The Paradox of Media Diversity: Values, Exposure, and Democratic Citizenship

by

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A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(Communication)
in the University of Michigan
2017

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to extend sincere thanks to the many people who so generously contributed to the work presented in this dissertation.

I am immensely grateful to my advisor and the chair of my dissertation committee, Nojin Kwak, for his excellent guidance and unwavering support throughout my doctoral studies at Michigan. I am fortunate to have been closely advised by a great mentor like him who genuinely cares about his students, and is willing to offer professional as well as personal advice. The passion and excitement he has for research has been contagious, resulting in numerous research meetings, many that went over the allotted time, and finally, this dissertation!

Profound gratitude goes to my advisor, Russ Neuman. I am particularly indebted to him for his tremendous academic guidance and constant faith in my research during my Ph.D. journey. My meetings with him encouraged me and helped to grow intellectually. Thanks to his support, I also had the rare chance to conduct research on media diversity at the Federal Communications Commission, and contribute to workshops at Northwestern and Oxford, which undoubtedly broadened my research perspectives to write this dissertation.

I am also hugely appreciative to my committee members, Josh Pasek, Brian Weeks, and Nicole Ellison. To Josh Pasek, for being a wonderful, dedicated mentor and collaborator for me, and especially for sharing his expertise in methods and writing so willingly. To Brian Weeks, for offering a range of helpful and insightful advice from broad, theoretical issues to detailed concerns involving survey questionnaires. To Nicole Ellison, for inspiring and encouraging me

to pursue research on social media, and for guiding me to seek answers to thought-provoking and challenging questions. Taken together, the above mentioned five committee members are my dissertation dream team, and I feel blessed to have had their guidance and support.

I would like to extend my gratitude to my mentor from the FCC, Mark Lloyd, and my Master's advisor, Jeonghyun Kim, for nurturing my enthusiasm for research on media diversity, and my long-time mentors at Korea University, Seongcheol Kim, Dong Hoon Ma, and Jae Chul Shim, for guiding and encouraging me to pursue a Ph.D. in Communication Studies. Special mention goes to all my friends, colleagues, and mentors in the department of Communication Studies at Michigan, including but not limited to my cohort (Monique Bourdage, Amanda Cote, Sarah Erickson, Kitior Ngu, Timeka Tounsel, and Lia Wolock), Joe Bayer, Scott Campbell, Robin Means Coleman, Sonya Dal Cin, Susan Douglas, Amy Eaton, S. Mo Jang, Adrienne Janney, Ozan Kuru, Dan Lane, Jessica Moorman, Yu Won Oh, Christian Sandvig, Darren Stevenson, and Jan Van den Bulck, for accompanying me on this Ph.D. journey. Thanks to you, this has been an amazing experience.

At Michigan, through both good and challenging times, I have experienced firsthand that in all things God works for the good of those who love Him, who have been called according to His purpose (Romans 8:28). With my own efforts and wisdom alone, I would not have been able to gain this degree. Indeed, I am blessed to have all the treasure in my jars of clay to show that this all-surpassing power is from God and not from me. (2 Corinthians 4:7)

Last, but by no means least, wholehearted thanks go to my parents, Young Ha Kim and Jong Nam Park, my parents in law, Cheonkey Hah and Jungae Kang, my brother and his wife, Soomin Kim and Jina Bang, my brother in law, Jungdo Hah, and my dear husband, Jungmoo Hah, for their unbelievable support and prayers. To my family, I dedicate this dissertation.

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ABSTRACT

Put forward by democratic theory, it is normatively expected that individuals value and seek news from diverse viewpoints in order to become good citizens. In this normative assumption, this dissertation identifies two paradoxes of media diversity: First, despite values widely ascribed to diversity-seeking, some individuals fail to seek diverse viewpoints (i.e., the diversity deficit). Second, individuals who consume diverse viewpoints do not appear to uniformly garner democratic benefits by becoming more politically informed, engaged, and capable of deliberation (i.e., there are mixed effects of diverse exposure on democratic citizenship). These paradoxes are explained with two sets of moderators: first, by applying the framework of Motivation, Opportunity and Ability (MOA), and second, by expanding on the theory of motivated reasoning. To accomplish this, two waves of survey data from an online panel of 1,328 Americans were collected during the 2016 presidential election campaign. On the first paradox, the results suggest that individuals with the right motivation, opportunity, and ability successfully translate their diversity values into diverse exposure. Specifically, people with strong diversity-seeking skills who also habitually consume news better-match their diversity values with diverse exposure. Political interest additionally helps individuals actualize their diversity values through diverse exposure on social media by following information sources. To explain the second paradox, this dissertation proposes and demonstrates three distinct motivations for cross-cutting exposure—defensive dismissal, defensive deliberation and balanced deliberation. For individuals with defensive motivations (who dismiss or counter-argue

opposing views), diverse exposure suppresses political knowledge, but facilitates political participation and diverse news sharing on social media. In contrast to normative expectations, for individuals who are motivated to process opposing views in a balanced fashion, diverse exposure suppresses political knowledge, but increases political participation. These individuals with strong balanced deliberation motivations reap primarily deliberative benefits through diverse exposure by engaging in more cross-cutting discussion. Furthermore, sub-group analyses suggest that the majority of significant findings take place among partisans. Despite the popular negative narrative, partisans appear to function as good citizens in a few notable aspects. Compared to weak or non-partisans, partisans make better use of resources at hand to match their professed diversity values with diverse exposure, through which they in turn garner greater democratic benefits, including political participation and cross-cutting discussion. Overall, this dissertation argues that to better understand the muddied relationship between diverse exposure and democratic citizenship, it is important to consider psychological factors such as individual diversity values, different motivations for cross-cutting exposure, and strength of party affiliation. Finally, it makes practical suggestions regarding the ways in which the news industry, policymakers, and audiences can work together to build a news media landscape for an informed, engaged, and deliberative citizenry.

CHAPTER I.

Introduction

[The First] Amendment rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public.

—Hugo Black, *Associated Press v. United States*, 1945

Today's 24/7 echo-chamber amplifies the most inflammatory sound bites louder and faster than ever before. And it's also, however, given us unprecedented choice…
And this can have both a good and bad development for democracy. For if we choose only to expose ourselves to opinions and viewpoints that are in line with our own, studies suggest that we become more polarized, more set in our ways. That will only reinforce and even deepen the political divides in this country. But if we choose to actively seek out information that challenges our assumptions and our beliefs, perhaps we can begin to understand where the people who disagree with us are coming from.

—Barack Obama, *Remarks at the University of Michigan Commencement*, 2010

Many policymakers, scholars, public intellectuals and politicians share the normative assumption that people need to seek diverse viewpoints and information in order to be good citizens (*AP v. U.S.*, 1945; Garrett, 2009a; Lee, Kwak, & Campbell, 2015; Mutz, 2006; Napoli, 1999; Obama, 2010; Pariser, 2011; Prior, 2007; Stroud, 2011; Sunstein, 2009). Diversity-seeking values (hereafter: diversity values) find their legal foundation in the tenets of the First Amendment, which guarantees press freedom under the assumption that diverse viewpoints and information are indispensable for the health of democracy (*AP v. U.S.*, 1945; Kim, 2016). Diversity values are effectively captured by the metaphor of the open marketplace of ideas, whereby diverse ideas, both agreeable and hateable ones, are available in a competition to reach

the ultimate good for a democratic society (Abrams v. U.S., 1919; Neuman, 2010, 2016). Scholarly proponents of diversity have widely assumed that citizens who choose to consume diverse viewpoints will be well-informed about politics and that this will adequately equip them to fulfill their democratic responsibilities (Mutz, 2006; Napoli, 1999; Stroud, 2011). Public intellectuals and politicians have joined this chorus, communicating to the general public the values and democratic benefits of diverse exposure along with the perils of not seeking diverse viewpoints (Obama, 2010; Pariser, 2011; Sunstein, 2009).

Achieving diverse exposure in citizens, however, has been challenging under today's media environment. With an abundance of partisan media outlets and audiences who are more autonomous and interactive than ever, people may be isolated in "filter bubbles" or "echo chambers," and end up not consuming diverse viewpoints (Jamieson & Cappella, 2009; Pariser, 2011). A growing body of literature on selective exposure suggests that people tend to expose themselves to viewpoints in line with theirs (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009; Knobloch-Westerwick & Kleinman, 2012; Stroud, 2011), although they do not necessarily avoid opposing views (Garrett, 2009a; Weeks, Ksiazek, & Holbert, 2016). This pattern of citizens' rather imbalanced information diets was especially pronounced during the 2016 presidential campaign. Trump voters primarily relied on *Fox News* whereas Clinton voters mainly used *CNN* and *MSNBC*; both groups relied on Facebook as their third main source of election news (Gottfried, Barthel, & Mitchell, 2017). When it comes to the degree to which individuals consume diverse viewpoints on social media, there are conflicting possibilities. Although social media algorithms may allow people to be exposed to slightly more news in line with their own view (Bakshy, Messing, & Adamic, 2015), they may be able to access antagonistic and novel perspectives in the process of

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connecting with diverse others including their weak-ties (Brundidge, 2010; Ellison & boyd, 2013).

Revisiting the acclamations for diversity-seeking reveals that they have in large part sustained on normative grounds. Although widely shared among scholars, policymakers and politicians, these normative claims around diversity-seeking rest on the assumed positive relationships linking diversity values with subsequent diverse exposure and democratic citizenship. That is, scholars presume that people who value diversity will expose themselves to diverse viewpoints and information in practice, and that these people will in turn become good citizens who are politically informed and are capable of political deliberation and participation, as illustrated in Figure 1-1.

Figure 1-1.

The Normative Pathway to Citizenship

The normative claims around diversity values, diverse exposure, and indicators of good citizenship, however, have yet to be empirically tested as a whole. That these normative claims ultimately presume positive democratic outcomes underscores the value of empirically testing them. Prior literature has examined the two assumed relationships (between diversity values and exposure, and between diverse exposure and citizenship) separately, and the empirical evidence accumulated so far casts some doubt on the two presumed relationships, let alone causality. Taking a closer look at the empirical evidence examining diversity values, exposure and

citizenship reveals two paradoxes as demonstrated in Figure 1-2: First, although individuals generally value seeking diversity, for various reasons, some individuals fail to actualize the diversity values they profess (i.e., the diversity deficit, Kim & Pasek, 2016a). Second, other individuals who do consume diverse viewpoints do not appear to uniformly garner democratic benefits by becoming more politically informed, or subsequently more capable of deliberation and participation (i.e., there are mixed effects of diverse exposure on citizenship). Collectively, then, it appears that the causal pathway justifying the impact of diversity norms may be fallacious.

Figure 1-2.

Two Paradoxes of Media Diversity

Given that the two direct links assumed in the *normative pathway to citizenship* (Figure 1-2) do not necessarily exist, this dissertation project aims to address and explain the two diversity paradoxes by introducing two sets of moderators: first, by applying the theoretical framework of MOA (Motivation, Opportunity, and Ability, Delli Carpini, 2000), and second, by expanding on the theory of motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990; Taber & Lodge, 2006). I seek to understand under what conditions the presumed links among diversity values, exposure and citizenship are more or less likely to emerge. The first diversity paradox involves the *diversity deficit,* the disconnect between values ascribed to seeking diversity and citizens' rather imbalanced information diets (Kim & Pasek, 2016a). As scholars, public intellectuals and

policymakers advocate seeking diverse viewpoints and information as an important citizenship practice, most individuals attribute high values to diverse information-seeking goals. A significant portion of individuals, nonetheless, report that they fail to live up to their professed diversity values, often selectively exposing themselves to the information consonant to their existing political beliefs in practice (Kim & Pasek, 2016a, also see Iyengar & Hahn, 2009; Knobloch-Westerwick & Kleinman, 2012; Stroud, 2011).

Why then do people fail to live up to the diversity values they hold in their everyday lives? The first part of this dissertation seeks to explain this diversity deficit in the context of both mass media and social media, by applying the framework of MOA (Motivation, Opportunity and Ability, Delli Carpini, 2000). Specifically, I examine whether a lack of certain motivations, opportunities and abilities does in fact prevent individuals from enacting their diversity values in their everyday lives. For example, for individuals who lack the ability to find news sources that present diverse viewpoints and information, the association between diversity values and practices may be weaker, compared to those who are already proficient in seeking a blend of political viewpoints. To put it another way, it is possible that individuals with the right motivations, opportunities and ability can better translate their diversity values into diverse exposure.

The second diversity paradox involves the *mixed effects* of exposure to diverse viewpoints on good democratic citizenship. Although scholars have long argued that people who seek diversity will be ideal citizens, empirical evidence suggests that these people do not possess all attributes of good citizenship (e.g., Mutz, 2006 and Stroud, 2011). To illustrate, individuals heavily exposed to both liberal and conservative news sources became more politically knowledgeable, but less active, compared to those who mostly consumed one type of content

(Kim & Kwak, forthcoming). An interesting pattern was found between exposure to both sides and strength of party affiliation. As weak partisans were exposed to more liberal content, they consumed more conservative content; however, strong partisans consumed no more conservative content when heavily consuming liberal content (Kim & Kwak, forthcoming). Perhaps different motivations lead individuals to consume viewpoints from both sides, resulting in dissimilar democratic outcomes. Literature on the theory of motivated reasoning (Druckman, 2012; Kunda, 1990; Taber & Lodge, 2006) would also underscore the importance of different *motivations* for exposure to diverse viewpoints—rather than mere exposure—in predicting democratic citizenship.

When encountering diverse viewpoints and information, individuals may have different information-processing motivations (see Kunda, 1990): Some individuals may be motivated to reach an *accurate* (or the best) conclusion. When processing diverse viewpoints and information, these individuals will likely not only seek to learn the strong parts of opposing views but also be willing to challenge their own views, in order to form a well-informed position. Other individuals, on the other hand, may be motivated to *defend* their existing views. These individuals, upon encountering diverse viewpoints and information, will likely discount or counter-argue information from opposing views. These individuals may disregard possibly relevant and useful information from opposing views in defense of their existing views, thereby demonstrating a weak association between diverse exposure and political knowledge. In the process, these defensive individuals nonetheless will likely bolster their existing views, and the relationship between diverse exposure and political participation could be strong among these individuals. That is, depending on individuals' motivations for processing diverse viewpoints and information, the relationships between diverse exposure and citizenship indicators may vary.

In explaining the two diversity paradoxes, this dissertation further examines whether *strength of party affiliation* plays a role. Specifically, I investigate whether the influence of the two sets of moderators in explaining the two paradoxes varies across different partisan groups. For partisans, the distinction between their political party and other political parties is essential to who they are. Prior scholarship on social identity theory demonstrates that partisans differentiate themselves by favoring their party and derogating other parties (Greene, 2004; Iyengar & Weswood, 2015; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In doing so, partisans tend to engage in selective exposure and selective judgment of information from different perspectives (e.g., Taber & Lodge, 2006), which will likely be relevant to explaining the two paradoxes—the diversity deficit as well as the mixed effects of diverse exposure on citizenship.

Figure 1-3.

Media Diversity Pathway to Citizenship

Finally, this dissertation project seeks to combine the separate pictures related to the two diversity paradoxes. I explicate under what conditions the assumed normative pathway to good

citizenship actually emerges as the *Media Diversity Pathway to Citizenship* (Figure 1-3). By synthesizing empirical evidence investigating this theoretical model, I seek to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the normative claims around diversity values, exposure and indicators of democratic citizenship.

To accomplish this, I have collected and analyzed a two wave national online survey conducted in the United States prior to the 2016 Presidential election. In the following sections, I first review relevant literature on the first paradox—the diversity deficit—and introduce a set of hypotheses to be tested. I then review literature on the second paradox—the mixed effects of diverse exposure on good citizenship that is informed, engaged and deliberative—and advance hypotheses. Next, I synthesize the two paradoxes of media diversity and discuss the theoretical model, the *Media Diversity Pathway to Citizenship*. In the methods section, I introduce data, variables, and analytical approaches. In the results section, I report findings regarding the two paradoxes of media diversity. I then discuss the theoretical and normative implications of the findings in particular light of the framework of Motivation, Opportunity, and Ability (Delli Carpini, 2000), theory of motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990; Taber & Lodge, 2006) and the social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Practical implications for civic education programs to promote diverse exposure in people's everyday lives, media diversity policies, and strategies in the news industry are also discussed. It is hoped that the empirical findings of this dissertation helpfully guide discussions regarding the importance of diversity-seeking in fostering good citizenship as well as diversity-related policymaking and development of interventions to improve democratic outcomes.

CHAPTER II.

Diversity Paradox 1: The Diversity Deficit

The Diversity Deficit

Seeking diverse viewpoints has long been viewed as an important citizenship attribute (Lee, Kwak, & Campbell, 2015; Mutz, 2006; Napoli, 1999; Prior, 2007; Stroud, 2011). Many scholars, public intellectuals, policymakers and politicians have emphasized that exposure to diverse viewpoints is a pre-requisite for an informed, deliberative and engaged citizenry (e.g., AP v. U.S., 1945; Obama, 2010; Pariser, 2011; Sunstein, 2009). As early as 1831 in *Democracy in America*, Alexis de Tocqueville argued that every citizen should consume diverse viewpoints and information so that they would be able to appreciate and discriminate between different facts and opinions. Diversity norms and values are effectively captured by the metaphor of the open marketplace of ideas, whereby diverse ideas, both agreeable and disagreeable ones, compete against each other to reach the ultimate good (*Abrams v. U.S.*, 1919; Neuman, 2016). Indeed, America's First Amendment rests on the presumed relationship between the diffusion of information from diverse and antagonistic sources and the wellbeing of democratic citizens (*AP v. U.S.*, 1945). Citizens consuming diverse viewpoints are expected to be politically knowledgeable and be capable of effectively participating in politics after deliberating on alternative perspectives (Dahl, 2000; Delli Carpini, Cook, & Jacobs, 2004; Fishkin & Luskin, 2005).

Despite the importance attributed to seeking diverse viewpoints, a burgeoning body of literature on selective exposure suggests that many individuals engage in imbalanced information diets (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009; Knobloch-Westerwick & Kleinman, 2012; Stroud, 2011), if they seek political information at all (Prior, 2007). That is, if individuals choose to seek political information, they tend to seek information consistent with their pre-existing viewpoints, although they do not necessarily avoid information that challenges those viewpoints (Chaffee, Saphir, Graf, Sandvig, & Hahn, 2001; Garrett, 2009a; Garrett, Carnahan, & Lynch, 2013). This apparent gap between the values widely ascribed to diversity-seeking and individuals' imbalanced information diets has been empirically established and subsequently termed the *diversity deficit* (Kim & Pasek, 2016a).

Indeed, a significant portion of individuals views diversity as a value, yet for various reasons, they fail to practice the values they profess (Kim & Pasek, 2016a). This group of individuals faces the diversity deficit in their everyday lives. Addressing and explaining why these citizens do not end up actualizing their diversity values is an important matter to the extent that citizens' deliberation on diverse viewpoints is regarded as a pillar for democracy (Fishkin & Luskin, 2005; Lee, Kwak, & Campbell, 2015; Mutz, 2006). A few potential reasons were suggested for why some individuals fail to enact their diversity values: They may lack political efficacy, time, effort or tools to find diverse viewpoints and information, or they have already formed news habits may preclude them from consuming diverse viewpoints (Kim & Pasek, 2016a).[1]

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[1] In a related study on young adults' news consumption, I conducted focus groups to gain insight into whether participants noticed a difference between their news-seeking values and practices and what they saw as the causes of the difference (Kim & Pasek, 2016b). The majority of participants indeed recognized a gap between their ideal news-seeking patterns and their actual practices. That is, college student participants believed that they should rely on trustworthy news sources and diversify sources in an effort to combat biases in news. However, many of them primarily encountered news that happened to be on

The first part of this dissertation project thus seeks to empirically explain the gap between individuals' diversity values and their levels of diverse exposure by considering a set of moderators. Specifically, a lack of certain resource may prevent individuals from actualizing their professed diversity values; the presence of certain resources may strengthen the relationship between individuals' diversity values and practices. Applying the theoretical framework of MOA (Motivation, Opportunity and Ability, Delli Carpini, 2000), which theorizes the roots of what prompts people to choose to become engaged in public life, this study hypothesizes that individuals with certain motivations, opportunities, and abilities will better translate their diversity values into diverse exposure (Figure 2-1).

Explaining the Diversity Deficit with Motivation, Opportunity and Ability

Motivation. Motivation is "goal-directed arousal" (MacInnis et al.,1991, p. 34). In the current context, the goal is to seek diverse viewpoints and information. Accordingly, motivation is individuals' desire, readiness, or interest to seek diversity (see MacInnis et al., 1991). As motivations for diverse exposure in the context of political news, the current study considers political interest and political efficacy (Delli Carpini, 2000).

Viewed as a stable, intrinsic motivation (Prior, 2010), *political interest* has been defined as a "citizen's willingness to pay attention to political phenomena at the possible expense of

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their social media. Many participants expressed frustration with this gap, and attributed the gap to their insufficient time, skills and incentives to adequately keep themselves up to date with news. According to the MOA framework, time, skills and incentives respectively belong to opportunities, ability and motivations.

A connected survey study empirically demonstrated that internal political efficacy indeed negatively predicted the distance between young adults' news-seeking values and practices. That is, young adults with a stronger belief that they could understand political affairs demonstrated a smaller gap between their news-seeking values and traits (Kim & Pasek, 2016b).

other topics" (Lupia & Philpot, 2005, p. 1122). Politically interested people follow and care about news covering who wins in the election or what is happening in the political process (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). Among politically interested individuals, politics is likely an important part of their lives; they are already keeping up with news. If some of these politically interested individuals value seeking diversity, they will likely seek diverse viewpoints in their everyday lives. For individuals who are politically disinterested, however, even if they profess that diversity-seeking is important, other priorities in their lives (such as family and careers) may precede seeking diverse viewpoints in political news. Hence, it is hypothesized that the relationship between diversity values and diverse exposure will strengthen for politically interested individuals (H1a).

The second motivation, *political efficacy*, was originally defined as "the feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process" (Campbell, Gurin, & Miller, 1954, p. 187). Research on political efficacy has demonstrated that this concept has two dimensions that involve personal political competence (i.e., internal efficacy) or a system-oriented sense of efficacy (i.e., external efficacy, Craig, Niemi, & Silver, 1990; Kenski & Stroud, 2006). People with internal efficacy are confident that they can effectively understand and participate in politics while those with external efficacy believe that the government will respond to the demands of citizens (Converse, 1972; Balch, 1974). If these politically efficacious individuals value seeking diversity, they will readily seek diverse viewpoints themselves. People without this sense of political efficacy, however, will likely not feel confident enough to actually seek diverse viewpoints, even if they believe that seeking diversity is something citizens should do. Thus, I hypothesize that the relationship between

diversity values and diverse exposure will be stronger for more politically efficacious individuals (H1b).

H1a. As political interest increases, the relationship between diversity values and exposure will *strengthen*.

H1b. As political efficacy increases, the relationship between diversity values and exposure will *strengthen*.

These hypotheses are also illustrated in Figure 2-1.

Figure 2-1.

Predicting the Relationship between Diversity Values and Diverse Exposure with MOA

(Motivation, Opportunity and Ability)

Opportunity. Opportunities to achieve a goal can be restricted by a number of factors, including limited time (MacInnis et al.,1991). In the context of seeking diverse viewpoints, some individuals who are preoccupied with other important matters (such as work) may conclude that they do not have the time for news consumption. These *busy* individuals may end up not actually consuming diverse viewpoints even if they think that citizens should seek diverse viewpoints (c.f. Martin & Park, 2003). However, other individuals who are less busy will be able to pursue diverse viewpoints in line with their diversity values, thereby demonstrating a strong relationship between values and exposure (H2a).

H2a. As perceived busyness decreases, the relationship between diversity values and exposure will *strengthen*.

Opportunities for seeking diverse viewpoints can also be restrained by individuals' strong news habits. Individuals whose news consumption patterns are *habitual*, meaning that they consume news rountinely, automatically, and without thinking (LaRose, 2010; Verplanken & Orbell, 2003), may persist in their news-seeking habits even if they notice a gap between their habits and their professed diversity values. These individuals with high habitual news use may demonstrate a weak relationship between diversity values and diverse exposure. Other individuals whose news use is not restrained by habits will be able to seek news from diverse viewpoints to match their diversity values. That is, for individuals with low habitual news use, the relationship between diversity values and exposure will be strong (H2b).

H2b. As habitual news use decreases, the relationship between diversity values and exposure will *strengthen*.

Ability. Ability is necessary in order for citizens to take advantage of opportunities (Delli Carpini, 2000). Ability refers to individuals' skills or proficiencies in performing goal-directed tasks (MacInnis et al.,1991). In the current context, individuals who do not have the *skills* to seek diverse viewpoints (on online and traditional media) will not be able to actualize their diversity values in practice. Individuals possessing the skills to seek diverse viewpoints, on the other hand, will be able to pursue their values and consume diverse viewpoints, thereby reporting a smaller gap between their diversity values and diverse exposure (H3a). In a similar manner, individuals who are *knowledgeable* about news sources presenting different political views are expected to actually consume diverse viewpoints if they value doing so (H3b). In line with these considerations, two hypotheses on ability are advanced:

H3a. As diversity-seeking skills increase, the relationship between diversity values and exposure will *strengthen*.

