

**Youth Involvement and Voting Age:
Evidence from South Korea**

청소년 참여와 선거연령: 대한민국을 중심으로

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A THESIS

Submitted to

The University of Michigan

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

HONORS BACHELOR OF ARTS

Department of Political Science

March 26, 2021

Abstract

While age has been studied as a factor of voting tendency, the academic discussions on minimum voting age and what affects its change are seriously lacking. This research contends that youth involvement in social movements impacts the political decision to lower the voting age. The South Korean case poses a question on why, among the 20 bills lowering the voting age introduced during the past decade, only the 2019 bill passed. The across-time study compiles every media-reported youth involvement in social movements over time, in relation to the final legislative status of voting age bills introduced each time. The across-politician study compares youth presence in each constituency with its lawmaker's reaction to the voting age bill. These suggest that once youth involvement increases to a common experience among the youth group, both politicians and parties become more conscious of the higher stakes of the voting age bills and reach a bipartisan consensus for prioritized passage.

국문초록

정치학 연구에서 연령은 투표 성향의 맥락으로 한정되어왔으며, 선거연령과 그 하향 요인에 대한 담론은 드물다. 본 연구는 최근 선거연령을 낮춘 대한민국을 예시로 지난 10 여년 간 발의된 20 건의 선거연령 하향 법안 중 왜 2019 년 안만 통과할 수 있었는지에 대해 탐구한 결과, 선거연령 하향을 이끄는 결정적인 요인은 청소년의 사회 참여라고 판단했다. 종단연구 부분은 월별 청소년 참여 보도 내용과 각 시점에 논의된 법안의 진전을, 횡단연구 부분은 지역구 별 청소년 인구, 비율, 참여도와 각 국회의원의 선거연령 하향 지지도를 비교한다. 청소년의 사회 참여 경험이 빈도와 규모 면에서 보편화 수준으로 증가함에 따라 그들의 민주적 역량에 대한 인식이 변화하며, 정치권은 선거연령 하향을 당파적 이해를 넘어 당위적 과제로 인식하게 된다. 정당과 개별 의원이 그 중대성을 의식한 결과 선거연령 하향은 준초당적 사안으로 부상하여 비로소 우선적 통과 요건을 갖추게 된다.

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Acknowledgements

First, I would like to thank Professor Jowei Chen for the wholehearted support as my thesis advisor. I was thrilled when you accepted my request, and I am always humbled by your insight. Professor Brian Min, Mike Thompson-Brusstar, Tom O'Mealia, and my thesis cohort have also greatly helped me complete this project. Aparna, Elias, Miryee, I wish you all the best for your future wherever you go. I would also like to thank Representative Sim Sang-jung and her staff for willingly participating in the interview.

I am grateful that I have been around amazing people at the University of Michigan. Ashley Kim, you are truly my family. Mr. Bryan Kim-Butler, you gave me not only confidence in writing but also motivation for the future. I will remember your dedication to your students and always look up to you as my role model. Ms. Mayumi Oka has passionately encouraged me to explore multilingual opportunities. Last but not least, Professor Allison Alexy has inspired me both as a scholar and my mentor. Although this is not a cultural anthropology thesis, your brilliant works taught me what an academic piece should look like. I hope to become a respected person like you in the future. All this would have been impossible without these great people. Thank you so much.

This thesis was funded by the generous Gerstein Family Research Stipend.

Introduction

The history of democracy is the history of enfranchisement. However, the universal suffrage that most contemporary liberal democracies claim to have reached is not truly universal, as the presence of minimum voting age disenfranchises the youth.¹ Some say that lowering the voting age is the final step toward universal suffrage, but there exists a time lag where each state gradually accepts the change. This is why different liberal democracies have had different voting ages over time and lowered them within their contexts. For example, the United States lowered its voting age to 18 through the Twenty-sixth Amendment to the Constitution in 1971.

On December 27, 2019, the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea passed amendments to the Public Official Election Act, lowering the national voting age from 19 to 18.² As Speaker Moon Hee-sang³ struck the gavel amid the wrestling lawmakers⁴ and flying placards in the chamber, the decades-long gridlock was finally over. South Korea⁵ became the last to join its peer liberal democracies with a voting age of 18 or lower. As of 2021, all members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have a national voting age of 18, except Austria, 16. But what factors motivate lawmakers to lower the voting age? While dozens of bills lowering the voting age from 19 to 18 had been introduced, the final passage in 2019 took a decade. The interesting contrast between the unsuccessful and successful ones suggests that lowering the voting age is more than just partisan dynamics or negotiation of interests. South Korea in the 2010s exemplifies how youth involvement in social movements demonstrates the political capacity of the youth and adds salience to the voting age agenda, which in turn pushes the lawmakers to prioritize the passage of the bill.

Identifying what increases the likelihood of lowering the voting age is important for two major reasons. First, the discussion of lowering the voting age could arise in any liberal

democracy, endlessly. South Korea started discussing lowering the voting age from 19 to 18 right after it was lowered from 20 to 19 in 2005, and the 2019 legislation was immediately followed by the demand to even eliminate the age restriction. Eighteen is not a terminal standard, and the voting age agenda is rather continuous. In fact, lowering the voting age to 16 has been not only a timely issue in regional politics but also a presidential campaign platform in the US, and some European parliaments have already started the formal discussion. Due to such universal and continuous characteristics of this particular topic, political scientists should be aware of the prerequisites or precursors in order to be able to tell when and where this significant change will likely take place in the future.

Second, knowing what elements other than immediate votes motivate politicians could provide meaningful insight into topics broader than voting age itself. Lowering the voting age is not just an amendment to a law, but an enfranchisement of political minorities. Due to the longstanding age discrimination, youths have been reduced to politically incapable dependencies. Even in many contemporary liberal democracies, youths are deprived of their political rights such as campaigning, running for offices, and of course voting. Therefore, lowering the voting age is in the continuity of enfranchisement since granting them political rights partially resolves such discrimination. Furthermore, the findings of this research could provide meaningful insight into the politics of enfranchisement in general, which requires a more comprehensive explanation for factors impacting politicians than votes. To elaborate, disenfranchised minorities, youths in this case, have no direct power to punish or award the politicians until they are finally enfranchised. Without other factors that urge the lawmakers to stand with the powerless, the intuitive electoral politics cannot explain the seemingly altruistic stance they take. The series of recent South Korean voting age bills gives important insight on what extra-electoral conditions

bring the gridlock closer to an end and enable enfranchisement. While this is especially about a gridlock that concerns franchise, the extra-electoral motives might also shed light on the representation of different minority groups left out of the majoritarian electoral politics. Intuitively, politicians are thought to pursue practical interests in accordance with their parties and constituents that actually determine their reelection, but they sometimes act based on their conscience over partisan interest when it comes to issues concerning morality typically around minority rights. In sum, the study on youths' impact on lowering the voting age might speak to a process where politicians are motivated to act on behalf of the minorities based on their conscience rather than direct or immediate incentives.

However, neither youth involvement nor voting age has sufficiently been discussed in political science. Conducting the research, I have noticed the scarcity of both youth literature and voting age literature which respectively correspond to the independent and dependent variables. First, most political science literature that address youths define them as "young adults." Youths in political context have been discussed as young voters or often college students typically over the voting age. The literature that define youths as minors under the voting age rather belonged to the disciplines like developmental studies, pedagogy, or psychology, which were simply too far from relevant. It was disappointing to realize that there are only a few credible political science literature that seriously address their capacity to independently impact the political process, while they have always been doing so all over the world. Throughout history, youths have played a significant role in major social movements (Nordås and Davenport 2013). This is not only about college students but also teenagers seeking social changes, especially in South Korea where teenagers have led most major historic movements from the Japanese occupation to the military rule to the 21st Century. However, the contribution of marginalized teenagers has

not as seriously discussed in scholarly settings. To summarize, neither teenagers themselves nor their substantial political contribution has been represented in the discipline of political science.

Voting age literature is lacking as well. Most political scientists do discuss *voter* age typically in terms of voting tendency, but rarely pay attention to those who are below the voting age. A few peer-reviewed journal articles do discuss *voting* age, but as an independent variable, not a dependent variable. In other words, even within the limited pool, voting age studies focus primarily on the consequence of lowering the voting age, not the cause. For example, Zeglovits and Zandonella (2013) hypothesize that lowering the voting age increases the political participation of the youth. In this case, lowering the voting age is exogenous to youth involvement. However, there is virtually no previous attempt to *explain* lowering the voting age with youth involvement. Therefore, this research questions the cause of lowering the voting age, or what motivates the lawmakers to vote in favor of lowering the voting age, focusing on the significance of youth involvement impacting the legislature outside the traditional partisan dynamics centered around politicians. This examines lowering the voting age to be endogenous to youth involvement: in other words, the possibility where youth involvement could be the cause as well as the effect of lowering the voting age.

