

# **Affective Trust and the Role of Social Norms in Constructing Faith in Others**

by

William J. Berger

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy  
(Political Science)  
in the University of Michigan  
2015

Doctoral Committee:

Professor Donald Jay Herzog, Chair  
Professor Elizabeth S. Anderson  
Professor Jenna Bednar  
Professor Arlene W. Saxonhouse

© William J. Berger 2015  

---

All Rights Reserved

For Grandma. You taught me that they can't take knowledge away.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Acknowledgement seems like the wrong word choice here. I feel like “contributors” more aptly describes my debt to the vast number of people that have let me bend their ears over my eight years of graduate studies. Or maybe the exercise is performative or reflexive in a way. I’m forced to acknowledge to myself all of the contributions I’ve had over the years. People who have generously given of their time and their energies to reflect on a question I had or a concern that was bothering me. Not because the issue was actually confusing or troubling, but just because I was curious. There is a passage in the Babylonian Talmud, tractate Ta’anit, folio 23b, which reads, “Rava said: Like it’s commonly said, ‘Give me an interlocutor or give me death.’ ” The translation is loose, but the sentiment is accurate. This is my debt to my interlocutors along the way.

Faculty in the Department of Political Science have been especially kind and welcoming over the years, willing to entertain my questions with patience and grace. The political theorists have offered me the best of feedback over all my coursework and many sessions of PTW—Liz Wingrove, Mariah Zeisberg, Pam Brandwein, Lisa Disch, Mika Lavaque-Manty, Kathleen, Brendan, Bonnie, Damien, Erin, Justin, Ben, Nev, Ben, and Alex (among others). Bill Clark, Anna GB, Pauline Jones Luong, Zvi Gitelman, Skip Lupia, and Nick Valentino stand out in my mind as faculty who were never formally responsible for my graduate student career, but still spent a tremendous amount of time helping me think about problems in the right way. Paul Poast was especially instrumental in that regard. As our departments resident GSI cum Pee Wee football coach, he did more than most anyone to guide me through the rigors of what it meant to think like a political scientist. My friends around the department Vincent Arel-Bundock, Amy Pond, Timm Betz, Julia Kamin, Alex VHJ, AJR, Paul Boswell, David Wiens, Abe Gong, Jon Atwell, and Diana Greenwald among others were just indispensable. The most important decision of my graduate career, however, was going to the gym one morning when Dan Singer approached me. He’d seen me around the Center for Complex Systems and the philosophy department and thought my interests might intersect with those of a group he

participated in. This introduced me to Patrick Grim et al, a debt that I can never repay. These projects have been some of the most rewarding efforts during my time here.

I had been spending time around Complex Systems that year because Scott Page and Jenna Bednar were incredibly gracious when deciding to award me an NSF IGERT grant. This gave me the excuse I had wanted to work with the brilliant and excitable crew at CSCS, which has become my second home at Michigan. Carl Simon, Scott Page, Mark Newman, Bob Axelrod, Rick Riolo, and the indomitable John Holland (a''h). These people remind me how large and wonderful the universe is.

To my committee of Don Herzog, Jenna Bednar, Arlene Saxonhouse, and Liz Anderson I owe the most, though. They patiently provided advice and support during all the inchoate iterations of the project. Don has bore the brunt of these revisions, always putting pressure on exactly the right joints in order to identify which components needed further consideration. I can't express my gratitude for all their collective grace and insight.

Per Rava's dictum, however, without Adam and Jean I couldn't. Not a chance. To these two I owe a great deal.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION . . . . .	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . .	iii
ABSTRACT . . . . .	vii
CHAPTER	
<b>I. Introduction . . . . .</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 Puzzlement . . . . .	4
1.2 Distinctions Between Particular, General, and Affective Trust	6
1.3 Extant Notions of Trust: Particular Trust . . . . .	8
1.4 Extant Notions of Trust: General Trust . . . . .	9
1.5 Affective Trust . . . . .	11
<b>II. Melville's Model of a Conventional Trust . . . . .</b>	<b>17</b>
2.1 Theoretical and Practical Motivations for Locating Trust in Melville . . . . .	19
2.2 Personalizing Trust and the Guinea's Plea . . . . .	20
2.3 Shifting Expectations Within <i>The Confidence Man</i> . . . . .	24
2.4 Model Thinking and Melville's Constructivist Ontology . . . . .	29
2.5 Charity . . . . .	32
2.6 Conclusion . . . . .	35
<b>III. A General Framework for Affective Trust . . . . .</b>	<b>37</b>
3.1 Trust's Illocutionary Effect . . . . .	39
3.2 Strategic Indeterminacy and Affective Trust . . . . .	41
3.3 Conventions and Norms . . . . .	47
3.4 Reactive Attitudes and Dual-Systems Theory . . . . .	52
3.5 Group Identity as a Social Norm . . . . .	56
3.6 Discussion . . . . .	60

<b>IV. The Political Theory of Affective Trust</b> . . . . .	63
4.1 The Moral Epistemology Fellow Feeling . . . . .	67
4.2 The Collocation of Trust, Social Order, and Faith . . . . .	70
4.3 Hobbes' Political Faith . . . . .	76
4.4 Conclusion . . . . .	85
<b>V. Affective Trust in the Field: Missionaries' Faith</b> . . . . .	88
5.1 Trusting Under Uncertainty . . . . .	93
5.2 Case Selection and Procedure . . . . .	96
5.3 Mission and Risk Acceptance . . . . .	102
5.4 Faith in Others . . . . .	113
<b>VI. Coda</b> . . . . .	115
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY</b> . . . . .	118

## ABSTRACT

Affective Trust  
and the Role of Social Norms  
in Constructing Faith in Others

by  
William J. Berger

Chair: Donald Jay Herzog

This dissertation introduces the concept of affective trust to complement the extant notions of particular and general trust in political science. While particular trust comes to explain how people generate localized expectations of others that vary across different contexts, general trust accounts for one's default context-invariant expectation that others will act cooperatively. This project comes to explain trust in the intermediate case, in which our expectations vary across contexts, even though we lack information regarding a specific agent necessary to form individuated credences about her. I argue that affective trust is a warm expectation that others are likely to act cooperatively, generated in light of social norms or institutional regularities. Social norms are the right kind of contextual feature to generate trust, since they construct both conditional preferences to act as well as first and higher order expectations that others can be expected to conform too. The nature of these norms makes affective trust second-personal, since we are apt to understand the norms to be reasons that others will accept. In this way, we are liable to elicit blame and reactive attitudes when this sort of expectation is upset.

I build this account over four substantive chapters. In the first I use Herman Melville's *The Confidence Man* to demonstrate the shortcomings of extant understandings of trust, while also indicating the need to rely on social conventions in order to construct trust. The second chapter offers a conceptual analysis, building conceptual intuitions progressively using a series of simple  $2 \times 2$  games. I note that trust should only be thought to obtain in situations of motivational uncertainty.



When agents' motives are independently at odds or compatible with one another, it doesn't make sense to argue that trust is operative in these contexts. The third chapter looks toward traditional political theory to claim that affective trust has political efficacy. Building on the recent literature on sentimental political theory, I claim that trust is the sort of epistemic feature that can explain political motivations. Using Smith, Machiavelli, and Hobbes I show the distinctly political character affective trust can take. Finally, in the fourth chapter I reflect on interviews I conducted with U.S. Christian Missionaries serving abroad to illustrate and demonstrate the plausibility of this theory. These individuals operate in environments where they lack information about the people to whom they reach out. I find that the identification of and with social norms facilitates their ability to trust others. I end the chapter by discussing the coincidence of their faith in God and trust in others.

## CHAPTER I

# Introduction

### ABSTRACT

In this introductory chapter I lay out the need to examine the concept that I call *affective trust*. Though there are other ways of cleaving the concept of trust, the two prevailing modes of doing so have been that of particular and general trust. Particular trust understands trust as an expectation that others act cooperatively in light of pertinent and individuated information. General trust, in contrast, is argued to be one's default expectation that unknown others will act cooperatively. While both of these conceptions have merit, I argue that they fail to track many of trust's behavioral regularities that psychologists and philosophers note. In contrast I lay out evidence for trust which complements the two on offer, advancing the need for a conception which is affectively informed and contextually variable.

It's old news that trust is an integral element of a strong civil society and flourishing state (Putnam et al. (1994); Uslaner (2002); Knack and Keefer (1997); Fukuyama (1996); Inglehart (1999); Zak and Knack (2001)). And there are plenty of good reasons to trust others. We might know them well (Hardin (2002a)), we might just be generally upbeat, well-raised citizens (Uslaner (2002); Putnam (1995)), we might have a strong civic culture that has led us to be trusting (Putnam et al. (1994); Fukuyama (1996)), there might be equilibria in place that make defection unreasonable (Fearon and Laitin (1996)), or just that good (institutional) fences make good neighbors (Levi (2000); Hobbes (1994)).<sup>1</sup> And all of these are fine reasons. Each comes to explain trust in either the most general or particular of cases, however,

---

<sup>1</sup>I refuse to cite Robert Frost here.

rendered either as a basic feature of one's psychology or a sharp expectation in light of detailed evidence.

Beyond particular and general trust this project looks at a third manifestation — affective trust — which aims to reorient how political science reckons with the concept of trust. Particular trust is understood as an expectation regarding the conduct of specific actors while general trust is an expectation of arbitrary others. In contrast to these I argue that affective trust is a warm expectation that others will act cooperatively. This warm expectation has both cognitive and emotional dimensions and is apt to develop in light of social norms or institutional regularities. The nature of such norms and rules is that they obtain broadly over some context—a norm isn't a norm if only one person abides by it. I argue that this conceptual framework explains how one can render such a disposition, along with its associated reactive attitudes, absent individuated information about a specific trustee. When one does possess such individuated information about another—consisting of the relevant attributes that make one fit for a task (e.g. competence, diligence, loyalty, intelligence, honesty, capability)—we still call this trust, but it isn't difficult to explain. If that were indeed all that was necessary to confide in another, trust wouldn't be mysterious.

But this clearly isn't the case, at least not in a whole host of instances where people elicit trust absent much information at all. The account of affective trust on offer here attempts to explain how one renders an expectation prior to receiving individuated information about a trustee. It further explains why trust outstrips reliance, possessing normative and sentimental valences. The picture is one of a versatile and robust trust, explaining both variation between contexts (which generalized trust cannot) as well as its manifestation under information scarcity (which particularized trust cannot). Importantly, affective trust is *not* just “semi-particular” trust—a halfway mark between broad and specific expectations. Instead of being conditioned as a low level trait or a high-level belief in light of localized evidence, affective trust is directed by social norms, I argue. This manifestation argues for a wholly distinctive mechanism to trust, one which accounts for both its ordinary phenomenology and epistemology. It is not, however, a fuzzy form of particular trust or a refined generalized trust. The dissertation makes sense of the loose ends which particular and general trust fail to tie up.

This dissertation is a project of political epistemology, seeking to make sense of psychological and cognitive phenomena in a way that is compatible with literatures in political science and political theory. Affective trust, as I understand it is *a*

*warm expectation that an agent will act cooperatively to obtain some ends or set of ends, apt to arise in light of an identified social norm or other conventional regularity.* Since trust is a collection of related epistemic features we oughtn't anticipate that there exists a unified theory of trust. Indeed, I proceed with the understanding that this account of affective trust is only one coherent account, among others. This "messiness" to trust leads me to construct the dissertation as a tapestry of distinct substantive treatments of the concept in order to make sense of this empirical regularity. I demonstrate its purchase by showing its traction literarily, conceptually, theoretically, and observationally. This sort of multi-method approach is best suited to track a concept that is experientially, rather than mechanistically, unified.

Chapter two launches the inquiry by turning to Herman Melville's novel *The Confidence Man*. Here I set out to problematize extant conceptions of trust, particularly those in the economic literature. By systematically varying the contexts which elicit trust, Melville sheds light on its distinctive characteristics and vulnerabilities. I use these depictions to argue that while Melville speaks to the instability of trust, he does so by identifying the role that settled norms and expectations play in its establishment, and how their absence vitiates its possibility. Chapter three serves to advance a conceptual analysis of affective trust. Beginning with examples of trust taken from ordinary language, I refine a concept of trust which is colloquially and observationally tractable. Using simple two-by-two games to build intuitions, I argue that trust is best understood as a coordination problem under motivational uncertainty. I then proceed to deploy the concepts of conventions and social norms as conceived of by David Lewis and Cristina Bicchieri in order to understand the normative and reactive attitudes that accompany trust. Finally, I also address how institutional analysis, as done in the work of Douglas North and Barry Weingast, is compatible with the arguments I lay out.

Chapter four explores the political nature of affective trust. Through a close reading of texts by Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Smith I argue that not only do these theorists operate with concepts similar to that of affective trust, but they also conceive of it as doing political work, creating bonds between actors as members of a common community. Finally, in chapter five I report findings from interviews I conducted with Christian missionaries who have worked abroad. Catholic, Evangelical, and Mormon missionaries all assume risk by making themselves vulnerable to those whom they preach to. I explain how their experiences of opening up to strangers under uncertainty conform to an account of affective trust. I end the chapter by examining the intersection between these missionaries faith in God and

their trust in others.

### 1.1 *Puzzlement*

The inability of the extant accounts of trust to explain many ordinary trappings of our experiences is curious. As an example of what I have in mind, take David Laitin's opening epigraph from his 1996 paper with James Fearon, "Explaining Interethnic Conflict."

I grew up in a Jewish section of Flatbush that bordered an Italian neighborhood. Sometimes on our way to school, some Italian kids—nearly all of them went to parochial schools—would hassle and even attack us. Although they lived only a few blocks away, we didn't even know their names. We just called them "the St. Brennan's kids." Our parents would see our injuries and report the incidents to our school principal, who was Jewish, but from a different neighborhood. He contacted the relevant authorities at St. Brennan's, who would investigate the matter and punish the culprits. The funny thing was, no one ever seemed to think of calling the police. They were Irish. (Fearon and Laitin (1996): 715)

Why don't they trust the cops? It is *not* because of a thick critique of Brooklyn's Finest—a lack of transparency or accountability, for example. Nor is it because of a general cynicism of all people. Rather the reason given is that the police force was (predominantly) Irish. Put like that the reason sounds absurd. What does the fact of Irishness have to do with trustworthiness? Clearly "Irishness" is not itself a reason, but an explanation, a way of marking social and epistemic categories. And despite the intellectual porousness of this sort of evaluation, we make assessments like this one all the time.

Or take this second example from my own research. I spoke to one Mormon missionary who worked in Albania during the rebellion of 1997. After only six weeks on the ground he and his colleagues were evacuated by U.S. military helicopter as the violence grew out of hand. While he enjoyed his time there, particularly the hospitality he was shown, the situation became more severe than his mission could contend with. The LDS Church moved him to Wales for a couple of months until the violence abated. His time in Wales was uneventful, though he noted that people were colder than in the Balkan region. When he finally learned that he

would return to Albania—a country he had never stepped foot in before going on mission—he celebrated like “a child at Christmas.” When I asked about this sentiment, he indicated that he had more trust and warmth toward Albanians than the Welsh. He was happy to serve the Church wherever he was called, but he felt more comfortable in Albania. The trust he felt toward Albanians was not the result of an idiosyncratic trait of his, but neither was it informed by knowledge about particular Albanians. Indeed Albania was markedly more dangerous than Wales, even after he returned. His trust was warranted by an identified norm of hospitality that existed in Albania that was lacking in Wales, rather than by specific expectations about outcomes. It was this social norm that served to warrant his trust within a circumscribed context.

But maybe you think that what Laitin or the missionary express here isn't really trust, but something else, some close cousin, not trust per se. That's the right impulse, but not the way to proceed here. Trust is not the sort of thing that we can distill in a lab. It's a messy human disposition with rough similarity across human experience. Trust is bound up with associated feelings of expectation, admiration, respect, dignity, and betrayal, among others. Moreover, trust is ubiquitous, present in relationships between lawyers at arbitration, derivatives traders, SEC inspectors and bank executives, bank tellers and managers, patrons and tellers, professors and students, parents and childcare professionals, parents and children, candidates and voters, corporations and consumers, the Speaker of the House and the President, Catholic shopkeepers and Irish Republican patrons, Israeli border guards and Palestinian laborers. It can't simply be understood in terms of a principle-agent problem either. My students trust me to be fair and transparent when filing their grades, but I trust my students to submit honest course evaluations. Though these responsibilities are related, they are not logistically contingent on one another.

Because trust is messy in these ways, any definition is necessarily both too broad and too limited to provide a complete theory. My model of affective trust attempts to thread an analytic needle, constructing an account which conforms both to ordinary intuitions about trust as well as observational research. Though the two dominant modes of theorizing trust are valuable ways of accomplishing this, they don't helpfully track much of what we observe. Affective trust goes some distance to address these lacunas, without claiming to capture trust in all its rich and irregular detail. By engaging in positive political theory I hope to unpack both the 'what' and the 'how' of trust—describe the experience of trust as well as explain the mechanisms that bring it about. I want to be clear, however, that while I discuss

normative aspects of trust, I mean this only insofar as people take there to be an obligation to trust, where one might feel as if they “ought to” or “has reason to” trust. Descriptively one might be said to act under a norm to trust, even though moral philosophers would assesses that, all things considered, no such obligation exists.

This account of affective trust makes sense of the puzzle offered by episodes like those presented by Laitin or the missionary with whom I spoke. By recruiting social norms and institutional analysis—studying the rules, formal and informal, that structure an actor’s environment—affective trust can explain how people develop dispositions which warrant certain expectations, exhibiting confidence absent individuated information. Our perception of trustworthiness turns on these background norms. Importantly, trust here is conceived as just an endogenous product of conventional practice—the consequence of developing attitudes in response to environmental regularities. In this way institutional constraints can condition our empathic responses, rendering trust as if it were warranted.

### 1.2 Distinctions Between Particular, General, and Affective Trust

	Particular	General	Affective
Informational Burden	High	Low	Moderate
Emotional	No	Yes	Yes
Reasoned	Yes	No	Yes
Externally Validated	No	Yes	Yes
Informational Cue	Individuated	Latent	Social

Table 1.1: Relative Features of Conceptions of Trust

Table 1 summarizes important distinctions between particular, general, and affective trust. While general trust is a default level of trust a person possesses, it turns on little to no context-specific information. Particular trust, in contrast, is rendered in light of a great deal of individuated information about the trustee. Affective trust, however, requires only a moderate degree of information regarding relevant social and institutional norms.

The emotional valence to trust also varies across kinds. General trust appears to be emotionally informed, an optimistic disposition which assumes the kindness of strangers. Particular trust, however, results from considered judgement rather

than sentimentality. Affective trust synthesizes these types of attitudes within one framework. It is both an emotional and reasoned reaction typical of hybridized moral sentiments (Nichols (2004), Greene et al. (2001), Greene and Haidt (2002), Kumar (2013), Copp (2001), Campell (1998), Campell (2007b), Campell (2007a), Ridge (2006), Schroeder (2009)). This duality results in trust having both passive and active states, assuming a “decision” at times and a “disposition” at others.

Though there is copious data on generalized trust from survey responses, there is not the same sort of observational data of particularized trust. Particular trust stands primarily as an analytic category, a minimalist model that fails to capture trust’s observed messiness. Affective trust, like generalized trust, benefits from observational research which supports its external validity. Lastly, particular trust is thought to be cued by individuated information which warrant credences of a particular delegate’s fitness for some task. General trust, on the other hand, is a stable preference over time rather than a context-specific belief. As such it is not triggered by any direct informational cue, but a default risk threshold that one carries in their back pocket. In contrast to these, affective trust is cued by social information—the presence of a social norm or institutional regularity. This explains how affective trust varies across context, even absent a high degree of specific information. While I do argue that the *effect* of affective trust is primarily germane to informational contexts that fall between general and particular trust—expectations of neither complete strangers nor close confidantes—I argue that it constitutes a unique concept in light of its distinctive mechanism. As opposed to general trust which is conditioned by one’s early family and civic life and particular trust which generated in light of individuated information, affective trust is propelled by social norms.

I should be clear that there are additional modes of classifying trust aside from the two dominant types I identified. While Wilson and Eckel (2011: 244) point to the distinction between particular and general trust, Uslaner (2002) identifies trust in strangers, trust in friends and family, and trust in government as the major distinct categories. Zmerli et al. (2007), though, discusses the contrasts between social and political trust, particular and general trust, and trust in contrast to confidence. I don’t take issue with any of these taxonomies, however, choosing to embrace Margaret Levi’s assessment that “[t]rust is not one thing and it does not have one source; it has a variety of forms and causes” (Levi (1998): 79). For my purposes, the framework of general and particular trust is useful to motivate an other-directed conception that occupies many of the lacuna that each admits.



### 1.3 Extant Notions of Trust: Particular Trust

A clean account of trust is provided by James Coleman who argues that it is the acceptance of risk when the expectation of gain outweighs the expectation of loss, formally where  $pG > (1 - p)L$  (Coleman (1998): 99). The impulse here is to explain the degree to which people take on risk. A related definition comes from Elias Khalil who argues that “trust denotes the conviction that one . . . will act in a trustworthy way, i.e. carry out bidding, fiduciary commitments towards specific individuals irrespective . . . of ex post incentives” (Khalil (2003): xiv). While more cumbersome than Coleman’s, they both point in the same direction: trust is the cognitive state that leads one to accept risk in a social or economic exchange. Neither accounts for the rich psychological trappings of trust, however. Using a hammer entails anticipation of both risk and gain, though to trust a hammer rather than merely relying on it would clearly be affective overkill.

Russell Hardin offers an epistemically richer account of particular trust, carefully carving out conceptual space that is neither a social capital catch-all nor a synonym for expectation. Rather, according to Hardin, “trust works primarily at the interpersonal level to produce microlevel social order to lower the costs of monitoring and sanctioning. . . Trust is important in many interpersonal contexts, but it cannot carry the weight of making complex societies function productively and effectively.” (Cook et al. (2007): 1-2). Though it is an important feature of social epistemology it cannot alone explain state capacity, Hardin argues. He acknowledges particular trust’s limited local reach, petering out well before it can effect broader political solidarity. There can also be a darker side to trust, manifesting as cronyism or rogue loyalty. Indeed as others also point out, interpersonal trust needn’t be a civic virtue and can have deleterious effects when misdirected (Putnam et al. (1994), Pettit (1995), Jones (1996)).

According to Hardin the first component of trust is that people determine that they share “encapsulated interests.” This arises when “I think it is in your interest to attend to my interest in the relevant matter. This is not merely to say that you and I have the same interests. Rather . . . the trusted values the continuation of the relationship with the truster. . .” (Hardin (2002b): 4-5). Trust isn’t rendered merely because of incentive compatibility, but due to an “enlightened self-interest,” as Karen Jones recapitulates it (Jones (2012): 67). Given the desire for an enduring relationship, the second component obtains when A expects B to perform X in a context Q. This conception of trust requires both that the principle has faith in

the agent's motives as well as expectations regarding her competence for the task. Since Hardin believes open ended pronouncements of trust to be nonsensical, he implicitly requires that the truster has a more-or-less sharp set of credences about the likely behavior of her trustee (Hardin (2002b): 9). Given the large cognitive demand here, its application is primarily for small, local interactions where trusters have a great deal of individuated information about potential trustees.

These accounts of particular trust describe instances where people have high-quality information about their surroundings and about others. Particular trust is not terribly politically tractable, though. Insofar as politics is a collective domain, particular trust primarily gives us means to consider only local, personal interactions. It provides us no tools to understand how trust facilitates the construction of communities or the instantiation of social boundaries, for instance. A second shortcoming is that particular trust lacks good observational support. Hardin's account is especially vulnerable to this critique since it demands that trust be restricted to contexts where expectations as well as motives can be sharply apprehended. There is, however, no empirical evidence to indicate that trust operates like this. We might, for instance, want to understand what Hardin means when he writes that "trust works." What is it that trust *does*? What processes does trust enable that would otherwise have been impossible? While a helpful minimalist model of micro-economic exchange, particular trust lacks the external support necessary to account for much of what we observe, both in the lab and in our own lives.

#### 1.4 Extant Notions of Trust: General Trust

On the matter of trust's external validity, Eric Uslaner proceeds methodically to understand how trust can be accurately measured. His meticulous work in *The Moral Foundations of Trust* explores the different components of trust in political life. In contrast to particular trust, general trust pertains to strangers and has been measured for decades through the American National Election Survey, General Social Survey, and World Values Survey, among others. The canonical question to gauge general trust reads, "Generally speaking, do you believe most people can be trusted or can't you be too careful in dealing with people?" (Uslaner (2002): 52). Beyond its normative import, the answer to this question has a strong, positive causal relationship with traditional dependent variables such as GDP per capita and economic growth (Inglehart (1999): 115; Knack and Keefer (1997); Zak and Knack (2001): 307-9). Francis Fukuyama adds to this chorus by arguing that general trust

allows people to interact more easily, promoting the consolidation of corporations, thereby lowering the costs of doing business (Fukuyama (1996)).

Uslaner (2002) convincingly demonstrates that survey measures of trust are stable over time, indicating that trust is a deeply held value rather than a “mere” preference (quotes in original: 57). Factor analysis yields three distinct dimensions of trust, corresponding to qualitatively different manifestations: trust in friends, trust in strangers, and trust in government. Answers to questions such as: Can most people be trusted? Can your neighbors be trusted? Can people be trusted where you shop? all form a coherent vector which Uslaner calls “trust in strangers.” The confidence to trust unknown others is manifest at what psychologists call a trait-level and important in light of its strong association with increased levels of participation in civil society. Those who come from trusting homes are themselves much more likely to trust. Those who have more education are also more trusting. Younger cohorts with higher levels of general trust are found to have stronger out-group ties. Conversely, those who report high particular trust are more likely to have strong in-group ties (Uslaner (2002): 54).

Uslaner’s account of trust provides mechanistic detail to explain the many well known positive correlates of trust that political science has identified. Raising kids in happy, supportive environments leads them to be more trusting of others and participate more actively in civic life. This ability to open up to others appears to create more vibrant and stable states in which economic and political institutions can flourish. Trust allows for a virtuous cycle of positive political feedback. Citizens raised in more nurturing environments are willing to open up to one another, generating a more robust civil society that in turn instills the next generation with even higher levels of trust.

General trust provides limited conceptual purchase, however, again in two important ways. The first is one of measurement. Data on general trust comes from surveys. Though the measure is stable over time, it is difficult to validate self-reported responses. Glaeser et al (2000), for instance, does not find a significant correspondence between self-reported general trust and observed trust. Instead self-reported trust seems to correlate more closely with a subject’s trustworthiness; individuals who report higher trust are themselves more trustworthy. William English’s behavioral study supports this skepticism, finding no significant relationship between survey responses and experimental behavior, a point which Ernst Fehr’s review of the literature echoes (English (2012), Fehr (2009)). Further muddying the conceptual validity of general trust is the close degree to which it tracks one’s level

of optimism. The two covary so closely that they may indeed be measurements of the same phenomenon (Uslaner (2002): chapter 4). Validation is just tricky with tools involving self-report. The second shortcoming is that what Uslaner identifies is not a behavior, but a trait. One does not wake up in the morning and decide whether to be a truster, or even how much to trust. General trust cannot explain variance within, only between, persons.

Though Uslaner's study focuses on "trusting strangers," he identifies other vectors related to trust that also deserve our attention. Specifically I believe what Uslaner identifies a "trusting friends and family" can help us get a handle on affective trust. This name is somewhat misleading, though, since the vector actually consists of trust in proximate, but not intimate, peers. Indicators such as whether people trust their neighbors, colleagues from work, and members of their church all load with high scores along this factor. (Ironically, trusting family members loads with a relatively low score here.) This vector captures trust in those whom one knows only peripherally.<sup>2</sup> We still come to trust though, even without precise information. I suggest that this dimension might serve as a point of departure to consider affective trust.

### 1.5 *Affective Trust*

You come to a new city and see a homeless woman asking for change, do you oblige? Even so, do you trust her? You are an eighteen year old missionary sent abroad to roam the streets and knock on doors of Southeast England. How do you steer clear of danger? After having served on mission in rural Dominican Republic for years you came to trust the people in your town implicitly. You let your kids wander around completely unattended. So why are you mistrustful of your daughter's male driving instructor once back in the States? While you yourself might decline to trust in one situation or another, it's not unreasonable to think that people elicit trust in these cases and in these ways. Though such examples are contrived to illustrate evocative scenarios—pulled from Melville's fictional *The Confidence Man* as well as my interviews with Christian missionaries—I believe they indicate how trust is more commonly deployed. Trust in the scenarios above is rooted in the same sort of socially constructed warrant that grounds affective trust more generally, I argue.

---

<sup>2</sup>I held a summer job working with a devout evangelical who turned out to have been sabotaging lab equipment in order to carry on an extramarital affair with the repair man—you really just never know.

Coleman's (1990) formal definition provides a simplifying way of contrasting my approach to that of particular trust. He understands trust as an expectation that the benefits of some interaction will overwhelm the losses, formally where  $pG > (1 - p)L$ . To play on this slightly, I am interested in explaining trust manifest as an expectation when  $rG > (1 - r)L$  where  $r = p - \epsilon$ , that is where trust serves as a necessary epistemic bridge of size  $\epsilon$  which inclines us to render a warm expectation that others will act cooperatively. This is the domain in which trust "acts" to facilitate interactions that would not otherwise take place. As I point to below, there is strong observational evidence to indicate that affective trust outstrips individuated evidence—by an amount I am just calling  $\epsilon$  for the sake of illustration—where people trust other humans to a greater degree than they do computers, for example.

Henry Farrell and Jack Knight have proposed a similar account to mine in their explanation of the "political economy of trust" (Farrell and Knight (2003); Farrell (2009)). Their conception also occupies a space distinct from particular or general trust, maintaining that trust can stretch, so not only can A trust B in context Q, but A can trust B in Q-like contexts (Farrell and Knight (2003): 541). They maintain that people come to trust in this way due to both the incentives institutions construct for actors as well as the informational environments which make trust sustainable. This "dynamic account" of the emergence of trust (ibid.: 539) comes about via, "cooperation through compliance with institutional rules, in particular social settings, [which] affects an actor's beliefs about the propensity of others to cooperate (their level of trustworthiness) in similar settings, which affects that actor's willingness to cooperate at some subsequent point in time in that same social setting" (ibid.: 543).

While this is the sort of account I want to endorse and bolster, it does not explain the experiential or epistemic trappings that ordinarily mark trust. Social norms can provide a better process-oriented account of how trust comes about. Such norms are perfectly consistent with Farrell and Knight's account of the institutional distribution of information, but also speak to the phenomenology and epistemology of trust—how it is that trust is rendered and experienced by actors. As such, affective trust also explains the endogeneity of trust that Ernst Fehr identifies (Fehr (2009): 236); the manner in which trust can emerge from actors' coordinative actions. As it stands, Farrell and Knight's claim that institutions create trust by broadcasting information only addresses the generation of reliance, whereas I also speak to its thicker epistemic elements.

### 1.5.1 Empirical Evidence

Affective trust is “personal” in the terms of Phillip Pettit and has many of the trappings of what Jane Mansbridge calls “altruistic trust” and Bernard Williams refers to as “thick trust” (Pettit (1995): 218; Mansbridge (1999): 290; Williams (1988)). These descriptions of trust presented in political theory don’t share much in common with the paradigm of particular trust advanced by Coleman or Hardin, however.