H3b. As knowledge of news sources increases, the relationship between diversity values and exposure will *strengthen*.

All six hypotheses attempting to explain the diversity deficit under the MOA framework are summarized in Table 2-1.

Table 2-1.

Predicting the Relationship between Diversity Values and Diverse Exposure with MOA

(Motivation, Opportunity and Ability)

MOA	Moderators	Relationship between Values and Exposure
<u>Motivations</u>	Political interest	strengthen
	Political efficacy	strengthen
<u>Opportunity</u>	Busyness	weaken
	Habitual news use	weaken
<u>Ability</u>	Diversity-seeking skills	strengthen
	Knowledge of news sources	strengthen

Social Media Context

The first part of this dissertation investigates the six hypotheses in two contexts, involving overall media (encompassing all available media, such as TV, newspaper, radio, and online media) and social media. On social media, there are largely two ways in which users are exposed to news and political viewpoints: (a) by following sources including journalists, news media and politicians, or (b) from individuals in their social networks. There appears an important distinction between these two types of exposure, pertaining to *pulling* vs. *being pushed* to news and political information (see Hargittai et al., 2012; Neuman, 2016). This distinction is in a way similar to exposure that is intentional vs. incidental (see Brundidge, 2010; Kim, 2011). On one hand, users get news and political viewpoints from the sources they follow because they have intentionally pulled these sources in the first place. On the other hand, getting news or personal opinions about politics and the election from individuals in one's social media network

happens in a more incidental fashion for largely two reasons. First, the political information users can get from individuals in their network depends on what these individuals choose to share or post. Social media users do not necessarily make connections with other individuals based on their political views (Brundidge, 2010; Gil de Zúñiga & Valenzuela, 2011). In fact, on social media, not only can users connect with weak-ties who do not necessarily share geographical location, social experiences or political viewpoints with them, but they can also form new relationships with others based on shared interests (Brundidge, 2010; Ellison & boyd, 2013). This offers a possibility where social media users can access novel perspectives in the process of connecting with diverse others in an incidental way. However, it is also worth noting the second aspect of users' incidental exposure to information from individuals in their network; social media users will not be presented with all the content posted or shared by individuals in their network due to algorithmic curation. On social media such as Facebook, algorithms sort news content based on people's political orientation and past viewing behaviors. Facebook Newsfeed, pushes users toward slightly more news that is consonant with their own views and away from news that is dissonant with their views (Bakshy et al., 2015). As a result, users are presented with less diverse content.

Going back to the current study's hypotheses: it is predicted that individuals with certain motivations, opportunities and abilities will make use of them—perhaps somewhat intentionally or actively—to live up to their diversity-values in their diverse exposure. Given that one type of exposure to news and political viewpoint on social media tends to be more incidental than the other, the hypothesized relationships may vary depending on the type of exposure. It is possible that people are able to make better use of resources at hand to actualize their values by following sources than by consuming information from individuals in their social network, which likely

happens more incidentally. To investigate this possibility, the following research question is

posed:

RQ1. In the context of social media, do the hypothesized interactive relationships vary by

types of diverse exposure?

CHAPTER III.

Diversity Paradox 2: Mixed Effects of Diverse Exposure on Citizenship

Diverse Exposure and Democratic Citizenship

Scholars have long shared the normative assumption that seeking diverse information and viewpoints is an essential attribute of democratic citizenship (Kim & Kwak, forthcoming; Mutz, 2006; Prior, 2007; Stroud, 2011). Citizens must be politically knowledgeable and deliberative to be effective participants in the political process, and awareness of diverse viewpoints is essential to this process (Dahl, 2000; Delli Carpini, Cook, & Jacobs, 2004; Kim & Pasek, 2016a; Napoli, 1999). Individuals who consume diverse viewpoints will likely reflect on issues from different viewpoints and in turn form more valid conclusions (Arendt, 1968; Habermas, 1989; Mutz, 2002a). Accordingly, these individuals with diverse exposure are expected to become well-informed on politics, and be capable of deliberating and participating in political activities (Kim & Kwak, forthcoming; Lee, Kwak, & Campbell, 2015; Mutz, 2002a, 2002b; Stroud, 2011). In line with these considerations, within the dimensions of citizenship (Neuman, Bimber, & Hindman, 2011), this dissertation investigates three distinct citizenship indicators—*political participation, knowledge, and deliberation*—in relation to diverse exposure.

Despite the normative expectation, empirical evidence on the relationship between diverse exposure and democratic citizenship is mixed at best. Individuals who consume diverse viewpoints do not appear to uniformly garner democratic benefits by becoming more politically informed or engaged (see for instance, Mutz, 2006 and Stroud, 2011), although

the operationalization of diverse exposure has been limited. Conceptually, diverse exposure is the degree to which people consume a wide range of viewpoints delivered from a wide spectrum of sources (Napoli, 1999), possibly including but not limited to exposure to liberal, neutral/mixed and conservative viewpoints (Kim & Kwak, forthcoming). In empirical work, however, diverse exposure has often been operationalized using measures of exposure to pro-attitudinal or counter-attitudinal political views. On the one hand, people's use of pro-attitudinal partisan media generally has been found to be positively related to their *political participation*. For example, exposure to pro-attitudinal sources appears positively related to political participation (Dvir-Gvirsman, Garrett, & Tsfati, 2015; Stroud, 2011). Furthermore, the use of pro-attitudinal sources has shown to cause an increase in political participation (Dilliplane, 2011; Jamieson & Cappella, 2008) although mixed or no effects have also been found (Conroy-Krutz & Moehler, 2015; Stroud, 2011). Exposure to counter-attitudinal media, on the other hand, generally has decreased political participation. Studies have shown that exposure to counter-attitudinal sources suppresses political participation (Conroy-Krutz & Moehler, 2015; Dilliplane, 2011), although no effects have also been reported (Dvir-Gvirsman, Garrett, & Tsfati, 2015).

When it comes to *political knowledge*, pro-attitudinal exposure has been found to be positively related to political knowledge (Feldman, Stroud, Bimber, & Wojcieszak, 2013) although a negative relationship has also been reported between political knowledge and the use of pro-attitudinal media of a conservative orientation (Jamieson & Cappella, 2008; Kull, Ramsay, & Lewis, 2003). Exposure to counter-attitudinal viewpoint, however, appears to be positively related to political knowledge in the context of interpersonal communication (Eveland & Hively, 2009).

The influence of exposure to pro-attitudinal and counter-attitudinal viewpoints on different elements of *deliberation* has been examined in only a few studies. Defined as a process of reasoning and discussion with a "judicious argument, critical listening, and earnest decision making" (Gastil, 2000, p. 22), deliberation largely involve three aspects: cognitions, attitudes, and behaviors (Park, 2000). One cognitive element of deliberation, namely the awareness of rationales for opposing political views, was positively predicted by exposure to counter-attitudinal viewpoints (Price, Capella, & Nir, 2002), but not by pro-attitudinal exposure (Mutz, 2002a) in the context of interpersonal communication. Similarly, in the context of mass media, strong partisans with more selective exposure to like-minded media were more familiar with reinforcing arguments. On the web, more frequent news use was related to increased familiarity with reinforcing arguments as well as somewhat increased familiarity with challenging arguments (Garrett, 2009a). An attitudinal component of deliberation, tolerance, was positively predicted by the awareness of rationales for opposing political views (Mutz, 2002a), suggesting the possibility that counter-attitudinal viewpoints may lead to tolerance. A behavioral element of deliberation, cross-cutting discussion, was found to be positively predicted by informational mobile phone use (Lee & Kwak, 2016) and newspaper and online news use while being negatively predicted by cable news use (Borah, Edgerly, Vraga, & Shah, 2013). Cross-cutting discussion, however, is yet to be examined in relation to pro-attitudinal or counter-attitudinal exposure.

Taken together, the empirical evidence accumulated so far is mixed at best, and often seems not to be in the direction that is normatively expected. Although citizens who consume diverse viewpoints through pro- as well as counter-attitudinal media should be informed and engaged, counter-attitudinal exposure appears to suppress political participation while certain

pro-attitudinal exposure appears negatively related to political knowledge. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that most studies to date have considered exposure to pro- and counter-attitudinal content via only one medium, such as TV (Dilliplane, 2011), radio (Conroy-Krutz & Moehler, 2015; Jamieson & Cappella, 2008), or the web (Dvir-Gvirsman, Garrett, & Tsfati, 2015), except for Stroud (2011) which considered TV, radio, newspaper and the web. Also, examining the effects of pro- and counter-attitudinal media use on citizenship indicators *separately* excludes the possibility of considering the effects of non-partisan media use (Dvir-Gvirsman, 2015). More importantly, by looking at the effects of *either* pro- or counter-attitudinal media use, the normative claim that people who engage in diverse exposure should be good citizens cannot be directly tested. For a direct test of the normative claim, this dissertation uses a measure of diverse exposure that is in line with its conceptualization in prior scholarship—the degree to which people partake of news from diverse viewpoints and sources (Kim & Pasek, 2016a; see also Baker, 2008; Einstein, 2004; Napoli, 1999).

In a similar effort, one study investigated how exposure to liberal and conservative media *jointly* predicted citizenship indicators. Although heavy exposure to both liberal and conservative news programs on TV increases politically knowledge, it suppresses political participation (Kim & Kwak, forthcoming). In this study, interestingly, while strong partisans consumed no more conservative content with greater consumption of liberal content, weak partisans consumed more conservative content if they heavily consumed liberal content. This raises questions as to with what motivations certain individuals chose to consume viewpoints from both sides. Strong partisans might be hearing opposing viewpoints, without necessarily listening to (Dvir-Gvirsman, 2014), comprehending or evaluating them (Garrett, 2009a). Possibly this is because partisans tune into opposing viewpoints with a motivation to bolster their existing views by

counter-arguing the opposing side rather than to learn. However, if individuals consume opposing viewpoints only with the motivation to reinforce their existing views, the democratic benefits of diverse exposure will likely be undermined (Garrett, Carnahan, & Lynch, 2013).

Motivations for Cross-Cutting Exposure

Scholarship on the theory of motivated reasoning suggests the possibility that different *motivations* (or goals) behind exposure to diverse viewpoints may lead to different democratic benefits rather than the mere diverse exposure uniformly resulting in democratic benefits. Literature on motivated reasoning distinguishes an accuracy motivation (i.e., a motivation to come up with an accurate or otherwise the best conclusion) from a partisan directional motivation (i.e., a motivation to arrive at a particular, desired conclusion) for processing information (Druckman, 2012; Kunda, 1990; Taber & Lodge, 2006). With an accuracy motivation, individuals are expected to carefully attend to all relevant information and process it in an even-handed way (Kunda, 1990). With a directional motivation, individuals will likely engage in motivated reasoning: they tend to seek information consistent with their prior beliefs; perceive consonant information as stronger; spend more time processing (possibly counter-arguing or dismissing) counter-attitudinal information; and are accordingly left more certain about their prior opinions (Bolsen, Druckman, & Cook, 2014; Druckman, 2012; Redlawsk, 2002; Taber & Lodge, 2006). Individuals, depending on their motivations, will process pro- as well as counter-attitudinal information differently, and thus, are likely to garner dissimilar democratic benefits from diverse exposure.

Building upon literature on motivated reasoning, the second part of this dissertation proposes three motivations, specifically for processing opposing viewpoints. When encountering

opposing viewpoints, individuals may be motivated to 1) readily reject the views opposing to theirs without serious engagement (i.e., defensive dismissal); 2) counter-argue opposing views and bolster their existing views (i.e., defensive deliberation); or 3) learn the strong parts of opposing views to form a well-informed position (i.e., balanced deliberation). The three motivations for cross-cutting exposure are compared and contrasted in Table 3-1.

Table 3-1.

Comparison of Three Motivations for Cross-Cutting Exposure

	Defensive Dismissal	Defensive Deliberation	Balanced Deliberation
Goal	To maintain existing views	To strengthen existing views	To be accurate
Strategy	Readily disregard opposing views	Counter-argue opposing views	Evaluate opposing views based on merits
Anticipation of Political Talks	No	Yes, political debates	Yes, political discussions

The first two motivations, defensive dismissal and defensive deliberation, are related to the directional goal in motivated reasoning. Both motivations aim to arrive at a desired conclusion that aligns with individuals' pre-existing beliefs. To achieve this goal, people could adopt two different strategies when they encounter opposing viewpoints. First, people can readily disregard opposing views without giving them a serious consideration. These people with *defensive dismissal motivations* for cross-cutting exposure do not tune out of opposing views, but

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choose to be exposed to what the other side has to say. Yet, they will likely laugh at arguments of opposing views, which they think do not deserve much of their attention.

Second, people can counter-argue arguments of opposing views to strengthen their existing views. These people with *defensive deliberation motivations* for cross-cutting exposure cognitively engage with information from opposing views only to refute them. They process the views that oppose theirs as if they anticipate having a debate with the other side. These individuals will primarily look for weaknesses in arguments of opposing views, so that they can counter-argue information from opposing views and defend their existing views against any challenges (as Garrett, 2009a imply).

Individuals with *balanced deliberation motivations* for cross-cutting exposure are in a way similar to those with an accuracy goal in the theory of motivated reasoning. As if anticipating a political discussion, these individuals process all pieces of information (including those consonant as well as dissonant to their views) based on merits, in an even-handed way. Their aim is to reach an accurate or well-informed conclusion. For this end, they are not afraid to rethink their existing views, and are willing to change their views if necessary.

Because the three motivations are new measures, research question 2 examines if these are indeed distinct motivations that are uniquely predicted by factors related to demographics, politics and news media use.

RQ2. What predicts the three motivations for cross-cutting exposure?

Diverse Exposure, Motivations for Cross-Cutting exposure, and Citizenship

When it comes to predicting dimensions of citizenship, motivations for cross-cutting exposure may moderate the relationship between diverse exposure and democratic citizenship (Figure 3-1).

Figure 3-1.

Predicting the Relationship between Diverse Exposure and Democratic Citizenship with Motivations for Cross-Cutting exposure

```
                ┌─────────────────────────────────┐
                │ Motivations for Cross-cutting   │
                │ Exposure                        │
                │                                 │
                │   •  Defensive dismissal        │
                │                                 │
                │   •  Defensive deliberation     │
                │                                 │
                │   •  Balanced deliberation      │
                └─────────────────────────────────┘
                                 │
                                 ▼
┌─────────────────────┐    ┌─────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Diverse Exposure    │    │ Democratic Citizenship              │
│                     │    │   •  Political knowledge            │
│   •  Overall media  │───▶│   •  Political participation        │
│                     │    │   •  Cross-cutting discussion       │
│   •  Social media   │    │   •  Diverse sharing-social media   │
└─────────────────────┘    └─────────────────────────────────────┘
```

Defensive Dismissal. Individuals with *defensive dismissal* motivations will readily disregard opposing views without effortful thinking. Such individuals are possibly over-confident with their existing views (regardless of how politically sophisticated they are). Already strongly committed to their own views, these individuals with defensive dismissal motivations

will likely not see the urgent need to defend their positions against challenges or the value of comprehending arguments of opposing views. Rather, upon encountering information from opposing views, they will laugh at them or shrug off them. These individuals with high defensive dismissal motivations will likely find pleasure in simply confirming their view is right. They do not see the value of engaging with opposing views in a substantive way, and do not bother to do so.

When it comes to predicting dimensions of citizenship with individuals' diverse exposure and defensive dismissal motivations, I expect to find that diverse exposure will more negatively predict political knowledge (H4a) for individuals with higher levels of defensive dismissal motivations. That is, because individuals with high defensive dismissal motivations will likely not substantially engage with information from opposing viewpoints at all, t their chance to learn from the opposing side would be closed. To readily disregard the opposing views, individuals with high defensive dismissal motivations will likely neglect arguments of the opposing side including potentially helpful information (Gaines, Kuklinski, Quirk, Peyton, & Verkuilen, 2007; Lavine, Johnson, & Steenbergen, 2012). Furthermore, they will be very vulnerable to misunderstanding political information. Being overly confident with their existing views, they will likely not properly process information from their own views in addition to opposing views. Accordingly, for people with higher defensive dismissal motivations, diverse exposure will be more negatively related to political knowledge.

I expect to find a similar relationship between diverse exposure and one indicator of deliberative citizenship—cross-cutting discussion (H4b). Upon encountering more diverse viewpoints, individuals with high defensive dismissal motivations will not bother to cognitively engage with or substantively consider opposing viewpoints. Through more diverse exposure,

these individuals will be less likely to see the value of listening to and learning from the opposing side and, thus, will be less inclined to discuss politics with others holding political views different from them.

Diverse exposure, however, may foster political participation for this group of individuals with higher defensive dismissal motivations (H4c). This is because diverse exposure will likely help these individuals—who are likely already over-confident with their existing views—bolster their views by dismissing information from opposing views and simply reconfirming their own view. Through diverse exposure, these individuals are not reaping deliberative benefits that are normatively expected. Because they choose not to reflect on the weaknesses of their own view or the strengths of opposing views after diverse exposure, they will only become more certain about their own view, possibly becoming more politically participating thereby (Lavine, Johnston, & Steenbergen, 2012; Mutz, 2002a).

Regarding defensive dismissal motivations, the following three hypotheses are advanced (also summarized in Table 3-2):

H4a. For individuals with higher defensive dismissal motivations, the relationship between diverse exposure and political knowledge will be more strongly *negative*.

H4b. For individuals with higher defensive dismissal motivations, the relationship between diverse exposure and cross-cutting discussion will be more strongly *negative*.

H4c. For individuals with higher defensive dismissal motivations, the relationship between diverse exposure and political participation will be more strongly *positive*.

Defensive Deliberation. Individuals with *defensive deliberation* motivations would process counter-attitudinal information as if they anticipate *debates* where they must maintain their established positions (Garrett, 2009a; Garrett, Carnahan, & Lynch, 2013). That is, in an effort to defend their views against any challenges, those individuals will scrutinize arguments of opposing views. They will spend a substantial time finding flaws in opposing views and counter-arguing them. These individuals with defensive deliberation motivations are in a way similar to a typical motivated reasoner: In the literature on motivated reasoning, strong partisans tend to spend more time and cognitive resources when processing (and very likely counter-arguing) the arguments that are incongruent to their own views, compared to processing congruent arguments (Redlawsk, 2002; Taber & Lodge, 2006). Since these strong partisans readily accept congruent arguments while arguing against incongruent arguments, they tend to evaluate congruent arguments more highly than incongruent ones (Druckman, 2012; Taber & Lodge, 2006). These biased information processing patterns in defense of individuals' existing views—which are apparently more pronounced among politically sophisticated individuals—lead them to solidify their views (Muffert, Chung, Joiner, Waks, & Garst, 2006; Taber & Lodge, 2006).

For individuals with higher levels of defensive deliberation motivations, the relationship between diverse exposure and political participation will be more strongly positive (H5c). These individuals will counter-argue and denigrate opposing views while conveniently accepting congruent views. Accordingly, they will likely bolster their existing views, which in turn encourages active participation in politics (Lavine, Johnston, & Steenbergen, 2012; Mutz, 2002a). In the process of counter-arguing opposing viewpoints after diverse exposure, these individuals with high defensive deliberation motivations may pick up a few arguments of the

opposing side. This will only lead them to feel the urgent need to defend their views against challenges, thereby becoming more active in political activities.

For individuals with higher defensive deliberation motivations, however, diverse exposure will more negatively predict cross-cutting discussion (H5b). With more diverse exposure, they will more strongly believe that they have already effectively counter-argued and addressed the arguments of opposing views. This belief will likely lead them to not see the value of listening to the opposing side through cross-cutting discussion.

When it comes to predicting political knowledge, there are conflicting possibilities. Upon encountering more diverse viewpoints, individuals with high defensive deliberation motivations will seriously consider information from opposing views although they are susceptible to motivated reasoning. These individuals will generally learn more pieces of information about their own views than opposing views (Muffert, Chung, Joiner, Waks, & Garst, 2006) while recalling arguments that are predominantly positive toward their own views and that are mostly negative toward opposing views (Taber & Lodge, 2006). Although one possibility is that individuals with high defensive deliberation motivations gain knowledge mostly through selective learning and retention, the other possibility is that they become less knowledgeable with more diverse exposure. These individuals who are motivated to deliberate in a defensive way might neglect or misinterpret relevant and potentially helpful information mostly from the opposing side (Gaines et al., 2007; Lavine, Johnson, & Steenbergen, 2012). Through misinterpretation of certain information, they might gain incorrect knowledge. With these possibilities, research question 3 is posed:

RQ3. For individuals with higher defensive deliberation motivations, is the relationship between diverse exposure and political knowledge more strongly *negative*?

H5a. For individuals with higher defensive deliberation motivations, the relationship between diverse exposure and cross-cutting discussion will be more strongly *negative.*

H5b. For individuals with higher defensive deliberation motivations, the relationship between diverse exposure and political participation will be more strongly *positive.*

Balanced Deliberation. Individuals with *balanced deliberation* motivations will process information in order to form an accurate or well-informed position (Bolsen, Druckman, & Cook, 2014; Kunda, 1999; Taber & Lodge, 2006) as if they anticipate *discussions* where they are open to changing their existing positions. Upon encountering opposing viewpoints, these individuals need not insist on their existing views, but carefully consider opposing and alternative viewpoints. Because they seek to reach the best conclusion, they try to learn the strengths or merits of the opposing side, and are not afraid to learn the weaknesses of their own side. These individuals tend to be free from biased information processing in the context of motivated reasoning (Bolsen, Druckman, & Cook, 2014). These individuals with balanced deliberation motivations are also in a way similar to what Mutz (2002a) identified as people with a civil orientation toward conflict. This peculiar group of civil people who valued both differences of opinion and social harmony—two attributes typically valued in a discussion—benefited the most from cross-cutting exposure. They learned more rationales for opposing viewpoints from cross-cutting exposure than others (Mutz, 2002a).

All in all, individuals with high balanced deliberation motivations will try to comprehend and evaluate arguments of opposing views as well as their own views even-handedly based on

merits. In the process, they will likely not only gain political knowledge but also cultivate capacity for deliberation by learning legitimate arguments of opposing views. They will likely see the value of engaging with opposing views, becoming more willing to listen to others whose views oppose their own. Accordingly, I expect to find that diverse exposure will more positively predict political knowledge (H6a) and cross-cutting discussion (H6c) for individuals with higher balanced deliberation motivations.

However, because individuals with higher balanced deliberation motivations will become more knowledgeable about the weaknesses of their own views as well as the strengths of opposing views in the process of deliberation, they may be more ambivalent about their existing views (Lavine, 2001; Mutz, 2002b). These individuals are in a way similar to what Lavine, Johnson, and Steenbergen (2012) termed ambivalent partisans, who are politically informed, yet hesitant to participate in politics, since they feel divided about issues. Thus, I hypothesize that for individuals with higher balanced deliberation motivation, diverse exposure will be more negatively related to political participation (H6c).

H6a. For individuals with higher balanced deliberation motivations, the relationship between diverse exposure and political knowledge will be more strongly *positive.*

H6b. For individuals with higher balanced deliberation motivations, the relationship between diverse exposure and cross-cutting discussion will be more strongly *positive.*

H6c. For individuals with higher balanced deliberation motivations, the relationship between diverse exposure and political participation will be more strongly *negative.*

All hypotheses along with research question 3 are summarized in Table 3-2.

Table 3-2.

Predicting the Relationships between Diverse exposure and Democratic Citizenship with

Motivations for Cross-Cutting Exposure

	Political knowledge	Cross-cutting discussion	Political participation
Defensive dismissal	-	-	+
Defensive deliberation	?	-	+
Balanced deliberation	+	+	-

Note. Positive or negative signs respectively denote that the positive or negative relationship between diverse exposure and a given citizenship indicator becomes stronger, as a given motivation increases.

Social Media Context: Diverse Sharing

On social media, the foundational activities involve sharing content with individuals in one's social network (Ellison & boyd, 2013). In addition to sharing personal news in text, video or photos, social media users can share news stories from news outlets rather easily; news sharing on social media is essentially one click away, through buttons such as "sharing" or "retweeting" (Kümpel, Karnowski, & Keyling, 2015). Defined as "the practice of giving a defined set of people access to news content via social media, as by posting or recommending it" (Kümpel et al., 2015, p. 2), news sharing has allowed citizens to distribute political information in meaningful ways. Not only can social media users endorse (or disapprove) certain news stories, they can also re-contextualize, interpret, evaluate or reframe news stories by adding comments at the time of news sharing (Choi, 2016).

Political news sharing has thus been viewed as an expressive form of political participation in a number of studies (e.g., Hasell & Weeks, 2016; Lane, Kim, Lee, Weeks, &

Kwak, 2017; Gil de Zúñiga, Jung, & Valenzuela, 2012). This line of research examined the relationship between different types of media used and news sharing behaviors. For example, heavy news users who utilize multiple sources are more likely to share news on social media (Kümpel et al., 2015). Certain content, including content that is positive (Bakshy, Rosenn, Marlow, & Adamic, 2012) or arousing (Berger, 2011) and partisan news inducing anger (Hasell & Weeks, 2016) tends to be shared more. When it comes to political viewpoints of news that is shared on social media, evidence is mixed: some scholars found that news that match individuals' political orientation was shared more (e.g., An, Quercia, Cha, Gummadi, & Crowcroft, 2014; Hasell & Weeks, 2016) whereas others did not (e.g., Morgan, Lampe, & Shafiq, 2013).

