, this operationalization does reflect a genuine difference in how the partisans in the sample are processing cues within the policy environment based on the partisanship of the incumbent.

The ANES pre-election interviews are conducted from September through November of presidential election years—the height of the campaign season. It is during this time that people are bombarded with cues about what the policy landscape will look like over the course of the next four years. For people opposed to the party of the incumbent president, the prospect of the continuation of the incumbent's policies in the next presidential regime (either by the incumbent himself in a second term, or by another opposing party member who promises to largely maintain his predecessor's course of action) is particularly threatening. These partisans' concerns

about the next presidential regime are not simply based on their future forecasts, but also rooted in their actual dissatisfaction with their present policy environment. Thusly, the policy threat heralded by the out-partisan candidate's presidential bid should constitute a relevant and salient threat.

Because the emotions measures were added to the ANES in 1980, this year marks the beginning point of my analyses. Given the lack of partisan variation among the black sample in the ANES, the vast majority of the sample would be classified as threatened under Republican presidential regimes under my operationalization. Thus, to make the racial comparisons most accurate, I limit my analyses to black and white Democratic identifiers, and I conceptualize these Democrats as being in environments of policy threat during the years 1984, 1988, 1992, 2004 and 2008.[5,6]

In the analyses, the variable representing anger is a dichotomous measure, with "1" indicating the respondent reported being made to feel angry by the *incumbent* president. I focus here solely on the incumbent rather than the major party candidates because I expect the incumbent to be the recipient of credit or blame for people's satisfaction level with their current context, thus making him the most likely object of their emotional responses. Additionally, in three of the five election years in the analyses, the Republican incumbent is also the Republican candidate, running for a second term. Additionally, in one of the remaining years (1988), the incumbent's purported party

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[5] Analyses for the year 2008 are conducted separately from the pooled analyses, due to the change in the way certain questions were asked of respondents (such as party ID). Results from 2008 will be presented along with results of the pooled analyses for the remaining years.

[6] In separate analyses, the entire sample of ANES respondents was included across all years 1980 through 2004 in the pooled ANES. The results for these analyses are consistent with those presented here, indicating that (1) the anger deficit is not unique to Democratic identifiers, and (2) generally, the anger deficit has consequences for the participation of African Americans relative to whites beyond party lines. See Appendix Figure 6.1 for respective predicted probabilities of reporting anger for whites and blacks. See Figure 6.2 for impact of reporting anger on participation across all years and party IDs.

successor in office is his Vice President. I assume the motivation to prevent Vice

Presidential successors to the office is equivalent to the motivation to oust incumbents

seeking a second term. All results discussed are from analyses run on the ANES for the

years 1984, 1988, 1992, 2004 and 2008. All independent and control variables are

coded 0 to 1.

Race, Policy Threat and Anger—Hypotheses

Consistent with my proposition that adherence to the black ideological narratives

of subjugation and resilience causes African Americans to possess more pessimistic

long-term assessments of the political environment than do whites, I expect that across

the election years included in my analyses, blacks in the ANES sample will consistently

report more negative evaluations of the economy than their white Democratic

counterparts (H_1). These narratives have the potential to constrain the emotional

response of African Americans in one of two ways. One, adherence to the narratives can

inhibit the arousal of anger among blacks (consistent with the first and second pathways).

If this is the case, I should expect a greater proportion of whites in the sample to express

anger toward specific relevant actors in the environment than blacks (H_2).

Alternately, the narratives can inhibit not the arousal of anger among blacks, but

rather, the mobilizing impact of anger on black respondents' political activity (the third

pathway; see Figure 2.7). If this is the case, then anger should be positively associated

with increased political activity for whites, but *not* for blacks (H_3). I expect H_2 and H_3 to

run in opposition to one another, such that if evidence is found in support of one,

evidence should also support the other's null.

Race, Policy Threat, and Anger—Findings

To test hypothesis 1, I examined the difference between black and white

Democrats on two measures of respondents' appraisals of their environment. The

variable labeled e*conomic evaluations* is a 5-category measure gauging how

respondents feel the condition of the national economy has fared over the past year. It

is coded so that 1 indicates respondents feel the national economy has gotten

significantly *worse*. *Incumbent approval* is a 5-category measure combining responses

to the questions of whether the respondent approves or disapproves how the incumbent

has handled his job, and how strongly they approve or disapprove. The variable is

coded so that higher scores indicate stronger disapproval of the job performance of the

Republican incumbent.

Figure 3.1 below displays black and white respondents' mean responses on

the economic evaluation measure, while Figure 3.2 displays their respective mean

responses on the incumbent approval measure.[7] For comparative purposes, the years

under Democratic incumbents (1980, 1996, and 2000) are also included to illustrate

that Democrats are indeed more negative under out-party incumbents than under

same-party incumbents.

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[7] Could racial differences in economic evaluations simply be a product of uncontrolled for economic disparities between blacks and whites in the sample? See Appendix Table 6.1 for results of OLS regression analyses with economic evaluations as the dependent variable, and race and personal economic indicators as independent and control variables. In most threat years, the positive effect of race on reporting negative evaluations is robust to inclusion of economic status variables. This supports the notion that African Americans indeed possess more negative orientations toward their political environment than whites. Also included is Table 6.2, presenting the results of OLS regressions with Republican incumbent disapproval as the dependent variables. Racial differences are even more robust to economic condition measures here.

Figure 3.1: Democrats' Evaluations of National Economy, by Race and Year

*Red outline indicates policy threat condition, represented by presence of Republican incumbent
**Variable reverse coded, so higher scores indicate belief economy has gotten *worse* in past year.

With the exception of the year 1980, when the economy sank into a recession, the economic evaluations of Democratic ANES respondents are noticeably more negative under Republican incumbents than Democratic presidents. This indicates that Republican regimes indeed signal threatening political environments for this sample.

Given their common threatening environment, there is no reason to expect black and white Democrats to feel unequally dismal about the state of the economy. Yet, as the figures indicate, in every year except 2008 African American Democrats report more negative evaluations of the economy than white Democrats.[8] ANOVA tests reveal these differences to be significant at alpha level 0.05 across all years in the study.

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[8] It is worth noting that the 2008 evaluations are reported in the midst of a national recession beginning in 2007, which may explain the higher numbers of white Democrats reporting dissatisfaction with the economy.

Figure 3.2: Democrats' Disapproval of Republican Incumbents, by Race and Year

*Red outline indicates policy threat condition, represented by presence of Republican incumbent
**Variable reverse coded, so higher scores indicate greater *disapproval* for incumbent

Turning to incumbent approval ratings, differences in black and white Democrats' approval of Republican incumbents are larger and consistent across all threat years. Blacks are consistently and significantly more disapproving of Republican incumbents than their white Democrats. These racial differences are essentially washed away when Democrats evaluate Democratic incumbents. This indicates that under the contexts operationalized as threatening, black Democrats are indeed more pessimistic toward the relevant actors within the political environment than their white Democratic counterparts. Whether this pessimism is due to perceptions of racially biased policy agendas tied to the Reagan and Bush administrations or a reflection of substantive socioeconomic disparities between blacks and whites in the sample, conventional

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thinking asserts this pessimism will lead to more anger from black Democrats relative

to white Democrats. However, analyses presented below reveal this is not the case.

Hypothesis 2 is tested via logistic regression analyses conducted on the sample

of Democrats. The dependent variable is the dichotomous measure of whether the

respondent expressed anger at the Republican incumbent. A host of variables are

included in the model that can be characterized as either resource variables (such as

household income, employment status and educational attainment), or measures of

engagement with politics (such as interest in the campaign and knowledge about

politics). Additionally included are measures of internal and external efficacy.[9] The

key variable in the model is the dichotomous variable identifying black Democrats.

Results of the logistic regression analyses for the years 1980 through 2004 are

presented in Table 3.1, and analyses from 2008 are presented in Table 3.2.

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[9] The measure of external efficacy is coded so that 1 indicates feeling *least* efficacious. This coding
decision reflects the expectation that feeling government is not responsive to one's input should be
positively associated with expressing anger toward a relevant political actor.

Table 3.1: Logistic Regression among Democrats—Reporting Anger toward Republican Incumbent as Dependent Variable, 1980-2004[10]

VARIABLES	MODEL 1		MODEL 2	
Black Democrat	-0.28*	(0.14)	0.33	(0.33)
Incumbent Disapproval	2.39***	(0.00)	2.52***	(0.19)
Black Democrat X Incumbent Disapproval	--	--	-0.83*	(0.41)
Negative Economic Evaluation	0.34	(0.24)	0.36	(0.24)
Education	0.76***	(0.21)	0.78***	(0.21)
Household Income	-0.08	(0.17)	-0.08	(0.23)
Home Ownership	-0.25*	(0.12)	-0.25*	(0.12)
Unemployed	0.08	(0.17)	0.08	(0.17)
Age	-0.80***	(0.21)	-0.80***	(0.21)
Female	0.12	(0.12)	0.12	(0.11)
South	-0.21^	(0.11)	-0.20^	(0.11)
Interest in Campaign	0.57***	(0.16)	0.56***	(0.16)
Political Knowledge	0.31**	(0.11)	0.31**	(0.11)
Strength of Partisanship	0.51*	(0.21)	0.54*	(0.21)
Internal Efficacy	0.16	(0.13)	0.15	(0.13)
Mistrust	1.08***	(0.25)	1.08***	(0.25)
External Efficacy (coded negatively)	0.13	(0.14)	0.13	(0.14)
Year=1988	-0.67***	(0.13)	-0.67***	(0.13)
Year=1992	-0.64***	(0.14)	-0.65***	(0.14)
Constant	-2.21***	(0.31)	-2.31***	(0.31)
Observations	2214		2214	

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[10] Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, ^ $p<0.10$. The control variable for year=2004 was dropped due to collinearity.

Pseudo R²	0.18	0.18

As the first column of Table 3.1 reveals, even when controlling for the battery of demographic and engagement variables, black Democrats are significantly *less* likely than white Democrats to report feeling anger toward Republican incumbents. Further, this result is robust to inclusion of the economic evaluation and incumbent approval measures. The black Democrat variable has a coefficient of -0.28, significant at the 0.05 alpha level.

Table 3.2: Logistic Regression among Democrats—Reporting Anger toward Republican Incumbent as Dependent Variable, 2008[11]

VARIABLES	MODEL 1		MODEL 2	
Black Democrat	-1.07**	(0.35)	13.06	(675.44)
Incumbent Disapproval	2.24***	(0.64)	2.67***	(0.72)
Black Democrat X Incumbent Disapproval	--	--	-14.19	(675.44)
Negative Economic Evaluation	-0.47	(1.41)	-0.07	(1.41)
Education	1.70*	(0.69)	1.66*	(0.69)
Household Income	-0.96	(0.80)	-0.90	(0.80)
Home Ownership	0.18	(0.34)	0.19	(0.35)
Unemployed	-1.21	(0.52)	-1.18*	(0.52)
Age	-2.13*	(0.85)	-1.97*	(0.86)
Female	0.15	(0.34)	0.13	(0.34)
South	-0.72*	(0.33)	-0.72*	(0.33)
Interest in Campaign	1.34*	(0.56)	1.27*	(0.57)
Political Knowledge	0.01	(0.32)	0.05	(0.32)
Strength of Partisanship	0.91*	(0.41)	0.88*	(0.41)
Internal Efficacy	0.37	(0.54)	0.33	(0.54)
Mistrust	1.66*	(0.83)	1.69*	(0.83)
External Efficacy (coded negatively)	-0.71	(0.49)	-0.69	(0.49)
Constant	-0.50	(1.62)	-1.30	(1.69)
Observations	453		453	
Pseudo R²	0.17		0.18	

[11] Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.10. The control variable for year=2004 was dropped due to collinearity.

As shown in Table 3.2, the coefficient on black Democrats in 2008 is also negative and significant in a two-tailed test. Figure 3.3 reveals black and white Democrats' respective likelihoods of expressing anger toward Republican incumbents when all control variables are set at their mean values.

Figure 3.3: Democrats' Predicted Probabilities of Expressing Anger toward Republican Incumbents, with Control Variables at Means

For the threat years 1984, 1998, 1992 and 2004 white Democrats are about seven percentage points more likely than black Democrats to express anger toward Republican incumbents. In 2008, the difference jumps to about ten percentage points.

The anger deficit displayed by black Democrats in 2008 is particularly striking given this time period offers black Democrats the chance to express their anger toward the incumbent for the government's response to Hurricane Katrina, which blacks overwhelmingly decried as an instance of racial discrimination on the part of the federal government (Dawson 2011; White et al 2007).

These findings provide support for hypothesis 2, revealing the presence of an anger deficit among black Democrats—despite their more pessimistic evaluations of the political environment relative to white Democrats. This anger deficit suggests the impact of black respondents' ideological worldview is to suppress the emergence of anger in response to the threat cue represented by the Republican incumbent. If the racial difference is indeed manifest at the level of emotion arousal, rather than at the influence of emotion on behavior, then additional findings should support rejecting H_3. I present these findings shortly.

For the years 1980-2004, the positive association between disapproval of the incumbent and likelihood of expressing anger toward him is particularly strong and large in magnitude. Accordingly, I re-ran the model with the inclusion of an interaction between race of the Democratic identifier and negative evaluation of the incumbent. Results for this model are shown in the second column of Table 3.1. The coefficient of -0.83 (SE=0.41) for the interaction term reaches significance in a two-tailed test. Because accurate interpretation of interaction terms requires examination of the marginal effects of the interaction components, I present in Figure 3.4 the marginal effects plots for white and black Democrats.

**Figure 3.4: Conditional Marginal Effect of Race on White and Black Democrats'
Likelihood of Expressing of Anger toward Incumbent at Various Levels of Approval,
with 95% CI**

Figure 3.3.5: Conditional Marginal Effect of Race on White and Black Democrats' Likelihood of Expressing of Anger toward Incumbent at Various

The marginal plots reveal a stark difference in the emotional responses of the black and white Democrats who evaluate the Republican incumbents most harshly. The upward sloping arc of the plot for white Democrats reveals that as their evaluations of the Republican incumbents become more negative, they become more likely to express anger toward them. In contrast, the downward slope of the plot for black Democrats reveals that as they become more disapproving of Republican incumbents, they become *less* likely to express anger toward them.

The confidence intervals of white and black Democrats stop overlapping as they move from weak disapproval to strong disapproval of the Republican incumbent, revealing that the racial anger deficit is most apparent among the most dissatisfied

Democrats. This disparity is inconsistent with extant scholarship. Yet it conforms to the expectations of the first and second pathways, as it indicates that blacks with the most negative perceptions of a relevant actor their political environment—the presidential incumbent—are reacting with anger to a considerably weaker degree than their white counterparts.

Finally, to test hypothesis 3, a series of logistic regression analyses were conducted with a range of political activities as the dependent variable, including voting in the Presidential election, attempting to influence the vote choice of someone else, attending a political meeting or rally, and wearing a campaign button or sticker. These are the types of activities that distinguish the most politically engaged citizens from the rest of the electorate.

If the racial difference in responses to policy threats manifests in the arousal of emotion, then there should be no difference in how anger translates to action for white and black Democrats, rejecting H_3. Finding a positive correlation between anger and taking part in political activities for both whites and blacks reveals the potential of the racial anger deficit to make African Americans disengaged from mainstream political behavior. Conversely, a finding that anger mobilizes political action among whites but not blacks suggests African Americans may be processing anger in a manner unanticipated by me.

Once again, resource and engagement variables are included in the model. The key independent variable of interest is the dichotomous variable measuring whether the respondent has expressed anger toward the incumbent. Also of interest is an interaction between race of Democrat and reporting anger toward the incumbent. This interaction

term is included to determine whether anger differentially impacts the political behavior of African Americans. Results of the logistic regressions are shown in Table 3.3 below.

Table 3.3: Logistic Regression Predicting Likelihood of Voting among Democrats, 1980-2004[12]

VARIABLES	MODEL 1		MODEL 2	
Report of Anger toward Incumbent	0.29*	(0.15)	0.20	(0.16)
Anger*Race of Democrat	--	--	0.37	(0.31)
Incumbent Disapproval	0.15	(0.22)	0.16	(0.22)
Negative Economic Evaluation	-0.20	(0.30)	-0.20	(0.30)
Black Democrat	0.41*	(0.17)	0.18	(0.25)
Education	1.32***	(0.28)	1.32***	(0.28)
Household Income	1.08***	(0.28)	1.07***	(0.28)
Home Ownership	0.57***	(0.15)	0.57***	(0.15)
Unemployed	-0.25	(0.19)	-0.26	(0.19)
Age	0.72**	(0.26)	0.73**	(0.26)
Female	0.40**	(0.14)	0.40**	(0.14)
South	-0.54***	(0.14)	-0.53***	(0.14)
Interest in Campaign	1.66***	(0.19)	1.67***	(0.19)
Political Knowledge	0.71***	(0.14)	0.71***	(0.14)
Strength of Partisanship	1.37***	(0.26)	1.36***	(0.26)
Internal Efficacy	0.28	(0.17)	0.29	(0.17)
Mistrust	-0.17	(0.33)	-0.17	(0.33)
External Efficacy (coded negatively)	-0.64***	(0.17)	-0.65**	(0.17)

[12] Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, ^ $p<0.10$. The control variable for year=2004 was dropped due to collinearity.

Year=1988	-0.23	(0.16)	-0.23	(0.16)
Year=1992	0.18	(0.17)	0.19	(0.17)
Constant	-2.48***	(0.38)	-2.48***	(0.35)
Observations	1951		1951	
Pseudo R²	0.25		0.25	

The first column presents the results for voting in the Presidential election. As expected, the coefficient on the anger variable is positive and passes a two-tailed significance test. Anger exhibits an empirically discernible positive correlation with this form of participation, even in the presence of a multitude of measures conventionally associated with political action. Further, the second row of Model 2 reveals a null interactive effect between race and reporting anger, indicating anger is working no differently for black Democrats than for white Democrats. The difference in likelihood of voting among individuals who express anger and those who do not with all control variables set to mean levels is about four percentage points. Given the little variation in self-reports of voting in presidential elections, the nontrivial boost offered by anger is notable.

Further, as presented in Table 3.4 below, the motivating impact of anger on political action is not limited to the domain of voting.

Table 3.4: Logistic Regression Predicting Political Activities among Democrats,

1980-2004

VARIABLES	Influencing another's vote choice		Attending a political mtg		Wearing a button/ Sticker	
Report of Anger toward Incumbent	0.66***	(0.13)	0.92***	(0.25)	0.50*	(0.20)
Incumbent Disapproval	0.56**	(0.20)	0.38	(0.34)	0.90**	(0.30)
Negative Economic Evaluation	0.35	(0.25)	0.36	(0.39)	0.24	(0.34)
Black Democrat	-0.48**	(0.14)	0.43*	(0.21)	-0.07	(0.19)
Education	0.15	(0.21)	0.89**	(0.32)	0.26	(0.29)
Household Income	0.48*	(0.24)	-0.07	(0.37)	-0.21	(0.33)
Home Ownership	0.04	(0.13)	-0.02	(0.20)	0.24	(0.18)
Unemployed	0.08	(0.18)	0.16	(0.27)	0.17	(0.23)
Age	-1.06***	(0.23)	-0.82*	(0.36)	-1.23***	(0.32)
Female	0.35**	(0.11)	-0.42*	(0.17)	-0.37*	(0.15)
South	0.09	(0.12)	-0.09	(0.19)	0.07	(0.17)
Interest in Campaign	1.61***	(0.18)	0.69*	(0.29)	1.28***	(0.26)
Political Knowledge	0.40**	(0.12)	0.64***	(0.13)	0.21	(0.18)
Strength of Partisanship	0.82***	(0.21)	0.55^	(0.33)	1.00**	(0.30)
Internal Efficacy	-0.37^	(0.12)	0.51**	(0.19)	-0.03	(0.17)
Mistrust	0.95**	(0.28)	0.41	(0.44)	0.28	(0.39)
External Efficacy (coded negatively)	-0.37*	(0.14)	-0.84***	(0.24)	-0.33^	(0.20)
Year=1988	-0.19	(0.14)	-0.13	(0.23)	-0.14	(0.20)
Year=1992	-0.33	(0.14)	-0.08	(0.22)	-0.03	(0.19)
Constant	-3.54***	(0.33)	-5.06***	(0.54)	-4.29***	(0.47)
Observations	1950		1951		1952	

Pseudo R²	0.16	0.15	0.10

Expressing anger toward the Republican incumbent is positively and significantly associated influencing the vote choice of others, attending a political meeting or rally and wearing a campaign button or sticker. Figure 3.5 presents the effect of anger on the probability of engaging in these activities, broken out by race of Democrat.

Figure 3.6: Effect of Anger on Democrats' Likelihood of Political Action, by Race—across all years 1980-2004

As the figure illustrates, possession of anger toward the Republican incumbent makes both white and black Democrats significantly more likely to engage in these political activities. In two of the cases, possession of anger not only closes the racial participation deficit for blacks, it boosts black participation to the point that it exceeds white participation. The motivating impact of anger on these actions makes more critical the fact that a greater proportion of blacks than whites are found in the "no anger" condition rather than the "anger" condition.

The results from the 1980-2004 analyses indicate the anger deficit exhibited by black respondents has real consequences for their participation relative to whites. Just as their general lack of socioeconomic resources relative to whites hinders the participation of African Americans, these analyses suggest that blacks' general lack of anger relative to whites also inhibits their participation. It must be noted, however, that the anger does *not* exhibit the same positive influences on participation in the 2008 analyses. As shown in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 below, anger is only significantly and positively related to one form of action—wearing a campaign sticker or button.

Table 3.5: Logistic Regression Predicting Likelihood of Voting among Democrats, 2008[13]

VARIABLES	MODEL 1		MODEL 2	
Report of Anger toward Incumbent	-1.31	(1.19)	-14.80	(1540.23)
*Anger*Race of Democrat*	--	--	14.09	(1540.23)
Black Democrat	-0.42	(0.77)	-14.32	(1540.23)
Education	1.39	(1.41)	1.37	(1.40)
Household Income	1.77	(1.57)	1.70*	(1.57)
Home Ownership	1.64*	(0.71)	1.67***	(0.15)
Unemployed	-0.69	(1.21)	-0.81	(1.23)
Age	-5.14*	(1.99)	-5.17*	(2.00)
Female	0.82	(0.67)	0.75	(0.67)
South	-0.56	(0.64)	-0.60	(0.64)
Interest in Campaign	3.91**	(1.22)	3.87***	(1.23)
Political Knowledge	0.48	(0.65)	0.44	(0.66)
Strength of Partisanship	2.56*	(1.00)	2.57*	(1.00)
Internal Efficacy	0.31	(1.19)	0.22	(1.18)
Mistrust	-2.25	(1.87)	-2.22	(1.87)
External Efficacy (coded negatively)	-3.38**	(1.27)	-3.34**	(1.28)
Constant	3.84^	(2.19)	-17.42	(1540.23)
Observations	422		422	
Pseudo R^2	0.32		0.33	

[13] Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.10. The variables economic evaluation and incumbent disapproval were dropped due to collinearity.

