

Examining Key Narratives Surrounding Public Opinion on Redistricting Reform: A Case Study of Michigan's Proposition 2 (2018)

By

Jordan Schuler

An Undergraduate Honors Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Honors Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy, Politics, & Economics
at The University of Michigan
March 26, 2021

Faculty Advisor:

Dr. Jowei Chen

Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I want to thank my family for their support on this project. Even after all the times I told you I had work to do on my thesis, was going to start that day, and inevitably found a way to procrastinate, you still had faith in me to get through it. My parents, Gary and Stacey Schuler, reviewed early drafts of my literature review, methods, and research proposal. I also owe a huge thanks to my brother, Zachary, whose poking fun at me for procrastinating motivated me to work because I couldn't allow him to tease me and be correct. All three of you have always helped me to be the best I can be, and I'll never be able to thank you enough for that.

There are also so many professors and GSIs who have helped me throughout this process. I never would have gotten a good start on this project if it weren't for Sara Morrell, my POLSCI 381 GSI, who helped me brainstorm an initial idea for my thesis and met with me week after week to craft my first draft of a proposal. Dr. Nancy Burns, who taught that class brilliantly, not only taught me the research skills I needed to complete this project, but also had a wealth of knowledge about literature to consult and professors to meet with that provided an important foundation for my research. I also have so much gratitude for Catherine Morse, Dr. Richard Hall, Dr. Ted Brader, Dr. John Chamberlin, and Dr. Vincent Hutchings, who all met with me over the course of working on this project and provided valuable feedback. And, of course, Dr. Brian Min, who has been an incredible supporter of our whole thesis cohort. Your advice has been invaluable, as has your feedback on my project. Our cohort was also lucky enough to not have just one, but two, amazing GSIs, Mike Thompson-Brusstar and Tom O'Mealia, who reviewed work on our theses and offered great suggestions for making our projects as strong as possible. Finally, I want to thank the Gerstein Family Foundation for helping to make this project possible.

I am so grateful to have been a participant in the Honors Summer Fellows Program, which enabled me to devote an extensive amount of time to this project last summer. Dr. Mika LaVaque-Manty, you not only took the time to meet with me more than once over the summer to teach me how to code, but you've also been one of my biggest supporters since I showed up at the Honors office for the first time at orientation. I'll forever be grateful for that. To Kaylee Shelton, who helped to make the program happen, and Megan Taylor, who was a great mentor over the course of the summer, thank you both for making the fellowship so rewarding. Finally, to my HSF cohort, while it's a shame we had to do the program virtually, I enjoyed getting to learn about all your projects and getting such insightful feedback on mine in return. I know you all have produced amazing theses and will go on to do incredible things beyond your time at Michigan.

Last, but certainly not least, I was so fortunate to have the guidance of Dr. Jowei Chen as I worked on my thesis. Although you didn't know me at all, you returned my first email about my thesis in 15 minutes with an offer to meet the next day. Since then, you've helped me frame my topic and develop my methods, screen-shared to code with me time and time again, and answered all my questions. You challenged me to think critically about my approach to this project and how I could make it so that it turns up interesting results, but, at the end of the day, you supported me in the direction I chose and helped me to make it as insightful and meaningful as possible. This project would not be what it is without your help, and I am so thankful for everything you've done to enable me to be successful.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	2
List of Figures	6
Abstract	7
Introduction	8
Chapter 1	11
Literature Review	11
Methodology	14
Data Analysis	16
Limitations	19
Discussion	21
Chapter 2	24
Literature Review	24
Methodology	26
Data Analysis	28
Limitations	32
Discussion	32

Chapter 3	35
Literature Review	35
Methodology	37
Data Analysis	39
Limitations	42
Discussion	43
Conclusion & Implications for Future Research	46
Appendices	49
Appendix A	49
Appendix B	56
Appendix C	57
References	58

List of Figures

Figure 1: Proposition 2 Votes Relative to Partisan Cues 17

Figure 2: Regression of “Yes” Votes on Votes for Both Democratic Candidates (2018) 17

Figure 3: Regression of “No” Votes on Votes for Both Republican Candidates (2018) 18

Figure 4: Margin of Victory & Republican Deviation 29

Figure 5: Margin of Victory & Hypothetical All-Republican Precincts 30

Figure 6: Regression of “Yes” Votes on Vote Share for President Obama (2012) & President Trump in Non-Conforming Republican Districts (2016) 41

Abstract

In the United States, the vast majority of states with multiple congressional districts give state legislatures the power to redraw their boundaries following the census every ten years. However, since the early days of American history, politicians have manipulated district boundaries to benefit themselves and their parties. Gerrymandering continues to plague the American electoral system to this day, but most states still use a redistricting method open to manipulation. The goal of this paper is to study one state, Michigan, that passed a ballot measure in 2018 to change the system. Michigan has since replaced the state legislature with a nonpartisan commission to handle the redistricting process. Ultimately, I intend to reveal what factored into Michiganders' opinions when deciding how to vote on this ballot measure. I hypothesize that partisan cues, electoral self-interest, and populist ideals will all play a role in people's opinions. Precinct data analyses from both within the 2018 election and across multiple cycles, including regressions, revealed that while partisan cues did play a strong role (although more so for Democrats than Republicans), electoral self-interest and populist ideals played a minor role, if any at all.

Introduction

Redistricting reform seems to be getting an increased amount of publicity as of late. Interest groups and citizens alike have protested the unjust nature of partisan gerrymandering and have demanded reform. In some states, such as Michigan, such efforts have yielded ballot initiatives like Proposition 2, which passed in 2018 (“Michigan Proposal 2”). Its passage took control of the redistricting process out of the hands of state legislatures and gave that power to a nonpartisan commission. However, despite the ability of such campaigns to point out the flaws of the current system, many states still give state legislatures the power to draw districts. In fact, this is the method of choice in 33 of the 43 states that are large enough to contain multiple districts (“State-by-State”).

While polls are taken fairly regularly on Americans’ opinions on redistricting reform, little has been done to address what affects these opinions beyond partisanship. Just as is the case with most political issues, it is assumed that partisan cues play a large role in shaping people’s opinions on such reforms. In determining how partisanship affects opinions on redistricting reform, researchers have examined two separate relationships: how a party’s ideology affects that person’s opinion, or how a party’s status as the winning or losing party in the state legislature affects that person’s opinion (McCarthy, 2019) (VanderMolen and Milyo, 2016). For example, in Michigan, people’s opinions were likely swayed by their partisan affiliation because state Democratic leaders largely supported Proposition 2, while state Republican leaders largely opposed it (Beggin, 2018).

Researchers have also suspected that, in tandem with the idea that a party’s status as the winning or losing party affects a person’s opinion, people’s votes on electoral reform are

determined by self-interest (Bowler, Donovan, and Karp, 2006). Essentially, people will vote in a way that maximizes their party's chances of winning future elections. This principle is best encapsulated by a quote from Sarah Anderson, a Michigan Republican Party spokeswoman. Anderson called Voters Not Politicians, the organization that led the effort to pass Proposition 2, a "front group who wants to change the rules because they can't win based on their ideas. VNP is a scam perpetrated by Democrats who are hoping to hoodwink Michigan voters into giving up their voice in the redistricting process" (Eggert, 2018). This quote illustrates that people may have perceived their vote on Proposition 2 as affecting their party's ability to win future elections. However, given the relative newness of redistricting reform efforts, no case study has been done to understand this effect.

As such, my thesis seeks to answer the question: how valid are key narratives surrounding public opinion on redistricting reform? A case study of Michigan's Proposition 2 can help to answer this question. While I suspect that partisan identification plays the largest role in shaping opinions, very little has been done to study how the characteristics of a person's district, such as electoral competitiveness, affect their willingness to vote for redistricting reform measures, and how that plays into voting in self-interest. By identifying precincts where people voted contrary to their party on Proposition 2 (which is determined by comparing their yes/no vote on Proposition 2 to the party of the winner of the most recent Senatorial and Gubernatorial elections), I can isolate situations where partisan identification was not the main determinant of a person's vote. I hypothesize that, in these districts, electoral competitiveness and self-interest will play a significant role in determining a person's vote. In each of these cases, I expect that less electoral competitiveness will cause a vote contrary to partisan cues. In precincts where Democratic candidates won but people voted against Proposition 2, I expect them to have had a

safe Democratic U.S. House seat with a well-liked Representative for a long period of time. Therefore, they would rather preserve the lack of competitiveness to keep the seat safe. Or, in a district where a Republican Representative was elected but people voted for Proposition 2, I suspect they will have had a relatively safe Democratic seat with little ability for a Republican to challenge the incumbent. Therefore, they seek to bring greater electoral competitiveness to their district to give their preferred candidate a greater chance of winning in the future.

However, it is unlikely that partisan cues and self-interest alone can comprehensively explain a person's opinion on redistricting reform measures. In the time allotted to compose an honors thesis, it is highly unlikely that such a complete picture can be painted. However, other narratives surrounding people's opinions on redistricting reform, including populist ideals and distrust of government, will be discussed. Together, these factors should comprise as complete of a profile as possible of the factors that shape opinions on redistricting reform.

Chapter 1: Partisan Cues

Literature Review

Generally, people have limited information about redistricting, and therefore lack strong opinions on the integrity of current processes or the ways in which they should be reformed (Fougere, et al., 2010). When voters lack factual information about politics, they are forced to rely on informational cues from others (Hobolt, 2006). Zaller (1992) finds that people tend to give credibility to political elites, typically from their preferred party, in searching for this information. As a result, the information they receive is “a highly selective and stereotyped view of what has taken place” (7). Given that a person’s value and ideology influence both the information they seek and how they perceive that information, those who are liberal tend to align themselves with the views of liberal elites, while those who are conservative tend to align themselves with conservative elites. Partisan cues are so powerful that they have the ability to shape people’s opinions even on issues that are directly observable to them, such as poverty or racial inequality. This suggests that, for an issue such as gerrymandering, which is not as directly observable, full of political complexities, and the perception of which is based heavily on how it is framed, partisan cues carry even greater power to determine a person’s opinion on the validity of a redistricting process.