What remains as a question is the factors that lead to the degree to which people share diverse news on social media (hereafter: diverse sharing). First of all, it is plausible that people who consume news from a diversity of views on social media share more diverse news. These people can share the diverse news by simply clicking the "share" button. Also, these people are possibly getting diverse news not only from followed sources but also from individuals in their social network. They thus likely perceive individuals in their social network (i.e., their "imagined audience," Litt, 2012; Marwick & boyd, 2010) to be politically diverse. This perception may lead them to share diverse news, which may interest their imagined audience. Prior work on the imagined audience demonstrates that it influences how people behave on social media (Litt, 2012; Marwick & boyd, 2010), including their news sharing behaviors (Coppini, Duncan, McLeod, Wise, Bialik, & Wu, 2017). For example, social media users share counter-attitudinal news stories if those stories match their imagined audience's political view (An et al., 2014). Accordingly, the following hypothesis is advanced:

H7. Diverse exposure on social media will be positively related to diverse sharing.

Furthermore, it is possible that depending on the motivations people have for consuming opposing viewpoints, they may demonstrate different relationships between diverse exposure and diverse sharing. After consuming diverse news on social media, people with defensive motivations (both defensive dismissal and defensive deliberation motivations) may share *less* diverse news, by sharing mostly pro-attitudinal news stories. However, it is also possible that these defensive people share *more* diverse news by additionally sharing counter-attitudinal news stories (and potentially neutral ones) in a negative or dismissive way (Coppini et al., 2017). People with balanced deliberation motivations may also share *more* diverse news with more diverse exposure on social media, for example, to engage in political discussion with individuals in their network. They may be interested in sharing their thoughts after deliberating on diverse viewpoints, the strengths and weaknesses of their own view as well as opposing views, and in hearing what others in their network think. To examine these possibilities, the following research question is posed:

RQ4. In the context of social media, how does the relationship between diverse exposure and diverse sharing vary by motivations for cross-cutting exposure?

CHAPTER IV.

Synthesis of Paradoxes 1 & 2: Media Diversity Pathway to Citizenship

The Role of Strength of Party Affiliation

For a more nuanced understanding of the relationships among diversity values, diverse exposure, and MOA, it may be important to take into account the strength of party affiliation. For strong partisans, compared to weak or non-partisans, the distinction between the political party to which they belong (i.e., in-group) and other parties (i.e., out-group) would be critical for their self-image and esteem in the context of the Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Partisans differentiate themselves by favoring in-group while derogating out-group (Greene, 2004; Iyengar & Westwood, 2015). Related to these aims, partisans tend to engage in selective engagement and judgement. For one, partisans may *selectively expose* themselves to news sources that are in line with their own views (Hart, Albarracín, Eagly, Brechan, Lindberg, & Merrill, 2009; Stroud, 2011) although they do not necessarily avoid opposing views (Garrett, 2009a), possibly to the extent that they seek to hear the other side (Weeks, Ksiazek, & Holbert, 2016). Also, partisans may be inclined to *selectively judge* the validity of information from different perspectives in order to favor their in-group and their positions (e.g., Taber & Lodge, 2006) more than weak or non-partisans. Such distinctiveness of partisans may be relevant to explaining the two diversity paradoxes, the diversity deficit as well as the mixed effects of diverse exposure on citizenship.

It is possible the strength of party affiliation plays a role in explaining the two diversity paradoxes such that the influence of the two sets of moderators varies across different partisan groups. Yet, it is not entirely certain what role the strength of party affiliation will play. Specifically, in explaining the diversity deficit (the relationship between diversity values and diverse exposure), the influence of motivations, opportunities and ability may be *weaker* among partisans, compared to weak or non-partisans. Susceptible to selective exposure to like-minded sources (Hart et al., 2009; Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng, 2009; Stroud, 2011), partisans may fail to seek out diverse viewpoints although they think it is important to do so. However, this may not be the case, because partisans do not necessarily avoid opposing views (Garrett, 2009a; Weeks et al., 2016), and furthermore, individuals who are confident that they can defend their views from challenges actually prefer like-mined messages less (Albarracín & Mitchell, 2004). Also considering that politics and news are fundamentally important to who partisans are (Greene, 2004), they might try hard to live up to their diversity values in their everyday news diets by making use of the various resources available to them. This means that the influence of MOA becomes *stronger* among partisans in explaining the relationship between diversity values and diverse exposure.

In explaining the relationship between diverse exposure and democratic citizenship indicators, it is possible that the influence of defensive motivations (both defensive dismissal and defensive deliberation motivations) is pronounced among partisans rather than weak or non-partisans. This is because partisans are more susceptible to selective judgment of information in a way that defends and favors their views (Taber & Lodge, 2006). For weak or non-partisans, who tend to be less vulnerable to selective judgment, the influence of balanced motivations may be stronger. Given the different possibilities, the following research question is thus posed:

RQ5. Do the hypothesized interactive relationships vary by strength of party affiliation?

Media Diversity Pathway to Citizenship

Finally, combining the separate pictures related to the two diversity paradoxes, this dissertation discusses *the Media Diversity Pathway to Citizenship* which investigates diversity values, exposure and citizenship as a whole (Figure 4-1). With this theoretical model, I seek to explicate under what conditions the normative pathway to citizenship (Figure 1-1) actually emerges (and apparently does not emerge).

Figure 4-1.

Media Diversity Pathway to Citizenship (Comprehensive)

For example, a case can be established where political interest may effectively moderate diversity values and diverse exposure; balanced deliberation motivations effectively moderate diverse exposure and political knowledge; and diverse exposure mediates diversity values and political knowledge. That is, when political interest and balanced deliberation motivations are present, diversity values' pathway to political knowledge mediated through diverse exposure emerges. Similarly, when political interest and balanced deliberation motivations are present, diversity values' pathway to political deliberation mediated through diverse exposure may emerge. A different pathway to a participatory citizenry may be established when political interest and defensive deliberation motivations are present, and this pathway may be especially strong among partisans.

By synthesizing empirical evidence investigating the media diversity pathway to citizenship, I seek to provide a broader picture and a more comprehensive understanding of the associations among diversity values, exposure and indicators of democratic citizenship. Only then will scholars, policymakers and politicians be able to confidently argue that exposure to diverse viewpoints, guided by diversity values, plays an important role in predicting democratic citizenship. In light of empirical evidence, scholars will be able to have discussions about what values and practices shapes good citizenship and who ideal citizens are; civic educators will then be able to design interventions to help guide citizens' news media consumption practices.

RQ6. Under what conditions does the media diversity pathway to citizenship emerge?

CHAPTER V.

Methods

Data

The current study analyzes data from a two wave national online survey conducted in the United States prior to the Fall Presidential election in 2016. The research company Qualtrics was contracted for data collection with their online panel. Quotas were applied for age, gender and education to ensure that the sample closely resembled the American population based on U.S. Census data (Ryan & Bauman, 2016). Respondents included 48.7% of males and 51.3% of females with a mean of 49.5 years of age. In terms of education, 13% held an advanced degree, 31.2% held a Bachelor's degree, 17.9% held some college or associate degree, 29.6% were high school graduates, and 8.4% were high school incompletes. Data for the first wave (W1) were collected between October 6 and October 17, 2016. A total of 1,348 individuals completed the first wave. Data for the second wave (W2) were collected between November 1 and November 8, 2016. A total of 895 W1 respondents completed W2 for a retention rate of 66.4%.

Diversity Paradox 1: Predictor Variable

Diversity values. In order to identify the news-seeking values that respondents held, respondents were asked to rate the importance of 17 news-seeking goals (Kim & Pasek, 2016a).

Among the 17 news-seeking goals, seven items tapped diverse news-seeking goals (i.e., to get news from multiple viewpoints; news from multiple sources; news that balances information from every possible point of view; news that reflects the diverse viewpoints within our society; news from both liberal and conservative viewpoints; news sources that are owned by different owners; and news that weighs different viewpoints against one another) and ten items tapped news-seeking goals that are not primarily concerned with diversity (i.e., to get news from highly trusted sources; news from sources that just present the facts, without opinions; news from sources that put news in context; news from mainstream sources; news from sources that are familiar and comfortable; news from viewpoints that you disagree with; news from lesser known sources; news from conservative sources; news from viewpoints that you agree with; and news from liberal sources).

For each item, respondents were asked, "Please rate the statements below in terms of importance. How important do you think it is for people to get *[ITEM]*." Respondents could then rate each item as "not at all important," "a little important," "somewhat important," "very important," or "extremely important," which ranged from 1 to 5. To measure the degree to which each respondent valued diverse news-seeking goals, value ratings of seven news-seeking items that were diversity-related were averaged together (W1 $M = 3.79$, $SD = .80$, $\alpha = .88$; W2 $M = 3.70$, $SD = .82$, $\alpha = .90$).

Diversity Paradox 1: Criterion Variables

Diverse exposure was measured in two different contexts. First, in the context of overall media (encompassing all available media, such as TV, newspaper, radio, and online media), *diverse exposure (overall media)* is a generic measure that closely resembles diverse news-

seeking values. Additionally, in the contexts of social media, *diverse exposure (social media)* was measured.

Diverse exposure (overall media). To measure people's diverse exposure, respondents were asked to rate the frequency with which they engaged in the same 17 news-seeking goals as in the value questions. Respondents were asked, "When you seek news, how often do you *[ITEM]*?" Response options were "never," "rarely," "sometimes," "most of the time," and "always," which were recoded to range from 1 to 5. To measure the degree to which each respondent engaged in diverse news-seeking goals, practice ratings of seven news-seeking habits that were diversity-related were averaged together (W1 $M = 3.45$, $SD = .82$, $\alpha = .91$; W2 $M = 3.37$, $SD = .75$, $\alpha = .90$).

Diverse exposure (social media). To measure individuals' diverse exposure on social media, respondents who reported that they used any social media in the past 30 days were asked, "In the past 30 days,[2] on social media, how often have you *[EXPOSURE ITEM]*?" Exposure items included: 1) "read or watched news about politics and the election that people shared; 2) read or watched news about politics and the election from news sources, journalists or politicians that you followed; and 3) read people's personal opinions about politics and the election." Response options were "never," "once in the past 30 days," "2-3 times in the past 30 days," "once per week," "a few times per week," and "every day," ranging from 1 to 6.[3]

Respondents who selected all response options but "never" to the three questions then read another introduction, "Some news about politics and the election is liberal or Democrat-

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[2] In questions asking behavior frequency in wave 2, "past 14 days" were used as a timeframe. Response options included: "never," "once in the past 14 days," "2-3 days per week," "4-6 days per week," and "every day," ranging from 1 to 6. A shorter timeframe was used in wave 2, because of the short time gap between wave 1 and wave 2. While this inconsistency in timeframe is a limitation this dissertation bears, there is no theoretical reason to suspect that this inconsistency has led to systematic over- or under-estimations of behavior frequency in respondents.
[3] Responses to these three questions were averaged to measure "exposure frequency," which was used as a control variable for analyses in the context of social media.

leaning while other news is conservative or Republican-leaning. Still, other political news is neutral or non-partisan." Respondents were subsequently asked, "You said you *[EXPOSURE ITEM]* on social media in the past 30 days. If you can estimate, what percentage of those political news stories/personal opinions that you read or watched is the following? (Total must sum to 100.)" They were then presented with three types of content: "liberal or Democrat-leaning," "conservative or republican leaning" and "neutral or non-partisan." Using respondents' estimates, an index of diverse news use was calculated by applying normalized Shannon's H Information Entropy (Boydstun et al., 2014), ranging from 0 to 1:

$$\text{Diverse exposure} = \frac{-\sum_{i=1}^{3} p(x_i) * \ln p(x_i)}{\ln 3}$$

Where: x_i represents a content type; and $p(x_i)$ is the proportion of total attention a given content type receives.

Diverse exposure scores were calculated respectively for three types of exposure and averaged to measure *diverse exposure on social media* (W1 M = .58, SD = .30; W2 M = .54, SD = .29). Diverse exposure scores from the first and third types of exposure were averaged to measure *diverse exposure from individuals in social network* (W1 M = .59, SD = .30; W2 M = .55, SD = .29). Diverse exposure scores from the second type of exposure constituted *diverse exposure from followed sources* (W1 M = .57, SD = .33; W2 M = .53, SD = .33).

Table 5-1.

Example of Diverse Exposure (Social Media) Score Calculation

Type 1 (%)	Type 2 (%)	Type 3 (%)	Diverse Exposure
100	0	0	0
99	0	1	0.051
90	10	0	0.2959
75	25	0	0.5119
60	40	0	0.6126
50	50	0	0.6309
70	20	10	0.7298
65	25	10	0.7799
65	20	15	0.8069
60	30	10	0.8173
55	35	10	0.8433
50	40	10	0.8587
60	20	20	0.865
50	25	25	0.9464
45	35	20	0.9545
40	40	20	0.9602
40	30	30	0.9912
35	35	30	0.9977
34	33	33	0.9999

Diversity Paradox 1: Moderator Variables

Political interest. Respondents rated how much they agreed with the following two items: "I am interested in politics." and "I have been interested in the 2016 presidential election." Response options were "not at all," "a little," "somewhat," "very," and "extremely interested," ranging from 1 to 5. To measure political interest, the degree to which respondents agreed with the two items were averaged together (W1 $M = 3.54$, $SD = 1.20$, $r = .76$).

Political efficacy. Respondents were asked to rate how much they agree with items tapping internal and external political efficacy (Kenski & Stroud, 2006). Items included:

"Sometimes presidential elections seem so complicated that a person like me can *not* really understand what is going on," and "People like me have *no* say over who gets to be president." Response options were "not at all," "a little," "somewhat," "very," and "extremely," ranging from 1 to 5. The degree to which respondents agreed with the two items were reversed coded and averaged together to measure a political efficacy (W1 $M = 3.27$, $SD = 1.06$, $r = .28$).

Perceived busyness. Respondents were asked how often "do you have too many things to do each day to actually get them all done?", "do you find themselves rushing from place to place trying to get to appointments or to get things done?", and "are you so busy that they miss scheduled breaks or rest periods?" (Martin & Park, 2003). Response options were "never," "rarely," "sometimes," "often," and "very often," ranging from 1 to 5. (W1 $M = 2.74$, $SD = 1.05$, $\alpha = .87$)

Habitual news use. This measure taps the degree to which people habitually get news. Respondents were asked to rate how much they agree with items tapping habitual news use, dimensions of which include behaviors that are uncontrollable, are done without awareness, and are efficient. Four items included: "Reading, watching or listening to news about politics and the election is part of my daily routine; something I do automatically; is something I do without having to consciously remember; and is something that would require effort *not* to do (LaRose, 2010; Verplanken & Orbell, 2003). Response options were "not at all," "a little," "somewhat," "very," and "extremely," ranging from 1 to 5. (W1 $M = 3.05$, $SD = 1.30$, $\alpha = .93$)

Diversity-seeking skills. This measure evaluates how people perceive their own skills in seeking diverse news using traditional and online media. Respondents reported the degree to which they agreed with the following items, respectively when they use TV, radio or newspapers or social media, and websites and apps to learn about politics and elections. Items included: "It is

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easy for me to find news sources that present different political viewpoints from one another; and I am knowledgeable about news sources that present liberal/conservative views on political issues." Response options were "not at all," "a little," "somewhat," "very," and "extremely," ranging from 1 to 5. The degree to which respondent agreed with the six items were averaged together to measure diversity-seeking skills (W1 $M = 3.10$, $SD = 1.05$, $\alpha = .91$).

Knowledge of news sources. Respondents were presented with two news sources and asked, "News from which news source do you think is leaning toward liberal/conservative?" Four pairs or news sources included: *The Sean Hannity Show* and *the Rachel Maddow Show; the Thom Hartmann Program* and *Glenn Beck Radio Program; Slate* and *the Drudge Report;* and *the New York Times* and *New York Post*. Respondents also had the option to choose "I am not sure." The number of correct responses was counted to construct the news source knowledge index, which ranged from 0 to 4 (W1 $M = 1.57$, $SD = 1.44$, $\alpha = .74$).

Diversity Paradox 2: Predictor Variables

Predictor variables for analyses of the second diversity paradox are identical to the criterion variables for analyses of the first diversity paradox: *diverse exposure (overall media)* and *diverse exposure (social media)*.

Diversity Paradox 2: Criterion Variables

Criterion variables included three indicators of informed, engaged and deliberative citizenship: namely, *political knowledge, political participation,* and *cross-cutting discussion*.

Political knowledge. Respondents were asked about the issue/policy positions of two presidential candidates from the Republican and the Democratic parties. Respondents were

asked, "Below are questions about various policy proposals and candidates. Please tell me whether Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump support or oppose each proposal. If you are unsure/undecided on a proposal, you may indicate as such." Four policy proposals were considered in each wave: increased background checks for gun sales (W1, W2); raising the federal minimum wage (W1, W2); forcing Syrian President Bashar al-Assad out of power (W1); approving the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement (W1); changing the business tax rate from 35 percent to 15 percent (W2); and pulling out of the current "Iran nuclear deal" (W2). Response options included "support," "oppose," and "I am not sure." A composite index ranging from 0 to 8 was calculated by counting the correct responses (W1 $M = 2.80$, $SD = 2.51$, $\alpha = .58$; W2 $M = 3.18$, $SD = 1.67$, $\alpha = .85$).

Political participation. Respondents' levels of political participation were measured by combining their offline and online political participation. Regarding *offline* political participation, respondents were first asked, "In the last 30 days, how often did you engage in the activities below <u>in person</u>?" Six activities included: attending a political meeting, rally, or speech; circulating a petition for a candidate or issue; contacting a public official; posting a political sign, banner, button or bumper sticker; volunteering for a political campaign; and donating money to a political party, candidate or political action committee. Regarding *online* political participation, respondents were then asked, "In the last 30 days, how often did you engage in the activities below <u>online</u>?" Activities included: "watching a political meeting, rally, or speech online; circulating an online petition for a candidate or issue; contacting a public official online; donating money to a political party, candidate or political action committee online; posting my political view or opinion online; and joining a political group online." Response options included: "never," "once a month," "two to three times a month," "every

week," "a few times per week," and "every day," which ranged from 1 to 6. A composite index was calculated by averaging the twelve participation measures (W1 $M = 1.52$, $SD = .93$, $\alpha = .95$; W2 $M = 1.39$, $SD = .85$, $\alpha = .96$).

Cross-cutting discussion. Respondents reported how many times in the past 30 days they talked about politics with someone "who did not share their political views" and "who supported a presidential candidate different from them" (see Lee, Kwak, & Campbell, 2015). Response options included: "never," "once a month," "two to three times a month," "every week," "a few times per week," and "every day," which ranged from 1 to 6. A composite index was calculated by averaging the two measures (W1 $M = 3.04$, $SD = 1.54$, $r = .87$; W2 $M = 2.67$, $SD = 1.48$, $r = .86$).

Diverse sharing (social media). Respondents were first asked, "In the past 30 days, how many times did you post a link to news about politics or the election?" Response options included: "never," "once a month," "two to three times a month," "every week," "a few times per week." Respondents who selected all response options but "never" to the question were subsequently asked, "You said you posted a link to news about politics or the election on social media in the past 30 days. If you can estimate, what percentage of those political news stories/personal opinions that you posted is the following? (Total must sum to 100.)" They were then presented with three types of content: "liberal or Democrat-leaning," "conservative or republican leaning" and "neutral or non-partisan." Using respondents' estimates, an index of diverse sharing was calculated by applying normalized Shannon's H Information Entropy (Boydstun et al., 2014), ranging from 0 to 1:

$$\text{Diverse sharing} = \frac{-\sum_{i=1}^{3} p(x_i) * \ln p(x_i)}{\ln 3}$$

Where: x_i represents a content type; and $p(x_i)$ is the proportion of total attention a given content type receives.

Diversity Paradox 2: Moderator Variables

Motivations for cross-cutting exposure. Respondents were asked to rate how much they agree with items tapping different motivations for getting news from the opposing side. Respondents were first asked, "When you encounter <u>news that opposes your own political view,</u> how often do you read, watch or listen to them?" Response options were "never," "rarely," "sometimes," "most of the time," and "always." Respondents who selected all response options but "never" were then be asked: "Please rate how much you agree with the following statements. When I encounter news that opposes my own political view, I read, watch or listen to them: [*items*]." Response options included "not at all," "a little," "somewhat," "very much," and "extremely," which ranged from 1 to 5.

Defensive dismissal motivations. Five items for defensive dismissal motivations included: to dismiss the views that oppose mine; to laugh at the views that oppose my view; to confirm that the views opposing mine do not matter to me; to confirm that the views opposing mine do not deserve my attention; and to confirm that the views opposing mine are worthless (W1 $M = 12.73$, $SD = 5.03$, $\alpha = .87$).

Defensive deliberation motivations. Five items for defensive deliberation motivations included: to defend my view against challenges; to find weaknesses in the views that oppose mine; to criticize the views that oppose mine; to find flaws in the views that oppose mine; and to strengthen my view against opposing opinions (W1 $M = 15.28$, $SD = 4.81$, $\alpha = .88$).

Balanced deliberation motivations. Five items for balanced deliberation motivations included: to consider alternative views; to learn about the strengths of the views that oppose mine; to refine, challenge or even change my own view if necessary; to form an informed position; and to even-handedly understand the views that oppose mine (W1 $M = 16.66$, $SD = 2.56$, $\alpha = .88$).

Predictor variables for three motivations. For analyses predicting the three motivations for cross-cutting exposure (RQ2), the following variables about demographics, politics and media were considered. Democratic variables included: sex, age, education and income (see *Control Variables* for more information). For *race*, respondents were asked to select all that apply, and response options included: White or Caucasian, Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin, Black or African-American, American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, Pacific Islander, or Asian American, and some other race. Respondents were then grouped into: White (if selected "White or Caucasian"), Hispanic (if selected "Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin"), Black (if selected "Black or African-American") and other races.

Political variables included: strength of party affiliation, political interest, and political efficacy, and political ideology. For *political ideology*, response options included: extremely liberal (coded as "1"), liberal ("2"), slightly liberal ("3"), moderate ("4"), slightly conservative ("5"), conservative ("6"), and extremely conservative ("8"). For *strength of party affiliation*, non-partisans were given "0," weak partisans were assigned "1," and partisans were given "2" (See *Strength of Party Affiliation* below for more information).

Media-related variables included: overall news media use and diversity values.

Strength of Party Affiliation

In terms of strength of party affiliation, respondents were categorized into three groups using their party identification: 1) non-partisan (i.e., those who identified themselves as independent, N = 314), 2) weak partisan (i.e., those who lean toward Democrat/Republican, N = 312), and 3) partisan (i.e., those who identified themselves as strong Democrat/Republican or Democrat/Republican, N = 655). Respondents who identified themselves as "other" (N=67) were excluded in sub-group analyses.

Control Variables

Demographic control variables included: sex, age, education, and income. For *education*, response options included: none, or grade 1-8, high school incomplete, high school graduate, some college or associate's degree, no 4-year degree, college graduate (B.S., B.A., or other 4-year degree), post-graduate training or professional schooling after college (e.g., toward a master's degree or Ph.D.; law or medical). For total family *income* in 2015, response options included: less than $10,000, $10,000 to under $20,000, $20,000 to under $30,000, $30,000 to under $40,000, $40,000 to under $50,000, $50,000 to under $75,000, $75,000 to under $100,000, $100,000 to under $150,000, and $150,000 or more.

Additionally, *overall news media use* was controlled for. Respondents were asked to indicate "In the past 14 days, how often have you used the following sources to get news about politics or the election?" News sources included television news programs, newspapers, online news sources, and talk radio. Response options included: "never," "once in the past 14 days," "once per week," "2-3 days per week," "4-6 days per week," and "every day," ranging from 1 to

6. To measure overall news media use, the frequency in which respondents got news from the four sources were averaged (W1 $M = 3.42$, $SD = 1.11$; W2 $M = 3.31$, $SD = 1.14$).

Social media-related control variables included network size and exposure frequency. *Network size* was measured by asking respondents the number of individuals in their network on the social media platform they use most frequently (W1 $M = 224.70$, $SD = 270.22$, see Ellison, Steinfield, & Lampe, 2011).[4] *Exposure frequency* measured the frequency in which people got news and opinions about politics and the election on social media (see *footnote 3*, W1 $M = 3.70$, $SD = 1.64$).

Validation: Motivations for Cross-cutting Exposure

Pilot data. To validate the three motivation measures, a pilot data set was collected online among 209 American respondents between July 29 and August 3 through a contract with Qualtrics. Quotas were applied for age, gender and education to ensure that the sample closely resembles the American population based on U.S. Census data (Ryan & Bauman, 2016).

Questions. Before being asked about the three motivation measures, respondents were first asked, "When you encounter news that oppose your political view, how often do you read, watch or listen to them?" Those who did not choose "never," but chose "rarely," "sometimes," "most of the time," or "always" were then asked a follow-up question. These respondents were presented with, "When I encounter news that oppose my own political view, I read, watch or listen to them," and then asked to rate the degree to which they agreed with fifteen items that were devised to measure the three motivations for cross-cutting exposure (items available in

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[4] Outliers, responses with values higher than 1,000, were recoded to be 1,000, which was the value at the 95% percentile.

Tables 6-2 and 6-3). Response options included: "not at all," "rarely," "somewhat," "very much," and "extremely."