In the 2008 analyses, anger is *negatively* associated with attending a political meeting or rally (b=-1.38, SE=0.49). Otherwise, anger produces only null effects, including in the domain of voting. In sum, anger is demonstrated to be positively associated with various campaign activities for both black and whites between 1980 and 2004. But anger fails to produce a consistently positive influence on participation in the 2008 analyses.

Table 3.6: Logistic Regression Predicting Political Activities among Democrats, 2008

VARIABLES	Influencing another's vote choice		Attending a political meeting or rally		Wearing a campaign button/sticker	
Report of Anger toward Incumbent	0.19	(0.32)	-1.38**	(0.49)	0.84*	(0.41)
Incumbent Disapproval	1.77*	(0.82)	-3.41***	(0.90)	1.44	(1.09)
Negative Economic Evaluation	-0.65	(0.95)	-1.44	(1.35)	0.02	(0.98)
Black Democrat	0.11	(0.65)	-0.95^	(0.56)	0.65**	(0.24)
Education	0.86*	(0.41)	-0.78	(0.86)	0.33	(0.43)
Household Income	0.16	(0.51)	-0.36	(1.01)	0.17	(0.54)
Home Ownership	-0.21	(0.23)	-0.34	(0.47)	-0.32	(0.24)
Unemployed	-0.44	(0.42)	0.31	(0.71)	0.30	(0.44)
Age	-0.57	(0.55)	0.49	(1.07)	0.46	(0.58)
Female	0.46*	(0.22)	-0.29	(0.45)	0.46	(0.24)
South	-0.48*	(0.22)	-0.43	(0.46)	-0.34	(0.23)
Interest in Campaign	1.76***	(0.42)	0.69*	(0.29)	1.55**	(0.48)
Political Knowledge	0.02	(0.21)	0.54	(0.42)	0.10	(0.23)
Strength of Partisanship	0.30	(0.26)	-1.05^	(0.55)	0.41	(0.28)
Internal Efficacy	-0.11	(0.35)	-1.44	(1.35)	0.44	(0.37)
Mistrust	0.13	(0.58)	-2.49*	(1.01)	-0.60	(0.62)
External Efficacy (coded negatively)	-0.17	(0.33)	-3.41***	(0.90)	-0.58^	(0.35)
Constant	-2.97*	(1.33)	6.61***	(1.87)	-4.68**	(1.58)
Observations	453		447		453	
Pseudo R^2	0.09		0.28		0.10	

Nevertheless, these analyses yield no racial difference in how anger translates to political activity, indicating rejection of H$_3$. Findings from the ANES data suggest that black ideological cues inhibit the arousal of anger among black Democrats, without inhibiting its mobilizing effect on black participation. These findings conform to the first and second pathways. As I have no means of testing the mechanism inhibiting anger for black respondents, I cannot say whether this black anger deficit is arising subconsciously (consistent with the AI pathway) or consciously (consistent with the CAT pathway). But the evidence that the arousal of anger is being impeded among black respondents relative to their white counterparts under a common threat is a notable one.

I ran an additional set of analyses to ensure the racial anger deficit uncovered here is not simply a proxy for blacks' general lack of socioeconomic resources, efficacy or political engagement relative to whites. First, I ran separate models for black and white respondents predicting expression of anger toward the incumbent. The results of these models are presented in Table 3.7.

Table 3.7: Logistic Regression Predicting Anger toward Republican Incumbents

1980-2004, for Black and White Democrats Separately[14]

VARIABLES	Black Democrats		White Democrats	
Incumbent Disapproval	1.71***	(0.43)	2.53***	(0.21)
Negative Economic Evaluation	0.12	(0.56)	0.46	(0.30)
Education	1.06*	(0.53)	0.75**	(0.25)
Household Income	0.80	(0.57)	-0.18	(0.27)
Home Ownership	-0.19	(0.28)	-0.28^	(0.15)
Unemployed	0.52	(0.33)	-0.02	(0.23)
Age	-1.22*	(0.51)	-0.84**	(0.26)
Female	0.20	(0.27)	0.13	(0.13)
South	-0.35	(0.25)	-0.07	(0.15)
Interest in Campaign	0.32	(0.35)	0.55**	(0.19)
Political Knowledge	0.33	(0.27)	0.27^	(0.14)
Strength of Partisanship	0.94^	(0.50)	0.55*	(0.26)
Internal Efficacy	- 0.28	(0.29)	0.22	(0.16)
Mistrust	1.13^	(0.58)	1.01**	(0.32)
External Efficacy (coded negatively)	0.35	(0.31)	0.14	(0.17)
Year=1988	-0.98**	(0.32)	-0.80***	(0.16)
Year=1992	-0.45	(0.32)	-0.81***	(0.17)
Constant	-2.35**	(0.76)	-2.37***	(0.37)
Observations	417		1535	
Pseudo R^2	0.15		0.20	

[14] Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.10. The control variable for year=2004 was dropped due to collinearity.

In addition to the previously examined markers of displeasure with the incumbent (incumbent disapproval, and dissatisfaction with the state of the national economy over the past year), the same factors that are significant (or marginally significant) and positively correlated with expressing anger for black respondents—political mistrust, education and strength of partisanship—are positively correlated with expressing anger for white respondents. Could the racial anger deficit simply be a product of blacks not possessing any of these anger-boosting attributes to the same degree as whites?

Independent sample t-tests reveal whites and black respondents to have no differences in their levels of mistrust, whereas blacks report stronger partisanship than whites. On the other hand, blacks lag significantly behind whites in mean education level. Is the racial anger deficit simply a product of disparities in blacks' possession of this anger stimulating resource? The fact that the anger deficit persists when we control for the education variable in a multivariate analysis suggests that it is not. To further refute this claim, I ran a logistic regression predicting expressions of anger toward the incumbent including an interaction term between race of respondent and education level. Results are presented in Table 3.8.

Table 3.8: Logistic Regressions Predicting Anger toward Republican Incumbents 1980-2004, including Interactions between Race and Education & Political Knowledge[15]

VARIABLES		
Race	-0.56*	(0.25)
*Race*Educ Interaction*	0.61	(0.48)
Education	0.69**	(0.22)
Political Knowledge	0.29*	(0.11)
Incumbent Disapproval	2.38***	(0.17)
Negative Economic Evaluation	0.34	(0.24)
Household Income	-0.07	(0.23)
Home Ownership	-0.23*	(0.12)
Unemployed	0.10	(0.17)
Age	-0.79***	(0.21)
Female	0.11	(0.11)
South	-0.23*	(0.11)
Interest in Campaign	0.61***	(0.15)
Strength of Partisanship	0.60**	(0.20)
Internal Efficacy	- 0.16	(0.13)
Mistrust	1.08***	(0.25)
External Efficacy (coded negatively)	0.15	(0.14)
Year=1988	-0.68***	(0.13)
Year=1992	-0.68	(0.14)
Constant	-2.19***	(0.30)

[15] Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, ^ $p<0.10$. The control variable for year=2004 was dropped due to collinearity.

Observations	2214
Pseudo R²	0.18

The coefficient on respondent race is negative and significant at the 0.05 alpha level. But the interaction term between race and education is only slightly larger than its standard error. This null result provides assurance that the racial disparity in education attained is not the driving force behind the black anger deficit.

The final set of analyses addresses a possible alternate explanation for the anger deficit findings that deviates from my theoretical contention. Are blacks less likely to express anger toward incumbents simply because they are expressing anxiety toward them? To answer this question, I ran a logistic regression model identical to that used to test hypothesis 2, but with expression of *anxiety* toward the incumbent as the dependent variable. Table 3.9 presents the results of this analysis.

Table 3.9: Logistic Regression among Democrats—Reporting Feeling Afraid of Republican Incumbent as Dependent Variable[16]

VARIABLES	1980-2004		2008	
Black Democrat	-0.15	(0.13)	-0.13	(0.26)
Incumbent Disapproval	1.98***	(0.18)	2.47***	(0.62)
Negative Economic Evaluation	-0.11	(0.22)	0.08	(1.04)
Education	0.94***	(0.20)	0.99*	(0.47)
Household Income	-0.16	(0.21)	-0.37	(0.58)
Home Ownership	0.01	(0.11)	-0.37	(0.27)
Unemployed	0.15	(0.16)	0.55	(0.47)
Age	-0.85***	(0.20)	-1.95**	(0.64)
Female	0.27**	(0.10)	0.71**	(0.25)
South	-0.12	(0.11)	-0.52*	(0.24)
Interest in Campaign	0.32*	(0.15)	0.52	(0.44)
Political Knowledge	0.21^	(0.11)	0.07	(0.24)
Strength of Partisanship	0.36^	(0.19)	0.47	(0.29)
Internal Efficacy	0.13	(0.12)	0.24	(0.40)
Mistrust	0.90***	(0.24)	0.92	(0.64)
External Efficacy (coded negatively)	-0.07	(0.13)	-0.92*	(0.38)
Year=1988	-0.66***	(0.13)	--	--
Year=1992	0.32**	(0.12)	--	--
Constant	-2.98***	(0.29)	-1.38	(1.29)
Observations	2242		467	
Pseudo R^2	0.15		0.12	

[16] Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.10. The control variable for year=2004 was dropped due to collinearity.

The first column of Table 3.9 presents the results from the pooled years 1980 through 2004, while results from 2008 are displayed in the second column. For both time periods, the coefficient on race of respondent is statistically indistinguishable from zero, indicating that blacks in the sample are no or more less likely than whites to report being made to feel anxious by the incumbent. These models refute the notion that African Americans are generally not expressing anger in these contexts of policy threat because they are expressing fear. Thus, the possibility remains that the anger deficit uncovered here reflects the generally muted emotional response of African Americans to policy threats. This paves the way for subsequent studies to examine *why* this muted response is generated. Is it because the threats represent only business as usual for blacks? Or is it due to blacks consciously employing ideological narratives to nullify the emotion-arousing effects of the threat?

The preceding sets of analyses uncover strong and robust evidence indicating policy threats elicit an emotional response of anger from a significantly smaller proportion of blacks than whites. These findings also provide a compelling counter to the claims that less blacks express anger because they possess less socioeconomic or engagement resources, or that blacks are more likely to feel afraid than angry in response to policy threats. Yet there exists another alternate explanation that must be addressed. Is it indeed the case that fewer blacks than whites are reporting anger under common policy threat climates? Or are fewer blacks *reporting* being angry despite actually feeling anger, due to social desirability concerns?

The stereotypical images of the menacing, violence-prone "angry black man" and the garish, domineering "angry black woman" are prevalent and easily accessible

in mainstream American discourse. Such stereotype frames have even been employed

as prisms through which to view the actions of both Barack (see Cassidy 2012) and

Michelle Obama (see Nelson 2013), illustrating their relevance to U.S. politics. Could

black ANES respondents, not wanting to conform to this salient stereotype,

inaccurately report that incumbents did not make ever make them feel angry when

indeed they *were* made to feel angry?

This may appear to be an intriguing explanation for the racial anger deficit

uncovered in the analyses. Yet, this explanation does not hold up under careful

scrutiny. Anger was empirically shown to be positively correlated with political

activity. Therefore, if a significant portion of blacks who reported feeling no anger

actually *did* feel anger, the differences in participation levels between blacks in the

"anger" column and those in the "no anger" column in Figure 3.5 should not be nearly

as large in magnitude as they are. Further, the predictors of anger for blacks are

largely consistent with those for whites, indicating there is no other factor along which

blacks are uniquely and systematically responding to the anger question.

Studies across multiple disciplines employing various methodologies to

explore feelings of anger among blacks tend to find no significant differences between

blacks and whites in reports of feeling and expressing anger (Mabry and Kiecolt 2005;

Walley-Jean 2009). Walley-Jean (2009) finds a tendency among black women to

suppress feelings of anger in immediate contexts triggering their frustration. Whereas

it seems this finding may corroborate the claim that black ANES respondents are

suppressing their true feelings of anger toward incumbents when asked, it is more

likely the case that this anger suppression conforms to the second pathway (see Figure

2.6). Once the immediately aroused affect of anger interacts with the predisposition of racial resignation invoked by the threat, such anger subsides by the time it is consciously manifested. Thus, responding to the survey question by saying one was not made angry is indeed an accurate assessment of the emotions the black respondent allowed himself to feel whenever provoked by the incumbent, as opposed to a fabricated response drudged up so as not to conform to a negative stereotype.

The notion that fear of conforming to the "angry black" stereotype may constrain African Americans' immediate affective response to cues in their political environment should not be dismissed outright. It should be explored in greater depth, because it reveals a critical means through which a salient narrative of the black American experience moderates the cognitive, affective and behavioral experiences of blacks in politically relevant contexts. Nonetheless, the racial anger deficit found here appears to not be driven by black respondents' surface-level social desirability concerns when responding to the ANES questions.

In sum, the findings presented thus far are most consistent with the image of African Americans employing a distinct interpretative lens of their political environment, which stems their tide of anger over a policy threat, relative to white counterparts. Blacks were no more likely than whites to express anxiety under the same policy threat contexts, refuting the notion that feelings of anger and anxiety are an either-or proposition in response to threat. It is not the case that fewer blacks than whites report anger because they are afraid. In the absence of anger or fear, what *are* they feeling?

The anger deficit has implications for participation, as expressions of anger are positively associated with voting and a host other electoral activities for both whites and blacks, but not across all analyses. these findings suggest anger can be viewed analogously to socioeconomic and engagement resources from the civic voluntarism model; the fact that blacks generally possess anger in smaller measure than whites hurts blacks' political participation relative to whites.

I now turn to hypotheses and analyses related to race, hope, and policy opportunity. To this point African Americans have shown less inclination to express anger than whites under contexts of policy threat. Will they show a greater inclination to express hope under climates of prospective policy opportunity? I adapt the logistic regression analyses employed above to answer this question.

Again, the primary comparison is between black and white Democratic identifiers. Consistent with the designation of hope as a future-oriented emotion state in the previous chapter, I shift focus in these analyses from incumbent Presidents in election years to Democratic presidential *candidates*. Among the Democratic identifiers in the sample, such candidates should represent the prospect of an agreeable policy landscape. Further, that prospect should be salient for Democrats regardless of their present policy environment. Hence, I make no theoretical or empirical distinction here for the party affiliation of the incumbent and examine all years 1980-2008.[17]

Race, Policy Opportunity and Hope—Hypotheses

In the previous chapter, I introduced the black ideological narrative of salvation, which is primed among African Americans when receiving cues of opportunity and

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[17] Once again, results for 2008 will be presented separately from those from the pooled data set

provides motivation for them to act on the opportunity (see Figure 2.8 for a visual model of the pathway connecting racial ideology, emotion and action). This concept informs my hypotheses regarding the respective influence of policy opportunity cues on black and white Democrats. Among Democrats, I expect a greater proportion of blacks to report feeling hopeful about the Democratic candidate than whites (H_1). Feelings of hope expressed by blacks will be mediated by their feelings of optimism regarding the future (H_2). Finally, expressions of hope will have a stronger positive association with political participation for black Democrats relative to white Democrats (H_3).

Race, Policy Opportunity and Hope—Findings

Hypothesis 1 is tested via multivariate logistic regression analyses conducted on the sample of white and black Democrats across all eligible years. The dependent variable is the dichotomous measure indicating whether or not the Democratic respondent at any point expressed hope for the Democratic candidate. The key independent variable is the race of respondent. The control variables included in the model are identical to those from the anger analyses, with the addition of one variable— how the respondent feels the national economy will change in the next year. This 5-category variable is employed as a measure of respondents' optimism. It is coded so that 0 indicates the respondent feels the economy will get significantly worse in the next year, and 1 indicates the economy will get significantly better. The results from analyses for the period from 1980 through 2004 are presented in Table 3.10.

Table 3.10: Logistic Regression among Democrats—Expressing Hope for

Democratic Presidential Candidates as Dependent Variable, 1980-2004[18]

VARIABLES	MODEL 1		MODEL 2		MODEL 3	
Black Democrat	0.27*	(0.11)	0.27*	(0.11)	0.49*	(0.20)
National Economy Forecast	--	--	0.39**	(0.12)	0.48**	(0.14)
Black Dem*Nat'l Economy Forecast	--	--	--	--	-0.42	(0.30)
Incumbent Disapproval	0.45**	(0.13)	0.50***	(0.14)	0.51***	(0.14)
Negative Economic Evaluation	0.24	(0.18)	0.26	(0.19)	0.26	(0.19)
Education	0.77***	(0.17)	0.76***	(0.17)	0.76***	(0.17)
Household Income	-0.26	(0.18)	-0.24	(0.18)	-0.25	(0.18)
Home Ownership	-0.26*	(0.10)	-0.26**	(0.10)	-0.25*	(0.10)
Unemployed	-0.01	(0.14)	-0.05	(0.14)	-0.04	(0.14)
Age	-0.05	(0.16)	-0.00	(0.17)	-0.01	(0.17)
Female	0.23**	(0.08)	0.26**	(0.09)	0.26**	(0.09)
South	-0.28**	(0.09)	-0.28**	(0.10)	-0.28**	(0.10)
Interest in Campaign	1.03***	(0.12)	1.01***	(0.13)	1.02***	(0.13)
Political Knowledge	0.31**	(0.10)	0.30**	(0.10)	0.30**	(0.10)
Strength of Partisanship	1.14***	(0.16)	1.04***	(0.17)	1.04***	(0.17)
Internal Efficacy	-0.30**	(0.10)	-0.30**	(0.10)	-0.30***	(0.10)
Mistrust	0.03	(0.20)	0.06	(0.20)	0.06	(0.20)
External Efficacy	-0.12	(0.11)	-0.12	(0.11)	-0.12	(0.11)
Constant	-0.82**	(0.27)	-1.38	(1.29)	-1.07	(0.30)
Observations	3546		3398		3398	

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[18] Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.10. The control variable for year=2004 was dropped due to collinearity. Year controls included in analyses but not shown for ease of reading.

Pseudo R²	0.08	0.09	0.09

The first column of the table shows the model without the optimism variable. The coefficient on the key measure—the dichotomous variable for black Democrats—is positive and statistically significant. As shown in column two, inclusion of the optimism variable has virtually no impact on the magnitude and standard error of the coefficient for race of respondent. Yet, the effect of the optimism measure is positive and significant at the 0.01 alpha level.

That neither the magnitude nor the significance of the coefficient on black Democrats are altered upon inclusion of the forecast variable suggests that optimistic economic forecasts do not mediate expressions of hope for either blacks not whites. Rather, this measure independently correlates with expression of hope for same-party candidates. As shown in Figure 3.7 (presented shortly), when setting all control variables at their mean levels, the predicted probability that black Democrats express hope toward the same-party candidate is about five percentage points higher than white Democrats.

Also of note in Table 3.10 is the strongly significant positive correlation between disapproval of the incumbent and expressed hope for the Democratic presidential candidate. Given the greater propensity of black Democrats to express disapproval of incumbents relative to their white counterparts, it is possible that this measure moderates blacks' expression of hope for presumptive Democratic presidents. Could the black Democrats' greater likelihood of expressing hope be driven by the subset of blacks particularly dissatisfied by the incumbent? In analyses not shown, an interaction between incumbent disapproval and respondent race yielded null findings.

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Apparently, the impact of incumbent disapproval on expression of hope toward the Democratic candidate is not differentiated by race.

Finally, column three includes an interaction term between race of the Democratic respondent and the optimistic economic forecast measure. The value of this interaction coefficient is not much larger than its standard error value, indicating there is no discernible racial difference in how optimism translates to white and black Democrats' likelihoods of expressing hope toward the same-party candidate. Optimistic economic forecasts seem to operate neither as mediators nor moderators of expressions of hope.

This first set of analyses has revealed the same set of black respondents who exhibited an anger deficit to exhibit a positive hope differential. This finding provides confirmation of hypothesis 1, which stated a greater proportion of black Democrats would report hope toward Democratic candidates than their white Democratic candidates. Contrary to hypothesis 2, however, expressions of optimism about the national economy do not contribute to racial differences in expressions of hope. This is apparent despite the fact that black Democrats in the sample generally express greater optimism than their white counterparts[19]. Conceivably, the hope differential exhibited by black Democrats in the years 1980 through 2004 should be even stronger in 2008, as the object of their affect—Barack Obama—is both a same-party and same-race candidate. As table 3.11 reveals, however, this is not the case.

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[19] See Figure 6.3 in Appendix for mean economic forecast values for black and white Democrats across all years

Table 3.11: Logistic Regression among Democrats—Reporting Hope toward Democratic Presidential Candidates as Dependent Variable, 2008[20]

VARIABLES	MODEL 1		MODEL 2	
Black Democrat	0.74	(0.45)	0.71	(0.45)
Unemployment forecast	--	--	0.11	(0.52)
Incumbent Disapproval	2.03***	(0.57)	1.91**	(0.59)
Negative Economic Evaluation	0.65	(1.35)	0.42	(1.77)
Education	0.33	(0.73)	0.20	(0.74)
Household Income	-0.21	(0.84)	0.02	(0.85)
Home Ownership	-0.26*	(0.10)	0.16	(0.38)
Unemployed	-0.41	(0.68	-0.02	(0.79)
Age	-0.36	(0.89)	-0.31	(0.90)
Female	0.23**	(0.08)	0.33	(0.37)
South	-0.46**	(0.37)	-0.45	(0.37)
Interest in Campaign	1.20*	(0.59)	1.05^	(0.61)
Political Knowledge	-0.40	(0.36)	-0.32	(0.36)
Strength of Partisanship	0.45	(0.46)	1.04***	(0.17)
Internal Efficacy	0.49	(0.60)	-0.30***	(0.10)
Mistrust	-0.14	(0.97)	-0.08	(0.99)
External Efficacy (coded negatively)	1.11	(0.56)	1.19*	(0.57)
Constant	-1.86	(1.62)	-1.66	(2.01)
Observations	467		456	
Pseudo R^2	0.14		0.13	

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[20] Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.10. The control variable for year=2004 was dropped due to collinearity.

The first column of Table 3.11 contains the model excluding any measure of optimistic forecast for the nation. The magnitude of the coefficient on race of Democratic respondent is large, but accompanied by a large standard error. It fails to reach significance in even a one-tailed test. The results from this column indicate that black Democrats were no more or less likely than their white counterparts to express hope for the African American Democratic candidate.

In the 2008 ANES, the question of how the national economy will fare in the next year is only asked to half the sample. As a proxy, this model includes the respondents' opinion of whether nationwide unemployment will rise, fall or stay the same in the next year. The variable is coded 0 to 1, with a value of 1 indicating the respondent believes unemployment will fall. This variable is included in the second column of Table 3.10. Once again, the magnitude and standard error on coefficient for respondent race remain virtually unchanged. Also, the coefficient for the unemployment forecast variable is much smaller than its standard error.[21] Finally, an interaction between respondent race and the optimism measure (not shown) produces null findings.

