One Hundred Colors of Violence

Ethnic Conflict Variation across Non-Democratic Regimes

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Abstract

Why do some non-democracies experience ethnic conflict on a greater scale than others in the post-Cold War era? This thesis examines variance in ethnic conflict outcomes through regression analysis of a 16-year period (1990-2005) as a result of differences in regime type and characteristics. Although a broad literature exists on the causes of civil conflict and its potential relationship to regimes, I show that identifying specific behaviors common to certain *subsets* of ethnically divided regimes helps to predict their likelihood of ethnic conflict in particular. I find strong results: that anocracies are more likely to experience ethnic conflict than autocracies; that non-democracies with multiple parties are more likely to experience ethnic conflict than those without parties; and that non-democracies with military involvement in politics are more likely to experience ethnic conflict than those without military involvement. Additionally, this study introduces a second scale measure, level of conflict, as measured through battle and civilian casualties. I find mixed results: that anocracies have less conflict deaths than autocracies; that non-democracies with multiple parties have no notable difference in casualties than those without parties; and that non-democracies with military involvement have more conflict deaths than those without military involvement. Ultimately, these findings contribute to two literatures. Regime characteristics are proven to be strong indicators of specific effects on conflict likelihood, which potentially helps to advance the study of regime classification. Levels of conflict are emphasized as an important dependent measure, and relationships between some regime characteristics and ethnic conflict levels are established as significant, contributing to the larger study of ethnic conflict.

Preface

On India

Everyone wants to know where they come from. Last year, I visited India for the first time since beginning college. I was used to going every few years just to visit family, but this time was special because I wanted something different. I wanted to learn more about my family and my identity: a common enough desire for a first-generation American.

With my cousins, I hiked up the walls of Golconda fort in Hyderabad, a crossroads for many different peoples. I learned it had been built by Hindu rulers several centuries ago, but had been conquered by Muslim rulers, who made their capital for many decades further. Surrounding this and the Old City were Muslim-dominant communities, and sprawling beyond were Hindu communities. I was told many Muslims who lived in Hyderabad claimed Northern ancestry akin to the Mughals, even though it was likely that most of their ancestors had been indigenous and had converted to Islam. It seemed that one's identity could change, for all intents and purposes, based on the environment. Genetics might have proven many of those ancestral claims false, but that did not matter in the larger context. What mattered was who was Muslim, and who was Hindu: the stronger you were attached to one group, especially ancestrally, the better.

I had a vivid conversation later with my grandparents at the dinner table as I scribbled down family trees and asked questions. I knew my religion was Hindu, my caste was Brahmin, and my language was Telugu, but as they spoke I learned more of the complex undercurrent that defined ethnicity in such a diverse country. Religion, caste, and language were the surface identifiers I knew of my family; I found that the specific Brahmin clan, and religious *philosophy*, and ancestral home all played into my grandparents' identities and therefore my own. Not everyone will recognize my full identity if I tell them, but to the people that will recognize it, it is valuable information about who I am and where I come from.

As we drove through the streets of Hyderabad another day, I recalled the keen interest my father took in previous years in Indian politics. The Indian state of Andhra Pradesh in 2014 split into two states: Telangana (which housed the city of Hyderabad) and the new Andhra Pradesh. Violence surrounded the movement for secession, and a common narrative among protestors and the media was that it was *them* versus *us*; Telangana had a different dialect of Telugu, had a different history, and had a much different population thanks to Hyderabad and the intermixing of race and religion. The violence that had so suddenly erupted and been fueled by political parties vanished from the public eye just as quickly after the split, so how real were those differences? I found it curious how my father, who was from Guntur in Andhra Pradesh yet grew up in Hyderabad in Telangana, could have a foot in both worlds. Because my mother taught me Telugu, I have an Andhra accent when speaking it, as does my father at home; but put him next to someone speaking the Telangana dialect in Hyderabad, and he will swim in it luxuriously.

Defining an ethnicity by dialect, then, is rather murky. Defining an ethnicity by ancestry is inexact. Factors like caste can affect some aspects of life, but not others. And after speaking with my family, I was introduced to a whole host of new dimensions.

I was finding ethnicity to be a slippery subject.

On America

Almost an entire year prior to my trip to India, I took my first comparative politics classes at the University of Michigan. One of them stood out to me because it was titled "How to be an Autocrat", taught by Professor Mai Hassan. *Handy,* I thought to myself, *if I ever achieve* *my ambition when I was six to take over the world.* Although that particular goal has not been accomplished to date, I found the subject material to be fascinating: we live in a world of diverse regimes, of one hundred colors of violence. Learning of the aspects that define an authoritarian regime was the beginning, to me, of learning to understand how the structure of a regime and its institutions can shape outcomes like conflict seen within a nation's borders.

For me, this thesis is a personal story. My ethnicity has always been a part of who I am, and it stands to reason that it can be a strong motivator for nationalism and for violence under the right circumstances. The importance of ethnic differences can be exacerbated and used as a political tool, as seen in the Telangana secession and in the religious tensions in Hyderabad today, capitalized upon by current political parties. Though a democracy, these same behaviors seen in India are seen extensively across non-democratic countries. As I learned in class, authoritarian regimes and their elites have a unique set of institutions and motivations. I believe that there are aspects within these regime types that lend themselves in particular to using ethnicity as a means to achieve their goals. Ultimately, I hope to understand ethnic conflict by viewing it through the eyes of non-democracies.

Acknowledgements

There are a great many people to whom I am grateful for their support in this endeavor. I am grateful, first and foremost, to my grandparents and family, who instilled in me the drive to pursue academic excellence; to my parents and sister, who listened to my many complaints and headed them off with food; and to my friends, who gave me the emotional support and understanding that I needed to keep going. I am thankful to the many peers and faculty that have supported me through my college political science adventure, and especially grateful to have worked with the talented students in my cohort (affectionately dubbed the Thesis Support Group) along with my graduate student instructor, Michael Lerner, who helped me overcome many blocks. Finally, I am lucky to have worked with Professor Brian Min and my advisor, Professor Mai Hassan, who offered me immense support, time, and advice throughout this process. I could not have completed this project without them, and they remain an inspiration for me.

Introduction

The Case of Rwanda

In April 1994, Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana was returning to the presidential residence near the capital of Kigali when his plane was unexpectedly shot down by anti-aircraft missiles, killing him and all other officials aboard the aircraft. This assassination triggered a horrific genocide and civil war in Rwanda, where ethnic tensions had been brewing for several years between the Hutus and Tutsis prior to the incident. In preceding years, the extrastate Tutsi organization RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front) had conducted attacks across the Rwanda-Uganda border against Habyarimana's Hutu government, and an uneasy peace between the two groups had been reached in 1993 through the Arusha Accords.[1]

The Rwandan Hutu government at the time of the assassination blamed the RPF and its leader Paul Kagame, accusing him of continuing the previous attacks and attempting to destabilize the government. Kagame denied any part in the killing, and further accused the Hutu government of committing it themselves to create a pretext for the ethnic cleansing of hundreds of thousands of Rwandan Tutsis. It would seem that Kagame was closer to the truth of the situation, as inside government events would prove. Hard-liners in Habyarimana's government who had disliked the terms of the Arusha Accords, which incorporated Tutsi forces into the militia, saw their chance to take back military and political power. Supported by these politicians, the FAR (national forces) and the loosely-organized Interahamwe militia went on their campaign of terror.[2] The now-extremist Hutu government perpetrated massacres against the Tutsi population and moderate Hutus within the country, killing an estimated 800,000 people in the space of one hundred days.

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[1] Nikuze, "The Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda: Origins, Causes, Implementation, Consequences, and the Post‐genocide Era", 1089.

[2] Idean Salehyan, *Rebels without Borders: Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics*, 147.

The Rwandan genocide and civil war remains one of the most recognizable and morbid examples of extreme warfare along ethnic lines, but there are particular aspects to this case that stand out when assessing the causes of conflict.

First, the historical context is important to understand. The Hutu-Tutsi distinction was enforced by Belgian colonizers, who placed minority Tutsis (who they believed to be racially superior) in advantageous positions within their administration over the majority Hutu group. This group distinction became the most important ethnic division in Rwanda even after the colonial period, and political groups formed around each ethnicity as it became a mobilizing cry once the government was opened to majority rule.[3]

Second, the political context matters to explain why events spiraled out of control the way that they did. Post-1990, Rwanda remained fundamentally undemocratic, with some classifying it as a full dictatorship.[4] Although technically Rwanda was considered to have multiple parties, the reality of ethnic power balance was that the Hutu ethnic group had a monopoly on government and the Tutsi ethnic group was discriminated against at the center of power.[5] In practice, this peculiar duality meant that, while on the surface level institutions typically common to democracies existed, their implementation afforded the executive and political elites unregulated access to power while repressing interests contrary to their own; a hallmark of non-democratic regimes.[6] It then comes as no surprise that a direct consequence of this structure was a lack of checks on the actions of individual politicians, which allowed events to spiral out of control. Additionally, the level of military involvement in the government was quite relevant to the scale on which this war was perpetrated. In the years prior to the assassination, the military was directly involved in government and the leader of the executive (Habyarimana) himself was an army officer.[7] The importance of the overinvolvement of the military grew when the FAR and Interahamwe became an important tool for the perpetration of a political agenda: to ensure Hutu domination.

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[3] Nikuze, "The Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda: Origins, Causes, Implementation, Consequences, and the Post–genocide Era", 1089-90.

[4] Svolik, "Regime Data."

[5] Cederman et al., "Ethnic Power Relations dataset."

[6] Marshall et al., "Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2018."

Third, the sheer number of people that perished in the hundred days of the genocide and the fighting that took place before and after during those four years was astonishing. For the entire period of the civil war, around ten thousand battle deaths were estimated, but this did not account for the vast toll taken on the citizens of the country, which numbered far higher than that, easily crossing half a million civilians by most estimates.[8] Several characteristics of the regime, including the extent to which the executive and elites had access to state power and the heavy involvement of the military in government, were influential in determining the outcome of this conflict. While multiple parties existed along ethnic lines which deepened ethnic tensions at the center of power, the Hutu monopoly meant unchecked power for the executive and elites, who were able to push an unopposed political agenda in the years prior to the conflict. This possibly increased the risk of conflict, along with increasing the *level* of conflict seen. Not only did military involvement in government potentially make the occurrence of ethnic conflict more likely, but it also ensured quick mass mobilization, which further impacted the level of ethnic conflict as viewed through the lens of casualties.[9] The idea encapsulated by this case study is ultimately that variation in relevant regime characteristics can be linked to different conflict outcomes.

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[7] Svolik, "Institutions in Dictatorships, 1946-2008."
[8] Gleditsch et al., "Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset", v. 3-2005b.
[9] Stanton, Dr. Gregory G. "The Ten Stages of Genocide".

Rwanda is an extreme example of the phenomenon of ethnic conflict, to be sure, but bears witness to the perhaps radical claim that all ethnic conflict has political components. The specific conditions under which tensions spiraled out of control may be unique, but I believe that the same aspects of the regime discussed above are main contributors to ethnic conflict across the globe. The complex ties between ethnic conflict and institutions that characterize regimes are fascinating, and the ways in which the implementation of institutions within non-democracies cause and continue ethnic conflict help to explain its prevalence and scale in recent years. In this thesis, I hope to explore the variation of ethnic conflict through an institutional perspective across non-democracies in particular, which ultimately will bring us one step closer to understanding when and how conflict occurs.

