A Study on the Party System in South Korea after Democratization

by

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A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(Political Science)
in The University of Michigan
2016

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INTRODUCTION

On February 16, 2015, the National Assembly of South Korea confirmed the departing floor leader of the ruling Saenuri party to be the next prime minister by a vote of 148 to 128. Not a salient event ordinarily, the confirmation process drew national attention because at the two year mark, the president had already lost three nominations for prime ministership, leaving the administration in a politically vulnerable position.[1] All three former nominees resigned after allegations of personal corruption or problematical ethics emerged, and the new nominee was no exception in that suspicions of draft evasion and dubious real- estate dealing surfaced right away. Ten days before the hearing, recordings of the nominee's conversation with a few reporters were leaked where he boasted his control over the media to stem the coverage of his corruptions. By the time of the confirmation hearing (February 10-13), approval rating for the nominee was down to about 30 percent, almost identical to the approval rating for the president's performance.[2]

On the second day of the hearing, a witness involved in the nominee's real estate scandal enraged the opposition party committee members, saying Chungcheong region is

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[1] Ever since the National Assembly adopted confirmation hearing laws in 2000, only three nominees failed to be confirmed as prime minister before the current administration.

[2] Not Appropriate 41%; Appropriate 29%; Don't Know/Reject 30%. "Gallup Korea Daily Opinion No. 150." 13 February 2015. Gallup Korea.

getting a (prime minister) nominee and the Jeolla people are relentlessly going at (him). The remark was immediately and widely criticized for invoking regional antipathy so blatantly, a rare occurrence in such a public setting.

This led to a dramatic shift in opinion in the nominee's home region, Chungcheong. While the attitude of Chungcheong respondents toward the confirmation was indistinguishable from the national average on the first day of the hearing, after the regionalism remark was broadcast, approval for the nominee jumped from 33.2% to 66.1% in just one day. Disapproval was consequently down from 57.4% to 31.2%. Roughly the same results held through the next day. After the confirmation, the least percentage of respondents (33.1%) disapproved the new prime minister in Chungcheong among all regions.[3]

The most recent of numerous similar incidents, the foregoing episode illustrates how deeply regionalism is embedded in the politics of South Korea and how susceptible it is to mobilization as an electoral cleavage.

Throughout this thesis, I define region as a sub-national territorial unit with "a configuration of shared characteristics" (Schwartz 1974, 5) that may or may not overlap administrative division, and regionalism as particular patterns in attitudes and behaviors that persist within region.

> A region is a homogeneous area with physical and cultural characteristics distinct from neighboring areas. As a part of a national domain a region is sufficiently united to have a consciousness of its customs and ideals and

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[3] 18 February 2015. Realmeter.

The prime minister resigned two months after inauguration when another large-scale bribery scandal broke out.

> thus possess a sense of identity distinct from the rest of the country.(Vance 1968, 377)[4]

There is a rough consensus on the factors that typically nurture regional consciousness among inhabitants; geographic separation, cultural differences (e.g., language, religion, ethnicity, shared past experience), and economic inequity.[5] The visibility of these differences, then, partly explains the propensity toward sociological approaches in the study of regionalism. However, the social differences *per se* cannot explain the success of a particular regional party at a particular time. Electoral rivalry between the southeastern and southwestern regions of Korea emerged suddenly in the country's first presidential election after democratization in 1987, and has since remained the most powerful predictor of the votes. Understanding Korean elections and party system after democratization thus requires not only an appraisal of the possible sources of political conflicts in the Korean society, but also an overview of the historical course that laid the foundation for a particular conflict to be politicized.

In the following section, I present the history of the Republic of Korea to show that the party system of 1987 that defined the subsequent political topography largely resulted from a historical contingency. It was the strategic choice of key politicians that transformed a latent cleavage, i.e., region, into the locus of electoral competition between

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[4] The definition, therefore, is clearly distinguished from the term used in International Relations and European Studies, where region refers to groups of countries as in North America, or Western Europe. (Keating and Loughlin 1997, 2).

[5] According to this perspective, regionalism (or sectionalism) emerges from accumulated experiences of economic disparity of a particular region. With this regard, often the scheme of world systems or core-periphery perspective is adopted to depict the developed region's dominance over the underdeveloped (Sanders 1999; Bensel 1984).

the two major political parties in South Korea. As will be described, uneven economic development among regions and the marginalization of the southwestern region—Jeolla— and its political leaders under the authoritarian regime provide the root of conflicts that shaped the post-1987 party system .

Historical Path to the Regionally Divided National Party System of 1987

1945 – 1961

The Korean Peninsula was liberated from Japanese colonial rule when Japan surrendered to the Allies on August 15, 1945. On September 8, the U.S. military forces occupied the peninsula south of the 38th parallel. In the ensuing three years, the United States Army Military Government in Korea (**USAMGIK)** focused on stabilizing the volatile political situation in accordance with the strategic interests of the U.S. Neither the U.S. nor the Soviet forces occupying the northern half of Korea acknowledged the spontaneous, indigenous efforts to establish an independent state, most notable of them led by political groups of revolutionary nationalism (Choi 1993: 14). The U.S. military government endorsed the right-wing nationalist leader Syngman Rhee to contain the threat of communist expansion of the Soviet Union. In August 1948 the Republic of Korea was founded, and Rhee was elected as the first president. The externally aided Korean War completely destroyed the country's industrial base and its economy was largely dependent on foreign aid throughout the 1950s, with no deliberate efforts at economic development by the personalistic ruler.[6] Meanwhile, the Rhee regime became

[6] Even within the economic sphere , Rhee's concerns were not with growth, but with short term objectives of reconstruction and maintenance of minimum consumption

increasingly autocratic; after repeatedly altering the constitution to prolong the president's power, the ruling party committed blatant election frauds in the presidential election of March, 1960 in an attempt to grant the president unlimited number of terms. Rhee was taken down by student uprisings[7] on April 19.

The constitution underwent another major transformation. In the Second Republic, Koreans briefly experienced democratic politics and a parliamentary system of government, yet the Chang Myon cabinet was severely undermined by the conflicts between two major factions within the governing party. The weak and fragmented government was toppled in a military coup led by General Park Chung-Hee and his junta of younger, intermediate officers on May 16,1961.

1961 - 1979

The military government adopted and executed the Five-Year Economic Development Plan originally prepared by Chang Myon cabinet, the first systematic state-led efforts for economic development in the Republic of Korea. Restoration of political order and a prosperous economy were the two-pronged justification for the military

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standards, both of which were to be achieved by aid maximization rather than investment and production (Jones and Sakong 1980, 42).

[7] Although joined by many citizens, the protests were initiated and led by university students. The legacy of student movements is a unique and crucial aspect of Korean politics. Going to college was both a privilege and responsibility in the underdeveloped society, and college students were considered intellectuals. While higher education provided many a chance to escape poverty, it also led some to fight for the values they learned. Often connected to labor and anti-poverty movement as well, university students developed national organizations and played a critical role in defying and overthrowing authoritarian regimes. Many former student activists became involved in politics, and now form a significant part of the political elite, though they are dispersed across generations and party lines. Most notably, the Uri party in 2004 was composed of a large number of former student movement leaders.

intervention. During Park's rule, human rights were violated and the opposition parties were repressed[8]; the technical rationality of the administration came first at the expense of the civil society alienated from political processes (Choi 1993, 26-27).

South Korea during Park's era is widely considered as a Capitalist Developmental State[9] in political economy literature. The first to the fourth Five-Year Plan implemented during this time illustrate the developmental function the state took on for industrialization. The state utilized industrial policies to focus its financial resources into chosen industry, which moved from building infrastructure toward heavy and chemical industries, steel, cars and ship-building. Also by giving subsidies to the industries and manipulating foreign exchange rate, the government promoted export-oriented growth aggressively. The average GNP growth rate for the decade of 1962 to 1971was 8.8%, significantly higher than that of the 1950s, about 4%. The concentrated investment in the Heavy-Chemical Industrialization paid off handsomely during the period of the third Five-Year Plan (1972 - 1976). The goal set in 1972, ten billion US dollars of export and a thousand US dollars per capita income by 1980, was achieved three years ahead of the schedule.

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[8] In June 1961, Park created the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) and appointed his trusted staff and relative, Kim Jong-pil, as its director. Kim Jong-pil later became the hegemonic political leader of Chungcheong region. KCIA functioned as Park's primary organizational tool to oppress anti-government activities and to penetrate and control the society in his regime.

[9] See, for example, Woo-Cumings, ed. 1999. For a historical analysis of this period using Capitalist Developmental State model, see Saxer.2002.

One of key features of CDS is an autonomous and competent bureaucrats like MITI in Japan. Both the military and the bureaucracy were the most modernized and technically advanced in Korea at the time.

The primary instruments of this late-industrialization was the large conglomerates known as *chaebol*. Shin and Chang (2003)[10] argue that Korea adopted substituting strategy of 'nationalistic' or 'mercantilistic' character, focusing on building internationally competitive 'local' industries (11-12) ; the control of major industries were kept local by discouraging foreign direct investment. Korea's industrialization was partly financed by domestic resource mobilization, yet the country relied on foreign debt heavily. The state had access to foreign aid and foreign loans—by selectively allocating capital in a capital scarce environment, the state planned chaebols' activities, assigned them specific projects and export goals (Evans 1995, 53); the system, in other words, combined state-led central-planning and capitalist economy. In the process of Korea's unbalanced growth path—import substitution in the aforementioned industries was considered critical to build an independent national economy (Ibid. 13)—*chaebols* gained the ownership of most of the main industries , in return for providing the regime with the basis of its legitimacy.

In his first presidential election of 1963, after ruling the country for two and a half years as the junta's leader, Park defeated Yun Po-son with a narrow margin. In 1969, Park pushed through a constitutional amendment that let him run for the third term. He barely won the 1971 Presidential Election, in which the opposition party candidate and the leading political figure from Jeolla region, Kim Dae Jung(President 1998-2002) ran for the first time. In the New Democratic Party (NDP) primaries, Kim Dae Jung had been selected as the party's presidential candidate after defeating Kim Young Sam(President 1993-1997), the political leader of Gyeongsang South region. To extend his tenure in

[10] The authors name the Korean system of the state-bank-chaebol nexus Korea Inc. (Shin and Chang 2003: 32-33).

office for life, Park declared national emergency in December, 1971 and proclaimed martial law in October, 1972. On November 21, 1972, a referendum was conducted under the martial law to pass another constitutional amendment. The new Yushin Constitution granted Park dictatorial power over both politics and the civil society.

1979 - 1987

Park's reign lasted for seven more years until he was assassinated on October 26, 1979. On December 12, Major-General Chun Doo-Hwan secured complete control of the armed forces through yet another military coup. In May 1980, under the extended martial law, Chun banned all political activities, closed down universities, censored the press, and arrested opposition politicians including Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam.

Civic protests against the actions of the new military power developed into a full-on popular uprising in Gwangju, the provincial capital of southern Jeolla when the troops Chun had sent in started firing at the civilians intensely and intentionally. The casualties of the May 18 Gwangju Democratic Uprising amount to 4,362, including 154 deaths.[11] In February 1981, Chun was elected as the president of the Fifth Republic under a revised constitution, and maintained authoritarian rule for the next seven years. Civil rights were seriously violated and political activities were severely restricted during this period. The National Security Law in combination with the anti-Communist Law were routinely utilized to repress political oppositions.

During Chun's rule, Korean economy underwent notable progress. The average GNP growth rate was 9.1%, and in 1986 the trade balance was in black for the first time. Following the example of Park, Chun relied on economic prosperity to legitimize his

[11] The tally indicates the number of amends paid in accordance with the law enacted for this purpose . Statistics by the May 18 Memorial Foundation.

regime, yet the political landscape became increasingly unstable near the end of his term as the demand for democracy grew with the growing economy.

For twenty days in June of 1987, the last year of Chun's term, massive pro-democracy demonstrations swept the whole nation, and Chun conceded to the citizens' demand for democratization. This concession, known as the June 29 Declaration, was formally announced by Roh Tae Woo, President Chun's handpicked successor and the ruling party leader. The declaration marked the beginning of South Korea's transition to democracy.

In sum, up until 1987 when a wave of civic protests against the authoritarian regime forced the governing party to adopt a set of institutional reforms that democratized presidential election laws and restored freedom of the press, civilian and military authoritarianism had alternated. Frequent changes in presidential as well as legislative electoral laws were the outcome of the governing party's endeavor to sustain its power and prevent a strong opposition party. Having had not a single opposition party with actual experience in governing, the citizens in South Korea were essentially forced to choose between rapid economic development under dictatorship and democratization with economic uncertainty; in fact, this clash of values had been the most crucial political cleavage, usually manifest along rural-urban division.[12] In 1987, in the first presidential election by direct popular vote held in sixteen years, the ruling party candidate, Roh Tae

[12] The division largely reflects the distribution of the educated and the uneducated. The right to vote was meaningless or not available for a major part of this period.

Woo, was elected president with only 37 percent of the vote.[13] It took ten more years for the first transfer of power to the opposition to take place.

The 1987 Presidential Election and the Puzzle of Electoral Regionalism

What happened in the 1987 presidential election? Given the explosion of popular demand for democratization early in that year, one would have predicted that the presidency would surely go to the opposition. Once the common goal was accomplished, the democratizing force was divided into two camps. Roh, who was born in Gyeongsang North, won a plurality mostly because two prominent civilian leaders, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, split the democratic opposition votes. The number of candidates who had a practical chance of winning was no fewer than three, and each garnered well over a majority of the votes from their region of birth. With Kim, Jong-Pil representing Chungcheong region in the presidential race, the country was divided into four voting blocs. The pattern of regional confrontation that emerged in this critical election (Key 1955) shaped the country's subsequent electoral topography.

[13] For presidential elections, the whole country is one big national district. All the votes for a candidate are summed up across regions, and then the plurality winner is elected as the president. This rule has not changed since 1978.

Figure 0-1: Regions and Metropolitan Areas of South Korea (Administrative Divisions)

The extremely high level of regionally concentrated voting pattern, which can be so intense that 90 percent of the voters in a region support a single candidate, set a research agenda for many scholarly works on Korean politics. In this new democracy, what one may call the country's first stable party system is laden with an electoral cleavage of a rather vague historical or social origin.

According to scholars of political culture, regional voting is nothing new since it has its root in traditional localism, a characteristic of pre-modern culture. Some scholars in this group understand traditional localism as an extension of Confucian family ideology, which emphasizes the importance of relational ties in forming one's political outlook. Rural voters tend to make their voting decisions based upon their proximity to the candidates' personal characteristics such as place of birth, familial relationships, education, or age (Choi and Lee 1980). Kim and Koh (1980) define regional voting as the voters' affectionate identification with and support for the candidates from their own region. In short, this perspective concludes that regionalism is nothing but the sense of belonging (Kim B.K. 1996). While studies of presidential and legislative elections in South Korea before the 1990's mostly focus on the discrepancy between rural and urban voters, research conducted as early as in 1972 found strong regional patterns that cut across the urban-rural divide (Kim and Koh 1972). Although regional voting had sporadically erupted in a few early presidential elections, scholars of Korean elections generally agree that a more persistent and severe form of regional voting emerged in the 1987 presidential election, putting the validity of claims about cultural cleavages into question. Cultural divisions did not change dramatically in the late 1980's, yet any explanation about current regional voting patterns has to incorporate factors that have changed over time in Korea. A major shortcoming of this perspective is that regional voting became more pronounced as rapid modernization and economic development process went on, directly contesting its main assumption. Traditional localism may better explain conformity voting in rural areas than regional voting.

More plausible explanations of the present voter alignment divided by the east-west regional line can be found in studies such as those by Hwang (1996), Sohn (1996) and Choi (2002). In explaining regional rivalries in voting patterns, these scholars

conclude that several factors are important: impacts of uneven industrialization, systematically biased elite recruitment by parties, and the voters' attachment to particular political leaders from their own regions.

Park Chung Hee and the succeeding presidents from the northern Gyeongsang region, Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo, adopted distributive policies favorable to their home region and exclusively allocated crucial governmental positions to individuals from their region (Choi and Lee 1980). Consequently, Jeolla, which had been a relatively affluent rural region, felt deprived of their just share. In addition, Kim Dae Jung, who led the most successful anti-government, democratization group, was the favorite son of Jeolla, and Park's animosity toward Kim contributed to the ruling bloc's rejection of the region.[14]

Hwang (1996) argues that regional consciousness developed in Gyeongsang due to the desire to keep its hegemonic position, while Jeolla regionalism was a manifestation of rightful resistance. Choi (1996) also points out that regional consciousness is not mere feelings, but a product of ruling ideology reinforced by the governing bloc to maintain its power. Jeolla had been the base of rebellious, democratizing forces and the home of the opposition party. The governing bloc succeeded in perpetuating anti-Jeolla sentiment by

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[14] Kim Dae Jung condemned the Yushin Constitution publicly and took refuge in the U.S. for a while, where he continued anti-Park regime campaigns. He was kidnapped while visiting Japan by Korean intelligence agents, and released by the intervention of Japan and the U.S.

Following Gwangju Rebellion, Kim Dae Jung was nearly put to death by the Chun Doo Hwan regime upon fabricated charges of conspiring and overthrowing the government. Kim was spared the death sentence only as a result of U.S. pressure (Diamond and Shin 1999: 3).

singling out the region as the bastion of leftists and insurgents,[15] as well as by insinuating its affinity for communism, which was detrimental to the region in a country laden with red scare. As a result, the region was alienated from electoral coalitions up until 1997 while repeatedly voting as a solid bloc to acquire political power. Also notable is Sohn's (1993) argument regarding the importance of elite strategy in instigating regional conflicts—especially in the 1987 presidential election when the opposition coalition failed to coordinate on single candidate, handing out the presidency to the governing party candidate in effect. Since there was no clear difference between Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam, both opposition leaders with careers in democratization movement, only their regional origins mattered (see also Park 1999).

In short, the ideological space left void after democratization was filled by regional antagonism and the political elite's active mobilizing efforts of this bias in the electorate (Choi 2002).

The first regular post-election public opinion surveys were conducted during and following the 1992 presidential election. Research based on these surveys typically uncovered the strong impact of regionalism on voting decisions. For example, N. Lee (1998), using the 1992 survey, finds that regional animosity not only influences one's affective and evaluative attitude toward a particular candidate or political party, but also affects his or her voting decision in a direct fashion. K. Lee (1998) offers an extensive study on regionalism and Korean elections, in which he concludes that region is a

[15] With control over the press and information dissemination process, the military government successfully framed Gwangju Uprising as violent riots led by communists, as the actual details of the standoff between the army and civilians were hushed for a long time.

singularly powerful factor that predicts vote choice after the transition to democracy, analyzing six post-election opinion poll surveys from 1992 to 1996.[16]

The literature on the cause and effect of regionalism reviewed above point to the 1987 presidential election as a historical contingency where the strategic choices of ambitious politicians produced a durable framework for the subsequent electoral competition. The differential past experience of the regions conditions this framework, yet the emergence of this particular electoral cleavage at this particular time is best explained by the failure of coordination at the elite level within the context of unequal distribution of wealth and power among the regions. Once set, the electoral partnership between political parties and regions has defined the Korean party system after 1987.

In the next chapter, I examine how regionalism interacts with electoral institution over time. As it turns out, the cause of Korean multi-party system at the national level is embedded in the regionally divided and concentrated pattern of vote distribution, structured by the electoral institution of simple plurality rule.

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[16] One peculiar conclusion drawn from these studies is that after controlling for region, standard demographic and socio-economic factors do not explain one's voting choice very well. Korea does not have measurable cleavages based on ethnicity, religion or language, and the political expression of class conflict has been successfully repressed both by the presence of North Korea and stubborn legal barriers. As a result, major political parties are hardly distinguishable in terms of the fundamental ideologies and programs they offer.

CHAPTER 1.

MEASURING REGINAL VOTING IN KOREA

Regional voting can occur for many reasons, and the political context matters a great deal in interpreting what regional voting means.

Research on ethno-regionalist parties and regional voting in Europe focus on the question of identity politics, and the relevance of ethnicity as a source of political mobilization in sub-national geographical territories as well as in nation-states. Regional voting literature often operates on a broad definition of ethno-regionalist parties such as a body that is formed for the purpose of protecting the interests of groups it represents. Often the orientation appears in the choice of party denomination. Perhaps the orientation is marked still more strongly in their programmes (Lane and Ersson 1991, 104), whereas the policy demands different regionalist parties make may not share a single claim. A typical definition of ethno-regionalist parties is the efforts of geographically concentrated peripheral minorities which challenge the working order and sometimes even the democratic order of a nation state by demanding recognition of their cultural identity (Müller-Rommel 1998, 19).

The apparent regional voting split in the Korean case poses a unique question that defies several aspects of these definitions. While the support for a political party or presidential candidate can be highly concentrated in a geographical territory for a reasonably long period, Korean parties almost invariably choose programs as well as denominations of national scope that encompass the interests of general public. Also, the

cultural heritage of Koreans is considered fairly homogeneous. According to Fearon (2003), South Korea has the second lowest ethnic fractionalization score (.004)[17] in his data comprising 822 ethnic groups in 160 countries. The country is also one of the least culturally fractionalized –the 7th, to be exact— when the structural distance between languages is used as a proxy for cultural diversity. Only a fourth of respondents in South Korea say that religion influences their social and political opinion in a cross-national study, the 24th among the sample of 27 countries and the 11th among 14 OECD countries in the study.[18] Secular values are strong in South Korea, as they are in other relatively prosperous eastern Asian countries such as Japan and Taiwan (Norris and Inglehart 2011, 257). In short, linguistic, ethnic or religious differences have never been a social cleavage, and are largely irrelevant for South Korean politics.

Electoral regionalism in Korea would better compare to the lopsided support for the Democratic party in the American South after the Civil War, than with European ethno-regionalist parties. The case of the American Democratic party exemplifies a scenario where virtually everyone in a particular region supports a party and that party only, but this may or may not mean that people in other regions vote for that party.

Perhaps the only invariable quality of regional voting is that the concept always entails some territorial units. As a region itself is the container for cultural, economic and political differences, a definition of regional voting that draws upon an enumeration of

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[17] The lowest is North Korea.

[18] www.mk.co.kr. 2007. "The BBC World Service and MBN in collaboration with the East Asia Institute: the 2nd report on the salient issues in the world: religion and politics." February 20. http://www.eai.or.kr/data/bbs/kor_report/200906081223614.pdf (in Korean).

characteristics of varying regionalist parties is tautological. In this approach, regional voting is to vote for a regionalist party that represents particular regional interests because the region is *the locus* of these particular interests. The logic is as follows; people in Quebec vote for the Bloc Québécois to protect the interests of Quebec, because Quebec has a distinct cultural identity different from the rest of Canada. In other words, Quebec people vote differently because Quebec region is different.

Also, I refrain from using a specific definition of regionalism such as "an ideology and.. political movements which demand greater control over the affairs of the regional territory by the people residing in that territory" (Keating and Loughlin, 5). One of the research questions for this study is to understand macro-level causes and individual motives underlying the persisting pattern of vote distribution—that is, to define regionalism in South Korea *per se*. Therefore, I equate r*egionally concentrated vote for a specific party or candidate* with regional voting, that would qualify as a measure of politicization of regional cleavage. For example, when different parts of a country are split in such a way that each region has a political party that enjoys a near monopoly of electoral support in it; when a region as a whole demonstrates a lopsided support for a particular political party or a candidate, regional voting occurs and the electorate is considered as divided along regional lines. A potential problem associated with this approach is that it may simply gauge a (combination of) social cleavage(s) that happens to overlap regional boundaries, other than regionalism whose effect is independent of the impact of the cleavages on the vote choice. However, this quantitative definition makes it possible to distinguish voting patterns across national and sub-national territorial units. How to interpret the vote distributions thus surfaced, then, would be the agenda for this study.

1.1 MEASURING REGIONAL VOTING IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

The standard Laakso-Taagepera's measure of effective number of parties (ENP[19], hereafter) at district, regional and national level can give an overview of the size of national and regional party system. The relationship between the effective number of parties at different levels—the size of local, regional, national party system— and electoral system has been the subject of sizeable scholarly efforts. Putting the findings from this body of research in a nutshell, Duverger's law (Duverger 1954) and later formulations such as Cox's M+1 rule (Cox 1997) provide a testable hypothesis regarding the relationship between the size of party system and electoral institutions.

It is worth looking into the basic logic underlying Duverger's Law and the literature on the relationship between electoral laws and the size of national party system in general.

While it has been argued that parties form around the dominant conflicts of the time, it has also been claimed that the number of parties, *i.e.*, the size of party system, is decided to a certain extent by the electoral laws a polity adopts. Forged by Duverger (1954), and termed by Riker (1982) as Duverger's Law, the perspective offers this succinct generalization: the simple majority single ballot system favors the two-party system, whereas both the simple majority with second ballot and proportional

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[19] The formula for Effective Number of Parties=$1/\Sigma v^2_i$, where v_i is party i's vote share. Independent candidates are counted as a political party, and a candidate's share, which is less than 2 percent of the total valid votes cast within a district, is dropped. Total votes, then, are recalculated, and the formula for ENP is applied. For the underlying logic of this procedure, see Chhibber and Kollman 1998.

representation system favor multi-partism. The main logic of the literature devoted to the study of the relationship between electoral institutions and party systems (Lijphart 1994; Cox 1997) is as follows: there are systematic biases that favor two-party system in a single member simple plurality system like the one used in the U.S. at least at the district level, namely, mechanical and psychological factors. The former indicates the immediate effects of the formula that translates the vote share into seats in a particular election. Mechanically, the plurality rule destroys third parties due to underrepresentation, meaning their share of the seats is inferior to the votes they gain at the poll (while almost all electoral rules in use favor larger parties to some degree, simple plurality discriminates against third parties the most). Psychological factor is in work when the voters come to realize that their ballots for smaller parties are either merely wasted, or may indirectly help their least favorite candidates (i.e., even though they favor the runner-up over the winner, they could face the lesser evil by not wasting their votes on a favorite but hopeless candidate). Then, polarization takes place as the initial third party voters are divided along major two-party line in an attempt to avoid the worst outcome; this is sophisticated or strategic voting. Yet for Duverger's Law to work perfectly, there should be another strategic action on the political elites' part. As Riker points out, and many party theorists emphasize (Schlesinger 1966; Downs 1957; Aldrich 1995; Cox and McCubbins 1993), office-seekers and resource providers such as donors and party activists should opt for entry. How often, if at all, will they be willing to form a new party? At least not as often as in a proportional representation system, seems the answer. Candidates who do not finish first have a substantial chance of getting seats in a PR system, depending on district magnitude, or under a run-off system provided that the supporters of the eliminated candidates vote for the initial runner-up in the second round.

Indeed, even the defeated candidates would reserve more political influence than they would in a SMSP system through the option of endorsing a winning candidate.

Strictly speaking, "the true effect of the simple-majority system is limited to local bipartism" (Duverger 1954, 223). Thus, even under simple plurality, we may observe more than two nationally competitive parties in combination with an effective number of parties averaging around two at district level.

