

What Does Trump Really Want?

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Abstract

Donald Trump's 2017 inaugural address was scored with a content analysis measure of implicit motives. The results show that compared to other 20th and 21st century U.S. presidents, he scores very high in achievement and power motive imagery, but only about average in affiliation imagery. Based on previous research on presidents' motive imagery, this profile suggests some predictions about the Trump presidency and possible problems for it. In political leaders, high achievement motivation often leads to frustration with the political process. Power motivation, while associated with rated greatness, is related to polarization of public opinion and war. The effects of motives are further channel by temperament and traits—in Trump's case, high extraversion and low agreeableness.

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Donald Trump fits no prior candidate or presidential template. He has broken countless political taboos. Since he had no prior experience in any elected office, predicting his behavior in the

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TRUMP'S MOTIVES

Oval Office presents unusual challenges. To be sure, some aspects of Trump's personality are obvious: For example, he comes from a background of wealth and privilege, five years at a militarized boarding school (but no actual military or government experience), and several decades in real estate—a business particularly known for puffery (defined by the *Oxford English Dictionary* as “extravagant or undeserved praise, especially for advertising or promotional purposes”). His free-associative and grandiose verbal style, laced with insults and often expressed in 140-character “tweets,” has become a media staple. Overall, his narcissism seems apparent to many ordinary people as well as to personality psychologists (see McAdams, 2016). One US senator expressed “great concern about the president's temperament” to the point of questioning whether he is mentally ill (Beutler, 2017, para. 1). Metaphorical characterizations of Trump abound. For example, a Republican state leader described him as “this menacing alien presence approaching Earth” (Portnoy & Costa, 2015, para. 11). He has also been described as “the slithering id of a nervous age” (Baker, 2016, p. 6).

But beneath his unconventional and unconstrained style, what does Donald Trump really want? This question is not so easy to answer, because motives are internal mental representations of goals, anticipations, plans, and satisfactions. Because they are inner cognitive-affective dispositions, motives can easily be disguised in garments of social desirability and impression-management. If anxiety-arousing or “unacceptable” to the person, they can be distorted or concealed. As a result, asking people about their motives may only produce their *beliefs* about what they want (or think they ought to want).

Drawing on insights by Sigmund Freud and Henry Murray, psychologists have developed experimentally-based ways of measuring three motives—achievement, affiliation, and power—through content analysis of their verbal texts: the imaginative stories they tell,

but also their conversation and writing (McClelland, 1985; Winter, 1973; 1992; 1996, chap. 5). These scoring systems were developed by experimentally arousing the motive in question and observing its effects on verbal imagery (see Winter, 1998b). This trio of motives can more usefully be thought of as defining three *dimensions of motivational space*, rather than three separate “motives.” Motives measured in this way are often described as *implicit* motives, because they do not correlate highly with people’s answers to questions about their motives. Political psychologists have adapted these content analysis measures to score political speeches, interviews, legislative debates, and diplomatic documents (see Donley & Winter, 1970; also Winter, 1992), including inaugural addresses of U. S. presidents since George Washington (Winter, 2002, p. 28; see also Winter, 2013, for a recent discussion of this research). From these scores, case study interpretations have been constructed for presidents Richard Nixon (Winter & Carlson, 1988), Bill Clinton (Winter, 1998a), and Barack Obama (Winter, 2011). Table 1 gives an outline of the motive imagery scoring system, along with characteristic behavior correlates of each motive (see Smith, 1992; Winter, 1996, chap. 5; 2002; for more information about the three motives).

Insert Table 1 about here

Can speeches, which are after all usually written by professional speechwriters and affected by a wide variety of situational and political factors, be taken as a valid sample of a leader’s words, and hence personality? Donald Trump claimed that he wrote his inaugural address himself, and on January 18, 2017, posted a picture taken “three weeks ago” of him at a desk (actually the concierge desk at his Mar-a-Lago estate) holding a large felt-tipped pen

and a pad of paper (but with a corner pulled up so the paper is not visible) (Bort, 2017). On the other hand, two days later a White House official confirmed to the *Wall Street Journal* that “much of the speech was written by [then top Trump advisers] Stephen Miller and Steve Bannon” (Bender, 2017, p. A3). In any case, however, leaders select their speechwriters and review drafts, especially for such an important speech. And experienced writers, in turn, are adept at crafting words and images with which the leader will feel comfortable. As for the influence of the situation and audience, because inaugural addresses take place literally in the first few minutes of a new presidential administration, they offer new presidents a tabula rasa for their major concerns, in a “standard situation” of a large crowd and worldwide media coverage.ⁱ