Additionally, respondents were asked three *open-ended questions* on how they would feel upon encountering the news stories opposing their views, and how they would process the opposing stories. These questions were asked to make sure that the motivations most people held for consuming opposing information were reasonably captured with the three motivations.

First, they were asked, "From mass media, including the Internet, TV, radio, newspapers and social media, people sometimes encounter news stories that oppose their own political views. When you come across news stories that oppose your own political view, how do you feel and react?" Before respondents were asked two more open-ended questions in the context of the 2016 presidential election, respondents were asked "If the election for President were held today, and you had to make a choice, for which candidate would you probably vote?" Response options included: Donald Trump, the Republican Party; Hillary Clinton, the Democratic Party; Jill Stein, the Green Party; Gary Johnson, the Libertarian Party; and I plan not to vote for any of the candidates). Respondents were then asked: "Throughout the presidential campaign season, people sometimes come across news stories about candidates. When you come across news stories that are critical of your favorite candidate, how do you feel and react? Please tell us in the space provided below." and "When you come across news stories that are favorable toward your least favorite candidate, how do you feel and react? Please tell us in the space provided below."

Factor analysis. Principal component analysis with the Oblimin rotation method was used to identify factors underlying the fifteen items tapping the three motivations for cross-cutting exposure. The aim was to check whether three factors tapping the three motivations were

indeed identified among the fifteen items. Initial Eigen values indicated that the first two factors

each accounted for 51.3% and 12.8% of variance. The third factor accounted for 5.4% of total

variance and had an Eigen value of .81. Below two solutions respectively with two factors (Table

5-2) and three factors (Table 5-3) are presented.

With a two factor solution, five items on the bottom that tap balanced deliberation

motivations are clearly differentiated from other items tapping defensive dismissal and defensive

deliberation motivations. Three items for defensive deliberation (i.e., to defend my view against

challenges, to argue the views that oppose mine, and to strengthen the arguments that support my

view) appeared quite divided with cross-loadings of .3 or above.

Table 5-2.

Two Factor Solution: Factor Loadings Based on a Principal Components Analysis with Oblimin

Rotation

	Factor 1	Factor 2
to dismiss the views that oppose mine	.87	
to confirm that they do not deserve much attention	.84	
to think about how flawed their arguments are	.81	
to laugh at the views that oppose mine	.79	
to confirm that they do not matter to me	.75	
to confirm my view is right	.74	
to find weaknesses in the views that oppose mine	.70	
to defend my view against challenges	.61	.30
to argue the views that oppose mine	.55	.31
to strengthen the arguments that support my view	.50	.42
to consider alternative views		.86
to form an informed position		.85
to evenhandedly understand the views that oppose mine		.83
to learn the strong parts of the views that oppose mine		.81
to refine, challenge or even change my own view if necessary		.77

Note. Factor loadings <.2 are suppressed.

A three factor solution presented a clearer picture. In line with the conceptual expectation, it demonstrated that there were three distinct factors underlying the fifteen items, each tapping defensive deliberation, balanced deliberation and defensive dismissal motivations. This result is considered as a validation of the measures for the three motivations for cross-cutting exposure. Fourteen items belonged to the factor as expected. However, the first item, "to confirm my view is right," appeared to belong to the defensive deliberation group although it was designed to tap defensive dismissal motivations. Additionally, the sixth item, "to argue the views that oppose mine," appeared a bit divided with a primary factor loading of .52 and a cross-loading of .22. While this three factor solution results were considered as a validation of the measures for the three motivations for cross-cutting exposure, I still decided to change the wordings of the abovementioned items that were divided between motivations and thus appeared slightly problematic in light of respondents' answers to open-ended questions (more information about this in the following section on *open-ended questions*).

Specifically, I referred to the languages and expressions that respondents most commonly used to tap each motivation in modifying the potentially problematic items. One of the defensive dismissal items, "to confirm my view is right," was modified to "to confirm that the views opposing mine are worthless." Two defensive deliberation items were modified as follows: "to argue the views that oppose mine" was changed to "to criticize the views that oppose mine" while "to strengthen the arguments that support my view" was changed to "to strengthen my view against opposing opinions." Additionally, one balanced deliberation item, "to learn about the strong parts of the views that oppose mine" was modified to "to learn about the strengths of the views that oppose mine."

Table 5-3.

Three Factor Solution: Factor Loadings Based on a Principal Components Analysis with

Oblimin Rotation

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
to confirm my view is right	.86		
to strengthen the arguments that support my view	.71	.26	
to defend my view against challenges	.68		
to find weaknesses in the views that oppose mine	.67		
to think about how flawed their arguments are	.53		
to argue the views that oppose mine	.52	.22	
to consider alternative views	-.20	.91	
to evenhandedly understand the views that oppose mine		.80	
to refine, challenge or even change my own view if necessary		.78	
to learn the strong parts of the views that oppose mine		.76	
to form an informed position	.38	.71	-.26
to dismiss the views that oppose mine			.83
to laugh at the views that oppose mine			.77
to confirm that they do not matter to me			.76
to confirm that they do not deserve much attention			.67

Note. Factor loadings <.2 are suppressed.

Open-ended questions. Respondents' answers to the three open-ended questions were individually read to ensure that the motivations most people held for cross-cutting exposure were reasonably captured with the three proposed motivations. Generally, responses fell under the three motivations,[5] providing support for the validity of the three motivations. Example responses for each motivation are presented in Table 5-4.

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[5] Some responses touched upon two motivations rather than being confined to only one. This suggests that people's motivations for cross-cutting exposure are not mutually exclusive. This also conceptually makes sense, because

Table 5-4.

Example Responses for the Three Motivations for Cross-Cutting Exposure

Motivations	Selected Responses
Defensive Dismissal	• IT DOES NOT BOTHER ME AT ALL. • It makes me laugh. • I read them, but I likely will dismiss unfavorable comments as irrational.
Defensive Deliberation	• Identify what is wrong with the ideas. • I often read them [news stories from opposing views] to gain insight on what the "other side" is thinking. • I listen to them [news stories from opposing views] so that I can think of reasons in support that greatly outweigh anything critical.
Balanced Deliberation	• I enjoy hearing both sides of the subject. • It is my intention to obtain enough information that would allow me to become a lot more informed about the issue. This is true whether or not the issue is of one that mirrors my own. In those CONSTANT instances when I find information less consistent than my own, I absorb (if possible), weigh it for its accuracies, and find a way to continue the "thought" and/or conversation. • I read them [news stories from opposing views] and try to stay open minded. I take in consideration their views and think rationally, trying to find what can be countered with my views.

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defensive dismissal and defensive deliberation motivations share "defensive" characteristics whereas defensive deliberation and balanced deliberation motivations share "deliberative" characteristics.

Analysis

To examine H1a through H3c and RQ1 on the first diversity paradox, Model 1 of SPSS macro Process, which utilizes ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, was used (Hayes, 2013). It is important to note that analyses done in this dissertation project took advantage of the panel survey design. Specifically, in testing H1a through H3c, W2 diverse exposure was predicted with W1 diversity values while levels of diverse exposure in W1 were controlled for. By taking this analytical approach of OLS lagged dependent variable regressions, findings of this dissertation demonstrate the degree to which independent variables predict *changes* in dependent variables (Eveland & Thompson, 2006).

Regarding RQ2 predicting the three motivations for cross-cutting exposure, OLS regressions were run. To investigate H4a through H6c along with RQ3 on the second diversity paradox, Model 1 of SPSS macro Process was used (Hayes, 2013). Again, W2 citizenship indicators were predicted with W1 diverse exposure in the context of overall media while levels of citizenship indicators in W1 were controlled for. To investigate H7 and RQ4 in the context of social media, W2 diverse sharing was regressed on W1 diverse exposure on social media while W1 diverse sharing was controlled for. Model 1 of SPSS macro Process (Hayes, 2013) was used to test RQ4.

Research question 5 on strength of party affiliation was examined through sub-group analyses. The aforementioned OLS lagged dependent regression analyses were conducted separately among three groups of non-partisans, weak partisans, and partisans.

CHAPTER VI.

Results

Explaining the Diversity Deficit

  Predicting Diverse Exposure on Overall Media. I first examined whether individuals

with the right resource (under the framework of Motivation, Opportunity and Ability) were able

to better-translate their diversity values into diverse exposure than those without the resource in

the context of overall media exposure. I began the analysis by testing H1, which predicted that as

motivation—political interest (H1a) or political efficacy (H1b)—increased, the relationship

between diversity values and diverse exposure would strengthen. Although not hypothesized, I

first investigated the simple relationship between predictor variables and diverse exposure (W2)

without the interaction term (Table 6-1, first column). Diversity values in W1 was positively

related to diverse exposure in W2 (β=.04, SE=.03, p<.01). Among six MOA items, political

interest (β=.04, SE=.03, p<.05) and diversity skills (β=.10, SE=.03, p<.01) were positively

related to W2 diverse exposure. I then added the respective interaction terms to the model.

However, neither political interest (β=.00, SE=.02, p>.10, Table 6-1, second column) nor

political efficacy (β=.01, SE=.02, p>.10, Table 6-1, third column) interacted with W1 diversity

values in predicting diverse exposure in W2. As a result, I do not find support for H1a or H1b.

Table 6-1.

Overall Media: Predicting Diverse Exposure with Diversity Values and MOA (Motivation

Opportunity Ability)

	Coeff. (SE)	Coeff. (SE)	Coeff. (SE)	Coeff. (SE)	Coeff. (SE)	Coeff. (SE)	Coeff. (SE)
(Constant)	.75(.16)**	.69(.28)**	.88(.31)**	1.11(.24)**	.69(.27)*	1.25(.28)**	.79(.18)**
Sex	.03(.04)	.03(.04)	.03(.04)	.04(.04)	.03(.04)	.03(.04)	.03(.04)
Age	.00(.00)	.00(.00)	.00(.00)	.00(.00)	.00(.00)	.00(.00)	.00(.00)
Education	.01(.01)	.01(.01)	.01(.01)	.01(.01)	.01(.01)	.01(.01)	.01(.01)
Income	-.01(.01)	-.01(.01)	-.01(.01)	-.01(.02)	-.01(.01)	-.01(.01)	-.01(.01)
News Use	.06(.02)**	.05(.02)*	.06(.02)**	.05(.02)**	.05(.02)**	.05(.02)**	.05(.02)**
Div. Exp. (W1)	.45(.04)**	.45(.04)**	.45(.04)**	.45(.04)**	.45(.04)**	.45(.04)**	.45(.04)**
Div. Val.	.08(.03)**	.10(.07)	.05(.08)	-.02(.06)	.10(.06)	-.05(.07)	.07(.04)+
Political Interest	.05(.03)*	.07(.07)	.05(.03)*	.06(.03)*	.05(.03)*	.06(.03)*	.05(.03)*
Political Efficacy	-.01(.02)	-.01(.02)	-.05(.08)	-.01(.02)	-.01(.02)	-.01(.02)	-.01(.02)
News Habits	.02(.02)	.02(.02)	.02(.02)	-.11(.07)	.02(.02)	.02(.02)	.02(.02)
Busyness	.02(.02)	.02(.02)	.02(.02)	.01(.02)	.04(.09)	.01(.02)	.02(.02)
Diversity Skills	.10(.03)**	.10(.03)**	.10(.03)**	.10(.03)**	.10(.03)**	-.08(.09)	.10(.03)**
Source Know.	.00(.02)	.00(.02)	.00(.02)	.00(.02)	.00(.02)	.00 (.02)	-.03(.06)
D. Val. X Pol. Int.	-	.00(.02)	-	-	-	-	-
D. Val. X Pol. Effi.	-	-	.01(.02)	-	-	-	-
D. Val. X News Habits	-	-	-	.04(.02)*	-	-	-
D. Val. X Busyness	-	-	-	-	-.01(.02)	-	-
D. Val. X Div. Skills	-	-	-	-	-	.05 (.02)*	-
D. Val. X Source Know.	-	-	-	-	-	-	.01(.02)
R-square	.475	.475	.476	.478	.475	.478	.476
N	892						

** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10

Table 6-2.

Overall Media: Conditional Effects of Diversity Values on Diverse Exposure at Values of

Habitual News Use and Diversity-Seeking Skills

Habitual News Use	Point Estimate	95% C.I.
1.84 (-1SD)	.05 (.03)	-.02 to .11
3.12 (Mean)	.09 (.03)	.03 to .15
4.41 (+1SD)	.13 (.04)	.06 to .21
Diversity-seeking Skills	**Point Estimate**	**95% C.I.**
2.06 (-1SD)	.04 (.03)	-.02 to .11
3.09 (Mean)	.09 (.03)	.03 to .15
4.12 (+1SD)	.14 (.04)	.06 to .22

I then tested H2, which predicted that the relationship between diversity values and diverse exposure would strengthen, as constraints on opportunity items, (a) busyness and (b) habitual news use, decreased. The interaction effect of W1 diversity values and habitual news use was found positive and significant for W2 diverse exposure when W1 diverse exposure was controlled for (β=.04, SE=.02, p<.05, Table 6-1, fourth column). This relationship holds despite accounting for prior levels of diverse exposure in W1, which strongly predicted diverse exposure in W2 (β=.45, SE=.04, p<.01). To have a better understanding of the nature of this interaction, the Johnson-Neyman technique was used (Hayes, 2013) to probe this relationship at three levels of habitual news use (Table 6-2). For individuals with low levels of habitual news use, the interactive relationship between diversity values and diverse exposure appeared non-significant, as the 95% confidence intervals for the point estimate included zero. For individuals with medium (point estimate = .09 (.03), 95% C.I. [.03 to .15]) or high levels of habitual news use (point estimate = .13 (.04), 95% C.I. [.06 to .21]), the relationship between diversity values and diverse exposure was positive and significant. That is, diversity values in W1 positively predicted diverse exposure in W2 among people with medium or high levels of habitual news

use. As a result, I found support for H2b. Busyness, nonetheless, was not found to interact with W1 diversity values (β=-.01, SE=.02, p>.10, H2a rejected) in predicting W2 diverse exposure.

Lastly, H3 predicted that the relationship between diversity values and diverse exposure would strengthen, as ability items, (a) diversity-seeking skills and (b) knowledge of news sources, decreased. The interaction effect of W1 diversity values and diversity-seeking skills was found positive and significant for W2 diverse exposure (β=.05, SE=.02, p<.05). Probing this relationship at three levels of diversity-seeking skills revealed that for individuals with low levels of diversity-seeking skills, the interactive relationship between diversity values and diverse exposure was not significant (Table 6-2). For people with medium (point estimate = .09 (.03), 95% C.I. [.03 to .15] or high levels of diversity-seeking skills (point estimate = .14 (.04), 95% C.I. [.06 to .22]), the interactive relationship between diversity values and diverse exposure was significant. That is, diversity values in W1 likely positively predicted diverse exposure in W2 among people with medium or high levels of diversity-seeking skills. This provides evidence in support of H3a. However, diversity values in W1 were not found to interact with knowledge of news sources (β=.01, SE=.02, p>.10, H3b rejected) in predicting W2 diverse exposure.

Predicting Diverse Exposure on Social Media. I then examined the same set of six hypotheses, whether individuals with the right motivation, opportunity and ability were able to better-translate their diversity values into diverse exposure than those without them, in the context of social media. I began the analysis by testing H1 on motivation, which predicted that as political interest (H1a) or political efficacy (H1b) increased, the relationship between diversity values and diverse exposure would strengthen. Although not hypothesized, I first investigated the simple relationship between predictor variables and diverse exposure on social media (W2)

without the interaction term (Table 6-3, first column). Diversity values (W1) appeared unrelated to diverse exposure on social media in W2 (β=.01, SE=.02, p>.10). Among six MOA items, busyness (β=.02, SE=.01, p<.10) and knowledge of news sources (β=.02, SE=.01, p<.05) were positively related to diverse exposure on social media W2. Interestingly, people who reported that they were busier engaged in diverse exposure more on social media to a marginal degree. I then added the respective interaction terms to the model. However, neither political interest (β=.02, SE=.01, p>.10, H1a rejected) nor political efficacy (β=-.01, SE=.01, p>.10, H1b rejected) interacted with W1 diversity values in predicting diverse exposure in W2.

I then examined H2 on opportunities, which predicted that as perceived busyness (H2a) or habitual news use (H2b) decreased, the relationship between diversity values and diverse exposure on social media would strengthen. The interaction effect of W1 diversity values and habitual news use was found positive and significant for W2 diverse exposure (β=.04, SE=.01, p<.01, Table 6-3, fourth column). Probing this relationship at three levels of habitual news use revealed that for individuals with low or medium levels of habitual news use, the interactive relationship between diversity values and diverse exposure on social media appeared non-significant (Table 6-4). For individuals with high levels of habitual news use, the relationship between diversity values and diverse exposure was significant, point estimate = .05 (.02), 95% C.I. [.002 to .09]. That is, diversity values in W1 likely positively predicted diverse exposure on social media in W2 among people with high levels of habitual news use (H2b supported). Diversity values in W1, nonetheless, were not found to interact with busyness (β=-.01, SE=.01, p>.10, H2a rejected) in predicting W2 diverse exposure.

Table 6-3.

Social Media: Predicting Diverse Exposure with Diversity Values and MOA

	Coeff. (SE)	Coeff. (SE)	Coeff. (SE)	Coeff. (SE)	Coeff. (SE)	Coeff. (SE)	Coeff. (SE)
(Constant)	.20(.10)*	.48(.20)*	.04(.22)	.63(.17)**	.10(.20)	.59(.20)**	.22(.12)+
Sex	-.02(.02)	-.02(.02)	-.02(.02)	-.02(.02)	-.02(.02)	-.02(.02)	-.02(.02)
Age	.00(.00)	.00(.00)	.00(.00)	.00(.00)	.00(.00)	.00(.00)	.00(.00)
Education	.01(.01)	.01(.01)	.01(.01)	.01(.01)	.01(.01)	.01(.01)	.01(.01)
Income	.00(.01)	.00(.01)	.00(.01)	-.01(.01)	.00(.01)	-.01(.01)	.00(.01)
News Use	.02(.01)	.02(.01)	.02(.01)	.02(.01)	.02(.01)	.02(.01)	.02(.01)
Div. Exp. (W1)	.46(.04)**	.46(.04)**	.46(.04)**	.45(.04)**	.46(.04)**	.46(.04)**	.46(.04)**
Exp. Freq.	-.01(.01)	-.01(.01)	-.01(.01)	-.01(.01)	-.01(.01)	-.01(.01)	-.01(.01)
Netw.Size	.00(.00)	.00(.00)	.00(.00)	.00(.00)	.00(.00)	.00(.00)	.00(.00)
Div. Val.	.01(.02)	-.06(.05)	.05(.05)	-.10(.04)**	.04(.04)	-.01(.05)+	.01(.02)
Political Interest	-.02(.02)	-.09(.05)+	-.02(.02)	-.02(.02)	-.02(.02)	-.02(.02)	-.02(.02)
Political Efficacy	.00(.01)	.00(.01)	.05(.06)	.00(.01)	.00(.01)	.00(.01)	.00(.01)
News Habits	-.02(.01)	-.02(.01)	-.02(.01)	-.16(.05)**	-.01(.01)	-.02(.01)	-.01(.01)
Busyness	.02(.01)+	.02(.01)+	.02(.01)+	.02(.01)	.06(.06)	.02(.01)	.02(.01)+
Div. Skills	.01(.02)	.01(.02)	.01(.02)	.01(.02)	.01(.02)	-.11(.06)+	.01(.02)
Source Know.	.02(.01)*	.02(.01)*	.02(.01)+	.02(.01)*	.02(.01)+	.02(.01)*	.01(.04)
D. Val. X Pol. Int.	-	.02(.01)	-	-	-	-	-
D. Val. X Pol. Effi.	-	-	-.01(.01)	-	-	-	-
D. Val. X N. Habits	-	-	-	.04(.01)**	-	-	-
D. Val. X Busyness	-	-	-	-	-.01(.01)	-	-
D. Val. X Div. Skills	-	-	-	-	-	.03(.01)*	-
D. Val. X Source Know.	-	-	-	-	-	-	.00(.01)
R-square	.267	.271	.268	.281	.268	.274	.268
N	555						

** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10

Table 6-4.

Social Media: Conditional Effects of Diversity Values on Diverse Exposure at Values of

Habitual News Use and Diversity-Seeking Skills

Habitual News Use	Point Estimate	95% C.I.
2.02 (-1SD)	-.03 (.02)	-.07 to .01
3.27 (Mean)	.02 (.02)	-.01 to .05
4.52 (+1SD)	.06 (.02)	.02 to .11
Diversity-seeking Skills	**Point Estimate**	**95% C.I.**
2.41 (-1SD)	-.01 (.02)	-.05 to .03
3.37 (Mean)	.02 (.02)	-.01 to .05
4.34 (+1SD)	.05 (.02)	.002 to .09

Finally, I tested H3 on ability, which predicted that as diversity seeking skills (H3a) or knowledge of news sources (H3b) increased, the relationship between diversity values and diverse exposure on social media would strengthen. The results suggested that the interaction effect of W1 diversity values and diversity-seeking skills was positive and significant for W2 diverse exposure on social media (β=.03, SE=.01, p<.05). Probing this relationship at three levels of diversity-seeking skills revealed that for individuals with low or medium levels of diversity-seeking skills, the interactive relationship between diversity values and diverse exposure was not significant (Table 6-4). For people with high levels of diversity-seeking skills, the interactive relationship between diversity values and diverse exposure was significant, point estimate = .05 (.02), 95% C.I. [.002 to .09]. That is, diversity values in W1 likely positively predict diverse exposure in W2 among people with medium or high levels of diversity-seeking skills (H3a supported). However, diversity values in W1 were not found to interact with knowledge of news sources (β=.00, SE=.01, p>.10, H3b rejected) in predicting W2 diverse exposure while W1 diverse exposure was controlled for.

I then turned to RQ1, which asked whether the hypothesized six interactive relationships would vary between the two types of diverse exposure on social media: (a) diverse exposure from sources that a user followed, and (b) diverse exposure from individuals in a user's social media network. To examine RQ1, I conducted OLS lagged dependent variable regressions, predicting diverse exposure respectively (a) from followed sources and (b) from individuals in social networks.

Predicting diverse exposure from followed sources. Before investigating RQ1, I first looked at the simple relationship between predictor variables and diverse exposure from followed sources (W2) without the interaction term (Table 6-5, first column). Diversity values (W1) appeared unrelated to diverse exposure from followed sources on social media in W2 (β=.01, SE=.02, p>.10). None of the six MOA items was statistically significantly related to W2 diverse exposure from followed sources on social media.

I then added the interaction terms between W1 diversity values and each of the six MOA items to the model. Three interaction terms between diversity values and each of the motivation, constraint on opportunity, and ability items were found positive and significant to a marginal degree. First, the interaction effect of W1 diversity values and political interest was found marginally significant for W2 diverse exposure from followed sources when W1 diverse exposure from followed sources was controlled for (β=.04, SE=.02, p<.10, Table 6-5, second column). Probing this relationship at three levels of political interest revealed that the relationship between diversity values and diverse exposure from followed sources was significant only for individuals with high levels of political interest, point estimate = .07 (.03), 95% C.I. [.01 to .14] (Table 6-6). That is, diversity values in W1 likely positively predicted

diverse exposure from followed sources in W2 among individuals who were highly politically interested.

Second, the interaction effect of W1 diversity values and habitual news use was found marginally significant for W2 diverse exposure from followed sources when W1 diverse exposure was controlled for (β=.03, SE=.02, p<.10, Table 6-5, fourth column). Probing this relationship at three levels of habitual news use revealed that the relationship between diversity values and diverse exposure from followed sources was significant only for individuals with high levels of habitual news use, point estimate = .07 (.04), 95% C.I. [.003 to .14]. That is, diversity values in W1 likely positively predicted diverse exposure from followed sources in W2 among individuals who got news highly habitually.

Third, the interaction effect of W1 diversity values and diversity-seeking skills was found marginally significant for W2 diverse exposure from followed sources when W1 diverse exposure was controlled for (β=.04, SE=.01, p<.10, Table 6-5, sixth column). Probing this relationship at three levels of diversity-seeking skills revealed that the interactive relationship between diversity values and diverse exposure from followed sources appeared marginally significant only for individuals with high levels of diversity-seeking skills, point estimate = .07 (.03), 95% C.I. [.01 to .14]. That is, diversity values in W1 likely positively predicted diverse exposure from followed sources in W2 among individuals who were skillful in diversity-seeking.

Table 6-5.

