

## **ABSTRACT**

Title of Thesis: Dutiful Daughter: an exploration of kinship politics through  
Park Geun-hye and Keiko Fujimori

Maureen Makiko O'Bryan

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Thesis Advisor: Professor Youngju Ryu, Ph.D.

Around the world, women who attain positions of political power are more likely to come from political families than their male counterparts. Park Geun-hye in South Korea and Keiko Fujimori in Peru are two recent examples of this trend and both cases highlight the intersection of kinship, gender, and memory. What is the effect of kinship and memory on political campaigns? By analyzing the campaign videos of Fujimori and Park from their presidential runs, this thesis argues that kinship ties allowed Park and Keiko to attain political popularity, while walking the thin line of their authoritarian fathers' fraught legacies. Park was able to capitalize on the nostalgia for her father more effectively because his memory is equated with a sense of economic progress and she ran during a period of slow economic growth. Although Keiko relied less on memory, she mimicked her father's campaign strategy and appealed to a similar base, but was ultimately held back by his ongoing criminal proceedings.

Winter Semester:  
Dutiful Daughter: an exploration of kinship politics through Park Geun-hye and Keiko Fujimori

By

Maureen Makiko O'Bryan

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Thesis Committee:

Professor Youngju Ryu  
Doctor Anthony Marcum

## Dedication

*To my father, who inspired me to Go Blue.*

*To my mother, いつも応援してくれてありがとう。*

## **Acknowledgements**

I would like to thank Dr. Anthony Marcum for being a wonderful teacher, advisor, and mentor. Without him this thesis would not have happened and I would not be the International Studies student that I am now. Thank you for always sending me articles either for my thesis or other projects I am working on, it shows how much you truly care about your students. I have grown immensely under your guidance in the classes I have had with you and you have given me such a great experience at Michigan.

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Although I had known I wanted to attempt an honors thesis, Professor Erin Brightwell provided me with the affirmation I needed to have the confidence to tackle such a task. I discovered my love for writing research projects and for this topic under your direction in Asian 381 along with Professor Ryu's help. During your class you were, and still are, such an inspiration and mentor to me.

To my best friend, Shashank Rao. Thank you for editing everything I have asked for your feedback on over the past four years. Thank you for letting me call you over the summer to ask about my proposal for this thesis and always being there to bounce ideas off of. Your revisions, but also your constant support and encouragement, have made me a better writer.

I would not be where I am today without my parents. Thank you, dad, for always talking through ideas with me and reading everything I have ever written. Thank you, mom, for always reminding me that I can do it even when I feel defeated. You both always inspire me and push me to do my best. I hope I have made you proud.

To all of my amazing friends and roommates I have had in college. Thank you for always asking how my thesis is going and telling me how interesting my proposal sounds even when I do a terrible job of explaining it. Your unwavering support is how I have been able to make it through these past four years. Thank you, David, for always being there for me, telling me that I could do it and that you are proud of me. I am also grateful for my wonderful cohort that I have gotten to know so well this year. We did it!

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## **Discussion of Translations**

This thesis uses sources in Spanish, Peruvian dialects of Spanish, and Korean. Videos in Spanish were translated by me using my eight years of studying the language, the transcription software Happy Scribe, and my favorite dictionary Wordreference. I then consulted with Edras Rodriguez-Torres, a Resident Librarian for International Studies at the University of Michigan and a native Spanish speaker. I also consulted with Adela Carlos Rios, an instructor for the Quechua Language Program in Latin American and Caribbean Studies. Korean translations were done by Professor Youngju Ryu, an Associate Professor of Modern Korean Literature at the University. Professor Ryu helped translate and explain the four videos in Korean to me.

## Chapter 1: Introduction

### Introduction

Indira Gandhi made history in 1966 when she was elected the first, and to date only, female prime minister of India. As the only daughter of Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first prime minister, she was destined for politics.<sup>1</sup> 20 years later the Philippines elected their first female president, Corazon Aquino. A self-proclaimed "plain housewife," she was the wife of Senator Aquino, who was an assassinated opposition leader.<sup>2</sup> Both women are hailed as leading females in political history, but how did they rise to the top and what are their legacies? Indira Gandhi worked her way up from assisting her father when he was prime minister in unofficial roles, to being President of the National Congress, to serving as a member of cabinet. Her terms as prime minister were marred by the legacy of her state of emergency, by nepotism and by an unprecedented centralization of power.<sup>3</sup> Corazon Aquino had no political experience prior to her presidency, but came from a powerful family and became the face of the opposition movement against dictator Ferdinand Marcos after the death of her husband, a prominent senator. Despite her mostly positive legacy as the leader who restored democracy to the Philippines, Aquino was also known for appointing many of her family members to political positions.<sup>4</sup> What do Aquino and Gandhi have in common? Being a female head of state, coming from political families, and engaging in corruption or nepotism.

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<sup>1</sup> "Indira Gandhi." *History*, A&E Television Networks, (9 Nov. 2009).

<sup>2</sup> Dick Lugar. "The Housewife Who Changed the World." *Huffington Post* (25 May 2011).

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* 1

<sup>4</sup> "Aquino Makes 'People Power' Policy All Relative." *Chicago Tribune* (16 Mar. 1987).

These characteristics may be simplistic similarities, but nonetheless parallels can be drawn. The careers and legacies of Indira Gandhi<sup>5</sup> and Corazon Aquino<sup>6</sup> have been previously discussed, and several other examples exist around the world of women who served, or came close to serving, as head of state after having a father or husband serve in that same position.<sup>7</sup> One of the most recent examples of this trend is Park Geun-hye, who was elected president of South Korea in 2013. She was the daughter of Park Chung-hee, who was also the President from 1963 to 1979, serving five consecutive terms after he seized power in 1961 in a military coup. Another less successful example is Keiko Fujimori, who ran for president of Peru in 2011 and 2016. Her father was Alberto Fujimori, who was elected president democratically in 1990 and served until 2000. Both fathers had fraught legacies, which their daughters had to address in their own presidential campaigns.

Given that women experience low rates of participation in the highest levels of politics worldwide,<sup>8</sup> studying examples of women who do or did serve in powerful positions and their careers provides insight on the relationship between gender and politics. When kinship is involved, evidence of nepotism and other forms of corruption could have negative implications on the political system. Corruption can undermine the authority of the state and citizens' trust in the government, as well as erode social capital and hinder economic development.<sup>9</sup> Women in

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<sup>5</sup> Crossette (2008); Dommermuth-Costa (2001); Frank (2002); Malik (1987); Somervill (2007).

<sup>6</sup> Haskins (1988); Komisar (1987); Lugar (2011); Reid (1995); Roces (1998); Zenon (2013).

<sup>7</sup> Benazir Bhutto was the first female prime minister of Pakistan. Her father previously served as both prime minister and president of the country. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, the 14th president of the Phillipines, is the daughter of the 9th president. Megawai Sukarnoputri was the first female president of Indonesia and is the daughter of the first president of the country. Cristina Fernández de Kirchner was elected president of Argentina directly after her husband's term as president. These women are just a few examples of high-ranking female politicians who come from political families. There are many other cases that could be mentioned, especially about women who serve in other positions such as as mayors, governors, and members of the legislature.

<sup>8</sup> Pamela Paxton and Sheri Kunovich. "Women's Political Representation: The Importance of Ideology." *Social Forces*, vol. 82, no. 1 (Sept. 2003), pp. 87–113.

<sup>9</sup> Eun Gee Yun. "A Comparative Analysis of Corruption in Canada and South Korea: Focusing the Effect of Corruption on Societal Development and Social Capital." *Korea Observer*, vol. 44, no. 1 (2013), pp. 143–165.

power, especially in Latin America and other non-western countries, are more likely to belong to political families than their male counterparts. In a study conducted by Meg Rincker and Farida Jalalzai 29% of female political executives, versus just over 10% of male executives, had family ties. Their link to power was usually a father or husband.<sup>10</sup> How did these women utilize kinship in their campaigns? What are the implications of kinship politics? What makes people nostalgic for a previous leader, especially an authoritarian one?

Analyzing the case studies of Park Geun-hye and Keiko Fujimori might not answer these questions universally, but by adding their stories to the existing scholarship of women like Indira Gandhi and Corazon Aquino, I can better understand the relationship between these phenomena. I chose the case studies of Park and Keiko in part because they are particularly relevant examples due to their fathers' legacies, but also because of similarities in their political careers.<sup>11</sup> Adding more recent examples of female kin in politics is also important because of the way candidates campaign change and become more accessible through the use of online platforms and mass media. Campaigns reach a greater audience with tools such as television ads and videos, which allow candidates to convey their message more easily.<sup>12</sup>

In this chapter I introduce my research question and answer, as well as the importance of studying female leaders and kinship politics. The chapter then discusses some of the existing literature on gender, kinship, and memory politics, which provides a foundation on which to review the campaign strategies of Park and Keiko. The methodology explains how and why I analyze the campaign videos, and how those videos fit into the legacies of the candidates' fathers

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<sup>10</sup> Meg Rincker & Farida Jalalzai. "Blood Is Thicker than Water: Family Ties to Political Power Worldwide." *Historical Social Research* (2018).

<sup>11</sup> See figure 1 for basic similarities and differences between the two case studies.

<sup>12</sup> Diana Owen. "New Media and Political Campaigns." *The Oxford Handbook of Political Communication* (Aug 2017).

and public opinion on all four leaders. I then provide a roadmap for the next four chapters of this thesis.

## **1.1 Research Question**

What is the effect of kinship and memory on political campaigns? I use the case studies of Park Geun-hye of South Korea and Keiko Fujimori of Peru to answer this question. Park is a more high-profile case considering her impeachment in 2016 and the large-scale democratic protests that preceded it. Although Keiko lost both her presidential elections, her case study as a congresswoman, party leader, and daughter of an authoritarian president still helps answer questions of kinship, gender, and memory in politics.

I conclude that kinship ties, regardless of how negative aspects of their fathers' legacies were, allowed these women to have political careers and gave them an advantage in their presidential campaigns. Although Keiko ultimately lost her elections, I do not characterize her as a failed candidate and Park as a successful one, because Keiko has enjoyed political popularity as a congresswomen and party leader. In addition to initial name recognition, both daughters used techniques to harken back to their fathers' accomplishments in their campaign. Many people in the older generations in Peru and South Korea who supported the fathers were also more likely to support their kin. The campaigns differ though, because Park was able to capitalize on nostalgia for her assassinated father.

Both Keiko Fujimori and Park Geun-hye were popular in part because of their fathers' legacies and the associated memory, but nostalgia for Park Chung-hee is stronger. His daughter was able to capitalize on this during the 1997 Asian Financial and 2008 Global Financial Crisis, when South Korea once again yearned for a sense of economic stability and progress. Due to

Park Chung-hee's assassination in 1979, he was also never formally implicated of corruption by a court of law. Alberto Fujimori, however, is imprisoned for multiple human rights abuses and abuse of power, and his daughter had for answer to the scandals of her father during her own campaign. Figure 1 features surface level similarities and differences between the two case studies to provide a foundation for my analysis.




Fig 1.1: Venn diagram of similarities and differences between Park Geun-hye and Keiko Fujimori.

## 1.2 Literature Review

### 1.2.1 Kinship and Gender Politics

In order to discuss the careers and campaigns of Park Geun-hye and Keiko Fujimori, one must first understand different values of kinship and gender. Using the example of post war Philippines, Mina Roces states that politics is a gendered field rather than a male-dominated

field.<sup>13</sup> Men occupy official seats of power while women exercise unofficial power through their kinship and marriage ties to male politicians. Through these unofficial roles, such as launching civic work projects and doing community service, women may develop into officially elected and appointed politicians themselves. Looking to Latin America, Magda Hinojosa states that when the process of selecting a candidate in politics is more exclusive it benefits women.<sup>14</sup> When processes are exclusive, the power is in the hands of a few political elites and this allows women to avoid self-nomination, which has been shown to be an obstacle for women to rise up the ranks in many different fields.<sup>15</sup> Studies in the United States have found that women are less likely to ask for raises and promotions and are less likely to negotiate than their male counterparts.<sup>16</sup>

Modern values in the western democratic context challenge kinship politics and view the unofficial political power mentioned above as “unsavory.”<sup>17</sup> Although processes which are inclusive are characteristics of democracies, they sometimes magnify obstacles and have the unanticipated and unintended effect of suppressing female candidacies.<sup>18</sup> These modern and democratic values, however, are those championed by western-centric scholarship, which also stresses loyalty to the nation-state above that of the family.<sup>19</sup> Returning to Roces’s scholarship, Filipino politicians use the rhetoric of loyalty to the nation-state to criticize others for corruption and use this rhetoric to create an image of being “modern” by western standards. Their behavior once elected, however, suggests an ambivalent engagement with modernity. Kinship politics and

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<sup>13</sup> Mina Roces. “Women, Power, and Kinship Politics: Female Power in Post-War Philippines.” Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. (1998).

<sup>14</sup> Magda Hinojosa. *Selecting Women, Electing Women: Political Representation and Candidate Selection in Latin America*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press (2012).

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.* 13

<sup>16</sup> Linda Babcock, et al. “Nice Girls Don’t Ask.” *Harvard Business Review* (Oct. 2003).

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.* 12, pg.17

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.* 13

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.* 12

western values are merely idioms used in the dynamics of politics and social action.<sup>20</sup> The female presidents of the Philippines, Corazon Aquino and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, accused former ruling parties of corruption prior to their presidential runs only to also be implicated in scandals that their kin were a part of.<sup>21</sup> Park and Keiko also ran on platforms of eradicating corruption and benefited from the scandals of former governments.

The literature also suggests that a woman who came into power with the help of kinship politics is not automatically unqualified for politics. Women can gain experience in unofficial and local roles.<sup>22</sup> While they can certainly benefit from the name recognition and their kinship ties may make them seem more trustworthy,<sup>23</sup> both Fujimori and Park served in unelected roles as First Lady, as well as in elected roles as congresswomen and party leader, before running for president.

This thesis further explores how gender and kinship ties can influence politics and how they manifest in the careers of Park Geun-hye and Keiko Fujimori. An analysis of kinship and gender will allow for a more in-depth comparison of Keiko Fujimori and Park Geun-hye's political careers. More specifically, understanding how the candidates used these values in their presidential campaigns will help me understand what strategies the women used, and how much they relied on using their kin ties versus proposing real policy.

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<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.* 12

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.* 12

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.* 12

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.* 13



### 1.2.2 Memory Politics

Much of the literature on memory politics discusses memory in the context of how countries remember wars and genocide through memorials and reparations movements.<sup>24</sup> This thesis aims to recontextualize these concepts of memory in relation to political campaigns and the relationship between kinship and memory. More specifically, this thesis will explore the nuances between simply being the kin of a previous politician and being nostalgic for that politician. The literature does not share one dominant application of or way to discuss nostalgia in politics. Several scholars discuss nostalgia in United States politics, and how campaigns of politicians such as President Donald Trump have capitalized on nostalgic yearning for a return to a “simpler and more secure past that imaginatively preceded losses of jobs, futures, homes, and identities.”<sup>25</sup> Using the slogan “Make America Great Again,” President Trump is able to capitalize on the nostalgia of rural America for an era perceived to be lost by years of harsh regulation and globalization. Particularly in his campaign in the coal mining communities of America, he uses phrases such as “coal keeps the lights on” to harken back to a golden age of coal, which never existed, according to Kimberly Smith. The height of the coal mining industry was characterized by black lung disease, poor worker safety and job security, and monopolistic company towns.<sup>26</sup> This lost ideal America is a memory simultaneously characterized by respect for the past, a feeling of loss in the present, and a hopeful longing to recover this ideal future.

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<sup>24</sup> Ellie Hamrick and Haley Duschinski. “Enduring Injustice: Memory Politics and Namibia’s Genocide Reparations Movement.” *Memory Studies*, vol. 11, no. 4 (Oct. 2018) 437–454; David A. Messenger. “Memory Politics and Memorial Democracy in Catalonia.” *Catalan Journal of Communication & Cultural Studies*, vol. 8, no. 1 (Apr. 2016), 175–182.

<sup>25</sup> Stacey L. Novack. “The Politics of Nostalgia: Perils and Untapped Potentials.” *Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society*, vol. 22, no. 1 (2017), pp. 1; Price, Bryan D. “Material Memory: The Politics of Nostalgia on the Eve of *MAGA*.” *American Studies*, vol. 57 no. 1 (2018), pp. 103–115; Walley, Christine J. “Transmedia as Experimental Ethnography: The Exit Zero Project, Deindustrialization, and the Politics of Nostalgia.” *Journal of the American Ethnological Society*, vol. 42, no. 4, 25 Oct. 2016, pp. 624–639.

<sup>26</sup> Will Kurlinkus and Krista Kurlinkus. “Coal Keeps the Lights on”: Rhetorics of Nostalgia for and in Appalachia.” *College English*, vol. 81, no. 2, 2018, pp. 87–109.