Thus even though the precise conceptual status of motive scores derived from presidential speeches may be uncertain, previous research has shown that they have a clear demonstrated empirical and predictive utility. This makes a motivational analysis of Trump’s inaugural of scientific and political interest and use.

Scoring Trump’s Motives

A transcript of Donald Trump’s January 20, 2017 inaugural address was scored for motive imagery by the author, who had originally developed the integrated scoring system for motive imagery, along with practice materials and expert-scoring for learning the system.ⁱⁱ The raw motive imagery totals were then transformed in two ways. Because the number of images for any given motive is usually correlated with the length of the text, the raw scores were first converted to images per 1,000 words to correct for length. However, motive scores undoubtedly vary by kind of document scored: for example, presidential inaugural addresses likely express quite different motives from romantic letters or corporate stockholder-newsletters. This means that the raw scores

of any single text are interpretable only in comparison with those of other texts of the same genre.

To facilitate this comparison, the corrected scores are standardized on a comparison group of texts, separately for each motive. In the case of Trump's inaugural address, the appropriate comparison group was the population of 20th and 21st century US inaugural addresses of US presidents. Finally, as an aid to interpretation these standardized scores were scaled with an overall mean of 500 and standard deviation of 100 (which is roughly how the Scholastic Aptitude Test used to be scaled, before the 2011 recentering; see Dorans, 2002).

Insert Table 2 about here

Inaugural Address

Table 2 presents the results of scoring Trump's January 20, 2017 inaugural address, as delivered and recorded by *The Washington Post*, along with the scores of his 20th and 21st century predecessors. Trump's most prominent motive is for achievement, manifested in positive phrases such as "a historic movement the likes of which the world has never seen before," or regrets and resolves to change alleged past failures, such as a national infrastructure that "has fallen into disrepair and decay." At 2.78 standard deviations above the 20th/21st century presidential mean, his score is the highest of all US presidents of that era.

Trump's power motive score, 2.14 standard deviations above the mean, is also the highest of all 20th/21st century presidents. Example phrases are a "decree to be heard in every city, in every foreign capital, and in every hall of power," or the "ravages of other countries . . . stealing our companies, and destroying our jobs." Finally, Trump's affiliation score, expressed in phrases such as

TRUMP'S MOTIVES

“we share one heart, one home, and one glorious destiny,” is about average for a presidential inaugural address (.15 standard deviation above the mean). The right-hand column of the table gives a measure of similarity of Trump’s overall motive profile to those of previous presidents (data from Winter, 2002)—that is, the distance, in standard-deviation units, between the two profiles in the three-dimensional space defined by the three motives (see above). Trump’s motive profile is not very close to any previous president, though there is some resemblance to those of Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton. He is very *unlike* Calvin Coolidge and other early 20th century presidents, including Republican icon Dwight Eisenhower.

Predicting the Trump Presidency

Given Trump’s scores of extraordinarily high achievement and power motives, and average affiliation motivation, what might be expected of the Trump presidency? To answer this, we can draw on studies relating presidential motives to behaviors and outcomes (Winter, 1987; 2002) as well as more traditional laboratory research on motive correlates based largely on studies of college students (Winter, 1996, chap. 5). At the time of final writing of this article (September 2017), most of the (first) Trump administration lies in the future, which can make prediction risky;ⁱⁱⁱ nevertheless, many of his surprising and unusual behaviors do appear to reflect his motive profile.

Predicting from Achievement Motivation

Achievement motivation predicts success in business, particularly as an entrepreneur, and it involves taking moderate (versus extreme) risks and changing one’s behavior and tactics on the basis of results. Trump’s very high achievement motive score is thus quite consistent with his background of success in real-estate and other entrepreneurial ventures,^{iv} as well as his behavior in politics.