Partisan cues are particularly influential in how people vote on ballot referenda. In fact, Kriesi (2005) refers to partisan cues as “the quintessential shortcut in direct democratic votes” (see also Hobolt, 2006). As Hobolt continues, parties have the ability to signal to voters where their party stands on a particular referendum, which can communicate to voters what is best for

them (161). In an examination of the Norwegian accession referendum, Hobolt found that partisan cues had the “same effect on voting behavior as detailed knowledge of EU politics,” provided that voters have sufficient knowledge of their party’s position (176). This conclusion is corroborated by Bisgaard and Slothuus (2018), who further illustrate the power of partisan identification in determining a person’s vote. In their first experiment, they used five survey waves to study attitudes on the budget deficit in Denmark. There was a change in partisan cues from the incumbent party between the second and third waves, in which they indicated a much greater concern about the increasing deficit. The authors found a statistically significant change in perceptions of the budget deficit among those who identified with the party in government, but no change among those who identified with the opposition party. This is consistent with the power of partisan cues, as such cues should have no effect on those who do not identify with that party. They even performed placebo tests on issues such as unemployment, about which many people are assumed to be informed, and the size of the budget deficit, which is a purely factual question, and found that partisan cues were still powerful. This is consistent with Zaller’s argument that partisan cues have the power to shape opinion even on issues that are factual or directly observable. They replicated this observation with an experimental design, permitting them to conclude causation due to comparison with a control group and the ability to show an effect for both parties, not just the one in power. They again found a statistically significant result, suggesting that partisan cues are impactful for those who identify with the party that disseminates them.

Although these studies were not based on American politics, the conclusions nonetheless apply to American voters, who operate similarly due to their generally low levels of political information. Cavari and Freedman (2019) find that, as partisan cues on the Israeli-Palestinian

conflict have increased, so has the proportion of Americans who hold an opinion on it. Further, the opinions expressed vary predictably with party identification. Republicans surveyed expressed a clear support of Israel with a low nonresponse rate, which is consistent with the strong, pro-Israel sentiment put forward by Republican leaders. On the other hand, Democratic leaders are less clear in public messaging on Israel. Support for Israel from Democratic respondents was not as clear, and there was a much higher nonresponse rate, which is reflective of party leaders' varying opinions.

Across all of these studies, partisan cues serve as substitutes for more detailed knowledge in driving people's opinions and voting decisions on referenda. As demonstrated by Fougere's study, voters are generally uninformed about redistricting issues. A shortcut to developing an opinion can be to learn and adopt the position of one's party. This provides party leaders with a powerful ability to shape the opinions of their constituents on the issue.

The role partisanship plays in people's voting decisions is reinforced by negative campaigns and a sense of rivalry between opposing parties (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes, 2012). When state party leaders used rhetoric that vilified opponents and replaced the discussion of the redistricting procedures with accusations of manipulating electoral processes for partisan gain, I anticipate that people became even more steadfast in their alignment with their party's position on Proposition 2. When the debate was about whether or not Proposition 2 was an effort by state Democrats to gain more control over the elections process rather than how the proposal affects the representativeness of elections, partisan identity became integral to how a person perceived it. This effect was then compounded when the media recycled these messages and people were continually exposed to them (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012).

As such, I expect that, in most precincts, voting on Proposition 2 will predictably follow

partisanship, which can be gauged through the result of the most recent Gubernatorial and Senatorial elections. In each precinct, a win for Republican candidates will typically accompany a defeat for Proposition 2, and a win for Democratic candidates will typically be paired with a win for Proposition 2. However, theories of partisan cues cannot explain precincts where such consistency is not present. As such, further exploration beyond the effect of partisanship on public opinion on redistricting reform is necessary. I hypothesize district characteristics and perceptions of electoral competitiveness will play the largest role in shaping this opinion, while distrust in government will also carry weight in opinion formation.

Methodology

The dependent variable in this study is whether Michigan precincts voted “Yes” or “No” on Proposition 2. This data was collected from the Michigan Secretary of State’s website. Since each person was casting their vote for or against a reform measure, it can be used as a valid measure of their opinion on the issue. The independent variable is broadly defined as the narratives surrounding what shapes a person’s opinion on redistricting reform. In this chapter, the narrative on which I am focused is partisan cues, which are theorized to be the largest influence on a person’s opinion or vote on any given political issue.

This chapter will use precinct-level data that was downloaded as a .txt file and cleaned in R. I will determine the party with which the majority of people in a particular precinct identify by using the results of the 2018 Gubernatorial and Senatorial elections, with the assumption that voters often vote for their party’s candidate. While this will not be true in every case, it is the most reliable way to determine the partisan makeup of a precinct without access to comprehensive data on party registration. Further, this is a fairly common method of determining

partisan affiliation or ideology in Political Science. Erickson and Wright (1980) conduct their study of legislators' responsiveness to the opinions of their constituents "presuming that presidential voting is indicative of district ideology," and numerous authors since have used the same measure based on this study. While there was no presidential election in 2018, these two races are a good indication of a person's party because they are high-profile and highly publicized. In a year without a presidential election, it can be assumed that these two races would be the elections that likely received the most attention. Thus, there are consistent cues from party leaders encouraging party members to vote for their chosen candidates. Further, the results of multiple elections were included to ensure that a precinct solidly identifies with one party or another. While straight-ticket voting is not uncommon, there are a fair number of precincts where candidates from different parties win races. Including multiple elections makes it more certain that the election results truly reflect the partisan makeup of the precinct by identifying precincts where a majority of voters voted for the same party across elections. Assuming that voters follow the cues of their party leaders, the results of these elections will typically predict the vote on Proposition 2. If Republican candidates win, I will expect Proposition 2 to be defeated in that precinct, while the opposite would be expected if Democrats were to win that precinct.

As explained previously, partisan cues are often credited with being the primary determinant of a person's opinion on political issues given the credibility people grant to political elites in soliciting information. I suspect that a person's opinion on redistricting reform is no exception to this rule, and this case study will allow me to examine this principle. In an attempt to estimate the impact of partisan cues as precisely as possible, I will also be performing a regression analysis. As with the prior approach described, this is also a fairly common method. For example, Gerber, Kessler, and Meredith (2011) regressed precinct data onto the amount of mail

sent to a precinct to determine how much it increased a candidate's vote share. To determine the impact of partisan cues on the vote shares for and against Proposition 2, I will be regressing the Proposition 2 results onto the results of the Senatorial and Gubernatorial elections in 2018. This regression will align with the expected vote patterns described previously. Thus, I will regress voting "Yes" on Proposition 2 (the dependent variable) onto voting for the Democratic candidate in both the Senatorial and Gubernatorial elections (the independent variable). I will also regress voting "No" on Proposition 2 onto voting for the Republican candidates. In accordance with my hypothesis, I expect a strong positive correlation between the two in both cases.

Precinct-Level Data: Proposition 2

If my hypothesis is correct, in the majority of precincts, the vote on Proposition 2 will follow reliably from the results of the Gubernatorial and Senatorial elections. If both winners were Republicans, a vote against Proposition 2 is to be expected. A vote for Proposition 2 is to be expected if both winners are Democrats.

Of the 4797 precincts (excluding precincts classified as Absent Voter Counting Board, or AVCB) in Michigan active during the 2018 election, 3141 followed partisan cues from either Democrats or Republicans (See Figure 1). Precincts that voted for independent candidates or candidates affiliated with minor parties were excluded from this analysis, as there were no consistent cues with which to compare their vote choices. Precincts that were split between Democratic and Republican candidates across the two elections were also excluded, as they lacked a solid partisan affiliation based on these results. The fact that the majority of solidly partisan districts conform with partisan cues is consistent with my hypothesis and is to be expected based on trends in the literature. However, the most interesting element of this analysis

is the source of the deviation from partisan cues. I initially expected there to be some deviation from both parties, as both Democrats and Republicans are subject to influences other than partisan cues, such as electoral self-interest. By and large, though, Democrats followed cues. In fact, there was only a single precinct where the two Democratic candidates won and Proposition 2 lost. In contrast, there were 1437 precincts where people voted for two Republican candidates and voted for Proposition 2, compared to only 717 precincts where Republicans voted consistently with partisan cues across the three elections.

Figure 1: Proposition 2 Votes Relative to Partisan Cues

Democratic Conformation	Democratic Deviation	Republican Conformation	Republican Deviation
2424	1	713	1437

The regression analyses demonstrate a similar result:

Figure 2: Regression of “Yes” Votes on Votes for Both Democratic Candidates (2018)

```

Residuals:
    Min       1Q   Median       3Q      Max
-0.26731 -0.02520 -0.00102  0.02432  0.69045

Coefficients:
              Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)  0.309550   0.001805 171.493 < 2e-16 ***
Gretchen     0.696332   0.033562  20.748 < 2e-16 ***
Debbie      -0.138570   0.034098  -4.064 4.91e-05 ***
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 0.04273 on 4740 degrees of freedom
(77 observations deleted due to missingness)
Multiple R-squared:  0.8776,    Adjusted R-squared:  0.8776
F-statistic: 1.699e+04 on 2 and 4740 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16

```

With an r-value of 0.9368, it is clear there is a strong positive correlation between having voted for both Democratic candidates (Gretchen Whitmer for Governor and Debbie Stabenow for Senate) and voting “Yes” on Proposition 2. With each increase in one percent of the vote share for the two candidates, there is approximately a 0.56 percentage point increase in “Yes” votes for Proposition 2. In a hypothetical precinct in which 100% of voters voted for both Democratic candidates, the expected vote share in support of Proposition 2 would be 86.73%. This matches the results from the initial precinct data analysis, as both show a strong alignment between votes for Democratic candidates and votes for Proposition 2. This suggests that Democratic voters were highly attentive to (and voted in accordance with) cues from their party.

