

Chinese National Day Civilian Parades

And the signaling of policy change in the Reform Era

改革开放后的中国国庆群众游行
与其传播的政策改变信号

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Abstract

Every 10 years, a grand celebration would be hosted on Beijing's Tiananmen Square to commemorate China's National Day. Every 10 years, hundreds of thousands of Chinese citizens would dress up in fancy attires and march across the Chang'an Avenue to celebrate the founding of their country. This is perhaps the single most important and elaborate state celebration occasion in China, and it is perhaps the single most high-status state propaganda effort that a Chinese leader will host during his tenure. During these National Day Civilian Parades, we see images of revolutionary forefathers being surround by oceans of colorful confetti-holding young people; in these parades, we see fantastic floats depicting China's most proud achievements since 1949. This is a political occasion that can only occur once during a leader's tenure, and every leader intends to imprint his own legacy upon this parade of the decade. In this project, I intend to discover this whole goldmine of political symbolism with a practical lens and an eastern perspective. I argue that China's state propaganda can serve the function of signaling policy change. I argue that beyond the stereotypical functions of ideological expression and so called 'brainwashing', China's state propaganda can signal important policy changes, which includes a change in policy focus, policy direction, as well as problem solving strategy. I also argue that amid the current trend of western countries using Sinophobia rhetoric to curtail China's rise, China's state propaganda machines are starting to strategically fight back by showcasing strength during important political occasions such as the National Day Civilian Parades. In this thesis, I focus on four case studies of four important policy areas that corresponds to the four functions of signaling that I am proposing. By looking at the connections between policy changes and parade imagery of these policy changes, I establish that the National Day Civilian Parades can indeed reflect the ongoing policy changes in the real world to an extent. I hope that by writing this thesis, I can demonstrate the political importance of these parades to the academia. Hopefully, we will see more studies done on this subject in the future.

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I would like to first send my appreciation to my two advisors, Professor Emily Wilcox and Professor Mary Gallagher. Professor Wilcox's class on contemporary Chinese performance arts opened my eyes up in the study of performances and their important cultural/political values. A conversation between Professor Wilcox and I on political performance in the Detroit Airport directly inspired me to study the National Day Civilian Parades. Professor Wilcox is one of those rare scholars who have a deep and fair understanding of Chinese culture as well as the performing arts, and I can't thank her enough for her inspiring force during the creation stage of this project. Professor Gallagher has been my principal guide in making my research more systematic and more organized. Professor Gallagher's deep knowledge of Chinese politics and history greatly facilitated our conversations, and her understanding of the Chinese language made our conversation much easier since we can discuss difficult concepts by speaking in Chinese. Professor Gallagher helped me establish my final research direction and the policy-area signaling framework. To me, these two professors can indeed be given the honorary name for teacher in ancient China: "Fuzi" (夫子).

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Author's Note

October 1st, 2019.

On a bench near the University Hospital, a lonely Chinese student sits quietly in the freezing night air while holding a phone in his gloved hands. The Midwestern wind maybe cold, but his heart is forever so warm. On that little iPhone screen, tens of thousands of people are marching across a wide boulevard cheerfully with wide smiles on their faces. While silently tearing up over this homesick inducing-scene, this lonely Chinese student had an epiphany: what if someone wrote a thesis about this and made it known to the world?

Introduction

Why study these parades?

Since the beginning of China's Reform Era, the highest authorities of the Communist Party of China (CPC)¹, the Chinese Military, and the Chinese Government have hosted four major celebrations on October 1st to honor China's National Day. The center of these celebrations was a duo-parade display on Tiananmen Square, which included both a military parade and a civilian parade. For many years, western media and academia have studied the military portion of this duo-parade display to understand the development of China's military power and China's position in the geopolitics of East-Asia and the World. It seems that, however, the civilian portion of this duo-parade display has not attracted as much attention as its military partner. During my research, I have found previous scholarly work on national celebrations such as parades for countries such as the Soviet Union, Iraq, Syria, and many others; I have also found literature on various other types of state-sponsored performances such as TV-shows, films, theater and dance in China; however, what I have not found is literature that specifically speaks about these civilian parades.

Why should anyone study these parades at all? In my opinion, we need to study these parades because of the following reasons.

The first reason is regarding the frequency and timing of these parades. Between 1949 and 1970, China hosted this kind of parade once per year. From 1978 until the present, China has hosted this kind of parade once every 10 years. Since the beginning of the Reform Era, this kind of parade takes place once during a leader's administration, and they tend to take place towards halfway of the second term of a leader's reign. Every leader gets only one

¹ Please note: you may see many scholars refer to the Communist Party of China (CPC) as the "Chinese Communist Party", or the "CCP". The usage of "CCP" is common in western academic literature on Chinese politics and it is not the official English name that the Communist Party has designated to itself. Since the goal of this project is to understand Chinese politics in China's own terms, I will be using the official English name of the Communist Party of China instead of the western given name.

parade during his administration, and every leader gets to host a celebration like this after a few years on the job. If we look at other forms of state-sponsored political performances in China, we do not really see any other equivalents. Every Chinese leader can make plenty of soap operas, songs, movies, and propaganda pieces to celebrate their achievements and express their hopes for the future; however, every Chinese leader only gets to stand in front of Tiananmen square once during their reign to accept the cheers and praises of his people. It has been possible for a leader to host multiple military parades during their time in office. However, it has yet to be proven possible for a leader, except for Chairman Mao, to have more than one civilian parade. The scarcity of this kind of parade means that it is not some common propaganda tool that a leader can wield willingly; the scarcity speaks to the crucial position and the high political value that these civilian parades hold in Chinese leaders' minds after 1978. In addition, given that these parades usually take place during the second term of the leader's administration, it is also reasonable to say that these parades are an important opportunity to imprint their own legacy in the history of the PRC. Inside this legacy, leaders showcase both their achievements so far as well as their visions for the future.

The second reason is regarding the special format of these parades. The Chinese leadership has a variety of propaganda tools that it can use to pay tribute to the revolutionary past, celebrate its current achievements, and express its visions of the future. In China, plenty of historical revolutionary TV dramas will be aired every year to pay respect to the armed struggles of the Communist Party; plenty of cultural performances such as dances and dramas will be planned every year to celebrate and praise the leadership for its achievements at present; every year's government work reports, and every party conference's political reports will lay out plans for what will be done in the future. None of these cultural or political performances, however, match the special format of the civilian parades. The civilian parades stand out of China's propaganda norm in that they perform all of the 3 main functions of

propaganda in one single setting. Since 1978, the 4 parades that have been hosted so far all share a similar structure: the first section of the parades would involve imagery of past leaders and past achievements, the middle section of the parades would involve imagery of the current leadership and the various achievements of the current leadership, and the final section of the parades would involve imagery of hope or visions for the future.

The third reason is regarding the discrepancy between the popular nature of the intended audience of the parades and the elitist nature of the messages being delivered through the parades. In the civilian parades, the past, present, and the future are presented with songs, dances, waving crowds, colorful floats, and mass choirs. Although there has been literature that shows that all political actions can be seen as performances, a civilian parade is a type of political action that looks like a regular performance for popular consumption and a politicized performance for message delivery.

In conclusion, I believe the Chinese National Day Civilian Parades would be important to study in order to further the understanding of Chinese politics as well as the signaling function of state propaganda and political performances. In the Chinese context, the National Day Civilian Parades is the only kind of political performance that has all of the 3 signaling functions of state-sanctioned political performances in one place: it glorifies the past, celebrates the present, and envisions the future within a public setting. It is the only major political performance that takes place with its scale of operation, popular participation, and leadership participation. Due to the fact these parades take place once during a leader's term in office, we can keep track how different policies are being portrayed in this public occasion by different leaders.

Research Question

How has the Chinese leadership used the National Day Civilian Parades to signal changes in policy focus and policy direction?

Outline:

In chapter 1, I provide an overview of existing research and literature as well as my theoretical framework. I divide my literature review into 3 sections. The first section discusses two works on function of state propaganda in China. The second section discusses two works on function of state propaganda elsewhere in the world. The third section discusses three works on the reason why we see a relatively systematic and stable presentation of major policy areas in the parades. The fourth section of chapter 1 details the theoretical framework of my project. In chapter 2, I explain my methodology. I divide my methodology into three steps: quantitative data collection, qualitative data collection, and comparative analysis. In chapter 3, I present the result of my research for each of the following policy areas: agriculture, anti-corruption/rule of law, ethnic policy, and response to foreign challenges. In chapter 4, I conclude my thesis by summarizing my theory and my findings, and I present some possible shortcomings as well as possible future study directions.

Chapter 1: Existing Research and Theoretical Framework

This chapter is divided into 4 sections. In the first section, I look at some existing research on functions of state propaganda in China. In the second section, I look at some existing research on functions of state propaganda elsewhere in the world. In the third section, I establish the first part of my theoretical framework: from what we see in the parades, major policy areas are represented more systematically and continuously in the parades since the Reform Era. Although policy direction and focus may change to adapt to a new situation, the general representation of these policies remain relatively continuous throughout the years. I seek to find the reason why representation of major policy areas became more stable, systematic, and continuous since the Reform Era. In the fourth section, I establish the second part of my theoretical framework: I propose that the National Day Civilian Parades in China have four functions: signal a change in policy focus, signal a change in problem-solving strategy, signal a change in policy direction, and showcase strength for a contentious issue.

Section 1: Functions of state propaganda in China

Establish a leader's image and an ideological stance:

Some scholars have argued that state propaganda in China is being used by a leader to establish his own image in Chinese society as well as to create a more “correct”/ “appropriate” version of Chinese history in order to fit into a leader's agenda. Chen Xiaomi argues in her book, *Staging Chinese Revolution : Theater, Film, and the Afterlives of Propaganda*, that films have been being used as a very convenient tool for propaganda purposes by the Chinese state to present its new public image when a new leader comes to power. She argued that films are frequently used by new leaders to reflect the positive image of his new type of leadership and his own new ideology. Chen's second argument is based on the construction of a common national history in China. Chen argued that one of the main

factors that allowed for changes in films is the need for the Chinese state to create a “correct” and “official” version of history. As time goes on, as leadership changes, and as the political situation changes, different leaderships will choose to emphasize different parts of history and portray them differently in films to show the version of history that they approve of.²

In China, state propaganda can be seen in almost every single type of performance art: films, dramas, plays, songs, and TV shows. These types of performance arts that have been used by the state as carriers of propaganda can be labeled as “main-melody themed” (主旋律主题). These “main-melody themed” performance art pieces are meant to educate the Chinese public about revolutionary history and political ideology; they are also intended to create a sense of sacred responsibility among the audience to “carry on the glorious traditions of our revolutionary forefathers” (继承革命先辈的光荣传统).³ These “main-melody themed” performance art pieces are usually released for public view during important political holidays such as the National Day and the Day of the Foundation of the Party.⁴ In some sense, we can see a similarity between these performance art pieces and the National Day Civilian Parades. As Chen argued in her book, the reason why these performances are labeled as “main-melody themed” is because they are created to express an official ideological stance. The “main” in “main melody” represents the communist party. All of these political performances are created to express the melody of the communist party to an audience of the Chinese public. Just like many of these TV shows, films and dramas that would often recreate historical images of leaders like Chairman Mao, all of the National Day Civilian Parades have reserved a front roll seat for Chairman Mao’s legacy. The “main-

² Chen, Xiaomi. 2016. “Propaganda Performance, History, and Landscape.” In *Staging Chinese Revolution Theater, Film, and the Afterlives of Propaganda*. Columbia University Press.

³ Chen, Xiaomi. 2016. “Propaganda Performance, History, and Landscape.” In *Staging Chinese Revolution Theater, Film, and the Afterlives of Propaganda*, 20. Columbia University Press.

⁴ Chen, Xiaomi. 2016. “Propaganda Performance, History, and Landscape.” In *Staging Chinese Revolution Theater, Film, and the Afterlives of Propaganda*, 21. Columbia University Press.

melody themed” political performances have a function of signaling the official ideological position of the Chinese leadership at the time of their creation. The National Day Civilian Parades certainly can also be labeled as a “main-melody themed” political performance that is created in order to present a congregated display of all the official ideologies of the Communist Party of China.

The National Day Civilian Parades are, however, different from the type of performance art that Chen studied in the following manners. Firstly, the role of the state is different in the two cases. Although the Chinese state is involved in the creation of both types of performances, its role in the films and the dramas is indirect, while its role in the parades is direct. In a popular movie or a popular drama portraying the revolutionary era, one does not see the contemporary Chinese leadership nor the government; one only sees the portrayal of past party leaders that are crafted according to the preferences of the current leadership. In the parades, one sees both the ideological image as well as the contemporary leadership. In the parades, one sees both of the production of propaganda as well as the creators of propaganda. The Chinese state actively participates in the political performance of the parades alongside its fellow citizens.

Secondly, while Chen’s studies focused on the ideological nature of these political performances, I focus on the signaling of policy change in political performances. Unlike these films and dramas that Chen studied, most of the parades’ time is devoted to presenting various policy areas. Instead of being a vessel that just displays revolutionary ideology and history, the parades have an important function of displaying policy changes. My work essentially would extend the scope of Chen’s analysis of propaganda beyond the analysis of how history and leadership images are being portrayed. By looking at the less intensively ideological world of policy making, my research would help answer the question: beyond the

usual function of ideological expression of state propaganda, what else can state propaganda do?

Similar to Chen, James Farley and Matthew D. Johnson also focused on the function of state propaganda as a channel for ideological expression in China. In their book, *Redefining Propaganda in Modern China: The Mao Era and its Legacies*, Farley and Johnson explores the legacy of Revolutionary Era state propaganda in Modern China. They argue that the CPC uses propaganda as a means of control, a tool to promote inclusion, as well as a tool to define and highlight division. The CPC also uses propaganda to promote the vision of patriotism and greater national power. For the Communist Party in the modern era, state propaganda remains one of the most important ways to establish ideological control so that the party can carry out its reform and provide guidance to the people.⁵

Another very important function of propaganda in Farley and Johnson's argument is the creation of a favorable historical narrative. The Chinese leadership, especially since Xi Jinping took office in 2013, has been increasingly using propaganda to create a narrative for the history of the CPC that would both be appealing to a domestic as well as to an international audience. China's state propaganda machine has created a carefully crafted narrative for the domestic audience to both reinforce the supremacy of the Party's position and to promote a stronger sense of patriotism. This machine has also created a carefully crafted narrative for the international audience to both promote the benefits of China's model of development and to publicize China's own view of world politics and human history.⁶

⁵ Farley, James. 2020. "Introduction." In *Redefining Propaganda in Modern China, the Mao Era and Its Legacies*, edited by Matthew D. Johnson, 1st ed., 6. Routledge Studies in Modern History . Routledge.

⁶ Farley, James. 2020. "Introduction." In *Redefining Propaganda in Modern China, the Mao Era and Its Legacies*, edited by Matthew D. Johnson, 1st ed., 7–8. Routledge Studies in Modern History . Routledge.

Farley and Johnson's work are very similar to that of Chen in the sense that both of their works have focused on the ideological aspect of state propaganda. Both of them, however, are missing a piece of the puzzle of the many functions of propaganda. Both of them saw contemporary Chinese state propaganda as some sort of a continuation of state propaganda in the Revolutionary Era; thus, both of them have highlighted this kind of legacy and its influence on how modern Chinese leaders use propaganda. I believe, however, that it is important to note the differences between state propaganda in the Revolutionary Era and state propaganda in the Reform Era. It is true that the modern Chinese leadership has inherited the legacy of Revolutionary Era state propaganda and put this legacy into use for their own benefits; however, I would argue that it is also true that the modern Chinese leadership made their own inventions that deviated from the Revolutionary legacy to an extent. Although state propaganda today in China still maintains a highly ideological nature as the previous authors have argued, it is important to note that this is not the only nature of state propaganda. My study would move beyond the traditional image of propaganda and the legacy-based functions of propaganda. I will not simply view the National Day Civilian Parades as just another generic example of state propaganda that continued the legacy of Chairman Mao; rather, I will view it as an exceptional form of modern state propaganda that includes both an ideological-expression function as well as a policy-change signaling function.

Different functions of state propaganda in different eras

Has expression of an ideological stance always been the central function of China's state propaganda work? In Anne-Marie Brady's book, *Marketing Dictatorship : Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China*, we see that China's state propaganda has had different kinds of functions during different eras since 1978. In the 1980s, reformist leaders like Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang downplayed the role of state propaganda as a tool for

expression of an ideological stance; rather, they are more focused on economic development and reforms than any political campaigns.⁷ In the early 1980s, China's state propaganda machine was a frequent battleground between conservatives and reformists, and its work direction frequently changed depending on the ideological stance of the head of the Central Propaganda Department at the time. In 1987, after Zhao Ziyang took office as the General Secretary of the CPC, the state propaganda machine gave out a signal that is more tolerating of debate and criticism as well as encouraging further economic reform.⁸

Although Brady did not analyze the parades specifically as a case of propaganda in her book, we do see a reflection of this general downplay of ideological propaganda work in the 1984 parade. Among the 34 formations that were present during the 1984 parade, I find that only five of them are strictly about any kind of ideological stance.⁹ In contrast, I find that there are 10 formations that are related to the theme of economic development.¹⁰ This significant disparity between ideological propaganda work and economic propaganda work is in sharp contrast to what we can see in some of the parades during the Cultural Revolution. For example, among the 82 formations in the 1969 parade, I find a total of 46 formations that are dedicated to some sort of expression of ideological stance.

After the Political Turbulence during the Summer of 1989, China's state propaganda saw another major shift in its role and functions. The student protests which resulted in chaos and Gorbachev's political reforms which resulted in the breakup of the USSR both taught the

⁷ Brady, Anne-Marie. 2009. "From Thought Reform to Economic Reform: Comparing Propaganda and Thought Work in Different Eras." In *Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China*, 40. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Accessed March 16, 2021. ProQuest Ebook Central.

⁸ Brady, Anne-Marie. 2009. "From Thought Reform to Economic Reform: Comparing Propaganda and Thought Work in Different Eras." In *Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China*, 40-41. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Accessed March 16, 2021. ProQuest Ebook Central.

⁹ These five formations are: "First Generation" 第一代领导人, "Goals for Moving-Forward" 前进目标, "Unify the Motherland" 统一祖国, "World Peace" 世界和平, and "The Four Upholds" 四个坚持.

¹⁰ These 10 formations are: "Family Responsibility in Production" 联产承包, "Agricultural Reform" 农业改革, "Civilized Village" 文明村, "Industrial Modernization" 工业现代化, "Electronics Industry" 电子工业, "Light Industries" 轻工业, "Spinning and Weaving" 纺织工业, "Outward Open-Up" 对外开放, "Modernization of Science and Technology" 科学技术现代化, and "Happy Resident" 幸福居民.

Chinese leadership an important lesson: relaxing control over state propaganda will only lead to the end of the regime itself. Jiang Zemin's administration re-emphasized the importance of using propaganda to stabilize society, to maintain the Party's power, and to create a safe and harmonious environment for economic development.¹¹ After 1995, Jiang Zemin's administration took another turn in how they approached propaganda work. In the last few years of the 20th century, China faced both threats from the west to try to contain China as well as threats from Taiwan in moving towards independence. In this challenging political environment, Jiang began to emphasize the idea of national unity, patriotism, as well as spiritual civilization. Starting in this time period, China began to try to balance its emphasis on the materialistic aspect of economic development versus the importance of spiritual and moral social development.¹² In the 1999 parade, we see a reflection of this kind of double emphasis of both political ideological as well as economic development. In the 1999 parade, three formations were used to celebrate the Revolutionary Era as well as the leadership of Chairman Mao; in the 1984 parade, there was only one formation that represented this theme. The middle section of the 1999 parade, which made up 21 of the 39 formations, mostly included China's achievements in both economic and social development. We can see that although economics still maintained a highly important presence with 7 formations, social development is being emphasized somewhat slightly more with 12 formations.