In sum, political science researches of youth involvement as an explanation for the success in lowering the voting age has been almost non-existent despite its importance, and this research attempts to fill the gap. In doing so, it takes a counterintuitive approach and argues that youths play a substantial role in the passage of the bill lowering the voting age. Lowering the voting age is typically considered a partisan project. To elaborate, liberal parties are more likely to support the bill lowering the voting age because it will invite more young people who tend to vote liberal. However, this does not apply to the 2019 passage in South Korea, the most recent

case as of now where a liberal democracy lowered its national voting age. Therefore, this research challenges the intuitive partisan politics explanation and suggests that the behavior of youths themselves has to do with the passage of the bill. This is significant because it not only explains the political process of lowering the voting age more universally accurately but also suggests that this is what youths earned rather than given as a byproduct of partisan contestation. Throughout history, enfranchisement has been thought to be a result of politicians' pursuit of practical interest disguised as a benevolent gift from the just. However, this research demonstrates that politically constrained youths had substantially contributed to this change.

I. Background

Multiparty System

In order to understand the political context of the voting age bills, it is crucial to understand the South Korean multiparty politics in the 2010s. South Korea is a unitary state with a presidential system. After a series of dictatorships that followed the Korean War, it became a liberal democracy in 1987 when the new constitution included direct election and established liberal democratic institutions like the rule of law and peaceful transfer of power. South Korea's unicameral legislature the National Assembly resides on Yeouido Island between the Han River banks. Its 300 seats are broken down into the first-past-the-post district seats and proportional representation. While the specific rules have differed over time, proportional representation has been a key aspect of post-democratic politics. The particular version of proportional representation relevant to this study was adopted in 2004¹ (National Law Information Center 2004). A voter separately votes for a district candidate and a party on a ballot, and the latter result independently divides the proportional representation seats that occupy about a sixth of the National Assembly. Proportional representation leads to a multiparty system (Duverger 1964) which allows minority parties to take some seats and formally engage in national politics.




Figure 1. Lineage of National Assembly Parties on Ideological Spectrum

South Korean politics in the 2010s exemplifies the dynamic nature of its multiparty system, characterized by very frequent merges and splits. In 2012, the 19th National Assembly was inaugurated with three main parties: the Justice Party (left),² the Democratic Party (center-left),³ and the Liberty Korea Party (right).⁴ “Phase one” lasted almost the entire 19th National Assembly, normalizing the longstanding three-party politics. In 2016, Democrats in the pro-Kim Dae-jung wing based in the Honam region and a rising technocrat Ahn Cheol-soo divorced the party and established the People’s Party (center) right before the 20th National Assembly election, successfully opening “phase two” thanks to the election victory.⁵ Months later, President Park Geun-hye (LKP) was impeached over Choigate, a scandal where Park illegally delegated the presidential authorities to her secretive friend and coerced the conglomerates to lobby her private foundations. In January 2017, LKP moderates abandoned Park and founded the Bareunmirae Party (center-right),⁶ opening “phase three.”⁷ The BMP self-proclaimed the anti-Park alternative for the conservatives, but soon lost half of its seats to the LKP during the 19th presidential election. Some BMP lawmakers demanded their candidate Yoo Seong-min to yield

and support LKP's Hong Joon-pyo in order to temporarily unite and defeat Moon Jae-in, a Democrat. As Yoo refused, they returned to the LKP to support Hong, shifting to "phase four." Halved in size, the BMP decided to combine with People's, the other centrist minority party. In 2018, the People's mainstream joined the BMP, and the pro-Kim wing remained due to its incompatibility with the conservative ideology and loyalty to its regional base.⁸ This is "phase five" that lasted until early 2020. When the voting age bill was finally passed in December 2019, five main parties, Justice (left), Democratic (center-left), People's (center), the BMP (center-right), and the LKP (right) were making up the ideological spectrum of the National Assembly.

Legislative Process

Due to the frequent merges and splits, the 20th National Assembly had never had a majority party. The partisan turmoil around Park's impeachment and its aftermath prevented the parties from reaching consensus under the legislative process due to gridlocks. When a bill is introduced by either the executive branch or 10 or more lawmakers, it is then allocated to a relevant committee (NLIC 2019).⁹ Committees, both standing and special, consist of lawmakers from different parties, and the chairs are not necessarily from the majority party, unlike the US Congress. The initial committee allocations, however, are not final. Each committee can discuss bills at subcommittees then bring them to the full committee floor, or send them to other committees. They are then sent to the Legislation and Judiciary Committee, then to the Plenary Session, the final discretion. Although both the Plenary Session and the committees decide based on majority rule, following debates (NLIC 2019), there are ways opposing parties can delay this process other than votes. Highly contested bills are conventionally excluded from the committee agenda without bipartisan consent, and opponents can even boycott their committee attendance, delaying the process.

II. Lowering the Voting Age

South Korea’s initial voting age 21 was set by the United States Army Military Government in Korea, prior to the First National Assembly election in 1948 (NLIC 1948). The 1960 amendment to the Constitution then lowered the voting age to 20 (NLIC 1960). The discussion to lower the voting age in the liberal democratic context began right after the democratization in 1987, which also transferred the authority to set the voting age from the Constitution to statutes. For the first time, Democrats brought their year-long project to lower the voting age from 20 to 18 to the National Assembly committee floor in 1992, while the LKP resisted (National Assembly of the Republic of Korea 1992).¹ The dispute lasted in the 21st century and the lawmakers compromised to lower the voting age from 20 to 19 in 2005 (NLIC 2005). However, the advocates continued to demand further lowering the voting age to 18, and the political discussion shortly reconvened. Throughout the last decade, protests, petitions, party platforms, executive proposals, and most importantly, legislative attempts reflect this demand, but actually passing the voting age bill had been extremely challenging. It took 14 years to take another year down, meeting what was then global standards for liberal democracies.

Year	President (Party)	NA Majority	Bill #	Introduced	Passed Committee	Passed Plenary	Result
2012	Lee (L)	19th	1902250	10/22/12			Introduced (I)
		None	1902330	10/30/12			
2013	Park (L)	L	1903887	2/27/13			
			1903968	3/6/13			
			1909122	1/21/14			
2014			1909835	3/21/14			
			1911954	10/1/14			
			2000043	5/30/16			
			2000335	6/17/16			
2016		20th None	2001206	7/26/16			
			2001404	8/4/16			
			2002173	9/6/16			
			2003277	11/4/16			
			2003546	11/14/16	1/9/17		Committee
			2007704	6/29/17			
			2008343	8/2/17			
			2010818	12/13/17			
2018			2012902	4/5/18			
			2016379	11/7/18			
2019			2019985	4/24/19	8/29/19	12/27/19	Passed Plenary

Table 1. List of Bills Lowering the Voting Age 2012-2019

This study concerns the period between the inauguration of the 19th National Assembly in May 2012 and the final passage of the bill under the 20th National Assembly in December 2019. Inaugurated in the final year of the Lee Administration (LKP), the LKP had been the 19th National Assembly majority except for a short period of time. The 20th National Assembly had never had a majority party, even after Park's impeachment and the inauguration of President Moon in 2017. The 19th and 20th National Assembly lawmakers had introduced 20 bills lowering the national voting age from 19 to 18. However, the first 19, with one bill passing a subcommittee once, all failed to reach the Plenary Session, and only the last bill introduced in April 2019 was able to make it to the Plenary Session, and passed in December. This leads to the research question: why did the 2019 bill passed while other voting age bills did not? The likelihood of the passage of a voting age bill serves as the dependent variable here. In other words, this is answering what is required for the support sufficient to bring the bill closer to the final passage.

Again, the 20 bills differed in their final results: introduced, passed a committee, and passed the Plenary Session. While the differing outcomes seemingly coincide with the administration change to the Democratic Party, this explains neither the five unsuccessful bills under the new administration nor the absence of a majority party in the 20th National Assembly since its inauguration in 2016. The table demonstrates that the Democratic control over the presidency was limited to the executive branch and the National Assembly still lacked a majority. In fact, an inauguration of a new president or change in partisan composition in the National Assembly cannot significantly resolve the recurring gridlocks. Also, given that any party-level opposition could endlessly delay the process, any passage requires bipartisan² consensus anyway. In other words, the partisan control over government branches had no

meaningful impact on increasing the likelihood of the voting age bill passing the National Assembly. Therefore, this study aims to provide a more comprehensive explanation than the simplistic partisan approach. The empirical evidence further chapters will lay out indicate that the passage of the voting age bill was not possible until the youth involvement became significant.

