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A Motivational Analysis of Russian Presidents, 1994 – 2018

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Abstract

This article analyzes the motivations of the three presidents of Russia since the end of the Soviet Union: Boris Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin, and Dmitry Medvedev. Imagery for the achievement, affiliation, and power motives was scored from the texts of annual presidential addresses to the Federal Assembly from 1994 through 2018. Although there were fluctuations from president to president, and from year to year within each term, the Russian presidents overall tended to be higher in achievement than power. This contrasts with many political leaders from other countries, and suggests modification in previous conclusions about the problems of high achievement motivation in politics. The scores of each president are related to the events and policies of that president's term of office. The third term of Vladimir Putin is particularly interesting, because his achievement scores were lower, and power and affiliation scores higher, than in his previous terms. These changes seem to fit with his changes in foreign and domestic policies from his earlier terms.

Personality of Russian Presidents: A Motivational Analysis, 1994 – 2018
When Is Personality Important in Politics?

Does personality matter in politics? The question has inspired many debates (see Jervis, 2013, for a thorough discussion of the many facets and implications of this question). Are situations and institutional frameworks more important for policy outcomes than is the personality of its leaders? Greenstein (1969/1975, chap. 2) suggested a middle position, specifying four conditions under which a political actor's personality is crucial for determining outcomes: (1) when the actor occupies a strategic position within the political system, (2) when the political situation is unstable, (3) when the situation requires spontaneous or especially effortful action, and/or (4) when role requirements for leadership are unclear.

All four conditions were undoubtedly met in Russia in the years after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Consider the first condition: The Constitution of the Russian Federation, adopted in 1993 and amended four years later, gives the president the right to propose a prime minister, appoint (and dismiss) ministers of foreign affirs, defense, national security, the interior, justice, and emergency situations (Semenova, 2015), as well as informing parliament and other authorities about major domestic and foreign developments. The resident can also propose specific legislation and initiatives, which have often been adopted by parliament and regional authorities (Dmitrieva, 2006).

Regarding the second condition, the collapse of communism and the Soviet Union triggered various simultaneous transformations—e.g., democratization of the political system, including the creation of a multi-party system and the adoption of free and secret elections; and liberalization of the economy, including privatization of state property (Semenova, 2012)—which taken together contributed to the country's instability. Consistent with Greenstein's third condition, Russian presidents were expected to act swiftly and forcefully in response to various challenges, including violent regional separatism (e.g., Chechnya), and economic disasters (e.g., the 1998 financial crisis and default on public and private debt). Finally, Greenstein's fourth condition was realized by the creation of the Russian presidency—a new institution with no prior role model or previous experience in democratic leadership. These events in post-communist Russia support our basic premise that the president's personality is likely to have played an important role in the political development of the Russian Federation.

In this article we present an at-a-distance analysis of the motives of the three Russian presidents who have served a combined six-plus terms: Boris Yeltsin (1991-1999), Vladimir

Putin (2000-2008 and 2012-   ), and Dmitry Medvedev (2008-2012). Each had successes and failures during his presidency. For example, Yeltsin helped to create a new, post-communist Russia by facilitating the multi-party political system and economic liberalization. However, his presidency also was associated with "wild" (i.e., corrupt) capitalism, dubious privatization deals, the financial collapse of 1998, and various territorial conflicts within Russia (e.g., in the Caucasus). During his first period in office, Putin worked to restore economic stability after the economic turbulence of the 1990s, but he also blocked political competition and conducted unpopular military actions. In his third period as president, Putin adopted a more confrontational foreign and military policy, including the annexation of the Crimea and extensive military involvement in the Syrian Civil War. Finally, Medvedev actively promoted technological modernization of the Russian economy, but he also continued some of Putin's most criticized policies, such as increasing Russia's military budget.

Personality in Politics: Theoretical Background and Empirical Framework

In reviewing research on political leaders' personalities, Winter (2003a; 2005; 2013) employed a conception of personality involving four distinct elements. For each element, Table 1 lists typical variables and cites a recent at-a-distance study of a political leader that ois based on that element.

Insert Table 1 near here

Social contexts. A leader's many macro- and micro- social contexts (lower-right cell of Table 1) can be assessed using traditional biographical, historical, cultural, and sociological sources of information and data. For example, in recent years *gender* has emerged from decades of scholarly neglect, as an important context of any leader—male no less than female (see Oxley, 2016, and Smith, 2018).

Traits. The adjectives that describe publicly observable regularities of people's behavior constitute their traits. These are traditionally measured through adjective checklists or questionnaires filled out either by the people themselves or by others who know them (friends, teachers, associates). For trait studies of leaders at a distance, these questionnaires are usually filled out by biographers or other experts, as in the Rubenzer and Faschlngbauer (2004) study of US presidents.

Cognitions. Cognitions include a wide variety of concepts and variables involving beliefs (what is), values (what ought to be), and cognitive styles (such as integrative

complexity; Suedfeld, 2010) measured through analysis of verbal or written texts. One of the most widely used cognitive variables is operational code, which represents the leader's *consciously-expressed* view of the nature of the world and politics. Operational codes have been inferred from philosophical and instrumental beliefs, as in Dyson's (2001) study of Vladimir Putin, or calculated by computer analysis of various combinations of verbs and other words, as in Dyson and Parent's (2018) later analysis of Putin.

  Motives. The current study involves motives—the element of personality providing direction (goals) and energy (physiological and behavioral mobilization) for action. Motives are *implicit*, in that they often operate outside of conscious attention. In contrast, people's self-reports are likely to reflect "reasons" (that is, beliefs about what their motives *ought* to be), as well as dissimulation, impression-formation, or even repression, rather than the actual motives themselves. Thus motives are often measured by content analysis of verbal and written texts, using experimentally-derived scoring systems in the McClelland-Atkinson tradition (see Winter, 1973, chap. 3; 1998b). These scoring systems consist of verbal images and themes occurring more often in imaginative texts written after the relevant motive has been experimentally aroused, as compared to text written under a neutral condition. Implicit motives measured in this way (see below) are the personality variables used in the present article.

  "Motive" is a hybrid concept: motives are stable dispositions, with different persons having different characteristic levels; but they are also variable states, depending on what incentives are present, how recently the motive was satisfied, and whether there are competing motives. (This variability makes possible experimental arousal of motives in order to develop scoring systems.) The stable and variable aspects of motives can be illustrated with the case of hunger. Hunger and eating vary over time: even the hungriest person eventually stops eating and turns to other goals. However, we readily distinguish "big" and "small" appetites as a stable dimension of individual difference that involves the number and variety of foods ("stimuli") that can arouse hunger, the slopes and maximum levels of hunger arousal, and the slopes of hunger decay after consummatory behavior (i.e., eating). Finally, implicit motives can also change over the course of life, in response to specific events, experiences, and institutions (See Densiunger & Brandstätter, 2018, for a review).