Changes and reversals of behavior. Like most achievement-motivated entrepreneurs, Trump is prone to changing his behavior depending on the circumstances. For example, between 1987 and 2012 he changed his New York State party voting registration five times (Gillen, 2015). Since being inaugurated president, he has made complete several reversals of policy in a breathtakingly short time. After a pre-inaugural statement that “we’re going to have insurance for everybody” that would be “much less expensive and much better” (Shear, 2017), he strongly urged passage of a bill that would have taken away insurance for tens of millions of people (Jackson, 2017). His responses to the threat of North Korea’s development of nuclear missiles have ranged from meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jung-un (“I would absolutely, I would be honored to do it,” Taley & Jacobs, 2017, para. 2), to presuming a good relationship (“I [or ‘I’d] probably have a very good relationship with Kim Jong-un,” Shear, 2018, paras.2-3), to a threat to unleash “fire and fury, and frankly power the likes of which this world has never seen before” (Baker & Choe, 2017, para. 4). Other reversals have involved the fate of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) persons, US-China trade relations, tolerance of federal deficits, the nature of a wall on the US-Mexican border, and transgender rights.

In the search for “whatever works,” achievement-motivated people readily ignore “established procedures,” sometimes even to the extent of cheating and employing illegal means (Mischel & Gilligan, 1964, and Cortes & Gatti, 1972.) This research finding is consistent with claims that the Trump Organization has failed to pay subcontractors on several projects, including outfitting of the Old Post Office Building in Washington DC as the Trump International Hotel (Northam, 2017; Tully, 2016), as well as Trump “University,” which operated from 2005-2010 and drew lawsuits from several “students,” as well as New York State. At the time of writing, allegations about election collusion between members of the Trump 2016 campaign and Russian officials are being investigated by US special prosecutor Robert Mueller.

TRUMP'S MOTIVES

In politics, however, the results of achievement motivation are quite different from in business, reflecting differences between the two domains in rules, rituals, and procedures: presidential achievement motivation is *unrelated* to several measures of presidential success and greatness (see Winter, 2010). Achievement-motivated leaders may enter office seeking “the best,” but they quickly encounter other political actors with different conceptions of what is “best” (for members of Congress, perhaps, whether it benefits their districts). As CEO of The Trump Organization, Donald Trump could get rid of those who disagreed with him; but in politics, opposition leaders usually have their own independent base. In the search for profits, achievement-motivated leaders tend to modify their positions and performance, but in politics ignoring ideology and changing policies can draw down the label of “flip-flopper” and thereby erode support. The best will certainly cost too much. Thus Trump’s campaign promises to spend \$1 trillion on national infrastructure, build a wall on the US-Mexican border, expand the military, and cut taxes on the rich—not to mention the costs of Hurricanes Harvey and Irma—will certainly cost more than a Republican-controlled Congress will want to pay. Finally, even the best program has to be implemented by a government apparatus that the president did not appoint, may not trust, and cannot remove.

Most of these problems typical of achievement motivation in politics can be discerned in the first year of the Trump Administration. Even Trump himself admitted, after his hopes to change health care died in the Senate, that “this is more work than my previous life. I thought it would be easier,” later complaining that “nobody knew health care could be so complicated” (Berman, 2017, para. 2). The conflict with Congress that led to the government shut-down of January 2018 reflected Trump’s unfamiliarity with *political* deal-making (Davis & Haberman, 2018, para. 24):

TRUMP'S MOTIVES

One senior administration official . . . described a neophyte president who genuinely wanted to reach a deal But Mr. Trump had not determined how it would play out or mapped out a strategy with Republican leaders, the official said, nor considered how the politics of a shutdown might unravel.

And just before his January 2018 State of the Union speech, Trump admitted to reporters that “Immigration is so easy to solve if it was purely a business matter, but it’s not. “And I think that’s something that I’ve learned maybe more than anything else: You have to — you govern with all of the instincts of a businessperson, but you have to add much more heart and soul into your decisions than you would ever have even thought of before” (Davis, 2018, para. 5).