III. Youth Involvement in Social Movements

This study hypothesizes that growing youth involvement in social movements tends to increase the likelihood of a bill lowering the voting age to pass. Prior to the theoretical explanation of this potential process, this chapter first introduces the brief history of youth involvement, especially in South Korea, in order to provide context for the argument of how youth involvement was responsible for this legislation.

Youths have been the frontline of social movements in modern democracies around the world (Earl et al 2017). Although social movements are typically associated with college campuses, youths well below the voting age both then and now have been another significant element of the social changes. Many American youths in the 1960s participated in the Civil Rights Movement, especially conveying their direct voice on the oppressive and discriminatory school environment (Schumaker 2019). Meanwhile, French youths led in the historic 1968 Revolution, a counter-culture movement that reformed the old family norms and educational institutions that directly related to their lives. The movement spread to the rest of the Western world and other liberal democracies like Japan, and so did the youth involvement in such equivalents. Even now, youths remain active in social movements around the world when it comes to the wide range of contemporary agenda. In the US, many youths continue to mobilize around racial justice, immigration, and gun control in response to school shootings. In different regimes, youths are contributing to the ongoing democratization movements, as in Hong Kong where youth activists substantially led the 2014 and 2019 protests, largely impacting the city's politics. Youths also have become icons of the 2021 democratization movement in Myanmar, echoing the significant youth presence in dramatic historic events. The worldwide climate activism is also led mainly by youth activists and their organizations. All of these examples are

youths, below the respective voting ages, having consistently impacted the institution of social movements.

Youth involvement in modern Korea dates back to the Japanese Occupation from 1910 to 1945 where the youth played a significant role in the independence movement.¹ One of the most famous independence activists who led the biggest rally throughout the period was 16, just like the countless number of her peer followers. Also, the 1929 Gwangju Student Independence Movement was led exclusively by regional high school students, sparked by the colonialist school environment. Youths continued to act in social movements after the independence and the Korean War challenging the series of dictatorships: both the 1960 movement against the election fraud against the first South Korean president Syngman Rhee² and the 1980 and 1987 movements against the final military dictator Chun Doo-hwan. All of these examples are invoked by the proponents of lowering the voting age, as evidence to back the claim that youths are politically capable. This rhetoric is demonstrated on both the youth NGO statements and the National Assembly committee minutes.

Even after the democratization, youths have participated in social movements regarding various contemporary agendas such as diplomacy, trade, and politics. In 2002, for example, a mass anti-US movement emerged over a US Army tank accident that killed two middle school girls, protesting against the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) which was then deemed responsible for the de facto extraterritoriality granted to the US soldiers. Middle and high school students about the same age as the victims voluntarily joined the protest (Kim 2003). Although youth involvement is not limited to the issues that directly impact youths, this exemplifies how they have exerted their voice as the party directly related to the matter (*dangsaja*).³ Youths engaging in social movements as directly involved parties resonates through different times and

places. In fact, many of the examples above, desegregation and school shootings in the US and the tension between Korean and Japanese students amid the colonial rule, have to do with the *dangsaja* cause. This continues in the 2014 Sewol Ferry Accident where hundreds of high school students were sacrificed largely due to the misleading emergency announcement directing them to “stay still” (*gamanhi isseura*). This sounded like a common situation where adults silence youths, enraging many, and eventually made a slogan for the youth-led anti-Park events. The worldwide movement around climate also counts as a case of *dangsaja* involvements, which inherently impacts the youth the most.

The particular wave of youth involvement especially relevant to this study is the protest from 2016 to 2017 demanding the impeachment of former president Park. As briefly mentioned above, this has to do with a political scandal around Park and her secretive friend Choi, who used the power to fulfill personal interests including her daughter’s college admissions. This, again, triggered many South Korean youths undergoing the rigorous college admissions process which is meant to be strictly merit-based. Directly impacted by the grave violation of the egalitarian principle of the college admissions process that promises social mobility through education, youths emerged as the unprecedentedly significant portion of the mass protests. This experience is imperative because it functioned as a momentum of youth involvement even after the impeachment. A collective sense of having their voice heard and successfully inducing a huge political reform was shared among youths fuel further involvement in social movements (Youniss et al 2002).

Given the context of the rising youth involvement in social movements in the 2010s South Korea, this research contends that the increase in youth involvement is a more reasonable explanation for the passage of the bill lowering the voting age, ending the decade-long gridlock.

Integrated with the relevant literature, this study hypothesizes that domestic growth in youth involvement increases the likelihood of legislation lowering the voting age. Growing youth involvement demonstrates the political capacity of the youth. Once the discussion of lowering the voting age gains salience through this, parties and politicians put their moral obligation at stake if they continue to drag their feet. Such conditions lead to the bipartisan consensus to prioritize the voting age agenda which is sufficient to push through the final passage of the bill.

Social movements are a significant part of democratic politics, setting political agenda and affecting party platforms. This most intuitive form of grassroots politics involves multiple political institutions such as media, interest groups, and political parties. Youth involvement in social movements can be conceptualized as how spontaneously and substantially youths have participated in those social movements. The examination of how these factors lead to the successful passage of the bill lowering the voting age will follow. Youth involvement will be assessed based on how impactful the youths were in such social movements, including but not limited to voting age issues. To elaborate, youths are impactful when the movements are big enough and they have actual say in those movements. This potentially includes their overall participation rate, role in organizations, and success in public opinion and policy change. The multi-faceted approach from youth-led organizations and events to the percentage of youths in social movements will holistically assess their impact over time. By doing so, the youth movement is framed as another wave of social movements, following the preceding ones such as women's rights, Civil Rights, and LGBTQ+ rights.

Youth involvement has been acknowledged to demonstrate youths' impact in asserting their political opinion through participation. Listed as "core participants of a wide variety of social movements" (Almeida 2019), youth involvement and leadership have been recognized as

essential to social movements in modern politics (Earl et al 2017). The literature suggest that there are elements that make youth involvement impactful. First, youth involvement has a long-lasting effect on the future constituency, as youths politicize themselves through their experience in social movements which amplifies and lasts after they become adults (Youniss et al 2002). Given this long-lasting impact, partisan politics will pay attention to youth involvement as an indicator of their potential citizenship. Second, youth involvements tend to be spontaneously motivated based on the participants' genuine needs. As mentioned above, youths around the world have spoken up especially when it comes to the agenda of their direct interests, such as the 1990s Japanese student movement that protested the repressive school regulations (Takahashi and Takeuchi 1993). This gives their agenda more salience and helps mobilize their peer participants, which is a way youths can be impactful in social movements.

The literature also counter the “youth deficit model” that regards youth as immature and thus politically incapable. This deficit model reduces youth engagement by “assuming that youth are not interested in politics, and denying youth agency in their own political socialization” (Earl et al 2017). Building on that youths are in fact impactful enough to politically organize themselves, scholars argue that spontaneous youth participation can make meaningful long-lasting contributions to social movements. Despite the institutional constraints that youths face as minors, scholars suggest that youths are capable of exerting their voice through various channels (Kwon 2013). In sum, the literature support that youth involvement, spontaneously organized and continuously carried out, can overcome the restrictive nature of adult-dominated politics and demonstrate the political capacity of the youth. Youth involvement, despite some preconceived notions of constraint, has been impactful in social movements in different societies. Since youth involvement has been significant over time and yielded long-lasting impacts in South Korea

during the previous decade, lawmakers recognized the political capacity of the youth and the urgency of the voting age agenda.

This leads to the next point: social movements literature explains how protests change peoples' perception of their agenda and bring legislative responses. Branton et al (2015) hypothesize that temporal and spatial exposure to minority movements turns people favorable. This relates to how social movements engender support outside the group that is directly involved. Gillion (2012) explains how minority involvement in social movements leads to congressional response at the level of individual representatives, based on the empirical data from the United States Congress roll-call votes. This introduces conventional wisdom that politicians pay attention to big protests in order to maintain accountability mainly for reelection. Here, partisan platforms are also addressed as an alternative explanation. While acknowledging that the Democratic Party was overall more responsive to minority activism than the GOP, the consistent trend throughout Congress where individual votes have responded to minority activism validates the hypothesis. The above findings provide relevant empirical evidence that social movements turn those who were exposed favorable to their agenda and often lead to legislative responses.