  Multivariate personality assessment. There is extensive evidence that measures from the four different elements of personality are empirically unrelated as well as conceptually distinct, even if their names seem similar. Thus implicit and self-report (or cognitive) measures of the presumed "same" motive are usually uncorrelated (Köllner &

Schultheiss, 2014), and both affiliation and power implicit motives are unrelated to the trait of extraversion (Poeller, Birk, Baumann, & Mandryk, 2018; Winter, John, Stewart, Klohnen, & Duncan, 1998). However, as Winter et al. (1998) demonstrated, trait variables such as extraversion or neuroticism can *channel* the expression of motives in quite different ways.

Since all four elements contribute to personality, leader assessments that include variables from multiple elements are likely to be the most complete and predictively useful. Some at-a-distance studies do attempt this; for example, Hermann's (1984; 2003) widely used Leader Trait Assessment system, which Cuhadar, Kaarbo, Kesgin, and Ozkececi-Taner (2017) employed to study three Turkish prime ministers. In this article, we present data on the motivation personality element of three Russian presidents. It would certainly be useful to add HEXACO (Ashton & Lee, 2007) or Big Five (McCrae & Costa, 2008) trait ratings, operational codes, and social context descriptions, if these were to become available for all three presidents.

Motivational Dimensions of Personality:

Measurement and Behavioral Outcomes

Insert Table 2 near here

Motive Scoring

Table 2 presents brief summaries of the scoring definitions of the three motives.[1] The *achievement* motive is scored for an expressed concern or desire for excellence, and doing a better job. For example, in a political interview, sentences like "Our economy is the only economy in the world with five percent growth" are scored as an achievement image. Scoring for *affiliation* involves reference to warm, friendly relations with other people or even nations (or concern and sadness about damaged relations), or mention of unity among persons or groups. An example sentence would be "We should be compassionate towards refugees." Finally, the *power* motive is operationalized as concern about having impact on others, prestige, or reputation. A political example would be "Our country is the dominant power in Europe."

Researchers may wonder whether motive imagery, defined in this way by experimental arousal, be scored by computer. Eventually this may be possible, but efforts to date have produced only moderate correlations (between +.31 and +.54) between computer and human scoring (see Pennebaker & King, 1999; Schultheiss, 2013)—well below the usual standard of human inter-scorer reliability (at least +.85) used in implicit motive imagery

research (Smith, Feld, & Franz, 1992, p. 526; Winter, 1991, p. 67). The reason is probably that these automated motive imagery scorings were based on individual *words* as the unit of analysis, whereas human scoring engages one of the most complex, abstract human abilities—to recognize similarities ("images" or "themes") that may not contain any identical elements ("words").

Insert Table 3 near here

Behavioral Outcomes of Three Motivational Dimensions

Decades of research have shown that each motivational dimension is related to characteristic specific actions and behavioral outcomes, as shown in Table 3. Winter's (2010) review showed that people who score high in achievement motivation tend to be successful business leaders, particularly in small or high-tech companies, because they anticipate societal trends, develop strategies and innovations, and organize labor and capital. Moreover, they excel at processing information and modifying their performance in response to a changing environment. They are hard and persistent workers, but *only* if they have some measure of control over outcomes and they assess their chances of success as realistic. Among the negative features of achievement-oriented behavior is a tolerance for illegal actions if they help to attain their goals, (This tolerance has obvious implications for politics, as will be discussed in the next section.)

In contrast, people who score high in the affiliation motive are not interested in unique accomplishments, but rather in communicating and spending time with other people and helping them. Because they seek out other people who are similar to themselves, whom they like, and who like them, they develop networks of social support. However, they are less agreeable and friendly when working or communicating with people they do not like or understand, or whom they see as "different" from themselves. In extreme and stressful situations, they may become defensive or even aggressive. Because affiliation-oriented people tend to rely on subtle gestures or words to interpret others' behavior, their reactions to others may appear unstable and erratic. Finally, affiliation-oriented people typically do not perform well in competitive situations.

People scoring high in power motivation are often active in organizations and professions where they can have a direct impact on others, such as teaching, journalism, or politics (Winter, 1992). They tend to be successful leaders in large organizations by creating high morale among subordinates (even though they may not be liked by everyone). They are

adept at building alliances with lower-status people, and they perform well in small groups where they can define the situation and develop strategies. If combined with altruism, self-control, and a sense of responsibility, power-motivated people may positively influence others. However, when their self-control is low, power-oriented people may be so competitive and aggressive that they disregard moral principles and social norms. They may be vulnerable to taking extreme risks, alcohol or drug abuse, sexual exploitation, and verbal or physical aggression.

Previous Research on the Motivation of Political Leaders

Numerous studies have extended the validity of motive imagery scoring to at-a-distance analysis of political leaders and historical figures (see reviews by Winter, 2003a; 2013; 2019). Winter (2002, p. 28) scored achievement, affiliation, and power motive imagery scores of first inaugural addresses of American presidents from George Washington to George W. Bush, later adding scores for Obama (Winter, 2011a) and Trump (Winter, 2018b). Researchers have also studied the motives and behavioral outcomes of individual leaders, such as Richard Nixon (Winter & Carlson, 1988), George H. W. Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev (Winter, Hermann, Weintraub, & Walker, 1991), Bill Clinton, and Saddam Hussein (Winter, 1998a; 2003b). Motive variables were included in studies of Canadian political leaders (Suedfeld, Conway III, & Eichhorn, 2001), 1996 Russian presidential candidates (Valenty & Shiraev, 2001), and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu (Kimhi, 2001). Related measures of power and affiliation motives (along with other characteristics measured at a distance) have been used to construct personality profiles of various world leaders (Hermann, 1983; 1988; Snare, 1992).

Studies of behaviors and outcomes associated with presidential motives have found that power motivation is associated with historians' ratings of "presidential greatness" (see also Winter, 2010). In contrast, although achievement motivation (usually associated with entrepreneurial success in business) was related to ratings of idealism, it was unrelated or even negatively related to rated presidential performance. Winter (2010) suggested that in democratic politics, as contrasted with business, many factors are outside presidents' control. In frustration, they may change staff (for example, Donald Trump), cut ethical corners (Richard Nixon), micromanage (Jimmy Carter), or exhaust themselves physically (Woodrow Wilson). Depending on the level of frustration and the structure and traditions of the political system, the "illegal" aspect of high achievement motivation noted above may emerge as corruption[2], even a full-blown kleptocracy—or in extreme cases, a military coup d'etat, as Winter (2002, p. 35) observed in a sample of 30 world leaders of the 1970s.