Figure 3: Regression of “No” Votes on Votes for Both Republican Candidates (2018)

```

Residuals:
      Min       1Q   Median       3Q      Max
-0.71397 -0.02423  0.00136  0.02488  0.25341

Coefficients:
              Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)  0.146587   0.001555  94.288 < 2e-16 ***
Bill         0.734755   0.033925  21.658 < 2e-16 ***
John        -0.167375   0.033825  -4.948 7.75e-07 ***
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 0.04269 on 4740 degrees of freedom
(77 observations deleted due to missingness)
Multiple R-squared:  0.8778,    Adjusted R-squared:  0.8777
F-statistic: 1.702e+04 on 2 and 4740 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16

```

The regression of “No” Votes on Proposition 2 on the votes for the two Republican candidates (Bill Schuette for Governor and John James for Senate) show virtually the same results as could have been inferred from the first regression, but the second regression was run to take into account the impact of the vote share for candidates outside of the two major parties. As

expected, there is a strong positive correlation between voting for both Republican candidates and voting against Proposition 2 (r-value = 0.9369). This is in accordance with my hypothesis. However, where the data for Republicans differs from that of Democrats is the strength of those cues, as measured by the hypothetical precinct in which all voters cast votes for the two candidates from one party. In the hypothetical all-Democratic precinct, the vote share for Proposition 2 would be 86.73%. However, in the all-Republican precinct, the vote share against Proposition 2 - while still a majority - would not nearly be as overwhelming. The expected vote share against Proposition 2 would be slightly over 15 percentage points less at 71.50%. This is not to say that Republican cues are not impactful. Clearly, they are a strong determinant of their members' votes. Still, as shown by both the initial precinct data analysis and the regression analyses, the cues are not nearly as strong as those of the state Democratic party, which is why there is so much more deviation from expected trends.

Limitations

As mentioned previously, the primary limitation in this part of the study is the lack of access to a party registry. Thus, there is no way to truly determine if a precinct is made up of a majority of registered Democrats or Republicans. While using the results of multiple high-profile elections as a proxy for partisanship is reliable, there is the potential for these elections to misrepresent a precinct's partisan makeup. This may occur because these two elections were anomalies, while the vast majority of other elections went in favor of the other party, or because the precinct swings from election year to election year. The use of multiple elections, combined with the high-profile and competitive partisan nature of these elections, should minimize the impact of the first concern. It is unlikely that a precinct made up primarily of voters registered

with one party would vote for opposition candidates in two major elections. Further, in precincts where there were winners from different parties, that precinct was excluded from the analysis as a precinct that lacked a solid partisan identification.

The second concern is raised in a paper by Levendusky, Pope, and Jackman (2008), who contend that using presidential electoral returns as a measure of district ideology is subject to short-term influences such as the appeal of a particular candidate or the saliency of certain issues. Once again, the use of multiple elections makes it less likely that the partisanship of a precinct is due to short-term issues, and instead is a stable partisan identification that persists across election years. Additionally, this critique is specifically related to using presidential election returns, and the races used in these analyses are less likely to flip voters based on pure candidate appeal than a presidential election.

There is also merit to narrowing the focus of my analysis to partisan identification only in 2018, as I am interested in the partisan affiliation of the majority of voters in a particular precinct in this particular election year (2018). Once again, presuming that these elections indicate voters' partisan identification, I would expect them to follow cues from the party with which they identify for other policy issues as well, including ballot referenda. If the precincts were split in 2018, they were excluded from the analysis. Therefore, this analysis only included data from solidly Democrat or solidly Republican districts, which indicates the majority of voters in a particular precinct likely followed those party's cues during that election cycle. It is unlikely that a district massively swung between parties all the way down the ballot from elections just a few years prior, even if they may have done so for a high-profile office such as the presidency. Still, even if they did, the fact that they followed cues from a different party in a prior election year has little bearing on their current identification with one party or the other and the accompanying

inclination to follow that party's cues.

Another limitation of this study is the ability to account for absentee ballots that are counted separately through Absentee Voter Counting Boards (AVCB). There is no uniform way that each county classifies its AVCB votes in order to affiliate them with a particular precinct, which makes them difficult to include in this analysis. However, unlike 2020, the circumstances were not such that a significantly large number of people would be voting by mail. Further, given that the AVCB ballots are not affiliated with a particular precinct, the number of votes split amongst all the precincts in a particular county would be marginal and unlikely to swing an individual precinct. Therefore, this should not inhibit the accuracy of this analysis.

Finally, there is the Ecological Inference Problem, which is concerned with drawing conclusions about individual behavior from aggregate data. While there is no way to isolate the vote of each individual voter beyond an examination of precinct data, performing a regression analysis to determine how likely a precinct is to vote for/against Proposition 2 based on the results of the other two elections in their precinct will allow me to get as close as possible to examining individual behavior. While I cannot definitively say that an individual voted one way or the other because of partisan cues (causation), the strong positive correlations enable me to comfortably conclude that partisan cues played a role. After all, precinct data is composed of the choices of each of its voters, and thus trends in the precinct data provide significant insight into the opinions and behavior of individual voters.

Discussion

Despite these limitations, there are still a number of conclusions that can be drawn from this data. The first is that my hypothesis was largely correct: many Michigan voters did vote as

expected in accordance with partisan cues on Proposition 2. The majority of precincts (3141/4797) that were either solidly Democratic or solidly Republican voted as expected on Proposition 2. This is, as suggested by Fougere, Hobolt, and other political theorists, likely due to a lack of information on redistricting. When voters lack information on a political issue, partisan cues can serve as an informational shortcut that guides their voting decisions.

However, the strength of partisan cues was not the same for both parties. When voters voted down the ballot for Democratic candidates, they voted as predicted on Proposition 2 the vast majority of the time. This was not true to the same extent for Republicans. There could be a number of explanations for this. It could be a larger volume of and/or more accessible messaging from the state Democratic party to its members. Or, as indicated by the higher-than-expected levels of Republican support, it may be that this ballot measure had broad popularity due to its appeals to fairness and electoral integrity. These were the values that support groups such as Voters Not Politicians espoused in their promotion of the referendum. This type of messaging may have the power to transcend party lines, but for Democrats, voting for Proposition 2 for this reason is not discernible from voting for the measure because of partisan cues. This would be more easily observable for Republican voters, who would have to vote in opposition to their party to vote in accordance with such messaging. The accessibility and appeal of pro-Proposition 2 messaging and how that affected voters' choice is a topic worthy of further research.

As a result of the differences between the two parties found in this chapter, from this point forward, the focus of the project will shift slightly. The main focus is to determine what affects a person's opinion on redistricting reform measures. However, for Democrats, there was very little deviation from partisan cues, which tends to be the main determinant of a person's opinion of political issues. Thus, the remainder of this thesis will examine more closely the cause of a

sizable amount of deviation from partisan cues for Republicans. Chapter 2, which will analyze the influence of electoral self-interest, will still reference the Democratic deviation (although, it is unlikely that any significant conclusions can be drawn from the one non-conforming precinct). Chapter 3 will focus solely on the source of Republican deviation by examining the influence of Populism, which has been associated with the Republican party under President Trump.

Chapter 2: Electoral Self-Interest

Literature Review

Anthony Downs, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and influential political economist, (1957) contends that voters are rational actors, in that they weigh the costs and gains, both politically and economically, of voting for a particular candidate or policy and make their choice based on the greatest net benefit. Downs “assume[s] that every individual, though rational, is also selfish,” meaning that these cost-benefit analyses are self-interested and concerned with maximizing personal gains (27). Downs discusses these concepts in the context of choosing which political party to vote for, but it can certainly be applied to voting on electoral reforms as well. If a person believes one party offers them more benefits than the other, then their interest lies in that party winning future elections. This makes it more likely that such benefits will be delivered. Further, there is additional utility from the perception that one is being accurately represented in government, the feeling of which is enhanced by having a representative of the party with which a person identifies elected in their district.

Electoral self-interest, or acting in ways that a voter perceives will maximize their party’s chances of winning future elections, seems to exert significant influence on people’s opinion on redistricting reform. Those who identify with the party in control of the state legislature, who often handle the redistricting processes, tend to believe the process is fair more often than those who do not (Fougere, et al., 2010). Yet, in general, people tend to find processes of redistricting to be fairer when carried out by a nonpartisan body, rather than by a state legislature. Still, despite the fact that only 10% of those surveyed prefer redistricting be handled by state

legislatures, most states continue to use this method. Kathryn VanderMolen and Jeffrey Milyo (2016) suggest that this disparity may persist because confidence in redistricting procedures is not related to the process itself. Instead, people tend to view the system more favorably when their party is in control. This is because, when their party is in control, they stand to benefit from the way districts are drawn.