Theorists like Pettit, Mansbridge, and Williams are working, at least in part, with intuitions of trust primed by ordinary language. Indeed, behavioral psychology research echoes many of these considerations. Berg et al (1995) provides the canonical experimental design here, using what has become known as the Trust Game to demonstrate that people regularly trust others absent obvious incentive compatibility. In the experiment two players are given a \$10 endowment. Player one, let’s call her Alice, is then told that she has the option of transferring some or all of the sum to the second, anonymous player, we’ll call him Bob, whereupon the amount will be tripled. For example, if Alice were to give Bob \$4, he would now have \$22 ( $\$10 + (3 \times 4)$ ). That second player then has the opportunity to return some or all of the amount back to the first. On average \$5.16 was sent from the first player to the second, resulting in a back-transfer which left the first person \$4.66 better off on average. Although the Nash equilibrium for the game is for no exchange to occur, this experiment reveals that participants are willing to trust anonymous others lacking any explicit assurance of returns.

Yet the results of the Trust Game differ substantially from other games for which the Nash equilibrium is also for no exchange to take place. The “divide the dollar” game, for instance, which has the same Nash equilibrium but which turns on altruism rather than trust, has a far lower average transfer.<sup>3</sup> The dissimilar outcomes illustrates that trust differs from sheer altruism. And trust also appears to be distinct from simple risk tolerance. People are shown to be less trusting when playing against computers than with other humans, even when the expected payout is the same (Kosfeld et al. (2005); McCabe et al. (2001)). Trust is thereby not purely a rational endeavor, but is also manifest as an affectively informed attitude (see for instance, Adolphs (2002), Delgado (2008), Delgado et al. (2005), deQuervain

---

<sup>3</sup>In the Divide the Dollar game one player is endowed with \$10 and asked if she would like to give some amount thereof to a confederate. In contrast to the Ultimatum Game, there the recipient has no ability to refuse the offer. Here, for instance, the modal transfer was zero, though the mean is not. See Forsythe et al. (1994); Kahneman et al. (1986); Roth et al. (1991); Hoffman et al. (1996).

(2004), King-Casas (2005), Kosfeld et al. (2005), Rilling et al. (2004), Tomlin (2006), Xu et al. (2009); Rilling et al. (2002): 400). Elias Khalil's large edited volume contains a section for projects that understand trust in compatible terms by scholars such as Amitai Etzioni ("moral utility") and Amartya Sen (honesty and pride). Khalil identifies these approaches as a "taste" for particular pro-social values, but points out a lack of strong theory to unify these accounts (Khalil 2003: xx-xxii).

Research in cognitive psychology supports these behavioral findings, providing mechanistic insight to the process of trust. Brain regions which absorb the neurohormone oxytocin, a strong marker of trust (Kosfeld et al (2005)), are also responsible for processing affect (Huber et al. (2005)) and empathy (Krueger et al. (2007); Tomlin (2006); King-Casas (2005)). This constellation of neural mechanisms is also associated with envy, gloating (Shamay-Tsoory et al. (2009)), and in-group preference (though it does not generate animosity towards out-group members, Dreu et al. (2010); (2011)). These results speak to a clear emotional valence to trust beyond the purely rational. And in as much as this literature identifies in-group affiliation as a variable of interest, it would indicate that the neurological phenomenon of trust is at least partially socially conditioned and constructed.

Ernst Fehr examines much of this research and concludes that "trusting cannot be captured by beliefs about other people's trustworthiness and risk preferences alone, but that social preferences play a key role in trusting behavior" (Fehr (2009): 236). Fehr's helpful intervention here is to locate trust in the domain of the social, arguing that the disposition is a function of social features, rather than idiosyncratic psychological traits. If trust is indeed a disposition cued by social norms, we can construe it as an expectation given a conditional preference to conform to some conventional practice.

The expansive evidence from cognitive and behavioral psychology indicates that many of our intuitions regarding the affective character of trust are borne out by good evidence. What I take to be affective trust is not a marginal instance of trust, but identifies core features of the phenomenon. That it exists is unimpeachable. The account I provide will better identify its mechanisms and explain its conceptual coherence.

### *1.5.2 The Conventional Production of Affective Trust*

As noted above Ernst Fehr discusses trust in terms of a social preference. Along those lines, social norms and institutions can come to explain the processes which generate these socially-held beliefs and preferences. Since one actor's preferences

are often conditional on the actions of others, conventions, norms, and institutions all come as collections of rules that direct actors towards one equilibrium or another, guiding them towards Paretian outcomes. From any number of “good” options we might choose, an institution helps us endorse particular ones. Once a group of actors settles on some convention, additional institutional scaffolding may well be constructed to instantiate those equilibria. Institutions also come to explain how agents operate in contexts of limited information or bounded rationality (Denzau and North (2000)). I argue that the process of developing these regularities, both constructing incentives and conditioning first and second order expectations, leads people to trust by giving them reason to believe and hold those beliefs as warranted. This can help unpack trust as an endogenous byproduct of institutional design.

This mode of inquiry is well established in political science. Already in the seventeenth century Thomas Hobbes understands religious faith as a kind of affective trust in others, conditioned by social norms and institutions. Hobbes quotes St. Paul from Romans 10:17 to explain that “faith comes of hearing” (Hobbes (1994): 213). By this Hobbes doesn’t mean that faith comes as divine premonition, but in light of social and contextual features that lead one to regard specific expectations and actions as warranted. More recently, works such as Paul Milgrom, Douglas North, and Barry Weingast’s paper on the role of the law merchant in medieval guild society (Milgrom et al. (1990)) and Avner Greif’s work on Maghribi and Genoese traders of the 11<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> centuries (Greif (1994)) explain the effects of medieval political institutions by demonstrating how particular rules reduced transaction costs and produced variation in higher-level social order. Change some of the rules and you can get radically different outcomes. Robert Axelod, Scott Page, and Jenna Bednar have also offered probative accounts of how formal rules under simple constraints can help us explain low-level social structure (Axelrod (1997); Page (2007); Page and Bednar (2007)). I use these methods of analysis to explore the political dimensions of affective trust.

\* \* \*

This framework helps make sense of Laitin’s anecdote. He expresses a lack of reliance in light of some salient reason—the Irishness of the cops. But we can dig deeper. There is not a particular task or duty that the police are anticipated to serve here—the worry is not that they will bungle the breakup of these fights or one of partiality. The implicit concern was that somehow the Irish cops were not the right *sort* of persons to intervene. It was a trust that pertained to fitness to the



task (qua *Irish* cops), rather than their handling of the task of intervention, per se. Affective trust is mediated by the socially normative similarity among agents. Since Laitin's actors lacked such common ground with the Irish cops, they also lacked an (apparent) reason to trust them.

## CHAPTER II

### Melville's Model of a Conventional Trust

#### ABSTRACT

This chapter looks at Herman Melville's *The Confidence Man* in order to explore the phenomenology and experiential elements of affective trust. I argue that Melville self-consciously uses the novel to interrogate the nature of trust. The project serves as a model to systematically explore the means by which trust is upset or undone. Through Melville's effort to show the tenuousness of trust, both among characters and between author and reader, he reveals the importance of settled conventions and socially normative expectations in supporting the kinds of ordinary trust we regularly experience. Indeed the author repeatedly places himself in the midst of the discussion, explicitly acknowledging his role in structuring the narrative. In these moves I find that he advances an argument that fiction can be used to explore behavioral dynamics. This conscious modeling effort on the part of Melville speaks to the import of conventional dynamics in structuring trust. In addition to the marked lack of social conventions in the novel, his reflections on fiction serve as another indication that trust can only develop in the presence of a priori norms and social expectations. Much like the conventional account I offer, the possibility of trust for Melville is contingent upon settled expectations, precisely the sorts of norms that are systematically scrubbed from the novel's landscape.

What I call affective trust is, at least at first, motivated by a practical or naturalistic concern. The trust implicit in the cries "just trust me" or "I trusted you" which indicate the deep affective aspect to trust that outstrips its credential component. Trust consists of a belief, sure, but it is more than that too. It holds people

accountable for upsetting expectations in a way that is not entailed by the usual process of belief updating. Withholding trust or failing to make good on one's trust is commonly accompanied by an attendant reactive attitude along the lines of *how could you?! It is this emotional valence to trust, outstripping a common belief, that leads to particular kinds of openness in contexts where people share common norms. I argue that even when people lack individuated information about trustees, the emotional attitude of trust can act to bridge one's faith.*

As I have laid out in the introduction, I don't believe trust is any one fundamental thing, but a constellation of attitudes and beliefs that we come to call trust. There are alternative accounts of trust on the table and I am fine with them. As such, I believe it fitting that this dissertation tackles the concept of affective trust using four distinct resources. Given that trust is not a unified phenomenon, either cognitively or behaviorally, it makes sense to account for it in different manners: literarily, conceptually, politically, and observationally. This approach serves to articulate a coherent argument for the manifestation of affective trust and identify its relevance and traction in different sorts of domains.

In this first substantive chapter I explore the problem of trust through the lens of Herman Melville's *The Confidence Man: His Masquerade*. The novel serves as a point of departure to problematize straight forward explanations of trust. Accounts of trust in the economic literature, for instance, depict trust as a well-formed kind of thing where principles construct thick beliefs of agents in light of relevant evidence. I don't think many of our intuitions run that way. This novel serves as a means of exploring exceptional, but not extraordinary, manifestations of trust priming us to think about the many affective and emotional considerations that attend to it. Throughout, passengers are cheated, hoodwinked, and otherwise have the wool pulled over their eyes. I choose to read the text as a mediation on the ways in which trust breaks down, and the conditions under which it might possibly obtain. The many tales of guile in the book serve as a contrast case which illustrates the conditions under which trust is warranted. Further chapters impose more analytic discipline upon my conceptual inquiry. For the moment, though, I turn to Melville in order to illustrate various plausible scenarios in which trust is present, and to help us think through generative "boundary cases" that can provide pushback against stock accounts of trust.

## 2.1 *Theoretical and Practical Motivations for Locating Trust in Melville*

The first reason for considering this novel is as a means of illustrating and narrativizing the phenomenological concerns associated with trust, laying out stories and episodes that allow us to imagine scenarios in which trust is apt to arise. It walks us through a story, which can help check whether the concepts under consideration travel well, whether they make sense in the context of other attendant circumstances in the world. Of course, fiction can be written in such a way as to blunt this process, but it commonly tries to capture some core verisimilitude. Naomi Arpaly, for instance, points out the ways that characters in novels can present representative and resonant accounts of distinctive psychologies (Arpaly (2003): 4). Fiction, similar to other established qualitative methods, has the ability to conform to a greater or lesser degree to the world as we take it to be.

While Melville's novel neither spells out a coherent account of trust nor a well specified conditional story for when it is justified, the book does motivate theorizing that gets at each concern. Indeed, the novel proceeds by illustrating how difficult it can be to justify our trust, identifying any number of circumstances in which the conventionality of trust completely falls apart. For my purposes, however, it gives both voice and structure to the worries surrounding the prospect of trusting. In so doing, it highlights conditions that are inhospitable to trust, while also positing an alternative or complementary context in which trust makes sense. While the novel continually upsets the aspirations of its characters, it also casts a spotlight on the way shifting expectations and fluid norms vitiate hopes of surety.

The second argument I want to make is that this novel is particularly well suited to interrogate this kind of epistemic question. Beyond the treatment in the text, the work is self-consciously a project of what James Johnson calls "model thinking" (Johnson (2014)). There is a skeptical worry that novels are an ill-fitting resource to mine evidence for social scientific concepts. After all, fiction is just the result of one person's imagination. Beyond narrativizing trust's conceptual limitations, literature can also serve as a site for its modeling. *The Confidence Man* puts pressure on conceptual shortcomings in which we traffic, offering a train of scenarios which subvert the grounds of trust in provocative ways. We might cast this as an effort to explore the boundary conditions in which trust might obtain. Cast as such, the novel serves as a model to assess the conceptual implications of trust. As James Johnson points out, models work to set aside extraneous details and assist our thinking by isolating conceptual relationships and identifying practical implications of the

mechanisms under consideration (Johnson (2014)). This is true for mathematical (e.g. Thomas Schelling and Kenneth Arrow) as well as non mathematical (e.g. John Rawls and Michele Foucault) models. Novels are just another instance of modeling, assisting our thinking by considering the conceptual implications of inputs on a set of diverse actors. Novels aren't science—neither are models for that matter—but they can serve to provide us with greater epistemic traction on the world. That's how I intend to read *The Confidence Man*, in any event.

In addition to the two methodological motivations that underpin this chapter, I pull out two important conceptual upshots of Melville's meditation on trust. The first is that trust can only exist in the presence of settled assumptions and conventions. Throughout the novel characters are constantly having assumptions altered or shifted, eviscerating the possibility of trust. Indeed the novel's characters are so mercurial that at one point the author himself emerges to respond to the plausibility of these moves. The point here is that without some settled beliefs, established through conventional practices, we have no firm ontological ground to stand on, either as actors or readers. The second theme that I hope to draw from the text is the role of charity in Melville's trust. While clearly distinct from trust, charity, as I understand it here, is a bridge that allows one to overcome an informational deficit. By playing this out, similar to the conventional commitments of Melville, we can illustrate the ways in which warm attitudes are instrumental in generating trust.

## 2.2 *Personalizing Trust and the Guinea's Plea*

To think through the puzzle of affective trust I first turn to the story of the unfortunate Black man in chapter three of *The Confidence Man*, an episode which serves to problematize simplistic reflections on trust. The novel is all about trust. This might sound like a naive reduction of its terms, but I don't think so. As I read it, *The Confidence Man* is shot through with epistemic concerns of trust, and the story of the disabled, free Black man highlights the concept's slipperiness as well as any.

The episode, which begins the novel in earnest, is at once completely understandable and totally curious. It describes a "grotesque negro cripple" with a pathetic disposition and ragged attire, "so cheerily endured, raising mirth in some of that crowd, whose own purses, hearths, hearts, all their possessions, sound limbs included, could not make gay" (Melville (1990): 15). Melville is not a racist, and the portrayal of Der Black Guinea is likely a lampoon of racial mores of the period,

not an endorsement thereof. Whatever the implicit racial politics, the man appears to be in a pitiful state. He is approached by another passenger who asks about his circumstances. “ ‘And who is your master, Guinea?’ ‘Oh sar, I am der dog widout massa.’ ‘A free dog, eh? Well, on your account, I’m sorry for that, Guinea. Dogs without masters fare hard.’ ” The passenger isn’t likely wrong—antebellum America was no utopia for Blacks, free or not. And the exchange serves to quickly convey the Guinea’s utter desperation. Not only does he claim total poverty, but he is also bereft of even the scraps of self-respect. If any man deserves charity, this one does.

Though you might want to believe that a person in such pathetic circumstances could only elicit compassion, the ship’s passengers don’t see fit to comply. He is taken to be a “curious object,” and though most pay him little mind, a few toss him some change. Then abruptly, and for no obvious reason, the poor man begins to pitch his head back and open his mouth wide, “like an elephant for tossed apples.” This does the trick. Now “as in appearance he seems a dog, so now in a merry way, like a dog he began to be treated.” His performance moves people “at once to *diversion* and charity” (Melville (1990): 16).

Passengers begin a penny-pitch game, “the cripple’s mouth being at once target and purse” (Melville (1990): 16). So though their hearts might not be in the right place, at least the effect of their actions is charitable, albeit perverse. During the frivolity a misanthropic disabled man approaches and accuses the Guinea of being a fraud, abusing the kind strangers of their generosity. This causes the spectators to abruptly turn on the Guinea, demanding that he produce bona fides.

[F]inding themselves left sole judges in the case, [they] could not resist the opportunity of acting the part: not because it is a human weakness to take pleasure in sitting in judgment upon one in a box, as surely this unfortunate negro now was, but that it strangely sharpens human perceptions, when, instead of standing by and having their fellow-feelings touched by the sight of an alleged culprit severely handled by some one justiciary, a crowd suddenly come to be all justiciaries in the same case themselves. (Melville (1990): 18)

While you might think that such enhanced scrutiny would have moved members of the crowd to a sympathetic view of the Guinea, indeed it only elicited their censoriousness.

The Guinea pleads for confidence; just ask his references, they’ll vouch for him. The crowd, however, is still skeptical. How can all these vaguely described

guarantors be tracked down anyway? A Methodist minister insists that people invoke their charitable spirits. But the disabled curmudgeon won't have anything of it. "Charity is one thing, and truth is another" he snaps (Melville (1990): 20).

This pathetic scenario is not in any way rarified or implausible. Some pompous jerk emerges from the crowd, souring everyone's goodwill (*er*, fun), which presses this self-righteous priest to intervene, who insists on serving a heaping ladle of gospel to everyone. Meanwhile this poor, disadvantaged man is wailing for sympathy, for trust. Amidst this chaos at least someone seems to have sense. A country merchant, moved by the man's plaintive cries, insists, "Yes, my poor fellow, *I* have confidence in you" (*ibid.*). Reaching into his pocket he provides evidence of his trust, giving over a full half dollar. The clergyman does eventually secure bona fides for the beggar, though it's of no consequence by then. He appears to have disembarked somewhere in the interim.

The episode probes the personal demands of trust while also illustrating the manner in which its experience varies across people. Literary critics commonly lean on the good/evil binary in the text, identifying the confidence man as the embodiment of the sinister, of which the Guinea is one of many forms he takes (Bellis (1987): 549, Parker (1971): 293). This reading doesn't come naturally to me, but more importantly it distracts the interpretation from the practical matters at hand: trust, confidence, treachery, guile. I set aside this traditional reading in order to gain purchase on these epistemic and phenomenological considerations.

The Guinea is positively mournful for being accused of fraud. It is not just a matter of being asked for verification, the man is distraught for failing to win confidence just in virtue of his pleas. Besides the crotchety old man, the villain here is the crowd. The narrator draws attention to the crowd's mercurial and capricious tendencies, switching almost arbitrarily from laconic and puerile mockery to high-minded judgement. The text also points to the irony that the Guinea is being charged by a man who is himself disabled—a point completely lost on the passengers.

As readers I imagine we are meant to sympathize with the savage circumstances of the beggar. We are meant to believe him, and precisely in light of sentimental considerations. Melville complicates this sense, however, by narrating events such that we never really get good evidence one way or another. (Indeed if you take the traditional line the Guinea is just one of the many instantiations of the Confidence Man.) Further confusing matters, while the crowd mistrusts the Guinea upon having their frivolity disrupted, it's not clear that they actually trusted anything about him to begin with. They didn't obviously hold any firm beliefs regarding

whether he was or wasn't the person he presented himself to be. They weren't charitable in light of his poverty, they saw the ordeal as a circus act. They withdrew a trust which they never extended in the first place.

It's hard to identify with anyone's conduct in all this, aside possibly from that of the country merchant. His title points to a rural sensibility, laden with connotations of the ordinary or common. The others, however, come off as somewhere between irritating and callous. The minister can do little more than preach of the banal value of charity. To this the misanthrope's rejoinder is spot on (albeit completely unfeeling): If what is in dispute is integrity, then shouldn't truth matter? What's more, charity isn't obviously the proper virtue to invoke here. If what the Guinea demands, what anyone might, is that he be believed, he is asking not for generosity but respect. And the crowd? A "flock of fools, under this captain of fools, in this ship of fools" (Melville (1990): 21)!

In the end the most anyone can say for the disabled Black man is, "Yes, my poor fellow *I* have confidence in you." The country merchant's sentiments are personal and personalized. Trustworthiness is not imputed to the man himself (the merchant does not say that the man is to be trusted in some extrinsic sense), but a projection of the merchant's own (possibly idiosyncratic) psychology. He is moved by the Guinea's pleas, and sympathizes with his predicament. But there is no indication that there is but one way of motivating trust, and no uniform set of circumstances that call forth such a disposition. While some in the crowd were less sympathetic to the man for his wailing, the merchant found himself moved. Evidence does not explain the variation in their judgement. They were all privy to the same information, and while one was stirred to confidence, the others instead became capricious.

That is true for the characters of the novel. We as readers, however, do feel sorry for the Guinea. Yes, he is downtrodden, and the crowd's turn strikes us as uncharitable. It is sorrowful that while the man pleads for their confidence they insist upon guarantors. We recognize his demand to be trusted on his own terms. The Guinea has no independent means of establishing his authenticity. He has no documents, no SSD card, no references. And even if he did, they might be fraudulent for all anyone knows. So how is he supposed to garner respect if he can't establish trust? (Or run this in reverse—how might he establish trust without respect?)

Melville, assuming the role of the narrator, is frequently chatty, serving to cleave apart the sentiments that we as readers are liable to elicit from those of



the fictional passengers. When he comments, reflects, or belittles the behavior of the characters it distances us from their immediate responses, magnifying the divergence between our reactions and theirs. As readers I imagine we're rather judgy as a group, questioning the prudence of the characters performance. These reactions are completely appropriate, but they oughtn't serve to undermine the experiences of the characters themselves. They are, Melville will remind us, the ones who were actually party to the events, after all.

This episode illustrates trust's affective valence and how it establishes beliefs that outstrip the individuated information at hand. The merchant, for his part, trusts the man even though he is presented with the same information as the other passengers. The Guinea's pleas induces sympathy and is meant to be directed emotionally, demanding a kind of second personal respect from the passengers. It plays out what a demand for trust looks like and the means by which it makes moral demands. That being said, it is not obvious that readers are expected to trust the man themselves. Pity, compassion, charity, sure, but there isn't any good indication that we as readers are expected to be moved to trust, to confide in the man. Nevertheless, the story forces us to reflect on the sorts of things that just do elicit our confidence, as well as the ways in which they operate inconsistently. Indeed, I am more inclined to trust the passengers' reflections than I am my own. They, after all, were present in the moment, whereas I, in the position of reader, can afford benevolent goodwill from the safe distance of my blue armchair.

### 2.3 *Shifting Expectations Within The Confidence Man*

The problem with simplistic accounts of trust is that they fail to capture the meaningful details that we encounter in the world. Simplified models are important for winnowing away distracting details, but gone too far and we are left with an entirely sterilized representation. The above episode of the man begging for trust shows aspects of trust that many of the accounts on offer miss. The narrative serves first to check our intuitions by performing a story which resonates with the reader. But it also introduces subtleties that test some of the beliefs we might have held. You might have thought that trust and distrust are complements of one another until confronting these chapters, for instance.

This is just one of many instances illustrating how Melville's *The Confidence Man* serves as a proving ground for intuitions about trust, putting pressure on conceptions of certainty and credulity. The novel revels in epistemic vertigo as

it continually sows suspicion among both readers and characters. Its opening sequence profiles a man boarding a large steamship called the *Fidele* (the “faithful”) chugging down the Mississippi River on April 1<sup>st</sup> (in case the situational symbolism isn’t otherwise obvious). As “suddenly as Manco Capac at the lake Titicaca, a man in cream-colors” appears. “Though neither soiled nor slovenly, his cream-colored suit had a tossed look, almost linty, as if, traveling night and day from some far country beyond the prairies, he had long been without the solace of a bed” (Melville (1990): 10). Nothing in this description gives reason to mistrust the man. Nothing here indicates guile or dishonesty. And yet, the reader is liable to feel queasy and suspicious. The novel is constantly interrogating how different kinds of information alter our expectations and willingness to trust, from the very outset of the novel all the way to its end.

I imagine that part of the discomfort comes from the peripatetic nature of the character’s description. He comes out of nowhere and appears as if he has come from anywhere. And though his suit is tidy, he appears worn, unsettled. But what does this tell us? Were these observations to affect our credences of the man’s rectitude, how ought they do so? What reliable inferences do these descriptions allow us to make? Our skepticism is in some sense borne of the absence of information, rather than any direct evidence of malice. A traveller is only mistrusted given the expectation that most people are sedentary, for example. (Though, of course, all the characters in the novel are travelers just in virtue of being aboard the ship.) Notably, the ancient Greek norm of *xenia*—the unquestioning hospitality of strangers—didn’t endorse this sort of wariness. Our ability to assess trustworthiness, but also to feel that our trust is warranted, is contingent on such background assumptions, of which we are intentionally deprived of here.

While characters are constantly frustrated in their attempts to trust well, the novel points to the absence of these commonly held conventional assumptions as one critical reason for this indeterminacy. “Upon a more attentive survey,” the narrator remarks, passengers on the boat, “perceiving no badge of authority about [the man in the cream colored suit], but rather something quite the contrary—he being of an aspect so singularly innocent; an aspect too, which they took to be somehow inappropriate to the time and place. . .” (Melville (1990): 8). He lacked the kind of conventional markers which commonly establish trust. Still, the passengers looked to find some indication of the man’s rectitude. Frustrated by a lack of salient evidence he appeared to them “somehow inappropriate to the time and place.” Their mistrust does not directly result from the lack of individuated information

about the man, but their inability to place him. It was not that he lacked credentials, the reason given here is more ambiguous. He is just “somehow inappropriate.”

But the man is otherwise innocuous, peddling gospel pabulum, rendering their unease all the more curious. On a chalk board upon the *Fidele* the man in the cream-colored suit, riffing off Corinthians, writes successively: “ ‘Charity suffereth long, and is kind.’ ‘Charity endureth all things.’ ‘Charity believeth all things.’ ‘Charity never faileth.’ ” Unsurprisingly, no one appears to be swayed by the stranger’s ministry. Passengers just jeer and laugh at him. Even if he were the second coming of the Lord and Savior, it wouldn’t matter to the passengers aboard the *Fidele*.

These high-minded instructions are juxtaposed with a sign exclaiming “NO TRUST” above the barber’s door. The barber wants none of this fellowship or charity, he just wants to be paid in exchange for his work, towing a cool rationalist line all through the novel. His circumspection seems reasonable given the poor assurances that people might offer him. But as assiduously as he might try, he still cannot remain a bystander to the corruption he sees. When, towards the end of the novel, the philanthropist digs at the barber for “contentedly deal[ing] in the impostures you condemn” he responds weakly, “Ah, sir, I must live” (Melville (1990): 274). The barber cannot be impartial to the tension between trust and incredulity. While he doesn’t presume to outwit frauds, he elects to take so few risks as to mitigate his exposure. He stands incredulous.

The novel is a steady march of episodes demonstrating the implausibility of simplistic approaches to trust. The diversity of characters, contexts, and scenes makes it impossible for the reader to gain much of an epistemic toe-hold, though neither can we nor the characters just abstain from taking sides. Trust is necessary component of the kind of exploration and experimentation that constructs a life worth living. Don Herzog reads the novel, at least in part, is an illustration of the intractability of the dilemma between blithe credulity and priggish skepticism (Herzog (2008): 179). Yes, there is no safe harbor. Every sort of interaction entails some modicum of risk, and you can’t just play it safe by waiting it out on the epistemic sidelines. Yet as I read it, the novel also points at the reasons to or grounds of trust by illustrating cases in which it fails to obtain.

Passengers on the *Fidele* “not lacking from variety” come and go, their identities impossible to keep track of. (Indeed Herzog notes that the novel leaves open the question of whether there is one or many confidence men working the boat that day.) Melville spends a full sentence (coextensive with a paragraph of his) listing just some of the different peoples that embarked the ship’s during its journey. “Natives

of all sorts, and foreigners; men of business and men of pleasure; parlor men and backwoodsmen; farm-hunters and fame-hunters; heiress-hunters, gold-hunters, buffalo-hunters, bee-hunters, happiness-hunters, truth-hunters, . . . ” (Melville (1990): 14). The Fidele was so busy that, indeed, no one knew whether the stranger in the cream colored suit even remained on board. He doesn’t reappear in the story, so it probably matters little anyway.

The contextual assumptions that the characters are working with are constantly upset. The above passage illustrates the variety of people on the ship—different cultures, proclivities, vocations, avocations. The man in the cream colored suit scans dubious because he can’t be placed in a particular context, while the charity the Guinea is shown abruptly ends when the situational norms are called into question by some jackass. The novel repeatedly demonstrates that when conventional expectations are upset, so is trust. A rather biting illustration of this point comes from chapters 28–31 when two men meet and immediately become fast friends.

“You are a man after my own heart,” . . .

“Indeed” the other adds, “our sentiments agree so, that were they written in a book, whose was whose, few but the nicest critics might determine.”

“Since we are thus joined in mind,” said the first, “why not be joined in hand?”

“My hand is always at the service of virtue,” the second frankly extending it to him as to virtue personified (Melville (1990): 189).

This effusive dialogue continues over a number of chapters, the two declaring their abiding affection for the other. The conversation persists, as does their drinking, until at the end of chapter thirty one of the men drops a bombshell: He’s broke and in need of a loan. The title of the subsequent chapter cuts to the quick of things: “A Metamorphosis More Surprising than any in Ovid” (Melville (1990): 214). The other character stumbles, startled, unsure of how to proceed. He’s just spent three chapters declaring his enduring devotion to this man. But surely this didn’t include money. How can he revoke it so hastily?

The situation is quickly defused—jj ;) —the first man fesses up that he was just pulling the leg of the second. The point is made, however. Friendships unravel precipitously when they become commercialized in that way. Again, it is the abrupt shift of contexts that unspools trust here. Charles Noble, the second man, thought he was operating with one set of social norms, when his acquaintance swiftly altered them. Trust vanished in the absence of contextual regularity. None of these

stories are dispassionate, risk assessments, but demonstrate the entanglement of the emotional considerations with circumstantial ones. Showing their tenuousness and the ease with which they can be upset is what the novel traffics in.

While Melville doesn't identify the epistemic foundations of trust—why these sorts of conventions are the right kind of apparatus to construct trust—the novel does direct our attention to the nature of a solution. Whatever trust is in the novel, it does not correspond well to the understanding in the economic literature of particular trust. Gary Lindberg, for instance, points out the lack of authority in the novel, noting that we never hear from the captain and that with the diversity of characters on the ship no social or cultural norms hold sway Lindberg (1982): 24, 45). The effect of this is to recognize the function of these social and literary sign posts, and underscore the difficulty of coming to confident beliefs absent that. The book serves as a model, a thought experiment of what happens if we reject the authoritative norms that unite us, what we become if we are not a nation that “holds these truths to be self-evident.” What we become as “interworking crewmen” rather than “disjunctive passengers” (Tichi (1972): 647). Indeed I see the upshot of the work as a faint call for transcendent unity rather than atomized self-reliance.

It is not just the scarcity of information that inhibits trust (though that clearly plays a role), but the fluid and contested nature of characters' overlapping norms—the country merchant trusts even though his fellow passengers do not. Melville experiments with the limits of trust by constantly changing context and undermining characters' expectations. It is not that he denies that trust means anything, rather his narrative is meant to demonstrate its instability. As Herzog points out, the novel leads us to a sort of epistemic water's edge—only so much skepticism is possible before you have condemned yourself to the life of a hermit.

The roles and identities of the characters in the novel are so totally opaque as to undermine any social convention which might support trust. And Melville even writes in a way to obfuscate the interpretations of the reader. In these chapters the names of the characters aren't even identified until well into the story. Indeed in chapter 28 the characters themselves say that “were [their words] written in a book, whose was whose, few but the nicest critics might determine.” The irony is not lost on the reader trying to make sense of the shell game cum novel. Which is the confidence man and which is the dupe is often just as hard for the reader to ascertain as for the characters themselves. This is a pattern throughout the novel, one of obfuscation and shifting assumptions. From the passengers incredulity of the “somehow inappropriate” manner of the man in the cream colored suit, to the abrupt

change of the sentiments of the passengers towards the Guinea, the metamorphosis of the friendship between Nobel and Goodman, all the way to the end when the philanthropist beguiles the barber. Indeed the confidence man himself is constantly shifting forms. Were he to operate under the same guise throughout he would be easy to out. It is this lack of stability makes it impossible for trust to obtain.

#### 2.4 Model Thinking and Melville's Constructivist Ontology

The difficulty of establishing trust is one that Melville took personally. Others point to his work *Pierre* as an indication that his ontological skepticism predates *The Confidence Man* and his interest in "the great art of telling truth" (Kemper (1980): 23; Lindberg (1982): 17). We can look back further, however, to his third novel from 1849, *Mardi: And a Voyage Thither* where he complains of being disbelieved in his first two works. In the preface to that novel he wrote:

Not long ago, having published two narratives of voyages in the Pacific, which, in many quarters, were received with incredulity, the thought occurred to me, of indeed writing a romance of Polynesian adventure, and publishing it as such; to see whether, the fiction might not, possibly, be received for a verity: in some degree the reverse of my previous experience (*Mardi*)

Already there he draws together concepts of trust and truth, while eliding the distinction between fiction and fact. Those other two books were fact and everyone took them to be fiction. If the truth is too fantastical, maybe fiction will appear more trustworthy?