Power-motivated presidents (Franklin Roosevelt, Kennedy, Reagan) are better able to manage these frustrations of politics through a variety of strategies such as humor or using personal representatives to cut through bureaucracy. Affiliation-motivated presidents tend to conclude arms limitation agreements, but are vulnerable to political scandals—perhaps because they are overly influenced by those they perceive to be friends.

Research on leaders from other countries has replicated some of these results. For example, an analysis of twenty-two southern African leaders (Winter 1980) showed a strong correlation between leaders' level of power motivation and experts' assessments of their propensity to use violence. In a sample of 45 world leaders, Hermann (1980b) found that affiliation-oriented leaders adopted cooperative foreign policies, whereas power-motivated leaders were more confrontational. And in a sample of Soviet Politburo members in the 1970s, Hermann (1980a) showed that high affiliation and low power motivation were positively related to a pro-detente stance toward the United States and Western Europe.

Study Design and Methods

The research reported in this article was designed to assess the characteristic achievement, affiliation, and power motive imagery of the three presidents of Russia since the end of the Soviet Union, over the years of their holding that office. Using these scores, we then interpret some of their actions and performance in office, and suggest possible future outcomes.

Identifying Documents

The Russian presidents' motives were scored from verbatim texts of their annual presidential addresses to the Federal Assembly (upper and lower chambers of the Russian parliament), along with top government officials, religious leaders, and media representatives. These speeches were selected for analysis because they were given on comparable occasions, to comparable audiences. With situational influences thus standardized and controlled insofar as possible, differences in motive imagery scores are more likely to reflect actual personality levels—and perhaps even more important, changes in these levels over time.

Yeltsin's addresses began in 1994 and usually occurred in February or March. Putin's first address was in July 2000, but the next three took place in April or May. Since 2008, these speeches have been given toward the end of the year, usually in November or December. (There was no 2017 address, but an address was given in March 2018.) Transcripts of these speeches are published on the president's web site.[3]

Scoring Documents

The 24 presidential addresses to the Federal Assembly from 1994 through 2018 were copied into separate documents. Each document was then divided into separate one-page excerpts and each excerpt was given a unique identification number. All excerpts were randomly mixed together and scored for achievement, affiliation, and power motive imagery, according to the manual developed by Winter (1994), by trained, expert scorers who had demonstrated the .85 scoring reliability on material pre-coded by expert scorers that is the standard for motive imagery research (Smith, Feld, & Franz, 1992, p. 526). Scorers were blind to the date of the address, the name of the president, and the hypotheses underlining this study. The results for each speech were expressed in terms of motive images per 1,000 words.

Results

Table 4 gives the date, length, and motive scores for each speech, as well as *M*s and *SD*s for each presidential term, and for all 24 speeches. Overall, achievement was slightly (though not quite significantly) higher than power; as might be expected in political speeches of this kind, affiliation imagery scores were much lower. A one-way ANOVA of the 24 scores showed only a near-significant difference among the three presidents in affiliation (F = 3.16, df = 2, 21, p = .063), with Putin significantly higher, and Medvedev nonsignificantly higher, than Yeltsin. Putin showed significantly higher variance in power than Yeltsin, and significantly higher variance in achievement than Medvedev.

Insert Table 4 near here

Copnsidering the scores of all three presidents, achievement and power varied over time, but without significant trends. Affiliation, however, increased significantly over time across (r between year and affiliation images/1000 words = +.64, p < .001). The three presidents showed different patterns of motive change over time. Over his six years as president, Yeltsin declined oin all three motives (significant only for power, r = -.82, p = .048), perhaps reflecting his declining health and increased cognitive problems. Over four years, Medvedev showed a significant increase in achievement motivation (r = .95, p = .051). Over 14 years (with a 4-year gap between the eighth and ninth years as president), Putin showed a striking and significant increase in affiliation (r = .72, p <.01).

Insert Figures 1 and 2 near here

To facilitate comparisons across motives and presidential terms, Figure 1 presents the

average motive scores by term, based on individual speech scores that were standardized separately for each motive, with overall $M = 500$ and $SD = 100$. (This is close to the standardization formerly used on the Scholastic Aptitude Test and Graduate Records Examination.) Figure 2 presents the ratio of (unstandardized) achievement to power. Based on Winter's (2010) analysis of achievement motivation in politics, this can be taken as a measure of the president's potential to experience frustration in the political sphere. Compared to US presidents (Winter, 2002), all three Russian presidents scored high. The decrease of this ratio, from Putin's first two terms and from Medvedev's term, to Putin's third term is of special interest (for the former comparison, Ms = 1.63 and .95, SDs = .61 and .18; $t = 2.66$, $df = 8$, $p = .029$). The change suggests that Putin's motivational shift from achievement to power coincided with a corresponding change in strategies of control (see Winter, 2010, pp. 1649-1650), greater success in gaining that control, and consequently fewer frustrations and more satisfactions. These changes will be discussed in greater detail below.

Motive Scores and Presidential Actions and Outcomes

Are the motive scores of Russian presidents associated with actions and outcomes in the same ways as they are among US presidents and other world leaders? The small number of presidents makes it difficult to answer to this question with the usual statistical procedures (e.g., as Winter, 2002, has done with US presidents and Hermann, 1980a, with Soviet Politburo members); nevertheless, the scores can be used to interpret aspects of Russian presidential politics and history during the 1995-2018 period, focusing especially on the relative achievement and power scores. Winter's (2010) research has shown that leaders with achievement imagery higher than power imagery are vulnerable to the frustrations of politics; in contrast, low scorers are more successful in politics, but are vulnerable to the dangers of untamed power drives—most notably aggression. Finally, we compare our findings to previous findings on Soviet leaders and American presidents, and formulate theoretical and practical implications of our study.

Boris Yeltsin

For the three speeches during his first term, Yeltsin's scores for each motive were similar to the overall averages for all 24 speeches. During his second term, however, average scores on all three motives were the lowest of any presidential term. This contrasts sharply with his earlier Soviet-era image as an economic and political reformer, or his role in profoundly transformating Russian politics and economy after the end of the Soviet Union. These 1997-99 motive levels doubtless reflect his age and especially his many health problems—heart disease, alcoholism, neurological disorders ("Yeltsin's health record,"

1999). Thus at the time of his December 31, 1999 resignation, an American journalist wrote that "Yeltsin, who had once been the epitome of vigor and energy, at the end was often hidden, isolated and ill at his country dacha" (Hoffman, 2000).