What are some factors that reduce the possibly numerable (sum of locally viable parties, if they are fragmented by region and even districts) parties to the viable two at the national level? Cox argues that the competition for presidency or premiership taken place under specific conditions, as in the U.S. in the 1820s—i.e., Jacksonian Democracy— or in the Westminster model, provides the incentive for linkage across districts and candidates. Kollman and Chhibber (1998; 2004) point out that as the national government centralizes power, both candidates and voters come to have strong incentives to coordinate into national parties, *i.e.*, party aggregation. As the decisions that have local consequences are made at the federal level, voters would develop preferences over political parties in accordance with their national policy positions, and consequently abandon locally competitive yet nationally noncompetitive parties, reinforcing the national party system at the district level. Similarly, political aspirants will have incentives to gain party labels that convey national party positions, and also want to influence national policy decisions as wells as the distribution of resources to different localities. Under the influence of the U.S. military occupation, South Korea adopted the electoral rule of Single Member Simple Plurality to decide the outcome of primary district elections.[20] Although Korean legislature had an upper tier, it did not serve the

[20] Except for the period between 1973 and 1988, during which time the district magnitude was 2.

usual purpose of mitigating the disproportionality inherent in plurality rule of translating votes into seats for a long time. On the contrary, the upper tier was contrived for the largest party to secure a majority in the legislature. It was not until 2004 that a partial proportional representation system was adopted for electing members of the National Assembly.[21] The institutional features such as strong presidency and the use of a national tier to inflate the size of legislative majority should provide politicians and political parties with an incentive to nationalize across individual districts, and quite possibly, across regions (Cox 1997; Duverger 1954).

In addition, despite the reintroduction of local elections in 1991, Korean local and regional governments are not autonomous in terms of both finance and policy initiative.[22] Centralized power with well-developed state apparatus and bureaucracy characterizes Korean government. Moreover, electoral laws concerning political party formation facilitate party aggregation in Korea. It is required by law that a political party should have headquarters in more than five regional administrative divisions.[23] This provision ensures that no overtly regional party can emerge, at least in theory. Although the combined theoretical predictions point to the convergence toward a national two-party system, Korea has constantly had a multi-party system at the national level for an extended period.

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[21] 54 out of 300 seats are allocated to those elected by second ballots cast for party lists.

[22] See Chhibber and Kollman (1998; 2004) for the importance of political and economic centralization in the process of party aggregation. Hicken (2009) discusses linkage incentives in detail.

[23] Up until 2004, the law also required that a political party should have local branches in no less than a tenth of the Assembly election districts, across more than five regional administrative divisions, and no more than a quarter of its local branches can be concentrated within a region.

The size of party system is not determined solely by electoral rules; the number of social cleavages is also positively related with the number of political parties when the electoral system is permissive (Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994; Amorim and Cox 1997; Clark and Golder 2006; Golder 2006). In other words, parties would multiply in proportion to the degree of social heterogeneity under a permissive electoral system such as proportional representation.

Most research on the number of social cleavages and political parties, however, admit that the number of parties does not automatically explode with the adoption of proportional representation system, nor does it immediately shrink to 2 with the introduction of SMSP system. The size of the regional and national party system has something to do with the number of social cleavages of a society; the number of *politicized* cleavages,[24] if I may add. Simply by looking at the ENP's, one can survey the level of fragmentation of local, regional and national party system, whereas any discrepancy in size between different levels of party system and different geographical units leads to the source of deviations from what is expected by theory.

Table 1-1 presents the history of presidential elections in South Korea since 1948, the year in which both the Constitutional Assembly formed and a presidential election

[24] The number of social cleavages may depend on the empirical measures. In other words, what data is available and how to conceptualize it. Insights are drawn from freezing hypothesis and displacement of conflicts; a party system reflects the institutionalization and freezing of cleavage alignment /parties organize and mobilize particular biases to gain dominant position.

took place for the first time after liberation from Japanese colonial rule in 1945, and the subsequent division and occupation of Korea by the Soviet and U.S. military forces.

Table 1-1: The Number of Effective Parties in Presidential Elections in South Korea

Presidential Elections		
Year	National N	Comments
1948	1.14	Elected by the Legislators
1952	1.78	
1956	1.73	
1960	1.00	Due to Death of Maj. Competitor
1963	2.16	
1967	2.25	
1971	1.98	
1972	1.00	Electoral College
1978	1.00	Electoral College
1979	1.00	Electoral College
1980	1.00	Electoral College
1981	1.17	Electoral College
1987	3.40	
1992	3.02	
1997	2.76	
2002	2.18	
2007	3.01	
2012	2.01	

In Korea, single member simple plurality system has been the standard in electoral rule that governs both the presidential and legislative elections, with a twist. As for presidential elections, the intermittent periods of civil and military authoritarianism

pose a challenge for the interpretation of election results as well as the application of the theory *per se*. Out of 16 presidential elections in the country's over sixty years' worth of electoral history, the first was conducted by legislative representatives. The 4^{th}, in 1960, was run with no competitor against the incumbent Rhee Syngman due to the sudden death of the opponent. For presidential elections in the decade after 1971 (8^{th}~12^{th}), a variation of electoral college was always in function, effectively denying the people the right to vote. Also, vote buying as well as government officials' direct involvement with campaigns were not rare before the 1970's. In short, a continuous period of free and fair presidential elections only began in December 1987, with the advent of the democratization in June of the same year. From then on, simple plurality has served as the unchanging rule for presidential elections, where the whole country is one big national district. All the votes for a candidate are summed up across regions, and then the plurality winner is elected as the president. Table 1-1 shows $ENP_{national}$ for presidential elections.

In absence of disturbing influences, it is expected that the combination of pure plurality rule and a powerful presidency would be related not only to a two-party system at the district level but also a national two-party system. On the contrary, for elections between 1987 and 1997, ENP is closer to 3 than 2, although the trend shows a sign of convergence toward M+1 rule. However, that the size of national party system is close to 2 may or may not mean less regional voting. It may be that the nation is simply divided into two parts that support a different party from each other, as much as a high fragmentation of the national party system may or may not point to a territorial fragmentation in terms of electoral support. A survey of $ENP_{regional}$ quickly settles this question.

Table 1-2: The Effective Number of Parties for Presidential Elections (Regional)

Region	1987	1993	1997	2002	2007	2012
Seoul	3.47	3.11	2.53	2.14	2.75	2.01
Busan	2.35	1.73	2.42	1.87	2.53	1.93
Daegu	1.79	2.36	1.68	1.56	1.92	1.47
Incheon	3.35	3.28	2.88	2.23	3.05	2.01
Gwangju	1.12	1.05	1.01	1.1	1.54	1.17
Daejeon	3.73	3.54	2.78	2.15	3.62	2.01
Ulsan	2.57	2.47	2.5	2.4	2.85	1.94
Gyeonggi	3.32	3.31	2.94	2.2	2.87	2.01
Gangwon	2.35	3.04	2.84	2.22	2.93	1.91
Chungcheong(North)	3.09	3.37	2.97	2.26	3.46[25]	1.99
Chungcheong(South)	2.95	3.34	2.67	2.25	3.62	1.99
Jeolla(North)	1.39	1.21	1.13	1.19	1.48	1.31
Jeolla(South)	1.22	1.12	1.07	1.14	1.59	1.24
Gyeongsang(North)	1.95	2.11	2.13	1.7	1.81	1.45
Gyeongsang(South)	2.25	1.56	2.35	1.88	2.71	1.88
Jeju	2.81	3.17	2.8	2.11	3.48	2.02

[25] Not only these numbers indicate that Chungcheong—including Daejeon metropolis—displayed the strongest support for Independent Lee, Hoi-Chang (28.9%, 23.4% 33.2%, respectively, when his national share was 15.07%), but also that the two major parties obtained their fair share in the region. The 2007 Presidential Election had an unusually full slate of candidates; 5 out of 10 candidates gained more than 3 percent of votes nationally with the electoral support for the two smallest party candidates more or less evenly distributed across regions.

Data: Republic of Korea National Election Commission



Figure 1-1: Effective Number of Parties in Select Regions (Presidential Elections 1987-2012)

Overall, whereas the regional party system in Seoul and greater Gyeonggi area, including Incheon metropolis, consistently reflects the national party system, the South diverts widely from the national standard. For the voters in Jeolla region (including Gwangju metropolis), there exists practically only one choice when it comes to the candidate for presidency—the democratic party. On the other hand, Gyeongsang region makes only slightly more diversified choices in presidential elections; the lineage of the longtime government party since the era of Park Chung Hee is usually the preferred choice here.[26] In other words, political rivalry between the two regions appears to affect

[26] A notable exception to this overall trend in the greater Gyeongsang region is Ulsan, where factories for HyunDai conglomerate are concentrated and the influence of labor unions are considered among the strongest in the country. Also, there are more voters migrated from other regions in the city compared to the rest of Gyeongsang region, and a leftist minor party—the Democratic Labor party garnered its biggest support in this area.

the voting decisions, resulting two nationally viable parties with distinctive regional bases.

The deviation from the convergence toward the ENP of 2 in the 2007 Presidential Election exemplifies how the coupling of a political party or candidate and a region always inflates the size of national party system. An intermittent player in the game of regional rivalry, the Chungcheong region and its native son Lee, Hoi-Chang provide the explanation for the increased national and regional ENP.

Regional Cohesion of the Votes for Major Parties: Changes and Implications

The degree of regional concentration of electoral support for a political party can be estimated by taking the average deviation of a party's regional vote shares from the party's national vote share.[27] This measure can be used within comparative contexts as

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[27] n= number of regions (provinces)

$size_i$= the proportion of ith region's population

V_i= a party's vote share in i^{th} region

V_N=a party's national vote share

Regional Concentration of Party (Weighted Average) = $\sum_{i=1}^{n} |V_i - V_N| \times size_i$

Or,

Regional Concentration of Party (Unweighted Average) = $\sum_{i=1}^{n} |V_i - V_N| / n$

Theoretically, the measure begins at 0, where there is no deviation of support for a party from its national share across all regions, and can never reach 1. The closer to 0 the value thus yielded is the more nationally balanced support the party receives.

well. The level of regional cohesion can be compared across countries and election years simply by comparing the means of all political parties in a country, or in a given election year.

Figure 1-2 shows how regionally dispersed the electoral support for the longtime governing party, Saenuri (meaning new world; former labels for this party include the Democratic Liberals, New Korea Party and Grand National Party) on the one hand, and the opposition democratic party that the former president Kim DaeJung formed and led and its successors on the other. This dichotomy may be overly simplistic in that there have been numerous dispersions and regroupings of elite party members across ideological line, and frequent changes in party labels. However, given the centrality of party bosses in Korean party politics and their visibility in the public's eye—established party leaders function as 'brand name' as party labels do in a stable party system—, it is possible to trace the paths the handful of major party leaders have taken. Moreover, Korean public opinion surveys substituted party identification survey item with government party vs. opposition party leaning survey items based on the assumption that habitual supporters for either party develop something equivalent to partisanship over the years. Here, the party defined as the opposition is the group(s) of politicians whose leader and presidential candidate has been Kim Dae Jung since the 1970's, and although Kim was finally elected to presidency in 1997, his party had been 'the' opposition for a long time, hence the label.



Figure 1-2: Regional Concentration of Party Support over Time in Korea (Presidential 1987-2012)

It is noteworthy that as $ENP_{national}$ has been dropping, converging to Duverger's prediction, the democratic party has increasingly broadened its appeal outside Jeolla region, reflected in the smaller values of its deviation term. In fact, the degree of regional cohesion was virtually the same for the two parties in the 2012 presidential election. The convergence implies that the two major parties are similarly nationalized outside their home regions for presidential elections. Although an election will be partially determined by the size of population and turnout rates in individual regions, there seems no systematic bias against the traditional democratic party embedded in regional division outside Gyeongsang.

The pattern presented in Figure 1.2 also gives a perspective into one of key research agenda for Korean electoral studies in recent years. The effects of age or generation gaps and ideology on vote choices are found to be increasingly important, and

whether these factors would replace or overshadow region as the main explanatory variable for election results is an important question to be examined. In general, a significant regional effect, independent of partisanship, age and ideology, on voting decisions is regularly observed for most of the elections in my study. Yet the pattern found above has a crucial implication for the findings at the individual level. Regional cohesion score for the traditional opposition-democratic party decreases, as the explanatory power of age and ideology increases. Because Jeolla residents are uniquely more progressive than the residents of other regions, and the older (above 50) are distinctively more conservative than the younger, the nationalization of the opposition party indicates that a process of party sorting—matching of policy views and party identification—is taking place in the Korean electorate. As I will present in chapter 3, both northern and southern Gyeongsang voters were indifferent between the two major parties' presidential candidates in the 2012 election, when the two parties converge in the figure above.

Is short, as the opposition-democratic party has broadened its electoral appeal outside its home region, a process of matching of the parties and supporters probably has taken place in the national electorate. The causal direction is not established, yet the regions have become ideologically distant as the parties become polarized.The emerging electoral cleavages are subsumed into the old party system based on regional division.

1.2 MEASURING REGIONAL VOTING IN LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS

Interpreting ENPs for National Assembly elections is carried out in somewhat more complicated institutional and political contexts. Although SMSP has been used to decide the outcome of primary district elections for the longest period, this norm was

disturbed by the adoption of 2-seats districts between 1973 and 1988. In addition, Korean national legislature has an upper tier, which did not serve the usual purpose of mitigating the disproportionality of electoral rule in translating votes into seats until 2004. On the contrary, the upper tier was contrived for the largest party to secure a majority in the legislature.[28] Up until 2004, voters are expected to have depended upon the same reasoning process as under pure SMSP system, since they only had one ballot each, and the way the upper tier seats were allocated ensured that a larger party would be more advantaged in the upper tier[29].

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[28] From the introduction of a second tier in 1963 to 1973, at least 50% of the national tier seats were warranted for the largest party. Between 1973 and 1980, the president nominated candidates for the national tier seats, and an electoral college voted to accept or reject the whole list. Between 1981 and 1987, the largest party was always granted the two thirds of the national tier seats. Between 1988 and 1992, the 50% rule was restored.

[29] Voters, of course, can vote both strategically and sincerely at the same time. A strong supporter of a minor party, which should overcome the national 3% threshold to be awarded a seat, would vote for the minor party candidate with little chance of winning in his district, in calculation that the minor party will nationally garner more than 3% of total votes.

Many minor parties—mostly leftist parties based on labor unions—resort to this logic when mobilizing for votes. When successful, this voting pattern contributes to increase national ENP.

Table 1-3: Effective Number of Parties (National Assembly Elections)

Legislative Elections		
Year	National N	Mean (distN)
1948	14.28	3.48
1950	40.06	5.58
1954	6.83	3.85
1958	3.39	2.66
1960	5.51	4.26
1963	.	3.61
1967	.	2.15
1971	.	2.05
1973	3.72	3.50
1978	4.58	3.79
1981	5.03	4.08
1985	4.03	3.32
1988	4.22	2.83
1992	3.75	2.73
1996	4.43	3.01
2000	3.10	2.57
2004	3.02	2.54
2008	3.44	2.37
2012	2.91	2.22

It is apparent from the table that in legislative elections, the convergence toward M+1 rule does not seem to happen as of 2012, at the national level. Setting aside the segment where district magnitude was 2, neither in the highly volatile earlier decades of the country nor under the relatively stable party system after 1987, the national ENP reached 2.

There are several reasons why there are more legislative parties than presidential ones. First, party switching is not infrequent in Korea. Due to the lack of open primaries, nomination process is mostly controlled by party bosses and high officials, who may or may not grant party nomination to local favorites or even incumbents. Party bosses may punish low loyalty by not nominating the renegade; they sometimes do so in favor of

fresher and more popular candidates. (Aspiring) legislative members respond by switching parties, creating new parties, or running as an independent. If not enough to win the seat, the votes they get are often enough to fragment local party system. Those who win the election often join one of the major parties afterwards, in an attempt to influence the legislative procedure and participate in presidential campaigns, *i.e*., to be a member of a major party. In addition, minor party candidates tend to do better in legislative or local elections, when the local condition is permissive—such as the concentration of supporters for a less popular party in a locality or district. Most importantly, although only the district votes are presented here, the impact of second ballot-partial proportional representation system reserved for the upper tier may well have been an inflating factor for the national legislative party system since 2004.

Table 1-4 shows the changes in $ENP_{regional}$ from 1985 (2-seats district) to 2012 National Assembly elections, and Figure 1-3. summarizes the secular trends in Greater Seoul, Jeolla and Gyeongsang areas and compares them to the national effective number of parties in each election. Note that from the 1988 election on, Jeolla region consistently maintained the smallest regional party system in the country before 2012, whereas there was virtually no difference in the region's viable number of parties from the national mean in 1985. Gyeongsang deviation from the national ENP is not as severe as Jeolla in terms of size. What is masked by this number, however, is that the higher fragmentation in the region is not mainly attributable to its support for the democratic party candidates. Both conservative and leftist minor parties such as the Liberal Democratic Coalition and the Democratic Labor, as well as independent candidates have garnered more votes than democratic candidates in many cases. The more fragmented regional party system in

Gyeongsang indicates less uniform vote choice compared to that of Jeolla, although the overall level of democratic support in Gyeongsang is still lower than the national average.

Table 1-4: Effective Number of Legislative Parties (Regional)

Region	1985	1988	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012
Seoul	3.30	4.41	3.37	3.41	2.46	2.68	2.54	2.42
Busan	3.28	2.58	3.38	2.98	2.30	2.25	3.33	2.59
Daegu	3.93	2.72	3.08	4.66	2.37	2.08	2.38	2.33
Incheon	3.43	3.63	3.78	3.43	2.82	2.73	2.86	2.35
Gwangju	3.22	1.52	2.09	1.63	1.54	2.29	2.09	2.85
Daejeon	3.24	3.01	4.49	3.60	3.20	3.14	3.34	3.16
Ulsan	4.40	4.65	3.42	5.08	4.34	3.79	2.90	2.54
Gyeonggi	3.84	4.33	3.46	4.20	2.93	2.58	2.62	2.43
Gangwon	3.39	3.50	3.52	4.83	3.19	2.82	3.25	2.34
Chungcheong(North)	2.68	3.14	3.37	3.65	3.55	2.65	3.22	2.49
Chungcheong(South)	3.68	3.02	3.73	2.75	3.04	3.34	2.97	3.15
Jeolla(North)	3.69	2.19	2.60	2.29	1.88	2.09	2.39	2.71
Jeolla(South)	4.14	1.91	2.25	1.86	1.59	2.60	2.24	2.48
Gyeongsang(North)	3.74	3.35	4.30	5.50	3.05	2.51	2.54	2.31
Gyeongsang(South)	3.83	2.72	3.13	3.50	2.62	2.73	3.06	2.94
Jeju	4.98	4.77	4.85	4.18	2.37	2.42	3.12	2.96



Figure 1-3: Effective Number of Parties in Select Regions (1985-2012 National Assembly Elections)

Figure 1-4. displays the variation in regional electoral support for the governing-conservative party and the opposition-democratic party over time (1985-2012) in Korea. The dramatic rise in regional cohesion of the votes for the democratic party in 1988, compared to the 1985 level, confirms that the 1987 presidential election was critical in shaping the subsequent election outcomes. The cohesion score for the democratic party in the 1988 National Assembly election is close to its score in 1987, at about .22 and .24.



Figure 1-4: Regional Concentration of Party Support over Time in Korea (National Assembly 1985-2012)

Despite fluctuations that are partly a function of the size of alternatives (number of parties competing in an election), the regional cohesion scores for the two major parties exhibit secular trends in opposite direction. As the legislative democratic party has become more nationalized, as it has been in presidential elections as well, the electoral support for the legislative conservative party became more regionally concentrated since the 2000 election. Beginning in 2000, the conservative party has maintained roughly constant regional cohesion score of electoral support at both levels of elections. I provide analyses for individual elections in chapters 2 and 3, yet it should be noted that the 2000 National Assembly election is the first election after the conservative party lost presidency, and all the benefits of being the incumbent's legislative party.

To summarize, in both presidential and legislative elections in Korea, voting for the two major parties became suddenly and extremely regionalized in 1987. The

exclusive electoral support for the democratic party among Jeolla voters, and their consequent abandonment of the long-time governing party, were molded into a consistent voting pattern in the 1987 presidential election. This pattern is consistent with the argument that regional voting in Korea was incited by the particular array of choice structure political elites provided in 1987 election.[30] As the legislative conservative party has become more regional after 2000, the voting pattern of regional rivalry between Jeolla and Gyeongsang still persists, although the democratic party has been gradually nationalized over the years.

[30] For example, see K. Lee 1998 and Park 1999.

CHAPTER 2.

REGONALISM AND IDEOLOGY: MOBILIZATION INCENTIVES FOR POLITICAL ELITES

2.1 CLEAVAGE MOBILIZATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES

Every society has its own set of latent and active conflicts, but not every social conflict is politicized. As discussed in Chapter 1, studies on the interaction between electoral system and social cleavages show that the number of social cleavages a society has, or may have, is not equal to the number of political parties in that society, as Duverger's Law does not necessarily hold at the national level. For a potential cleavage to become politicized, and to have any systematic impact on the political system, it is essential for political elite, who provide the voters with electoral choice, to exploit the latent opportunity of usurping power by adopting strategies to maximize votes.

The Downsian definition of political party is based on the simple assumption that professional politicians, as rational actors, are driven by the motive of self-interest, and it is the very interaction between the institution of election and personal ambition that makes representative democracy work (Schumpeter 1950). Facing next election, office seekers and holders who want to maintain a long and successful career are constrained to promise what the public wants and to deliver what the public finds at least minimally

satisfactory (Aldrich 1995, 51)[31]. However, 'what the public wants' is only a half of the story. Equally as important is what parties and political elite want. It takes political parties to pick up a particular set of cleavages and turn it into a politically activated set of cleavages. Parties, after all, are created and sustained around a set of dominant cleavages and conflicts in a given society. Schattschneider (1960) emphasizes that not every conflict is represented by political parties; the determination of dominant conflict reflects the power hierarchy of a given society in that each substitution of cleavages severs and arrays the political world in a different manner, therefore produces a new allocation of power. Parties, then, are a crucial organization for mobilizing particular biases both in the electorate and in the ruling strata so that the configuration of power relations is to be maintained. In short, social cleavage, or, the distribution of interests and beliefs among the electorate is crucial in deciding the shape of party system. Yet equally as imperative is the role of political elite. While channeling, aggregating and articulating various interests, and arraying those interests along the cleavage line, parties may or may not survive or be successful depending on the strategic decisions they make[32]. Political parties not only translate social cleavages into party competition; the party system, once

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[31] See also Downs 1957, Rohde 1979, Schattschneider 1942, Schlesinger 1966, and Schumpeter 1950.

[32] A good example is the success of the Republican Party. The latent trends in or apparent proclivities of the voting population is a critical condition that shapes a party's success or failure, but it was the ability of political elites to flexibly adapt to and employ existing or potential social cleavages that brought about the consolidation of the Republican party. By discarding Catholics in the North and slavery-supporters in the South, the party established itself as a sectional, yet nationally strong party, something the Whigs or the American party could not achieve (Gienapp 1987). As is illustrated in this example, parties sometimes seem to opt for sectional monopoly, to gain sufficient influence at the national level.

developed, contributes to its own perpetuation. It is not merely the result of other forces, but an independent factor contributing to its own stability (Sitter 2002, 429).

The case study presented in this chapter is accordingly based on the assumption that parties are capable of actively and independently mobilizing and 'politicizing' a latent conflict. The present Korean party system is almost 'frozen' in that it largely reflects the voter alignments of the 1987 Presidential Election and the subsequent Great Conservative Coalition of 1990 that emerged as a decisive electoral cleavage (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). The 2002 Presidential Election was the first race in which neither of major party candidates comes from the regional base of his party; thanks to this unique condition, the election provides an excellent opportunity to understand why and how individual political parties selectively keep a cleavage politicized.

I present the results from the post-election party elite survey I conducted after the 2002 Korean presidential election. The questionnaires were sent to district party heads, including National Assembly members who assume the same role in their districts. The parties selected were the Millennium Democratic party, the Democratic Labor, and the Grand National Party, whose candidates were invited to participate in the series of TV debates, based on their vote share in the latest election (local election in 2002). While this cross-sectional data set cannot illuminate the process by which a social cleavage is translated into partisan preference, it can contribute to understanding the translation of partisan preference into votes. The latter process involves factors such as monetary and organizational resources and media access (Cox 1997, 26-27); in short, it requires the role of political party.

The data collected from this survey, while limited, provide a glimpse into how party personnel directly responsible for planning and conducting election campaigns perceive and utilize regional cleavage in their electoral strategies. My approach, and any

research on Korean voting behavior that explore political consequences of regionalism, should first verify regionalism expressed in voter attitude. Accordingly, I give a portrayal of the Korean electorate; in particular, changes in their partisanship, ideology and attitudes toward out-groups over time.

2.2 REGIONALISM IN MASS OPINION

In this section, I look at the landscape of regionalism in the minds of the voters.

2.2.1 Social Distance between Regions

Polls that include a measure of regionalism or its effects are few; and empirical research on the subject was limited in the period when regional animosity was at its most intense –from the 1987 critical election until the first government turnover.[33]

There are four post-election surveys that offer items drawing upon Bogardus scale of social distance between regions.

"The social distance approach may contribute to sociometrics in a number of ways. One illustration may be given: By obtaining the reactions of persons in one geographic area or in one cultural region toward people living in a different geographical area or cultural region the social distance approach may have predictive value regarding

[33] The only empirical survey on the subject was conducted by the Korean Sociology Association under the title of Regional Conflict Survey in Korea in 1988. See J. Kim 1988, Jhee 2015, and Kim and Cho 2015.

possible outbreaks of intergroup hostilities and of possible developments of intergroup cooperation and assimilation" (Bogardus 1947, 306).

In 1988, 1997 and 2000, the respondents were asked if they would marry or accept as a business partner someone from a particular region. In 2012, they were asked if they would accept someone from a particular region as their own or their children's marriage partner.

Error! Reference source not found. 2-1 to 2-4 display the mean scores of regional group, presenting the proportion of respondents in each group who refuse to marry someone from a particular region. Respondents clearly display in-group favoritism in general. While the attitude toward the rest of the nation seems quite bland, more than a fourth of the people outside Jeolla would not marry a Jeolla native. Those residing in Gyeongsang, the rival region, especially care to keep the distance. Jeolla natives are even more unpopular than someone from North Korea—many of whom do not have relatives or resources regarded important for building a family. While the distance between the two rival regions, Gyeongsang and Jeolla, is the widest, Jeolla is the least preferred region among the respondents in general. The respondents are even less inclined to do business together with someone from Jeolla(see appendix).