During the first several years of Hu Jintao's administration, Brady argues that Hu purposefully relaxed restrictions on media and press to a limited extent to try to reduce Jiang's residual influence in the political system. Brady argues that Hu purposefully allowed

¹¹ Brady, Anne-Marie. 2009. "From Thought Reform to Economic Reform: Comparing Propaganda and Thought Work in Different Eras." In *Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China*, 45-47. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Accessed March 16, 2021. ProQuest Ebook Central.

¹² Brady, Anne-Marie. 2009. "From Thought Reform to Economic Reform: Comparing Propaganda and Thought Work in Different Eras." In *Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China*, 51-53. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Accessed March 16, 2021. ProQuest Ebook Central.

some level of popular criticism to try to create unfavorable public views of Jiang's time of office in order to create social pressure to force Jiang to give up the remaining military power he still held. Soon after Jiang resigned from his last military post in 2004, Hu began to once again return to a more standard mode of control over propaganda work.¹³ It is hard to know if it is true that Hu indeed used state propaganda to unseat Jiang, but it is true that as 2009 arrived, we do see a rather hardline approach of propaganda in the 2009 parade. In the 2009 parade, the imagery of Chairman Mao and the Revolutionary Era was presented by 5 formations. Each of the previous leaders' imagery was presented alongside with a broadcast of an audio recording of the leaders' speeches.

It seems that although Brady presented a temporal analysis of state propaganda work in China, she once again failed to consider the aspect of policy signaling. She did a very thorough job in explaining the reasons behind the different kinds of approach of propaganda work during different administrations, but she did not move her analysis further beyond the realm of ideological struggle and political in-fighting. In my research, my goal is to move away from the usual "social control", "ideological expression", and "political struggle" types of paradigm in analysis of state propaganda in China. My goal is to try to look at state propaganda in China with less of a cynical lens but with more of a practical lens. All of the authors that I have mentioned so far have done a very good job at theorizing how China runs its propaganda machine, what China does with its propaganda machine, and how has China's propaganda machine changed throughout history. What I wish to explore in this project is to narrow down the analysis of state propaganda into a single event that would take place in regular intervals in history. In this project, I am not going to treat China as an authoritarian state whose political leadership is desperate to try to use propaganda to brainwash its

¹³ Brady, Anne-Marie. 2009. "From Thought Reform to Economic Reform: Comparing Propaganda and Thought Work in Different Eras." In *Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China*, 56-60. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Accessed March 16, 2021. ProQuest Ebook Central.

population in order to maintain power for itself; rather, I am going to view China as a modern state with a mindful political leadership that is trying to communicate to the public about the policy changes and visions via the National Day Civilian Parades, a kind of propaganda tool and a kind of political performance whose scale, prestige, and temporal importance are unmatched elsewhere.

Section 2: Functions of state propaganda elsewhere in the World

Creation and consolidation of a national identity:

In the previous section, I discussed that China's state propaganda can have a goal of promoting patriotism and a sense of having a unified national identity. This function of propaganda is shared by many other countries in the world, with many employing similar kinds of national celebratory events to China. Elie Podeh's research on national celebrations in the Arab Middle East highlighted this precise function. In his book, he argues that in many post-colonial states, the newly independent regimes often employed national celebratory events such as parades, festivals, and other forms of mass gatherings to create a unified identity for the people of their countries.¹⁴ He also argues that in many immigrant states such as the United States and Australia, national celebrations are often used to create a new national identity in a society that is usually diverse in ethnic and cultural make-up.¹⁵

More specifically, Podeh argues that many countries in the Arab world use national celebrations to enforce a sense of national unity in order to create a differentiation between "us" and "them". In the post-colonial sense, "us" usually refers to people in a particular country or the Arabic people as a collective nation; "them" usually refers to colonists, Europeans, or people from another religion or another Arab country. Because many Arab

¹⁴ Podeh, Elie. 2011. "Celebrating Nation and State: A Theoretical Framework." In *The Politics of National Celebrations in the Arab Middle East*, 10–11. Cambridge University Press.

¹⁵ Podeh, Elie. 2011. "Celebrating Nation and State: A Theoretical Framework." In *The Politics of National Celebrations in the Arab Middle East*, 12. Cambridge University Press.

states share similar languages and religions, it would be difficult for the newly established regimes to create a separate national identity for their own people; therefore, national celebrations were used as a powerful propaganda tool to not only create and consolidate a national identity, but also to maintain a sense of legitimacy for the regime. Podel also argues that national celebrations as a propaganda tool can also have an individually emotional effect. When a person participates in a parade, a festival, or attend a leader's rally, that person would likely to acquire a sense of being a part of a collective national community as well as being a part of the nation's history. This emotional effect can not only promote an individual's affection towards the regime/the state, but also can help inject the new national identity into an individual's consciousness.¹⁶

The functions of propaganda that Podel presented are once again ideological in nature. We see that the ideological-expression functions of propaganda are used extensively by many countries in the world, regardless of regime type. Specifically, national celebratory events as a form of state propaganda are used across the globe to promote a sense of national unity and patriotism. I argue that we can see some of this function in-action in China as well. Since China is a unified multi-ethnic state, the Chinese leadership has always been trying to carefully balance emphasis on individual ethnic identity versus emphasis on a broader sense of Chinese national identity. In the analysis section regarding China's ethnic policy, I will demonstrate that through a change of imagery in the National Day Civilian Parades, we can see a change of direction of China's ethnic policy from having more emphasis on individual ethnic identity to having more emphasis on a unified Chinese national identity.

Social Engineering, Social Control, and Outside Image

¹⁶ Podel, Elie. 2011. "Conclusions." In *The Politics of National Celebrations in the Arab Middle East*, 285-286. Cambridge University Press.

From what we have seen so far, it seems that state propaganda has been used mostly for its ideological expression function by China and many other countries. This, however, is only a part of the bigger story of what propaganda can do. From Tricia Starks' 2009 book, *The Body Soviet: Propaganda, Hygiene, and the Revolutionary State*, we can see that propaganda can also serve as a tool for the USSR to engage in social engineering as well as engage in social control. During the early years of the newly born Soviet state, disease and lack of hygiene became a major cause in high death rate and poor public health. The new Soviet state made solving this health crisis a principal priority in its policy making actions. The Soviet state employed its state propaganda machine in creating public health campaigns which would send thousands upon thousands of professional and party health workers into the general society in order to promote personal hygiene as well as to promote the idea of a healthy socialist body.¹⁷ In a sense, this public hygiene campaign was used by the early Soviet state both as a tool for ideological expression as well as a tool for promoting a certain policy to the general population.

Starks argues that by employing these public hygiene improvement campaigns, the Soviet state was trying to cleanse the entire population out of the "filth" of the old feudalism/capitalist Russia. "Filth" here can refer to either the physically poor condition of Russian people's health, or it can refer to the reactionary and outdated institutions of imperial Russia. Through a cleanse of "filth", the Russian people can be reborn into a new type of people that are both physically healthy and ideologically healthy. The early Soviet state saw this cleanse of public health and hygiene as a way to construct a new socialist identity for its population. Having a clean city, a clean house, and a clean body can be powerful evidence of the benefits of a new socialist regime in which workers can be taken care of and protected.¹⁸

¹⁷ Starks, Tricia. 2009. "Introduction." In *The Body Soviet: Propaganda, Hygiene, and the Revolutionary State*, 5. University of Wisconsin Pres.

¹⁸ Starks, Tricia. 2009. "Introduction." In *The Body Soviet: Propaganda, Hygiene, and the Revolutionary State*, 4. University of Wisconsin Pres.

Starks also argues that this hygiene propaganda campaign was intended to create effective social control for the new Soviet state. She argues that the creation of the Soviet health care system was based on the German economic theory of cameralism. This propaganda campaign was an effective way for the Soviet state to surveil its population as well as to establish firm hierarchical control over the population. The Soviet state employed health inspectors and hygienists to maintain control over the population. Control became a central part of this public health campaign, and the Soviet state wanted to use hygiene as an opportunity to spread the socialist ideology into individual households on a closely personal level. Even though the material condition of the early Soviet state reduced many of these hygiene efforts to a more symbolic level, the idea of “being healthy means being revolutionary” was deeply imprinted in the consciousness of most Soviet citizens.¹⁹

Starks presents a very interesting hybrid-nature of state propaganda in this book. The Soviet public health campaign was in a way both ideological and practical. It was a propaganda campaign that both promoted an ideological expression as well as promoted a policy action. It signaled to the population that the Soviet state is committed to improving people’s health as well as to cleanse the society of the filth of the old times. Starks’ arguments are still mainly focused on the ideological effect of this policy campaign, but she is able to move more beyond the simple paradigm of ideological control; she recognizes that this campaign produced real but limited actual results.

Starks’ idea that state propaganda can be both ideological and practical in nature can be seen in the parades. The parades act both as a channel for ideological education as well as a signaling device for policy shifts. As the Chinese political system gets more and more institutionalized, the parades are becoming more and more systematic in their demonstration

¹⁹ Starks, Tricia. 2009. “Introduction.” In *The Body Soviet: Propaganda, Hygiene, and the Revolutionary State*, 7, 206-207. University of Wisconsin Press.

of the imagery of both ideological stances as well as the imagery of policy preferences. Each generation of leaders are able to showcase their ideological stance as well as their own policy preferences in a continuous fashion while paying tribute to their predecessors. Specifically, there are certain sections within a parade that are dedicated to express an ideological stance, while others are dedicated to signal policy shifts. There are usually formations that directly pay tribute to previous leaders and the current leader; these formations are usually placed in the forefront of parade, and they are often accompanied by giant slogans showcasing the leaders' ideological stances. The policy area formations are usually present in the second half of the parades.

Section 3: A more stable and systematic representation of policy

Peaceful succession and institutionalization:

As we see in the parades, many major policy areas maintain a continuous existence throughout the years. Policy areas such as agriculture, industrial development, environmental protection, residential living, education, culture, and science are generally always present in the parades since the Reform Era. In addition, the way that these major policy areas were presented has been largely standardized since the Reform Era, with most of them appearing in the parades with their own formation and their own float. This observation leads to a very interesting question: why are we seeing this kind of systematic, stabilized, and continuous presentation of important policy areas in the parades?

To answer this question, we can look at the idea of “institutionalization”. In his 2003 article, *China's Changing of the Guard: Authoritarian Resilience*, Andrew J. Nathan proposes that the CPC's ability to institutionalize its bureaucratic governance and party organization is the reason why the CPC is able to stay in power and maintain a resilient authority in a world where many similar regimes had fallen. From the first 2 paragraphs in his article, we can see that Nathan believes that authoritarian regimes are naturally fragile

because they don't have proper legitimacy, they rely too much on coercion, they overcentralize decision making, and they prioritize a leader's personal power over institutions.²⁰

One crucial aspect of the stability of the Chinese political system is regarding the leadership succession process. Unlike many other non-western democratic regimes whose succession processes are often accompanied by crisis, violence, chaos, or even civil war, China's succession process since Jiang Zemin has been proven to be peaceful and orderly. Nathan argues that the institutionalization of the succession process is the key to this rather unusual phenomenon.²¹ Before the Reform Era, although China had a formal set of state institutions, these institutions were not used systematically and many of these institutions were not fully organized. For example, during the Revolutionary Era, there were no effective term limit or retirement age for officials in the category of "Leader of the Party and the State" 党和国家领导人. Many first-generation leaders such as Chairman Mao and Zhou Enlai stayed in office until their death; this lifelong service in office was not helpful when it comes to picking a successor beforehand: in 1971, one of China's most famous general, Lin Biao, staged a failed coup against Chairman Mao. Even though Deng Xiaoping tried to start the process of institutionalization, he was not able to create a safe succession process as the Political Turmoil of 1989 forced him to remove his previously chosen successors.²²

In addition to succession, the institutionalization of China's political system can also be seen in the everyday workings of the government. After 1959, the state governance process broke down slowly and eventually became paralyzed during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). After the 1960s, the Party Congress and the National People's Congress failed

²⁰ Nathan, Andrew J. 2003. "China's Changing of the Guard: Authoritarian Resilience." *Journal of Democracy* 14 (1): 6.

²¹ Nathan, Andrew J. 2003. "China's Changing of the Guard: Authoritarian Resilience." *Journal of Democracy* 14 (1): 7.

²² Nathan, Andrew J. 2003. "China's Changing of the Guard: Authoritarian Resilience." *Journal of Democracy* 14 (1): 7-8.

to meet on regular intervals, and many other aspects of China's government institutions stopped functioning normally as years of political struggles heavily hindered the abilities for these institutions to do so. Since the Reform Era, however, these government institutions began to function normally again. The National People's Congress would be reelected every 5 years, and it would congregate once every year for a full plenary session; the Party Congress would also be reelected every 5 years, and a new politburo would form accordingly. As for the succession process, the institutionalization process can be seen in the following instances: first, after Jiang Zemin took office in 1989, none of the more senior party leaders ever tried to replace or unseat him even though there had been some conflicts between them. Second, Jiang Zemin did not stay in office past the time when he was supposed to retire. Third, even though Jiang Zemin preferred his own successor pick, he did not challenge Deng Xiaoping's pick, which was Hu Jintao. Fourth, after 1992, the retired leaders stopped intervening in the political decision-making process. Fifth, the Chinese military since 1989 has not taken a role in the succession process which protected China from the danger of civil wars. Sixth, since the selection of a new generation of leaders has to be approved by consensus from the previous generation, factional interests are usually restricted and could not have any meaningful influences in most cases.²³

Although this article was written in 2003, the arguments that Nathan presented still make sense to this today. After Hu Jintao took office around 2002-2004, he continued this institutionalized process and was able to successfully hand over his power to Xi Jinping in 2012. Nathan's article provides us with a very important insight into why the Chinese political system managed to be stable and organized throughout the years. If we look at the National Day Civilian Parades, we can see a very good reflection of this kind of orderly and

²³ Nathan, Andrew J. 2003. "China's Changing of the Guard: Authoritarian Resilience." *Journal of Democracy* 14 (1): 8-9.

peaceful transition of power. In every one of these 4 parades that I have studied, all of them had sections dedicated to celebrating the legacy of the previous leaders. In Deng's parade in 1984, the imageries of Chairman Mao, Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, and Zhu De were presented in one of the first formations; in Jiang's parade in 1999, Chairman Mao and Deng Xiaoping's images were presented in form of a giant portrait for the first time; in Hu's parade in 2009, the portraits of all of his three predecessors were accompanied by the broadcasting of a record of an excerpt of their speeches; in Xi's parade in 2019, each previous leader's imagery was accompanied by a second formation dedicated to celebrate two of his most important achievements. We can see from the parades that every Chinese leader maintains a sense of respect towards his predecessors in this very important political occasion, indicating a kind of orderly inheritance of previous leaders' ideologies and policies. This is the reason why we also see a continuous, stable, and systematic presentation of all the major policies. All the major policies are being inherited by the next generation of leaders just like all the institutions/powers of the previous generations would always be inherited by the next generation of leaders. I argue that although new leaders would reform existing institutions, this reform would be more of a "build-upon" kind of process rather than a "destroy and rebuild" kind of process.

Atrophy and Adaptation:

In the parades, we can see that the imagery of the different policy areas changes every time to reflect the changing policy stances of the Chinese leadership throughout the years. One can almost say that from these changing imageries, we can see that the CPC is adapting its policy making in some way according to the changing outside circumstances. In David Shambaugh's 2008 book, *China's Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation*, he presents this precise point with some reservations.

Shambaugh firstly argues that the CPC is in a stage of atrophy. Similar to many western scholars, he argues that the CPC has exhibited some symptoms of an atrophying and aging Leninist Party similar to that of the Communist Party of the USSR. Second, he argues that this atrophying outlook of the CPC is not the full story of China's current political regime.²⁴ He argues that while the CPC has shown some signs of aging and decaying, the party itself is also actively adapting to the changing circumstances. In the short run, the CPC seems to be able to stabilize its society and maintain its dominance over the political landscape by consistently going through a cycle of reform, readjustment, reform, and then readjustment.²⁵ Shambaugh argues that due to the fact that the CPC is in an atrophying stage, it has to constantly adapt in order to survive as a regime and being flexible would be the key to continue its rule. It is crucial for the CPC to be able to address the forever changing demands of its population and adapt its policy making accordingly. It is also important for the CPC to maintain its governing legitimacy by effectively providing public goods and services to its people, which makes adaptation an even more useful tool to use. Shambaugh argues that one of the reasons why the Soviet System collapsed was because the aging Soviet Communist Party failed to respond to the changing demands of the society. The CPC, having learned many valuable lessons from the dissolution of the USSR, managed to position itself in a place where it can, within a certain limit, both adapt to the forever changing world while maintaining its ideology and control.²⁶

Although neither Shambaugh nor I know if this strategy of consistent adaptation would allow the CPC to rule perpetually, both of us would agree that this strategy has indeed allowed the CPC to escape the fate of many non-western democratic regimes. In a sense, the

²⁴ Shambaugh, David. 2008. "Introduction: The Chinese Communist Party and Communism." In *China's Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation*, 5. Berkeley: University of California Press.

²⁵ Shambaugh, David. 2008. "Introduction: The Chinese Communist Party and Communism." In *China's Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation*, 4. Berkeley: University of California Press.

²⁶ Shambaugh, David. 2008. "Introduction: The Chinese Communist Party and Communism." In *China's Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation*, 7. Berkeley: University of California Press.

CPC has been able to establish a stable and relatively peaceful internal environment for development because it is not staying the same. It has managed to achieve a general level of political stability by sacrificing some level of policy stability. From the outside world, it may seem that China is constantly reforming and reinventing; this is precisely what China is doing right. We can see that from actual policy making to policy reflection in the parades, China is forever evolving to change its policies in order to effectively respond to the changing demands of its population as well the changing world as a whole.

As I will theorize later, this adaptation strategy can be seen in the four functions of signaling of the National Day Civilian Parades. China changes constantly its policy direction, policy focus, and problem-solving strategies, and it has managed to change its strategy of dealing with foreign threats in recent years. In almost every segment of the parades, we see some kind of adaptation to update the imageries of important ideological figures and important policy areas. In the 1984 parade, we see that the overwhelming oceans of heavily ideological segments have been cut; in their place, we see mainly presentations of economic achievements and improvement of people's daily lives. In the 1999 parade, we see parade marchers wearing flashy western styled clothing while giant portraits of leaders march across the avenue as highlights of the event. In the 2009 parade, we see more sophisticated-looking floats with more formations presenting imageries of policy areas. In the 2019 parade, we see an emphasis of each of the previous leaders' legacy while tens of thousands of young people dressed up in freshly designed modern attire march across an avenue that has seen most of China's modern history. I believe that these parades are an excellent reflection of China's strategy of adaptation and constant reforms, and it would be interesting to see how this trend adaptation will be reflected in ten years' time in 2029.