Social Media: Predicting Diverse Exposure from Followed Sources with Diversity Values and

MOA

	Coeff. (SE)	Coeff. (SE)	Coeff. (SE)	Coeff. (SE)	Coeff. (SE)	Coeff. (SE)	Coeff. (SE)
(Constant)	.19(.15)+	.76(.33)*	.35(.33)	.62(.28)*	-.14(.30)	.79(.35)*	.27(.18)
Sex	-.02(.02)	.02(.03)	.02(.04)	.02(.03)	.02(.03)	.02(.03)	.02(.04)
Age	.00(.00)	.00(.01)	.00(.01)	.00(.01)	.00(.01)	-.01(.01)	.00(.01)
Education	.01(.01)	.00(.00)	.00(.00)	.00(.00)	.00(.00)	.00(.00)	.00(.00)
Income	-.01(.01)	.01(.01)	.00(.01)	.01(.01)	.01(.01)	.01(.01)	.01(.01)
News Use	.02(.02)	.01(.02)	.02(.02)	.02(.02)	.02(.02)	.02(.02)	.02(.02)
Div. Exp. (W1)	.43(.05)**	.42(.05)**	.43(.05)**	.42(.05)**	.43(.05)**	.42(.05)**	.43(.05)**
Exp. Freq.	-.02(.02)	-.02(.02)	-.02(.02)	-.02(.02)	-.02(.02)	-.02(.02)	-.02(.02)
Netw.Size	.00(.00)	.00(.00)	.00(.00)	.00(.00)	.00(.00)	.00(.00)	.00(.00)
Div. Val.	.03(.02)	-.12(.08)	-.01(.08)	-.09(.07)	.10(.07)	-.12(.08)	.00(.03)
Political Interest	-.02(.03)	.17(.08)*	-.02(.03)	-.01(.03)	-.02(.03)	-.02(.03)	-.02(.03)
Political Efficacy	-.01(.02)	-.01(.02)	-.06(.09)	-.01(.02)	-.01(.02)	-.01(.02)	-.01(.02)
News Habits	-.02(.02)	-.02(.02)	-.02(.02)	.16(.08)+	-.02(.02)	-.02(.02)	-.02(.02)
Busyness	.03(.02)	.02(.02)	.03(.02)	.02(.02)	.14(.10)	.02(.02)	.03(.02)
Div. Skills	.03(.03)	.02(.03)	.03(.03)	.03(.03)	.03(.03)	-.15(.10)	.03(.03)
Source Know.	.00(.01)	.00(.01)	.00(.01)	.00(.01)	.00(.01)	.00(.01)	-.05(.06)
D. Val. X Pol. Int.	-	.04(.02)+	-	-	-	-	-
D. Val. X Pol. Effi.	-	-	.01(.02)	-	-	-	-
D. Val. X N. Habits	-	-	-	.03(.02)+	-	-	-
D. Val. X Busyness	-	-	-	-	-.03(.02)	-	-
D. Val. X Div. Skills	-	-	-	-	-	.04(.01)+	-
D. Val. X Source Know.	-	-	-	-	-	-	.01(.01)
R-square	.225	.234	.226	.232	.228	.233	.227
N	361						

** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10

Table 6-6.

Social Media: Conditional Effects of Diversity Values on Diverse Exposure from Followed

Sources at Values of Political Interest, Habitual News Use and Diversity-Seeking Skills

Political Interest	Point Estimate	95% C.I.
3.05 (-1SD)	.00 (.03)	-.05 to .05
4.00 (Mean)	.04 (.02)	-.01 to .08
4.95 (+1SD)	.07 (.03)	.01 to .14
Habitual News Use	**Point Estimate**	**95% C.I.**
2.43 (-1SD)	.00 (.03)	-.06 to .05
3.56 (Mean)	.03 (.02)	-.01 to .08
4.69 (+1SD)	.07 (.04)	.003 to .14
Diversity-seeking Skills	**Point Estimate**	**95% C.I.**
2.76 (-1SD)	.00 (-.03)	-.06 to .05
3.61 (Mean)	.04 (.02)	-.01 to .08
4.47 (+1SD)	.07 (.03)	.01 to .14

Predicting diverse exposure from individuals in social networks. Before investigating

RQ1, I first looked at the simple relationship between predictor variables and diverse exposure

from individuals in social media networks (W2) without the interaction term (Table 6-7, first

column). Diversity values (W1) appeared unrelated to diverse exposure from individuals in

social networks in W2 (β=.01, SE=.02, p>.10). Among six MOA items, only knowledge of news

sources (β=.02, SE=.01, p<.05) was positively related to W2 diverse exposure from individuals

in social networks.

Table 6-7.

Social Media: Predicting Diverse Exposure from Individuals in Social Networks with Diversity

Values and MOA

	Coeff. (SE)	Coeff. (SE)	Coeff. (SE)	Coeff. (SE)	Coeff. (SE)	Coeff. (SE)	Coeff. (SE)
(Constant)	.18(.10)+	.31(.21)	.01(.22)	.56(.17)**	.07(.19)	.45(.21)*	.17(.12)
Sex	-.02(.02)	-.02(.02)	-.01(.02)	-.02(.02)	-.02(.02)	-.02(.02)	-.02(.02)
Age	.00(.00)	-.01(.01)	-.01(.01)	-.01(.01)	-.01(.01)	-.01(.01)	-.01(.01)
Education	.01(.01)	.00(.00)	.00(.00)	.00(.00)	.00(.00)	.00(.00)	.00(.00)
Income	-.01(.01)	.01(.01)	.01(.01)	.01(.01)	.01(.01)	.01(.01)	.01(.01)
News Use	.02(.01)	.02(.01)	.02(.01)	.02(.01)	.02(.01)	.02(.01)	.02(.01)
Div. Exp. (W1)	.48(.04)**	.48(.04)**	.48(.04)**	.48(.04)**	.48(.04)**	.49(.04)**	.48(.04)**
Exp. Freq.	-.01(.01)	-.01(.01)	-.01(.01)	-.01(.01)	-.01(.01)	-.01(.01)	-.01(.01)
Netw.Size	.00(.00)	.00(.00)	.00(.00)	.00(.00)	.00(.00)	.00(.00)	.00(.00)
Div. Val.	.01(.02)	-.02(.05)	.06(.05)	-.08(.04)*	.04(.04)	-.05(.05)	.02(.02)
Political Interest	-.02(.02)	-.05(.05)	-.01(.02)	-.01(.02)	-.02(.02)	-.02(.02)	-.02(.02)
Political Efficacy	.00(.01)	.00(.01)	.05(.06)	.00(.01)	.00(.01)	.00(.01)	.00(.01)
News Habits	-.01(.01)	-.01(.01)	-.01(.01)	-.13(.05)**	-.01(.01)	-.01(.01)	-.01(.01)
Busyness	.02(.01)	.02(.01)	.02(.01)	.02(.01)	.06(.01)	.02(.01)	.02(.01)
Div. Skills	.01(.02)	.01(.02)	.00(.02)	.01(.02)	.01(.06)	-.08(.06)	.01(.02)
Source Know.	.02(.01)*	.02(.01)	.02(.01)*	.02(.01)*	.02(.02)*	.02(.01)**	.03(.04)
D. Val. X Pol. Int.	-	.01(.01)	-	-	-	-	-
D. Val. X Pol. Effi.	-	-	-.01(.01)	-	-	-	-
D. Val. X N. Habits	-	-	-	.03(.01)*	-	-	-
D. Val. X Busyness	-	-	-	-	-.01(.01)	-	-
D. Val. X Div. Skills	-	-	-	-	-	.02(.01)	-
D. Val. X Source Know.	-	-	-	-	-	-	.00(.00)
R-square	.294	.295	.295	.304	.295	.297	.294
N	535						

** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10

Table 6-8.

Social Media: Conditional Effects of Diversity Values on Diverse Exposure from Individuals in

Social Networks at Values of Habitual News Use

Habitual News Use	Point Estimate	95% C.I.
2.04 (-1SD)	-.02 (.02)	-.06 to .02
3.28 (Mean)	.02 (.02)	-.01 to .05
4.52 (+1SD)	.06 (.02)	.01 to .10

I then added the interaction terms between W1 diversity values and each of the six MOA

items to the model in order to examine RQ1. The results suggested that only one interaction term

between diversity values and habitual news use was positive and significant for W2 diverse

exposure from individuals in social networks (β=.03, SE=.01, p<.05, Table 6-7, fourth column).

Probing this relationship at three levels of habitual news use revealed that the relationship

between diversity values and diverse exposure from individuals in social networks was

significant only for people with high levels of habitual news use, point estimate = .06 (.02), 95%

C.I. [.01 to .10] (Table 6-8). That is, diversity values in W1 likely positively predicted diverse

exposure from individuals in social networks in W2 among people who got news highly

habitually.

Sub-Group Analyses by the Strength of Party Affiliation. I then turned to RQ5, which

asked whether the hypothesized six interactive relationships would vary by strength of party

affiliation. To examine this, two sets of OLS lagged dependent variable regressions, predicting

diverse exposure on overall media and social media, were run separately among three groups: (a)

non-partisans, (b) weak partisans, and (c) partisans.

Non-partisans. Among non-partisans, I first looked at the simple relationships between the predictor variables and diverse exposure in the context of overall media, without any interaction terms. Among non-partisans, diversity values in W1 had positive impacts on W2 diverse exposure (β=.17, SE=.07, p<.05). None of the six MOA items appeared significantly related to W2 diverse exposure. When added to the model, none of the interaction terms between diversity values and each of the six MOA items appeared significant for W2 diverse exposure.

I then looked at the simple relationships between the predictor variables and diverse exposure in the context of social media. Among non-partisans, diversity values in W1 was found to be unrelated to W2 diverse exposure on social media (β=-.01, SE=.01, p>.10). Among the six MOA items, habitual news use (β=-.07, SE=.04, p<.10) and knowledge of news sources (β=.06, SE=.02, p<.05) appeared significantly related to diverse exposure on social media. That is, non-partisans who were less likely to get news habitually, but who knew news source from diverse viewpoints ended up engaging in more diverse exposure on social media.

I then added interaction terms between diversity values and each of the six MOA items to the model. Two interaction terms between diversity values and constraints on opportunity items were found marginally significant among non-partisans. First, the interaction effect of W1 diversity values and habitual news use was found positive and marginally significant for W2 diverse exposure on social media (β=.01, SE=.01, p<.10). Probing this relationship at three levels of habitual news use revealed that the relationship between diversity values and diverse exposure on social media was marginally significant only for non-partisans with low levels of habitual news use, point estimate = -.13 (.06), 95% C.I. [-.24 to -.01] (Table 6-9). That is, diversity values in W1 likely negatively predicted diverse exposure on social media in W2 among non-partisans with low levels of habitual news use.

Second, the interaction effect of W1 diversity values and busyness was found negative and marginally significant for W2 diverse exposure when W1 diverse exposure was controlled for (β=-.09, SE=.04, p<.10). Probing this relationship at three levels of busyness revealed that the interactive relationship between diversity values and diverse exposure on social media appeared marginally significant only for non-partisans with high levels of perceived busyness, point estimate = -.15 (.06), 95% C.I. [-.27 to -.02] (Table 6-9). That is, diversity values in W1 likely negatively predicted diverse exposure on social media in W2 among non-partisans who were highly busy.

Table 6-9.

Non-Partisans: Conditional Effects of Diversity Values on Diverse Exposure (Social Media) at Values of Busyness and Habitual News Use

Busyness	Point Estimate	95% C.I.
1.86 (-1SD)	.01 (.05)	-.10 to .12
2.79 (Mean)	-.07 (.04)	-.15 to .01
3.72 (+1SD)	-.15 (.06)	-.27 to -.02
Habitual News Use	**Point Estimate**	**95% C.I.**
1.70 (-1SD)	-.12 (.06)	-.24 to -.01
2.96 (Mean)	-.05 (.04)	-.13 to .03
4.21 (+1SD)	.02 (.06)	-.10 to .15

Weak partisans. Among weak partisans, I first looked at the simple relationships between the predictor variables and diverse exposure in the context of overall media, without any interaction terms. Among weak partisans, diversity values in W1 did not have an impact on W2 diverse exposure in the context of overall media (β=.06, SE=.06, p>.10). Among the six MOA items, only diversity-seeking skills (β=.13, SE=.06, p<.05) were positively related to diverse exposure. When added to the model, none of the interaction terms between diversity values and

each of the six MOA items appeared significant for W2 diverse exposure when W1 diverse exposure was controlled for.

I then looked at the simple relationships between the predictor variables and diverse exposure in the context of social media. Among weak partisans, diversity values in W1 did not have an impact on W2 diverse exposure on social media (β=.04, SE=.07, p>.10). None of the six MOA items was statistically significantly related to diverse exposure on social media. When added to the model, none of the interaction terms between diversity values and each of the six MOA items appeared significant for W2 diverse exposure on social media.

Partisans. I began by looking at the simple relationships between the predictor variables and diverse exposure in the context of overall media, without any interaction terms. Among partisans, diversity values in W1 was found to be unrelated to W2 diverse exposure (β=.05, SE=.04, p>.10). Among the six MOA items, political interest (β=.10, SE=.04, p<.01), political efficacy (β=-.07, SE=.03, p<.01), and diversity-seeking skills (β=.11, SE=.04, p<.01) were found statistically significantly related to W2 diverse exposure. That is, partisans who were more politically interested, less politically efficacious and more skillful in finding diverse news, engaged in more diverse exposure at a later time.

I then added interaction terms between diversity values and each of the six MOA items to the model. Two interaction terms were found significant among partisans. First, the interaction effect of W1 diversity values and habitual news use was found positive and significant for W2 diverse exposure when W1 diverse exposure was controlled for (β=.06, SE=.03, p<.05). Probing this relationship at three levels of habitual news use revealed that the relationship between diversity values and diverse exposure was significant only for partisans with high levels of habitual news use, point estimate = .13 (.05), 95% C.I. [.02 to .24] (Table 6-10). That is,

diversity values in W1 likely positively predict diverse exposure in W2 among partisans with high levels of habitual news use.

Second, the interaction effect of W1 diversity values and diversity-seeking skills was found significant for W2 diverse exposure (β=.10, SE=.03, p<.01). Probing this relationship at three levels of diversity-seeking skills revealed that the interactive relationship between diversity values and diverse exposure appeared significant only for partisans with high levels of diversity-seeking skills, point estimate = .17 (.06), 95% C.I. [.06 to .28] (Table 6-10). That is, diversity values in W1 likely positively predicted diverse exposure in W2 among partisans who were highly skillful in diversity-seeking.

Table 6-10.

Partisans: Conditional Effects of Diversity Values on Diverse Exposure (Overall Media) at Values of Habitual News Use and Diversity-Seeking Skills

Habitual News Use	Point Estimate	95% C.I.
2.16 (-1SD)	-.02 (.05)	-.11 to .08
3.38 (Mean)	.06 (.04)	-.03 to .14
4.60 (+1SD)	.13 (.05)	.02 to .24
Diversity-seeking Skills	**Point Estimate**	**95% C.I.**
2.32 (-1SD)	-.03 (.05)	-.12 to .07
3.30 (Mean)	.07 (.04)	-.01 to .15
4.28 (+1SD)	.17 (.06)	.06 to .28

I then looked at the simple relationships between the predictor variables and diverse exposure in the context of social media. Among partisans, diversity values in W1 was found to be unrelated to W2 diverse exposure on social media (β=.02, SE=.02, p>.10). None of the six MOA items were significantly related to diverse exposure on social media.

Table 6-11.

Partisans: Conditional Effects of Diversity Values on Diverse Exposure (Social Media) at Values of Habitual News Use and Diversity-Seeking Skills

Habitual News Use	Point Estimate	95% C.I.
2.32 (-1SD)	-.04 (.03)	-.09 to .02
3.51 (Mean)	.03 (.02)	-.02 to .07
4.70 (+1SD)	.09 (.03)	.03 to .15
Diversity-seeking Skills	**Point Estimate**	**95% C.I.**
2.64 (-1SD)	-.02 (.03)	-.07 to .04
3.56 (Mean)	.02 (.02)	-.02 to .06
4.49 (+1SD)	.06 (.03)	-.003 to .12

I then added interaction terms between W1 diversity values and each of the six MOA items to the model, predicting W2 diverse exposure on social media. Among partisans, two interaction terms were found significant. First, the interaction effect of W1 diversity values and habitual news use was found positive and significant for W2 diverse exposure on social media among partisans (β=.05, SE=.02, p<.01). Probing this relationship at three levels of habitual news use revealed that the relationship between diversity values and diverse exposure on social media was significant only for partisans with high levels of habitual news use, point estimate = .09 (.03), 95% C.I. [.03 to .15] (Table 6-11). That is, diversity values in W1 likely positively predicted diverse exposure on social media in W2 among partisans who got news highly habitually.

Second, the interaction effect of W1 diversity values and diversity-seeking skills was found positive and marginally significant for W2 diverse exposure on social media (β=.04, SE=.02, p<.10). Probing this relationship at three levels of diversity-seeking skills revealed that the interactive relationship between diversity values and diverse exposure on social media appeared marginally significant only for 9.97% of partisans with extremely high diversity-

seeking skills (higher than 4.92), point estimate = .07 (.04), 95% C.I. [.00 to .15]. That is,

diversity values in W1 likely positively predicted diverse exposure on social media in W2 among

partisans who were most skillful in diversity-seeking.

Explaining the Mixed Effects of Diverse Exposure on Citizenship

  Predicting Three Motivations for Cross-Cutting Exposure. Before turning to a set of

hypotheses and research questions to explain mixed effects of diverse exposure on citizenship

indicators with motivations for cross-cutting exposure, I first examined RQ2. Research question

2 investigated whether three motivations for cross-cutting exposure—(a) defensive dismissal, (b)

defensive deliberation, and (c) balanced deliberation—are uniquely predicted by a set of factors.

To examine RQ2, I conducted OLS regression analyses, predicting each motivation with a range

of factors related to demographics, politics and news media. Demographic factors included sex,

age (in years), education, income and race while political factors considered political ideology,

strength of party affiliation, political interest and political efficacy. Also, news use and diversity

values were included in the analyses.

  First, I analyzed what factors predicted *defensive dismissal motivations*. Individuals with

high defensive dismissal motivations expose themselves to news from viewpoints that opposed

their own political views just to dismiss them. These individuals engage in cross-cutting

exposure to confirm that opposing viewpoints do not matter to them. The regression results

demonstrated that defensive dismissal motivations were greater among individuals who were less

educated (b=-.06, t=-2.01, p<.05, Table 6-12). Other demographic factors such as age, income

and race appeared not to be related to defensive dismissal motivations to a statistically significant

degree. In terms of political factors, although political ideology was found not to be related to

defensive dismissal motivations, the strength of party affiliation was (b=.14, t=5.24, p<.01). Regardless of which political ideology individuals identify with, stronger partisans were likely to engage in cross-cutting exposure just to dismiss viewpoints that oppose their own. That is, less educated partisans were likely to consume news from opposing viewpoints to dismiss them while defending their political views.

Also, individuals who were more politically interested (b=.20, t=6.33, p<.01), yet were less politically efficacious (b=-.22, t=-8.31, p<.01) demonstrated greater defensive dismissal motivations. In terms of news media use, individuals who more heavily used news media demonstrated greater defensive dismissal motivations (b=.13, t=.13, p<.01), and they thought seeking news from diverse viewpoints and sources was important to only a marginal degree (b=.05, t=1.72, p<.10).

Second, I analyzed what factors predicted *defensive deliberation motivations*. Individuals with high defensive deliberation motivations engage in cross-cutting exposure in order to strengthen their political views. These individuals consume news from viewpoints that oppose their own to find weaknesses in the opposing views as well as to defend their views against any challenges. The regression results suggested that defensive deliberation motivations were greater among younger individuals (b=-.04, t=-2.11, p<.05, Table 6-12). Other demographic factors such as sex, education, income and race appeared not to be related to defensive deliberation motivations. In terms of political factors, political ideology (b=.04, t=1.65, p<.10) to a marginal degree and the strength of party affiliation was positively related to defensive deliberation motivations (b=.12, t=4.77. p<.01). Stronger partisans were more likely to engage in cross-cutting exposure to counter-argue the arguments of opposing views while strengthening their own view; more so if they identified with a conservative ideology. Also, individuals who were

more politically interested (b=.32, t=10.68, p<.01), yet less politically efficacious (b=-.13, t=-5.23, p<.01) demonstrated greater defensive deliberation motivations. News media use-wise, individuals who more heavily used news media demonstrated greater defensive deliberation motivations (b=.09, t=3.24, p<.05), and they valued seeking news from diverse viewpoints and sources to a greater degree (b=.22, t=8.21, p<.01).

Lastly, I analyzed what factors predicted *balanced deliberation motivations*. Individuals with high balanced deliberation motivations expose themselves to news from viewpoints that oppose their own to form an informed position. These individuals are willing to learn the strengths of the opposing viewpoints and to accept the weaknesses of their own political views. The regression results demonstrated that balanced deliberation motivations were greater among younger individuals (b=-.08, t=-3.31, p<.1) and who had higher income (b=.05, t=2.01, p<.1, Table 6-12). Other demographic factors including sex, education and race appeared not to be related. In terms of political factors, although political ideology was found not to be related to balanced deliberation motivations, the strength of party affiliation was in a negative direction (b=-.08, t=-3.65, p<.01). That is, younger individuals with weaker party affiliation were likely to consume news from opposing viewpoints to learn from them, with the intention to change their political views if necessary.

Also, individuals who were more politically interested (b=.23, t=8.51, p<.01), yet less politically efficacious (b=-.12, t=-5.18, p<.01) demonstrated greater balanced deliberation motivations. In terms of news media use, individuals who valued seeking news from diverse viewpoints and sources to a greater degree demonstrated greater balanced deliberation motivations (b=.49, t=20.26, p<.01). However, news media use was found to be unrelated to balanced deliberation motivations.

Table 6-12.

Predicting Three Motivations for Cross-Cutting Exposure with Demographic, Political and

News Media Variables

	Defensive Dismissal		Defensive Deliberation		Balanced Deliberation	
	b	t	b	t	b	t
(Constant)		7.74		5.75		5.38
Sex	-.04	-1.38	-.04	-1.35	.02	.96
Age	.02	.67	-.06*	-2.11	-.08**	-3.31
Education	-.06*	-2.01	.00	-.03	.04	1.42
Income	.02	.56	.01	.21	.05*	2.01
White	-.05	-1.00	-.03	-.67	-.04	-.85
Black	.03	.77	.03	.71	-.01	-.15
Hispanic	.02	.61	.01	.43	-.01	-.40
Other Races	.00	.03	-.03	-1.01	-.03	-1.02
Political Ideology	.02	.67	.04+	1.65	.01	.47
Strength of Party Affiliation	.14**	5.24	.12**	4.77	-.08**	-3.65
Political Interest	.20**	6.33	.32**	10.68	.23**	8.51
Political Efficacy	-.22**	-8.31	-.13**	-5.23	-.12**	-5.18
News Use (W1)	.13**	4.53	.09**	3.24	.03	1.34
Diversity Values (W1)	.05+	1.72	.22**	8.21	.49**	20.26
Total R²	.176		.283		.402	
N	1,348		1,280		1,280	

** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.1

All in all, the results suggested that three motivations for cross-cutting exposure were uniquely predicted by a range of factors that were related to demographics, politics and news media (RQ2).

Predicting Political Knowledge. I then turned to H4a, RQ3, and H6a which respectively predicted political knowledge with three motivations for cross-cutting exposure along with diverse exposure in the context of overall media. I began the analysis by testing H4a, which predicted that for individuals with higher *defensive dismissal* motivations, the relationship between W1 diverse exposure and W2 political knowledge will be more strongly negative. For this, I regressed W2 politically knowledge on W1 diverse exposure and all three motivations while sex, age, education, income, political interest, news media use, diverse news values along with W1 political knowledge were controlled for. Although not hypothesized, I first investigated the simple relationship between predictor variables and W2 political knowledge (Table 6-13, first column). Diverse exposure was found to be unrelated to political knowledge (β=-.15, SE=.10 p>.1). Defensive dismissal motivations appeared negatively related to political knowledge (β=-.04, p<.05) while defensive deliberation motivations and balanced deliberation motivations were found not to be related to political knowledge.

Table 6-13.

Predicting Political Knowledge with Diverse Exposure and Motivations for Cross-Cutting

Exposure

	W2 Political Knowledge Coeff. (SE)	W2 Political Knowledge Coeff. (SE)	W2 Political Knowledge Coeff. (SE)	W2 Political Knowledge Coeff. (SE)
(constant)	1.06 (.35)**	-.84 (.62)	-1.61 (.67)*	-2.01 (.70)**
Sex	-.33 (.10)**	-.22 (.10)**	-.33 (.10)**	-.32 (.10)**
Age	.01 (.003)**	.01 (.00)**	.01 (.00)**	.01 (.00)**
Education	.08 (.03)*	.08 (.03)*	.08 (.03)*	.09 (.03)**
Income	.04 (.02)+	.04 (.02)+	.04 (.02)	.04 (.02)
Political Interest	.23 (.05)**	.23 (.05)**	.02 (.05)**	.23(.05)**
News Use	.05 (.05)	.06 (.05)	.07 (.05)	.06 (.05)
Diverse News Value	.08 (.08)	.08 (.08)	.07 (.08)	.05 (.08)
Political Know. (W1)	.53 (.03)**	.52 (.03)**	.52 (.03)**	.52 (.03)**
Diverse Exposure (W1)	-.15 (.10)	.40 (.18)*	.67 (.20)*	.82 (.22)**
Defensive Dismissal	-.04 (.01)*	.02 (.05)**	-.03 (.01)+	-.03 (.01)*
Defensive Deliberation	.03 (.02)	.02 (.02)+	.21 (.04)**	.02 (.02)
Balanced Deliberation	-.02 (.02)	-.02 (.02)	-.03 (.02)+	.18 (.05)**
Div. Exp. x Def. Dis.	--	-.04 (.01)**	--	--
Div. Exp. x Def. Del.	--	--	-.05 (.01)**	--
Div. Exp. x Bal. Del.	--	--	--	-.06 (.01)**
Total R^2	.42	.43	.44	.44
N	892	892	892	892

** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.1

Table 6-14.