Earlier, Yeltsin's February 1996 speech shortly before his re-election emphasized Russia's extraordinary achievements during his first term, showed a very high achievement-power ratio of 1.49. Yet for all these accomplishments, Yeltsin experienced the characteristic frustration of achievement motivation in politics, as his reforms became mired in confrontations with the so-called oligarchs who controlled the Rusian economy and with the Communist-controlled State Duma (lower chamber of parliament) and regional authorities, as well as his declining popularity (White, 2011). His final 1999 address, with achievement motivation at its lowest point and power motivation increased, coincided with an attempt at strengthening federal control over regional authorities.

Dmitry Medvedev

On average, Medvedev's four speeches scored very high in achievement imagery, with the highest achievement-power ratio (1.64) of the three presidents. This pattern is consistent with his reputation as an able modernizing administrator, as well as with many of his actions as president.[4] In his November 2009 remarks on the global financial crisis, for example, he proposed modernizing the Russian economy by emphasizing high technology and innovation. (This speech had the highest achievement-power ratio (2.29) of all 24 presidential speeches.) One of his final presidential accomplishments was the completion of Russia's entry into the World Trade Organization, which augured well for the Russian economy. Appropriately enough, the formal accession ceremony occurred a few days before Medvedev's final speech to the Federal Assembly, which had the highest level of achievement imagery of his four speeches.

Medvedev's first address in November 2008, however, showed the opposite pattern, with power greater than achievement (achievement-power ratio of 0.86). This speech occurred only three months after the brief but intense war between Russia and Georgia. The conflict had roots going back to the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution and was focused on South Ossetia and Abkazia, two formerly autonomous regions of Georgia whose independence was supported by Russia but not recognized by Georgia or most other countries. More broadly, the conflict highlighted complex and problematic relations between Russia, many former Soviet republics, and the West. Thus Medvedev's elevated power motive score in that 2008 speech can be linked to that border conflict, which is consistent with Winter's (2018a) research relating high levels of power motivation to conflict escalation and war.

Vladimir Putin—First and Second Terms

Putin's motive profiles are of special interest, both because as of 2019 he has served much longer than any other Russian president, and also because his third-term profile (2012-2018) is quite different from that of his first two terms (2000-2007). Changes in Putin's motive profile can perhaps explain some of the great differences in actions and outcomes between the two periods of his presidency.

In five of eight speeches during Putin's first two terms, achievement was higher than power. This is consistent with his early focus on career preparation and success, as well as his hard work and persistence when the chances of success are at least moderate (see Putin, Gevorkyan, Timakova, & Kolesnikov, 2000, pp. 1-44 passim). Looking back on his first two terms, he recalled that "all these eight years I plowed like a slave on galleys, from morning to night, and did it with all my might" (RIA Novosti, 2008).

Achievement-motivated successes. Consistent with his relatively high achievement motivation scores, Putin initially focused on rebuilding an economy seriously weakened by the 1998 crisis, and strengthening central authority over regions. Opposition from the oligarchs, who had grown powerful during Yeltsin's presidency, could have created a problem of control typical of those encountered by achievement-motivated political leaders (see Winter, 2010, pp. 1646-1649); however, Putin was able to break their power by controlling the media and launching criminal prosecutions of major oligarchs such as Mikhail Khodorkovsky (YUKOS petroleum conglomerate) and Vladimir Gusinskiy (Media-Most conglomerate). These "powerful" actions were given an achievement-related rationale—that "the basic reforms and privatization of the 1990s were so flawed and unfair that they created an unstable business environment" (Goldman, 2004, p. 34).

In 2004, Putin countered centrifugal tendencies within Russia by abolishing regional gubernatorial elections. Instead, regional parliaments selected governors from a set of candidates proposed by the Russian president; moreover, governors can be dismissed by the president (Semenova, 2012). Governors of the national republics within Russia also lost their unilateral power to collect taxes and sign international treaties.

Overall, during Putin's first two terms several factors made it relatively easy to exert strong control, while shielding him from many of the problems encountered by US presidents with high achievement motivation (see Winter, 2010): the newness of the Russian political structures and procedures, the magnitude of the problems, public opposition to the emerging oligarchs, and Russia's improving economic situation, helped by high world prices for oil and gas. (Between 2000 and 2007, per-year GNP growth improved to 7.2 percent; see

International Monetary Fund, 2018). Finally, strengthened central authority in the regions was perceived positively by the general population (Levada-Center, 2018).

Foreign affairs problems. On the other hand, the Russian economic success was tempered by several continuing problems in foreign affairs that arose during Putin's first two terms, which may be connected with his occasional bursts of power motive imagery.[5] For example, the high power score of his 2000 first speech was likely a response to the previous year's Wahhabi Islamic movement attacks in the Dagestan region (adjacent to Chechnya), which led to the Second Chechen War as well as terrorist attacks in Moscow and elsewhere. His 2006 power score of 28.90—the highest of all 24 presidential speeches—may have been affected by the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute.

Initially Putin maintained a cooperative relationship with the West; for example, assisting the United States after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. However, this cooperation failed to deflect NATO from expanding right up to the borders of Russia. By March 2004, NATO included virtually all of the Warsaw Pact countries as well as the three Baltic Republics formerly part of the Soviet Union—*despite* the common impression of US assurances that NATO would not expand eastward.[6] And only three months after the September 11 attacks, and despite Russian criticism, US President George W. Bush withdrew from the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty with the Soviet Union. Subsequent plans for a US-led missile defense system based in Poland and the Czech Republic were seen by Russian leaders as ignoring their concerns. Finally, toward the end of Putin's first term the U.S. invaded Iraq, despite opposition from Russia (as well as France and many other countries). Overall, Putin's ambition to have Russia's status as a great power restored and recognized (a Russian quest that dates back to medieval times; see Neumann, 2008a; 2008b) seemed to have been blocked.

Vladimir Putin—Third Term

After serving four years as Prime minister during Medvedev's presidential term, Putin was elected to his third term in 2012 and then a fourth term in March 2018.[7] His third-term speeches showed a very different motive profile from those of his earlier terms. Power was quite high: five of the six third-term speeches scored above the overall mean of the 24 speeches, and all six had achievement/power ratios below the mean. Many policies and events of Putin's third term fit with this changed profile.