This is based on the scholarly consensus that legislators closely pay attention to their constituents and reflect their calls beyond partisan interests. Bergan and Cole (2015) demonstrate that lawmakers reflect their direct relationships with their constituents on their legislative votes. In addition to reelection, the professional duty also motivates lawmakers to represent their constituents. While the occupational obligation might not be the definitive answer to this case, it is noteworthy that the partisan motive around reelection is not the only factor, thus enabling the lawmakers to represent youth citizens as well. Adding onto this, Bishin (2004) argues that

legislator behavior is rather complicated and multi-dimensional so that it cannot be reduced to partisan dynamics only. The literature addresses the aspect of rich representation of the constituents which has been overlooked. There are direct and indirect effects deciding the lawmaker's behavior, and constituent ideology is one factor. Given that constituent ideology can affect lawmakers' behavior, youths can also exert their political significance to their representatives outside the traditional paths such as political parties and lobbying.

In sum, once youths successfully mobilize and demonstrate their political capacity, legislators are likely to pay attention to their voice, despite the institutional constraint that they can neither reward nor penalize the legislators immediately. Even without suffrage prior to lowering the voting age, youths can affect the lawmakers' behavior outside the traditional path of partisan politics by claiming their political significance through social movements. In doing so, their involvement demonstrates their political capacity and raises the stake of the most relevant agenda, the bill lowering the voting age. Again, the lack of literature directly speaking to this very specific sort of legislation made conducting this research felt like building a house from scratch, or with bricks brought from miles away. However, this study will focus on linking the first and second parts of this literature review and finding how youth involvement empowers social movements so that they can induce favorable legislative responses.

This study hypothesizes that the higher stakes of the voting age agenda pressure parties and lawmakers. First of all, party image has long been perceived as a factor that voters take into account. For example, voters associate parties with images such as religiosity (Campbell et al 2011), urban and rural (Walsh 2012), race (Stephens-Dougan 2016), and unemployment solution (Healy and Lenz 2014). Regardless of how many of those attributes the parties actually have, it is commonly accepted that there are party images shared among voters significantly affect how

they vote. Likewise, as the youth involvement in social movements grows in significance over time, parties focus on whether their images are youth-friendly, which depends on their stance on the bill lowering the voting age. To elaborate, the youth-friendly images to appeal to the newest constituents who will be shortly enfranchised, motivates parties to demonstrate their support for the bill. This starkly differs from the intuitive explanation that Democrats are intrinsically in favor of lower the voting age in order to get more votes. The new explanation applies to not only the Democratic Party but also almost every party. In fact, all parties, even the most consistent opponent the LKP, reached the bipartisan consensus to vote in favor of the bill in 2018. The shared motive here was to build a youth-friendly party image and attract new voters, since their risk of gaining negative images associated with the reluctance to lower the voting age outweighs the risk of losing vote shares due to the enfranchisement of more liberal voters. This explains why those parties joined the commitment to lower the voting age instead of dragging their feet. As domestic youth involvement grows, parties become more and more concerned with their images over time. One image that deters many young votes is “oldness” (Seok et al 2019). In fact, the LKP leadership blames its negative reputation associated with this particular negative image for its loss in the 2020 National Assembly election, and is seeking ways to abandon it: not only the LKP but other parties put effort to do the same. Because the opponents of the voting age bill resemble the “authoritative old generation,” their reluctance to lower the voting age is significantly associated with this particular negative image.

Although their images have always mattered, the motivation to support the bill was not strong enough when the youth involvement in social movement was not as imperative as it was around the time when the bill finally passed. Once the issue became imperative, the motive to demonstrate a youth-friendly image peaked together and the parties included their commitment

to lower the voting age into their protocols (*dangnon*) which enabled the bipartisan consensus in 2019 to eventually pass the bill. The rising youth involvement demonstrated the youths' interest in politics and readiness to assess party images based on which stance each party took regarding the issue of lowering the voting age. To elaborate, when youth involvement was limited to a few politically active youths, voters are less aware of the fact that youths are involved in social movements at all. However, once it increases to a common experience, in frequency, scale, and quality, voters are more likely to be informed about youth involvement. This adds another way voters can assess party images, which party leaderships keenly respond to. In sum, the rise of youth involvement past the threshold demonstrates youths' potential political capacity and motivates parties to adjust their priorities and support the bill lowering the voting age and appeal to not only voters but also the incoming wave of citizenship.

In addition to the party-level platforms, the degree of youth involvement might also affect individual lawmakers. While the 47 proportional representatives are affected by their party protocols or the overall national youth involvement, those who are representing the 253 constituencies have to be aware of their future voters as well. Each constituency consists of between 100,000 and 200,000 voters, but the generational makeup starkly differs due to the South Korean migration pattern where the rural young tend to move to the capital area (*ichonhyangdo*). For example, the mega constituencies in the remote mountain regions that cover up to five rural counties consist of mostly the old generation, whereas most urban constituencies that cover down to one-third district (*gu*) consist of youths and their relatively young parents. This is why redistricting commonly happens when youths reach the voting age and enter into the eligible voting population: rural constituencies merge and the urban ones split. Constituencies with more youth population consist of more schools, or regional bases that youths can gather for

collective action. Those who are representing such constituencies are more likely to be aware of those youth citizens as well as their agenda. Put differently, the significance of youth involvement in inducing the legislative momentum to pass the bill lowering the voting age will be reflected in the individual lawmakers' response.

In sum, this study hypothesizes that once a domestic youth involvement grows past the threshold, the well-demonstrated political capacity of the youth will confer salience to the timely voting age agenda. The continued reluctance of the parties and lawmakers will raise the stakes of their moral obligation, so that most parties will consent to prioritize the passage of the bill lowering the voting age. The party- and lawmaker-level of this process will be empirically vindicated through the across-time and across-politician analyses of temporal and spatial variables, respectively.

IV. Across-time Study

The across-time study will examine the correlation between the national youth involvement over time and the legislative steps the bills from corresponding periods reached. Here, the step each bill lowering the voting age reached indicates how close it got to the final passage, which requires bipartisan support this study is looking for. In order to do so, it is necessary to first assess the national youth involvement over time. There have been separate researches assessing youth involvement and social movements, but not youth involvement *in* social movements. While they provide no direct precedent, they do provide insights essential to assessing youth involvement in social movements in a comprehensive manner.

First, Mazumder (2018) measures social movements to demonstrate how social movements continue to shape politics. The protest data from the *New York Times* until 1965 is collected, deliberately setting the period to prevent other factors from getting involved. However, the civil rights protests are counted on a binary basis, considering only whether or not it happened, disregarding how many people participated, how long it lasted, or how much attention it gathered. In order to assess the impact of social movements, it could be more comprehensive to include such aspects. Next, Branton et al (2015) examine how immigration rallies affected public opinion, based on the evidence the survey results before and after the events. Their research examines both temporal and spatial exposures to the protests, taking the period of protests and their effects to convince that, post-protest respondents were likely to support the content of the protests. They also considered the spatial exposure, concluding that the closer the respondents live the more likely they become supportive of the agenda. Temporal exposure was measured binarily conducting surveys before and after the protests, and spatial exposure was measured based on the location of protests on the county level. Therefore their measure is more

comprehensive than Mazumder that measured protests by simple counts. This discerns which event affected the public more clearly, and the survey data was effectively demonstrated so that the readers can intuitively compare the effects of the protests. However, the size of the protests and the scale of impact are still not taken into account. This fails to distinguish, for example, a mass demonstration in Gwanghwamun from a small street rally.

Gillion (2012) examines empirical data from the US Congress to hypothesize how minority activism affects congressional roll-call votes supporting the minorities. The congressional responses are divided into two, aggregate and individual actions, and the research focuses on the latter to assess the district level responsiveness more accurately. Then the protests are also divided into two: small and large. “Smaller protests that lack institutional support and are short-lived struggle to become recognized and have their political preferences considered. But large, contentious protests that are backed by a political organization” (Gillion 2012). Politicians pay attention to such voices in order to maintain accountability, closely monitoring not only the protests but also the opposition. This determines which side takes the “issue ownership” leading to a more specified version of the hypothesis: a pro-minority protest has to outweigh its minority in scale in order to take issue ownership. In addition to the similar *New York Times* coverage counts, this study comes up with its own measures to assess the salience of protests. Protest activity that involves more than 100 individuals; lasts more than a day; is supported by a political organization; results in property damage; draws a police presence; leads to an arrest; involves individuals carrying weapons; leads to injury; or involves death. These binary points are used to calculate the salience score to discern which protest is informative enough to dominate the opponents. Gillion provides a very straightforward and comprehensive

insight about how to assess both the scope of activism and the congressional response which can be useful relevant to this research.