Cultural theorist Svetlana Boym calls this yearning to restore the past and minimize the negative aspects of this carefully selected past "restorative nostalgia," a type of longing that thinks of itself as "truth and tradition".<sup>27</sup>

Suk Koo Rhee analyzes nostalgia politics as the use of movies and mass media to refigure and aesthetically exploit the narratives of Korean Chinese migrants.<sup>28</sup> Wen-chin Ouyang researches how Arabic novels have created a politics of nostalgia which contribute to discourse on aesthetics, ethics and politics that are relevant to cultural transformations of the Arabic speaking world.<sup>29</sup>

When does an event or a person become memory or nostalgia within a state and when does nostalgia emerge for that memory? This distinction is especially important for the case study of Keiko Fujimori, whose father is still alive and present in the country's political landscape. What is considered the "past" is critical in defining nostalgia. The Oxford English Dictionary describes nostalgia as sentimental longing for a period of the past, especially one in an individual's own lifetime.<sup>30</sup> This definition will now be applied to a political context, specifically in elections. Nostalgia, because it is associated with the past, may be interpreted as a conservative concept in antithesis to radicalism and the left.<sup>31</sup> Nostalgia could have played a greater role in the campaigns of Park and Keiko because they are both conservative candidates catering to conservative voters.

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<sup>27</sup> Svetlana Boym. *The Future of Nostalgia*. Basic Books (2001), p. 13.

<sup>28</sup> Suk K. Rhee. "Uncanny Hybridity and Nostalgia Politics in the Yellow Sea." *The Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 76, no. 3 (2017), pp. 729-750.

<sup>29</sup> Wen-chin Ouyang. "Politics of Nostalgia in the Arabic Novel: Nation-State, Modernity and Tradition." *Edinburgh University Press* (2013).

<sup>30</sup> "nostalgia." *Merriam-Webster.com* (2019).

<sup>31</sup> Alastair Bonnett. *Left in the Past: Radicalism and the Politics of Nostalgia*. Bloomsbury Academic & Professional (2010).

How memory is created or memorialized is important for a state transitioning into democracy because it defines the previous authoritarian regime and how citizens remember it. The literature references several different modes through which a state creates memory, including education, memorials, days of commemoration, official apologies, rehabilitation, and reparations.<sup>32</sup> Manning states that confronting memory is a process that societies must undergo to properly progress socially and amend the trauma of the past.<sup>33</sup> These processes are often created by state governments. In these governments, though, there may be actors who use memory as a tool to reproduce history and strengthen a political order in states undergoing transition.<sup>34</sup> Ko examines a new textbook written in 2016 by Park Geun-hye's administration that neglects some of the human rights abuses committed by her father, pointing to how her political motivations to positively shape her father's legacy may have impacted the text.<sup>35</sup> The voluntary omission of critical atrocities in Korea's human rights history shapes how the memories of the younger generations are created. Ko states that this case reveals how memory initiatives and truth-seeking are constrained by competing political interests in Korea and highlights the difficulties of achieving a collective historical account of past abuses in line with the findings of the truth commissions.<sup>36</sup>

This notion of nostalgia as a conservative concept applies to the Parks and Fujimori as right-wing political families. In the Park case study, many of the older generation in South Korea

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<sup>32</sup> Elizabeth A. Cole. "Transitional Justice and the Reform of History Education." *International Journal of Transitional Justice* vol. 1, no. 1 (March 2007) 115–137; Ñustra Carranza Ko. "South Korea's Collective Memory of Past Human Rights Abuses." *Memory Studies* (2018); Peter Manning. *Transitional Justice and Memory in Cambodia*. London: Routledge (2017).

<sup>33</sup> Peter Manning. *Transitional Justice and Memory in Cambodia*. London: Routledge (2017).

<sup>34</sup> Ñustra Carranza Ko. "South Korea's Collective Memory of Past Human Rights Abuses." *Memory Studies* (2018).

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.* 34

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.* 34

fondly remember Park Chung-hee.<sup>37</sup> The scholarship acknowledges that nostalgia played a large role in Park Geun-hye's election.<sup>38</sup> Although deceased for over three decades, public opinion polls in South Korea figured Park Chung-hee as the most favored and most well performing past president from the time of his assassination until 2012,<sup>39</sup> with other national surveys revealing that citizens would re-elect him if they could.<sup>40</sup> What may have been at first a negative memory turned into nostalgia for the country's revolutionary leader that rebuilt their economy. The literature also explains what Park Geun-hye's narrative about her father was as she campaigned for president. In her autobiography, Park states that she entered into politics to set the record straight about her father and describes him as a "romantic" husband and father.<sup>41</sup> She further echoes this desire to clarify negative ideas about her father during her campaign in speeches and interviews as well.<sup>42</sup> Park never, though, explicitly apologizes for her father's authoritarian actions, at risk of distancing voters more sympathetic to her and her family.<sup>43</sup>

Although the literature draws from several different sources in analyzing Park's campaign strategy in 2012, this thesis provides an in-depth examination of her four campaign videos and adds to the literature a detailed analysis of how Park utilized nostalgia to win the presidential election. This thesis then compares Park's campaign to that of Keiko Fujimori of

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<sup>37</sup> Woojin Kang. "Democratic Performance and Park Chung-Hee Nostalgia in Korean Democracy." *Asian Perspective*, vol. 40 (2016) 51–78.

<sup>38</sup> Jamie Doucette. "The Occult of Personality: Korea's Candlelight Protests and the Impeachment of Park Geun-Hye." *The Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 76, no. 4 (2017) 851–860; *Ibid.* 18; Young-Im Lee. "From First Daughter to First Lady to First Woman President: Park Geun-Hye's Path to the South Korean Presidency." *Feminist Media Studies* 17.3 (2017) 377–391; Yeon-Cheol Seong. "The origins and style of Park Geun-Hye." *The Hankyoreh* (6 Dec. 2012).

<sup>39</sup> Jae-Geun Ahn 2013; Jae-Hoon Lim 2012; Bong-Seok Sohn 2011 as cited in Lee, 2017

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.* 37

<sup>41</sup> Geun-hye Park. *The Exercise of My Despair* (2013).

<sup>42</sup> Jamie Doucette. "The Occult of Personality: Korea's Candlelight Protests and the Impeachment of Park Geun-Hye." *The Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 76, no. 4 (2017) 851–860

<sup>43</sup> Yeon-Cheol Seong. "The origins and style of Park Geun-Hye." *The Hankyoreh* (6 Dec. 2012).

Peru and discusses how differences in their strategies indicate how much kinship politics helped their campaigns.

### **1.3 Methodology**

The main primary sources I analyze for evidence of kinship and memory politics are the campaign videos of Park Geun-hye and Keiko Fujimori, as well as election results and polling data from those elections. Campaign videos and polling data offer two sides of the same coin. The videos show what the candidates hope to tell the electorate about themselves and what kind of president they would be. The polling data shows what the electorate actually thinks of the candidate and the campaign. Through visual media a candidate can convey a message (e.g. I will be a president similar to my father) without having to verbally say it and is, to an extent, up to interpretation by the viewer. If a viewer is a supporter of a candidate's father, he or she might draw more parallels between the father and daughter, whereas a viewer who might not know as much about the father figure or is not a supporter of the father might not see those parallels and think of the daughter as her own candidate. Polling data offers quantitative evidence as to how popular a candidate is and for what reasons. If a poll shows that a candidate is popular because the electorate perceives them as someone who will strengthen the economy (without them having a particular platform), and revitalizing the economy was something their father was well-liked for, then the candidate's popularity can at least in part be contributed to kinship. Together, the campaign videos and public opinion help answer the question of how Park Geun-hye and Keiko Fujimori used kinship and memory in their campaigns, how much they relied on those tactics, and how effective their campaigns were.

Travis Rideout and Michael Franz found that campaign videos do matter in elections, particularly within the American political system, but their impact is contingent on the characteristics of the video and who the viewer is. These characteristics include whether the video is a positive or negative ad, a promotional versus attack ad, and the emotional appeal of the ad, among other things.<sup>44</sup> The different types of videos make the impact difficult to measure, however, and I cannot exactly determine how effective the candidates' videos were and how many votes they may have moved. Rideout and Franz also stated that the emotional appeal present in the campaign ad and its tone are important to how persuasive the video is.<sup>45</sup> In analyzing political campaign videos of the 2015 general election in Nigeria, Gbadegesin and Onanuga found that campaign videos were particularly persuasive because they utilize different modes of communication and convey a message despite any language or educational barriers the viewer may have.<sup>46</sup> Although Korean is the only national language of South Korea, Peru is officially a multilingual country and recognizes at least 15 different ethnolinguistic groups other than Spanish.<sup>47</sup> The literacy rates are also lower in Peru. The literacy rate for people ages 65 and over, who are more likely to support former regimes, was 74% in 2014.<sup>48</sup> I chose to analyze the campaign videos of Park Geun-hye and Keiko Fujimori because the videos offer insight into the campaign strategies of the two women, specifically in how they use tools such as emotional appeal and nostalgia to persuade voters.

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<sup>44</sup> Travis N Rideout. "The Role of Campaign Advertising." *The Persuasive Power of Campaign Advertising*, by Michael M Franz, Temple University Press (2011).

<sup>45</sup> Travis N Rideout. "How Negativity and Emotional Appeals in Ads Matter." *The Persuasive Power of Campaign Advertising*, by Michael M Franz, Temple University Press (2011).

<sup>46</sup> Paul Ayodele Onanuga, and Victoria Oluwamayowa Gbadegesin. "The Enactment of Ideology and Self-Presentation in Political Campaign Videos of the 2015 General Election in Nigeria." *Discourse, Context & Media* (27 Nov. 2017).

<sup>47</sup> Tony Durnell. "The Many Languages You'll Hear in Peru." *TripSavvy* (17 Jan 2018).

<sup>48</sup> "Peru: Literacy Rate." *UNESCO Institute of Statistics* (12 Apr 2017).

With the help of professors, librarians and the Language Resource Center at the University of Michigan I was able to transcribe and translate all of the videos into English. I analyzed both the script and any visual text, as well as the visual media of the campaign videos for visual and verbal allusions or similarities to Keiko and Park's fathers' campaigns and governments. Analysis of the visual media was done at the consultation of professors and librarians at the University to confirm and further elaborate on my own research of the history and legacy of the political families. The limits of analyzing campaign videos is that a minute-long video cannot communicate the extent of a candidate's entire platform. Four videos uploaded onto YouTube are analyzed for Park, at recommendation from Professor Youngju Ryu. All four of these videos are high quality, scripted videos of similar style.

I use five videos to discuss Keiko's campaign. These videos were found on her political party's official YouTube account. Keiko's videos consist of different methods and seemingly different production values. Her videos included one following her on a day-in-the-life on the campaign trail, two song videos, and one featuring a voiceover of Keiko, which could be considered more of a "traditional" campaign video that might be seen in the United States. Of the day-in-the-life videos, of which there were nine days, I chose the one with the most views, which was Day 3. These videos will be analyzed for verbal and visual allusions to their fathers and kinship, as well as for gendered imagery and for policy platforms. Because Alberto Fujimori's presidential campaign took place in the 1990s his campaign materials are more easily accessible. Comparing Keiko's videos to his demonstrates that she used a similar campaign strategy as her father. Park Chung-hee's government began in the 1960s and he did not come to power democratically, so I do not analyze campaign materials for him.

In order to fully analyze the campaign videos, I also research the history of the fathers' careers using literary sources, as well as research election results, polling data, and public opinion from newspapers articles from election cycles. This complementary information provides me with a better idea of what to look for in the campaign videos and discern how the candidates used their fathers' histories or points of popularity.

#### **1.4 Chapter Summary**

Chapter 2 discusses the legacies of fathers Park Chung-hee and Alberto Fujimori. After a summary of the history of the two men, I examine the careers of both presidents, outlining their leadership styles, the positive aspects of their economic policies, and the negative aspects of their human rights abuses. If the daughters had similar leaderships styles and party politics to their fathers, then this would have helped them establish similar voting bases and kinship politics would benefit them. By analyzing the negative and positive aspects of the fathers' legacies, I can establish to what parts of their fathers' legacies the candidates harkened back to in their campaigns and to what degree. This discussion lays the groundwork for analyzing how Park and Keiko have either capitalized on or distanced themselves from their fathers' governments. The conclusion of this chapter also begins to draw comparisons between the leaders and their daughters, specifically how the political landscapes of their times led to their entrances. It then starts to establish the kinship ties between the father-daughter pairs, considering the roles both women had as First Lady to their fathers.

Chapter 3 provides analysis of campaign videos from Park Geun-hye and Keiko Fujimori. Campaign videos demonstrate what the candidate hopes to convey to the electorate using both verbal and visual cues. Rather than reading the candidates platforms and watching a



debate, the artistic components of a campaign video contain more apparent symbols and imagery that could relate to their fathers' presidencies. Campaign videos are an effective way for a candidate to demonstrate to voters that she is aware of and cares about the concerns of the voters. Campaign videos incorporate many different methods of communication, and visuals can help convey messages and values that may be more difficult to express through language. Videos are also concise. Rather than listen to an hour-long debate between multiple candidates, a campaign video is a short way to find out a candidate's political leanings and interests. This aspect also makes them easy to consume and to share, and can reach more people more quickly. In addition to television, campaign videos thrive on online video sharing and social media platforms, which make them easier to disseminate. A campaign video can be a candidate's opportunity to share their platform, attack their opponent, or convey a sentimental message. Chapter 3 helps in understanding how the female candidates campaigned and what audiences and demographics they were targeting.

Chapter 4 compares election and polling data from the father-daughter pairs. Election results and polling data complement the video analysis with empirical analysis. Election results show if the daughters kept the regional strongholds that their father had, highlighting the importance of kinship and their fathers' legacies in their own political careers. Polling data show what the public thought of each president and which policies and actions were most popular and unpopular. By comparing the public's opinions of the candidates to their fathers, I can understand for what reasons the daughters were popular and what role kinship and memory played in shaping the public's opinions. The limitations of analyzing polling data is that the questions asked of citizens will not be the same throughout the case studies and will highlight different aspects of a candidate's popularity. This data is less relevant for Keiko Fujimori, who

did not serve as president. I also analyze polling data stating how popular the father figures still are today in their respective countries, speaking to the effects of nostalgia.

The final chapter discusses where Park Geun-hye and Keiko Fujimori are now in their political careers and what their reputations are. Although issues of corruption are not included in the main research question, in both case studies kinship and corruption are related. Both fathers committed terrible human rights abuses and paid the price. Park Geun-hye was impeached for corruption associated with her father's relationship with the chaebol. Keiko Fujimori was implicated in the bribery scandal that her father was a part of and was arrested, facing public backlash. I include explanations for corruption discussed by scholars and the relationship between kinship and corruption. I take no definitive stance on how the candidates became corrupt or on what their relationship of kinship and corruption was. I conclude summarizing the findings of my thesis and proposing questions for future research.

## **Chapter 2: The Father's Fraught Legacies**

This chapter aims to discuss the careers of two authoritarian leaders, Park Chung-hee of South Korea and Alberto Fujimori of Peru, and how their political legacies influenced their daughters' careers. Like the daughters' case studies, I can draw parallels between Park Chung-hee and Alberto Fujimori, specifically regarding how they rose to power during a time of crisis and disenchantment, and that they are best known for their "success" in economic growth in their respective countries. Understanding the policies and personalities of the father's will help uncover what aspects of their legacies Park Geun-hye and Keiko Fujimori distanced themselves from or drew upon in their own campaigns.

The discussion of the fathers focuses on their leadership styles, the positive legacies of their economic policies, and the negative legacies of their human rights abuses. The first section provides background on Park Chung-hee. It discusses how he became an authoritarian leader, as well as which aspects of his rule could have hurt or helped his daughter. The section then introduces the political career of Park Geun-hye and how she went from a president's daughter to president herself. The second section lays out the career of Alberto Fujimori, focusing on his rise as a personalistic and neopopulist leader in Peru. It then outlines Keiko Fujimori's path to becoming a presidential hopeful. The final section offers initial comparisons between the case studies of the two fathers. It analyzes the leadership styles of all four leaders and draws similarities between their rises to popularity. The section then discusses how the legacies of Park Chung-hee and Alberto Fujimori have maintained positive aspects, especially among the older generation in their respective countries, despite their human rights abuses. Finally, it highlights how kinship played a role in the political entrances of Park Geun-hye and Keiko Fujimori as they served as First Lady to their fathers at a young age.

## 2.1 The Miracle on The Han River: Park Chung-hee's Mixed Legacy

In 1952, the Korean War ended leaving South Korea as one of the poorest countries in the world.<sup>49</sup> The economy was slow to develop. The country was largely agricultural and relied heavily on imports for energy and technology.<sup>50</sup> South Korea's rise began in 1961 after a military coup by Park Chung-hee overthrew the Democratic Party. His national Five Year Plan aimed to develop the country's economy through expansion of agriculture and energy industries; improvement of infrastructure including roads, railways, and ports; full utilization of idle resources, including increased employment; export promotion to improve the balance of payments; and encouragement of science and technology.<sup>51</sup>

Park's final goal of developing the technology industry and the rise of the conglomerate *chaebol* is what made South Korea a successful developmental state. Park created the state-owned Pohang Iron and Steel Company to provide cheap steel for the *chaebol*, who were founding the first automobile factories and shipyards in South Korea.<sup>52</sup> The military government under Park worked closely with the *chaebol* companies such as Hyundai, Lotte, Samsung, LG, and SK Group, rewarding those who met their targets under the Five Year Plan with loans on easy terms of repayment, tax cuts, simple and expedited licensing processes and subsidies. This government protection against bankruptcy encouraged firms to undertake aggressive investment as they discounted downside risks.<sup>53</sup> These companies started off in the 1950s and early 1960s concentrating on wigs and textiles and then grew in the 70s and 80s focusing on heavy, defense,

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<sup>49</sup> South Korea's lowest recorded GDP per capita was in 1955 at 64.0 USD.