Politics is different from business. Peter Peterson, who had been a high officer in politics (Nixon’s secretary of commerce) and business (chair of a New York investment bank), characterized the differences as follows (Sanger, 2001, paras. 12-13):

[Business executives have] the undiffused power to implement their individual corporate visions. When you are a C.E.O., you observe, listen, and decide. When you are a cabinet secretary, you observe, listen, testify, subject everyone to interagency review, get resistance from Congress, and then, more often than not, someone else decides.”

Early on, columnist David Brooks (2017, p. A27) observed that “The Civil Service has a thousand ways to ignore or sit on any presidential order”; thus “President Trump can push all the pretty buttons on the command deck of the Starship Enterprise, but don’t expect anything to actually happen, because they are not attached.” Speaking to a home-state audience six months later, the Republican majority leader of the Senate explained the failure of Trump’s health-care legislation in terms of business-politics differences: “Our new president, of course, has not been in this line of work before. And I think he had excessive expectations about how quickly things happen

TRUMP'S MOTIVES

in the democratic process” (Flegenheimer & Haberman, 2017, para. 12). Later, he privately “questioned Mr. Trump’s understanding of the presidency, describing Trump as “entirely unwilling to learn the basics of governing.” Other Senate Republicans “blame the president for not being able to rally the party around any version of legislation to repeal the Affordable Care Act, accusing him of not knowing even the basics about the policy.” In the concluding words of one journalist, “Mr. Trump is a political amateur, still unschooled in the ways of Washington” (Burns & Martin, 2017, paras. 9, 17, 26). Having insisted during the campaign that he is the decisive dealmaker who “alone can fix it,” Trump “confuses executive orders with achievements” and dashes off orders “without input from Congress and government officials who would implement them” (quotations from “President Trump, White House Apprentice,” 2017).

As a result, achievement-motivated presidents tend to end up frustrated and angry at their lack of control—blaming the opposition, the media, or even internal sabotage for their failures (see Farrell, 2017, for examples from the career of achievement-motivated Richard Nixon). In terms of the typology offered by the late David Barber (1992), they become *active-negative*; while political scientist and presidential scholar Fred Greenstein (2000) rates them low in political skill and emotional maturity. They may go over the heads of Congress to “the people” (as did Woodrow Wilson, at the cost of his health), take illegal shortcuts (as did Nixon), or exhaust themselves in micro-managing (as did Carter). In other countries, they may even lead a coup d’etat.^v Some of Trump’s words during the campaign reflected a style bordering on the dictatorial, in ways characteristic of frustrated achievement-motivated political leaders: for example, in the March 3, 2016 Republican debate he explained how he would persuade the U.S. military to carry out torture: “Frankly, when I say they’ll do as I tell them, they’ll do as I tell them.” Overall, his sense of frustration seemed to grow in the weeks and months since his inauguration.

Predicting from Power Motivation

On the other hand, Trump's power motive is almost as high as his achievement motive. (Achievement and power motivation are uncorrelated among the other 20th and 21st century presidents; $r = -.04$.) High power motivation, too, is consistent with Trump's business career: whereas achievement motivation predicts entrepreneurial success, the power motive is associated with success in large corporations (McClelland & Boyatzis, 1982). Historically, the Trump collection of companies and "brands" has included both kinds of ventures.

Historically, power-motivated presidents are "active-positive" (Barber, 1992); that is, they are active and enjoy being president—even the scimmages of politics that so frustrate their achievement-motivated peers. They use a variety of techniques to work around the bureaucracy,^{vi} and are able to deploy humor at critical moments. Perhaps as a result, presidential power motivation has been associated with several aspects of presidential success: historians' ratings of greatness (e.g., Maranell, 1970), being viewed by followers and staff as "charismatic" (House, Spangler, & Woycke, 1991), and making "great" decisions that have shaped the nation's history. They also arouse polarizing emotions—devotion from their followers, but hostility from opponents and discontented people at the margins of society.^{vii} However, they also tend to involve the U.S. in wars—not necessarily a nuclear Armageddon, but at least "war" by Lewis Richardson's (1960) definition: an interstate conflict involving more than 316 battle deaths. (The association of power motivation with both war and rated greatness may reflect a tendency of historians—at least until recently—to consider a successful war as the ultimate presidential "accomplishment.") Among samples of recent presidents, presidential power motivation is positively correlated with White House reporters' ratings (Shearer, 1982) of combative skill and sense of humor, but negatively correlated with Greenstein's (2000) ratings of strategic (or long-range) cognitive style.