He doesn't expressly say that *Mardi* is a fictional account, it is only implied. But that he never comes out and says it serves to question the efficacy of the dialectic. It is as though to dwell on it is to miss the point of the project. To "be received for a verity" is not to be thought of as somehow a fact of history, but "as real" in a constructivist sense. The reality that concerns Melville is not the ontology, but the veracity—whether it is taken "for a verity," for a fact.

In chapters 14 and 33 of *The Confidence Man* finds Melville pursuing a similar line of argument. At these moments the narrator as author emerges is if behind a curtain to explain himself. In chapter 14, after a curious about-face by the country merchant—the man so generous to the Guinea, who had up till now been so trusting, suddenly blurts out his dismal appraisal of society in chapter thirteen—Melville apologize for the novel's fictionalized account human behavior. "To some,

it may raise a degree of surprise that one so full of confidence, as the merchant has throughout shown himself, up to the moment of his late sudden impulsiveness, should, in that instance, have betrayed such a depth of discontent. He may be thought inconsistent, and even so he is. But for this, is the author to be blamed?" (Melville (1990): 84). Are we to take the strange events narrated in fictional episodes seriously? Absolutely, Melville argues. The world frequently exhibits anomalies, if anything more often than does literature. "Fiction based on fact should never be contradictory to it; and is it not a fact, that, in real life, a consistent character is a *rara avis*?" (Melville (1990): 84). The rare bird becomes a case that literature comes to manipulate and put pressure on, to test our intuitions about the world, posing plausible boundary conditions, a form of literary simulation as it were. If you're incredulous because you think these are rare or remote cases, don't be. Remember, he points out, when naturalists brought back the duck-billed platypus from Australia the zoological community thought it a fraud. Rare birds aren't as rare as you might think.

Later in chapter 33 Melville also makes an appearance, this time defending his "sloppy" writing. He writes that he imagines readers clamoring that his characters and costumes are just too fanciful. "How unreal all this is! Who did ever dress or act like your cosmopolitan? And who, it might be returned, did ever dress or act like harlequin?" (Melville (1990): 217). His answer is dismissive, though. Why would you want literature to be as boring as real life? While the substance of the response diverges from that in chapter 14, the impulse is the same: fiction is only after a certain the kind of verisimilitude. The about-face of the merchant bears resemblance to the kind of narrative or story that Melville is trying to tell. The model attempts to capture human behavior, and so behavior must hue to that of the world at large. The outrageous costumes and fanciful characters however, they are not the point of the novel. Plus, fantasy is just fun, quit complaining.

In these moments Melville becomes explicit about engaging a kind of "model thinking," self-consciously manipulating the narrative to explore particular kinds of dynamics. The model is true, he argues, insofar as it captures the salient aspects of the world. It is up to the author to decide what to study and inspect. Melville here explicitly steps out of the role of narrator to insist upon the efficacy of narrative in modeling the world. It is a funny move, in some ways, as he would seem to have sprung his own ontological trap. Inasmuch as the novel studies the archetype of the confidence man, the author here is implicated by placing himself inside the story. In so doing he accepts the epistemic worries that come along with manipulating

and dissimulating confidence. His aim is not to avoid this controversy, but place the project of fiction in the center of it. The move helps convey the disregard he has for the empirical and his embrace of veritistic fiction.

The novel is constructed in such a way that it repels simple interpretations of characters and their behavior. He creates this effect by failing to name characters, depriving them of a history, and allowing them complete freedom to board and disembark anonymously. He refuses to provide a social context or a shared set of assumptions for the actors, making it impossible to freely trust anyone. When these social expectations fray, the fabric of trust becomes rent beyond recognition. The project, its method, composition, and narrative structure all point to the constructed nature of truth.

Scholars argue that *The Confidence Man* is Melville's both surly dismissal of his contemporary critics who were bored by the defiantly proto-modernist turn to his work and rejection of transcendentalists like Emerson who are primarily concerned with an internalistic ontology. The standard line is that Melville is retreating to an isolating and relativistic narrative hole (e.g. Tichi (1972), Lindberg (1982): 43, Bellis (1987)). I don't want to endorse that view, however. Rather I see Melville stumping for a defiantly externalist and conventional approach to veracity. If, like the passengers of the ship, like a community of readers that jump down Melville's throat for his literary imagination, we deprive literature of its conventional authority we're epistemically and ontologically sunk. We are then in the position of the passengers of the *Fidele*, incapable of trusting the right people, and unable to receive solace when betrayed. But if we subscribe to the constructivist model that Melville lays out, a doctrine of charity, then we are in a position to ground our beliefs.

The literary project of *The Confidence Man* examines the grounds of trust by systematically altering the assumptions of both readers and characters. Internally, the book deprives characters the ability to trust, or at least trust well, by constructing a world which is devoid of social convention. Passengers of all sorts and kinds come and go without notice. No one has a reputation and characters cannot agree on which interpretative frames to impose on their interactions. Yes, the lack of information mitigates the possibility of trust, but it is not only the informational deficit we're placed in. Rather the actors are deprived of conventional knowledge. And what I take Melville to be saying in chapters 14 and 33 is that if we have a hope for extracting meaning from the world, we are going to need to recruit the kind of trust that comes from settled conventions, including those between reader and



author, modeler and audience.

## 2.5 *Charity*

Conventional understandings are the cornerstone of Melville's project, and by their careful absence trust becomes a labored process throughout the novel. He does, however, point to a second epistemic mechanism that brings about the possibility of trust: charity. The leitmotif runs through the novel, from its beginning to end, with characters making different claims to charity with more or less success. His point here is not to advance an uncritical approach to the virtue of a charitable inclination. Clearly people become vulnerable were they to always see the best in others. Rather I believe that Melville's point is to show that charity is a crucial element of trust and social cohesion, even if it cannot be universally justified. To return to Herzog's interpretation, we can't live in a world (or make sense of a novel, for that matter) where we deprive ourselves of charity solely on account of skepticism.

The motif is presented in the first chapter with the arrival the man in the cream colored suit admonishing the passengers aboard for charity to their blithe disregard. Indeed while they ignore his message they're skeptical of his person. They identify a "singular innocence," but also sense that he is otherwise "somehow inappropriate." The demand for charity comes to have the opposite of its intended effect. I imagine the joke here is that a "singular innocence" can only evoke incredulity. No one is that guileless, unless they aim to manipulate you somehow.<sup>1</sup> Of course one wonders what these Christian folk aboard the *Fidele* would have made of Jesus Christ come to redeem the world. Herein lies the paradox of divinity: salvation can never be conventional. Anyone that pure is either God's only son, come to sacrifice himself for man's sins or a con. And though there has been but one Jesus and many cons, Christianity must implore its members to endorse the virtue of charitable credulity. Saint Paul insists on this when writing to the Corinthians (chapter 13), the lines that the man in the cream suit alludes to, explaining that:

<sup>3</sup> And though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and though I give my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing.

<sup>4</sup> Charity suffereth long, and is kind; charity envieth not; charity vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up,

<sup>5</sup> Doth not behave itself unseemly, seeketh not her own, is not easily

---

<sup>1</sup>My mother has always harbored skepticism of people that smile too much. I've thought of it as the inverse of "the lady doth protest too much, methinks" principle.

provoked, thinketh no evil;

<sup>6</sup> Rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth in the truth;

<sup>7</sup> Beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things.

Christian virtue implores the faithful to be modest, credulous, and hopeful. Paul instructs his audience to “believe all things” irrespective of the social or epistemic vulnerability it produces. Faith requires that actors withhold judgement; that Christians withhold judgement regarding what is possible in order to receive God’s grace. Paul instructs the Corinthians to extend that charity in all their interactions in order to open their hearts to God’s gifts—presumably Christ among them.

Run the Pauline dictum like this: if you want to be the kind of person that is charitable, if you want to be a Christian, you ought to make yourself vulnerable in the above mentioned ways. I take Melville to offer an extended meditation on St. Paul’s remarks here. Is this actually an estimable heuristic? And even if so, do we really want to be such suckers? Melville puts the question to the characters on the boat. On a chalk board upon the *Fidele* the man in the cream-colored suit, riffing off Corinthians, writes successively: “ ‘Charity suffereth long, and is kind.’ ‘Charity endureth all things.’ ‘Charity believeth all things.’ ‘Charity never faileth.’ ” Unsurprisingly, no one appears to be swayed by the stranger’s ministry, passengers just jeer and laugh at him. Even if he were the second coming of the Lord and Savior, it wouldn’t matter to these people.

This is not to say that Melville endorses divesting of our frontal lobes for some Old Time Religion. The novel does illustrate the ways that naive trust can lead to real unhappiness. But again, as Herzog points out, what choice do we have but, at least in large part, to construct charitable communities in which trust is warranted? The text itself is a study, tautly strung between the sentimentality of charity and the unease of being swindled. As such there are no disastrous consequences to the actions of the con man, nor is there a big reveal at the end. The confidence man is less Satan than a trickster, an impish demon who delights in the confusion and frustration of others. He doesn’t make off with more than a hundred dollars and a swell new haircut, making it unlikely that profit is his game. The effect of the narrative is to inquire what might justify charity rather than stake out one position or other. By restricting the novel’s stage to one day on one ship, Melville reins in worries of catastrophe, focusing rather on the ordinary consequences of a charitable disposition.

While no one is brought to ruin because of charity, its manifestation becomes

strained in a context without shared assumptions. The most anyone can say is that they have an impulse to be charitable, not that charitable is warranted more generally. The point here is that trust, and charity's facilitation of trust, doesn't come about without some prior arrangement. Indeed the novel itself requires a charitable reading, one in which we assume that the author, the source of authority, is trying to tell us something rather than just mess with us for three hundred pages. The author cum narrator is clearly in on the gag, being just one more instantiation of the confidence man, though our confidence in him is well warranted. We are to proceed as if the novel, the events, were true (Lindberg: 18). Melville cuts away all the sources for authority aside from the conventional relationship of author and reader and asks the us to be charitable.

Trust here leans on charity, at least minimally, finding warrant in conventional expectations. The book begins with the man in the cream suit invoking Corinthians and demanding charity and is followed by claims to charity made by and on behalf of the Guinea. Chapter twenty eight begins with Frank Goodman exclaiming, "charity, charity! . . . never a sound judgement without charity. When man judges man, charity is less a bounty from our mercy than just allowance for the insensible lee-way of human fallibility" (Melville (1990) 187). Charity is contrasted with the maxim "NO TRUST" in both the beginning and end of the novel. The barber is juxtaposed to the philanthropist (literally "lover of people") Frank Goodman, who advocates confidence and charity (no doubt because he stands to benefit). And even the barber, at the end of the novel, is unable to hold fast to his dictum as he appears to get duped by Goodman—charity's Pyrrhic victory.

Trust is not altruistic in the way charity is, but it too involves an anticipation that outstrips evidence. Trust moves one to make inferences, extrapolating from the information one is acquainted with. These data might involve individuated characteristics of a trustee or a general optimism one has gleaned of humanity. Whatever the impetus, it is a first step, it is a "nice" game theoretic strategy, one in which actors begin by assuming the best even though it makes them vulnerable. Sure charity can be exploited, but trust requires some measure of charity and conventionality in order to come about.

Admittedly, it is difficult to conceive of trust without charity. Paul's charitable doctrine, the need to maintain an unwavering commitment to openness, may be a vulnerable norm open to the sorts of game theoretic "macho" strategies that generally undermine cooperative communities (Bendor and Swistak (1997)). Conditional on others being charitable, though, there is good reason to be charitable

too. Cooperative communities are much more pleasant places to inhabit than those teaming with defectors. Trust requires an expectation that outstrips evidence—this is at least part of what Nicholas Luhmann described as trust in trust, I imagine (Luhmann (1995)).

Affective trust, however, offers a natural way of speaking about such charity. As I spell out in the next chapter, trust, as opposed to reliance, is best thought of as a kind of expectation that outstrips evidence. It is not that trust is irrational, just that it is not entirely so. As rational choice theory would cast trust, it is a credence  $p$  one ought to hold such that  $pG > (1 - r)L$ . Were I to borrow this model, I would argue that the threshold for trust is  $rG > (1 - p)L$  where  $r = p - \epsilon$ . That is, tracking the experimental data on trust, there is some component of one's inclination to trust,  $\epsilon$ , which comes just in virtue of the affective nature of trust.<sup>2</sup>  $\epsilon$  is the degree of charity necessary to open up to others.

## 2.6 Conclusion

Melville's *The Confidence Man* does an exquisite job of simulating the problems and pitfalls of trust. The novel is, admittedly, a turgid read and can appear at times as if the author is purposefully trying to confound or repel the reader. It is a narrative in which trust is constantly undermined and the grounds for trust are called into question as a matter of course. In so doing, however, it serves to interrogate the conditions under which trust fails to obtain. It systematically explores how the removal of particular social epistemic building blocks vitiates any hope of surety. Instead of advocating for a completely skeptical or nihilistic position, I argue that Melville uses this radical text to stump for a constructivist ontology. By structuring the novel as a series of events which upset credulity by depriving characters (and readers) of settled expectations, he comes to argue that the only way we can come to trust is when we accept a kind of conventionally minded charity. The very same kind of interpretive charity that Melville argues readers must bring to the text.

The novel serves as a site to motivate my account of affective trust, and problematize those of general and particular trust. Though my conception of trust is more articulated than what Melville lays out in the novel, his work comes to illustrate the necessity and instrumentality of social conventions for trust, and the kind of warmth and charity that it recruits. This work is a perfect vehicle to illustrate the

---

<sup>2</sup>As in Kosfeld et al. (2005) and McCabe et al. (2001), for instance, where humans trust others to a greater degree than they do computers playing with the same set of strategies.

point I want to make. Melville self-consciously structures the novel to interrogate the questions surrounding trust. The sequence of episodes vary character type and circumstance to work through what the absence of settled social conventions does to trust. Characters do come to place trust in others, but the trust is unstable, as in the story of Francis Goodman and Charles Noble. The moment Goodman asks for money the friendship is nearly ended. Besides varying the parameters of the novel, he also inserts himself in choice moments to remind the reader that the project is an exploration of the uses of fiction. Fiction is not false, he argues, but a means of thinking through hard cases while at the same time imposing flourishes in order to focus our attention. Melville himself is completely on board with interpreting the project as one of “model thinking.” It serves to capture salient and relevant features of our world to explore choice aspects of the world which we inhabit.

We are left with a distinct sense that social conventions and assumptions matter for the viability of trust. I have argued that *The Confidence Man* is an inquiry of the tensions between charity and skepticism in the absence of social conventions. Melville admits the importance of charity, but does not provide an account of when or why charity is reasonable (other than that the alternative is miserable). When is charity, when is trust, appropriate however? In the following chapter I explore the circumstances that warrant such charity. I go on to argue that trust is needed precisely because there exist scenarios in which the incentive compatibility of an interaction appears indeterminate and we need some epistemic mechanism to direct our decisions. Trust is a hybridized moral attitude, turning both on emotional and cognitive considerations. This just entails that trust consists of two epistemic elements: a rational expectation and a sentimental disposition which incorporates reactive attitudes.

## CHAPTER III

# A General Framework for Affective Trust

### ABSTRACT

The primary effect of this chapter is to conceptually cleave trust from reliance. This entails formulating the distinction between the basic cooperative expectations associated with reliance from thicker, emotional considerations which I seek to identify with trust. Using a simple two-by-two game theoretic framework, I argue that trust should be thought endemic to circumstances in which an agent is otherwise agnostic as to whether her partner will cooperate or not. That is, from where she stands, the other has just as much reason to cooperate as not. In such circumstances, I argue, trust is necessary to overcome uncertainty by providing an affective inclination to trust and be trustworthy. Since the nature of cooperation is fluid, social norms are required to create not only contextually appropriate expectations regarding what constitutes cooperation, but also the normative force to condition the attitudes that accompany trust. Such an account explains the mechanisms that generate trust, as well as why such strong reactive attitudes come to be bound up with it.

In this chapter in particular, and the dissertation more generally, I lay out an account of trust that is both epistemically felicitous and empirically tractable. Because I do not claim that affective trust is the definitive instantiation of trust I don't need to nail either. I readily acknowledge that other concepts of trust are helpful descriptors which aid us in making sense of how people come to assume risk. In the spirit of good modeling practices, however, I hope to do a better job addressing both phenomenological and empirical considerations than accounts currently on offer.

What I do here is not completely novel. Indeed, as I argue in the coming chapter, early modern political theorists voice concepts that are very similar to trust. Others in the recent literature discuss the socially normative and emotional aspects of trust (e.g. Morgan and Hunt (1994); Jones (1996); Pettit (1998); Uslaner (2002); Rothstein (2005); Nannestad (2008)). But each tackles a different facet of what I am calling affective trust, without unifying the concept as I do. Some run the socially normative aspects of trust together with general trust, while others identify an emotional valence, but don't disentangle it from the general or particular. The concept of affective trust I advance owes a great deal to Karen Jones' account in her article "Trust as an Affective Attitude" (Jones (1996)). And although she outlines a trust that is both cognitive and emotional, she stops short of explaining the conditions under which such trust is germane, thereby running it together with the optimistic disposition of general trust. In this chapter I argue that affective trust can be motivated by contextually appropriate social norms or institutional rules, thereby fit for situations where actors have only a minimal amount of information.

Affective trust is an attitude expressed as a warm expectation that others will act cooperatively. Philosophers have a great deal to say regarding what an attitude is and how it is expressed. The kind of attitude I have in mind here is not so deeply ensconced in the weeds, however. I mean something along the lines of a positively valenced feeling or disposition. Confidence accompanies trust here, conditioned not only by a credible expectation of cooperation, but also by empathic and sentimental resources. Such trust is liable to generate warm fellow-feeling upon faithful resolution, and reactive attitudes of resentment and betrayal if others wantonly fall short. This dual character is a large part of trust's curiousness. It is an epistemic judgement that carries with it definitively normative, second-personal characteristics.

I go on to claim that the normativity associated with trust appears warranted in light of conventional practices. Conventions, such as social norms and institutional rules, are apt by their construction to generate trust since they prompt both conditional preferences to cooperate and widely held expectations that others will and ought to comply. That is, you yourself have reason and inclination to act in some conventional manner, conditional that some number of others are expected to do the same. In this way, such norms elegantly track both the cognitive and emotive facets of trust. Norms of fairness, generosity, hospitality, or group-solidarity, for example, can all serve as reasons to warrant trust. Given this, one might also have a second order reason to trust in light of a shared group identity. As members of the

same community, I might feel disposed to trust you in virtue of our shared norms, and failing to do so would implicitly call into question your membership. In this way the second order norm builds off of a shared set of first order social norms.

I lean on conceptual apparatuses developed by David Lewis, Cristina Bicchieri, Stephen Darwall, and Joshua Greene to explain the odd manifestations of trust. It is an expectation, but also an attitude. It elicits reactive attitudes, but is not itself a virtue. It is epistemic and also moral. I maintain that social norms can make sense of a lot of this confusion. Conditional on a conventional practice that is taken to be action guiding, one has reason to comply and expect that others do too. This expectation will lead to second-personal, agent-relative, context specific demands directed at others to comply too. Thus I come to believe that I should *R* and that you will too. And if you don't, I anticipate that you will acknowledge responsibility. Two German Jews might well trust one another to show up to a meeting promptly, while two Hungarian Jews would never think of making such a demand. Conditional on the existence of a social norm, second-personal claims are anticipated to obtain. Greene's dual-systems approach to moral psychology accounts for the cognitive aspects of these reactive attitudes much as Darwall (and Strawson) account for the conceptual fitness of these features. This dissertation comes to provide an epistemic account both of how and why trust manifests—and feels—as it does.

I can, however, imagine a skeptical position that thinks that social norms have nothing to do with trust. The argument might run that trust results from the idiosyncratic preferences towards some, but not others, and that all the instances of shared conventions motivating trust are just correlative, not causal. Indeed, I can't really identify a context in which no conventions are conceivably operative. As such, all I can offer is a conceptually coherent account of why conventions are a good candidate feature that generates trust and that identifies how the variation of these norms affect how trust is elicited. But I can't claim to have a knock-down argument for such a skeptic.

### 3.1 *Trust's Illocutionary Effect*

Any number of common examples might illustrate the puzzlement that motivates the need for a concept like affective trust. CNN calls itself "The Most Trusted Name in News" while Proctor and Gamble wanted you to know that "Cooks Who Know Trust Crisco." And though you might think Time-Warner is a glorified



infotainment brand and that Crisco (before it was reformulated) was legalized poison, you intuitively understand what these slogans intend to express. My favorite illocutionary use of trust (i.e. the speech act eliciting trust) is from the Disney film *Aladdin*. After failing to impress his love interest, Princess Jasmine, with a Broadway musical number, Aladdin slinks around back, sidles up next to her bedroom window, and proposes that they go on a magic carpet ride together. “Do you trust me?” he asks shyly. The movie doesn’t require a close reading to know that everyone is meant think in unison: “Yes, trust him!” Sure, we in the audience know he is a fraud, a liar, and a criminal, but I and the millions of others that come to that scene want Jasmine to trust him. We know he’s a good guy, though if we found out that our blind date were guilty of that degree of obfuscation we’d drop them like a load. So why ought she trust him?

Beyond just rational, trust is also emotional and ethical here, along the lines of Eugene Garver’s discussion of the phenomenon in *For the Sake of Argument*. More than being trusted, we want to be identified as trustworthy, to be trusted because of who we are, on our own terms. There is a second-personal authority to trust in this way (Darwall (2009): 57). Garver claims that “I want to be trusted for non-instrumental reasons. I want to be trusted because of my character, and not for other, adventitious traits. I wanted to be accurately seen as trustworthy” (Garver (2004): 135). Consider the Guinea’s mournful cry when the passengers of the *Fidele* fail to take him at his word. The character is making the case for just this valence to trust. And while there are important conceptual distinctions between “trust” and “trustworthiness” (Pettit (1995); Hardin (1996), Jones (2001); Jones (2012)), the demand “trust me!” posits the existence of a correspondence between the two. To insist on being trustworthy in this way is to implicitly make a demand for trust (Nannestad (2008): 415). Like Aladdin’s plea, Garver wants to elicit one’s trust just in virtue of his agentic standing.

Indeed, the problem isn’t just epistemic as evidence does not necessarily salve the problem. Garver points out that we are often not content to be relied upon merely because of our credentials. We want to be trusted for intrinsic reasons, he claims, rather than being patronized by an “I’ll take your word for it” (Garver (2004): 141). Cristina Bicchieri points to a similar feature of trust, noting the “personalizing” rules with which it is associated lead, “a spouse [to] be very upset and offended if he is not trusted (without good, explicit reasons by his partner)” (Bicchieri (2006): 77). Trust entails an expectation with attendant normative demands. You will likely be met with either relief or indignation depending on whether you agree to trust or

not. Were you to withhold your trust, I am liable to take it personally, rather than as a quaint disagreement about some fact in the world. It reflects your estimation of my person.

Affective trust, however, offers a natural way of speaking about such charity that comes with taking people at their word. Psychology's dual-systems theory advocated by Joshua Greene, among others, advocates for thinking about moral processes in terms of both the cognitive and emotive processes that they recruit. To say that "trust is a belief" or "trust is a disposition" is in some very basic sense missing the point. Trust is at first an experience which we as scholars and scientists attempt to conceptually isolate. The experience of trust, I argue, results from the near synchronicity of these dual-systems. Much of the time our rational belief that one will act cooperatively and our emotional sense that they will align, but because these systems are independent, they can also come apart. Moments such as those in the trust game where players trust other humans to a greater degree than computers (Kosfeld et al. (2005), McCabe et al. (2001)). And it is in these moments, where our trust outstrips our evidence by some  $\epsilon$ , in which I am primarily interested.<sup>1</sup>

### 3.2 *Strategic Indeterminacy and Affective Trust*

Garver's trust comes down to Aristotelean *ethos*, one's character, and how the standing one has motivates and grounds trust. But I want to interrogate how that kind of personal trust can develop and be expressed even when those relationships are looser, when we may not have the recourse to such intimate demands. Consider Melville's *Guinea*. He pleads for trust, the kind of personal trust that Garver identifies, absent the conditions that would give him standing in light of particular aspects of his character. I want to understand how trust comes about at distances between the near and far, the particular and the general. I want to understand how trust develops not with those with whom we are familiar or those whom we have never imagined, but with those who are peripheral to our everyday activities. How we come to trust those with whom we interact, even if only briefly.

---

<sup>1</sup>In the movie *The Wrestler* (2008), for instance, the main character is a professional wrestler who has largely been absent from his daughter's life. He seeks to make amends and plans to meet her for a lunch. She resists though, explaining the extensive therapy that she had undergone to manage the deep trauma he has caused her. She just isn't willing to expose herself to any more disappointment. He implores her to trust him and she concedes. Of course, incapacitated by a coke-induced tryst, he misses lunch, and of course she is livid. What this episode illustrates, however, is the separability of these systems. The daughter had a very low credence that her father would show, but still trusted that he would. Although it is an unusual case, it's illustrative of how the emotional and credential aspects of trust are separable.

Given the empirical evidence presented in the introductory chapter, we ought to be searching for a state of mind that is a warm (Krueger et al. (2007)) expectation (Berg et al. (1995)), given a certain amount of indeterminacy (Kosfeld et al. (2005)), of cooperative behavior on the part of others (McCabe et al. (2001)), which is not just altruistic (Tomlin (2006)) and elicits recrimination upon non-compliance (Krueger et al. (2007)). With these desiderata in mind, I turn to a series of simple two-by-two games to hone intuitions about the contexts apt to elicit affective trust. These sorts of games have few parameters, which make them a parsimonious model to interrogate our intuitions about trust. In each game there are only two actors, and each has two possible actions in their choice set, *A* and *B*. For the moment assume that all the normative value that might result from the outcomes is captured by the stipulated payoffs.

### 3.2.1 *Game #1*

As a means of contrast, consider first a case that is not trust-apt. Here both players receive a payoff of 1 independent of both their own action and the action of the other player. There is neither a reason for or against *A* (or *B*, for that matter). Such a landscape isn't implausible or farfetched, it's just not terribly probative. When I go to Whole Foods and pick a bunch of asparagus I am agnostic regarding which I pick. Moreover, the utility I get from my asparagus is independent of whether you decided to come by earlier and pick your bunch. Whole Foods has plenty of asparagus to go around, and each bunch is delicious. This first game is a fine model for such an episode, but not an instance that recruits trust. Since the payoffs are invariant to the choices either actor makes, the actions aren't risky in any sense.

### 3.2.2 *Game #2*

In a second game we again have two players and two actions, though each has the same dominant strategy. Each player gets a payoff of 1 for choosing action *A* and 0 for action *B*. This might qualify for trust were we to equate it with reliance as Jones suggests (Jones (2001): 15918). Put like this:

Trust is an expectation that some means can faithfully obtain some specific ends or set of ends.

This definition is compatible with James Coleman's where expected gains exceed expected losses ( $pG > (1 - p)L$ ). The means might be a tool or a person, and the

end can be anything from soldering copper piping to picking up your dry cleaning. An upshot here is that, were we able to identify values for  $p$ ,  $G$ , and  $L$ , we would have a normative theory of when to trust. This way of casting trust is not strategic, however. Both players know that  $EU_{(i|A)} > EU_{(i|B)}$ , and they needn't solicit the actions of the other in order to obtain their aims.

My payoff here is contingent only on the landscape (i.e. the correspondence between action and outcome as a product of the terrain). In order not to make a blunder I must know something about the world, but I needn't know anything about my partner. It is not a strategic environment, though, since an agent does not require information about others to avoid erring. Take my Whole Foods case from above. Now imagine that one of the bunches of asparagus is rotten. There are plenty of others which are hearty and hale, it's just this one that looks pathetic. All you need to do is avoid this one bunch and, likewise, I ought to do the same. But there is no material way in which your choice affects my utility. As such it is difficult to see the conceptual purchase gained by identifying this scenario as involving trust.

### 3.2.3 Game #3

The third game is one of straightforward coordination. Now the landscape is strategic, with rationality dictating a mixed strategy to "solve" the game. Here again both players have options  $A$  and  $B$  at hand, but their payoff is 1 conditional on the other player choosing the same action. If we both  $A$  or both  $B$  we each get a payoff of 1, but 0 otherwise. This arrangement is incredibly probative, having received great attention from the likes of David Lewis and Thomas Schelling. The payoffs are conditional for both players, which makes it a candidate to consider trust. Each player is in some way concerned for the decision of the other. Moreover, rationality doesn't obviate the problem. One's best response is to  $A$  or  $B$  with probability  $\frac{1}{2}$ , which is a "no duh" result. If you and I planned to go for dinner, but dead cell phone in hand, I forget whether we agreed on Sava's or Seva's, directing me to choose Sava's with  $p = \frac{1}{2}$  is unhelpful. Were I confronted with two such options, I don't need a Nash solution concept to tell me that I need to pick each with probability one half. Choose between the two options; *I got that part.*

While this arrangement does look a whole lot more like trust than the previous two games, it still lacks important features associated with trust. It does require acceptance of risk and synchronizing behavior with others, but it doesn't require that the motive is in any way unselfish. Were this the paradigmatic case of trust we

might run the definition this way:

Trust is an expectation that an agent will act coincidentally to obtain some ends or set of ends.

Both actors have reason to believe that the other will enable them to obtain some constructive ends. Were one to believe that others are prone to cheat, lie, or steal we wouldn't call that expectation trust except in the loosest sense. (Indeed, if you can be taken to reliably lie, the act ceases to have the same mendacity to it.) But while the coordination game is a wonderful illustration of rationality's water's edge, it is still not the best model for a trust-apt situation.

Insofar as others don't have a plausible alternative strategy it isn't obvious that the actors are working together, i.e. "co-operating." Conditional on my A-ing, others would rather A too. Their decision is neither independently pro-social nor altruistic, it is just utility maximizing. An iterated strategy of Win-Stay, Lose-Random (WSLR), for instance, would allow actors to arrive at a stable equilibrium without collaboration, since (A,A) and (B,B) are absorbing states.<sup>2</sup> Because we want the same outcome we needn't appeal to another's better nature to obtain the ends we seek. While trust is sufficient to facilitate players converging to a coordinative equilibrium, it is not necessary.

### 3.2.4 Games #4 & #5: Two Trust Games

Turning to a fourth variant of the games above, we can tweak the setup to further identify the limits of rationality and ascertain the role of trust in obtaining estimable outcomes. My motive is not to dump on rationality here, but to assess the what sort of epistemic resources might come to bear where rationality ceases to be meaningfully action-guiding. In this instantiation of the game one agent receives a payoff of 1 for choosing A conditional on the other agent doing the same, and zero otherwise. The second agent, however, receives a payoff of zero for any action she might take. Again, keep in mind that the set up is a model of interaction and that the payoffs are the result of the landscape, not the players themselves. The world, rather than the players, generates the players' asymmetric outcomes. Furthermore, let's assume that an agent's moral utility is already "baked in" to the payoffs.

---

<sup>2</sup>Nowak and Sigmund (1993) discuss a strategy of Win-Stay Lose-Shift as a solution to the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. That would not work here, since players would just continually switch back and forth between sub-optimal outcomes. A strategy of Win-Stay, Lose-Random would work without too much trouble, however. Here players initially adopt a strategy at random. If it is successful they stay, and if not they select another at random. Such a strategy would likely converge to an optimum in two turns.