Politicians similarly tend to perceive the integrity of redistricting processes in a self-interested fashion (Bowler, Donovan, and Karp, 2006). While values such as fair democracy and political ideologies play a role, the main predictor of politicians' attitudes toward redistricting issues is electoral self-interest. In surveying national-level politicians in Germany, Australia, Holland, and New Zealand over a three-year period, Bowler, Donovan, and Karp found that those who lost their elections were more likely to support changes to electoral institutions than winners and be less satisfied with the current functioning of their democracy. Inherent in these perceptions is the idea that a more "legitimate" system is one that maximizes their party's chances of winning elections. Even federal judges are prone to evaluating the legitimacy of district maps through the lens of their party's interests. In cases where the law or precedent are ambiguous, judges tend to strike down district maps drawn by the party opposite to the judge reviewing the case (McKenzie, 2012).

These theories explain much of the landscape of opinion on Proposition 2 in Michigan around the time of its passage. Since Republicans controlled the state legislature, they generally opposed the policy. The opposite was true for the Democrats, as they sought reform because they did not have significant influence on district maps in the status quo. This literature also serves to explain my hypothesis on how electoral competitiveness affects people's opinion. People vote for the option that maximizes the chance of their desired representative to win a seat, which, in

each case, necessitates either more or less electoral competitiveness. Still, no case study has been done to directly compare perceptions of electoral competitiveness to a person's opinion on redistricting reform, which is where my study can add to current scholarship.

Methodology

Beyond partisanship, electoral self-interest is the primary factor I expect to have an influence on people's opinions on redistricting reform. Essentially, people will vote on electoral reform proposals in ways that maximize their party's chances of winning future elections, which could conflict with partisan cues. Redistricting reform is often aimed at making congressional elections more competitive. However, for a majority Democratic precinct with a long-serving Democratic Representative, people may not be interested in increasing electoral competitiveness in a way that threatens the safety of that seat (even if the party supports the proposal). Or, in a majority Republican precinct in an uncompetitive district with a Democratic Representative, people may be interested in making elections more competitive in a way that allows for a successful Republican challenger. While the party is encouraging voters to vote a certain way based on state-level politics, individuals may prioritize their own district at the polls. Thus, the primary hypothesis in this chapter is restated as follows:

H1: In a safe Democratic district, Republicans will be incentivized to deviate from partisan cues and vote for Proposition 2 in an attempt to improve their party's chances of winning future elections in their district.

Previously, my second hypothesis would have been: In a safe Democratic district, Democrats will be incentivized to deviate from partisan cues and vote against Proposition 2 in an attempt to safeguard their party's chances of winning future elections. However, as was revealed in the

previous chapter, there was only one instance of Democratic deviation from partisan cues. Thus, there is not enough data to draw conclusions on this hypothesis. As mentioned at the end of the previous chapter, the remainder of this thesis will instead focus on explaining Republican deviation from partisan cues because Democrats overwhelmingly conformed.

The dependent variable in this chapter is still how Michigan precincts voted on redistricting reform, which is measured through the results of the vote on Proposition 2. The independent variable is electoral competitiveness. Electoral competitiveness can be measured through examining the average electoral margin of victory for U.S House races in each district in 2012, 2014, and 2016. These are the three election cycles prior to 2018 that used the same district map at the time of Proposition 2 being on the ballot. As Barber and Schmidt (2018) note, while there is no perfect measure of electoral competitiveness, examining the margin of victory in an election in the past cycle is the closest approximation. By examining that statistic over multiple election cycles, I can get a greater understanding of a district's competitiveness in the long term, as well as see how the presence of a long-serving Representative may affect how someone votes on Proposition 2.

To evaluate my hypothesis, I will compare the percentage of Republican precincts (as classified by voting for the Republican candidate for both Governor and Senate) that deviated from partisan cues in each district. These are precincts that voted Republican for Senate, Republican for Governor, and "Yes" for Proposition 2. If my hypothesis is correct, the percentage of Republican precincts that deviated from partisan cues will be higher in districts that are safely Democratic than those that are safely Republican, as Republicans will be interested in changing the electoral system in places where they believe it could benefit them (despite their party's cues). In safe Republican districts, they have little incentive to change the

system, along with the fact that their party is discouraging them from voting to do so.

I will also run a regression analysis similar to the one used in Chapter 1. For each congressional district, I will use election results to determine the vote share against Proposition 2 in a hypothetical precinct where 100% of voters voted for both Republican candidates (Bill Schuette for Governor and John James for Senator). If my hypothesis is correct, the percentage of voters who would vote against Proposition 2 would be lower in safe Democratic districts than safe Republican districts. In Democratic districts, this percentage would also get lower as the margin of victory got higher (essentially, as the Democratic district got safer). If that were the case, it would indicate a deviation from partisan cues in accordance with electoral self-interest.

Electoral Competitiveness Data

There does not appear to be a significant difference in the percentage of Republican precinct deviations based on whether or not the district in which they are located is safely Democratic or safely Republican. In fact, in every district, over 50% of solidly Republican precincts voted for Proposition 2 (see Figure 4).

Figure 4: Margin of Victory & Republican Deviation

U.S. House District	Party of Representative (2013-2018)	Average Margin of Victory - 2012, 2014, 2016 (Percentage Points)	Republican Conformations (Prop 2: No)	Republican Deviations (Prop 2: Yes)	Deviation Percentage
1	Republican	7.4	164	222	57.51%
2	Republican	29.1	81	119	59.50%
3	Republican	16.4	42	124	72.90%
4	Republican	25.5	119	187	61.11%
5	Democrat	31.7	17	87	83.65%
6	Republican	16.6	47	121	72.02%
7	Republican	12.5	58	142	71.00%
8	Republican	16.9	37	130	77.80%
9	Democrat	24.2	0	49	100%
10	Republican	36.4	141	144	50.53%
11	Republican	11.5	4	91	95.79%
12	Democrat	35.9	0	16	100%
13	Democrat	64.6	0	1	100%
14	Democrat	61.5	3	4	57.14%

While the only precincts with a 100% deviation rate are in safe Democratic districts, the number of Republican precincts in these districts is small compared to the number of precincts in the safe Republican districts. Further, there are some Democratic districts with lower rates of deviation than Republican districts (for example, District 5, a Democratic district, has a deviation rate of 83.65%, while District 11, a Republican district, has a deviation rate of 95.79%, and the two districts have a similar number of solidly Republican precincts). Therefore, it does not appear that electoral self-interest has a significant impact on people’s vote choice on Proposition 2.

The single Democratic deviation is in District 1, which is the Republican district with the lowest margin of victory. The single deviation is not enough to draw any conclusions about the

influence of electoral self-interest on Democrats’ vote choice on Proposition 2, but it is nonetheless interesting to note that the only deviation is in a Republican district. This would provide an additional bit of evidence that electoral self-interest is unlikely to affect a person’s opinion on redistricting reform, regardless of partisan identification. If it were to be the case, I would instead expect any instances of Democratic deviation to be in the safest Democratic districts, rather than in a district that leans Republican in the status quo (and, in this case, is the most competitive district in Michigan).

The regression analyses, when comparing Democratic and Republican districts, largely corroborate the findings revealed in Figure 4 (see Appendix A for detailed regressions):

Figure 5: Margin of Victory & Hypothetical All-Republican Precincts

U.S. House District	Party of Representative (2013-2018)	Average Margin of Victory - 2012, 2014, 2016 (Percentage Points)	Votes Against Proposition 2 in All-Republican Precinct
1	Republican	7.4	83.35%
2	Republican	29.1	70.21%
3	Republican	16.4	72.16%
4	Republican	25.5	81.27%
5	Democrat	31.7	68.75%
6	Republican	16.6	74.13%
7	Republican	12.5	76.46%
8	Republican	16.9	76.91%
9	Democrat	24.2	74.73%
10	Republican	36.4	74.22%
11	Republican	11.5	73.46%
12	Democrat	35.9	84.92%
13	Democrat	64.6	69.36%
14	Democrat	61.5	62.83%

There is no pattern of clear, consistent deviation from the expected percentage of Republican voters who would vote against Proposition 2 in accordance with partisan cues as found in Chapter 1 (71.50%) in safe Democratic districts. This provides additional evidence that electoral self-interest plays a limited role in voters' choices. For three of the five Democratic districts, the percentage does not differ much from safe Republican districts (68.75% in District 5, 74.73% in District 9, and 69.36% in District 13). Most safe Republican districts were between 70% and 75%. Two of the three extreme values are from Democratic districts, but if the hypothesis is correct, both would be significantly lower than the percentage in safe Republican districts. Instead, while the value in District 14 is lower at 62.83%, the value in District 12 is much higher at 84.92%. This is actually the highest value on the table, and would have been associated with a safe Republican district if H1 was correct. Therefore, the regression analyses provide evidence against H1.

However, an additional regression analysis of this data suggests that, although the effect is somewhat weak, there is some correlation between a decreasing Republican margin of victory and a decreasing percentage of Republican voters who vote against Proposition 2. In a regression of expected vote percentage against Proposition 2 on Democratic margin of victory (the Republican margins of victory were made negative), the percentage of Republicans voting against Proposition 2 decreased by 0.066% for every percentage increase in the Democratic margin of victory (or decrease in the Republican margin of victory) (see Appendix B). The effect, although still small, becomes more pronounced when the regression is run only for the Democratic districts. For every increase in the Democratic margin of victory, the percentage of Republicans voting against Proposition 2 decreases by 0.24% (see Appendix B). Overall, the correlation for both is between -0.25 and -0.26. While this does not suggest that electoral self-

interest has a significant influence on vote choice, it does provide some support for H1 and suggests electoral self-interest plays a minor role in shaping people's opinions.