Table 2-1: Willingness to accept someone from a particular region as a family member's marriage partner

Respondent Residence	Seoul	Gyeonggi	Gangwon	Chung cheong	**Jeolla**	Gyeong sang North	Gyeong sang South	North Korea
Other	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	**0.27**	0.08	0.08	0.13
Chungcheong	0.03	0.01	0.04	0.01	**0.36**	0.05	0.04	0.18
Jeolla	0.07	0.04	0.07	0.05	**0.04**	**0.20**	**0.20**	0.23
Gyeongsang North	0.07	0.04	0.06	0.07	**0.40**	0.01	0.01	0.24
Gyeongsang South	0.07	0.05	0.05	0.04	**0.36**	0.03	0.01	0.18
Total	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.03	**0.28**	0.08	0.07	0.17

Note. The Korean Sociology Association Regional Conflict Survey in Korea in 1988

Table 2-2: Social Distance Among Regions: Willingness to Marry Someone from a Particular Region (1997)

Respondent Residence	Seoul/ Gyeonggi	Gangwon	Chung cheong	**Jeolla**	Gyeongsang	Jeju	**North Korea**
Other	0.01	0.03	0.03	**0.20**	0.09	0.06	**0.14**
Chungcheong	0.04	0.02	0.02	**0.20**	0.03	0.07	**0.13**
Jeolla	0.06	0.11	0.06	**0.00**	**0.16**	0.06	**0.18**
Gyeongsang North	0.05	0.04	0.06	**0.27**	0.03	0.06	**0.27**
Gyeongsang South	0.05	0.04	0.07	**0.40**	0.05	0.09	**0.27**
Total	0.03	0.04	0.05	**0.22**	0.08	0.07	**0.18**
N	1171	1162	1162	1172	1165	1158	1150

Note. The 15th Presidential Election Survey by the Institute for Korean Election Studies with the Korean Social Science Data Center

Table 2-3: Social Distance Among Regions: Willingness to Marry Someone from a Particular Region (2000)

Respondent Residence	Seoul/ Gyeonggi	Gangwon	Chung cheong	**Jeolla**	Gyeongsang	Jeju	**North Korea / Foreign**
Other	0.00	0.01	0.02	**0.09**	0.04	0.03	**0.13**
Chungcheong	0.01	0.04	0.02	**0.24**	0.07	0.06	**0.15**
Jeolla	0.01	0.02	0.02	**0.02**	0.04	0.03	**0.12**
Gyeongsang North	0.00	0.02	0.01	**0.23**	0.02	0.01	**0.29**
Gyeongsang South	0.01	0.00	0.00	**0.09**	0.01	0.00	**0.10**
Total	0.00	0.01	0.01	**0.11**	0.04	0.02	**0.14**
N	1100	1100	1100	1100	1100	1100	1100

Note. The 16th National Assembly Election Survey by the Korean Social Science Data Center

Table 2-4: Social Distance Among Regions: Marriage of Respondent or Child (2012)

Respondent Residency	Seoul/ Gyeonggi	Gangwon	Chungcheong	**Jeolla**	Gyeongsang	Jeju
Other	0.01	0.05	0.07	**0.14**	0.10	0.10
Chungcheong	0.04	0.12	0.03	**0.24**	0.08	0.13
Jeolla	0.04	0.13	0.05	**0.01**	**0.17**	0.11
Gyeongsang North	0.04	0.07	0.07	**0.23**	0.01	0.07
Gyeongsang South	0.03	0.04	0.04	**0.18**	0.01	0.04
Total	0.02	0.06	0.06	**0.15**	0.08	0.09
N	2047	2047	2047	**1997**	2046	2046

Note. The 2012 19th National Assembly Election Survey by Seoul National University and the Korea Research

It appears that attitudes toward other regions adjust to the level of conflicts between the in-group and out-group, while the overall pattern persists.[34] For example, Southern Gyeongsang people are more hostile toward Jeolla in 1997 when Kim Dae Jung, the perennial favorite of Jeolla was finally elected as president on the fourth try. He had run against President Kim YoungSam—a native son of Gyeongsang South—twice in the past for presidency. In fact, the two Kims' rivalry brought about the regional divide of 1987 election that shaped the Korean party system after democratization. Usually less extreme in their electoral support, people in Gyeongsang South exhibited more hostile attitude toward Jeolla at this particular moment.

While the overall hostility toward Jeolla decreased during Kim Dae Jung presidency, northern Gyeongsang remained distant to the region. In 2012, regional conflict is on the rise, and even Jeolla developed out-group negativity toward Gyeongsang.

2.2.2 Experience of Regional Discrimination

The 1997 and 2000 survey also included a set of questions that ask the respondents to report their experience in the following types of discrimination on account of where they come from; insult, financial loss, disadvantage in getting a job,

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[34] Regionalism at individual level can be defined in terms of social identity; we derive the sense of who we are from the groups we belong to, region, in this case. As Iyengar et al. point out, the definitional test of social identity requires not only positive sentiment for one's own group, but also negative sentiment toward those identifying with opposing groups (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012). See also Allport 1954; Sherif et al. 1961; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Conover 1988, Green, Palmquist and Schickler 2002), Kinder and Kam 2010.

disadvantage in promotion, and being ignored and/or bullied within a group they belong to.

The measure of regional discrimination thus ranges from 0, no such experience, to 5, having suffered all five types of unfair treatment.



Figure 2-1: Average Experience of Discrimination by Home Region (1997)

The figure above shows that a person of Jeolla origin has personally encountered roughly one of the five scenarios of discrimination listed here, on average. The score is in a shark contrast to the experience of people from North Gyeongsang, the home of three presidents who ruled consecutively for more than three decades in total.

An ANOVA (Bonferroni) of the above result confirms that Jeolla experience is unique; people from Jeolla have experienced unfair treatment significantly more than people from all other regions, and North Gyeongsang also gets distinctively better treatment than people from Jeolla or Other regions that include North Korea.

A logit estimation of the 1997 election shows that experience of discrimination does affect voting decision between the ruling New Korea Party and the opposition National Congress for New Politics (NCNP), the impact of other determinants of the vote controlled. A one unit rise in the variable measuring personal encounter with regional discrimination increases the likelihood of a Kim Dae Jung (NCNP) vote by 9 percent (0 to 5 scale, $p<.05$).[35]

The KSDC repeated the same questions once in their subsequent survey for the 2000 National Assembly Election.

Three years into a first Jeolla presidency, a much smaller segment of Jeolla people reported personal experience of discrimination. Anova analysis indicates that only Jeolla experience is significantly distinct from that of the other regions this time.

A logit estimation of 2000 election outcome equivalent to the 1997 model was run, and personal experience of discrimination did not have statistically significant effect on vote choice.

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[35] The effects of socioeconomic factors (age, gender, education and income); regions (North and South Gyeongsang, Chungcheong, Jeolla); ideology, partisanship, opinion on the electoral alliance of Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong-Pil; retrospective evaluation of government performance and blame the conservative incumbent party are all controlled in the estimation.



Figure 2-2: Average Experience of Discrimination by Home Region (year: 2000)

Then, social distance between regions is true and durable; its consequences are real. People from Jeolla region are isolated and avoided, encountering discrimination significantly more people from northern Gyeongsang, the regional base of the traditional ruling party. Also, the out-group hostility was the greatest between the two regions.

The 2002 Presidential Election was arguably held at the time when regionalism in mass opinion was at the lowest, especially in Jeolla, after the rule of their first president.

2.3 THE 16TH PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION SURVEY

The survey data used here is gathered from the post-election elite survey I conducted in January, 2003 after the 16th Korean presidential election was held on December 19th, 2002. The goal of the survey was to directly question the local party heads, including national legislators, who usually are responsible for managing the presidential election campaigns at the district level, about how and why they resort to a certain set of campaign strategies.

Survey items asked the respondents if they had ever evoked regionalism and related issues in an effort to maximize their candidate's votes in their districts. Blatant regionalism in Korea is positioned similarly to blatant racism in the U.S., and the survey participants may be reluctant to acknowledge their utilizing regionalism for electoral gain. By asking the local party heads if their strongest opponent had ever relied on a regionalist campaign strategy, I endeavored to obtain more accurate information on the level of cleavage mobilization in individual districts done by local party elites.

2.3.1 The Continuing Regional Cleavage

The winner of the 16th Presidential Election, Roh, MooHyun, was a former human/ labor rights lawyer, a member of the National Assembly, and a minister of Kim DaeJung administration. He was well-known for his stellar performance in the investigative hearings of Chun Doo Hwan, yet he lacked the patronage of a strong party sect. A native son of Busan, South Gyeongsang, he started his political career in the Reunification Democratic party of Kim Young Sam, but did not join him in the merger with the then ruling party Democratic Justice in 1990. He remained in a liberal minor

party, and eventually joined Kim, Dae Jung's National Congress party before the 1997 election. In a failed challenge in the 2000 National Assembly election, Roh ran as a Democratic candidate in Busan, leaving the Seoul district where he held seat, in a pursuit of overcoming the obstacle of regionalism.

Generation effect was quite strong in the 2002 presidential election that Roh won. Voters under 45, especially the age cohort that experienced the democratic movement of the 1980's as young adults, not only voted heavily for Roh but also organized the nation's first online-based support group for the candidate.

In a close race against the opposition Grand National Party candidate, Lee Hoi-Chang, Roh's campaign focused on building the image of a young candidate that was reform-minded, down-to-earth, close to the people and free from corruption. In a word, the candidate's marketability hinged upon his distance from the older Lee. Lee had an impeccable law career, having been appointed as the youngest-ever Supreme Court judge, and subsequently headed various state commissions that monitor elections (the National Election Commission) and government revenue and expenditures (the Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea). He briefly held the position of prime minister in Kim Young Sam administration before publicly breaking off with the president, refurbishing the incumbent party, and running as its presidential candidate in 1997. Having been known as a man of principle and a conservative reformer, his upright image became tainted when his two sons were suspected of deliberately avoiding compulsory military service and it became known that his campaigns received a vast amount of illegal contributions.[36]

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[36] President Roh demanded a thorough investigation into illegal contributions to both his and Lee's camp. It was revealed that the conservative party received truckloads of cash

As Lee's pledge to clean politics was losing credibility, Roh's petition to end the old, corrupt politics and replace it with politics of new generation gathered more support.

In campaign speeches, Roh used key phrases such as without money, without networks, and without sponsors repeatedly, to describe his political career and presidential campaign. He also emphasized that the pivotal issue of the election was, by any standard, making a change, by ending the old politics.[37]

On the surface, thus, regionalism does not appear to have played a central role for this election. The candidates seldom mentioned regionalism, at least in TV debates and official appearances, and in the few cases they did, they did it to denounce the negative effects of regionalism. Indeed, regionalism is so routinely condemned for arousing the unfortunate and unnecessary regional animosity that it would have constituted a political suicide to blatantly mobilize it. Open regionalism never gained the dignified status of a legitimate political cleavage in either elite discourse or mass opinion.

However, the configuration of regional support hardly changed from the last presidential election of 1997. While Jeolla region uniformly supported the Democratic candidate, more than two thirds of the voters in Gyeongsang region favored the GNP candidate. Did the apparent electoral issues such as generation change and political corruption have no effect down there?

Neither party could rely upon explicitly and continually mobilizing regional bias. As mentioned above, not only regional cleavage is generally regarded as something to

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from several chaebols, although Roh's own camp was not immune to illicit chaebol contributions, albeit in much smaller scale (You 2015, 111-112).

[37] Based on Roh's campaign speech on December 17th, 2002, at Ilsan City.

eradicate, but also was it not good for maximizing the total number of votes to indiscriminately engage in regionalist strategy.

The parties had different incentives, too. For the Millennium Democratic party, evoking regionalism contradicted their election interests on average. The party's campaign focused upon denouncing the old, corrupt insider politics, which logically contradicted any regionalist claim even in its political base, Jeolla. In any case, the Democratic party did not have much reason to campaign upon regional issues in this area, since regional cleavage was already so highly politicized it was practically a waste of limited resources. The story is a little different for the Grand National Party, though. The party had lost a presidential election for the first time in 1997 to then Democratic candidate Kim Dae Jung, and the popular view was that an unenthusiastic Gyeongsang support for Lee Hoi-Chang, the party's first presidential candidate not from that region, had helped losing the close race. For example, close to a third of southern Gyeongsang voters found an alternative in the independent Lee In Je. Facing the major opponent born and raised in southern Gyeongsang, the party had a sufficient reason to turn to a strategy that would evoke the time-honored partnership of the party and the region in the minds of ambivalent Gyeongsang voters. M. Kim (2003) points out that the electoral strategy of Gyeongsang-based ruling party had been to alienate Jeolla and the democratic party from not only Gyeongsang, but also the rest of the nation. In short, the Grand National Party had the greatest incentive to activate the anti-Jeolla cleavage in the electorate. The Democratic Labor, the only left party in legislative politics, is largely irrelevant in this conflict. They may criticize the major parties on the issue, yet would not engage in any active campaign strategy based on regionalism.

In short, given the regional distribution of party supports and the powerful but illegitimate status of regional cleavage, the parties faced dissimilar opportunity structure and choices.

I derive a few predictions concerning the strategies each party may adopt to maximize both the national and local votes. Given the conditions described above, it is reasonable to expect that the Grand National party would engage in activating regional cleavage vigorously, preferably at the local level. Those who are responsible for district campaigns would know their way to carry out this strategy, without openly relying on the national party leadership, although the national party would not prohibit this strategy in the districts, either. Voters in Gyeongsang region would be more receptive to this strategy, or so would the campaign strategists feel. Finally, district parties are expected to actively mobilize regional bias if they perceive the opponent is doing the same—by the logic of prisoner's dilemma. Also, if they feel that their districts are already sufficiently mobilized around regional cleavage, they might not want to waste limited resources on a sure thing. By the same logic, the closer the district races are, if other things are equal, regional identity might exert stronger influence on voter choice; the critical marginal votes may be cast for the candidate from the party that the region favors.

To test this scenario, two multiple regressions are done and presented below. The dependent and independent variables used are in Table 2-5.

Table 2-5: Description of Variables Used

(Regional Advantage and Campaign Strategy)

Variable	Description
Impact	ordinal variable indicating the respondent's *a posteriori* evaluation of the degree of influence regional cleavage exerted on the constituents' voting decisions in his/her district 1=if regional cleavage had no impact 5= if regional cleavage was extremely important
Regional Strategy	1= if the respondent's district campaign used regionalist strategy 0= if the respondent's district campaign did not use regionalist strategy
Regional Strategy (Opponent)	1= if the respondent answered that the opponent's district campaign had engaged in regionalist strategy 0= if the respondent answered that the opponent's district campaign had not engaged in regionalist strategy
Competitive	ordinal variable indicating the respondent's *a posteriori* evaluation of the level of competitiveness between the two major candidates in his/her district 1=Not Competitive 4=Very Competitive
Gyeongsang	1= if the district belongs to Gyeongsang region 0=Otherwise
Regionalism Issue	1= if the respondent selected regional cleavage as the single most influential issue that affected the constituents' voting decisions in his district 0 =if the respondent selected an issue other than regional cleavage as the most influential issue that affected voting decisions in his district
Old Politics Issues	1= if the respondent selected generation shift / ending old politics as the single most influential issue that affected the constituents' voting decisions in his district 0=otherwise

Variables below have a 5-point scale that indicates:

1 'not effective,' 2 'a little effective', 3 'moderately effective,' 4 'very effective,' 5'extremely effective.'

Candidate Image (The respondent's party candidate)	Ordinal variable indicating the respondent's evaluation of the impact of the candidate's image and personality in determining election outcome in the respondent's district.

Regional Strength	ordinal variable indicating the respondent's evaluation of his party's regional appeal in the respondent's district
Regional Strength(Opponent)	ordinal variable indicating the respondent's evaluation of the regional appeal of the strongest candidate opposite the respondent's party in his district
Local Party	ordinal variable indicating the respondent's evaluation of the importance of the district party in steering and deciding the direction of campaign and strategies in the district
National Party	ordinal variable indicating the respondent's evaluation of the importance of the national party in steering and deciding the direction of campaign and strategies in the district.

Table 2-6: The Impact of Party, Region, and Party Organizations on Voting Decision Driven by Regionalism (Ordered Logit Estimation)

Impact	Coefficient	Std. Err.	Z	P>z
Gyeongsang	1.84	0.61	3.01	0.00
Competitive	0.39	0.21	1.85	0.07
Candidate Image	-0.51	0.25	-2.01	0.04
Regional Strength	0.56	0.21	2.64	0.01
Regional Strength(Opponent)	0.55	0.21	2.62	0.01
Local Party	0.58	0.21	2.84	0.01
National Party	0.47	0.22	2.18	0.03
Number of Observations=72	Pseudo R^2			0.19

Table 2-6 illustrates how several institutional and strategic conditions affect regional voting at district level, as assessed by political elites most closely involved in the local presidential campaigns. The dependent variable measures how much impact the local party officials think regionalism had on their constituents' voting decisions, and ranges from no impact to extremely important.

The regression results corroborate that Gyeongsang voters are motivated by regionalism and related issues very strongly, or local party elites and campaign managers consider them so. Note that the respondents in Gyeongsang regard regionalism as a crucial factor that influences the electoral outcome in their districts (corr=.41*). They assess that regionalism and related issues are very important in the voting decisions of their constituents. In accordance with the results of data and historical analyses I presented in the preceding chapters, Gyeongsang residents appear particularly invested in regional identity. Consider the wordings of survey question, In your opinion, how important regionalism and *related issues such as regional inequality or regional resentment* were for the voters in your district when making their voting decision? The term regionalism evokes a negative value judgment in Korean society, and is repeatedly condemned in popular political discourse as a sickness that will make the nation crumble. The question prompts the respondents to speak more freely of regionalism in their districts, by pointing out legitimate cases of regionalism. Gyeongsang region is the major beneficiary of the uneven economic development and its people are among the least discriminated, as discussed previously. The voting behavior of Gyeongsang residents looks motivated by hegemonic regionalism (Hwang 1996), after all.

Table 2-7: Evaluation of the Influence of Regionalism on Vote Given by Party Elites

	Mean	Freq.
Millenium Democrats	3.07	27
Labor	3.07	14
Grand National Party	3.56	34
Gyeongsang	3.96	25
Other Regions	2.96	50
Total	3.29	75

As anticipated, regional influence of the two major parties has a positive and significant relationship with the impact of regionalism on vote choice. The questionnaire asked the respondents to determine the relevance of their and their opponent party's weight in the region to the election outcome in their districts. As the effectiveness of the parties' regional influence in determining district election outcome increases in local party heads' evaluation, regionalism is also assessed to play an increasingly important role in the constituents' voting decisions by the respondents.

Table 2-8: Distribution of Respondents by Party and Region

Party	Gyeongsang	Other	Total
Democrats	11	16	27
Labor	3	11	14
GNP	11	23	34
Total	25	50	75

The role that both the national party and the district party in district campaigns was also deemed to have a positive relationship to the increasing importance of regionalism in district vote choices. Among the various groups and information sources that may help to

formulate local campaign strategy, the national party's steering was regarded most crucial the local party heads, closely followed by the news coverage by national media and the district party itself.[38]

The significance of campaign strategizing at the national party level on intensifying local regional voting substantiates another common notion about Korean political parties. Both the ruling and opposition parties have centralized power structure, where the president or notable party leaders have a strong control over party organization and affairs[39].

One markedly mitigating factor on the impact of regionalism on vote choice is the candidate's image and personal attributes. In other words, as the election became more candidate-centered, voting decisions became less motivated by regionalism and related issues, or so the district party heads thought. The slate of presidential candidates in 2002 did not match the voter alignments based on regional identity. In addition, one of the central messages that Roh's campaign and career carried was to break off from the era of regionalism that three Kims symbolized. The character and image of the candidates, especially their irrelevance in mobilizing regional identity, have a decreasing effect on the intensity of regional voting.

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[38] Direct contacts with the local voters and were considered informative and online newspapers were preferred to local news outlet for getting help in campaign decision making.

[39] Thus, Korean parties cannot be clearly classified by organizational forms, since they have characteristics of both cadre parties and mass bureaucratic parties. Party notables who fund most of their own election expenses (cadre party) control the party organization that has formalistic bureaucratic structure, consisting of national regional and local organizations (mass party) (Kil and Moon 2010, 154-157; Wolinetz 2002).

Table 2-9: The Impact of Region, Party and the Opponent's Strategy on Adopting Campaign Strategy in District Campaigns (Logit Estimation)

	Reg. Strategy	Marginal Effect	Reg. Strategy	Marginal Effect
Gyeongsang	2.52**	0.53	2.58**	0.54
	(3.17)		(2.92)	
Grand National Party	3.02***	0.63	2.87***	0.61
	(3.80)		(3.61)	
Regionalist Strategy	1.99*	0.44	2.41**	0.51
(Opponent)	(2.28)		(2.73)	
Candidate Campaign	-0.61*	-0.15		
	(-2.02)			
Ending Old Politics	1.19*	0.29		
	(1.66)			
Regionalism			-1.42+	-0.34
			(-1.71)	
Constant	-2.67*		-3.54***	
	(-2.06)		(-3.46)	
N	74		75	
Pseudo R^2	0.35		0.29	

Table 2-9 investigates the conditions that may induce the district party campaigns to activate regional bias in the constituents. Consistent with the conjectures provided above, the local parties that belong to Gyeongsang region or the Grand National Party engaged heavily in campaign strategies based on mobilizing regionalism of various sorts.[40] Local presidential campaigns in Gyeongsang districts were 53- percent more likely to employ regionalist strategy. When all other predictors are set at their means, a local chapter of Grand National Party is 63 percent likely to rely on regionalist campaigns.

There are two factors that clearly discourage the adoption of campaign strategy that instigates regional bias; an effective alternative and oversaturation.

[40] The survey question asked if the campaign used regionalism, regional bias or other regionalism-related issues in a positive or negative way.

The probability of adopting regionalist strategies in district-level campaigns decreases in proportion to the increasing impact of the presidential candidate's making campaign appearance in the district on determining district-level electoral outcomes. The more effective the candidate's campaigning in person was on getting more votes in local party heads' opinion, the less likely they were to resort to regionalist strategy. If a district campaign manager changed her opinion of the candidate's campaign appearance on vote choices in her district from having no impact to extremely effective, the likelihood of her adopting regionalist campaign strategy would decrease by 60 percent. Also, in districts where the single most important issue that dominates the constituents' voting choice is perceived as regionalism, district parties appear not to waste limited resources on a cleavage that cannot be exploited further.

Interestingly, those who thought that their district voters cared the most about ending old politics and bringing in new generation, utilized regionalist strategy more vigorously, other things being equal. I argue that this finding is consistent with significance of ideology and generation shift that the 2002 election represented. Those who were threatened by the electoral allure of this issue chose walking down the sure path.

Finally, in adopting regionalist strategy, district parties do so more actively when they perceive that their opponent is doing the same thing.

2.3.2 Summary of Results and Conclusions

The results, in a nutshell, support the predictions regarding the district party campaigns made above. Both Gyeongsang region and Grand Party affiliation are consistently significant, indicating a positive relationship between these two factors and the decisive influence of regionalism on vote choices, perceived by the district party

heads. Competitiveness, controlling for other things, also helps intensifying the influence of regional cleavage on vote choice, or so the campaign officials think.

2.4 THE VOTERS' CHOICE IN 2002 AND 2004: REGION AND IDEOLOGY

In this section, I examine whether the findings from the elite survey is consistent with what went on in the mass electorate.

2.4.1 The 2002 Presidential Election

Figure 2-10 presents logit estimation results for the 2002 Presidential Election. The model is comparable to those in Chapter 3, yet economic evaluation and issues are replaced by political issues.[41] In the 2002 race, Roh defeated Lee by carrying Seoul-Gyeonggi capital area, Chungcheong, Jeolla and Jeju—the entire western half of the nation. Region variables are all significant except Chungcheong and the signs are in expected direction. Although this election was the first presidential race after democratization where none of three Kims ran, region remained one of the strongest predictors of the vote. This finding matches the results of my elite survey as well. In Gyeongsang region, local party heads mobilized regional bias as a vote-getting strategy significantly more than in other regions, and they also assessed that regional identity and related issues were very important in their constituents' voting decisions. Their observation and strategy are consistent with the results of voter survey analysis. Other

[41] In both years, survey items on retrospective or prospective evaluation of the national economy are unavailable. With regard to economic issues, prioritizing price stability is negatively related to a Democratic vote, albeit weakly, in the same model used in Chapter 3.

variables set at their respective mean, the likelihood for Gyeongsang to vote against Roh increases, though less so in the southern Gyeongsang, Roh's birthplace. Democratic partisanship and positive evaluation of the performance of Kim Dae Jung government improved the likelihood of a Roh vote, as the preference for Grand National Party cut the probability of voting for Roh by more than 50 percent in the model.

Table 2-10: the 2002 Presidential Election:
Rho Moo Hyun (Democratic) vs. Lee Hoi Chang (Conservative Grand National)

	Vote for Rho Moo Hyun	Marginal Effect
Age	-1.05**	-0.23
	(-3.28)	
Male	0.05	0.01
	(0.24)	
Education	-0.23+	-0.05
	(-1.67)	
Income	-0.02	0.00
	(-0.36)	
Gyeongsang South	-0.76**	-0.18
	(-3.14)	
Gyeongsang North	-1.19***	-0.28
	(-4.18)	
Chungcheong	0.03	0.01
	(0.10)	
Jeolla	2.47*	0.32
	(2.28)	
Ideology[a]	-0.46***	-0.10
	(-4.49)	
Conservative Partisan	-2.57***	-0.56
(Grand National Party)	(-10.43)	
Democratic Partisan	1.60***	0.29
(Millennium Democrats)	(5.12)	
Evaluation of Government Performance[b]	0.51***	0.11
	(4.74)	
Efficacy[c]	0.40**	0.09
	(2.80)	
Aid to North Korea[d]	-0.52***	-0.11
	(-4.71)	
SOFA Revision[e]	-0.15	-0.03
	(-1.43)	
Constant	5.88***	
	(3.62)	
N	1094	
Pseudo R^2	0.49	

Note a. Political ideology. 5-point scale. 1=Very progressive; 5=Very conservative
b. Evaluation of Incumbent Government's Overall Performance .5-point scale.
1=Very poor;5=Very good
c. "The single vote I cast could change the direction of a policy."
1=Strongly Disagree; 4=Strongly Agree
d. "Aid to North Korea should continue regardless of the development of nuclear weapons in North Korea." 4-point scale. 1= Completely Agree; 4=Absolutely Disagree.
e. "Revising SOFA is necessary even though it may hurt the Korean-US relation."
1= Completely Agree; 4=Absolutely Disagree.

The national economy recovered quickly during Kim Dae Jung's term and continued to expand; according to the World Bank, GDP growth rate was 7.4% in the president's last year in office. With the charismatic leaders of yesteryear retiring from presidential politics, the emerging political leadership provided the voters with an opportunity to be excited about politics. The introduction of primaries for nominating presidential candidates, in particular, stimulated more voluntary participation at grass roots in an unprecedented scale.[42] This institutional change and the mass participation it kindled are what made Roh, a complete underdog before the series of 16 regional primaries began, win the presidential nomination, having garnered the critical Gwangju support at the beginning. In addition, a new way of mobilization—online campaigning— benefited Roh the most, who openly distanced himself from party machines and regional loyalty yet had the backing of a very influential internet-based voluntary organization in a country with world-leading broadband network. It was the Democratic party and Roh's campaign that actively invited the mass into electoral process, and political efficacy has a significant and positive impact on the vote for Roh.

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[42] According to Chang (2003), the anxiety over the impending retirement of Kim Dae Jung with no heir apparent and lack of competitive advantage in elections were what prompted the Democratic party elites to adopt the primaries. Having won not a single race in the 2001 by-election, the party succumbed to the demands of reform faction consisting largely of freshman and sophomore members of the National Assembly. While the new institution improved intra-party democracy and openness, it also weakened the presidential candidate's control over party leadership and elites.

The sophisticated internet campaigning that promoted the image of the candidate as a man of determined integrity in tune with ordinary people was particularly successful in attracting younger voters—major users of the internet—and small donations. Figure 2-10 shows that younger voters do prefer Roh over the conservative party candidate. According to an exit poll, Roh had a definite lead over Lee among voters in their 20's (62.1 %) and 30's (59.3 %), while Lee's electoral support came from those over 45 (Ahn 2003). According to Kang (2003)'s analysis, younger voters placed themselves and Roh close to each other and moderately left on the ideological scale of 0 to 10 that ranges from liberal to conservative. In addition, those in their 30's gave Roh the most liberal ideological score, and were most devoted to the online pro-Roh support group mentioned above. Reflecting their exposure to fierce student activism in the democratizing movement as well as material benefits of rapid economic development, the so-called 386 generation,—meaning thirty-somethings who were born in the 1960's and went to college in the 80's— emerged as the core political generation that embodies progressive, post-materialistic values (Kang 2003, 268-282).