Literature to date has thoroughly explored the potential causes of ethnic conflict, viewing the problem from an onset perspective. One area that remains largely unexplored is how the same factors that contribute to the onset of conflict can ensure its continuation; in essence, how they can increase the level of conflict. This uncharted territory is where I seek to make a contribution. By first exploring factors that can affect the onset of ethnic conflict as a subset of civil conflict, I hope to then explain variations in the *scale* of conflict. The robust introduction to conflict and regime literature will set the stage for regression analysis using several relevant datasets, which will indicate what particular relationships are present and their relevance to the larger question at hand. Ultimately, finding the answer to this question will take me across the globe through over thirty cases of ethnic conflict from 1990 through 2005, with many different aspects and details; however, I hope to find similar threads throughout these stories.

And so, we embark on a journey to answer the question: Why do some non-democracies experience ethnic conflict on a greater scale than others in the post-Cold War era?

Overview of Thesis

I will briefly outline the chapters in this thesis and their structure. In Chapter 1, I overview ethnicity and the nature of ethnic violence. I review several definitions of ethnicity and explanations for the causes of ethnic conflict, which I weave together to create the theoretical foundation. Then, I go on to discuss the study of regime variation in Chapter 2, and how ethnicity plays a unique role within politics. I expand upon the conflict patterns that have been studied, and hypothesize what can be expected in different kinds of non-democracies. I examine multiple axes of a regime, including party system and military involvement, to better understand what aspects of non-democracies can contribute to greater ethnic conflict. In Chapter 3, I overview my hypotheses once again and explain relevant variables, going in-depth on previous studies' measurements and developing my own. I then explain the operationalization of my main variables through a compiled dataset and the methods I use to test my hypotheses. Chapter 4 provides an overview of my regression analysis and findings. along with the limitations my study may contain. Chapter 5 explores the applications of this research and further discusses the implications of my results, and I conclude with my contribution to the continuing study of ethnic conflict.

Chapter 1

Ethnicity and the Nature of Ethnic Violence

Introduction

The study of ethnic conflict has grown significantly over the past couple of decades, for many reasons. Attention-grabbing headlines across the globe proclaiming conflict in a diverse set of regions have drawn the focus of the world.[10][11] Broadly, a movement away from interstate conflict and toward civil conflict occurred after 1945 and has continued past 1990 (the end of the Cold War), of which ethnic conflict is a significant subset.[12] The sheer diversity of the scale of these events is staggering; ethnic conflicts have ranged from localized inter-city riots to full-blown genocide, and have involved hundreds of various ethnic groups with different levels of relative power.[13] Thus, learning of commonalities and similar threads between events is a challenging and sometimes nigh-impossible task. An extensive literature has developed surrounding the topic, not only exploring what ethnicity and ethnic conflict *is* at its most basic level, but also attempting to explain how ethnic conflict arises.

In this chapter, I will explore the concept of ethnicity and define it in the scope of my research. I will then explore the implications this definition has for the causes of ethnic conflict, along with reviewing several theories that attempt to explain other mechanisms by which violence erupts. Finally, I will drive towards the idea that ethnic conflict is contributed to by institutions and power distributions, which are influenced by the way they are expressed within the framework of a non-democratic regime.

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[10] Young, “The Heart of the African Conflict Zone”, 301-3.

[11] Posner, *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*, 5.

[12] Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”, 75.

[13] Cederman, Wimmer, and Min, “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel?”, 87-8.

Defining Ethnicity

Ethnicity as a concept is considered by much of the world to be ancient and unchangeable, and by others as insubstantial and fickle. Its base definition can be summarized as an “experienced sense of commonality based on the belief in common ancestry and shared culture”.[14] The importance of understanding ethnicity in order to explore ethnic conflict cannot be understated; as will be seen, many of the components to defining ethnicity come up again when considering why conflict occurs along those same lines, and where it can be expected to occur based on how and why ethnic groups form. Four main schools of thought will be examined and analyzed, and every one of them ultimately contributes to the further understanding of ethnicity.

It is easy and almost instinctive to make the judgement that ethnic conflicts are deeply rooted, and that the identities which are involved in the conflict are in fact what have caused it. This is the beginning of the essentialist argument, which first explains ethnicity as based on preexisting ethnic boundaries, waving a hand at postcolonial ethnic conflicts as an example of pre-modern-state ethnic divisions[15]. While some of the more radical theories from this school have since been contested by others, some authors continue to employ mainly emotional and psychological approaches to understanding why ethnicity forms and why ethnic groups behave as they do.[16] This model of ethnicity is somewhat rudimentary compared to later schools of thought in explaining the *purpose* of ethnicity, though some attempt to justify its purpose in policing “winning” groups.[17] Regardless, essentialism does have its points, as many ethnic identities today have their origins in history, and many ethnic conflicts are fought in a cycle of violence as previous events set the precedent to resolve intergroup grievances through force.[18]

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[14] Wimmer, Cederman, and Min, “Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict”, 317.
[15] Kaufmann, “Rational Choice and Progress in the Study of Ethnic Conflict”, 200.
[16] Ibid., 201.
[17] Caselli and Coleman, “On the Theory of Ethnic Conflict”, 162.

Ethnicity is more fluid than essentialism would suggest and can exist in more than one dimension: race, religion, and language are examples of potential ethnic cleavages in society.[19] However, these divisions are not created equal, and some become more salient than others in different social and political contexts. Constructivism suggests that ethnic identities do not wholly have their roots in historical differences but rather are influenced and manipulated to serve a political purpose, discounting the notion of 'ethnic membership' altogether.[20] Although the original 'strong form' of constructivism over-attributes the formation of ethnic groups to political manipulation, newer work is useful to understanding inter-group behavior between ethnicities, along with explaining why new ethnic groups may rise over time.[21] The logical extension of these two separate concepts suggests that different cleavages become important in different political contexts, as Daniel Posner finds in his 2005 book. He observes that, in Zambia, lingual differences become important in forming constituencies in a multi-party government, whereas tribal differences are more salient under a one-party system of rule.[22] This finding spurs further questions about the uses of ethnicity and different ethnic cleavages in society as a tool to obtain political power.

The structuralist theory is worth touching upon briefly as well, although much of its definitions of ethnicity overlap with explanations of ethnic conflict; these explanations will recur later in this chapter. Structuralist theory wrestles with the question of the interactions among ethnic groups in an environment of state collapse, and broadly explores the way security dilemmas influence the behavior of ethnic groups aimed at preserving their own survival.[23] Structuralism assumes the continuing existence of ethnic groups and does not seek to explain their origins and uses in the same way that essentialist and constructivist viewpoints do; in this sense, structuralist theories are more suited to being combined with one of the previous two perspectives, as indeed they often are. In conjunction with a 'weak-form' constructivist viewpoint, some authors in structuralism support that conflict contributes to the 'hardening' of ethnic identities that may not have been as robust prior to the conflict.[24]

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[18] Andreas Wimmer et al., *Facing Ethnic Conflicts: Toward a New Realism*, 96-99.
[19] Posner, *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*, 7-10.
[20] Laitin and Posner, "Constructing Ethnic Fractionalization Indices", 1-3.
[21] Kaufmann, "Rational Choice and Progress in the Study of Ethnic Conflict", 197.
[22] Posner, *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*, 17.

A fourth viewpoint is rational-choice. Rational-choice in practice has many similarities to constructivism, insofar as scholars of both schools take an institutionalist perspective in understanding when certain ethnic identities become important, looking especially at electoral incentives.[25] However, rational-choice breaks from the other three theories in the importance it attributes to individual attachments to communal identity; it suggests that attempts to maximize personal gain are more important to outcomes than attempts to maximize the communal gain for one's ethnic group[26]. This perspective becomes important later when considering the role of ethnonationalism in the mass consciousness as a call to action, because it questions the validity of considering ethnonationalism as a cause of conflict rather than the effect.

The perspective taken on ethnicity in this thesis is a combination of the stronger points made by each school. Essentialism makes the operable observation that individuals do have a certain amount of attachment to ethnic identity, and this attachment plays a large role in the formation of political and social groups. Constructivism balances this claim by showing that certain ethnic identities can be emphasized over others and even manipulated in the pursuit of political power; however, there generally exists a basis for, and a common identity at, the core of any ethnic group that forms. Structuralism bolsters this argument further by showing that identities can increase in their importance before and during a conflict. With respect to rational-choice, while individual interests do play a role in the use of ethnicity for political ends, collective ethnic identities are powerful mass movers.

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[23] Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict", 27-29.

[24] Kaufmann, "Rational Choice and Progress in the Study of Ethnic Conflict", 201.

[25] Wilkinson, *Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India*, 6.

[26] Fearon and Laitin, "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation", 715-718.

The Causes of Ethnic Conflict

The definitions of ethnicity and ethnic identity examined previously provide a means of understanding where ethnic conflict can arise. The simplest definition of ethnic conflict is also a useful one: ethnic conflict happens when ethnicity is the most salient cleavage in society, and violence breaks out along these lines. The term used going forward for such a regime is "ethnically divided". This definition suggests that ethnic conflict is a subset of civil conflict, which is how it has been studied by many authors in the past: however, I argue that ethnic conflict should be studied on its own merits, particularly because the ways in which ethnicity becomes relevant societally lend it both to being capitalized upon by elites and mass populations alike. I will expand on the motives to use ethnicity for power, and how this can lead from mere division to conflict. I will also identify certain environments in which the motives to capitalize on ethnicity are stronger, and explain how this may occur.

Any number of things can come together and escalate grievances to conflict in each instance; in ethnic conflicts, though, several motifs can be regarded as significant. One argument for ethnic conflict touches on the distribution of resources. While much of the argument can take an overly essentialist view of ethnicity, it makes an important point that in many societies, resources can be equated with political power. Within a quasi-electoral environment specifically, ethnicity not only acts as a cry to action and a motive to support leaders of the same identity, but it creates an in-group for distribution of resources by victorious elites that is difficult to otherwise penetrate.[27] From this elite perspective, ethnicity is a compelling tool to form a constituency and later a minimum winning coalition.[28] The minimum winning coalition has just enough supporters needed to gain power over competitors, while at the same time keeping the group small enough that any rewards or resources are distributed among the least number of people.[29][30] Thus, ethnic identity can be useful as a stepping stone towards resource control and power: conflict can naturally follow from this as rival elites seek to create their own ingroups for resource control, deepening ethnicity as the salient cleavage and increasing intergroup tensions. I postulate then that more opportunities for this kind of group competition on the political stage will mean greater ethnic conflict.

The electoral scheme affects elites and the masses alike, and helps to explain the manifestation of political agendas. This institutionalist perspective is useful to understand how political movements can trickle down through society, with ethnic conflict arising as a symptom of central power distribution: constructivist and rational-choice scholars both apply this viewpoint, looking to electoral incentives to understand when identities become important and where conflict breaks out.[31] Electoral incentives themselves can change the way ethnicity behaves, as demonstrated by Posner (2005).[32] Studies of ethnonationalist politics show that politically relevant ethnic group representation is constantly shifting, and also shows that excluding relevant groups from political power increases the likelihood of ethnic conflict.[33] This can be explained using previous concepts as the following: elite manipulation of the political landscape to gain power means that ethnic identities are emphasized where they provide an electoral advantage to do so. As a result, conflict can be observed to take place along certain cleavages and not others, divided by religion in India and race in Peru, for example.[34] Tying in with elite motivations, anti-minority sentiment among other things can solidify the identity of the majority while assuring victory for the elite. These narratives have been discounted in favor of individual decision-making as the driving force behind conflict within the rational-choice school, but therefore creates an incomplete picture of both the onset of the conflict and its intensity.[35]

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[27] Caselli and Coleman, “On the Theory of Ethnic Conflict”, 163-5.