<sup>50</sup> Jong-Sung You. "Demystifying the Park Chung-Hee Myth: Land Reform in the Evolution of Korea's Developmental State," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 47:4 (5 Jun. 2017).

<sup>51</sup> WooJin Kang, "Democratic Performance and Park Chung-Hee Nostalgia in Korean Democracy." *Asian Perspective* 40 (2016): 51–78.

<sup>52</sup> Wonhyuk Lim. "Chaebol and Industrial Policy in Korea." *Asian Economic Policy Review* 7 (2012): 69–86.

<sup>53</sup> Michael Schuman. "Why Won't Korea's Chaebols Change? Ask Confucius." *The Straits Times* (1 Mar. 2017).

and chemical industries. Real growth happened when they turned to electronics and high-industry in the 1990s and the *chaebol* helped turn South Korea's trade deficit in 1985 to a trade surplus in 1986.<sup>54</sup>

This growth, though, came at a cost for the country. Park Chung-hee believed that South Korea was not ready to be a fully democratic country. As he stated in his autobiography *To Build a Nation*, "Democracy cannot be realized without an economic revolution."<sup>55</sup> Park argued that the poverty of the country would make it vulnerable, and therefore the priority was to eliminate poverty rather than establish a democratic government. His military dictatorship was characterized by a one-party regime. During his presidency South Koreans lived in fear of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, with the government frequently imprisoning dissenters.<sup>56</sup> South Korea's economic restoration was also prioritized at the expense of human rights as Park exploited the abundant supply of cheap labor, implemented media censorship, and established morality laws for mandatory curfews and regulations on attire and music.<sup>57</sup> Specifically for gains in technological development, collusion between members of the *chaebol* and the government granted preferential statuses to the companies. The *chaebol* would funnel bribes to politicians and bureaucrats through slush funds and illegal donations. This relationship maintained the government's position of power, allowing the companies to secure contracts for major government projects and provide favorable treatment to the donor firm.<sup>58</sup> The success of Park Chung-hee was amplified by the need for economic growth and stability during one of South Korea's darkest times after the war.

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<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.* 51

<sup>55</sup> Chung-hee Park. *To Build a Nation* (Acropolis Books, 1971). Print.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.* 50

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.* 49

<sup>58</sup> Sherisse Pham. "South Korea's Long History of Light Sentences for Business Leaders." *CNN Money* (17 Jan. 2017).

### 2.1.1 *The Start to Park Geun-hye*

Park Chung-hee's economic success set the stage for his daughter, Park Geun-hye, and her political career. During his presidency she was constantly in the public spotlight as First Daughter and also served as First Lady at the age of 22 following the assassination of her mother in 1974. Almost two decades after her father's assassination in 1979, Park finally reemerged from mourning when she was elected as an assemblywoman for the conservative Grand National Party (GNP) in the city of Daegu, close to where her father was from.<sup>59</sup> She was reelected to this position three more times between 1998 and 2008. In 2004, amidst a bribery scandal of the GNP president, Park was appointed as the chairwoman of the party and led the re-election efforts. Although the party lost their majority position in Parliament, Park helped her party make significant gains in local elections and eventually win back a majority in 2006. Hoping to ride this success, Park ran for the party's presidential nominee in 2007, but lost by a narrow margin. Undeterred, Park became the chairwoman of the rebranded Saenuri Party in 2011 and then won both the presidential nominee bid and the election in 2012.<sup>60</sup> An analysis of Park Geun-hye's campaign strategy and early career reveals how she capitalized on her father's legacy to gain political popularity and win the 2012 presidential election.

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<sup>59</sup> Young-Im Lee. "From First Daughter to First Lady to First Woman President: Park Geun-hye's Path to the South Korean Presidency." *Feminist Media Studies* 17:3 (2017): 377-391.

<sup>60</sup> Jamie Doucette. "The Occult of Personality: Korea's Candlelight Protests and the Impeachment of Park Geun-Hye." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 76:4 (2017) 851-860.

## 2.2 ¡Chino Presidente!: Alberto Fujimori's Complicated Legacy

In the late 20th century Peru went through a long battle with inflation. The country faced austerity policies imposed by the International Monetary Fund following the Latin American financial crisis that began early in the 1980s. President Garcia, who preceded Alberto Fujimori, enacted populist economic reforms that only served to weaken the economy and shut Peru out of international credit markets. With a lack of access to credit and deteriorating economic conditions, sustained high inflation became hyperinflation in Peru.<sup>61</sup> Peru was also being terrorized by the Shining Path, a communist revolutionary group which carried out terrorist attacks in the countryside and in cities like Lima.<sup>62</sup> The group's goal was to overthrow the state by guerrilla warfare and establish rule of the proletariat. Approximately 69,000 died in the rebellion and the counter-insurgency campaign it triggered between 1980 and 2000.<sup>63</sup>

These two crises made way for neopopulist leadership by harming the credibility of the existing political class and paving the way for an outsider.<sup>64</sup> The neopopulism that emerged in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s was characterized by the rule of personalistic leaders, like Alberto Fujimori, who often took an anti-organizational stance and usually targeted the largely unorganized poor who were not members of preexisting political organizations.<sup>65</sup> Fujimori capitalized on the profound disenchantment with outgoing president García and his party the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance. He campaigned heavily in poor shantytowns and highland regions where people were more heavily affected by the death and destruction of the

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<sup>61</sup> Matthew Boesler. "How 9 Countries Saw Inflation Evolve into Hyperinflation." *Business Insider* (5 Oct. 2013).

<sup>62</sup> "Americas | Profile: Peru's Shining Path." *BBC News* (5 Nov. 2004).

<sup>63</sup> Juan Forero. "Peru Report Says 69,000 Died in 20 Years of Rebel War." *The New York Times* (23 Aug. 2003)

<sup>64</sup> Kurt Weyland. "The Rise and Decline of Fujimori's Neopopulist Leadership." *The Fujimori Legacy: The Rise of Electoral Authoritarianism in Peru*, edited by Julio F Carrión, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006, pp. 13–38.

<sup>65</sup> Kurt Weyland. "Neopopulism and Neoliberalism in Latin America: How Much Affinity?" *Latin American Studies Association*, 2003.

Shining Path. Fujimori claimed to be an outsider, as he was an agricultural engineer with no political experience until he decided to run for president. He ran on the slogan “*Un presidente como tu*” (“A president like you”). Although he was born to Japanese immigrants and did not look like most Peruvians, Fujimori’s campaign strongly resonated with the disadvantaged and the indigenous peoples in the highlands. He promised to revive the rural economy and bring more infrastructure to the impoverished countryside.<sup>66</sup>

Fujimori enjoyed strong popular support, especially during his first term, for the way he addressed the two crises. When he took office in 1990, he enacted wide-ranging neoliberal reforms, known as *Fujishock*. He implemented policies of unrelenting austerity, drastically reducing government subsidies and government employment. *Fujishock* relaxed private sector price controls, eliminated exchange controls, and reduced restrictions on investment, imports, and capital. Fujimori’s measures proved effective, only further bolstering public support for his presidency. Inflation rapidly began to fall and foreign investment capital flooded into Peru’s economy. In 1994, the Peruvian economy grew at a rate of 13%, faster than any other economy in the world.<sup>67</sup> Fujimori’s popularity ratings closely tracked economic policy approval ratings.<sup>68</sup>

His strategy against the Shining Path was more controversial than his economic policies, and Fujimori was later found guilty by the Peruvian judiciary of human rights abuses for his actions. Led by Abimael Guzman, the insurgency strove to establish a perfect communist state, imposing its rule on the rural areas it seized, killing villagers suspected of siding with the government. In 1980, they burned ballot boxes during the first democratic election in 12 years.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> Ellen Perry. *The Fall of Fujimori*. Cinema Libre Studio, 2006.

<sup>67</sup> John Crabtree and Jim Thomas. *Fujimori's Peru: The Political Economy*. Institute of Latin American Studies, 1998.

<sup>68</sup> Julio F. Carrión. “Public Opinion, Market Reforms, and Democracy in Fujimori's Peru.” *The Fujimori Legacy: The Rise of Electoral Authoritarianism in Peru*, edited by Julio F Carrión, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006, pp. 126–149.

<sup>69</sup> Juan Forero. “Shining Path Rebels Are Spreading Terror Again in Peru.” *The New York Times* (23 July 2003).



President Garcia's administration at first neglected the threat posed by the Shining Path, but then launched an unsuccessful military campaign to eradicate it. This blunder undermined public faith in the state and precipitated a distrust of elites in Peru.<sup>70</sup> Fujimori campaigned on the promise to free Peru from this violence and the antiterrorism policies he enacted once elected were harsh and effective. As soon as he entered office Fujimori granted the military broad powers to arrest suspected insurgents and try them in secret military courts with few legal rights. His swift action drew support from the populous who was unsatisfied with how previous leadership handled the situation, but congressional politicians raised procedural and constitutional objections.<sup>71</sup> They criticized his measures for compromising the fundamental democratic and human right to an open trial. Fujimori contended that these measures were both justified and necessary. He claimed that members of the judiciary were too afraid to charge the alleged insurgents, fearing retaliation against them or their families. At the same time, Fujimori's government armed rural Peruvians, organizing them into groups known as "rondas campesinas" ("peasant patrols").<sup>72</sup>

The naysayers in Congress, though, only strengthened support for Fujimori. While his opposition attacked him, they only discredited themselves. In the eyes of the citizens, they were established politicians concerned only with procedures and bureaucracy, obstructing government efficacy. In times of a clear and imminent crisis, the electorate will support the concentration of power in a neopopulist leader if that leader uses this concentrated power to attain concrete accomplishments.<sup>73</sup> In Peru, the populous wanted solutions to problems that the government had previously helped to fuel or failed to address. To that end, the electorate still supported Fujimori after his self-coup in 1992. He temporarily dissolved Congress, reorganized the judiciary, and

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<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.* 64

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.* 64

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.* 62

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.* 64

censored the press. The legislature, in which his party was a minority, was not passing his anti-terrorism laws to defeat the Shining Path nor his economic reforms recommended by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Fujimori ended the coup after international pressure, but his approval ratings during the coup were as high as 82% because he posed it as a justification for a gridlocked congress trying to hamper his plans to help Peru.<sup>74</sup> Fujimori rescued the country from imminent collapse, restored economic stability, and defeated one of the most dangerous guerilla groups in Latin America. Thanks to these successes, even when Fujimori's tactics were not as democratic, his actions elicited support from the public. The success of Alberto Fujimori's presidency resulted from two crises in Peru: hyperinflation and the insurgency known as the Shining Path.

### *2.2.1 Keiko's Beginnings*

Alberto Fujimori's daughter Keiko entered the political sphere after he had marital problems with his wife Susana. Susana became an open critic of the president, publicly accusing him of corruption. She spoke out against him regarding human rights violations, military influence, insufficient social programs, and surveillance. The president "fired" Susana and Keiko replaced her at age 19 while she was still a student at Boston University. Susana then announced plans to run against him in the 1995 presidential election. Keiko served as First Lady from 1994 to 2000 and has remained by her father's side since.<sup>75</sup> In 2005, she interrupted her MBA studies and returned to Peru after the government initiated an extradition process on her father. She became the leader of the Fujimorista Political Group and was elected to the Peruvian Congress

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<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.* 68

<sup>75</sup> Gregory D. Schmidt. "All the President's Women: Fujimori and Gender Equity in Peruvian Politics." *The Fujimori Legacy: The Rise of Electoral Authoritarianism in Peru*, edited by Julio F Carrión, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006, pp. 150–177.

with more votes than any candidate, serving as a Member of the National Congress from 2006 to 2011 for Lima.<sup>76</sup>

As a congresswoman and leader of her political party, Fujimori defended the reforms executed by her father during the 1990s. She also led the opposition to the government of President García, who was serving another, nonconsecutive term. She took a similar hard-on-crime stance as her father, authoring a law that restricted penitentiary benefits for those who commit serious offenses, and another law that obligated judges to give the highest sanctions to repeat offenders.<sup>77</sup> Keiko lost the runoff election for president in 2011 and in 2016 lost the presidential election by less than half a percentage point.<sup>78</sup> Although she may not be president, Keiko still maintains popularity as the leader of *Fuerza Popular* and as a congresswoman. An analysis of her campaign strategy highlights that she employed similar tactics as her father to attain her political achievements.

### 2.3 Initial Comparisons

Comparing the fathers in these two case studies strengthens similarities drawn between Park Geun-hye and Keiko Fujimori. In order to discuss how the daughters capitalized or distanced themselves from their father's legacies it is necessary to understand what those legacies exactly were for the fathers and how the fathers became such powerful leaders. All four leaders emerged at a time of crisis, either within their party or nationally. These crises prompted the leaders to create or rebrand new parties, which helped establish their political authorities and personalities. These similarities emphasize that the daughters maintained the ideologies and

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<sup>76</sup> Magda Hinojosa. *Selecting Women, Electing Women Political Representation and Candidate Selection in Latin America*. Temple University Press, 2012.

<sup>77</sup> "No Lesser Evil: Peru's Presidential Election." *The Economist* (4 June 2011)

<sup>78</sup> "Peru Elections: Keiko Fujimori Concedes to Kuczynski." *BBC News* (10 June 2016)

leadership styles of their fathers, which contributes to the daughters' political popularity based on kinship.

Park Chung-hee came to power as a result of a military coup. After a student protest ousted the authoritarian president Syngman Rhee a new democratic government took office in 1960. The leadership, though, could not manage the social instability and economic suffering left by Rhee. The military, in which Park was a Lieutenant General, took over the government until 1963 when Park was elected president of South Korea as a candidate of his newly formed Democratic Republican Party. The electorate distrusted the government under Rhee and welcomed the change from political chaos.<sup>79</sup> While Park worked his way up through the military, Alberto Fujimori emerged as a political outsider. Similar to Park, Fujimori rose to power during a time when his country was suffering from an underdeveloped economy and the populous was unhappy with the previous leader. He also was elected president of Peru as a candidate of a party he founded, *Cambio 90* (Change 90).<sup>80</sup>

Park Geun-hye led a split from the Grand National Party amidst a bribery scandal and dwindling approval ratings in 2011. She was appointed chairwoman of the *Saenuri* party (New Frontier) and in 2012 went on to win the presidency as their candidate.<sup>81</sup> In Peru, ahead of the 2011 presidential elections, Keiko Fujimori created her own party *Fuerza Popular* (Popular Force).<sup>82</sup> The party's platform was still conservative and not drastically different from her father's platform, but she most likely created a new party with a new name to show that she

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<sup>79</sup> Yong-Sup Han. "The May Sixteenth Military Coup." *The Park Chung Hee Era*, edited by Ezra F Vogel and Byung-Kook Kim, Harvard University Press, 2011, pp. 35–57.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.* 64

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.* 59

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.* 77

could also be her own politician and distance herself from the scandals of her father that the public might associate with her.

In all four cases some crisis, whether it be national economic suffering, a bribery scandal within the party or human rights abuses, led to the need for the leaders to rebrand and/or create their own political parties. This allowed the candidates to better establish their own political identity and independence. In Peru especially, political parties are strongly identified with the leader and helps to characterize Alberto and Keiko Fujimori as personalistic leaders.

The fathers have a legacy necessary to consider when discussing the careers of their daughters. Their legacies are closely associated with the crises they mitigated and the sense of progress that occurred during their governments. Park Chung-hee and Alberto Fujimori targeted major economic reforms which allowed their respective countries to be more competitive globally. Clear improvements were made, but at a cost. Leaders often champion that they facilitated rapid economic growth, but fail to address other issues and the ramifications of this growth. For example, Alberto Fujimori enjoyed relatively high approval ratings that never dropped below 40% into his second and third terms. He curtailed hyperinflation, but unemployment rates and average income were still not much better than they were in the early 1990s.<sup>83</sup> In South Korea, the public image of Park Chung-hye began to improve posthumously against the backdrop of the Asian Crisis in 1997. South Korea's economy was in danger of collapsing due to a regional monetary and financial crisis. Despite his human rights abuses, South Korea rediscovered the authoritarian leader as a symbol of national identity. Even if people knew that Park Chung-hee was a dictator, they admire his record of economic growth.<sup>84</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.* 68

<sup>84</sup> Momoyo Hüstebeck. "Park Geun-Hye: The Eternal Princess?" *Dynasties and Female Political Leaders in Asia: Gender, Power, and Pedigree*, edited by Claudia Derichs, Deutsche Nationalbibliothek, 2013, pp. 353–380.

The electorate in South Korea and Peru overlooked the human rights abuses committed by Alberto Fujimori and Park Chung-hee given their success in economic growth. Although Park was the architect of the “Miracle on the Han River,” he did so by subjecting laborers to harsh working conditions and enforcing strict regulations in a military-like manner. During his regime dissenters were silenced. Fujimori also abused his powers operating his military courts to defeat the Shining Path. His self-coup was also marked by a heavily censored press, similar to policies Park implemented during his rule.