This set up of the game presents two Nash equilibria, (A,A) and (A,B). Since *A* is weakly dominant for player one, she won't select *B*. Player two, however, is indifferent between *A* and *B*, and as we have specified things, she has no *reason* to select one strategy over another. This is curious though. One option is clearly the right one, since for no effort on his part, player two can effect a Pareto improvement on the outcome. And while it is obvious to anyone outside the game, the constraints of rationality do not provide the means for the players to identify such an equilibrium. In such a case trust can provide the motivation necessary to rely on another, leading one to expect that she will come through irrespective of her (apparent) rational indeterminacy.

Altering things slightly, we can now configure a final game to have conditional and asymmetric preferences for one of the actors. This time player one obtains a payoff of 2 if both she and her partner select *A*, and 1 if both select *B*, but 0 otherwise. Player two, however, gets the fuzzy end of the lolly—she receives 0 no matter what she selects. Now player one has a set of conditional preferences and options. In the previous version she was stuck playing *A* and just hoping that her partner would cooperate. But now her choice is conditional on that of the other, with a Paratian impulse towards (A, A). It is essentially the same problem as above, with two Nash equilibria and no endogenous means of players one and two coordinating. A random strategy in iterated play won't resolve the matter either, since player two can neither win nor lose; she is totally indifferent.<sup>3</sup>

This last configuration tracks a lot of our intuitions about the contexts which recruit trust. In order for the one actor to confidently select *A* she must impute an a priori inclination for cooperation on the part of the other. Whatever the motivation that one projects on the other, it must be without respect to shallow self-interest. It is these conundrums that elicit rhetorical moves such as “trust me” or “can I trust you?” Importantly, that the same set up would track player one's decision were she merely to lack information about player two's incentive structure. It might be, for instance, that player two's interests are indeed aligned with those of player one. Were she to lack this information, however, *it would appear to her as if* this last game framed her decision. Though it is rare that others are actually indifferent between alternatives, we often lack insight regarding their true motives, making them *seem* indifferent to us.

Trust is an attitude we affect under uncertainty to overcome such an epistemic

---

<sup>3</sup>A strategy of WSLR will lead players to happen on (A,A), but it is not an absorbing state, since player two is liable to choose *B* in the next move with the same probability as *A*.

conundrum. To say “I trust you” in the face of such indeterminacy indicates that one believes that the means exist to move her partner to cooperate, either directly (“I trust you to  $\phi$ ”) or implicitly (“I’m not worried. I trust her to  $\phi$ .”). It both forges and fastens relationships. This way of casting things leads me to define affective trust as:

A warm expectation that an agent will act cooperatively to obtain some ends or set of ends.

The warmth here tracks this faith under uncertainty. Even absent individuated information, the principle may still possess a positively valenced disposition towards the agent. This kind of sentiment tracks the discussions of emotional valences from psychology, while also recruiting Simon Blackburn’s notion of “concerns” (de Sousa (2014); Blackburn (1998)). This language indicates an expectation that corresponds to a positive feeling, akin to happiness or excitement, but also “enter our reasoning [as] things we care about,” a language Blackburn uses to get away from flattened understandings of want or desire (Blackburn (1998): 123). This choice of language reflects trusts hybridized character, that it is both cognitive and emotional. Trust doesn’t (usually) fly in the face of evidence, but it comes to secure expectations under an amount of uncertainty. The emotional warmth that trust elicits comes to make these decision feel secure. I haven’t yet justified this account, though. I’ve only motivated the types of contexts in which it might be necessary to overcome a rational indeterminacy.

The experience of trust comes in these moments of uncertainty when other’s motives hang in the balance to offer an “attitude of optimism” in order to overcome indecision (Jones (1996): 11). Once resolved to say that that one trusts the trustee doesn’t indicate positive affect despite continual epistemic uncertainty, but that one thats it to be the case that trust would be *sufficient* to warrant those expectations again. This in part explains the odd elision of charity with trust throughout *The Confidence Man* illustrates the tenuousness of trust in the novel. What I argue, however is not that charity is a proxy for affective trust, rather it is a candidate virtue to elicit confidence under uncertainty. Charity is both a means which inclines a trustee to act cooperatively and a virtue which would facilitate a truster confiding in a trustee. While Melville is more skeptical about the prospects for trust than am I, we both configure the problem as turning on these sorts of cognitive resources that construct cooperative attitudes in order to overcome epistemic indeterminacy.

Lastly, I think that this last configuration of trust conforms well to the Trust Game from Berg et al (1995). Though Berg et al’s experiment is that of a dynamic

and not a static game, it captures many of the same strategic considerations. Though the game's material incentives ought to incline player twos to defect, the experimental results lead us to believe that they act under non-material considerations as well. What's more, player ones count on this, anticipating that, given a kind of motivational indeterminacy, player twos are disposed to cooperating, thus demonstrating trustworthy behavior. The fact that player ones transfer resources to player twos indicate that player ones believe player twos to possess non-material, action-guiding reasons. Importantly, however, though we as researchers can observe that the modal players are disposed to cooperation, player ones are still acting under uncertainty—from where they sit transferring resources feels risky. So even if the game is *really* an assurance game, it appears to player ones as if it were of the form of game #5. For this reason I will refer to both Berg et al's "investment game" and configuration #5 as the Trust Game.

### 3.3 *Conventions and Norms*

In the previous section I argued that trust is a candidate epistemic mechanism to solve (apparent) one-sided coordination problems. Yet I only identify the landscape on which the problem sits, presenting trust as a possible solution. I don't explain how trust is fit for the task. Karen Jones has argued that emotional considerations are sufficient to generate trust as a kind of optimism (Jones (1996)), and the psychological research I point to in the introduction indicates that there is good observational evidence to support this speculation. Empathy, for instance, is another cognitive mechanism that has been shown to generate trust. But empathy is not the best means to explain as trust is elicited in contexts where weaker ties are in place or directed at individuals with whom one lacks a substantive history. As such we must identify some other means by which the disposition of trust might be activated. Since I want to explain trust in the liminal space between the particular and the general, I don't imagine that trusters naturally have access to these sorts of resources. I instead turn to conventions and social norms in order to explain trust's "attitude of optimism."

Reporting trust—"oh yeah, I trust Tom"—can convey either a maximal or a minimal kind of confidence. Going back to the threshold model, such that some  $r$  is sufficiently large to elicit trust, where  $r = p - \epsilon$  in the expression  $rG > (1 - r)L$ , and  $\epsilon$  can vary in size.  $\epsilon$  here might be at a maximum with my mom, where even with very scant evidence, or evidence to the contrary (i.e. a low value for  $p$ ), I will



still trust her. Contrariwise, it might be at a minimum with my friend David who asks to borrow my car. In both cases I can be said to trust, but the “amount” of work trust is doing differs.<sup>4</sup> Invoking the concept of trust makes most sense under the kind of motivational indeterminacy of the Coordination or Trust Games (as opposed to cases like the Prisoner’s Dilemma in which there is a clear motivational impulse against cooperation). In these two contexts rational considerations fail to identify a unique course of action. The Nash equilibrium identifies a dilemma which requires additional machinery to resolve. In order to do so, actors must adopt strategies that are conditional on the actions of the others that have somehow been endowed with salience (Lewis 14).

### 3.3.1 *Conventions*

And this is why the technology of conventions is powerful. David Lewis remarks that conventions are a means of solving coordination problems by establishing “preeminently conspicuous analog[ies]” (Lewis (2002): 38). If some feature on the terrain is easy to spot out—“focal” in the language of Thomas Schelling—it gives a reason for everyone to act on it. For the moment we can black box the process by which the “preeminent conspicuousness” is ascertained. Were such an analogy to exist, though, it would serve as a means of converging on a stable equilibrium. For instance, were we to meet in New York City, we might think to do so atop the observation deck of the Empire State building, not because we communicated, but because we both know it to be an iconic landmark. The “focalness” or “preeminent conspicuousness” of the Empire State building is what makes it a candidate solution to the problem, rather than its convenience or some prior agreement. The reasonability of these solutions comes not because either of us has a particular incentive which draws us to one outcome or the other, but because of shared background information that directs us to converge on some solutions with greater likelihood than others.<sup>5</sup>

Conventions, as Lewis casts them, are one way of generating focalness given such a dilemma. There are two components to a convention which together give actors independent reasons to converge on a particular outcome. First, conventions entail that one has a conditional preference to abide by some rule  $R$  in context  $S$ ,

---

<sup>4</sup>Oddly, trust here does more work in the minimal case than the maximal one. In the minimal case I might not have not chosen to assign some task were it not for trust. In the maximal case, however, the situation is likely overdefined. It is rare that trust actually leads me to act in ways I wouldn’t have otherwise.

<sup>5</sup>In all honesty, I’d choose Fairway on seventy-fifth. Much more focal.

given that sufficiently many others abide by  $R$  too. You need to know that, given the compliance of at least some number of others, you will be better off acting on  $R$  than  $\neg R$ . Second, there must exist common knowledge that  $R$  is the thing to do in  $S$ . It is not a convention unless others are in on the rule and expect compliance of one another.  $R$  is arbitrary in some deep sense, though. There will always exist some competing  $R'$  which would be just as suitable, in some sense.<sup>6</sup> Whether being on time entails being five minutes early, as the clock strikes, Michigan time (ten minutes late), or a half hour late (what we colloquially referred to as “Jewish Time” growing up) is perfectly arbitrary. But in case some number of people conform to  $R$ , other members of  $P$  come to have a reason to do so too.

Despite this inherent arbitrariness, there is a kind of “oughtiness” to conventional practices that Lewis elides. Failure to conform to these rules can elicit the kinds of second-personal responses that Darwall and Strawson have in mind. Though Lewis acknowledges that the violation of conventional practices will likely elicit confusion and indignation, he still somewhat misses the reactive mark.

[I]f they see me fail to conform, not only have I gone against their expectations; they will probably be in a position to infer that I have knowingly acted contrary to my own preferences, and contrary to their preferences and their reasonable expectations. They will be surprised, and they will tend to explain my conduct discredibly. The poor opinions they form of me, and their reproaches, punishment, and distrust are the unfavorable responses I have evoked by my failure to conform to the convention. (Lewis (2002): 99)

Although conventions are a priori arbitrary, they are not toothless. As such, violating a convention is likely to elicit recriminations or just plain bafflement according to Lewis. Think about the reaction a woman in a crop top gets when she walks into the Hasidic neighborhood of Borough Park. Or, for the sake of absurdity, a nudist showing up to Sunday mass at St. Paul the Redeemer. Dress codes are certainly conventional, but that doesn’t mean their violation won’t get people riled up.

### 3.3.2 *Social Norms*

To Lewis’ scaffolding Cristina Bicchieri adds normative joists, explaining the apparent “oughtiness” of these rules. In addition to actors having beliefs and conditional

---

<sup>6</sup>Were  $R$  to be a priori distinctive, we should imagine that people could converge on the equilibrium without the conventional arrangement.

preferences, they also assign normative weight to their expectations of others. Here not only does *i* expect others to comply with *R*, she also believes that some  $p \subseteq P$  expect her to do so and will likely blame her if she fails. Social norms are a type of convention which entail normative expectations. These normative expectations go beyond the descriptiveness of conventional rule following, imposing blame or sanction in the event of noncompliance. This additional assumption seems a better fit for the kind of case Lewis has in mind when someone drops the conventional ball. It is not just that the other person chose not to *R* (which, because *R* is arbitrary, they are well within their right to), but that we hold them accountable for not doing so. And this can only happen in the presence of normative expectations (either with or without the threat of sanction, Bicchieri (2006): 11).

Consider a social norm not to litter in the park. We have lots of spaces to litter. In Ann Arbor these include a wealth of trash bins. Of course it is not called littering when you dispose of trash in that way, but it is the same action. Parks are pristine and not the place for litter. This rule is part of a social norm. I have a conditional preference to litter in the trash and not in parks so long as a sufficient number of others agree to do the same. If some number of people violate the norm, and turn the park into a large waste basket, I have a conditional preference to drop my trash there too rather than hold onto that dirty Kleenex. This norm entails both an expectation and a conditional preference. I myself want to abstain from littering so long as I expect you to do the same. But its salience, dictated by the existence of a conditional preference, and normativity are instantiated by the fact that as members of *P* we expect each other to comply, and will blame members otherwise.

The point here is not to explain the emergence of social norms, but to describe Bicchieri's incredibly elegant articulation of how coordination problems might be solved. In the face of an otherwise indeterminate problem, Lewis explains that conventions provide an intervention which is capable of overcoming confusion. Conventions provide reasons for actors to coordinate. They embed both conditional preferences and expectations of compliance, giving agents reasons to adopt *R*, irrespective of whether they possess specific information about the compliance of others. Bicchieri's discussion of social norms adds social judgement and sanctions to Lewis' concept of convention in order to pull out a kind of normativity that is conventionally circumscribed. Here not only do I have reason to *R*, but I anticipate that others are under similar expectations to *R* as well, holding us both accountable to keep up our end of the practice.

Bicchieri's account begins to explain the outrage associated with violating

social norms. Again, preferences against dropping trash or wearing crop tops are arbitrary, but that doesn't mean doing so won't elicit indignation or rage. When people come to develop contingent expectations, you are naturally inclined to feel as if you are on the hook and answerable for not following through. That doesn't mean you must comply all things considered, it just entails that you are liable to believe that you ought to or have reason to. And I think Lewis misunderstands this point somewhat. He asserts that were I to violate a convention, even one as innocuous as not knowing when to return a call, others "will probably be in a position to infer that I have knowingly acted contrary to my own preferences." But that is not quite right. It is not that my failure here leads others think that I don't know what I want. They just think my wants no longer conform to theirs. In so doing I actively disrespect them by flouting their aims and expectations. Violating a norm might convey that "I am not the person others took me to be" but not that I "acted contrary to my own preferences." Others want me to adopt  $R$  because their preference for the norm is conditional on me conforming. There is also a secondary concern, that by flouting  $R$  I reduce the number of compliers in the population, thereby undermining the convention's efficacy. So while you're liable to be upset with me were I to  $\neg R$ , it is rash to think that just because I violated a convention you are apt to think me some looney who doesn't know what I want.

### 3.3.3 *Trust in Light of Social Norms*

The means by which social norms dissipate uncertainty make them a strong candidate mechanism to precipitate affective trust. To begin with note that coordinative landscapes conform to the contours of both trust and social norms. Each comes to resolve motivational uncertainty giving actors a reason to select one behavior over others. Norms first do this by creating a conditional preference whereby actors have reason to conform so long as others do too. So, for instance, at the University of Michigan I have a conditional preference to arrive ten minutes after the specified meeting time, conditional on you being ten minutes late too. Social norms identify some rule or regularity as being a candidate expectation about which to trust another. Norms give one reason to find one more salient, focal, or reasonable, than others. Second, social norms generate expectations of others that are necessary for trust. Not only does one have a conditional preference to  $R$  so long as others do, but I also have reasons to expect that others will  $R$ . Third, social norms generate higher-order beliefs about the normative expectations of others. For starters, the trustee and I both believe that we will be held accountable were we to fail to  $R$ . This

gives each of us reason to expect others to comply on pain of sanction or blame, but it also constructs a context of warrant. Even if the trustee fails, my behavior is understood to be proper. So even were one let down, one has still “done the right thing” in being guided by and instantiating the norm to *R*. That sense of warrant, both as a first and second order matter, provides one with the affective attitude necessary for this brand of trust. The sense that this context or circumstance is trust-apt.

As an example, let’s return to the social norm of punctuality. I agree to pick Gretchen up in Munich and drive her to her flight. I’m late and she misses her flight. She likely had an expectation that I would be punctual, and that her trust in me was warranted. Moreover, when she complains to her friends regarding what happened they are liable to be outraged that someone would flout such a widely held norm. Were I, however, to agree to drive Amichai in Tel-Aviv and drive him to the airport, but again show up late and he misses his flight, his friends are less likely to be sympathetic. The norm of punctuality is not held as firmly by Israelis as by Germans, and the latter’s trust is seen as less justified than the former’s.

This account offers distinct parallels with trust and provides the epistemic bootstraps from which to generate expectations absent individuated information about a trustee. While trust is a warm expectation of another’s cooperation, absent deeper epistemic grounding all trust has to go on is vague optimism. There are lots of circumstances in which such general optimism is perfectly prudent. We might run optimism as a “nice” strategy in repeated play, for instance. Here goodwill holds out the prospect of Paratian outcomes. But that way of running it sounds a whole lot more like general trust than something context specific. Plus, as *The Confidence Man* would appear to caution, such an optimistic disposition is not only naive, but a recipe for a lot of disappointment. Social norms, by contrast, allow for the bootstrapping of trust without the evidentiary agnosticism of straight optimism. Embedded within contextual cues and activated by relevant scripts social norms can, at a negligible cost, convey information about the normative environment.

### 3.4 *Reactive Attitudes and Dual-Systems Theory*

But why are social norms apt to generate trust as a warm sentiment, along with associated reactive attitudes? I have so far argued that trust is both cognitive and emotional in nature, consisting of both a conditional preference to act in some specific way as well as an expectation that others will do so as well. Social norms

are good candidates to generate affective trust since they identify some action as salient or focal by generating conditional preferences and sowing expectations that others are likely to comply too. By recruiting social sanction and blame they render the behavior justified or warranted in some context. Moreover, were one of us to fail—me in my willingness to trust, the agent in her commitment to be trustworthy—social norms entail that we be held accountable, answerable for our non-compliance.

What is curious about trust, though, is the recriminations that a failure to comply brings about. I might well expect  $\phi$  to be the case, and I might be very confident of my belief, but when  $\phi$  turns out to be false I'm apt to cautiously update—"oh well," I might mutter to myself as a lower by credence that  $\phi$ . But that's not true when I trust someone. Were someone to squander my trust I am apt to feel anger, resentment, or betrayal. None of these can simply be explained by either the existence of a conditional preference or the expectation I had for the compliance of others.

In this way violations of social norms and trust appear similar. Both can leave others feeling let down, doubting the foundations of their relationship, generating "poor opinions they form of me, and their reproaches, punishment, and distrust are the unfavorable responses I have evoked by my failure to conform to the convention." While others had taken me to be guided by particular considerations, my actions confound that estimation, and not just regarding the matter at hand, but more generally too. In the trust game, for instance, were player two to choose *B* I would have reason to think that she lacks consideration for my person, for what I want, as the slightest effort on her part would make me much better off. Lewis himself identifies this by pointing to the bewilderment that ensues upon a conventional violation—you're apt to no longer know what to think of me. A violation of trust feels much the same way. When one betrays you (rather than just letting you down) you feel as if they have severed the relationship more general instead of thinking "oh, I better not trust her with *X* anymore." To be privy to a convention, as to be privy to one's trust, is to reveal something about your commitments more broadly. In the case of a convention you are inclined to act in concert with others, in light of a conditional preference for *R*. Failing to *R* indicates both that you are disinclined to *R* and insulated from the recriminations of others. By selecting *R'* you invite the castigation of others.

There are two complementary explanations which account for trust's associated reactive attitudes. The first is a conceptual account which explains why such attitudes are fitting for affective trust. The second is a psychological account that

explains how reactive attitudes function to facilitate trust.

Stephen Darwall's account of the second-personal standpoint helps explain the nature of trust's demands. Darwall argues that all the deontic machinery necessary for moral relations is just inherent in the second-personal perspective. If you are going to make such claims you can't help but drag all these important assumptions with you (Darwall (2009): 5). "A second-personal reason is one whose validity depends on presupposed authority and accountability relations between persons..." (Darwall (2009): 8). The nature of these kinds of claims is that actors take themselves to occupy a position of moral authority to make certain demands of others. Trust is agent-relative and second personal in this way. Just as I don't implore arbitrary others to get off my toe, but the person standing thereupon, I don't demand trustworthiness of a third party, but the agent herself. The efficacy of that claim is contingent upon her occupying a position in which she is apt to respond and hold herself responsible.

Social norms give me reason to believe that others are responsive to such reasons. Because they are germane in some broad context, they allow me to project that others hold themselves accountable to these reasons. Were I to trust you to *R*, or in virtue of such an expectation (say to do something that might follow from *R*), I anticipate that by being a member of *P* you hold yourself to abide by *R*. Were I to find that my trust was misplaced I could intelligibly ask you why you let me down. Sure, you could say that you have no commitments to *R* and that you've thought that *R*-ing was silly all along, but my willingness to trust initially proceeded from a normative expectation that you would be responsive in this way. The had to be something about your social standing or presentation that led me to believe that you took yourself to be a member of  $p \subseteq P$ . Social norms don't explain the basis of obligation, but how the construction of a particular kind of convention might lead one to feel as if they were under an obligation. Whether rightly or not, my reaction will take on a second-personal character, deriving authority from the ubiquity of the identified social norm. Darwall's account, then, comes to explain why reactive attitudes are a fitting response to the violation of trust stemming from a social norm.

There is still the puzzle of why trust assumes a coarse rather than continuous mode of epistemic updating. Ordinarily we should update our beliefs continuously. If someone were to let me down I might think that she is slightly less credible than I had initially. But betrayal entails a more radical form of updating—if you cross me I am liable to say something like "oh Bob, yeah, he's untrustworthy." I bin you in a wholly distinct category. The reactive attitudes associated with trust and distrust

lead one to update beliefs discretely rather than continuously. Furthermore, insofar as trust is predicated upon social norms it is arbitrary. Why ought these sorts of reactive attitudes and coarse updating be associated with arbitrary demands?

That psychologists and moral philosophers both have taken to thinking about our moral sentiments as the product of a dual-system can explain this conundrum (Greene et al. (2001), Greene and Haidt (2002), Kumar (2013), Copp (2001), Campell (1998), Campell (2007b), Campell (2007a), Ridge (2006), Schroeder (2009)). Our moral convictions and intuitions are constructed by both cognitive and emotional neural apparatuses, with deontic judgements being more associated with emotional evaluation and consequentialist judgements with cognitive assessments (Greene et al. (2001), Greene (2007)). The cognitive side of trust is apt to evaluate the reliability of the expectation. So if my expectation were upset I would merely update my credences. But this is not all there is to trust. The denontic valence to trust is liable to get me yelling obscenities when I'm betrayed. This is the emotional response.

Greene argues that these attitudes and associated emotionally charged updating is compatible with evolutionary accounts of altruistic punishment (Gintis et al. (2003)). Given the frailty of cooperative societies and their susceptibility to invasion by vicious strategies (Bendor and Swistak (1997)), such radical updating is one plausible respond to such a threat. In the face of possible exploitation of cooperative norms, people are inclined to react harshly to the undermining of goodwill. It's a means of insulating cooperation from exploitation. On the point Greene writes, "Why should our adaptive moral behavior be driven by moral emotions as opposed to something else, such as moral reasoning? The answer, I believe, is that emotions are very reliable, quick, and efficient responses to re-occurring situations, whereas reasoning is unreliable, slow, and inefficient in such contexts" (Greene (2007)). This radical form of updating, where the truster's reactive attitudes are liable to assess an agent as either trustworthy or not absent middle ground, is completely consistent with the all the evidence Greene points to here. The dual nature of trust, being both cognitive and emotional, explains why trust is apt to elicit reactive attitudes. Being shown to flout one's trust, as to flout a social norm, is to show oneself as a non-cooperator, as an outsider.

Affective trust, I argue, is an actor's warm expectation that others will behave cooperatively. This process is apt for coordinative contexts in which actors have a dearth of information and must elicit a disposition of optimism. But what comes to warrant such a disposition? Jones argues that emotions are frequently instrumental



in inclining us towards actions, but that can't explain how we come up skeptical so often. What might explain trusting strangers in Ghana but not in Turkey?

This is why I choose the nomenclature of *affect* to describe trust. What I have in mind is the experience of trust, the warmth generated in delegation and the bitterness elicited upon betrayal. Trust is closely associated with reactive attitudes which direct blame and demand responsibility when violated. Social norms explain what comes to justify trust. These norms create conditional preferences as well as expectations regarding the conduct of others. Moreover, they warrant trust by ceding normative expectations within some relevant population. These onlookers give approbation to those that conform, and blame to those that flout. These normative expectations provide the foundation for warrant, for even if one's trust is betrayed while following a norm, others will acknowledge the rightness of the behavior nonetheless. Such social norms recruit emotional machinery that lead trust to manifest as hybridized. As such, updating occurs coarsely and reactive attitudes are triggered when one's expectations fail to be met, in contrast to others sorts of epistemic failures which lack these sorts of recriminations.

The fullness of my account now described, I want to offer a final definition of trust as:

A warm expectation, with corresponding reactive attitudes, that an agent will act cooperatively to obtain some ends or set of ends, apt to arise in light of an identified social norm.

I don't believe that affective trust necessarily comes about as a response to such regularities, but they are apt to give rise to such confidence. While Karen Jones also identifies trust as an affective attitude, with both rational and emotional correlates, the account I provide goes further to identify how contextual cues work in tandem with social expectations to motivate trust and its associated attitudes. I explain affective trust as more than an idiosyncratic disposition towards a person one knows well (Jones uses the example Othello and Iago as one of misplaced trust), moving into the domain of the social and political. Beyond general or particular optimism, affective trust can be generated by widely disseminated norms which don't require individuated information.

### 3.5 *Group Identity as a Social Norm*

My account of affective trust conforms nicely with extant epistemological thinking both in the domain of the personal and the social. Affective trust makes sense both

as a kind of belief that an individual might hold, but also as a social phenomenon couched in a wider context of conventional expectations. This framework also works well within the political literature of new institutionalism. Elinor Ostrom offers a capacious understanding of an institution as “the prescriptions that humans use to organize all forms of repetitive and structured interactions” which include everything from the family to Congress to intramural sports leagues (Ostrom (2008): 3). Such research specifies the rules which structure social and political interactions, providing the building blocks to construct broader theory regarding human behavior. The nature of trust and the structure of social norms are a perfect candidate site and mechanism to add to this existing theory. While there have been critiques of new institutionalism which argue that institutions are ineffective at disciplining actions in contexts where actors are in conflict (Diermeier and Krehbiel (2003): 140), I sidestep these worries by casting the problem of trust as coordinative rather than conflictive. Trust is prudent when the context is cooperative rather than competitive. Institutions qua norms can come to explain how might converge on some equilibria over others, rather than outright altering actor’s basic incentives.

Institutional rules can be more complex than simple social norms, though their effect is the same. Traffic rules are a favorite example here. They act as a means of coordinating the flow of vehicular traffic, consisting of a bundle of coherent rules. The rules of “right on red” and “right of way”—where drivers that meet simultaneously at a stop give priority to the driver to their right—conform to our system in North America where we drive on the right side of the road. They would not work in Commonwealth countries that drive on the left. Traffic regulations as a whole constitute an institution in Ostrom’s sense, governing conduct in this complex interactive domain.

At times we might think that these institutions serve as a bundled social norm. Instead of some group of people adopting a single rule  $R$ , we might think that  $R$  is constituted by some number of other rules  $\{r_1, r_2, \dots, r_n\}$ . The more coherent these rules are, the tighter the analogy between social norms and institutions. Like in the traffic case, it makes sense to say that all these rules that pertain to driving on the right side of the road are indeed part of the same meta-rule. If groups and group identity function in this way then there is reason to think that affective trust may be motivated by group identities much the same as it is by social norms.

The largest lapse in the history of British intelligence came because Kim Philby was trusted just in virtue of his membership in British high society. The willingness of M.I.6 to trust Philby had nothing to do with the presence of a particular shared

social norm. Rather Philby, who turned out to be the West's largest intelligence liability during the Cold War, was trusted because he was an Eton boy. He was connected in the right ways, he went to the right schools, and his parents held the right sort of company. Rather than use relevant information about Philby's political commitments to vet him for clandestine service, these social markers were used as proxies to vet him. We can view this as affective trust of the second kind, where one's group identity generates a second order reason to trust. It is the kind of reason one might point to by saying "I knew his people" (New Yorker: 70). Being a member of the club is sufficient to warrant trust. But it is also the kind of betrayal that will devastate a community.

Michael Chwe makes a similar point in *Jane Austen, Game Theorist* regarding how we trust people in light of extrinsic rather than intrinsic facts (2013). He writes,

As is true for all social roles, the person who is 'it' is defined by a social process. A 'police officer' is a person who has gone through specific training, has passed certain specific tests, and is employed by a certain organization. This is a social process, and no person is inherently a police officer, just as no person is inherently 'it.' In a very small village, I might know the history and experiences of every single individual, and know that a person is a police officer in the same way that I know who 'it' is when playing tag. [But is this not the case in larger societies.] Thus a police officer wears a uniform, and even though we all know that a person becomes a police officer through a lengthy social process, in a given situation it is convenient to think that a person is a police officer because she wears a uniform. . . The uniform makes the police officer's identity literal (Chwe (2013): 217-8).

I take this to be saying that we have confidence in the uniform itself, *not* (necessarily) in what the uniform is supposed to signify. When you are stopped by the police you obey because you trust the uniform, though you know little about the woman herself or even whether the uniform is authentic or not. You could schlep down to HQ to verify them, but you won't. You just trust them.

As Chwe points out, our social expectations are tacit in smaller communities, and often become explicit in larger ones. While in my own home I know to wash my hands before I prepare food, restaurants have helpful signs explicitly reminding staff to do the same (which double to let patrons know that this is indeed the expectation). Most often we carry on just fine without interrogating the validity

of these beliefs, because in the main they aren't disputed. When they do become contested, however, it is difficult to provide firm grounds for their justification. These instances of trust, however, do not appear to be warranted by such higher-order social norms that regulate behavior or social identity. The officer's uniform doesn't convey a norm of fairness on its own, but a convention that people have come to rely on people in that uniform to serve a role, and we then come to trust that role.

These institutions are collections of norms, in a way. They are interlocking rules that govern various domains of social and political life. We look to uniforms, bona fides, and group identities to convey this sort of information regarding the rules by which people operate. These institutional distinctions come to carry the force of a norm themselves—they are just a kind of meta-norm that constructs a conditional preference on some set of dimensions  $\{r_1, r_2, \dots, r_n\}$  as well as beliefs of compliance and the normative expectations of others. Violating a group norm can elicit the same kind of opprobrium as does violating a social norm. In this way a bundle of rules can explain affective trust on this higher order of abstraction. Research has shown that trust and group identity are closely associated (Kosfeld et al. (2005)), but recruiting Bicchieri's apparatus of social norms provides one kind of mechanistic account for how trust is conditioned. Here, for instance, Philby is trusted in virtue of his membership in British society. Membership entails adopting  $R \in \{r_1, r_2, \dots, r_n\}$ , and violation on any one dimension would constitute a violation of  $R$ . There exists the expectation that he and everyone arounds him conforms to  $R$ , and, the kicker, to assert otherwise is itself a violation of  $R$ . Thus no one would condemn the person that hired him. Such a hiring process was completely conventional. Philby's ultimate betrayal (which wasn't so much ultimate as persistent) came to shock and disgust all those around him. As his protege Nicholas Elliot describes, they all felt violated.

Group identity can in this way can function as a meta-norm, where the dimensions are entangled. Being a member of a community entitles one to trust in virtue of these shared expectations, and violation of one norm undermines (at least to some degree) one's commitment to all others. Likewise, refusing to trust someone in such a context is akin to questioning their status as a group member. If being a member of a particular group entails commitment to  $R$ , then withholding trust indicates lack of confidence on some dimension  $\{r_1, r_2, \dots, r_n\}$ . But trust here works the same way as it does with regards to social norms. Conditional preferences and normative expectations ground affective trust, and render a kind of hurt and

betrayal if misplaced. With very little information, then, one can come to have warrant to trust.

### 3.6 *Discussion*

This chapter provides a conceptual account of affective trust, outlining the circumstances that require it, the mechanisms that generate it, and the underlying reasons for the peculiar kind of epistemic updating and reactive attitudes that it entails. Trust consists of both an expectation and a sentiment, coming with a belief about another's behavior as well as an empathic warmth that arises when one can confide in another. The flip side, of course, is that when trust is betrayed one is likely to experience any number of reactive attitudes—rage, disappointment, resentment—that normal expectations don't.