Lastly, Youth Speak Out Coalition and Zimmerman (2007) divide youth organizations into different degrees of youth participation. Since some media reports were insufficient to discern all six categories, this study simplifies the spectrum and translates it into numerical scores of one, two, and three.

- Youth as Clients: served by adults, no input into decision-making 1
- Youth Participation: youth input solicited by adults 1
- Youth Involvement: regular input 2
- Youth Driven: substantive youth leadership 2
- Youth Run: majority of operation 3
- Youth Led: all youth leadership, adult support 3

Although this literature deals with a broader sense of youth organizations, not necessarily of activist character, this spectrum is relevant to this research in defining and measuring youth involvement. It is also useful in determining what degree of youth involvement is enough to inform the politicians in the legislature.

The following data counts all media-covered social movements with evidence of youth involvement between June 2012 and December 2019 every month, based on a binary basis, Gillion score, and Youth Speak Out Coalition and Zimmerman score. Different sets of keywords like youth protest, youth rally, middle and high school student protest, youth involvement, and youth organizations were searched on Naver, one of the nation's most used portal websites. Among around 10,000 search results, about 600 turned out as relevant cases of youth involvement. A social movement is two or more people jointly advocating ongoing social

agenda. This definition is used to discern what is a social movement and what is not while searching for media coverages. For instance, a religious event is not a social movement because it usually does not, or should not, contain a social agenda. Likewise, a hate event does not count as a social movement because hate speech is not a legitimate social agenda. Attending memorial events is not a social movement because the agenda is not ongoing, but they count as social movements if they make a linkage to an ongoing social agenda like holding the government accountable or calling for further political actions.¹ Also, unaffiliated one-person protests do not count in accordance with the South Korean legal definition of a protest, but if there is an organized background for “relay protests” or “contemporaneous protests,” they count although they might seem like a one-person protest. Lastly, the youth involvement has to be genuinely spontaneous. Therefore, extracurricular activities encouraged by schools as a form of volunteering do not count as genuine youth involvement in social movements. These are to count the genuine youth involvement in social movements more accurately without exaggeration.

First, the number and scale of youth-led organizations and events enable the evaluation of the overall political mobilization of youths, and their willingness to participate in politics. Second, the degree of youth involvement indicates their position in those social movements. To elaborate, a rally that mainly consists of protesters in their forties where some bring their children, is significantly different from a climate strike in a local community led by high school students. This enables a more accurate picture of what is the youths’ place in such movements. In order to be impactful, a considerable portion of the youth population should take initiative to mobilize themselves, and they should participate as significant members with actual say. This evaluates how impactful the youths had been in demonstrating their political capacity and competence.




Figure 2. Media Reports on Youth Involvement over Time

Figure 2 examines the number of media reports on youth involvement each month from June 2012 to December 2019. While incidences of media-reported social movements with evidence of youth involvement over time show an upward trend, the actual fluctuation somewhat differed from the initial speculation. Youth-involved social movements did not steadily grow and peaked right before the 2019 passage, but rather fluctuated every time there was a salient agenda, namely the National Intelligence Service's presidential election intervention allegations (2013), Sewol Ferry Accident (2014), the state Korean history textbook controversy (2015), and Choigate (2016). However, the waves, especially the last wave that was unprecedentedly tall, left a long-lasting legacy as they accumulated. That is turning involvement in social movements into a common experience.

First, the agenda became much more diverse. At the beginning of the decade, youth involvement in social movements was largely restricted to only a few agendas such as diplomacy. However, as youths were familiarized with social movements through those major events, they started to turn to different agendas like youth rights, education, labor, feminism,

climate, and immigration. Their agenda was not necessarily partisan, because youth involvement took place around not only agendas typically associated with the Democratic Party but also its opponents. Broader agenda means more social movements they can engage in, naturally increasing the media coverages, as well as the number of people appealed by their input.

Second, youth involvement expanded to different localities. Youth involvement in its initial state was limited to the capital area, mostly the heart of Seoul consisting of government complexes and business districts. However, as youths that participated in big waves of social movements return to their homes, they brought the social movement experience culture with them. Not only in major cities but also in rural villages, socially active youths started to seek local events or even mobilize their peers. Localization of youth involvement also contributed to the increase of the overall count at the national level.

Lastly, youth involvement had become consistent compared to the early stage. The monthly incidences almost doubled at the end of the decade and the normal incidences tripled or even quadrupled, excluding the points where youth involvement hit its peaks. Even when there are no big events like impeachment, youths started to find issues that are relevant to their lives like school sexual harassment or regional student rights ordinances. This formed a seamless continuum that contrasts with the sporadic “seasons” shown at the beginning of the decade, also increasing the case count.

In sum, over the last decade, youth involvement in social movements had become more diverse, local, and consistent, normalizing the experience. The earlier waves were fluctuant, but the later ones rather stabilized into plateaus. The 2016 movements around the impeachment played a significant role as a turning point, providing momentum to this shift. This shift implies that youth involvement is no longer a peculiar phenomenon among a minority of socially active

ones but is now recognized as a common experience shared among the entire generation. While the former can be easily disregarded, the latter newly framed youths as political citizens, weighing the voting age agenda and raising the stakes of the legislative activities around lowering the voting age.




Figure 3. Gillion Scores of Youth Involvement over Time

Figure 3 examines the monthly sums of Gillion scores of youth-involved movements in the same period, which serve as the scale of youth involvement over time. The second part of the across-time study addresses the scale of youth-involved protests over time based on the Gillion score, which shows relatively steady growth. The previous data demonstrate that youth involvement had become a much more widespread phenomenon. But this shows it is not only the occurrence that had grown but also the scale of each occurrence. This means that youth-led movements are not only happening more often but also bigger. If the Gillion score did not demonstrate a correlation that is as significant as that of the general case count, it could mean that youth involvement just split into more smaller events. However, this supplement rules out that possibility.




Figure 4. Youth Speak Out Coalition and Zimmerman Scores of Youth Involvement over Time

Figure 4 examines the monthly sums of Youth Speak Out Coalition and Zimmerman scores of youth-involved movements in the same period, which serve as the degree of youth input over time. This is the most notable growth among the three data. At first, youth involvement was largely youths joining the adult-led events as guests. In other words, the majority including the leadership was adults, and youths rather sporadically participated as not-so-much visible participants of such events, such as weekly rallies calling for the resolution of the “comfort women” issue. However, once youth involvement had become a much more common experience, youths started to organize themselves based on schools and regional networks. More youth involvements in the latter portion of the decade are youth-led, where the majority including the leadership was youths, or the affiliated organization was even exclusively youths. For example, students organized to combat school sexual harassment and urge municipal legislatures to enact student rights ordinances. This suggests that youths had moved away from the dependent model and claimed dominance of their own movements.

In sum, the media coverages, Gillion scores, and Youth Speak Out Coalition and Zimmerman scores display the upward trend in youth involvement in social movements in South Korea between 2012 and 2019. This upward trend of youth involvements had been consistent in both the quality and quantity. Going back to the 20 bills, the November 14, 2016 bill passed the subcommittee on January 9, 2017, and the April 24, 2019 bill passed the committee on August 29, 2019, and the Plenary Session on December 27, 2019, and the rest failed. The first period was when the youth involvement was skyrocketing amid the impeachment process, and the second period was when it was stably growing. The correlation between youth involvement, both in quality and quantity, and the steps toward the final passage suggests the legislative response to the youth involvement.

V. Across-politician Study

However, the above results need to be complemented by more statistical certainty than simple legislative steps: the spatial variation among politicians representing different districts. As mentioned above, about five-sixth of the National Assembly is district seats. Each constituency represents around 100,000 to 200,000 voters, but the generational composition rather varies. The census data was collected from the official government websites of the National Election Commission, the Korean Statistical Information Service, and the Ministry of Interior and Safety. Constituencies with the most youth population, between 14 and 18, are residential areas of Seoul and its outskirts, while the least are rural counties. Youth involvement in each constituency also differed from one another. These variations also related to how individual district lawmaker responds to the voting age agenda. There were strong and moderate proponents, the indifferent, and opponents of the bills lowering the voting age. Their response is measured by counting each time they act in accordance with their views: introducing the bill, voting for or against the bill at committees and the Plenary Session, formally advocating or opposing the bill on the National Assembly floor or informally off the floor all of which significantly varied.