Why does the positive hope differential among black Democrats seemingly erode in 2008? A difference of means test reveals that the mean response of black Democrats to the hope question is significantly higher than the mean response of white Democrats, suggesting that indeed considerably more black Democrats than white Democrats expressed hope toward Obama. The null effect of race in the multivariate

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[21] In analyses not shown, the model was run with the original national economy forecast variable included. This measure also failed to reach conventional significance.

analysis must be attributable to inclusion of a variable in the model that co-varies with

race and subsumes its impact on the dependent variable.

I have identified that variable to be the dichotomous measure of respondents'

political knowledge, indicated by correctly identifying the party in control of the U.S.

House of Representatives. Table 3.12 presents the results from the respective analyses

with the political knowledge variable included and excluded.

Table 3.12: Logistic Regression among Democrats—Likelihood of Expressing Hope toward Democratic Candidate in 2008, Knowledge Excluded[22]

VARIABLES	MODEL 1: KNOWLEDGE INCLUDED		MODEL 2: KNOWLEDGE EXCLUDED	
Black Democrat	0.74	(0.45)	1.09**	(0.41)
Political knowledge	-0.40	(0.36)	--	--
Unemployment forecast	0.11	(0.52)	0.24	(0.43)
Incumbent Disapproval	2.03***	(0.57)	1.68***	(0.44)
Negative Economic Evaluation	0.65	(1.35)	-0.46	(1.07)
Education	0.33	(0.73)	0.33	(0.57)
Household Income	-0.21	(0.84)	0.79	(0.67)
Home Ownership	-0.26*	(0.10)	0.13	(0.30)
Unemployed	-0.41	(0.68	0.02	(0.60)
Age	-0.36	(0.89)	-0.49	(0.75)
Female	0.23**	(0.08)	0.22	(0.30)
South	-0.46**	(0.37)	-0.23	(0.29)
Interest in Campaign	1.20*	(0.59)	1.51**	(0.46)

[22] Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.10. The control variable for year=2004 was dropped due to collinearity.

Strength of Partisanship	0.45	(0.46)	0.73*	(0.37)
Internal Efficacy	0.49	(0.60)	0.41	(0.49)
Mistrust	-0.14	(0.97)	-0.25	(0.74)
External Efficacy (coded negatively)	1.11	(0.56)	0.50	(0.45)
Constant	-1.86	(1.62)	-1.41	(1.27)
Observations	467		583	
Pseudo R²	0.14		0.16	

The two columns of Table 3.12 present the model with the inclusion and exclusion of the political knowledge variable. As shown in the second column, in the absence of this measure, the coefficient on race of Democratic respondent increases in magnitude and achieves significance at the 0.01 alpha level. Setting all control variables to their mean values, the predicted probability of expressing hope toward Obama among black Democrats is about seven percentage points higher than the probability among white Democrats (see Figure 3.7 below).

Figure 3.7: Democrats' Predicted Probabilities of Expressing Hope for Democratic Candidates, with Control Variables at Means

Comparing the remaining variables from the first and second columns reveals very few changes to the model result from exclusion of the political knowledge variable. Further, the standard error for the political knowledge measure is almost as large as the coefficient. Finally, the pseudo R^2 is larger is larger in the model excluding the knowledge measure. This indicates that excluding the measure leads to a model that provides a stronger predictor of the dependent variable over a null model.

The fact that inclusion of the political knowledge variable completely erases the impact of race on the dependent variable suggests African American Democrats' expression of hope toward Obama in 2008 is mediated by their political knowledge. Sobel-Goodman mediation tests, however, reveal that the indirect effect of black

Democrats' knowledge on their likelihood of expressing hope is indistinguishable from zero. So this particular empirical test does not confirm what the naked eye observes from the analyses. What could explain this apparent entanglement between race, knowledge and expression of hope in 2008?

One possible explanation is that the Obama presidential campaign generally motivated African Americans to pay heightened attention to politics. Black enthusiasm over the prospect of an Obama presidency therefore translated to increased knowledge of politics. And in the 2008 analyses, the effect of the enthusiasm translating to increased knowledge is the seemingly mediating effect of knowledge on blacks' likelihood of hope expressions.

While plausible, this account is not born out empirically. Comparing the proportions of black Democrats who correctly identified the majority party in the House in the 2008 ANES to the proportion that answered correctly in the 1980-2004 ANES reveals virtually no change. About 40% of black respondents answered correctly between 1980 and 2004, compared to around 41% in 2008. The difference is actually found among white Democrats. Between 1980 and 2004, about 56% of white Democrats correctly identified the House majority party. In 2008, only about 50% of white Democrats gave a correct answer. Could the apparent decline in political knowledge among white Democrats plausibly reflect a decline in their enthusiasm over the prospect of an Obama presidency relative to blacks? And could this differential account for the observed relationship between race, knowledge and hope? In the absence of clear means of testing these claims, I cannot move beyond speculation.

Thus far, the pooled analyses from 1980 through 2004 provide evidence in support of the claim that when faced with a common cue of policy opportunity, African Americans are more likely to express hope than whites. The 2008 analyses provide weaker support for this hypothesis, with a racial effect only detectable in the absence of the political knowledge measure. Both sets of analyses illustrate black and white respondents' hope expressions to be independent from their optimistic economic forecasts, contradicting hypothesis 2.

The remaining analyses test Hypothesis 3, examining whether expressing hope is positively associated with increased political action—particularly among African Americans. As with the anger tests, I ran a series of logistic regression analyses with various forms of political activity as the respective dependent variables, and expression of hope toward the Democratic candidate as the key independent variable. Table 3.13 below presents only the findings for the hope variable, for both the 1980-2004 and 2008 data.[23]

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[23] These analyses included all control variables listed in Table 3.12

Table 3.13: Logistic Regressions Predicting Political Activities among Democrats, 1980-2004

Action	Hope Effect		Hope*Race	
	1980-2004	*2008*	*1980-2004*	*2008*
Voting in presidential election	0.04 (0.44)	-1.35 (0.95)	0.70* (0.33)	-10.64 (1055.00)
Influencing others' vote choice	0.33* (0.13)	0.17 (0.29)	-0.10 (0.34)	1.06 (1.21)
Attending political meeting/rally	0.38 (0.23)	-1.52*** (0.39)	-0.20 (0.52)	0.54 (1.52)
Wearing button/sticker	0.17 (0.20)	0.23 (0.39)	-0.51 (0.44)	-0.48 (1.05)

Expressing *anger* toward incumbents was found to be positively associated with various forms of political activity among Democrats. As Table 3.13 illustrates, hope exhibits far less consistent effects. In the data from 1980-2004, expressing hope toward the Democratic candidate is positively and significantly associated with only one of the four political activities examined—attempting to influence someone's vote choice. As shown in the second column, expressing hope actually *decreases* Democrats' likelihood of attending a political meeting or rally in 2008.

The third and fourth columns of Table 3.12 present the interaction terms for hope and race of Democrat. This interaction reaches two-tailed significance for voting in the 1980-2004 data. Could this positive effect be indicative of the distinctly motivating hope effect for the participation of African Americans, as hypothesized? The difference in the predicted probabilities of voting between white and black Democrats who report hope for a Democratic candidate with all other variables at their

means amounts to about 4.5 percentage points. This difference serves as the only indication that hope exerts a stronger mobilizing effect for the black Democrats in the sample relative to the white Democrats.

So overall, hope fails to produce a mobilizing effect on participation that is on par with the demonstrated effects of anger. This finding is consistent with prior literature, which finds threat cues are stronger motivators of political action than cues of opportunity (see Miller and Krosnick 2004). Additionally, the data provide very little evidence that hope produces unique mobilizing effects for blacks. African American Democrats appear to possess a positive hope differential relative to their white Democratic counterparts, but that differential does not translate to substantially more political activity.

Overall, this set of analyses invokes an image of the relationship between race, hope and political action that seems less certain, less definitive, and less potentially impactful than the relationship emerging from examinations of race, anger and action. Under common conditions of prospective policy opportunity, do significantly more African Americans express hope than whites? Under certain conditions, yes. Does hope translate to increased likelihood of engaging in political action? With the exception of voting, no. Does the apparent hope differential exhibited by African Americans carry the potential to be as critical a concept within future studies of black political behavior as their anger deficit? The evidence from ANEs data casts doubt on that possibility.

Summary: Implications and Arising Questions

Analyses of the ANES paint a picture of African Americans as generally being both less prone to anger and more prone to hope relative to whites. Being less prone to anger places blacks at somewhat of a participatory disadvantage relative to whites, and blacks' disposition towards hope fails to overcome that disadvantage.

These analyses are certainly not without limitations, including the inability to explore emotional responses outside of the four designated emotions, and an inability to pinpoint more precise conditions of policy threat and condition for respondents. Nevertheless, the findings yielded from the examinations are largely consistent across varied time periods, and generalizable to the national population, thus effectively heralding a call for modification to extant understanding of the impact of policy threat on individuals' affect and behavior.

In essence, these findings reveal that race matters. Race plays an influential role in the cognitive and affective processing of changes to one's political environment. In particular, race constrains the emotional response of African Americans to cues of policy threat, consistent with the first and second pathways discussed in the previous chapter. Importantly, no evidence suggests that the race differences uncovered here are simply capturing differences in efficacy between whites and blacks.[24] This lends credence to my contention that the black ideological narratives informing their worldview condition the affective responses of African Americans to cues of change in the policy environment.

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[24] In analyses not shown, I ran Sobel-Goodman mediation tests to determine whether efficacy and trust measures mediate the effect of race on respondents' emotional responses the incumbents. All results were null.

The findings presented here raise a number of important questions that drive future examinations deriving from this work. Among them is the question of what emotional response African Americans feel in lieu of either anger or anxiety when confronted with the prospect of policy threat. Aforementioned research has connected political anxiety to coping behaviors. Could the coping posture of blacks reflect their genuine feelings of anxiety in threatening environments, despite their self-reports? Or is it the case that blacks are indeed getting angry, yet their anger is transferred more diffusely than whites, and thus not captured in these kinds of empirical examinations? Whereas whites may direct anger over their political environment toward specific institutions and actors in that environment, blacks direct their anger toward more broadly at the system itself.

The implications for participation should remain largely unchanged if this is the case. Targeting specific actors should provide whites with a greater sense of control, thus fueling their participation. In contrast, blacks should feel less sense of control over the entire sociopolitical system itself, thus inhibiting their action. Regardless of the implications for behavior, the actual emotions felt by African Americans in the face of threats needs to be determined. The following two chapters present the design and results from a survey experiment I created to gain more leverage on these key issues. But the experiments reveal racial differences manifesting in an entirely different manner than they manifest from the ANES analyses, thus raising even more questions that inform future work the development and refinement of a theory of racialized responses to policy change cues.

Chapter 4

Study 2: Overview of Experiment Data

In this chapter, I present details regarding the design and administration of an experiment conducted on a sample of adults living in the Detroit metro area from May 2013 through May 2014. In total, 139 whites and 148 blacks are included in the sample. Evidence from analyses of survey data in Chapter 3 provide evidence that racial cues constrain blacks emotional responses to policy change cues. Policy threat conditions provoked a significantly greater proportion of whites than blacks to express anger, whereas policy opportunity conditions made a greater proportion of blacks express hope relative to whites. The experiment was designed to press further into this racial dynamic by exposing white and black subjects to treatments designed to be cues of either policy threat or opportunity, then inviting them to take a variety of actions in response to the cue. Additionally, the experiment measures subjects' emotional responses to the cue, and their attitudes on the responsiveness of the local political elites to their opinion on the issue.

This experimental study is designed to allow for more in-depth exploration of the theoretical model by providing subjects with more concrete and definitive cues of potential threat and opportunity in a relevant policy domain. Additionally, the experiment allows for examination of a greater range of emotional responses to policy change cues than that allowed by the survey data.

The administration of the experiment was not without its challenges. The Detroit metro area is host to a bevy of unique demographic, socioeconomic and political

characteristics that interact to pose significant barriers to the data collection. Factors ranging from high segregation to a prevailing area-wide sense of fatigue with political incompetence and corruption at the local level to a weakened political infrastructure resulting in outdated archives of registered voter addresses all contributed to my encountering many difficulties recruiting subjects for participation in what was only an approximately 15 minute survey. Survey recruitment included sending invitations to mailing lists of registered voters, advertising in local newspapers, and entering local area churches, universities and workplaces with invitations to take the survey.

Working through these challenges ultimately yielded a sample of African American subjects that was significantly older, more religious, more attentive to local news and more politically trusting and efficacious than the white sample. Nevertheless, empirical tests reveal that black and white subjects' reported emotions and actions across the treatment conditions remain virtually unchanged upon inclusion of the demographic variables as controls. The robustness of the treatment effects to the inclusion of the demographic and social characteristics indicates that the experimental treatments are indeed influencing subjects' attitudes, feelings, and behavioral stances independent of the social characteristics that vary from whites to blacks in the sample.

In the next section, I describe the treatments and experiment questionnaire. I then review my expectations for the experiment, describe the data in greater detail and highlight the analyses I employ to test those expectations. Finally, I present the key preliminary findings from the analyses, and discuss their implications for my theory of a racialized model of affective response to policy change.

Experiment Design

I first describe the treatments, before discussing the pre- and post- treatment

questionnaires.[25] In total, there are three treatment conditions:

1. Control
2. Policy Threat
3. Policy Opportunity[26]

The treatment takes the form of variations of a political flyer believed to be

authentic by the subjects. All of the treatments address the same issue—a proposed plan

to privatize the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department (DWSD). As of the time of this

writing, the privatization plan is actually in discussion to become a reality. Proponents of

the plan assert that privatization will reduce longstanding inefficiencies, which will better

streamline water service, and lower rates. Opponents, on the other hand, decry

privatization as a job-killer for local workers and argue such a move will lead to lax

standards that make water less safe.

I followed the example of Miller and Krosnick (2004) in making the treatments

address an issue of potential relevance to the subjects that is actually being deliberated in

their policy environment. With actual political goods at stake, ranging from the safety of

subjects' water and its cost to their concerns over government efficiency and local

employment, subjects were expected to elicit authentic emotional responses to the flyers,

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[25] See Appendix for all of the treatments, and the questionnaire.

[26] Originally, there were three threat conditions and three opportunity conditions. The treatment for the "threat (or opportunity) + racial prime" condition contained alterations of the wording and imagery intended to prime subjects' racial group identification (e.g. inclusion of a picture either a black or white family). The treatment for the "threat (or opportunity) + narrative" condition contained altered text intended to invoke either the narrative of subjugation (e.g. inclusion of the text "here we go again…") or the narrative of salvation (e.g. "we've finally got somebody on our side"). Due to these manipulations not changing how subjects responded to neither the threat nor opportunity condition, and the smaller numbers of people grouped across these conditions, I collapsed these conditions into the broader "threat" and "opportunity" conditions. See Appendix for the treatments for all of the original conditions.

and make decisions regarding what political action they would realistically take on the issue. This method strikes me as yielding more credible responses form subjects than a design that asks them to produce reactions to a hypothetical situation.[27]

The issue of water in the Detroit area is contentious. For years, residents have complained about paying exorbitant rates and receiving inefficient service. Whereas one may expect that a proposal to overhaul the organization providing the service would be universally heralded, the proposal to shift authority over water service to a private firm operating outside the state of Michigan has drawn the ire of many. The notion that local residents would be dependent on forces outside of the city for a valued service reinforces in the minds of many the notion that local residents are steadily losing their control over the collective destiny of their community (Duran 2014; Gullien 2014). This tension between the desire for better water service and the demand for continued control over local resources has made the DWSD privatization issue particularly divisive. Accordingly, I expected to tap into authentic emotions among subjects due to the use of this issue in the treatments.

All of the flyers comprising the treatments purport to be from citizen advocacy groups, and all highlight the potential privatization of the DWSD. The *control* flyer provides a pair of arguments made by proponents of the privatization alongside two arguments made by its opponents. The control flyer encourages people to gather more information about the privatization from a nonpartisan policy group specified on the flyer. The *threat* flyers emphasize three negative possible consequences of the privatization: loss of local jobs, increased risk to subjects' water, and even higher water bills. This

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[27] To ensure the issue represented a relevant threat or opportunity to subjects, I limited the population to people living within the geographic bounds of the DWSD. This includes residents of Wayne, Macomb and Oakland Counties in southeast Michigan.

content is accompanied by imagery of people with dour expressions. In contrast, the *opportunity* flyers emphasize three positive potential consequences of the change: elimination of wasteful government spending, improved water quality standards and the smallest increases to water bills in decades. This content is accompanied by imagery of people with cheery demeanors. I strove to echo as accurately as possible in the flyers the pro and con arguments actually used by advocates on either side of the issue, while also maintaining a conceptual parity in the relative strength of the threat and opportunity arguments in the treatments.

The pre- and post-test questionnaire consists almost entirely of close ended questions with five-response categories adapted from the text of the ANES and the 2001-2003 National Survey of American Life. To stem the risk for acquiescence bias, I avoided using the *strongly disagree* to *strongly agree* response items, opting instead for *not at all likely* to *extremely likely* where relevant. The pre-test questions ask about subjects' general senses of external efficacy and political trust, as well as their senses of system blame and how fairly they believe American society has treated people from their background.

Two questions from the post-test questionnaire invite subjects to take immediate action on the DWSD privatization. They are invited to add their name to a letter either favoring or opposing the privatization, which they are told will be sent to the state legislature. This represents the type of direct immediate action expected by conventional literature to be associated with anger over the issue). Additionally, subjects are invited to provide an email or mailing address to receive more information on the privatization

form a non-partisan group. This is an example of the information seeking action typically associated with anxiety.[28]

Subjects are also asked to report the degree to which they felt the following emotions, ranging from *not at all* to *extremely*: angry, anxious, concerned, delighted, distressed, enthusiastic, frustrated, hopeful, motivated, optimistic, outraged, relieved, and worried. In addition, questions are posed gauging subjects' senses of efficacy related to the particular issue of the DWSD privatization (e.g. *how likely it is that politicians care about what people like you think about this issue?)*. Finally, subjects are asked a standard battery of demographic and social characteristic questions, ranging from frequency of church attendance to education level. In total there are 33 questions, taking most subjects around 10 to 15 minutes to complete.

Expectations

Due primarily to the small size and non-representativeness of the sample, I hesitate to view this experiment as more than a pilot study. While precluding definitive tests of hypotheses, this study allows me to explore emergent trends and consider their implications for the burgeoning theory, as well as inform future iterations of the study that will contain larger and more representative samples.

I am foremost interested in exploring the following factors. Are there significant racial differences in the emotions subjects report feeling over the issue of DWSD privatization? The ANES data yielded such differences, as black respondents were found

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[28] In addition to these immediate actions, subjects are asked to report the likelihood that they engage in the following actions in the future: *discussing the DWSD plan with others*, *attending a meeting or forum on DWSD*, and *contacting a public official about DWSD*. Analyses in which subject responses to these questions are the dependent variable yielded similar results to those in which the immediate action questions are the dependent variables. Due to the overlap between these questions and the immediate action questions, and the fact these questions measure only intended action as opposed to actual actions taken, the empirical examinations focus only on the immediate actions subjects can take within the survey.

to be less likely to report anger and more likely to report hope than their white counterparts under common policy conditions. Will the experiment yield the same trends, which would constitute further evidence supporting the first two threat racial pathways (see Figures 2.5 and 2.6), as well as the racial opportunity pathway (Figure 2.8)?

Alternately, I will examine whether there are racial differences in how the various reported emotion states—particularly anger—associate with the types of action subjects are invited to take on the issue. The ANES data uncovered no racial differences in how anger associated with political activity, and one instance in which race influenced the association between hope and activity (in the domain of voting). Will the experiment corroborate this finding? Or will it yield evidence in support of the third racial pathway (see Figure 2.7), which models how racial resignation dampens the mobilizing influence of anger on blacks' political participation?

Finally, I will explore detectable racial differences in whether subjects are more mobilized by exposure to the policy threat treatment or the policy opportunity treatments. Uncovering evidence that black and white subjects differ in their participatory responsiveness to the respective treatments illuminates the implications of the racial differences in emotional responses to policy change cues. If anger—through whatever mechanism—is not the mobilizing force for blacks that it is for whites, then the policy threat cues so prevalent in American political discourse (see Chapter 1 for examples) may be ineffective at propelling African Americans to action.

Description of the Data

In order to maximize both the parsimony and theoretical richness of the analyses, I used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to categorize the multiple emotion variables

into five proposed constructs. I originally proposed constructs relating to the core emotion states designated in conventional literature: *angry,* composed of the items angry, frustrated and outraged; *anxious*, composed of the items anxious, distressed, concerned, and worried; *satisfied,* composed of the items delighted, enthusiastic and relieved; and finally *hopeful,* comprising optimistic and hopeful.

Table 4.1 below presents the factor loadings from CFA with varimax rotation. Component loadings for three of the four originally proposed constructs far exceed the conservative cut-off point of 0.40. The items for *angry* and *satisfied* in particular load very strongly, indicated high validity for each of proposed constructs. In contrast, the components of *hopeful* load considerably weaker.

Table 4.1: Emotion Variables—Obliquely rotated component loadings and communalities based on principal components analysis with varimax rotation

COMPONENT	ANGRY	ANXIOUS	CONCERNED	SATISFIED	HOPEFUL
Outraged	0.82				
Frustrated	0.80				
Angry	0.79				
Anxious		0.58	0.39		
Distressed		0.57	0.37		
Concerned		0.39	0.57		
Worried		0.38	0.57		
Delighted				0.78	0.23
Enthusiastic				0.74	0.23
Relieved				0.68	0.21
Optimistic				0.54	0.43
Hopeful				0.34	0.40
n	352	344	344	337	337
Eigenvalues	1.92	1.82	0.07	2.41	0.11
% of total variance	1.15	1.19	0.05	0.95	0.23
# of measures	3	2	2	3	2

Of significant interest is the emergence of another negative emotion construct—

one composed of items that were expected to load onto *anxious*, yet appear to be

empirically distinct from that emotion state. This construct is labeled *concerned,*

composed of the items concerned and worried. As subsequent analyses show, this

emotion influences the activity of black subjects in unanticipated and intriguing ways.

Because the variable for signing the letter is both immediate and an assertive

action, it serves as the key dependent variable to determine the effect of the treatment on

activism through making respondents angry (or hopeful, in the case of my expectation

regarding African Americans). Accordingly, the variable for signing up for more

information (or *information seeking)* allows me to test for the presence of the

conventional relationship between an emotion state of anxiety (or perhaps concern) and

seeking information to clarify one's political position.

I shift focus now to providing illustrative descriptions of the sample. Figure 4.1

on the following page presents comparisons of the mean levels of the black and white

samples on several key demographic and social characteristics.

Figure 4.1: Subjects' Mean Levels of Demographic Factors, by Race of Subject

(variables coded 0 to 1)[2930]

As the wide margins denote, black sample subjects are significantly more educated and civically engaged than their white counterparts. These differences are most likely due to the fact that a majority of black subjects were drawn from churches in the Detroit metro area. In contrast, the majority of white subjects were drawn from a local area college. More racial differences emerge when comparing black and white subjects' respective mean reported levels of political efficacy and trust, presented in Figure 4.5 below.