Cultural Governance:

In Elizabeth Perry's article, *Cultural Governance in Contemporary China: 'Re-Orienting' Party Propaganda*, she presents another explanation to the reason why the CPC has been able to endure the test of time and to lead a stable and organized regime. She proposes that the state propaganda machine in China is crucial in maintaining the communist party rule. Perry argues that since the Reform Era, the CPC has been re-orienting its propaganda to appeal to a broader audience in the Chinese public. This new orientation intends to create a favorable image of the CPC by connecting the Party itself with images of a China that is revitalizing. Chinese state propaganda has been trying to create a kind of systematic historical narrative for the Party that involves the following principles: first, the narrative establishes that China used to be a great nation with a long and proud history. Second, it establishes that since 1840, China had been through a harsh decline in its national power, and China had endured a tremendous amount of hardship and shame. Third, it establishes that amid all of the humiliations and darkness in China, the CPC was born not only as a party that strives for communism, but also as a party that strives for the revival of the Chinese nation. Fourth, it establishes that the CPC in the modern age is carrying on the exact responsibility of reviving the Chinese nation to a new stage of glory that involves an inheritance of both of its previous history and culture.²⁷

Perry argues subsequently that this cultural and political historical narrative provides the CPC with a strong basis of legitimacy. The idea of the CPC being the only party that can bring back old glory as well as bring in new glory to the Chinese nation gives the CPC legitimacy from a population that is largely proud of their historical past as well as their cultural identity. Through various patriotic education programs that broadcast various kinds of propaganda to the general public, the CPC is actively creating support within its

²⁷ Perry, Elizabeth J. 2017. "Cultural Governance in Contemporary China: 'Re-Orienting' Party Propaganda." Chapter. In *To Govern China: Evolving Practices of Power*, edited by Vivienne Shue and Patricia M. Thornton, 29–30. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

population by promoting a sense of unity among its people based on the idea of pride of one's own history and one's own culture.²⁸

In her article, Perry also highlights an important mechanism in the cultural governance strategy. In order to effectively produce propaganda that can produce positive public reaction, the state propaganda machine often conducts research on public opinion to determine if a certain propaganda idea for a policy/reform would be popular. This research can inform the party what would be acceptable and what would not be acceptable. Therefore, the party can usually create propaganda effectively targeting the right group and change its policy to minimize public opposition.²⁹ She argues that based on this mechanism of gathering information on public opinion, the CPC has been able to be relatively responsive to its population's concerns by being flexible and adaptive in policy making.³⁰ We can see a reflection of this kind of policy flexibility and responsiveness in the National Day Civilian Parades. The visual representations of all the major policies are continuously changing throughout the years. As we will see in the Agriculture policy section, the presentation of agricultural reform/new countryside changes in every parade to reflect the changes made to the focuses of China's agricultural policy. The imageries on these agricultural formations, as we shall see, are made to be adaptive to the specific historical circumstance at the time in order to present an accurate image of the governments' positions on agricultural reform.

These changes in imagery, I argue, serve to create a positive narrative for changes made to agricultural policy. The Chinese leadership intends to use these changes in imagery to demonstrate the fact that these policies are indeed changing, and that these changes would

²⁸ Perry, Elizabeth J. 2017. "Cultural Governance in Contemporary China: 'Re-Orienting' Party Propaganda." Chapter. In *To Govern China: Evolving Practices of Power*, edited by Vivienne Shue and Patricia M. Thornton, 31-33. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

²⁹ Perry, Elizabeth J. 2017. "Cultural Governance in Contemporary China: 'Re-Orienting' Party Propaganda." Chapter. In *To Govern China: Evolving Practices of Power*, edited by Vivienne Shue and Patricia M. Thornton, 29-55. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

³⁰ Perry, Elizabeth J. 2017. "Cultural Governance in Contemporary China: 'Re-Orienting' Party Propaganda." Chapter. In *To Govern China: Evolving Practices of Power*, edited by Vivienne Shue and Patricia M. Thornton, 43. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

benefit the people. I believe that the National Day Civilian Parades can be considered as an important part of the Cultural governance strategy. These parades are used as a signaling tool for the CPC to communicate the following message to the people in order for the Party to gather popular support: first, the images of previous leaders show that the Party is respectful of the Revolutionary past. Second, the heavy display of patriotic symbolism such as flags, emblems, and songs create a strong sense of patriotism upon the audience. Third, the forever-changing presentation of important policy areas indicate to the population that the party cares about their concerns and that the party will be responsive and flexible in order to make positive changes to the policies.

Section 4: Theoretical Framework

After having understood why these parades present systematic, stable, and continuous imageries of major policy areas, the central purpose of my project would be to understand how these parades are presenting these purposeful imageries. To answer this question, we must first understand what the purpose of these National Day Civilian Parades is. The most important piece of literature relating to the study of parades in China is an article written by Chang-tai Hung called *Mao's Parades: State Spectacles in China in the 1950s*. In this article, Hung argues that these kinds of parades in the 1950s are multi-purpose in nature. They can signal to the mass populace that the old order has been demolished and a new era has arrived. They can serve to legitimize the CPC's rule. They can be an excellent opportunity for the Chinese leadership to showcase their current achievements. They can present Chairman Mao's image as central to China's revolutionary history. Finally, they can also reinforce China's status in the international communist movement.³¹

³¹ Hung, Chang-tai. "Mao's Parades: State Spectacles in China in the 1950s." *The China Quarterly*, no. 190 (2007): 413. Accessed February 26, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20192777>.

In addition to these general functions, Hung also argues that these parades have a timelier adaptiveness in their nature. He finds that in the 1950s, the parades' themes are often direct reflections of the major political campaigns that took place or were taking place at the time.³² Regardless of if a campaign is economic in nature (for example, the "Great Leap Forward" campaign) or political in nature (for example, the "Resist America and Aid Korea" campaign), the parades are usually indicative of what is considered as most important during that year. Hung further argues that these parades in the 1950s reflected the political-class social structure in China. In most of these parades, the Young Pioneers would usually come up first as a representation of the successors to the Socialist Revolution; then the workers would march on, symbolizing the leadership-status of the working class. Right after the workers, the peasants would march on, symbolizing the unity between the two revolutionary classes.³³ This kind of reflection of political social class status still remains to this day, as the imagery of workers and farmers would still come up usually quite forward within a parade.

In terms of ethnic policy, Hung notes that the imagery of ethnic groups was present as early as the 1950s. Similar to the presentation of ethnic policy in the 1984 parade, the early parades showcased ethnic policy by using primarily grouped ethnic dance performances that highlighted the individual cultural identities of the ethnic nations. This indicates that even though national unity has been a central emphasis of the CPC since the beginning, the "laissez-faire" attitude had always been the actual underlying theme of China's ethnic policy from the 1950s to the 2000s.³⁴ As to responding to foreign threats and rivals, although the messages of patriotism and anti-imperialism have always existed in some form in the 1950s

³² Hung, Chang-tai. "Mao's Parades: State Spectacles in China in the 1950s." *The China Quarterly*, no. 190 (2007): 421. Accessed February 26, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20192777>.

³³ Hung, Chang-tai. "Mao's Parades: State Spectacles in China in the 1950s." *The China Quarterly*, no. 190 (2007): 421-422. Accessed February 26, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20192777>.

³⁴ Hung, Chang-tai. "Mao's Parades: State Spectacles in China in the 1950s." *The China Quarterly*, no. 190 (2007): 420. Accessed February 26, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20192777>.

parades, Hung finds that the presentation of negative imageries of OUTSIDE enemies was not permitted in the parades.³⁵ He finds that unlike the Soviet tradition of ridiculing enemies in the parades, the Chinese leadership refused the usage of direct symbolism to negatively portray its enemies; instead, more indirect symbols such as slogans and posters would be used to send the message. We can see the reflection of this kind of indirect symbolism in later parades as well. In the fourth analysis section, we shall see that even during the most intense period of China-US trade war, Xi Jinping did not show around a dummy image of Trump during his parade in 2019, which is very different from what the Soviets did to the imagery of kulaks: Hung notes that during one parade in the USSR, effigies of the kulaks were burned on the Red Square.³⁶

Hung's research provides me with a very good basis in understanding the various functions and themes of parade politics in China, but I argue that more functions and themes have been added to the parades, and some of the functions he presented are no longer in effect after the Reform Era, while some of the functions have remained until the modern era.

I argue that in contrast to the highly ideological nature of Chairman Mao's parades, parades in the Reform Era are used much more for their signaling function for policy change. I also argue that in contrast to the highly turbulent nature of policy making during the Revolutionary Era, there is generally much more policy stability after the Reform Era. One function of the 1950s parades that is being inherited into the Reform Era would be the function of showcasing an administration's achievements to the public. This function is perhaps one of the most obvious and common functions of any kind of state propaganda, whether in China or in the west. I argue that within this function of showing off one's own

³⁵ Hung, Chang-tai. "Mao's Parades: State Spectacles in China in the 1950s." *The China Quarterly*, no. 190 (2007): 428. Accessed February 26, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20192777>.

³⁶ Hung, Chang-tai. "Mao's Parades: State Spectacles in China in the 1950s." *The China Quarterly*, no. 190 (2007): 428. Accessed February 26, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20192777>.

achievements, there are four types of more specific signaling effects related to policy change. I argue that the parades are not as simple as they appear: they are not just another opportunity for the CPC to tell the people how great it is. The CPC is using the parades to signal the following:

The first function of these parades is to signal a change of focus within a policy area (we have done enough on this aspect, now let's focus on this other aspect of the same policy area) 政策重点的改变. I will use the example of agricultural policy and its imagery in the parades to demonstrate how the CPC signaled a change from focusing on the macro-economic aspect of agriculture to focusing on the poverty alleviation and the life quality aspect of agriculture.

The second function of these parades is to signal a change of problem-solving strategy (we tried to solve this problem this way and it didn't work out, so let's now try a new way to deal with it) 问题解决方式的转变. I will use the example of anti-corruption/rule of law and their imageries in the parades to demonstrate how the CPC signaled a change from a more educational/internal-party strategy of combating corruption to a more legalistic/participatory strategy of combating corruption.

The third function of these parades is to signal a change of policy direction (we have been doing things a certain way, but now we need to go the opposite direction due to some new challenges) 政策方向的转变. I will use the example of ethnic policy and its imagery in the parades to demonstrate how the CPC signaled a change from an ethnic policy that tolerated more individuality to an ethnic policy that emphasized more unity.

The fourth function of these parades is to show strength for a contentious issue (we are being challenged by an outside source right now, and we need to show that we are

powerful as a response right now) 对外展示实力. I will use the issues of Hong Kong and the Trade War to demonstrate how the CPC used the parade in 2019 to show China's strength during a time period of contentious diplomatic relations and outside challenges.

Chapter 2: Methodology

The research process of this project can be divided into 3 steps: quantitative data collection, qualitative data collection, and comparative analysis of these two types of data.

Step 1: Quantitative Data Collection:

Quantitative data collection involves 4 steps. First, I determined which policy areas would be the best fit for each of the first 3 functions of signaling. Second, by doing a brief survey of all the 51 government work reports (政府工作报告) and all the 12 party congress reports (某届党代会报告/政治报告), I determined key terms and/or phrases that would best represent these 3 policy areas. Third, I conducted a word search for these key terms and/or phrases and recorded the frequency of their usage in these reports. Fourth, I added all the terms' frequency of usage together into 3 indices that would represent a summarized frequency of mention of these 3 policy areas in the reports. The data sheet is organized chronologically and annually from 1954 to 2019. It is important to note that from 1961 to 1963, from 1965 to 1974, and from 1976 to 1977, the Chinese government did not publish an annual government work report. Data for the party congress reports are recorded every 5 years in accordance with the frequency of party congresses, which usually convenes quinquennially, with the exception of the 8th, 9th, and 10th party congresses.³⁷

³⁷ The 8th Party Congress took place in 1956, the 9th in 1969, and the 10th in 1973.

One important thing to note here is that the process of determining which terms or phrases would best describe and represent the policy areas is a very subjective one. For agricultural policy, only a handful of terms would be sufficient to accurately reflect its level of importance in the reports; for anti-corruption/rule of law and ethnic policy, there are more terms that needed to be included in order to accurately reflect their level of importance. The principal problem with trying to determine which terms or phrases I should include in the calculation of these 3 indices is the fact that different administrations would use a different set of terms to describe the same policy area. The biggest problem is that as time passes, new terms and phrases would be added to the list of terms and phrases as governments enact new policies. New policies might mean new ways to think about a certain problem, which means that new terms might be invented in order to describe a new concept or a new strategy. As time goes on, the list of terms or phrases to search for would grow larger and larger, which is very time consuming.

In addition, it is hard to collect all the possible terms or phrases that can relate to a policy area, as that would require me to go through every report qualitatively and read through all the sections relating to that policy area. As I do not have enough time during the time limit of a senior thesis project, I have decided to limit the number of terms within each index to be under 20. This solution to this unfortunate problem can have some negative impact on the quality of the data collected. It is highly likely that most of the quantitative trends will be skewed in favor of the older government work reports. Many of the newer terms and phrases might be missed in the calculation of the 3 indices, and as a result, the relative importance of these 3 policy areas after the 2000s might be underestimated to a degree. If I were to be given more time for this research process, I would find some automated text analysis software to perform a text analysis by decade instead of by each year. As I only established my current research framework a few weeks

before the final due date, I did not have time to look for and learn to use an advanced text search tool. Another very important issue to be noted here is that frequency of key term and phrase usage is only an approximation for the relative importance of these 3 policy areas in government and party reports. The frequency of key term and phrase usage is not a perfect indication for the actual level of importance of these policy areas in China.

One will also note that there is no quantitative data collection with respect to the Hong Kong/Trade War policy areas. The primary reason for this unusual exception is a constraint of time. As I have revised my research process and structure many times, I did not have sufficient of time to collect data on this fourth policy area. Instead, I decided to take a fully qualitative approach. As both of these policy areas are highly contemporary and have a nature of being on-going current issues, it is reasonable to say that a quantitative analysis for these two policy areas would have very skewed trends in favor of the present. Since the major Hong Kong protests only started 2 years ago and since the Trade War only started 3 years ago, it is reasonable to assume that neither issues will have much of a presence in government or party reports before 2018. Even though Hong Kong has been under Chinese sovereignty since 1997, I still decided to not collect quantitative data related to “One Country, Two System”. This decision was made with respect to the “right-now” nature of the 4th type of signaling. In contrary to other 3 policy areas, the fourth policy area is much more about the parades as a tool to present a response to an on-going current issue rather than a tool to signal a change in policy for a continuous and pre-existing issue.

Step 2: Qualitative Data Collection:

Qualitative data collection consists of 6 categories: formations, notes, function, theme, interaction score, and songs. All data for these 6 categories are collected by watching video recordings of the four parades and taking notes in the process. Here are

some brief descriptions of the 6 categories. More specific coding information can be found in the appendix.

Formations: I recorded the name of each of the formations in the parades. In the 1984 and 1999 parades, some formations do not have formal names, so I had to create a name for them based on observing and determining the theme of the formation. In the 2009 and 2019 parades, the CCTV video recordings have subtitles for the formations, so I simply took notes on those subtitles. I translated these formation names to my best ability, but you may see slightly different translations from other news sources.

Visual Representation: I took notes on the appearances of the parades while watching the video recordings. This is a very subjective process as I am looking for what is considered as interesting to my topic of analysis. I am mainly looking for any new innovations in the presentation of images of the 4 policy areas. Many of these notes are used in my results and analysis section to help explain the change in appearance of some of the formations.

Function: the formations can have three main functions. They can either pay tribute to China's revolutionary past, celebrate achievements of the current administration, or they can provide a vision for the future. Please note that this category is unrelated to the four types of signaling. Data from this category adds a temporal dimension to the analysis of the contents of the formations. This category can be useful for future research in terms of analyzing, for example, the presence of the legacy of Chairman Mao in these parades.

Theme: the theme of the formations refers to the general policy area or the social class/population group that the formations intend to represent. The theme of a formation is determined subjectively by both looking at the name of the formations and the physical appearance of the formations.

Interaction score: the interaction score of each formation is a quantitative measurement for the level of interaction between the marching crowds and the viewing leadership. This score is determined subjectively by watching the video recordings of each parade and observing to see if the marching crowds had any direct interaction such as eye contact or hand waving with the leadership.

Songs: every formation in every parade is accompanied by one or a set of background music. These songs are usually chosen to match the general theme of a segment, a section, or a particular formation. The songs that are being used in the parades are usually very well-known and popular music scores in China, meaning they can be determined easily by simply listening to them and then taking notes on their names.

Step 3: Comparative Analysis:

The comparative analysis of quantitative and qualitative data involves both descriptive statistics and qualitative comparison. For the first three types of signaling, there are three analysis sections: qualitative analysis, quantitative analysis of government work reports, and quantitative analysis of party Congress reports.


In the qualitative analysis sections, I describe each of the policy areas' presence in the parades chronologically. For the agricultural policy and ethnic policy sections, I made a detailed account of the presence of agricultural and ethnic policy formations in each of the four parades and provided my own analysis on the significance of change in float imagery and are the policy implications of these changes. For the anti-corruption/rule of law section, I made a detailed account of the presence of this policy area in the 2009 and 2019 parades. For the 1984 and 1999 parades, I explained why this policy area was not present. For the Hong Kong/Trade War section, I made a detailed account of the presence of the relevant formations in 2019. For the previous 3 parades, I explained why this policy area was not present.

In the quantitative analysis of the government work reports section, I presented a graph of the frequency of term usage for 3 or 4 most important terms related to the first 3 policy areas. I then took notes on the various important trends seen in the graphs and then compared these trends with what we saw in the parades. I compared the trends with the parade imagery and focused on which parts matched together and which parts did not match together. For those parts that matched together, I explained how exactly the two are related by using qualitative evidence such as which specific policies were enacted in these policy areas during a specific time period. For those parts that did not match together, I explained why they might not have matched together, and I explained the historical background of these policy areas to see why there are discrepancies.

In the quantitative analysis of the party congress reports section, I performed a similar mode of descriptive statistics of the frequency of term usage in the party congress reports with comparisons made with the qualitative descriptions of the parades. I then made a comparison between the trends we see in the government work reports and the trends we see in the party congress reports. I explained why these trends have or have not matched and how these matches/mismatches are reflected or not reflected in the parades.

Parade Terminology and Parade Structure

This section is created with the purpose of introducing some of the important terms that I will be using in describing the parades. I will be using some graphics to define these terms.



Chapter 3: Results and Analysis (Descriptive Statistics)

Civilized Village and Agricultural Reforms:

The first type of the parades' signaling functions involves the presentation of the change of focus within a policy area. For thousands of years, agriculture has been the most important and the most difficult policy for any Chinese leader to manage. Being able to feed one's population had become a staple achievement that any benevolent kings or emperors would wish to have as a part of their legacy. The first major piece of economic reform that the newly born PRC enacted was the famous Land Reform Law of 1952; after 1978, agriculture once again became the vanguard policy area for economic reform during the Reform Period. As we shall see in the following sections, the National Day Civilian Parades demonstrated a transition of agriculture policy in China from focusing on production & macroeconomic reforms to focusing on living quality and more issue-specific reforms.

Qualitative Analysis:

In the 1984 parade, the "Household Responsibility" formation was led by a set of giant physical slogans that displayed the phrase: "Household Responsibility is Good". The "Agricultural Reform" formation centered around a colorful float depicting a model for the "Number One Document". The "Number One Document" refers to the first official policy document that the Central Committee of the CPC publishes every year, and in this case, it refers to the "Number One Document" that was published every year from 1982 until 1986 which all specifically focused on agricultural reforms.³⁸ These two formations celebrated

³⁸ Wei, Xiangyuan 魏向远. 2018. "Gaige Kaifang yilai Shenong 'Zhongyang Yihao Wenjian' Yanjiu 改革开放以来以来涉农 '中央一号文件' 研究 [Research on Agriculture Related Central No.1 Document since Reform and Opening up]" Shuoshi Xuewei Lunwen 硕士学位论文 Master of Law diss , Kaifeng 开封: Henan Daxue 河南大学 University of Henan.

one major policy achievement and presented a favorable image of CPC by emphasizing the importance of the “Number One Document”.