I have argued that these attitudes, both empathic and reactive, are a result of social norms that condition trust. Environments in which there exists motivational uncertainty, or one perceives there to be uncertainty, require additional epistemic machinery to resolve. While classic coordination games are one example of such a landscape, I claim that it is not a perfect candidate to elicit trust since positive feedback alone can generate convergence absent "co-operation." In the Trust Game, I argue, players are apt to be agnostic about the motivations of others and thereby require trust in order to converge on a Pareto equilibrium. Social norms provide the additional information that inclines one to trust.

Social norms resolve indeterminacy by creating conditional preferences as well as first and second order expectations—that others will conform to the rule and those around will expect all parties to conform—that create a context of justification. For some community, in some area of practice, trust is warranted in virtue of a social norm. In this way the expectation associated with trust is coupled with the deontic normative characteristics associated with praise and blame, and reactive attitudes more generally. This further explains why trust updates coarsely. When let down, one is apt to distrust the person much more than were other sorts of expectations to be upset in light of the normative nature of the expectation.

What sets trust apart from other attitudes, such as expectation and confidence, is an associated normative expectation. One feels as if trust is the appropriate response to the context. The expectation and sentiment dispose us to believe that these features come together in a hybrid package, even though the two are eminently separable. In this way trust behaves much like a virtue, conforming

well to recent literature describing hybrid moral sentiments more generally (Kumar (2013), Copp (2001), Campell (1998), Campell (2007b), Campell (2007a), Ridge (2006), Schroeder (2009)). As Peter Railton quoting Jonathan Haidt points out, the cognitive/non-cognitive binary of moral psychology has broken down, as we have come to realize that our attitudes are frequently composites of both. Given that “social psychologists have increasingly embraced a version of the ‘affective primacy’ principle” we have good evidence to cast trust as an affectively motivated expectation (Railton (2012): 38). Cognitively it would make little sense were it only one or the other.

Social norms provide the context to make second-personal demands, as Stephen Darwall casts them. Social norms operate broadly over some context leading one to believe that some rule is normative, and that expectations in light of the rule are similarly warranted. Were that trust upset, one would have reason to direct agent-relative claims at the trustee, which presume that he seems himself as answerable (given the ubiquity of the specified norm). Reactive attitudes are a natural response to such a violation. Moreover, we can explain the coarse nature of epistemic updating in light of betrayal as a result of trust’s dual-system. As Joshua Greene points out, the cognitive response to trust’s failure results from the system’s emotional contingency.

I imagine this is why trust has been such a confusing topic for so long. It’s just hard to put your finger on what it effects or why it’s useful. As an expectation and affective disposition it is easy to feel as if you’ve been let down or cheated in the Trust Game even though the other player never bared an a priori obligation to reciprocate. Trust responds to a sense of warrant making it appear justified (thereby implicitly positing a duty to be trustworthy on the other side of things). The apparent coincidence of normative and expectational aspects of trust likely contributes to its broad appeal to the literatures of politics, marketing and management. It generates a wrong headed interpretation which casts trust as both virtuous and explanatory. It is not at all surprising that trust positively correlates with brand assessment and consumer behavior, for instance, though the literature is entirely confused regarding whether trust is the result of good marketing or the cause of consumer habits (e.g. Morgan and Hunt (1994); Mayer et al. (1995); Sirdeshmukh et al. (2002), which between them have over 25,000 citations). In politics too, scholars cast trust as normative absent good arguments (e.g. Fukuyama (1996); Inglehart (1999)). As I see it trust isn’t the cause of legitimacy, but a byproduct of many of the same processes that generate legitimacy such as low divisiveness and shared social

conventions. It's a normative canary in the coal mine, of sorts.

## CHAPTER IV

# The Political Theory of Affective Trust

### ABSTRACT

This chapter looks at the political valence of affective trust. While I have explored the affective and epistemic dimensions of trust, I haven't yet considered its political upshot. In this chapter I locate affective trust politically in the writings of Smith, Machiavelli, and Hobbes. I begin by framing the discussion with the recent efforts of political theorists to reintroduce sentimental considerations into politics. The aim of sentimental political theory, like my own, is not to displace traditional democratic theory, but to offer a complementary and compatible avenue of research to explain the motivations and dispositions of political actors. With an eye for motivational theory, I then locate affective trust in the writings of Smith and Machiavelli to explore its cohesive potential for politics. I move from these constructions of trust to that of Hobbes's notion of faith. While Hobbes builds the concept of faith in similar terms to those of Smith and Machiavelli, I show how the concept serves a foundational role in his social contract theory. My account reveals Hobbes' project to be far more pragmatic than commonly understood, building legitimacy by co-opting faith in existing social and political institutions. My aim here is not to argue that affective trust is constitutive of politics as a matter of fact, but to identify the latent political properties of affective trust.

I have argued until now that affective trust is conditioned by social norms and institutional practices. One elicits trust not only in light of individuated information about a trustee or one's basic predilection to do so, but also due to identifiable norms



in the environment, which serve to generate and warrant contextual expectations. These norms motivate warmth towards other rule followers and associated reactive attitudes towards rule breakers. Although trust appears to be necessary for social order as Melville's *The Confidence Man* repeatedly illustrates—without it we are resigned to loneliness and reel from epistemic vertigo—the process of generating trust can easily be disrupted in the absence of common or clear norms.

The attention I've given to an affective element of politics does not come in a vacuum. Political theory of late has endeavored to put passion back in politics. Bolstered by an attentive eye to empirical research in social psychology, theorists have attempted to understand how sentimentality fits into normative political life (Walzer (2006); Krause (2008); Kingston and Ferry (2008); Allen (2009); White (2009); Frazer (2010); Macedo and Macedo (2009); Morrell (2010); Nussbaum (2013)). Sharon Krause in her book *Civil Passions* lays the project out well. She pushes back against a mode of theorizing in which "there is *no* right combination of reason and passion... The only way to achieve good deliberation, in other words, is to excise passions from the deliberative process entirely" (Krause (2008): 2). To be sure, this is a caricature of positions like those of John Rawls and Jurgen Habermas (Frazer (2010): 178), but it is a sensible one. Her point here is not to say that these considerations have been completely excluded, but to show how they have been tactically omitted from the dominant discourse. Democratic theorists are want to reflect on the formal rules that guide democracy, while ignoring the human elements of its subject. People can be thought to have well ordered preferences, sure, but they also exhibit sympathy, rage, and hubris. By reintroducing passion into politics, these projects aim to better understand political motivations. Attitudes, emotions, sentiments, and dispositions all provide reasons to act and motivate conduct. A tighter account of these affective states can assist in better identifying both the means and ends of politics.

The upshot of such sentimental political theory is admittedly circumscribed within modest boundaries. Idiosyncratic feelings clearly can never offer a full and comprehensive justification for politics. And Krause's work, again exemplary, does not seek to reconfigure politics, but argues that affective judgement can still provide the kind of impartiality that we demand of political judgements. Kingston and Ferry (2008), for their part, list a set of considerations that they believe sentimental political theory can inform. They seek to, in their words, rethink public and private considerations, grasp the effect these attitudes have for our broader commitments, identify different normative outcomes for politics, and gain a more tractable set of

models with which to interpret politics (Kingston and Ferry (2008): 11). Aims such as these are apt for the tools of sentimental theory.

Theorists can, however, get excited and overstretch these commitments. Danielle Allen's moving work, *Talking to Strangers*, for instance, commits such an error. The book seeks to articulate "forms of citizenship that, when coupled with liberal institutions" can dissolve distrust between individuals and divergent groups in our society (Allen (2009): xx). The thrust of the work claims that "ordinary practice of friendship provides all citizens with knowledge that can be carried into the political realm to good effect," thereby bolstering the trust necessary for citizenship (Allen (2009): xxi). This, however, assumes a kind of atomized, particular trust, one which builds broad social confidence through person-to-person contact. As I have argued, however, that kind of social trust is likely generated by contextually embedded norms and institutions, rather than weak Granovetter ties of the friendship that Allen describes. Assuming, as Allen has, that trust is the input rather than the outcome inverts the causal arrow. There just isn't good evidence to think that particular trust is up to the task of affecting social change (see for instance Gubler (2011)). Her theory can't carry its evidentiary weight. In a telling moment of the theory's tenuousness, Allen begins the epilogue by pointing to an ideal example of such friendly engagement. "[I]f the experience of the most powerful citizen in the United States is any guide, talking to strangers is empowering; the president is among the few citizens for whom the polity holds no intimidating strangers" (Allen (2009): 161). One can't help but chuckle at this line, however. In point of fact the President is among the most vulnerable and guarded citizens, singularly unfree to engage in spontaneous garrulousness. Her example actually illustrates just how much violence and control are necessary for even the most casual of political encounters, rather than friendship's conciliatory potential.

While acknowledging the limitations of affective trust, I seek to illustrate and explain its political properties in this chapter. The account of affective trust comes to embrace the impulse of theorists such as Krause, Frazer, and Kingston and Ferry. Trust, like other attitudinal states, is effective in generating kinds of political solidarity and continuity. Though it is not sufficient to constitute politics more broadly, it does describe a part of the dynamics of political cohesiveness. Consider for instance the missionary whom I referred to in the introduction, the one who trusts Albanians more than the Welsh, despite his cultural affinity with Anglophone culture. What are the contextual grounds for his trust (and mistrust)? If we think that trust bridges uncertainty—bringing people together who might not have otherwise associated—

the answer to this question will necessarily have political implications. While the bonds of trust are certainly a far cry from those of citizenship, both effect many of the same aspects of solidarity. Trust serves as an adhesive to bind people together and construct communal solidarity.

Particular trust affords no such political analogy, since all expectations are individualized and atomistic. General trust, however, does afford many of these political trappings. Generalized trust serves an important role in bringing people together, making political communities feel more coherent. Work by Inglehart and Uslaner, for example, identifies and explains how trust in strangers produces more amicable modes of citizenship. The ability to trust arbitrary others instantiates a firmer sense of social belonging, intensifying the bonds of citizenship. While this trust takes an unspecified object, it still produces confident expectations that others will act cooperatively. This belief leads people to see themselves as members of the same collective project, broadly speaking.

Affective trust has a different political role to play, however. It does not construct political affinities on the broadest level, but instead invites solidarity among people in some circumscribed context. Within our communities, neighborhoods, and schools, affective trust facilitates a feeling of collectivism by keying into extant social norms. While I don't mean to wax overly *Bowling Alone*, Putnam's notion that overlapping civil associations produce political harmony is the same impulse that leads me to think that affective trust possesses a political valence. Affective trust creates expectations that obtain in some domain and do so for contextually relevant reasons. Shared norms motivate expectations, inclining us to feel that another agent is trustworthy. We might ask two sorts of questions about the political valence of this kind of trust. First, we might want to know how trust affects greater solidarity, and what properties of norms have the capacity to generate political affinities. A second line of questions might ask whom these norms apply to and how these rules shape the stickiness of trust. After all, these norms don't obtain for just anyone, but only those members of some group  $P$  (again borrowing Bicchieri's notation) who take them to be authoritative. Who is a member of  $P$  and what its boundaries are are precisely political considerations. Trust both facilitates interactions as well as rendering a warm sense of solidarity with others—both those who are a part of  $p$  and  $P$ . The specificity and constraints of such norms and regularities mark political membership as well as a kind of consent that places one within a community.

In this chapter I interrogate the first set of considerations by exploring the texts of Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Smith, leaving the second set for the following

chapter. Though I want to be upfront about the fact that none of these thinkers motivates trust using social norms as I have, each does carve out the conceptual space necessary for affective trust, addressing its political implications in the process. Rather than focusing on their empirical claims, I turn to their writings to mine latent political possibilities of affective trust. While all three argue for a prominent role for affective trust and its correspondence to religious faith, I single out Hobbes for special consideration. As I read him, Hobbes locates affective trust cum faith at the heart of his political project. Contrary to the standard reading of *Leviathan*, I argue that such faith is foundational to Hobbes' social contract theory. While both Smith and Machiavelli conceive of affective trust in political terms, Hobbes makes the most forceful argument for the ways in which it is (or holds the possibility of being) constitutive of political order. This inquiry provides me with the opportunity of contributing to sentimental political theory by further articulating the political implications of a well defined affective phenomena. I turn to these resources with an eye to, as Michael Frazer puts it, "suggest[ing] an impassioned rather than a dispassionate politics, politics in which a diverse citizenry strives to spur itself continually onward..." (Frazer (2010): 14).

#### 4.1 *The Moral Epistemology Fellow Feeling*

Smith's opening of *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (TMS) highlights its positive rather than normative ambitions. The project here is not to unify social and moral psychology, but to get our dissonant motives on the table. Expect Smith to have many different reflections on trust rather than a single coherent account.

How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion which we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner. (Smith (1982): 9)

Smith, by noting that there exist "principles in [people's] nature, which interest [them] in the fortune of others," sets the stage for a naturalistic ethics, insofar as we are, he claims, just hard-wired to be other-regarding. Though these do not paper over humanity's selfish tendencies, they do provide an endogenous means of resisting mere egoism.

Beginning the work by identifying the pro-social mechanism of empathy<sup>1</sup> comes to end-around a kind of Hobbesian worry that, absent compulsion, people can do nothing but compete. Sure, we also have selfish impulses, but Smith here contends that we are also endowed with cognitive faculties which bring us to care about others and construct social order. Without this capacity, since “we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea of the manner in which they are affected, ... Though our brother is upon the rack, as long as we ourselves are at our ease, our senses will never inform us of what he suffers.” It is only “by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation” that we can come to relate to another’s experience (ibid.: 9). Empathy is the means of internalizing the pain and pleasure of others, making it possible for us to incorporate their interests in our own. The moral response which assigns praise and blame is facilitated by the empathic capacity to see and feel the world from others’ perspectives (Smith (1982): 317). This capacity allows us to do more than acknowledge another person’s suffering. It brings us to feel what others do, “by representing to us what would be our own, if we were in his case” (Smith (1982): 9). This capacity to experience the sensations of others involves not only cognitive simulation, but the ability to experience *their* pain and pleasure.<sup>2</sup>

What’s nifty about Smith’s account for my purposes is not just its naturalistic and positivist thrust, but the collocation of moral sentiments and social cohesion. Smith’s arguably more famous work, *The Wealth of Nations*, is concerned with people’s economic motivations and the ways in which these tendencies produce and reproduce social patterns. He doesn’t abandon those insights in TMS. But beyond material incentives, Smith argues that emotional and sentimental considerations are indeed just as motivationally salient. “What reward is most proper for promoting the practice of truth, justice, and humanity? The confidence, the esteem, and love of those we live with. Humanity does not desire to be great, but to be beloved. It is not in being rich that truth and justice would rejoice, but in being trusted and believed, recompenses which those virtues must almost always acquire” (Smith (1982): 166). Sure, market forces can incentivize estimable conduct, but Smith doesn’t believe that that is a sufficient psychological explanation for much of human behavior. This complementary account rests with the desire to be admired and relied on by others.

---

<sup>1</sup>Though Smith refers to this perspective taking as ‘sympathy,’ Darwall recasts it as ‘empathy.’ For the purposes of this paper I borrow Darwall’s terminology (Darwall (1998)).

<sup>2</sup>This actually occurs through neurological apparatuses such as mirror neurons, for instance (see §1.5.1).

For Smith, our normative reactions are contingent on our empathic responses. To approve or disapprove of behavior recruits our empathic capacity in order to identify the degree of fellow feeling we share in the instance. He writes, “to approve or disapprove, therefore, of the opinions of others is acknowledged, by every body, to mean no more than to observe their agreement or disagreement with our own. . . . A little attention, however, will convince us that . . . our approbation is ultimately founded upon a sympathy or correspondence of this kind” (Smith (1982): 17). The empathic mechanism is triggered by other’s expressions, but the force of one’s reaction is mediated by the perceived social distance. The more we share in common with another, the greater our inclination to approve of their action. The process of empathizing, according to Smith, corresponds in part to how a person believes she would behave in like circumstances. To approve is to agree with the response and to blame is to disagree. To wit, the process of Smithian empathy is compatible with Darwall’s account of second-personal moral claim-making. Moral demands are made with regard to one’s ability to effect a response (i.e. responsibility) from another, rather than pointing towards a third-party or other external standard. Empathy is a candidate mechanism to make such a claim. Second-personal claims are directed as to assume the other’s responsiveness and responsibility—when I say “step off my toe” I take you to be responsive to that claim. Empathy is a means by which one might come to infer the existence of such extant moral and personal agreement.

Smith’s interest in the psychological correlates of moral attitudes provides a political argument for the relevance of these attitudes to political theory. Empathy, Smith tells us, motivates and gives us reason to take action “in proportion to the vivacity or dulness of the conception” we have of the experiences of others (Smith (1982): 9). Our moral sense is modified by the degree of social commonality that we share with others, whereby, “a certain reserve is necessary when we talk of our own friends, our own studies, our own professions. All these are objects which we cannot expect should interest our companions in the same degree in which they interest us” (Smith (1982): 33). Here as above, Smith notes that people are apt to regulate their empathic responses in accord with the social distance they feel with others. However, Smith thinks that empathy is not only conditioned by social dynamics, but also feeds back to generate greater cohesion. The sentiments of selfishness and empathy, he writes, “. . . have such correspondence with one another, as is sufficient for the harmony of society” (Smith (1982): 22). This is a wonderfully succinct presentation of his two major projects. While *Wealth of Nations* emphasizes

the individualistic motives, TMS points to other-regarding inclinations, the concert of which can explain social dynamics according to Smith. And inasmuch as we think of political space as a collective domain with moral ambitions, the account of TMS can help us understand the synthesis of social and moral schema. I don't want to oversell the point here—there is plenty of excellent discussion regarding both the uses and limitations of empathy (Morrell (2010), Valentino et al. (2014))—but only to identify how empathy's role in drawing people closer together, as well as pushing them apart, is political in kind. Empathy acts as soft political force, regulating local dynamics upon the larger landscape of the state.

But how can a moral system, which hangs so precariously on the idiosyncratic attitudes of individuals, produce social harmony? Indeed, social forces often lead our attitudes to manifest haphazardly, generating approval of some conduct (“he’s so bold!”) but disapproval of others (“she so bossy!”). It would appear to be a ripe mechanism for social polarization rather than harmony. Like extends fellow feeling to like, and blame towards dissimilar others. Smith’s description of the impartial spectator comes to mitigate this worry. This impartial spectator “allows no word, no gesture, to escape it beyond what this more equitable sentiment would dictate; which never, even in thought, attempts any greater vengeance, nor desires to inflict any greater punishment, than what every indifferent person would rejoice to see executed” (Smith (1982): 24). When considering our actions, we naturally reflect on what we believe an arbitrary and impartial judge would endorse. This impulse holds the possibility of moving beyond our own idiosyncratic dispositions to assess the conduct of others by reflecting on more generally held considerations. That is not to say that one’s impartial spectator is indeed “impartial,” but that it purports to be, or feels as if it were. We believe that moral judgements ought to be impartial, even though the prospect is faint. Smith acknowledges this in writing of distinct impartial spectators (in the plural), since we are inevitably going to have divergent opinions regarding what counts as “impartial” (Smith (1982): 69). This impulse certainly has the potential to cement existing social or political divisions, though it will more commonly move people to form judgements that are cooler and more dispassionate.

#### 4.2 *The Collocation of Trust, Social Order, and Faith*

Trust, for Smith, is the reflexive analogue of empathy. While empathy is the capacity to identify with others, trust is evidence that others identify with us. Absent trust,

we might well worry that our moral intuitions are just in our head, completely distinct from those of others. In describing the nature of epistemic uncertainty he notes that

a wise man may suffer great pain from the serious imputation of a crime which he never committed... What the peculiar constitution of his own mind may or may not admit of, is, perhaps, more or less a matter of doubt to every man. The trust and good opinion of his friends and neighbours, tends more than any thing to relieve him from this most disagreeable doubt; their distrust and unfavourable opinion to increase it." (Smith (1982): 122)

Yes, trust is an affective means of conveying one's approval and good opinion. But it is also a token of another's sympathies, coming to allay the worries of a lonely and "peculiar [moral] constitution." Trust indicates a shared moral calculus, that others sufficiently esteem one's judgement as to assume (contextually variable) cooperation. Smith's conception of trust here describes an affective and moral identification with others, a second personal reaction that confers approbation or opprobrium in response to shared social and moral resonance. Conforming to the way I describe affective trust, Smith's deployment here is not foremost about individuated information about others conditioning these expectations. Rather, we form these beliefs in light of the similarity we feel with others, a similarity which is expressly empathic and socially constituted. It is an affective rendering of trust that comes about in light of social practices and regularities. Just as empathy turns on social distance "in proportion to the vivacity or dulness of the conception" we have of the experiences of others and is also "sufficient for the harmony of society," trust too feeds back to generate greater social and political order.

While I am primarily concerned with the way theorists have reflected on this brand of trust in a decidedly political manner, it is instructive to point the correspondence between their discussions of trust and my own. In the passages above on duty and on virtue, Smith clearly identifies trust as a brand of affect, directed at those we have reason to identify with or feel for. His concept of trust foregrounds the affective and socially contingent aspects of trust, while softening the focus on the credential features. What is interesting to Smith about trust is not primarily its credential component, but the impulse that elicits it. He writes that "[w]e trust the man who seems willing to trust us. We see clearly, we think, the road by which he means to conduct us, and we abandon ourselves with pleasure to his guidance and



direction" (Smith (1982): 337). Trust here is expressed both as an expectation and a sentimental disposition towards others to whom we relate. Rather than employing attendant individuated facts to generate our expectations, our sympathies lead us to believe that we understand "the road by which [another] means to conduct us."

Though the affective aspects of our theories align well, his does not map perfectly onto the discussion of affective trust I offer in the last chapter. Empathic tendencies appear to underpin Smith's account, while social norms do the work for mine. Smith understands interpersonal similarities to drive such epistemic bonds, where we come to trust those who favor us or to whom we look up to, my account relies on a more pedestrian mechanism of social norms that posit  $n^{th}$ -order expectations regarding how others act. I don't reject Smith's insight, it is just not directly a part of the theory I offer. Contrast his remarks, however, with the concept of particular trust. Smith's view is much closer to mine than Coleman's, certainly. Smith is not so concerned with *what* evidence we have, as how we interpret it. And while Hardin's approach does include encapsulated interests, Smith remarks that we can have such trust precisely at the moment we're sure we're goners.

Indeed trust is at times inversely correlated with positive expectations of outcomes. "Good soldiers, who both love and trust their general, frequently march with more gaiety and alacrity to the forlorn station, from which they never expect to return, than they would to one where there was neither difficulty nor danger" (Smith (1982): 236). Trust is grouped with love here, producing greater fellow-feeling for the general, despite the bleak outlook, pointing to an affective valence to trust that outstrips expectations regarding outcomes. Because of one's trust in his commander he is liable to obey her, precisely *because of* the dire prospects. Though it might seem that this falls in the category of particular trust—maybe trust is especially activated by the prospect of calamity, calling for a more stoic leader—it doesn't have the attendant trappings. It is not contingent on individuated expectations, and there is no expectation of a persisting relationship, as per Hardin. Rather there seems to be a shared set of values that leads one to stake a warm confidence in the commander. Soldiers trust the competence of the general as a function of the severity or gravity of the mission. It's not that the soldiers are irrational, but that the disposition to trust turns not on the probability of victory, but the authority imputed to the general.

Machiavelli also conceives of trust in similar terms as Smith, arguing for its political role in fortifying and generating esprit de corps. "The things that make [an army] confident are: that it be armed and ordered well, that [its members] know

one another. Nor can this confidence or this order arise except in soldiers who have been born and lived together. . . Such things, well observed, are the great cause that the army trusts and, by trusting, wins" (Machiavelli (1996): 285). As in Smith, trust for Machiavelli is initially the result and not the cause of a well regulated army. Strong fellow feeling and discipline ground trust and incline forces to be victorious. But rather than the individuated expectations driving trust, Machiavelli posits that camaraderie generates trust which, in turn, enhances the likelihood of victory. Trust here is socially constructed, a function of the military culture and the relationship between soldiers. While trust is initially the result of unit cohesion, it may come to be the cause after some time. As in Smith, trust's political role results of positive feedback on agents' mutual confidence. The men experience fellow feelings, which leads to trust that then strengthens the order of the company.

Machiavelli argues that trust cannot be coerced, but must be earned over time by individuals firmly planted within the confines of the state—exiles, for instance, lack the standing to be relied upon (§2.31). These observations lead Machiavelli to make the conceptual move to run faith together with trust. After identifying the efficacy of trust among soldiers he notes that "the Romans used to make their armies pick up confidence by way of religion. . ." (Machiavelli (1996): 285). Religion is a powerful social force which can be employed to reify the state, since according to Machiavelli,

every religion has the foundation of its life on some principle order of its own. . . for they easily believed that the god who could predict your future good or your future ill for you could also grant it to you. . . Thus, princes of a republic or of a kingdom should maintain the foundations of the religion they hold; and if this is done, it will be an easy thing for them to maintain their republic religious and, in consequence, good and united. (Machiavelli (1996): 37)

Religion is itself an order that lends itself both to the creation of political institutions as well as the conditioning of trust among its members. Machiavelli understands that trust affects unit cohesion, but he also identifies how faith can be deployed to bring about the same end. Faith results from extant social order and can be manipulated to strengthen the ends of the state and the expectations that its members hold. The reason he provides is that "for they easily believed that the god who could predict your future good or your future ill for you could also grant it to you." This is a common (or natural) conflation between the power of a god and its normative

force. This order is useful not only in constructing political institutions, but also in its ability to generate a common identity among citizens, thereby generating further bonds of trust.

Indeed, this elision of faith and trust is resonant in both the writings of Machiavelli and Smith. Machiavelli's *Discourses on Livy* employs the terms trust (*confidare*, *confidarsi*) and faith (*fede*) with a fair amount of conceptual overlap.<sup>3</sup> The title of §1.59 asks "which confederation or other league can be more *trusted* . . ." while the chapter discusses "which *faith* is more stable . . . that of a republic or that of a prince" (Machiavelli (1996): 119, emphasis added). Elsewhere he writes that faith (not trust) may be withdrawn from an individual who has let down a republic in the past (§1.53.1). Machiavelli just doesn't distinguish too finely between the two terms. And I believe for good reason. Like Smith, Machiavelli understands trust to be socially constructed in the manner close to that I have in mind. Money cannot buy trust nor can violence enforce it (§2.10.1, §1.59.1). Trust can, however, be conditioned in light of historical considerations and alter the way we receive that history (§1.5.1, p139). These indications also lead me to believe that trust is affective in kind here, though the evidence for this is weaker.

Smith too sees such a disposition to bow to authority as a natural one, remarking that the "magnanimous resignation to the will of the great Director of the universe, [does not] seem in any respect beyond the reach of human nature" although he ultimately couches the impulse in moral rather than expressly political terms (Smith (1982): 236). While moral sensibilities are shaped by a learned association between actions and outcomes, there are moments which lead one to concede powerless to right all the wrongs encountered, Smith tells us.

When we thus despair of finding any force upon earth which can check the triumph of injustice, we naturally appeal to heaven, and hope, that the great Author of our nature will himself execute hereafter, what all the principles which he has given us for the direction of our conduct, prompt us to attempt even here; that he will complete the plan which he himself has thus taught us to begin; and will, in a life to come, render to every one according to the works which he has performed in this world. And thus we are led to the belief of a future state, not only by the weaknesses, by the hopes and fears of human nature, but by the noblest and best principles which belong to it, by the love of virtue, and by the

---

<sup>3</sup>In lieu of a keyword searchable Latin text, I rely on Harvey Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov's index and translation to keep score.

abhorrence of vice and injustice. (Smith (1982): 169)

The idea of God comes to right this moral hiccup in the world. Though humans lack the power to correct the world's inequities, we come to project a belief in an omnipotent being capable of doing so. Insofar as our ethical dictates are coextensive with what we imagine an all powerful being desires, "they necessarily acquire a new sacredness from this consideration" (Smith (1982): 170). God serves the role of ideal impartial spectator. Though the argument is distinct from that of Machiavelli, they share an impulse to explain the efficacy of religion, and faith more specifically, by gesturing towards an inclination to do a kind of social induction. In both cases the divine serves to provide greater coherence to an otherwise fractured moral and social world. Don't think that Smith drank the Kool-Aid, however. He goes on to nod and wink to his skepticism of organized religion.<sup>4</sup> Rather than endorsing such a position, he merely explains how the notion of God might elicit trust qua faith.

For both Smith and Machiavelli religion acts as a means of conditioning our dispositions, generating greater social coherence and constructing trust. While acknowledging the contested status of religion, both identify the means by which it can sow social harmony. Machiavelli goes so far as to advise that, "princes of a republic or of a kingdom should maintain the foundations of the religion they hold; and if this is done, it will be an easy thing for them to maintain their republic religious and, in consequence, good and united" (Machiavelli (1996): 37). What's more, a consonance emerges between the trust one shows in others and the faith one has in a god. Faith in God engenders a belief that lacks direct evidence, similar to the kind of expectation produced by affective trust. The intersection between these two mechanisms serves to direct attention towards religious communities as generative sites to consider the political upshot of affective ties.

My point here is not to argue that trust is either necessary or sufficient to generate a politics, but that it is instrumental in furthering political cohesion. It can emerge in light of fellow feeling and be accentuated by social order, as in the case of religion. In this way, trust brings people together by affective means. Trust is neither the first step in the process of building social solidarity nor the last. Instead it is a means of bringing agents in the same affective neighborhood closer together. And while

---

<sup>4</sup>I can't help but quote Smith's rant here: "And wherever the natural principles of religion are not corrupted by the factious and party zeal of some worthless cabal; wherever the first duty which it requires, is to fulfil all the obligations of morality; wherever men are not taught to regard frivolous observances, as more immediate duties of religion, than acts of justice and beneficence; and to imagine, that by sacrifices, and ceremonies, and vain supplications, they can bargain with the Deity for fraud, and perfidy, and violence, the world undoubtedly judges right in this respect, and justly places a double confidence in the rectitude of the religious man's behaviour" (Smith (1982): 170).

we know that these bonds can generate further social solidarity, it is also possible for trust to push people apart. Feeling solidarity with one group may cause one to diminish trust in another, for instance. The point, rather, is to identify the political properties of trust.

### 4.3 *Hobbes' Political Faith*

The collocation of trust and social solidarity is made by both Smith and Machiavelli—the ability for trust to bring greater coherence to extant social order—but neither employ trust as centrally to their politics as does Hobbes. The particulars of my interpretation here is novel. Hobbes is commonly read as an analytic project convincing the reader to embrace a coherent political project embodied by the Leviathan. Parts three and four, by contrast, are read as somewhat antiquated, taking aim at particular early modern religious commitments that contemporary readers lack. Reading through the introductions of the popular editions of the work gives one the sense that prominent scholars don't really know what to make of Hobbes' religious project. C.B. Macpherson barely makes mention of parts three and four in his description of the project in his introduction, while Tuck and Peters note the importance that religion plays in the work, though they don't explain how its substance might alter our understanding of the text (Hobbes et al. (1962); Hobbes and Macpherson (1968); Hobbes and Tuck (1991)). Curley is most attentive to the issue, explaining how Hobbes nests Christianity under the dominion of the secular commonwealth (Hobbes (1994)). Yet even he doesn't go so far as to reinterpret the political machinery of the first half in light of the substance of the back half. In direct contrast to these treatments I argue that the latter parts are not merely complementary to the project of the former, but come to fundamentally modify how the covenant in parts one and two is read. Although Hobbes' work in the back half of the book is largely a studied doctrinal argument for the proper understanding of Christianity's demands on its adherents, it also serves as a site to explore and co-opt more conventional features of politics. Contrary to Macpherson's reading, for instance, Hobbes' theory does not proceed from collectively emerging from our respective armchairs to acknowledge the validity of his well specified arguments. Rather conventional practices and civic institutions bolster these analytic arguments in order to produce his more comprehensive political vision. It is these considerations which the latter parts come to integrate into the project of *Leviathan*.