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[29] *denotes difference significant at 0.05 alpha level. ^ denotes difference significant at 0.10 alpha level.
[30] Notes: Average age of black subjects: 40/white subjects: 23. Both black and white subjects report mean income in range of 45,000-55,000. As of 2011, median household income in was $45,981.

Figure 4.2: Political Engagement & Worldview Variables, by Race of Subject[31]

Relative to white subjects, black subjects report higher levels of political

efficacy—operationalized as the belief politicians care about their opinion, and people

like them have say in government affairs. Additionally, blacks' mean level of reported

trust in government is marginally higher than that of whites, but the difference of three

points is almost negligible. All of these results run counter to expectations based on

scholarly understanding of racial attitudes (e.g. Aberbach and Walker 1970), thus

underscoring how unique both samples are relative to the actual population. These unique

results suggest the churches from which black subjects were drawn play a central role in

socializing them to believe they have a vital voice in local political operations.

Turning to comparisons of generalized life outlooks, the only significant racial

difference is found in subject reports of how fairly American society has treated people

from their background. As expected, the mean report by black subjects is considerably

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[31] Treated fairly= "How fairly would you say American society has dealt with people from your background?" Life chance= "How big of a problem is it if some people have more of a chance in life than others?" Blame ppl=" If people don't do well in life, how much are they to blame themselves?"

lower than that for whites—a difference of nearly 30 points. While this finding may provide corroboration of the aforementioned narrative of black subjugation, the preceding comparisons seem to indicate the blacks in this sample exhibit more than resilience in the face of this acknowledged subjugation, but also a sense of confidence in their ability to transcend it and participate effectively in politics. I expect this confidence to manifest in higher reports of positive emotions among black subjects in relevant contexts, as well as strong associations between such positive emotion and willingness to engage in political action among black subjects. I also acknowledge the possibility that this apparent political confidence may manifest in blacks exhibiting emotions and participation patterns no different from their white counterparts.

The remaining sets of figures provide greater insight into the characteristics of the sample, presenting the racial homogeneity and general economic condition of the neighborhoods in which respondents live, the personal age and household income distributions of respondents, and finally, the distributions of respondents taking the survey online versus on paper, and recruited from the local area college.

Figure 4.3: Racial Composition of Black Subjects' Zip Codes

Figure 4.4: Racial Composition of White Subjects' Zip Codes

Reflecting the high degree of racial segregation in the Detroit metro area, both sets of subjects live in neighborhoods that are overwhelmingly occupied by people of the same race, according to the 2010 census (Figures 4.3 and 4.4 above).

Figure 4.5: Median Income of Black Subjects' Zip Codes

Figure 4.6: Median Income of White Subjects' Zip Codes

The median incomes of subjects' zip codes also reflect the economic stratification of the area (Figures 4.5 and 4.6). Just over half (51%) of white subjects live in in areas with median household incomes considerably higher than the state average. In contrast,

nearly half (47%) of black subjects live in areas with median household incomes

considerably lower than the state median.

Figure 4.7: Distribution of Household Income among Black Sample

Figure 4.8: Distribution of Household Income among Black Sample

Despite this neighborhood-level distinction, the distribution of subjects' personal incomes are quite similar (Figures 4.7 and 4.8), offering further indication of the uniqueness of the black sample.

Figure 4.9: Age Distribution of Black Sample

Figure 4.10: Age Distribution of White Sample

Also of note is the difference in age distribution of the subjects. Virtually all of the white subjects are 30 years old or younger, consistent with the fact that many are recruited from a college community. Among black subjects, there is far greater parity across age levels. It is plausible the varying age distributions among the samples can have impact on the results, because the prospect of DWSD privatization should be of greater concern to older people who hold the bulk of bill paying or maintaining a household.

Figure 4.11: Proportion of Home Owners among Black Sample

Figure 4.12: Proportion of Home Owners among White Sample

Figure 4.13: Percentage of Black Sample Recruited from Local College

Figure 4.14: Percentage of White Sample Recruited from Local College

Figure 4.15: Proportion of Black Sample taking Survey Online or on Paper

Figure 4.16: Proportion of White Sample taking Survey Online or on Paper

The substantive variations in factors such as age, education level, and home ownership across race lines makes possible an outcome in which differences in subjects' responses to the treatment are varying not along the main variable of interest (their race), but rather, along one or more of these variables.[32] To ensure that these social and demographic variables do not pose potential barriers to my identification of genuine race effects in subjects' responses to the treatment, I ran OLS analyses for each race separately. In the first set of analyses, the full slate of social and demographic characteristics, as well as the efficacy and trust measures, are regressed on subjects' reported emotion (see Table 4.2). In the second set, these variables are regressed on subjects' responses to the participation questions (Table 4.3).

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[32] Of course, controlling for these variables in multivariate analyses—which I do in the next chapter— isolates the effect of race on subjects' responses to treatments. But the recent wave of experimental work emphasizes the importance of analyzing and evaluating treatment effects in the absence of controls (see Imai, Keele, Tingley and Yamamoto 2011)

Table 4.2: OLS Regression—Effect of Demographic and Social Characteristics on

Reported Emotions, by Race of Subject

	ANGRY		ANXIOUS		CONCERNED		SATISFIED		HOPEFUL	
	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE
EDUCATION	-0.20^	-0.00	-0.02	0.07	-0.07	-0.10	-0.15^	-0.12	-0.46**	-0.20
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.17)
INCOME	0.12^	0.07	0.10	0.04	0.05	0.11	0.02	-0.01	-0.00	0.16*
	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.07)
AGE	0.26	-0.31	0.19	-0.17	0.13	-0.47^	-0.03	0.25	0.08	0.22
	(0.17)	(0.26)	(0.15)	(0.26)	(0.18)	(0.28)	(0.11)	(0.25)	(0.18)	(0.36)
OWNHOME	-0.06	-0.02	-0.09	-0.01	0.02	0.03	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.09
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.09)
PARTYID	0.09	-0.08	0.12	-0.03	0.08	0.01	0.11^	0.04	0.04	-0.03
	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.10)
CHURCH ATTEND.	-0.02	0.11^	-0.01	0.16*	0.03	0.03	0.15*	0.13*	0.17^	0.08
	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.09)
LOCAL NEWS	0.01	0.05	0.07	-0.08	-0.07	0.02	-0.06	-0.10	0.08	-0.07
	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.10)
OFF'LS CARE	0.02	0.05	0.01	0.02	0.06	0.14	-0.07	0.10	0.09	0.15
	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.15)
SAY IN GOVT.	0.14	0.10	-0.03	0.09	-0.01	-0.05	-0.09	0.14	0.05	*0.25*
	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.13)
TRUST IN GOVT.	-0.29^	0.04	-0.11	0.08	-0.08	0.11	0.16	0.01	-0.03	0.03
	(0.15)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.16)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.16)	(0.14)
FAIR BACKGROUND	0.04	-0.08	0.20^	-0.08	0.03	-0.16*	-0.04	-0.05	0.01	-0.15
	(0.13)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.14)	(0.10)
LIFE CHANCE	0.12	-0.11	0.04	-0.07	0.21^	-0.03	-0.14^	0.05	0.00	0.07
	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.11)
BLAME PPL	-0.07	-0.00	-0.11	-0.00	-0.12	-0.00	-0.07	0.12	0.12	0.24
	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.15)
CONSTANT	0.11	0.31	-0.02	0.19	0.23	0.46*	0.20^	-0.07	0.20	-0.01
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.20)
N	111	122	111	118	113	122	110	122	113	122
ADJ. R^2	0.03	-0.00	0.05	-0.01	-0.05	0.06	0.15	0.05	0.11	0.07

As Tables 4.2 and 4.3 reveal, none of the observed variables exert consistent, significant effects across the dependent variables of interest. The only conventionally significant effect for education level is to make black subjects less likely to report hopefulness. Church attendance produces two positive and significant associations with white subjects' emotions on DWSD, boosting both their anxiety and their satisfaction.

Table 4.3: OLS Regression—Effect of Demographic and Social Characteristics on Reported Actions, by Race of Subject

	LETTER SIGNING		INFO. SEEKING	
	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE
EDUCATION	-1.01 (1.03)	-1.35 (1.43)	1.95^ (1.05)	0.42 (1.93)
INCOME	-0.62^ (0.64)	0.07 (0.58)	0.22 (0.65)	0.37 (0.98)
AGE	3.06^ (1.58)	2.83 (2.84)	1.17 (1.51)	0.97 (3.65)
OWNHOME	-1.23* (0.60)	-0.03 (0.70)	0.19 (0.57)	1.67 (1.10)
PARTYID	0.69 (0.76)	-0.36 (0.74)	-0.18 (0.77)	1.01 (1.26)
CHURCH ATTEND.	0.65 (0.81)	0.21 (0.68)	0.03 (0.81)	-0.66 (1.13)
LOCAL NEWS	-1.19 (0.74)	-0.69 (0.78)	0.16 (0.80)	-1.53 (1.17)
OFF'LS CARE	-2.72* (1.20)	-1.26 (1.21)	-0.32 (1.17)	0.82 (1.65)
SAY IN GOVT.	-0.95 (1.17)	0.58 (1.02)	0.52 (1.16)	2.84^ (1.47)
TRUST IN GOVT.	3.46* (1.37)	1.03 (1.13)	0.64 (1.36)	-4.21* (2.07)
FAIR BACKGROUND	-0.91 (1.17)	-0.36 (0.80)	0.64 (1.22)	-0.91 (1.28)
LIFE CHANCE	0.14 (0.96)	-0.21 (0.83)	2.35* (1.06)	1.82 (1.38)

BLAME PPL	-1.60 (1.15)	0.97 (1.17)	0.78 (1.13)	2.05 (1.79)
CONSTANT	0.69 (1.38)	-0.54 (1.53)	-5.05 (1.54)	-4.87 (2.52)
N	119	123	118	123
ADJ. R^2	0.15	0.06	0.11	0.19

Table 4.3 reveals only one instance in which the variable for home ownership exerts an effect that is significant at the 0.05 alpha level—with black home owners less likely than non-home owners to add their name to the letter to the state legislature. Aside from a marginally significant negative association with reporting feelings of concern among white subjects, age exerts no discernible impact on emotions or actions. Exposure to local news fails to associate with any of the emotions or participation variables.

Turning to the efficacy, trust and general attitude variables that make up the bottom half of Table 4.2, there are virtually no associations between these measures and subjects' reported emotions. The lone exception to this is the conventionally significant and negative relationship between believing American society has treated people from the subject's background fairly and reporting concern, among whites. More significant effects are present in Table 4.3, especially among the government trust variable. Yet, no clear patterns of influence emerge for any of these variables.

In sum, these OLS regressions reveal an absence of strong, clear patterns of influence from any of these social, demographic and attitude measures on subjects' responses to the emotion and participation prompts This gives me confidence that despite the significant (and in some cases, non-representative) differences between the black and white samples in the study, analyses can indeed yield measurable treatment effects that vary by race rather than the characteristics held in unequal measure by each racial group.

Summary: Setting the Stage for Empirical Tests

Due to the limitations of data collecting, the samples of white and black adults yielded by the process are in many ways unique from the general populations from which they were drawn. Nevertheless, the preliminary investigations presented in this chapter indicate that these differences will not preclude race from being a determinant factor in how subjects respond to the treatment conditions. The higher than average education, political trust and efficacy levels of the African American sample should make it more difficult to ascertain measurable race differences in the empirical analyses. Hence, the race differences that do materialize in the next chapter provide particularly strong verification of the existence of a racial divide in how people process and respond to cues of policy threat and opportunity.

Confirmatory factor analysis of the data uncovered the presence of a negative emotional state that falls outside of the conventional negative affect spectrum of anger and fear. Analyses in the next chapter reveal this emotion, labeled *concerned*, to primarily exhibit influence on the participation of black subjects.

The experimental treatments to which subjects are exposed directly and explicitly communicate policy change cues to them. The survey instrument invites subjects to take immediate political action on the policy in question. Additionally, subjects report a wide range of affective responses to the treatment. These three factors allow for precise and direct examinations of the relationship between exposure to cues of policy threat and opportunity, emotional responses to those cues, and the participation decisions associated with those emotions.

In the next chapter I present the results from a set of empirical examinations employed to make those precise tests. The methods range from simple t-tests to structural equation modeling (SEM), and together they begin to paint a complex and intriguing picture illustrating the role of race in shaping individuals' emotional and behavioral responses to cues of policy change.

Chapter 5

Study 2: Analyses of Experiment Data

This chapter presents and discusses the findings from the survey experiment. Analyses range from comparisons of means across treatment conditions to structural equation modeling (SEM) and robustness checks. Recall from the previous chapter that analyses of the data will examine three key areas: whether racial differences emerge in subjects' reported emotions across threat and opportunity conditions (relating to the first and second pathways), whether racial differences emerge in which emotions—particularly anger and hope—stimulate action among subjects (relating to the third and fourth pathways), and whether racial differences emerge in subjects' participatory responsiveness to the threat and opportunity treatments.

The SEM methodology allows me to simultaneously measure the effect of the treatments on subjects' reported emotions, and the effect of those reported emotions on subjects' participation. This means of analysis is rooted in my expectation that the primary pathway through which the treatments influence subject participation on DWSD privatization is through engendering one or more emotional responses to the issue. SEM allows me to examine if the emotions engendered in response to the treatments are indeed associated with greater likelihood of action, as well as if the treatments stimulate action among subjects independent of their effects on subjects' emotions. Figure 5.1 below illustrates the logic behind the structural equation models.

Figure 5.1: Proposed Path Diagrams Illustrating Influence of Treatments on Subject

Participation

As indicated by the arrows, there are two ways through which the respective

policy change treatments are expected to influence subjects' participation on DWSD

privatization. Primarily, I expect the cues to influence action by engendering certain

emotions. These engendered emotions in turn influence the subjects to take action.

Hence, the primary impact of the treatments on subject participation is indirect, through

arousing particular emotions. But as the curved arrows indicate, in addition to this

indirect effect, the treatments may also exert direct effects on subjects' participation, net

of their effects on emotions.

Structural equation modeling allows me to examine both the indirect effects of the

treatments on subject participation—through the emotions they arouse—as well as the

effects of the treatments on subject participation independent of those emotions. Further,

this methodology allows me to pinpoint where racial differences emerge in the translation

of policy cues to political participation. Evidence that white subjects in the threat

treatment—but not black subjects—are more likely to report anger would indicate the

racial difference emerges in the arrow connecting the threat cue to anger. This racial

difference would have implications for participation only if anger is shown to be

positively associated with action taking among *both* black and white subjects. This is

precisely the account indicated by the ANES analyses in Chapter 3 (and conforming to

the first and second pathways discussed in Chapter 2). Black respondents were less likely

than white respondents to report anger, and this anger deficit had implications for a racial

participation gap because reported anger boosted political activity among both blacks and

whites.

Alternately, the evidence could indicate that both white and black subjects are

more likely to report anger in the threat condition, yet such reported anger is positively

associated with action for white subjects, but *not* for black subjects. The racial difference,

therefore, would be evident in the arrow connecting anger to action. That anger indeed

arises in response to policy threat cues but does not translate to action among blacks

would conform to the third racial pathway.

The same logic holds true for the effects of opportunity on subject participation.

The racial difference may emerge in black subjects being more likely than white subjects

to report hope from the opportunity condition. But this difference only has implications

for racial participation differences if hope bolsters action among both sets of subjects.

Alternately, both whites and blacks may be more likely to report hope in the opportunity

condition, yet hope is positively associated with action only for blacks. The ANES data

produced evidence that black respondents were more likely than whites to express hope

under conditions of policy opportunity. The evidence on whether hope was a mobilizing

force—particularly for African Americans—was more mixed.

Overall, the experimental findings indicate no evidence of racial differences in subjects' reports of anger in the threat condition or hope in the opportunity condition, contradicting the results of the ANES analyses. The arrows connecting the treatments to the emotions are similar for each group. Yet, significant racial differences are present in which emotions stimulate action among subjects. These differences in turn suggest possible racial variation in whether subjects are more responsive to the threat or opportunity treatments.

Across most SEM specifications, the anger aroused among white subjects in the threat condition was strongly and positively correlated with action. In contrast, the anger reported among black subjects in the threat condition produced null effects on participation. This finding provide support of the third pathway (see Figure 2.7), which posits racial cues inhibit the mobilizing effect of anger on action for African Americans.

In contrast, reported hope among subjects in the opportunity condition produces null effects on participation for both black and white subjects, with one exception. In the presence of attitude and efficacy measures, hope stimulates participation for *white* subjects. Thus, whereas the ANES data provided mixed results on racial differences and hope, the experiment produced no evidence in support of my claims. Interestingly, among black subjects, there is a significant, positive association between reporting *satisfaction* over the DWSD privatization and taking immediate action on the issue. Among white subjects, on the other hand, no such association between satisfaction and participation is present.

This chapter proceeds first with presentation and discussion of the trends emergent from observation of mean comparisons across treatment conditions. This paves

the way for the various specifications of SEM models. The chapter concludes with

discussion of how the findings—both that conform to my claims and that surprised me—

further the development of a model of racialized responses to policy change cues. In

particular, I grapple with arising and lingering questions and concerns, and begin to chart

out the future steps that will build on the insight gained through this process.

Mean Comparisons: Observing Treatment Effects on Attitudes, Emotions and Behavior

The initial set of figures present the mean effects of the treatments on subjects'

opinions on the DWSD privatization, as well as their feelings of external efficacy specific

to the issue. As illustrated by Figures 5.2 and 5.3 below, the treatments generally have the

intended effect on whether subjects support or oppose the proposed DWSD

privatization.[33] Figure 5.3 displays the results for black subjects, and Figure 5.3 presents

the results for white subjects.

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[33] The opinion variable is coded 0 to 1, with 0 indicating the subject strongly opposes the privatization
(consistent with the threat flyer, which opposes the privatization), and 1 indicating strongly favoring
privatization (consistent with the opportunity flyer).

Figure 5.2: Black Subjects' Views on DWSD, by Condition[34]

[34] These figures present the mean responses of subjects on each of the indicators.

Figure 5.3: White Subjects' Views on DWSD, by Condition

☐Control ■Threat ☐Opportunity

For black subjects, approval in the control condition hovers right around the midpoint, which indicates they neither approve nor favor the DWSD privatization. Approval drops 20 points for blacks in the threat condition, and rises 13 points for black in the opportunity condition. White subjects in the control condition sit just beyond the midpoint at 0.54. White approval of DWSD privatization drops 12 points from the control to the threat condition, and rises just seven points from the control to the opportunity condition.

The treatments' apparent influences on subjects' attitudes and efficacy on the issue reveal a mixed bag.[35] For both subject groups, reporting that the DWSD issue will turn out as they want it to is actually highest in the threat condition. Black subjects generally believe the DWSD privatization is more important than white subjects, and exposure to the threat condition only increases this sentiment among African Americans, as indicated by the nine point differential between threat and control. Among blacks, there appear to be no distinguishable differences across treatments in reports that officials care what people like them think about the DWSD issue, nor for reports of how much influence they have on the issue. Whites in the threat condition are more pessimistic about the likelihood public officials care about their opinion on DWSD, indicated by the nine-point differential between control and threat. Meanwhile, exposure to either treatment condition is associated with a slightly increased likelihood that whites believe they have influence on the issue, indicated by the 5-6 point differentials.

The patterns evident from observations of the mean effects are confirmed by the results of simple ordinary least squares (OLS) analyses regressing the treatment effects on each of the DWSD opinion and efficacy variables. As shown in Table 5.1, the threat condition is strongly and positively associated with both black and white subjects reporting opposition to the privatization (as indicated by the negative sign on the respective coefficients). The effect is slightly larger for blacks, indicated by their respective coefficient sizes. The opportunity treatment, however, exhibits only a marginally positive association with supporting the privatization, and this effect is only present for black subjects (p=0.07). White subjects in the opportunity condition are no

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[35] *Outcome:* how likely is it this issue turns out the way you want it to? *Importance:* how important is this issue to you? *Officials care*: how likely is it that officials care about the opinion of people like you on this issue? *Influence:* How likely is it that you are able to influence politicians on this issue?

more likely to support the privatization than white subjects in the control condition. This absence of a treatment effect on white opinion can be attributed to the fact that the mean opinion of whites in the control condition is tilted toward support of the privatization, whereas the mean opinion of black subjects in the control is essentially neutral.

Table 5.1: Effect of Treatments on DWSD Atittudes by Race, No Controls[36,37]

	OPINION		*OUTCOME*		*IMPORTANCE*		*OFF'LS CARE*		*MY INFLUENCE*	
	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE
THREAT	-0.19** (0.06)	-0.12* (0.06)	0.10^ (0.05)	0.08 (0.05)	0.08 (0.06)	0.00 (0.05)	0.00 (0.05)	-0.09 (0.05)	0.02 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.05)
OPP.	0.14^ (0.07)	0.07 (0.07)	0.07 (0.06)	0.05 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.07)	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.06)	0.00 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)

Surprisingly, in all but one case the threat and opportunity treatments produce null results for belief the DWSD issue will turn out as subjects want, importance of the DWSD privatization, belief public officials care what subjects think about the issue, and how much influence they have on the issue of DWSD privatization. The lone exception is the positive effect of the threat condition on black subjects' belief that the privatization will turn out as they want, which falls short of two-tailed significance (p=0.07). That such factors prove robust to exposure to the treatment conditions suggests the cues of policy change do not influence subjects' feelings of efficacy related to the change. Rather, those feelings of efficacy likely mediate the emotional response to the cue. Analyses presented later provide evidence suggestive of this mediating effect.

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[36] In this and all subsequent regression tables, the respective dependent variables from each simple model are listed along the top row, with the independent variables listed in the far left column.
[37] *=p<0.05, **=0<0.01, ***=p<0.001. Standard errors below each coefficient in parentheses.

Figures 5.4 and 5.5 below present the mean emotion levels across condition for black and white subjects, respectively

Figure 5.4: Black Subjects' Mean Emotion Levels across Conditions

Figure 5.5: White Subjects' Mean Emotion Levels across Conditions

Relative to African American subjects in the control condition, blacks in the threat condition report what seem to be substantively higher levels of each of the negative emotion states—anger, anxiety and concern. The differential between threat and control is 17 points for anger, 12 points for anxiety, and 11 points for concern. White subjects in the threat condition also report more anger relative to those in the control, but the differential is a much smaller seven points. The differential for anxiety is an even smaller three points. And whites in the threat condition report slightly *less* concern than those in the control. On the whole, black subjects, despite the preponderance of evidence (presented in the previous chapter) indicating they come from a sample with uncharacteristically positive orientations toward the political system, express all measured negative emotions at an apparently higher rate than white subjects when exposed to cues of policy threat.

Exposure to the opportunity treatment appears to engender positive emotions more effectively for black subjects than white subjects. Among blacks, the differential between the opportunity and control conditions is nine points for satisfaction, and seven points for hope. For whites in contrast, the opportunity treatment fails to engender greater reports of positive emotions relative to the control. The mean satisfaction report for white subjects in the opportunity condition is four points less than the mean report in the control. Meanwhile, just one point separates whites' mean hope levels in the control and opportunity conditions. But the opportunity condition appears to notably reduce white subject's reports of negative affect. The differential between the control and opportunity conditions is 9 points for anger, 5 points for anxiety, and 23 points for concern.