Figure 1: The “Household Responsibility” formation in the 1984 National Day Civilian Parade



Source: Li, Xianzhong 李显忠. 2016. *1984 Nian Guoqing Dayuebing He Qunzhong Youxing (Wanzheng Zhibo)* 1984 年国庆大阅兵和群众游行 (完整直播) [1984 National Day Military Parade and Civilian Parade (Full Live Feed)]. May 5, 2016. Youtube video, 40:45. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M_tZPZTx3B8

The “Constructing a Civilized Village” formation was centered around a giant physical slogan and a float depicting the image of a bounty of crop harvest with flowers. It did not present a specific image of what a civilized village would look like, indicating that there was no specific plan yet for actually constructing modern villages in China; rather, this formation with extreme vagueness was trying to present a future vision for something that China did not have power to accomplish during that time. Its vagueness functioned as a fill-in-the-blank question for future leaders. Essentially, what Chinese leaders were trying to say was: we have presented this future dream for our country, and it will be up to the efforts of the next generations to inject specific policies into this dream and then make this dream come true.

Figure 2: The “Constructing a Civilized Village” formation in the 1984 National Day Civilian Parade



Source: Li, Xianzhong 李显忠. 2016. *1984 Nian Guoqing Dayuebing He Qunzhong Youxing (Wanzheng Zhibo)* 1984 年国庆大阅兵和群众游行（完整直播） [1984 National Day Military Parade and Civilian Parade (Full Live Feed)]. May 5, 2016. Youtube video, 42:43. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M_tZPZTx3B8

In the 1999 parade, there was only one formation dedicated to agriculture. This one formation was led by two floats, one depicting the image of a harvest, and the other depicting the image of a river dam. The harvest float was centered around a female statue holding a slogan with the message: “Agricultural Modernization”. This float indicated an emphasis on the modernization of production, but not quality of life. The river dam float indicated an emphasis on agricultural infrastructure in terms of major national projects, but not in terms of fixing locally specific infrastructural problems. These two floats were then followed by a giant block of people marching in unison, whose confetti formed a colored image of the word for “Good Harvest” in Chinese. This whole formation in 1999 indicated that the Chinese leadership at the time still focused on macroeconomic goals of agricultural reforms, which included an emphasis on both production output and national-level infrastructure planning.

Figure 3: The “Agriculture” formation in the 1999 National Day Civilian Parade



Source: Mei Neng Da Yinghua 美能达映画. 2019. *1999 Nian Guoqing 50 Zhounian Shengda Yuebing (Gaoqing Wanzheng Ban)* 1999 年国庆 50 周年盛大阅兵（高清完整版） [1999 50-Year Anniversary National Day Grand Military Parade (HD Full Version)]. October 16, 2019. Bilibili video, 83:29. <https://www.bilibili.com/video/av71455376/>

In the 2009 parade, there were two formations dedicated to agriculture. The first formation was called “Agricultural Development”, and the second one was called “Constructing a New Socialist Countryside”. The first formation was very similar to its 1999 counterpart, with the imagery of a harvest, a green house, and a mechanical harvester. The emphasis on sustaining a high level of agricultural production has always existed as the principal goal of China’s agricultural development, and we can see that this principal goal will come first during every parades’ agricultural section.

Figure 4: The “Agricultural Development” formation in the 2009 National Day Civilian Parade



Source: Wang, Xuguan 王徐冠. 2017. *2009 Nian 60 Zhounian Guoqing Yuebingshi* 2009 年 60 周年国庆阅兵式 [2009 60-Year Anniversary National Day Military Parade]. January 26, 2017. Youtube video, 1:56:17. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SmSMQoTigos&t=6856s>

The second formation presents a very specific image of what a modern new Chinese village would look like. Its float included a model of a library, a streetlamp, a citizen service center, and a modern house with a solar panel in the back. This second formation and its specificity filled in the blank that was presented by the “Civilized Village” formation in 1984. It indicated that China had enough economic power to actually began creating and implementing specific policies related to modernizing the rural areas. It also indicated that the long-term vague dream of 1984 has been turned into a short-term actionable vision. Certain items presented on this float was already being achieved in 2009, and some other items would become major policy ideas during Xi Jinping’s “Poverty Elimination” campaign.

Figure 5: The “Constructing a New Socialist Countryside” formation in the 2009 National Day Civilian Parade



Source: Wang, Xuguan 王徐冠. 2017. 2009 Nian 60 Zhounian Guoqing Yuebingshi 2009 年 60 周年国庆阅兵式 [2009 60-Year Anniversary National Day Military Parade]. January 26, 2017. Youtube video, 1:57:42. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SmSMQoTigos&t=6856s>

In the 2019 parade, there were two formations dedicated to agriculture. The first formation was called “Rural Rejuvenation”, and the second one was called “Eliminate Poverty”. This time, the order of presence of the two types of formations has changed. This time, the formation dedicated to improving of rural living conditions came before the formation dedicated to agricultural production and rural economic development. The “Rural Rejuvenation” formation was centered around a float that depicted a very detailed image of a new and modern Chinese village. In comparison to its counterpart in 2009, this float is much more detailed and bigger in size. It depicted clean houses with a clean natural environment in both northern and southern architectural style. The people who were marching around this float dressed in mostly modern-style clothing. This formation in 2019 presented three main interesting changes: firstly, the more detailed and bigger-sized float indicated that the dream of a “Civilized Village” is being realized right now, and the

images being presented on the float are no longer just visions for the future, but actually reflections of the present achievements.

Figure 6: The “Rural Rejuvenation” formation in the 2019 National Day Civilian Parade



Source: CCTV Zhongguo Zhongyang Dianshitai CCTV 中国中央电视台 CCTV China Central Television. 2019. *Qingzhu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chengli 70 Zhounian Dahui Yuebingshi Qunzhong Youxing Tebie Baodao* 《庆祝中华人民共和国成立 70 周年大会阅兵式 群众游行特别报道》 [Special Report on the Celebration of the 70th Anniversary of the Founding of the PRC: Military Parade and Civilian Parade]. October 1, 2019. Youtube video, 2:16:17. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TypEKtdYN6w&t=8161s>

Secondly, the fact that we see this formation before the “Eliminate Poverty” formation meant that the Chinese leadership is now placing a heavy emphasis on the multi-dimensional nature of rural development. From the beginning of the PRC until the 2010s, China’s agricultural policy has focused upon improving production conditions and alleviating poverty by raising income levels. This formation in 2019 demonstrated that the Chinese leadership is placing an emphasis on non-monetary aspects of poverty alleviation and rural development. Improving hygiene, improving environmental protections, and improving literacy and education are important goals that are being pushed alongside with other traditional agricultural goals as China is moving closer and closer towards eradicating absolute rural poverty. This formation in 2019 also shows us that China’s

current agricultural reforms are being connected more and more closely with Xi Jinping's own visions and policy goals, which means that Xi Jinping is trying to distinguish his agricultural achievements from efforts of previous leaders.

Figure 7: The "Eliminate Poverty" formation in the 2019 National Day Civilian Parade




Source: CCTV Zhongguo Zhongyang Dianshitai CCTV 中国中央电视台 CCTV China Central Television. 2019. *Qingzhu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chengli 70 Zhounian Dahui Yuebingshi Qunzhong Youxing Tebie Baodao* 《庆祝中华人民共和国成立 70 周年大会阅兵式 群众游行特别报道》 [Special Report on the Celebration of the 70th Anniversary of the Founding of the PRC: Military Parade and Civilian Parade]. October 1, 2019. Youtube video, 2:25:03. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TypEKtdYN6w&t=8161s>

Thirdly, if we compare the traditional-culture elements of these formations, we can see that the Chinese leadership in 2019 is not only emphasizing improvement of rural areas' material condition, but also emphasizing a need for change in rural areas' spiritual condition. In 1984, the agricultural formations included a lot of cultural elements such as traditional instruments, traditional clothing, and traditionally styled floats. In 1999, these cultural elements were presently in a very limited fashion by only having the marching masses wearing traditional clothing and waving traditional fans. In 2009, these traditional elements were only visible on the marching of traditional opera boats. In 2019, the marching masses wore modern style clothing, and the only culture that was present was the

static images of traditional painting on the walls of the fake buildings on the float. This slow process removal of traditional elements indicated a process of modernization of rural culture. This modernization has been a heavy point of emphasis by Xi Jinping’s administration. During his term in office so far, both the central and local governments have announced various kinds of policies that tried to encourage rural people to move away from any harmful traditions such as wasteful spending on food during social occasions.

Quantitative Analysis of Government Work Reports:

Figure 8: Trend of Frequency of usage of Agriculture-related terms in Government Work Reports (1954-2019)³⁹⁴⁰



In this graph, we see the frequency of usage of terms related to agriculture in government work reports (政府工作报告) from 1954 to 2019. The years in which the four parades took place are marked with red lines. The time periods of each leader’s term in office are marked with squares whose length are equal to the length of their tenure.

³⁹ Please see the Data Source section of the Appendix for an example citation of a government or party report.

⁴⁰ Please note that from 1961 to 1963, from 1965 to 1974, and from 1976 to 1977, the State Council did not publish a government work report.

We can see that agricultural policy was heavily emphasized during the very early years of Deng Xiaoping's term. We know that China's Reform-Era commenced with agricultural reforms that involved the annulment of the People's Commune system and the installment of the Household Responsibility System. This explains why we see a high frequency of usage of agricultural terms from 1978 to 1982, which was the time period that began with the first villager-initiated experimentation on household-responsibility for production in Anhui Province and ended with the official recognition of the Household Responsibility System by the Central Committee of the CPC.

After 1982, we see a sudden drop in the frequency of mention of agricultural terms and then a relative long period of lower frequencies of mention from 1984 to 1999. After the establishment of the first special economic zone in Shenzhen in 1980, China's reform activities have been focused on opening-up in the coastal urban front, so we could reasonably expect a relatively weaker emphasis on agricultural policy after the enactment of the single most important agricultural policy in 1982. The only rise in emphasis on agriculture policy can be seen on the spike in the usage of "poverty" related terms from 1994 to 1997. This spike is highly likely to be the reflection of a major policy action that was called the "Eight-Seven National Poverty Alleviation Plan" (国家八七扶贫攻坚计划). This plan was created in 1994 by Jiang Zemin's administration with the intent to alleviate extreme poverty for the 80 million people living in rural areas within the last 7 years of the 20th century.⁴¹ Although this poverty alleviation effort had much success in improving people's lives in the rural areas, it was not mentioned during the 1999 parade as

⁴¹ Guo Wu Yuan 国务院 State Council. 1994. "Guo Wu Yuan Yinfa 'Guojia Baqi Fupin Gongjian Jihua' 国务院印发《国家八七扶贫攻坚计划》 [The State Council publishes 'The 8-7 National Plan for Poverty Alleviation']" . In *Zhongguo Gaige Kaifang Xinshiqi Nianjian* 中国改革开放新时期年鉴 [Yearbook of the New age of Reform and Open Up in China], edited by Wang, Zhenchuan 王振川, 352–56. Beijing 北京: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi Chubanshe 中国民主法制出版社 [China Democracy and Legal Publishing House].

a major achievement. This can be explained, once again, by the fact that China's reform efforts during Jiang Zemin's administration was focused much more on urban open-up.

If we look at the two trends described above together, we can see that the 1984 parade served both as a presentation for current achievements as well as a presentation for long term future goals. After having seen some success in agricultural reform, the Chinese leadership began to envision long term goals for future agricultural development. The "Household Responsibility" formation and the "Agricultural Reform" formation both presented what the CPC had achieved so far between 1978 and 1984; the "Civilized Village" formation presented a vague long-term vision for the next step in agricultural development: moving from production-related reforms to life-quality-related reforms. Since China did not have the economic power to achieve this dream of a modern village, this future vision was only present vaguely once in 1984 and did not appear again in 1999. In between 1984 and the beginning of the new century, we see a relatively low level of emphasis on agriculture, indicating that the future vision presented in 1984's parade was indeed only a dream-for-later, not a plan that can be immediately realized.

In 2009, the "Civilized Village" formation was presented once again in a more specific fashion as China has gained enough economic strength to change the "Rural Modernization" plan into a short-term vision. In 2005, the Chinese government already began taking actions to renovate rural areas, so this formation in 2009 is both a reflection of the actions that were already taking place as well as a signal for upcoming major policy actions.⁴² After only 4 years, in 2013, Xi Jinping announced a new plan to eradicate rural poverty, and a series of major rural policies were announced to aim at improving living

⁴² Cao, Yingwang 曹应旺. 2012. "Shiliuda Yilai Woguo Jianshe Shehuizhuyi Xinnongcun de Sange Shijiao" 十六大以来我国建设社会主义新农村的三个视角 [Three perspectives on the Construction of Socialist New Countryside since the 16th Party Congress] Edited by Li, Zhentong 李振通. Hongqi Wengao 红旗文稿, no. 13: 18-21.

conditions in the rural areas by building new toilets, better roads, and safer houses.⁴³ We can see the upcoming major policy actions from two trends after 2009. After 2009, we see a consistent drop in the usage of “Agriculture” and “Farmer” related terms; however, we see a rise in the usage of “Poverty” related terms. These two trends have two connections with what we see the in the 2009 and 2019 parades.

Firstly, the dramatic increase of detailedness of the “Civilized Village” formations from 2009 to 2019 indicated a transition from a focus on the macroeconomic goals of agricultural reform to a focus on the specific goal of eradicating absolute poverty in the rural areas. As the presentation of agricultural reform becomes less related to production and more about improving people’s lives, we could reasonably expect a rise in emphasis on poverty alleviation and a relative decline in emphasis on agricultural production.

Secondly, as China has achieved much in terms of eradicating absolute poverty in the country’s most isolated rural areas during Xi Jinping’s administration so far, it would be reasonable to conclude that we would see a sustained high level of usage of “Poverty” related terms in government work reports as China approaches the final deadline of poverty eradication in 2021; we would also expect to see the images of “Civilized Village” and “Poverty Eradication” being prioritized over the image of “Agricultural Reform”. The image of “Agricultural Reform”, which is related to the production aspect of agricultural policy, was present during the 2019 parade as a mere “Tribute to the Past” formation within a segment dedicated to celebrating Deng Xiaoping’s life. We can see from this change that the idea of improving agricultural production has been pushed away to become a past tense, while the idea of improving living conditions and eradicating poverty have been pushed to the front to become a source of pride for the present.

⁴³ Wang, Tengfei 王腾飞. 2018. “Xi Jinping Xinshidai Tuopingongjian Sixiang Yanjiu 习近平新时代脱贫攻坚思想研究 [Research on Xi Jinping’s thought of the Fight Against Poverty in New Era]” Shuoshi Xuewei Lunwen 硕士学位论文 Master Diss, Chang Chun 长春: Jilin Daxue 吉林大学 University of Jilin.

Figure 9: The “Hopeful Fields” formation in the 2019 National Day Civilian Parade




Source: CCTV Zhongguo Zhongyang Dianshitai CCTV 中国中央电视台 CCTV China Central Television. 2019. *Qingzhu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chengli 70 Zhounian Dahui Yuebingshi Qunzhong Youxing Tebie Baodao* 《庆祝中华人民共和国成立 70 周年大会阅兵式 群众游行特别报道》 [Special Report on the Celebration of the 70th Anniversary of the Founding of the PRC: Military Parade and Civilian Parade]. October 1, 2019. Youtube video, 2:01:47. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TypEKtdYN6w&t=8161s>

Quantitative Analysis of Party Congress Reports:

Figure 10: Trend of Frequency of usage of Agriculture-related terms in Party Reports (1954-2019)⁴⁴

⁴⁴ Please see the Data Source section of the Appendix for an example citation of a government or party report.



In this graph, we see the frequency of usage of terms related to agriculture in Communist Party Congress Reports from 1954 to 2019. The years in which the four parades took place are marked with red lines. The time periods of each leader’s term in office are marked with squares whose length are equal to the length of their tenure. There have been 12 Party Congresses since the founding of the PRC in 1949. There have been 8 Party Congresses since 1976: the 11th Congress in 1977, the 12th Congress in 1982, the 13th Congress in 1987, the 14th Congress in 1992, the 15th Congress in 1997, the 16th Congress in 2002, the 17th Congress in 2007, the 18th Congress in 2012, and the 19th Congress in 2017. Mao Zedong’s administration corresponds to the 8th, 9th, and 10th Congresses. Deng Xiaoping’s administration corresponds to the 11th, 12th, and 13th Congresses. Jiang Zemin’s administration corresponds to the 14th and 15th Congresses. Hu Jintao’s administration started and ended with the 16th and the 18th Congresses. Xi Jinping’s administration started with the 18th Congress, and he hosted the 19th Congress in 2017.

We can see from the series of blue dots that since 1978, agriculture maintained a generally important presence in topics discussed by the Party Congresses. Similar to the government work reports of the early 1980s, we see a very high emphasis in agriculture during the 12th Party Congress. Similarly, as we move into the late Deng period and early Jiang Period, we see a general decline in the relative importance of agriculture from the 13th to the 15th Congress. Since the 16th Congress in 2002, we see very little variation in the emphasis on agriculture, which is different from the highly volatile changes we saw in the government work reports.

This trend of stability of emphasis in Party Congress Reports presents us with two important implications. Firstly, this trend can help us understand the different functions of the government work reports and the Party Reports. Government work reports are published annually, so their content changes year after year according to that each year's specific circumstances. They are a reflection of the present, and they contain important policy information that are specific to what has been achieved for the previous year and what needs to be done next years. Party Reports, on the other hands, are published usually quinquennially. Their content, once published, will guide China's development for the next five years. Rather than outlining every specific policy and development goals, the Party Reports provide political rhetoric and general policy direction to government work in the future. Government work reports are more specific and circumstantial than Party Reports, so that's why we see this difference in the level of variations. Secondly, this trend tells us that since the 16th Congress, China has been consistently focusing on agricultural development as one of its principal policy goals. Even though we see a fluctuating image from government work reports, the steady image we see from the Party Reports shows us that the Communist Party has established agriculture as a long-term policy area of focus.

This emphasis of stability by the Party can be seen in the parade as well. There are some policies that would disappear in the parades as time go on, and there are some policies that show up in some parades but not others. For example, there is a formation called “World Peace” in 1984 that demonstrated a theme and anti-imperialism and internationalism. This formation with a very Marxist-Leninist view of the world never returned again in later parades, and the topic of “World Peace” would be presented again in 2009 and 2019 with a much less ideological focus on international cooperation. The agriculture theme, however, is always present in the parades.

Figure 11: A sheep-shaped float in the “Great Leap Forward” achievement section in the 1959 National Day Civilian Parade



Source: Revolutionary Force. *Qingzhu Jianguo Shi Zhounian* 庆祝建国十周年 [1959 CHINA NATIONAL DAY]. May 7, 2016. Youtube video, 1:02:11. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l5psl_ao2q0&t=3749s

Ever since the first National Day Civilian Parade in 1950, agricultural has maintained a consistent presence. From available video evidence from parades of 1959, 1966, and 1970, we can see that even while many other policies have disappeared from

public view during the height of the Cultural Revolution, an agricultural formation managed to stay as the single most important and indispensable formation during all the parades in the history of the PRC. After 1978, all the four parades have placed agriculture either as the first or the close-second formation in the segment that is dedicated to showcase important policy areas and achievements of the current administration. All of the evidence indicates to us that parades can both reflect specific government policy goals as well as broad policy directions.