The complete record of the Trump administration on war versus peace, or consensus ratings by historians of “greatness,” can only be compiled when his presidency is complete, or even well after that. If Trump’s very high power motivation inclines him toward war, there is certainly no shortage of situations that could develop into crises where a president’s power motivation could tip the balance between war and peace: for starters, North Korean nuclear-tipped missiles, Russia’s relationships with former Soviet republics, Chinese territorial ambitions and claims, or almost anywhere in the Middle East from Palestine to Syria to Iran to Libya. Trump’s January 27, 2017 telephone call with Mexican President Peña Nieto even raised—in jest, or seriously, or both?—the possibility of an American invasion of Mexico: “You have some pretty tough hombres in Mexico. . . . maybe your military is scared of them, but our military is not afraid of them, and we will help you with that 100 percent because it is out of control” (“‘This deal will make me look terrible’: Full transcripts of Trump’s calls with Mexico and Australia,” 2017, 9th utterance by Trump).

Meanwhile, Trump’s polarizing effect on U.S. public opinion is certainly consistent with his high power motivation. As David Brooks (2017) noted, “everything about Trump that appalls 65 percent of America strengthens him with the other 35 percent” (p. A27).

Predicting from Affiliation Motivation

It is important to emphasize that the affiliation *motive* (a concern for warmth and friendship), on which Trump scores average among presidents, is quite different from the *trait* of extraversion. According to McAdams (2016), Trump is very high in extraversion (talkative, assertive, sociable, not reserved) and very low in agreeableness (quarrelsome, distrustful, rude, not considerate).^{viii} As mentioned in Table 1, affiliation-motivated people are friendly with other people but only so long as they feel safe; in the presence of people they perceive as disagreeing or disliking them, or just being “different,” they can be prickly and defensive. Among 20th/21st century

TRUMP'S MOTIVES

presidents, affiliation motivation is unrelated to rated greatness, idealism, or war-entry, but it is related to concluding arms-limitation treaties and major political scandals such as Teapot Dome or Watergate.

Trump's curious pattern of moderate affiliation motivation, high extraversion, and low agreeableness makes predictions about his presidency difficult. Perhaps a moderate level of defensiveness based on his motive score would be exacerbated by his trait-based tendencies toward suspicion and distrust. Such a combination could produce rapid and extreme alternation of his liking and disliking of others (particularly close associates), depending on his perception of their similarity, agreement, and liking of him. This may have been one contributing factor to the record high turnover of top-level staff during the first year of the Trump administration (Tenpas, 2018).

What to Look for in the Future

Trump scores exceptionally high on both achievement and power motivation. Given the great difference in presidential outcomes predicted by these two motives, the balance between them is likely to be an important sign of his state of mind and future actions. While most motives have characteristic dispositional levels, their expression (and hence their scores) fluctuate, both as a result of shifts in the internal hierarchy of motives (for example, even a glutton usually becomes sated stops eating after a while) and in response to situations (for example, if the food is unappetizing, or if no food is available at all; see Atkinson & Birch, 1970; see Winter, 1998a for a discussion of these factors in Bill Clinton's first term). For Trump, the responses of his domestic and foreign political counter-players will surely affect the level and expression of his achievement and power motives. Such fluctuations could be monitored by systematic longitudinal scoring and analysis of future Trump speeches or press conferences. Perhaps even his Tweets can be scored: although short, they are often rich in motive imagery. If his achievement motive is ascendant, we

would expect his frustration, policy changes and reversals, and renewed attempts to grasp control.

On the other hand, if his power motivation predominates, we might expect some mix of charismatic appeal and effective performance, on the one hand, and an upsurge of aggressive words and deeds directed toward perceived enemies—with the ratio between these alternative effects depending on fluctuations in his temperament, his advisers, and the external situation.

Are Motives Important by Themselves?