One of the most salient issues in the 2002 election was the stance toward North Korea. As discussed in previous chapters, Kim Dae Jung administration pursued an engagement policy toward North Korea. The opposition Grand National Party harshly criticized the administration's soft stance toward the North, and insisted on economic sanctions while the country continues to build nuclear weapons. The regression result shows that opinion on this issue does affect the voting decision between two major party candidates, who differed clearly. Those who disagree with the statement Aid to North Korea should continue regardless of nuclear weapons development would likely to vote against Roh (H. Kim 2007). An unexpected tragic incidence brought another issue to public attention. The death of two school girls by a U.S army mine-clearing vehicle and

the subsequent acquittal of the drivers by the U.S courts-martial instigated waves of nation-wide vigils that demanded the revision of the treaty governing U.S. forces in South Korea, STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT (SOFA). Disagreement with the statement SOFA should be revised even though doing so may damage the Korea-U.S. relations is positively correlated with a vote for the pro-American GNP party, although the effect of the variable loses significance in the model.

In sum, the 2002 presidential election outcome was determined by the continuing impact of regions, the emergence of new political generation and culture, and some salient issues on which the parties maintain clearly different positions; paving the way into a party system where region and ideology converge.

2.4.2 The 2004 National Assembly Election

Figure 2-11 presents analyses of the 2004 the Korea Association of Electoral Studies / KSDC's the 17th National Assembly Election Survey and the 2004 Korean General Social Survey.[43] The regression results are largely comparable.

[43] The KGSS has been conducted every year since 2003. People were asked for which party they voted only in 2004 and 2012. I complement the KSDC data with the 2004 KGSS because different survey items are available.

Table 2-11: The 2004 National Assembly Election:
Uri Party (Democratic) vs. Grand National Party (Conservative)

	Uri Party Vote	Marginal Effect		Uri Party Vote	Marginal Effect
Age	-0.98+	-0.19		-2.13***	-0.48
(in logarithms)	(-1.81)			(-4.34)	
Male	-0.62*	-0.12		-0.19	-0.04
(Male=1; Female=0)	(-2.08)			(-0.70)	
Education	-0.05	-0.01		-0.10	-0.02
(8-point scale)	(-0.49)			(-0.87)	
Income	0.23	0.04	Income	-0.07+	-0.02
(5-point scale)	(1.38)		(22-point scale)	(-1.89)	
Gyeongsang South	-0.57	-0.12		-0.66+	-0.16
	(-1.55)			(-1.85)	
Gyeongang North	-0.95*	-0.21		-1.35**	-0.32
	(-2.04)			(-3.19)	
Chungcheong	0.95+	0.15		1.14*	0.21
	(1.82)			(2.48)	
Jeolla	2.14*	0.25		1.79*	0.29
	(2.02)			(2.18)	
Respondent Ideology[a]	-0.22**	-0.04	Respondent	-0.58***	-0.13
	(-3.21)		Ideology[b]	(-3.83)	
Conserv. Party Supporter	-2.06***	-0.45		-2.36***	-0.52
(Grand National Party)	(-5.15)			(-7.62)	
Democratic Party	2.19***	0.34		2.54***	0.48
(Uri Party)	(4.82)			(6.67)	
Evaluation of	0.49*	0.09		0.42*	0.09
Government[c]	(2.03)			(2.22)	
Impeach[d]	0.92***	0.17	Satisfied w/ Politics	0.29+	0.07
	(4.85)		(1=Very Satisfied;	(1.70)	
			5=Very Dissatisfied)		
Economic Stability and	-1.15***	-0.23	Prospect for	-0.17	-0.04
and Local Development[e]	(-3.88)		Politics[f]	(-1.01)	
			North Korea	-0.44**	-0.10
			Policy[g]	(-2.79)	
			Reduce Regionalism[h]	-0.31*	-0.07
				(-2.18)	
Constant		1.99		11.64***	
		(0.86)		(4.47)	
N	588			715	
Pseudo R-squared	0.58			0.61	

Note a. Political ideology. 11-point scale. 0=Very Progressive; 10=Very Conservative
b. Political ideology. 5-point scale. 1=Very Progressive; 5=Very Conservative
c. Evaluation of Incumbent Government's Overall Performance. 5-point scale. 1=Very Poor; 5=Very good
d. Impeach President Roh Moo Hyun. 4-point scale. 1=Strongly Approve; 4=Strongly Disapprove
e. Issue Most Important to the Respondent Was Economic Stability and Local Development 1=Yes; 0=No
f. Do you think the political conditions in South Korea will be 1=Much Better; 5=Much Worse
g. Please tell me how well the government is handling Policies toward North Korea 1=Very Good; 5=Very Poor
h. . Please tell me how well the government is handling the issue of Resolving Regional Conflicts 1=Very Good; 5=Very Poor

The 2004 election was dominated by one and only agenda—the impeachment of sitting President Roh Moo Hyun (Kihl 2005, 343). Just one month before the election, the majority-opposition National Assembly ousted Roh by a 193-2 vote on charges of incompetence and corruption—citing the lowest economic growth rate in 5 years (2.9 percent of the GDP growth in 2003 by the World Bank), a campaign funds scandal involving presidential aids, and the president's violation of the election law by publicly endorsing the new incumbent Uri party in the upcoming election. Although Roh's approval rating had dramatically sunk from 71.4 percent[44] to 29.2 percent[45] in his first year in office amid constant criticism of his leadership style by the conservative media and politicians, the action of an outgoing legislature encountered a great public backlash. The impeachment debacle was initiated by the disgruntled Millennium Democrats when they suddenly lost the governing party position and were replaced by a new legislative group sympathetic to the president's mandate. Uri party had been launched in November, 2003 as a coalition of mostly liberal-minded legislators gathered from across party lines,

[44] Research Plus-The Hankyoreh Daily. 2003/03/29

[45] World Research-The Kookmin Daily 2004/02/21

yet Uri party consisted largely of the former Millennium Democratic party members (35). The remaining Millennium Democratic party members joined forces with the opposition Grand National Party to pass a bill to impeach the president. The solid partnership of the opposition parties reflected the electorally and culturally threatened political elite's contempt at the president and what the president represented.[46] The regression result shows that disapproving the presidential impeachment did have a significantly positive impact on an Uri vote, in accordance with the electoral outcome, an Uri party landslide.

The election produced the first unified government by a progressive party in South Korea; Uri party, whose 49 members had been evicted from the chamber after physical brawls in an attempt to stop the bill, came back as the majority party consisting of 152 assemblymen. 108 of them were freshmen. The Constitutional Court reinstated Roh back to presidency on May 14, 2004, after one month of the election.

Figure 2-11 shows that age is an important determinant of the vote in 2004, as it was in 2002. Other things being equal, opposition votes were less significant in southern Gyeongsang, and Chungcheong support was solid this time, indicating that the presidential party widened its electoral appeal across regions. Uri party won most of the seats (25 out of 31) in the greater Jeolla region,[47] yet races were close in many districts, and five seats went to the Millenium Democratic party in Jeolla South, Kim DaeJung's home region. Although the region voiced its strong discontent with the role the Millenium Democratic party members played in impeaching the president, the underlying tie between Jeolla and the Democratic party did not completely break, as was shown in

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[46] Ahn (2005) reports that conservative politicians and pundits were calling the Roh voters fools of a people who elected someone at their level to presidency (Ahn 2005, 88), probably implying the fact Roh only finished high school due to poverty.

[47] Three of them were won by former Democratic incumbents who joined the Uri party.

the region's national tier votes. The Millenium Democrats still garnered larger than 30% of the vote share in Jeolla South and Gwangju, whereas the Uri party gained about the half of the votes.

Ideology, partisanship and evaluation of Roh administration's performance were all significant predictors of the votes. The new party's platforms and the impeachment fiasco seemed to have figured prominently in the vote choice for Uri party.

Known as the brain-child of Roh, Moo Hyun for which he nearly lost his presidency, Uri party literally means Our Party; the official name Yeol-Lin-Uri-Dang means a political party that is both open and ours. The naming conveys both Roh's path to presidency and the party's goal; participation. The party aimed to eradicate the politics of regional rivalry by shifting the axis of cleavage—making conflict of ideology more salient— and changing the scope of conflict –bringing in the segment of voters hitherto alienated from politics, to borrow Schattschneider (1960)'s words. Uri pary inherited the former administration's engagement policy toward North Korea—Sunshine Policy, endeavored to extend welfare and social services, and introduced some new regulations on the market. In short, the party position is unquestionably liberal on the ideological spectrum of Korean parties. Based on a content analysis of the formal speeches given by the legislative party leaders in the 17th National Assembly, Park (2008)[48] found that each political party had its own issue areas of saliency. While the two major parties differed

[48] Park's research relies on factor analyses of speeches, not actual legislation by the parties. While quantitative content analyses of party platforms, manifestos, and electoral programs are important in distinguishing policy preferences of s a political party (Laver and Budge 1992), the behavior of lawmakers is what makes or breaks the promise.

clearly in their economic policies and attitudes toward North Korea, Uri party focused on the Sunshine Policy and welfare expansion in their proposition. On the other hand, the Grand National party prioritized policies related to small government/ autonomy of market economy/ free trade, and demanded North Korea's denuclearization before rapprochement with the country.

Based on the analysis of KGSS in Figure 2-11, it appears that key issues on the presidential party's agenda did affect the way voters decide. Dissatisfaction with the government's policy stance toward North Korea decreases the probability of an Uri vote, whereas voters would vote less for Uri party when they think the government was doing a poor job of resolving regional conflicts. On the other hand, those whose main issue preference in the election was economic stability and local development voted significantly more for the Grand National Party, the heir of developmental state's ruling party. In sum, vote choice was most clearly defined in terms of the parties' professed ideological positions and the corresponding issue areas they own.

The 17th National Assembly offers the first complete voting records of the legislators. In a first attempt to apply NOMINATE to the Korean legislature, Chang, Kim, and Park (2012) find two significant dimensions over 146 contested bills. The 1st dimension, with a bimodal distribution, represents political competition, or position-war between the incumbent and opposition parties. The authors argue that it is the 2nd dimension that explains the fate of Uri party and Roh government. After a series of unsuccessful endeavor at ambitious reform legislation, the infant party quickly disintegrated into factions. The plummeting popularity forced Rho to adopt conservative

policies, which accelerated the depletion of his political capital. The intra party pro-Rho group voted with the president's changing position, while many went their own ways.

Uri party disbanded in 2007, a few months before the presidential election, and was merged into the United New Democratic Party with the Jeolla-based Democratic Party. While Chang et al.'s research illustrates the discrepancy between the presidential reform agenda and its execution, Uri party did attempt to implement its proposals, and given that the KGSS and KDSC surveys were conducted within a few months of the election, it is safe to assume that the respondents judged Uri party according to its initial stance (Chang, Kim, and Park 2012).

2.4.3 Summary

The 2002 Presidential and the 2004 National Assembly elections exhibit that a new cleavage was mobilized around the axis of generation by the political elite's active employment of ideology. Also, the election results indicate that the impact of regions was persistent, especially strong in northern Gyeongsang where the Grand National party had everything to gain from mobilizing the region's bias against Jeolla and the party of Jeolla. The analysis of the election outcomes is consistent with the findings from the elite survey.

As will be shown in the next chapter, the failure of Uri party meant that ideological conflict—expressed especially well in age/ generation effect—did not replace regionalism as the principal electoral cleavage. Rather, the voters are being sorted into the parties where their ideology and regional identity converge; the most noteworthy impact is that the gradual dealignment of southern Gyeongsang from the conservative party coalition.

CHAPTER 3.

ECONOMIC VOTING: MICRO LEVEL

In this chapter, I present a unified model to explore how South Korean voters relate their assessment of government performance, issue preferences and group consciousness, *i.e*., regional identity, to their vote choice.

I show that there exists a consistent and unique configuration of economic considerations that Korean voters incorporate into their voting decision, after controlling for the powerful impact of regions. Drawing upon the history of the developmental-conservative party that ruled South Korea until 1997 and the longtime opposition party rooted in the democratization movement, I argue that the former owns the economic issue area, especially related to price stability/ inflation control, and economic growth or development. Conversely, the traditional opposition party's agenda largely focused on regime change before 1997; having had no governing record, the only issue area the opposition party could rightfully claim as its own was its enduring commitment to and struggle for democracy. Even after the first horizontal transfer of power in 1998, the democratic party is more linked to issues with distinctly political contents. Thus, reform, or changing the political status quo,[49] would best describe the democratic party's agenda

[49] Reforming politics, ending corruptions (in government), demand for new political leadership— typically termed as generational change in politics—all make up the issues named by South Koreans as the nation's most important problem, in the election surveys examined in this thesis.

that often gains saliency with the emergence of a new political leader as in the 2002 election discussed in the previous chapter, for example.

In the following analyses of the presidential and legislative election surveys since democratization, I examine the change and continuity in the impacts of the survey respondents' regional identity, evaluation of the national economy, issue priority and partisanship on their voting decisions over time. In a linearly additive model, each explanatory variable is expected to correlate with the vote choice in a specific manner described below.

Based upon the preceding chapters and Korean electoral literature, a Gyeongsang resident is generally expected to support the conservative party, whereas a Jeolla resident is more likely to vote for the traditional opposition party, other things being equal. As will be shown, this seemingly solid relationship between region and party is affected by both election-specific circumstances and changes in other explanatory factors.

The voters draw upon their perception of the state of the national economy in conjunction with their issue priorities when they make an electoral decision between the two major parties. Voter evaluation of the state of the national economy, when available, is the measure I use to examine whether economic retrospective voting is found among voters. I also test if and how the voter's issue priority—what she sees as the nation's most important problem or the most critical electoral issue— affect her vote choice. Drawing upon the logic of reward-punishment model of voting and issue ownership, a simple prediction would be that the voters are less likely to vote for the incumbent—the president's— party when they feel that the economy worsened; they would vote more for the party that is better at handling the issue they regard as the most urgent, other things being equal. Thus, people who cite price stability or economic growth as the most

important national problem would vote more for the conservative party, the traditional ruling party of the developmental state.

I argue that South Korean voters used their assessment of the national economy in a different manner from their assessment of the overall government performance when making voting decision, before the first government turnover. Consistent with the logic of retrospective voting, negative opinion of the overall government performance almost invariably and consistently led to sanctioning the incumbent party electorally throughout the period covered in this study. On the other hand, voters were more likely to vote for the opposition party when they felt the national economy was doing fine.

Here, the rationality of South Korean voters is put to test. There exists a body of works advocating some form or another of voter rationality,[50] yet it remains unchanged that any habitual vote will eventually undermine democratic accountability. This is why the potent and persistent impacts of region on vote choice make the scholars of Korean elections troubled. Voting, if predetermined by socio-demographic factors such as class, religion and social networks (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Lazarsfeld, Gaudet, and Berelson 1944), would be neither responsive nor rational. Regional voting may still reflect the voter's instrumental rationality—group interest— or affective attitude toward the group she identifies with; yet any additional evidence of voter rationality

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[50] The body of scholarly works which focuses on the consequence of voter sophistication is particularly relevant. Voters are rational when relying on cues and information shortcuts that political parties or reference groups provide. They can still act responsive without paying the cost of collecting processing encyclopedic knowledge. See Popkin 1995 and Lupia 1994.

The stability of partisanship also gains more evaluative thus rational dimension when perceived as the running tally of how each party has performed (Fiorina 1981).

would contribute to the understanding of the electoral connection in Korea, especially if found in early elections.

I suggest and show that Korean voters, while deeply affected by regional cleavage, exhibited uniquely rational voting behavior in that they made more room for advancing democracy as their satisfaction with the national economy increases—both undoubtedly invaluable goals of the Korean society before the 1998 transfer of power.

Research on party issue ownership and its electoral consequences spanning the electoral history of South Korea is rare. My analyses establish that Korean voters who prioritize maintaining price stability or promoting economic growth in the national agenda are more likely to support the conservative party.

I will briefly discuss how retrospective voting and issue ownership theory of voting are related, and present the analyses of election surveys on how region, economic evaluations and issue orientations all affect the vote choice.

3.1 ECONOMIC VOTING AND ISSUE OWNERSHIP

The logic underlying V. O. Key's (1968) 'reward-punishment' model of voting is one of the most intuitive of electoral studies scholarship. To borrow Lippman's simple formulation, the essence of popular government is to support the Ins when things are going well; to support the Outs when they seem to be going badly (Lippman 1925). Citizens only need to calculate the changes in their own welfare during the incumbent's time in office to make voting decisions. The model does not stipulate economic conditions to be central in the voter assessment of government performance, yet most research following its logic examines the effects of the changes in inflation, unemployment rates and real disposable income on party support (Clarke, Elliott and

Seldon 1994). A strong economy is rewarded by an increase in (electoral) support for the incumbent—often the president's— party. Conversely, the governing party is punished for a deteriorating economy by losing votes and even the office come next election.

The model is also normatively appealing. The elected are held responsible only when the electors are able to monitor and oust them when found unsatisfactory. Elections are the mechanism by which voters—principals— can sanction or reward their agents—the politicians (Duch 2001, 895). Democratic accountability thus requires a certain level of voter rationality, yet it is often questioned whether the mass public is sufficiently sophisticated to make a rational and responsible voting decision. A significant part of the public has been found lacking in basic political knowledge; incapable of processing information by coherent belief system, thus incapable of sustaining a true attitude; susceptible to elite manipulation through the use of media (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Converse 1964; Campbell et al. 1960; Zaller 1992; Iyengar and Kinder 1987). Yet voters are not fools (Key 1968, 7) when they employ retrospective evaluation as a cost-cutting device in voting decision, since knowing past performance is cheaper and more reliable information than knowing future plans (Downs 1967, 36-46; Fiorina 1981). In this Downsian definition of retrospective voting, elections do have policy implications, even though citizens are not required to know specific policies. They know the results of those policies, thus can make more direct use of concrete facts when deciding between the parties. In the absence of perfect information, it would be more rational for a voter to compare 'one actual present utility income and one hypothetical present one' than 'two hypothetical future utility incomes.'

To the electorates, parties will have different perceived strengths on policy priorities. There are two things to consider: economic voting could occur on the dimension where voters could blame or reward the incumbent party based on past

performance of the economy (attribution of responsibility). On the other hand, economic voting might occur on another dimension where voters utilize the perceived strength or emphasis of the parties on their economic policy proposals regardless of their incumbent status. Arguably, the first dimension is what the literature calls the retrospective economic voting while the second dimension represents the prospective calculus of the voters.

Since the conservative party held the presidential office throughout the years before 1998 in South Korea, the voters' retrospective assessment of incumbent performance is hard to distinguish from their prospective evaluation for the conservative party's economic policy program. In short, the traditional ruling parties would be evaluated for their economic performance in office at the same time for their platform on economic policies.

On the other hand, the differentials on the perceived policy priorities of the conservative and liberal parties in Korea seem to align well with the literature on the political orientation and economic policies. For example, Hibbs (1977) investigates the relationship between the political orientation of regimes data on unemployment and inflation outcomes in 12 Western European and North American countries. These cross-national comparisons suggest that the revealed preference of leftist governments has been for relatively low unemployment at the expense of high rates of inflation, whereas comparatively low inflation and high unemployment characterize political systems dominated by center and right-wing parties. According to the study, the macroeconomic policies pursued by left and right-wing governments are in accordance with the objective economic interests and subjective preferences of their core class-based constituencies. Labor/liberal parties typically attach far greater importance to full employment than to inflation, whereas business-oriented, upper middleclass-based conservative parties

generally assign higher priority to price stability than to unemployment (Hibbs 1977, 1470). This is why in times of high unemployment, support for Social Democratic governments tends to increase rather than decrease (Nannestad and Paldam 2000a, 137); instead of uniformly punishing the incumbent for poor performance as the sanctioning model expects, voters give more control to the party owning this issue.

Petrocik generalized this logic beyond party differentials in economic policy priorities; to claim ownership, parties should have developed a reputation for having both competence and enduring policy interest in a particular problem of concern to voters. When a particular problem becomes salient in an election, voter support will increase for the party perceived as having the ability to handle it. The record of the incumbent may provide either the incumbent or the challenger a short-term issue ownership, or lease, depending on the government's performance. Having achieved good times, the incumbent party would benefit from making its performance salient in election, whereas the opponent party will make the incumbent's poor record their campaign issue, for instance (Petrocik 1996, 826-827). Thus formulated, the electoral consequence of performance-based issue ownership theory is very similar to that of retrospective voting—economic or otherwise. On the other hand, parties own the issues their sociologically distinctive and stable constituency groups prioritize;

> …groups support a party because it attempts to use government to alter or protect a social or economic status quo which harms or benefits them; the party promotes such policies because it draws supporters, activists, and candidates from the groups. (Petrocik 1996, 828)

Parties build issue handling reputation through this process, and are considered to own the issue integral to the groups which are part of the party's coalition (Petrocik 1996,

847), although not all group differences are politicized and aligned with party preference. Thus, party constituency ownership of an issue is closely related to the literature on the relationship of social cleavages, group politics and party systems.

In short, Petrocik's definition of issue ownership—which party is best at handling an issue—has at least two dimensions, performance and priorities. Based on a series of empirical analyses of surveys on 17 issues since 1970 in the U.S., Egan (2013) concludes that issue ownership originates only from the parties' priorities out of the three theoretical possibilities; policies, performance, and priorities. Thus, issue ownership describes "the long-term positive associations between political parties and particular consensus issues in the public's mind—associations created and reinforced by the parties' commitments to prioritizing these issues with government spending and lawmaking" (Egan 2013, 156).

Egan's argument that parties can pursue ownership only on consensus issues – with shared goals agreed by members of a society in general, such as better education or health care— without losing votes helps explain why the democratic party has been steadily losing electoral appeal since democratic consolidation. There exists no consensus goal anymore in the issue area the party is associated with. For example, engagement policy toward North Korea—the most consistent policy position of the democratic party since Kim Dae Jung government— finds strong objection among conservative voters, and it is doubtful whether reunification with North Korea even qualifies as consensus goal. In the most recent presidential election of 2012, the two major candidates' platforms were almost identical. In short, while the conservative party owns the consensus issue of economic prosperity, the democratic party is yet to find an issue with shared goal on which they have a better reputation.

3.1.1 Empirical Model

My purpose in this chapter is two-fold; to test whether economic and issue voting take place in Korean elections, and if there is a unique pattern to them. In accordance with my analysis of the macro-economic indices, regions and aggregate electoral data, I expect to find that the economy does influence voting decision, with a distinct political implication.

Evidence of economic voting (sanctioning model) in Korean electoral research is limited. Using the small number of survey items that directly ask the respondents to evaluate the economic performance of the incumbent, I first test whether retrospective voting occurs. I also use items such as name the most urgent problem the country faces or what is the most important issue in this election to see whether concerns about the economy is linked to the vote in a specific way[51]. The combined outcomes not only suggest that there *is* economic voting in Korean elections, but also that the matter of handling the economy is more closely associated with the conservative party in the eyes of Korean voters.

I specify the empirical model that I use to estimate the impact of economic evaluation on vote choice.

$$\Pr(vote) = \Lambda(\alpha + \beta_1 PID + \beta_2 ECON + \beta_3 ISSUE + \cdots),$$

[51] The main data set for the analyses in this chapter is the election survey data collected by the Korean Social Science Data Center (hereafter KSDC). KSDC surveys were conducted in collaboration with the National Election Commission until YEAR and are the only series that covers every election in South Korea since the democratization of the country. I offer the analysis for one election year by the Korean General Social Survey and another by East Asia Institute. I report here that over the years, the wordings and order of questions have been changed and items of interest have appeared irregularly, which advised me to employ the simplest model as possible for ensuring continuity across elections.

where Λ is a logistic function to explain the probability to vote for a given party. The functional core of the model is written in a linearly additive form where the independent variables can be grouped in the following way.

1. Political Preferences: Party identification, ideology, and political leaning (*yeo-ya* orientation or governing-party vs. opposition-party support).
2. Retrospective Evaluation of Performance: National economy and general government performance evaluation.
3. Demographics: Age, gender, education, and income.
4. Region: Gyeongsang South, Gyeongsang North, Chungcheong, and Jeolla.
5. Issues: Inflation (price stability), economic growth, employment stability (more jobs), welfare extension. Assortment of political issues.
6. Prospective Evaluation of the National Economy when available.

A more detailed description of the variables and their place in the model follows.

3.1.2 Variables and History

Region

There is such a firm consensus on the strength of region as a predictor of the vote that no empirical study of Korean elections can do without it. To explore the impact of the voters' retrospective evaluation and issue preferences on their vote choice, region effect should be controlled. More importantly, the four regional dummies—Chungcheong, Jeolla, Gyeongsang North and South— are proxies of the regions' intricate political and economic history that make them a part of particular electoral coalition. To briefly remind how regions work as a vote predictor, the two southern regions are closely aligned with the two major parties in the simple plurality system of South Korea. It is a popular view that Gyeongsang, the southeastern region, was a major beneficiary of rapid

economic growth under the authoritarian rule of Presidents Park Chung Hee (1963-1979) and Chun Doo Hwan (1980-87), both from Gyeongsang North. The heirs of the ruling party of this era have consistently garnered major electoral support of Gyeongsang voters ever since Kim Young Sam brought Gyeongsang South into the governing coalition in 1990. The smaller Chungcheong-based New Democratic Republican party, led by Kim Jong Pil—one of Park Chung Hee's closest associates in his junta— also joined the Great Conservative Coalition. Kim Jong Pil defected to the National Congress for New Politics in the 1997 Presidential Election, marshaling Chungcheong votes for Kim Dae Jung.

Jeolla, the southwestern region, exhibits highly cohesive support –often reaching 90 percent of the votes— for the longtime opposition party led by the former president Kim Dae Jung (1997-2002). The collective memory of Gwangju massacre is deeply embedded in Jeolla. For those ten days, the regional capital of Gwangju and the vicinities were cut off from the outside world under the martial law, and the citizens formed their own 'fate community' in standing up against military violence. The unwavering regional sponsorship of Kim Dae Jung's political path came from the group consciousness born in the midst of Gwangju Democratic Movement (Kang 1998).

Given the history, I divide Gyeongsang region into Gyeongsang North and Gyeongsang South[52], and introduce another regional control of Chungcheong –the middle part of the country between Seoul-Gyeonggi and the south. Each region and sub-region is highly populated, with several metropolitan areas; the critical presidential election of 1987 divided Gyeongsang into north and south, along with Jeolla and Chungcheong. Although the greater Gyeongsang has been supportive of the traditional ruling party (*yeo dang*) in general, the south tends to be less solid, reflecting the difference in each sub-

[52] Gyeongsang North and Gyeongsang South are also formal administrative units.

region's position inside the electoral coalition. A significant part of Chungcheong votes moved with Kim Jong Pil as he changed coalition partners.

Region dummies may also communicate resentment toward uneven economic development. For example, according to the 1988 Regional Conflict Survey in Korea, 84 percent of Jeolla residents thought that regional economic disparity was due to the government's unequal development policy, whereas slightly above half of Gyeongsang residents thought so. About 40 percent of the respondents considered the greater Gyeongsang as the primary beneficiary of the economic development since 1960, whereas 46 percent of the respondents considered Jeolla as the most disadvantaged in the process (vs. 40 percent that said don't know). 49 percent of all respondents also thought that regional economic inequality was produced during the Park Chung Hee or Chun Doo Hwan rule. While a comparable opinion poll is not available for later years, it is clear that people were keenly aware of regional economic disparity and blamed government policies for it, especially in the deprived regions.

In sum, I want to emphasize that region dummies in my model can be considered as proxies that summarize various concerns of their residents, or issues not presented in the model.

Age (Demographics)

As Achen (1992, 198) points out, demographics are only relevant in so far as they are correlated with the voter's political history. Yet I proceed with what Sniderman, Griffin, and Glaser (1990, 121) describe as a consensual approach to the study of voting, if only to examine whether it yields any meaningful pattern of correlation between demographic factors and voting behavior.