### *2.3.1 From First Daughter to First Lady*

Park and Fujimori’s daughters were visible symbols of their regimes and both daughters had a unique introduction into politics. Both Keiko Fujimori and Park Geun-hye served as First Lady at a young age, Park because her mother was assassinated and Fujimori because her parents separated. The role of First Lady is not one that legally needs to be filled or replaced, meaning that it was the fathers’ choices to incorporate their daughters into their governments. The women became symbolic of their fathers’ government from a young age, being put in the spotlight at 19, Fujimori, and 22, Park.

While Park’s mother was assassinated, Alberto Fujimori was not yet divorced from his wife Susana when he kicked her out of the Government Palace and made Keiko First Lady. Fujimori retaliated against Susana who accused him of corruption. Although Keiko stood by her father’s side among all her parents’ drama, the separation and Susana’s presidential bid might have primed Peru’s political scene for Keiko’s run as well. Mirko Lauer, a political analyst, stated that Susana Higuchi’s high-profile campaign as a woman helped create a new notion in

Peru that women are more likely to vote for female candidates than before.<sup>85</sup> In addition to being the daughter of Alberto Fujimori, her mother's actions helped Keiko Fujimori's political career. Keiko served as First Lady, giving her a higher profile, and the electorate became more familiar with the idea of a female running for high office.

Being the eldest or only daughter, both Keiko Fujimori and Park Geun-hye were put into the political spotlight by their fathers from a young age. Their roles as First Lady are a primary example of how kinship shaped the political careers of these two women. Many women who enter formal politics come from political families themselves.<sup>86</sup> Keiko Fujimori and Park Geun-hye were highly visible symbols of their fathers' regimes because of their position as First Lady. In their roles they accompanied their fathers on diplomatic trips and sponsored social projects and charities. Keiko attended private meetings with the King and Queen of Spain and smiled with Hillary Clinton, while Park received President Jimmy Carter's family and other foreign diplomats in the Blue House in Seoul. Rather than just being part of the First Family, the role of First Lady is closely associated with the presidency, therefore making the daughters more closely associated with their fathers' legacy. This proximity helps the daughters in patriarchal societies, where women can be accepted as political leaders because they are seen as an extension of their father or husband. Park especially symbolizes her father because after she served as his First Lady she never married or had children. Her lack of other kinship ties and male figures in her life

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<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.* 76

<sup>86</sup> Indira Gandhi, elected the first female prime minister of India in 1980, was the daughter of India's first prime minister. Corazon Aquino, a political widow, was elected president of the Philippines in 1986. Benazir Bhutto was the first female prime minister of Pakistan. Her father previously served as both prime minister and president of the country. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, the 14th president of the Philippines, is the daughter of the 9th president. Megawati Sukarnoputri was the first female president of Indonesia and is the daughter of the first president of the country. Cristina Fernández de Kirchner was elected president of Argentina directly after her husband's term as president. These women are just a few examples of high-ranking female politicians who come from political families. There are many other cases that could be mentioned, especially about women who serve in other positions such as as mayors, governors, and members of the legislature.

more closely associates her with her father and his leadership. As a presidential candidate this helps her secure a constituency and gives her a platform to speak before the campaign even begins.<sup>87</sup> It is already difficult for women to enter into politics, but this view that the daughters are an extension of their fathers, even in a patriarchal society, gives women with kinship ties a leg up on their female counterparts with no family ties.

## **2.4 Conclusion**

This chapter discussed the legacies of Park Chung-hee in South Korea and of Alberto Fujimori in Peru. It highlighted that neither can be considered democratic leaders and they both abused their power. Positive aspects of their legacies do exist, though. Park is credited for the growth South Korea experienced following the Korean War, but is also condemned for how he exploited cheap labor, censored the press, and silenced his opposition. Fujimori is hailed as the leader who finally defeated the Shining Path and opened Peru up to foreign investment after years of hyperinflation. In doing so, though, he was guilty of running secret military courts that violated human rights, as well as unconstitutionally halting the powers of the other branches of government. Regardless of the negative aspects of their legacies, their popularity helped launch the political careers of their daughters. The similarities between the leadership styles and ideologies of the fathers and daughters highlights how kinship influenced what kind of politicians the daughters would be and how having similar political personalities benefited the daughters in gaining a base. The cases of Park Geun-hye and Keiko Fujimori are both unique and similar in that both women served as First Lady to their father at a young age. This visibility helped the women because they were already well known to the public, but also tethered them

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<sup>87</sup> Aswath Komath. "The Patriarchal Barrier to Women in Politics." *International Knowledge Network of Women in Politics* (2 Oct. 2014).



closer to their fathers' regimes. The following chapters delve deeper into the specific imagery Keiko and Geun-hye used in their campaigns and how it relates back to the legacies laid out in this chapter.

### Chapter 3: Campaign Video Analysis

This chapter aims to analyze the campaign strategies of Park Geun-hye and Keiko Fujimori for reliance on kinship and nostalgia. Park and Keiko are two recent examples of female politicians who are kin to former male politicians. Their campaigns utilize different tools and methods than the campaigns of Indira Gandhi, Corazon Aquino, and other historical examples, allowing for a contemporary analysis of the discussion concerning kinship, memory, and gender. Specifically, campaign videos are a tool that can convey messages through both words and visuals. These videos express what policies and values a candidate prioritizes. In these two sets of videos I look for allusions to their father's presidencies and legacies and examine how the videos communicate kinship and nostalgia. In the case of Keiko Fujimori, I access material from Alberto Fujimori's presidential campaign and find parallels between their strategies. These allusions to and similarities with their father's presidencies help answer the question of how each candidate relied on kinship and memory to gain popularity and add to a broader conversation of kinship, memory, and gender.

#### 3.1 Park's Campaign

In a series of four campaign videos Park Geun-hye highlights both her feminine and maternal characteristics, as well as her seasoned leadership experience. Her first video, titled "Crisis,"<sup>88</sup> opens with a ship stuck in a stormy sea with crashing waves and bolts of lightning. Dramatic music plays in the background while a voiceover states that Korea needs a strong president in this time of "crisis," not referring to any specific problem or issue. The music

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<sup>88</sup> "박근혜 새누리당 대선후보 TV 광고 2탄 - 위기에 강한 글로벌 리더십편 (Global Leadership in Crisis)." *YouTube Nuri TV* (12 Dec. 2012). Translation help from Professor Youngju Ryu, Director of the Korean Language Program at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

becomes more urgent and the screen flashes twenty images of Park Geun-hye with different heads of state, including those from 1979 in the Blue House with President Jimmy Carter,<sup>89</sup> from 2007 with Secretary Condoleezza Rice in the White House,<sup>90</sup> and from 2010 with Chancellor Angela Merkel in Seoul.<sup>91</sup> The ship reaches calm and sunny waters, and the words “the five years to come are going to determine the future of Korea” are proudly displayed. The video ends with an image of Park and her slogan: First Prepared Female Candidate.

“Crisis” showcases Park’s so-called experience and leadership abilities, and alludes to her father’s time in office using images from her past political career and time as First Lady. The video also creates a sense of urgency for the audience, and feels almost as if Park is the only option in this time of need. The video is open-ended, as there are no references to policy or her specific qualifications. The “crisis” could mean a few things, such as the economic struggles of the country,<sup>92</sup> growing tensions with North Korea,<sup>93</sup> or the declining birthrate of the country,<sup>94</sup> but the vagueness serves to heighten the anxiety of the viewer. Park also plays a balancing act between appealing to voters who are nostalgic for her father and those who saw him as an authoritarian dictator. The first image shown in the video of Park with President Carter has strategically been cropped to not include her father. At the time, Park was serving as First Lady and was constantly in the public spotlight, attending diplomatic meetings with her father. The image attempts to evoke Park’s experience in government and policy without accrediting it to her

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<sup>89</sup> Gerhard Peters, and John T Woolley. “Jimmy Carter: ‘Seoul, Republic of Korea Joint Communique Issued at the Conclusion of Meetings with President Park.’” *The American Presidency Project* (University of California, Santa Barbara, 1 July 1979).

<sup>90</sup> “Park Geun-Hye Starts U.S. Tour.” *The Chosun Ilbo (English Edition): Daily News from Korea* (12 Feb. 2007).

<sup>91</sup> “Park Geun-Hye to Meet Angela Merkel.” *The Chosun Ilbo (English Edition): Daily News from Korea* (11 Nov. 2010).

<sup>92</sup> Cheon Jong-woo and Yoo Choonsik. “South Korea Heads towards First Recession in 11 Years.” *Reuters* (22 Jan. 2009).

<sup>93</sup> Jethro Mullen and Paul Armstrong. “North Korea Carries out Controversial Rocket Launch.” *CNN* (12 Dec. 2012).

<sup>94</sup> Kim Yang-joong. “Low South Korean Birth Rate Shows Signs of Increasing.” *Hankyoreh* (26 Jan. 2013).

kinship ties. Viewers who are nostalgic for her father might be primed to remember Park within the context of her father's regime, but the video does not explicitly conjure the memory of Park Chung-hee for viewers who do not remember him positively. The phrase "the five years to come" could also be reminiscent of Park Chung-hee's Five Year Plan. Although "five years" explicitly refers to the presidential term limit in Korea, Park Chung-hee's Five Year Plan is an iconic symbol of the economic growth the country experienced under his leadership. This nostalgia is especially important for Park Geun-hye to underscore in a time of economic hardship for Korea, alluding to the idea that she, like her father, can bring the country out of depression.

Although she does not explicitly refer to an economic crisis, since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis Korea has been experiencing slowed GDP growth and increased unemployment. The *chaebol* also further aggravated the issue of unequal distribution of wealth in South Korea. The structure of the group as a collection of family-controlled conglomerates means that most of the wealth in the country is concentrated within these top families. The companies also tend to guarantee lifetime employment to an elite group of employees, which leaves the young people in South Korea without secure jobs.<sup>95</sup> Since the *chaebol* effectively wield monopolistic powers over their suppliers, workers at smaller businesses that depend on the large companies for their revenue often suffer from depressed wages and tough working conditions. The youth unemployment rate in South Korea is nearly 10%, because the jobs at non-*chaebol* companies are low-paying or nonexistent, leaving the younger generation of the country disenchanted with their government and their economic system.<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>95</sup> Motoko Rich. "In South Korea, New President Faces a Tangle of Economic Problems." *The New York Times* (12 May 2017).

<sup>96</sup> Carlos Tejada. "Money, Power, Family: Inside South Korea's Chaebol." *The New York Times* (17 Feb. 2017).

None of this, though, is expressly addressed in Park Geun-hye's campaign video. She refers to a “crisis,” to her time in politics under her father and to his economic plan, but lets the viewer fill in the gaps, since her election platform cannot just be that she is her father’s daughter. It would be risky to openly say that because her father helped the economy she can too. That direct reference would diminish her political qualifications and alienate voters who disapprove of her father. She also does not refer to a specific crisis because then she would have to propose a policy plan to address it. By leaving the reference open, Park is able to draw in a broader audience. The viewer can perceive whichever crisis he or she sees as most imminent or pressing, and then that viewer can associate Park with addressing it.

Park Geun-hye second video, “Wound,”<sup>97</sup> takes a softer tone. Melancholy piano music plays over the image of Park Geun-hye pensively looking out a window. The camera zooms in on Park’s face, the viewer notices a scar running down her right cheek. Black and white pictures of her 2006 knife attack and her recovery fade in and out on the screen. At a campaign rally a man slashed Park with a utility knife, causing an 11 centimeter long and 4 centimeter deep cut that injured her jaw muscles, requiring 60 stitches and weeks of recovery. Her apparent response after waking from surgery -- “How is Daejeon?” -- referring to the party's campaign in that city, earned her the nickname “Queen of Elections.”<sup>98</sup> In the video, Park narrates over footage of citizens holding vigils after the attack, stating that “you all [Korea] gave me the will to live. From that point on I decided to give my life to take on the wounds of the Korean people.” The video again ends with her slogan.

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<sup>97</sup> “박근혜 새누리당 대선후보 TV 광고 1 탄 - '박근혜의 상처' 편 (The Wounds of Park Geun-Hye).” *YouTube 오 른소리* (27 Nov. 2012). Translation by Ryu, Youngju.

<sup>98</sup> “Opposition Leader Attacked by Knife-Wielding Assailant.” *The Hankyoreh* (22 May 2006).

“Wound” also has multiple meanings. The first is Park Geun-hye’s own wounds, both physical and emotional. Her physical wound, which is the primary subject of the video, is her scar that represents her dedication to her party’s 2006 campaign. Park’s wound could also be read as an emotional one, caused by the assassination of both her parents. This painful memory plays on the sympathies of the older, conservative generation in Korea who are nostalgic for Park Chung-hee. Highlighting Park Geun-hye’s physical and emotional wounds in this video portrays her as someone who has overcome many challenges and is deserving of public’s support for president. At the end of the video Park states that her wounds are Korea’s wounds. Like “Crisis,” this ambiguity could mean a number of things, such as the country’s economic downturn or their neighborly issues. Park saying that she will take on the pain of the people is maternalistic of her. While the first video channeled the commanding strength and economic themes of her father, “Wound” has the softer tone of her mother. The video features Park wearing her mother’s feminine haircut and alluding to the loss of her parents. Again, she provides no concrete examples or solutions, and relies purely on sentiment and her personality to campaign.

The third campaign video, “Mother’s Country,”<sup>99</sup> is similar to “Wound” in that it highlights Park’s softer and more maternal side. The video features several black and white images of different women: an elderly woman sleeping on a couch, a young woman cuddling with her newborn, a working woman at the market, and a crying woman wearing a cap and gown. The images are rotated with text reading: “with an ardent heart,” “the strength,” “the ultimate sense of responsibility,” and “with the warm delicacy like that of a mother.” The final image is a smiling Park Geun-hye, followed by “I will open an era of happiness for the Korean people.” A song called “mother’s country” plays over the video.

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<sup>99</sup> “새누리당 박근혜 후보 대선 광고 - 어머니의 나라 (Mother’s Country).” *Youtube 오름소리* (15 Dec. 2012). Translation by Ryu, Youngju.

Narratives of motherhood and maternalism are often used to encourage and justify female political participation. During First-wave feminism, women argued that their political values and suffrage were grounded in the moral sensibilities that come from mothering.<sup>100</sup> But even as the older conservative generation becomes more accepting of the shift away from the narrative that women should be mothers and stay at home, working women are still expected to be mothers, first and foremost, and should possess maternal qualities. Female politicians, though, can use this expectation as a selling point.<sup>101</sup> During a campaign appeals to nurturance and the family formulates a political image built on fundamental values of compassion, generosity, and interpersonal connectedness.<sup>102</sup> Although Park claims that she will channel these maternal qualities to lead Korea, she is not a mother herself. In fact, her image in Korea is somewhat of a Virgin Queen, married to her country.<sup>103</sup> The cult of virginity surrounding her stems from her renunciation of motherhood and wifhood in order to put Korea first, forever preserving herself as Park Chung-hee's daughter. The only thing maternal about her, at least in this video, is how she wears her hair like her late mother. Park's mother remains South Korea's most popular First Lady and is remembered for her extensive charity work. Thousands of people, mostly those in their 50s and older, attend memorial services on the anniversary of her assassination each year. Although Park never clearly defined her policy platform on economic issues such as taxation and

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<sup>100</sup> Susan Franceschet, Jennifer M. Piscopo, and Gwynn Thomas. "Supermadres, Maternal Legacies and Women's Political Participation in Contemporary Latin America." *Journal of Latin American Studies*, vol. 48, no. 1 (2016). pp. 1-32.

<sup>101</sup> During the 2016 Democratic National Convention in the United States, there were several references to motherhood. First Lady Michelle Obama endorsed candidate Hillary Clinton stating: "I trust Hillary to lead this country because I've seen her lifelong devotion to our nation's children – not just her own daughter, who she has raised to perfection, but every child who needs a champion." Chelsea Clinton also offered personal stories of Hilary Clinton as a mother.

Jill Greenlee, and Rachel VanSickle-Ward. "Hillary Clinton Uses Motherhood as a Credential for President." *U.S. News*, 5 Aug. 2016.

<sup>102</sup> Grace Deason. "Maternal Appeals in Politics: Their Effectiveness and Consequences." *University of Minnesota* (2011).

<sup>103</sup> Anna Fifield. "As a Bizarre Scandal Unfolds, South Korea's President Depicts Herself as Lonely." *The Washington Post* (16 Nov. 2016).

welfare, she claimed to share her mother's vision for a more equal society and pledged to work toward that during her campaign.<sup>104</sup> The video "Mother's Country" is another example of Park's campaign strategy of relying on kinship and nostalgia, in this case for her mother, to garner support in the 2012 presidential election.