Hobbes outlines the contours of his major claim of the latter half of the work at

the beginning of chapter 35, writing:

The kingdom of God in the writings of divines, and specially in sermons and treatises of devotion, is taken most commonly for eternal felicity, after this life, in the highest heaven, which they also call the kingdom of glory; and sometimes for (the earnest of that felicity) sanctification, which they term the kingdom of grace; but never for the monarchy, that is to say, the sovereign power of God over any subjects acquired by their own consent, which is the proper signification of kingdom. *To the contrary*, I find the Kingdom of God to signify, in most places of Scripture, a *kingdom so properly named*, constituted by the voted of the people of Israel in peculiar manner, wherein they chose God for their king by covenant made with him, upon God's promising them the possession of the land of Canaan. . . (Hobbes (1994): 271-2)

Hobbes's project here offers a reading of the Bible which runs it together with his secular politics. "The kingdom of God" he writes is "is taken most commonly for eternal felicity, after this life, in the highest heaven." His move, however, is to strip the metaphysics from this interpretation in order to demonstrate the compatibility of the biblical politics with his own. Indeed Hobbes argues that worries of consent run throughout the Bible, motivating the Decalogue (Hobbes (1994): 223) and grounding the need for repeated covenants (Hobbes (1994): chpt 45). The kingdom of heaven isn't imposed upon the faithful, but accepted volitionally, as specified in part two. And though his definition of consent is unusual (see Hobbes' explanation of "voluntary", Hobbes (1994): 112), it still serves to motivate the need for an epistemic valence to politics. Subjects must come to acknowledge the legitimacy of their political regime.

Prima facia, "the kingdom of Christ is not of this world; therefore, neither can his ministers (unless they be kings) require obedience in his name" (Hobbes (1994): 336). Lacking this direct transmission of authority from Christ (e.g. Hobbes (1994): 358) it cannot generate authority since it is "only upon certainty or probability of arguments drawn from reason or from something men believe already" from which authority can come (Hobbes (1994): 337). This inability to marshal appropriate evidence entails that Christ's Church alone cannot generate voluntary consent, since it fails to bring about the appropriate state of mind to yield authority (e.g. Hobbes (1994): 367).<sup>5</sup> Here's the hitch however: "the office of Christ's ministers in this

---

<sup>5</sup>Consent for Hobbes notion of consent diverges from its more common understanding of what

world is to make men believe and have faith in Christ; but faith has no relation to, nor dependence at all upon compulsion or commandment” (Hobbes (1994): 337). This entails that Christ’s ministers, those that claim to be his representatives, have no inherent political power, since they lack the authority to compel the faith they demand, “for God accepteth not a forced, but a willing obedience” (Hobbes (1994): 388).

#### 4.3.1 *Hobbes’ Construction of Faith*

Hobbes considers the rightful authority of the Christian church in part three of *Leviathan* using language that has been crafted in part one specifically in order to insure the soundness of his political project. Although the integrity of the Hobbesian political project is largely premised on the coherence of his lexicon, he indicates that there are also other avenues to establish certainty. Alternatively then,

When a man’s Discourse beginneth not at Definitions, it beginneth either at some other contemplation of his own, and then it is still called Opinion; Or it beginneth at some saying of another, of whose ability to know the truth, and of whose honesty in not deceiving, he doubteth not;... (Hobbes (1994): 36).

If we are not able to work from settled definitions, then we must rely on either our own intuitions or on the pronouncements of others—we may either trust ourselves or trust others.

... and then the Discourse is not so much concerning the Thing, as the Person; And the Resolution is called BELEEF, and FAITH: Faith, In the man; Beleeve, both Of the man, and Of the truth of what he sayes. So then in Beleeve are two opinions; one of the saying of the man; the other of his vertue. To Have Faith In, or Trust To, or Beleeve A Man, signifie the same thing; namely, an opinion of the veracity of the man (Hobbes (1994): 36).

Observation can provide evidence for one’s beliefs, but so can other people. Since we don’t always have access to analytic truths or empirical facts, we must rely on

---

one wants, all things considered. In context it is a state of mind that acknowledges some state of affairs or set of constraints. Curley, for instance, notes that Hobbes’ deliberately defines “voluntary” such that every action one takes is to be considered voluntary, even if compelled (Hobbes (1994): xvi, 112). Given Hobbes’ epistemology, reason and observed evidence have privileged strength to generate such consent, entailing that the commonwealth and not the church is in a ready position to facilitate legitimate authority by way of the consent of the governed.

the word of others. We can render beliefs in light of evidence, but we can also hold them in light of what others say or take to be true. Hobbes doesn't expand upon his epistemic account of faith here, leaving open what it means to believe a proposition in light of "the veracity of the man." So what does give a person standing to provide such a reason to believe?

While Hobbes' notion of trust is contrary to my own, his construction of faith shares a great deal with affective trust as I have described it. Hobbes' trust runs along the lines of reliance, as Karen Jones understands it, as when a charge is given to a delegate (Hobbes (1994):119-120). Trust here is related to expectations of outcomes in light of individuated evidence, rather than a judgement with reference to social norms (Hobbes (1994): 52, 60, 84, 89). Particular trust turns on strong assumptions that are too specific to ground anything as broad as a general political project.

Religious convictions, as cast in chapter seven, seem to be primarily driven by faith in persons rather than trust in evidence. Hobbes maintains that while religious dogma claims veracity for its teachings, yet, "whatsoever we believe upon no other reason than what is drawn from authority of men only and their writings, whether they be sent from God or not, is *faith* in men only" (emphasis added, Hobbes (1994): 37). Lacking direct access to God's pronouncements, we are left to have faith in His messengers. It follows, then, that our "faith in supernatural law" must pertain to the messenger of that law, rather than the rectitude of the law itself (ibid.: 187). Hobbes' point in all this is to ultimately run civil and religious authority together, as he plainly argues for at the start of chapter thirty five. By weakening the credences we have in religious figures, he strengthens our deference to civil authority figures. But still worried of inspired zealots who act without regard for civil authority, Hobbes also reconceptualized a notion of faith by rebuffing the claim that it is endowed by means of inspiration. He does this by offering a radical gloss on Paul's teaching that "faith comes by hearing," (Romans 10:17) that is,

hearing by those accidents which... are all contrived by God Almighty, and yet are not supernatural but only... unobservable. *Faith and sanctity are, indeed, not very frequent, but yet they are not miracles, but brought to pass by education, discipline, correction, and other natural ways, by which God worketh them in his elect at such time as he thinketh fit* (emphasis added, Hobbes (1994): 213).

Faith is not supernaturally endowed, he claims, but results from hearing Christ's message from within one's community.



This turn at once diffuses the authority of religious figures while also pointing towards the power of learned social knowledge. Faith is explicitly cast as socially constructed, echoing my account of affective trust. What it is “to have faith in, or to trust to, or belief in a man” corresponds to the same state of belief which regards “an opinion of the veracity of the man” (Hobbes (1994): 132). According to Hobbes here, faith is an expectation that develops from social conditioning. Faith emerges because one’s friends, colleagues, and peers give one warrant to have faith as well—this social conditioning warrants one’s confidence. “Whereby it is evident, that the ordinary cause of believing that the Scriptures are the word of God, is the same with the cause of the believing of all other Articles of our Faith, namely, the Hearing of those that are by the Law allowed and appointed to Teach us, as our Parents in their Houses, and our Pastors in the Churches” (Hobbes (1994): 401). In this same way religious faith is bestowed by hearing—one comes to accept Christ through one’s family, Church attendance, summer potlucks, summer camps, and religious education. Faith becomes warranted in a community of believers. I concede, however, that Hobbes isn’t going full blown *Bowling Alone* here. Part of the efficacy of the faith imparted doubtless comes from “those that are by the Law allowed and appointed to Teach us,” as directed by the sovereign. But in the main, Hobbes seeks to harmonize the disparate commitments of the members of the state. Indeed, some members of the commonwealth may possess a peculiar conception of faith or may lack belief altogether. To this worry Hobbes notes that even the Bible teaches that faith is a gift of God (Hobbes (1994): 338), bestowed unto those fortunate to be taught the Word by members of the Church—the extant community of Christians. Faith is not earned but selectively parceled out. This deployment of faith serves at least two of Hobbes’ aims. It comes to argue not only that Christians ought to acknowledge the authority of the state, but also that Christians must tolerate non-Christians, for they can neither be blamed nor coerced into accepting Christ as their savior—faith is a gift, after all.

#### 4.3.2 *Faith and the Covenant*

Reconceptualizing faith in terms of learned social expectations allows Hobbes to mitigate the divide between the foundations of religious and political legitimacy. He begins the last chapter of part three by underscoring the perniciousness of the conflict between politics and religion. “The most frequent pretext of sedition and civil war, in Christian commonwealths, hath a long time proceeded from a difficulty... of obeying at once both God and man, then when their commands

are one contrary to the other” (Hobbes (1994): 398). In order to address political anarchy Hobbes must manipulate a notion of faith to dissolve the conflict that most frequently leads to political paralysis. We all know the punch line, of course. By writing that, “All that is necessary to salvation is contained in two virtues: faith in Christ, and obedience to laws” (Hobbes (1994): 398), he effectively flattens the possible sites for conflict. Obedience to God’s laws becomes coextensive with obedience to the sovereign. Hobbes stresses the nature of the knowledge we have of scripture. “It is manifest, therefore, that Christian men do not know, but only believe that Scripture is the word of God” (Hobbes (1994): 401). The authority of the Bible is therefore not the domain of knowledge, but faith—trust in a person, as Hobbes explains (Hobbes (1994): 36). In so doing, faith moves from a public claim to a private or idiosyncratic one. Since we do not have direct access the Bible’s message, we are left to take it on faith, as it were.

Annette Baier comes closest to acknowledging the contribution of Hobbesian faith to political theory.

Faith, Hobbes tells us ‘is in the man, Beleeffe both of the man and of the truth of what he says.’ It is faith in its Hobbesian sense, in men, not merely belief in the truth of what they say which I shall argue is the only “substance” of the hoped-for cooperation which avoids futility and self destructiveness of its alternatives. (Baier (1980): 134)

Her aim here is to construct an argument for “secular faith” which is “faith in the human community and its evolving procedures” and is constituted through, “a community of just persons” (Baier (1980): 133). Baier wants to argue that political membership must be anchored by a faith in each other, as moral agents who strive for harmonious living.

As the just man *now*, in an unjust world, has no certainty, only faith and hope, that there really can and will be a just society of the living, so, in any apparently attained just society, that is in one with just institutions, its members will rely on the faith and hope that they could if necessary act for a mere idea, and so that they really qualify for membership. A new variant of Hobbesian faith in man will be needed. Both in the absence and in the presence of an actual just society, then, the just will live by faith. (Baier (1980): 148)

It is true that for Hobbes faith does not directly regard belief in the justness of others, but his schema is largely similar to that Baier has in mind. Hobbesian faith

already serves, not only generate political justification through membership in common institutions, but also to construct the foundation of the political order. What Baier picks up (without even knowing it, possibly) is the conceptual drift that Hobbes employs to move faith from a belief in individuals, to that same instantiation of belief, now in light of institutional practices. Hobbes's faith is actually more ambitious than what Baier proposes as it encompasses both citizens and the institutional milieu they inhabit.

Faith is an expectation *in people* rendered in light of social practices according to Hobbes. It is not simply an expectation of outcomes, but of the rectitude of others, warranted due to education, political institutions, and social conditioning. Faith is contextually variant like affective trust—a “gift of God”—insofar as it is a function of social context.<sup>6</sup> Hobbes' epistemology makes way for a form of trust which is not individuated as is particular trust. Such trust is a learned expectation throughout one's life, causing one to trust in some more and less in others, in some contexts and not others.

Yet this construction is not that of a social norm in Lewis or Bicchieri's sense. Hobbes makes no reference to  $n^{th}$ -order beliefs, though it is not far off to say that he is working with conditional preferences all the way down the line. Moreover, it is not clear what role sentiment plays in this notion of faith. His account is particularly interesting for the ways it straddles the different approaches to trust on offer. At first it might seem like Hobbes' faith is contextually grounded, thereby indicating greater similarity with affective than general trust. His project is ultimately totalizing, however, so ultimately “those that are by the Law allowed and appointed to Teach us” are those authorized directly by the sovereign (Hobbes (1994): 401). In practice, then, I might imagine Hobbes to be totally agnostic between the two approaches. If the Leviathan's sovereignty becomes uniformly effective, trust will de facto become context-invariant. Because of this total authority, such faith provides an overriding reason to trust particular people too. Hobbes just doesn't think even fools might be persuaded to break their commitments. Still, his attention to the way in which expectations can be endowed *in people*, and the mechanistic process

---

<sup>6</sup>An interesting sidebar to this discussion is the debate regarding whether Hobbes' epistemology is subjectivist or projectivist. If Hobbes is a subjectivist it might be the case that faith is merely the imputation of trust given an apparent background, but that the whole account is internal to me—you merely appear to me as trustworthy. Stephen Darwall, however, argues that Hobbes is a projectivist entailing that one would project trustworthiness on to another given one's contextual background. Upon this telling, Hobbes would endorse an account of trust that is assigned to the person, that is I perceive her to actually be trustworthy. This squares better with my account that attempts to construct affective trust as constituted by the outside world (Darwall (2000)).

that he identifies as generating those expectations, leads me to believe that he would endorse the efficacy of an affective account of trust outside the domain of the Hobbesian commonwealth.

Indeed, in most respects we don't read Hobbes because we want a "how to" manual for constructing authoritarian regimes, but because of the insight he offers regarding the ways a political puzzle might potentially fit together. As such, his attention to the epistemic contours of faith provides a crucial intervention in the reading of *Leviathan*. It's not a secret that Hobbes spends half the work undertaking a gloss of a Christian politics, but it is hard to see what a contemporary reader ought to make of such an exercise. Placing faith in this relief, it becomes evident how integral the latter half is to the former. That is, the analytic and religio-social projects are hard-wired together. Hobbes argues that the sovereignty of God is passed from Moses to Christ to the Apostles. Transmission is done through covenanting, first through the covenant at Sinai, then Christ as the Angel of the Covenant, and finally through the covenant of baptism (Hobbes (1994): 259, 269, 273). The covenant is the process by which God generates voluntary consent, "for God accepteth not a forced, but a willing obedience" (Hobbes (1994): 388). This process of covenanting, between the members of the Church of Christ and God is the same as that in the secular commonwealth, though, as Hobbes says "the church, if it be one person, is the same thing with a commonwealth of Christians, called a *commonwealth* because it consisteth of men united in one person, their sovereign; and a *church*, because it consisteth in Christian men united in one Christian sovereign" (Hobbes (1994): 260). Any political body comprised of Christians that is united under one sovereign is itself a church.<sup>7</sup>

Hobbes' political covenant, the one on full display in chapter seventeen, is never intended to be taken as a purely ideal construct. Even in part one, keeping the covenant is referred to as "keeping of a promise, or faith" and violating the covenant a "violation of faith" (Hobbes (1994): 260). The covenant is an agreement to execute an action at the moment in expectation of cooperation at some later time. By assuming an imagined position in which everyone set down her arms on the condition others set down theirs the covenant in chapter seventeen works magically to effect a social contract to which all people consent. While no moment of covenanting ever transpired, we might all imagine sitting around on our hands

---

<sup>7</sup>Compare, for purposes of illustration, the portrait of the sovereign on the title page of the Head Edition of *Leviathan* with Galatians 3:28, "There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free man, there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus."

waiting for the last person to agree to the terms of the covenant (and abstaining from a breach as not to violate faith). But to assume that position, to read the remedy in that way, completely obscures the full effect of the Hobbesian project here. As I have explained it, abiding by the terms of the covenant comes to be an act of faith.

The trust on which we rely, the faith that we have in others, can seem ethereal in the abstract, though it abounds in practice. Christians, devout in their zeal, experience faith every day of their lives. Their status in the Church of Christ is justified in that faith. And it is that faith that generates their consent to God's rule in "willing obedience." But faith is a gift. It is not an a priori truth of the world, but constructed socially, institutionally, and eventually politically. It comes through hearing and moving through an extant social space. What Hobbes reveals in part three is that the commonwealth is held together in part by faith. It is not enough for citizens to imagine themselves armchair philosophers, acknowledging the analytic truth of Hobbes' meticulously crafted syllogism in parts one and two. In order for politics to cohere, citizens must have faith. Faith in each other and faith in the sovereign. Faith that others will keep to the covenant, and faith that they are being lead by an ambassador of God. Faith acts as a social-epistemic means of generating consent to the power of the state, deploying Christian faith to incorporate believers and unbelievers alike.

This can help explain the confusion arising from Hobbes' use of "covenant" rather than "contract" to describe the foundational political bond. Curley, for one, struggles to explain why Hobbes employs a device that entails non-simultaneous execution, wondering aloud if the Fool is indeed foolish (Hobbes (1994): xxvi). But if the bond is imagined, why not *contract* to authorize and give up one's right of governing at the moment all others do too? I argue that Hobbes deploys the concept of covenant in order to co-opt Christian commitments in service of the state, and to seed that same zeal among all its subjects towards political ends.

But this also explains why Hobbes waits until the end of part three to tout the political efficacy of faith. Rather than a pious embrace of metaphysics, faith provides order to society by producing common, contextually held terms of justification. Much like accounts of Smith and Machiavelli above, Hobbes argues that social cohesion generates faith, which then feeds back to produce greater social and political cohesion. In an ironic twist, it turns out that Hobbes' project bootstraps preexisting institutions to effect his renewed project of "let us make man" (Hobbes (1994): 4). Literarily, Hobbes could not have introduced these arguments at the start of the work, since the reader lacks the necessary argument to buy into the

commitments of Hobbesian civil faith at that point. It is only after after establishing the analytic arguments that he can address Christian opposition, reconceptualizing faith in the process.

While Machiavelli sees that faith can be manipulated in the service of political order, Hobbes goes further, running faith directly into the ordering of politics. The same impulse that motivates reliance on God now moves people to construct the political order. At once he defangs Christian zealotry, indicating that “to believe that *Jesus is the Christ* is faith sufficient to the obtaining of life [everlasting]” (Hobbes (1994): 404), and also diverts that faith towards the ends of political consent. Insofar as the commonwealth is the Church, faith in Christ is consent of the governed.

Hobbes and Baier remind us that faith communities, either religious or secular in kind, are useful sites to study trust. Religious societies excel at constructing a context that allows members to “hear” in Hobbes’ sense. They present both formal and informal institutions that require great commitment of their members, shaping and constraining the practices which emerge from the community. Mormon missionaries commonly attend church weekly as children, attend seminary classes during release time in high school, and are taught scripture through weekly readings in their homes with family. This is the faith to which Hobbes refers, the faith in God which appears simply obvious in the presence of such interlocking civil institutions. Faith in these communities is not reserved just for God, but religious and lay leaders alike. The structure of the religious communities constrains and constructs the trust they exhibit, justifying these communities and the actions of their members (Hobbes (1994): 408). In undermining Christian objections of persecution with an account of faith through grace, Hobbes demonstrates the latent political potential of faith as a means of endogenously generating social solidarity.

#### 4.4 Conclusion

Affective trust is a particular example of the kind of sentimental feature that theorists of sentimental politics argue ought to be reintroduced to political theory. And consistent with this trove of theory that has been examined in roughly the last decade, I don’t argue that affective trust is either necessary or sufficient to constructing a political order. Rather I want to identify its political potential.

Beginning with Smith, I note that empathy and trust work in tandem, allowing us to explore the epistemic contours of the social world. Empathy brings us outside ourselves, allowing us to feel and care for others. Trust indicates reciprocity, that

others take us to share their moral and ethical commitments. This mode of trust generates expectations of others in virtue of considerations that outstrip the evidence at hand. Machiavelli and Smith both maintain that we come to trust leaders, and ultimately God, because of the way social order directs us to. In the case of God, Smith thinks that we are lead to believe in the necessity of justice, though we come to acknowledge that we lack the ability to effect such order ourselves. We thus posit a perfect impartial spectator that comes to reconcile these disparities. Trust in our leaders and faith in God are generated by the same set of impulses. They are constructed to fill social and ethical lacunae that we have been conditioned to anticipate.

While Machiavelli acknowledges the role of faith in generating greater political solidarity, Hobbes advocates for more ambitious possibilities. Part three of *Leviathan* comes to run his political project together with Christianity. He argues that the church is a Christian commonwealth with the earthly sovereign as God's messenger. In so doing, Hobbes inserts faith directly into the center of his political project. Faith serves both as the means of consenting to the authority of God and binding citizens to the state. At once he argues for a minimal and maximal role for faith in politics. Minimally, faith requires nothing more of Christians than to acknowledge that Christ is the messenger of God. These commitments direct them to take on no further actions on behalf of their faith. Maximally however, faith is revealed to entail those commitments that we take, and expectations we maintain, which result from the coherence of the extant civil institutions—the rules and beliefs we come to adopt in light of instruction we receive at home, in school, and in church. According to Hobbes, these expectations are not ancillary, but lie at the core of his social contract theory.

Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Smith all provide lenses through which we can identify the political upshots of affective trust as a mechanism to generate civil solidarity. While none construct the concept precisely as I do, their considerations are generative of the kind of political role affective trust might occupy. None of the theorists identify social norms as I have to motivate their accounts of trust and faith. But they provide facets of the concept I argue for, which help to locate affective trust in the tradition of political theory. My primary argument in this chapter is that affective trust—a warm expectation that others will act cooperatively in light of extant social norms or institutional rules—carries many of the political properties that motivate political cohesion. Each of the theorists I have considered identify a generative feedback process by which extant social order yields greater camaraderie by way of

the affective bonds of trust. In the following chapter I examine how the cohesive properties of trust manifest in the world by reflecting a series of semi-structured interviews that I conducted with Christian missionaries.



## CHAPTER V

### **Affective Trust in the Field: Missionaries' Faith**

#### ABSTRACT

In this chapter I explore an illustrative case study that sheds light on the manifestation of affective trust in the world. I report on my conversations with Christian missionaries of varying denominational backgrounds to better understand how it is that they came to trust others while working abroad. Though this meditation does not claim to validate the theory, it does seek to illustrate the role that institutions and particularly social norms play in the formation of trust. It serves as a means of establishing the theory's plausibility, demonstrating that the account I sketch out resonates with the experiences of others who have occupied situations of uncertainty, while also laying out potential avenues to further test the theory empirically. I find that missionaries can come to selectively trust others in these uncertain situations, and that they do so in light of socially normative cultural cues. I conclude by remarking on the parallels between the faith missionaries place in God and the trust they come to have in others.

Juan Rogel, a Jesuit missionary from Spain sent a dispatch to the Holy See regarding his work in La Florida in 1568. "I never saw the vice of theft and if they [the native Americans] do anything bad it's because the Spaniards taught them such. They do no evil to those who do good to them. I feel secure among them" (Cushner (2006): 45). Rogel was serving as part of a Spanish delegation of missionaries, ostensibly deployed to acculturate the population of the New World to their aspiring Spanish hegemony. That is not how he saw himself, however. He considered himself a spiritual messenger sent to spread the word of Christ, conquistadors be damned.

He felt more at ease with the unconverted than with the brutish Christian soldiers providing his security. And this despite that, not two years earlier, one of his fellow churchmen along with five escorts were killed upon coming ashore to ask directions (Cushner (2006): 32). Rogel realized it was rough neighborhood, but it didn't seem to shake him. His disposition is curious. What can explain why Rogel trusts the presumptive out-group more than members of his nominal in-group?

It is easy to write off the religiously pious like Rogel as simple or half-witted. A common trope is expressed in some of Machiavelli's writings, for instance. While in the last chapter I showed that he finds utility in religious faith, he clearly expresses a skeptical voice too. He famously advocates that a prince feign piety to inspire his (gullible) subjects (Machiavelli (1998): 70). And he continues to mock religion in his play *Mandragola* where the wily protagonist conspires to hook-up with a married Lucrezia by deploying a phony priest to dupe her, her mother, and her husband—the pious come off just as gullible as they are earnest.

As a practical matter, however, it's just not possible to defend the naive portrait of the pious as particularly dull or irrational. And though one might be inclined to argue that religion is just beyond the ken of academic study for such reasons, there is a growing interest in the systematic study of political religion which resists precisely this contention. For one, there is considerable work showing that religion is just an ordinary domain of social and political life. The existing scholarship has identified the ways that costly barriers to entry diminish the rate of attrition (Iannaccone (1988), Grzymala-Busse (2012a)) while religious competition leads to enfranchising marginal political groups (Grzymala-Busse (2013), Trejo (2009), Woodberry (2012), Smith (2011)). Highlighting its importance, scholars such as Anna Grzymala-Busse and Anthony Gill gleefully point out that the tale of a world hurdling towards a secular consensus is laughably wrong (Grzymala-Busse (2012b), Gill (2001)). The efficacy of the political voice of American Evangelical Christians, the emergence of radical Islamic resistance movements across the Middle East, and the recent political struggle of the *Ichwan* (Muslim Brotherhood) and Muhammad Morsi in Egypt are all reminders that Locke's *Letter* did not decisively disentangle religion and politics. The study of political religion focuses on how religions, like other social movements, impose doctrinal and ritual rules on their members, which structure the routines of its members, as does any institution. Of course, neither of these observations is terribly new. As I argued in the previous chapter, both Machiavelli and Hobbes were already attentive to the ways that religion itself serves

as a (often competing) site of politics.<sup>1</sup>

As such, the experiences of the missionaries with whom I spoke can offer us portrayals of a ubiquitous epistemic feature of affective trust, albeit elicited under unusual circumstances. And though I don't go so far as to argue that this study validates the theory I offer, it does bring the claims I make into focus. Only a suitable contrast case could hope demonstrate the theory's validity. Instead, this case study looks to a particular group of individuals to explore and portray how they report their experiences of trust. I have spoken with twenty six Christian missionaries from the United States who have served on mission abroad. The impulse for this was two-fold. First, I was interested in examining a group of individuals who were motivated to trust others whom they did not previously know, absent the background information that one might normally take for granted. Particular trust argues that trust entails expectations derived in light of individuated information. But the absence of such contextual familiarity in this case makes it harder to sustain that account. I view this sample as paradigmatic. The cultural shock that these individuals experience upon going abroad can help to better identify the role that social norms play in the construction of our beliefs under ordinary circumstances. My argument is that we commonly look to such norms to generate trust, it's just more easily observed among missionaries that serve abroad who lack access to ordinary background information. Second, I had intended to account for the ways in which the institutional rules of varying Christian denominations conditioned people's trust in different manners. My hope was to tell a decisively institutional story for the generation of trust by explaining how the variation of religious doctrine and practice altered the manner and means by which one comes to trust.

While I continued to gather reports from Christian missionaries, I found that it was not possible to pursue the second avenue of inquiry here. For one, the prospect of identifying and isolating the precise determinants of one's religious affiliation that affect the propensity to trust became daunting. Any sample, particularly those of small-N, exhibit such heterogeneity as to make it extremely difficult to know that the dimensions I might identify are the truly salient ones. The larger impediment, however, was the doctrinal similarity among subjects and the role differentiation between denominations. Catholic missionaries whom I met had spent decades abroad as nuns in an orphanage or nurses in hospital. While their roles were

---

<sup>1</sup>Indeed even Machiavelli nods to the savvy of religious actors when, at the end of *Mandragola*, Sostrata, Lucrezia's mother, thinks out loud and, giving a nod and a wink to being in on the gag, asks "Who wouldn't be happy [with the play's resolution]?" (Machiavelli (1981): 54).

religiously informed, their primary responsibility was to serve in a professional capacity. Evangelical missionaries, in contrast, are more loosely coordinated than either Catholics or Mormons. YWAM, or Youth With a Mission, sends tens of thousands of volunteers abroad as community builders (e.g. teaching English, irrigation, or farming, all on an ad hoc basis). Mormons hew the closest to the naive take on a missionary's role. They go out in the field for either 18 months or two years and knock on doors (otherwise known as "tracting") spreading what they believe to be the gospel of Jesus Christ. Clearly a nun who has served 40 years as a physician in Central Africa will have very different reflections of trusting "foreign" strangers than will a 21 year old Mormon woman sent to the Philippines for a year and a half.

An equally flummoxing problem turned out to be the doctrinal similarity among the missionaries with whom I spoke. Though we oughtn't expect totally uniform practice in any religion, we do observe strong regularities among religious denominations that can inform our understanding of members' behaviors and attitudes. To this end the Pew "U.S. Religious Landscape Survey" of 2008 provides systematic data on the regularities that exist in these communities. Using a representative sample of 35,000 Americans, the study probes how different religious denominations practice in distinctive ways. Remaining agnostic whether regularity in the data marks sectarian orthodoxy, I identified roughly two dozen dimensions on which Catholics, Evangelical Protestants, and Mormons systematically diverged. These dimensions mainly fell into two categories: belief in an active or a passive God, and high versus low social closure, that is whether denominational members frequently associate with non-members.<sup>2</sup> In practice I could not find divergence between missionaries' responses to these prompts.

For eighteen of twenty six participants I asked specific questions regarding their theology and social practices, which I drew from the 2008 Pew study. I was interested in ascertaining the diversity of doxa and praxis among my sample, but for better or worse, there was nearly no variation. This was in part because the sample was small, but in part because those who go on mission are all high-commitment community members. I spoke to no one who went on mission after only recently joining their respective church. Nearly everyone exhibited a high degree of theological similarity and social closure. All but three of the interviewees

---

<sup>2</sup>"[Social] closure refers to processes of drawing boundaries, constructing identities, and building communities in order to monopolize scarce resources for one's own group, thereby excluding others from using them" (Mackert (2012)).

attend church every week, and have done so for much of their lives. All but one still identified with the movements with which they went on mission, and all expressed a belief in God with high certainty and pray at least daily, most so frequently they could not specify a number. Even the most heterodox member of my sample, the one individual with whom I spoke that no longer affiliates with an organized church, is still a devout theist. On the cultural end, their responses were largely consistent too. Thirteen of eighteen did not participate in church clubs, and the sample was nearly split regarding whether they would send their children to public or private schools. No one responded strongly to the question, with many indicating that it would turn on the quality of the available education. The sample just didn't elicit the variation necessary to construct the kind of inquiry I had intended.

Instead the account I provide offers three means of building out the theory of affective trust. The first substantive contribution of this chapter is to demonstrate the plausibility of affective trust's empirical validity. It's a bad habit of theorists to author accounts of some concept, be it justice or love, without exploring whether the descriptive properties are borne out in the world. We likely all possess some coherent but idiosyncratic notions, which ultimately fail to generalize because others don't experience the world as we do or attendant facts in the world make the claims unlikely or even impossible (Wiens (2015)). By examining the reports of Christian missionaries I hope to demonstrate that there is at least plausible evidence that the theory I offer is empirically valid.

The second purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the properties of affective trust as it appears in the world. While conceptual work can articulate a set of clear distinctions between categories, it is then useful to point to phenomenon in the world to identify its observed correlates. To say that affective trust is distinguished from particular trust due to the role social norms play in motivating the attitude is meaningful, but ultimately unhelpful if we don't know how to identify the attitude as people discuss it or how to point to a particular practice as a social norm. Indeed the undertaking is not a straightforward one. Experimental settings are ideal for artificially manipulating the intended intervention, such as a social norm, but the results lack external validity. Observational settings are more challenging, though clearly important as ultimately all our social scientific theories are borne out *in vivo*. In this chapter I seek to point to specific aspects of the participants' responses in order to identify how my theory corresponds to our observations of the world.