Increased power motivation, relative to achievement. The effects of Putin's increased power motivation were visible in both words and deeds. The overthrow of Ukrainian President Yanukovich in February 2014 set off the greatest crisis between Russia

and the West since the end of the Cold War. Shortly after Yanukovich fled to Russia, Russian troops and pro-Russian paramilitary groups took control of the Crimean peninsula (historically part of the Russian Empire, but since 1954 part of Ukraine[8]); in late March, Russia formally annexed Crimea. Despite Western economic sanctions, fighting between pro-Russian forces and Ukrainian government troops has continued in the eastern Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine (referred to by Putin as the historical Novorossiya or "New Russia").

In December 2014 Putin promulgated a "new military doctrine" that amounted to a "sea change" in Russian foreign policy and security and defense postures. The doctrine listed as "key military risks" the enhanced capabilities of NATO, "which brings the alliance infrastructure closer to Russia's borders," and "foreign force deployments close to Russia" as well as US ballistic missile defense plans and its Global Strike[9] concept. In addition, the notion of "military risk" was further elaborated to include information and communication technologies (Trenin, 2014).

In September 2015, Russia intervened in the Syrian Civil War against several groups fighting Syrian government forces (and in many cases fighting among themselves), including a coalition of opposition groups opposed to Bashar al-Assad and supported by various Middle Eastern countries, as well as the United States. Russia also opposed the Islamic State (ISIS). All these military actions were consistent with Putin's elevated third-term power motivation scores. They also appeared to reflect his nostalgia for Russia's lost superpower status, which had earlier led him to claim that "the collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the [20th] century."[10]

Partly as a consequence of these policies, Russian relationships with the United States, the European Union, and Ukraine deteriorated considerably during Putin's third term.[11] Economic sanctions imposed on Russia by American and many West European countries were criticized by the Russian leadership, with Putin feeling "rage at being told what he could do and not do in what he considered his own backyard" (Shane & Mazzetti, 2018). Russian cyber-hacking and internet influence capabilities were mobilized to interfere with the November 2016 US presidential election—wreaking revenge on former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, helping the campaign of her opponent Donald Trump, and more generally destabilizing democratic attitudes and processes (Jamieson, 2018; Shane & Mazzetti, 2018). Similar Russian cyber attempts to sway public opinion through social media were launched during the June 2016 "Brexit" referendum in the Unied Kingdom (House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee, 2018, section 5), the May 2017 French

presidential election (Willsher & Henley, 2017) and the November 2018 US midterm Congressional election (Goldman, 2018).

Despite enjoying a broad public support for his foreign policy (Levada-Center, 2018), Putin's third term also brought domestic protests that elicited official crackdowns, beginning with December 2011 protests claiming the parliamentary election was flawed, and including the famous performance of the feminist punk rock group Pussy Riot inside Moscow's Cathedral of Christ the Savior, for which three group members were convicted of "hooliganism" (a catch-all term for unapproved behavior). In March 2017, demonstrations— some legal, most illegal—protesting "blatant and unabashed corruption" and "enthusiasm for challenging the authorities" took place in 100 Russian cities and towns (Higgins & Kramer, 2017).

Taken together, these foreign (specifically military) and domestic actions of the Russian leadership can be readily understood as expressions of Putin's increased power motivation (desire to have impact), as well as decreased achievement orientation (rational cooperation in pursuit of excellent outcomes).

Increased affiliation motivation. Finally, during his third term Putin's affiliation imagery scores imagery increased substantially and significantly over those of his first period as president (Ms and [SDs] = 5.93 [2.16] and 2.89 [.90], respectively; $t = 3.61$, $p = .004$), as well as those of Yeltsin ($t = 3.67$, $p = .002$) and Medvedev ($t = 2.65$, $p = .035$). At the same time, Putin's public opinion rating (approval minus disapproval) actually declined slightly, from an average of 54 percent to 53 percent (data from the Levada Analytical Center, which has been critical oif the Kremlin; Levada-Center, 2018). A closer examination of the relationship between Putin's approval ratings and his affiliation imagery shows an interesting difference between Putin's first and second periods as president. During his first two terms, there was a strong *negative* relationship between Putin's approval rating during the two months before each speech and the level of affiliation in that speech ($r = -.73$, $p = .041$). In other words, *declines* in Putin's approval were followed by *increased* affiliation imagery. In everyday language: in 2000-2007, when Putin perceived that he is not liked, his concern with establishing friendly relations increased. In 2012-2018, however, this relationship disappeared ($r = -.11$, $p = ns$), even though the affiliation levels in this period were much higher. during this latter period, Putin's approval ratings did not affect his subsequent expression of affiliation imagery.

How can Putin's changing levels of affiliation motivation be explained and understood? Given his public persona of tough and unsmiling austere virility, the notion that

Putin might have high affiliation motivation (particularly in his third term) may seem surprising—even impossible. While it is true that the affiliation motive *can* lead people to have warm friendly relations with others, it can also lead to defensive, even aggressive reactions. The critical factor is how those "others" are perceived: are they close, similar, agreeing with and liking one's self? Or are they distant, dissimilar, disagreeing, and disliking? This "closeness-similarity-agreeing-liking" complex is key understanding the duality of affiliation motivation: high levels make people friendlier to their friends, *and* more hostile to those perceived as "enemies." An illustrative example from terrorism research: Smith (2008) and Winter (2011b) found that documents from terrorist organizations scored actually higher in affiliation motivation than similar documents from matched nonterrorist organizations—but that affiliation motive was directed *only* toward their own groups, rather than to other groups or people in general. In other words, terrorists do not lack concerns for affiliation and love; rather, they channel such concerns exclusively toward their own group.

In the light of Putin's strong support of traditional Russian historical, territorial, cultural, and religious beliefs and values—including persecution of members of "extremist" organizations such as Jehovah's Witnesses (Chan, 2017; Higgins, 2018), his increased third-term levels of affiliation imagery seem to be directed only toward the ingroup—an ideological, ethnic, and historical "enclave Russia"—the doctrine that "Moscow is the Third Rome"—and so must be preserved, protected, and defended against perceived threats from decadent and godless "western" values and practices.

Understanding Putin's motive profile change. What caused the substantial change in Putin's motive profiles between his first two terms and his third term? The experiences and results of those first two terms, as noted by Trenin (2015) may provide a clue. In the early years of his first term, Putin did extol "Russia's existing or potential great power status" (Light, 2015, p. 15), but he also sought "to restore and upgrade Russian-Western relations," particularly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks (p. 34). Although these overtures continued into Medvedev's administration, Putin became disillusioned with what he saw as poor results. When he resumed the presidency in 2012, "the renowned pragmatist had turned into a missionary"; rather than integrate with the West, he would preserve "Russia's distinct identity in a highly competitive global environment" (p. 35). To summarize: Putin's expressed motives changed—from frustrated achievement to power and control—in response to perceived changes in the situation, especially the actions of foreign and domestic counterplayers.