Age is one of the most influential on vote choice among socio-demographic factors in South Korea, where income, education or gender rarely affect vote choice. It is likely that its predictive power indicates the importance of generation than natural life cycle effects. The age cohorts that experienced the democratic and labor movements of the 1980's as young adults vote more for a left-leaning party, while the elders tend to support the party of Park Chung Hee, under whose rule they toiled to build the nation and witnessed the country going through stages of economic development swiftly.

Party Identification

Party identification may not be as stable a concept as in American politics, yet an analysis of descriptive and aggregate data warrants partisanship as a meaningful vote predictor in Korean elections.

I have been intentionally vague in designating political parties because they have frequently changed names. It is also very common that notable politicians and factions switch parties or disband and merge to form a new party. The genealogy of political parties shown in Figure 3-1 chronicles the emerging and regrouping process of parties after the 1987 election in detail. In many instances, a new party is born when a viable presidential aspirant fails to secure the candidacy from a major party. Third parties have fared particularly well whenever Chungcheong was engaged, thus swaying presidential elections.



Figure 3-1: Genealogy of Major Korean Political Parties since 1987 (Constructed by the author based on the National Election Committee Archive and KyungHyang Daily 6-28-2012)

The case of President Kim YoungSam (1993-1997) is exemplary in showing how regionalism interacts with the process where coalitions of personage, factions and political parties are built and resolved. In 1987, Roh Tae Woo of the ruling Democratic Justice Party had won the presidency with only 37 percent of the votes, and the administration was in desperate need for obtaining a legislative majority after the 1988 National Assembly election, which produced a majority opposition legislature (174 out of 299) for the first time in Korean electoral history. The three opposition parties' initial collaboration upon reform agenda, including a series of special hearings that investigated the various power abuse and corruption by key members in Chun Doo Hwan's family and coterie, collapsed within less than two years.

Among the parties in the opposition, the Reunification Democrats' vote share was the second largest, having won fewer seats than Kim Dae Jung's Party for Peace and Democracy in 1988. By 1989, the parties were strongly disagreeing upon whether, when and how Roh's campaign pledge of mid-term referendum—a vote of confidence—should be implemented. Each political party had its own problems as well; Kim Young Sam's Reunification Democratic Party was losing by-elections after it was exposed that their party's high official bribed a rival party candidate in exchange for his withdrawal. On the other hand, the news that several activists had publicly visited North Korea without the government permission broke in the early 1989, and the Peace Democrats were in a difficult place when it was also revealed that one of the party's assembly members had made a secret trip to the north. The government applied the National Security Law liberally, and Kim Dae Jung was taken into custody. Kim Jong Pil's New Republican Party was the closest to the ruling party in political predisposition, and the party was the smallest as well.

In February 1990, Kim Young Sam led most members of his Reunification Democratic Party into the ruling party to launch the Democratic Liberal Party, which also absorbed Kim Jong Pil's New Democratic Republicans. The third and fourth parties thus chose to be fused into a governing party of massive size—216 assembly members, a supermajority capable of amending the constitution—, leaving the Peace Democrats isolated and ineffectual. Gyeongsang South, which already had reserved 30 to 40 percent of the votes for the governing party, now became a fixed member of the Great Conservative Coalition, which helped Kim Young Sam to win the 1992 Presidential Election with a comfortable margin. A few assembly members in the Reunification party, including a future president Roh MooHyun, strongly opposed the top-down decision that destroys the majority opposition legislature chosen by the people. It is both treachery on the electorate and sellout of the opposition parties. They formed the Democratic party (1990) with like-minded independents, which eventually merged with the Peace Democrats to produce the (Unified) Democratic party in 1991 (Republic of Korea National Election Commission 2009).[53]

There are similar cases from both sides of political spectrum. Sometimes the parties change label mostly because they want to impart a fresh image, signaling that they are making a serious effort to reform from within, or when they absorbed minor parties or factions. All in all, it would be impossible to study Korean political parties if we treat them as a completely new party every time there is a change in name or composition. After identifying the lineage of two fixed major political groupings, I now call the ruling party of authoritarian regime and its heirs the conservative party, and the opposition party from that period on the democratic party. The designation reflects each party's heritage

[53] Roh MooHyun did not join.

above all else, and characteristic issue stances in key areas such as policy toward North Korea. The foregoing description of how Korean political parties conduct elections also explains why I include a third party and Chungcheong region in the equation.

The single-minded electoral ambition explains the behavior of third parties best. Typically, a presidential aspirant forms a third party that does not survive more than one electoral cycle, yet is influential enough to sway the electoral result. For example, the first transition of power in 1998 to the Democratic party had a lot to do with the presence of Lee In Je from Chungcheong—the recurrent player region in this scenario—, who was a former favorite of the ruling party and garnered 19.2 percent of the vote as a third party candidate.

Ideology

Ideology is expressed in two variables. The standard measure of self-placement of the respondent on the progressive –conservative scale of 0 to 10 was not employed until 1997 survey. Political leanings, which is measured by asking individuals whether they support the ruling party (*yeo dang)* or the opposition party (*ya dang*) can comprise both party identification and political ideology. As shown in the previous discussion, Korean party system was defined by the competition between developmental-authoritarian and democratizing forces for a long time, and a turnover of the presidency did not occur until 1998.[54] Over the decades, voters became sufficiently accustomed to the one-party dominant system that they equate the authoritarian-conservative party with the government party and the democratic group with the opposition party. This particular

[54] Drawing upon the Schumpeterian model of democracy, Huntington considers a new democracy to be consolidated when it has undergone two peaceful turnovers of governing power after elections. Having passed this 'tough test,' Korean democracy would now be considered as fully consolidated. See Huntington 1991, 266-267.

setup, where one party or political group is perennially in power facing a meaningful opposition over a lengthy period, meant that many voters had time and practice to develop psychological attachment to either of the parties. Scholars of Korean politics accordingly consider this durable political disposition as functionally equivalent to party identification in Western democracies (C. Park 1993). Whether one leans toward the ruling or opposition party is dependent upon the standing partisanship; for example, the social groups that traditionally favor the conservative party—Gyeongsang residents and the elderly— leaned more heavily toward the opposition in the 2000 election survey after the conservative Grand National Party lost the presidency, yet displayed greater support for the government party in 2008 when GNP was back in power (K. Kee 2011, 124-128).

Political Leaning – If *yeo-ya* orientation was identical to party identification, though, it would not have any significant predictive power independent of partisanship. Yet this disposition directly affects the vote choice in every election before the first turnover of the government. In addition, the volatility of Korean parties prevents the voter from forming enduring attachment to a *specific party*. Navigating through the shifting topography of the party system, voters can only commit to the ruling party or the opposition party, or the set of political values or policy goals that each political group represents, to be exact. Long-term support for the ruling party is thus related to issue preferences of economic growth and national security, whereas those who prioritize democratization, human rights and social justice show more support for parties in the opposition. I thus treat political leanings, *i.e. yeo-ya* orientation, as a proxy for political ideology, later replaced by the standard self-placement on conservative-liberal scale in

Korean electoral surveys.[55] I assume that people who lean toward the ruling party are more conservative and the opposition party supporters more liberal, given the history of political parties.

National Economy and Government Performance Evaluation

How the respondent evaluates past government performance is one of the regular survey items. It is expected that a positive evaluation is linked to a higher probability of voting for the candidate from the incumbent party. It is likely that the variable's predictive power is summary of influences that are not captured distinctly by the other controls in the equation. The impact of retrospective evaluation of overall government performance is found to be stable across elections and specifications, and I use the variable in absence of a measure of retrospective evaluation of the national economy.

Issues

Through numerous changes of coalition partners and party labels, the conservative party has always remained as the heir of the developmental state. The party's legitimacy relies upon maintaining economic and social stability. The democratic or leftist party, on the other hand, demanded the democratic transfer of power first and foremost. Once in government, the democratic party administrations endeavored to cultivate a peaceful relationship with the North, and pursued policies that promote social and distributive justice. For example, in the aforementioned 1988 survey, 72 percent of the respondents gave a moderate to very positive evaluation of price stability policy of Chun government (1981-88). Surprisingly, the regions aligned closely with the two political parties

[55] Also see J. Cho 1993. Cho (1993) interprets the *yeo-ya* orientation as a deeply-seated psychological predisposition that controls his political attitudes and behaviors, something closer to belief system or political ideology.

exhibited conflicting attitudes about reunifying with North Korea. When asked about their opinion on reunification in a multiple choice survey item with choices 1) as soon as possible 2) wait until the right time 3) keep as it is 4) reunification is impossible, 45 percent of Jeolla residents answered as soon as possible, whereas 25 percent of Gyeongsang residents gave the same answer. National mean was 29 percent. ANOVA result shows that Jeolla residents' attitude toward reunification with North Korea was significantly progressive in comparison to the other regions' attitude, while Gyeongsang residents were significantly more skeptical toward reunification[56] In recent elections, typical of catch-all parties, the two major parties are positioned closely on valence issues (Stokes 1992) such as reducing wealth polarization—termed economic democratization— and extending welfare service.

3.2 RESULTS

In this section, I present the empirical analysis of individual level data from five elections in Korea after democratization, three presidential (1992, 1997, and 2007) and (1996 and 2008) legislative.

3.2.1 1992 and 1997 Presidential Elections and 1996 National Assembly Election

Figure 3-1 shows the multinomial logistic estimation results that explain the vote for Kim Dae Jung and Chung Ju Yung—the founder of Hyundai conglomerate— against Kim Young Sam in the 1992 Presidential Election. The ruling party candidate Kim Young Sam had the edge over the opposition party candidate Kim Dae Jung among elder voters,

[56] No partisanship or ideology variable available in this survey.

who often display favorable attitude toward the ruling party or the conservative party in Korean elections. Residing in either of the home regions of the two Kims was one of the crucial predictors of the vote for these candidates. A respondent in Kim YoungSam's home region, Gyeongsang South, was less likely to choose Kim Dae Jung as well as Chung Ju Young (by 18-percent and 11-percent points, respectively). When other variables are held at their respective means, living in Jeolla increases the probability to vote for Kim Dae Jung over Kim YoungSam by 74 percent. In fact, Kim Dae Jung garnered well over 90 percent of the votes cast in the greater Jeolla, and the regression results show that the region's devotion to Kim Dae Jung cannot be explained without understanding Jeolla region's unique position in the historical context of democratization movements and industrialization. Both Gyeongsang North and Chungcheong did not have a significance impact on the vote although the ruling party candidate did prevail in those regions. Considering the fact that Gyeongsang North has been a long-standing base of the ruling party, Kim YoungSam benefits from additional 'native-son premium' in southern Gyeongsang. Born in the North Korean territory of northern Gangwon, Chung did not have a regional base, and fared worse in both of the home regions of his contenders. The combined results show regional voting of great magnitude; there was a clear difference in the voting patterns of regions that had or did not have a native presidential candidate of their own.

Table 3-1: 1992 Presidential Election: Multinomial Logit Estimation
Kim Dae Jung (democratic) and Chung Ju Yung (third Party) vs. Kim YoungSam (conservative: Baseline Outcome)

	Vote for Kim Dae Jung/ KimYoungSam	Marginal Effect	Vote for ChungJuYung/ KimYoungSam	Marginal Effect
Age	-1.00+	-0.18	-0.73	-0.04
(in logarithms)	(-1.95)		(-1.36)	
Male	-0.33	-0.07	0.19	0.03
(Male=1; Female=0)	(-1.15)		(0.65)	
Education	-0.01	-0.01	0.17	0.02
(4-point scale)	(-0.06)		(0.90)	
Income	0.02	0.01	-0.11	-0.01
(9-point scale)	(0.28)		(-1.33)	
Gyeongsang South	-1.31**	-0.18	-1.99***	-0.11
	(-3.15)		(-3.94)	
Gyeongsang North	-0.61	-0.10	-0.52	-0.03
	(-1.12)		(-1.06)	
Chungcheong	-0.03	0.01	-0.76	-0.06
	(-0.07)		(-1.52)	
Jeolla	3.97***	0.74	0.29	-0.10
	(5.53)		(0.25)	
Political Leaning	-0.93***	-0.17	-0.41**	-0.01
(*Ya*=1; *Yeo*=5)	(-6.18)		(-2.64)	
Conservative Partisan	-2.02***	-0.32	-1.68***	-0.09
(The Democratic Liberal)	(-4.82)		(-4.48)	
Democratic Partisan	2.62***	0.55	0.34	-0.06
(The Democratic)	(7.54)		(0.75)	
Third Party Partisan	0.73	-0.18	4.07***	0.72
(Unification People's)	(0.92)		(6.69)	
National Economy	0.14	0.03	-0.22+	-0.03
(1=Much Worse; 5=Much Better)	(1.00)		(-1.38)	
Price Stability	-0.74*	-0.15	0.32	0.05
(Issue that Affected Vote)	(-2.38)		(0.96)	
Economic Growth	0.22	-0.04	1.63***	0.23
(Issue that Affected Vote)	(0.48)		(3.68)	
Constant	5.66**		3.09	
	(2.58)		(1.32)	
N			963	
pseudo R^2			0.61	

+ (p<.1); * (p<.05); ** (p<.01); **** (p<.001); z-scores are in parentheses.

Political leanings also had a quite strong impact on voting decision between two Kims. One unit increase in the support for the ruling party reduces the probability of Kim Dae Jung vote by 17 percent. The variable's impact was significant but slight for the choice between Chung and Kim YS; opposition-leaning voters favored Chung over Kim YS, *cateris paribus*.

Party identification had a significant impact of substantial magnitude on all the vote choice. A partisan for the ruling Democratic Liberal was 32 percent and 9 percent less likely to vote for Kim Dae Jung and Chung Ju young, respectively. Democratic partisanship enhanced a chance for Kim Dae Jung vote by 55 percent, and identifying with the People's party was the most powerful factor in deciding the vote between Chung and Kim YS, increasing the probability of a Chung vote by 72 percent.

Evaluation of the past national economy does not have a significant impact in the presented result. In this election, an economic consideration that did affect the vote choice was the issue that the voters prioritized. Consistent with the prediction that the political parties have an electoral advantage in the specific issue area they own, those who consider price stability the most important were less likely to vote for Kim Dae Jung by 15 percent. Voters seem to have differentiated the long-standing reputation of the conservative party on keeping inflation in check from the unproven ability of handling government affairs of its presidential candidate, who spent most of his life in the opposition. How Kim Young Sam would handle the national economy was a separate matter from the incumbent's record.[57] On the other hand, those who report that economic growth was the most important issue when making voting decision favored the successful entrepreneur Chung Ju Young over the ruling party candidate who lacked any

[57] Similar to the findings that the government performance effect is stronger for the incumbent running for the second term than a successor.

administrative experience. Apparently, Chung drew votes from the economy-oriented and independent-minded.

Figure 3-2 analyzes what decided the vote choice between two major party candidates. As noted, the creation of the United Liberal Democrats greatly undermined the meaning of democratic choice by reversing the electoral outcome. With the addition of a variable that asks the respondent's opinion of the three-party merger, it becomes clear that a positive evaluation of the national economy enhances support for *the opposition* (the other factors hardly change). The more positive a voter feels about the state of the national economy during Kim YoungSam incumbency, the more likely he is to vote for the Democratic candidate, Kim, Dae Jung.

Figure 3-1 also shows that respondents who feel that the national economy is looking up vote against Chung. Compared to the charismatic political leader Kim Young Sam, Chung must look like a one-trick pony superfluous in a good economy. The positive relationship between a good evaluation of the national economy and a vote for opposition democratic candidates lasts until the second turnover of the government in 1998. Apparently, more democracy requires economic stability.

Table 3-2: 1992 Presidential and 1996 National Assembly Election: Logit Estimation
Kim Dae Jung (democratic) vs. Kim Young Sam (conservative)
National Congress for New Politics (democratic) vs. the incumbent New Korea Party (conservative: Baseline Outcome)

	1992 Presidential			1996 National Assembly	
	Vote for Kim Dae Jung	Marginal Effect		Vote for NCNP	Marginal Effect
Age	-1.14+	-0.25		-0.54**	-0.11
	(-1.79)			(-3.19)	
Male	-0.17	-0.04		-0.25	-0.05
	(-0.47)			(-0.72)	
Education	-0.17	-0.04		-0.29	-0.06
	(-0.80)			(-1.35)	
Income	0.09	0.02		-0.06	-0.01
	(0.98)			(-0.69)	
Gyeongsang South	-1.09*	-0.21		-4.19**	-0.45
	(-2.24)			(-3.05)	
Gyeongsang North	-1.02	-0.19		0.00	
	(-1.43)			(omitted)	
Chungcheong	-0.48	-0.10		-4.09**	-0.35
	(-0.86)			(-2.97)	
Jeolla	3.87***	0.72		0.08	0.02
	(3.78)			(0.15)	
Political Leaning	-0.81***	-0.18		-0.65***	-0.13
	(-4.21)			(-3.45)	
Conservative Partisan	-1.96***	-0.40		-1.19**	-0.23
	(-3.81)			(-2.69)	
Democratic Partisan	2.22***	0.49	NCNP Partisan	5.07***	0.85
	(5.30)			(5.94)	
National Economy	0.38*	0.08		0.68***	0.14
(1 to;5=Much Better)	(2.13)			(3.86)	
Price Stability	-0.82*	-0.17			
	(-2.17)				
Dislike DLP Merger	0.67**	0.15			
(4-points scale)	(2.87)				
Constant	3.82			1.79	
	(1.39)			(1.58)	
N	611			533	
pseudo R^2	0.72			0.66	

+ (p<.1); * (p<.05); **(p<.01); **** (p<.001); z-scores are in parentheses.

I now turn to the 1996 National Assembly Election (Figure 3-3). This is one of the election years which the United Liberal Democrats (ULD), the most viable 3rd party that lasted for a relatively long period (1995-2006), participated in. The party was led by the fourth competitor of the 1987 presidential election and a former power figure of the Park ChungHee regime, Kim Jong-pil. A strong conservative despite the party name, he cleverly mobilized his home region of Chungcheong into the electoral rivalry, and the region tends to vote for its native son when presented with an opportunity. He also formed a coalition with Kim Dae Jung for the 1997 Presidential election and secured the premiership under President Kim DJ. The vote for ULD thus mainly came from Chungcheong residents and ULD partisans.

Again, there exists a trade-off between the two conservative parties. The ruling conservative party temporarily lost its usual partnership with Gyeongsang North, having an increasingly unpopular president from Gyeongsang South (Kim YoungSam, the financial crisis etc.) and an aloof successor not from the region. Gyeongsang North, for the first time, had no regional ties with the party leadership. After controlling for ideology and partisanship, the region actually voted against the ruling conservative party, and sent some of its support to the party of Park regime nostalgia, ULD.

The ruling conservative (New Korea Party: NKP) candidates gained votes from elders, NKP supporters and those with a positive view of overall government's performance. Gyeongsang South and Chungcheong voted against the party of their regional rival and ideological opponent, NCNP (Democratic).

A positive evaluation of the national economy is negatively related to the incumbent conservative party yet again, whereas the same evaluation leads to more votes for the opposition Democratic Party. When only the two party votes were analyzed, the pattern became more apparent.

Table 3-3: 1996 National Assembly Election: Multinomial Logit
National Congress for New Politics (democratic) and United Liberal Democrats (3rd Party) vs. the incumbent New Korea Party (conservative: Baseline Outcome)

	Vote for NCNP	Marginal Effect	Vote for ULD	Marginal Effect
Age	-0.51**	-0.03	-0.19	0.00
	(-3.09)		(-1.24)	
Male	-0.24	-0.01	-0.27	-0.02
	(-0.73)		(-0.88)	
Education	-0.33	-0.01	-0.49*	-0.03
	(-1.60)		(-2.51)	
Income	-0.05	0.00	0.07	0.01
	(-0.62)		(0.97)	
Gyeongsang South	-4.10**	-0.17	-2.60*	-0.13
	(-3.13)		(-2.47)	
Gyeongsang North	-36.62	-0.31	1.56***	0.23
	(0.00)		(3.32)	
Chungcheong	-4.27**	-0.20	0.56	0.12
	(-3.08)		(1.42)	
Jeolla	0.05	0.04	-39.44	-0.19
	(0.09)		(0.00)	
Political Leaning	-0.71***	-0.04	-0.49**	-0.02
(*Ya*=1; 5=*Yeo*)	(-3.95)		(-2.99)	
Party Identification	-1.25**	-0.05	-2.25***	-0.15
(NKP)	(-2.90)		(-4.48)	
Party Identification	4.90***	0.48	1.22	-0.06
(NCNP)	(5.95)		(1.08)	
Party Identification	-0.01	-0.06	2.14***	0.23
(ULD)	(-0.01)		(5.38)	
National Economy	0.65**	0.04	0.21	0.00
	(3.20)		(1.11)	
Pocket Book	0.07	0.00	0.31	0.02
	(0.31)		(1.41)	
Constant	1.86		0.22	
	(1.61)		(0.21)	
N			678	
Pseudo R^2			0.59	

z-scores are in parentheses.

The mishandling of the 1997 Asian financial crisis by the conservative administration undoubtedly helped ushering in the first government turnover. Both the causes and progression of the crisis had a lot to do with policy missteps on the government's part. Krugman points to the moral hazard problem of unregulated financial intermediaries whose liabilities were (implicitly) guaranteed by the government (Krugman 1998). Radelet and Sachs (2000, 106-107) diagnose that among other things, the government's policy mistakes unnecessarily exacerbated the crisis, which was essentially caused by a boom of large-scale foreign capital inflows followed by a sudden withdrawal—a liquidity crisis. They emphasize the effect of panic, triggering event that leads short-term creditors to expect the flight of other short-term creditors (Radelet and Sachs 2000, 133). In other words, while the system was vulnerable to financial panic that resulted from the economy's weaknesses such as growing short-term debt exceeding foreign exchange reserves—itself a direct result of an extensive financial liberalization under Kim Young Sam government (Shin and Chang 2003, 39)—, these problems did not warrant the depth and severity of the 1997 financial crisis. The worst of the crisis could have been avoided if it were not for bad policy judgments and accidents that activated the panic (Radelet and Sachs 2000, 149).

Table 3-4: 1997 Presidential Election: Multinomial Logit Estimation
Kim Dae Jung (democratic) and Lee In Je (third Party) vs. Lee Hoi Chang (conservative: Baseline Outcome)

	Vote for Kim DaeJung	Marginal Effect	Vote for Lee In Je	Marginal Effect
Age	-0.40	0.01	-1.12**	-0.14
	(-0.99)		(-2.66)	
Male	-0.02	0.00	-0.01	0.00
	(-0.08)		(-0.03)	
Education	-0.22	-0.03	-0.21	-0.01
	(-1.38)		(-1.27)	
Income	0.03	0.00	0.05	0.01
	(0.42)		(0.88)	
Gyeongsang South	-1.20**	-0.28	0.06	0.12
	(-3.25)		(0.18)	
Gyeongsang North	-1.19**	-0.23	-0.61	0.00
	(-3.02)		(-1.59)	
Chungcheong	0.21	0.02	0.33	0.03
	(0.51)		(0.74)	
Jeolla	1.67*	0.40	-0.48	-0.19
	(2.48)		(-0.55)	
Political Leanings	-1.21***	-0.20	-1.05***	-0.05
	(-6.71)		(-5.54)	
Conservative Partisan	-2.20***	-0.33	-2.68***	-0.19
(Grand National Party)	(-4.63)		(-4.33)	
Democratic Partisan	2.46***	0.42	1.45***	-0.03
(National Congress)	(6.28)		(3.36)	
Third Party Partisan	0.72	-0.20	2.47***	0.43
(New People Party)	(1.57)		(6.41)	
Government Evaluation	-0.05	-0.03	0.15	0.03
(1=Very Poor; 5=Very Good)	(-0.34)		(1.03)	
Price Inflation	0.14	0.04	-0.07	-0.03
	(0.52)		(-0.28)	
Employment Stability	0.93+	0.18	0.41	-0.04
	(1.84)		(0.75)	
Economic Growth	0.81+	0.17	0.28	-0.04
	(1.95)		(0.65)	
GNP Responsible for	0.98***	0.17	0.69**	0.02
Financial Crisis	(3.91)		(2.64)	
Constant	3.61+		5.14**	
	(1.95)		(2.70)	
N			985	
Pseudo R^2			0.46	

+ (p<.1); * (p<.05); **(p<.01); *** (p<.001); z-scores are in parentheses.

Figure 3-4 shows that regions, political leanings and partisanships all have significant predictive power. Those who attribute the responsibility for financial crisis to the Grand National Party are 17- percent more likely to vote for the opposition candidate Kim Dae Jung. The incumbent party is punished for its miserably poor handling of the economic disaster, and people who seek job stability and even economic growth seemed to turn to the opposition. It is noteworthy that those concerned with keeping the prices down—'the' issue in which the conservative party has ownership—did not defect to the democratic candidate.

The 1997 Presidential Election demonstrates the difficulty of the first government turnover in a new democracy. Electoral prospect for the conservative party was dismal; not only the incumbent party was responsible for the economic catastrophe; for the first time, its presidential candidate Lee, Hoi-Chang had no political home in any of the regions, not to mention Gyeongsang, and was widely unpopular.[58] Still, it required a coalition partner and a strong third party candidate for the long-time opposition leader to win the presidency. Chungcheong-based United Liberal Democrats' candidate Kim Jong-Pil had agreed to drop out of presidential race in exchange for a partnership in coalition government with National Congress shortly before the election. Lee In Je, another native son of Chungcheong, lost the incumbent party nomination to Lee Hoi Chang, formed New People Party, and received nearly 20 percent of the votes. Chungcheong allegiance seems split in my result; and the actual election outcome was that at least a plurality of the region's voters moved into the DJP Coalition by voting for Kim Dae Jung, in a stark contrast to their voting behavior in the 1996 legislative election. Thus, other things being

[58] Although he settled in Chungcheong later in his political career, Lee was of ambiguous regional origin, having been born in North Korea before the war and raised in various regions in the South.

equal, region was irrelevant in deciding the vote between two Lees. What made a difference was the voter's age, political disposition toward the opposition, and a partisanship in the opposition parties. Lee In Je, a former judge-turned labor lawyer had been a successful minister of Labor in Kim Young Sam's cabinet, which he joined after his time in the National Assembly as a Reunification Democrat and Democratic Liberal after 1990. The younger Lee's campaign to end old politics—to end the era of three Kims— appears to have drawn in a segment of the electorate that includes younger, independent, opposition-leaning voters.

The ruling party was punished clear and strong for its mishandling of the financial crisis. Those who blame the incumbent party are likely to choose the opposition candidate over the ruling party candidate in both match-ups. Even the ordinarily stable predictors such as the evaluation of overall government performance and inflation control lose significance. The result suggests that responsibility attribution process had a pervasive impact on the assessment of the incumbent party's past and future ability to handle the job it had been so trustingly delegated. Those who yearn for economic stability and growth engaged in prospective voting for Kim Dae Jung.

Despite the catastrophic impact of the economic crisis on the governing party, it required a strong third runner and an unlikely partnership with a former enemy for the opposition party to permanently shed the label. What remains striking is the robust impact of regions and political factors on the vote choice in a time of unprecedented economic disruption.

3.2.2 The 2007 Presidential and 2008 National Assembly Elections

The democratic incumbent Roh MooHyun (2003-2008) had a roller coaster ride of a presidency, and was very unpopular toward the end of his term. The objective economic indices may suggest otherwise, yet it was widely believed that the national economy worsened during Roh presidency. The opposition Grand National Party candidate Lee Myung Bak—a former CEO of HyunDai Construction turned mayor of Seoul—defeated the Democratic Party candidate Chung Dong Young with over 22 percent margin in an unprecedented landslide.