The final contribution of the chapter is to suggest testable means by which this research might be advanced. Reflecting on observational data such as these can

provide suggestions of what to look for when pursuing causal empirical research. One of the important observational upshots of these interviews, for instance, is that the boundaries of affective trust are not clean. While I argue that affective trust is a distinct attitude, I never claim that it must operate apart from particular or general trust. Indeed, frequently the mechanisms that bring about trust occur simultaneously—one might possess a high degree of general trust, but also have context specific information about a particular individual, both necessary but neither sufficient to bring about trust in that specific case. Here too the individuals with whom I spoke possess a high degree of general trust, though their work is also facilitated by affective trust. Using this case study of semi-structured interviews allows me to identify candidate markers that we might interrogate further to distinguish affective trust from complementary accounts, while being mindful of the ways in which the concepts inevitably overlap.

In analyzing more than two dozen semi-structured interviews I point to the importance of identifiable and resonant social norms in generating affective trust. I point to the ways in which trust is (and is not) effective in forging bonds between otherwise loosely affiliated individuals, shedding light on the kind of work we might hope trust to accomplish. These accounts indicate the plausibility of the theory I offer, illustrate its purchase, and identify potential future avenues of inquiry. So while I cannot validate the theory using these tools, I can place substantive observational meat on the theoretical bones laid out in previous chapters.

### *5.1 Trusting Under Uncertainty*

I have so far argued that affective trust is a warm expectation that others will act cooperatively, informed by social norms. In this way, even though one might not know anything of a potential trustee (i.e. lacking relevant information about her appropriateness or capacity for some task) one might still trust her. This can be explained by the identification of social norms that create environments in which actors can be anticipated to have similar preferences. A norm conveys the existence of a contingent preference that one act in accord with some rule, so long as some minimum number of others do as well. In this way, not only might I expect others have reason to conform to the rule, but indeed that they prefer to do so. Thus for a particular set of possible actions one might take in a situation, a norm gives priority to some over others.

The identification of a norm seeds both a conditional preference to act in accord

with the rule and an expectation about another's willingness to conform. A norm for generosity, say, conveys something about her willingness to sacrifice for the sake of Paretian considerations. As I argue in chapter two, this process generates not only expectations, but emotional dispositions that lead one to feel warmth to those who conform to the norms one does, and indignation upon violation. As a higher order matter, one also expects that other members of *P* will hold each to the norm, entailing that both conducting oneself in accord with the norm, and one's expectations deriving from that conduct, are broadly socially justified. (So even if one were stiffed, others could still be anticipated to think that acting in accord with the rule was "the right thing to have done.") This sense of warrant leads one to render second-personal claims as well as reactive attitudes when another disappoints. Knowing that a norm exists in a context doesn't just provide you with an expectation regarding the comportment of others, it also gives you an independent reason to conform to that norm. That's what is meant by a "conditional" preference. Conditional on everyone else not littering in the park, for example, you yourself prefer not to litter as well.

To show the plausibility of my theory, I want to identify each of the eight components of affective trust from chapter three where I define trust as a

- warm
- expectation that
- others
- will act
- cooperatively
- in light of extant social norms,
- while violation of the expectation
- is apt to elicit reactive attitudes

This proves to be difficult in practice. While one or another element might not be evident in a particular interaction, the theory posits that each is present, though possibly unobservable. Though the missionaries with whom I spoke were exceedingly thoughtful and reflective about their time abroad, their responses were not crafted to conform to my theory. They often discuss trust, but without reference to a specific act, or they identified the salience of social or cultural norms, but did not explicitly associate those practices with their attitude of trust. My task is to synthesize their reports and identify the degree to which these accounts conform to my theory, though there is no uniform procedure for doing so. I should add, however, that this

messiness muddies the plausibility of competing accounts as well. Insofar as all the candidate theories on the table entail an expectation of the actions of others, for instance, the difficulty of identifying these associations is just as much a problem for my theory as for others. As I have noted above, however, I hope that the regularities of the account I provide in this chapter indicate the plausibility of the theory, while problematizing the tractability of competing theories in information-scarce contexts.

As I write above, I chose to speak with Christian missionaries because of the vulnerability that they assume for the sake of religion. Trust in a very broad sense is an expectation that others will act cooperatively, that others can be relied upon without harm coming to the truster. Missionaries, by virtue of their roles, are forced to trust those around them. Unlike most interactions however, they lack many of the common cooperation-inducing devices that might typically explain such behavior (e.g. Henrich and Henrich (2007), chapters 6 and 7). While in the prior chapter I moved to distinguish affective from general trust, here I primarily move to distinguish it from particular trust. General trust is meant to explain an aggregate phenomenon, the default level at which people are willing to rely on others. As I have noted, it does not explain within case variation. General trust doesn't explain why a person's trust varies between distinct contexts, as in the reports of missionaries I discuss. At issue in this chapter is whether affective trust can explain behavior that particular trust cannot. Particular trust entails that there exists individuated information about a trustee that would lead one to trust her. Aside from her personal proclivities, for fidelity say, there might be reputational costs or sanctioning mechanisms that would lead one to believe that she is more likely to cooperate than not. By selecting a context in which subjects lack access to such devices—reputations don't matter to missionaries who change their stake every two to four months—I hope to isolate the affective and socially normative aspect of trust from its individuated elements.

At this point I want to call out a nettlesome and confusing strategy employed by rational choice theorists who argue for particular trust. While I claim that social norms produce affective trust, competing advocates might argue that social norms are merely informational signals that are broadcast over some context  $Q$ , and thus affective trust just a special case of their theory. And, they might add, while it may seem like there are no reputational costs to norm violators, indeed there may exist audience costs for those who exploit missionaries. Aside from the implausible task of digesting all relevant situational information, these moves are old saws and mostly irritating because they are thrown around so casually. Don Herzog, for



instance, has written convincingly that you can't have a good theory that does all its work post hoc (Herzog (2000)). In the sample arguments above that would entail describing exactly what those costs look like on a case by case basis. Such theory argues that people are rational, but the post facto work just generates rationality by construction. Unless advocates of particular trust can articulate the informational fungibility between social norms and individuated information, the burden remains on them to claim that social norms are just another kind of information.

This objection is in addition to the worry I outline in the introduction that particular trust lacks clear observational support. Indeed, were particular trust the primary explanation for the phenomenon of context-variable trust one should imagine it to be far more fluid than it is. A knife-edged model like Coleman's would indicate that we ought to observe trust being extended and withdrawn as swiftly as the sun might dart between the clouds. My account of affective trust explains why trust should be as stable as it is within a given context. With those chalk lines drawn, I will contrast my view of affective trust to that of particular trust in the discussion of my analysis of the data (section 5.3.4) to better mark the distinctions between the theories. My aim here is to track how the eight criteria listed above come to favor my account of over competing proposals.

## *5.2 Case Selection and Procedure*

Using snowball sampling, I reached out to a group of more than two dozen American Christian missionaries who worked abroad. Though in some sense all motivated by the verse from Matthew (28:19-20) which admonishes Christians to evangelize, each has a distinct reflection on their work abroad, and each came to elicit trust differently. I elected to study missionaries that served abroad in order to understand how one might form relationships and trust, absent a deep personal or cultural knowledge. So while these U.S. Christians were very familiar with cultural rules in the States, I hoped to better understand how they elicited trust when they were without such contextual knowledge. As mentioned above, I understand their experiences of trust to be common to everyday life. I primarily selected the case because I believe affective trust to be especially identifiable under these circumstances. Every missionary with whom I spoke talked of distinctions between the communities in which they worked and those they were familiar with back home. Most worked in non-OECD countries, though others worked with immigrant communities in Western Europe. Ironically (though not entirely unexpectedly) missionaries who

worked with white populations in OECD contexts had some of the most difficult time developing relationships with those to whom they sought to reach out.

### 5.2.1 *The Worry of Cultural Imperialism*

Their stories were not of those of *The Poisonwood Bible*. They don't see themselves as going abroad to civilize the local population. Though there are doubtless imperialist concerns that underlie the practice of missionizing in lower income areas of the world, the men and women who go abroad see themselves as being sensitive to the culture they join. LT, an evangelical missionary in Turkey, was particularly keen on serving God in pursuit of cultural exchange. She noted that culture plays a large part in one's faith and, as a result, a church in one part of the world will likely look very different than that in another. While she was interested in traveling to experience and observe different cultures, she was also mindful to avoid the paternalism that could result from such tourism. While LT spoke to this most directly, others described the comfort they felt while abroad and indicated their identification with the local communities. Multiple times I heard that missionaries were complemented by being told "you are more like us than American." Indeed, this sensibility is not unexpected given that the ethos of unity with co-religionists (or potential co-religionists) is deeply ingrained in Christianity going back at least as far as the Pauline dictum from Galatians (3:28): There is neither Jew nor Gentile, neither slave nor free, nor is there male and female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus.

My study is neither meant to endorse nor inoculate missionary practice from such real criticisms. Instead my accounts of earnest missionaries seek to convey the honesty of their encounters. The people with whom I spoke were thoughtful, kind, dedicated, and devout. They did not view their service abroad as a means of enriching themselves or subverting the cultural values of vulnerable populations. Indeed, they sought to build relationships with others across a wide swath of cultural, ethnic, and racial backgrounds in order to help people self-actualize (as they understood it). While they all believed that people would be better for accepting Christ in their lives and being baptized in their particular church, many were frank that this was not their primary objective. For starters, few of them were successful at baptizing large numbers of non-Christians. Five to ten families in the course of a Mormon mission would have been a huge success—out of the possibly hundreds of people with whom they would interact. Many see their work as primarily one of grassroots education.

A secondary goal of mission is doubtless to instill religious conviction in the individual through the practice of preaching. I asked RH, a Mormon missionary, whether she thought mission served to do more good for the missionary or the missionized. She responded that both aspects were a part of the service, though she still believed the evangelical aspect of her work to be primary. That being said, she did not think that most of her engagement would directly bring people to be baptized in the LDS Church. Instead much of what she and her colleagues would do was in pursuit of a cultural exchange, where she might teach and be taught about God.

I spoke with another Evangelical man who echoed some of these sentiments. TR went to Jarabacoa in the Dominican Republic and remained there for twelve years; five of his six children were born in the DR. He told me that he was not initially accepted by the local community, and that at first he did not preach either. He saw his mission as one of building relationships with the local community and spreading the light of Christ. He had an animal bank where locals could borrow livestock and a garden that produced food. Eventually people came up to his wife and him asking why they were in Jarabacoa that would spark longer conversations. He saw himself as a model that one might look to in order to live a Christian life. Eventually 20% of the town of 500 “became Christians” (a term Evangelicals often use to describe one accepting a Protestant theology), he told me. (Though I was not clear what marked the transition to becoming Christian or how the figure was determined.) He thought that one didn’t need to preach in order to evangelize. Living in “a way that is inclusive” is enough to successfully spread the gospel. Contrary to RH, TR was apparently successful at winning converts for his faith. Both their methods, however, were similar. Build relationships, start conversations, and eventually people will be drawn in. Their reports were typical of others who described the experience as one of planting seeds that would later flower with the intervention of others.

Maybe it is a bit nefarious and underhanded. You come to an impoverished community as a (comparably) wealth American and wait for people to come over to you and ask questions. If you’re patient enough you don’t need to preach on the street corners. The unconverted will come to you. That is doubtlessly true in some sense. The worry, however, does not obviate the question of how these missionaries are able to open themselves up to the risks they encountered and how that openness varied across contexts.

### 5.2.2 *Method of Contact and Interview Techniques*

I reached out to each contact over email asking for a phone conversation that I indicated would last between an hour and an hour and a half. My response rate was roughly 80%. I spoke with six evangelical missionaries, nineteen Mormon missionaries (one who no longer identifies with the church), and one Catholic. With each call I would begin by introducing myself and my project. I said that I was a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Michigan writing my dissertation on distinct understandings of trust. I mentioned that while it might be easy to understand why one would trust a third party vendor on Amazon.com in virtue of the numerous formal and informal guarantees the site makes, it is less obvious why we trust people we only know peripherally, where such institutional recourses are harder to identify. I had reached out to them, I remarked, in order to identify and understand how they developed trust with people whom they worked.

The interviews consisted of a formal survey and a semi-structured interview. I began by asking questions from the survey and then moved on to the interview. While as noted above, the results of the survey regarding belief and practice were not illuminating, there did exist greater heterogeneity on the matter of trust. While thirteen of twenty<sup>3</sup> answered that you can trust most people (when asked the canonical trust question from the General Social Survey), all but two said that most people were trustworthy, that is that most people are themselves disposed to act cooperatively (one of whom said that it depends). There was no indication that theology, cultural background, or denominational affiliation affected the expression of general trust in my sample, though they were a comparably trusting group to begin with (since, by way of contrast, only about one third of Americans answer affirmatively to whether they trust most people).

After completing the formal survey I moved on to conduct a semi-structured interview, recommended for process tracing (George and Bennett (2005)), which conforms to my effort to assess the theory's plausibility. I began by asking for their religious experiences growing up, and how it was that they decided to go on mission. Our conversations proceeded chronologically, for the most part, beginning from their experiences as young children, through adolescence and ultimately their late teens and early twenties, when each had made the decision to serve abroad. This decision looked different for Mormons than it did for the Evangelicals

---

<sup>3</sup>The additional two were those whom I asked the question to during the interview rather than in the survey portion.

I spoke with.<sup>4</sup> Mormons, particularly those who are disposed to go on mission, are embedded in communities in which doing so is a social norm. While it is not a requirement, it is strongly encouraged for men and admirable for women. I was told by a number of Mormons that roughly three in four men go on mission and one in four women. Not every Mormon subject was set on serving prior to their subsequent decision—RH, for instance, told me that she had intended on continuing studies towards a career in medicine until very shortly before she decided instead to go on mission—but all had been affiliated with communities in which this was the norm.<sup>5</sup> In contrast, though two of the evangelicals I spoke with went abroad to fulfill a college requirement, the other four were clearly acting “over and above” what was expected of them. They felt a call to serve abroad, but each (serving with YWAM) remarked that the context in which they worked was previously unfamiliar to them.

Following a discussion of the path these individuals took to go on mission, I proceeded to ask about their experience abroad. In the cases of Mormons these followed a clear trajectory. Following an online application, missionaries receive what is known as their “call” from the Church, which they believe to be a prophetic message where God reveals where he wishes them to serve. The call comes a few months before the beginning of service, at which time they go off to a Missionary Training Center (MTC for short, often the one in Provo, UT). After a period of six to nine weeks, depending on the difficulty of the language in which they were instructed, they would depart to their destinations. Men would spend a total of twenty four month on mission, while women spend eighteen months. Upon arrival they are paired with a senior companion who serves as their trainer, instructing them on tactics and logistics. Mormons are commonly known for tracting, but that is not effective in all regions, and actually against the law in some (e.g. France). Alternatively, Mormon missionaries will engage people in a public space, such as a park or a square, or will use member referrals to find potential investigators.<sup>6</sup> Missionaries will also occasionally make contact with individuals or families who have distanced themselves from the Church for one reason or another. Local churches keep detailed records of affiliated members and investigators, so it is straightforward to contact those that have been absent for a time. Missions are

---

<sup>4</sup>Because of the formalization and duration of Catholic missions, only one member of my sample was Catholic.

<sup>5</sup>Where  $p_m \in P$  is the 3/4 of men that go on mission and  $p_w \in P$  is the 1/4 of women that go on mission.

<sup>6</sup>The term Mormons used to identify those who sought to learn more about LDS Christianity.

broken up into zones of roughly ten to twenty missionaries, and zones are broken into districts of four to eight missionaries. The size of the districts varies widely from a few blocks in a dense city, to a few miles across in rural areas. Mormon missionaries will move zones four or five times during their service.

Missionaries with YWAM with whom I spoke had very different experiences. Each decided for their own reasons that they would serve on mission abroad, and did not hew to a particular course. Each operated like a YWAM franchise, clearing their stake with the central offices, but proceeding as they saw fit. TR, for instance, began his work in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, but later decided to move to Jarabacoa. There he built a house and a small farm. When he first arrived he endeavored to build relationships with the local community. (The term “relationship” is one that came up frequently in my conversations with YWAMers, both with respect to their bonds with others as well as God. They would, for instance, distinguish between those who had a “relationship” with Christ and those who were merely “religious,” that is they identified with the faith, without making a costly commitment.) Another missionary, KN, served on a medical boat for a number of years, delivering medical aid to the DR. He then set up a mission in Santo Domingo, and would also travel to North African refugee camps on occasion to preach the gospel. JH, however, has spent more than two decades in a school he started in Namibia, evangelizing through community service. These experiences diverge distinctly from the comparably brief experiences of Mormons with whom I spoke.

After hearing how they came to serve, I asked them to walk me through the events of their mission. I wanted them to reconstruct their experiences and emotions from their time abroad. I asked what a common day might look like, and prompted them to guide me through the landscape that they encountered. What did the town look like? Where did people congregate? How close were residences to one another? How many hours of the day would they spend in conversation with others? I found that these questions moved interviewees to better remember their past. Rather than providing me with their reflections and narrativization of their experiences, they were able to recall specific details and feelings they had had while abroad.

After this conversation, I would probe on matters of trust directly. I inquired whether they had felt vulnerable or exposed on mission and discussed the precautions they took to protect themselves and avoid harm. Upon discussing their expectations and tolerances (which were rather risk accepting), I would focus the discussion on the concept of trust for which I advocate. Not wanting to bias re-

sponses, I held off offering my own account until late in the interview, at which point I would say that I had argued for a distinction between trust and reliance—reliance being the simple expectation that others would not cause them harm, while trust is a warm emotional expectation coupled with reliance—and ask if it made sense and tracked their experiences abroad. While many had stories that were evidence of trust, only a handful had stories which allowed them to reflect on both the forging and the rupturing of the attitude. By progressively focusing on the concept of affective trust I had in mind I hoped to understand the manifestation of trust without unduly distorting the sample's responses. At the end of the conversation I would thank participants and ask if there were others whom they knew that I might contact as well.

### *5.3 Mission and Risk Acceptance*

People want to adhere to a fine epistemic line when it comes to trust. While most respondents did not want to be baselessly mistrustful, they also didn't want to appear naive. You can see this in the divergence in their responses to questions relating to trust—their comparable skepticism given beliefs of others' general trustworthiness. This population was especially sensitive to this tension. They had all put themselves in a compromised situation where they knew little to nothing about the communities in which they were operating. To admit that they did not trust the people whom they were evangelizing would impugn their belief in God and his plan for them. I was repeatedly told by missionaries that they felt especially protected by God while on mission. If God had sent them on mission, he would protect them in the process. That being the case, all those to whom I spoke insisted that they were not naive about the risks that were posed. They all took some precautions in order to mitigate those risks, following the dictum that God protects those who protect themselves. In an effort to illustrate the elements of the theory I offer, this section relates the risks, confidence, and reactive attitudes of the missionaries with whom I spoke.

#### *5.3.1 Risks*

The risks of serving on mission, particularly in more remote locations of the world, were real. Though the vast majority of people are not hostile, missionaries occupied contexts in which poor state capacity made crime and violence more probable, while poor resources for the disabled put a number of people at risk with individuals

who were mentally ill. Those I spoke to wanted to protect themselves from these sorts of dangers, but did not want to appear mistrustful more generally. It was their responsibility to be forthcoming and engaging with investigators and potential converts. In unpacking this paradox, people commonly pointed to social norms and institutions, feelings of solidarity, and reliance on God as the means of securing them from harm.

When speaking to RW, a Mormon missionary who served in Albania and Wales between 1997-1999, you sense the incongruity of the risks and the rewards. He received his mission call when he was 18 years old and arrived in Albania at the beginning of 1997. This was a moment of severe political turmoil for Albania. The country was repressive, and fall of the Soviet Union destabilized the country's already weak political regime. The government of the newly liberalized economy endorsed financial products that were pyramid schemes. Large losses resulted when these products were ultimately devalued, exacerbating political dissatisfaction. By March of 1997 a civil war broke out which lasted ten days, and a new regime was installed.

Even though the Mormon missionaries were not targets of violence, they were at risk of being injured during the rioting and were asked by the U.S. State Department to evacuate. The missionaries in the country left by military helicopter to Italy. After only three weeks on the ground RW was reassigned to Wales for six months until the violence abated. Even upon returning to Albania there were still sporadic incidents of violence, though. He witnessed a man gunned down by a machine gun mounted to the back of Volvo while out training a newly minted missionary, just three days on the ground. There were areas you could just tell were bad, he said, but there were things he was willing to do in order to reach out to contacts that he would never do under normal circumstances. "Man, I would never to that [stuff] now."

RH told me another story that speaks to the risks that missionaries assume. Upon arriving in rural Brazil she found her senior companion to be a bit irreverent, uninterested in following the directions they had been given with terrible precision, aggravating RH's ability to adapt to her new environment. After a few days in her new station, she and her companion were approached by a man who presented himself as a Universalist minister. He offered to guide them around, and serve as a cultural interpreter showing them the layout of the town as well as explaining common voodoo rituals. He would find the women between their meetings and ask them questions, which they found to be welcome distractions.

Soon after, however, he showed up at their door asking about contemporary



prophecy (a sort of dog whistle for Mormon missionaries). It was already irregular to be approached at their home (on their day off, their “p-day” or preparation day, no less), but even more so because they lived behind two locked gates. He asked if he might be a prophet and told RH that he could name her siblings. Her companion came out to see what the stir was and, herself checked out and unexcited at the prospect of a new baptism, told the man he had to leave. Subsequently they found him waiting for them right as they left their apartment in the morning. He knew their schedule.

RH does not remember being particularly alarmed by these events, however. Her companion appeared to be unmoved and RH was still acclimating to the new environment, so she didn’t really have a good sense of what constituted the new normal. This, even after he slipped a note in their door with a letter addressing her companion’s siblings by name. Then, one day, upon returning to their apartment they found the mail and been piled in a neat stack with a house key lying atop. At that point both women freaked out and wrote their parents who promptly contacted the mission office. The two were relocated within days. RH later learned that the man had found the names of her companion’s siblings by reading letters sent by her family that had been thrown in the trash. They had a bone fide stalker.

Some of the risks they faced were more intentional. KN who missionized in refugee camps in North Africa indicated that he could have been attacked for proselytizing Muslims. KN is a clearly a gritty and strong willed fellow to begin with. Almost as an afterthought, he mentioned that while in the DR he and his family were taken hostage on another occasion during a bank robbery as well as burgled five times. His circumstances were undoubtedly extreme, but other missionaries who served in favelas of South America noted the generally high levels of crime that surrounded them regularly. There were more pedestrian concerns, like the time CO was almost gored by a buffalo, but others were also attacked by the mentally ill or just placed in compromised situations with members of the opposite sex.

But perhaps the most indicative story for my purposes was that of KW and EO, companions on the same island in the Philippines. On KW’s last day she was distraught at having to leave. She absolutely loved the Philippines and had come to particularly love this community. Before she left she went around to everyone she knew to wish them goodbye, insuring them that she would return. That night she and EO stayed up late into the night talking, waking early the next morning to depart to their new respective zones. As they looked around the apartment,

however, they saw that things were amiss—they couldn't locate their belongings. Sometime between 3 and 6 in the morning someone had pried their way into their apartment with a crow bar and robbed them, leaving only the equivalent of \$10 so they could make their way. KW was shaken by this. How could someone have done this to her? What if they have woken, what would the burglars have been willing to do them? Though these weren't common occurrences, the violence missionaries opened themselves up to was real, and their risks were elevated by being foreign to the communities in which they operated.

### 5.3.2 *Confidence and Pro-Sociality*

In the face of the risks that these missionaries bore, they repeatedly justified their confidence in two ways: God and culture. In at least nine of the twenty six interviews I conducted, unprompted, respondents identified God as a prime source for their confidence in others. Though they knew that there was the chance that harm could befall them, they remarked that they would receive protection from God or that the spiritual nature of their work would protect them from harm.

This protection subjects reported evidences the power that faith has in their lives, though it doesn't obviate the puzzle of where trust comes from. As more than one person identified, the confidence that God gave them allowed them to rely on others—to anticipate that they would be spared from harm—but did not effect trust as I understand it, as characterized by warm feelings towards others. Their holy mission gave them confidence to do their work, but doesn't explain the emotional relationships that they could develop with others. More concretely, though, even though the missionaries are firm believers in God, they were quick to concede that harm *could* befall them. This kind of general trust that they felt God endowed them doesn't explain the variation in their experience of trust, however. KW, for instance, explicitly remarked that she felt as in a protective bubble, as God was protecting her. After discussing the break in, however she pivoted slightly noting that as a result of the incident she became more street smart and didn't relax as much as she had, even though she still believed that God was protecting her.

The process of acclimating to life as a missionary was not easy for KW. She hated the MTC and her mother was horribly upset to be without her. And though she had studied anthropology in university and was excited to go abroad and learn a new culture, she found it difficult to connect with people initially. Her companion was Filipina, but quiet, which inhibited KW from expressing herself. It was also hard for her to be at ease while trying to sell religion to others, it didn't

feel natural. She felt like she wasn't herself anymore. KW decided she would just start talking to strangers on jitneys and not worry about whether she stayed on message. It was at that point that she began to warm to the culture. She had done extensive backpacking but she remarked that there was no better way of learning a culture and getting to know people than through missionary work. People were extremely friendly to her and one another (an observation reiterated by two others I spoke with who served in the Philippines) and over time she came to absorb the culture. One funny story she told (apropos of Henrich et al. (2001)) was that a U.S. companion yelled at her for repeatedly eating her food from the fridge. It took KW a moment to figure out what rule she had broken, only to realize that she had imbibed the local norm of sharing, one decidedly un-American. Over time, she remarked, she had absorbed the country's collectivist culture. One of the more memorable conversations she had was with an older fellow who remarked "Your companion is very white. . . she's not Filipino like us."

The consistency with which subjects discussed culture and the ways in which pro-social norms led them to generate fellow feelings resonates with the account of affective trust I've outlined. Nineteen of twenty six missionaries whom I interviewed explicitly noted a correspondence between cultural norms and the trust they experienced while abroad. Consider hospitality, a norm which the missionaries whom I spoke to repeatedly identified when discussing their trust in members of local communities. Hospitality entails that people open up their homes to others, showing them grace and kindness in their personal domain, while potentially opening themselves up to exploitation. Though it is not inherently a fault of Americans that we are, by and large, an individualistic culture, other less atomistic cultures commonly have norms that entail that people share their resources with others. In these cultures it is more than an expectation that one is hospitable, it is commonly understood that one ought to do so. The social norm provides a reason for people to comply as well as an expectation that people will, as a matter of fact. Observing such a norm might well generate a disposition of confidence towards a person, that they warrant our confidence, that they deserve it.

RW's life was physically in danger in Albania in a way that he just wasn't in Wales. As he told me, Wales was "safe as can be." Yet he felt a warmth and trust of Albanians that he didn't of the Welsh. The norms of hospitality disposed him towards those that opened up their homes to him. It wasn't just that his mission was easier, it was that he enjoyed the environment more, he felt a warmth towards the people. His preference for one region over the other doesn't directly speak to

the role of his belief in divine protection either. RW made clear that he believed that the help of Jesus Christ and the divine facilitated all his work. But this doesn't account for the change in his disposition between Wales and Albania. I want to identify this social norm of hospitality as one which motivated his affective trust, beyond mere reliance.

The presence of such norms were repeatedly identified as a motivation for one's trust. KB noted many of the warm tendencies of people in the Philippines. The people were always smiling and would immediately approach when greeted. LT, an Evangelical missionary who had served in both Ghana and Turkey, pointed out similar cultural markers. She remarked feeling safer in Ghana than Turkey, noting that Ghanaians smiled more and had a generally friendly disposition. If someone stole in Ghana people in the vicinity would shout "thief!" until the perpetrator was apprehended. She felt this trust of the population in Ghana despite militias demanding taxes at checkpoints and stories of her orphanage falling victim to armed robbery. Nonetheless she felt safer there than in downtown Chicago.

KB was totally comfortable in the Philippines. Indeed, she came to find it easier for her to express herself in Tagalog than English, remarking that language has facilitated her ability to convey emotion. There people's friendliness spilled over into their hospitality. She would frequently be greeted by strangers; "Come eat with us, come eat with us!" they would shout. Ultimately she found it more difficult to depart than it had been to leave for mission. Back in the U.S. she found people much colder and more reserved. She came to be incredibly fond of jitneys there. People would pass money forward to pay for the fare, a norm KB felt would never be in place in the States because "people would steal your money."

Another Mormon woman KH, served in the south of France. Initially she was disappointed to have been called to a region with which she was familiar. Her mother had served on mission there, while her father was a missionary Belgium. He ultimately became a professor of medieval history and the family made numerous trips to France when she was young. Though she admitted a bad attitude when she began, she slowly warmed to her task. Native French people were not generally receptive to her message, but after time she found refugees and immigrants from Western and Northern Africa to be very warm to her.

She acknowledged that over time you become conditioned to seek out immigrants, a point which another missionary who worked in France, TC, also mentioned. She would make a beeline to them when on the street and they were commonly willing to engage. And though in principle Mormons are not supposed

to preach to Muslims due to overarching political sensitivities, she found that in practice they were very eager to talk. She recounted that Muslim men would often speak with her and her companions, not because they were interested in being baptized, but because they wanted to engage in interfaith dialogue and explain their commitments to her. She identified with many of these immigrants as both foreigners and people of faith, in contrast to the mostly secular French population she encountered.

Her stories speak to a slightly different role for social norms in the process of generating trust. While she did not directly identify a specific norm that might recruit an affective response, the commonality she felt with them produced a warmth and trust of the members of these immigrant communities. The commonality she identified with the population facilitated her trust and ability to effectively work with those groups, reminiscent of Smith's remark regarding the relationship between piety and trust. Notably, she did not claim to be successful at baptizing members of these communities. Instead she was just pleased to engage in substantive conversations about her deep commitments. In fact the only time she did feel unsafe was when invited over to the house of an ethnic Frenchman who appeared not to respect her need to return before curfew. Nothing came of it, but she and her companion were concerned when his hospitality encroached on their commitments.

JH, an Evangelical missionary with YWAM, has worked in Namibia for more than two decades operating a school and teaching pottery. His friends, who were few, tended to be American ex-pats or English speakers from other African countries. He lamented a sense of alienation resulting from his poor command of Afrikaans and other African languages—he remarked that English is only the third language spoken by black Africans—and a legacy of Apartheid. It was obvious that this really hurt him. He had worked tirelessly to better the lives of people in Namibia and while they were very thankful for his efforts, they were not friendly towards him. After twenty-five years living abroad he still has more friends in the States than in Africa.

RH felt a similar alienation from people in Brazil, despite an excellent command of Portuguese. Of all the missionaries I spoke with she was the most self-critical and direct about the difficulty she faced opening up to people. When she was moved to the poorer suburban areas of Rio de Janeiro, for instance, she mentioned that while she spoke perfect Portuguese, she had a difficult time understanding the people she encountered. While she cared deeply for the people, she talked about the difficulty she had opening up and trusting people more substantively. This came into focus

when she mentioned that she was once told, “You’ve mastered being a missionary, your grammar is perfect, but no one would ever mistake you for a Brazilian because you are too cold.”

Or EO, for another, KW’s companion in the Philippines the night their apartment was broken into. While KW was ebullient about the local culture, EO felt more distant. She remarked that there was a lot she could not relate to in the culture and identified the difficulty building relationships with people. Indeed, she didn’t mention the culture’s warmth or pro-social norms during our conversation. Trust for her was endowed in God and in her companions with whom she felt 100% confident. The absence of identified pro-social norms and culture was as distinctive in the interviews I conducted as their report. Those who were unable to identify with such norms had a more difficult time trusting others.