Anti-Corruption and Rule of Law:

The second type of the parades' signaling functions involves foreshadowing upcoming changes in problem solving strategy. The problems of corruption and rule of law have been a long-existing headache for Chinese leaders. Corruption within the political system had caused the Chinese people to rise up and rebel against their kings and emperors time after time. Even the strongest of dynasties such as Han, Tang, or Ming could not escape the fate of being plagued by corruption at the end of their reign. Ever since its establishment in 1921, the CPC has tried many times to rid itself of corruption by implementing various kinds of anti-corruption campaigns. As we shall see from the following sections, the National Day Civilian Parades have been used by the Chinese leadership as a platform to show strength and dedication to anti-corruption right before Xi Jinping's intensive anti-corruption campaign. The parades are also used to show strength and dedication to issues relating to rule of law right before Xi Jinping brought rule of law up into the public front. Both of these issues have been long-existing issues that preceded their first appearance in the parades; however, due to their contentious and politically sensitive nature, they had not gotten much public appearance in politically charged occasions such as the parades.

Qualitative Analysis:

In 1984, neither anti-corruption nor rule of law appeared in any format during the parade. In 1984, most formations were dedicated to various policies areas regarding economic reform, indicating that the reform focus of the Chinese government at the time was on economic issues rather than on political issues. In 1999, neither anti-corruption nor rule of law appeared in any format during the parade. In 1999, most formations were dedicated to present various policy achievements that the CPC has been making since the beginning of the reform period, indicating that the focus of the Chinese government at the time was still on furthering economic reform and development. It is important to note, however, that an absence from the parades does not equal to an absence in actual policy making. An absence from the parades just meant that either the Chinese government did not perceive anti-corruption/rule of law as positive policy areas to celebrate, or that the Chinese government did not perceive that it was the right time to present these policy areas in public.

Figure 12: The “Democratic Politics” formation in the 2009 National Day Civilian Parade



Source: Wang, Xuguan 王徐冠. 2017. *2009 Nian 60 Zhounian Guoqing Yuebingshi* 2009 年 60 周年国庆阅兵式 [2009 60-Year Anniversary National Day Military Parade]. January 26, 2017. Youtube video, 2:02:58. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SmSMQoTigos&t=6856s>

In 2009, anti-corruption and rule of law made their debuts in the parades. The “Democratic Politics” formation (民主政治) in 2009 is centered around a float in shape of a model of the Great People’s Hall (人民大会堂). On the sides of the float, there was a slogan displaying the following phrase: “Uphold and Improve the System of National People’s Congress” (坚持和完善人民代表大会制度). On the float, several representatives of various political parties, social classes, and minority groups can be seen waving with flowers in their hand. Right after the “Democratic Politics” formation, we have the “Rule of Law” formation (依法治国). The “Rule of Law” formation is centered around a float in shape of a model of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China. On the sides of the float, there was a slogan displaying the following phrase: “Construction a socialist legal regime with Chinese characteristics” (建设中国特色社会

主义法律体系) . On the float, several representatives of law enforcement officers can be seen saluting towards the leadership.

Figure 13: The “Rule of Law” formation in the 2009 National Day Civilian Parade



Source: Wang, Xuguan 王徐冠. 2017. 2009 Nian 60 Zhounian Guoqing Yuebingshi 2009 年 60 周年国庆阅兵式 [2009 60-Year Anniversary National Day Military Parade]. January 26, 2017. Youtube video, 2:03:57. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SmSMQoTigos&t=6856s>

At the first glance, the Anti-Corruption theme was not directly present in either of these formations; however, if we think about the implication of emphasizing both democratic rule and rule of law, we will see that both of these formations existed to support the indirect theme of Anti-Corruption. I argue that these formations sent a very important signal regarding the manner in which China’s future anti-corruption efforts will be conducted. Whether it’s Chairman Mao’s “Rectification Movement” in 1957 (整风运

动)⁴⁵, or Jiang Zemin’s “Three Stresses Campaign” in 1998 (三讲教育)⁴⁶, or Hu Jintao’s “Campaign to Maintain the Advanced Nature of Communist Party Members” in 2005 (保先教育)⁴⁷, China’s anti-corruption efforts since 1949 had largely been rooted in a strategy which can be called “Internal Party Rectification” (党内整风). This strategy concentrated anti-corruption efforts within the party structure, without much public participation or supervision. This strategy usually would not lead to any mass arrests of corrupt officials; rather, the goal of this strategy is to warn party members of their wrongdoing instead of directly punishing them for their crimes. Essentially, the “Internal Party Rectification” strategy treats corruption as a style-of-conduct problem (作风问题) rather than a criminal-charge-problem (犯罪问题). Even though corruption has been a crime since 1949, the only instances of mass arrests and prosecutions of corrupt officials took place during Chairman Mao’s administration. After 1978, although there had been arrests and prosecutions, the scale and intensity of these legal actions was never sufficient to toggle corruption’s increasingly negative impact on China’s economic and social development.

The two formations in 2009 presented a different strategy for fighting against corruption. This new strategy brings the criminal nature of corruption to the front and tries to fight corruption by strengthening and reinventing the organization of China’s legal system. Rather than only educating party members about proper values and correct style of

⁴⁵ Tang, Zhengmang 唐正芒, and Yan Hu 胡燕. 2006. “Lue lun Yi Jiu Wu Qi Nian Zhi Yi Jiu Wu Ba Nian de Quanmin Zhengfeng Yundong” 略论一九五七年至一九五八年的全民整风运动 [A Brief Discussion on the Rectification Movement of the Entire Nation in 1957 and 1958]. *Zhonggong Dangshi Yanjiu* 中共党史研究, no. 3: 66–69.

⁴⁶ Ma, Xianzhang 马宪章. 2001. “Youyi de Tansuo Chenggong de Shijian-‘Sanjiang’ Jiaoyu de Huigu yu Sikao” 有益的探索 成功的实践——‘三讲’教育的回顾与思考. [A beneficial exploration and a successful practice-Analysis and Retrospective of the ‘Three Requirement’ Educational Campaign]. *Qiu Shi* 求是, no. 1: 49–53.

⁴⁷ Qiu, Suqin 邱素琴. 2005. “Kaizhan Baochi Dangyuan Xianjinxing Jiaoyu de Yiyi” 开展保持党员先进性教育的意义 [The Meaning of commencing the ‘Campaign to Maintain the Advanced Nature of Party Members’]. *Dangzheng Luntan* 党政论坛, no. 1: 14–15.

conduct, China is now adding a criminal-law dimensional to the anti-corruption efforts. By arresting and prosecuting corrupt officials in civilian courts as if they are common criminals, China opens up the process of anti-corruption and allows for some limited public participation and supervision.

Figure 14: The “Strict Governance of the Party” formation in the 2019 National Day Civilian Parade



Source: CCTV Zhongguo Zhongyang Dianshitai CCTV 中国中央电视台 CCTV China Central Television. 2019. *Qingzhu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chengli 70 Zhounian Dahui Yuebingshi Qunzhong Youxing Tebie Baodao* 《庆祝中华人民共和国成立 70 周年大会阅兵式 群众游行特别报道》 [Special Report on the Celebration of the 70th Anniversary of the Founding of the PRC: Military Parade and Civilian Parade]. October 1, 2019. Youtube video, 2:39:31. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TypEKtdYN6w&t=8161s>

In the 2019 parade, there were two formations dedicated to rule of law and anti-corruption. The first formation is called “Democracy and Rule of Law” (民主法治), and the second formation is called “Strict Governance of the Party” (从严治党). By looking at these two formations, we can finally see the end result of the new strategy of anti-corruption that the 2009 parade foreshadowed for us. In the “Strict Governance of the Party” formation, we can see the anti-corruption theme directly and visibly. The “Strict

Governance of the Party” formation is centered around a float in shape of a model of the Constitution of the CPC. On the float, there are also models depicting various other important laws and regulations regarding anti-corruption and party member conduct. The whole formation expresses a very legal-centric atmosphere, which matches what is being displayed in the “Democracy and Rule of Law” formation.

Figure 15: The “Democracy and Rule of Law” formation in the 2019 National Day Civilian Parade




Source: CCTV Zhongguo Zhongyang Dianshitai CCTV 中国中央电视台 CCTV China Central Television. 2019. *Qingzhu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chengli 70 Zhounian Dahui Yuebingshi Qunzhong Youxing Tebie Baodao* 《庆祝中华人民共和国成立 70 周年大会阅兵式 群众游行特别报道》 [Special Report on the Celebration of the 70th Anniversary of the Founding of the PRC: Military Parade and Civilian Parade]. October 1, 2019. Youtube video, 2:17:11. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TypEKtdYN6w&t=8161s>

The “Democracy and Rule of Law” formation is centered around a float in the shape of the Constitution of the PRC. On top of the float, there is also a vote box as well as a model of the famous “Radiant Star” roof decoration in the Great People’s Hall (人民大会堂穹顶). Both of these formations have something in common with their 2009 counterparts: they are all centered around the imagery of the ultimate symbols of rule of law and democratic accountability. Whether it’s the constitution, the party constitution, or

the Great People’s Hall, these formations demonstrated a common theme: the ideal of Rule of Law is no longer a policy in preparation; Hu Jintao’s administration had established many firm base works for rule of law, and Xi Jinping is now moving forward in employing rule of law as the not only the guiding principle of ruling the country, but most importantly as the guiding principle of fighting against rampaging political corruption.

Quantitative analysis of Government Work Reports:

Figure 16: Trend of Frequency of usage of Anti-Corruption/Rule of Law-related terms in Government Work Reports (1954-2019)⁴⁸



In this graph, we see the frequency of usage of terms related to anti-corruption/rule of law in government work reports from 1954 to 2019. The years in which the four parades took place are marked with red lines. The time periods of each leader’s term in office are marked with squares whose length are equal to the length of their tenure. Similar to what

⁴⁸ Please see the Data Source section of the Appendix for an example citation of a government or party report.

we have seen in the agricultural data, we see a lot of variation in the usage of anti-corruption/rule of law related terms. In the very early years of the Reform Era, we see a relatively low level of emphasis on these two policy areas as the leadership at the time was focused on fixing the mistakes of the Cultural Revolution as well as enacting important economic reforms to improve people's living conditions.

From 1985 to 1990, we see a sudden spike in focus on these two policy areas. This sudden spike was perhaps a response on part of the government in face of the increasingly discontent society regarding corruption. This spike then slowly tapered off after Jiang Zemin took power, while we see a gradual rise in emphasis on rule of law during the same period of time. This rise in emphasis on rule of law and the accompanied gradual decrease in emphasis on anti-corruption are two good reflections of both what we saw in the parades and what we did not see in the parades.

One of the main demands of students during the 1989 Incident was regarding political corruption. The fourth of the 7 initial demands drafted by students in April stated the following: “(We the students) demand that all national leaders and cadres are to publish their actual income and income of their families, and we demand that the government is to have a serious investigation into the problem of officials engaging in smuggling and insider trading.”⁴⁹ As we can see, due to the fact that students invoked corruption as one of their principle cause for protest and demonstration, the Chinese corruption had to respond by increasing its emphasis in policy making; however, also due to the fact that the 1989 Incident greatly destabilized Chinese politics as well as the Chinese society, anything related to the incident would be seen as favorable subjects to be presented during a

⁴⁹ Zhao, Dingxin. 2001. “A Brief History of the 1989 Movement.” In *The Power of Tiananmen: State-Society Relations and the 1989 Beijing Student Movement*, 148–49. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

National Day Civilian Parade. This is probably the principal reason why we do not see the imagery of anti-corruption nor the imagery of rule of law in the 1999 Parade.

Going from the late Jiang Zemin administration to the Hu Jintao administration, we see a general increase in the emphasis of rule of law and a slow decrease in emphasis of anti-corruption. These two trends have two implications: firstly, the idea of rule of law is now being promoted as a subject in policy making; secondly, a slow decrease in emphasis of anti-corruption did not mean that Hu Jintao's administration was soft on anti-corruption.


I argue that since the 15th Party Congress in 1997, China has begun a process of establishing a policy basis for rule of law and eventually a legal basis for a massive anti-corruption effort. This process would explain why we see a gradual rise in emphasis in rule of law but a slow decline in emphasis on anti-corruption. Hu Jintao's administration maintained the old strategy of anti-corruption effort while it was working on the creation of a newly improved legal regime. Due to Hu Jintao's push for creating a harmonious society, we do not see much publicity for anti-corruption efforts; however, a strong and reformed legal basis for legal action centered anti-corruption efforts was already under construction in the background. By the time Xi Jinping had consolidated his power in around 2013, we see both a rise in emphasis of rule of law as well as anti-corruption. I argue that Xi Jinping's administration is both implementing the new anti-corruption strategy as well as perfecting the legal regime during the process of using this legal regime to combat corruption.

Many existing research works on the Hu Jintao administration would suggest that the contrary to my argument. Many scholars would argue that the Hu Jintao's weakness, his lack of political capital, and his unwillingness to have a high public profile were the

main reason why he was not able to act firmly against corruption.^{50 51} While these arguments have their own merits in trying to figure out why Hu Jintao didn't do a lot of tough reforms, I would point out that it is a very difficult task to understand the true intention behind a leader's decision. Unlike Western politicians who love to appear in front of the television for an interview, Chinese leaders have been generally reluctant to be under the focus of the spotlight. In each case of argument, it would hard to find direct evidence for what is the real intention behind Hu Jintao's decision to not act firmly against corruption.

Quantitative analysis of party congress reports:

Figure 17: Trend of Frequency of usage of Anti-Corruption/Rule of Law-related terms in Party Reports (1954-2019)⁵²



⁵⁰ Brown, Kerry. 2012. "Hu Jintao: China's Silent Ruler." In , 197–200. World Scientific.

⁵¹ Lam, W. Wo-Lap. 2006. . "The Rise of Hu Jintao and the Traits of the Fourth-Generation Leadership." In *Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era: New Leaders, New Challenges*, 21-22. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

⁵² Please see the Data Source section of the Appendix for an example citation of a government or party report.

In this graph, we see the frequency of usage of terms related to anti-corruption/rule of law in Communist Party Congress reports from 1954 to 2019. The years in which the four parades took place are marked with red lines. The time periods of each leader's term in office are marked with squares whose length are equal to the length of their tenure. As we can see, from beginning of the Reform Era to the early 1990s, both policy areas received relatively less emphasis in Party rhetoric and future policy visions. In 1997, the 15th Party Congress announced the goal of constructing a socialist legal regime with Chinese characteristics for the first time, which is where we see the first major rise in emphasis for both policy areas. After 1997, the two policy areas maintained a consistent and high level of importance from the 16th to the 18th Party Congress. This indicates that after the 15th Party Congress both anti-corruption and rule of law have become a staple part of Party rhetoric and future policy visions. As the negative effects of the 1989 Incident on anti-corruption faded away with time, anti-corruption can be brought up into the view of public policy making. Similarly, as China's economic strength increased and its governance style modernized, the issue of rule of law can also be brought up into the public's eyes. After more than a decade of heavy emphasis in policy making as well as party rhetoric, these two policy areas finally made their first public appearance in the 2009 parade.

This first debut has an important implication for the discussion of what may be considered as politically sensitive in China. Although it is undoubtable that these two issues are still politically charged and thus can be considered as very sensitive topics, due to the actual progress that the government has been making and the many positive impacts that this progress has been producing, the positive sides of these two policy areas are now presentable enough for the government to place them on display in front of the public during politically significant occasions such as the National Day Civilian Parades. In 2019,

both policy areas are on presentation, which indicates that the Chinese government is now considering its achievements on these two areas are major victories that should be publicly celebrated. From hardly getting a mention in Party reports in the 1980s to getting more and more mentions in Party reports later on and then finally being able to be presented in public, the issues of anti-corruption/rule of law have made a complete transformation from issues that can only remain under-the-counter to issues that can be openly discussed to a limited extent.

Ethnic Policy:

The third type of the parades' signaling functions involves the presentation of a change in policy direction. Similar to the issue of corruption, ethnic policy has been another contentious issue for the Chinese government since the beginning. During the early years of the PRC, China's ethnic policy was guided by a more Soviet view of ethnicity. Minority ethnic regions (民族地区) were largely left along to govern themselves based on the policy of "Regional Ethnic Autonomy" (民族区域自治).⁵³ Without a doubt, this autonomy was limited and tightly supervised by the Central government. As the People's Liberation Army marched into areas of minority ethnic concentration, they brought with them not only words of land reform, but also communist party cadres who were trained to set up both state and party institutions in even the most remote of the country's minority villages and towns. Nevertheless, for a very long time until the Cultural Revolution, China both emphasized the individuality of its 55 minority groups as well as an idea of bringing everyone united under the umbrella of a unified socialist state.

⁵³ Zhang, Jiao 张娇, Zheni Li 李祯妮, and Binghao Jin 金炳镐. 2019. "Xin Zhongguo 70 Nian Minzu Quyu Zihui Zhengce de Fazhan" 新中国 70 年民族区域自治政策的发展[The Development of Ethnic Regional Autonomy Policy in 70 years since the Foundation of New China]. *Heilongjiang Minzu Congkan* 黑龙江民族丛刊, no. 6: 15–16.

Figure 18: The “Uyghur Dance” performance in the 1965 “East is Red” Song and Dance Epic



Source: Luke Fomiatti. 2013. “The East is Red 东方红 1965 Chinese 'song and dance epic' with English subtitles”. October 11, 2013. Youtube video, 1:49:58
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LQaK3tL6qIE>

Figure 19: The “Tibetan Singing” performance by Tseitain Zhoima in the 1965 “East is Red” Song and Dance Epic



Source: Luke Fomiatti. 2013. “The East is Red 东方红 1965 Chinese 'song and dance epic' with English subtitles”. October 11, 2013. Youtube video, 1:51:51
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LQaK3tL6qIE>

Figure 20: The “Thai Peacock Dance” performance in the 1965 “East is Red” Song and Dance Epic



Source: Luke Fomiatti. 2013. “The East is Red 东方红 1965 Chinese 'song and dance epic' with English subtitles”. October 11, 2013. Youtube video, 1:55:24
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LQaK3tL6qIE>

Figure 21: The “Korean Drum Dance” performance in the 1965 “East is Red” Song and Dance Epic



Source: Luke Fomiatti. 2013. “The East is Red 东方红 1965 Chinese 'song and dance epic' with English subtitles”. October 11, 2013. Youtube video, 1:57:12
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LQaK3tL6qIE>

The 1964 “East is Red” Song and Dance Epic（东方红歌舞剧史诗）was an excellent reflection of this early vision of ethnic policy. In this epic display of Chinese

revolutionary performance arts, there is a section dedicated to the portrayal of ethnic minority culture. In the segment titled “The Chinese People Has Arisen” (中国人民站起来), representatives from the Mongolian, the Uyghur, the Tibetan, the Thai, the Li, and the Miao ethnic groups performed their own ethnic dances in celebration of the founding of the PRC.⁵⁴ These minority performers came one ethnicity after another, establishing a clear and separate identity for each and every one of their own group, but all congregate at the end with a common sentiment of unity and brotherhood. This song and dance epic, with so many other similar examples of minority art performance, demonstrated clearly the guiding principle for China’s ethnic policy at the time. Ethnic minority groups are encouraged to form their own distinguishing identities by promoting their own art, language, and customs through state sponsorship; however, there would always be a limit to the promotion of these identities. All of these individualities must be compatible with the broader ideology of “Greater Unity of All Ethnic Peoples” (各族人民大团结)⁵⁵.