Conditional Effects of Diverse Exposure on Political Knowledge at Values of Three Motivations

for Cross-Cutting Exposure

Defensive Dismissal	Point Estimate	95% C.I.
7.84 (-1SD)	.07 (.11)	-.15 to .28
12.80 (Mean)	-.15 (.10)	-.33 to .04
17.76 (+1SD)	-.36 (.11)	-.57 to -.15
Defensive Deliberation	**Point Estimate**	**95% C.I.**
10.53 (-1SD)	.10 (.11)	-.11 to .31
15.25 (Mean)	-.15 (.09)	-.34 to .03
19.97 (+1SD)	-.41 (.11)	-.62 to -.20
Balanced Deliberation	**Point Estimate**	**95% C.I.**
12.07 (-1SD)	.11 (.11)	-.10 to .32
16.51 (Mean)	-.16 (.09)	-.34 to .03
20.96 (+1SD)	-.42 (.11)	-.63 to -.21

To examine H4a, I then added the interaction term between diverse exposure and defensive dismissal motivations to the model, which was found negative and statistically significant (β=-.04, SE=.01, p<.01, Table 6-13, second column). To better understand the nature of this interaction, the Johnson-Neyman technique was used (Hayes, 2013) to probe this relationship at three levels of defensive dismissal motivations (Table 6-14). For individuals with weak or moderate defensive dismissal motivations, the interactive relationship between diverse exposure and political knowledge appeared non-significant, as the 95% confidence intervals for the point estimate included zero. For individuals with high levels of defensive dismissal motivations, however, the relationship between diverse exposure and political knowledge was significant, point estimate = .36 (.11), 95% C.I. [-.57 to -.15]. That is, diverse exposure was likely negatively related to political knowledge among people with high levels of defensive dismissal motivations. As a result, I found support for H4a.

I then turned to RQ3, which asked whether the relationship between diverse exposure and political knowledge would be more strongly negative, as *defensive deliberation* motivations increased. When the interaction term between diverse exposure and defensive deliberation motivations was added, it appeared negative and statistically significant (β=-.05, SE=.01, p<.01, Table 6-13, third column). Probing this relationship at three levels of defensive deliberation motivations revealed that only for individuals with high levels of defensive deliberation motivations, the relationship between diverse exposure and political knowledge was significant, point estimate = .41 (.11), 95% C.I. [-.62 to -.20] (Table 6-14). That is, diverse exposure likely is negatively related to political knowledge among people with strong defensive deliberation motivations (RQ3). Additionally, the relationship was significant among a small group of individuals, 6.73% of respondents, with defensive deliberation motivations lower than 7.82, point estimate = .25 (.13), 95% C.I. [.00 to .50]. Diverse exposure likely is positively related to political knowledge among people with extremely low levels of defensive deliberation motivations.

Finally, I investigated H6a, which predicted that the relationship between diverse exposure and political knowledge would be more strongly positive, as *balanced deliberation* motivations increased. I added the interaction term between diverse exposure and balanced deliberation motivations, and found that the interaction term appeared negative and statistically significant (β=-.06, SE=.01, p<.01, Table 6-13, fourth column). Probing this relationship at three levels of balanced deliberation motivations, however, revealed that only for individuals with strong balanced deliberation motivations, the relationship between diverse exposure and political knowledge was significant, point estimate = -.42 (.11), 95% C.I. [-.63 to -.21] (Table 6-14). That is, diverse exposure likely is negatively related to political knowledge among people with high

levels of balanced deliberation motivations (H6a rejected). Additionally, the relationship was significant among a small group of individuals, 6.73% of respondents, with balanced deliberation motivations lower than 9.85, point estimate = .24 (.12), 95% C.I. [.00 to .48]. Diverse exposure likely is positively related to political knowledge among people with extremely low levels of balanced deliberation motivations.

Predicting Political Participation. Next, I examined H4c, H5b, and H6c, which respectively predicted political participation with three motivations for cross-cutting exposure along with diverse exposure in the context of overall media. I began the analysis by testing H4b, which predicted that for individuals with higher *defensive dismissal* motivations, the relationship between diverse exposure and political participation will be more strongly positive. For this, I regressed W2 political participation on diverse exposure and three motivations for cross-cutting exposure while sex, age, education, income, political interest, news media use, diverse news values along with W1 political participation were controlled for. Although not hypothesized, I first looked at the simple relationships between predictor variables and W2 political participation, without any interaction terms (Table 6-15, first column). The results suggested that diverse exposure was positively related to political participation (β=.01, SE=.03 p<.05). Defensive dismissal motivations appeared positively related to political participation (β=.02, SE=.01, p<.01) while defensive deliberation and balanced deliberation motivations were found to be unrelated.

Table 6-15.

Predicting Political Participation with Diverse Exposure and Motivations for Cross-Cutting

Exposure

	W2 Political Participation Coeff. (SE)	W2 Political Participation Coeff. (SE)	W2 Political Participation Coeff. (SE)	W2 Political Participation Coeff. (SE)
(constant)	-.07 (.12)	.51 (.21)*	.41 (.23)+	.57 (.24)*
Sex	.01 (.01)	.00 (.03)	.00 (.03)	.00 (.03)
Age	.00 (.00)*	.00 (.00)+	.00 (.00)*	.00 (.00)*
Education	.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)
Income	.00 (.01)	.03 (.02)	.00 (.01)	.00 (.01)
Political Interest	.00 (.02)	.00 (.02)	.00 (.02)	.00 (.02)
News Use	.03 (.02)	.03 (.02)	.03 (.02)	.03 (.02)
Diverse News Value	-.03 (.03)	-.04 (.03)	-.03 (.03)	-.03 (.03)
Political Part. (W1)	.78 (.02)**	.76 (.02)**	.77 (.02)**	.77 (.02)**
Diverse Exposure (W1)	.01 (.03)*	-.09 (.06)	-.07 (.07)	-.12 (.07)+
Defensive Dismissal	.02 (.01)**	-.03 (.02)*	.01 (.00)**	.01 (.00)**
Defensive Deliberation	-.01 (.01)	.00 (.01)	-.04 (.02)*	.01 (.00)
Balanced Deliberation	.00 (.01)	.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)	-.04 (.02)*
Div. Exp. X Def. Dis.	--	.01 (.00)**	--	--
Div. Exp. x Def. Del.	--	--	.01 (.00)*	--
Div. Exp. x Bal. Del.	--	--	--	.001 (.00)**
Total R^2	.69	.69	.69	.69
N	892	892	892	892

** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.1

Table 6-16.

Conditional Effects of Diverse Exposure on Political Participation at Values of Three

Motivations for Cross-Cutting Exposure

Defensive Dismissal	Point Estimate	95% C.I.
7.84 (-1SD)	.01 (.04)	-.06 to .08
12.80 (Mean)	.08 (.03)	.01 to .14
17.76 (+1SD)	.14 (.04)	.07 to .22
Defensive Deliberation	**Point Estimate**	**95% C.I.**
10.53 (-1SD)	.03 (.04)	-.04 to .10
15.25 (Mean)	.08 (.03)	.02 to .14
19.97 (+1SD)	.12 (.04)	.05 to .20
Balanced Deliberation	**Point Estimate**	**95% C.I.**
12.10 (-1SD)	.02 (.04)	-.05 to .09
16.51 (Mean)	.08 (.03)	.02 to .14
20.96 (+1SD)	.13 (.04)	.06 to .21

To test H4c, I then added the interaction term between diverse exposure and defensive

dismissal motivations, which was found positive and statistically significant (β=.01, SE=.00

p<.01, Table 6-15, second column). Probing this relationship at three levels of defensive

dismissal motivations using the Johnson-Neyman technique demonstrated that the relationship

between diverse exposure and political participation was significant for individuals with medium

and high levels of defensive dismissal motivations (Table 6-16). While for individuals with low

levels of defensive dismissal motivations, the relationship between diverse exposure and political

participation was not significant, the relationship was positive among those with moderate (point

estimate = .08 (.03), 95% C.I. [.01 to .14]) or strong defensive dismissal motivations, point

estimate = .14 (.04), 95% C.I. [.07 to .22]. That is, diverse exposure likely is positively related to

political participation among people with medium or high levels of defensive dismissal

motivations, not among those with low levels of defensive dismissal motivations. Thus, I found support for H4c.

Next, I examined H5b, which predicted that the relationship between diverse exposure and political participation would strengthen, as *defensive deliberation* motivations increased. For this, I added the interaction term between diverse exposure and defensive deliberation motivations to the model, which appeared positive and statistically significant (β=.01, SE=.00, p<.05, Table 6-15, third column). Probing this relationship at three levels of defensive deliberation motivations revealed that for individuals with low levels of defensive deliberation motivations, the interactive relationship between diverse exposure and political participation appeared non-significant (Table 6-16). However, the relationship between diverse exposure and political participation was significant for individuals with medium (point estimate = .08 (.03), 95% C.I. [.02 to .14]) or high levels of defensive deliberation motivations (point estimate = .12 (.04), 95% C.I. [.05 to .20]). That is, diverse exposure was likely positively related to political participation among people with medium or high levels of defensive deliberation motivations, not among those with low levels of defensive deliberation motivations (H5b supported).

Finally, I investigated H6c, which predicted that the relationship between diverse exposure and political participation would be more strongly negative, as *balanced deliberation* motivations increased. For this, I added the interaction term between diverse exposure and balanced deliberation motivations to the model. The interaction term appeared positive and statistically significant (β=.001, SE=.00, p<.01, Table 6-15, fourth column). Probing this relationship at three levels of balanced deliberation motivations demonstrated that the interactive relationship between diverse exposure and political participation appeared non-significant for individuals with low levels of balanced deliberation motivations (Table 6-16). The relationship

between diverse exposure and political participation was significant among individuals with medium (point estimate = .08 (.03), 95% C.I. [.02 to .14]) or high levels balanced deliberation motivations (point estimate = .13 (.04), 95% C.I. [.06 to .21]). That is, diverse exposure was likely positively related to political participation among people with medium or high levels of balanced deliberation motivations, not among those with low levels balanced deliberation motivations (H6c rejected).

Predicting Cross-Cutting Discussion. Next, I examined H4b, H5a, and H6b, which respectively predicted cross-cutting discussion with three motivations for cross-cutting exposure along with diverse exposure in the context of overall media. I began the analysis by testing H4b, which predicted that for individuals with higher *defensive dismissal* motivations, the relationship between diverse exposure and cross-cutting discussion will be more strongly negative. For this, I regressed W2 cross-cutting discussion on diverse exposure and three motivations while sex, age, education, income, political interest, news media use, diverse news values along with W1 cross-cutting discussion were controlled for. Although not hypothesized, I first looked at the simple relationships between predictor variables and W2 cross-cutting discussion, without any interaction terms (Table 6-17, first column). The results demonstrated that diverse exposure appeared not statistically significantly related to cross-cutting discussion (β=.08, SE=.07 p>.10). None of the three motivations were found to be related to cross-cutting discussion.

Table 6-17.

Predicting Cross-cutting Discussion with Diverse Exposure and Motivations for Cross-Cutting

Exposure

	Cross-cutting Discussion (W2) Coeff. (SE)	Cross-cutting Discussion (W2) Coeff. (SE)	Cross-cutting Discussion (W2) Coeff. (SE)	Cross-cutting Discussion (W2) Coeff. (SE)
(constant)	-.11 (.27)	.22 (..47)	.60 (.52)	1.23 (.54)*
Sex	.00 (.08)	.00 (.08)	.00 (.08)	.00 (.08)
Age	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)
Education	-.02 (.03)	-.02 (.03)	-.02 (.03)	-.02 (.03)
Income	.02 (.02)	.02 (.02)	.02 (.02)	.03 (.02)
Political Interest	.09 (.04)*	.09 (.04)*	.09 (.04)*	.09 (.04)*
News Use	.12 (.04)**	.12 (.04)**	.11 (.04)**	.11 (.04)**
Diverse News Value	-.04 (.06)	-.04 (.06)	-.04 (.06)	-.02 (.06)
Cross-cutting Discussion (W1)	.55 (.03)**	.55 (.03)**	.55 (.03)**	.55 (.03)**
Diverse Exposure (W1)	.08 (.07)	-.02 (.14)	-.14 (.15)	-.34 (.17)*
Defensive Dismissal	.00 (.01)	-.02 (.04)	.00 (.01)	-.01 (.01)
Defensive Deliberation	-.01 (.01)	-.01 (.01)	-.06 (.03)+	-.01 (.01)
Balanced Deliberation	.02 (.01)	.02 (.01)	.02 (.01)	-.07 (.03)*
Div. Exp. x Def. Dis.	--	.01 (.01)	--	--
Div. Exp. x Def. Del.	--	--	-.01 (.01)	--
Div. Exp. x Bal. Del.	--	--	--	.03 (.01)**
Total R^2	.465	.466	.467	.470
N	892	892	892	892

** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.1

Table 6-18.

Conditional Effects of Diverse Exposure on Cross-Cutting Discussion at Values of Balanced

Deliberation Motivations

Balanced Deliberation	Point Estimate	95% C.I.
12.07 (-1SD)	-.03 (.08)	-.20 to .13
16.51 (Mean)	.08 (.07)	-.06 to .22
20.96 (+1SD)	.19 (.08)	.03 to .36

To test H4b, I then added the interaction term between diverse exposure and defensive dismissal motivations, which did not appear statistically significant (β=.01, SE=.01 p>.10, Table 6-17, second column). As a result, I found no support for H4b. Next, I examined H5a, which predicted that the relationship between diverse exposure and cross-cutting discussion would be strongly negative, as *defensive deliberation* motivations increased. For this, I added the interaction term between diverse exposure and defensive deliberation motivations to the model. The interaction term, however, did not appear statistically significant (β=-.01, SE=.01, p>.10, Table 6-17, third column). Thus, I found no support for H5a.

Finally, I tested H6b, which predicted that the relationship between diverse exposure and cross-cutting discussion would be strongly positive, as *balanced deliberation* motivations increased. For this, I added the interaction term between diverse exposure and balanced deliberation motivations to the model. The interaction term appeared positive and statistically significant (β=.03, SE=.01, p<.01, Table 6-17, fourth column). Probing this relationship at three levels of balanced deliberation motivations demonstrated that the interactive relationship between diverse exposure and cross-cutting discussion appeared non-significant for individuals with low or medium levels of balanced deliberation motivations (Table 6-18). The relationship between diverse exposure and cross-cutting discussion was significant among individuals with

high levels of balanced deliberation motivations (point estimate = .19 (.08), 95% C.I. [.03 to .36]). That is, diverse exposure was likely positively related to cross-cutting discussion among people with high levels of balanced deliberation motivations, not among those with low or medium levels of balanced deliberation motivations. This provides evidence in support of H6b.

Sub-Group Analyses by the Strength of Partisanship. Next, I examined RQ5, which asked whether the abovementioned hypothesized interactive relationships (i.e., H4a through H6c along with RQ3) would vary by strength of party affiliation. To examine this, three sets of OLS lagged dependent variable regressions, predicting political knowledge, political participation, and cross-cutting discussion, were run separately among three groups: (a) non-partisans, (b) weak partisans, and (c) partisans.

Non-partisans. Among non-partisans, I first looked at the simple relationships between the predictor variables and *political knowledge*, without any interaction terms. Among non-partisans, diverse exposure was found to be unrelated to political knowledge (β=.08, SE=.21, p>.10). None of the three motivations appeared related to political knowledge. When added to the model, none of the interaction terms between diverse exposure and the three motivations was found statistically significant.

I then looked at the simple relationships between the predictor variables and *political participation,* without any interaction terms. Among non-partisans, diverse exposure was found to be unrelated to political participation (β=.02, SE=.05, p>.10). None of the three motivations appeared related to political participation. When added to the model, none of the interaction term between diverse exposure and the three motivations was found statistically significant.

Finally, I looked at the simple relationships between the predictors and *cross-cutting discussion,* without any interaction terms. Among non-partisans, diverse exposure was found to be unrelated to *cross-cutting discussion* (β=.04, SE=16, p>.10). None of the three motivations appeared related to cross-cutting discussion. When added to the model, none of the interaction terms between diverse exposure and the three motivations was found statistically significant.

Weak partisans. Among weak partisans, I first looked at the simple relationships between the predictor variables and *political knowledge*, without any interaction terms. Among weak partisans, diverse exposure was found to be unrelated to political knowledge (β=.04, SE=.15, p>.10). Among the three motivations, only defensive deliberation motivations were negatively related to political knowledge to a marginal degree (β=-.06, SE=.03, p<.10).

Table 6-19.

Weak Partisans: Conditional Effects of Diverse Exposure on Political Knowledge at Values of Defensive Deliberation Motivations

Defensive Deliberation	Point Estimate	95% C.I.
10.26 (-1SD)	.07 (.25)	-.42 to .55
14.61 (Mean)	-.14 (.19)	-.51 to .23
18.97 (+1SD)	-.34 (.20)	-.73 to .04

I then added the interaction terms between diverse exposure and each of the three motivations to the model. Only one interaction term, between diverse exposure and defensive deliberation motivations, was found negative and statistically significant to a marginal degree (β=-.05, SE=.03, p<.10). Probing this relationship at levels of defensive deliberation motivations revealed that only for a small group of individuals, 9.18% of respondents, with defensive

deliberation motivations higher than 20.83, point estimate = -.44 (.22), 95% C.I. [-.86 to .00] (Table 6-19). Diverse exposure was likely negatively associated with political knowledge among people with extremely high levels of defensive deliberation motivations.

Next, I looked at the simple relationships between the predictor variables and *political participation*, without interaction terms. Among weak partisans, diverse exposure was found to be unrelated to political participation (β=-.01, SE=.04, p>.10). None of the three motivations appeared related to political participation. When added to the model, none of the interaction terms between diverse exposure and the three motivations was found statistically significant.

Finally, I looked at the simple relationships between the predictor variables and *cross-cutting discussion*, without interaction terms. Among weak partisans, diverse exposure was found to be unrelated to *cross-cutting discussion* (β=.12, SE=12, p>.10). None of the three motivations appeared related to cross-cutting discussion. When added to the model, none of the interaction term between diverse exposure and the three motivations was found statistically significant.

Partisans. Among partisans, I first looked at the simple relationships between the predictor variables and *political knowledge*, without any interaction terms. Among partisans, diverse exposure was found to be unrelated to political knowledge (β=-.20, SE=.13, p>.10). Among three motivations for cross-cutting exposure, defensive dismissal motivations (β=-.06, SE=.02, p<.01) and balanced deliberation motivations (β=-.07, SE=.02, p<.01) were negatively related to political knowledge whereas defensive deliberation motivations were positively related to a marginal degree (β=.05, SE=.03, p<.10). Notably, W1 diversity values were also positively related to political knowledge to a marginal degree (β=.21, SE=.12, p<.10).

I then added the interaction terms between diverse exposure and each of the three motivations to the model. All three interaction terms were found statistically significant. First, the interaction term between diverse exposure and defensive dismissal motivations was found negative and statistically significant (β=-.05, SE=.02, p<.01, Table 6-20). Probing this relationship at three levels of defensive dismissal motivations revealed that only for individuals with high levels of defensive dismissal motivations, the relationship between diverse exposure and political knowledge was significant, point estimate = -.46 (.17), 95% C.I. [-.80 to -.12]. That is, diverse exposure was likely negatively related to political knowledge among people with high levels of defensive dismissal motivations (RQ3).

Second, the interaction term between diverse exposure and defensive deliberation motivations was found negative and statistically significant (β=-.05, SE=.02, p<.01, Table 6-20). Probing this relationship at three levels of defensive deliberation motivations revealed that only for individuals with strong defensive deliberation motivations, the relationship between diverse exposure and political knowledge was significant, point estimate = -.59 (.17), 95% C.I. [-.92 to -.26]. That is, diverse exposure was likely negatively associated with political knowledge among people with high levels of defensive deliberation motivations. Additionally, the relationship was significant among a small group of individuals, 4.20% of respondents, with defensive deliberation motivations lower than 7.73, point estimate = .38 (.19), 95% C.I. [.00 to .76]. Diverse exposure likely is positively related to political knowledge among people with extremely low levels of defensive deliberation motivations.

Third, the interaction term between diverse exposure and balanced deliberation motivations was found negative and statistically significant (β=-.08, SE=.02, p<.01, Table 6-20). Probing this relationship at three levels of balanced deliberation motivations revealed that for

individuals with medium (point estimate = -.29 (.14), 95% C.I. [-.57 to -.01]) and high levels of

balanced deliberation motivations (point estimate = -.65 (.17), 95% C.I. [-.98 to -.32]), the

relationship between diverse exposure and political knowledge was significant. That is, diverse

exposure was likely negatively associated with political knowledge among people with medium

or high levels of balanced deliberation motivations. Additionally, the relationship was significant

among a small group of individuals, 3.98% of respondents, with balanced deliberation

motivations lower than 8.89, point estimate = .35 (.18), 95% C.I. [.00 to .70]. Diverse exposure

was likely positively related to political knowledge among people with extremely low levels of

balanced deliberation motivations.

Table 6-20.

Partisans: Conditional Effects of Diverse Exposure on Political Knowledge at Values of Three

Motivations for Cross-Cutting Exposure

Defensive Dismissal	Point Estimate	95% C.I.
8.67 (-1SD)	.01 (.16)	-.31 to .32
13.78 (Mean)	-.23 (.14)	-.51 to .05
18.90 (+1SD)	-.46 (.17)	-.80 to -.12
Defensive Deliberation	**Point Estimate**	**95% C.I.**
11.81 (-1SD)	.08 (.15)	-.23 to .38
16.32 (Mean)	-.26 (.14)	-.54 to .02
20.83 (+1SD)	-.59 (.17)	-.92 to -.26
Balanced Deliberation	**Point Estimate**	**95% C.I.**
11.81 (-1SD)	.08 (.15)	-.23 to .37
16.32 (Mean)	-.26 (.14)	-.57 to -.01
20.83 (+1SD)	-.59 (.17)	-.98 to -.32

Next, I looked at the simple relationships between the predictor variables and *political*

participation, without interaction terms. Among partisans, diverse exposure was found to be

positively related to political participation (β=.12, SE=.06, p<.05). Among the three motivations,

only defensive dismissal motivations (β=.02, SE=.01, p<.01) were positively related to political participation.

I then added the interaction terms between diverse exposure and each of the three motivations to the model. All three interaction terms were found statistically significant. First, the interaction term between diverse exposure and defensive dismissal motivations was found positive and statistically significant (β=.03, SE=.01, p<.01, Table 6-21). Probing this relationship at three levels of defensive dismissal motivations revealed that only for individuals with medium (point estimate = .15 (.06), 95% C.I. [.04 to .26]) and high levels of defensive dismissal motivations (point estimate = .30 (.07), 95% C.I. [.16 to .43]), the relationship between diverse exposure and political participation was significant. That is, diverse exposure was likely positively related to political participation among people with medium or high levels of defensive dismissal motivations.

Table 6-21.

Partisans: Conditional Effects of Diverse Exposure on Political Participation at Values of Three Motivations for Cross-Cutting Exposure

Defensive Dismissal	Point Estimate	95% C.I.
8.67 (-1SD)	.00 (.06)	-.13 to .12
13.78 (Mean)	.15 (.06)	.04 to .26
18.90 (+1SD)	.29 (.07)	.16 to .43
Defensive Deliberation	**Point Estimate**	**95% C.I.**
11.81 (-1SD)	.00 (.06)	-.13 to .12
16.32 (Mean)	.15 (.06)	.04 to .25
20.83 (+1SD)	.29 (.07)	.16 to .43
Balanced Deliberation	**Point Estimate**	**95% C.I.**
11.81 (-1SD)	.05 (.06)	-.07 to .17
16.32 (Mean)	.15 (.06)	.04 to .26
20.83 (+1SD)	.25 (.07)	.12 to .38

Table 6-22.

Partisans: Conditional Effects of Diverse Exposure on Cross-Cutting Discussion at Values of

Three Motivations for Cross-Cutting Exposure

Defensive Dismissal	Point Estimate	95% C.I.
8.67 (-1SD)	-.07 (.12)	-.30 to .17
13.78 (Mean)	.10 (.11)	-.11 to .32
18.90 (+1SD)	.27 (.13)	.01 to .53
Defensive Deliberation	**Point Estimate**	**95% C.I.**
11.81 (-1SD)	-.06 (.12)	-.30 to .17
16.32 (Mean)	.11 (.11)	-.10 to .33
20.83 (+1SD)	.28 (.13)	.03 to .54
Balanced Deliberation	**Point Estimate**	**95% C.I.**
11.81 (-1SD)	-.03 (.12)	-.26 to .20
16.32 (Mean)	.12 (.11)	-.10 to .33
20.83 (+1SD)	.27 (.13)	.01 to .52

Second, the interaction term between diverse exposure and defensive deliberation

motivations was found positive and statistically significant (β=.02, SE=.01, p<.05, Table 6-21).

Probing this relationship at three levels of defensive deliberation motivations revealed that only

for individuals with medium (point estimate = .14 (.06), 95% C.I. [.03 to .25]) and high levels of

defensive deliberation motivations (point estimate = .22 (.07), 95% C.I. [.09 to .35]), the

relationship between diverse exposure and political participation was significant. That is, diverse

exposure was likely positively related to political participation among people with medium or

and high levels of defensive deliberation motivations.