The final campaign video is called "Dialect"<sup>105</sup> and addresses regional differences in Korea. The video opens on an older woman working at a dry cleaner while a video of Park giving a speech plays in the background. "I will clean up the government," Park says on the little old TV, "I will be the president that cuts the chain of corruption." The dry cleaner nods approvingly and says to the screen, "yeah, that's why a woman should become president. That's how things will change. Change everything!" The second part cuts to an elderly man cleaning a small indoor market selling dried fish, also watching the same speech on a small TV. "Everyone talks a big game, but not everyone can put it into effect," Park says. "I am someone who keeps promises no matter what." The man, waving his duster at the screen, says "times have changed, people who keep to these old ways aren't gonna succeed. This time, Park Geun-hye, you do it. Change everything!"

This video attempts to appeal to different regions in Korea based on who it features. The first woman speaks in a distinct Jeolla southwest dialect. This dialect is significant because the Jeolla Province is a historically liberal province and was the geographic base of opposition to President Park Chung-hee. Park arrested several of his democratic opponents from this area, which helped fuel the 1980 Gwangju Uprising, where approximately 600 people, many of them

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<sup>104</sup> Ju-min Park. "Slain Dictator's Daughter Turns to Mother's Legacy in Bid to Lead South Korea." *Reuters* (28 Aug. 2012).

<sup>105</sup> "박근혜 새누리당 대선후보 TV 광고 3 탄 - 사투리편 (The Dialect)." *YouTube Nuri TV* (10 Dec, 2012). Translation by Ryu, Youngju.



students from Chonnam University, were fired upon, killed, and beaten by government troops.<sup>106</sup> This discrimination against Jeolla also came in the form of economic development as the Park Chung-hee administration concentrated development efforts in his conservative home province of Gyeongsang in the 1960s and 70s. Park neglected Jeolla and the province suffered from poor transportation infrastructure and experienced decreased economic growth compared to other regions.

The second person featured in the video is a man speaking in a dialect prominent in the Gyeongsang Province where Park Chung-hee was born and raised. During his regime, his Five Year Plan for industrialization benefited this region disproportionately, with projects such as the construction of the Seoul-Busan highway which linked Gyeongsang to the capital, the creation of an industrial complex, and the location of the world's second largest integrated steel mill. The people in Gyeongsang continued to revere him and his family, demonstrated by four-fifths of their voters supporting his daughter in the 2012 election.<sup>107</sup>

“Dialect” addresses several aspects of Korean politics, including the country’s regional divide and the economic concerns of the older generation. By featuring two people from different provinces between which her father’s policies exacerbated the division, Park suggests that she will be the one to finally heal this divide (although she fails to attribute this divide to her father’s policies). Park strategically leaves out part of the memory of her father’s government, hoping her audience and the voters will have forgotten or do not know about the negative implications of his policies. Why include the Jeolla dialect specifically if her father is so disliked there? She demonstrates that two different people, despite coming from opposing political and

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<sup>106</sup> Se Young Jang. “The Gwangju Uprising: A Battle over South Korea's History.” *The Wilson Center* (17 July 2017).

<sup>107</sup> “The Fading of South Korea’s Preeminent Political Dynasty.” *The Economist* (24 Feb. 2017).

historical backgrounds, can agree on one thing: that Park Geun-hye is the candidate to change Korea. But this proposed change is again merely a suggestion, for if she were to explicitly apologize for what her father did, she risks distancing voters who are sympathetic to her father and family. The characters in the video are also older working-class people, who are more likely to be nostalgic for the authoritarian leader and are insecure about Korea's economic state. Their lives are in the process of being supplanted as their businesses are not dependent on advanced technology and are under threat in an economy that rapidly introduces newer and newer technology. In South Korea the government has an intimate relationship with the tech companies in *chaebol*, which is why the economy is driven by technological advancements. By promising to eradicate "corruption" (which implicitly refers to the government's relationship to the *chaebol*) Park attempts to alleviate the anxieties of the older generation in Korea.

Although "Dialect" most directly references some of the country's political and economic history and concerns, it still does not offer any solution further than cutting the "chain of corruption." The president who served before Park, Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013), was found guilty by the Seoul Central District Court of embezzling approximately \$21.77 million from his brothers company and accepting bribes from *chaebol* companies like Samsung.<sup>108</sup> Before him, several people in president Roh Moo-hyun's administration (2003-2008) were arrested for corruption and the president himself was also accused of bribery, but was never formally charged.<sup>109</sup> President Kim Dae-jung's (1998-2003) two sons were jailed for taking bribes.<sup>110</sup> Even after its democratization South Korea has struggled with corruption in its political

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<sup>108</sup> Choe Sang-hun. "Former South Korean President Gets 15 Years in Prison for Corruption." *The New York Times* (5 Oct. 2018).

<sup>109</sup> Choe Sang-hun. "Despair Overwhelmed Former South Korean Leader Embroiled in Scandal." *The New York Times* (23 May 2009).

<sup>110</sup> "Why South Korea's Corruption Scandal Is Nothing New." *BBC News* (24 Nov. 2016).

leadership. The last four presidents of South Korea all campaigned on the promise to clean up the government, and all four were in some way implicated in scandals. Although there is a history of corruption in South Korea, Park claims to be the candidate who will not fall prey to this trend. While she gives no reason why, voters may have trusted her more than her male predecessors and opponents because of her gender. Several studies have shown that women are perceived to be more trustworthy than their male counterparts.<sup>111</sup> This perception may account for why Park is trusted to “cut the chains of corruption” even though the male presidents before her promised the same thing in their campaigns before they too were caught in the intricate web of corruption.

All four of these videos exemplify how Park Geun-hye ran a presidential campaign driven by nostalgia, rather than proposing specific policy changes. Park uses specific images and phrases to cultivate this feeling, never explicitly referencing her father or mother.

### **3.2 Keiko’s Campaign**

Keiko Fujimori uses a variety of videos to convey her general message that a united Peru is important for the country's future and that she is the people’s candidate. She does so primarily by featuring footage of Peruvians from all walks of life. Her first video, titled “Crime, Enough Already”<sup>112</sup> conveys a sense of urgency using dramatic music and acting. The video opens with black and white security camera footage of crimes and criminals being taken down and handcuffed by law enforcement. It then switches between a male voiceover and Keiko narrating

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<sup>111</sup> Marilyn G. Boltz, et al. “Jo Are You Lying to Me? Temporal Cues for Deception.” *Journal of Language and Social Psychology*, vol. 29, no. 4 (2010), pp. 458–466; Michael A. Johnson, et al. “A Woman's Place Is in the... Startup! Crowdfunder Judgments, Implicit Bias, and the Stereotype Content Model.” *Journal of Business Venturing*, vol. 33, no. 6 (2018), pp. 813–831.

<sup>112</sup> “¡Delincuencia Basta Ya! (Crime, Enough Already!).” *Youtube Fuerza Popular* (25 May 2016). Translated by Maki O’Bryan.

over a male boxer dramatically beating up a punching bag. Words such as “insecurity,” “criminals,” and “rapists” are written in big bold letters on the punching bag, while the words “political decision” and “intelligence” show up on the gloves. Keiko states that crime is a major problem in Peru and she, along with her party *Fuerza Popular*, plan to bring order to the country.

Although the last major terrorist attack carried out by the Shining Path occurred in 2002, Peru’s overall crime rate and homicide rate have been steadily increasing and the country faces security threats from drug trafficking groups.<sup>113</sup> This video highlights that part of Keiko’s platform is being hard on crime. Her father Alberto ran on a similar message regarding the ongoing insurgency in Peru, promising to rid the country of the Shining Path, during his first election. During his campaign he promised to defeat the Shining Path, responsible for tens of thousands of deaths. By the end of his government attacks had stopped almost completely and many Peruvians credit him for eradicating the Shining Path from the country. By taking a similar stance on crime as her father, Keiko can allude to the positive aspects of his legacy without explicitly naming him and being associated with the negative aspects of his legacy as well. “Crime, Enough Already” could also play upon the fears of the voters. Its footage of real crimes and fighting, paired with the dramatic music and voiceover, instills a sense of urgency in the viewer.

How does this relate back to her approach? I do not believe that Keiko is suggesting that she would go outside of the bureaucracy to get justice like her father did. Rather she is creating this sense of urgency, making it feel like there is a problem, so she can run on the same tough-on-crime platform that her father did. This way voters will think that she has real solutions to real

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<sup>113</sup> “Slight Increase in Peru's Homicide Rate.” *Peru Telegraph* (24 Jan. 2018).

problems and is a candidate worth voting for. When her father ran for president there was an imminent threat of the Shining Path and he did not need to create a sense of urgency.

The second video is called “A Peru with Keiko”<sup>114</sup> and features clips of Keiko on the campaign trail with a version of her theme song playing in the background. The shots are of her with children, with the elderly, and with crowds of her supporters waving her flag branded with the *Fuerza Popular* logo, a bright orange “K.” Most notably, though, is that in almost every shot she is wearing a different hat, scarf, poncho, or other item of clothing that appears to be the local traditional wear of the village she is visiting. This allows her constituents to physically see her as one of them and allows them to better relate to her. She dances and smiles with people from the indigenous and poor highland populations. Keiko highlights her trips to these areas in her campaign videos because her father focused his campaign on, and was also popular with, the same poor indigenous populations in rural Peru. By going to the same places and visiting the same people that her father visited, Keiko attempts to win the same voters that her father won over. During his campaign her father appealed to these populations in the same manner by playing music and dancing with them at rallies, passing out water bottles and t-shirts. Once elected, he maintained popularity in the rural areas by building schools, hospitals, and orphanages.<sup>115</sup> In this video Keiko capitalizes on her father’s legacy without directly mentioning him. Her campaign’s theme song plays in the background and is sung to a softer melody. The tune is uplifting and hopeful, and the lyrics, for the most part, are simply “Vamos Keiko” (Let’s go Keiko) repeated.

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<sup>114</sup> “¡El Perú Con Keiko! (A Peru with Keiko!).” *Youtube Fuerza Popular* (2 June 2016). Translated by Maki O’Bryan.

<sup>115</sup> Lucien Chauvin. “In Peru, the Daughter Who Would Be President Too.” *TIME* (24 May 2011).

The third video “The Future is Underway,”<sup>116</sup> is similar to “A Peru with Keiko” in that it features a song played over footage of everyday Peruvians. The song lyrics are different in this campaign video and sing more about teamwork and unity but have a similar uplifting melody. The song features lines such as “you work day to day with sacrifice and great passion,” and “together we can succeed.” Several phrases appear next to the people in the video, including “good health,” “safe streets,” “insurance for taxi drivers,” and “fair sales tax.” These phrases could be considered to be a part of Keiko’s policy platform and gives the most variety of policy issues out of all the campaign videos. The phrases are more specific than the generic songs used in her other videos (except for “Crime, Enough Already”). None of the lyrics or phrases (except for possibly “safe streets”) could be construed as being related to Alberto Fujimori’s legacy, who is most known for his large scale economic reforms and fighting crimes. In the one campaign video for Alberto Fujimori that I was able to analyze (“El Baile del Chino”) the only line that could be considered to be within the theme of unity that Keiko refers to is the lyric about the coast, the mountains, and the jungle all being under the “rhythm of the chinaman.”<sup>117</sup> By not explicitly referring to her father or his specific accomplishments, Keiko Fujimori is less at risk of alienating voters who remember her father less fondly.

“Ruta Peru” is a more informal vlog-esque series on *Fuerza Popular*’s Youtube channel, totaling 43 videos. I watched and analyzed “Day 3,” which had the most view counts of the series.<sup>118</sup> “Ruta Peru” is comprised of footage of Keiko visiting five different villages and cities, dancing and singing with the local people, as well as giving speeches along the way. In this video Keiko wears the local dress of each of the places she visits. In Curahuasi, a district outside

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<sup>116</sup> “¡El Futuro Está en Marcha! (The Future is Underway!).” *Youtube Fuerza Popular* (26 May 2016). Translated by Maki O’ Bryan.

<sup>117</sup> *El Baile Del Chino*. Ana Kohler, *YouTube* (8 Dec. 2006).

<sup>118</sup> “Keiko Fujimori #RutaPerú - Día 3.” *YouTube*, *Fuerza Popular* (13 May 2016).

of Cusco, Keiko gives a speech in Quechua, an indigenous language spoken during the Inca Empire. Approximately 8 million people in Peru speak Quechua.<sup>119</sup> Keiko's Quechua, however, is not good and she speaks simplistically.<sup>120</sup> Keiko uses indigenous language in her speech to demonstrate that she is one of them and will be a president for the indigenous populations. Her father also used the strategy of dressing in the traditional clothing of the indigenous populations.<sup>121</sup> Alberto Fujimori won the department where Curahuasi is located (Apurimac) in the second round of the 1990 election, but not the first round.<sup>122</sup> By speaking their language, dressing in their clothes, and going to their towns and villages, Keiko embodies her father's campaign slogan from 1990 of "A President Like You" and uses a similar strategy that he did.

The final video, titled "Vote for the Future,"<sup>123</sup> is most similar to what a campaign video looks like in the United States. It features the same song and soft melody as in "A Peru with Keiko." It cuts between shots of everyday Peruvians doing different things, Keiko speaking to the camera, and shots of Keiko interacting with people. Despite this being the only video with a clear script, Keiko offers no policy platform. If a viewer were to decide to vote for Keiko solely by watching this video it would not be because she proposed strong policy recommendations, but rather because the video made them feel good. Instead, she simply stresses that Peru needs to be united and that everyone should work together. She states that people on the right, the left, and in the center need to come together; that agriculture and ranching and the fishing industries can grow stronger; that laborers and entrepreneurs can work together; and that a responsible mining

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<sup>119</sup> "Quechua." *The Columbia Encyclopedia, 6th Ed*, Encyclopedia.com (2019).

<sup>120</sup> Adela Carlos-Rios, University of Michigan Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies, Quechua Language Program.

<sup>121</sup> I was unable to find videos of Alberto Fujimori speaking an indigenous language on the campaign trail, but in the video *El Baile del Chino* he is seen wearing indigenous dress. When you Google "Alberto Fujimori Quechua" the first hits are for articles about his forced sterilization of indigenous women.

<sup>122</sup> The International Foundation for Electoral Systems. Republic of Peru

<sup>123</sup> "¡Votemos por el Futuro! (Vote for the Future!)." *YouTube Fuerza Popular* (30 May 2016). Translated by Maki O'Bryan.

industry can live in harmony with the environment.<sup>124</sup> She did not specify what this unity would accomplish.

Although Keiko calls for unity, Peru does not experience high levels of political partisanship. Rather, this could reflect the diversity of political parties that exist within the country, but this leads to a weak party system.<sup>125</sup> In Peru Political parties are usually created around political personalities, as demonstrated by Alberto Fujimori founding *Cambio 90* in 1990 and *Si Cumple* in 1998, and Keiko Fujimori founding *Fuerza 2011* in 2009 and rebranding it as *Fuerza Popular* for the 2016 presidential election. The reason for Keiko founding her own party though, was also an attempt to further herself from her father's legacy. She branded herself, her party, and her campaign focusing just on her first name, leaving out the last name that connects them. The symbol of her *Fuerza Popular* Party is a "K" for Keiko, putting distance between her and her father.<sup>126</sup> By distancing herself from her father she made her kinship ties more implicit, letting the voters who support her family name also support her, but also letting the voters who are unsure focus on her alone.

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<sup>124</sup> Edras Rodriguez-Torres, a librarian at the University of Michigan focused in Latin American politics, suggests that Keiko's call for unity could refer to regaining the trust of people who were harmed by her father's government. Although Alberto Fujimori is hailed as the president who eradicated the Shining Path, his militaristic methods left many rural villages weaker and harmed innocent people. Keiko wants these people to once again trust her family name and trust the government. She wants people from all demographics and geographies to unite under her government and work together.

<sup>125</sup> Christopher Carter. "Party System Erosion: Evidence from Peru." *Party Politics* (Aug. 2018).

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.* 115





Figure 3.1: *Fuerza Popular's* Logo<sup>127</sup>

Keiko's call for unity in "Vote for the Future" more likely refers to the geographic and ethnic diversity that exists in Peru. The country is split into three regions: the jungle, the coast, and the highlands, and these geographic differences also divide the people and industry.<sup>128</sup> Peru is also home to many different ethnicities. The indigenous and Amerindian population constitutes 26% of the country and the majority (60%) are mestizos, people of mixed ancestry. There are also black Afro-Peruvians, white Europeans, and Chinese and Japanese populations in Peru.<sup>129</sup>

In addition to not outlining her own platform or qualifications, this video does not have any clear allusions to her father or his policies. Under Keiko's narration of people working together is footage of friends hugging, mothers holding their children, laborers working on the field and in boats smiling, and Keiko shaking hands and dancing with her indigenous supporters. The overarching message of "Vote for the Future" is that Keiko is a candidate that can make cooperation happen as president. The lack of a clear platform or her qualifications, but the insistence that she is the candidate to unify Peru, could be interpreted as Keiko relying on

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<sup>127</sup> "Fuerza Popular." *Facebook*, 2017, [www.facebook.com/PFuerzaPopular/](http://www.facebook.com/PFuerzaPopular/).

<sup>128</sup> "Peru: General Information." *Peruanos En Stanford*, Stanford University (2004).

<sup>129</sup> "Perú: Perfil Sociodemográfico." *Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática* (2017). p. 214.

viewers to connect that she will make it work just as her father made a failing Peruvian economy work.