Regressing the treatment conditions on subjects' reported emotions across race provides confirmation of the patterns on display in the mean comparisons. See Table 5.2 for the results below.

Table 5.2: Effect of Treatments on Emotion by Race, No Controls

	ANGER		*FEAR*		*CONCERN*		*SATISFIED*		*HOPEFUL*	
	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE
THREAT	0.16** (0.06)	0.07 (0.05)	0.11* (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	0.08 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.12* (0.05)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.12* (0.06)
OPP.	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.09^ (0.05)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.07)	-0.19** (0.06)	0.03 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)	0.07 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.07)

As the table indicates, if there is a racial deficit in subjects' likelihood of responding with anger to the threat condition, the deficit is possessed by *white* subjects. The association between exposure to the threat and reporting anger is strong and positive among black subjects, and only null among white subjects. This finding is in stark

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contrast to the main finding from the ANES data. This finding contradicts the first and second race pathways (see Figures 2.6 and 2.7), which posit race cues will inhibit the arousal of anger among black subjects in the threat condition. The possibility remains that the experiment conforms to the third pathway, wherein the anger reported among black subjects does not increase their likelihood of adding their name to the DWSD letter.

Also running counter to my expectations is the apparent failure of the opportunity treatment to increase reports of hope among either set of subjects, let alone African Americans. In Chapter 2, I laid out the expectation that the influence of the black ideological narrative of salvation would cause policy opportunity cues to have disproportionately stimulating effects on the participation of African Americans. The failure of the opportunity treatment to arouse hope among black subjects casts serious doubt on that proposition.

I turn now to comparing black and white subjects' respective mean rates of participation on the DWSD issue across the treatments, shown in Figures 5.5 and 5.6.

Figure 5.6: Black Subjects' Participation, by Condition

Figure 5.7: White Subjects' Participation, by Condition

Across all conditions and both forms of participation, black subjects generally exhibit a higher likelihood of taking action than whites. Mean black participation rates generally hover between 0.3 and 0.5, with white rates generally between 0.1 and 0.4. Again, this is likely due to the distinct characteristics of the sample. The black sample possesses more of the engagement resources associated with political participation, thus alleviating the costs of action for them relative to the white sample (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995).

Notably, black subjects appear to be most likely to engage in action in the threat condition. This enhanced participation should cast a major blow to my expectations should subsequent analyses reveal the threat treatment to be indirectly mobilizing black subjects through making them angry. Consistent with the expectations of extant literature, the opportunity condition does not appear to stimulate participation for either group as

effectively as the threat condition. This constitutes another apparent departure from my expectations, as my models posit the opportunity condition will be a greater mobilizer for black subjects than the threat condition.

Once again, the patterns indicated by the mean comparisons are confirmed by the results of logistics and OLS regression analyses. As revealed by Table 5.3 below, regressing the treatment condition on participation paints a more definitive picture of the absence of a direct effect of the treatments on subjects' action taking on DWSD. For both subject groups, the treatment effects fail to meet the threshold for significance in even a one-tailed test.

Table 5.3: Effect of Treatments on Participation Across Race, No Controls

	LETTER WRITING		*SEEKING INFORMATION*	
	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE
THREAT	0.62 (0.47)	0.82 (0.55)	0.26 (0.50)	-0.40 (0.65)
OPPORTUNITY	0.36 (0.52)	0.06 (0.65)	0.00 (0.55)	-0.81 (0.82)

The absence of direct effects of the treatments on subjects' participation does not mean the treatments are completely without impact. It is likely the case that the primary influence of the treatments on subjects' participation is through the respective emotions they arouse. So the SEM analyses will paint a more accurate picture of the influence of the treatments on subjects' actions.

Figures 5.8 and 5.9 below display the respective mean rates of adding one's name to the letter for black and white subjects whose reported emotion falls below the midpoint, and those whose reported emotion falls above the midpoint on the respective emotion scales. This display allows me to ascertain whether an increase in each

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respective emotion appears to be positively or negatively associated with the direct immediate form of participation.

Figure 5.8: Black Subjects' Mean Rates of Letter Signing across Emotions

Figure 5.9: White Subjects' Mean Rates of Letter Signing across Emotions

The figures suggest that anger exerts a stronger mobilizing effect on direct action among black subjects relative to white subjects. But blacks appear to be just as mobilized by the negative emotions of anxiety and concern as they are by anger. Further, hope seems to exert no discernible mobilization effects for either subject group. But these apparent differences are statistically indistinguishable from zero, limiting their instructiveness. To effectively discern the influence of subjects' reported emotions on their political activity requires regression analysis.

Figures 5.10 and 5.11 display the mean rates of information seeking for those below and above the midpoint for each emotion.

Figure 5.10: Black Subjects' Mean Rates of Information Seeking across Emotions

Figure 5.11: White Subjects' Mean Rates of Information Seeking across Emotions

A near mirror image emerges between black and white subjects. Among black subjects, all emotions appear to be positively related to seeking information. Among whites, all but one emotion—concern—appear to be either negatively or negligibly related to seeking more information on DWSD privatization.

Logistic and OLS analyses regressing the emotion states on the participation variables reveal effects not easily discernible from observing the mean comparisons. Results of the regressions are presented in Table 5.4 below.

Table 5.4: Effects of Emotions on Participation Across Race, No Controls

	LETTER WRITING		SEEKING INFO	
	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE
ANGRY	3.00^ (1.79)	3.91* (1.71)	-2.72^ (1.62)	0.61 (2.40)
ANXIOUS	-1.44 (1.68)	-1.35 (1.63)	1.30 (1.53)	-0.46 (2.38)
CONCERNED	2.14^ (1.12)	-1.54 (1.312)	3.92** (1.19)	-1.26 (1.88)
SATISFIED	3.59* (1.63)	1.24 (1.32)	-1.31 (1.33)	1.19 (1.67)
HOPEFUL	-0.20 (1.15)	1.13 (1.13)	1.35 (1.11)	1.46 (1.51)

The regression analyses reveal anger, concern, satisfaction, and hope exhibiting influence on participation in distinct ways for black and white subjects. For white subjects, anger works precisely as predicted by conventional literature. As indicated by the coefficient of 3.91, which is more than twice as large as the standard error, anger is strongly and positively associated with taking immediate action on DWSD.

Anger also exhibits an apparently large positive effect on black subjects' immediate action. But this positive effect is only marginally significant (p=0.09), falling short of the conventional two-tailed test.

The state of concern appears to positively influence both forms of immediate action, but only for African American subjects. For black subjects in the information seeking model, the coefficient on concern is more than three times larger than the standard error. Concern has by far the strongest positive association with black subjects' information seeking. Concern also marginally increases black subjects' likelihood of taking immediate action on DWSD (p=0.06), although its coefficient places it behind anger in magnitude of influence. Concern exhibits null results for whites in both

participation models. This finding necessitates further the effort to better understand the meaning and role of concern for African Americans.

The regressions indicate only a few instances in which either positive emotion—satisfaction and hopefulness—have empirically discernible effects on subjects' participation. Among black subjects, reported feelings of satisfaction over the DWSD privatization have a strong, positive association with taking up immediate action. The coefficient on satisfaction indicates the mobilizing effect of satisfaction for blacks is only slightly smaller in magnitude than the mobilizing effect of anger for whites. In this case, satisfaction plays the role I expected to find for hope, which exhibits no relationship with action. Hope has null associations with both forms of participation for both sets of subjects.

The striking observation from these simple regression analyses is the distinction in the respective influences on black and white subjects' immediate action taking on the DWSD issue. Anger is apparently the sole mobilizer of immediate action for whites in the sample. For African Americans, anger (as well as concern) serves as a weaker mobilizer, while satisfaction appears to be the strongest motivator of immediate action among blacks.

I did not anticipate the present-oriented emotion of satisfaction to elicit any racially distinct influence on participation. Yet as the SEM analyses reveal, satisfaction largely plays the mobilizing force for black subjects that my model posits hope should play. This raises many questions for my model and subsequent tests of it. Has my theoretical contention overstated the impact of future-oriented emotions such as hope and overlooked the importance of present-oriented emotions for African Americans?

Alternately, are the results for satisfaction and hope reflecting measurement issues? The hope construct, after all, did load considerably weaker than the other emotion constructs.

In sum, the preliminary observations of the experimental data yield the following overarching patterns. Neither the threat nor opportunity treatments manage to elicit strong or consistent direct impacts on the participation of black and white subjects relative to the control. Yet they do manage to elicit distinct emotional responses from the subjects relative to the control. White subjects generally follow the patterns laid out by conventional literature; the emotion state with the strongest positive effect on their immediate action is anger. Black subjects do not appear to depart from conventional expectations in all the ways I anticipated. Exposure to the threat treatment strongly engenders anger among black subjects, contradicting the findings of Chapter 3. And blacks appear to be motivated to take action not by feelings of hope, but rather feelings of anger, concern, and most strongly, feelings of satisfaction.

Proposing structural equation models that estimate the direct and indirect effects of the treatments and emotions on subjects' immediate action taking on DWSD provides more clarity into how blacks and whites in the sample respond distinctly to the cues of policy threat and opportunity in their political environment. The models, presented and discussed in the following section, do provide some evidence corroborating the existence of racialized distinctions in subjects' emotional and behavioral responses to policy cues.

Results from SEM Analyses

The SEM analyses reveal suggestive evidence that exposure to the threat condition mobilizes—albeit indirectly through the emotions it engenders—white subjects more effectively than black subjects. There is considerably weaker support for the claim

that exposure to the opportunity condition more effectively mobilizes black subjects than white subjects—again, indirectly through the emotional responses generated by the treatment. Across various model specifications, anger—which is effectively aroused among both black and white subjects in the threat condition—emerges as the emotional state most consistently animating immediate action among whites. In contrast, satisfaction—which is only weakly aroused by the opportunity condition—consistently motivates action among blacks across specifications. Results for both sets of subjects are altered only slightly upon inclusion of demographic and life stage controls such as age, gender, education level, and home owner status. On the other hand, inclusion of attitude and efficacy variables such as governmental trust and belief that public officials care about subjects' opinion on DWSD leads to results that depart from those yielded by other specifications. This model specification reveals suggestive evidence of mediating effects for the attitude and efficacy measures.

For each model specification, I first present the direct effects of each treatment on subjects' reported emotions. These treatment effects provide further leverage on the question of whether there is a racial difference in anger reported by subjects exposed to the threat treatment and hope reported by subjects exposed to the opportunity condition. Recalling Figure 5.1, this inquiry explores if racial differences manifest in the arrow from the treatment to the subjects' reported emotions.

I proceed to show the direct effects of the threat cue and each emotion on subjects' actions. This set of results provides insight in my second area of exploration— whether racial differences emerge in whether emotions engendered by the threat cue (particularly anger) are subsequently associated with greater likelihood of participation

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among subjects. These results examine racial differences both in the arrow leading from the emotion to action, and the arrow flowing directly from the treatment to action.

Following this set of findings is presentation of the indirect and total effects of threat on subjects' actions for each emotion state. These findings shed light on the final question of whether racial differences exist in subjects' participatory responsiveness to the policy threat treatment. Those differences will largely reflect the indirect effects of the treatments, through the emotions they arouse among black and white subjects.

Presentation of the direct and indirect effects of the opportunity treatment follow. Again, I am first examining whether racial differences emerge in the impact of the opportunity cue on subjects' reported emotions. I then will examine whether there are racial differences in which emotions aroused by the opportunity treatment associate with greater participation. Based on comparisons of the direct and indirect effects of the opportunity treatment on subjects' emotions, I draw inferences about the responsiveness of both black and white subjects to this type of policy cue.

Finally, I present path diagrams displaying the impact of the treatments on subjects' reported emotions, and those emotions' subsequent influence on participants' actions. The path diagrams illustrate the direct and indirect influence of the treatments on subject participation, illuminating the potential differences in subjects' responsiveness to each.

The first model specification includes no control variables, isolating the direct and indirect treatment effects on subjects' reported emotions and actions. Table 5.5 below displays the direct effects of the threat and opportunity treatments on subjects' reported emotions.

Table 5.5: Structural Model Parameters—Direct Effects of Threat and Opportunity

Conditions on Reported Emotions by Race, No Controls

	ANGRY		*ANXIOUS*		*CONCERNED*		*SATISFIED*		*HOPEFUL*	
	BLACK	*WHITE*	*BLACK*	*WHITE*	*BLACK*	*WHITE*	*BLACK*	*WHITE*	*BLACK*	*WHITE*
THREAT	0.18*** (0.05)	0.14*** (0.04)	0.11** (0.04)	0.08* (0.04)	0.10* (0.05)	0.11** (0.04)	-0.07* (0.03)	-0.11** (0.04)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.11** (0.04)
OPPORTUNITY	-0.16* (0.05)	-0.15** (0.04)	-0.09* (0.05)	-0.08* (0.04)	-0.12* (0.05)	-0.18** (0.04)	0.07^ (0.04)	0.07 (0.04)	0.08 (0.05)	0.09^ (0.05)

The threat treatment in this model influences all emotions in the expected direction. And with the exception of hopefulness for black subjects, the influence of the treatment on reported emotions is significant at the 0.05 alpha level. Based on this direct effects table, exposure to the threat condition engenders more anger among black subjects than white subjects, producing evidence rejecting the first two racial pathways. Subjects' race does not appear to inhibit the arousal of anger in response to the threat.

The opportunity treatment alleviates both black and white subjects' feelings of anger, anxiety or concern, and all effects are empirically distinguishable from zero. Yet, the treatment manages to exhibit only marginally positive effects on subjects' positive emotions, as black subjects report slightly more satisfaction (p=0.052) and whites report slightly more hope (p=0.07). Overall, both treatments are shown to be effective influencers of subjects reported emotions—particularly their negative emotions.

I turn now to examining the direct impact of the threat treatment on subjects' participation, as well as the impacts of the emotions aroused by the threat cue. Table 5.6 below displays the direct effects both of the threat condition and each reported emotion on subjects' likelihood of adding their name to the advocacy letter on DWSD (the direct

immediate action) and signing up to receive more information on DWSD (immediate information seeking).

Table 5.6: Structural Model Parameters—Direct Effects of Threat and Reported Emotions on Subject Participation by Race, No Controls

	LETTER SIGNING		SEEKING INFORMATION	
	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE
THREAT	0.01 (0.10)	0.15^ (0.09)	0.07 (0.10)	0.04 (0.06)
ANGRY	0.46 (0.34)	0.69* (0.33)	-0.57^ (0.33)	0.02 (0.24)
ANXIOUS	-0.24 (0.32)	-0.31 (0.32)	0.32 (0.32)	-0.06 (0.23)
CONCERNED	0.42^ (0.24)	-0.29 (0.23)	0.72** (0.23)	-0.11 (0.16)
SATISFIED	0.72* (0.31)	0.37 (0.27)	-0.15 (0.31)	0.21 (0.19)
HOPEFUL	-0.06 (0.23)	0.27 (0.22)	0.28 (0.23)	0.17 (0.16)
N	109	125	109	125
χ^2	217.73 p=0.00	239.15 p=0.00	217.73 p=0.00	239.15 p=0.00
RMSEA	0.44	0.43	0.44	0.43

The direct effect of the threat treatment on letter signing for white subjects has a marginally positive coefficient (p=0.09). This is the only instance in which the treatment condition exhibits a direct effect on subject participation that approaches empirical verifiability. In contrast, the coefficient on the direct of threat for black subjects is a fraction of its standard error. Comparing the respective direct effects of the threat cue on white and black subjects' willingness to take up direct immediate action on DWSD is

noteworthy, because it provides suggestive evidence of whites conforming to the expectations of conventional literature, while giving no indication that African Americans also comport in the same manner.

The direct effects of reported emotions on subjects' actions further illuminate racial differences. For whites, anger is the only emotion that exhibits a significant association with signing the letter, and the magnitude of the coefficient on anger is substantively large. Meanwhile for African Americans, the effect of anger on signing the letter is null. For this group, concern exhibits a marginally positive effect on letter signing (p=0.07). But it is satisfaction that has the strongest positive association with anger for blacks. The coefficient of 0.72 on satisfaction is on par with the effect of anger for whites in the sample, suggesting this positive emotion state is as mobilizing for African Americans as is anger—the emotion conventionally associated with political activism— for whites. Because the threat condition both increases anger and decreases satisfaction among both groups (as indicated by Table 5.5), the indirect effect of exposure to the threat condition appears to be stimulating direct action among white subjects, while producing a null or negative impact on direct action on black subjects.

Turning to the domain of information seeking, there is among black subjects a marginally negative association between reporting anger and signing up for more information (p=0.09). This result constitutes one instance suggestive of African Americans conforming with expectations, as anger makes people more confident and less reliant on others for information. Among blacks, reporting concern is strongly associated with seeking information. Thus, among African Americans, concern exhibits influences on participation that make it akin to both anger (stimulating direct immediate action) and

anxiety (stimulating information seeking). Finally, no emotions exhibit empirically

discernible influences on information seeking among whites.

Table 5.7 (next page) presents the total and indirect effects of exposure to the

threat treatment on subjects' participation, across each respective emotion. All effects are

null (or marginal in the case of the indirect effect of threat on stimulating blacks'

information seeking through making them more concerned) with one notable exception.

Between its marginal direct effect on white participation and its indirect effect through

increasing whites' anger, the threat treatment boasts a strong total effect on white

subjects' likelihood of adding their name to the letter. This effect confirms again the

conformity of white subjects to the expectations laid out by conventional literature.

Meanwhile, the null findings for black subjects illustrate the need to revise that existing

literature[38].

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[38] The null total effect for African Americans is likely due to the conflicting pulls on their action due to the varying impacts the threat treatment exerts on their emotions. Because the threat condition dampens their satisfaction, it demobilizes action. But threat also increases concern, which is marginally associated with letter signing. Therefore, rather than an outright demobilizing effect, which would be indicated by a significant and negative coefficient effect, the null effect likely represents the slight mobilizing effect of increasing concern offset by the greater relative demobilizing effect of decreasing satisfaction.

Table 5.7: Structural Model Parameters—Total and Indirect Effects of Threat Condition on Participation across Emotions & Race, No Controls

SIGN LETTER	ANGRY		ANXIOUS		CONCERNED		SATISFIED		HOPEFUL	
	BLACK	*WHITE*	*BLACK*	*WHITE*	*BLACK*	*WHITE*	*BLACK*	*WHITE*	*BLACK*	*WHITE*
Total	0.10 (0.10)	0.24* (0.09)	-0.01 (0.10)	0.13 (0.09)	0.06 (0.10)	0.12 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.10)	0.11 (0.09)	0.02 (0.10)	0.12 (0.00)
Indirect	0.08 (0.06)	0.09^ (0.05)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.03)

SEEK INFO	ANGRY		ANXIOUS		CONCERNED		SATISFIED		HOPEFUL	
	BLACK	*WHITE*	*BLACK*	*WHITE*	*BLACK*	*WHITE*	*BLACK*	*WHITE*	*BLACK*	*WHITE*
Total	-0.03 (0.10)	0.04 (0.06)	0.10 (0.10)	0.04 (0.07)	0.14 (0.11)	0.03 (0.07)	0.07 (0.09)	0.02 (0.06)	0.05 (0.10)	0.02 (0.06)
Indirect	-0.10 (0.07)	0.00 (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.08^ (0.04)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)

I turn now to the direct and indirect effects of the opportunity condition on subjects' participation in the absence of controls. The direct effects of the treatment and emotions are displayed in Table 5.8 below.

Table 5.8: Structural Model Parameters—Direct Effects of Opportunity Condition and Emotions on Subjects' Participation, No Controls

	LETTER SIGNING		*SEEKING INFORMATION*	
	BLACK	*WHITE*	*BLACK*	*WHITE*
OPPORTUNITY	0.04 (0.10)	-0.13 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.10)	-0.08 (0.07)
ANGRY	0.50 (0.33)	0.73* (0.33)	-0.52 (0.33)	-0.01 (0.24)
ANXIOUS	-0.24 (0.32)	-0.27 (0.32)	0.32 (0.32)	-0.04 (0.23)
CONCERNED	0.42^ (0.23)	-0.34 (0.23)	0.71** (0.23)	-0.15 (0.16)
SATISFIED	0.70* (0.31)	0.29 (0.27)	-0.19 (0.31)	0.19 (0.19)
HOPEFUL	-0.07 (0.28)	0.28 (0.22)	0.28 (0.23)	0.19 (0.16)
N	109	125	109	125
χ^2	219.20 p=0.00	236.76 p=0.00	219.20 p=0.00	236.76 p=0.00
RMSEA	0.44	0.43	0.44	0.43

As evidenced by the null results across the first row, the opportunity treatment fails to exhibit any significant direct effects on subject participation. The direct effects of the emotions are generally equivalent here to their effects in the threat model displayed in

Table 5.6. One notable difference between the models is that here the anger on information seeking among blacks is null.

Because exposure to the opportunity condition decreases anger among both groups, its indirect effect on letter singing among white subjects is apparently demobilizing. Conversely, because exposure to the opportunity condition slightly increases satisfaction and decreases concern among black subjects, the indirect effect of this treatment is to exhibit both mobilizing and demobilizing effects on blacks' direct action taking.

The total and indirect effects of the opportunity condition, presented in Table 5.9, are virtually identical to the effects of the threat condition, save the lone major exception.

Table 5.9: Structural Model Parameters—Total and Indirect Effects of Opportunity Condition on Participation across

Emotions and Race, No Controls

SIGN LETTER	ANGRY		ANXIOUS		CONCERNED		SATISFIED		HOPEFUL	
	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE
Total	-0.04 (0.11)	-0.25* (0.11)	0.06 (0.11)	-0.12 (0.11)	-0.02 (0.11)	-0.08 (0.10)	0.09 (0.11)	-0.12 (0.10)	0.03 (0.10)	-0.11 (0.10)
Indirect	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.11^ (0.06)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.05 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)

SEEK INFO	ANGRY		ANXIOUS		CONCERNED		SATISFIED		HOPEFUL	
	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE
Total	0.05 (0.11)	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.11)	-0.08 (0.00)	-0.11 (0.11)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.10)	-0.07 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.10)	0.02 (0.06)
Indirect	0.08 (0.06)	0.00 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.09^ (0.05)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.07 (0.07)

Because exposure to the opportunity condition reduces reported anger among white subjects, it exhibits a total effect on whites' likelihood of signing the letter that is demobilizing. While the opportunity condition makes whites less likely to sign the letter relative to the control, it demonstrates a null effect on blacks' likelihood of signing the letter. This null effect is likely due to the inability of the opportunity treatment to engender more than marginally greater feelings of satisfaction among blacks. Thus, similar to the takeaways from the ANES data, findings from the experiment data raise doubt that policy opportunity cues can close the gap in black participation in the wake of the disparity in black participatory responses to policy threat cues.