Third, the interaction term between diverse exposure and balanced deliberation

motivations was found positive and statistically significant (β=.02, SE=.01, p<.01, Table 6-21).

Probing this relationship at three levels of balanced deliberation motivations revealed that only

for individuals with medium (point estimate = .15 (.06), 95% C.I. [.04 to .26]) and high levels of

balanced deliberation motivations (point estimate = .25 (.07), 95% C.I. [.12 to .39]), the

relationship between diverse exposure and political participation was significant. That is, diverse exposure was likely positively related to political participation among people with medium or high levels of balanced deliberation motivations.

Finally, I looked at the simple relationships between the predictor variables and *cross-cutting discussion*, without interaction terms. Among partisans, diverse exposure was found to be unrelated to *cross-cutting discussion* (β=-.13, SE=.09, p>.10). None of the three motivations appeared related to cross-cutting discussion.

I then added the interaction terms between diverse exposure and each of the three motivations to the model. All three interaction terms were found statistically significant. First, the interaction term between diverse exposure and defensive dismissal motivations was found positive and statistically significant (β=.03, SE=.01, p<.05, Table 6-22). Probing this relationship at three levels of defensive dismissal motivations revealed that only for individuals with high levels of defensive dismissal motivations, the relationship between diverse exposure and cross-cutting discussion was significant, point estimate = .27 (.13), 95% C.I. [.01 to .53]. That is, diverse exposure was likely positively related to cross-cutting discussion among people with high levels of defensive dismissal motivations.

Second, the interaction term between diverse exposure and defensive deliberation motivations was found positive and statistically significant (β=.04, SE=.01, p<.01, Table 6-22). Probing this relationship at three levels of defensive deliberation motivations revealed that only for individuals with high levels of defensive deliberation motivations, the relationship between diverse exposure and cross-cutting discussion was significant, point estimate = .28 (.13), 95% C.I. [.03 to .54]. That is, diverse exposure was likely positively related to cross-cutting discussion among people with high levels of defensive deliberation motivations.

Third, the interaction term between diverse exposure and balanced deliberation motivations was found positive and statistically significant (β=.03, SE=.01, p<.01, Table 6-22). Probing this relationship at three levels of balanced deliberation motivations revealed that only for individuals with high levels of balanced deliberation motivations, the relationship between diverse exposure and cross-cutting discussion was significant, point estimate = .27 (.13), 95% C.I. [.01 to .52]. That is, diverse exposure was likely positively associated with cross-cutting discussion among people with high levels of balanced deliberation motivations.

Predicting Diverse Sharing on Social Media. I turned to H7 and RQ4, which predicted diverse sharing on social media. I began the analysis by testing H7, which predicted that diverse exposure on social media would be positively related to diverse sharing. For this, I regressed W2 diverse sharing on W1 diverse exposure on social media while controlling for sex, age, education, income, political interest, news media use, diverse news values, social media exposure frequency, social media network size, three motivations for cross-cutting exposure along with W1 diverse sharing. Diverse exposure was found to be positively related to diverse sharing (β=.24, SE=.09 p<.01, Table 6-23, first column). This provides evidence in support of H7. Notably, none of the three motivations appeared statistically significantly related to diverse sharing on social media.

Next, I examined RQ4, which asked whether the relationship between diverse exposure on social media and diverse sharing would vary by motivations for cross-cutting exposure. For this, I added the interaction terms between diverse exposure and each of the three motivations to the regression model. Two interaction terms appeared statistically significant. First, the interaction term between diverse exposure on social media and defensive dismissal motivations was found positive and statistically significant (β=.03, SE=.01 p<.05, Table 6-23, second

column). Probing this relationship at three levels of defensive dismissal motivations demonstrated that the interactive relationship between diverse exposure and diverse sharing appeared non-significant for individuals with low levels of defensive dismissal motivations (Table 6-24). The relationship between diverse exposure and diverse sharing was significant among individuals with medium (point estimate = .22 (.09), 95% C.I. [.05 to .39]) or high levels of defensive dismissal motivations (point estimate = .37 (.10), 95% C.I. [.17 to .57]). That is, diverse exposure was likely positively related to diverse sharing among people with medium or high levels of defensive dismissal motivations.

Second, the interaction term between diverse exposure and defensive deliberation motivations appeared positive and statistically significant (β=.04, SE=.02, p<.05, Table 6-23, third column). Probing this relationship at three levels of defensive deliberation motivations demonstrated that the interactive relationship between diverse exposure and diverse sharing appeared non-significant for individuals with low levels of defensive deliberation motivations (Table 6-24). The relationship between diverse exposure and diverse sharing was significant among individuals with medium (point estimate = .25 (.09), 95% C.I. [.08 to .42]) or high levels of defensive deliberation motivations (point estimate = .43 (.11), 95% C.I. [.21 to .65]). That is, diverse exposure was likely positively associated with diverse sharing among people with medium or high levels of defensive deliberation motivations.

However, the interaction term between diverse exposure and balanced deliberation motivations appeared not statistically significant (β=.03, SE=.02, p>.10, Table 6-23, fourth column).

Table 6-23.

Social Media: Predicting Diverse Sharing (W2) with Diverse Exposure on Social Media and

Motivations for Cross-Cutting Exposure (W1)

	Diverse Sharing Coeff. (SE)	Diverse Sharing Coeff. (SE)	Diverse Sharing Coeff. (SE)	Diverse Sharing Coeff. (SE)
(constant)	-.14(.19)	.09(.21)	.21(.22)	.09(.24)
Sex	-.06(.04)	-.06(.04)	-.05(.04)	-.06(.04)
Age	.00(.00)	.00(.00)	.00(.00)	.00(.00)
Education	-.01(.01)	.-.01(.01)	-.01(.01)	-.01(.01)
Income	.01(.01)	.00(.01)	.01(.01)	.01(.01)
Political Interest	.02(.03)	.02(.03)	.02(.03)	.01(.03)
News Use	.03(.02)	.02(.02)	.02(.02)	.03(.02)
Diverse Sharing (W1)	.40(.07)**	.37(.07)**	.36(.07)**	.38(.07)**
SM Exposure Freq.	.01(.02)	.02(.02)	.02(.02)	.02(.02)
SM Network Size	.00(.00)	.00(.00)	.00(.00)	.00(.00)
Diversity Values (W1)	.00(.04)	.00(.04)	.01(.04)	.01(.04)
SM Diverse Exposure (W1)	.24(.09)**	-.21(.20)	-.47(.27)	-.21(.30)
Defensive Dismissal	.01(.01)	-.01(.01)	-.01(.01)	-.01(.01)
Defensive Deliberation	-.01(.01)	-.01(.01)	.01(.01)	.00(.01)
Balanced Deliberation	.01(.01)	.01(.01)	.01(.01)	.00(.01)
Div. Exp. x Def. Dis.	--	.03(.01)*	--	--
Div. Exp. x Def. Del.	--	--	.04(.02)*	--
Div. Exp. x Bal. Del.	--	--	--	.03(.02)
$Total\ R^2$	.413	.430	.433	.420
N	231			

** $p<.01$, * $p<.05$, + $p<.1$

Table 6-24.

Social Media: Conditional Effects of Diverse Exposure on Diverse Sharing on Social Media at

Values of Defensive Dismissal and Defensive Deliberation Motivations

Defensive Dismissal	Point Estimate	95% C.I.
9.40 (-1SD)	.06 (.11)	-.16 to .29
14.69 (Mean)	.22 (.09)	.05 to .39
19.98 (+1SD)	.37 (.10)	.17 to .57
Defensive Deliberation	Point Estimate	95% C.I.
13.00 (-1SD)	.07 (.11)	-.14 to .28
17.40 (Mean)	.25 (.09)	.08 to .42
21.79 (+1SD)	.43 (.11)	.21 to .65

Sub-group Analyses. I then turned to RQ5, which asked whether the abovementioned hypothesized interactive relationships in the social media context would vary by strength of party affiliation. To examine this, one OLS lagged dependent variable regression, predicting diverse sharing on social media, was run separately among three groups: (a) non-partisans, (b) weak partisans, and (c) partisans.

Non-partisans. Among non-partisans, I first looked at the simple relationships between the predictor variables and diverse sharing on social media. Among non-partisans, when interaction terms between diverse exposure on social media and each motivation for cross-cutting exposure were not included in the analysis, diverse exposure on social media was found to be unrelated to diverse sharing (β=.43, SE=.34, p>.10, H7 rejected). None of the three motivations appeared related to diverse sharing. When added to the model, none of the interaction terms between diverse exposure on social media and the three motivations was found statistically significant.

Weak partisans. Among weak partisans, I first looked at the simple relationships between the predictor variables and diverse sharing on social media, without any interaction terms. Among weak partisans, diverse exposure was found to be unrelated to diverse sharing (β=-.25, SE=.20, p>.10, H7 rejected). Notably, diversity values (β=.14, SE=.08, p<.10) were positively related to diverse sharing to a marginal degree. None of the three motivations appeared related to diverse sharing. When added to the model, none of the interaction terms between diverse exposure on social media and the three motivations was found statistically significant.

Partisans. Among partisans, I first looked at the simple relationships between the predictor variables and diverse sharing on social media, without any interaction terms. Among partisans, diverse exposure was found to be positively related to diverse sharing (β=.26, SE=.12, p<.05, H7 supported). Among the three motivations, balanced deliberation motivations appeared positively related to diverse sharing (β=.02, SE=.01, p<.05).

I then added the interaction terms between diverse exposure on social media and the three motivations for cross-cutting exposure to the model. While the interaction term between diverse exposure and defensive dismissal motivations did not appear statistically significant (β=.02, SE=.01, p>.10), two other interaction terms were found statistically significant. First, the interaction term between diverse exposure and defensive deliberation motivations appeared positive and statistically significant (β=.05, SE=.02, p<.05, Table 6-25). Probing this relationship at three levels of defensive deliberation motivations demonstrated that the interactive relationship between diverse exposure and diverse sharing appeared non-significant for individuals with low levels of defensive deliberation motivations. The relationship between diverse exposure and diverse sharing was significant among individuals with medium (point

estimate = .27 (.12), 95% C.I. [.03 to .50]) or high levels of defensive deliberation motivations (point estimate = .45 (.14), 95% C.I. [.17 to .73]). That is, diverse exposure was likely positively related to diverse sharing among people with medium or high levels of defensive deliberation motivations.

Second, the interaction term between diverse exposure and balanced deliberation motivations appeared positive and statistically significant to a marginal degree (β=.03, SE=.02, p<.10, Table 6-25). Probing this relationship at three levels of balanced deliberation motivations demonstrated that the interactive relationship between diverse exposure and diverse sharing appeared non-significant for individuals with low or medium levels of balanced deliberation motivations. The relationship between diverse exposure and diverse sharing was significant among individuals with high levels of balanced deliberation motivations (point estimate = .38 (.14), 95% C.I. .11 to .65]). That is, diverse exposure was likely positively related to diverse sharing among people with high levels of balanced deliberation motivations.

Table 6-25.

Partisans: Conditional Effects of Diverse Exposure on Diverse Sharing on Social Media at

Values of Defensive Deliberation and Balanced Deliberation Motivations

Defensive Deliberation	Point Estimate	95% C.I.
14.32 (-1SD)	.08 (.14)	-.19 to .36
18.45 (Mean)	.27 (.12)	.03 to .50
22.57 (+1SD)	.45 (.14)	.17 to .73
Balanced Deliberation	**Point Estimate**	**95% C.I.**
13.65 (-1SD)	.10 (.16)	-.21 to .40
18.04 (Mean)	.24 (.12)	-.002 to .48
22.44 (+1SD)	.38 (.14)	.11 to .65

Media Diversity Pathway to Citizenship

Finally, research question 6 examines under what conditions, the media diversity pathway to citizenship emerges, by synthesizing all findings from this dissertation project. All the significant moderation relationships, between diversity values and diverse exposure, and between diverse exposure and citizenship indicators, in the context of both overall media and social media, are summarized in the following tables, according to the different groups: (a) all respondents, (b) partisans, (c) weak partisans, and (d) non-partisans.

First, among *all respondents*, the MOA moderators that were found statistically significant in explaining the relationship between diversity values and diverse exposure are summarized in Table 6-26 (left pane). Also, the motivations for cross-cutting exposure that appeared significant in explaining diverse exposure's relationship with citizenship indicators are summarized in Table 6-26 (right pane). In the social media context, the MOA moderators that were significant in explaining the relationship between diversity values and diverse exposure are summarized in Table 6-27 (left pane). The motivations that appeared significant in explaining diverse exposure's relationship with diverse sharing on social media are also summarized in Table 6-27 (right pane).

The results among all respondents demonstrate that individuals who more habitually use news and those who are more skilled in finding diverse news sources will better translate their diversity values over time into diverse exposure in an overall media environment. If these individuals strongly hold any of the three motivations for cross-cutting exposure and engage in more diverse exposure, they will become less knowledgeable about politics. If these individuals with strong habitual news use and diversity-seeking skills hold very weak defensive deliberation or balanced deliberation motivations, they will become more politically knowledgeable through

more diverse exposure. That is, when strong habitual news use (or diversity-seeking skills) along with very weak deliberation motivations are present, diversity values' pathway to political knowledge mediated through diverse exposure emerges.

To engaged citizenship, a different pathway emerges when individuals with high levels of habitual news use (or diversity-seeking skills) strongly hold any of the three motivations for cross-cutting exposure and engage in more diverse exposure. To deliberative citizenship, bearing cross-cutting discussion, a media diversity pathway emerges when individuals with high levels of habitual news use (or diversity-seeking skills) strongly hold balanced deliberation motivations and engage in more diverse exposure.

On social media, individuals with the right motivation (political interest), opportunity (habitual news use) and ability (diversity-seeking skills) better actualize their diversity values in diverse exposure. If these individuals hold stronger defensive dismissal or defensive deliberation motivations, they will engage in diverse news sharing more through diverse exposure on social media. That is, when the right MOA (i.e., political interest, habitual new use and diversity-seeking skills) along with strong defensive motivations are present, diversity values' pathway to diverse sharing mediated through diverse exposure emerges on social media.

Second, significant results from the *partisan* group are summarized in Tables 6-28 and 6-29. Interestingly, the majority of the abovementioned significant results from analyses among all respondents were repeatedly found among partisans, not weak or non-partisans. This implies that most of the hypothesized relationships were demonstrated among partisans. In Tables 6-28 and 6-29, findings that were different from those from all respondents in italics.

Similar media diversity pathways to informed and engaged citizenship were identified among partisans and all respondents. To informed citizenship, a pathway emerges when partisans

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with high levels of habitual news use (or diversity-seeking skills) hold very weak levels of deliberation motivations for cross-cutting exposure and engage in more diverse exposure. To engaged citizenship, a pathway emerges when these partisans with high levels of habitual news use (or diversity-seeking skills) strongly hold any of the three motivations for cross-cutting exposure and engage in more diverse exposure.

However, to deliberative citizenship, represented with cross-cutting discussion, a media diversity pathway emerges when partisans with high levels of habitual news use (or diversity-seeking skills) strongly hold not just balanced deliberation motivations, but also other two defensive motivations, and engage in more diverse exposure. On social media, only habitual new use and diversity-seeking skills were helpful in matching diversity values and diverse exposure; political interest appeared no more helpful among partisans. Also, in linking diverse exposure and diverse sharing, holding defensive dismissal motivations was no more relevant among partisans. In the end, partisans with strong habitual new use and diversity-seeking skills along with more deliberation motivations (both defensive deliberation and balanced deliberation motivations) demonstrated diversity values' pathway to diverse sharing mediated through diverse exposure emerges on social media.

Among weak or non-partisans, significant findings were rarely reported. This implies that the hypothesized relationships linking diversity values, exposure and citizenship seldom take place among weak or non-partisans. For *weak partisans*, non of MOA items were relevant in translating diversity values into diverse exposure (Table 6-30). The only significant pattern was found among weak partisans with very strong defensive deliberation motivations in that they became less politically knowledgeable through more diverse exposure. Lastly, for *non-partisans*, a few significant moderation relationships were found in explaining diverse values and diverse

exposure on social media. Non-partisans who were very busy or habitually got news were less

likely to actualize their diversity values into diverse exposure on social media (Table 6-31).

Table 6-26.

All Respondents: Predicting Democratic Citizenship

	Diversity Values → Diverse Exposure			Diverse Exposure → Democratic Citizenship		
				DE→ Political Knowledge	DE→ Political Participation	DE→ Cross-cutting Discussion
Motivation	N/A/		**Defensive Dismissal**	Strong (-)	Moderate, strong (+)	N/A/
Opportunity	Strong habitual news use (+)		**Defensive Deliberation**	Strong (-) Very weak (+)	Moderate, strong (+)	N/A/
Ability	Strong diversity-seeking skills (+)		**Balanced Deliberation**	Strong (-) Very weak (+)	Moderate, strong (+)	Strong (+)

Note. Positive (or negative) signs denote that a predictor variable has a positive (or negative) influence on a criterion variable over time among individuals with strong/moderate/weak levels of a given moderator.

Table 6-27.

All Respondents: Predicting Diverse Sharing on Social Media

	Diversity Values → Diverse Exposure			Diverse Exposure → Diverse Sharing
Motivation	N/A/		**Defensive Dismissal**	Moderate, strong (+)
Opportunity	Strong habitual news use (+)		**Defensive Deliberation**	Moderate, strong (+)
Ability	Strong diversity-seeking skills (+)		**Balanced Deliberation**	N/A/

Note. Positive (or negative) signs denote that a predictor variable has a positive (or negative) influence on a criterion variable over time among individuals with strong/moderate/weak levels of a given moderator.

Table 6-28.

Partisans: Predicting Democratic Citizenship

	Diversity Values → Diverse Exposure		**Diverse Exposure → Democratic Citizenship**		
			DE→ Political Knowledge	DE→ Political Participation	DE→ Cross-cutting Discussion
Motivation	N/A/	**Defensive Dismissal**	Strong (-)	Moderate, strong (+)	*Strong (+)*
Opportunity	Strong habitual news use (+)	**Defensive Deliberation**	Strong (-) Very weak (+)	Moderate, strong (+)	*Strong (+)*
Ability	Strong diversity-seeking skills (+)	**Balanced Deliberation**	*Moderate*, strong (-) Very weak (+)	Moderate, strong (+)	Strong (+)

Note. Positive (or negative) signs denote that a predictor variable has a positive (or negative) influence on a criterion variable over time among individuals with strong/moderate/weak levels of a given moderator. *Italicized entries* denote that findings are different from those from all respondents

Table 6-29.

Partisans: Predicting Diverse Sharing on Social Media

	Diversity Values → Diverse Exposure		**Diverse Exposure → Diverse Sharing**
Motivation	N/A/	**Defensive Dismissal**	*N/A/*
Opportunity	Strong habitual news use (+)	**Defensive Deliberation**	Moderate, strong (+)
Ability	Strong diversity-seeking skills (+)	**Balanced Deliberation**	*Strong (+)*

Note. Positive (or negative) signs denote that a predictor variable has a positive (or negative) influence on a criterion variable over time among individuals with strong/moderate/weak levels of a given moderator. *Italicized entries* denote that findings are different from those from all respondents

Table 6-30.

Weak Partisans: Predicting Democratic Citizenship

	Diversity Values → Diverse Exposure			Diverse Exposure → Democratic Citizenship		
				DE→ Political Knowledge	DE→ Political Participation	DE→ Cross-cutting Discussion
Motivation	N/A/	**Defensive Dismissal**		N/A/	N/A/	N/A/
Opportunity	N/A/	**Defensive Deliberation**		Very strong (-)	N/A/	N/A/
Ability	N/A/	**Balanced Deliberation**		N/A/	N/A/	N/A/

Note. Positive (or negative) signs denote that a predictor variable has a positive (or negative) influence on a criterion variable over time among individuals with strong/moderate/weak levels of a given moderator.

Table 6-31.

Non-partisans: Predicting Diverse Sharing on Social Media

	Diversity Values → Diverse Exposure		Diverse Exposure → Diverse Sharing
Motivation	N/A/	**Defensive Dismissal**	N/A/
Opportunity	Strong busyness (-) Strong habitual news use (-)	**Defensive Deliberation**	N/A/
Ability	N/A/	**Balanced Deliberation**	N/A/

Note. Positive (or negative) signs denote that a predictor variable has a positive (or negative) influence on a criterion variable over time among individuals with strong/moderate/weak levels of a given moderator.

CHAPTER VII.

Discussion

Diversity Paradox 1: Explaining the Diversity Deficit

The first part of this dissertation addresses the first paradox of media diversity: the

diversity deficit. The diversity deficit refers to the disconnect in the political communication

literature between values widely ascribed to diversity-seeking (*AP v. U.S.*, 1945; Garrett, 2009a;

Lee, Kwak, & Campbell, 2015; Mutz, 2006; Napoli, 1999; Obama, 2010; Pariser, 2011; Prior,

2007; Stroud, 2011; Sunstein, 2009) and people's rather imbalanced information diets (Iyengar

& Hahn, 2009; Knobloch-Westerwick & Kleinman, 2012; Stroud, 2011). By empirically

explaining the disconnect, this dissertation advances our theoretical understanding of diversity

norms. Specifically, I apply the theoretical framework of MOA (Motivation, Opportunity and

Ability, Delli Carpini, 2000) to investigate the possibility that individuals with certain resources

can better translate their diversity values into diverse exposure in the context of mass media as

well as social media. Furthermore, this dissertation examines whether individuals' strength of

party affiliation makes a difference in their translation of diversity values into diverse exposure

in the broad context of the Social Identity Theory (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015; Tajfel & Turner,

1979).

Findings from this dissertation demonstrate that while holding diversity values is

important in diverse exposure at a later time, having the right opportunities (habitual news use)

and ability (diversity-seeking skill) also helps individuals translate their values into diverse

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exposure in the contexts of both mass media and social media. Individuals can better actualize their diversity values into their news consumption habits if they are confident about their skills to navigate the media environment and find sources that present diverse viewpoints. Also, individuals who habitually consume news can better-translate their diversity values into diverse exposure. In the social media context, although diversity values did not directly influence diverse exposure in social media, political interest appeared as a significant moderator. Having the right motivation (i.e., political interest) helps individuals actualize their values into diverse exposure on social media by following information sources.

Analyses in the context of social media also revealed important differences between diverse exposure (a) from followed sources and (b) from individuals in one's network. People can "pull" certain information sources including news media, journalists, and politicians, whereas they can also be "pushed" to content posted or shared by individuals in their social network (Hargittai et al., 2012; Neuman, 2016). Diverse exposure from followed sources tends to be intentional exposure while diverse exposure from individuals in one's network tends to be rather incidental (Brundidge, 2010; Kim, 2011). Although only one moderator—habitual news use—was found significant in predicting diverse exposure from individuals in one's network, all three moderators (pertaining to motivation, opportunity and ability) were significant in predicting diverse exposure from followed sources. Perhaps people with more resource can do a better job of consuming diverse viewpoints on social media if they wish to, by "pulling" sources on their own.

Exposure to news and political viewpoints from individuals in a user's social media network, however, depends on what his/her network share, meaning that the user has little control over it. When it comes to the content people can get from individuals in their network,

they can theoretically be exposed to political differences and novel perspectives. This is because not only can people connect with weak-ties who do not necessarily share geographical location, social experiences or political viewpoints with them, but they can also form new relationships with others based on shared interests (Brundidge, 2010; Ellison & boyd, 2013). Furthermore, certain affordances of social media, such as hashtags and social endorsement cues, allow people to be exposed to cross-cutting viewpoints easily (Conover, Ratkiewicz, Francisco, Gonçalves, Menczer, & Flammini, 2011; Messing & Westwood, 2014). However, recent evidence indicates that this kind of exposure from individuals in one's network is slightly less diverse due to algorithmic curation (e.g., Bakshy et al., 2015). Or it may be that many people end up not vocally posting news or political viewpoints of their own, because they care about their self-presentation and do not wish to be associated with rants and harmful disagreements (e.g., Vraga, Thorson, Kligler-Vilenchik, & Gee, 2015). Many social media users choose to disclose information and viewpoints that are not upsetting but appropriate for all individuals in their network (Ellison, Vitak, Steinfield, Gray, & Lampe, 2011; Hogan, 2010), which may exclude vocal political content. If so, users will be presented with less diverse viewpoints on their social media, meaning that they are left with less wiggle room where they can make use of resource to actualize their diversity values in diverse exposure from individuals in their network social media. These, however, are speculations which will merit further empirical investigation.

Sub-group analyses in the context of both overall media and social media revealed that it is mostly partisans—not weak or non-partisans—who benefit from high levels of diversity-skills and habitual news use. Partisans seem to make use of the resource to match their diversity values with their diverse exposure. It may be that for anyone to actually make use of their resource in order to live up to their news values in their practices, they first need the *motivation*: news,

politics and the election have to be important to them. Partisans likely already have this motivation, for their political self-identity is important (Greene, 2004), especially in the context of Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In line with this speculation, this study's sub-group analyses showed that only among the non-partisan group, did those who were highly busy fail to match their diversity values into diverse exposure on social media. Perhaps for non-partisans, news and politics took a back seat, as they became busier, thereby demonstrating a weaker relationship between diversity values and diverse exposure on social media.