All five videos, except for the first one, are stylistically similar. Specifically, they all feature candid footage of people, whether it's a few people waving at the camera or Keiko addressing a rally of supporters. This characteristic of the videos conveys that Keiko would be a candidate for the people. She goes out of her way to meet her constituents, especially those poorer, indigenous populations in the countryside, and has heard their needs. Although important for a presidential candidate to meet constituents, Keiko offers little concrete policy in her campaign videos. In a few videos, though, she does tell what her goals are generally on crime and economic reform, which are similar to her father's. The song lyrics and scripts used are also similar throughout the videos. Phrases that consistently appear are "Let's go Keiko," "President Keiko," "the coast, the mountains, and the jungle" and if "*Fuerza Popular*" (Popular Force) is not directly mentioned, "fuerza" is used in another context. The line "the coast, mountains, and the jungle" is consistent with the theme of a united Peru featured throughout the videos. Her message was: no matter what terrain, no matter the job or the industry, no matter whether you're old or young, male or female, indigenous or not, everyone in the country is stronger together.

Keiko's campaign strategies and videos are also similar to her father's 1990 campaign. Alberto Fujimori used a song called "El Baile del Chino" (the Dance of the Chinaman) during his campaign.<sup>130</sup> He would play this song at his rallies in the poor rural areas and the audience would sing and dance with him. The song is similar to "Vamos Keiko" and is upbeat and repetitive. Their songs also share lyrics; "El Baile del Chino" sings "The rhythm of the chinaman/It's in the coast/It's going to the mountains/And in the jungle/The rhythm of the

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<sup>130</sup> *Ibid.* 117

chinaman.”<sup>131</sup> “Vamos Keiko” sings “Let’s go until we win/The future is in your hands/the coast, the mountains, and the jungle/Let’s go *Fuerza Popular*.”<sup>132</sup> A voter who supported Alberto Fujimori in 1990 and knew his campaign song would probably feel similar listening to Keiko’s song in 2016. Keiko Fujimori targeted the same people and used similar strategies as her father to harness his 1990 popularity. Her father was a skilled grass-roots politician and diligently crisscrossed Peru to give stump speeches to small audiences, a strategy Keiko also adopted, as highlighted in her campaign videos. As she visited these rural and poor areas, she would offer to install running water in towns where there was none, provide uniforms and shoes to schoolchildren, and build hospitals and airports and universities. Building infrastructure, especially schools, in rural areas is something Alberto Fujimori is remembered fondly for by the people in these areas.<sup>133</sup> Using song and dance, as well as visiting these particular populations is unique to Alberto and Keiko Fujimori. The campaign videos of the other 2016 presidential candidates did not feature songs, dance, or meeting poor indigenous people.<sup>134</sup>

Ahead of the first round of elections in 2016, Keiko was a front-runner and played it safe. She largely avoiding public statements and giving interviews, and skipped a presidential debate in February. This avoidance of appearances allowed her to evade questions about campaign financing, corruption scandals that a few *Fuerza Popular* officials were involved in, and whether she would pardon her father. Keiko did not explicitly mention her father in her run for president, although she did mimic his campaign style and strategy. Keiko also offered more of a concrete platform in her videos and relied less on memory in her campaign than Park Geun-hye.

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<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.* 117

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.* 115

<sup>133</sup> *Ibid.* 115

<sup>134</sup> “PPK Última Llamada.” *YouTube*, ÚLTIMA LLAMADA PPK (23 May 2016); “El #FrenteAmplio Por #ElNuevoPerú.” *YouTube*, Frente Amplio Perú (31 Jan. 2016).

### 3.3 Comparisons

The campaigns of Keiko Fujimori and Park Geun-hye utilize memory differently, but both feature videos alluding to the father's legacies. Park had specific phrases and images that referred to her father's government and policies, while Keiko used a campaign strategy that mimicked her father's. Keiko's campaign also differed in that she avoided speaking about her father and the pardon process he was going through at the time and she also offered more of a platform than Park did in her videos. Park's videos draw upon aspects from her past, such as the time she served as First Lady, and this lends as a reference to her father's regime. The videos' emphasis on economic reform and prosperity also allude to the positive legacy of Park Chung-hee's economic success in South Korea during the 1980s. Keiko's videos implicitly reference her father's era by making crime a focal point of her campaign, as well as by heavily featuring Peruvians from the poor countryside and indigenous people from the highland regions.

Park's videos were more nuanced and told more of a story than Keiko's did. Each of her four videos had a distinct theme, from "Crisis" to "Dialect" and showcased different parts of her campaign strategy. The imagery and language used in "Crisis" and "Wound" made references to her political past. "Crisis" used images from her time as First Lady, and "Wound" told a story about a previous campaign she worked on for the *Saenuri* party. These two videos could speak to the political qualifications of Park Geun-hye. "Mother's Country" is a video that relies heavily on emotional appeal. Park uses imagery and language to suggest that she is a maternal and feminine candidate, while Keiko does not. This could be to compensate for the fact that Park is not a mother (while Keiko is) and symbolize that she does have family values.

Keiko's videos, particularly "Crime, Enough Already" and "The Future is Underway," make more specific policy references than do Park's. Although they are just general phrases, "secure streets," "fair taxes," and "insurance for taxi drivers," gives voters a sense of what her priorities and goals are but leaves open how she would accomplish them. Both campaigns, though, primarily rely on conjuring emotions within the voters to garner support. Park's videos, on one hand, have more of a range of emotions to them. "Crisis" is fear and urgency. "Wound" is sympathy and determination. "Mother's Country" is warmth and hope. "Dialect" is unity and change. Keiko's, on the other hand, mostly convey positive feelings of togetherness, especially through her use of songs. The one video I would not categorize as positive is "Crime, Enough Already" which, similarly to Park's "Crisis" instills a sense of urgency in the viewer.

### **3.4 Conclusion**

Visual symbols, text and dialogue, as well as general styles and strategies in Park Geun-hye and Keiko Fujimori's respective campaign videos demonstrate that both candidates alluded to their fathers' regimes. These allusions were employed to evoke nostalgia in voters who support the fathers and remember them fondly, but were subtle enough to avoid driving away voters who did not view them positively. An analysis of election results reveals that both campaigns were fairly effective. Park Geun-hye narrowly won the presidency with 51.6% of the vote. Keiko Fujimori, however lost her election by less than 1%, but still maintains political strength as the leader of *Fuerza Popular* and as a congresswoman. Even though Keiko Fujimori lost, I argue that kinship politics and memory benefitted both candidates. Based on my analysis of the campaign videos and the polling data examined in the next chapter, I conclude that nostalgia played a greater role in, and was more effective, in Park's case study.

## Chapter 4: Election Results and Polling Data

This chapter aims to analyze empirical data from election results and public opinion polls regarding Park Geun-hye, Keiko Fujimori, and their fathers. These numbers can illustrate the priorities and the decisions of the voters. Voting data can reveal if the regional and demographic bases of the fathers were passed down to the daughters come their elections and public opinion can reveal how the voters came to these decisions. By comparing who voted for the father or daughter, and why, I can better understand the role of kinship and memory in the case studies of the Parks in South Korea and the Fujimoris in Peru. The case in Korea offers stronger evidence that nostalgia for Park Chung-hee influenced the election of his daughter, using polls that ask current Korean citizens about their opinion of the late authoritarian leader. Although polling data on the popularity of Alberto Fujimori during his three terms are documented in the literature, current public opinion on the former president in Peru and public opinion on his daughter has been more difficult to find. The strength of evidence for the South Korea case, though, demonstrates that Park Geun-hye benefited greatly from her kinship ties and nostalgia for her father and his government.

### 4.1 South Korea

#### *4.1.1 Park Chung-hee Nostalgia*

Park Geun-hye clearly benefited from the popularity and successes of her father. The 2012 presidential election in South Korea was historic for several reasons. The election was the highest voter turnout in nearly two decades at 75.8%, signaling that the citizens cared and believed they could make an impact. Park Geun-hye won with a narrow victory of 51.6% of the vote, but her win was the first time in 41 years that a candidate received an actual majority of

votes. The last time this occurred was in 1971 when her father, Park Chung-hee, won with 53.2% of the votes.<sup>135</sup> Election results show that support for Park Geun-hye in 2012 exceeded 80 percent in the North Gyeongsang Province, the region with a traditionally strong, conservative stance, which also showed a high level of support for her father, Park Chung-hee.<sup>136</sup>

Nostalgia for Park Chung-hee is apparent in public opinion polls and helped his daughter win the presidential election in 2012. Nostalgia for the dictator has been widespread in South Korea since the 1997 economic crisis. As the country realized how vulnerable its economy was—and against the backdrop of the government signing an unprecedented bailout deal with the IMF—nostalgia for Park, the “strong man and leader,” heightened.<sup>137</sup> Citizens yearned for the former president and his strong economic record, but Park Chung-hee nostalgia is a systematic phenomenon, going beyond mere respect for a charismatic former leader.<sup>138</sup> Park has been selected consistently as the former president most citizens would choose to reelect.<sup>139</sup> More than half of respondents also chose Park as Korea’s best-performing government. They view his government’s performance much more positively than that of any democratic government.<sup>140</sup> Furthermore, according to a 2010 Korean Barometer Survey, Park’s government was ranked as Korea’s best government by more than one-third (34.9%) of respondents after the 1960s. Considering his conservative policies and leadership, Park’s government is also politically supported by a considerable portion of progressive voters at 28.4%.

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<sup>135</sup> Youngmi Kim. “The 2012 Parliamentary and Presidential Elections in South Korea.” *Electoral Studies* (3 June 2014): 326–330.

<sup>136</sup> “Trial-Heats of the 2012 Presidential Election by Gallup Korea.” *Seoul: Gallup Korea*. (2013)

<sup>137</sup> Guy Podoler. “Who Was Park Chung-hee?” *East Asia: an International Quarterly*. (2016)

<sup>138</sup> Other notable examples include nostalgic sentiment toward a leader is communism in post-communist countries; unwavering support for Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore, a growing fondness for Mahathir in Indonesia and a nostalgic reverence for Chavez in Venezuela.

<sup>139</sup> WooJin Kang. “The Past is Long-Lasting: Park Chung Hee Nostalgia and Voter Choice in the 2012 Korean Presidential Election.” *Journal of Asian and African Studies*. (2016)

<sup>140</sup> 18.24% of the respondents of the same survey viewed the Kim Dae-jung government positively and 17.16% did for the Roh Moo-hyun government.

Korean nostalgia also reflects the public's acceptance, and even active advocacy of, Park's governing ideology of developmentalism, which places economic development at the forefront of the country's political endeavors. Even during democratic consolidation, the Korean people retain a strong preference for economic growth at more than 50% (the highest score was 69.59% in 2003). By contrast, they express only half-hearted appreciation of the relative importance of democracy (at best below 25% in 2011). This statistic highlights that the governing ideology of authoritarian regimes during Korea's industrialization period continues to attract overwhelming support, diminishing the importance of democracy. The Korean public's preference for developmentalism has never fallen below 50%.<sup>141</sup>

"Restorative Nostalgia," as described by Boym,<sup>142</sup> can be applied to nostalgia for Park Chung-hee. South Korea in the 1970s was still a poor country and was also marked by Park Chung-hee's period of martial law, so why would people be nostalgic for this time? Boym characterizes restorative nostalgia as "simplified." In South Korea yearning for the authoritarian leader is associated with a yearning for a simplified sense of progress and improvement that existed during his period of rapid modernization, excluding the negative aspects of his government. Restorative nostalgia harkens back to an ideal South Korea that Park's daughter can recover.

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<sup>141</sup> *Ibid.* 139

<sup>142</sup> p. 27



#### 4.1.2 Park Geun-hye's Capabilities

Before the 2012 presidential election, the Korean Elections Panel Study asked voters about their opinions of the top three candidates. When rated on ability to understand the problems of ordinary people, opposition candidate Moon Jae-in received a 38.24% approval rating, beating Park Geun-Hye at 27.70%. However, Park ranked first in the two remaining areas: the candidate's ability to manage national affairs (48.29%) and his or her ability to make people better off (38.10%), well ahead of the other candidates.<sup>143</sup> In regards to capability, though, Moon was a former chief secretary and Ahn Cheol-soo was a successful CEO. Park had no direct experience of governmental affairs; nevertheless, the public valued her ability to manage governmental affairs and revive the economy. Given her relatively thin career, her high capability ratings could be significantly associated with public nostalgia for her father.




Fig 4.1: Voters' Evaluations of Major Candidates' Capabilities in the 2012 South Korean Presidential Election<sup>144</sup>

<sup>143</sup> *Ibid.* 139

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid.* 139

Nostalgia for the late authoritarian leader could also have translated to the older generation's support for Park Geun-hye. Starting with the 2002 presidential election, generational politics created a sharp contrast between the electoral choices of Korean youth (voters in their 20s and 30s) and older voters (in their 50s and 60s). According to recent studies, patterns of generational politics in the 2012 presidential election were significantly different from those seen in other elections.<sup>145</sup> Before the 2012 election, the generational divide worked in favor of the progressive bloc, as in the 2002 election. In 2012, the opposite was the case, with older people rallying around Park. Older voters remember the country's poverty before Park Chung-hee took power in a 1961 military coup. They lived through South Korea's rags-to-riches transition and still revere the former president, while Korean under the age of 40 never knew that poverty. The younger generation, especially students, viewed Park Geun-hye's candidacy and presidency as reverting back to an era where dissenters and student activists were persecuted and tortured.<sup>146</sup>

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<sup>145</sup> Koh, 2013 and Park, 2013 as cited in Kang, 2016.

<sup>146</sup> Hans Schattle. "South Korea's Generation Gap" *The New York Times*. (21 Dec 2012).

Table 1: Results by Province for the 1963 and 2012 Presidential Elections in South Korea

Province or City	Park Chung-hee (1963)	Park Geun-hye (2012)
TOTAL	46.6%	51.56%
Busan	48.2%	59.82%
South Gyeongsang	61.7%	63.12%
North Gyeongsang	55.6%	80.82%
Jeju	70.0%	50.46%
Seoul	30.1%	48.18%
Gangwon	40.0%	61.97%
Gyeonggi	33.1%	50.43%
South Chungcheong	40.8%	56.66%
North Chungcheong	39.8%	56.22%
South Jeolla	57.2%	10.00%
North Jeolla	49.4%	13.22%

Colors indicate whether or not the candidate won the province or city, red indicating a loss and green indicating a win.<sup>147</sup>

<sup>147</sup> Adam Carr's Election Archive. Republic of Korea, Presidential Election, National summary and voting by province. His source: Korean National Election Commission website.




Fig 4.2: Visualization of Above Data

In Kang’s analysis of the 2012 Korean Elections Panel Study, he found that regional divisions, although identified as an important division in Korean politics, did not garner any statistical support in the public opinion polls.<sup>148</sup> In simply looking at the provincial breakdowns of the results from the 1963 election and 2012 election, the father-daughter pair only won four out of 11 of the same provinces and lost one of the same provinces. In the other six provinces one or the other won.<sup>149</sup>

The election results from Gyeongsang and Jeolla in 2012, though, do reveal attitudes toward the late authoritarian leader. Although she won, Park Geun-hye’s video “Dialect” clearly did not resonate with the voters of Jeolla.<sup>150</sup> While her father won both provinces, these were the two places she received the least number of votes. “Dialect” was the campaign video in which

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.* 139

<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.* 147

<sup>150</sup> This campaign video, as well as others, are discussed further in Chapter 3.

Park attempted to address and reconcile the differences between the two regions of Gyeongsang and Jeolla. On one hand, Gyeongsang is where Park Chung-hee was born and raised. During his regime, his Five Year Plan for industrialization benefited this region disproportionately.<sup>151</sup> In North Gyeongsang an overwhelming 80.82% voted for Park Geun-hye in 2012 and 63.12% of South Gyeongsang voted for her as well. On the other hand, Jeolla was home to the opposition of Park Chung-hee. Park arrested several of his democratic opponents from this area and Jeolla also remained underdeveloped compared to the rest of South Korea under his Five Year Plan.<sup>152</sup> His daughter dismally lost North and South Jeolla, at 13.2% and 10%, respectively.

## 4.2 Peru

### 4.2.1 *Tsunami Fujimori*

Keiko Fujimori, unfortunately, did not enjoy that success her father did in his three terms as president of Peru. Alberto Fujimori's surprising win in the 1990 election was dubbed his "*tsunami*."<sup>153</sup> As a political newcomer, Fujimori was one of five minor candidates who together claimed no more than one percent of voter preferences in public opinion polls in March of 1990, one month before the first round of elections. Yet, on April 8th he almost matched the vote for the favorite to win, novelist Mario Vargas Llosa.<sup>154</sup> On June 10th, Alberto Fujimori beat Vargas Llosa and clinched the presidency with 62.4% of the runoff vote.

Fujimori's *tsunami* can be attributed to the decline of Peru's party system in the 1980s and Vargas Llosa's inability to appeal to the median voter. Vargas Llosa's alliance with the

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<sup>151</sup> "The Fading of South Korea's Preeminent Political Dynasty." *The Economist* (24 Feb. 2017).

<sup>152</sup> Se Young Jang. "The Gwangju Uprising: A Battle over South Korea's History." *The Wilson Center* (17 July 2017).