[28] Posner, *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*, 17-20.

[29] Bueno De Mesquita et al., “Political Institutions, Policy Choice and the Survival of Leaders”, 561.

[30] Caselli and Coleman, “On the Theory of Ethnic Conflict”, 162.

[31] Wilkinson, *Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India*, 6.

[32] Posner, *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*, 17

[33] Cederman, Wimmer, and Min, “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel?”, 95

The importance of ethnicity for the population follows from the examination of elite behavior. A group identity is mutually beneficial for elites who desire political elevation and for those among the populace who share similar goals and ideals. The in-groups mentioned previously allow members of the elite's ethnicity to secure control of resources and increase their economic power through preferred treatment. The flip side of this situation indicates that economically disadvantaged groups without ground-level access to resources have an incentive to mobilize for large-scale change, which can lead to more than one instance of civil conflict.[36] More broadly, mass ethnic mobilization can and does reflect the constellation of power at the state's center discussed earlier.[37] The creation of in-groups, or winning coalitions, or any other sort of exclusionary faction is tightly woven with the idea of ethnonationalism.

Ethnonationalism is influential within the mass consciousness, conflating the nation's identity and governance with group ethnic identity and pushing mass action to shape the state in its own image.[38] As a result of ethnonationalist struggle over access to state power at the elite level, mass mobilization can occur if groups feel excluded from resources or benefits. In societies where there is little opportunity for this discontent to be expressed or resolved through peaceful means, mass mobilization along ethnic lines can lead to greater conflict. Structuralist literature examines ethnic group behavior in an environment of anarchy or state collapse, which leads to violence between groups as each seeks to protect their own communal interests.[39] Ethnic conflict does not often occur even in an environment of total state collapse, but the pursuit of communal interests and protection of the group's overall security are also motives that can ultimately be relevant politically. From a practical standpoint, this means solidifying social divisions and excluding 'outsiders' in a country while fulfilling the need for scapegoats in undesirable situations.[40]

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[34] Cederman et al., "Ethnic Power Relations dataset."

[35] Wilkinson, *Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India*, 6-10.

[36] Walter, "Does Conflict Beget Conflict?", 372.

[37] Cederman, Wimmer, and Min, "Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel?", 88.

[38] Ibid., 92.

As can be seen, the true question driving at prevalence and scale of ethnic conflict is what deepens ethnicity as a salient societal cleavage, and what is at stake that could prompt conflict to arise. The importance of ethnicity as a cleavage in society is determined to a large extent by incentives to gain power, and ethnic divisions are emphasized by elites when they seek popular support. This is not simply an elite phenomenon, but a mass one as well; the role of ethnonationalism in excluding certain ethnic groups from power and therefore spurring ethnic conflict is important to better understand the larger movements that take place during a protracted armed conflict. Resource control is a motivation to construct exclusive ingroups, as seen from both an elite and mass perspective. While all levels of analysis become relevant to the larger landscape of ethnic conflict, looking from the center of power outward, often from the elites to the masses, helps to explain why conflict takes place in the way that it does. This becomes particularly relevant when examining the political movements within non-democracies, and the way security and resources are treated in that environment. Ultimately, through mechanisms such as these that affect the preponderance of conflict, regime characteristics can affect both the beginning and the duration of an ethnic conflict.

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[39] Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict", 27-9.
[40] Young, "The Heart of the African Conflict Zone", 311.

Chapter 2

Ethnicity and Regime Type

Introduction

While the study of ethnic conflict was booming in one area of political science, a simultaneous wave of study was happening concerning regime types. Since the end of the Cold War, not only was the overall trend of conflict overwhelmingly tending towards civil war as opposed to interstate conflict, but the "Third Wave" of democratization was throwing countries into upheaval.[41] A consequence of the movement towards relative democratization was a slew of regimes with some semblance of democracy but largely retaining an autocratic character; institutions typically seen in democracies on the surface allowed countries with non-democratic regimes to secure support and resources from more consolidated, wealthier democracies.[42] Ultimately, measures of internal repression, civil liberties, and leadership selection combined with measures of political freedom and fairness define regime type and behavior for a given nation, with the existence of consolidated democracies, consolidated autocracies, and everything in between.[43]

While institutions common to democracies are also seen within non-democracies, such as a party system or a legislature, their execution in practice is different and can result in a more volatile political environment.[44] As seen in Chapter 1, ethnicity is a powerful tool to use for political means; through continued study of regime behavior, it can be predicted where and how ethnicity will arise as a force, and therefore where ethnic conflict is bound to occur. Among these regime types, conflict variation has already become evident to some degree, which implies that regime type can affect the prevalence of ethnic conflict. The question then lies in what aspect of regime variation among non-democracies can truly affect change.

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[41] Huntington, "Democracy's Third Wave", 12-16.

[42] Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War*, 20.

[43] Marshall et al., "Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2018."

[44] Hegre et al., "Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992", 34.

In this chapter, I will explore regime type and characteristics as the explanatory factors of interest for ethnic conflict. I will examine first the science of measuring regime variation, which has undergone significant development in recent years but has maintained key underlying characteristics. There exists a tight relationship between quantifying regime types and their analysis in relation to outcomes like conflict in literature, so this development is explored thoroughly. I will make an argument for the definition of regime type through regime characteristics as opposed to broader regime type, which I believe to be relatively unhelpful in determining a causal relationship, yet valuable to re-test in this setting. I will then examine two relevant regime characteristics which I believe to be important to the different levels of ethnic conflict seen, which are the party system and the level of military involvement in government. Finally, I will set the stage for my experimental analysis of variation in occurrence and levels of ethnic conflict as a result of regime variation.

Institutions and Differences in Regimes

To understand regime variation in the post-Cold War era, some foundational theory will prove useful. A regime is the combination of institutions and rules that dictate access to public office and that regulate the ascension and behavior of actors in the political arena. A regime therefore encompasses individual administrations or forms of government, and a change in leadership by itself does not lead to regime change.[45] A regime is a system of governance, and dictates the relationship between political leaders, elites, and their constituencies, the mass population of the country. Regime change occurs only when these institutions and rules are fundamentally challenged and altered. Democracies are regimes in which “rulers are held accountable for their actions...by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives,” and those in which political and civil liberties are granted to citizens. Non-democracies can then be defined as regimes in which one or more of these conditions are broken, with traditional autocracies expected to fulfil nearly none of these conditions.[46]

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[45] Schmitter and Karl, "What Democracy Is. . . and Is Not", 75.

The implementation of particular institutions within non-democratic regimes grant each a sort of character. It is important to recognize that institutions, in and of themselves, cannot be categorized as “democratic” or “autocratic”. However, although the unfettered operation of certain institutions is critical to the foundation of democracy, their existence within a non-democracy can in fact strengthen the legitimacy and reach of the regime.[47] The peculiar juxtaposition of institutions meant to ensure accountability with elites who desire greater control in a non-democracy means that institutions within non-democracies behave differently than their counterparts in democracies, despite in name being similar; incremental democratic backsliding proves that non-democracies can appear to operate like democracies on the surface. [48] Because the operation of institutions in non-democracies is influenced by the agenda of groups in power, they can serve as the origins for ethnic conflict because they are the proverbial battlefield for competing political interests, which in ethnically divided regimes are often centered around ethnicity.

Variation in non-democratic regimes can be broad, encapsulating the ‘character’ of institutions along with the general nature of the regime, or specifically examining the differences within each particular institution. Both methods are useful to understand the roots of ethnic conflict in non-democracies, but the differences in implementation of institutions traditional to democracies can make a difference in conflict outcomes. In the hypotheses presented below, these perspectives are tested.

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[46] Schmitter and Karl, “What Democracy Is. . . and Is Not”, 75-79.

[47] Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War,* 2-24.

[48] Bermeo, “On Democratic Backsliding”, 11.

Regime Type and Ethnic Conflict

History provides a specific context for regime types and change in the modern world. Neorealism purports that the Cold War caused a bipolar power balance, within which political ideology among other things was in flux.[49] The USA and USSR sought to increase their 'spheres of influence' during this period, and one of the consequences of this expansion was pressure towards respective allies.[50] The capitalist-communist ideological battle gave way to a push for democratization; after the fall of the USSR, democratizing pressure increased from consolidated Western democracies. Far from having a direct impact in increasing the number of democracies in the world, a side effect was the creation of regimes that retained much of their autocratic character yet bore democratic institutions on the surface, motivated by mechanisms like linkage and leverage.[51] This "Third Wave" of democratization meant that regimes were growing more varied, and new global balances were emerging.[52]

Early literature on regime classification after the Cold War postulated the existence of consolidated, strong democracies and autocracies, but noted that there existed a middle category of hybrid regimes that had some appearance of democracy but demonstrated autocratic character in institutional implementation. Terms for this phenomenon abounded, the most common being *anocracy*, *semi-democracy*, *partly-free states*, and *hybrid regimes*. The first studies categorizing regimes were mainly concerned with broad descriptions of 'freedom', based on sub-classification of civil liberties and political rights measures. Some studies, like Fein

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[49] Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory", 21-22.
[50] Gaddis, "The Cold War, the Long Peace, and the Future", 239.
[51] Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War,* 2-16.
[52] Huntington, "Democracy's Third Wave", 12-16.

(1995), classified regimes categorically as ‘not free’, ‘partly free’, or ‘free’.[53] Importantly, the methods of measurement of regime type and the categorization of regimes are interrelated, and are analyzed as such for the rest of this chapter. In this decade of exploration, measures of freedom, openness, and repression dominated the literature on regime type.

Later literature expanded on this designation, and this development was echoed back by advancement in measurement methods by dataset creators. The Polity family of datasets was used extensively in the following decade in international relations literature, and it provided a continuous scale for regime measurement, creating an aggregate score from a combination of measures of democracy and autocracy. Individual aspects contributing to these measures build on the concept of freedom through provision of civil liberties and rights, but add analysis of traditional checks and balances and constraints on executive power.[54] With a more detailed scale, correspondingly greater analysis could be done on regimes “mix[ing] democratic and autocratic features”, termed *anocracy*. Some studies created three separate buckets from this data, and others allowed the mid-range regimes to continue on a continuous scale.[55]

As a result of this strong middle designation, parallel studies emerged examining conflict patterns within hybrid regimes as compared to more established autocracies and democracies. Studies found that both repression[56] and civil conflict[57] were greater in regimes in the middle (“anocracy” or “partly free”) as opposed to either strong autocracies *or* strong democracies, suggesting a connection between the mixed character of anocracy and the preponderance of conflict. This “U-shape” finding was theorized to be the result of several characteristics innate to a hybrid regime type. The partly-open or partly-free nature of regimes in the middle opens up the "possibility of greater class and group conflict", which means "challengers...may resort to violence" as a viable way to change the existing order through mobilization.[58] Within later research, regimes in the middle seem to mix "mass politics...with authoritarian elite politics in a volatile way", leading to a greater level of civil conflict than either democracies on one end of the spectrum or autocracies on the other end.[59]

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[53] Fein, “More Murder in the Middle: Life-Integrity Violations and Democracy in the World, 1987”, 175.