In the election year the ruling party had undergone a transformation: in an attempt to break off from the president and unify all non-Grand National Party political groups for the upcoming election, 81 out of 139 National Assemblymen in Uri party had left the party by August. Five Democratic Party Assemblymen and one prominent GNP politician joined the group, which subsequently absorbed the remaining 58 Uri party members. Yet the half-year long process of tiring negotiations for merger and a series of multiple defections achieved hardly anything but a name change in effect; the legislative Unified New Democratic Party (UNDP) consisted of 138 former Uri party members and five Democratic Party members of the National Assembly.[59]

The ruling party, then, was in disarray and fell out of public favor. The UNDP candidate Chung Dong-Young's approval ratings averaged below 20 percent, undistinguishable from those of the third party candidate Lee Hoi Chang. Chung,

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[59] Chosun Ilbo(Daily). 2007.08.10 (in Korean).

The Democratic Party eventually merged with the UNDP to form the (Unified) Democratic Party in February, 2008. The National Election Commission http://museum.nec.go.kr/vote/voteKorea2.do

formerly a journalist and major TV news anchor, was a key member in Rho administration—he carried out Sunshine policy as the Minister of National Unification and was the Uri party chairman in 2004 and 2006.[60] Chung also had a bad history with the already GNP-leaning elderly voters. While campaigning as the Uri Party chairman for the 2004 National Assembly Election, Chung suggested that the older voters in their 60s and 70s might as well stay home, and delegate the decision for the future to the young. The remarks met immediate and severe criticism from all sides, and Chung relinquished his position on the party list.[61] The candidate apparently failed to inspire the electorate, despite the efforts of many Uri party politicians to distance themselves from the unpopular president described above. In fact, both Uri party and the new UNDP fared even worse in public opinion than the president in the last two years of Roh's term, when his approval ratings dropped below 30 percent. The opposing Grand National Party's 40-point lead over the governing party lasted for a year, an unprecedented phenomenon since the beginning of Kim Young Sam administration. The average approval rating for President Roh's performance was 35%, which is significantly lower than the average

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[60] Chung had been recruited by Kim, Dae Jung in 1996 and elected with the highest number of votes in both the 1996 and 2000 National Assembly Elections. He was part of the intra-Democratic Party group mostly consisting of freshmen and sophomore Assembly members that criticized the imperial party bosses. The bosses had not only controls on candidate selection but also funds at their disposal that, in combination with the closed party structure, gave them a great amount of power over party members. The reform group demanded a generational shift within the party through the introduction of an open nomination process in which non-party members are allowed to participate. Also see Chapter 2 and S. park 2014.

Although Chung did not benefit from the new institution, Chung worked unfalteringly for Roh's campaigns, after being defeated by Roh Moo Hyun in the nomination race in 2002.

Chung Dong Young official website: http://www.cdy21.net/mydy/profile.asp

[61] KookMin Ilbo. 2004. 04. 01 (in Korean).

approval ratings of the previous two administrations (>50%). Furthermore, while the two Kims enjoyed a highly favorable public opinion for at least three years during their term, Roh's approval rating fell below 50% only after four months in office, and never recovered except the month of impeachment process and the National Assembly election in 2004 (C. Park 2008, 60-61). In short, the electoral base of the presidential party was in shambles.

Although voter turnout has been on the decline since 1987, the 63 percent turnout in the 2007 Presidential Election as well as the 46 percent turnout in the 2008 National Assembly Election is the historical low for each type of general election. It is evident that the unusually skewed distribution of political support made the election outcome highly predictable, which would discourage many voters from going to the poll. Given that the 2008 Assembly Election was held less than two months into the new presidency, both the 2007 and 2008 elections cannot be analyzed without understanding why President Roh was so intensely disliked. As discussed in Chapter 2, Roh was the first Korean president for whom the people voluntarily organized and funded campaigns in a large scale, yet he sustained harsh criticisms and defections of former supporters during his time in office. Public opinion reversed again after he killed himself amid the investigation of bribery scandals involving his family and aides in 2009; now he is considered as one of the best presidents the country has ever had by many.[62] As Roh Moo Hyun's politics and path to

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[62] According to a recent survey, 24 percent of the respondents chose Roh Moo Hyun as the president who led the country best; he took second place only to Park Chung Hee whom 44 percent picked.

"Gallup Report No. 174." 04-06 August 2015. Gallup Korea.

presidency were previously described, I now turn to the sources of popular discontent with President Roh's administration.

One of the defining issues for the 2007 and 2008 elections was the economy (Jung and Kwon 2009). Involved in various scandals, including election law violations and financial fraud, the opposition party candidate Lee Myoung Bak was constantly criticized for his questionable ethics, yet enjoyed sure advantage in the economic issue area. Particularly salient in the campaign was the real estate policy of Rho administration.

In South Korea, home ownership has had a greater meaning than securing a living space. A house is the primary household asset, an emblem of the owner's social class, a source of retirement income and a crucial part of inheritance. House prices have risen faster than income increase over the industrialization and urbanization process, and homeownership forms the material basis of family-provided welfare that substitutes publicly funded social safety nets. Thus, housing policies have focused upon expanding housing stock to increase owner-occupation rates (15.1 million new homes were built between 1962 and 2007 in the country of 15.9 million households).

This supply-side policy, however, gave rise to serious side effects: the rapid growth of multiple property-owners, leading to a disparity in housing access and asset distribution as well as volatile house prices. In effect, the owner-occupation rates remained at relatively modest level (71.1% in 1970; 49.9% in 1990; 55.6% in 2005), despite various anti-real estate speculation measures of the government.[63]

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[63] The real estate market policy that consists of supply and price–regulation meant that the government could utilize the housing market to revitalize the economy (Ronald and Jin 2010).

House prices had undergone double-digit increases for a few years leading to 2002, and the new president Rho frequently communicated that it was a principal administrative goal to stabilize the housing market, and in the long run to reduce economic inequality (K. Cho 2006) by curbing the polarizing effect of real estate speculation. The key measure in the government's real estate policy program was a new progressive tax; called comprehensive real estate holding tax, it was introduced to target the owners of high-priced estates and multiple houses as well as short-term owners (Song and Kang 2008). The policy objective was to promote fair distribution of the tax burden and reduce the financial disparity between Seoul-metropolitan areas and provincial governments.

The new tax failed to suppress the escalation and volatility of housing prices. Housing price inflation led to a great increase in the number of taxable households (from 70,676 in 2005 to 482,622 in 2007), mostly in the metropolitan area. Single home owners, affected or threatened by the new tax, now firmly opposed the administration. The tax reform failure and its consequences contributed to the government turnover in 2007 (M. Kim 2014).

Rho also lost the support of progressive groups, having adopted policies such as promoting Korea-U.S. Free-Trade Agreement and sending troops to Iraq. Furthermore, the dominant conservative media were hostile to Rho administration and consistently attributed negative images to him such as an incompetent leftist (D. Kim 2009).

Overall, retrospective voting was stronger in the 2007 Presidential Election than in the previous ones. As discussed above, Roh had maintained low approval ratings throughout his term and a negative evaluation of Roh administration's performance had a direct negative impact on the vote choice.

Table 3-5: 2007 Presidential and 2008 National Assembly Election:
Chung Dong Young (Democratic) vs. Lee Myung Bak (Conservative)
United New Democratic Party (Democratic) vs. Grand National Party (Conservative)

	2007 Presidential		2008 National Assembly	
	Vote for Chung Dong Young	Marginal Effect	Vote for United New Democratic Party	Marginal Effect
Age	0.47	0.05	-0.61	-0.10
	(0.96)		(-0.84)	
Male	-0.33	-0.04	0.01	0.00
	(-1.15)		(0.02)	
Education	-0.52+	-0.06	0.00	0.00
	(-1.96)		(-0.02)	
Income	0.09	0.01	-0.01	0.00
	(1.41)		(-0.13)	
Gyeongsang South	-0.87*	-0.08	-2.33**	-0.24
	(-2.01)		(-3.17)	
Gyeongsang North	-0.74	-0.07	-3.38**	-0.28
	(-0.82)		(-3.01)	
Chungcheong	-0.01	0.00	0.20	0.04
	(-0.02)		(0.27)	
Jeolla	1.25**	0.20	2.03*	0.45
	(2.90)		(2.33)	
Political Leaning	-0.08	-0.01	-0.24*	-0.04
	(-1.16)		(-2.28)	
Conservative Partisan	-2.93***	-0.43	-2.53***	-0.38
	(-7.76)		(-4.17)	
Democratic Partisan	2.56***	0.48	2.32**	0.50
	(5.78)		(3.08)	
National Economy	0.79**	0.09	1.15**	0.20
(1=Worse;3=Better)	(3.04)		(2.81)	
More jobs	-0.17	-0.02		
	(-0.60)			
Prospect of Economy			-0.94**	-0.16
			(-2.89)	
Constant	-1.81		4.13	
	(-0.81)		(1.22)	
N	669		291	
pseudo R^2	0.55		0.58	

+ (p<.1); * (p<.05); **(p<.01); **** (p<.001); z-scores are in parentheses.

The left-hand side of the Figure 3-5 presents the 2007 Presidential Election results. The United New Democratic Party candidate, Chung Dong Young, predictably gained the support of his home region of Jeolla, and the Democratic partisans. Contrary to the common belief that Chung's much publicized blunder in 2004 rendered him even more unpopular among the elderly, age did not have any statistically significant influence on the vote between the two candidates in 2007. While the elder voters do prefer the Grand National party, they do not necessarily hate the Democratic Party. The 2007 KSDC survey shows that people over 60 have positive feelings toward the GNP; the correlation between the age group and their feeling thermometer scores for the GNP is .17 ($p<.05$). Also, there are more GNP partisans in this age group (corr = .14; $p<.05$), yet there is no statistically significant correlation between the age group and their attitudes toward the Democratic party.[64]

The impacts of party identification on the vote choice between the two major candidates were sizable and were in expected directions. When all the other variables were set at their respective means, a GNP partisan was 43% less likely to vote for Chung than non GNP identifiers, whereas a Democratic partisan is 48% more likely to vote for Chung than other party supporters or independents. When other variables are controlled, partisanship is the most powerful predictor for the vote choices of those who cast their ballot for one of the major two candidates in this election. In other words, despite Lee's landslide victory where he beat Chung in all demographic categories, it was still the GNP party identification that contributed the most to Lee's winning the presidency.

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[64] In this vein, in an analysis that tested the separate effects of positive and negative attitude toward a party on the vote choice in the 2007 election, Hwang found that the votes for the GNP candidate, Lee Myung Bak, were not related to the negative attitude to the other parties (Hwang 2008).

After other variables were controlled, ideology did not have much explanatory power in shaping individual vote choices. The direction is correct in the sense that the more conservative a voter is, the less likely he is to vote for Chung but the impact is not statistically significant.

Regions continue to influence vote choice although their impact also decreased; a Gyeongsang South voter would be 9% less likely to vote for Chung, whereas a Chula voter would be 20% more likely to vote for Chung. Although Gyeongsang North was not significantly different from the baseline when other variables were controlled, it was due to the fact that about three-fourths of Gyeongsang North respondents were GNP identifiers, and three-fourths of northern Gyeongsang voters chose Lee. It appears that while the persistent electoral bond between northern Gyeongsang and the conservative party candidate remains strong, the impact of region is absorbed by partisanship effect.

The impact of economic variables on the vote choice is of particular interest in this election where Lee Myung Bak tapped heavily into the popular hope for a better economy when campaigning. The results show that a favorable assessment of how the national economy has done during the past presidency is negatively related to a vote for Lee. Every additional unit increase in the economic evaluation in the positive direction would return a 9% increase in the probability for a Chung vote, when other variables were held at their means. This is economic voting working at its simplest form; voters clearly rewarded the incumbent party when they thought the national economy was better.

Almost every media report on the 2007 election pointed to the dominance of the economic issue on voting decision. In December, the global financial turmoil was spreading from sub-prime mortgages, and oil price was on steep rise. Wealth polarization

was deepening.[65] Despite the centrality of the economy as an electoral issue and Lee's clear advantage over Chung in this area, the results confirm that voters do not have confidence in the conservative party when it comes to employment. In fact, what the GNP candidate campaigned on was growth of GDP, increase in GNI per capita, and ascension of the country's position in the order of world economy. The electorate seemed familiar enough with the discourse of economic development to discern that growth does not necessarily mean creating more jobs, and still voted for Lee. The voters clearly punished the incumbent party for poor economic and overall performance,[66] yet considered neither of the major parties as particularly capable of creating more jobs—the policy area to which half of the respondents paid the most attention in this election. In other words, no major Korean party has issue ownership on solving job problems.

The 2008 National Assembly election was held only four months after the 2007 Presidential Election. Voter turnout in the 2008 National Assembly Election is the lowest for any general election since democratization. Polls reported that public opinion hardly shifted since the last presidential election, and it was evident that the opposition Democratic Party would lose a large number of seats in addition to its majority status in the legislature. The most notable change came from within the Grand National Party. Park Geun-Hye, the eldest daughter of Park Chung Hee, had been defeated by Lee

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[65] Analyzing inheritance tax data between 2000 and 2013, a recent research concludes that not only the wealth gap in Korea has grown during this period, and it is much wider than the income gap. The overall level of economic inequality in Korea is higher than other OECD countries in the continental Europe, though lower than U.S.A. (N. Kim 2015).

[66] When economic policy failure or mishandling government affairs measure replaces more jobs dummy in the model, its impact on vote choice is strong and significant, with the correct direction.

Myung Bak in a very tight and bitter nominating race in 2007. Many in Park's faction left the Grand National Party after failing to secure a party nomination for the assembly election, while some remained in the party with the faction leader. Park allies ran as Pro-Park independents, as GNP candidates, or as Pro-Park Coalition Party candidates,[67] and had a particular success in Gyeongsang region, which is commonly called the political fatherland of the former GNP chairwoman. The GNP seats in the Greater Gyeongsang went down from 62 to 46 mostly due to pro-Park competitors, and the Pro-Park Coalition took the third largest share of the proportional representation votes as well. Party support became more diversified within both Gyeongsang North and Gyeongsang South, which explains the significant and much stronger impact of the regions on vote choice in this election; Gyeongsang residents are 24% to 28% less likely to vote for the United Democratic Party candidate in their districts. The United New Democratic Party finally succeeded in merging with the old Democratic Party before the election to become the United Democratic Party. The overall consequence of the merger was to concentrate the political allegiance of the region on the new party. Jeolla residents were 45 percent more likely to vote for a United Democratic Party candidate than the voters in the northern half of the country. With a new Chungcheong-based conservative party led by Lee Hoi-Chang, who had gained 15 percent of the votes as an independent in the 2007 presidential race, the conservative parties together earned 58 percent of the party votes, despite the split (GNP, 38%; Pro-Park Coalition, 13%; Lee Hoi Chang's Liberty Forward Party; 7%). On the other hand, parties on the liberal side earned only a total of 35 percent (Democratic Party, 25%; Democratic Labor Party, 6%; Creative Korea Party, 4%) (C. Park 2009).

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[67] These GNP deserters joined a nominal political party as a group and changed the party name to Pro-Park Coalition due to time constraint.

The actual electoral outcome was clearly divided along regional line.regional cleavage. GNP earned 50% in Gyeongsang North and 44% in Gyeongsang South, whereas got only 7% in Chunra. On the other hand, Democratic earned 67% in Chunra, yet received 5% in Gyeongsang North and 11% in Gyeongsang South.

The right-hand side of the Figure 3-5 reports the 2008 National Assembly Election results. Unlike demographic variables, the coefficient for political ideology achieves statistical significance, and has the correct sign. One unit of movement to the right along the 11-point liberal-conservative self-placement scale results in a 4 percent decrease in the odds of a Democratic vote, other variables held at their mean. If a respondent were to change his ideology from the most liberal to the most conservative, his likelihood of voting for the Democratic Party would decrease by 40%. As in the 2007 election, the moderate and the conservative overwhelmingly supported the GNP, yet the margin diminished. Liberal voters clearly preferred the Democratic Party this time, whereas they were divided equally between Chung and Lee in the 2007 election. In short, ideology reemerged as a significant predictor of the vote in the 2008 National Assembly Election.[68]

Partisanship was the strongest predictor of the vote; a Democratic partisan was 50 percent more likely to vote for the party's candidate in his district, whereas a Grand National party supporter was 38 percent less likely to do so.

Both economic evaluation variables had significant impacts on the vote choice. The odds of a Democratic vote increase by 20 percent with one unit move toward

[68] Same pattern is found in an analysis based on a different election survey (C. Park 2009).

positive on the scale measuring economic evaluation. For example, those who say the economy is better off than that was four years ago are 20 percent more likely to vote Democratic in their districts than those who think the strength of the national economy is about the same. Likewise, a positive unit change in the prospective economic evaluation decreases the probability of a Democratic vote by 16 percent.

A favorable opinion of the national economy is positively related to a vote for the opposition party, yet it seems due to the fact that the government changes party hands only a month ago.[69] The respondents were asked to assess the economy is faring compared to 4 years ago, whereas the new president has been in office for only a month.

[69] The 2007 Survey Questionnaire offers one additional multiple-choice question that directly involves economic policies and their evaluation. Those who choose the (general) economic policy as the key failure of Roh government are more likely to vote against the Democratic party (whereas real estate policy failure does not have an impact on the vote). Those with more negative view of overall government performance were also less likely to vote for the former governing party.

Table 3-6: 2008 National Assembly Election: EAI Data
United New Democratic Party (Democratic) vs. Grand National Party (Conservative)

	Vote for UNDP	Marginal Effect	Vote for UNDP	Marginal Effect
Age	0.31	0.07	0.22	0.05
	(0.67)		(0.48)	
Male	0.31	0.06	0.30	0.06
	(1.27)		(1.24)	
Education	0.19	0.04	0.20	0.04
	(0.99)		(1.04)	
Income	0.06	0.01	0.07	0.01
	(0.95)		(1.02)	
Gyeongsang South	-0.80*	-0.15	-0.86*	-0.16
	(-2.17)		(-2.33)	
Gyeongsang North	-2.08**	-0.28	-2.16**	-0.29
	(-3.05)		(-3.10)	
Chungcheong	-0.02	0.00	-0.07	-0.01
	(-0.06)		(-0.18)	
Jeolla	2.05***	0.47	2.16***	0.49
	(3.85)		(3.93)	
Political Leaning	-0.34***	-0.07	-0.34***	-0.07
	(-4.73)		(-4.69)	
Democratic Partisan	1.75***	0.40	1.73***	0.40
	(5.08)		(4.95)	
Conservative Partisan	-2.29***	-0.47	-2.28***	-0.46
	(-8.58)		(-8.41)	
National Economy	0.00	0.00	-0.03	-0.01
	(0.02)		(-0.20)	
Prospect Economy	-0.40*	-0.09	-0.35+	-0.07
	(-2.31)		(-1.96)	
Pocketbook	0.21	0.05	0.23	0.05
	(1.34)		(1.45)	
Homeowner	-0.56+	-0.13	-0.59*	-0.13
	(-1.95)		(-2.03)	
Issue (Econ Growth)			-1.04**	-0.20
			(-2.93)	
Issue (Econ Equality)			-0.79*	-0.17
			(-2.44)	
Constant	1.19		2.08	
	(0.63)		(1.08)	
N	718		718	
pseudo R^2	0.49		0.50	

+ (p<.1); * (p<.05); ** (p<.01); **** (p<.001); z-scores are in parentheses.

Figure 3-6 reports an additional analysis of the 2008 National Assembly Election.[70]. Among home owners, another salient issue in 2008 was the government-initiated development plan— New Town Renovation Project. The Grand National Party had the clear support of home owners hopeful that their asset value would increase.

Voters' evaluation of the 'present state' of the national economy did not have an impact on their vote choice. More positive prospect for the new administration's economic performance led to a decreased likelihood of a Democratic vote. Economic growth is found to be closely tied to the conservative Grand National party again.

3.3 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The forgoing analyses of Korean election survey data find the following.

While a good evaluation of overall government performance regularly has a positive relationship with the vote for the incumbent party as predicted by classic reward-punishment theory, how a voter factors in her evaluation of the national economy has changed over time, reflecting the shift in the major cleavage that defines party competition. As discussed in the previous chapters, the conservative party has been associated with economic stability with emphasis upon growth than redistribution, until recently. On the other hand, the traditional opposition party represented the democratizing forces in Korean society and focused on the transfer of power. This value conflict between economic prosperity and political freedom defined the Korean party system for such a long time that ideology was gauged by whether one supports the

[70] Data from the East Asia Institute at Korea University.

governing party or the opposition party. Based on the regression results and historical account presented in this chapter, I argue that Korean citizens made room for democratic consolidation when they felt more confident in the state of the national economy, thus voted more for the democratic party, regardless of the incumbency. Previous researches accordingly found the impact of retrospective economic evaluation on vote choice scarce or in wrong direction in early Korean elections. Insofar as vote choice is correlated with voters' subjective evaluation of the national economy, and this evaluation provides them with an information shortcut (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981), I argue that Korean voters utilized the information about the general state of the national economy in an unexpected yet rational manner.

After the opposition party finally won the presidency in 1997, the actual policy differences between the two major parties came into focus, addressed by a new and popular discourse of ideology. The old setup of the ruling party against the opposition party became confusing, and the two parties were assigned positions on the spectrum of progressive to conservative now.[71]

I also find that economic interest does affect the vote choice consistently in Korea, mainly by issue voting and prospective evaluation of the national economy. When a respondent cites rising prices as the most important problem the country faces, or considers economic growth as its most urgent goal, he will probably vote against the democratic party, other things being equal. As described above, a great part of the

[71] *Yeo dang* means a political party that is together or friendly with (the government), whereas *ya dang* means a party that is in the field, thus not inside with the government. Simply speaking, Ins and Outs.

conservative party's electoral allure came from voters' confidence in the party's ability for handling economic matters.

The 1998 financial crisis and the subsequent restructuring of Korean economy embarked during Kim Dae Jung administration changed the Korean society profoundly, yet the conservative party seems still at advantage in the eyes of the public when it comes to increase the size of the pie. I find a strong and positive correlation between the vote for the traditional ruling party and issue preference for price stability or economic development/growth. A vote for the democratic party is either negatively related or unconnected to such preferences in general. Economic policies that promote job stability or redistribution do not appear owned by either of the two major parties; sporadic correlation between these issues and the vote largely reflect a complete loss of confidence in the incumbent party's ability to handle the economy, more than anything.

I maintain that this asymmetry in electoral support for the major parties is due to the differences in the parties' history regarding economic issues. It also indicates that the current Korean party system partly represents the voter alignment formed at the beginning of the democratization transition. Gyeongsang North, joined in a few years by Gyeongsang South voters, conservatives or habitual ruling party supporters, and those who prioritize economic stability comprise the electoral coalition for the conservative parties that continues the legacy of Park Chung Hee regime. Both Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations implemented neoliberal economic policies, while civil liberties and rights were promoted.

In sum, the pattern I find for Korean economic voting has two implications for further inquiry: asymmetry of party support and issue ownership. Before the government turnover, the conservative party was not proportionately rewarded for good economic performance whereas the democratic-opposition benefited from voters' positive

assessment of the national economy. The conservative party, however, had a very clearly defined issue area they own—the economy. As democratic consolidation is complete by formal definition and political issues are volatile, the traditional democratic party is in urgent need of an issue area it can own.

A quick overview of the two 2012 general elections support the findings and their implications presented in Chapters 2 and 3 (Figure 3-7). For the assembly election, note the strong electoral allure the conservative Saenuri party has over those who regard economic growth as the most urgent task of our society. As job insecurity and the lack of social security net were rapidly becoming serious problems in Korean society since the economic restructuring during the 1997 financial crisis, both major parties offered policy proposals to deal with them. Usually associated with a leftist party in the Western democracies, these issues appear not aligned with either of the parties yet.

As a former chief of staff to President Roh Moo Hyun, the Democratic presidential candidate Moon Jae-In from Gyeongsang South brought the generation and ideological conflict back in to the race against the strongman's daughter. Partisanship and the incumbent's economic performance were all significant predictors of the vote; yet region dummies, except Jeolla, did not affect vote choice. Partisanship, after all, seems to have absorbed much of regional impact, indicating that what region represented in the past has been sorted into political parties.

Table 3-7: 2012 National Assembly and 2012 Presidential Election: Democratic United Party (Democratic) vs. Saenuri Party (Conservative) Moon Jae In (Democratic) vs. Park Geun Hye (Conservative)

	2012 National Assembly		2012 Presidential	
	Vote for	Marginal	Vote for	Marginal
Age	0.13	0.03	-1.13**	-0.28
	(0.20)		-2.75	
Male	-0.48	-0.12	0.08	0.02
	-1.27		0.32	
Education	0.31*	0.08	0.03	0.01
	2.15		0.14	
Income	-0.01	0.00	0.05	0.01
	-0.16		1.12	
Gyeongsang South	-1.40**	-0.32	0.01	0.00
	-2.60		0.03	
Gyeongsang North	-0.49	-0.12	-0.22	-0.05
	-0.86		-0.50	
Chungcheong	-0.84	-0.20	-0.19	-0.05
	-1.27		-0.45	
Jeolla	1.95*	0.40	1.38*	0.32
	2.11		2.40	
Ideology	-0.16+	-0.04	-0.24***	-0.06
	-1.90		-3.59	
Conservative Partisan	-2.91***	-0.61	-3.24***	-0.65
	-6.02		-9.71	
Democratic	2.65***	0.56	2.69***	0.58
Partisan	4.83		7.86	
National Economy	-0.07	-0.02	-0.66***	-0.16
	-0.34		-3.47	
Economic growth	-1.17**	-0.28		
	-2.89			
More jobs			-0.47	-0.11
			-1.62	
More welfare	-0.03	-0.01	-0.17	-0.04
	-0.07		-0.51	
Constant	0.19		6.74***	
	0.07		3.51	
N	412		1000	
pseudo R^2	0.61		0.66	

To conclude, the charts presented below trace the changes in the key variables of interest over time. Figure 3-2 shows how the voter evaluation of the state of the national economy affects the democratic party. In the 1992 and 1996 elections, under a conservative incumbent, a positive view of the national economy actually increases the likelihood for an opposition democratic vote.



Figure 3-2: Impact of Voter Assessment of the National Economy on Democratic Vote (95% confidence interval)

The 1997 data point is the impact of the respondent's attribution of responsibility for the financial crisis to the incumbent Grand National Party on the opposition-democratic vote. The 1997 election survey did not include national economy evaluation measure. There was no question that the national economy deteriorated before the election, and it is reasonable to expect that voter assessment of the national economy would have been almost uniformly negative. Retrospective voting requires a process

where voters find the national economy unsatisfactory and blame the incumbent / presidential party for it. I assume that most voters would have been dissatisfied with the national economy, and examined whether they blamed and punished the incumbent party for the poor performance. As shown, omitting 1997 does not change the overall trend, and I include the year since it arguably marks the beginning point when Korean voters started to utilize classic reward-punishment logic of voting. Positive economic evaluation increased the likelihood of voting for the incumbent democratic party in 2007. The 2008 National Election, as noted, was held less than two months after the new president inaugurated. In the 2012 Presidential Election, as the respondent's satisfaction with the national economy increases, the probability to vote for the opposition democratic candidate decreased, in perfect accordance with Key's classic formulation.



Figure 3-3: Impact of Prioritizing Economic Issues (Price Stability and Economic Growth) on Democratic Vote

From figure 3-3, economic issues are generally correlated with a democratic vote in a negative way, except in the 1997 transitional election. Voters who prioritize economic concerns in their vote choice were less swayed when political agenda dominated the election (the 2004 Impeachment debacle), and more electorally affected when a particular economic policy *per se* was a salient campaign issue (the 2008 New Town Project).