<sup>153</sup> Gregory D. Schmidt. "Fujimori's 1990 Upset Victory in Peru: Electoral Rules, Contingencies, and Adaptive Strategies." *Journal of Comparative Politics*. (1996)

<sup>154</sup> Julio F. Carrión. "Public Opinion, Market Reforms, and Democracy in Fujimori's Peru." *The Fujimori Legacy: the rise of electoral authoritarianism in Peru*. (2006)

established conservative party severely compromised his candidacy, while Fujimori and his new party *Cambio 90*, appealed to voters longing for a break from the past. Fujimori's Japanese ancestry and accented Spanish could have also helped him win the vote of the poor indigenous and mestizo majority of Peru. Vargas Llosa, a wealthy novelist of Spanish descent, represented Peru's white, westernized elite.

Fujimori made it a point to campaign heavily in the poorer provinces and shantytowns, but even won Lima over, which is typically associated with the Peruvian elite and would have been considered a stronghold for Vargas Llosa. In Fujimori's 1995 landslide victory, where no runoff election took place, he swept all 43 of Lima's districts, running strongest in the poorest parts of the city.<sup>155</sup> Although Keiko Fujimori also targeted the poor and indigenous areas that her father was so popular in, it was not enough to win her neither the election in 2011 nor 2016. Lima, which she did not win in the runoff election, accounts for approximately a third of the total votes in Peru.

Alberto Fujimori's *tsunami* is largely credited to his position as a political newcomer and him having no strong ties with existing political parties. He founded his party *Cambio 90* while he was an agricultural engineer and mathematics professor at *Universidad Nacional Agraria*. The party's membership began growing, gaining support from people such as technically oriented university professors, Peru's evangelical protestant community, and emerging informal entrepreneurs of mostly indigenous and mestizo descent. These groups shared a sense of alienation from a political system that had historically accorded favors to a privileged few.<sup>156</sup> *Cambio 90* and Alberto Fujimori's message and image as a political outsider, an everyday

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<sup>155</sup> *Ibid.* 153

<sup>156</sup> *Ibid.* 153

person, resonated with many in Peru as he shot from claiming less than 1% in the polls to winning the 1990 election in a matter of months.

Keiko Fujimori lost despite her father enjoying relatively high and consistent approval ratings throughout his three terms. These ratings though, are most likely affected by Alberto Fujimori's regime's control of the media and its influence on public opinion.<sup>157</sup> Fujimori knew how to spin stories in his favor. The day after his self-coup in 1992 independent polls showed that 71 to 87% of Peruvians approved of the temporary dissolution of congress and the call for new legislative elections in 1993, and almost 95% approved of the forced reengineering of the judiciary.<sup>158</sup> Even in his second term, after the public became highly critical of his economic policies, his approval ratings never dropped below 40%.<sup>159</sup> In his third term Fujimori's regime was implicated in buying arms illegally from Jordan and Colombia in August of 2000. Despite the following media frenzy and with a significant sector of the country's population now actively opposing the regime, Fujimori maintained an approval rating of 53%.<sup>160</sup>

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<sup>157</sup> Sebastián Calderón Bentin. "The Politics of Illusion: The Collapse of the Fujimori Regime in Peru." *Theatre Survey*. (2018)

<sup>158</sup> *Ibid.* 154

<sup>159</sup> *Ibid.* 154

<sup>160</sup> *Ibid.* 154

Table 2: Results from All Presidential Election Alberto and Keiko Fujimori Appeared In

Election	First Round	Second Round
Alberto Fujimori (1990)	29%	62.4%
Alberto Fujimori (1995)	64.4%	n/a
Alberto Fujimori (2000)	49.85%	74.3%
Keiko Fujimori (2011)	23.55%	48.55%
Keiko Fujimori (2016)	39.82%	49.88%

Colors indicate whether or not the candidate won the election, red indicating a loss and green indicating a win. Only in the 1995 election was there a clear winner in the First Round and no runoff occurred.<sup>161</sup>

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<sup>161</sup> *Ibid.* 122






Fig 4.3: First and second round results for Alberto Fujimori's 1990 presidential campaign.




Fig 4.4: First and second round results for Keiko Fujimori's 2016 presidential campaign.

#### 4.2.2 Keiko's Popularity

Keiko, however, could never claim this outsider appeal simply by virtue of his kin. Keiko could not be a political outsider because of her record as First Lady and as a congresswoman. During her campaign she did, though, play the everyday candidate and appealed to similar demographics that her father was popular with. Her strategy was effective, but not effective enough as she lost both the 2011 and 2016 presidential elections by narrow margins (48.55% and 49.88 respectively).<sup>162</sup> Although she was not a political outsider, Keiko was still different than her educated-elite opponents of European-descent (just as Alberto Fujimori was different than Vargas Llosa in 1990). Pedro Pablo Kuczynski of the PPK was a Polish-Peruvian former World Bank economist and Wall Street banker, and Veronika Mendoza of Frente Amplio was a French-Peruvian psychologist and educator.<sup>163</sup>

Going into the first round of voting in the 2016 elections, Keiko was the front-runner and her support was the most evenly distributed nationwide of the top three candidates. Of the three, Keiko was the candidate with the most votes in 113 out of the 196 provinces and had relatively homogenous results territorially, except for some of the poor southern provinces, where Mendoza's electorate was concentrated.<sup>164</sup> Kuczynski's support came mainly from urban voters and the more developed provinces. The pro-Kuczynski vote of a province was strongly correlated with that province's Human Development Index (HDI), figuring life expectancy, education, and per capita income indicators.<sup>165</sup> Keiko also did well in the most populated provinces, including Lima, Callao, Trujillo, Chiclayo, Huancayo and Ica. Keiko's supporters

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<sup>162</sup> *Ibid.* 78

<sup>163</sup> Holly K. Sonneland. "Explainer: Who's Running in the 2016 Peruvian Presidential Election?" *Americas Society/Council of the Americas* (8 Mar. 2016)

<sup>164</sup> Thomas Dosek and Maritza Parades. "Peru Might Elect an Authoritarian President. These Four Maps Tell You Why." *The Washington Post* (3 June 2016).

<sup>165</sup> *Ibid.* 163

come from almost every socioeconomic level in Peru. Her voters came from both the more and less well-off provinces, as did her father's in his time, with that support being especially strong from poor rural and lower-class urban voters.<sup>166</sup> Kuczynski and Mendoza both ran a close race for second place, although in the end Kuczynski pulled ahead more than polls predicted and won 21.05% of the vote. PPK's support is far more regionalized and less uniform territorially than Keiko's.<sup>167</sup> Figure 4.4 displays the 2016 election results by region.

In her campaign Keiko presented herself as a moderate, attempting to distance herself from her father's hard-right brand of fujimorismo and authoritarian regime and legacy. She also dropped some of her father's longest-serving, most loyal and extreme supporters from her party's list of congressional candidates.<sup>168</sup> As she walks a fine line between taking credit for her father's achievements and distancing herself from his abuses, Keiko has also engaged in historical revisionism. Alberto Fujimori committed "errors" rather than crimes, she said on the campaign trail.<sup>169</sup> She stated that her father's notorious state program of sterilizations, which he intended to reduce poverty, was betrayed by a handful of rogue doctors who ignored protocols. Human rights campaigners have said that this program resulted in the bullying and tricking of hundreds of thousands of mainly poor, often indigenous, women into unwanted procedures.<sup>170</sup>

Keiko needed voters to remember the positive aspects of her father's government, and many of them did. Veronica Valdivia, who is a resident of a Lima slum, was uprooted from her home by the Shining Path. She stated that "Keiko has learned a lot from her father, but she won't repeat the bad things her father did because she is a young woman with fresh ideas."<sup>171</sup> In

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<sup>166</sup> Simon Tegel. "A Softer, Gentler Fujimorismo." *Foreign Policy* (1 Mar. 2016).

<sup>167</sup> *Ibid.* 164

<sup>168</sup> *Ibid.* 163

<sup>169</sup> Simon Tegel. "Corruption and Legacy in Lima." *Foreign Policy* (3 June 2016).

<sup>170</sup> Dan Collins. "Network of Corruption!: Fujimori's Legacy at Heart of Fierce Battle for Peru's Future." *The Guardian* (3 June 2016).

<sup>171</sup> Veronica Valdivia as quoted in "Peru: The Return of Fujimori." *Public Radio International* (19 Mar. 2011).

Valdivia's case, she does recognize the negative aspects of Alberto Fujimori's legacy, but nonetheless supports Keiko. Although she is just one supporter, Valdivia's sentiment begs the question of whether Keiko is thought to be a good candidate for president, despite her father's legacy, because she is a "young woman." Several studies have shown that women are perceived to be more trustworthy than their male counterparts.<sup>172</sup> Marilyn Boltz states that women are thought to be more trustworthy because of how men and women are taught to play their respective gender roles. Men are encouraged to brag about themselves and assert themselves over others, while women are encouraged to be more modest and develop relationships with others.<sup>173</sup> Being their fathers' daughters Keiko and Park should not be thought of as trustworthy candidates, but their gender may lessen this blow to their political image.

Keiko's popularity was also fueled by a strong anti-incumbent tide. During the 2016 election outgoing President Ollanta Humala's approval ratings were at 12% after he was charged with taking bribes from a Brazilian contracting company in exchange for government contracts.<sup>174</sup> Elected governments in Peru have continuously broken promises the last 15 years, said Steven Levitsky, a political scientist and columnist for *La República*, a leading Peruvian newspaper. "Authoritarian governments are looked on in Peru as being more responsive and representative than democratic ones."<sup>175</sup> According to Latinobarómetro, a public interest polling company, only 24% of Peruvians are satisfied with democracy.<sup>176</sup> This statistic and Levitsky's analysis demonstrates the dichotomy between kinship and democracy as discussed by Mina

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<sup>172</sup> *Ibid.* 111

<sup>173</sup> Marilyn G. Boltz, et al. "Jo Are You Lying to Me? Temporal Cues for Deception." *Journal of Language and Social Psychology*, vol. 29, no. 4 (2010), pp. 458–466.

<sup>174</sup> "Ollanta Humala and Wife Detained in Corruption Probe." *Aljazeera* (14 July 2017).

<sup>175</sup> *Ibid.* 158

<sup>176</sup> *Ibid.* 159

Roces.<sup>177</sup> Particularly to those living in the poor, rural, indigenous areas of Peru, kinship and family values could be more important than values of democracy, especially if it means the government will operate more efficiently. Keiko's loss in 2016 can be attributed, at least in part, to Veronika Mendoza's endorsement of Pedro Pablo Kuczynski. Mendoza finished third in the primary election with 18.8% of the votes after Keiko (39.8%) and Kuczynski (21%).<sup>178</sup> Although Keiko lost, she lost by a narrow margin and is still a popular figure in Peruvian politics despite the negative aspects of her father's legacy and his vocal dissenters.

### 4.3 Conclusion

While the polls suggest that nostalgia for Park Chung-hee helped his daughter win the 2012 presidential election in Korea, the same cannot be said for Keiko Fujimori in Peru.<sup>179</sup> Keiko lost both attempts to become president and despite mimicking her father's campaign strategy, polling and voting data do not reveal a consistent, shared regional stronghold. The Fujimori case study lacks the nostalgia toward Alberto Fujimori which exists in Korea toward Park Chung-hee. Although Keiko lost her elections, she still enjoys political popularity in congress and as a party leader. I can still claim that Keiko was able to strategically walk the line between her father's positive and negative legacies to try to win both supporters and non-supporters of her father to garner popularity. Both Park Geun-hye and Keiko Fujimori benefited from being the daughters of authoritarian male presidents in South Korea and Peru.

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<sup>177</sup> Mina Roces. "Women, Power, and Kinship Politics: Female Power in Post-War Philippines." Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. (1998).

<sup>178</sup> Dan Collens. "Keiko Fujimori Concedes Defeat to Pedro Pablo Kuczynski in Peru Election." *The Guardian* (10 June 2016).

<sup>179</sup> Although I was unable to find polling of public opinion on Alberto Fujimori after his regime to match that data of Park Chung-hee nostalgia, 60% of Peruvians said they would agree with a presidential pardon to release Fujimori from prison due to health concerns, but 54% would oppose it if he were not found to be sick enough to merit doing so for humanitarian reasons. ("Poll: Most Peruvians Back Pardon for Jailed Ex-president Fujimori." *Voice of America News*. [18 July 2017])

Knowing the candidates' kinship ties, were the voters who supported both candidates not afraid that the daughters too would be corrupt? Or did they not care, or not believe, that their fathers were corrupt? Both countries have a clear pattern of corruption within the presidency. Does this mean that voters do not mind if a president does not act democratically as long as there is perceived progress? Polling data demonstrates a clear dichotomy between democracy and efficiency in the minds of the voters. In South Korea, citizens prefer economic development to democracy and in Peru polls showed that voters value a government being responsive rather than being completely democratic. Did their supporters vote for Park and Keiko because they thought the women were the best democratic choice? Or because they thought the women would get things done? Now that I have established that Park and Keiko were popular (even though Keiko lost) because of kinship and memory, I will now explore the negative ramifications of kinship politics in the following chapter.

## Chapter 5: Corruption

In this thesis I found that kinship ties allowed Park Geun-hye and Keiko Fujimori to have political careers. Their presidential campaign videos demonstrated how each candidate walked the thin line of their fathers' fraught legacies. In Park's case, she relied more on the memory of her father and his government. Nostalgia for Park Chung-hee was particularly effective because his memory is equated to economic development, and his daughter ran after the instability of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and 2008 Global Financial Crisis. Although Keiko mimicked her father's campaign strategy and attempted to appeal to the same base he was popular with, she also offered more of a platform in her videos than Park did. That being said, nostalgia did not work in Keiko's favor in either of the presidential elections she ran in. This could possibly be because her father is still alive and in prison for the crimes he committed, while Park's father was assassinated over three decades before his daughter's campaign. Kinship also helped the two candidates because they had an early start to their political careers by serving as First Lady to their fathers. Women are already underrepresented in politics, and those who hold high offices tend to come from political families. Serving in unofficial roles, such as First Lady, help women enter into politics. Gender can also benefit a candidate, even those coming from families with contested legacies, because women are perceived to be more trustworthy and nurturing than their male counterparts.

To conclude this thesis, I begin to analyze the relationship between kinship and corruption in politics, a topic that requires future research. I discuss how a country's structure and values, specifically pertaining to family, can explain cases of corruption, and outline the crimes of Park Geun-hye and Keiko Fujimori. Although corruption is not central to the research question of how kinship and memory are utilized in political campaigns, it can be an important

implication of electing kin to positions of power. I am not making the claim that kinship politics causes corruption, however in these two cases both the fathers and daughters were corrupt and the positive legacies of the fathers helped the daughters be elected.

## 5.1 Corruption and Kinship

Transparency International defines corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain.”<sup>180</sup> However, Daniel Smith states that this simple definition of corruption assumes a rigid dichotomy between the public and private, and individual and society.<sup>181</sup> While it is generally agreed upon that corruption hinders democracy, explanations for corruption vary from country to country, and are in part based on the structure of the society and its values. Smith argues that corruption must be understood in the context of everyday instances of patronage as they occur in networks of kin, community, and interpersonal association. In his research on the Igbo people of Nigeria, Smith found that the very nature of personhood is grounded in relationships with family, kingroup, and community of origin. The motives of individual actors are inextricably tied to the interests of the social groups to which they belong.<sup>182</sup>

Similarly, Peru and South Korea are both characterized as collectivist societies. In collectivist societies people belong to ‘in groups’ that take care of them in exchange for loyalty. Loyalty in a collectivist culture is paramount, and overrides most other societal rules and regulations.<sup>183</sup> In the case of Nigeria, people use their kinship ties to invoke moral obligation

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<sup>180</sup> “What Is the Corruption Perceptions Index?” *2011 Corruption Perceptions Index*, Transparency International, (2011).

<sup>181</sup> Daniel Jordan Smith. “Kinship and Corruption in Contemporary Nigeria.” *Ethnos Journal of Anthropology*, vol. 66, no. 3 (2001), pp. 344–364.

<sup>182</sup> *Ibid.* 176

<sup>183</sup> “Country Comparison: Peru and South Korea.” *Hofstede Insights* (2019).



from others, and thus as a means to navigate the country's clientelistic political economy.<sup>184</sup> The importance of kinship in collectivist societies could help explain the popularity of Park Geun-hye and Keiko Fujimori in their respective countries, but it could also help explain why both politicians were found to be corrupt. In collectivist countries, the kinship ties Park and Keiko possess could be seen as a positive attribute because of the importance of family and the 'in group.'

Interestingly enough, Alexandru Roman and Hugh Miller argue that social status and kinship responsibilities should also be considered possible precursors to corruption. Corruption is often thought to be motivated by financial interests and material gain, but their research of corruption in Moldova emphasized the importance of nonmonetary rewards, such as bargaining, personal favors and gift giving, and how these acts are a part of everyday social life in Eastern European cultures. They stated that there is a thin line between relational practices and corrupt acts. In their case studies they found that often kinship associations trump financial interests in fostering corruption. Another theme they found in their research was that officials tended to think that there was nothing wrong with what they did because everyone does it or expects it. An expectation of corruption is attached to the position.<sup>185</sup> This claim brings into question whether the case studies in South Korea and Peru were prone to corrupt tendencies because they were the kin of corrupt politicians, or whether they were corrupt as a result of an expectation and history of corruption in their roles as president or congresswoman.