[54] Marshall et al., “Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2018.”

[55] Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”, 75.

[56] Fein, “More Murder in the Middle: Life-Integrity Violations and Democracy in the World, 1987”, 184.

[57] Hegre et al., “Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992”, 43.

Ethnic conflict as discussed previously is influenced by many of the same traits that increase the likelihood of civil conflict within middle regimes. As mentioned in Chapter 1, ethnonationalism can be a conduit for mass mobilization for change, especially if politics at the power center exclude or disadvantage certain groups. In these mid-regimes, theoretically conflict can be induced through mobilization when violence is the only mechanism for change. Institutions that are susceptible to manipulation in such regimes can be sources for ethnic tensions over an uneven distribution of power, and therefore serve as arenas for conflict origination.[60] Furthermore, findings suggest that a self-sustaining cycle of violence can occur; where ethnic conflict has occurred before, it is more likely to occur again.[61] Extending these findings to variation among non-democracies, a simple prediction can be made: ethnic conflict as a subset of civil conflict can be expected to occur in anocracies with greater likelihood than in autocracies, under similar conditions as were imposed in preceding literature. This yields the first hypothesis:

H1. Anocracies will have an *increased likelihood* of ethnic conflict compared to autocracies.

Interestingly, not many, if any studies at all, measure the effect of regime type on the level of civil conflict. Because this project aims to quantify this effect as well, an extension of the above theory suggests that mass mobilization combined with volatility and increased patterns of repression by elites would indicate that higher levels of ethnic conflict could be expected from regimes in the middle. This gives rise to the second hypothesis:

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[58] Fein, "More Murder in the Middle: Life-Integrity Violations and Democracy in the World, 1987", 175-6.
[59] Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War", 5.
[60] Hegre et al., "Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992", 34.
[61] Cederman, Wimmer, and Min, "Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel?", 87.

H2. Anocracies will have *increased levels* of ethnic conflict compared to autocracies.

These hypotheses re-test initial findings on civil conflict patterns across regime type with respect to ethnic conflict specifically, as opposed to broad civil conflict, and extend the test to levels of ethnic conflict as well.

However, this subset of literature (especially those that use Polity IV's composite measure to segment regimes) is not without its criticisms. The first of these criticisms regards the measurement used in many of these studies. Vreeland (2008) criticizes one specific factional subscore making up the Polity composite score, noting that using the composite score to measure onset is tautological given that the coding rules for that subscore include the occurrence of civil unrest or conflict during that time period.[62] A second criticism of this literature is more theoretical in nature. The term 'anocracy' is a broad term encompassing many regimes that do not neatly fit into the democratic or autocratic spheres, and many studies use the middle-scoring countries within regime datasets to define this. As a result, this is less than helpful to determine what *exactly* about such regimes lends them to greater conflict. The hypotheses proposed above are purposefully vague, to demonstrate that many aspects of the regime can affect occurrence and levels of ethnic conflict simultaneously. While these are valid criticisms of this particular approach, retesting ethnic conflict as the outcome specifically and recreating these methods will be valuable to compare with the changes in testing specific regime characteristics. Not only will trends between this subset of studies be comparable for the first time through the utilization of multiple methods, but the merit of classifying a regime in a general way will be compared to the value of examining independent institutional behavior within that same regime.

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[62] Vreeland, "The Effect of Political Regime on Civil War", 401-25.

Regime Characteristics and Ethnic Conflict

Another movement within the literature has aimed to categorize regimes based on their characteristics or factors, and while several factors are emphasized in most work as important, in practice they are executed differently. Geddes (1999) segments authoritarian regime types not based on the level of democratic or autocratic character seen, but rather how factions within the government interact and their control of the executive position. This approach "emphasize[s] control over access to power…rather than formal institutional characteristics", which allows the segmentation of regime types based on the particular combination of actors with power.[63] Several different types are possible under this model; a military regime, a personalist regime, a single-party regime, or a combination of two types. Under such a model, the specific character of the regime would determine risk factors that exacerbate ethnic conflict, rather than a vague classification as a 'consolidated' regime or a hybrid regime. However, this model incorporates seemingly small concepts into its definition of regime type, when in reality the regime can be far more varied. Svolik (2012) utilizes a more elegant and exhaustive approach, arguing that military classifications and party classifications, for instance, are more varied than Geddes suggests and exist on different 'axes', meaning a multi-party regime with military involvement would be possible as a classification where it was not previously.[64] Ultimately, however, both studies find importance in key factors such as these when defining the character of a regime.

Svolik creates a detailed classification for authoritarian regimes, using a typology with four different categories affecting politics in non-democracies, including military involvement in politics, party system, the system of executive selection, and the system of legislative selection. Party system classifications and level of military involvement in particular are of interest when considering effects on occurrence and levels of ethnic conflict. A non-democracy can have no parties, a single party, or multiple parties that are allowed to compete in the electoral process; as a result of this variation in competition, the strategies surrounding the acquisition of constituencies changes, which can change conflict outcomes. A high level of military involvement can change incentives for acquiring power, and has been known to increase the likelihood of interstate conflict; there is a possibility that this effect extends to civil conflict, and therefore ethnic conflict, as well.[65] In the following sections, I expand on these two factors within an autocracy, the knowledge about them to date, and their potential effects on ethnic conflict. While Svolik's classification is preferred methodologically, Geddes and many other scholars offer sound theory that is incorporated.

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[63] Geddes, "What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?", 123.

[64] Milan W. Svolik, *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*, 29.

Party Systems and Ethnic Conflict

The ideals of democracy include the ability to openly contest in elections and access to power granted at the behest of the people of a nation. Many non-democracies have formal parties that are allowed to contest, but the competition does not have a fair chance at winning office or does not have a chance at all. From Svolik's theory, party systems for the election of an executive exist on an axis within a regime that can then be used to define that regime; I theorize that this variation can then have an effect on differences in ethnic conflict across non-democracies.[66] The particular classification is inspired from Geddes' work, where single-party regimes are those which ban any form of opposition or repress it to the extent that any other parties are effectively rendered ineffective.[67] The existence of multiple parties within a non-democracy is more interesting, and more nuanced in its theory; it is peculiar for a non-democracy to have multiple parties when electoral freedom does not usually exist, so they must serve a particular purpose.

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[65] Weeks, "Strongmen and Straw Men", 326-27.

[66] Milan W. Svolik, *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*, 32.

[67] Geddes, "What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?", 123.

Competitive authoritarian regimes are regimes in which regular elections occur with multiple parties, but competition is uneven and unfair. Levitsky and Way (2010) explain that democratizing pressure after the end of the Cold War focused on emphasizing certain institutions as the hallmarks of democracy, such as the existence of elections for the executive. While this pressure seemed to be outwardly successful, what emerged was a particular subset of the hybrid regimes previously mentioned: those who incorporated such institutions as a method of securing support from wealthier, older democracies in the West.[68] Many existing autocrats were able to liberalize their governments partially, without any real effort to democratize. Competitive authoritarianism opened up a new world of regime subtypes, and a pattern emerged. Within such regimes, an "inherent tension" was created with the existence of legal arenas for political competition, where incumbents could be challenged regularly and where mass mobilization would be encouraged.[69] A particular benefit exists in the form of resource patronage for the victorious in-group, raising the stakes of any existing elections.[70]

On the other hand, while such measures might have proved advantageous for elites in these regimes in one regard, in practice elections, and the incorporation of rival elites within government, can prove quite risky to the status quo. The coup-civil war trap is a well-noted phenomenon: when rival elites are incorporated, the regime is more unstable and prone to conflict, but the absence of their incorporation risks civil conflict as rival elites attempt to seize power.[71] In terms of variance in party systems, multiple parties can offer the risk of incorporation, which would potentially increase the likelihood of ethnic conflict within such regimes. It is possible that regimes with any opening for rival elites to create constituencies and seize power run the risk of an increased chance of conflict.

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[68] Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War,* 19.

[69] Ibid., 33.

[70] Caselli and Coleman, "On the Theory of Ethnic Conflict", 163-5.

[71] Philip Roessler, *Ethnic Politics and State Power in Africa: The Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap*, 6-16.

Furthermore, in an electoral non-democratic regime, the motives for emphasizing ethnic divisions to create constituencies would increase. For elites from a majority ethnic group, stirring ethnonationalism would allow the solidification of existing constituencies along such lines, decreasing the threat offered by elections. Ethnic minority leaders who seek office are then prompted to run along similar lines or risk losing existing voters. Additionally, regimes which have surface-level elections without actual change risk the power dynamic described by Cederman et al. (2010), who find that ethnic groups excluded from the power center are more likely to engage in conflict with the government.[72] With the deepening of ethnic divisions, civil conflict that erupts is more likely to be along ethnic lines, and conflict overall becomes more likely through competing ethnonationalist claims to power.[73] Another study from Davenport (2007) finds that overall repression within regimes with single-parties is lower than other regime types, suggesting that a "tyrannical peace" is achievable and that not every authoritarian regime is as likely to have internal conflict.[74] Finally, resource control is a main motivator for ethnic conflict, and the patronage employed by autocrats for their in-groups is but an extension of this concept.[75] From this set of findings, a third hypothesis can be drawn:

H3. Non-democracies with multiple parties will have an *increased likelihood* of ethnic conflict compared to those with one or no party.

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[72] Cederman, Wimmer, and Min, "Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel?", 88.
[73] Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict", 136.
[74] Davenport, "State Repression and the Tyrannical Peace", 485.
[75] Walter, "Does Conflict Beget Conflict?", 372.

Mass mobilization is key to the onset of conflict within competitive authoritarian regimes, because there are motives for elites to encourage mobilization along ethnic lines. As a result, the level of ethnic conflict can be expected to be higher where such motivations exist, because more people are affected, leading to longer and harsher conflict. A fourth hypothesis draws from this concept:

H4. Non-democracies with multiple parties will have *increased levels* of ethnic conflict compared to those with one or no party.

Military Involvement and Ethnic Conflict

One particular area of interest is the military's involvement- outside of national security affairs- in the executive. Entire regimes can be classified as military regimes or military hybrid regimes under the system proposed by Geddes (1999).[76] While the military can be involved in a regime to the extent where it takes on an overall militaristic character, this exists on a separate axis from party systems as explained by Svolik (2012).[77] Regardless, regimes with high levels of military involvement tend to view force as a means to solving external regime problems. This is the consequence of both the organizational structure innate to a military, but also a movement to prove necessity to the regime.[78] It is possible that this can create a similar viewpoint towards resolving internal threats.