Limitations

The same limitations regarding the use of precinct data mentioned in Chapter 1 one apply to this chapter as well. For the same reasons, this data can still be useful in drawing conclusions about voter behavior. The only unique limitation in this chapter, which is related to the time and scope of this project, is the potential for state-level election data to reveal additional insight into this hypothesis. While federal election data did not reveal any trends suggesting that electoral self-interest played a significant role in people's decisions on Proposition 2, this could be because federal elections feel more distant. U.S. House elections are spread over a much larger district, so the effects of competitiveness may not be as immediately felt. However, state-level elections are fairly local, as the districts cover a much smaller area. Thus, people may have voted in accordance with electoral self-interest based on their perceptions of state-level elections, the competitiveness of which may be much more easily observed. However, this data analysis would not reveal these effects. This would be a valuable subject of future research.

Discussion

There are a number of possibilities as to why self-interest was not a significant influence on vote choice for Proposition 2. Just as a lack of information on redistricting may have motivated people to defer to partisan cues, so might a lack of information have prevented them from voting in accordance with self-interest. After all, to truly know what is best for a voter or their party, the

voter would have to know the relevant details and the potential outcome of each choice. If people lack the information on their district's competitiveness or how the redistricting system may change that, this is unlikely to have affected their vote.

Philip Converse (1964) writes that belief systems must be bound by constraints, which are justifications for beliefs that provide logic and consistency. However, the average voter often lacks the political context necessary to develop them. Typically, constraints are developed by elites, just as we saw with Proposition 2. Elites include politicians, journalists, academics, and other highly attentive and influential actors in the political arena. In this case, partisan elites consistently framed the issue in terms of electoral self-interest. State Democratic leaders framed Proposition 2 as an effort to check the power of Republicans gerrymandering districts, while state Republican leaders framed it as a Democratic ploy to steal elections because they could not win them in the status quo. However, Converse notes that such constraints are often transmitted imperfectly to voters. Thus, while voters may get the broader message to vote for or against Proposition 2, the full extent of the complexities of how voting on the measure may affect electoral competitiveness is likely not received. Further, Fougere's finding that Americans generally have low levels of information on redistricting suggests they are unlikely to get this information elsewhere. Ultimately, if voters do not have this information, they cannot make choices in accordance with rational self-interest, which is contingent on being able to evaluate and compare outcomes.

Instead, findings from Sears, et al. (1980) align with the results from Chapter 1. The authors conclude that symbolic considerations such as partisan identification are much more reliable predictors of vote choice than self-interest. These symbolic political factors are learned through socialization in pre-adult years, which have little to do with rational calculations of future costs

and benefits. As a result, when exposed to policy issues as adults, they evaluate them through these symbolic lenses. The authors analyzed data from the 1976 Current Population Survey, finding that symbolic political factors such as people's partisan or ideological identification were significantly more impactful on preferences related to healthcare, unemployment, busing, and law and order than self-interest.

Although focused on the national economy instead of electoral politics, findings from Kinder and Kiewiet (1981) provide further evidence that self-interest is not a strong determinant of vote choice. The authors call voting with concern for the national economy "Sociotropic voting," which they found to have significant effects on vote choices in both congressional and presidential elections (145, 152). Kinder and Kiewiet find that these perceptions are not an extension of pocketbook (personal self-interest) preferences. Instead, voters are much more interested in voting based on which party they believe is better equipped to handle national economic issues, even if this only has more distant effects on their individual well-being.

Similarly, the data reveals that voters are not overly concerned with the impact of their vote on Proposition 2 on their party's ability to win elections in their own district. Instead, they may be concerned with voting with their party's preferences for broader electoral self-interest across the state. This can be discerned from the overarching message of partisan cues and does not require extensive information. It is also possible that voters may be more concerned with the broader issues of fairness and electoral integrity that were also possible reasons for why voters may have deviated from partisan cues. This would be more in-line with focusing on broader well-being, as was the case with voters who voted based on perceived national economic outcomes rather than personal well-being. Once again, further research on the effects of these values would provide a better understanding of public opinion on redistricting reform.

Chapter 3: Populist Ideals

Literature Review

Inherent in the cries for redistricting reform are themes of government distrust, diminished popular sovereignty, and the threat of corruption from leaving the power to draw districts in the hands of politicians who stand to benefit from manipulating the system. Such attitudes affect how Americans perceive the legitimacy of the country's democracy. Perceptions of electoral integrity, as reflected in global standards regarding appropriate elections conduct, are central to people's level of satisfaction with democracy (Norris, 2019). This is because elected officials are supposed to be representatives of the people, and the only way to ensure accountability is free and fair elections. Dahlberg and Solevid (2016) found across four different models, each controlling for various individual and system-level variables, that even just perceptions of manipulation or corruption significantly reduce political trust.

Reynolds, Reily, and Ellis (2006) find that electoral reforms tend to occur when there is "high public mistrust and dissatisfaction with the political system" (20). This is corroborated by Norris's (2011) analysis of survey data collected prior to electoral reforms in over 90 independent countries. Norris finds that "mass aspirations for democracy are indeed one of the factors which help to catalyze the agenda for successful reform movements and legislative initiatives" (545). Essentially, people's perceptions of an ideal democracy shape electoral reform efforts, and distrust of a political system that is perceived to be illegitimate drives public engagement to make those reforms a reality.

Such distrust of the political establishment became particularly salient during President

Donald Trump's 2016 campaign. By studying polling data around the time of the 2016 New Hampshire primary, Dyck, Pearson-Merkowitz, and Coates (2018) found that those with less trust in government were more likely to support Trump than other Republican candidates. The authors conclude that this was a rebuke of establishment politicians in an era of increasing distrust in the political system. As such, some Trump Republicans may not be conservatives as much as they are Populists, or those "whose political sympathies lie with the non-elite and marginalized" (Lakoff, 2017). Populists consider the people and elites to be in irreconcilable opposition, and the elites are characterized by self-interest and corruption (Silgo, 2018). This viewpoint is accompanied by a feeling of powerlessness and inability to participate meaningfully in politics, which leads people to seek identification with a populist movement that they perceive will better their chances of being fairly represented in government.

This rhetoric was central to President Trump's campaign, and, as a result, caused many who identified with these values to align themselves with the Republican party under his leadership. His campaign was characterized by populist messaging from the moment he announced his run for the Presidency. Oliver and Rahn (2016) used a content analysis and the Diction software program to measure the use of anti-establishment rhetoric, with "political populism" being captured by phrases such as "the government," "the system," or "special interests," among others (192). Trump scored the highest of seven leading 2016 presidential candidates on the measure of political populism in his announcement speech, with a higher use of such language than well-known anti-establishment candidate Senator Bernie Sanders. In terms of Trump's supporters, a survey conducted by the authors revealed they scored high on measures of anti-elitism and mistrust of expertise. While these voters turned out for Trump, the important distinction here is that those who identify more strongly on these measures may not be voting Republican because

they are Conservative in the traditional sense of the word. Instead, they found their anti-elitism and mistrust of the political establishment echoed in President Trump's campaign, which led to an identification with the current Republican Party under Trump.

Such feelings of distrust and marginalization may lead to supporting measures such as Proposition 2. Norris, Garnett, and Grömping (2020) posit that populist attitudes are accompanied by an inclination toward conspiratorial thinking, which can result in a paranoia about the integrity of elections. Using American National Election Study (ANES) data and the 2016 election as a case study, the authors find that “there is a significant negative relationship between populist orientations and beliefs about the fairness of the vote,” with “a 0.4-point difference in predicted trust in fairness between those with the lowest and highest populist values” (117). This correlation remains stable regardless of whether or not the respondent's party is in power, which contrasts with the way in which the power of a person's party was theorized to mediate views of electoral integrity in Chapter 2 of this paper. Ultimately, a sense of “cynicism about politics... and a consequential distrust in the efficacy of democratic values and processes” leads to support for policies that check the government's power and promote equity in the electoral system (Silgo, 2018: 134). As a result, such Trump Republicans may be voting for a Republican representative because they identify with the Republican party's identity under Trump, but also support Proposition 2 because of a distrust of government. This can explain a deviation from the expected Republican vote against Proposition 2 in alignment with partisan cues.

Methodology

As with the first two chapters, the dependent variable in this scenario is how each precinct

voted on redistricting reform (as measured through their vote on Proposition 2). In this chapter, I will only be examining the non-conforming Republican districts, and the independent variable is populist ideals. I expect populist ideals to play a role in people's opinions because Proposition 2 places a check on government power by transferring the responsibility of drawing districts from the state legislature, which is subject to the influence of self-interested politicians, to a nonpartisan commission made up of private citizens.

A useful measure of populism is to observe if a precinct flipped from voting for President Obama in 2012 to President Trump in 2016. Both candidates, although from separate parties, embodied populism in their rejection of establishment politics. If a person voted for both Obama and Trump, the lack of partisan consistency makes the vote for President Trump in 2016 seem to be less due to principled Conservatism and more due to populism and an identification with the Republican Party under President Trump. Similar to the precinct data analysis from Chapter 1, I downloaded the data for the 2012 and 2016 presidential elections from the Michigan Secretary of State's website. It was downloaded as a .txt file, and it was cleaned and organized in R. The results from 2012 and 2016 were then compared for the solidly Republican precincts that voted for Proposition 2 in 2018.

Another useful measure of populism is the share of each precinct that voted for President Obama and President Trump in 2012 and 2016, respectively. The votes the two candidates got between the two elections will be totaled, and I will calculate the percentage of the total votes between the two elections earned by Obama and Trump (see Appendix C). If the vote share for the two candidates totaled over 50% for a precinct between the two elections, that precinct will be considered to have populist ideals for the purpose of this analysis. There will be both an analysis of how many non-conforming Republican precincts in 2018 had a vote share of 50% or

higher for the two candidates, as well as a regression analysis to determine to what extent voting for populist candidates in non-conforming Republican districts correlated with a vote for Proposition 2.