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<sup>184</sup> *Ibid.* 176; The claim that someone becomes corrupt because the role expects it could apply to Alberto Fujimori. He started off a well-intentioned engineer who entered into politics because he wanted to see change in Peru, only to end up a corrupt authoritarian leader.

<sup>185</sup> Alexandru V. Roman and Hugh T. Miller. "Building Social Cohesion: Family, Friends, and Corruption." *Administration & Society*, vol. 46, no. 7 (2013), pp. 775–795.

Additionally, officials interviewed for Roman and Miller's research believed that they were helping to move things along in a slow bureaucratic system.<sup>186</sup> This thought process relates back to the original ideologies of Park Chung-hee and Alberto Fujimori. Both leaders believed that democracy could be paused in the name of progress. Park halted certain civil liberties and exploited labor to grow South Korea's democracy, and Fujimori organized illegal death squads and judicial systems to stop the terrorist group The Shining Path. Although there may be several explanations for why corruption happens in certain societies, and it can be based off something seemingly harmless such as family values, corruption still has a negative impact on countries. Even if Park Geun-hye and Keiko Fujimori were more likely to be corrupt, either because their fathers were corrupt or because they came into positions which are historically corrupt, this does not change the fact that their crimes, described in the next sections, were a hindrance to democracy.

## **5.2 Park's Crimes and Impeachment**

During her time as president Park Geun-hye failed in several regards, namely in that she rarely publicly addressed the country and that she was a central figure in the corruption she promised to eradicate. Most notably, the SEWOL ferry tragedy on April 17, 2014 stained the rest of her presidency. A passenger ferry carrying over 300 people, most of them high school students on a field trip, sank off the southwest coast of Korea. 304 people were missing or dead, and most of the crew survived. Investigation revealed that the incident was caused by negligence of the coast guard and crew, and the Captain and chief engineer were charged with murder.<sup>187</sup>

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<sup>186</sup> *Ibid.* 180

<sup>187</sup> James Griffiths, and Sol Han. "Park Impeachment: Bittersweet Victory for Families of Sewol Ferry Victims." *CNN* (12 Mar. 2017).

The tragedy had many political implications as well, as Park Geun-hye was absent while the events were unfolding in what is known as her “seven missing hours.” Since then, parents protested at the presidential Blue House and a semi-permanent camp of friends and families gathered in Seoul's Gwanghwamun Square, criticizing the government and commemorating the victims of the disaster. That week Park’s approval rating fell from a high of 71% to the 40% range for the first time in a year.<sup>188</sup> Her seven-hour absence during the ferry disaster was the one of the primary reasons why Koreans lost trust in her, it was a failure of the country’s crises management system. During her impeachment hearings, Park’s administration submitted documents of her agenda for April 17th, the day the ferry sank, but the court dismissed it as “insufficient” and a “tactic to delay court proceedings.”<sup>189</sup>

The primary reason for Park Geun-hye’s impeachment, along with the ferry tragedy, was her involvement in corruption with the *chaebol* conglomerate. Even before Park’s presidency, South Korea struggled with problems of collusion and bribery within their government and top industries. In February 2007, Chung Mong-koo, chairman of Hyundai and son of the company’s founder, was convicted of embezzlement and breach of fiduciary duty. He was pardoned two years later.<sup>190</sup> After Park was elected as president in 2012, chairman Choi Tae-won of the SK Group, the third largest conglomerate, was found guilty of embezzlement of over \$40 million from SK companies to cover up trading losses and was sentenced to 4 years in prison. In 2015 the SK Corporation was accused of donating a total of 11.1 billion Won to slush funds for then President Park Geun-hye to pardon Choi, as well as illegal lobbying to win a license for a

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<sup>188</sup> “South Korea Ferry Disaster: Distrust, Anger over President's Actions.” *The Straits Times* (2 May 2014).

<sup>189</sup> KH 디지털 2. “Court Dismisses Park’s Explanation on Missing 7 Hours as ‘Insufficient.’” *The Korea Herald* (10 Jan. 2017).

<sup>190</sup> *Ibid.* 183

lucrative duty-free business.<sup>191</sup> In 2016 Lotte's 94-year-old founder Shin Kyuk-ho and his three oldest children were indicted on charges of embezzlement, fraud, tax evasion, and breach of trust.<sup>192</sup>

The most significant of these allegations, though, come from the Samsung group. In August of 2017 Lee Jae-yong, heir to the Samsung empire, was sentenced to five years in prison for bribery. He was found guilty of bribing Park Geun-Hye in exchange for government support for a merger between Cheil Industries, the group's de facto holding company, and Samsung C&T, the country's biggest construction firm, that helped Lee tighten control over Samsung.<sup>193</sup> The court also found Lee guilty of perjury, concealing criminal profits, embezzlement and hiding assets overseas. Samsung was the biggest donor to a foundation set up by President Park Geun-hye's confidante Choi Soon-sil, donating over 43 billion Won in return for government support for the merger in 2015. Prosecutors also suspect that Samsung funneled a further 2.8 million Won to Choi through Wided Sports, a German company she used to buy horses and equestrian lessons for her daughter.<sup>194</sup>

Park's bribery scandal led the Korean people to call for the impeachment of their president. On March 10th, 2017, Park became the first South Korean president removed from office through parliamentary impeachment after the Constitutional Court upheld the National Assembly's decision. The court determined that she was guilty of conspiracy, abuse of authority in the appointment of government officials, failure to protect citizens' lives, violation of press freedom, receiving bribes, and extortion in conjunction with Choi Soon-sil. Three-quarters of South Koreans approved of the impeachment of Park after she was elected to office in her

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<sup>191</sup> Song Jung-a. "SK Group Executives Questioned in Bribery Probe." *Financial Times* (16 Mar. 2017).

<sup>192</sup> "South Korea's Powerful Lotte Family Goes on Trial." *BBC News* (21 Mar. 2017).

<sup>193</sup> "Samsung Is Sucked into South Korea's Political Crisis." *The Economist* (24 Nov. 2016).

<sup>194</sup> *Ibid.* 186

father's footsteps in 2012 with 51.6% of the vote.<sup>195</sup> Over a year later on April 6th, 2018 Park was sentenced to 25 years in prison by the Seoul Central District Court for multiple counts of abuse of power, bribery and coercion, primarily citing the collusive ties between Park and Samsung. She was additionally fined \$17 million. The judge stated that a tough sentence was needed to send a firm message to the country's future leaders.<sup>196</sup> It seems that Park also took after her father in his close relationship between politics and business, as well as his disregard for the Korean people.

### 5.3 Keiko's Arrest

Although Keiko Fujimori was never elected president, she is still marred by scandal within her party and as a congresswoman. On October 31, 2018 Keiko was sentenced to three years in prison while she awaits trial for corruption. She was accused of taking \$1.2 million in bribes from the Brazilian construction firm Obrecht during her campaign in 2011. Several other Latin American leaders have been charged with or found guilty of taking money from Obrecht to finance their campaigns in exchange for guaranteed building contracts. The construction giant has built venues for the 2016 Olympics and 2014 World Cup in Brazil, as well as metro systems, airports, dams, and motorways in other countries.<sup>197</sup> Although Keiko denied the accusations, the judge affirmed that she had been organizing money laundering within her party, *Fuerza Popular*.<sup>198</sup> Despite her denials, a poll revealed that 77% of Peruvians believe that she is not innocent<sup>199</sup> and more than 70% are in favor of the judge's decision to keep her in jail while

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<sup>195</sup> "South Korea's President Is Impeached." *The Economist* (16 Mar. 2017).

<sup>196</sup> Paula Hancocks and Yoonjung Seo. "Former South Korean President Park Sentenced to 24 Years in Prison." *CNN* (6 Apr. 2018).

<sup>197</sup> "Odebrecht Case: Politicians Worldwide Suspected in Bribery Scandal." *BBC* (15 Dec. 2017).

<sup>198</sup> Dan Collyns. "Keiko Fujimori, Peru's Opposition Leader, Sent Back to Jail Ahead of Corruption Trial." *The Guardian* (31 Oct. 2018).

<sup>199</sup> "El 77% De Peruanos No Cree En La Inocencia De Keiko Fujimori." *El Telégrafo* (26 Oct. 2018).

awaiting trial.<sup>200</sup> Her approval rating subsequently dropped to 11%<sup>201</sup> and Peru's congress, where *Fuerza Popular* holds a majority, has fallen to 12% approval rating.<sup>202</sup>

In addition to these formal charges, Keiko has been linked to the *cuellos blancos*, a group of corrupt judges and prosecutors led by supreme court judge César Hinostroza, who fled to Spain in September 2018.<sup>203</sup> A leaked online chat also revealed members and lawmakers of her party insulting the current president Martín Vizcarra and plotting to intimidate José Domingo Pérez, the prosecutor investigating Keiko.<sup>204</sup> During her presidential runoff campaign in 2016 Keiko lost *Fuerza Popular*'s general secretary and principal financier to an investigation by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Joaquín Ramírez, a former bus-fare collector, was caught admitting to laundering \$15 million for Keiko during her failed 2011 presidential campaign. Although the DEA stated that Keiko was not under investigation for the same crime, Ramírez was one of Keiko's closest confidants and friends.<sup>205</sup> Ramírez also faces a separate investigation by Peruvian prosecutors over a business empire. His resignation from the campaign came three weeks before the final election which Keiko lost.<sup>206</sup>

All of this comes amidst her father's own legal troubles. Alberto Fujimori, now 80 years-old, was ordered back to prison by Peru's Supreme Court in October 2018 just before Keiko was arrested.<sup>207</sup> In 2009 Alberto Fujimori was sentenced to 25 years in prison for human rights abuses that included the killing of more than two dozen people by a military death squad that

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<sup>200</sup> Michael Krumholtz. "More than 70% of Peruvians Agree with Decision to Detain Keiko Fujimori, per Poll." *Peru Reports* (13 Oct. 2018).

<sup>201</sup> "Peru Opposition Vows to Halt Clashes as Leader Faces Jailtime." *Reuters* (25 Oct. 2018).

<sup>202</sup> Simeon Tegel. "In Peru, an Accidental President Moves Against Corruption." *Americas Quarterly* (13 Sept. 2018).

<sup>203</sup> "Peru's Keiko Fujimori Jailed until Bribery Case Trial." *BBC* (1 Nov. 2018).

<sup>204</sup> *Ibid.* 92 (Collins)

<sup>205</sup> Simeon Tegel. "Corruption and Legacy in Lima." *Foreign Policy* (3 June 2016).

<sup>206</sup> "Keiko Fujimori Loses Key Aide to Scandal in Midst of Peru Presidential Run-Off." *The Guardian* (19 May 2016).

<sup>207</sup> Andrea Zarate and Nicholas Casey. "Fujimori Is Ordered Back to Prison in Peru, Angering Supporters." *The New York Times* (3 Oct. 2018).

prosecutors said the former president had created.<sup>208</sup> In December 2017 President Pedro Pablo Kuczynski pardoned Fujimori on medical grounds, which came as a shock as he was a fervent critic of the Fujimoris while he was running against Keiko. Even though Kuczynski was not an ally of the Fujimoris, he was facing an impeachment threat led by Keiko in congress.<sup>209</sup> Kenji Fujimori, Keiko's brother who also served in congress, had himself and his supporters abstain from the impeachment vote, which Kuczynski survived. Days later Kuczynski pardoned Alberto Fujimori and he was released from prison.<sup>210</sup> In June 2018 Kenji was suspended from congress over allegations that he bought votes to keep Kuczynski from being impeached. Kuczynski resigned in March 2018.<sup>211</sup> Keiko and Kenji Fujimori disagree on how their father's case has been handled.

During her 2016 campaign Keiko vowed to not pardon her father, but still stated that he was innocent and should be released without government intervention. During a televised debate in April 2016 Keiko signed a "Commitment of Honor" which included statements on respect for democracy and human rights, respect for the press and freedom of expression, and a statement that she would not use political power to benefit family members. She also promised to expand reparations to victims of the government's conflict with the Shining Path and women who were victims of her father's forced sterilizations program.<sup>212</sup> Kenji, as demonstrated by the accusations of buying votes, has stayed more loyal to their father and has relied on their father's old guard to stay relevant.

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<sup>208</sup> *Ibid.* 170

<sup>209</sup> *Ibid.* 207

<sup>210</sup> "Peru's Fujimori Family Feud Deepens as Kenji Expelled from Opposition Party." *BBC* (31 Jan. 2018).

<sup>211</sup> "Peruvian Congress Suspends but Cannot Oust Kenji Fujimori over Alleged Corruption." *The Japan Times* (7 June 2018).

<sup>212</sup> Colin Post. "Peru: Keiko Fujimori Vows Not to Pardon Her Father If Elected." *Peru Reports* (3 Apr. 2016).

The pardon sparked outcry in Peru and from the international community. Thousands of Peruvians took to the streets of Lima after Kuczynski's decision was announced. The police used tear gas to disperse demonstrators who tried to march on President Kuczynski's home. People, including many relatives of victims, marched holding pictures of those lost to the guerrilla conflict under Fujimori's rule.<sup>213</sup> The pardon was also met with several resignations from Kuczynski's administration, including members of Congress, cabinet members, and other senior civil servants.<sup>214</sup> The United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner also released a statement condemning the decision, stating that "the presidential pardon granted to Alberto Fujimori on politically motivated grounds undermines the work of the Peruvian judiciary and the international community," and that it was "a slap in the face for the victims and witnesses whose tireless commitment brought him to justice."<sup>215</sup> Keiko Fujimori, although publicly distanced herself from her family, still demonstrates how kinship and corruption helped her climb up the political ladder.

## 5.4 Conclusion

In the case studies of Park Geun-hye and Keiko Fujimori both women came from political families and both women committed crimes of bribery. I do not claim that kinship ties cause corruption, but these two case studies add to a separate conversation about the role of political families in democratic countries. Kinship allowed Park and Keiko to have political careers, although they both ended up acting undemocratically. These are just two case studies,

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<sup>213</sup> Dan Colllyns. "Thousands March in Lima in Protest over Pardon for Former Peru President." *The Guardian* (29 Dec. 2017).

<sup>214</sup> Andrea Zarate and Marcelo Rachobrun. "Peru's Pardon of Fujimori Condemned by U.N. Rights Experts." *The New York Times* (28 Dec. 2017).

<sup>215</sup> Agnès Callamard and Pablo De Greiff. "Peru: UN Human Rights Experts Appalled by Fujimori Pardon." *United Nations Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights* (28 Dec. 2017).



though, and does not mean that the kin of former politicians should never be elected. As demonstrated by this thesis, kinship ties benefit women in beginning their political careers. As wives or daughters of former politicians they assume unofficial roles, such as First Lady, that can help build their experience and credibility, and give them name recognition. This advantage comes irrespective of whether the former political figure, in this case their fathers, has an entirely positive or negative legacy, and also of whether the woman campaigns with a cohesive policy platform. In the case of Park Geun-hye especially, she was seen as an extension of her father's government and leadership in a patriarchal society, making her a more popular candidate. Gender also affects a candidate's popularity, as women have often been viewed as more trustworthy than their male counterparts. This perception of women could explain why daughters and wives of authoritarian leaders can still be popular politicians.

Nostalgia was also critical for the case studies of Park and Keiko. Both Park Chung-hee and Alberto Fujimori are credited with saving their countries from crises. Evidence of nostalgia for economic security and a sense of progress and improvement is apparent in Park's case. Voters in South Korea equated that feeling with Park Chung-hee (a feeling that was heightened during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis) and believed that his daughter could recover this ideal. Although Keiko lost her presidential election, she is still a successful congresswoman and is popular among the same demographics her father was because she mimicked his campaign strategy to garner support.

When I started my research, I expected to answer the questions of whether Park and Keiko were qualified and successful politicians or not. Since then I have realized that the conversation is not so binary. There are different aspects to consider when discussing the relationship between kinship and gender politics, as well as the role of nostalgia. By studying the

campaigns of Park and Keiko, however, I have learned about the different ways in which candidates can walk the thin line of fraught legacies. While Park was able to capitalize on nostalgia, Keiko had to contend with the challenges her campaign faced as a result of her father's current imprisonment. Instead, she highlighted his positive aspects through song and dance. Both women used implicit allusions to their father's governments in their campaign videos, avoiding mentioning them directly, but including specific images and phrases to hark back to their fathers' successes. The daughters wanted to remember the economic growth and the sense of security that was enjoyed under their fathers' administrations, but neglected to mention the numerous malfeasances committed by them, namely the exploitation of labor, forced sterilization of indigenous women, unlawful killings of political opponents, rampant censorship of the media, and the halting of all other branches of government save for the executive branch. There is a dangerous disconnect between these memories. "Remembrance of things past," as Marcel Proust writes in his magnum opus, *In Search of Lost Time*, "is not necessarily the remembrance of things as they were."<sup>216</sup>

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<sup>216</sup> Marcel Proust as cited in "Memory Lane Has a Three-Way Fork." *The Atlantic* (2016).

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