Later on, after the Reform Period, China’s ethnic policy would soon change to a different direction. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, China became very wary of its own ethnic groups. It is since this time that China began to slowly change its direction in ethnic policy making. After the 2008 and 2009 riots in Lhasa and Urumqi, both the Chinese society and the Chinese government saw a need in changing course on its ethnic policy amid the fear of terrorism and the need to establish greater national unity. After Xi Jinping took power, the threat of terrorist groups such as the “Turkestan Islamic

⁵⁴ Wilcox, Emily. "A Revolt from Within: Contextualizing Revolutionary Ballet." In *Revolutionary Bodies: Chinese Dance and the Socialist Legacy*, 148. Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2019.

⁵⁵ Ma, Anping 马安平. 2014. “Yinyue Wudao Shishi ‘Dong Fang Hong’ Zhong de Shaoshu Minzu Xingxiang Biaoshu” 音乐舞蹈史诗《东方红》中的少数民族形象表述 [The Visual Representation of Ethnic Nations in the Song and Dance Epic ‘East is Red’]. *Yinyue Shikong* 音乐时空, *Yinyue Zhuanti Yanjiu* 音乐专题研究, no. 11: 36.

Movement” became the principal source of security threat in Xinjiang.⁵⁶ During Xi’s administration, the idea of ethnic unity is being emphasized much more than ethnic individuality, and as we shall see, the change in presentation of ethnic policy in the parades would match relatively well with what is going on during this change of direction.

Qualitative Analysis:

Figure 22: The “Ethnic national dance” segment in the 1984 National Day Civilian Parade



Source: Li, Xianzhong 李显忠. 2016. *1984 Nian Guoqing Dayuebing He Qunzhong Youxing (Wanzheng Zhibo)* 1984 年国庆大阅兵和群众游行（完整直播） [1984 National Day Military Parade and Civilian Parade (Full Live Feed)]. May 5, 2016. Youtube video, 50:24. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M_tZPZTx3B8

In the 1984 parade, there was not a stand-alone formation for ethnic policy. The only portrayal of ethnicity was presented as a part of the cultural policy segment. In this segment, dancers from various ethnic groups performed their own dances while marching

⁵⁶ Yang, Fuxue 杨富学. 2015. “‘Dong Tujuesitan’: Yige you Yuyna er Dili zai Zhengzhi de Weimingti” ‘东突厥斯坦’: 一个由语言而地理再政治的伪命题 [“East Turkestan”: A Pseudo-proposition Derived from Language, Geography to Politics]. *Shihezi Daxue Xuebao* 石河子大学学报, *Zhexue Shehui Kexue Ban* 哲学社会科学版, 29 (4): 1–9.

across the Tiananmen square. As expected, since the focus of policy making during the early Reform Era was on economic development, social issues such as ethnic policy did not get much emphasis during this time period.

Figure 23: The “Jiang Zemin” formation in the 1999 National Day Civilian Parade



Source: Mei Neng Da Yinghua 美能达映画. 2019. *1999 Nian Guoqing 50 Zhounian Shengda Yuebing (Gaoqing Wanzheng Ban)* 1999 年国庆 50 周年盛大阅兵（高清完整版） [1999 50-Year Anniversary National Day Grand Military Parade (HD Full Version)]. October 16, 2019. Bilibili video, 105:17. <https://www.bilibili.com/video/av71455376/>

In the 1999 parade, we see a much stronger presentation of ethnic policy. Although there was still not a stand-alone formation for ethnic policy, the ideal of ethnic unity is being presented in a much more overt way. In the formation dedicated to Jiang Zemin himself, representatives from the 56 ethnic nations marched around a giant portrait of Jiang Zemin. In the CCTV commentary, the news reporter introduced this formation by saying: “This segment presents the image of all ethnic peoples uniting around the Party Center under the core leadership of Comrade Jiang Zemin...”（各族人民紧密团结在以江泽民同志为核心的党中央周围）. This drastically different presentation of ethnic policy can

be explained by two reasons. Firstly, I argue that the image of all ethnic groups uniting around the portrait of the highest leadership can be considered as a response to the Yining Riots which took place only two years prior in 1997. On February 5th, 1997, a series of terrorism-inspired riots took place in the city of Yining in Xinjiang. Islamic extremists and Uyghur ethnic separatists killed 7 Han ethnic residents and hundreds were injured.⁵⁷ This series of riots attracted attention from Jiang Zemin, who personally required law enforcement forces to “quickly resolve this case with utmost diligence and seriousness”. It is reasonable to argue that the imagery of heightened ethnic unity in the 1999 parade is at least partially connected with this violent display of inter-ethnic violence and separatism. The second reason would be that this display of ethnic unity in 1999 was just a commencement of a 2-decade long process of a turn of direction in ethnic policy. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union which involved the separation of all the ethnic republics and after the 1997 riots, the Chinese leadership had realized that it was necessary to begin changing direction in how much they emphasized ethnic unity. I argue that starting from Jiang Zemin’s administration, the Chinese government began to consider making policies that would reinforce a united Chinese national identity rather than emphasizing individual ethnic identities.

⁵⁷ Chen, Lan 陈蓝. 2007. “1990-2007: Zhongguo Fanji ‘Dongtu’ Shiqinian’ ” 1990—2007: 中国反击‘东突’十七年 [1990-2007: 17 Years of China’s fight against ‘East Turkestan’]. *Nanfang Zhoumo* 南方周末, January 12.

Figure 24: The “Love my China” dance performance in the 2009 National Day Civilian Parade



Source: Wang, Xuguan 王徐冠. 2017. *2009 Nian 60 Zhounian Guoqing Yuebingshi* 2009 年 60 周年国庆阅兵式 [2009 60-Year Anniversary National Day Military Parade]. January 26, 2017. Youtube video, 2:16:39.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SmSMQoTigos&t=6856s>

Figure 25: The “Unite and Go Forward” formation in the 2009 National Day Civilian Parade



Source: Wang, Xuguan 王徐冠. 2017. *2009 Nian 60 Zhounian Guoqing Yuebingshi* 2009 年 60 周年国庆阅兵式 [2009 60-Year Anniversary National Day Military Parade]. January 26, 2017. Youtube video, 2:18:01. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SmSMQoTigos&t=6856s>

In the 2009 parades, we see that now ethnic policy has been singled out with a formation to its own. The “Ethnic policy” formation, which was called “Unite and Go Forward” (团结奋进), appeared after a marching dance performance by representatives from all ethnic groups. This formation was centered around a float in the shape of the Chinese flag pointing forward. In this formation, we can clearly see the theme of “Ethnic Unity”. The 56 nations marching around a Chinese flag indicates that the Chinese leadership has begun to actively promote the idea of a shared Chinese national identity. By using the Chinese flag as the centerpiece of display in this formation, we can also reasonably infer that the content of “Ethnic Unity” is also changing from “Unity of All Ethnic Peoples” to “Unity of the Chinese Nations”. In a sense, after the terrible shocks of the 2008 Lhasa riot which took place right before the Olympic Games, a Chinese nationality based on a common political ideology and a common civic identity

overwhelmingly took over as more important than a Chinese nationality that was based on a union of 56 distinguishing ethnic groups.⁵⁸

Figure 26: The “Ethnic Unity” formation in the 2019 National Day Civilian Parade



Source: CCTV Zhongguo Zhongyang Dianshitai CCTV 中国中央电视台 CCTV China Central Television. 2019. *Qingzhu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chengli 70 Zhounian Dahui*


⁵⁸ Wang, Mingming 王鸣鸣. 2009. “Cong Lasa 3.14 Shijian kan Xifang dui Zhongguo de Pianjian” 从拉萨 3.14 事件看西方对中国的偏见 [Western bias against China in the 3.14 Lhasa Incident]. *Quanqiu Zhengzhi yu Anquan Baogao* 全球政治与安全报告. Beijing 北京: Zhongguo Shehui Kexueyuan Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi Yanjiusuo 中国社会科学院世界经济与政治研究所.

Yuebingshi Qunzhong Youxing Tebie Baodao 《庆祝中华人民共和国成立 70 周年大会阅兵式 群众游行特别报道》 [Special Report on the Celebration of the 70th Anniversary of the Founding of the PRC: Military Parade and Civilian Parade]. October 1, 2019. Youtube video, 2:18:52. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TypEKtdYN6w&t=8161s>

In the 2019 Parade, we can see that ethnic policy has now been completely singled out as a formation of its own, not just a part of another segment. In 2009, the “Unite and Go Forward” formation and the ethnic dance performance were technically an introductory piece of the segment titled “Beautiful China”. Essentially, the 2009 formation still did not present ethnic policy as a separate and stand-alone policy area with an equal status with other major policy areas such as agriculture or industrial development. In 2019, ethnic policy was not only presented with its own formation, but also it was presented as a stand-alone policy area alongside other policy areas as equals. The “Ethnic Unity” formation (民族团结) is centered around a float in shape of a giant red vase decorated with artistic renderings of ethnic figures. In the CCTV commentary, the news reporter used this following phrase to introduce this formation: “...the 56 nations...are connected with blood and veins” (血脉相连). Although in this formation, everyone in the marching crowd dressed up in their own ethnic clothing, it is undoubtful that the focus of this formation is overwhelmingly on the idea of unity rather than individuality. Unlike the previous 3 parades, this 2019 formation greatly reduced the element of presentation of ethnic dance performance by only including a tiny troupe of dancers in front of the “Ethnic Unity” formation. I argue that everything we are seeing in the 2019 formation reasonably indicates that the direction of China’ ethnic policy has officially changed completely into one that still protects the basic idea of ethnic autonomy, but now overwhelmingly emphasizes a unified Chinese ethnic identity over separate ethnic identities of the 55 minority groups.

Quantitative analysis of Government Work Reports:

Figure 27: Trend of Frequency of usage of Ethnic Policy related terms in Government Work Reports (1954-2019)⁵⁹



In this graph, we see the frequency of usage of terms related to ethnic policy in government work reports from 1954 to 2019. The years in which the four parades took place are marked with red lines. The time periods of each leader's term in office are marked with squares whose length are equal to the length of their tenure. By looking at the yellow line, we can see a relatively higher emphasis of ethnic individuality over ethnic unity. The yellow line values are calculated by contracting blue line values (terms related to ethnic unity) with orange line values (terms related to ethnic individuality). Later on in the 1980s, we still see a general heavier emphasis of individuality over unity. This trend matches what we saw in the 1984 parade, which was not really much of any presentation of the ethnic policy except for a dance performance that highlights the individual cultural identities of the ethnic nations. After 1990, we see a period of time of higher emphasis of unity over individuality from 1991 to 1998. As explained in the previous section, this

⁵⁹ Please see the Data Source section of the Appendix for an example citation of a government or party report.


period marked the start of the change in ethnic policy direction. Due to the wary of ethnic separatism after the dissolution of the Soviet Union as well as a response to the terrorism-inspired riots in 1997, we can reasonably expect a higher level of emphasis on unity during this time period. This also matches what we saw in the 1999 parade, which was the first display of any kind of ethnic unity during the Reform Era. From 1999 to 2007, we see that both unity and individuality became equally emphasized. I argue that the reason why we see this more equal emphasis of the two policy directions was due to the “Harmonious Society” objective of the Hu Jintao administration.⁶⁰ I believe that in order to achieve social harmony in the minority ethnic regions, the Hu Jintao wanted to both promote unity while giving space for the individual ethnic identities in order to not spark any ethnic conflict.⁶¹ This trend was cut short after 2008 as we can see from the graph. From 2008 and on, the yellow line follows a generally increasing trend, which indicates that ethnic unity is increasingly being emphasized as the threat of Islamic terrorism and Tibetan separatism loom over Xinjiang and Tibet. As we enter the Xi Jinping administration after 2013, we see a level of emphasis of unity over individuality that can only be compared to the early 1990s level. I argue that for Xi Jinping administration, the wariness of ethnic separatism has taken over the importance of promoting individual ethnic identities. This is why we see a corresponding presentation of ethnic policy as a stand-alone and equally significant policy area in the 2019 parade.

Quantitative analysis of party congress reports:

⁶⁰ Zhang, Xu 张胥. 2015. “Makesi Engesi Minzu Guanxi Lilun Guanxi Lilun yu Hexie Shehui Goujian de Neizai Qihe” 马克思恩格斯民族关系理论与和谐社会构建的内在契合 [Internal Coincidence of The Construction of A Harmonious Society and Marx and Engels’ s Theory of Ethnic Relations]. *Guizhou Minzu Yanjiu* 贵州民族研究 36 (1): 35–38.

⁶¹ Lu, Cairong 鲁彩荣. 2005. “Goujian Shehuizhuyi Hexie Shehui yao Guanzhu Minzu Wenti” 构建社会主义和谐社会要关注民族问题 [Pay attention to the Ethnic Problem during the Construction of the Socialist Harmonious Society]. *Neimenggu Daxue Xuebao* 内蒙古大学学报 11 (2): 43–46.

Figure 28: Trend of Frequency of usage of Ethnic Policy related terms in Party Reports (1954-2019) ⁶²



In this graph, we see the frequency of usage of terms related to ethnic policy in party congress work reports from 1954 to 2019. The years in which the four parades took place are marked with red lines. The time periods of each leader’s term in office are marked with squares whose length are equal to the length of their tenure. As we can see, with the exception of the 17th Party Congress in 2007, the Communist Party rhetoric maintained a generally pro-unity stance on ethnic policy since the beginning of the Reform Era (the yellow dots). As expected, we also see a rise in pro-unity stance since the 18th Party Congress in 2012. As I have explained during the previous sections on Agriculture and Anti-Corruption, we should expect less variation and less volatility in data from Party Congress Reports. This relative low level of variation is somewhat reflected in the parades. During the 1984, 1999, and 2009 parades, an element of ethnic cultural performance remained more or less the same. This consistency meant that although the Chinese

⁶² Please see the Data Source section of the Appendix for an example citation of a government or party report.

leadership wanted to signal a direction of change, they did not want to set off any unnecessary conflict by pushing the direction change too far and too drastically.

The pro-unity stance of the Party Congress Reports remained relatively consistent from the 11th Party Congress to the 16th Congress, which indicates that the official Party rhetoric has decided to place a heavier emphasis on unity since the beginning. This heavier emphasis shows us that although China's direction may have changed for ethnic policy, the overarching ideological stance has remained largely the same: self-rule but not self-determination, protection of individual identity but not supremacy of individual identity over the national identity.

Hong Kong and Trade War:

Ever since the beginning of the Reform Era, the Chinese leadership has been employing a strategy called “Hide one's talent and bide one's time” (韬光养晦) when dealing with the outside world.⁶³ For a very long time, China has been trying to avoid any direct confrontation with any outside forces; even when Chinese interests are being challenged, the Chinese leadership preferred to seek non-confrontational ways to resolve the conflict.⁶⁴ After Xi Jinping took power, however, it seems that this strategy has been changed. During Xi Jinping's first appearance after being elected the Secretary General of the CPC, he used the following phrase in his first speech to the world: “Let China know more about the world, and let the world know more about China”.⁶⁵ Ever since he took

⁶³ Li, Li 李莉. 2006. “Lun Deng Xiaoping ‘Taoguang Yanghui, Yousuo Zuowei’ de Waijiao Zhanlue Sixiang” 论邓小平‘韬光养晦、有所作为’的外交战略思想 [Discussion of Deng Xiaoping's ‘Hide your strength, Make real achievement’ Strategic Diplomatic Doctrine]. Shandong Sheng Qingnian Guanli Ganbu Xueyuan Xuebao 山东省青年管理干部学院学报, no. 1: 18–20.

⁶⁴ Zhu, Jiangnan, and Jie Lu. 2013. “One Rising China, Multiple Interpretations: China's 60th Anniversary Celebration through the Lens of the World's Printed Media.” *Journal of Contemporary China* 22 (84): 1071.

⁶⁵ Xie, Huanchi 谢环驰. 2012. “Xi Jinping deng Shibajie Zhonggong Zhongyang Zhengzhiju Changwei tong Zhongwai Jizhe Jianmian” 习近平等十八届中共中央政治局常委同中外记者见面 [Xi Jinping and other permanent members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPC meets with domestic and foreign journalists]. Embassy of the People's Republic of China to the United States of America 中华人民共和国驻美利坚合众国大使馆. November 15. <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceus/chn/zt/bada/t989539.htm>.

office, China has become more and more vocal and proactive on the international stage. China is more willing to show its strength and defend its interests openly than ever before.

Xi Jinping's administration has been facing two major challenges from the outside world among many other challenges. Firstly, China has to face economic attacks from the United States in terms of trade tensions and the tariff war; secondly, China has to face challenges to its sovereignty by Hong Kong separatists and their foreign supporters. These two challenges came at a time during which China is trying to actively increase its international influence and presence through its many economic initiatives. As we shall see, the 2019 parade was an important opportunity for the Chinese leadership openly and clearly demonstrated its strength on these two contentious contemporary issues.

Qualitative Analysis of the “One Country, Two System” formation (一国两制方阵) :

The imagery of Hong Kong and Macau made their first appearance in the 1999 parade as a part of the “March with the Motherland” formation. After this first appearance, floats dedicated to Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan are always present alongside floats of other Chinese provinces. In 2019, however, in addition to this traditional presence in the parades, Hong Kong and Macau were present in another formation earlier on in the parade. In the “Reform and Open Up” segment, there is a section dedicated to Jiang Zemin's legacy. Like his predecessors, Jiang Zemin's legacy was represented by a formation of his portrait and two formations representing what the Chinese leadership consider as the most important achievements of their administrations.

One of the two formations dedicated to Jiang Zemin's time was the “One Country, Two System” formation. This formation was centered around a float that includes images of four items. There is a model of the Chinese Redbud flower statue in Hong Kong, a

model of the Lotus flower statue in Macau, a model of the Basic Law of Hong Kong, and a model of the Basic Law of Macau. The float was surrounded by representatives from Hong Kong and Macau. During the 2009 parade, there was not such a formation during Jiang Zemin's section, and there has not been any formations in the past that singled out "One Country, Two System" as a stand-alone policy area. Considering for the fact that the Hong Kong protests and riots started in March 2019, the timing of the appearance of this formation is undoubtedly purposeful. I argue that this formation was clearly created for Hong Kong residents as well as the international community.

Figure 29: The "One Country, Two System" formation in the 2019 National Day Civilian Parade



Source: CCTV Zhongguo Zhongyang Dianshitai CCTV 中国中央电视台 CCTV China Central Television. 2019. *Qingzhu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chengli 70 Zhounian Dahui Yuebingshi Qunzhong Youxing Tebie Baodao* 《庆祝中华人民共和国成立 70 周年大会阅兵式 群众游行特别报道》 [Special Report on the Celebration of the 70th Anniversary of the Founding of the PRC: Military Parade and Civilian Parade]. October 1, 2019. Youtube video, 2:04:26. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TypEKtdYN6w&t=8161s>

Firstly, this formation demonstrates the stance that the Chinese government is upholding the idea of “One country, two systems” tightly. The models of the two basic laws demonstrated a red line for anyone in Hong Kong who wished to challenge the authority of the Central Government: The Basic Law of Hong Kong is the political boundary which all political activities in Hong Kong have to respect and follow.⁶⁶ If we take a look at the name of this formation, we can also see what the Chinese leadership is focusing on here. This formation was named as “One country, two systems” (一国两制) but not “The return of Hong Kong and Macau” (港澳回归). This naming strategy is not just a literary choice or a result of random selection. I argue that by choosing “One country, two system”, the Chinese leadership is not only making a patriotic and emotional stance, but also making a legal and systematic stance. As China moves along with its reforms on rule of law, its combat strategy against separatism has been increasingly guided by legal principles such as the Constitution, the Basic Laws, and the Anti-Secession Law (反国家分裂法).