The military in a non-democracy can get involved in the political arena in ways that would not be possible under the institutions and checks of a democracy. This involvement has implications for conflict outcomes as a result, because the military has a particular set of motivations and behaviors that influences its members. Political factions within the military are far less likely to cooperate than that within regular civilian elites, and with violence being the *modus operandi* of resolving such disputes, conflict within the country becomes more likely as conflict within factions becomes more likely.[79] Furthermore, repression is often carried out within non-democracies by the military, which means that repressive behavior itself, and civil conflict stemming from it, are more likely and occur on a greater scale.[80] Ethnicity can be used for the development of support for elite military factions among the population, and it can fulfill the other aspect that encourages mobilization: targeting 'scapegoats', seeming outsiders who would be threats to the regime and to important ethnic groups.[81] Ethnic conflict as a subset of civil conflict would be expected to behave similarly in relation with the level of military involvement in politics, which gives rise to the hypothesis:

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[76] Geddes, "What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?", 123.

[77] Milan W. Svolik, *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*, 31.

[78] Weeks, "Strongmen and Straw Men", 343.

H5. Non-democracies with a military involved in politics will have an *increased likelihood* of ethnic conflict compared to those without military involvement.

A characteristic of regimes with high military involvement includes the increased ability to supply groups with weaponry and training, due to a closely integrated supply process. The capacity to quickly supply militias and direct their actions has been a clear cause of several genocides, resulting in a high number of casualties.[82] This, combined with the general pattern of increased repression in militaristic regimes, leads to the final hypothesis:

H6. Non-democracies with a military involved in politics will have *increased levels* of ethnic conflict compared to those without military involvement.

The six hypotheses proposed above will be tested in the coming chapters.

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[79] Geddes, "What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?", 124.

[80] Davenport, "State Repression and the Tyrannical Peace", 486.

[81] Young, "The Heart of the African Conflict Zone", 311.

[82] Stanton, Dr. Gregory G. "The Ten Stages of Genocide".

Chapter 3

Methodology

Introduction

In this chapter, I will review my methods and detail my empirical approach to testing my hypotheses. To summarize past chapters, I am interested in the effect regime type has both on the occurrence of ethnic conflict and the level of ethnic conflict seen. I first begin my analysis from an onset perspective, recreating for ethnic conflict what previous studies have examined only for civil conflict. I then test the effect of regime type and regime characteristics on levels of ethnic conflict, which I operationalize as the level of casualties seen at a country-year level. I will review the kind of study I undertook, my data collection measures, and my treatment of the variables involved. I will then talk about my method of analysis and the models I created, finishing with some notes on the process as a whole.

Hypotheses

First, I review my hypotheses and the simple relationship expected below. For a list of the formal hypotheses and accompanying measures, please see the hypothesis table attached in Appendix C.

H1. Anocracies will have an *increased likelihood* of ethnic conflict compared to autocracies.

H2. Anocracies will have *increased levels* of ethnic conflict compared to autocracies.

H3. Non-democracies with multiple parties will have an *increased likelihood* of ethnic conflict compared to those with one or no party.

H4. Non-democracies with more than one party will have *increased levels* of ethnic conflict compared to those with one or no party.

H5. Non-democracies with a military involved in politics will have an *increased likelihood* of ethnic conflict compared to those without military involvement.

H6. Non-democracies with a military involved in politics will have *increased levels* of ethnic conflict compared to those without military involvement.

In order to simplify my approach to the research question, I divided my study along vertical divisions according to the explanatory variable of choice, and along horizontal divisions to distinguish between likelihood of conflict and levels of conflict. Going forward in this section, I will refer to the hypotheses by their number for shorthand. Below, I demonstrate these divisions in a matrix, which will become important when deciding what the models for testing these hypotheses will be.

Fig. 1: Hypothesis Matrix and Divisions



		Vertical Divisions		
		Anocracy/Autocracy	Party System	Military Involvement
Horizontal Divisions	Likelihood of Ethnic Conflict	H1	H3	H5
	Level of Ethnic Conflict	H2	H4	H6

Research Design

In this study, I decided to undertake a large-N study with quantitative regression analysis, aggregating several datasets to acquire the variables I wished to test against one another. I examine cases across non-democracies exclusively, which internally vary along the vertical divisions specified in Fig. 1 above. I will first review the explanatory variables in my vertical divisions, and detail their measurement and the way I chose to operationalize them. In my vertical divisions as explained above, I am primarily interested in distinguishing between the "bucket" regime type and regime variation among relevant characteristics that I believe will impact the outcomes of ethnic conflict. I believe that the two regime characteristics above will yield more interesting and more detailed results than a bucket regime type, which will allow for more nuanced analysis of the research question.

In previous studies, in practice, anocracies have been distinguished from autocracies through the simple expedient of using the Polity IV aggregate measure for the level of democracy present in a given country. In the past, anocracies have been found to have both higher levels of repression and civil conflict using this method.[83][84] If the patterns within ethnic conflict follow the patterns seen on a larger scale within civil conflict, then the expectation is that this division will prove to be predictive of the likelihood of ethnic conflict seen: specifically, that anocracies will be more *likely* to have ethnic conflict.

Though this U-shape hypothesis in civil conflict literature predicts that repression and civil conflict again dips when countries are democracies, this is not addressed within this particular research question focused on non-democracies. Practically, this means that I have the luxury of predicting a linear relationship: from autocracy to anocracy, the likelihood of ethnic conflict increases. This is the subject of H1. Through describing the general character of anocracy in previous chapters, I arrive at H2, which similarly postulates that the level of conflict seen in anocracy will be higher, because the partly-open nature of such regimes will encourage mobilization without sufficient channels for political participation, and will promote violence as one of the foremost tools for change. This again predicts a linear relationship. Due to the way I have described both of these effects, the measure of this variable is transformed from a numerical score to a binomial variable; either a regime is an anocracy, or it is not (it would be an autocracy otherwise).

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[83] Hegre et al., "Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992", 33-48.

[84] Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War", 75-90.

While regime type by definition may encompass the two regime characteristics of interest (party system and level of military involvement), there are more factors included that may change the net outcome above. In looking at regime factors, I first examine the party system of the regime of interest. I am primarily interested in the difference between regimes without parties/with one party, and regimes with multiple parties. Regimes with no parties and regimes with one party are operationally similar in the way they would affect ethnic conflict, as the existence of a party in name does not open the political process much more than the lack of existence of parties. In this way, this variable becomes a binomial variable from a categorical one: either a regime allows multiple parties, or it does not. The relationship with likelihood of ethnic conflict and level of ethnic conflict is predicted to be direct: if a regime has multiple parties, it is more likely to have ethnic conflict and has ethnic conflict on a greater scale. These predictions are the subject of H3 and H4, respectively.

The second regime factor that I examine is the level of military involvement in political processes and the executive branch within a regime. Again, in this situation there are many potential measures for the involvement of the military, which examined by themselves would perhaps offer a more nuanced perspective on whether increasing the involvement would affect ethnic conflict. However, I seek to answer the broader question of whether involvement affects the outcome of ethnic conflict at all, making this categorical variable a binomial one: either a regime has military involvement outside of national security affairs, or it does not. I also predict a positive relationship between this and both measures of outcome: if a regime has military involvement and interference in the political arena, it is both more likely to have ethnic conflict and will have greater levels of ethnic conflict. These are the final two hypotheses, H5 and H6, respectively.

Moving towards the outcomes, the first variable I am interested in examining as dependent on these three explanatory variables is the likelihood of ethnic conflict, also measured as the 'onset' of ethnic conflict. An important point to clarify is my level of aggregation, which is at the country-year level, and examines conflict at that level. My methods for executing this half of the study is based on previous studies. The variable itself is quite simple: either conflict occurred in a country-year or it did not, making it a binomial response. However, many studies lag explanatory variables back one year in relation to the occurrence of conflict, to better clarify the effects of factors of interest and to avoid reverse causation. This is a method I employ as well, in relation to the conflict binomial variable. This is straightforward enough, although the method of regression analysis between this variable and the three explanatory variables I am interested in is different than for the other outcome variable (I will touch on this in a later section). The relationship between conflict occurrence and the explanatory variables predicts the likelihood of conflict, and is the subject of H1, H3, and H5 respectively.

The second outcome I am interested in, and which is original to this study, is the level of ethnic conflict as a function of the explanatory variables. This variable is a bit more difficult to quantify and put into practice, as many aspects can play into the 'scale' of conflict. There are two measures that are decent proxies for this idea: the duration of ethnic conflict, and the casualties due to ethnic conflict. The duration of conflict is useful as a measure, because theoretically it can indicate whether multiple parties lead to longer conflict, or if military involvement leads to longer conflict. This is a description of peace on a greater scale, and it describes whether causal regime aspects or regime types can predict the duration of fighting. However, there are a number of complications in using this as a measure. The way in which the war ends, or the success of negotiations, can heavily impact it. Instead of measuring the effects from regime characteristics, some aspects of the resolution of conflict can affect the results. Furthermore, the duration measure and the effect on it cannot be examined at the country-year level, because it spans multiple years; the preceding years to the conflict only could be examined, which becomes complex when more than one conflict is occurring in a country at a given time.

I explored another measure of the level of conflict, the number of casualties, as an intriguing way to think about the scale of ethnic conflict. In practice, many of my hypotheses are based on studies of levels of repression and variance in civil conflict within different regime types, which would indicate perhaps that, in regimes where mobilization is possible but violence is high, the deaths attributed to such a conflict (both battle deaths and civilian deaths) would be higher as the conflict was more widespread. As a result, a higher number of deaths due to ethnic conflict could occur in an anocracy as opposed to an autocracy, or in a regime with multiple parties as opposed to one party or less. The concept would be to explain that, in such regimes, conflict can touch more lives and cause more havoc than it would be able to in other regimes.

Casualties as a measure of level of conflict is a count measure, in integers, because it is a count of the number of deaths attributed to conflict at the country-year level. This measure has the added benefit of being simpler to work with within the parameters of my other variables and the scope of my question. Since this is a measure of how many people are affected, it is an absolute measure and one that I decided not to normalize by population or otherwise adjust.[85] Regardless of the population of the country, the scale of conflict as measured by casualties is absolute, and one hundred deaths in a small country does not correlate to half the relative loss in a larger country, but rather affects just as many lives. There are two measures included within the total conflict number: battle deaths and civilian deaths. The ideal measure of conflict casualties would include both direct and indirect deaths, as civilian deaths in particular are generally higher than reported; however, indirect deaths are difficult to quantify reliably and so are omitted from this particular model.[86]

Finally, I decided to use three control variables in my study, which are quite common in civil conflict models and which I believe to be appropriate for this as well. The first variable I controlled for is GDP per capita as a measure of country wealth, and the second is the population of the country. Wealth is important, and affects the regime type and to a certain extent the party system and military involvement of the country as well, as a result: some literature has found that democracies (and the trappings of democracy, like multiple parties and little military involvement) tend to survive more in wealthier countries.[87] Wealth also affects ethnic conflict outcomes, as poorer countries will more likely experience the phenomenon of civil conflict by a significant amount: I have extended this expected effect to my study of conflict casualty variance as well.[88] In terms of population, the likelihood of civil conflict occurring in larger countries increases exponentially, and it can also have a significant impact on regime type and regime factors; I extend this theory to the level of conflict as well.[89] After determining these two variables to be important as controls in my models, I decided to log them in practice because both variables have been found to have exponential impacts on conflict odds with similar marginal changes.

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[85] There is precedent for using both relative and absolute methods of measurement when measuring casualties of ethnic conflict, though I use absolute measurements: see the Igarapé Institute report, "Counting Conflict Deaths", for an in-depth discussion of casualty data collection and analysis (pp. 5-13).