Figure 3-4: Impact of Living in Jeolla on Democratic Vote



Figure 3-5: Impact of Living in Gyeongsang South on Democratic Vote



Figure 3-6: Impact of Democratic Partisanship on Democratic Vote

The last three charts presented above show the changes in the impacts of regions and partisanship on the vote over time.

Jeolla maintains a significant and positive relationship with the democratic party, yet the region is not unaffected by the political circumstances of individual elections and tides. Southern Gyeongsang is more sensitive to the changing political setup, and has impacts of less magnitude on the vote choice. Distant from the democratic party during Kim YoungSam government, this region was less antagonistic to Roh Moo Hyun in 2002 than Kim Dae Jung, and did not meaningfully oppose Roh Moo Hyun's Uri party in 2004. In the 2012 Presidential Election, Southern Gyeongsang was indifferent between the two major candidates. A process of dealignment may have been taking place in Gyeongsang South, where two presidential candidates—Roh and Moon— of the democratic party came from. The regional gap in the support for the democratic party narrowed in the most recent elections; from figure 3-6, the impact of democratic partisanship on the democratic vote was strongest in 2012 among the elections studied in this thesis. In Chapter 1, I showed that the democratic party has been gaining nationally balanced support (Figure 1-2 and 1-4). While Jeolla still remains the political home of the democratic party, the electoral support for the democratic party has been increasingly dispersed territorially, and concentrated along ideological or partisan line.

CHAPTER 4.

MACRO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND THE VOTES

In this chapter, I explore the relationship between macro-economic conditions and the electoral outcomes in South Korea. As repeatedly shown in the preceding chapters in this thesis, region is the most powerful and consistent predictor of the electoral returns after 1987, while there is no consensus on the impact of the economy on electoral support in the entire period. By focusing upon *how the regional economy affects regional party votes over time*, I examine whether the findings at individual level in Chapter 3 are corroborated at the aggregate level.

4.1 REGIONALISM AND RETROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC VOTING

In the standard sanctioning model of economic voting (Downs 1957; Fiorina 1981), voters punish the incumbent governments for bad economic times, and reward them for acceptable economic outcome. The incumbent governments gain or lose vote or popularity in proportion to the changes in economic conditions. In short, inflation and unemployment rate should be negatively correlated with government support on the one hand, and growths in real disposable income and gross domestic product should be positively related to government support on the other hand (Kramer 1971; Tufte 1978; Erikson 1989). Thus construed, elections are a referendum on the past economic performance of the incumbent (Key 1966; Fiorina 1981); and economic voting, in this

simple supposition, ensures democratic accountability (Anderson 2007). Elections dissolve the problem of delegation intrinsic to representative democracy by providing voters with control over the incentive of their agents, i.e., office-seeking politicians (Duch 2001).

For this normative structure to work, two premises should be met. Voters correctly observe and evaluate the economy; they then apply this evaluation to their voting decision. Testing the second linkage essentially involves modeling the connection from voter perception to electoral support (or government popularity), the subject of Chapter 3. By asking the respondents to assess the past and prospect of the national economy,[72] individual survey items directly connect how the voters interpret the economy to the vote.[73] I explore the first premise in this chapter, while recognizing that individual level relationship cannot be directly inferred from aggregate level findings. However, the aggregate-level relationship between the economy and the votes consistent with the individual-level relationship will corroborate and add to the understanding of the process.

Whether the public possesses adequate political knowledge to effectively monitor the agents is itself subject to interpretation, and varies by context and issues at stake. Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) found that the level of political information varies considerably around a low mean within the public. Zaller (1992) points out that many

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[72] The survey items thus differentiate retrospective voting from prospective voting, or in MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson (1992)'s words, whether voters behave as bankers or peasants.

[73] Biases in information sources, the differences in people's incentives and cognitive abilities, and the possibility that individual errors in measures of public opinion are not random (Bartels 1996; Duch, Palmer, and Anderson 2000) are some of the issues that individual-level economic voting literature encounters.

citizens are susceptible to elite manipulation of political communication due to their lack of attention to public affairs, and even those with high awareness respond mainly on the basis of partisan cues. Yet the deficiency in factual knowledge may only represent the rationality on the voter's part who minimize the costs of political decision-making by relying upon informational shortcuts rather than encyclopedic knowledge (Lupia 1994) and long standing votes (Downs 1957; also see Aidt 2000). Still, the reasoning voter (Popkin 1991) is required to be able to make a close connection between the objective economic condition and his perception of the economy for the logic of economic voting to hold. Akin to the findings on general political information, even when voters are not familiar with the exact level of major macro-economic factors, they have a remarkably acute sense of the economic improvement or decline, which in turn strongly influences their party preferences (Sanders 2000).

This section presents an analysis of the relationship between regional economic conditions and the vote shares of the two major political parties in Korea, for the period from 1987 presidential election to 2014 provincial election. In Figure 4-2, I also provide the results for the full period to underline the advantage of sorting the data with the criterion of which party held presidency at the time of a given election.

The main approach of this chapter is a time-series cross sectional analysis of election data and economic indices, namely, changes in unemployment rates and gross domestic products in South Korea. Since the data are in CSTS (Cross-Sectional Time Series) format, I choose to employ fixed effect and random effect models. While fixed effect model is the more conservative test in the sense that it tries to eliminate any region-specific traits, it would not allow the effect of time-invariant independent variables to be estimated. Random effect model is thus used when region dummies are in the equation.

The data structure reflects the two dimensions of analysis; time and geographic unit. The temporal frame starts with the 1987 presidential election that took place immediately after the extensive democratic reforms, and ends with the most recent provincial election in 2014.[74] The period includes six presidential elections, seven National Assembly elections, and six provincial-local elections—every election since the restoration of democratic institutions. A more detailed list of elections that are analyzed can be found in Figure 4-1.

Table 4-1: List of Elections Analyzed

Presidential Elections	Legislative Elections	Provincial Elections
1987	1988	1995
1992	1992	1998
1997	1996	2002
2002	2000	2006
2007	2004	2010
2012	2008	2014
	2012	

The spatial dimension of the data is provinces (or regions), which is the level of aggregation for both the votes and economic indices. The sixteen provinces are the primary political and administrative units of South Korea, and I examine whether my propositions regarding the relationship between the economy, party votes, and regional divides are consistent with empirical evidence.

The data structure basically assumes that voters look and respond to the changes in regional economy when evaluating the national government's performance. This

[74] Since regional polarization of the votes was manifest in the first democratic election after a long pause of authoritarian regime, and remained electorally influential around a high mean, the 1987 election has often been characterized as a critical election.

assumption also corresponds to the structure of most claims on the economic origin of regionalism—that the central government policies tend to favor or hurt specific regions depending on which party is the incumbent—the president's party, to be exact. On the other hand, Korean election survey items that can be employed to explore the connection between the economy and the votes focus on the questions of pocketbook or sociotropic voting at the national level, leaving the possible connection at this mid-level unexamined. This particular omission, combined with the general bias that there can be no real variance in the economy in a single cross-section (Kramer 1983), makes it advisable to rely on macro-level data in testing the relationship between the fluctuations in objective conditions and vote choices. This chapter also enriches the largely neglected area in economic voting literature of utilizing regional variations in economic conditions, in the absence of data better tailored to examine the temporal dynamics of individual economic voting, such as panel data (Lewis-beck and Stegmaier 2000, 195-196).

Table 4-2: Economic Conditions and Party Support:

Linear Regression with Random Effects[75]

	Entire Period		Conservative Incumbent Period		Democratic Incumbent Period	
	Con. P.	Dem. P.	Con. P.	Dem. P.	Con. P.	Dem. P.
Lagged Party Vote Share	0.38*** (0.06)	0.23 *** (0.06)	0.40 *** (0.07)	0.38 *** (0.07)	0.26 * (0.11)	0.03 (0.05)
Unemployment (6 mon.)	-0.02** (0.01)	0.03 ** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 ** (0.01)	0.04 ** (0.01)
Local GDP (Log)	0.02** (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 ** (0.01)	0.03 ** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Gyeongsang	0.11*** (0.02)	-0.14 *** (0.02)	0.10 *** (0.02)	-0.12 *** (0.02)	0.15 *** (0.04)	-0.20 *** (0.02)
Jeolla	-0.19*** (0.02)	0.31 *** (0.02)	-0.17 *** (0.02)	0.27 *** (0.02)	-0.25 *** (0.04)	0.35 *** (0.02)
Constant	-0.02 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.16)	0.06 (0.11)	-0.20 (0.16)	-0.20 (0.16)	0.51 (0.15)
R^2-within	0.13	0.10	0.13	0.08	0.05	0.18
R^2-between	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.95	0.98
R^2-overall	0.77	0.75	0.74	0.81	0.81	0.72
Wald (χ^2)	1779	2752	2238	1150	1624	996
N	265	265	154	154	111	111

Notes: a. The dependent variable is the two-party vote share of the major parties. Robust standard errors in the parentheses. *** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05.
b. I obtained very similar results excluding the election in 1998, the year after the unemployment skyrocketed due to the financial crisis in the previous year.

[75] The East Asian financial crisis and the IMF bailout brought about structural reforms of Korean economy. The subsequent governments closely pursued neoliberal economic policies. It can be argued that the economic crisis directly affected voter priority, and indirectly affected vote choice as well by shaping the way electoral competition was conducted; issue saliency, media framing, candidate selection might all have been influenced. Running the model excluding the year 1998, which is an outlier for its high unemployment rate, returned qualitatively same results.

The simplest way to see whether economic condition is meaningfully correlated with party support in Korean elections is to start with a basic model that controls for region, a known predictor indispensable for the period of interest (N. Lee 1998; K. Lee 1998; Kang 2003, 2010). It should be emphasized that the results here have implications at provincial level, thanks to the construction of the data set and the provincial nature of economic variables. Gyeongsang and Jeolla dummies are included to determine the regions' presumed explanatory power relative to the changes in economic conditions.

Figure 4-2 shows how the changes in provincial unemployment rate in six months, annual provincial economic growths and regions by themselves affect the vote share of the two major parties over time. Following the classification of the two major political parties in Chapter 3, the relationship is then examined in the conservative party(CP) incumbent period and the democratic party (DP) incumbent period.

A brief description of the main dependent variable, the vote share of the two major parties, is in order. The conservative party and the democratic party have been the only political parties that had actual potential for winning the presidency during this period. Most importantly, they represent the regional rivalry between Gyeongsang (CP) and Jeolla(DP). The labels CP and DP are also proxies for the precursor parties that existed before them in earlier elections. CP stands for the traditional ruling bloc and is the successor to parties that were heavily supported by Gyeongsang Region. Inheriting the legacy of Democratic Republican Party (1963-1980), the political apparatus of the authoritarian Park, Chung Hee regime, the Democratic Justice Party sustained President Chun, Doo Hwan and elected President Roh, Tae Woo during the 1980's before it became the Democratic Liberal Party in 1990, effectively maintaining its ruling party status through Kim Young Sam presidency up until 1997. Despite the label changes, this party always represented the more conservative side of political spectrum, and most

importantly, had the core support basis in Gyeongsang Region. Grand National Party was established in 1997, and changed label into Saenuri in 2012, making it the political party that lasted longest without a label change after democratization. I identify Saenuri Party and all of its predecessors as CP.

DP is represents a democratizing group and the traditional opposition party in South Korean politics. It has monopolized electoral support in Jeolla region and defined itself as the party against the ruling bloc of Gyeongsang region. Various opposition coalitions, almost invariably led or created by Kim, Dae Jung (President 1998-2002), became the many precursors to the democratic party. By the label DP, I indicate the lineage of political parties including the Unified Democratic Party; National Congress for New Politics; the Millennium Democratic Party that won Kim, Dae Jung the presidency, Roh, Moo Hyun's Uri Party (Shim 2004). CP remained as the ruling party until 1997, before it lost the election to Kim, Dae Jung. DP kept the presidency for a decade with Roh, Moo Hyun winning the 2002 presidential election, but handed it back to CP's Lee, MyoungBak in 2007. It may be questioned if the voters have the ability and incentive to follow party label changes, or whether they entirely agree with my identification. However, the cost of necessary information and the possibility of disagreement are both very low; notable political leaders functioned as brand name, and symbolized regional divides.

Of economic variables, unemployment rate is often considered as a measure people are best aware of. Paldam and Nannestad (2000b) found that more than half of the respondents in their sample of Danish voters could correctly assess the number of unemployed, and that people's micro knowledge about unemployment based on their personal experience or first-hand observations—thus circumventing the possible problem with political information discussed earlier— are highly correlated with the macro

picture.[76] Unemployment rate could also be a lagging indicator (Sanders and Gavin 2004), meaning that it takes time for the true effect of changes in unemployment rate to be felt. I thus measure the predictor variable with a lead time, taking the change in provincial unemployment rate from six months before the election to the election month.

Another indicator of the incumbent's economic performance used in this chapter is the yearly changes in provincial gross domestic product. Measures of total economic production could be the best available summaries of the average state of material well-being or prosperity in the electorate (Goodman and Kramer 1975, 1260); have yielded consistent empirical evidence of the economy's impact on the vote (Pacek and Radcliff 1995, 750), for both single- and multiple-country studies (Powell and Whitten 1993; Lewis-Beck and Tien 1996; Benton 2005). According to the basic reward and punishment model of economic voting, higher unemployment should contribute to lower support for the party in government. The macro-level analyses presented in Figure 4-2 establish that changes in unemployment rate have a statistically significant and solid influence on electoral returns. Its impact is not as strong as that of region, but it remains significant even after the ever powerful influence of regions and party are controlled. Yet the pattern found in the strong correlation does not follow the predictions of reward-punishment model. Higher unemployment have consistently contributed to higher DP votes, especially during the years when the democratic party held the presidency. Over

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[76] Nannestad and Paldam (2000b), however, find that most voters are unable to make accurate estimates of other macro-economic indicators such as the balance-of-payments and the budget balance. Sanders (2000) argues that while voters may not have precise macro-economic knowledge, they make an informed judgment about the state of the economy since their overall sense of macro-economic ups and downs are acute. What matters electorally is the voters' *perception* of the economy, and it reflects and follows the objective changes in unemployment and inflation. Furthermore, their perception also responds to the level of issue saliency of the economy.

the entire period, regional gross domestic product is positively correlated with the vote share of the developmental-conservative party. Yet economic variables are not significantly related with CP votes during CP governing period. The simple reward-punishment model does not explain this particular pattern.

Both Gyeongsang and Jeolla have the expected sign—the former region is negatively related to DP electoral performance, the latter positively and very strongly. The results for CP show a mirror image. As expected, Gyeongsang support contributes to CP vote share, while Jeolla is negatively and strongly correlated with CP votes. Regional divide obviously played a sturdy role in deciding the two major parties' vote share.

Reflecting its legacy as the ruling party through the years of rapid state-led economic development, CP is constantly associated with economic performance in the media and public perception. One of the recurring themes in campaign discourses, along with issues involving North Korea, has been who would be most capable of providing for both economic growth and stability. Individual-level surveys provide evidence that voters do turn to the reliable, long-standing apparatus of the development state when it comes to controlling the inflation or economic growth, as I have shown in Chapter 3.

In Table 2-2, CP vote share is not correlated with economic conditions when the party actually held presidency; higher unemployment rate tends to hurt CP in elections, whereas DP consistently gets more votes when jobs are being lost. The emerged relationship is not captured by the throwing the rascals out logic of economic voting. In this version, if the party in government does a bad job of handling the economy, joblessness among others, it is expected to be ousted from office or lose electoral support, other things being equal. The overall pattern revealed tells a different story; one of the two parties with actual potentials for governing is always helped by an increase in

unemployment rate, while the other tends to be hurt by it. This aggregate-level result points to another theory about relationship between the economy and electoral returns.

The next section introduces an alternative hypothesis, as well as a more complex and detailed picture of the tendency described above.

4.2 ISSUE OWNERSHIP, REGIONAL ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND CHANGES IN ELECTORAL SUPPORT

This section empirically examines some of the most influential claims about the evolution of Korean regionalism, by extending the basic model introduced above.

As discussed, DP has been aligned with and based on Jeolla support through numerous party label changes resulting from splits, mergers and reinventions, as CP has been aligned with Gyeongsang support. The high volatility scores of Korean party system is somewhat exaggerated in this sense—although the frequent changes of party label and regroupings among politicians warrant such scores. Especially after Kim Young Sam opted to join the governing conservative coalition in 1990, DP was regarded as the only feasible alternative to the perennial ruling party, CP. S. Kim (2013, 79) quotes the result from an October, 1987 Voter Survey; 56. 5% of the respondents chose 'political democratization' as the nation's most important problem compared to 29.3% who said 'economic growth.' Whether or when it can succeed in winning the presidency was uncertain, but there was no doubt that DP was consistently the most powerful opposition. The two rival parties monopolized the electoral support of the regions from which they respectively claimed loyalty.

The regional cleavages among political elites, emotional identities, historical grievances and uneven economic development have all been identified as sources of

regionalism (Croissant 2002, 253). The main tenet of studies that trace the origin of regionalism focuses on the inequity in economic development between the two regions in question. Throughout the Japanese occupation and the ensuing authoritarian regimes, industrialization and its benefits amassed in Gyeongsang, while Jeolla kept producing agricultural, primary industry goods. However, the uneven economic development was and remains most acute between the capital and the rest of the country. It alone cannot explain why a rivalry emerged between Gyeongsang and Jeolla regions, or the role the rivalry has played in the dynamics of electoral process. A more focused approach points to Park regime (1961-1979)'s policies that effected economic and political alienation of Jeolla region in searching for the direct cause of regionalism of today. State-led development strategies planned and implemented by Park regime—continued in its heir Chun government—shaped the national economy, which dictates the future possibilities of economic development.

Gyeongsang was the regional base for military-political elites of the authoritarian regime that lasted for more than thirty years since the 1961 coup of General Park (Park 2001). While it is a popular notion that the region, with its more export-oriented, heavy, petrochemical industry complexes and advanced infrastructure, enjoyed its status as the superior among regions,[77] it is rarely examined whether the supposed economic prosperity directly led to the vote choice.

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[77] The Korean War and the circumstances of its aftermath made the military elite the primary political actor (Compton 2000), and the fact that close to 90% of the chief-of-staff positions for the army, navy and air force were filled by Gyeongsang natives between 1966 and 1990 (Sohn 1996) is often cited as the evidence of Gyeongsang region's hegemonic position in the Korean Developmental State. According to B. Park (2001)'s calculation, those of Gyeongsang origin accounted for 40% of all high-ranking officials within the executive branch, over-representing the regional population share by more than 30% between 1963 and 1979. Gyeongsang continued to produce a

That Jeolla was excluded from state-led industrialization and elite recruitment process alone does not explain the region's extraordinary unison in electoral choice, as regions other than Seoul and Gyeongsang were similarly deprived, yet hardly exhibited the same pattern. Theories of group consciousness emphasize the role of dramatic political events that may produce a sudden rise in the salience and distinctiveness of a group which in turn leads to heightened group identity (Conover 1984).[78] Widely recognized is the role of Gwangju Massacre of 1980 and the ensuing civil uprising in shaping the political attitudes of Jeolla people. The region's loyalty to Kim DaeJung –a symbolic victim of authoritarian repression and the favored native son— and his personal political organization over his long career as a leader of democratization was repeatedly manifested in the subsequent elections.

Jointly, historical-sociological analyses of Korean regionalism assign a particular version of collective consciousness to each region (Hwang 1996; Sohn 1996). Reflecting the critical theory and modern state theory tradition shared by this literature (for example, Choi 2002), Gyeongsang is characterized by false consciousness in that they want to keep the illusion of their hegemonic position among regions, consummated in having a native son as the president. Expectations for tangible policy benefits implied by this attitude may or may not have to do with the desire. Pork-barreling (Cho 2000), booming regional economy or more generous transfer from central government (Kwon 2005) can be what is demanded in exchange for votes, or it may be the symbolic status that matters more. On

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disproportionately large number of government officials throughout the whole period covered in Park's study (up to 1997).

[78] Modern history also witnessed the region's occasional excursions into radicalism such as peasant uprisings and some indigenous communist movements around the time of Korean War.

the other hand, the depiction of Jeolla regionalism as a combination of regional identity originating from shared social experience and progressive political attitudes have been partially corroborated by the region's support for Roh Moo Hyun (a South Gyeongsang native) in the 2002 presidential primaries. In this rendition, Jeolla regionalism transcends simple affective support for a native son. Remarkable as the region's high level of unity in vote choice is, there exists a clear ideological dimension to Jeolla regionalism, which places the region on the progressive-left. For example, an ANOVA analysis of election survey for the 17th National Assembly election reports more than a 5-point difference between CP and DP on the thermometer scale of 0 to 10 in Jeolla, where the difference was a mere .18 point in Gyeongsang. Also, while respondents in both regions correctly placed the parties on the ideological scale, Jeolla positioned CP at slightly more right and DP at more left than Gyeongsang respondents did (Chung and Im 2006). I provide the regions' ideological distribution over time in the concluding chapter; Jeolla region, as a group, are indistinguishable from the democratic party identifiers and the voters in their 30's. Remarkably, a whole region is as progressive/ liberal as the most liberal political or demographic group identifiable. The result shows that regional cleavage overlaps ideological conflicts, which also define the electoral competition between the two major parties.

I articulate and emphasize the premise of most studies on Korean regionalism; regionalism is by and large a political phenomenon. Differences in dialects, customs, resources and environment do not warrant the degree of divergence in vote choice between the regions, from comparative perspective. No account of its origin and evolution can be given without recognizing the primary role of politics, and detecting the specific way how it plays out in the electoral arena has been the subject of many studies

on Korean politics, although there is a rather unmistakable scarcity of empirical works drawing upon longitudinal data.

I start with testing whether the economy has a meaningful relationship with the fluctuations in electoral support for the two parties within the affiliated regions, then compare the results with the general findings.

Table 4-3: Changes in Economic Conditions and Party Support in the South

Linear Regression with Fixed Effects

Region	Gyeongsang			
Incumbency	Conservative Incumbent		Democratic Incumbent	
Change in Party Support[a]	Con. Party	Dem. Party	Con. Party	Dem. Party
Lagged Party Vote Share	-0.78***	-0.80***	-1.32***	-1.19***
	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.19)	(0.20)
Unemployment (6 months)	0.03	0.00	-0.01	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)
GDP Annual Growth	-1.01	-0.71	-0.26	1.01
	(0.53)	(0.35)	(0.56)	(0.68)
Constant	0.47***	0.17***	0.83***	0.17*
	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.11)	(0.07)
R^2-within	0.43	0.57	0.68	0.69
R^2-between	0.02	0.05	0.35	0.55
R^2-overall	0.41	0.45	0.41	0.67
N	45	45	34	34
Region	Jeolla			
Incumbency	Conservative Incumbent		Democratic Incumbent	
Change in Party Support	Con. Party	Dem. Party	Con. Party	Dem. Party
Lagged Party Vote Share	-1.10***	-1.11***	-0.76**	-1.14***
	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.25)
Unemployment (6 months)	-0.04	-0.02	-0.02**	0.06
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.00)	(0.03)
Regional GDP Yearly Diff.[b]	0.89	1.09	-0.24	1.18
	(0.48)	(0.69)	(0.20)	(1.32)
Constant	0.10***	0.79***	0.06**	0.78***
	(0.03)	(0.18)	(0.01)	(0.20)
R^2-within	0.63	0.51	0.63	0.61
R^2-between	0.52	0.83	0.79	0.49
R^2-overall	0.51	0.45	0.62	0.60
N	30	30	21	21

Notes: a. The dependent variable is *the change* in two-party vote share of the major parties from the last election. Standard errors in the parentheses.

b. The change in Regional GDP from last year in percentage term.

*** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05.

Figure 4-3 directly examines how economic conditions affect the party support within Gyeongsang and Jeolla after the impact of the electoral history of each party is controlled. Switching to differenced vote share as the dependent variable generally decreases the explanatory power of the same set of variables used for Figure 4-2. Essentially, election specific factors such as candidates, events related to national security or political scandals would have more sway over the margins of electoral gains or losses of the two major parties, which hold a stable portion of the votes. It is likely that the support for the same party or candidate is sticky enough that there is some level of autocorrelation between the dependent variable and the vote share in the last election, especially for presidential elections where identical candidates competed repeatedly across several elections. Korean voters are reportedly more candidate-oriented than party-oriented, and voters had allegiances to particular candidates of long standing, for example, the three Kims. A party's electoral performance in the last election is somewhat expected to decrease the same party's marginal gain in the present election due to the tendency to regress toward the mean, as is the case with the results in Table 4-3 and 4-4.

Changes in regional economic conditions do not explain much of the variation in these particular regions' electoral support. In Gyeongsang, the changes in regional unemployment rates and regional economic growths appear largely irrelevant in the changes in party vote share. Conspicuous is the negative effect of higher unemployment rates on CP support during the DP incumbency years in Jeolla. Out of the possible setups that involve the incumbency status of the major parties and their sponsor regions, this is the only case where a turn to more labor-friendly policy in times of job scarcity takes place, after controlling for the electoral history of the parties and the impact of regional GDP. While security and North Korea relations, along with a selection of social policies,

are what most clearly distinguish DP from CP, DP is summarily classified as a left-leaning or progressive party in public discourses. Debatable as it is whether the party is ideologically distant from CP in actual economic *policies*, election surveys routinely confirm that voters position DP at left and CP at right on the ideological spectrum, giving a considerable distance between the two parties.

Table 4-4: Changes in Economic Conditions and Party Support

Linear Regressions with Random Effect

Incumbency	Conservative Incumbent		Democratic Incumbent	
Change in Party Support[a]	Con. Party	Dem. Party	Con. Party	Dem. Party
Lagged Party Vote Share	-0.56*** (0.06)	-0.63*** (0.07)	-0.68*** (0.09)	-0.98*** (0.04)
Unemployment (6 months)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)
Regional GDP Yearly Diff.[b]	-0.55** (0.20)	-0.53* (0.21)	-0.79*** (0.19)	1.06*** (0.26)
Gyeongsang	0.10*** (0.01)	-0.12*** (0.03)	0.14*** (0.04)	-0.19*** (0.02)
Jeolla	-0.17*** (0.02)	0.26*** (0.02)	-0.25*** (0.04)	0.37*** (0.02)
Constant	0.26*** (0.03)	0.26*** (0.03)	0.34*** (0.04)	0.30*** (0.02)
R^2-within	0.33	0.46	0.60	0.61
R^2-between	0.64	0.26	0.00	0.04
R^2-overall	0.32	0.37	0.44	0.59
Wald(χ^2)	181.34	270.35	195.76	713.32
N	138	138	111	111

Notes: a. The dependent variable is *the change* in two-party vote share of the major parties from the last election. Robust standard errors in the parentheses.
b. The change in Regional GDP from last year in percentage term.
*** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05.

Figure 4-4 shows how the electoral performance of the political parties in the last election, and the recent changes in the regional economy affect the changes in the parties' vote share under different incumbency. Gyeongsang and Jeolla dummies are also

included to measure the impact of regionalism in the general sense. Region dummies, in this vein, are expected to capture the unspecified effects of various regional contingencies that coincide with the administrative and politically meaningful units.

The combined results from Table 4-2 and 4-4 corroborate the impact of the partisan issue ownership on the votes (Hibbs 1979; Petrocik 1996; Egan 2013) that I presented in Chapter 3. The core argument of this theory is that voters would make differential judgments about leftist and rightist government's macro-economic performance on the basis of the parties' ideological difference. The parties also cater to their constituents' class-based interests. Consequently, high unemployment rate may even increase the support for a leftist incumbent because a leftist party is expected to prioritize job growth and stability, while a rightist party, with its priority on low inflation, is expected to be less disposed to address unemployment problem. Empirically, Nannestad and Paldam (2000b) find that government support tends to increase with higher unemployment rate, and decrease as unemployment rate goes down, yet only for Social Democratic governments. Carlsen (2000) reports that rightist governments are hurt by rising unemployment rate in the US, Canada, the UK and Australia. On Korean elections, Kwon (2010) finds that previous right party voters changed their political allegiance to a center-left party when unemployment was one of the most salient issues in the election.