Figures 5.12 and 5.13 on the following pages illustrate the significant and marginally significant direct and indirect effects of the threat treatment and emotions on the participation of black and white subjects, respectively. Subsequently, Figures 5.14 and 5.15 illustrate the significant and marginally significant direct and indirect effects of the opportunity treatment and emotions on the participation of black and white subjects, respectively. These figures display the stark contrast in the emotions serving as the major pathways translating receipt of the policy change cue to action—anger for whites, and satisfaction (and to a lesser extent, concern) for blacks.

Figure 5.12: Path Diagram–Direct & Indirect Effects of Threat on Action among Black Subjects, No Controls

Figure 5.13: Path Diagram–Direct & Indirect Effects of Threat on Action among White Subjects, No Controls

Figure 5.14: Path Diagram–Direct & Indirect Effects of Opportunity on Action among Black Subjects, No Controls

Figure 5.15: Path Diagram–Direct & Indirect Effects of Opportunity on Action among White Subjects, No Controls

In the absence of any control variables, clear racially distinct patterns emerged. But as indicated in the previous chapter, the black and white samples vary from one another in many key dimensions. To ensure the racial differences uncovered here are not artifacts of the uniqueness of the samples, I re-specified the structural model with a host of demographic control variables included.[39] The racial differences prove largely robust to the inclusion of these controls, an encouraging sign that these analyses are uncovering a genuine phenomenon rather than a series of quirks limited to a wonky sample.

Once again, first on display are the respective direct effects of the threat and opportunity treatments on each reported emotion. Table 5.10 presents these effects below.

Table 5.10: Direct Effects of Threat and Opportunity Conditions on Reported Emotions by Race, Demographic Controls Included

	ANGRY		*ANXIOUS*		*CONCERNED*		*SATISFIED*		*OPTIMISTIC*	
	BLACK	*WHITE*	*BLACK*	*WHITE*	*BLACK*	*WHITE*	*BLACK*	*WHITE*	*BLACK*	*WHITE*
THREAT	0.19*** (0.05)	0.13*** (0.04)	0.13** (0.04)	0.07* (0.04)	0.12* (0.05)	0.10** (0.04)	-0.07* (0.03)	-0.11** (0.04)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.11** (0.04)
OPPORTUNITY	-0.16*** (0.05)	-0.16*** (0.04)	-0.10* (0.05)	-0.09* (0.04)	-0.13* (0.05)	-0.18*** (0.04)	0.07^ (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.07 (0.05)	0.08^ (0.05)

All effects that were significant or marginally significant in the first model retain their respective levels of influence upon inclusion of the demographic variables. Further, none of the coefficient sizes change by more than 0.02 points from the first model specification. Notably, the anger deficit possessed by *white* subjects has become slightly larger.

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[39] The demographic control variables included are: highest education attained, frequency of religious service attendance, number of voluntary, civic, social, or labor organizations involved with, home owner status, party identification (coded Republican to Democrat), frequency of viewing/reading local news, age and gender. Also included in this and the subsequent model specification with attitude and efficacy controls are the following: scale measure indicating whether the subject opposes or favors the DWSD privatization (coded "strongly oppose" to "strongly favor"), and a dichotomous variable indicating whether the subject took the survey online or via pen and paper (1 =via pen and paper). All variables are coded 0 to 1.

Turning focus squarely to the impact of the threat condition and emotions in the presence of demographic controls, shown in Table 5.11 below.

Table 5.11: Structural Model Parameters—Direct Effects of Threat Condition and Emotions on Subjects' Participation, Demographic Controls Included

	LETTER SIGNING		SEEKING INFORMATION	
	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE
THREAT	0.07 (0.10)	0.09 (0.10)	0.09 (0.10)	0.04 (0.07)
ANGRY	0.54 (0.36)	0.62^ (0.33)	-0.20 (0.35)	0.16 (0.24)
ANXIOUS	-0.43 (0.33)	-0.09 (0.33)	0.04 (0.33)	-0.06 (0.23)
CONCERNED	0.44^ (0.23)	-0.30 (0.24)	0.55* (0.23)	-0.11 (0.16)
SATISFIED	0.72* (0.33)	0.42 (0.28)	0.00 (0.34)	0.21 (0.19)
HOPEFUL	-0.12 (0.18)	0.33 (0.23)	0.38 (0.26)	0.19 (0.16)
FAVOR DWSD CHANGE	-0.02 (0.18)	-0.31^ (0.23)	0.01 (0.18)	0.07 (0.13)
EDUCATION	-0.16 (0.23)	*-0.46* (0.26)	0.54* (0.23)	0.17 (0.18)
CHURCH ATTEND.	0.09 (0.17)	-0.11 (0.13)	-0.05 (0.17)	-0.16^ (0.09)
CIVIC ORGS.	0.09 (0.15)	-0.07 (0.14)	-0.07 (0.14)	0.11 (0.09)
HOME OWNER	-0.26* (0.12)	0.02 (0.13)	0.05 (0.12)	0.12 (0.09)
PARTY ID	-0.06 (0.17)	-0.05 (0.15)	-0.22 (0.17)	0.14 (0.10)
LOCAL NEWS	-0.23 (0.16)	-0.03 (0.15)	0.10 (0.16)	-0.04 (0.10)
AGE	0.62^ (0.35)	*0.85* (0.47)	0.29 (0.35)	0.00 (0.34)
FEMALE	0.22* (0.10)	0.19* (0.09)	0.14 (0.10)	0.02 (0.06)
PAPER	0.09 (0.12)	0.12 (0.09)	0.08 (0.13)	0.04 (0.07)

N	99	119	99	119
χ^2	301.17 p=0.00	239.15 p=0.00	301.72 p=0.00	308.50 p=0.00
RMSEA	0.20	0.43	0.20	0.19

In the presence of the demographic controls, exposure to the threat condition now has a null effect on letter signing among white subjects. Similarly, the positive effect for anger on whites' direct immediate action falls just short of two-tailed significance (p=0.06).

For black subjects on the other hand, the emotion effects remain unchanged in the face of this set of controls. Concern remains marginally related to letter signing while satisfaction remains strongly related to this domain of action. Further, the coefficient on satisfaction is unchanged with demographic controls added. In sum, controlling for the life stage variables weakens the associations between threat, anger and direct action for whites, but does not erase them entirely. Including these variables has no effect on the noted association between satisfaction and direct immediate action among African Americans.

In the domain of information seeking, direct effects remain largely unchanged by inclusion of the controls. Again, no emotion states are associated with signing up for more information on DWSD among whites. Among blacks, the positive effect on concern is identical to its effect in the model sans controls. Meanwhile the marginally negative effect of anger on African Americans' information seeking has dissipated into a null result.

Table 5.12 on the following page presents the total and indirect effects of the threat treatment on subject's participation across emotion states in the demographic

variables model. As expected, based on the weaker direct effects observed for white

subjects in Table 5.11, the total effect of the threat on white letter signing is only

marginally positive in this model. All other effects remain virtually identical here to their

effects in the model without controls.

Table 5.12: Structural Model Parameters—Total and Indirect Effects of Threat Condition on Participation across Emotions

and Race, Demographic Controls Included

SIGN LETTER	ANGRY		ANXIOUS		CONCERNED		SATISFIED		HOPEFUL	
	BLACK	*WHITE*	*BLACK*	*WHITE*	*BLACK*	*WHITE*	*BLACK*	*WHITE*	*BLACK*	*WHITE*
Total	0.16 (0.12)	0.17^ (0.10)	0.00 (0.11)	0.08 (0.10)	0.11 (0.11)	0.06 (0.10)	0.00 (0.10)	0.04 (0.10)	0.06 (0.10)	0.05 (0.10)
Indirect	0.10 (0.07)	0.09^ (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.03)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.04 (0.03)

SEEK INFO	ANGRY		ANXIOUS		CONCERNED		SATISFIED		HOPEFUL	
	BLACK	*WHITE*	*BLACK*	*WHITE*	*BLACK*	*WHITE*	*BLACK*	*WHITE*	*BLACK*	*WHITE*
Total	0.05 (0.11)	0.06 (0.07)	0.10 (0.11)	0.03 (0.07)	0.16 (0.11)	0.02 (0.07)	0.09 (0.10)	0.01 (0.07)	0.07 (0.10)	0.02 (0.07)
Indirect	-0.04 (0.07)	0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.07^ (0.04)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)

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Table 5.13 below presents the direct effects of the opportunity cue and reported emotions on subjects' participation.

Table 5.13: Structural Model Parameters—Direct Effects of Opportunity Condition and Emotions on Subjects' Participation, Demographic Controls Included

	LETTER SIGNING		SEEKING INFORMATION	
	BLACK	*WHITE*	*BLACK*	*WHITE*
OPPORTUNITY	-0.02 (0.11)	-0.07 (0.10)	0.03 (0.11)	-0.06 (0.07)
ANGRY	0.57 (0.35)	0.62^ (0.34)	-0.17 (0.35)	0.14 (0.24)
ANXIOUS	-0.42 (0.33)	-0.05 (0.32)	0.05 (0.32)	-0.09 (0.23)
CONCERNED	0.44^ (0.24)	-0.32 (0.23)	0.54* (0.24)	-0.14 (0.17)
SATISFIED	0.72* (0.33)	0.39 (0.27)	-0.05 (0.33)	0.20 (0.20)
HOPEFUL	-0.11 (0.27)	0.33 (0.23)	0.39 (0.26)	0.20 (0.16)
FAVOR DWSD CHANGE	-0.03 (0.18)	-0.31^ (0.18)	-0.02 (0.18)	0.08 (0.13)
EDUCATION	-0.17 (0.23)	-0.49^ (0.26)	0.53* (0.23)	0.16 (0.09)
CHURCH ATTEND.	0.10 (0.17)	-0.11 (0.13)	-0.04 (0.17)	-0.16 (0.09)
CIVIC ORGS.	0.10 (0.15)	-0.07 (0.14)	-0.06 (0.15)	0.11 (0.10)
HOME OWNER	-0.26* (0.12)	0.01 (0.13)	0.04 (0.12)	0.11 (0.09)
PARTY ID	-0.06 (0.17)	-0.06 (0.15)	-0.22 (0.17)	0.13 (0.10)
LOCAL NEWS	-0.24 (0.16)	-0.03 (0.15)	0.10 (0.16)	-0.04 (0.10)
AGE	0.62^ (0.35)	*0.87* (0.47)	0.29 (0.35)	0.01 (0.33)
FEMALE	0.22* (0.10)	0.19* (0.09)	0.14 (0.10)	0.02 (0.06)
PAPER	0.09 (0.13)	0.13 (0.09)	0.07 (0.13)	0.04 (0.06)

N	99	119	99	119
χ^2	307.81 p=0.00	309.40 p=0.00	307.81 p=0.00	309.43 p=0.00
RMSEA	0.20	0.19	0.20	0.19

Results here are virtually identical to those for the threat condition. The opportunity condition produces only null direct effects on subject participation. Anger has a marginally positive effect on letter signing among whites (p=0.06), while remaining null among blacks. The strong positive association between satisfaction and letter signing remains for blacks, as well as the marginally positive relationship between concern and direct action (p=0.07). Finally, concern remains strongly and positively related to black subjects' information seeking.

The total and indirect effects of opportunity (in Table 5.14 on following page) achieve one notable result. By decreasing reports of anger among white subjects, the opportunity treatment produces a marginal negative indirect impact on whites' propensity to add their name to the letter.

Table 5.14: Structural Model Parameters—Total and Indirect Effects of Opportunity Condition on Participation across

Emotions and Race, Demographic Controls Included

SIGN LETTER	ANGRY		ANXIOUS		CONCERNED		SATISFIED		HOPEFUL	
	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE
Total	-0.11 (0.12)	-0.17 (0.11)	0.02 (0.11)	-0.07 (0.11)	-0.08 (0.12)	-0.02 (0.10)	0.03 (0.11)	-0.05 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.11)	-0.05 (0.10)
Indirect	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.10^ (0.06)	0.04 (0.04)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.06 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)

SEEK INFO	ANGRY		ANXIOUS		CONCERNED		SATISFIED		HOPEFUL	
	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE
Total	0.00 (0.12)	-0.09 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.11)	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.10 (0.12)	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.11)	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.00 (0.11)	-0.05 (0.07)
Indirect	0.03 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.07 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)

Taken altogether, these findings show that inclusion of demographic factors weakens the impacts of the threat cue and the state of anger on whites' direct immediate action, while having no impact on the relationships between satisfaction, concern and action among blacks. The stark racial differences remain just as apparent in the presence of this set of controls as it does in their absence. Figures 5.16 through 5.19 display the direct and indirect effects of the respective treatments and emotions in these models, as well as the significant and marginal effects of the control variables.

These figures illustrate the same patterns found in the figures for the model sans controls. Among black subjects, exposure to the threat treatment produces a slight indirect mobilizing effect by increasing concern; but this effect is overtaken by a stronger indirect demobilizing effect brought about by decreasing blacks' feelings of satisfaction (Figure 5.16). Among whites, there is a clear pathway from threat to anger, and a marginal pathway from that anger to direct action (Figure 5.17). Turning to opportunity, Figure 5.18 reveals scant evidence of an indirect mobilizing effect of the treatment among African Americans, by slightly increasing feelings of satisfaction. This effects runs in opposition to the slight indirect demobilizing effect of the opportunity treatment, via its decreasing of concern among black subjects. Finally, Figure 5.19 illustrates a scant indirect *demobilizing* effect of opportunity for white subjects, as it decreases their feelings of action-stimulating anger.

Figure 5.16: Path Diagram–Direct & Indirect Effect of Threat on Action among Black Subjects, with Demographic Controls

Figure 5.17: Path Diagram–Direct & Indirect Effect of Threat on Action among White Subjects, with Demographic Controls

Figure 5.18: Path Diagram–Direct & Indirect Effect of Opportunity on Action among Black Subjects, with Demographic Controls

Figure 5.19: Path Diagram–Direct & Indirect Effect of Opportunity on Action among White Subjects, with Demographic Controls

Inclusion of a standard battery of demographic and life stage control variables weakened associations among whites, but did not otherwise alter any of the observed racial distinctions in how emotions condition subjects to participate on DWSD privatization. Are these racial differences similarly robust to the inclusion of variables measuring subjects' broader political attitudes and sense of efficacy on the DWSD issue?

It is plausible that the racialized lenses through which blacks and whites view their political environment are reflected in part in their respective senses of efficacy. Accordingly, the proposed structural equation model with attitude and efficacy variables included strongly suggests the presence of mediating effects[40].

Examination of the direct effects of the treatments on subjects' emotions, shown in Table 5.15 below, reveals the first manner in which the attitude and efficacy model departs from the previous specified models.

Table 5.15: Direct Effects of Threat and Opportunity Conditions on Reported Emotions by Race, Attitude and Engagement Controls Included

	ANGRY		*ANXIOUS*		*CONCERNED*		*SATISFIED*		*OPTIMISTIC*	
	BLACK	*WHITE*	*BLACK*	*WHITE*	*BLACK*	*WHITE*	*BLACK*	*WHITE*	*BLACK*	*WHITE*
THREAT	0.18*** (0.05)	0.13** (0.04)	0.11* (0.04)	0.06^ (0.04)	0.09^ (0.05)	0.09* (0.04)	-0.08* (0.03)	-0.11** (0.04)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.11** (0.04)
OPP.	-0.15** (0.06)	-0.16*** (0.04)	-0.08^ (0.05)	-0.08* (0.04)	-0.11* (0.06)	-0.17*** (0.04)	0.08* (0.04)	0.07^ (0.04)	0.08 (0.05)	0.10* (0.05)

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[40] The attitude and efficacy variables are: trust in government to do the right thing; belief that people like the subject have a say in government, how important the subject thinks the DWSD privatization is; how much the subject believes public officials care what people like her think about the DWSD privatization; how much influence people from the subject's community have on the DWSD issue; how much influence the subject herself has on the DWSD issue; and how likely the subject believes it is the issue will turn out how the subject wants it to.

The effects of exposure to the threat cue have only marginally positive effects on white subjects' anxiety (p=0.07) and black subjects' concern (p=0.08). Additionally, exposure to the opportunity condition only marginally reduces black subjects' anxiety (p=0.07). Yet, opportunity generally exhibits stronger positive effects on subjects' positive emotions than it produced in prior specifications. The positive effect of exposure to the opportunity cue on black subjects' satisfaction becomes significant at the 0.05 alpha level, while its effect on white subjects' satisfaction goes from null to marginally significant (p=0.07). Additionally, the effect on whites' reported hope goes from marginally to conventionally significant. Still, however, there is no arousal of hope among black subjects.

Examining the direct effects of the threat treatment and emotions on subject participation reveals more critical differences from prior specifications; the results are displayed in Table 5.16 below.

Table 5.16: Structural Model Parameters—Direct Effects of Threat Condition and Emotions on Subjects' Participation, Attitude & Engagement Controls Included

	LETTER SIGNING		SEEKING INFORMATION	
	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE
THREAT	-0.05 (0.11)	0.06 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.10)	0.04 (0.06)
ANGRY	0.74^ (0.38)	0.61* (0.31)	-0.41 (0.35)	-0.03 (0.22)
ANXIOUS	-0.40 (0.34)	-0.22 (0.30)	0.25 (0.32)	-0.02 (0.21)
CONCERNED	0.22 (0.27)	-0.75* (0.22)	0.50* (0.25)	-0.17 (0.16)
SATISFIED	0.60^ (0.34)	0.10 (0.26)	-0.26 (0.31)	0.11 (0.18)
HOPEFUL	-0.17 (0.25)	0.45* (0.21)	0.18 (0.24)	0.03 (0.15)
FAVOR DWSD CHANGE	-0.01 (0.19)	-0.28^ (0.17)	-0.12 (0.18)	0.04 (0.12)
TRUST IN GOVT	0.42 (0.27)	0.44* (0.26)	0.20 (0.25)	-0.38** (0.14)
SAY IN GOVT	-0.18 (0.24)	0.05 (0.17)	0.06 (0.22)	0.37** (0.12)
DWSD IMPORTANT	0.19 (0.19)	0.76*** (0.18)	0.49* (0.18)	0.35** (0.09)
DWSD—OFF'LS CARE	-0.02 (0.27)	-0.72*** (0.21)	0.03 (0.25)	0.19 (0.15)
DWSD—LOCAL INFL.	0.00 (0.24)	-0.09 (0.21)	0.08 (0.22)	-0.09 (0.15)
DWSD—MY INFL	0.13 (0.28)	0.28 (0.22)	-0.11 (0.25)	0.00 (0.16)
DWSD OUTCOME	0.04 (0.27)	0.27 (0.20)	0.33 (0.25)	0.11 (0.15)
PAPER	0.02 (0.10)	0.06 (0.08)	-0.09 (0.09)	0.03 (0.05)
N	104	121	104	121
χ^2	325.42 p=0.00	329.96 p=0.00	325.42 p=0.00	329.96 p=0.00
RMSEA	0.22	0.20	0.22	0.20

Anger retains its positive and significant effect on white subjects' direct immediate action. But anger also exhibits a positive effect on black subjects' participation that falls ever so short of two-tailed significance (p=0.053). Furthermore, the positive effect of satisfaction on black subjects' direct action has been weakened to be only marginally positive (p=0.07). And the magnitude of this coefficient is lower than the coefficient on anger for black subjects. When controlling for subjects' senses of efficacy on the DWSD issue, the clear racial differences in the association between anger and action become much less evident.

Table 5.16 reveals two additional results that depart notably from those of prior specifications. Reported feelings of hope are strongly and positively associated with direct immediate action, but only for *white* subjects. In previous models, hope has produced null effects on participation, despite the initial expectation that it would mobilize action among African American subjects. Yet upon inclusion of the attitude and efficacy variables, this emotion state stimulates action among only whites.

Also, concern produces a significant and *negative* effect on white subjects' direct immediate action. The magnitude of this demobilizing effect is considerably larger than the positive effects of both anger and hope for white subjects. The threat treatment, therefore, yields both participation stimulating and depressing influences for whites, as it has been shown to yield for black subjects in prior models.

It should come as no surprise that efficacy variables exert a partial mediating effect on the association between subjects' reported emotions and their participation. After all, efficacy is capturing individuals' assessments of their capacity to participate

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effectively in politics and extract responsiveness from government elites. I have

essentially argued that African Americans' assessment of the diminished collective

efficacy of the group is what dampens the association between anger over policy threats

and action. Accordingly, inclusion of efficacy variables should account in part for a

portion of the demobilizing effect of that collective assessment.

Table 5.17 (on the following page) presents the total and indirect effects of the

threat treatment on subjects' participation, in the presence of the attitude and efficacy

controls.

The one notable result is that for both black and white subjects, the exposure to

the threat condition yields a marginally positive indirect effect on direct immediate

action. This finding further illustrates how racial differences are much less apparent in the

presence of attitude and efficacy variables.

Examining the direct effects of the opportunity treatment on participation

reveal the same associations between emotion and action as those found in Table 5.16.

The results are displayed in Table 5.18 (on page 190).

Table 5.17: Structural Model Parameters—Total and Indirect Effects of Threat Condition on Participation across Emotions and Race, Attitude & Engagement Controls Included

SIGN LETTER	ANGRY		ANXIOUS		CONCERNED		SATISFIED		HOPEFUL	
	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE
Total	0.08 (0.12)	0.13 (0.09)	-0.10 (0.12)	0.04 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.11)	-0.01 (0.10)	-0.10 (0.10)	0.05 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.11)	0.01 (0.09)
Indirect	0.13^ (0.08)	0.08^ (0.05)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.03)

SEEK INFO	ANGRY		ANXIOUS		CONCERNED		SATISFIED		HOPEFUL	
	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE	BLACK	WHITE
Total	-0.10 (0.11)	0.04 (0.06)	0.01 (0.11)	0.04 (0.06)	0.02 (0.11)	0.02 (0.06)	0.00 (0.10)	0.03 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.10)	0.04 (0.06)
Indirect	-0.07 (0.07)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.04 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)

Table 5.18: Structural Model Parameters—Direct Effects of Opportunity Condition and Emotions on Subjects' Participation, Attitude & Engagement Controls Included

	LETTER SIGNING		SEEKING INFORMATION	
	BLACK	*WHITE*	*BLACK*	*WHITE*
OPPORTUNITY	0.08 (0.11)	0.04 (0.10)	-0.01 (0.10)	-0.05 (0.06)
ANGRY	0.71^ (0.37)	0.62* (0.31)	-0.44 (0.34)	-0.03 (0.22)
ANXIOUS	-0.39 (0.34)	-0.21 (0.30)	0.26 (0.32)	-0.01 (0.21)
CONCERNED	0.25 (0.26)	-0.78** (0.23)	0.51* (0.25)	-0.19 (0.16)
SATISFIED	0.62^ (0.33)	0.08 (0.25)	-0.24 (0.30)	0.10 (0.18)
HOPEFUL	-0.18 (0.26)	0.46* (0.21)	0.19 (0.24)	0.04 (0.15)
FAVOR DWSD CHANGE	-0.02 (0.19)	-0.29^ (0.17)	-0.11 (0.18)	0.04 (0.12)
TRUST IN GOVT	0.41 (0.27)	0.44* (0.19)	0.20 (0.25)	-0.38** (0.14)
SAY IN GOVT	-0.15 (0.24)	0.03 (0.17)	0.06 (0.22)	0.36** (0.12)
DWSD IMPORTANT	0.19 (0.19)	0.77*** (0.18)	0.49* (0.18)	0.35** (0.13)
DWSD—OFF'LS CARE	-0.02 (0.27)	-0.73*** (0.21)	0.02 (0.25)	0.19 (0.15)
DWSD—LOCAL INFL.	0.01 (0.24)	-0.07 (0.21)	0.08 (0.22)	-0.07 (0.15)
DWSD—MY INFL	0.13 (0.28)	0.28 (0.22)	-0.11 (0.25)	0.00 (0.16)
DWSD OUTCOME	0.01 (0.27)	0.27 (0.20)	0.31 (0.25)	0.11 (0.15)
PAPER	0.03 (0.18)	0.06 (0.08)	-0.10 (0.09)	0.02 (0.06)
N	104	121	104	121
χ^2	321.74 p=0.00	327.68 p=0.00	321.74 p=0.00	327.68 p=0.00
RMSEA	0.22	0.20	0.22	0.20

Once again, both anger and satisfaction elicit marginally positive effects on black subjects', direct immediate action. Meanwhile among white subjects, both anger and hope produce significant positive effects on direct action, while concern produces significant and negative effects.