[86] Muggah, "Counting Conflict Deaths: Options for SDG 16.1", 5-13.

[87] Epstein et al., "Democratic Transitions", 551-69.

[88] Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War", 75.

[89] Ibid., 76.

The third variable I controlled for was the number of ethnic groups present in the country. The primary theoretical reason for this inclusion was the idea that ethnic conflict as defined and described earlier could be more possible in a setting with a greater number of ethnic groups. Since ethnic conflict occurs when ethnicity becomes a salient cleavage in society, along which tensions can form, there would potentially be more opportunities for this to occur with a higher number of groups. In practice, I found this variable to be correlated to a certain degree with the population control variable; higher populations are correlated with a higher number of ethnic groups, which can be expected. However, because both are control variables and neither is an explanatory variable of interest, multicollinearity is not a concern. This variable was treated similarly to population and GDP, and logged.[90]

Data Collection

The beginning stages of data aggregation necessitated a frame within which relevant data could be placed. An important point to note is that the study of the occurrence of ethnic conflict would need *all* country-years within the period of interest, and the study of the level of ethnic conflict would only need country-years *with conflict* within the period of interest. This distinction comes from the questions asked about conflict. First, within H1-3-5, the question is whether a certain aspect makes ethnic conflict in the following year likely or not. This necessitates comparisons to years where there is no ethnic conflict; hence, all country-years within my time period are necessary. In H2-4-6, among the years with conflict, the question is what can affect the level of casualties seen, which requires solely those country-years in which there is ethnic conflict.

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[90] The distribution of groups is skewed heavily right, so to normalize this distribution and improve linearity, log(group) is used within the model. Because of this measurement, countries marked with 0 ethnic groups were treated as countries marked to have 1 ethnic group, indicating a homogenous population.

Excel was the primary tool used for dataset construction. First, ethnic conflict country-years were aggregated from the Ethnic Armed Conflict dataset.[91] Because the scope of the question is post-Cold War, the lower time limit was set to 1990. This scope was chosen because of the particular interest in describing ethnic conflict through the lens of civil unrest and regime change after the Cold War ended, as touched on previously. Data for the last decade has only recently become available and is being published currently, so the time period is more limited than would be preferred; there are still enough samples for statistical analysis, so this is not a cause for concern. The Ethnic Armed Conflict data goes through 2005, which was set as the upper limit, making the sample size for H 2-4-6 all conflict country-years from 1990-2005. A separate dataset was created containing all country-years from 1990-2005 pulled from Polity IV as a framework for H 1-3-5.[92] To maintain consistency within results, this time period was used across every dataset.

After setting the frames, the explanatory variable data was collected, beginning with anocracy and autocracy regime types. Country-year level regime type data was added from Polity IV, which has aggregate scores of democracy. Operationalizing differences between regime types can be difficult; many authors use composite index measures like this one to group regimes into clear buckets. For this particular explanatory variable, a common measure was used to score anocracy and autocracy. This was later re-coded as a binomial variable, with anocracy being the classification of interest. To reiterate, this particular method recreates the subset of studies that observe patterns in civil conflict and repression among ‘anocracies’ by using the same classifications for regime types as compared to ethnic conflict country-years and non-conflict country-years.[93]

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[91] Cederman et al., “Ethnic Armed Conflict dataset.”

[92] Marshall et al., “Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2018.”

For the two regime characteristics of interest, I decided to use Svolik's "Institutions in Dictatorships" dataset, which records various regime traits and institutions among non-democracies. Among these, there are country-year level measures for the type of party system within the regime and the level of military involvement. Svolik's data was aggregated in a separate set which focuses specifically on the party system and level of military involvement. Both variables began as categorical measures, but as explained previously were more useful to the analysis as binomial variables, and were also recoded. All of this data was matched to the two frames created previously at the country-year level: however, these factors were lagged by one year to establish the causal relationship for the model. There are some edge cases that Polity IV and Svolik disagree on when determining democratic or non-democratic character for a particular country-year, and as a result some non-democratic ethnic armed conflict years are different between the two datasets. However, the small number of different cases indicates that this is not overtly significant to the analysis.[94]

The two outcome variables were then aggregated, once the three explanatory variables were added to the datasets. The occurrence of conflict within a given year was pulled from the Ethnic Armed Conflict dataset, and was coded as a binomial variable.[95] The casualties attributed to conflict were taken from two separate sources. The first measure was battle deaths, and was aggregated from the PRIO dataset at the country-year level.[96] The second measure was civilian deaths, taken from the Ethnic One-Sided Violence dataset, also a member of the PRIO family[97].

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[93] Please see Appendix B for greater detail on the scores used.

[94] For greater detail on the specific scores and re-scores present in this section, please see Appendix B.

[95] Cederman et al., "Ethnic Armed Conflict dataset."

[96] Gleditsch et al., "Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset", v. 3-2005b

[97] Fjelde et al., "Introducing the Ethnic One-Sided Violence dataset."

The sum total of these two figures yielded a total casualty count per country-year. This data was then matched to the previous data, and the few omitted country-years were ignored for the purposes of the model. Both of these outcome variables account for data over the year, and are not disaggregated further in any dataset used.

The GDP per capita and population data for every country-year were added from the World Bank Data family. In order to prevent the effect of ethnic conflict on wealth or population from entering the model, figures from 1989 were used consistently for each country regardless of the year, providing a relative measure of wealth and population. The time period is a relatively narrow 16 years, so this adjustment is less consequential. Log-GDP per capita and log-population measures were created and incorporated into the final models. Ethnic group data was taken from the "Ethnic Power Relations" dataverse, which provides the number of politically relevant ethnic groups present in a country-year[98]. Some country-years were not present within the full dataset for H1-3-5, and those country-years were omitted from the analysis. All data for the limited conflict dataset for H 2-4-6 was present. Although measures of ethnic fractionalization are also present in this dataset, incorporation would be outside of the scope of analysis; this extension is further discussed in a later chapter. The log of this variable was included within each of the final models to improve linearity.

Ultimately, four separate datasets were created, from which six models were drawn. Dataset 1 examines the effect of regime type on the likelihood of ethnic conflict (H1), with regime type, conflict occurrence, and the three logged control variables present: N = 1181. Dataset 2 examines the effects of regime factors on the likelihood of ethnic conflict (H3 & H5), with party system, lagged level of military involvement, conflict occurrence, and the three logged control variables present: N = 896.

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[98] Cederman et al., "Ethnic Power Relations dataset."

Dataset 3 tests the effect of regime type on the level of ethnic conflict during conflict years (H2), with regime type, conflict casualties, and the three logged control variables present: N = 330.

Dataset 4 tests the effect of regime factors on the level of ethnic conflict during conflict years (H4 & H6), with party system, lagged level of military involvement, conflict casualties, and the three logged control variables present: N = 237.

An important note: party systems and level of military involvement are not included within the same model (despite being assembled within the same dataset) because they exist fundamentally on different axes of the regime, and would not influence one another,

Methods of Analysis

Each hypothesis has its own corresponding model, and due to different types of measurement for dependent variables, has different regressions as well. I will briefly review the models and the decisions made for analysis methods: the model number corresponds to the hypothesis going forward (H1 = model M1). R and RStudio were the tools of choice for regression analysis on the data.

M1 uses Dataset 1, and is similar to M3 and M5 using Dataset 2 in the regression method employed. Because the outcome variable of interest, conflict occurrence, is binomial, a logistic regression is the method of choice when assessing a relationship between it and the three explanatory variables. M2 uses Dataset 3, and is also similar to M4 and M6 using Dataset 4 in the regression method utilized as well. The outcome variable, level of casualties per country-year, is a count variable and thus would utilize a Poisson or a negative binomial model. After testing the casualty data for overdispersion, M2 was fitted to a Poisson model whereas, for M4 and M6, a negative binomial model was determined to be the better method. An OLS regression with logged casualty count data would also be a possibility, but comes with complications and does not give an accurate portrayal of the dispersion of the data.

An important point to reiterate is that M3 and M5 are kept separate, and M2 and M4 are kept separate as well. While the party system and level of military involvement are both characteristics of a regime, they are not included as covariates within the same model. Although some literature combines the two characteristics and interlink them, the idea of little to no interaction between the two as separate axes of a regime is a more accurate representation of real-world outcomes as argued by Svolik (2012).[99] In this situation, then, they have little influence on one another and so are used in separate models. A list of the full models used can be found in Appendix C, along with relevant method details and regression choices.

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[99] Milan W. Svolik, *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*, 2-25.

Chapter 4

Analysis and Limitations

Introduction

Within this chapter, I have included a set of regression results from running the aforementioned models. I will analyze my findings and explain their implications for the hypotheses, whose theoretical extension I will discuss. I will then identify some limitations of the study, along with suggested extensions for future projects building from this work. The standard for statistical significance across every model is set at a 95% confidence interval ($p < 0.05$), and the corresponding significance of my results will be discussed accordingly. In all tables below, 'conflict' denotes ethnic conflict specifically, the subsets of which are specified in Chapter 3; all conflict results are specific and are extended to ethnically divided regimes, whose theory is expanded upon in Chapter 1.

Regressions and Analysis



Table 1: The Effect of Broad Regime Type on Occurrence and Levels of Conflict

	Model M1 (**H1**) (1) Occurrence of Conflict [Logit]			**Model M4** (**H4**) (2) Level of Conflict [Poisson]
	coefficient	odds	probability	coefficient
regime_type	0.403** (0.140)	1.496	60%	-0.850*** (0.002)
log_population	0.470*** (0.142)			-0.003 (0.002)
log_GDP (per capita)	-0.868*** (0.157)			-0.092*** (0.002)
log_groups (number present)	0.627** (0.220)			-0.863*** (0.003)
Constant	-2.300* (1.059)			9.728*** (0.014)
N	1181			330

All variables describe the previous year's data (lagged by one year) save the GDP and population variables.
regime_type is a binomial variable; 0 is an autocracy, and 1 is an anocracy.
Standard error included in parentheses below coefficient estimates.
* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Table 1 above displays the total effect of broad regime type on ethnic conflict. H1 postulates a positive relationship between anocracy and the likelihood of ethnic conflict, based on previous studies of general civil conflict. Model M1 yields a statistically significant positive result showing that, for a one-unit increase in the explanatory variable (regime type), the log odds of conflict occurrence increase by 0.403. When exponentiated to the odds ratio, for a one-unit increase in regime type, the odds of ethnic conflict occurring increase by a factor of approximately 1.5:1. There is only one possible increment in regime type, which is the change from autocracy to anocracy. These two categories are therefore being directly compared against one another. In layman's terms, it is more likely that ethnic conflict will occur in anocracies than autocracies, so H1 is substantiated: these results follow on the heels of the theories of previous studies and add weight to the "U-shape" hypothesis of more conflict in middle regimes. Because ethnic conflict occurs when ethnicity is the salient political division within society, the implication of this result is that ethnically divided regimes that can be classified as anocracies have a higher likelihood of experiencing ethnic conflict than their autocratic counterparts.