Lawmaker support adds up a lawmaker's roll call votes on bills lowering the voting age, both in committee and Plenary Session levels, introduction or sponsor of voting age bills, formal politics speech for or against lowering the voting age during National Assembly sessions, and informal politics speech outside the National Assembly. For example, Chang Byoung-wan (P-Dong Nam 1) voted in favor of the voting age bill once, introduced two voting age bills, and informally supported lowering the voting age four times, adding up to the numerical score of seven. Conversely, another lawmaker could earn a negative score if they are an opponent. Positive numbers, zero, and negative numbers indicate advocacy, indifference, and opposition,

respectively. This meticulous counting method enables a more accurate assessment of a lawmaker’s informal support for lowering the voting age.

Measuring the informal politics portion required thoughtful decisions of whether a media-reported act or speech counts as independent support. This data only includes reports with individual lawmaker’s own words, not a general party platform or bill summary. This should include a normative statement, not a simple reiteration of their party’s stance like “our party has reached a consensus” or “I promise that we would do everything to pass the bill this time.” Each informal support is counted based on contexts. If there are two media coverages, one on a party convention on lowering the voting age and the other on a participant’s tweet supporting it, these should count as one context.




Figure 5. Youth Population and Lawmaker Support




Figure 6. Youth-to-Voter Ratio and Lawmaker Support

Figures 5 and 6 respectively examine the youth population and youth-to-voter ratio of each district corresponding to the lawmaker’s support for the bill lowering the voting age. As shown from the figures, the youth population and youth-to-voter ratio vary greatly throughout districts. Either way, they depict how lawmakers were consistently conscious of the presence of their potential voters with growing political significance. This suggests that lawmakers are likely to take the voting age issue more seriously if their constituencies had more youths, the forecasted influx of new voters raising the stakes.




Figure 7. Youth Involvement and Lawmaker Support

Lastly, Figure 7 compares the youth involvement in each constituency with the lawmaker's response. The location a social movement took place and its youth organization base are counted on a binary basis. This should acknowledge that due to the geographical features of South Korea, many protests are concentrated in one particular constituency, Jongno, one of two districts that make up the heart of Seoul. Although this is an executive and financial center with not much youth population, people visit here to participate in plenty of events, and youths are not the exception. As shown in the appendix, youth organizations based in regions other than Jongno travel in order to hold rallies at this bustling city center and reach more audiences. A Democrat from Jongno, then-Speaker Chung Sye-kyun, earned a fairly high support score, five.¹ More generally, youth involvement in each constituency and the legislative response show a somewhat consistent link. Put together, lawmakers' support for the voting age bills is contingent upon their constituencies' youth population, ratio, and involvement in social movements, which have to do with the political influence of their potential constituents. Compared to when youth involvement was limited to a small number of politically active youths, lawmakers had become more and more aware of youths. Their support for the voting age bill reflects their effort to demonstrate this.

Such a tendency is also backed by the lawmakers' own words, as many recognize that they had been influenced by the youth's demonstration of democratic capacity through their involvement in social movements. First, they exert their views on youth involvement in their formal and informal political activities. Park Nam-choon (D-Namdong 1) spoke at a committee: "the questions raised by the youths [at protests], by looking at their speech and act, they are even better than me." Similarly, Sim Sang-jung (J-Goyang 1) testified "youths have enough proven their civic capacity at the vigil." These remarks exemplify how lawmakers were perceiving the

increasing youth involvement in relation to the ongoing voting age agenda. “This bill is about suffrage. This is not something you oppose because of your political interests, as if it is a change to a random election rule” (Lee Jae-jeong). Their reaction also demonstrates the shift in the “is-ought” problem: rather than that lowering the voting age “is” beneficial to their political interests but what is “ought” to be done. Youth involvement that has grown enough to signal the lawmakers increases the moral stakes of the agenda in turn.

Second, the qualitative findings of the in-depth written interview enriched the theory alongside the empirical vindication. Sim Sang-jung recognizes that youths “possess a potential to organize independently from the older generation or teachers” and a similar public consensus had been reached due to the increase in youth involvement starting from the 2016-2017 movement. As the committee Chair who was responsible for the actual passage, she concludes that youth involvement decisively impacted the 2019 passage. Sim’s response was also consistent with the is-ought problem suggested above: “disenfranchising the 18-year-olds not only infringes on their political rights but also undermines the advancement of our democracy [...] We think that the expansion of rights to vote and run for offices are the basic conditions of democratic advancement.” In sum, the legislative experience directly echoes the theory: the National Assembly was informed about the increasing youth involvement and the public support for the voting age bill. Given the higher stakes, lawmakers prioritize the agenda as something that is ought to be done, which is crucial to the final passage.

VI. Discussion

One major alternative explanation is that lowering the voting age is a typical Democratic project because young people tend to vote more liberal. Under this conventional wisdom, it is understood that the Democratic leadership will push this change and have their lawmakers vote for lowering the voting age. In other words, lawmakers do whatever they are told by the party leadership, and that is the case for the 20th National Assembly since 2017 where the Democratic Party took the presidency. The literature on this side argues that partisan leadership dominates legislators' individual choice (Longley 1998). Given this condition, the constituent interest is represented by the parties rather than individual lawmakers, undermining the voter-lawmaker response.

However, as explained above, Bishin (2004) challenges this view and claims a more multi-faceted aspect of the constituent-legislator relationship, where constituent ideology influences legislative behavior as well as partisan stance. Although adult and youth constituencies are not identical, it is more likely that legislators closely pay attention to youth interests in representing them. As shown from the interview response, National Assembly lawmakers were conscious about the influx of new voters who were unprecedentedly politically active. Youth involvement was the clear sign of their interest in politics, and lawmakers perceived their greater potential impact, in a fairly bipartisan manner.

Another is that lowering the voting age is already a quite universal trend, and South Korea was following the rest of the OECD liberal democracies just as time passes. This has to do with democratic diffusion theory, where external factors like supranational organizations play a role in adopting expanded democratic measures. International norms diffuse across the border and help implement more political rights. "Domestic political processes are deeply affected by

what goes on in neighboring societies, even if the specific ways in which external events influence transitions vary from context to context” (Gleditsch and Ward 2006). The literature explain this diffusion that voters pay attention to international standards introduced by media, and the reelection-driven politicians emulate those preceding democratic measures. The news that an internationally renowned state implemented a democratic measure, can increase voter support, and signal the politicians (Linos 2011). If lowering the voting age is considered as an enfranchisement of youths, such context can apply to the issue of lowering the voting age. In fact, as Japan lowered its voting age from 20 to 18 in June 2016, South Korea became the only OECD member with a voting age higher than 18. In South Korea, OECD is an organization both the legislature and media like to use as a comparative example. As discussed above, this fact had been invoked by multiple executive government agencies to endorse lowering the voting age to 18.

However, the democratic diffusion theory does not fully explain the South Korean case. The “international norm” claim had been used by many proponents of lowering the voting age since long ago in the early 2010s when Japan and South Korea were the only OECD members with voting ages higher than 18. However, it did not significantly motivate the lawmakers to prioritize the task. Even after 2016 when Japan lowered its voting age to 18 and South Korea became the only member, there had been 12 unsuccessful bills, more than half of the total. This even stronger narrative, that South Korea is “lagging behind,” also failed to bring about a significant shift to the National Assembly. This theory fails to explain this significant incoherence.

It should be acknowledged that youth involvement might not have been the only cause that led to the final passage in 2019. While the increasing youth involvement succeeded in

motivating the pan-liberal parties and lawmakers and some moderate conservatives, the passage might have been much harder if the ideological spectrum of the National Assembly was further on the extreme right. However, what is imperative is that youth involvement actually helped overcome, at least in part, the initial partisan division around voting age and generated a result that would have been impossible otherwise. In other words, youth involvement in social movements, both in protests and organizations, made a more comprehensive weapon to break through the gridlock and played a decisive role in passing the bill eventually. In sum, the partisan dynamics fails to explain the several unsuccessful bills after the inauguration of the Democratic administration, and the democratic diffusion theory is also chronologically irrelevant. Although it might not be the only factor that contributed to the passage, youth involvement is by far the most appealing explanation according to the holistic examination based on both quantitative and qualitative methods.

Conclusion

As with any historical case of enfranchisement, lowering the voting age is a complicated political process that concerns the will of not only those who can vote but also those who cannot. Although it superficially seems like a partisan project to introduce more liberal voters, it is in fact largely impacted by youth involvement in social movements. Once youth involvement gets big enough to be a common experience among the domestic youth group, youths are more regarded as politically capable citizens. This raises the stakes of the recurring legislative discussion of lowering the voting age, and lawmakers start to perceive this as their moral obligation (*dangwi*) rather than an ordinary partisan issue. Parties reach bipartisan consensus as they become aware of their party image which increasingly depends on their cooperation with the voting age bill. Individual lawmakers also respond to the youth population and involvement in their constituencies. There are other potential factors that are thought to have impacted the recent passage of the bill lowering the voting age from 19 to 18 in South Korea, such as a party in leadership or consciousness of peer liberal democracies. However, both the across-time and across-politician studies indicate that youth involvement in social movement better explains the end of the decade-long gridlock.