These contrasting ways in which high affiliation motivation can be expressed are also

reflected in analyses of Putin's operational code at different points in his presidency. At the beginning of his first term, Dyson (2001) pointed out that his belief in harmonious relations was highly contingent, suggesting that for Putin, "political life is harmonious to the degress that it is governed and regulated by norms, laws and rules" (p. 334), but with the condition that he would not "act in a norm-bound manner when those with which he is engaged do not." Thus "Putin is unlikely to 'stick to the rules' in the face of deviation by another, in the hope that his own conformity will eventually encourage a reciprocation" (p. 344).

In a later analysis, using automated text coding, Dyson and Parent (2018) suggested that because "re-establishing the power of the state, and specifically the presidency, has been a priority . . . Putin's military interventions, in particular toward Chechnya, Ukraine, and Syria, are fundamentally about his perception that chaos and state weakness are existential threats" (p. 93). Similarly, the outster of Ukrainian President Yanukovych "was seen by Putin as another example of what he portrayed as Western-orchestrated regime changes," with himself "potentially the next target" (p. 94).[12] Thus he came to see the United States, the European Union, and NATO as more and more hostile.[13]

Comparing Russian Presidents to Soviet General Secretaries and U.S. Presidents

For political leaders as well as ordinary people, one of the most familiar and accessible ways of describing a person is to compare them to some other familiar person: for example, "She reminds me of *X*," or "He is the complete opposite of *Y*." Motive profiles can be used to refine such comparisons and the predictions that can be derived from them. Because the three achievement, affiliation, and power motives are conceptualized as defining orthogonal dimensions of a three-dimensional space (power as up-down, achievement as forward-backward, affiliation as near-far), each person's profile can be represented as a point in that space. The similarity of any two motive profiles is therefore the inverse of the 3-dimensional distance between their respective points, adapting the familiar Euclidian formula:

$$Distance = \sqrt{D_{ach}^2 + D_{aff}^2 + D_{pow}^2}$$

In this equation, D_{ach} = the difference between the two achievement scores, D_{aff} = the difference in affiliation scores, and D_{pow} = the difference in power scores. (To weight the motives equally, scores on each motive are standardized separately.)

Table 5 presents the results of comparing the average profiles of each Russian presidential term with those of two other groups of leaders: (a) the four General Secretaries of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union between 1924 and 1991 (Josef Stalin, Nikita

Khrushchev, Leonid Brezhnev, and Mikhail Gorbachev), based on their first "Political report [or Organizational Report] of the Central Committee" to a party congress (data from Schmitt & Winter, 1998)[14]; and (b) US presidents of the 20th and 21st centuries, based on their first inaugural addresses (from Winter, 2002; 2011a; 2018b). Motive scores were standardized, separately for each motive, within each comparison groups.

Insert Table 5 near here

Based on similarity of motive profile, Yeltsin most closely resembled an interesting—and seemingly quite diverse—array of other leaders: in his first term, US presidents Ronald Reagan and Woodrow Wilson, and Soviet leader Brezhnev; in his second term, presidents Calvin Coolidge and Franklin Roosevelt, and Stalin. (Unlike these leaders, Yeltsin scored below average on all three motives, but V-shaped *profile*—achievement and power *relatively* high, affiliation much lower—does resemble the profiles of these four leaders.

Medvedev resembled several more liberal leaders: Gorbachev, and presidents Wilson and Lyndon Johnson. Throughout his periods as president, Putin most closely resembled Brezhnev among Soviet leaders—even more closely in his third term. (It is interesting that Russians consider Putin and Brezhnev as the best political leaders since the early 20th century; Levada-Center, 2017.) In his first two terms, he also resembled presidents Reagan, Wilson, and Franklin Roosevelt, but later he came to resemble the more combative Kennedy and Truman. It is interesting—and perhaps consequential for Russian-US relations—that Donald Trump is consistently among the *least* similar US presidents to all three Russian presidents.

Insert Figure 3 near here

Figure 3 presents the year-by-year motive profile "distances" between the profiles of Russian and US presidents during the 1994-2018 period. The US profiles are based on each president's first inaugural address, whereas the Russian profiles are based on the averages of those speeches that occurred during the corresponding US president's time in office. During this period the average distance between Russian and US presidents—2.36 standard-deviation units—was relatively great, with Yeltsin-Clinton and Putin 3rd term-Obama as slightly more similar to each other, in comparison to the other three pairs. Whether these distances (or changes in them over time) are related to the state of relations between the two countries is an

interesting topic for future research.

Discussion

Rethinking the Theory of Achievement Motivation in Politics

This article provides a new perspective on the fate of achievement motivation in politics. Overall, the Russian speeches show higher levels of achievement motivation, relative to power, than do US presidential inaugural addresses. In the Russian presidents we do see some traces of the "problems" of achievement motivation identified by Winter (2010); nevertheless, they do not seem as frustrated, even immobilized, as do their achievement-motivated US counterparts. While some of the motive imagery differences may reflect differences in the occasion and type of speech, or even liberal-versus-conservative scoring of motive imagery, they may also reflect differences in political institutions and structures, and even national history.

In a political system of checks and balances, such as the United States, a president's scope for making decisions and implementing policies is likely to be constrained by other institutions of government. In such systems, power-motivated presidents are likely to be more successful because they enjoy and are adept at playing in political "scrimmages," as well as appealing to voters. On the other hand, Winter (2010, p. 1661) pointed out that prime ministers by definition usually enjoy a legislative majority (unless they head a coalition or a minority government, or their party is in disarray); thus an achievement-motivated leader in parliamentary systems may have a less obstructed path to control. The Russian data suggest another contrast: while transitioning to democratcy, formerly-authoritarian countries may require—and—reward, transformational leaders (see Burns, 1978) who are likely to have high levels of achievement motivation, and who are able to reorganize and create new economic and political structures—rather than transactional leaders who may have other motives, such as power.

Limitations

There are limitations to the present research. Following prior studies of motivational profiles of U.S. presidents (Winter 2002), we have calculated motive profiles through content analysis of regular formal public speeches, but the analysis could be expanded to include more frequent and less formal remarks, such as at news conferences. More systematic dependent variables, for example reflecting military action or pooled judgments of expert observers, could be calculated from archival sources or surveys.