In Chapter 3, I showed that voters who prioritize price stability or economic growth tend to vote more for the conservative party, other things being equal. While the pattern in Figure 4-2 shows that regional GDP is consistently and positively correlated with the increase in the conservative party's vote share, the relationship does not hold when the entire period is divided by incumbency. In addition, while the changes in

unemployment rate has the predicted relationship with the change in the two parties' electoral performance, regional GDP growth has the wrong sign.

Pacek and Radcliff (1995) point out the possibility that voters react to recession and growth differently. In an analysis of the developing world elections, they conclude that economic growth provides no benefits for the incumbent government, while punishment for bad economic times is apparent. These findings are in accordance with the impact of yearly difference in regional GDP on the election-to-election change in the vote shares of the major two parties in South Korea. While higher unemployment clearly benefits the leftist democratic party, the conservative party does not gain electoral support from regional economic growth.

Also, these results suggest that while the parties do own a specific issue area, their performance in this issue area may or may not be rewarded by more votes. Figure 4-2 shows that for the elections at every level after democratic transition, the support for the conservative party is positively correlated with regional GDP, whereas higher unemployment rate leads to the democratic party's electoral gains. Yet for the conservative party, a better performance in promoting regional GDP does not contribute to increasing the party's vote share over the last election. In accordance with Egan (2013)'s argument, the overall pattern found in this chapter strongly supports the issue ownership hypothesis. A political party with known *priorities* in handling a specific economic problem is consistently and positively associated with the relevant economic index. On the other hand, the short-term fluctuations in its issue area are not necessarily correlated with the party's electoral gains or losses.

In sum, regional economic growth is correlated with the conservative party vote whereas higher unemployment rate is likely to increase the democratic party vote share. The conservative party inherits the legacy of developmental state, and has been reputed to be more growth-driven than concerned with redistribution and equality. Over the two democratic party presidencies, the short-term macroeconomic fluctuations at regional level were directly correlated with the parties' gain or loss in vote share, in a manner that is consistent with the predictions of both performance-based retrospective economic voting and issue ownership theory. This post-1997 phenomenon, in other words, is in accordance with differential partisan capability approach (Hibbs 1977) and clarity of responsibility thesis (Powell and Whitten 1993). Although regional rivalry remains constantly powerful, economic conditions also began to shape electoral outcomes in a more explicit manner during this period.

Lastly, the analyses of the cross-sectional time series data presented in this chapter give an opportunity to directly compare the relative strengths of region and the economy in South Korean elections. The (regional) economy matters, but it only does through the mediation of political contexts. The foremost and unmistakable impact of region is that there exists a durable negative linkage between the parties and the regions in rivalry, in addition to the party's monopolizing of the votes in its affiliated region.

In combination with the findings at micro-level in chapter 3, the aggregate-level results in this chapter support the following argument.

South Korean voters incorporate the information on macro-economic conditions and the way the two major parties handle these conditions into their voting calculus. A political party's longstanding commitment to a specific economic issue area is a more consistent predictor of the party's vote share, whereas the parties' short-term economic performance lead to more nuanced and politically conditioned electoral results.

Overall, the economy was relevant, and in a specific manner. Due to actual differences in policy priorities and the corresponding perception of voters, which party occupied the central government mattered in deciding the way economic conditions shaped election outcome at regional level.

CHAPTER 5.

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I propose to disentangle the electoral influence of regionalism, be it affective, evaluative, or strategic, instigated by a historical contingency at the beginning but developed as a stable and intense linkage between the parties and their core regional bases from other stable grounds for party support; the economy and ideology.

Since the first presidential election in democratic transition of 1987, Korean electoral politics has been characterized by a very high level of regionally concentrated vote distribution, although the regions are hardly divided by social cleavages associated with regional voting around the world. Thus, I adopt a quantitative definition of regional voting as a region's cohesive electoral support for a specific party or candidate over an extended period, as opposed to voting for a political party that explicitly represents and promotes the particular interests of a region and its inhabitants.

By showing the changes in the effective number of parties at presidential and national legislative elections over time, I first verify that the size of Korean national party system is inflated than the country's electoral rule—simple plurality single member—would predict. With two or three regions giving an exclusive support for a different party, the number of viable parties exceeded 2 at national level. Recent trend, especially in presidential elections, shows a convergence toward 2, indicating a party aggregation process. I examined the level of party aggregation, or nationalization, by taking the

deviation of a political party's regional electoral support from its national average. I found that the size of the national party system has decreased over time due to the fact that the democratic party—the opposition party before the first government turnover—has been broadening its electoral appeal across regions. On the other hand, the effective number of legislative parties is still relatively high at the national level, while the electoral support for the conservative party—the ruling party from the authoritarian era—has become more regionally cohesive after it lost incumbency status for the first time in 1997. The combined results suggest that while regional divide is consistently relevant in Korean elections, there are other factors that help explain the shifting relationship between the parties and their constituent regions.

One possible explanation is that parties selectively mobilize regional cleavage in the electorate for vote maximization. There are evidences from voter surveys that there exists a significant social distance between the residents in the two regions—Gyeongsang and Jeolla. Although both regions demonstrate out-group hostility toward each other, as the regional home of the longtime ruling party, Geyongsang enjoys a distinctly superior social position than Jeolla. Respondents who come from Jeolla are uniquely more exposed to a personal encounter with discrimination. Regionalism and its effect, then, is real, although its origin is still debatable.

I conducted an elite survey of the local party heads and national legislators who were responsible for the 2002 presidential election campaigns at district level. My analysis of this survey corroborates that the party elites are well aware of the electoral consequences of regionalism among their constituents, and mobilize it when they think it would influence local electoral returns or the opponent is engaged in a campaign strategy that stimulates regionalism in their districts. Gyeongsang and the conservative party were more reliant on regionalist campaigns in general, and this finding is largely consistent

with the earlier discovery that electoral support for the conservative party has recently been more regionally cohesive. Results from the Korean voter survey for the 2002 election show that region remained as a strong predictor of the vote for this race, although the election was dominated by discourses on generation change.

In the next two chapters, I explored whether the economy has a meaningful impact on South Korean elections at both micro and macro-level. Economic voting, in various forms, is one of the most influential model of voting behavior, yet a systematic application of the model to Korean elections across all years and at both individual and aggregate level is hard to find. Specifically, I examined two most common versions of economic voting; reward-punishment model and party issue ownership model. In my analysis of legislative and presidential elections where relevant survey items are available, I tested whether the retrospective evaluation of the incumbent's performance on the national economy has an impact on the vote choice, after controlling for regions, partisanship, and ideology. I also tested whether the conservative party's reputation for handling economic issues better, especially maintaining price stability and economic growth, is correlated with the vote choice.

I find two things. In the elections before the first government turnover, South Korean voters used their evaluation of the state of the national economy as an information shortcut, and voted for promoting democratization when they felt the economy was safe and sound, contrary to the reward-punishment model. The predictions of the retrospective model of economic voting held in elections after 1997. Also, voters who felt inflation or economic development was the nation's most important problem were significantly more likely to vote for the conservative party. As the traditional ruling party of developmental state, the conservative party does appear to own the economic

issue area common for a rightist party. While the conservative party keeps its hold upon economic growth issue, the democratic party lost a consensus issue –democratization—it once owned, now that democratic consolidation is complete. This may be one of the reasons why the latter has not fared very well in recent elections.

The aggregate level analysis of macro-economic indices and party votes corroborates and strengthens the findings at the individual level. Not only the regional vote share of the conservative party is correlated with regional GDP, the democratic party vote is strongly and positively correlated with unemployment rate. The latter relationship was sporadically observed at the individual level, largely due to the scarcity of survey items, yet the aggregate level result is both strong and consistent with a particular version of issue ownership theory—differential partisan capability approach.

In sum, I find a closer relationship between the economy and the votes in Korean elections than previously thought, after controlling for the steady and powerful impact of region and partisanship (or party vote).

To conclude my study upon the Korean party system after democratization, I provide an assessment of the overall trend in the dynamics of region, ideology and party in the next section. Drawing upon the preceding chapters, I argue that the 2004 experiment of Uri party clearly introduced ideology into the arena of political conflict.

As the size of the national party system converges on 2, and the democratic party gains more balanced electoral support, regional cleavage is being absorbed into party competition, most likely along the ideological divide. Notably, I observe that South Gyeongsang, where two presidential candidates of the democratic party came from, is going through a dealigning process from the conservative party coalition.

Changes in the Dynamics of Region, Ideology and Partisanship Over Time

In the last section, I give an overview of the changes in the distribution of partisanship and ideology by region and age since democratic transition in South Korea. The pattern that emerges from the combined charts (5.1 to 5.4) summarizes the dynamics in the electoral history of South Korea after 1987. Note that the governing party is the democratic party from 1998 to 2007. Jeolla had the greatest share of the opposition democratic party identifiers before the first government turnover, which peaked in the 1997 Presidential Election. Gyeongsang exhibits almost a mirror image of Jeolla.



Figure 5-1: Conservative Party Identifiers by Region[79]

[79] The 2000 election survey questions used the sequence of "Do you think of yourself as close to any particular political party?" followed by "what party is that?" This change in the measure of party identification seemed to yield a much smaller percentage of partisans than in other years where the survey items offered the respondents a list of political parties to choose from.

Both actual election outcome and the vote choice of KSDC survey participants showed a strong support for the Grand National Party in Gyeongsang South as expected, and a Gallup poll conducted around the same time reported that 53.9 percent of southern



Figure 5-2: Democratic Party Identifiers by Region[80]

Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show how the close partnership between the two major parties and their sponsor regions found in the aggregate-level electoral outcome is expressed at the individual level. The proportion of conservative partisans among South Gyeongsang residents was greater than that among North Gyeongsang residents throughout Kim Young Sam government and the immediately following Kim Dae Jung government period. After the Roh Moo Hyun presidency, southern Gyeongsang is more loosely aligned with the conservative party, and voters in the region turn increasingly democratic partisans.

Gyeongsang and 48.7 percentof northern Gyeongsang respondents supported the GNP, while 79.6 percent in Jeolla supported the Democrats. The deviation, thus, seems largely due to question effect; yet the picture also suggests that southern Gyeongsang is more loosely aligned with the GNP.

[80] The value for Jeolla in 2004 indicates the proportion of supporters for the new incumbent Uri party. In the figures above, Jeolla scores represent only Uri party identifiers. The Millennium Democrats will add another 15 percent.



Figure 5-3: Changes in Mean Ideology Score by Region of Residence over Time (Normalized 0 to 10)

Given that the average ideological score of southern Gyeongsang is consistently indistinguishable from the national average, the fluctuation in the conservative partisan share within the region is anticipated and largely reflects the impact of political mobilization. Contrary to popular belief, even the proportion of democratic partisans in "solid" Jeolla fluctuates depending on the electoral tides and available political alternatives. The more stable pattern is that conservative partisans are rare in Jeolla over the entire period. In short, intra-region macro partisanship moves systemically with respect to time, whereas the well-known electoral link between the two major parties and two southern regions in Korea perseveres.



Figure 5-4: Ideology by Age Groups(normalized 0 to 10)[81]

The impact of age and/or generation on vote choice is significant in recent Korean elections. While the mass electorate has become increasingly conservative in the period after the two democratic presidencies, the distance between the youngest cohorts (those in their 20's and 30's) and the oldest remain the widest throughout. Age effect was also strongest in the 2002 presidential election that Roh won. Voters under 45, especially those in their 30's and early 40's, supported Roh heavily, reflecting the generation's unique experience as students and young adults in the democratization movement.

The aforementioned generation of respondents who were in their 30's around 2002 is the most liberal of all the age cohorts throughout the period. In fact, every age

[81] Ideology, not *yeo-ya* orientation, is only available since 1997. The five point-scale (1995, 2002) and three point-scale of 2000 were normalized to the 11 point-scale adopted since 2004.

group in 2002 is more liberal than their counterparts in the other years. In other words, the electorate was at its most conducive to the creation of an ideological party in 2002. There was a roughly one-point shift toward right on the ideological continuum with the demise of Uri party near the end of Roh administration. Also, voters over 60's in the 2012 elections are the most conservative of all time. Age had as much an impact on the vote choice in these elections as it did in 2002. This time, it was the oldest cohorts who disproportionately supported the conservative candidate, Park Geun-Hye. The oldest daughter of the longtime authoritarian ruler Park Chung Hee , she had the older voters' sympathy and nostalgia for the time of her father's rule at her disposal. More importantly, the conservative candidate appealed to the oldest generation with the promise of a monthly subsidy for everyone over 65. As the economy is ever slowing down and traditional Confucian values are rapidly dissolving, Korean citizens cannot count on the care of their children in the old age. Expansion of welfare benefit was one of the salient electoral issues in 2012, and her campaign pledge proved widely popular among those over 60.



Figure 5-5: Subjective Ideology of the National Assembly Members and the Mass Public (0 to 10 scale: Liberal to Conservative) Source: The JoongAng Daily. 2012. 07.23[82]

Figure 5-5 tracks the changes in the self-assessments of political ideology of National Assembly members and the mass electorate from the 16th to the most recent 19th cohorts. Compared to the 18th Assembly cohorts (6.2), the conservative party[83] members moved slightly toward the center (5.9), positioning themselves on the virtually same point with the average mass preference (5.8). With the sharp left turn of the new Democratic

[82] Based on survey of the 19th National Assembly Members by the *Joongang Daily* in collaboration with the Korean Association of Party Studies.

[83] The Grand National Party changed its name to Saenuri Party in early 2012 in preparation for the general election, after Park Geun-Hye (President 2013~) took control of the party.

cohorts (3.8 to 2.7), the ideological distance between the two parties is the widest ever (magnitude changed from 2.4 to 3.2). While the two major parties grow ideologically apart further, the mass preference becomes more conservative and close to the mean conservative party position. The mean mass ideology leaned slightly liberal between the beginning of Kim Dae Jung presidency (1997~) until the impeachment election of 2004, and switched to a conservative position (5.4) as the governing party changed. In combination with the figures above, it is clear that as the voters have grown increasingly conservative toward the end of unpopular Roh presidency and the replacement of the ruling party, their attitudes also reflect what went on the elite level.

Together, the figures in this section depict an electorate that is responsive to the events in the political world. While mass ideological preferences move more slowly, their affective attitudes toward the parties are receptive to the signals sent by the changes in party policies or party composition. To borrow Fiorina's words, "partisans have become better sorted into the parties than in past decades. Thus, at the highest levels the parties are more polarized, …this partisan polarization has only a faint reflection in popular polarization, so the latter certainly is not a cause of the former" (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2005, 5-6).



Figure 5-6: Ideological Placement of Parties and Self by Conservative Party Identifiers



Figure 5-7: Ideological Placement of Parties and Self by Liberal Party Identifiers

Figures 5-6 and 5-7 also show that Korean partisans are affiliated with the correct party; they entered the party consistent with their ideological position or adjust their positions according to their party affiliation (Fiorina el al., 25). Together, figures 5-5 to 5-7 depict the polarization of the two major political parties that is reflected in the mass electorate. Not only the self-assessed policy positions of the political elites—national legislators— grew apart, the mass public regarded the two major parties as far more distant from each other than they actually were.

To summarize, the foregoing overview of the changes in mass ideology and partisanship divided by region and age over time provides three noteworthy points. First, while the rival regions and the two major parties remain polarized, the distance is most striking in presidential elections. The focal point of regional and/or party competition, voters identify more strongly with the party of their respective region in presidential elections. Second, the same logic applies to the division inside the greater Gyeongsang region as well. Associated with the conservative party in general, northern and southern Gyeongsang display varying macro partisanship depending upon from which part of Gyeongsang the presidential candidate comes at a given time. For example, South Gyeongsang identified strongly with the ruling conservative party of their native son, Kim Young Sam. The region is more loosely aligned with the conservative party in that it also showed increased support for Uri party in 2004 and the Democratic party in 2012 when the party's presidential candidate, Moon Jae In, was also from South Gyeongsang. Third, I argue that the short-lived Uri party (absorbed back into the Democratic party in 2007 before the election) was enough of a catalyst to start a dealigning process of southern Gyeongsang from the conservative party coalition. A presidential party most detached from the political conflicts defined along regional cleavage in theory, the

party's agenda also actively engaged in the discourse of political ideology. In the history of Korean elections since democratization, the 2004 legislative election is unique in that the dominating political conflict began to be defined in terms of progressive (liberal) against conservative values and policies.[84]

While the regional polarization of party identifiers is back to the high level of the early 1990's when the three Kims monopolized political support in different parts of the country, I argue that the polarization in 2012 now reflects the distance between the political parties *per se*. Electoral competition between parties were heavily influenced by regional identity and the symbolic personages of the regions before the juncture of Roh Moo Hyun presidency, that disrupted the familiar party-region partnership and experimented a new political cleavage. Both the democratic party identifiers and the general electorate moved left and close to Uri party in 2004—the most liberal point in the data; they also perceived the Grand National party as a lot more conservative than the party elites' policy positions warranted. Affective attitudes toward parties were polarized in this election as well. Partisans or not, only less than one tenths of the survey respondents were neutral toward both major parties. Fifty percent of the respondents

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[84] There is another important reason why this happened; institutional change. Since 2004, the voters cast two ballots in a National Assembly Election, one for a political party and one for a district candidate. About 54 to 56 legislators out of 299 to 300 legislators are elected by party vote. The previous way of allocating second tier seats—national district seats—were ruled unconstitutional in 2001.

The most notable consequence was, of course, the increase in the number of legislative parties. The Democratic Labor secured ten seats and 13% party votes, a whopping difference from the 1.2 % district votes in the previous election. The success of the party on the far left of ideological spectrum seems largely thanks to the electoral rule change.

liked one party and disliked the other. In short, the electorate in 2004 was starkly polarized.

Why? To the extent that mass behavior echoes elite behavior, it is not the stable policy preferences of both parties and the mass public that brought about this dramatic polarization in the electorate. Elite polarization clarifies public perceptions of the parties' ideological differences (Hetherington 2001, 619), which renders political parties relevant and salient for the mass. The debacle of the impeachment of President Roh and its aftermath made it highly visible who ran with whom. It was also very easy to choose sides; the question was whether the president should step down, and which party and legislators wanted to impeach him.

The party system of 1987 based on regional divide is persistent in that the alignment of the regions and political parties remains electorally relevant. There has been a crucial intervention of ideology in 2002 and 2004 elections, which accelerated the polarization at the elite level and party sorting in the mass electorate. In consequence, the Korean party system of 2012 reflects not only the electoral partnership between the two southern regions and major political parties, but also the coordination in ideology and issue positions between the parties and their constituents.

APPENDICES

A. The 16th Presidential Campaign Survey Questionnaire

Some of the questions and instructions in this questionnaire were modified from Paul S. Herrnson, *Party Campaigning in the 1980s* (1988).

Instructions for Completing the Questionnaire

A. *Your cooperation in this study is sincerely requested. Please read carefully the following questions and choose the answer that best describes your opinion.*
B. *Please do not sign the questionnaire. The data collected for the survey will be analyzed and used in quantitative form only. Once the completed questionnaire is received, your answers will be coded and it will be impossible to associate the questionnaire with your name.*
C. *If you want to receive a copy of the findings from this survey, write your name, address and e-mail address on a separate sheet of paper, and return it with the completed questionnaire.*

Your cooperation is crucial in making this study a success, and to helping all those interested in Korean elections and political parties. Thank you.

- *Please circle the answers to the following questions.*

Q1. What was your position in your district party organization during the 16th Presidential Campaign? (Circle all the answers that apply)

(1) National Assembly Member
(2) Head of District Party (but not an NA member)
(3) Campaign Manager for District Party
(4) Campaign Manager for Regional Party Chapter
(5) Head of Staff for National Assembly Member
(6) Other_____

Q2. What was your party affiliation?

(1) The (New Millennium) Democratic Party
(2) The Democratic Labor Party
(3) Hannara (The Grand National Party)

Q3. How many times have you been involved in a presidential campaign?
(1) Once
(2) Twice
(3) Three times
(4) More than three times

Q4. To which region does your district belong?

(1) Seoul
(2) Busan
(3) Daegu
(4) Incheon
(5) Gwangju
(6) Daejeon
(7) Ulsan
(8) Gyeonggi
(9) Gangwon
(10) Chungcheong (North)
(11) Chungcheong (South)
(12) Jeolla (North)
(13) Jeolla (South)
(14) Gyeongsang (North)
(15) Gyeongsang (South)
(16) Jeju

Q5. How would you characterize your district?

(1) Urban
(2) Rural

Q6. In your opinion, how competitive was the race in your district?

(1) Very competitive
(2) Moderately Competitive
(3) Slightly Competitive
(4) Not competitive

Q7. Who was the strongest opposing candidate to your party in your district?

(1) Roh, Moo-Hyun of the Democratic Party
(2) Kwon, Young-Gil of the Democratic Labor Party
(3) Lee, Hoe-Chang of the Grand National Party

Q8. In your opinion, among the issues focused in this presidential election, which one did

the voters in your district care about the most?

(1) Economic stability/development
(2) Economic equality between social classes
(3) Corruption in government

(4) Regionalism
(5) Generation Shift/ Ending Old Politics
(6) Relations with/ policies regarding North Korea
(7) Relations with/ policies regarding the U.S.

For the following questions, 1 indicates 'not effective,' 2 'a little effective', 3 'moderately effective,' 4 'very effective,' and 5 'extremely effective.' Circle the number that best represents your opinion.

Q9. How important do you believe the following factors were in determining the outcome of the election in your district? Evaluate the impact of the following factors on the opposing candidate you indicated in Q7.

	Not	Moderately			Extremely
Candidate's image and personality	1	2	3	4	5
Candidate's party affiliation	1	2	3	4	5
Candidate's region of origin	1	2	3	4	5
Candidate's party's regional appeal	1	2	3	4	5
District party's campaigns	1	2	3	4	5
Regional party chapter's campaigns	1	2	3	4	5
The candidate's personal appearance in district campaigns	1	2	3	4	5
National campaign via the media	1	2	3	4	5
Policies	1	2	3	4	5
Issues	1	2	3	4	5

Q10. How important do you believe the following factors were in determining the

outcome of the election in your district? Evaluate the impact of the following factors on your party's candidate.

Candidate's image and personality	1	2	3	4	5
Candidate's party affiliation	1	2	3	4	5
Candidate's region of origin	1	2	3	4	5
Candidate's party's regional appeal	1	2	3	4	5
District party's campaigns	1	2	3	4	5
Regional party chapter's campaigns	1	2	3	4	5
The candidate's personal appearance in district campaigns	1	2	3	4	5
National campaign via the media	1	2	3	4	5
Policies	1	2	3	4	5
Issues	1	2	3	4	5

Q11. How important were the following factors in deciding the formulation of campaign strategy and campaign decision making for your district? Circle the number associated with the most appropriate choice for each factor.

	Not		Moderately		Extremely
Opinion polls done by the national party	1	2	3	4	5
Opinion polls done by regional party chapter	1	2	3	4	5
Opinion polls done by district party	1	2	3	4	5
Direct contacts with voters in your district	1	2	3	4	5
National media	1	2	3	4	5
Local media	1	2	3	4	5
Internet journals	1	2	3	4	5
Opinions registered at the party website	1	2	3	4	5

Others _____

Q12. How important were the following groups in assisting the campaign with the formulation of campaign strategy and campaign decision making for your district? Circle the number associated with the most appropriate choice for each factor.

	Not		Moderately		Extremely
District party	1	2	3	4	5
Regional party chapter	1	2	3	4	5
National Party	1	2	3	4	5
Labor Unions	1	2	3	4	5
Civil organizations	1	2	3	4	5
Other Interest groups	1	2	3	4	5

Q13. Did your district campaign ever rely on regionalism or related issues to increase your party votes?

(1) Yes
(2) No

Q13-A. (If yes), how frequently?

(1) Very often
(2) Often
(3) Occasionally
(4) Few times

Q13-B. (If yes to Q12.), how effective do you think the reliance on regionalism was in increasing your party votes?

(1) Very effective
(2) Effective
(3) Slightly effective
(4) Not effective
(5) Negative effect

Q14. Now recall the strongest opposing candidate you indicated in Q7. As far as you can tell, did the opposing candidate's campaign ever rely on regionalism or related issues to increase his votes in your district?

(1) Yes
(2) No

Q14-A. (If yes), how frequently?

(1) Very often
(2) Often
(3) Occasionally
(4) Few times

Q14-B. (If yes to Q14), how effective do you think the opposing candidate's reliance on

regionalism was in increasing his party votes?

(1) Very effective
(2) Effective
(3) Slightly effective
(4) Not effective
(5) Negative effect

Q15. In your opinion, how important regionalism and related issues such as regional inequity or regional resentment were for the voters in your district when making their voting decision?

(1) Extremely important
(2) Very important
(3) Moderately important
(4) Slightly important
(5) No impact

Thank you for your cooperation. Please return the completed questionnaire in the self-addressed envelope provided.

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B. Additional Results for Regionalism and Ideology



Figure B-1: Changes in Ideological Placement over Time by Partisanship (Normalized 0 to 10. From Liberal to Conservative)

Conservative Self =Mean of self-assessments on the ideological scale by conservative party supporters

Mean Conservative Party= Mean ideological score of the conservative party given by all respondents

Mean Self=Mean of self-assessments on the ideological scale by all respondents

Liberal Self= Mean of self-placement on ideological scale by democratic party supporters

Mean Liberal Party= Mean ideological score of the democratic party given by all respondents

Q: Would you accept someone from the following regions as your business partner?

A: Yes/Indifferent=0; No=1

Table B.1: Social Distance Among Regions: Business Partner by Respondent's Residence (1997)

Respondent Residence	Seoul/ Gyeonggi	Gangwon	Chung cheong	**Jeolla**	Gyeong sang	Jeju	**North Korea**
Other	0.03	0.04	0.06	**0.24**	0.09	0.05	**0.12**
Chungcheong	0.05	0.02	0.02	**0.31**	0.07	0.09	**0.11**
Jeolla	0.07	0.14	0.10	**0.03**	0.18	0.07	**0.18**
Gyeongsang North	0.08	0.06	0.11	**0.32**	0.04	0.08	**0.28**
Gyeongsang South	0.10	0.05	0.07	**0.43**	0.03	0.09	**0.26**
Total	0.06	0.05	0.07	**0.26**	0.08	0.07	**0.17**
N	1159	1150	1150	**1158**	1156	1148	**1136**

Table B.2: Social Distance Among Regions: Business Partner by Respondent's Residence (2000)

Respondent Residency	Seoul/ Gyeonggi	Gangwon	Chungc heong	**Jeolla**	Gyeong sang	Jeju	**North Korea**
Other	0.01	0.01	0.04	**0.12**	0.07	0.02	**0.10**
Chungcheong	0.03	0.02	0.02	**0.25**	0.10	0.04	**0.17**
Jeolla	0.02	0.02	0.02	**0.01**	0.02	0.02	**0.06**
Gyeongsang North	0.04	0.02	0.03	**0.23**	0.01	0.02	**0.21**
Gyeongsang South	0.02	0.02	0.01	**0.11**	0.01	0.01	**0.06**
Total	0.02	0.02	0.03	**0.13**	0.05	0.02	**0.11**
N	1100	1100	1100	**1100**	1100	1100	**1100**

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