Although this study focuses on South Korea, the findings potentially have international implications. European liberal democracies have started discussing lowering the voting age to 16, as well as some American politicians, all of which seem to be contingent upon the consistent trend in youths in liberal democracies that are more politically active than ever. Youths' political capacity has long been overlooked in both political and academic settings. Youth involvement in social movement has been considered endogenous to social conditions at most, but this study shows that it can be an exogenous factor in itself. In other words, youth involvement is not an

outcome of a change induced by adults, but a spontaneous phenomenon that can lead to significant political changes affecting the entire public and youths themselves. Existing political science literature tend to explain youth politics with the language of the dominant. However, the power dynamics between political parties and diplomatic influences seem to provide superficial answers to the politics of lowering the voting age, which, in fact, is a multifaceted process involving different factors, even those who cannot vote, yet. Who lowers the voting age is the youth, not the politicians.

Appendix A: Raw Data

Across-time Study

	Coverage	Event	Scale	Duration	Gillion	YSOCZ	Y. Org. Affiliation	Size
2012 June	10	Jongno	2			0	1	
	16	Jongno	20	50		1	3	
July	25	Jongno		1	1	1		
	31	Jongno	10	1	1	3	Nationwide	70
August	1	Jongno		1	1	1	1	
	6	Jongno	12	1	0	3		
	6					1	Nationwide	80
	29	Jongno		1	1	3		
September	12	Jongno	10	1	0	1	Danyang	
October	29	Jongno		1	1	2		
November	16	Jongno	5	20	0	2	Nationwide	10000
	20	Haeundae Gijang 1	3	1	0	3	Nationwide	
December	19	Nationwide	100	1	1	3	Nationwide	
2013 January	14	Cheonan 1	80	1	0	2	Nationwide	10000
	14	Yeonsu	25	1	0	1		
February	28	Jongno	150	1	1	1	Nationwide	
March	8	Jung, Seoul	20	1	0	3	Nationwide	
	22	Jongno	6	1	0	3	Nationwide	350
April	28	Jongno	100	3	1	1	Nationwide	
May	1	Jongno		1	1	1		
	19	Jongno	10	1	0	3	Gongju	
June	17	Jeonju	20	1	0	1	Jeonbuk	40
	24	Jongno	500	1	4	1		
	29	Jongno	70	3	1	3	Nationwide	
July	6	Jung, Seoul	5000	1	3	1		
	10	Jongno	50	1	1	1		
	13	Jung, Seoul	10000	1	3	1		
	17	Jung, Seoul	60	1	0	3	Nationwide	817
	19	Seongsan	100	1	1	1	Changwon	
	20	Jongno	400	1	3	1		
	26	Jongno	100	1	1	3	Nationwide	817
	27	Jung, Seoul	10000	1	3	1		
	28	Seocho	10	1	1	3	Nationwide	
	29	Seogwipo	700	6	2	1	Seogwipo	
	29	Dong, Gwangju	120	1	0	3	Gwangju	
	31	Jongno	70	1	1	1		
August	1	Jung, Seoul	11	1	0	2		
	14	Hwacheon	60	1	0	2		
	15	Namdong 1	10	1	0	3	Incheon	
	16	Jongno	1000	1	2	1		
	17	Jung, Seoul	20000	1	3	1		
	20	Jung, Seoul	30000	5	3	1		
	21	Songpa 3	7	1	1	3		
	24	Jeju 2	150	1	1	1		
	30	Seongsan	200	1	2	1		
September	7	Jongno	10000	1	2	1		
	14	Jongno	24	1	1	3		
	16	Yeongdeungpo 2		1	1	1		
	19	Jongno	500	1	1	1		
	26	Jongno	20	1	1	3		
	28	Jongno	3000	1	2	1		
October	3	Miryang	150	4	3	1		
	7	Jongno	200	1	1	1		
	11	Jung, Seoul	400	1	2	1		
November	7	Jung, Seoul	12	1	0	3		
	13	Jongno	200	1	2	1		
December	19	Jung, Seoul	10000	1	2	1		
	25	Jongno	300	1	1	1		
	28	Jongno	200	1	2	1		
	29	Jongno	15000	1	5	1		
	29	Gangnam 2	100	1	1	3		
2014 January	1	Jongno	100	1	2	1		
	8	Jongno	200	1	3	1		
	11	Jongno	20	1	0	3		

		29 Jongno	100	1	3	1	
February		22 Jongno	10	1	2	2	
		26 Jongno	300	1	1	1	
March		1 Jongno	200	1	1	1	
April		22 Chuncheon	60	1	0	2	
		23 Cheonan 2	30	1	0	1	
		26 Jongno	100	1	1	2	
		29 Jongno	20	1	0	1	
May		1 Jongno	30	1	0	1	
		3 Jongno	300	1	1	3	
		9 Danwon 2	2000	1	1	3	
		10 Jung, Seoul	4000	1	2	1	
		10 Danwon 2	500	1	2	3	
		18 Jongno	600	1	2	1	
		24 Jongno	20	9	1	3	
		24 Jung, Seoul	20000	1	2	1	
		24 Dong, Gwangju	300	1	1	3	
		25 Nam 2, Incheon	100	1	1	3	
		28 Jongno		1	2	1	
June		1 Jung, Seoul	10000	1	2	1	
		4 Jongno	4	1	0	3	
		4 Jongno	800	1	2	1	
		11 Jongno	300	1	3	1	
		16				1	
		18 Jongno	300	1	2	1	
July		16 Yeongdeungpo 2	600	2	3	2	
		19 Jung, Seoul	10000	1	3	1	
		20 Jongno	8	8	1	3	
		23 Jongno		1	2	1	
		25 Jung, Daejeon	700	1	1	1	
August		13 Jongno	700	1	1	3	
		26 Jongno	150	34	3	1	
September		20 Jongno	11	1	1	3	
October		30 Jeonju	70	1	0	1	
November		1 Jongno	300	1	1	3	
		10 Haeundae Gijang 1	30	1	0	2	Yeonje
		13 Jung, Seoul	10	1	0	3	
December		3 Jongno	100	1	2	1	
		10 Jongno	100	1	2	1	
		17 Jongno	150	1	2	1	
		24 Jongno	400	1	2	2	
		31 Jongno	100	1	2	1	
2015 January		7 Jongno	100	1	2	1	
		21 Jongno	100	1	2	1	
February		22 Jongno	150	1	2	1	
March		25 Jongno	100	1	2	1	
April		11 Nam 1, Ulsan	200	1	1	1	
		12 Sokcho	150	1	1	2	
		14 Jongno	30	1	1	1	
		16 Uijeongbu 1	250	1	1	1	
		16 Jinju 2	150	1	1	1	
		18 Jung, Seoul	8000	1	3	1	
		19 Dong, Gwangju	200	1	1	1	
		23 Jongno	20	1	0	1	
May		6 Jongno	100	1	2	1	
June		3 Jongno	100	1	2	1	
July		7 Sasang	10	1	0	2	
		29 Jongno	700	1	2	1	
		30 Wonju	20	1	0	3	
		31 Jongno	150	1	2	2	
August		12 Jung, Seoul	500	1	2	1	
		19 Jongno	300	1	2	1	
		24 Seo 1, Gwangju	150	1	1	1	
September		2 Jongno	150	1	2	1	
		14 Uijeongbu 1	10	1	0	3	