The results when testing this effect on the levels of ethnic conflict as measured through battle deaths (soldier and civilian) are less clear. H4 suggests that anocracies would have higher levels of conflict and conflict-related deaths than autocracies. We find that there is a marked, significant *negative* effect on the level of casualties when the regime is an anocracy as opposed to an autocracy. The coefficient of -0.85 means that, for a one-unit change in regime type, the log-casualty-count would be expected to drop by that amount: H4 is therefore not substantiated. This is a surprising finding, and indicates that an increased likelihood of ethnic conflict does not necessarily mean an increased level of conflict. There are several potential theoretical and methodological causes of the difference. Theoretically, it is possible that there is simply a different pattern happening within this subset of regimes, where perhaps more localized and frequent conflicts break out on a smaller scale than those that happen within autocracies. To isolate these differences, the time-series data of conflict can be further disaggregated past the country-year level, with geospatial analysis to determine event clusters; different patterns of repression or resolution could possibly also be at play. Anocracies are regimes that, among other things, have some democratic character that could positively impact conflict resolution.

One methodological concern echoes Vreeland (2008)[100]; the XRREG component variable of the Polity IV score includes within it a ranking of whether the executive was removed forcibly through conflict, which can create a false positive in Model M1 above, because this ranking is tied to whether conflict was currently occurring.[101] Regimes categorized as anocracies with a ranking heavily influenced by this conflict rating may make the entire anocracy category 'more likely' to experience conflict, when commonalities among them that potentially *influence* conflict are fewer than expected, leading to a lower level of conflict than 'consolidated autocracies'. Another general concern surrounding this kind of broad bucket regime type is the reflection in aggregate results of potentially mixed results among various axes of that regime. One characteristic of an 'anocracy', like the presence of a legislature, can have a negative effect on the likelihood of conflict, whereas another characteristic like the presence of multiple parties can have a positive effect on the likelihood of conflict, as had been demonstrated previously.[102] The results observed in the models above may be capturing the net effect of these differences.

Ultimately, none of these potential reasons for mixed results can be ruled out without further analysis with variables and extensions outside of the scope of the current study. These variations are explored further in Chapter 5. The strengths of regressing conflict on specific characteristics like party system and military involvement, seen in the following two tables, are precisely that they run into few of the same issues. In the subset of non-democracies used, none are transitional and do not code for conflict, and the results are more indicative of the specific effects of different systems within regimes.

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[100] Vreeland, "The Effect of Political Regime on Civil War", 401-25.

[101] Marshall et al., "Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2018."

[102] Wright and Escribà-Folch, "Authoritarian Institutions and Regime Survival", 283-286.



Table 2: The Effect of Party System on Occurrence and Levels of Conflict

	Model M2 (H2) (1) Occurrence of Conflict [Logit]			**Model M5 (H5)** (2) Level of Conflict [Negative Binomial]
	coefficient	odds	probability	coefficient
party_system	0.537** (0.189)	1.711	63%	-0.091 (0.234)
log_population	0.374* (0.162)			-0.794** (0.260)
log_GDP (per capita)	-1.171*** (0.203)			-0.300 (0.274)
log_groups (number present)	1.130*** (0.274)			-2.428*** (0.391)
Constant	-1.255 (1.202)			16.201*** (1.701)
N	896			237

All variables describe the previous year's data (lagged by one year) save the GDP and population variables.
party_system is a binomial variable; 0 is the absence of multiple parties, and 1 indicates the presence of multiple parties.
Standard error included in parentheses below coefficient estimates.
* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Table 2 shows the effects of party systems- specifically, multiple parties- on the occurrence and level of conflict within non-democracies. H2 hypothesizes that regimes with multiple parties will more likely experience ethnic conflict than regimes with one party or less. This hypothesis is substantiated in the above findings with a significant positive effect in M2. A one-increment increase in party system leads to an increase of 0.537 in log-odds of conflict, which means that a regime with multiple parties has an increased odds of ethnic conflict, 1.711:1, when compared to regimes without multiple parties.

M5 tests H5, which proposes that there is a positive relationship between the presence of multiple parties and increased levels of ethnic conflict. While M5 finds a slight negative effect of multiple parties on levels of conflict, this finding is not statistically significant- with the included margin of error, the relationship can be either slightly negative or slightly positive. Therefore, this proposed relationship is not substantiated. The presence of multiple parties has no tangible effect on the level of conflict as observed through casualties.



Table 3: The Effect of Military Involvement on Occurrence and Levels of Conflict

	Model M3 (H3) (1) Occurrence of Conflict [Logit]			**Model M6 (H6)** (2) Level of Conflict [Negative Binomial]
	coefficient	odds	probability	coefficient
military_involvement	0.706*** (0.161)	2.026	67%	1.123*** (0.194)
log_population	0.422* (0.166)			-1.042*** (0.250)
log_GDP (per capita)	-1.179*** (0.194)			-0.082 (0.264)
log_groups (number present)	1.093*** (0.278)			-2.174*** (0.376)
Constant	-1.505 (1.205)			16.355*** (1.634)
N	896			237

All variables describe the previous year's data (lagged by one year) save the GDP and population variables.
military_involvement is a binomial variable; 0 is the absence of military involvement in government past security affairs, and 1 is its presence.
Standard error included in parentheses below coefficient estimates.
* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Table 3, similar to Table 2, tests the influence of another aspect of a regime on conflict- the presence of military involvement. Because both characteristics come from the same dataset source, the number of observations tested are the same.

H3 postulates that an increased level of military involvement will increase the odds of ethnic conflict, as measured in the next year. By this measurement, the military can either be involved in the government past traditional security affairs, or is not involved. Model M3 finds a very strong influence of military involvement on the likelihood of ethnic conflict, yielding a positive coefficient of 0.706. This ultimately means that, when military involvement is present in the regime, the odds of ethnic conflict occurring increase by a factor of *over* 2:1. H3 is substantiated; when the military is involved in politics in an ethnically divided regime, the likelihood of ethnic conflict increases. H6 proposes that an increased level of military involvement will increase the levels of ethnic conflict as observed through casualties. This effect is observed in Model M6, which finds a significant, large positive effect of 1.123 on the log-casualty-count with a change to military involvement in the regime.

The effect of party systems on conflict is mixed, but the effect of military involvement in the regime on conflict is astounding. The presence of multiple parties increases the likelihood of ethnic conflict, as does the presence of military involvement in government. While both had strong effects, the military effect was notable. The mixed results found for levels of conflict are more interesting, because this particular comparison is novel. The presence of multiple parties does not have any significant or observable effect on the level of conflict; this suggests that there exists no true relationship between casualty outcomes and parties that are present. It underscores the point found in Table 1, that there is not necessarily any tie between an increased likelihood of conflict and an increased or decreased level of conflict. Military involvement, on the other hand, increases the level of conflict easily beyond any other factor tested. These findings have exciting implications for the study of regime effects on conflict outcomes, which are explored further in the following chapter.

Limitations

I find it beneficial to discuss some of the limitations present within this particular analysis. It is important to note that this is a preliminary study of these particular variables; no one has compared regime characteristics and ethnic conflict in quite this way before. While M1 and H1 essentially replicate previous studies by testing regime type effects on the onset of conflict (although ethnic conflict specifically), every other comparison is novel. The variable ‘level of conflict’, in particular, is rudimentary: deaths attributed to battle are an important component, but indirect deaths and duration of conflict as measures of intensity are also important to include in future studies.

A central concern of this study is data aggregation level and causality. Assessing the spread of conflict and the pattern of casualties is difficult from a data collection standpoint. Furthermore, the direction of causality is difficult to assess with complete certainty within the limits posed by data currently. This has been remedied in part by lagging the variables, but events that take place within the same year at different points of time are important inclusions in the dataset that cannot currently be done. For example, it is possible that a conflict occurs earlier in the year, and military involvement increases as a consequence later in the year, which would mean that the causal relationship would be reversed.

A bigger concern in this direction is mid-year regime change, which is recorded in some datasets as occurring in the next year. Therefore, regime change as a consequence of conflict is recorded as ‘no authority’ in some datasets, whereas it is noted in the following year as change in others. This also requires disaggregation, to the day or week level. However, current datasets almost all aggregate at a country-year level, which makes any modification a field-wide effort.[103] A second point is that data is continuously emerging; for M5 and M6, where sample count is relatively low (N = 237), added data points could prove beneficial. The time period described in this study is narrow, 16 years, which is a strength in this regard, because conflict trends across time are largely not incorporated and do not affect the study.

The explanatory regime characteristics tested in this study are limited and can be expanded, and must be compared to counterparts in other datasets for the most accurate result. The dataset V-Dem has multiple measures of electoral democracy that examine particular aspects of the electoral scheme, which would help to pinpoint more aspects of the regime than just the type of party system present.[104] Comparing these measures to the institutional data provided by Svolik (2012) will capture essential electoral aspects and their effects on conflict, which may have been left out of the initial analysis[105]. Furthermore, the dependent measure of levels of conflict would benefit from multiple sub-components as opposed to pure casualties- this raises questions of whether there are other aspects at play, like access to arms, urban-rural differences, and overall population health, to name a few. Many of these would become new control variables.

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[103] A notable exception to this rule is the ACLED data family, whose data is more disaggregated; however, regime-level data is present consistently at a country-year level, making this difficult to use in tandem with those sets.

A second portion of this limitation is that the strength and weakness of states is not what this study has tested. One portion of the definition of strength of a state is its monopoly on violence, which can be influenced by its regime. This study only goes as far as assessing whether certain regime characteristics lend themselves to increasing the likelihood or level of conflict, and this strength variable would be an addition to the model that could potentially influence the outcome. Additionally, some of the variables have ordinal rankings which in this study are converted to binomial measures because of the specific research objective. Testing incremental differences among ordinal rankings is challenging, but could prove useful to demonstrate changes in conflict between regimes with some military involvement and others with high military involvement, for example.

Finally, the interactions of ethnic groups at the center of power and in society are just beginning to be understood. While much of the theory surrounding this point has supported the creation of my hypotheses, there exists no direct proxy variable within the model for ethnic fractionalization. It is possible that the size of ethnic groups, or the extent to which they are represented in government, has an impact on the likelihood or level of conflict. The number of groups is included only as a control measure- including measures of fractionalization as explanatory variables would perhaps yield results indicating that institutions within non-democracies are only the channels for expressions of ethnic power imbalance, and not that they in and of themselves affect the preponderance of ethnic conflict. Including this variable was out of scope for this particular study, but could have far-reaching effects if tested in tandem with institutional data against conflict outcomes.

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[104] Coppedge et al., “V-Dem Codebook v8.”

[105] Milan W. Svolik, *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*, 2-25.

Chapter 5

Applications and Discussion

Summary

In this chapter, I will discuss my findings, their broader implications for this research objective, and their potential impact on this field of study. Then, I will explore several extensions of this project that are intriguing and will likely provide more insight into the broader questions that the above findings raise. Finally, I will synthesize the important points of this thesis and finish with some commentary on ethnic conflict as a whole.

Implications of Findings

Despite the significant findings of M1, which substantiates H1, the theoretical weakness remains for this method of classification for regime type. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the blanket designation of "anocracy" tells an observer little of what defines that regime as a hybrid regime, or why it is not considered a consolidated autocracy. While the broader "U-shape" hypothesis has been observed by other authors and has been substantiated even in this experiment with ethnic conflict as well, the study of civil and ethnic conflict across regimes has advanced significantly enough that it is time to leave blanket terms like this in the past. The emergence of different typologies mean that models can be recreated with different and better measures for regime characteristics, and this study is able to acknowledge these differences in M2-5 and M3-6.