One problem with prediction is that motivation is only one element of personality (see Winter, 1996). Like all people, presidents also have stylistic traits, beliefs and cognitions (about themselves, the world of politics, and ultimate values), and social contexts that include gender, social class, culture, age and generation, religion, and experience in particular institutions. For example, both power and affiliation motives look quite different in extraverts compared to introverts (see Winter, John, Stewart, Klohnen, & Duncan, 1998), and several personality variables may channel power motivation in different directions (Winter, 2016). For this reason it is important to take a closer qualitative look at Trump's temperament and traits.

Do any of the following characterizations sound familiar (see Winter, 2017)?

- When he was young, his mother remarked that “he talks for the sake of his own voice, without making any effort whatsoever to think or to express a particular thought.”
- By his teenage years, he had developed “a superiority complex . . . combined with an icy coldness and an aggressive contempt for those he considered weaker than himself.”
- His best friend wrote that he “becomes sullen unless he is given recognition from time to time by someone of importance.”

TRUMP'S MOTIVES

- Installed as the leader and self-proclaimed “sole master” of policy of his nation, he declared that “we are destined for greatness, and I shall lead you to glorious days.” At the same time, however, one of his diplomats lamented his “almost crass ignorance” of foreign affairs, and the wife of another diplomat complained that he “is ruining our political position and making us the laughing-stock of the world!”
- A foreign leader thought his communications reflected “the workings of a disordered brain.”

Actually, all these comments were made about Wilhelm II, the German Kaiser who led his country over the cliff and into the abyss of World War I (Röhl, 2014, pp. 11, 18, 67, 56, 53, 110, 126). The Trump-Kaiser similarity has also been noted by *Washington Post* columnist Richard Cohen (2017), who titled his May 1 column, “Germany used to have a leader like Trump,” adding that “it’s not who you think.”

Some parallels are obvious: flamboyant and erratic behavior, verbal bombast, childish language, a bullying interpersonal style, views changing by the day—or even the hour—often in response to the last person he talked to, and a “dangerous susceptibility to sycophantic flattery and backstairs intrigue” (Röhl, 2014, p. xvi). Both men even had narcissistic body anxiety focused on hands. (Wilhelm took pains to conceal his withered left arm, the result of a traumatic breech birth.) And Kaiser Wilhelm indulged his own early 20th century version of Tweet storms, particularly during crises. He would scribble bizarre, hasty, and often xenophobic comments in the margins of diplomatic telegrams and reports: for example, “How hollow the whole so-called Serbian power is proving itself to be”; “[British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward] Grey is a false dog who is afraid of his own cheapness and false policy”; or “Scoundrel! In spite of his written compact!”—this last a rant against Italian King Vittorio Emanuele III (Montgelas & Schücking, 1924, pp. 186, 462, 514).

More worrisome than Wilhelm's marginal scribbles, however, was his behavior in July 1914: as the crisis deepened, his uncertainty and ambivalence increased; but in the end, he went along with his generals. As the war descended into a stalemated slaughter, Wilhelm faded to a mere figurehead, ceding actual control of Germany to Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and General Erich Ludendorff. They pursued the chimera of victory until their forces practically disintegrated, leaving them no choice but to ask for an armistice—even as they denied Germany's defeat by making up the "stab in the back" legend that Hitler was able to exploit so effectively in the 1930s (Wheeler-Bennett, 1938, p. 200).

Analysis of Trump's motive profile, along with knowledge of other elements of his personality may help to anticipate and understand his performance as president. But of course some humility is in order, because it is certainly possible that the Trump presidency will overturn previous research findings, just as it has upended so much conventional wisdom about American politics and the presidency.

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TRUMP'S MOTIVES

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Table 1

*Brief Scoring Definitions and Action Correlates of the Achievement, Affiliation, and Power Motives*¹

	Achievement motive	Affiliation motive	Power motive
Verbal images scored	Concern about a standard of excellence, quality of performance, success in competition, or unique accomplishment	Concern about establishing, maintaining, or restoring warm friendly relations among persons or groups	Concern about having impact, control, or influence on another person, group, or the world at large; acquiring prestige
Actions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Moderate risks • Use feedback to modify performance • Entrepreneurial success • Dishonest when necessary to reach goal 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cooperative and friendly with similar friendly others • Defensive and even hostile with others who are dissimilar or disagree 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Successful leadership and high subordinates' morale, if responsibility high • Profligate impulsivity (alcohol, drugs, sex, aggression) if responsibility low

¹ Based on Winter (1996, chap. 5; 2002).