In this article, as in past research on political leaders (e.g., Winter, 2002), we have assumed that presidents express their motivational profiles in their public speeches, in

particular, their annual addresses. Testing this assumption in a wider variety of situational and institutional settings would add to our understanding of presidential motivation, and taking into account additional settings would allow for larger sample sizes and greater variation in motive imagery. Moreover, considering the motive profiles of presidents and their interaction with followers could be useful for exploring and understanding charismatic leadership.

Finally, increased understanding of the motivational profiles of transformational versus transactional leaders can open up new avenues of research in political contexts. For example, some post-Soviet countries (in particular, the Baltic countries) successfully democratized, most post-Soviet countries of Central Asia (e.g., Turkmenistan) and Russia under Putin have become consolidated authoritarian regimes (Freedom House, 2018). Future studies could explore the role of political leaders in this "authoritarian backsliding."

Footnotes

[1] The complete system for scoring motive imagery in running text, along with practice materials and expert scoring, is available at no cost at this website: https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/handle/2027.42/117563

[2] For 38 US presidents from George Washington through Barack Obama, achievement motivation is significantly correlated with estimated peak wealth expressed in 2016 US dollars ($r = .27$, 1-tailed $p = .05$). While this is *consistent* with a connection between achievement motivation and political corruption/kleptocracy, it certainly does not *prove* such a link. Presidential wealth data are taken from < https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_presidents_of_the_United_States_by_net_worth >.

[3] Available online at < www.kremlin.ru/events >; English translations available online at < en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/messages

[4] Some analysts have asked whether Medvedev was his own man, or rather a place-holder ("puppet"?) for Putin. While the answer would be relevant to the analysis of Medvedev as a person, it does not affect the analysis of the Russian president as a *role*. As with US presidents, the speeches and scores can be considered as reflecting the motives and

personalities of the loose collectivity referred to as "the administration" or "the Russian government" (see Winter, 2002, pp., 46-47). The real question is whether the resulting scores lead to accurate predictions about the actions and outcomes.

[5] Domestic factors, such as the mass protests of unpopular reforms of social benefits and hunger strikes by State Duma parliamentarians, which precipitated the first decrease in Putin's popularity (Levada-Center, 2018), may also have contributed to Putin's increased power imagery in 2004.

[6] For a recent dialog on the question of US guarantees about NATO expansion, see the exchange by Kramer and Itzkowitz Shifrinson (2017). The December 2017 and March 2018 postings of declassified US, Soviet, German, British, and French documents by the National Security Archive supports the notion that the US gave guarantees against expansion. These postings are available online at https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansion-what-gorbachev-heard-western-leaders-early and https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2018-03-16/nato-expansion-what-yeltsin-heard

[7] The length of presidential terms was increased from four to six years in December 2008, but this did not apply retroactively to Medvedev, who had been elected in March of that year.

[8] The 1954 transfer was officially explained as due to "close economic connections and territorial proximity," as well as for "further strengthening of brotherly ties between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples" (Salisbury, 1954). Actually, Party General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev probably hoped that the transfer would create Ukrainian support for his later successful effort to oust Georgy Malenkov as Soviet leader.

[9] Global Strike, or Prompt Global Strike (PGS) refer to proposals to develop weapons

would allow the United States to strike targets anywhere on earth in as little as an hour.

[10] Putin's 2005 speech to the Federal Assembly, official English translation available online at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22931 .

[11] Another incident contributing to worsened relations with the west was the March 2017 poisoning of former Russian intelligence officer Sergei Skripal (characterized by Putin as "a traitor to the motherland . . . simply a scumbag, that's all"; Reuters, 2018) and his daughter in Salisbury, England.

[12] Putin has also condemned the "colored revolutions" in Kyrgyzstan and Georgia as "Western-led" regime changes (RIA, 2017).

[13] Schafer, Nurmanova, and Walker (2015) give a similar analysis of Putin's operational code, which could be summarized in everyday language as follows: "Cooperation is possible; I even tried it: but events were not as much in my control as I thought, and so I have turned to conflict in those situations where I do have control."

[14] Georgy Malenkov, the Soviet leader from 1953-1955, did not hold the position of General Secretary, and General Secretaries Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko did not live long enough to address a party congress.

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Table 1.

Elements of personality measured at a distance

	Inner, private, subjective	Outer, public, objective
	Cognitions: measured by experts' ratings, and/or analysis of texts	*Traits and temperament:* measured by ratings or questionnaires
Enduring across situations	Beliefs and values Operational code (philosophical and instrumental beliefs) Authoritarianism Explanatory style (optimism/pessimism) Self-concept and ego ideals ("heroes") Narcissism versus wisdom	"Big Five" trait factors and sub-facets: Extraversion Agreeableness Conscientiousness Neuroticism Openness to experience HEXACO (Big Five factors plus "honesty")
	Example at-a-distance study: Dyson & Parent (2018)	*Example at-a-distance study:* Visser, Book, & Volk (2017)
	Motives: measured by implicit analysis of texts	*Social contexts:* measured from standard social science and biographical sources
Situation-dependent	Three dimensions of motivation: Achievement Affiliation Power	Culture and social structure History Gender Family (including sibling structure)

Defense mechanisms	Age and "generation"
	Religion
	Experiences in prior institutions (e.g., government, military, university)
Example at-a-distance study: Winter (2018b)	*Example at-a-distance study:* Smith (2018)

Note: Based on Winter (1996, pp. 6-14; 2005, pp. 566-573)

Table 2.

Brief outline of scoring systems for motive imagery

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Imagery type	Definition
Achievement	Someone is concerned about a standard of excellence: • Directly, by words indicating the quality of performance, or indirectly, by actions clearly suggesting a concern for excellence, or by success in competition. • By negative emotions or counter-striving in response to failure. • By carrying out some unique, unprecedented accomplishment.
Affiliation	Someone is concerned about establishing, maintaining or restoring friendship or friendly relations among persons, groups, etc. • By expression of positive, friendly, or intimate feelings toward other characters, nations, etc. • By expression of sadness or other negative feeling about separation or disruption of a friendly relationship, or wanting to restore it. • By affiliative, companionate activities. • By friendly, nurturant acts.
Power	Someone is concerned about having impact, control, or influence on another person, group, or the world at large • By taking strong, forceful actions that inherently have impact on other people or the world at large. • By controlling or regulating others. • By attempting to influence, persuade, convince, make or prove a point, argue. • By giving unsolicited help or advice. • By impression others or the world at large; prestige or reputation. • By eliciting a strong emotional reaction in someone else.

Note: Adapted from Winter (1994). This summary is not adequate for scoring purposes; however, the complete scoring system, along with practice materials and expert scoring, is available at no cost at this website: https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/handle/2027.42/117563

Table 3.