Turning to Table 5.19, which presents the total and indirect effects of the opportunity treatment on participation (see next page), there is one instance in which the opportunity condition produces a non-null effect. Among whites, the opportunity treatment has a strongly positive indirect effect on letter signing through decreasing feelings of concern, which themselves are negatively correlated with direct action.

Figures 5.20 through 5.23 are path diagrams displaying the direct and indirect effects of the respective treatments and emotions on subject participation, by race. These figures illustrate the dramatic departure of the findings of the attitude and efficacy model from those of the prior models.

In the absence of the efficacy factors, exposure to the threat condition produced both slight indirect mobilizing effects and moderately indirect demobilizing effects on black subjects' direct immediate action on DWSD. But as Figure 5.20 reveals, when factoring in measures of efficacy, the indirect mobilizing influences of the threat treatment (through increasing anger—an emotion here marginally associated with action) appear to outweigh the demobilizing indirect influences (through decreasing satisfaction—an emotion here marginally associated with action) on black action.

Figure 5.20: Path Diagram–Direct & Indirect Effects of Threat on Action among Black Subjects, With Attitude & Efficacy Controls

**Figure 5.21: Path Diagram–Direct & Indirect Effects of Threat on Action among White Subjects, With Attitude & Efficacy Controls**

Figure 5.22: Path Diagram–Direct & Indirect Effects of Opportunity on Action among Black Subjects, With Attitude & Efficacy Controls

Figure 5.23: Path Diagram–Direct & Indirect Effects of Opportunity on Action among White Subjects, With Attitude&

Efficacy Controls

Among white subjects an opposite pattern emerges, as shown in Figure 5.21. In prior specifications, threat produced a clearly positive indirect influence on direct action through increasing whites' anger. But in the presence of attitude and efficacy controls, threat produces indirect demobilizing effects as well. By both increasing concern—which makes whites *less* likely to sign the letter, and decreasing hope, which makes whites *more* likely to sign the letter, the threat treatment appears to indirectly dampens whites' direct action more than it bolsters it.

Effects of exposure to the opportunity treatments are also altered upon inclusion of attitude and efficacy variables. As shown in Figure 5.22, the opportunity treatment's marginal indirect mobilizing effects deriving from the increased feelings of satisfaction among black subjects appear to be outweighed by its marginal indirect demobilizing effects via decreased feelings of anger. Among whites, the opportunity condition produces a similar indirect demobilizing effect via decreased feelings of anger (see Figure 5.23). Yet, the treatment's apparent indirect mobilizing effects—through both decreasing concern and increasing hope—appear to be strong enough to outweigh the demobilizing effect.

What to make of the fact that inclusion of the attitude and efficacy variables transformed two previously null effects—anger for African Americans and hope for whites—into marginal and significant effects, respectively? The strong effect of hope for whites in the efficacy model suggests that the efficacy measures play a greater relative mediating role for black subjects. In other words, there may be a stronger correlation between reported hopefulness among black subjects and their feelings of efficacy. As

blacks become more efficacious, do they tend to become more hopeful relative to more efficacious whites?

Conversely, the trends suggest that as whites become more efficacious, they tend to report more anger. The relationship between efficacy and anger appears to be not as strong for African Americans. The inclusion, therefore, of the efficacy measures uncovers a marginal anger effect for blacks, while accounting for a portion of the anger effect among whites previously found to be strong.

Mediating effects of the efficacy measures fail to reach conventional levels of significance in Sobel-Goodman tests (not shown). In the absence of definitive empirical evidence, I can only speculate as to the how efficacy might mediate the impact of emotions differently for black and white subjects. But the concept of efficacy mediating distinct emotions for blacks and whites is worthy of further exploration in future studies.

Scholarship has generally found a positive association between possessing efficacy and expressing anger at threat cues within the environment (Lerner and Keltner 2001; Valentino et al 2009; 2011). Could this positive association be bound to whites? Would sufficient sample sizes of blacks uncover empirical evidence that efficacy actually associates with positive emotions such as hope for this group? Informed by the results of this study, I can prioritize this examination going forward.

Discussion of the Findings

Recall from the "Expectations" section of the previous chapter, that I aimed to explore the following from the experiment:

- Whether racial differences emerge in the emotions reported by subjects in response to the policy threat and opportunity treatments

- Whether racial differences emerge in which emotions—particularly anger and hope—influence political participation among subjects

- Whether racial differences emerge in whether subjects are more responsive to the threat or opportunity treatments with political action

The experiment yielded findings that provide suggestive but illuminating insight on each of these areas. Regarding the first question, the experiment yielded no evidence of racial differences in the emotions subjects reported across treatment conditions. In particular, the anger deficit uncovered by the ANES analyses is not apparent from the experiment. Black subjects in the threat condition carried a high propensity to report anger over DWSD privatization. Overall, the experiment yielded no evidence to support the first and second racial pathways (Figures 2.5 and 2.6), which posit anger will not be aroused among African Americans due to the influence of their racial ideological worldview.

But racial differences did appear to emerge in the translation of emotions to political action on DWSD. Anger reported among white subjects was generally the emotion most positively associated with taking up immediate direct action on the DWSD privatization issue. In contrast, reported anger among black subjects exhibited null effects on participation, at least in the absence of attitude and efficacy measures. In contrast to my expectations, hope virtually never mobilized action among either group. And in the one specification in which hope did elicit greater participation, the effect was limited to whites. To my surprise, satisfaction was the emotion most positively associated with taking up immediate direct action on the DWSD issue among black subjects.

Because the threat treatment effectively increased both subjects' anger, but anger only influenced action among whites (at least in absence of attitude and efficacy

measures), this treatment appeared to engender greater participatory responsiveness among whites relative to the opportunity treatment. Among black subjects, both the threat and opportunity treatments produced both mobilizing and demobilizing indirect effects. Among blacks, the threat treatment decreased satisfaction—which stimulated action—but also increased concern—which marginally increased action. In contrast, the opportunity treatment only slight increased satisfaction, while decreasing concern.

Thus, the results were not consistent with my overarching expectations for African Americans. Neither the threat treatment resoundingly demobilized black subjects nor did the opportunity treatment resoundingly mobilize them. But the responsiveness of African Americans to the treatments proved nonetheless to be distinct from that of white subjects, thanks largely in part to the varying effects of anger on black and white subjects' direct action taking. The discovery of varied racial effects on participation of the anger aroused by the threat condition is the major takeaway from this experiment.

As one can reasonably expect, efficacy mediated the effects of emotions on subjects' action, across race. As stated earlier, previous scholarship has found an empirical linkage between efficacy and anger. I found trends suggesting this linkage may vary along race lines, motivating future exploration of this dynamic.

Also contrary to my overarching expectations, no evidence was uncovered indicating a mobilizing role played by hope on the participation of black subjects. Yet a positive emotion was found to mobilize effectively African Americans while not exhibiting a similar effect for whites—satisfaction. As alluded to earlier, this could be a result of an issue regarding the operationalization or measurement of the constructs I labelled as satisfaction and hope. Or, it could reflect a need to revise my thinking about

precisely which type of positive emotion is made resonant by the black ideological narrative of salvation.

Another surprise concerns the emergence of *concern* and its apparent influence on the participation of black subjects. Across all model specifications, concern enacted a positive influence on African Americans' information seeking, making it conceptually akin to anxiety (which itself exerted no influence on either subject groups' participation). Yet additionally, in the absence of attitude and efficacy controls, concern exerted marginally positive effects on African Americans' direct action. Thus, concern exhibited influences on the participation of African Americans that conventional literature would ascribe to both anger and anxiety.

Adding to the noteworthiness of concern's influence on black participation is the absence of an analogous influence on the participation of whites in the sample. To further understand how race conditions the translation of affect to political activity requires solving the puzzle of concern. What does it signify for blacks and whites, respectively? And what precisely is the mechanism through which it translates to varying types of action among only one of these groups? In the next section I attend to this and the other most pressing questions raised by the experimental findings.

Where To Go From Here: Addressing Emergent Questions and Next Steps for Future Inquiry

The unique characteristics of the sample preclude me from drawing definitive conclusions from it. Yet the trends that emerge raise critical questions that carry meaningful implications for the theory of racialized responses to policy cues I seek to

develop. I address some of those questions here, and delineate possible ways I can address the questions empirically in future iterations of the project.

First, what is signified by the indicators that black subjects did not hesitate to report anger in the threat condition, but their anger did not stimulate direct action? The ANES analyses revealed black Democrats were significantly less likely than white Democrats to report anger under conditions operationalized as threatening; yet for black and white Democrats alike, anger was an effective mobilizer of political participation. Meanwhile, black subjects in the experiment's threat condition were if anything *more* likely than white subjects to report anger over DWSD; yet anger often failed to materialize as direct action among blacks.

What differences other than characteristics of the sample might inform where the anger deficit manifested on the part of African Americans? One, the potential objects of respondents' emotions differed across studies. The ANES sample directed anger toward individuals—Presidential incumbents. The experiment sample directed anger toward policy—the DWSD privatization.

The findings from both studies might indicate a hesitance on the part of African Americans relative to whites to express anger toward individuals, as opposed to policies. Alternately, the findings may indicate that African Americans possess more resignation relative to whites in the domain of partisan politics. Due to the near universal adherence of African Americans to the Democratic Party, coupled with the widespread perception that Republicans represent the party of the conservative white male, individual blacks may share the deeply ingrained belief that Republican elites will always pursue agendas to the detriment of the black populace. This belief would preclude blacks from feeling

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angry toward individual Republicans, as any perceived threat posed by Republican regimes is simply consistent with blacks' longstanding expectations of how Republicans act toward African Americans.

The action domains constitute another key difference between the ANES and experimental data. In the ANES study, respondents' examined actions are limited to the domain of campaign activity—voting, campaigning and discussing the candidates with others. In the experiment on the other hand, actions are focused not on campaign activity, but on policy advocacy. Thus, the forms of activity measured in the respective studies fall under the distinct categories of electoral and governmental participation (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993).

The emergent trends from the studies may indicate that anger translates to action as effectively for blacks as for whites in the domain of electoral activity, but not as effectively in the sphere of governmental participation. I see no obviously intuitive reason why this would be the case. Perhaps electoral activates such as voting or wearing a campaign sticker are perceived to be less costly and energy consuming than governmental activities such as signing an advocacy letter or contacting an elected official. Relatedly, perhaps African Americans' general skepticism regarding the responsiveness to the political system is made more salient in the realm of governmental activity, thus exhibiting a stronger influence on their decision to act when angered by a policy threat cue, and steering them toward a modal state of inaction in response to the cue.

Whether any of my proposed reasons for the varying anger deficits are ultimately borne out, it is key to note that across the studies whites were consistently

angered by the imposition of a relevant threat, and their anger consistently and strongly translated to direct relevant action. So regardless of where and how the anger deficit manifests among blacks, it does indeed distinguish the participatory responses of African Americans to threat cues from that of whites. It is nevertheless important to pinpoint precisely under which conditions one can expect either type of anger deficit to emerge among African Americans. To address this, I can increase and vary both the potential targets of anger for black and white subjects in a study, and the action types available for subjects to take.

How might such a plan be executed in the context of my existing experimental design? One way is through inclusion of additional threat and opportunity conditions that specify a specific elected official who is responsible for the DWSD privatization. Subjects in these additional conditions are asked to report both their feelings about the DWSD privatization and about the individual to which the privatization is attributed. This allows me to ascertain differences in black subjects' willingness to report anger toward policies versus people.

The types of immediate actions subjects are invited to take within the survey can also be broadened to include both governmental and electoral forms of activity. For example, subjects can be told that the official responsible for the privatization is up for re-election. Subjects can subsequently be presented with the options to donate money to the campaign of the official or his opponent, request a bumper sticker for the official/opponent, and request a template letter to send or email to their friends supporting either the official or his opponent. With a wider range of action types available to

subjects, I can better pinpoint whether and how the racialized associations between emotions and political activeness vary across differing modes of political participation.

The next key question revolves around the influence of concern on black subjects' participation. This affective state appears to exist outside of the dichotomous anger-fear paradigm to which the scholarship on negative affect is usually focused, exerting influences on black participation akin to the effects of both anger and anxiety.

Because concern exhibits a stronger association with information seeking than direct action, it may be the case that the component variables comprising concern measure subjects' anxiety more effectively than the component variables I actually labeled as anxiety. Yet even if this is the case, there remains the question of why this anxiety measure produced the intended effect for African Americans in the sample but not whites. Thinking through what differentiates hope from satisfaction raises similar questions

Inclusion of an affect induction component to the experiment may help to pinpoint what the states of concern, hope, satisfaction and other constructs are truly measuring, and why their effects differ across race. Subjects will be asked to take between three and four minutes to write about an experience that made them feel one of the following randomly assigned emotions: angry, fearful, concerned, happy, and hopeful.[41] Immediately following this induction step, subjects will be exposed to the

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[41] The direct text of the prompt can come from the study by Banks and Valentino (2012): "Here is a picture of someone who is [CONCERNED]. We would like you to describe in general things that make you feel like the person in the picture. It is okay if you don't remember all the details, just be specific about what exactly it is that makes you [CONCERNED] and what it feels like to be [CONCERNED]. Please describe the events that make you feel the most [CONCERNED], these experiences could have occurred in the past or will happen in the future. If you can, write your description so that someone reading it might even feel [CONCERNED]."

normal policy threat, opportunity, or neutral (control) cues, and then be invited to take the variety of immediate actions on the issue.

Content analysis of responses to the induction prompts will allow me to ascertain what distinguishes fear from concern in the minds of the subjects. And analyses of the associations between induced emotions and participation will clarify the respective influences of anxiety and concern on subjects' participation choice, both within and across race.

The experiment design allowed for distinct emotion states such as concern to be uncovered, but lacked a means by which to provide a precise operationalization of racial resignation. In Chapter 2, racial resignation was conceptualized as a resounding a sense of fatalism over impending policy threats, which is rooted in the pervasively skeptical ideological worldview of African Americans. I argued racial resignation can be primed alongside African Americans' affective response to threat cues, inhibiting either the arousal or impact of anger in particular on blacks' participation.

The null and marginal effects of anger on black subjects' participation could be suggestive of a sense of resignation uniquely possessed by blacks that inhibits the mobilizing impact of the anger they feel. Further, while concern itself does not act in a way that allows it to be identified as a proxy for resignation, its emergence and influence among black subjects may constitute additional suggestive evidence that something unique to African Americans is conditioning the translation of their reported anger to action on DWSD.

But these amount to mere speculations. In order to systematically account for the presence of resignation among blacks in the sample requires a proper

operationalization of the concept. It is best that resignation not be thought of as an emotion state itself, but rather as a cognitive valuation that conditions the emergence of affective states in response to a cue and the consequent influence of those affect states on participation. Additional closed and open ended questions can help determine whether this cognitive valuation is present among blacks in the sample, and how it impacts the association between their reported affect and action.

For instance, once subjects report how likely it is that the DWSD issue turns out in their favor, they can be asked *why* they responded as they did. Also, in addition to the battery of questions gauging how subjects feel about the issue after receiving the treatment, they can be asked how they would feel specifically if the issue does *not* turn out as they desire. For this question, *surprised* would be added to the list of emotions.

Inclusion of such questions can begin to provide a means of testing for the presence and impact of resignation among black subjects.

Content analysis of responses to the open ended question regarding the likelihood of subjects getting their way can reveal varying degrees to which black and white subjects possess a sense of optimism or fatalism over policy outcomes. Comparing black and white subjects' reported emotions if the issue does not turn out as desired can uncover relative mutedness in blacks' emotion relative to whites over the prospect of losing out in the policy space. Taken together with the finding that black subjects' anger does not translate to direct action as effectively as for whites, the data would now show multiple areas in which African Americans' affect is impacted by a cognitive heuristic shaped by relevant racial narratives. This would constitute a stronger case for the presence of resignation among African Americans.

The data from the experiment prevent assessment of how black racial consciousness impacts the associations between policy cues, affect and participation—a result of limitations in both the design and the data collection. Given the centrality of black narratives to the account I provide, possession of racial group consciousness among African Americans must be accounted for in future analyses. The extent to which African Americans possess black consciousness should affect the extent to which the narratives of black subjugation, resilience and salvation are accessible and salient when they encounter cues of policy change.

Race consciousness has been demonstrated to be positively associated with political activity for blacks (see Chong and Rogers 2005 for review). Consistent with my argument, I contend race consciousness will exhibit varying influences on black participation, depending on the policy cue to which the black individual is exposed. Black consciousness should amplify the *demobilizing* effects of policy threat cues on black participation, due to the increased accessibility and salience of the narratives of black subjugation and resilience for highly conscious African Americans. I expect racially conscious blacks to show greater signs of resignation in the face of policy threats, which mitigates their likelihood of taking up direct action in response to the policy threat.

In contrast, I expect that among racially conscious blacks, the mobilizing effects of positive affect will be stronger relative to less conscious blacks. Again, this is due to the increased accessibility and salience of the narrative of salvation among conscious blacks.

One way to examine the effects of group consciousness is to collect enough cases to be able to distinguish between the effects of the treatments with and without implicit

racial group cues (see Chapter 4 for description of original treatment conditions). This allows me to examine how the interaction between an individual's racialized perspective on politics and her affective response to a policy cue differ based on whether or not she perceives the prospective policy change as one disproportionately affecting her racial group.

Additionally, the post-test should directly ask questions that measure the identification and political dimensions that comprise group consciousness.[42] This allows for direct examination of the impact of racial group consciousness on subjects' affective and behavioral responses to policy change cues.

The final question to be addressed concerns the generalizability of the experiment findings. As discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4, the samples are far from representative of the broader populations from which they were drawn, both in the Detroit metro area and beyond. But the fact that the black sample possessed greater levels of education, income, and political efficacy than the black population should make it harder for racialized differences in emotional and behavioral responses to emerge. That the race differences in effects of anger, concern and satisfaction emerged so clearly from analyses of the treatment effects indicates they capture fundamental race differences that transcend such confounding factors.

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[42] I adhere to the conceptualization of group consciousness offered by McClain et al (2009, p.476) that was previously mentioned in Chapter 2: "in-group identification politicized by a set of ideological beliefs about one's group's social standing, as well as a view that collective action is the best means by which the group can improve its status and realize its interests." I adapt a set of questions from among those drawn from the National Black Election Study (NBES) by Chong and Rogers (2005) to assess the multiple dimensions of black group consciousness: extent to which subjects feel what happens to other members of the group affects them personally; how often subjects think about how much they have in common with other members of their racial group; degree of subject support for shopping at stores owned by members of their racial group; whether subjects believe most Whites want to see Blacks get better break, keep Blacks down, or don't care; and whether subjects believe their group can improve their standing by working individually or collectively.

The unique design elements of the experiment also aid the generalizability of the findings—specifically, having the treatments refer to an actual ongoing local issue at the time of data collection. Rather than expose subjects to a hypothetical issue in a sterile laboratory environment, subjects were engaging an issue of actual relevance and proximity to them. And their prior knowledge of and opinions on the DWSD privatization varied according to how attentive they were to this particular issue within a noisy and contentious political environment. In this way, the experiment design more effectively mirrored the real world context, in which people are surrounded by messaging about current and prospective policies, and choose the extent to which they pay attention to and receive those messages.

Having said that, I acknowledge that in order to draw more definitive and convincing observations from such an experiment requires a substantially larger sample, with white and black subjects who are more representative of the respective population groups from which they are drawn. I reiterate a point made throughout; I view the findings from this experiment not as providing the final word, but rather as uncovering some potentially compelling trends that inform and motivate future inquiry. As a pilot study, this experiment provides more than enough incentive to continue developing and testing the theory of racialized emotional and behavioral responses to policy change cues.

Highlighted above are some of the ways the experiment design can be modified to address some of the most pressing questions and limitations present in the current iteration of the study. In sum, such actions include expanding and diversifying the targets of subjects' emotions and the types of actions available for them to take, adding an emotion induction component, extending the questionnaire to further probe subjects'

senses of skepticism over the prospect of losing out on the policy change, and including a battery of group consciousness questions.

Exploring these questions and the possible ways to answer them constitutes the necessary first step in building on the research agenda established by this project and making greater contributions to our understanding of how race conditions the manner through which individuals process and formulate emotional and behavioral responses to policy change cues.

Chapter Summary

The purpose of this chapter was to comb through the survey experiment data to detect the presence of significant racial differences in the arousal of emotions, the influence of emotions on participation, and subject responsiveness to policy threat and opportunity cues. The emergent trends from this study should prove to be of interest to both students of politics and political actors alike. In contrast to the main findings of the ANES study, black experimental subjects were no less likely than white subjects to report anger when exposed to a cue of policy threat. Yet anger produced null effects for participation among blacks, while strongly mobilizing whites to take up direct immediate action. On the other hand, feelings of satisfaction exerted the strongest positive influence on black participation, while producing only null results for whites.

The stark disparity in the affective motivators of action across race cannot be overstated. The negative emotion of anger was shown to boost direct action taking among whites, suggesting threat cues were the better mobilizer of white action than opportunity cues. But the positive affect of satisfaction boosted direct action taking among African Americans, meaning opportunity cues—to the extent they could actually engender

satisfaction—were potentially better mobilizers than threat cues. Inclusion of attitude and efficacy variables distorted this pattern, while potentially revealing additional noteworthy racial variations in need of further exploration.