In a sense, what the parade is trying to present here for Hong Kong is similar to what the parade is trying to present for anti-corruption. In both cases, the problem-solving strategies seem to have both had a legalist and systematic turn. The difference here involves the history of the two problems and the nature of the two problems. To the Chinese leadership, corruption is a problem where the only positive aspect would be the elimination of the problem itself; for the Hong Kong problem, the Chinese leadership has to consider how to create a sense of unity among the majority of Hong Kong residents who may not want to participate in the separatist movements. We also have to take into account

⁶⁶ Hao, Tiechuan 郝铁川. 2017. “Deng Xiaoping ‘Yiguo Liangzhi’ Lilun yu ‘Xianggang Jibenfa’ de Zhiding” 邓小平‘一国两制’理论与《香港基本法》的制定 [Deng Xiaoping’s ‘One Country, Two System’ theory and the Creation of the ‘Basic Law of Hong Kong’]. *Jiangnan Daxue Xuebao* 江汉大学学报, Shehui Kexueban 社会科学版, 34 (1): 46–53.

that Hong Kong has only recently returned to the rightful governance of China, and major conflicts only started to arise since Xi Jinping took power in 2012. The problem with corruption has a much deeper historical root and is continuous in nature, while the problem with Hong Kong is much more of an emergency and an instantaneous problem. I believe that this formation in 2019 intends to send out two messages to two different audiences. Firstly, it intends to tell Hong Kong separatists that a scenario of Hong Kong independence and western-style democratic reform would never take place under the legal regime of the Chinese constitution, the Basic Laws, and the Anti-Secession Law. Secondly, it intends to tell any foreign sponsor or supporter of the Hong Kong separatist movement that Hong Kong will remain as an integral part of the PRC, and that their efforts will only be met with more push for unity by the Chinese government. This formation demonstrated once again the willingness of the Chinese leadership to directly and publicly address the mine field-like problem of Hong Kong.

Qualitative Analysis of the “Master of the Country” formation（当家作主方阵）：

Since Xi Jinping took office in 2012, the United States and China have engaged in numerous political and economic conflicts. China’s increasing economic influence with its Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank and its Belt and Road Initiative and China’s increasing political influence with its active participation in international organizations have been perceived as challenges to American domination of the world. The Trump administration has employed the Trade War since 2018 as a strategy to try to stop or at least slow down China’s inevitable rise. In this contentious outside environment, the Chinese government has been increasingly strong and clear in its response to many of the United States’ attacks.

Figure 30: The “Master of the Country” formation in the 2019 National Day Civilian Parade



Source: CCTV Zhongguo Zhongyang Dianshitai CCTV 中国中央电视台 CCTV China Central Television. 2019. *Qingzhu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chengli 70 Zhounian Dahui Yuebingshi Qunzhong Youxing Tebie Baodao* 《庆祝中华人民共和国成立 70 周年大会阅兵式 群众游行特别报道》 [Special Report on the Celebration of the 70th Anniversary of the Founding of the PRC: Military Parade and Civilian Parade]. October 1, 2019. Youtube video, 1:54:40. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TypEKtdYN6w&t=8161s>

We can see this kind of strong response in the “Master of the Country” formation in 2019. This formation appeared as a part of the “Founding of the Nation” segment. This segment was dedicated to Chairman Mao’s legacy. Similar to the “One country, two systems” formation, this formation was presented as an example of Chairman Mao’s achievements. This formation is centered around a giant float with colorful statues depicting the imagery of People’s Representative leaving the People’s Great Hall (人民代表步出人民大会堂). This formation is surrounded with marching crowds who are dressed in 1950s clothing and holding wide red ribbons in their hands. The most notable and unusual feature of this formation is undoubtedly its background music. A song called “Socialism is Good” (社会主义好) was playing as the formation marches across Tiananmen Square. This song was written by Li Huanzhi and Xi Yang in celebration of the completion of the “Anti-Rightist Movement” in 1957. Its lyrics sent a very clear message of unite together and fight against an outside enemy. Some of the lyrics are listed below:

“反动派被打倒、帝国主义夹着尾巴逃跑了”

Translation: “The reactionaries have been beaten, and the imperialists ran away with their tails between their legs”

“社会主义江山人民保、人民江山坐得牢”

Translation: “The people will protect the socialist state, and a people’s state is invincible”

“反动分子想反也反不了”

Translation: “The reactionaries won’t be able to fight against us even if they wanted to”

If we take a closer look at the lyrics, we can understand much better why this song and this formation were used to signal to the outside world directly that China is ready to take on any challenges. The first lyric mentions two kinds of enemies that China faced and is still facing: reactionaries and imperialists. Specific to the situation of contemporary day, the term “imperialist” is particularly crucial to the message sent by this formation. I believe

it is reasonable to say that the “imperialist” here is highly likely a reference to the United States and other countries who are willing to ally with the United States. This lyric presents a rather dramatic image of the end result of this trade war, which involves the supposed “imperialist” losing and then running away shamefully. This is definitely a very fantastical image that could not happen in the real world, but it is nevertheless a powerful one to present to both the patriotic domestic audience as well as the hostile foreign audience.

The second lyric focuses on the ultimate power source of the Chinese government: the Chinese people. This lyric intends to showcase the strength of the Chinese government as not only including the strength of its economy or its military, but also including the strength of its rather large population. It is common for the Xi Jinping administration to invoke the “Chinese people” as a way to demonstrate the fact that the Chinese government is not only fighting this trade war as a political institution, but also as a representation of the mass populace at home.

The third lyric intends to present another fantastical image of the outside threat. I believe that the Chinese leadership is trying to use this lyric to demonstrate the fact that the “reactionaries”, a term that is inclusive of all kinds of enemies, won’t be able to succeed in their attempt to overturn China’s progress no matter how hard they try. Once again, this is another way to show strength. The Chinese leadership is basically saying: “We know they will come and try to fight us again, but no matter how many times they try that, they won’t succeed.”

This song was very popular in the late 1950s but soon ran into controversy in the 1960s. Some at the time argued that these lyrics was unreasonably optimistic about China’s increasingly difficult economic and political situations, while others argued that this song was necessary to promote enthusiasm and encourage optimism during such a difficult

time.⁶⁷ Due to its politically charged lyrics, it was not used in public occasions much during the 1980s and 1990s; however, it has made a comeback in recent years, especially since the 2010s.⁶⁸ The comeback of this song, accompanied by China's increasingly vocal stance in defending its own interest, are both signs that China is more and more ready to face challenges from the west on its very non-western system of governance and political regime.

Chapter 4: Conclusion

Discussion of Theoretical Framework

State propaganda and political performance are both popular subjects for social scientists to study. In a country like China whose government and leading party possesses an overwhelming power over all of its institutions and citizens, state propaganda and political performance have been used extensively since its establishment to achieve various political, social, and economic goals. Many scholars have studied these subjects in relation not only to China but also to the rest of the world. During my research process, I find that many in the academia have focused only on the ideological aspect of state propaganda; many of them take a rather cynical view on how and why countries like China use propaganda. Most political scientists in the western world will perhaps agree with the idea that China's state propaganda machine is used by the CPC in order to control its citizens, to legitimize its rule, to brainwash its people, and to promote a fever of nationalism.

⁶⁷ Ye, Jiefu 叶介甫. 2018. "Guanyu Gequ 'Shehuizhuyi Hao' de Yichang Taolun" 关于歌曲《社会主义好》的一场讨论 [A Discussion Regarding the Song 'Socialism Is Good']. *Wenshi Jinghua* 文史精华, no. 19: 64–67.

⁶⁸ Meng, Fei 孟菲. 2019. "'Shehuizhuyi Hao': Gaoge Rehuochaotian Gaojianshe de Hongtu Meijing" 《社会主义好》: 高歌热火朝天搞建设的宏图美景 ['Socialism is Good': a Grand and Beautiful scene of Loudly Singing and Enthusiastically Constructing]. *Dangshi Wenhui* 党史文汇, no. 4.

I, however, being educated and raised in China, have decided to take a different approach and viewpoint when I began to design this project. I created this project in October of 2019 to try to study China in the following manners. First, I try to study China with a practical rather than ideological mindset. I do not see China as a rival of any kind to the western world, and I do not stand on the traditional perspective of western democratic superiority. Second, I seek to understand China in its own terms. You may have noticed that I have been using “CPC” instead of “CCP” when referring to the Communist Party of China, and you may also have noticed that words such as “dictatorship”, “nationalism”, “authoritarianism”, “repression”, “oppression”, or “autocracy” are either absent or used only a few times in this thesis. The reason why you see this deviation from academic tradition is because I created my theoretical framework with reference but not dependence on existing western literature on state propaganda.

Most of the existing scholarly work on state propaganda in China or countries alike have focused on the ideological-expression functions of propaganda. These existing works are valuable in the sense that they have provided me with different kinds of perspectives on how and why China uses propaganda. They also helped me in forming my framework by identifying what is the general common view that is shared by political scientists. I have formed my theoretical framework in opposition to this general common view: I am studying the practical policy change-signaling functions of National Day Civilian Parades as a form of state propaganda.

Discussion of Findings

My research has produced 3 main pieces of findings. First, there is evidence to suggest that major policy direction, focus, and problem-solving strategy changes are reflected in the imagery of important policy areas presented in the National Day Civilian Parades. We can see from the first three case studies that the imagery of important policy areas in a parade

often reflect the general policy stance of that administration. We can also see from the fourth case study that the Chinese leadership has been more willing to showcase its stance on a contentious issue directly in important public occasions such as the National Day Civilian Parade. I have created the following chart to summarize my findings on these four case studies in terms of policy stance and parade presentation:

Important Policy Areas and Signaling Function	Agriculture	Anti-corruption/Rule of Law	Ethnic Policy	Contentious issue/foreign threat
1984 (Deng Xiaoping)	Macroeconomic focus: increase production, solve hunger problem	Economic focus: government priority focus on economic reform instead of political reform	Policy Direction: laissez-faire and individual ethnic autonomy on the basis of a loose limit of national unity	Deng Xiaoping establishes the “Hide your strength and bide your time” strategy when dealing with foreign policy
	Imagery: harvest themed formations and a vague presentation of village life	Imagery: not present at all	Imagery: present as ethnic cultural performance, no dedicated policy formation	Imagery: this is the last when slogans of “Anti-imperialism” and “Internationalism” appeared in the parades
		Problem Solving Strategy: internal party rectification campaigns	Ethnic violence example: 1985, 1988, 1989 Urumqi riots (not categorized as terrorist events in the 1980s)	Major foreign threat and contentious issue: Self Defense War against Vietnam (1979), Unification of Taiwan with Mainland China
1999 (Jiang Zemin)	Macroeconomic focus: Mechanization and modernization of production	Economic focus: government priority is still focused on economic development. Political concern: a need to ensure political and social stability makes a total crackdown on corruption too risky	Policy Direction: generally laissez-faire but begin to emphasis unity more as a response to major ethnic conflict	Jiang Zemin continues Deng’s “Hide your strength, bide your time” policy China began to face more and more challenges and threats from the outside world
	Imagery: harvest themed formations and images of agricultural infrastructure	Imagery: not present at all	Imagery: no dedicated policy formation; all ethnic groups unite around the image of top leader.	Imagery: no direct appearance of any formations that addressed any contentious issues or foreign threats

		Problem solving strategy: internal party rectification campaigns	Ethnic violence example: 1997 Yining Terrorist Riots	Major foreign threat and contentious issue: Yinhe Cargo Ship Incident (1995), NATO attack on Chinese Embassy in Belgrade (1999), US-China fighter jet crash (2001), Taiwan Regional Leader Chen Shuibian “Taiwanese Independence” Speech (2002)
2009 (Hu Jintao)	<p>Macroeconomic focus: Modern agricultural production and technology</p> <p>Life quality focus: urbanized housing and improvement of rural living quality (material and spiritual life)</p>	Political focus: government priority is focused on establishing social harmony and preventing instability	Policy Direction: generally laissez-faire, but emphasize more and more on national unity	<p>Hu Jintao continues Deng’s foreign policy principle.</p> <p>It is commonly believed that the 2008 Olympic Games was the start of China’s gradual change from totally hiding its strength to slowly showing its strength</p>
		Imagery: present partially in the parade. Images of rule of law and democratic politics present for the first time in parades	Imagery: first singled out formation alongside with ethnic cultural performance. No theme of ethnic policy directly presents	Imagery: no direct presentation of any kind of response to a foreign threat in the parade; however, there was a formation called “Together as one World” that presented a global vision.
	Imagery: harvest themed formation and modern village themed formation. More specific and detailed imagery of modern villages	Problem solving strategy: internal party rectification campaigns. Establishing a basis for rule of law reforms later	Ethnic violence example: 2008 Lhasa Terrorist Riots, 2009 Urumqi Terrorist Riots	Major foreign threat and contentious issue: The Anti-Secession Law passed in 2005, attacks on Olympic Torch runners in various foreign cities, Japanese government covets on the Diaoyu Islands
2019 (Xi Jinping)	Life quality focus: opportunity-centric poverty alleviation	Political focus: government prioritizes anti-	Policy Direction: Emphasis on national unity	Xi Jinping begins to change Deng’s foreign policy

	and modernization of rural life	corruption and rule of law	becomes a priority, maintains the basic policy of ethnic autonomy	principle to a more “Let China know more about the world, and let the world know more about China” stance.
	Imagery: very detailed presentation of new modern villages and results of rural poverty alleviation	Imagery: images of anti-corruption, democratic politics, rule of law, and party discipline are all present in the parade	Imagery: ethnic policy directly presents as a separate formation.	Imagery: the “One Country, Two system” formation and the “Master of the Country” formation.
		Problem solving strategy, a combination of internal party rectification and public-participatory campaigns on the basis of rule of law and strong legal actions.	Ethnic violence example: 2014 Kunming Terrorist Attack Note: there has not been reports of any major terrorist activities after 2017.	Major Foreign threat and contentious issue: US-China Trade War, Rise of Secessionist forces in Taiwan, Rise of Secessionist forces in Hong Kong and foreign interference in the Hong Kong issue, false accusation from western media and governments regarding the Uyghur people in Xinjiang and origins of COVID-19
Signaling Function	Signal policy focus change	Signal policy problem solving strategy change	Signal policy direction change	Demonstrate strength for a contentious issue or in front of foreign threats

These findings have the three main implications. Firstly, it is important to note that I did not intend to find any causal relations between policy making and parade imagery. My goal was to look to see if there is any evidence to suggest that important policy changes are reflected in the parade imageries of these policies. It seems that there is sufficient evidence to suggest that important policy changes are indeed reflected in a limited fashion in the parade imageries.

Second, as we have seen in the first three case studies, there are always mismatches between policy making and parade imagery. Sometimes, policy changes are not being represented in the parades at all. I have tried to find explanations for why these mismatches happen. During my analysis process, I employed the principle of “Specific situation requires specific analysis” to analyze each piece of evidence of each case study.⁶⁹ For each policy area, I provided my own perspective on why these mismatches existed alongside with some historical evidence. It is important to note that it is impossible to know for sure how and why each leader made their decision; however, it is possible to provide a reasonable explanation based on a careful inference from historical evidence. My explanations to these mismatches should be understood as products of my own interpretation of this historical evidence; other scholars who will study this subject will perhaps have different interpretations based on the same set of evidence. I did not design this project as a scientific study; rather, I designed it to be more like a mixture of humanities cultural analysis and political science phenomenon analysis. Therefore, even if future scholars follow the same procedure, they may end up interpreting the evidence differently than me.

Third, my findings show that the National Day Civilian Parades are very valuable to study as a case of political performance and state propaganda in China. My research, I believe, has demonstrated that there is a tremendous amount of political symbolism in the imageries presented in all the parades, and it would be loss for the academic community if these symbols go unstudied. I have demonstrated that it is possible to track the change in imageries of some of China’s most important policy areas across time and then compare them with the actual policy making process. I have demonstrated that it is possible to go

⁶⁹ Mao, Zedong 毛泽东. 1968. *Mao Dun Lun* 矛盾论 [On Contradiction]. In *Mao Zedong Xuanji* 毛泽东选集 [Selected Works of Mao Zedong], 1st ed., 287. Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe 北京: 人民出版社 Beijing: People’s Press.

beyond the traditional realm of treating propaganda as simple ideological expression cases; hopefully, we will see more studies on this subject matter in the future.

Limitations and Future scholar work possibilities

As I have stated previously, I did not design this project as a scientific study in the traditional sense of the phrase. Unlike most of my fellow students who formed a hypothesis, collected quantitative data, performed regression analysis, and then drew conclusion of a correlational nature, I told a story in my thesis. Because my methods and my analysis are not strictly scientific, there can be many limitations to the quality of links I found between parade imagery and policy changes.

For my data collection on important policy related terms, there is a lot of room for improvement and possibly rectification. If allotted more time and resources, I can potentially conduct a more thorough word search in these reports or even perform a similar kind of research on other types of government documents. Future projects can look into the possibility of searching for the number of laws and regulations made per year for each of these policy areas. Future projects can also perform a qualitative analysis of leaders' speeches in regard to these policy areas. This project's quantitative data collection is an imperfect and subject process, but it is reasonably sufficient enough considering the qualitative nature of this project's central argument.

Another limitation is regarding the qualitative data of the parades. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, I was not able to return to China in summer 2020 to interview people who participated in these parades. Unlike Chang Tai-hung who utilized interviews of parade participants in his analysis, I could not do so. This severely limited the scope of my research. The only resource I can find are primary video evidence and secondary scholarly source. Future scholars can consider doing a cross-time tracking program for these parades that usually take place every ten years. In a normal parade year, scholars can

potentially do a field study of these parades in China to gather data on public reaction and parade organization.

One more limitation would be the entire research design. As stated previously, I wanted to create a project that is different from the conventional political science model of research. I wanted to create a project that brings in aspects of humanities research and popular science. This project's research design is a way for me to experiment with the possibility of moving away from the usage of heavy quantitative analysis, and it has proven to be a worthwhile experiment. Due to the fact that this is an unconventional research design, there are many parts of the design that I wish I could change. It is important to note that I only was able to solidify my "Four Signaling Functions of State Propaganda" framework less than a month before the final due date of this thesis. If given more time and more resource, I would be able to design this research in a much more sophisticated fashion. Future scholars should see this project as a pioneer project in its nature. Future scholars should continue this experiment of trying to design political science research that would bring in elements from other disciplines. I believe it is worthwhile for future scholars to consider more interdisciplinary research between political science and the humanities.

Final Thoughts

The first conception for this thesis was born during a dark night in October 2019, and the final words of this thesis were written during a dark night in March 2021. The beginning of this thesis coincided with the height of the US-China trade war, and the end of this thesis coincided with terrible attacks on Asian American communities across the United States. The whole process of designing and writing this thesis was accompanied by constant turbulence in the world outside my fifth-floor apartment. Back in 2019, my mental health issues were only beginning to manifest themselves; in 2021, my mental

health issues have become an every-day nightmare for me that I just can't escape. In early 2020, I was worried sick for my friends and family in China due to the newly emerged coronavirus; in 2021, I am worried sick myself and friends here in the United States due to the still-ravaging COVID-19. During these 2 years, I have had several mental breakdowns, suicide attempts, and moments of pure despair. The Youtube videos of these parades used to be simple empirical evidence for my research; now they are the only few things left in my life that can cheer me up. I have watched these parades thousands of times, and I often put on my headphones and imagine myself being one of those parade marchers, marching across the Tiananmen Square under those bright October days.