Negotiating style	Cooperative and "rational"	Cooperative when "safe;" defensive if threatened	Exploitative, aggressive
Seeks help from	Technical experts	Friends and similar others	Political "experts"

Table 2

Motive Scores of Trump and Previous 20th and 21st Century U.S. Presidents


President	Year	Standardized imagery/1,000 words ¹			Distance from Trump in SD units
		Achievement	Affiliation	Power	
Trump	2017	777	515	714	
Roosevelt, T.	1905	525	364	358	4.6
Taft	1909	391	361	482	4.8
Wilson	1913	552	429	454	3.5
Harding	1921	416	482	382	4.9
Coolidge	1925	387	413	402	5.1
Hoover	1929	562	402	416	3.8
Roosevelt, F.	1933	455	402	502	4.0
Truman	1949	464	523	597	3.3

¹ Overall *M* = 500 and *SD* = 100.

TRUMP'S MOTIVES

Eisenhower	1953	379	482	425	4.9
Kennedy	1961	438	657	611	3.8
Johnson	1965	470	489	423	4.2
Nixon	1969	560	602	457	3.5
Carter	1977	627	496	492	2.7
Reagan	1981	513	441	519	3.4
Bush, G.H.W.	1989	494	694	450	4.3
Clinton	1993	607	523	534	2.5
Bush, G.W.	2001	401	670	613	4.2
Obama	2009	483	555	670	3.0

Figure 1. Trends in Presidential Inaugural Motive Imagery, 1905 – 2017.



Biographical Note

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TRUMP'S MOTIVES

University of Oxford. He is a personality and social psychologist with a special interest in political psychology, including measurement of personality at a distance, psychological aspects of war and peace, and authoritarianism. He is the author of *Roots of War: Wanting Power, Seeing Threat, Justifying Force*, published in October 2017 by Oxford University Press. Previous publications include *The Power Motive*, a translation of Otto Rank's *The Don-Juan Legend, A New Case for the Liberal Arts, Personality: Analysis and Interpretation of Lives*, and numerous papers in academic journals.

He is a past president of the International Society of Political Psychology.

ⁱ An alternative interpretation would be that most political speeches are—like the political processes in which they originate—a group product, even if the leader's name is applied as an eponymous label. Perhaps then we should speak of the motives of the “inner circle of the Trump Administration,” rather than the motives of Donald Trump? However, if successful predictions can be made on the basis of inaugural-based motive scores (as seems to be the case, for example, in studies by Winter, 2001; 2002; 2009), then the precise ontological status of these scores may be less controversial.

ⁱⁱ The *Manual for scoring motive imagery in running text* and associated training materials are available online, without cost, at the Deep Blue archive of the University of Michigan Library, at this link: <https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/handle/2027.42/117563>. Since trained scorers attain a standard of category agreement and correlation $\geq .85$ with expert scoring, reliability calculations with an additional scorer were not considered necessary.

ⁱⁱⁱ However, previous early predictions from the inaugural address motive profiles of George W. Bush and Barack Obama were largely confirmed by subsequent events and outcomes (see Winter, 2001; 2009).

^{iv} While some Trump enterprises have been abandoned and others have gone bankrupt, that is an expected result of entrepreneurial risk-taking.

^v In countries with a parliamentary government, achievement-motivated leaders with parliamentary majority (rather than a coalition), such as Margaret Thatcher (Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1979 to 1990), may be more successful, because their parliamentary majority gives them more control over governmental processes.

^{vi} For example, power-motivated Franklin Roosevelt would assign the same tasks to multiple officials, thus preserving his own control as the final arbiter. He had incoming messages deciphered by the Army, and outgoing messages enciphered by the Navy; thus he was the only person who knew *everything* (see Hamilton, 2014, p. 152).

^{vii} Thus presidential power motivation is significantly associated with assassination attempts.

^{viii} For example, Richard Nixon scored low on extraversion (he once described himself as an “introvert in an extraverted profession”; see Mazlish, 1972/1973), but high on the affiliation motive (Winter et al., 1998).