The experiment was not without its limitations. Chief among them are the size and representativeness of the samples, a lack of variation in the targets of subjects' emotions, a limited range of actions available to take on the relevant issue, and the inability to properly measure resignation and racial group consciousness among subjects. Assessing these limitations lays the groundwork for future iterations of the study, which can provide more definitive word on whether the racialized patterns uncovered here are truly present.

In the subsequent and final chapter, I attempt to situate the findings from this project in context of the current political environment. It is not sufficient for these findings to be labeled as valuable simply because they support my initial claims. Their value must be derived from their ability to reveal something illuminating about the actual political landscape being navigated—often precariously—by rank and file African Americans. How does the theory of racialized responses to cues of policy change better inform our understanding of black and white participation, from Occupy to the 2012 election to the streets of Ferguson? And how does this theory better illuminate the path to more proportionate and effective action from African Americans in the policy sphere?

Chapter 6

Conclusion

The conceptual origin of this project can be traced back to the early autumn of 2011, when thousands of protesters descended upon business districts, streets and parks nationwide to voice their discontent with perceived corporate injustice and demand more equitable treatment of the "99%" from the economic and political systems. The tone of the political environment at this time seemed best captured by the resounding rallying cry of "we're mad as hell and we're not going to take it anymore."

Yet many an inquisitive mind wondered what message was being conveyed by the general absence of African Americans from the national frontlines of protest action during this time. Perhaps the resounding message of black America in response to the present economic and political environment was indeed captured in the passage from Patton quoted here some 100-odd pages ago; "Nothing will change. We've been here already. It's hopeless."

The dominant narrative around the black experience in America is often tethered to stirring, impassioned rhetoric of uplift and overcoming, from King's *I have a dream* to Maya Angelou's *And still I rise*. But as the studies presented in this project indicate, the rhetoric that more accurately reflects the reality of African Americans' day-to-day navigation of the political environment may indeed be something more akin to *nothing will change. We've been here already*.

Given African Americans' general perceptions that their political goods are uniquely vulnerable to political and social forces beyond their limited scope of influence, it indeed appears rational to respond to any of the constantly emerging policy threats in their environment with restraint rather than activism. But in the long term, the response of inaction is the destructive response. As these final pages intend to make clear, mobilization of direct black action in response to emergent threats in the policy space is a necessary and essential step if African Americans are to acquire meaningful reprieve from their perpetual states of vulnerability in the social, economic, political and legal spheres. The Occupy case was one of many examples highlighting the plausible reasons why African Americans would refrain from taking up intensive political action on policy threats. The cases below provides key examples of the inherent (and perhaps inevitable) danger posed collectively to blacks should they decide to not counteract such policy threats.

This project draws to a close in the context of a political environment in which thousands of people have once again taken to the streets, giving voice to their sense of injustice over a police culture perceived to be excessively violent and unequal in its distribution of force, and demanding equitable treatment under the law. This time the movement is mainly associated with African Americans, as evidenced by the name attached to it, "Black Lives Matter" (BLM).

At first glance, the BLM movement seems to contradict the argument at the heart of this entire project. The dominant image of the movement is that of thousands of rank and file African Americans across the nation—joined by empathetic members of other races and ethnicities—moved to anger by incidents from Ferguson, MO to Staten

Island, NY to Cleveland, OH. This anger has propelled them off of the sidelines and onto the streets, where they take part in political activity that makes them spiritual successors to the Black-led protests of the mid-20th Century.

BLM seems to reveal anger to be both an easily primed and effectively mobilizing emotion among African Americans, which stands in stark contrast to all of the racial pathways modeled in Chapter 2. But subjecting BLM to more critical scrutiny reveals that it does not discredit my findings, but rather complements them. Further, scrutinizing the aims and targets of the movement underscores the need for African Americans to be rallied to act *within* the sphere of policy creation and change, which may prevent them from constantly having to act in *reaction* to crises that manifest from the policies that should have faced prior challenge.

Unlike the cases this project examines, the BLM movement is not a participatory response to a prospective or immediate threat. Rather, it is a participatory response to a series of crises that highlight the marginalized status of African Americans in the eyes of the law. BLM is only the latest in a long succession of citizen action decrying incidents of excessive police violence against African Americans, including recent cases such as Aiyana Jones in Detroit in 2010, Oscar Grant in Oakland in 2009, and Sean Bell in New York in 2006.

While each instance of action response to such an event elevates the conversation on policing in black communities to the mainstream discourse either locally or nationally, it is clear from the preponderance of these movements that they are not achieving long-term shifts to either the culture or policy landscape. For instance, the protests over the police shooting of unarmed man Sean Bell and the acquittal of the officers on all charges

did nothing to stem the tide of the city's "Stop, Question and Frisk" policy, which critics claimed allowed police officers to systematically racially profile black and Latino men. This policy's de facto demise ultimately came at the hands of a ruling in a federal class action lawsuit in 2013[43].

Relatedly, the protests over the shooting death of unarmed teenager Trayvon Martin in Florida in 2012 sparked national debates about "Stand Your Ground" laws, which relieve people of the responsibility to retreat when facing threat, and give them the legal right to use lethal force under imminent danger of physical harm. The Martin case appeared to strike a particular chord with African Americans around the country, sparking vociferous displays of opposition to the laws and pleas for the shooter, George Zimmerman, to face charges for the killing that spread nationwide.

But in the aftermath of the protest action and the concurrent national discourse on the laws, zero out of 22 states repealed or ratified their existing Stand Your Ground laws. The movement elevated the conversation, but failed to affect policy. Within a year of the Martin killing, another controversial Stand Your Ground case emerged in Florida. Once again the case was centered on the death of an unarmed black youth—Jordan Davis—in an altercation with a white man. In this and subsequent incidents across the country—notably Renisha McBride in Michigan—the recurrent question was *Is this the next Trayovn Martin?* (Sterbenz 2013; Wagstaff 2013)

Had the original mobilization of African Americans in response to the Martin case actually focused on changing Stand Your Ground policies across states, either through mounting legal challenges, or vote referenda to remove the law from state ledgers,

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[43] Floyd v. City of New York. The court ruled the policy violated the Fourth Amendment for stopping individuals without proper legal basis, and the Fourteenth Amendment, for targeting blacks and Latinos due to their race.

perhaps the next Trayvon Martin could have been prevented. These examples highlight the critical difference between mobilizing around the threat posed by unfavorable policy, and mobilizing around events that make plain the consequences of that policy.

I see here a critical disconnect between African Americans' willingness or capacity to engage in the politics of *response* opposed to the politics of *policy*. Mobilizing impassioned responses to perceived crises or injustices such as the Bell and Martin shootings undoubtedly carries utility, but that utility stops short of institutionalizing the changes in practices that are necessary to prevent the same injustice or crisis from being repeated. Mobilization of action aimed at modifying, removing or preventing the implementation of threatening policies in the first place is what is needed to enhance or preserve the collective material outcomes of African Americans. Action aimed not simply at airing grievances or making generalized calls for justice. But rather, action aimed at achieving a precisely defined goal on a specific and concrete policy outcome in question, such as the restructuring and privatization of the city's water board, or the imposition of body cameras on the city police force.

It is such discrete policy-focused action that this project subjected to rigorous examination. Whether that action is as broad based as voting and campaigning for the Presidential candidate with the more favorable policy agenda, or as narrow as adding one's name to correspondence pressuring the state legislature on a local water issue, my studies reveal that African Americans are systematically less likely than whites to take up such activity when facing cues of policy threat. Regardless of how the deficit in mobilizing anger manifests itself among African Americans (i.e. whether it manifests as fewer blacks than whites reporting anger, or as blacks feeling angry, but not taking up

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action on par with whites who feel equally angry), the consequent deficit in black action to counteract these policy threats has deep consequences. Inaction in the domain of policy will inevitably force blacks to mount action in response to a crisis emanating from the policy they originally failed to challenge.

I return to the BLM movement to illustrate how the process of black inaction on policy translates to black action in crisis response over time. The BLM website notes the movement's attempt to broaden the conceptualization of state sanctioned violence against black communities beyond the police, labelling ills such as entrenched poverty as additional forms of state violence against blacks. But because BLM is attempting to mobilize around the *crisis* of poverty rather than specific *policies* that impact poverty, the potential impact of its efforts pales in comparison to the potential impact that anti-poverty mobilization carried two decades ago.

As noted in Chapter 1, the political environment of the mid-1990s offered African Americans a critical moment to mount a mobilized challenge to a proposed policy change with the potential to exacerbate poverty, with particular reverberations felt by the economically marginalized African American community. If mobilized opposition to the PRWORA bill could not have prevented its passage, it could have at least lightened some of its more punitive measures and provided more safeguards to ensure fewer aid recipients were pushed deeper into poverty. But this moment was not met with any notable black-led efforts to pre-empt or modify the threatening legislation. Nearly twenty years later, the most prominent current black activism movement is decrying the very entrenched poverty that critics of PRWORA argued would only be intensified by its passage.

Would BLM's forceful call to action around poverty as a form of state violence still be necessary if African Americans had first heeded the call to respond to the policy threat posed by PRWORA? This question does not have a definitive answer. But it is a question raised to point out the consequences of the context-specific form of black inaction uncovered and dissected in this project. All crises animating an impassioned black response, from state sanctioned violence against blacks to abject poverty to mass incarceration, are consequences of policies implemented at the local, state and federal levels. If the examples cited here are at all instructive, it is in showing that mounting responses to the crises themselves attack only the symptom but not the disease. Unless black oriented action efforts focus on preventing, altering or removing the policies that give rise to the crises in the first place, we will continue to see a vicious cycle of crisis and mobilized response failing to lead to substantive change.

In laying out the theory of racialized responses to cues of policy change, I argued that we should expect to witness African Americans exhibiting a distinct participatory response to policy threats—one that is plausible, rational, and even predictable. As I apply the theoretical lens to the actual world of politics, I conclude that this distinct black response—or more appropriately non-response—is also undeniably harmful to African Americans. The distinction in how blacks and whites respond to cues of policy threat does not in any way reflect inherent deficiencies on the part of African Americans. But it nevertheless results in disadvantage for blacks, as their relative inaction to counter policy threats often manifests in implementation or continuance of policy that further erodes black economic, sociopolitical and legal standing.

The importance of the racial differences uncovered in this project derives not simply from the evidence of their existence, but from their potential for black outcomes. Political scholars of race, affect and participation should be joined by individuals and groups seeking to mobilize marginalized communities in parsing through the theory and evidence presented here—questioning it, refining it and testing its applications across contexts and groups.

What factors determine when and how anger manifests among blacks, and when it will or will not stimulate black Americans to greater political action? Why does it appear easier for anger to be primed and motivating at the crisis stage than the policy stage? Can the mobilizing effect of anger at the crisis stage be effectively transferred over to the policy stage? Or is the most effective way to mobilize black action at the policy stage invoking positive affect? How effectively can one induce positive affect in a policy domain that can be framed as nothing but threatening?

These are the types of questions that must be asked of scholars and practitioners alike, as the answers will inform the formulation of action recommendations aimed at closing the racial participation gap in the face of policy threats. It may be the case that varying the focus of the policy domain (i.e. emphasizing either an individual or an issue) or the type of action requested of blacks (e.g. electoral, governmental, or protest) affects whether African Americans engender sufficient anger to motivate a participatory response. Alternately, perhaps only positive emotions engendered among African Americans is sufficient to motivate action in the policy domain. These factors determine which contacting and framing strategies are most effective for mobilizing African

Americans to respond proactively to policy threats, causing political interest and advocacy groups to act accordingly.

This project has added considerably to our understanding of the motivating effects of threat and opportunity on political action, and the associations between affect and action. Race exerts profound and distinct impacts on how individuals process and respond to cues of threats and opportunities in their political environment. The preponderance of evidence presented in this project points to a gap in black participation in response to cues of policy threat, with anger being the primary culprit. The absence of a mobilizing effect of threat cues for African American political action has significant consequences, as calls to action centered on countering policy threats are a constant feature of the political environment. Black inaction to counter policy threats leads to material outcomes that further marginalize black well-being.

This project does not purport to provide the final word on the impact of race on individuals' emotional and participatory responses to cues of policy change. But hopefully it adds to an ongoing conversation about how changes in the political environment provide people with varying motivation to take up political action. Indeed one critical element of this project concurs with previous work in the area; anger is an emotion state that carries unique potential to be harnessed to fuel political action. A better understanding of how this emotion is managed or *mismanaged* in attempts to mobilize African Americans can pave the way for identifying the conditions that propel African Americans into the frontlines of political action in the policy sphere—which may preclude them from having to take action in response to policy crises.

Appendix

Appendix A. Predicted Probability of Expressing Anger toward Incumbent by Race, across All Years and Party ID's

Appendix B. Effect of Expressing Anger toward Republican Incumbents on
Respondents' Likelihood of Political Action, by Race—across all years 1980-2004 and
Party ID

Appendix C. Democrats' Forecasts for national Economy in Next Year, by Race and Year

Appendix D. OLS Regression—Effect of Race and Economic Status Indicators on Democrats' Economic Evaluations

Year	Race effect		Income effect		Education effect		Unemployed effect		No. of obs.
1984	0.10***	(0.03)	-0.15***	(0.04)	-0.06^	(0.03)	0.07**	(0.03)	821
1988	0.02	(0.02)	-0.06^	(0.04)	0.06^	(0.03)	-0.00	(0.03)	703
1992	0.04*	(0.02)	-0.04	(0.03)	0.01	(0.03)	0.02	(0.02)	902
2004	0.05^	(0.03)	-0.09^	(0.05)	-0.02	(0.04)	0.01	(0.04)	457
2008	-0.01	(0.01)	0.02	(0.03)	0.05*	(0.02)	-0.01	(0.02)	692

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.10

Appendix E. Experiment Pre- and Post-Test Questionnaire

Thank you for agreeing to take part in this brief (about 15 min) survey. The results from this study will be used in my dissertation. My goal is to learn how people react to issues that arise in local issues. If at any point you would like to skip a question, please feel free to do so. Thank you once again for your cooperation!

1. Please answer the following:

Age:

Zip code of residence:

2. Please check the boxes to indicate the following:

	Never	A little of the time	About half The time	A lot	All of The time
How often do you think public officials care about what people like you think?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
How often do people like you have a say in how government handles important issues?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
ow often do you trust government to make fair decisions on important issues?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

3. How fairly would you say American society has dealt with people from your background?

Not at all fairly	A little fairly	Moderately fairly	Very fairly	Extremely fairly
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

4. How big of a problem is it if some people have more of a chance in life than others?

Not at all a problem	A small problem	A moderate problem	Very much a problem	An extreme problem
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

5. If people don't do well in life, how much are they to blame themselves?

Not at all to blame	A little To blame	Moderately to blame	Very much to blame	Extremely To blame
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Before answering the remaining questions, I'd like you to view flyer on a local issue on the following page. The specific flyer you see was drawn at random from a group of flyers focusing on local issues. Again, if at any point you would like to skip a question, please feel free to do so.

1. Please indicate whether you support or oppose the DWSD restructuring plan.

Oppose strongly	Oppose Somewhat	Neither oppose Nor favor	Favor Somewhat	Favor Strongly
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

2. Different groups are writing letters signed by state residents that will be sent to the Michigan legislature asking members to either support or oppose the DWSD restructuring. Please indicate whether you would be willing to add your name to either of these letters.

YES, I would add my name to the letter **opposing** the DWSD restructuring	YES, I would add my name to the letter **supporting** the DWSD restructuring	NO, do not add my name to **either** letter.
☐	☐	☐

3. Would you like to provide an email or mailing address to receive more information on the DWSD restructuring from the independent, non-partisan group Midwestern Commission on Water?

☐ Yes (please do so in
space provided here) ·······································

☐ No, thank
you.

4. Please check the boxes to indicate your likelihood of taking the following actions:

	NOT AT ALL LIKELY	A LITTLE LIKELY	MODERATELY LIKELY	VERY LIKELY	EXTREMELY LIKELY
Discussing the DWSD plan with others	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Attending a meeting or forum on DWSD	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Contacting a public official about DWSD	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

5. How important is the DWSD restructuring issue to you?

Not at all important	A little important	Moderately important	Very important	Extremely important
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

6. Please mark the boxes that indicate the following:

	NOT AT ALL LIKELY	A LITTLE LIKELY	MODERATELY LIKELY	VERY LIKELY	EXTREMELY LIKELY
In your opinion, how likely is that the DWSD issue will turn out the way you want it to?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
How likely is it that politicians care about what people like you think about this issue?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
How likely is it that people from your community are able to influence politicians on issues like this?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
How likely is it that YOU are able to					

| | influence politicians on issues like this? | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |

7. How did you feel when reading the flyer about this issue? Please mark with an "X" how much you felt each of the following emotions while viewing the flyer:

	NOT AT ALL	A LITTLE	MODERATELY	VERY MUCH	EXTREMELY
Angry					
Anxious					
Concerned					
Delighted					
Distressed					
Enthusiastic					
Frustrated					
Hopeful					
Motivated					
Optimistic					
Outraged					
Relieved					
Worried					

8. Without looking back at the flyer, would you be able to answer the following?

a. What is the racial make-up of the people shown on the flyer?

No photo	All white	Mostly white	Racially diverse	Mostly black	All black	No people in photo
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

b. Which geographic region of Michigan is covered by DWSD?

East	Southeast	Northeastern	Southwestern	Entire state
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

c. Did the flyer support the DWSD restructuring, oppose it, or neither?

Support	Oppose	Neither
☐	☐	☐

d. What is the name of the organization on the flyer?

Michigan Urban Water Watch	Michigan Water Watch	Michigan Commission on Water	Michigan Suburban Water Watch
☐	☐	☐	☐

9. Please answer the following:

Gender: ☐ Male ☐ Female

Race or ethnic group(s) that best describe you:

What best describes your current marital status:
☐ Never married ☐ Divorced
☐ Widowed ☐ Married/Live-in partner

Do you have any children, step-children, or grand-children that live at home with you?
☐ Yes ☐ No

Are you a homeowner?
☐ Yes ☐ No

10. Please indicate the highest level of education you have completed:

Grade/middle school	Completed high school/GED	Some college	Four-year college degree	Post-graduate degree
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

11. How many days during a typical week do you watch, listen to, or read the local news from any source (whether it is television, radio, the Internet or a newspaper)?

None	1 Day	2 Days	3 Days	4 Days	5 Days	6 Days	7 Days
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

12. Please indicate the party label that best reflects you:

Strong Democrat	Not so strong Democrat	Independent, Leaning Democrat	Independent	Independent, Leaning Republican	Not so strong Republican	Strong Republican
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

☐ Other (please specify): _____

13. How often would you say you attend a church or religious service?

Never	A few times a year	Once or twice a month	Nearly every week	Once or more per week
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

14. Please indicate how many groups or associations you belong to. This includes everything from labor unions to fraternal groups, to hobby clubs or sports teams, community and school groups, and groups working on political issues:

Zero	1	2	3	4 or more
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

15. Please select the income group that includes the income your entire household had in 2012, before taxes:

Less than $20,000	$20,000- 29,999	$30,000- 39,999	$40,000- 49,999	$50,000- 59,999	$60,000- 69,9999	$70,000 or more
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

This completes the study. Again, thank you so much for your participation!

Appendix F. Treatments

Changes coming to YOUR water service. What Can YOU Do?

Michigan's largest water supplier (DWSD) covers 40% of the state's residents across the southeast. And it is beginning a restructuring process that can mean big changes to your water service. But will these changes be what you want?

Supporters say it will:

⇒ **Lower** *your rates*

⇒ *Improve your water quality*

Opponents say it will:

⇒ **Increase** *your rates*

⇒ *Kill jobs for Michigan workers*

What do independent researchers say?

Which side should you take?

Follow the **Midwestern Commission on Water** to learn the facts about how changes to DWSD will affect your water. Tell your state rep to take a stand on this issue. And join our mailing list to stay up to date on this and other issues affecting your service and your pocketbook.

MIDWESTERN COMMISSION ON WATER
Protecting our greatest natural resource
www.michwaterwatch.org

Michigan Water is *AT RISK.*

What Can YOU Do?

Michigan's largest water supplier (DWSD) covers 40% of the state's residents across the southeast. So why do some politicians want to pass the buck to big business from outside the state to transform and control this department? They claim they would make *your* service more efficient, but in fact, their restructuring plan would only deliver:

⇒ *Big job cuts for Michigan workers*

⇒ *Lower standards for **your** water quality, and*

⇒ *Increases to **your** service rates.*

Join the efforts of the **Michigan Water Watch** to oppose this restructuring plan and keep control of *your* water in *your* hands. Tell your state rep to oppose this job-killing, rate-raising plan. And join our mailing list to stay up to date on this and other issues affecting your service and your pocketbook.

MICHIGAN WATER WATCH
Protecting our greatest natural resource
www.michwaterwatch.org

Our Water is *AT RISK.*

What Can WE Do?

Michigan's largest water supplier (DWSD) covers 40% of the state's residents across the southeast. So why do some politicans want to pass the buck to big business from outside the state to transform and control this department? They claim they would make *our* service more efficient, but in fact, their restructuring plan would only deliver:

⇒ *Big job cuts for **our** workers*

⇒ *Lower standards for **our** water quality, and*

⇒ *Increases to **our** service rates.*

Join the efforts of the ***Michigan Urban Water Watch*** to oppose this restructuring plan and keep control of *our* water in *our* hands. Tell your state rep to oppose this job-killing, rate-raising plan. And join our mailing list to stay up to date on this and other issues affecting your service and your pocketbook.

MICHIGAN URBAN WATER WATCH
Protecting our greatest natural resource
www.miurbanwaterwatch.org

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Our Water is *AT RISK.*
What Can YOU Do?

Here we go again. Michigan's largest water supplier (DWSD) covers 40% of the state's residents across the southeast. So why do some politicians want to pass the buck to big business from outside the state to transform and control this department? We've seen this before. Although these politicians once again claim they're looking out for *our* interests, in fact, their restructuring plan would only deliver:

⇒ *More big job cuts for* **our** *workers*

⇒ *Lower standards for* **our** *water quality, and*

⇒ *Even more increases to* **our** *service rates.*

Join the efforts of the *Michigan Urban Watch* to say enough is enough, oppose this restructuring plan and keep control of *our* water in *our* hands. Tell your state rep they need to finally take up our side and oppose this job-killing, rate-raising plan. And join our mailing list to stay up to date on this and other issues affecting your service and your pocketbook.

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Join the efforts of *Michigan Water Watch* in voicing support for the continuation of this transformation. Tell your state rep to defend this service-improving, rate-lowering plan. And join our mailing list to stay up to date on this and other issues affecting your service and your pocketbook.

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We've finally got somebody on our side. Michigan's largest water supplier (DWSD) covers 40% of the state's residents across the southeast. In response to *our* rising demand for quality water provision, the department has begun a bold transformation, with the support of some politicians. We've been served empty promises before, but this transformation is actually delivering on the promises of:

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Join the efforts of the *Michigan Suburban Watch* in taking advantage of this rare opportunity and voicing support for the continuation of this transformation. Tell your state rep to defend this service-improving, rate-lowering plan. And join our mailing list to stay up to date on this and other issues affecting your service and your pocketbook.

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