Many times, during these 2 years, I was discouraged from doing a project my way. I got push back for my ideas and I didn't know what to do with this goldmine of political symbolism. Gladly, through help of my two advisors and my good friends, I managed to keep pushing forward without losing my original intentions. I managed to reach March 2021 with a thesis that I think is at least readable. I hope I have presented my readers with a different perspective on Chinese politics. I hope I have shown people that it is possible to study China without having an ideological bias. I hope that I have presented a more reasonable image of China to the American people during a time when China is hated by both the American government and the American society for various of political and economic reasons.

May our two countries finally find peace someday. May we see cooperation instead of conflict. May we see understanding instead of accusations. May we see mutual respect rather than mutual destruction.

See you during the 2029 National Day Civilian Parade.

-----Jiahao Liu 刘嘉灏

Appendix: Data Source

During my research process, I have collected 2 types of data. The first type involves qualitative data on the 4 parades (1984, 1999, 2009, 2019). This type of data is collected through a process of viewing video footage of the parades and taking notes during the viewership. Here is a list of video footages with links:

National Day Civilian Parade in 2019:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TypEKtdYN6w&vl=zh-Hans>

National Day Civilian Parade in 2009:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SmSMQoTigos>

National Day Civilian Parade in 1999:

<https://www.bilibili.com/video/av71455376/>

National Day Civilian Parade in 1984:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M_tZPZTx3B8

The second type of data involves quantitative data on the frequency of usage of various important political terms within China's annual government work reports and the CPC's quinquennial party congress political reports. This type of data is collected through a process of word search within these reports. Here are examples of what citation would look like for these reports:

Li, Keqiang. 2020. "REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE GOVERNMENT." Government Work Report. Beijing: State Council of the People's Republic of China.

Xi, Jinping. 2017. "Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era." Party Congress Political Report. Beijing: Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

Since there are 11 party congresses and more than 50 government work reports, I have decided to not cite all of them in the reference. All of them will have citations that are similar to the two examples above.

Data Format and Code Book

In the dataset which I will send alongside this assignment, you will see 6 separate sheets of data. In this section, I will be explaining the format of these data, my reasoning for using these formats, and my coding strategy. For the purpose of making a draft, I will be listing this information; I will be reformatting this information according to appropriate academic styles.

Section: Parade Formation Data

Data time range: 1984, 1999, 2009, 2019.

Sheet name: Quantification
Data location: Row 2
Variable: Year
Variable usage: This variable is used to measure time.
Data format: Quantitative
Reason for data format: This format has been selected as year is a time variable which is naturally quantitative.
Coding: Data for this variable will be listed chronologically from 1954 to 2019.

Sheet name: Quantification
Data location: Row 3
Variable: Total Formation
Variable usage: This variable is used to measure the total number of formations present within a parade.
Data format: Quantitative
Reason for data format: Calculating the total number of formations present within a parade will help us to see the length of a parade.
Coding: This data is calculated by counting the number of formations present within each of the 4 parades. A list of formations can be found in each of the 4 sheets dedicated to collecting qualitative information on the parades.

Sheet name: Quantification
Data location: Row 4

Variable: People-Tribute Formation (PTF)
Variable usage: This variable is used to measure the total number of formations present within a parade that are dedicated to tribute to the Chinese people.
Data format: Quantitative
Reason for data format: Calculating the total number of formations present within a parade that are dedicated to tribute to the Chinese people will help us to see how much of a parade is about paying tribute to the populace.
Coding: This data is calculated by counting the number of formations present within each of the 4 parades that pays tribute to the people. Determining if a formation is paying tribute to the people is a subjective process. Generally, formations that represent social groups such as veterans, workers, farmers, and minorities can be considered as “PTF”; formations that present topics such as democracy and early socialist industrialization can also be considered as “PTF”. Relevant topics and social groups represented during the parades can be found in column C of each of the 4 sheets dedicated to collecting qualitative information on the parades.

Sheet name: Quantification
Data location: Row 5
Variable: First appearance of PTF
Variable usage: This variable is used to indicate the order of appearance of the first formation that is dedicated to the people within a parade.
Data format: Quantitative
Reason for data format: Indicating the order of appearance of the first formation that is dedicated to the people within a parade can help us see the relative position of a PTF within a parade and to see the level of priority that the populace has been given by the leadership (more early=more important).
Coding: This data is collected by looking for the first PTF within each of the four parades and noting their order of appearance. This information can be found in column A of each of the 4 sheets dedicated to collecting qualitative information on the parades. All PTFs and qualitative information regarding the PTFs will be written in white colored text.

Sheet name: Quantification
Data location: Row 6
Variable: Leader-Tribute Formation (LTF)
Variable usage: This variable is used to measure the total number of formations present within a parade that are dedicated to tribute to the Communist Party leaderships.

Data format: Quantitative
Reason for data format: Calculating the total number of formations present within a parade that are dedicated to tribute to the Communist Party leaderships will help us to see how much of a parade is about paying tribute to the leaders/party.
Coding: This data is calculated by counting the number of formations present within each of the 4 parades that pays tribute to previous and current leaders. Determining if a formation is paying tribute to the leadership is a subjective process. Generally, formations that present the portrait or statue of previous or current leaders can be considered as “LTF”; for the sake of simplicity and convenience of analysis, formations that are not “PTF” can be considered generally as “LTF”. Information on whether or not leadership images are present in a formation can be found in column A of each of the 4 sheets dedicated to collecting qualitative information on the parades.

Sheet name: Quantification
Data location: Row 7
Variable: LTF Proportion
Variable usage: This variable is used to measure the proportion of formations present within a parade that are dedicated to tribute to the Communist Party leaderships.
Data format: Quantitative
Reason for data format: Calculating the proportion of formations present within a parade that are dedicated to tribute to the Communist Party leaderships will help us to see the relative level of emphasis of leadership’s imagery within a parade.
Coding: This data is calculated by dividing the number of LTF within a parade by the total number of formations within a parade. This proportion is generally rounded to the second decimal point.

Sheet name: Quantification
Data location: Row 8
Variable: People-Tribute Music (PTM)
Variable usage: This variable is used to measure the total number of background songs present during a parade that are dedicated to tribute to the Chinese people.
Data format: Quantitative
Reason for data format: Calculating the total number of background songs during a parade that are dedicated to tribute to the Chinese people will help us

to see how much of a parade is about paying tribute to the people. This variable can be seen as a complimentary variable with the number of PTF.

Coding: This data is calculated by counting the number of background songs present during each of the 4 parades that pays tribute to the Chinese people. Determining if a background song is paying tribute to the populace is a subjective process. Generally, there are several well-known songs in China that are commonly known to be about people's life or about paying tribute to a major social group within the common populace. Examples of such songs include "On the Hopeful Fields", "Us the Workers have Power", and "Mountains and Rivers". Names of songs in the order of their appearance during the parade can be found in column E of each of the 4 sheets dedicated to collecting qualitative information on the parades.

Sheet name: Quantification

Data location: Row 9

Variable: Total Music

Variable usage: This variable is used to measure the total number of background songs present during a parade.

Data format: Quantitative

Reason for data format: Calculating the total number of background songs during a parade will help us to see the general level of musical variation within the parade (more songs=more variations). This variable can be seen as a complimentary variable with the total number of formations.

Coding: This data is calculated by counting the number of background songs present during each of the 4 parades. Names of songs present can be found column E of each of the 4 sheets dedicated to collecting qualitative information on the parades.

Sheet name: Quantification

Data location: Row 10

Variable: Total Interaction Score

Variable usage: This variable is used to measure the general level of interaction between the leadership and the marching populace during a parade.

Data format: Quantitative

Reason for data format: By summing all of the individual formations' interaction scores, we can see the how much interaction there was during the parade.

Coding: This data is calculated by making a summation of all of the individual formations' interaction scores. A higher total interaction score would indicate

more interactions during a parade, while a lower total interaction score would indicate less interactions during a parade.

Sheet name: Quantification

Data location: Row 11

Variable: PTM Proportion

Variable usage: This variable is used to measure the proportion of background songs present within a parade that are dedicated to tribute to the Chinese people.

Data format: Quantitative

Reason for data format: Calculating the proportion of background songs present within a parade that are dedicated to tribute to the Chinese people will help us to see the relative level of emphasis of the populace's imagery within a parade.

Coding: This data is calculated by dividing the number of PTM within a parade by the total number of background songs within a parade. This proportion is generally rounded to the second decimal point.

Sheet name: Quantification

Data location: Row 12

Variable: PTF Proportion

Variable usage: This variable is used to measure the proportion of formations present within a parade that are dedicated to tribute to the Chinese people.

Data format: Quantitative

Reason for data format: Calculating the proportion of formations present within a parade that are dedicated to tribute to the Chinese people will help us to see the relative level of emphasis of the populace's imagery within a parade.

Coding: This data is calculated by dividing the number of PTF within a parade by the total number of formations within a parade. This proportion is generally rounded to the second decimal point.

Sheet name: Quantification

Data location: Row 13

Variable: Interaction Proportion

Variable usage: This variable is used to measure the proportion of formations present within a parade that had signs of interactions between the populace and the leadership.

Data format: Quantitative
Reason for data format: Calculating the proportion of formations present within a parade that had signs of interactions between the populace and the leadership can help us see the relative level of willing of the leadership to show a closer relationship with their people.
Coding: This data is calculated by dividing the total interaction score by the total number of formations. This calculation strategy was used because during parade where there was full interaction during every single formation, we would see total interaction score=total number of formations. This proportion is generally rounded to the second decimal point.

Sheet name: Quantification
Data location: Row 14
Variable: Mass-Line Index
Variable usage: This variable is used to measure the general level of Mass-Line sentiment during the parades.
Data format: Quantitative
Reason for data format: Calculating a mass-line index can help us see how much of the parades' content and outlook are in-line with one of the CPC's most important ideologies: The Mass-Line Principle.
Coding: This data is calculated by summing up 3 variables: PTM proportion, PTF proportion, and Interaction Proportion. All of these proportions are indicators of how much of these parades' content and outlooks are being designed to pay tribute to the populace. After calculating a summation, these summations will be turned into a number value by removing the percentage sign while preserving the decimal point.

Section: Political Term Usage in Government Work Reports

Data time range: 1954-1960, 1964, 1975, 1978-2019.

Sheet name: Quantification
Data location: Row 19-37
Variables: Important political and policy terms used in government work reports Mass 群众 Mass-Line 群众路线 People 人民 Economy 经济 Agriculture/Village 农业/农村

<p>Industry 工业</p> <p>Science/Technology 科学技术</p> <p>Literature and Art/Culture/Art 文艺/文化/艺术</p> <p>Education 教育</p> <p>Enterprise 企业</p> <p>Worker 工人</p> <p>Farmer 农民</p> <p>Socialism 社会主义</p> <p>Rural/Three Agricultural Policy 乡村/三农</p> <p>Migrant Worker 农民工</p> <p>Intellectual 知识分子</p> <p>Frontline 一线</p> <p>Base 基层</p> <p>Employee 职工</p> <p>Poverty Alleviation 贫困/穷困/贫穷/脱贫/扶贫</p> <p>Environment 环境/环保/保护/自然/植树/造林/生态/污染</p> <p>Anti-Corruption 反腐/腐败/廉洁/贪污/官僚主义/违纪/形式主义/三讲/廉政/四风/八项</p> <p>Rule of Law 法治/依法/宪法/法制</p> <p>Ethnic Unity 团结/共同体/民族问题/交流/交融/和睦/和衷/统一/中华民族大家庭</p> <p>Ethnic Laissez Faire 民族区域自治/差别化/少数民族文化</p> <p>Nation 少数民族/民族政策/民族</p> <p>Ethnic Policy=Ethnic Unity - Ethnic Laissez Faire</p>
Variable usage: This variable is used to measure the frequency of usage of important political and policy terms in government work reports.
Data format: Quantitative
Reason for data format: Counting the frequency of usage of important political and policy terms in government work reports helps us to see the general level of emphasis of these political principles and policies within each year's report of government work.
Coding: This data is collected by doing a word search of each of these terms or set of terms within the full text of each year's government work report and recording the numbers of times that these terms show up within the reports.

Section: Political Term Usage in Party Reports

Data time range: 1956, 1969, 1973, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, 2012, 2017

Sheet name: Quantification
Data location: Row 42-60
Variables: Important political and policy terms used in communist party congress reports

<p>Mass 群众 Mass-Line 群众路线 People 人民 Economy 经济 Agriculture/Village 农业/农村 Industry 工业 Science/Technology 科学技术 Literature and Art/Culture/Art 文艺/文化/艺术 Education 教育 Enterprise 企业 Worker 工人 Farmer 农民 Socialism 社会主义 Rural/Three Agricultural Policy 乡村/三农 Migrant Worker 农民工 Intellectual 知识分子 Frontline 一线 Base 基层 Employee 职工 Poverty Alleviation 贫困/穷困/贫穷/脱贫/扶贫 Environment 环境/环保/保护/自然/植树/造林/生态/污染 Anti-Corruption 反腐/腐败/廉洁/贪污/官僚主义/违纪/形式主义/三讲/廉政/四风/八项 Rule of Law 法治/依法/宪法/法制 Ethnic Unity 团结/共同体/民族问题/交流/交融/和睦/和衷/统一/中华民族大家庭 Ethnic Laissez Faire 民族区域自治/差别化/少数民族文化 Nation 少数民族/民族政策/民族 Ethnic Policy=Ethnic Unity - Ethnic Laissez Faire</p>
<p>Variable usage: This variable is used to measure the frequency of usage of important political and policy terms in communist party congress reports.</p>
<p>Data format: Quantitative</p>
<p>Reason for data format: Counting the frequency of usage of important political and policy terms in party reports helps us to see the general level of emphasis of these political principles and policies within every five year's report of communist party congress.</p>
<p>Coding: This data is collected by doing a word search of each of these terms or set of terms within the full text of each party congress report and recording the numbers of times that these terms show up within the reports.</p>

Section: Parade Qualitative Information

Data time range: 1984, 1999, 2009, 2019

Sheet names: 1984, 1999, 2009, 2019
Data location: Column A
Variable: Formations
Variable usage: This variable is used to catalog the names of each of the many formations present during the parades.
Data format: Qualitative
Reason for data format: Making a list of all the names of formations can help us see clearly what each formation is generally about. They can help us indicate the topic, social group, or important policy that these formations are trying to represent.
Coding: For the 2009 and 2019 parades, there are officially designated formation names. These official formation names can be found within the background commentary made by the CCTV during live reporting of the two parades. For the 1984 and 1999 parades, some formations have officially designated formation names, while others do not have officially designated formation names as the two parades are not organized strictly according to separated formations. Names for formations of these two parades are collected by both using names designated to these formations by the CCTV commentary as well as by making an observation of the formations and designated names for them based on the imagery presented on the floats.

Sheet names: 1984, 1999, 2009, 2019
Data location: Column B
Variable: Notes
Variable usage: This is a list of notes I have taken in order to note the consistencies and changes made to various formations within the parades.
Data format: Qualitative
Reason for data format: Taking notes on the qualitative changes made to the formations will help us to compare formations from different parades as well as the different changes made to the same formation across different parades.
Coding: Notetaking while viewing the video recordings of these parades is a subjective process. Here are some important elements that are usually present in the notes: 1: What is this formation supposed to be depicting with its imagery? 2: Have we seen this formation before in previous parades? 3: What did this formation look like before, and how is it different in the present parade comparing to the past? 4: Is there anything special to be noted about this formation? Are there any changes that seem to be unusual and odd? 5: For some formations that are particularly interesting, I will offer a few sentences of subjective interpretation of why a change has been made.

Example of a note's coding: (Please refer to Sheet 2019, Row 5 and 6, Formation: "Our Blood in War")

What is this formation supposed to be depicting with its imagery?

Answer: "Reminding people of their glorious warring past by having two formations dedicated to veterans and history of revolution."

Have we seen this formation before in previous parades?

Answer: "Yes we have. This formation was present during the 2009 parade."

What did this formation look like before, and how is it different in the present parade comparing to the past?

Answer: "In 2009, there was only one formation dedicated to the veterans; this formation was inherited in style in 2019, but an addition formation was added in 2019. This additional formation includes more than a dozen buses full of veterans and retired national heroes."

Is there anything special to be noted about this formation? Are there any changes that seem to be unusual and odd?

Answer: "This is the first time when buses are used in the parades are a type of float."

For some formations that are particularly interesting, I will offer a few sentences of subjective interpretation of why a change has been made.

Interpretation: "With increasing tension between China and the United States, Xi Jinping is not shying away from symbols of past victories over outside enemies. The 2019 parade definitely wishes to emphasize the pride in one's warring past."

Sheet names: 1984, 1999, 2009, 2019
Data location: Column C
Variable: Theme
Variable usage: This is a list of themes I have designated to each and every one of the formations.
Data format: Qualitative
Reason for data format: Designating a short one phrase theme to a formation can help us understand the topic of the formation without having to read through a lengthy description.
Coding: Determining which theme each formation is trying to present is a subjective process. The theme of each formation is determined by taking into consideration of the following elements: which social group is this formation trying to represent? Which national policy is this formation trying to represent?

For example: Please refer to Sheet 2009, Row 9 and 34.

(Row 9) Formation Name: “Story of the Spring”.

Theme: Leadership

Reason for designation: This formation centers around a giant oil painting portrait of Deng Xiaoping, who is the leader of China from 1978 to 1989. Due to the fact that his imagery is the dominant and the only image present in this formation, and due to the fact that the background music played during this formation’s march is also a song tributing to his term in office, one can reasonably designate “Leadership” as the theme of this formation.

Sheet names: 1984, 1999, 2009, 2019

Data location: Column D

Variable: Interaction Score

Variable usage: This variable is used to measure whether or not there is populace-leadership interaction present while a formation is marching past Tiananmen.

Data format: Quantitative

Reason for data format: Using a 0-1 scale to indicate the existence of populace-leadership interaction helps us to understand the level of relationship between China’s leadership and the Chinese people that the leadership is willing to show in public (more interaction=more willing to show a closer relationship).

Coding: This data is collected by assigning every formation a 0, 0.5, or 1 score. A 0 score represents no interaction. A 0.5 score represents partial interaction. A 1 score represents full interaction. Determination of interaction scores is a subjective process. This process involves watching the parades and make observations to see if there are any signs of interaction during the march of a formation. Signs of interaction include eye contact, cheering, hand waving, and direction of body turn. A 0 score would mean that there is no sign of any direct eye contact between the populace and the leadership, and/or that there is no sign of the marching populace turning towards the leadership and cheering. A 0.5 score would mean that these signs are only present with people standing on the floats within each formation. A 1 score would mean that these signs are present both on the floats and in the marching populace within a formation. Every formation’s interaction score can be found in column D of each of the 4 sheets dedicated to collecting qualitative information on the parades.

Sheet names: 1984, 1999, 2009, 2019

Data location: Column E

Variable: Songs

Variable usage: This variable is used to catalogue that different background songs used during the parade.
Data format: Qualitative
Reason for data format: Noting the name of the songs can help us understand the general political tone of the parades as most of the songs used in these parades were written with a political purpose in mind. Most of these songs are commonly known as “Red Songs”, which means that were written alongside communist party guidelines or ideologies.
Coding: The cataloguing of these songs is done by listening to the background music while viewing the video recordings of the parades. Since most of these songs are widely known in the Chinese public, it is a subjective but simple process to listen to a song and note what is the song’s name.

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