Behavioral outcomes of the motivational dimensions

	Achievement	Affiliation	Power
Characteristic associated actions	Moderate risks, using information to modify performance, entrepreneurial success, dishonest means when necessary to reach goal	Cooperative and friendly under "safe" conditions, defensive and even hostile under threat	Leadership and high morale of subordinates, if high in sense of responsibility; profligate impulsivity, if low in sense of responsibility
Negotiating style	Cooperative and "rational"	Cooperative under "safe" conditions, hostile under threat	Exploitative, aggressive
Seeks help from	Technical experts	Friends and similar others	Political "experts"
Political-psychological manifestations	Frustration	Peacemaking and arms limitation, vulnerability to scandal	Charisma, war and aggression, independent foreign policy, rated greatness

Major reference	Schultheiss and Brunstein (2010, chap. 2) Smith (1992; chap. 9)	Schultheiss and Brunstein (2010, chap. 3), Smith (1992, chaps. 13 and 15)	Schultheiss and Brunstein (2010, chap. 1), Smith (1992, chaps. 19 and 21)

Note: adapted from Winter (2003a, p. 139).

Table 4.

Motive imagery scores of Russian presidents' speeches, 1995-2015

			Images/1000 words			
president	year and date	words	achieve-ment	affil-iation	power	Ratio of achievement to power
Yeltsin – 1	1994, Feb 24	15,755	21.45	4.82	17.58	1.22
	1995, Feb 16	20,767	15.51	1.78	15.02	1.03
	1996, Feb 23	12,681	19.87	1.26	13.33	1.49
Mean			*18.94*	*2.62*	*15.31*	*1.25*
(SD)			*(3.08)*	*(1.92)*	*(2.14)*	*(.23)*
Yeltsin – 2	1997, Mar 6	13,710	14.30	.80	13.86	1.03
	1998, Feb 17	14,893	19.34	2.35	10.14	1.91
	1999, Mar 30	21,070	12.50	.70	12.90	.97
Mean			*15.38*	*1.28*	*12.30*	*1.30*
(SD)			*(3.54)*	*(.92)*	*(1.93)*	*(.52)*

Images/1000 words

president	year and date	words	achieve-ment	affil-iation	power	Ratio of achievement to power
Putin – 1	2000, Jul 8	5,256	16.93	3.81	20.93	.81
	2001, Apr 3	6,455	17.51	1.55	14.87	1.18
	2002, Apr 18	5,752	16.00	2.80	14.10	1.13
	2003, May 16	5,981	25.08	3.51	14.21	1.76
Mean			*18.88*	*2.92*	*16.03*	*1.22*
(SD)			*(4.18)*	*(1.00)*	*(3.28)*	*(.40)*
Putin – 2	2004, May 10	5,217	15.90	2.10	17.60	.90
	2005, Apr 25	5,212	17.27	4.22	9.98	1.73
	2006, May 10	6,529	14.20	2.80	28.90	.49
	2007, Apr 26	8,037	18.29	2.36	10.08	1.81
Mean			*16.41*	*2.87*	*16.64*	*1.24*
(SD)			*(1.77)*	*(.94)*	*(8.92)*	*(.64)*
Medvedev	2008, Nov 5	8,325	16.34	2.28	19.10	.86
	2009, Nov 12	9,485	18.34	2.21	8.01	2.29
	2010, Nov 30	7,228	20.20	4.15	10.65	1.90
	2011, Dec 22	6,448	20.30	2.80	13.50	1.50
Mean			*18.80*	*2.86*	*12.82*	*1.64*
(SD)			*(1.87)*	*(.90)*	*(4.75)*	*(.61)*
Putin - 3	2012, Dec 12	9,236	11.48	5.63	13.10	.88
	2013, Dec 13	7,637	17.81	6.15	18.59	.96

			Images/1000 words			
president	year and date	words	achieve-ment	affil-iation	power	Ratio of achievement to power
	2014, Dec 4	7,028	12.70	3.60	18.50	.69
	2015, Dec 3	6,107	15.90	3.80	18.20	.87
	2016, Dec 1	7,324	27.03	9.42	24.30	1.11
	2018, Mar 1	11,429	25.64	7.00	21.70	1.18
Mean			*18.43*	*5.93*	*19.06*	*.95*
(SD)			*(6.54)*	*(2.16)*	*(3.77)*	*(.18)*
Grand Mean			*17.91*	*3.41*	*15.80*	*1.24*
(SD)			*(4.01)*	*(2.06)*	*(4.96)*	*(.46)*

Note: All speeches were taken from the website of the Russian presidency: www.kremlin.ru/events

Table 5.

Comparing Motive Profiles of Russian Presidents, Soviet Leaders, and US Presidents

Russian president	Most similar leader	Distance	Least similar leader	Distance

Yeltsin, term 1

Russian president	Most similar leader	Distance	Least similar leader	Distance
Soviet leader	Leonid Brezhnev	1.50	Joseph Stalin	2.29
US president	Ronald Reagan	.38	Donald Trump	3.41
	Woodrow Wilson	.55	George W. Bush	2.72
Yeltsin, term 2				
Soviet leader	Joseph Stalin	1.28	Nikita Khrushchev	2.82
US president	Calvin Coolidge	.60	Donald Trump	4.59
	Franklin Roosevelt	.74	George W. Bush	3.31
Medvedev				
Soviet leader	Mikhail Gorbachev	1.18	Joseph Stalin	2.35
US president	Woodrow Wilson	.55	Donald Trump	3.77
	Lyndon Johnson	.57	George W. Bush	2.89
Putin, term 1				
Soviet leader	Leonid Brezhnev	1.29	Joseph Stalin	2.37
US president	Ronald Reagan	.39	Donald Trump	3.31
	Woodrow Wilson	.74	George W. Bush	2.54
Putin, term 2				
Soviet leader	Leonid Brezhnev	1.30	Mikhail Gorbachev	2.14
US president	Ronald Reagan	.60	Donald Trump	3.74
	Franklin Roosevelt	.74	George H. W. Bush	2.33

Russian president	Most similar leader	Distance	Least similar leader	Distance
Putin, term 3				
Soviet leader	Leonid Brezhnev	.61	Joseph Stalin	3.48
US president	John F. Kennedy	.94	Theodore Roosevelt	3.32
	Harry Truman	1.14	Donald Trump	3.22

Note: "Distance" in 3-dimensional space, measured in *SD* units.

Figure 1

Standardized average of all addresses to the Federal Assembly, by presidential term

Figure 2

Ratio of achievement images/1000 words to power images/1000 words, average by term

Figure 3

Average motive profile distance between Russian and US presidents, 1994-2016