Not all the missionaries with whom I spoke indicated that culture or norms were a means to developing trust. TC, a Mormon fellow who recently returned from Ecuador, believes that God performs miracles in order to protect missionaries. “Trust is a two way street,” he said, “and only by trusting God can you trust others.” There are certainly missionaries that articulate their trust as a manifestation of their belief in God, but most of those with whom I spoke also pointed towards social norms and culture as an important feature upon which their trust rested. Moreover, what TC discussed with me is more closely related to reliance than trust. He never identified the warm sentiments attending to affective trust as facilitating his work during our conversation.

### *5.3.3 Reactive Attitudes*

While rupturing expectations and betrayal is not a common occurrence, the sense of betrayal or let down marks the decidedly emotional and second-personal aspects of affective trust. One of JH’s only peers in Namibia was PB, an ex-pat from Zambia. They bonded in many respects over their status as foreigners and their common language (which just as a practical matter makes it easy to exchange feelings and ideas). PB had known JH for fifteen years and his wife had worked at JH’s school for eight. One day PB told JH that he needed to talk, and resigned from the school. JH was stunned and hurt, why hadn’t PB told him sooner? Why had he withheld his plans? PB went on to start a school only a few miles away. JH was hurt by this, and upset at PB for not being upfront with him. He was deserted by one of his only close coworkers.

As discussed above, those who had a more difficult time accessing the local

culture's norms had a more difficult time trusting others. In JH's case, this drew him near to PB, who ultimately left him, and in some ways revealed himself to have never been a confidant to begin with. PB hadn't approached JH earlier because he had thought it would have been disrespectful. While JH thought them to be equals, PB instead noted that a cultural hierarchy persisted. RH, by contrast, lacked these attitudes towards her stalker. I repeatedly circled back to inquire how that initial experience—a complete breakdown in institutional communication coupled with a direct invasion of her space and security—shaped the rest of her mission. Yet she responded that it didn't really change how she interacted with people subsequently. She was a dedicated missionary who relied on all sorts of people around her, but she lacked a sympathy for the culture, which inhibited her ability to trust or, relatedly, feel the kind of second-personal condemnation upon being intruded. The act was criminal rather than personal for her.

This outcome divergence—the feeling of emotional rupture when one experienced shared norms, but none otherwise—was marked in the experience of the two companions, EO and KW when their apartment was broken into that night in the Philippines. As I wrote above, EO had told me that she didn't recall trusting everyone on mission, and that she struggled building relationships across the local culture. Despite having experience doing humanitarian work in China and Peru previously, it was difficult for her to navigate the culture as a personal matter. KW, by contrast, felt that these were her people and that the Philippines was where she belonged and even considered moving there at one point. Their reactions to the robbery also diverged markedly. EO recalled not being too angry or bitter about the events. She thought of the robbery as an ordinary crime and it didn't seem to affect the rest of her service. KW, however, was devastated. The burglary affected how she carried herself on mission following the event. These were people with whom she felt a close connection, and was shaken afterward. She tried to circumscribe the event by saying that she thought she knew who the culprit was—a man only loosely affiliated with the community—but she could not lose the worry that it may have been someone else, someone that was directly party to these shared norms she had come to identify with. “It felt like trust had been broken” she told me. KW clearly imbibed the social and cultural norms in a way that EO never felt like she had. KW was eager to adopt norms of generosity, fairness, and etiquette.<sup>7</sup> Adopting

---

<sup>7</sup>She relayed a story about a time she wanted food at a street vendor, who had just sold his last item to this other woman. The woman turned to KW and asked if she's like to finish the half eaten food. KW shrugged and said, yeah, why not?!

those norms generated certain expectations and trust of others, which outstripped common ethics. When her apartment was broken into she felt a rupture in that trust in way EO didn't, herself lacking identification with those norms.

#### 5.3.4 *Discussion*

These experiences I document conform in many ways to the theory I offer for affective trust. Missionaries abroad were able to form warm expectations of others in light of norms they identify in the culture. The narratives I provide in the previous section both illustrate the contours of the theory as well as indicate its plausibility. Though these missionaries had comparably high levels of general trust to begin with, their ability to open up to the local communities in which they operated was not uniform, indicating another mechanism at work. There are risks involved in going abroad and embedding oneself in a foreign community, but each person I spoke with relished their decision.

Were this a story of particular trust I would have anticipated hearing stories of information gathering about specific people. Before missionaries would enter others' homes they might ask around about those individuals, or progressively build their risk exposure to others. And even if that sequence were not to obtain in every circumstance, that would have been the trend—more information would generate greater trust. I did, however, observe a tendency for individuals to elicit greater trust as a function of the social and cultural norms they identified. Feelings of normative camaraderie allowed people to open themselves up and experience solidarity that they could not otherwise. Furthermore, people reported an emotional component to the trust they experienced that outstripped the information they had. While in some cases these feelings were particular in kind, such as GG's trust for a woman (who never baptized) that named her son for his companion or AG's trust in an elderly man who led a simple life on the outskirts of the village in which she worked, in many other cases the trust people described was not directed at particular individuals, but germane to a particular context. Their trust did not appear and vanish on a dime, but was enduring. Once a community or a person gained trust it was difficult to lose. When that trust was violated, as in JH or KW's case, they had hard feelings, which outstripped the violation entailed by the breach itself. Both phrased the experience in second-personal terms, in fact—how could s/he do this to me? Note, finally, how deeply embedded these norms of generosity were in the context KW occupied. Even the thief could not bring her or himself to abscond without leaving the housemates something to get by (500 pesos,



approximately \$10).

Returning to the eight conditions I identified in section 5.1, collectively these cases demonstrate people's warm expectations that others will act cooperatively, and that those expectations are at least in part a result of identified social norms in context. In the handful of cases where people who experienced affective trust reported that their expectations had been violated, they felt hurt and upset with the violator.

Though these accounts are not sufficient to sustain my account against all competing proposals, they do conform well with the theory I offer. In the cases I described, it is clear that general trust is at play motivating individuals to place themselves in unfamiliar contexts, while particular trust explains how they build relationships with particular others that progress over time. Returning to Uslaner's three vectors of trust, affective trust seeks to explain the second dimension, trust in familiar but not intimate contacts (coreligionists rather than family and friends). Persons such as coworkers (as with JH's PB), companions, or community members (as with KW) all fall squarely in Uslaner's second category of trust. In these contexts affective trust indicates how affective attitudes bound up with social norms and institutional values can bridge uncertainty, and allow people to open up to others.

The interviews I conducted indicate the plausibility of the account of trust I offer. In the presence of pro-social norms such as hospitality (e.g. RW) or generosity (e.g. KW) people extended warm expectations towards members of local communities that they will be treated well. Absent the identification of or with those norms, people were less likely to trust others in this way. And when I heard those expectations were violated, people felt hurt and articulated second-personal demands for responsiveness. Instead of particular trust's demand that these expectations must be well defined for agents, tasks, and contexts, I find (like Farrell and Knight) these expectations were for categories of agents, tasks, and contexts.

Moving forward I would like to see these conjectures tested for communities that have experienced shock of some kind. RW remarked that after returning from Wales it was difficult to solicit people's trust again, having left in their time of need. While my project focuses on the trust of the missionaries rather than the trust of the people they reach out to, it would be instructive to understand how others serving at the time or in similar situations of political unrest experience trust and rupture. This work allows for empiricists to compare Mormon missionaries who serve abroad for a couple of years with Peace Corps volunteers, to better understand the underlying interactions between general, affective, and particular trust across

comparable dimensions (e.g. age, duration, education).

#### 5.4 *Faith in Others*

Although I have been discussing the way affective trust motivates individuals to open up to others in their communities, as I noted, the most common discussion of trust I had with the sample regarded the trust that people had in God and came to have in their companions. Without prompting, nine of eighteen respondents remarked that they trusted in God, while ten of eighteen remarked trusting in their companions or faith communities abroad. Since the missionaries moved around every three to four months companions came and went. Indeed HN noted that this churn made it difficult for her to build trust with local populations, despite her being a true extrovert. Even though companions would frequently relocate, I would commonly hear how deep their friendship and trust of their companions were, both those from the U.S. and abroad. While there is a particularity to these relationships, the shared norms of mission and their faith in God intensified their bonds, even though their time together was short.

The experience of these missionaries is, in no small part, constructing faith communities. Yes, I mean that as a term of jargon, they are going out and persuading people to adopt their faith and enlarge their religious communities. But more specifically I have in mind a confluence of the faith that they experience in God and the affective trust they show towards others. These missionaries believe that God protects them from harm, but they also experience a personal relationship entailed by that belief. Every subject I asked indicated that they believe in a personal god, one who intervenes in their daily lives. I don't understand faith in terms of Clegg's notion of belief without doubt (Clegg (1979)), but in the way Baier and Hobbes do, as socially warranted belief (Baier (1980)). Each one of these missionaries was raised in a church. Their upbringings involved regular church attendance, boy scouts, seminary during release time from school, weekly family home evening and Bible study, summer camps, often times faith-based university study. Their whole lives have been constructed around their faith, and in turn their faith in God becomes completely justified in context. They experience warm expectations of him. This expression of faith is what I have in mind in the dissertation's title—affective trust generates more than expectations of others but constructs faith in others. That is, the nature of the affective trust we are justified in experience is constituted by the social norms that one has access to in context, those rules that she can reliably

adopt, and anticipate that others will as well. And this also goes some distance to explain why Juan Rogel trusted the indigenous population of La Florida more than the Spanish troops. Members of local tribes demonstrated cooperative norms that the Spanish army flouted with acts of theft (according to Rogel). As a pacific missionary, intent on spreading the Word of Christ to the New World, the norms of the local population were far more compatible with his own than those of his commanders.

\* \* \*

These data are first and foremost illustrative. They begin to round out the conceptual analysis I have already done, and demonstrate the potential contribution that the notion of affective trust might offer to the discipline as a whole. Even when people lack information about specific others, they still have the means to offer a discriminating trust that varies between and within contexts. Respondents that point to social norms are more likely to have experienced thicker sentiments associated with trust, and those who identified cooperative norms in one culture rather than another more commonly related trusting sentiments in the context with those norms. In these ways trust can appear to be a part of the fabric of life, woven in so tightly as to appear to be constitutive of social interactions more broadly.

## CHAPTER VI

### Coda

By now I have beat the distinctions between general, particular, and affective trust to a fine, Gerber-like pulp. While the theory surrounding general trust seeks to understand how people come to have a default willingness to trust, particular trust account for the circumstances in which people are willing to trust others with specific tasks in specific contexts. The theory I offer explains how—that is the mechanism by which—people come to trust in intermediate cases. It unpacks how we decide that some risks are prudent in dealing with members of our church but not our fencing club. The mechanism I offer is that of social norms, which generate a context specific expectation that some rule or behavior is appropriate, giving one reason to not only abide by the rule, but also anticipate that others believe the practice to be justified. Doubtlessly we regularly experience all these three variants of trust operating simultaneously. We might, for example, decide to trust someone both because of a social norm and particular information that we have about their propensity for following through on their commitments. This project has attempted to analytically cleave the three apart, to look under the hood and better understand their distinctive workings.

My motivation for studying affective trust, however, was as much for methodological reasons as substantive ones. Indeed I have argued that trust is limited in scope, operating locally in contexts where people's preferences are neither at odds nor independently compatible as to obviate trusts efficacy. While affective trust has political valences, generating reasons and justifications for people to come together and coordinate actions, it is not a sufficient means of generating social harmony. Although I am open to broader applications of the concept of affective trust, say to explain the polarization of the American media landscape, my methodological commitment to using compatible theories from across social sciences and humanities

limits the sweeping claims I am willing to make.<sup>1</sup>

Instead I hope to petition political scientists and political theorists to stop chasing James' proverbial squirrel around the tree. William James opens his essay "What Pragmatism Means" by discussing a light hearted conversation he and his colleagues had one day on a hike. They wondered if a man chases a squirrel around a tree but never catches up to it "does the man go round the squirrel or not?" His answer, thankfully, was that it "depends on what you *practically mean* by 'going round' the squirrel" (James (1981): 25). I take Elinor Ostrom to offer the same advice in her triumphant *Governing the Commons* (Ostrom (2008)). Are people rational? Sure, it just depends what you *practically mean* by "rational." Theorists have a way of disregarding the practicality of the matter, discussing trust in a vacuum without empirical evidence, while the other end of the discipline can get callous with meanings and terms (e.g. discussions rife with slippage between context dependent and context independent trust). Reading accounts of trust in the empirical literature I found definitions which were stretched beyond credulity. Literature in political theory, meanwhile, insists on remaining detached from observation and empirical analysis. In this project I sought to bring these two conversations closer to one another to demonstrate the kind of meaningful dialogue the two discourses might have.

Rational choice theory is too broad to explain the social world that we occupy. When we attempt to deploy it to explain all instances of trust it makes a mockery of human experience. I have taken a different approach, building a localized theory that resonates with scholarship in philosophy, psychology, political science, and economics, while not violating core axioms. Thomas Hobbes can help us think about human emotion and, like Michael Morrell and Danielle Allen, construct a sentimental politics, one which we can come to *feel* good about as well as justify rationally (Hobbes (1994); Morrell (2010); Allen (2009)). These considerations are also bound up on the very contemporary projects of people like Anna Stilz and Eric Beerbohm who argue for responsibility in politics that resonates with the affective and socially normative features I lay out (Stilz (2009); Beerbohm (2012)). We (might) take there to exist a political responsibility in light of preexisting norms that already regulate collective conventions. As David Lewis, Stephen Darwall, and Cristina Bicchieri point out, these norms not only motivate action, but they also generate conditional duties to act (Lewis (2002); Darwall (2009); Bicchieri (2006)). The construction of such a conventional understand of norms is completely consistent

---

<sup>1</sup>I want to thank Jon Atwell for making this point clear to me.

with the kind of social preferences Ernst Fehr and William English identify in trust, and conforms theories of cooperation advocated by people like David Kreps, Jack Knight, Henry Farrell, and Natalie and Joseph Henrich (Fehr (2009); English (2012); Kreps (1990); Farrell and Knight (2003); Farrell (2009); Henrich and Henrich (2007)). The theory I offer in no way assumes irrationality, rather it advocates thinking deeply about the normative and epistemic topography of a landscape before imposing a theory of action.

I don't doubt that the Jewish and Italian kids in David Laitin's Brooklyn neighborhood did a fair amount of self-policing (or their school administrators did, anyway), but the reason that he and James Fearon thought to develop the model as they did was in light of relevant, context specific knowledge that the third party Irish cops were not involved in the dispute resolution. Whether the neighborhood kept quiet because in-group policing was a norm or because of a second-order norm of in-group affiliation inhibited the Jewish kids from reaching out to the Irish cops, their model came to make sense of conditions after the fact. My intention is for this account of affective trust to further focus the discipline's efforts on such compatible and context-specific modeling projects.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adolphs, R. (2002). Trust in the brain. *Nature Neuroscience*, 5(3):192–193.
- Allen, D. (2009). *Talking to strangers: Anxieties of citizenship since Brown v. Board of Education*. University of Chicago Press.
- Arpaly, N. (2003). *Unprincipled Virtue*. Oxford University Press.
- Axelrod, R. (1997). The Dissemination of Culture: A Model with Local Convergence and Global Polarization. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 41(2).
- Baier, A. (1980). Secular faith. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 10(1):131–148.
- Beerbohm, E. (2012). *In our name: The ethics of democracy*. Princeton University Press.
- Bellis, P. J. (1987). Melville's Confidence-Man: an Uncharitable Interpretation. *American Literature*.
- Bendor, J. and Swistak, P. (1997). The evolutionary stability of cooperation. *American Political Science Review*, 91(02):290–307.
- Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., and McCabe, K. (1995). Trust, reciprocity, and social history. *Games and Economic Behavior*, 10(1):122–142.
- Bicchieri, C. (2006). *The Grammar of Society*. Cambridge University Press.
- Blackburn, S. (1998). *Ruling passions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Campell, R. (1998). *Illusions of Paradox*. Rowman and Littlefield.
- Campell, R. (2007a). The problem of moral judgement. In Sherwin, S. and Schotch, P. K., editors, *Engaged Philosophy: Essays in Honour of David Braybrooke*. Toronto University Press.
- Campell, R. (2007b). What is moral judgement. *Journal of Philosophy*, 104:321–349.
- Chwe, M. S.-Y. (2013). *Jane Austen, Game Theorist*. Princeton University Press.
- Clegg, J. (1979). Faith. *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 16(3):225–232.
- Coleman, J. (1998). *Foundations of Social Theory*. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

- Cook, K. S., Hardin, R., and Levi, M. (2007). *Cooperation Without Trust? (Russell Sage Foundation Series on Trust)*. Russell Sage Foundation Publications.
- Copp, D. (2001). Realist-expressivism: a neglected option for moral realism. *Social Philosophy and Policy*, 18:1–43.
- Cushner, N. P. (2006). *Why Have You Come Here: The Jesuits and the First Evangelization of Native America*. Oxford University Press.
- Darwall, S. (1998). Empathy, Sympathy, Care. *Philosophical Studies*, 89:261–282.
- Darwall, S. (2000). Normativity and projection in Hobbes's Leviathan. *The Philosophical Review*, 109(3).
- Darwall, S. (2009). *The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability*. Harvard University Press.
- de Sousa, R. (2014). Emotion. In Zalta, E. N., editor, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Stanford University, spring 2014 edition.
- Delgado, M. (2008). Fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on oxytocin. *Neuron*, 58(4):470–471.
- Delgado, M. R., Frank, R. H., and Phelps, E. A. (2005). Perceptions of moral character modulate the neural systems of reward during the trust game. *Nat Neurosci*, 8(11):1611–1618.
- Denzau, A. T. and North, D. (2000). Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions. In Lupia, A., Popkin, S., and McCubbins, M. D., editors, *Elements of Reason*. Cambridge University Press.
- deQuervain, D. J.-F. (2004). The Neural Basis of Altruistic Punishment. *Science*, 305(5688):1254–1258.
- Diermeier, D. and Krehbiel, K. (2003). Institutionalism as a Methodology. *Journal of theoretical politics*, 15(2):123–144.
- Dreu, C. K. W. D., Greer, L. L., Handgraaf, M. J. J., Shalvi, S., Kleef, G. A. V., Baas, M., Velden, F. S. T., Dijk, E. V., and Feith, S. W. W. (2010). The Neuropeptide Oxytocin Regulates Parochial Altruism in Intergroup Conflict Among Humans. *Science*, 328(5984):1408–1411.
- Dreu, C. K. W. D., Greer, L. L., Kleef, G. A. V., Shalvi, S., and Handgraaf, M. J. J. (2011). Oxytocin promotes human ethnocentrism. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 108(4):1262–1266.
- Druckman, J. N., Green, D. P., Kuklinski, J. H., and Lupia, A., editors (2011). *Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science*. Cambridge University Press, 1 edition.



- English, W. (2012). Demystifying Trust: Experimental Evidence from Cambodia and Thailand. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 24(2).
- Farrell, H. (2009). *The Political Economy of Trust: Institutions, Interests, and Inter-Firm Cooperation in Italy and Germany*. Cambridge University Press.
- Farrell, H. and Knight, J. (2003). Trust, Institutions, and Institutional Change: Industrial Districts and the Social Capital Hypothesis. *Politics and Society*, 31(4).
- Fearon, J. and Laitin, D. (1996). Explaining interethnic cooperation. *American political science review*, pages 715–735.
- Fehr, E. (2009). On the Economics and Biology of Trust. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 7(2/3).
- Forsythe, R., Horowitz, J. L., Savin, N., and Sefton, M. (1994). Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments. *Games and Economic Behavior*, 6:347–369.
- Frazer, M. (2010). *The enlightenment of sympathy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fukuyama, F. (1996). *Trust: The Social Virtues and The Creation of Prosperity*. Free Press, 1st free press pbk. ed edition.
- Garver, E. (2004). *For the sake of argument: Practical reasoning, character, and the ethics of belief*. University of Chicago Press.
- George, A. L. and Bennett, A. (2005). *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. MIT Press.
- Gill, A. (2001). Religion and comparative politics. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 4(1):117–138.
- Gintis, H., Bowles, S., Boyd, R., and Fehr, E. (2003). Explaining altruistic behavior in humans. *Evolution and Human Behavior*, 24(3):153–172.
- Glaeser, E. L., Laibson, D. I., Scheinkman, J. A., and Soutter, C. L. (2000). Measuring Trust. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 115(3):811–846.
- Greene, J. and Haidt, J. (2002). How (and where) does moral judgment work? *Trends in cognitive sciences*, 6(12):517–523.
- Greene, J. D. (2007). The secret joke of Kant's soul. *Moral Psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings*, pages 359–372.
- Greene, J. D., Sommerville, R. B., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M., and Cohen, J. D. (2001). An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment. *Science*, 293(5537):2105–2108.
- Greif, A. (1994). Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: A historical and theoretical reflection on collectivist and individualist societies. *Journal of political economy*, pages 912–950.

- Grzymala-Busse, A. (2012a). Good Clubs and Community Support: Explainign the Growth of Strict Religions. *Journal of Church and State*.
- Grzymala-Busse, A. (2012b). Why Comparative Politics Should Take Religion (More) Seriously. *Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.*, 15(1):421–442.
- Grzymala-Busse, A. (2013). Why there is (almost) no Christian Democracy in post-communist Europe. *Party Politics*, 19(2):319–342.
- Gubler, J. R. (2011). *The Micro-Motives of Intergroup Aggression: A Case Study in Israel*. PhD thesis, University of Michigan.
- Hardin, R. (1996). Trustworthiness. *Ethics*, 107(1):26–42.
- Hardin, R. (2002a). *Trust and Trustworthiness*. Russell Sage Foundation.
- Hardin, R. (2002b). *Trust and Trustworthiness*. Russell Sage Foundation Series on Trust. Russell Sage Foundation Publications.
- Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., and McElreath, R. (2001). In search of homo economicus: behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies. *American Economic Review*, pages 73–78.
- Henrich, N. and Henrich, J. (2007). *Why Humans Cooperate: A Cultural and Evolutionary Explanation*. Oxford University Press.
- Herzog, D. (2000). Externalities and Other Parasites. *The University of Chicago Law Review*, pages 895–923.
- Herzog, D. (2008). *Cunning*. Princeton University Press.
- Hobbes, T. (1994). *Leviathan*. Hackett.
- Hobbes, T. and Macpherson, C. B. (1968). *Leviathan; edited with an Introduction by CB Macpherson*. Penguin.
- Hobbes, T., Oakeshott, M., and Peters, R. S. (1962). *Leviathan Or The Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil. D. by Michael Oakeshott. Introd. by Richard S. Peters*. Collier.
- Hobbes, T. and Tuck, R. (1991). *Leviathan*. Cambridge University Press.
- Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., and Smith, V. (1996). On expectations and the monetary stakes in ultimatum games. *International Journal of Game Theory*, 25(3):289–301.
- Huber, D., Veinante, P., and Stoop, R. (2005). Vasopressin and Oxytocin Excite Distinct Neuronal Populations in the Central Amygdala. *Science*, 308(5719):245–248.
- Iannaccone, L. R. (1988). A Formal Model of Church and Sect. *American Journal of Sociology*, pages 241–268.

- Inglehart, R. (1999). Trust, well-being and democracy. In Warren, M. E., editor, *Democracy and Trust*, pages 88–120. Cambridge University Press.
- James, W. (1981). *Pragmatism*. Hackett Press.
- Johnson, J. (2014). Models Among the Political Theorists. *American Journal of Political Science*, 58(3):547–560.
- Jones, K. (1996). Trust as an affective attitude. *Ethics*, 107(1):4–25.
- Jones, K. (2001). Trust: Philosophical Aspects. *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, pages 1–6.
- Jones, K. (2012). Trustworthiness\*. *Ethics*, 123(1):61–85.
- Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J., and Thaler, R. (1986). Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics. *Journal of Business*, pages 285–300.
- Kemper, S. E. (1980). The Confidence-Man: A Knavishly-Packed Deck. *Studies in American Fiction*, 8(1):23–35.
- Khalil, E. L., editor (2003). *Trust*. Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.
- King-Casas, B. (2005). Getting to Know You: Reputation and Trust in a Two-Person Economic Exchange. *Science*, 308(5718):78–83.
- Kingston, R. and Ferry, L. (2008). *Bringing the passions back in: The emotions in political philosophy*. UBC Press.
- Knack, S. and Keefer, P. (1997). Does Social Capital Have An Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation\*. *Quarterly journal of economics*, 112(4):1251–1288.
- Kosfeld, M., Heinrichs, M., Zak, P. J., Fischbacher, U., and Fehr, E. (2005). Oxytocin increases trust in humans. *Nature*, 435(7042):673–676.
- Krause, S. R. (2008). *Civil passions: moral sentiment and democratic deliberation*. Princeton University Press.
- Kreps, D. M. (1990). Corporate culture and economic theory. In Alt, J. E. and Shepsle, K. A., editors, *Perspectives on Positive Political Economy*, Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions. Cambridge University Press.
- Krueger, F., McCabe, K., Moll, J., Kriegeskorte, N., Zahn, R., Strenziok, M., Heinecke, A., and Grafman, J. (2007). Neural correlates of trust. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 104(50):20084.
- Kumar, V. (2013). *Naturalizing Moral Judgement*. PhD thesis, The University of Arizona.
- Levi, M. (1998). A State of Trust. In Levi, M. and Braithwaite, V., editors, *Trust and Governance*. Russell Sage Foundation.

- Levi, M. (2000). *When Good Defenses Make Good Neighbors*, pages 137–157. Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.
- Lewis, D. (2002). *Convention*. Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
- Lindberg, G. (1982). *The Confidence Man in American Literature*. Oxford University Press.
- Luhmann, N. (1995). *Social systems*. Stanford University Press.
- Macedo, S. and Macedo, S. (2009). *Diversity and distrust: Civic education in a multicultural democracy*. Harvard University Press.
- Machiavelli, N. (1981). *Mandragola*. Waveland Press.
- Machiavelli, N. (1996). *Discourses on Livy*. University of Chicago Press.
- Machiavelli, N. (1998). *The Prince*. University of Chicago Press.
- Mackert, J. (2012). Social Closure. [oxfordbibliographies.com](http://oxfordbibliographies.com).
- Mansbridge, J. (1999). Altruistic trust. In Warren, M. E., editor, *Democracy and Trust*. Cambridge University Press.
- Mayer, R. C., Davis, J. H., and Schoorman, F. D. (1995). An integrative model of organizational trust. *Academy of management review*, 20(3):709–734.
- McCabe, K., Houser, D., Ryan, L., Smith, V., and Trouard, T. (2001). A functional imaging study of cooperation in two-person reciprocal exchange. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 98(20):11832.
- Melville, H. (1857/1990). *The Confidence-Man: His Masquerade*. Penguin Books.
- Milgrom, P., North, D., and Weingast, B. (1990). The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Medieval Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs. *Economics and Politics*, 2(1):1–23.
- Morgan, R. M. and Hunt, S. D. (1994). The Commitment-Trust Theory of Relationship Marketing. *Journal of Marketing*, pages 20–38.
- Morrell, M. E. (2010). *Empathy and democracy: Feeling, thinking, and deliberation*. Penn State Press.
- Nannestad, P. (2008). What have we learned about generalized trust, if anything? *Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.*, 11:413–436.
- Nichols, S. (2004). *Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment*. Oxford University Press.
- Nowak, M., Sigmund, K., et al. (1993). A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the Prisoner's Dilemma game. *Nature*, 364(6432):56–58.

- Nussbaum, M. C. (2013). *Political emotions*. Harvard University Press.
- Ostrom, E. (2008). *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for collective action*. Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions. Cambridge University Press, 22 edition.
- Page, S. E. (2007). *The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools, and Societies*. Princeton University Press.
- Page, S. E. and Bednar, J. (2007). Can Game(s) Theory Explain Culture?: The Emergence of Cultural Behavior Within Multiple Games. *Rationality and Society*, 19(1).
- Parker, H. (1971). The Confidence Man's Masquerade. In Parker, H. and Neimeyer, M., editors, *The Confidence-Man: His Masquerade*, pages 293–303. Norton.
- Pettit, P. (1995). The Cunning of Trust. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 24(3).
- Pettit, P. (1998). Republican Theory and Political Trust. In Levi, M. and Braithwaite, V., editors, *Trust and Governance*. Russell Sage Foundation.
- Putnam, R. D. (1995). Bowling alone: America's declining social capital. *Journal of democracy*, 6(1):65–78.
- Putnam, R. D., Leonardi, R., and Nanetti, R. Y. (1994). *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton University Press.
- Railton, P. (2012). The Obscure Object, Desire. In *Proceedings and Addresses of the APA*, volume 86.
- Ridge, M. (2006). Ecumenical expressivism: finessing Frege. *Ethics*, 116:302–36.
- Rilling, J., Gutman, D., Zeh, T., Pagnoni, G., Berns, G., and Kilts, C. (2002). A neural basis for social cooperation. *Neuron*, 35(2):395–405.
- Rilling, J., Sanfey, A., Aronson, J., Nystrom, L., and Cohen, J. (2004). Opposing BOLD responses to reciprocated and unreciprocated altruism in putative reward pathways. *Neuroreport*, 15(16):2539.
- Roth, A., Prasnikar, V., Okuno-Fujiwara, M., and Zamir, S. (1991). Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An experimental study. *The American Economic Review*, pages 1068–1095.
- Rothstein, B., editor (2005). *Social Traps and the Problem of Trust*. Cambridge University Press.
- Schroeder, M. (2009). Hybrid expressivism: virtues and vices. *Ethics*, 119:257–309.
- Shamay-Tsoory, S. G., Fischer, M., Dvash, J., Harari, H., Perach-Bloom, N., and Levkovitz, Y. (2009). Intranasal Administration of Oxytocin Increases Envy and Schadenfreude (Gloating). *BPS*, 66(9):864–870.

- Sirdeshmukh, D., Singh, J., and Sabol, B. (2002). Consumer trust, value, and loyalty in relational exchanges. *Journal of marketing*, 66(1):15–37.
- Smith, A. (1982). *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. Liberty Fund.
- Smith, D. T. (2011). *Essays on the Persecution of Religious Minorities*. PhD thesis, University of Michigan.
- Stilz, A. (2009). *Liberal loyalty: freedom, obligation, and the state*. Princeton University Press.
- Tichi, C. (1972). Melville's Craft and Theme of Language Debased in the Confidence-Man. *ELH*, 39(4).
- Tomlin, D. (2006). Agent-Specific Responses in the Cingulate Cortex During Economic Exchanges. *Science*, 312(5776):1047–1050.
- Trejo, G. (2009). Religious Competition and Ethnic Mobilization in Latin America: Why the Catholic Church Promotes Indigenous Movements in Mexico. *American Political Science Review*, 103(03):323.
- Uslaner, E. M. (2002). *The Moral Foundations of Trust*. Cambridge University Press.
- Valentino, N. A., Villalobos, J., and Sirin, C. (2014). The Social Causes and Political Consequences of Group Empathy. APSA 2014.
- Walzer, M. (2006). *Politics and passion: Toward a more egalitarian liberalism*. Yale University Press.
- White, S. K. (2009). *The ethos of a late-modern citizen*. Harvard University Press.
- Wiens, D. (2015). Against Ideal Guidance. *The Journal of Politics*, 77(2):433–446.
- Williams, B. (1988). *Trust: making and breaking cooperative relations*, chapter 1, pages 3–13. Basil Blackwell Inc.
- Woodberry, R. D. (2012). The Missionary Roots of Liberal Democracy. *American political science review*, 106(02):244–274.
- Xu, X., Zuo, X., Wang, X., and Han, S. (2009). Do You Feel My Pain? Racial Group Membership Modulates Empathic Neural Responses. *Journal of Neuroscience*, 29(26):8525–8529.
- Zak, P. and Knack, S. (2001). Trust and growth. *The Economic Journal*, 111(470):295–321.
- Zmerli, S., Newton, K., and Montero, J. R. (2007). Trust in people, confidence in political institutions, and satisfaction with democracy. *Citizenship and involvement in European democracies: A comparative analysis*, pages 35–65.