The hypotheses for this chapter are as follows:

H1: A significant number of non-conforming Republican precincts will have voted for President Obama in 2012 and President Trump in 2016.

This is unlikely to explain every deviation, and this is also not to say that it will necessarily explain a majority. This measure, which involves a flipped precinct, will show the more extreme cases of voting almost solely based on populist ideals instead of based on partisanship. The latter two measures will more directly examine the correlation between vote shares for these two candidates and “Yes” votes on Proposition 2, which are less extreme measures and more likely to show a broader effect.

H2: The majority of non-conforming Republican precincts will have a vote share of over 50% for President Obama and President Trump between 2012 and 2016, respectively.

H3: In non-conforming Republican districts, there will be a moderate to strong positive correlation between the vote share for President Trump and President Obama and the percentage of “Yes” votes on Proposition 2.

Precinct Data: 2012 & 2016 Presidential Elections

H1: A significant number of non-conforming Republican precincts will have voted for President Obama in 2012 and President Trump in 2016.

Of the 1437 Republican precincts that deviated from partisan cues by voting for

Proposition 2, 206 (14.34%) of them were precincts that flipped from President Obama in 2012 to President Trump in 2016. All but two of the precincts voted for Trump in 2016, but the vast majority of them also voted Republican for Mitt Romney in 2012. Therefore, in a majority of cases, using only a flip from Obama to Trump as a measure of populism does not on its own suggest that populism played a significant role in people's opinions on Proposition 2. Once again, this is to be expected, as this is would be the most extreme form of populism one could observe. It would involve voters who rejected partisanship altogether in favor of voting for candidates that represented a break from establishment politics. Given the power of the two major parties in the American political system, this is not common. However, the number of 2018 Republican precincts that flipped from President Obama to President Trump and voted for Proposition 2 is not trivial, suggesting that populist ideals and distrust of government did play at least a minor role. The evaluation of the second and third hypotheses will examine this possible role further.

H2: The majority of non-conforming Republican precincts will have a vote share of over 50% for President Obama and President Trump between 2012 and 2016, respectively.

The evaluation of precinct data for this hypothesis involves a lower threshold for classifying a precinct as populist. Instead of requiring a flip from Obama in 2012 to Trump in 2016, a precinct is instead classified as populist if the total vote share for both candidates is over 50% of the entire pool of votes across the two elections. This total vote share for Obama and Trump is composed of all the voters who supported the two major-party populist candidates. Using this measure, the overwhelming majority (1001/1437) of non-conforming Republican precincts

would have been considered populist. This too is to be expected. Unlike the measure of populism used to evaluate H1, this is a significantly lower threshold to be considered a populist precinct. Still, this measure of populism suggests that populist ideals could have played a role in people's opinions on Proposition 2.

Given that these two measures of populism suggest different conclusions about its role in people's vote choice on Proposition 2, a third measure is needed to reconcile them. A regression of "Yes" votes on Proposition 2 on the vote share for the two candidates across the 2012 and 2016 elections is the measure of choice (see Figure 6). It provides a more precise evaluation of populism's impact on Proposition 2 vote choices than just the 50% threshold, while simultaneously avoiding the extremely high threshold of a flipped district.

H3: In non-conforming Republican districts, there will be a moderate to strong positive correlation between the vote share for President Trump and President Obama and the percentage of "Yes" votes on Proposition 2.

Figure 6: Regression of "Yes" Votes on Vote Share for President Obama (2012) & President Trump in Non-Conforming Republican Districts (2016)

```

Residuals:
    Min       1Q   Median       3Q      Max
-0.07189 -0.02421 -0.00224  0.01996  0.18527

Coefficients:
              Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)  0.66606    0.01282  51.974 <2e-16 ***
Populist     -0.22120    0.02464  -8.976 <2e-16 ***
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 0.03193 on 1392 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared:  0.05471,    Adjusted R-squared:  0.05403
F-statistic: 80.56 on 1 and 1392 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16

```

The regression analysis reveals the most interesting results of this chapter. First and foremost, while the correlation is statistically significant, the correlation between the vote share for Obama and Trump ($r = -0.2246$) is not very strong relative to the correlation for partisan cues. Essentially, votes on Proposition 2 are not as well explained by a linear relationship with the vote share for Obama and Trump. The correlation is certainly expected to be weaker, as partisan cues were hypothesized to play the largest role, but this large of a disparity was unanticipated. Further, any linear correlation that can be observed is negative. For each 1 percentage point increase in the vote share for Obama and Trump, the “Yes” votes for Proposition 2 decreased by approximately 0.22 percentage points. In the hypothetical precinct where the vote choice for Obama and Trump is zero (where voters largely voted for Hillary Clinton or Mitt Romney, as well as some third party or independent candidates), there would still be 66.61% of voters who voted for Proposition 2. Both the relatively weak correlation and the direction of the correlation suggest that populism, as measured by the vote share for President Obama and President Trump, does not play a significant role in people’s opinions on Proposition 2. Further, even if it does, for what can be explained by this measure, the correlation is negative. Therefore, H3 is false (if it were true, the correlation would be moderate to strong ($r > 0.5$) and positive).

Limitations

The primary limitation for the analysis in this chapter is the changing nature of precincts over multiple election cycles. Precinct divisions and locations, although largely the same from year to year, are not exactly the same. Of the 1437 precincts studied, 27 were unable to be fully analyzed because of precinct changes between 2012 and 2018. For some, there was no data for a particular

precinct for both 2012 and 2016, and for others, it was only one of the two elections. This is not a large enough number to inhibit the ability to draw conclusions from this analysis, but the inclusion of these precincts would slightly change the results.

Discussion

Just as low levels of information about redistricting may have prevented many voters from factoring self-interest into their decision, it may also make it difficult for them to view politics through an ideological lens. At first, it may not seem that information is necessary in order to be ideological. In Lane's (1962) characterization of ideology, he describes an ideology as having qualities such as addressing questions of leadership selection, being related to principles and values, describing attitudes about social institutions, rationalizing group interests, and having a moral tone (14-15). However, while it is one thing to identify with an ideology, it is another to articulate it and use it to make political judgements. This requires the political knowledge to do so. Studies by Converse and Zaller indicate that, although people may indicate identification with a liberal or conservative ideology, their foundational views on particular issues are not stable over time in accordance with one ideology or the other. When both researchers asked participants about the same political issue over time, they found inconsistencies, with Converse finding that only slightly more than half regularly took the same side. This is consistent with Converse's discussion of constraints, which suggests that the mass public often lacks the logical constraints that enable them to apply an ideology with consistency to multiple issues (or even the same issue over time). If voters were truly voting based on a clear ideology, their foundational views would remain relatively consistent across time. If Michigan voters similarly lack the consistency needed to predictably apply an ideology to vote choice, this could explain why these

measures of populist ideology did not correlate with votes for Proposition 2.

It is also possible that, contrary to my original intuition, those who vote in accordance with populist ideology may perceive Proposition 2 to still be pro-establishment. While some viewed Proposition 2 as taking the power to redistrict out of the hands of self-interested politicians and placing it into the hands of the people, others viewed it as a strategic political move by state Democrats. As mentioned earlier in the paper, some Republicans perceived it as a way to alter electoral processes to benefit Democrats. There is reason to believe that some populists viewed it this way as well. Thus, they simply saw Proposition 2 as another establishment policy. Populism thrives on the ability to create an “enemy.” In this case, that enemy would be the establishment and politicians that usurp power from the people. However, if Proposition 2 becomes associated with Democratic establishment politics, it no longer motivates those who identify as populists to vote for it.

These voters may also see Proposition 2 as pro-establishment in that it enables state legislators to continue to influence the redistricting process under the guise of giving the power back to the people. While the commission is nonpartisan based on its final makeup, it still has members that identify with the two major parties. There is also ambiguity as to how to ensure people are accurately reporting their partisan identification. Further, State House and Senate leadership, as well as partisan leadership in each chamber, can strike applicants from the final pool from which commission members are randomly chosen (Beggin). The critical difference is, unlike state legislators, voters then have no power to remove them if they object to their actions. These voters may have voted against Proposition 2 because, as a policy that does not go far enough, its passage could lead to complacency and a lack of motivation to further correct the process. This seems less likely, as results throughout this paper suggest that voters had limited

information on the measure (and thus its complexities), but it is still worth considering and examining in future research.

Finally, the results may also be explained by the measure populism used in this chapter. This is not to say that the vote share for populist candidates cannot be used as a valid measure of populism. Just as the vote share for or against Proposition 2 reveals information about voters' opinions and beliefs, so do the votes for populist candidates. However, voters may not have voted for one candidate or the other solely because of a populist ideology. While the first measure used to evaluate H1 suggests this is more likely to be the case because it would transcend partisanship, the latter two measures dilute to some extent the effect of populist ideology. Once again, the time and scope of this thesis is limited, so it was not possible to conduct a survey in these precincts of interest focused on gathering data on populist beliefs. This would provide a more precise measure of populism, as it could directly evaluate voters' levels of trust in government and resentment of establishment politics. It could also reveal if these voters voted for Obama and/or Trump due of these reasons. This is another area in which future research would be valuable.