One surprise finding is that habitual news use appears to serve as an opportunity, rather than a restraint on opportunities, for diverse exposure. Of course, how diverse one's news diet is and what constitutes one's news habits will depend on each individual, and this dissertation's habitual news use measures the *intensity* of news habits, rather than the *content* of news habits. The habitual news use measures used in this dissertation is robust in that they are in line with the established conceptualization of media habits, tapping the extent to which people get news automatically, unconsciously and without thinking (LaRose, 2010; Verplanken & Orbell, 2003). The measures, nonetheless, may somewhat overlap with people's overall news use. In fact, habitual news use was moderately correlated with overall news use (r=.49, p<.01) in wave 1. Given the important role habitual news use plays in predicting diverse exposure, it may be beneficial to conduct more in-depth research on the content of people's news habits and devise an improved measure tapping *diverse* news habits—the degree to which people habitually get diverse news. It would be essential to consider the different contexts in which people form news habits. Social media is one context though there are two ways of consuming news via social media. Users can rather incidentally engage with news shared by individuals in their social media network or actively follow news sources. If certain users follow a number of news sources

that present diverse viewpoints, then they may have a better chance of forming diverse news habits.

Along this line of research on diverse news habits, this dissertation's sub-group analyses among partisans may shed some light. Specifically, partisans who more habitually consume news do a better job of matching their diversity values with diverse exposure in both mass and social media whereas non-partisans with strong habitual news use do a worse job. Compared to non-partisans, partisans may have news habits that expose themselves to more diverse viewpoints. Although this may appear counter-intuitive at first glance, this is in line with a number of studies demonstrating that partisans do not avoid opposing views (Chaffee, Saphir, Graf, Sandvig, & Hahn, 2001; Garrett, 2009a; Garrett, Carnahan, & Lynch, 2013), and sometimes they even seek out opposing views (Weeks et al., 2016; Jang, 2013). Partisans tend to be interested in understanding (and possibly counter-arguing) their opponents' arguments (Neuman, 2016; Neuman, Bimber, & Hindman, 2011) in addition to following hard news reporting (Prior, 2003). If partisans indeed habitually engage in diverse exposure on social media, they likely train algorithms to amplify diverse political content on social media feeds (Bakshy et al., 2015). Partisan users who highly value diversity will then be able to actually consume diverse viewpoints on their social media feeds. This scenario is in line with this dissertation's findings.

Nonetheless, considering that this dissertation's news habit measure is self-reported, relying on respondents' perceptions, it cannot exclude the possibility that partisans, compared to weak or non-partisans, are more sensitive to ideological diversity in media and messages in general rather than habitually engage in more diverse exposure. It may be worthwhile to conduct future research on news habits, using experiments or web log data where the content of respondents' news habits can be better quantified. Still, the findings from the current study hold

important implications for interventions to improve individuals' media diets. For example, civic education programs may look for ways to develop people's media literacy and diversity-seeking skills as well as their news habits (see Munson, Lee, & Resnick, 2013; Park, Kang, Chung, & Song, 2009). This will help individuals diversify their news media diets and live up to their diversity values in line with the normative claims put forward by democratic theory.

Diversity Paradox 2: Explaining the Mixed Effects of Diversity Exposure on Citizenship

The second part of this dissertation addresses the second paradox of media diversity: the mixed effects of diverse exposure on democratic citizenship. This dissertation advances our theoretical understanding of diversity norms by explaining the mixed effects of diverse exposure on democratic citizenship with different motivations for cross-cutting exposure. Although scholars consider it important for individuals to consume diverse information and viewpoints to become citizens who are politically informed, engaged and capable of deliberation, the empirical evidence accumulated so far casts some doubt on the presumed relationship (e.g., Mutz, 2006; Stroud, 2011). That is, individuals who consume news from diverse viewpoints may not uniformly garner democratic benefits by becoming more politically informed, engaged and capable of deliberation. Drawing from the theory of motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990; Taber & Lodge, 2006), the current study empirically examines the possibility that different motivations behind diverse exposure moderate the relationship between diverse exposure and citizenship indicators such as political knowledge, political participation and cross-cutting discussion.

First, this dissertation expands on the theory of motivated reasoning by demonstrating that there are three distinct motivations for exposure to news from cross-cutting viewpoints: defensive dismissal, defensive deliberation and balanced deliberation. That is, people choose to

engage in cross-cutting exposure with different motivations. Some people with *defensive dismissal* motivations expose themselves to news from viewpoints that oppose their own just to maintain their political views by readily disregarding opposing viewpoints. Other people with *defensive deliberation* motivations consume news from opposing viewpoints in an effort to strengthen their existing views by counter-arguing the arguments of the opposing side. Yet, other people with *balanced deliberation* motivations engage in cross-cutting exposure to form an accurate or well-informed position by learning the strengths of viewpoints that oppose their own. These motivations for cross-cutting exposure were distinct in that they were uniquely predicted with demographic, political and news media use factors.

Furthermore, the findings of the present study suggest the importance of different motivations for exposure to diverse viewpoints—rather than mere exposure—in predicting democratic citizenship indicators. That is, the three motivations for cross-cutting exposure moderated the relationship between diverse exposure and citizenship indicators, including political knowledge, political participation and cross-cutting discussion.

Political knowledge. When it comes to predicting *political knowledge*, diverse exposure demonstrated a negative relationship among individuals with strong *defensive* motivations, both defensive dismissal and defensive deliberation. Perhaps, diverse exposure with defensive motivations—to maintain or strengthen existing viewpoints—is not helpful in being politically informed. For instance, because individuals with high defensive dismissal motivations tend to not give serious consideration to news from opposing viewpoints, they will likely not take advantage of the opportunity to learn from the opposing side (Gaines et al., 2007; Lavine, Johnson, & Steenbergen, 2012). Individuals with high defensive deliberation motivations tend to

engage in biased information processing, looking for weaknesses in arguments of opposing viewpoints while acquiring strengths in arguments of their own political views (Druckman, 2012; Redlawsk, 2002; Taber & Lodge, 2006). These individuals may learn information that is favorable to their own views, but misinterpret and neglect information from the opposing side.

In opposition to theoretical and normative expectations, among individuals with strong balanced deliberation motivations, diverse exposure demonstrated a negative relationship with political knowledge. Considering that the partisan media of different slants tend to present conflicting facts and viewpoints (Dilliplane, 2011; Jamieson & Cappella, 2008), individuals may end up being confused after trying to process such conflicting messages in an even-handed way. In the end, they may become less political knowledgeable. One additional surprise finding is that diverse exposure also demonstrated a positive relationship among a small group of individuals with extremely weak *deliberation* motivations, including both defensive deliberation and balanced deliberation. Although it is a norm, deliberation of diverse and possibly conflicting ideas and pieces of information, including those from opposing sides, may actually do more harm than good for ordinary citizens when it comes to political learning. Nonetheless, it is worth noting who these two groups of people are. Those with higher levels of defensive deliberation and balanced deliberation motivations tend to be younger people, who are yet to be politically sophisticated, interested and knowledgeable (Norris, 2000). Also, those with strong balanced deliberation motivations are still not affiliated with a political party. It is possible that these young, less partisan individuals with deliberation motivations are in a trial and error phase when it comes to processing political information and learning. Perhaps, they are not yet in the "virtuous cycle" where politically interested individuals gain political knowledge and subsequently become more politically interested and knowledgeable (Norris, 2000). If these

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young people continue to practice processing diverse viewpoints with balanced deliberation motivations, they might become more politically knowledgeable. This possibility that people with balanced deliberation motivations actually reap the democratic benefit as normatively expected will merit empirical investigation over an extended period of time.

Political participation. In predicting *political participation*, diverse exposure demonstrated a positive relationship among individuals with moderate or strong *defensive* motivations, both defensive dismissal and defensive deliberation. On one hand, individuals with high defensive dismissal motivations likely bolster their existing views by readily disregarding arguments from opposing views; accordingly, these individuals demonstrate higher levels of political participation (Lavine, Johnson, & Steenbergen, 2012; Mutz, 2002a). On the other hand, individuals with high defensive deliberation motivations counter-argue opposing viewpoints, which may help them to confidently participate in politics to have their voices heard (Muffert et al., 2006).

Among individuals with high balanced deliberation motivations, in opposition to the hypothesis, diverse exposure positively predicted political participation. Given that the degree to which individuals are certain and confident about their positions is related to their willingness to participate in politics (e.g., Lavine et al., 2012), findings from the current study imply that those with strong balanced deliberation motivations solidify their views and become polarized, rather than modify their existing views, after diverse exposure (c.f. Lee, Choi, Kim, & Kim, 2014).[6] Although these individuals have reported their motivations to be deliberate on diverse viewpoints in a fair and balanced way, they might end up scrutinizing the arguments of "the other side" in

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[6] People with more diverse network on social media became more polarized if they engaged in more political discussion (Lee et al., 2014).

favor of their side. In support of this speculation, there is experimental evidence indicating that even when participants are induced with "accuracy" motivations, many of them still process diverse information in a defensive way (e.g., Winter, Metzger, & Flanagin, 2016). For this line of inquiry, the current study's subgroup analyses might also provide some support, because it was the *partisan* group who demonstrated that balanced deliberation motivations interacted with diverse exposure to positively predict political participation. For partisans, it must have been challenging to stay balanced when exposed to diverse viewpoints, especially in the context of the 2016 presidential election, a particularly polarizing campaign with the "two most unpopular major-party presidential nominees in polling history" (Walsh, 2016).

It is possible that these partisans with strong balanced deliberation motivations, despite their motivations, may (subconsciously) assign undue weight to pro-attitudinal messages, essentially defensively deliberating on diverse viewpoints. This speculation finds some support from this study's pilot dataset. When asked about how respondents feel about and react to news stories from political views that oppose their own, a few expressed their failure to actually process news stories that opposed their political view in a balanced way. For example, one respondent wrote, "I try to read them, and will fight to focus on trying to understand their perspective -- but I often fall short of that goal and get angry or dismiss the article" while another respondent confessed "[I] try to see their side of it, but usually make dumb faces because I can't wrap my head around their logic."

One potential mechanism at work involves message or source credibility where people perceive pro-attitudinal messages as being more credible than balanced or counter-attitudinal ones (Metzger, Hartsell, & Flanagin, 2015). Despite balanced deliberation motivations, after diverse exposure, people may perceive viewpoints in line with theirs as being more credible, and

solidify their existing views, becoming more politically participatory thereby. It would be worthwhile to empirically test this possibility and clarify the mechanisms in experimental studies. This would be an especially important subject considering the recent prevalence and popularity of *fake news* or "distorted signals uncorrelated with the truth" (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017, p. 212). In the 2016 presidential election, fake news stories were more extensively shared on social media than news from mainstream media, and many people who were exposed to the fake news reported that they believed it (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017). These individuals might have believed fake news, perhaps perceiving it as credible, regardless of the source's actual credibility, because it reinforced their existing political views. This possibility would merit further empirical examination.

Cross-cutting discussion. When it comes to predicting *cross-cutting discussion*, diverse exposure demonstrated a positive relationship only among individuals with strong balanced deliberation motivations. Individuals with high balanced deliberation motivations will process information from different perspectives in an even-minded manner, learning the merits and strong parts of opposing views (cf. "people with a civil orientation toward conflict" in Mutz, 2002a). In the process, they will likely develop deliberative capacity while learning the value of engaging with the opposing side. Accordingly, these individuals with high balanced deliberation motivations may more frequently engage in cross-cutting discussion with more diverse exposure. However, individuals with high defensive deliberation motivations, upon encountering more diverse views, may feel like they have already counter-argued the arguments of opposing views (Druckman, 2012; Taber & Lodge, 2006). They may end up seeing less value in listening to the opposing side. Individuals with high defensive dismissal motivations, do not substantively

engage with opposing views upon encountering them. They will likely laugh at and readily

dismiss opposing views, not seeing at all the value of listening to individuals whose views

oppose their own views thereby.

Interestingly, sub-group analyses have revealed that among partisans, diverse exposure

interact with all three motivations to positively predict cross-cutting discussion. This finding is

encouraging in that the deliberative outcome (i.e., cross-cutting discussion) was facilitated

through diverse exposure among a wider group of partisans; regardless of what motivated these

partisans to be exposed to diverse viewpoints, they talk more about politics with the opposing

side after diverse exposure. However, it is possible that partisans who consume opposing views

with different motivations engage in cross-cutting discussion, again with different motivations.

For example, partisans who are primarily motivated to defensively dismiss opposing views may

have very different cross-cutting discussion than other partisans with balanced deliberation

motivations. Although the current dataset does not address the content of cross-cutting

discussion or the degree to which such discussion is deliberative, it would be worth investigating

not just the *frequency*, but also the *quality* of cross-cutting discussion. In this line of future

research, prior scholarship on citizen deliberation and the public sphere would provide a helpful

guidance. For example, drawing from Habermas' ideal speech situation, Neuman and colleagues

(2011) identified criteria for successful deliberation in an online public sphere including the

capacity for collective will formation along with discursive equality and reciprocal respect.

Cross-cutting discussion will be of little democratic value if participants do not attend to the

conversations (Kwak, Williams, Wang, & Lee, 2005) or offer comments that are mindless, close-

minded or impolite (Neuman et al., 2011). Considering the quality of cross-cutting discussion in

future research would help us better understand how diverse exposure, in interaction with different motivations for cross-cutting exposure, benefits individuals with deliberative outcomes.

Diverse Sharing on Social Media. In the context of social media, this dissertation considers *diverse sharing* by drawing from the prior literature on "news sharing" as an expressive form of political participation (e.g., Hasell & Weeks, 2016; Lane, Kim, Lee, Weeks, & Kwak, 2017; Gil de Zúñiga, Jung, & Valenzuela, 2012). The results demonstrate that individuals who consume more news from diverse viewpoints on social media actually share more diverse news. Furthermore, with more diverse exposure, individuals with strong defensive motivations (both defensive dismissal and defensive deliberation) share even more diverse news stories. Although sharing news about politics and the election on social media is known to be easy and effortless (Kümpel et al., 2015), it carries elements of expression and endorsement that is rather *public* (Bode, Vraga, Borah, & Shah, 2014). What individuals share will be visible to other people in one's social network. Due to this public characteristic of sharing, diverse sharing on social media has the potential to pose threats to harmonious social relationships (see Mutz, 2002b, 2006). Some social media users may refrain from sharing vocal political content in case it upsets some individuals in their network ("the imagined audience") while only sharing content that is seemingly appropriate for everybody (Ellison, Vitak, Steinfield, Gray, & Lampe, 2011; Hogan, 2010; Marwick & boyd, 2011). People with strong balanced deliberation motivations may be especially susceptible to this, because they will likely be familiar with the pros and cons of diverse viewpoints (see also Vraga et al., 2015).

Those with strong defensive motivations, however, may not be hesitant to publicly express themselves about political issues publicly on social media. Even after becoming more

aware of diverse viewpoints on social media, these defensively motivated individuals will likely find viewpoints in line with their own more valid, only becoming more committed to and certain about their political party or view. Thus, it is possible that these defensive individuals not only share like-minded news in a favorable light, but also share news from opposing views rather sarcastically or critically in an effort to advance their agenda (Coppini et al., 2017). However, the current dataset does not contain evidence for this speculation, although the pilot dataset provides anecdotal evidence. When asked about how respondents would feel or react to a news story from political viewpoints that opposed theirs, one respondent with defensive motivations mentioned, "sometimes I post it to social media with my comments; often I am displeased." While this is notable considering that the question did not explicitly ask about their reaction on social media, it is possible that this "displeased" respondent posts news stories from opposing viewpoints with a negative comment. Comments made and emotions felt while sharing news stories will be important in future research on diverse sharing; researchers can collect, for example, comments individuals leave when sharing news stories from diverse perspectives or ask people to report on their emotion at the moment of sharing. Perhaps a mixed method project combining social media log analyses with an online survey would be ideal (e.g., Dvir-Gvirsman, Tsfati, & Menchen-Trevino, 2016).

Taken together, an interesting divide emerges between diverse exposure's respective relationships with political knowledge and participation. That is, individuals who are most politically informed are not necessarily the most active participants in politics, and vice versa (Lavine, Johnson, and Steenbergen, 2012; Mutz, 2006). For instance, for partisans with strong motivations—whether they be defensive, balanced, deliberative or dismissive—diverse exposure

appeared positively related to political participation, although it was found to be negatively related to political knowledge. On the other hand, partisans with extremely weak deliberation motivations became more politically knowledgeable, but no more participatory, with more diverse exposure. While this study demonstrated that diverse exposure and democratic benefits do not necessarily go hand-in-hand, normative questions remain as to whether it is problematic that those who participate in politics are not necessarily well-informed, and that over time democratic changes in citizens are not entirely in line with the expectations put forward by democratic theory.

It is also worth noting that findings regarding balanced deliberation motivations were not fully in line with normative and theoretical expectations. Although theoretically individuals with high *balanced deliberation* motivations are expected to demonstrate a positive relationship between diverse exposure and political knowledge, the relationship was in an opposite direction. Also, these individuals with high balanced deliberation motivations may be expected to demonstrate a negative relationship between diverse exposure and political participation, since they may be politically ambivalent due to their familiarity with the strengths of views that oppose their own. However, among these individuals, a positive relationship was found between diverse exposure and political participation. Despite normative and theoretical expectations about ideal citizens, it may be rather difficult for ordinary individuals to maintain this balanced deliberation motivation when encountering opposing viewpoints. However, in line with theoretical as well as normative expectations, individuals with high balanced deliberation motivations did appear to engage in more cross-cutting discussion with more diverse exposure. It is possible that these individuals who are highly motivated to deliberate in a balanced way, compared to those with high defensive motivations, garner primarily *deliberative benefits*

through diverse exposure. In future research, it would be worthwhile to examine whether diverse exposure indeed more positively predicts other deliberative outcomes, such as awareness of arguments for opposing views and political tolerance, along with the abovementioned *quality* of cross-cutting discussion, among individuals with higher balanced deliberation motivations.

Future research expanding on these motivations for cross-cutting exposure may also benefit from more accurate measures. As noted above, in predicting political knowledge and participation, the three motivations functioned similarly, in contrary to theoretical expectations. This might have in part resulted from the fact that conceptually, the three motivations share overlapping psychological components. Specifically, the three motivations conceptually each contain two psychological components (e.g., defense and deliberation for defensive deliberation motivations), one or two of which are shared with other motivations. One way to improve the motivation measures used in this dissertation[7] may involve a more granular approach where two psychological components of a given motivation are separately measured and then combined. This would require a development of four measures of defense, balance, dismissal, and deliberation mechanisms. Using these four measures, we would be able to have more accurate operationalization of the three motivations.

Assuming that defense is the opposite of balance and dismissal is opposite to deliberation on a spectrum, people may be plotted onto the graph in Figure 7-1, depending on their responses to four measures.[8] Respondents may then be categorized into one of the three groups, characterized with defensive dismissal, defensive deliberation, or balanced deliberation motivations. The question remains whether a group with *balanced dismissal* motivations actually emerges. Additionally, there may be another group of people who do not score high on any of

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[7] Another way may involve scale-building or ipsatization, using this study's measures.
[8] If so, researchers may need only two measures, instead of four.

the measures. These people are possibly those who are not motivated for cross-cutting exposure themselves, yet are still exposed to counter-attitudinal viewpoints. One feasible scenario is that this group is somehow *incidentally* exposed to opposing views. If this group with no motivations actually emerges, it may be interesting to examine the relationship between diverse exposure and democratic outcomes among this group. Upon unexpected encounter with cross-cutting views, maybe they process them properly, and be further informed and engaged. This line of speculation would merit future investigation.

Figure 7-1.

Typology of People by Components behind Motivations for Cross-Cutting Exposure

Findings from this study seek to contribute to and potentially challenge the popular negative narrative around *partisans*. Partisans are often criticized in that they are not willing to compromise with the opposing side, making politics dysfunctional (Abramowitz, 2013). Sub-

group analyses of this dissertation, however, demonstrate that partisans function as good democratic citizens in a few notable aspects. Partisans tend to match their diversity values with diverse exposure in their everyday lives by making use of their resources. When partisans do engage in diverse exposure, regardless of what motivations they hold for cross-cutting exposure, they appear to garner greater democratic benefits—they discuss politics more frequently with the opposing side and participate more in the political process, compared to weak or non-partisans. Perhaps for anyone to actualize their professed diversity values and to reap democratic outcomes that are normatively expected from diverse exposure, politics has to be important to them. For partisans, political matters are important. Political self-identity is essential to them, as argued in the broad context of social identity theory (Green et al., 2004; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In future research in this vein, it would be important to consider whether Republicans and Democrats (or conservatives and liberals) demonstrate different patterns. This is a plausible path that is worth exploring, given the psychological and behavioral differences between different partisan groups, especially as regards involving selectivity (Barberá, Jost, Nagler, Tucker, & Bonneau, 2015; Garrett, 2009b; Garrett & Stroud, 2014; Jost, 2017), although some studies argued otherwise (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009, Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng, 2009).

This dissertation is limited in a few ways. First of all, the measures used in this study relied on self-reported data. Due to respondents' imperfect recall, self-reported measures of media use might not be the best measures (Neuman, 2016; Prior, 2009). Also, some of this study's psychological and behavioral measures involved societal norms (e.g., diversity values, diverse exposure, and balanced deliberation motivations for cross-cutting exposure), leaving room for a social desirability bias and potential inflation of these measures. Second, because this study relied on a two-wave survey, it was only able to examine changes in diverse exposure and

changes in citizenship indicators over time in the *separate* models. It would be worthwhile to

collect more longitudinal data and test a moderated mediation model of diversity values, diverse

exposure and citizenship indicators. Third, datasets for this dissertation were collected during the

2016 presidential campaign, a particularly polarizing one with the "two most unpopular major-

party presidential nominees in polling history" (Walsh, 2016). During the campaign, some

people may have failed to enact their diversity values when consuming news although they

would normally do so. The peculiarity of this election, however, may have only muddied the

relationships between diversity values and diverse exposure or relationships among diverse

exposure, motivations for cross-cutting exposure and democratic citizenship, which would not

hurt the solidity of the findings. Lastly, this study relied on a non-probability sample from

internet-based panels, limiting the generalizability of the findings to a wider population (c.f.

Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012). This holds true although age, gender and education quotas were

applied in an effort to ensure that this study's sample closely resembles the American population.

Given the limitations of this study, future researchers are encouraged to replicate the

findings of the current study using data from a probability sample collected in non-election

seasons or during the next election campaign. Also, self-reported survey measures can be

corroborated with other data sets, including actual web log data of media use[9] (e.g., Dvir-

Gvirsman et al., 2016) or behavioral data from experiments. Continued investigation of the

relationship between diverse exposure and democratic citizenship along with people's diversity

values, motivations for cross-cutting exposure, and strength of party affiliation will help advance

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[9] Using web log data or social media log data, researchers may devise more *granular* media use measures. For instance, on social media, users who get news once a day or a few times a day can be distinguished from those who get news multiple times a day, as opposed to the approach the current study takes, which is, having one group of users who get news from social media on a daily basis.

a more comprehensive theoretical and normative understanding of what constitutes ideal citizens in a democratic society.

This dissertation makes theoretical, methodological and practical contributions in the following ways. Theoretically, I identified and explained two paradoxes in media diversity norms by drawing from the framework of motivation, opportunity and ability (Delli Carpini, 2000) and the theory of motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990; Taber & Lodge, 2006). Notably, I proposed and demonstrated three distinct motivations for cross-cutting exposure—defensive dismissal, defensive deliberation, and balanced deliberation. Methods-wise, I devised and validated original survey measures, examples of which include the three motivations for cross-cutting exposure along with diverse exposure and diverse news sharing on social media, applying normalized Shannon's H Information Entropy (Boydstun et al., 2014). By using two-wave panel survey data, I clarified the assumed causal path from diversity values to diverse exposure and democratic citizenship, which in large part was based on norms and cross-sectional evidence.

The findings of this dissertation also hold practical implications for civic education, media diversity policies, and strategies in the news industry. In designing civic education programs and interventions to improve people's information diets, it would be vital to consider their news media literacy, diversity-seeking skills and news habits in today's media environment. In such an evolving environment, not only can people seamlessly get news from a myriad of media outlets on a smartphone, but also they can create, share and distribute news stories on social media. People may no longer sympathize with the legal division among public broadcasting, cable communications, and the Internet and other interactive computer services in the Communications Act of 1934. For better policies on media diversity, there needs to be more discussion about a holistic, audience-centered approach (Napoli, 1997; also see Kim, 2016),

which would allow a more comprehensive understanding of how people navigate and contribute to today's information environment. Empirical evidence collected with an audience-centered approach may provide insight into designing media diversity policies to achieve one of the legal goals for the internet and other interactive computer services—to offer "a forum for a true diversity of political discourse" (§ 230. (3)). Finally, in developing strategies in the news industry, decision-makers may utilize the results of this dissertation—for example, on people's news values. For business purposes, brand marketers may emphasize the diverse perspectives covered in their news outlet, because overall, people preferred diverse news over most other news values. Also, social media marketers may somehow find the result that social media users with primarily defensive motivations for cross-cutting exposure end up sharing more diverse content that they consume helpful in writing headlines or promoting certain news stories on their social media channels. I, however, hope that other findings on the democratic outcomes of diversity-seeking and deliberation, which are somewhat disconnected from the societal norms, can also draw the attention of the news industry. It is hoped that this dissertation provokes thoughts among different players in the news industry as they write and distribute news stories, about the ways in which they can work with policymakers and audiences in building a news media landscape for an informed, engaged and deliberative citizenry.

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