Ethnically divided regimes with multiple parties are more likely to have ethnic conflict than their counterparts without multiple parties. This has interesting implications for competitive authoritarian regimes in particular, confirming the idea that partial democratization through the implementation of parties is only partly beneficial. As mentioned previously, not only does the presence of multiple parties increase the motives for constituency formation, allowing contenders to deepen existing ethnic divides, but it also increases instability among elites. This is substantiated in M2. What is not substantiated is the mobilization theory- that increased mobilization will occur as a result of multiple parties competing, and therefore will lead to an increased level of conflict should it break out. The finding is instead that there is no significant difference between the levels of conflict with or without multiple parties. Although unexpected, this finding shows either that there are nuanced influences from this system that may cancel out at a higher level, or that there is simply no good direct tie between the party system of a regime and the levels of conflict seen.

The finding that military involvement in non-democratic regimes increases the likelihood and level of ethnic conflict is striking and expected. This expands on the work of authors such as Weeks (2012), who finds variation among non-democracies, but observes as a whole that military officials in a leader's coalition tend to promote the use of force to "settle political matters" when compared to their civilian counterparts.[106] It comes as no surprise, then, that conflict is more likely and more severe when such entities are involved in the political aspects of a regime. Furthermore, one of the main guiding factors for recognizing genocide is the ability of aggrieved groups to *organize*, to provide arms and disseminate propaganda.[107] This ability is arguably greater in a regime which actively promotes genocide *and* which has the infrastructure to be able to organize ground support through an integrated military. As such, the intensity of ethnic conflict is surely higher, captured in this study through the metric of conflict casualties. These findings provide empirical support for this observation, underscoring the urgency with which widespread ethnic conflict and violence must be prevented in non-democracies with such characteristics.

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[106] Weeks, "Strongmen and Straw Men", 343.

[107] Stanton, Dr. Gregory G. "The Ten Stages of Genocide".

Extensions

The first, and most powerful, extension to this particular research question would be geospatial analysis in two stages. Although previous studies have found that adding a dummy variable for region or continent changes little in the way of statistically significant results, examining ethnic conflict data through the lens of geographic clustering would add additional nuance to findings like those in M1 and M4, where overall likelihood of conflict in ‘anocracies’ is found to be higher despite a trend of lower casualties as compared to an autocracy. Urban-rural differences in ethnic conflict would become apparent, which is highly relevant to inter-elite politics in autocratic regimes. The second stage of this analysis would make use of emerging cross-border data, which examines ethnic groups that exist in multiple countries which are often clustered as well. The Great Lakes region of Africa is a particular example, explained in the Rwanda case study earlier. As seen here, ethnic groups and divisions that become politically salient in other countries can influence the behavior of the whole region; this effect on conflict is notable in various cases, but formally including this within the model would advance the understanding of the influence of such groups both on the behavior of the regime and on the likelihood of conflict.

A second extension would be changing the variables or their interpretations to further test the research question. One method is to change the explanatory variables that are tested against occurrence and levels of ethnic conflict. Following the nature of this study, methods of legislative selection and executive selection could be tested, because the behavior of ethnic groups would potentially change under variations of each system. For example, it is plausible that the rules of executive selection would change motivations for using ethnic groups or various ethnic cleavages as a means to gain support. Additionally, a study of legislative selection and ethnic power imbalances within the regime could indicate how selection of representatives varies to possibly embody those imbalances and tip them over into conflict.

Finally, the broader question, of regime effects on ethnic conflict, is not just applicable to non-democracies, although that is what is tested here. Democracies are misconstrued to be more peaceful than other kinds of regimes, but the "democratic peace" applies only to interstate conflict among democracies: in fact, repression within democracies is a well-documented phenomenon[108]. I found that ~40% of country-years with ethnic conflict occurred in democracies as classified by Polity IV, indicating that ethnic conflict is quite impactful even within the democratic subset.[109] However, much of the theory that has been applied to non-democracies cannot be applied to democracies; for instance, there is no concept of testing whether the presence of multiple parties increases the likelihood of conflict. Ethnic conflict within democracies will surely look different than that which appears in non-democracies as presented within this paper, but to what extent will no doubt prove surprising.

Conclusion

The desire to explore ethnic conflict fundamentally stemmed, for me, from a desire to understand the human condition. Through this study, we have proved that the nature of ethnicity itself is fluid and can be used with varying degrees of success in politics for the pursuit of power. Variables like the number of ethnic groups, or the number of people in a country, have not taken away from the effects of certain influences within non-democratic regimes on ethnic conflict. There is, then, an organizational component to ethnic conflict which is bigger than any one person or identity. This knowledge is valuable (in the same way other advances in this topic have been) to informing policy goals and perspectives on politics. Although non-democracies account for the majority of ethnic conflict country-years within this period, the fact remains that within these regimes there is a tremendous amount of variation. This variation then has a great deal of influence on the scale of ethnic conflict. Encouraging the exploration of what specifically acts as a catalyst for ethnic conflict can help us learn where and why it breaks out, which then pushes us further to predict certain risks that some regimes have which others may not. The pursuit of peace is a never ending task, but understanding the one hundred colors of ethnic conflict brings us one step closer to achieving that ultimate goal.

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[108] Davenport, "State Repression and Political Order", 1-3.

[109] Marshall et al., "Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2018."

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Appendix A: Supplemental Figures

Fig. 1 (re-included): *Hypothesis Matrix and Divisions*



		Vertical Divisions		
		Anocracy/Autocracy	Party System	Military Involvement
Horizontal Divisions	Likelihood of Ethnic Conflict	H1	H3	H5
	Level of Ethnic Conflict	H2	H4	H6

Fig. 2: *Me at Golconda Fort, Hyderabad, on Dec. 23, 2019*

Appendix B: Variable Coding and Recoding

Explanatory Variables

Regime Type

Since the sample is limited to all non-democracies, the two regime types are anocracies and autocracies. Epstein et al. (2006) use a Polity score of -10 to 0 for autocracies, and 1 to 7 for anocracies; Fearon and Laitin (2003) use -10 to -5 for autocracies, and -4 to 5 for anocracies.[110][111] In the vein of previous studies, I have used the Polity score to segment regime type, choosing to use -10 to -5 for autocracies and -4 to 5 for anocracies. Although the cutoffs can vary, this captures the majority of regimes that would follow the theoretical conflict patterns proposed. This was re-coded as a binomial variable, with anocracy = 1 and autocracy = 0, to model a hypothetically positive relationship between change in regime and change in likelihood and levels of conflict.

Regime Characteristics

For both party system and military involvement, the sample of countries coded as non-democracies differed slightly from the Polity IV subset. Svolik's specific classification gave regimes a 'democracy', 'no authority', or 'dictatorship' score. The codebook definition of 'no authority' included conflict as a potential factor, meaning that any use of 'no authority' country-years as part of the explanatory variables for conflict would be tautological. As a result, country-years were limited to 'dictatorships' only, which were found in the sub-dataset, "Institutions in Dictatorships", referred to in the following sections[112].

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[110] Epstein et al., "Democratic Transitions", 551-69.

[111] Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War", 75.

[112] Svolik, "Institutions in Dictatorships, 1946-2008."

Regime Characteristic- Party System

The "Institutions in Dictatorships" dataset classifies parties per country-year in dictatorships as either *banned*, *single*, or *multiple*. Since presence of multiple parties was the causal factor of interest, this was made a binomial variable, with 0 coding for one or no party and 1 coding for the presence of multiple parties.

Regime Characteristic- Level of Military Involvement:

The "Institutions in Dictatorships" dataset classifies the levels of military involvement as *civilian* (no involvement outside of security affairs), *indirect*, and *direct (corporate/personal)*. Direct involvement includes the head of the executive being a military official- indirect denotes an influence but no direct representation. Because the presence of military involvement at all was the causal factor of interest, this was re-coded as a binomial variable, with *civilian* [no involvement] coded as 0 and any other level of involvement coded as 1.[113]

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[113] Svolik, "Institutions in Dictatorships, 1946-2008."

Appendix C: Supplemental Methods

Table 4: Hypothesis and Model Summary Table [rotated]

Number	Hypothesis	Independent Variable	IV Measure	IV Type	Dependent Variable	DV Measure	DV Type	Regression
H1	Anocracies will have an increased likelihood of ethnic conflict compared to autocracies.	Anocracy or Autocracy	Polity overall index: -4 to 5 is anocracy -10 to -5 is autocracy	Binomial: 0 for autocracy in cY 1 for anocracy in cY	Occurrence of Ethnic Conflict	Occurrence from EAC dataset Range 1990-2005	Binomial, Lagged 0 for no occurrence in cY 1 for occurrence in cY	Logistic Regression ("Logit")
H2	Anocracies will have increased levels of ethnic conflict compared to autocracies.	Anocracy or Autocracy	Polity overall index: -4 to 5 is anocracy -10 to -5 is autocracy	Binomial: 0 for autocracy in cY 1 for anocracy in cY	Level of Ethnic Conflict	PRIO data family: Number battle deaths (soldier and civilian) attributed to conflict	Integer, lagged Number of battle deaths/country-year	Poisson (not overdispersed)
H3	Non-democracies with multiple parties will have an increased likelihood of ethnic conflict compared to those with one or no party.	Party System	Svolik's Party measures ("Institutions in Dictatorships")	Binomial: 0 for no parties or one party 1 for multiple parties	Occurrence of Ethnic Conflict	Occurrence from EAC dataset Range 1990-2005	Binomial, Lagged 0 for no occurrence in cY 1 for occurrence in cY	Logistic Regression ("Logit")
H4	Non-democracies with multiple parties will have increased levels of ethnic conflict compared to those with one or no party.	Party System	Svolik's Party measures ("Institutions in Dictatorships")	Binomial: 0 for no parties or one party 1 for multiple parties	Level of Ethnic Conflict	PRIO data family: Number battle deaths (soldier and civilian) attributed to conflict	Integer, lagged Number of battle deaths/country-year	Negative binomial (overdispersed)
H5	Non-democracies with a military involved in politics will have an increased likelihood of ethnic conflict compared to those without military involvement.	Level of military involvement	Svolik's Military measures ("Institutions in Dictatorships")	Binomial: 0 for no military involvement 1 for military involvement	Occurrence of Ethnic Conflict	Occurrence from EAC dataset Range 1990-2005	Binomial, Lagged 0 for no occurrence in cY 1 for occurrence in cY	Logistic Regression ("Logit")
H6	Non-democracies with a military involved in politics will have increased levels of ethnic conflict compared to those without military involvement.	Level of military involvement	Svolik's Military measures ("Institutions in Dictatorships")	Binomial: 0 for no military involvement 1 for military involvement	Level of Ethnic Conflict	PRIO data family: Number battle deaths (soldier and civilian) attributed to conflict	Integer, lagged Number of battle deaths/country-year	Negative binomial (overdispersed)
Control 1	–	Wealth of the country	World Bank Data Per-capita GDP, 1989	Constant: log-1989 GDP	–	–	–	–
Control 2	–	Population of the country	World Bank Data Population per country, 1989	Constant: log-1989 population/country	–	–	–	–
Control 3	–	Number of ethnic groups per country	Ethnic Power Relations Number of groups	Integer: number of groups/year	–	–	–	–