Conclusion & Implications for Future Research

The analyses in this paper have offered different conclusions about each of the factors hypothesized to play a role in public opinion on redistricting reform. As is the case with most political issues, partisan cues do seem to be the primary determinant of people's opinions. Although causation cannot be proven directly from this thesis, there is a strong correlation, and the majority of precincts with a solid partisan identification voted as predicted on Proposition 2. However, this effect was much stronger for Democrats than Republicans. Only one Democratic precinct deviated from the expected vote in favor of Proposition 2, while well over half of Republican precincts did not vote as expected on Proposition 2. While some of this may be due to influences such as values of fairness and electoral integrity being indiscernible from the effect of partisan cues for Democratic voters (but would involve voting in opposition to partisan cues for Republican voters), it nevertheless appears that partisan cues mattered. Partisan cues offer an informational shortcut for voters on an issue many know little about, and thus, people voted in accordance with these cues.

Electoral self-interest did not appear to play significant role in people's votes on Proposition 2. Acting in self-interest requires the information to evaluate each outcome, but if Americans are largely uninformed on redistricting issues, it is unlikely that a large number of voters could factor this into their vote. Instead, most of the voters with the relevant information are political elites, who adhere much more closely to belief constraints and are more likely to vote in self-interest. This is still consistent with the findings of Bowler, Donovan, and Karp, as their results were based on responses from politicians. Symbolic considerations, such as partisan cues or concerns

about the broader electoral system such as fairness and integrity, are far more likely to influence a person's opinion on redistricting reform than electoral self-interest.

Finally, the results of populist ideals as an explanation for Republican votes against Proposition 2 were mixed. Using the highest threshold for classifying a precinct as populist (flipping from Obama in 2012 to Trump in 2016) revealed that populism played a small role. Using a lower threshold of a greater than 50% vote share for Obama and Trump across the two elections indicated that populism played a large role. The regression analysis suggested that there may even be a negative correlation between the vote share for the two populist candidates and the vote share in support of Proposition 2. Findings from Converse and Zaller show that, in general, Americans lack ideological consistency, and that is even more likely to be true for an issue that Americans have very little information about. This could serve to explain why populist ideals ultimately may not play a significant role in people's opinions on redistricting reform. It is also possible that, despite my own inclinations, populist voters may still have perceived Proposition 2 as pro-establishment, and thus voted against it. Finally, the measure of populism used in this chapter is limited to inferences based on vote choice, whereas a survey could analyze the influence of populist ideology much more closely.

That being said, a survey would be a valuable direction in which to take future research on examining Michiganders' opinion on Proposition 2. A survey could ask more targeted questions about populist ideology, information levels, frequency of exposure to messaging about Proposition 2, and ideals of fairness. This can then be compared with precinct data to more precisely determine how much of an influence each factor examined in this thesis (as well as a few others) had on each voter's decision. This would also allow researchers to discern the effects of factors that may have affected Democratic voters' opinions that may otherwise have been

indistinguishable from the effects of partisan cues in this paper.

This research could also be enhanced by a focus on state-level data in future analyses. As mentioned in Chapter 2, particularly as it pertains to electoral competitiveness, the effects of state-level elections are much more easily observed. A focus on electoral competitiveness on a federal level would fail to account for any vote choices made in accordance with perceptions of competitiveness on a state level.

Ultimately, while this thesis contributes to the literature on public opinion on redistricting reform by offering precinct data analysis to study a few large factors, future research using both precinct and survey data would provide an even more comprehensive understanding of what affects a person's opinion on the issue. While I have found the results of this project to be illuminating, I also know there is so much more interesting and valuable research to be done to gain the best possible understanding of voters' opinions on redistricting reform.

Appendices

Appendix A: Electoral Competitiveness Regressions

District 1:

Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-0.230123	-0.024395	0.002052	0.025167	0.165737

Coefficients:

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)
(Intercept)	-0.01117	0.01299	-0.860	0.39
Bill	0.41761	0.09252	4.514	7.96e-06 ***
John	0.42707	0.09221	4.631	4.65e-06 ***

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 0.04592 on 496 degrees of freedom

(2 observations deleted due to missingness)

Multiple R-squared: 0.7293, Adjusted R-squared: 0.7282

F-statistic: 668.2 on 2 and 496 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

District 2:

Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-0.165838	-0.027243	-0.005159	0.023508	0.120603

Coefficients:

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)
(Intercept)	0.163907	0.009055	18.101	< 2e-16 ***
Bill	0.903631	0.127573	7.083	8.77e-12 ***
John	-0.365458	0.130591	-2.798	0.00544 **

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 0.03935 on 325 degrees of freedom

Multiple R-squared: 0.8121, Adjusted R-squared: 0.811

F-statistic: 702.4 on 2 and 325 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

District 3:

Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-0.069106	-0.019663	-0.003069	0.015758	0.111129

Coefficients:

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)
(Intercept)	0.092079	0.007008	13.139	< 2e-16 ***
Bill	0.463586	0.118513	3.912	0.000113 ***
John	0.165916	0.120698	1.375	0.170254

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 0.03161 on 305 degrees of freedom
(5 observations deleted due to missingness)

Multiple R-squared: 0.913, Adjusted R-squared: 0.9124

F-statistic: 1600 on 2 and 305 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

District 4:

Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-0.08515	-0.02253	-0.00178	0.02013	0.10146

Coefficients:

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)
(Intercept)	0.008526	0.012054	0.707	0.47983
Bill	0.557748	0.081527	6.841	3.19e-11 ***
John	0.246380	0.088781	2.775	0.00579 **

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 0.03214 on 376 degrees of freedom
(8 observations deleted due to missingness)

Multiple R-squared: 0.8402, Adjusted R-squared: 0.8393

F-statistic: 988.4 on 2 and 376 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

District 5:

Residuals:

	Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
	-0.140675	-0.017622	-0.000011	0.015781	0.095899

Coefficients:

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)	
(Intercept)	0.161298	0.003997	40.354	< 2e-16	***
Bill	0.581799	0.075381	7.718	1.4e-13	***
John	-0.055618	0.074003	-0.752	0.453	

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 0.02847 on 332 degrees of freedom
(11 observations deleted due to missingness)

Multiple R-squared: 0.9134, Adjusted R-squared: 0.9129

F-statistic: 1752 on 2 and 332 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

District 6:

Residuals:

	Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
	-0.118748	-0.021796	-0.004319	0.017487	0.133990

Coefficients:

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)	
(Intercept)	0.088113	0.007201	12.236	< 2e-16	***
Bill	0.673234	0.143037	4.707	3.9e-06	***
John	-0.020061	0.142782	-0.141	0.888	

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 0.03508 on 290 degrees of freedom
(4 observations deleted due to missingness)

Multiple R-squared: 0.8964, Adjusted R-squared: 0.8957

F-statistic: 1255 on 2 and 290 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

District 7:

Residuals:

	Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
	-0.06295	-0.02020	-0.00146	0.01940	0.09431

Coefficients:

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)	
(Intercept)	0.057040	0.009405	6.065	3.91e-09	***
Bill	0.664382	0.109886	6.046	4.34e-09	***
John	0.043178	0.114074	0.379	0.705	

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 0.02904 on 304 degrees of freedom
(3 observations deleted due to missingness)

Multiple R-squared: 0.8816, Adjusted R-squared: 0.8808

F-statistic: 1132 on 2 and 304 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

District 8:

Residuals:

	Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
	-0.33468	-0.01452	-0.00078	0.01547	0.09298

Coefficients:

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)	
(Intercept)	0.068679	0.006593	10.418	< 2e-16	***
Bill	0.930141	0.130776	7.112	8.35e-12	***
John	-0.229704	0.130748	-1.757	0.08	.

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 0.03131 on 301 degrees of freedom
(1 observation deleted due to missingness)

Multiple R-squared: 0.925, Adjusted R-squared: 0.9245

F-statistic: 1856 on 2 and 301 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

District 9:

Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-0.110894	-0.024268	0.005147	0.024707	0.091784

Coefficients:

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)
(Intercept)	0.127416	0.008369	15.224	< 2e-16 ***
Bill	0.779336	0.135791	5.739	2.32e-08 ***
John	-0.159424	0.140079	-1.138	0.256

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 0.03467 on 301 degrees of freedom
(7 observations deleted due to missingness)

Multiple R-squared: 0.7967, Adjusted R-squared: 0.7953

F-statistic: 589.8 on 2 and 301 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

District 10:

Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-0.74216	-0.01543	0.00095	0.01876	0.12078

Coefficients:

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)
(Intercept)	0.15835	0.02031	7.797	8.52e-14 ***
Bill	0.48812	0.10299	4.739	3.20e-06 ***
John	0.09569	0.11438	0.837	0.403

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 0.04908 on 328 degrees of freedom
(1 observation deleted due to missingness)

Multiple R-squared: 0.531, Adjusted R-squared: 0.5282

F-statistic: 185.7 on 2 and 328 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

District 11:

Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-0.087804	-0.010431	0.001492	0.012447	0.087881

Coefficients:

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)
(Intercept)	0.104659	0.007129	14.681	< 2e-16 ***
Bill	0.383040	0.103306	3.708	0.00026 ***
John	0.246905	0.102032	2.420	0.01627 *

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 0.01994 on 239 degrees of freedom

(10 observations deleted due to missingness)

Multiple R-squared: 0.8831, Adjusted R-squared: 0.8821

F-statistic: 902.4 on 2 and 239 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

District 12:

Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-0.099848	-0.027539	-0.002368	0.023773	0.108140

Coefficients:

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)
(Intercept)	0.067682	0.004984	13.581	< 2e-16 ***
Bill	1.142677	0.172853	6.611	1.61e-10 ***
John	-0.361076	0.164878	-2.190	0.0293 *

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 0.03767 on 319 degrees of freedom

(14 observations deleted due to missingness)

Multiple R-squared: 0.8891, Adjusted R-squared: 0.8884

F-statistic: 1278 on 2 and 319 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

District 13:

Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-0.182944	-0.020585	0.000596	0.019527	0.217056

Coefficients:

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)
(Intercept)	0.18294	0.00322	56.812	< 2e-16 ***
Bill	0.84277	0.13611	6.192	1.5e-09 ***
John	-0.33207	0.13182	-2.519	0.0122 *

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 0.04286 on 394 degrees of freedom

(8 observations deleted due to missingness)

Multiple R-squared: 0.6966, Adjusted R-squared: 0.695

F-statistic: 452.3 on 2 and 394 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

District 14:

Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-0.170127	-0.021256	0.001806	0.022656	0.116097

Coefficients:

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)
(Intercept)	0.170127	0.003156	53.909	< 2e-16 ***
Bill	0.479979	0.143318	3.349	0.000889 ***
John	-0.021788	0.141595	-0.154	0.877788

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 0.03711 on 392 degrees of freedom

Multiple R-squared: 0.7682, Adjusted R-squared: 0.767

F-statistic: 649.4 on 2 and 392 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

Appendix B: Democratic Margin of Victory Regressed onto Hypothetical Republican

Vote Share Against Proposition 2

For all districts:

Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-0.07831	-0.03426	-0.01377	0.01492	0.12579

Coefficients:

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)
(Intercept)	0.74697	0.01551	48.163	4.2e-15 ***
Margin	-0.06562	0.04765	-1.377	0.194

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 0.05774 on 12 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.1365, Adjusted R-squared: 0.06451
F-statistic: 1.896 on 1 and 12 DF, p-value: 0.1936

For Democratic districts:

Residuals:

1	2	3	4	5
-0.06326	-0.02214	0.10890	0.02476	-0.04826

Coefficients:

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)
(Intercept)	0.8297	0.1020	8.132	0.00389 **
Margin	-0.2490	0.2192	-1.136	0.33846

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 0.08019 on 3 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.3008, Adjusted R-squared: 0.06776
F-statistic: 1.291 on 1 and 3 DF, p-value: 0.3385

Appendix C: Populism Vote Share Variable

To illustrate how this variable is calculated, the election results from Alcona County, Alcona Township, Precinct 1 will be used.

Candidate (Year)	Votes
Obama (2012)	254
Romney (2012)	455
Hoefling (2012)	0
White (2012)	0
Alexander (2012)	0
Johnson (2012)	0
Anderson (2012)	2
Stein (2012)	4
Goode (2012)	1
Hoefling (2016)	0
Maturen (2016)	0
Moorehead (2016)	0
McMullin (2016)	0
Kotlikoff (2016)	0
Hartnell (2016)	0
Fox (2016)	0
Stein (2016)	2
Soltysik (2016)	0
Castle (2016)	4
Johnson (2016)	13
Trump (2016)	500
Clinton (2016)	199

The Formula used is as follows:

$$(\text{Trump Votes} + \text{Obama Votes}) / (\text{Total Votes 2012} + \text{Total Votes 2016})$$

Therefore, for this precinct, the variable would be calculated as follows:

$$(500 + 254) / (716 + 718)$$

$$754 / 1434 = 0.5258$$

References

- Barber, Michael and Soren Schmidt. 2019. "Electoral Competition and Legislator Effectiveness." *American Politics Research* 47, no.4: 683–708.
- Beggin, Riley. "Michigan Ballot Issues: What to Know about Prop 2 (Redistricting)." 2018.
<https://www.bridgemi.com/michigan-government/michigan-ballot-issues-what-know-about-prop-2-redistricting>.
- Beggin, Riley. "Here's How Michigan's Redistricting Commission Would Work. 2018.
<https://www.bridgemi.com/michigan-government/heres-how-michigans-redistricting-commission-would-work>.
- Bisgaard, Martin and Rune Slothuus. 2018. "Partisan Elites as Culprits? How Party Cues Shape Partisan Perceptual Gaps." *American Journal of Political Science* 62, no. 2: 456-469.
- Bowler, Shaun, Todd Donovan, and Jeffrey A. Karp. 2006. "Why Politicians Like Electoral Institutions: Self-Interest, Values, or Ideology?" *The Journal of Politics* 68, no. 2: 434-446.
- Cavari, Amnon and Guy Freedman. 2019. "Partisan Cues and Opinion Formation on Foreign Policy." *American Politics Research* 47, no. 1: 29–57.
- Converse, Philip E. 1964. *Ideology and Discontent*. New York: The Free Press.
- Dahlberg, Stefan and Maria Solevid. 2016. "Does Corruption Suppress Voter Turnout?" *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* 26, no. 4: 489–510.
- Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Dyck, Joshua J, Shanna Pearson-Merkowitz, and Michael Coates. 2018. "Primary Distrust: Political Distrust and Support for the Insurgent Candidacies of Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders in the 2016 Primary." *PS, Political Science & Politics* 51, no. 2: 351–57.

- Eggert, David. 2018. "Democratic Group Gives \$250K to Redistricting Initiative." *AP NEWS*.
<https://apnews.com/8bc164e8c1624402b8e9241a8fe13a41>.
- "Election Precinct Results Search." 2018. Jocelyn Benson, Secretary of State, Michigan Department of State. https://miboecfr.nictusa.com/cgi-bin/cfr/precinct_srch.cgi.
- Erikson, Robert S, and Gerald C. Wright. 1980. "Policy Representation of Constituency Interests." *Political Behavior* 2, no. 1: 91–106.
- Fougere, Joushua, Stephen Ansolabehere, and Nathaniel Persily. 2010. "Partisanship, Public Opinion, and Redistricting." *Election Law Journal* 9, no. 4: 325-347.
- Gerber, Alan S., Daniel P. Kessler, and Marc Meredith. 2011. "The Persuasive Effects of Direct Mail: A Regression Discontinuity Based Approach." *The Journal of Politics* 73, no. 1: 140-155.
- Hobolt, Sara Binzer. 2007. "Taking Cues on Europe? Voter Competence and Party Endorsements in Referendums on European Integration." *European Journal of Political Research* 46, no. 2: 151–82.
- Iyengar, Shanto, Gaurav Sood, and Yphtach Lelkes. 2012. "Affect, Not Ideology: A Social Identity Perspective on Polarization." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 76, no. 3: 405–31.
- Kinder, Donald R. and D. Roderick Kiewiet. 1981. "Sociotropic Voting: The American Case." *British Journal of Political Science* 11, no. 2: 129-161.
- Kriesi, Hanspeter. 2005. *Direct Democratic choice: The Swiss Experience*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Lakoff, Robin Tolmach. 2017. "The Hollow Man Donald Trump, Populism, and Post-Truth Politics." *Journal of Language and Politics* 16, no. 4: 595–606.
- Lane, Robert. 1962. *Political Ideology*. New York: The Free Press.

- Levendusky, Matthew S., Jeremy C. Pope, and Simon D. Jackman. 2008. "Measuring District-Level Partisanship with Implications for the Analysis of U.S. Elections." *The Journal of Politics* 70, no. 3: 736-753.
- McKenzie, Mark Jonathan. 2012. "The Influence of Partisanship, Ideology, and the Law on Redistricting Decisions in the Federal Courts." *Political Research Quarterly* 65, no. 4: 799-813.
- McCarthy, Devin. 2019. "The Limits of Partisanship in Citizen Preferences on Redistricting." Duke University Department of Political Science. https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/web.sas.upenn.edu/dist/7/538/files/2019/07/Redistricting-Opinion_6.29.pdf.
- "Michigan Proposal 2, Independent Redistricting Commission Initiative." Ballotpedia. [https://ballotpedia.org/Michigan_Proposal_2,_Independent_Redistricting_Commission_Initiative_\(2018\)](https://ballotpedia.org/Michigan_Proposal_2,_Independent_Redistricting_Commission_Initiative_(2018)).
- Norris, Pippa. 2011. "Cultural Explanations of Electoral Reform: A Policy Cycle Model." *West European Politics* 34, no. 3: 531-50.
- Norris, Pippa. 2019. "Do Perceptions of Electoral Malpractice Undermine Democratic Satisfaction? The US in Comparative Perspective." *International Political Science Review* 40, no. 1: 5-22.
- Norris, Pippa, Holly Ann Garnett, and Max Grömping. 2020. "The Paranoid Style of American Elections: Explaining Perceptions of Electoral Integrity in an Age of Populism." *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* 30, no. 1: 105-25.

- Oliver, J. Eric, and Wendy M. Rahn. 2016. "Rise of the 'Trumpenvolk': Populism in the 2016 Election." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 667: 189–206.
- Reynolds, Andrew, Ben Reilly, and Andrew Ellis. 2006. *The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design*, 2nd ed. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.
- Sears, David O., Richard R. Lau, Tom R. Tyler, and Harris M. Allen, Jr. 1980. "Self-Interest vs. Symbolic Politics in Policy Attitudes and Presidential Voting." *The American Political Science Review* 74, no. 3: 670-684.
- Sligo, Frank. 2018. "Trump's Populism, La Trahison Des Clercs and Embracing Dissent." *Media International Australia* 169, no. 1: 131–43.
- "State-by-State Redistricting Procedures." Ballotpedia. https://ballotpedia.org/State-by-state_redistricting_procedures.
- "Statistics of the Congressional Election from Official Sources for the Election of November 6, 2018." 2019. Office of the Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives, Cheryl L. Johnson. <https://history.house.gov/Institution/Election-Statistics/Election-Statistics/>.
- VanderMolen, Kathryn and Jeffrey Milyo. 2016. "Public Confidence in the Redistricting Process: The Role of Independent Commissions, State Legislative Polarization, and Partisan Preferences." *State and Local Government Review* 48, no.4: 236-245.
- Zaller, John. 1992. *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.