October	7 Yeonje	300	1	1	1			
	11 Jongno	100	1	1	3			
	14 Jongno	500	1	3	1			
	17 Jongno	1000	3	2	2	Nationwide	950	
	20 Yeongdo	104	1	1	2			
	20 Jongno	20	1	0	3	Gwanak		
	22 Jongno	1000	1	1	2			
	24 Jongno	150	2	3	3	Nationwide	2800	
	31 Jongno	300	1	2	3	Nationwide		
	November	1 Seodaemun 2	30	1	0	1		
1 Cheonan 1		20	1	0	3	Chungnam		
3 Jongno		300	1	1	1			
4						Incheon	1104	
7 Jongno		100	1	2	3			
11 Jongno		15	1	1	3			
12 Jung, Seoul		10	1	0	2	Nationwide		
14 Jongno		100000	1	5	1			
15 Dong, Gwangju		70	1	0	3			
22 Masanhoewon		20	1	0	3			
December	5 Jongno	300	1	1	3			
	6 Dong, Gwangju	50	1	0	3	Gwangju		
	9 Jongno	100	1	2	1			
	12 Jongno	24	1	0	3	Nationwide	1370	
	19 Jongno	5000	1	2	1			
	26 Jongno	20	1	0	3			
	30 Jongno	700	1	2	1			
	2016 January	2 Jongno	30	1	0	3		
		6 Jeju 1	30	1	0	3		
		6 Suwon 2	100	1	1	2	Suwon	
6 Masanhappo		20	1	1	2			
6 Nam 1, Ulsan		200	1	1	1			
10 Jung, Seoul		600	1	2	1			
11						Jung, Seoul		
11						Nationwide		
13 Jongno		100	1	2	1			
13 Jeju 2		50	1	0	1			
February	16 Jung, Seoul	80	1	0	3	Nationwide		
	18 Gwangju, Gyeonggi	30	1	0	1			
	22 Uichang	100	1	1	1			
	10 Jongno	300	1	2	1			
	22 Jongno	100	1	2	1			
	27 Jongno	40	1	0	3			
	27 Seodaemun 2	10	1	0	3			
	March	1 Jung, Seoul	500	1	3	1		
		12 Tongyeong	50	1	0	3		
	April	16 Gwangju, Gyeonggi	200	1	1	1		
16 Jongno		50	1	1	3	Nationwide		
17 Dong, Gwangju		300	1	1	1			
May	25 Gangnam 1		8	3	1			
June	29 Dong, Busan	120	160	3	1			
July	17 Yongsan	200	1	1	3			
	28 Jongno	100	1	1	1			
August	14 Jongno	1000	1	3	1			
	18 Seo, Daejeon	100	1	1	1			
September	28 Jeju 2	100	1	1	1			
October	1 Jongno	15000	1	2	1			
	8 Jongno	70	1	1	3			
	8 Jongno		1	0	3			
	20 Jongno		1	0	1			
	27					Nationwide		
	27 Jongno	10	1	0	3			
	29 Jongno	20	1	0	3			
November	29 Jung, Seoul	10000	1	3	1			
	29 Jeju 2	1000	1	2	1			
	1 Jongno	1000	2	4	1			

1	Gimje	10	1	0	3	
3	Chuncheon	100	1	1	1	
3	Sangdang	1000	1	1	1	
4	Busanjin 2	1000	8	2	2	
4	Sangdang	10	1	0	3	Chungbuk
4	Yesan	15	1	0	3	
5	Jongno	400	1	2	2	Nationwide
5	Jongno	50	1	0	3	
5	Jongno	100000	1	3	1	
5	Dong, Busan	2000	1	2	1	
6	Gwangyang	300	1	1	3	
6	Yeongdeungpo 2	30	1	0	3	Nationwide
6	Dong Nam 2	20	1	0	3	
7	Jung, Daegu	1500	1	1	1	
8	Seo 2, Daejeon	800	1	2	1	
9	Suwon 3	20	1	0	3	Suwon
9	Wonju 1	200	1	1	3	Wonju
9	Namwon	200	1	1	3	Namwon
9	Jeju 2	1000	1	1	1	
10	Jinju 2	10	1	0	3	
11	Jung, Daegu	10	1	0	3	
11	Gunsan	500	1	1	3	Gunsan
11	Jung, Daegu	4000	1	2	2	Daegu
11	Gimhae 2	150	1	1	1	
12	Jongno	2000	1	1	3	Nationwide
12	Jeju 2	429	1	0	3	Jeju
12	Sangdang	400	1	1	1	
12	Jongno	500000	1	1	2	
12	Busanjin 2	5000	1	2	1	
13	Yeonje	20	1	0	3	Busan
13	Jeonju 1	1500	1	3	1	
13	Jongno		1	0	3	Incheon
16	Cheonan 1	400	1	1	3	Cheonan
16	Seongsan	300	1	1	3	
16	Cheonan 1	3000	1	2	1	
17	Jongno	150	1	1	3	
18	Geochang	150	1	1	3	Geochang
19	Mapo 2	300	1	1	2	
19	Jongno	200	1	1	2	
19	Busanjin 2	60000	1	3	1	
19	Dong Nam 2	50000	1	2	1	
19	Gunpo 2	1000	1	2	1	
19	Nam 2, Ulsan	5000	1	2	1	
19	Jeonju 1	8000	1	3	1	
19	Wonju 1	2000	1	1	1	
19	Uichang	10000	1	1	1	
19	Jeju 2	5000	1	1	1	
19	Chuncheon	5000	1	1	1	
19	Sangdang	10000	1	1	1	
19	Jongno	500000	1	2	1	
20	Gangneung	2000	1	1	1	
23	Jeonju 1	300	1	1	3	Jeonju; Wanju
23	Dong Nam 2	1000	1	1	1	
24	Masanhoewon	100	1	1	1	
25	Dalseo 2	500	1	1	1	
25	Seogwipo	500	1	1	1	
26	Jongno	400	1	1	3	
26	Dong Nam 2	100	1	1	3	Gwangju
26	Busanjin 2	300	1	1	3	
26	Uichang	7000	1	2	1	
26	Jung, Daegu	30000	1	2	1	
26	Nam, Ulsan	5000	1	2	1	
26	Jeju 2	1500	1	1	1	
26	Chuncheon	700	1	2	1	
26	Jongno	900000	1	2	1	

December	26 Busanjin 2	60000	1	2	1		
	27 Jongno	20	1	0	3		
	30 Wonju 2	200	1	1	3	Wonju	
	3 Yeongdeungpo 2	1700	1	2	1	Nationwide	
	3 Jongno	200	1	1	3	Nationwide	
	3 Namdong 1	60	1	0	3	Incheon	
	3 Jung, Daegu	20000	1	1	1		
	3 Dong Nam 2		1	0	3	Gwangju	
	3 Busanjin 2	50000	1	2	1		
	3 Seo 2, Daejeon	30000	1	3	1		
	3 Chuncheon	5000	1	1	1		
	3 Jongno	1000000	1	2	1		
	3 Sacheon		1	1	1		
	3 Jeonju 1	10000	1	1	1		
	4 Seo 2, Daejeon	600	1	1	2		
	10 Jongno	150	1	1	3	Nationwide	
	10 Jeju	4000	1	2	1		
	10 Sangdang	2000	1	2	1		
	10 Jongno	700000	1	2	1		
	10 Yeosu	400	1	1	1		
	10 Seo 2, Daejeon	5000	1	1	1		
	12 Jung, Seoul		1	0	3	Nationwide	
	16 Masanhappo	100	1	1	2		
	17 Jongno					Nationwide	
	17 Jeonju 1	2000	1	2	1	2000	
	17 Busanjin 2	300	1	1	3		
	17 Jongno	300000	1	2	1		
	24 Dong Nam 2		1	0	3		
	24 Jongno	1000	1	1	3		
	24 Seo 2, Daejeon	1000	1	2	1		
	31 Jeonju 1	2000	1	3	1		
	2017 January	7 Buk, Pohang		1	0	1	
7 Jung, Daegu		2000	1	1	1		
8 Yeongdeungpo 2		20	1	0	3	Nationwide	
8 Jeonju 1		200	1	1	2	Jeonbuk	
8 Dong Nam 2		1000	1	1	3		
9 Yeongdeungpo 2		10	1	0	3	Nationwide	
10 Jongno		10	1	0	3		
11 Jongno		200	1	2	1	Paju	
12 Yeongdeungpo 2		10	1	2	3		
14 Dong Nam 2		2000	1	1	1		
14 Nam 2, Ulsan		300	1	2	1		
18 Andong		25	1	0	3	Daegu; Gyeongbuk	
18 Jongno		200	1	2	1		
18 Uichang		20	1	0	3	Gyeongnam	
18 Yeongdeungpo 2		500	1	2	2		
18 Seo 2, Daejeon		20	1	0	3	Dangjin; Daejeon; Seosan; Sejong.	
18 Dong, Busan		20	1	0	3	Busan	
19 Yeongdeungpo 2		500	1	2	2		
21 Jongno		150000	1	1	1		
21 Jeonju 1		2000	1	1	1		
21 Jung, Daegu		1500	1	1	1		
21 Seo 2, Daejeon		500	1	1	1		
February		1 Yeongdeungpo 2	3	1	0	3	
		4 Jongno	15	1	0	3	Nationwide
		4 Jeju 2		1	1	1	
		6 Jung, Daegu	700	1	1	1	
		8 Yeongdeungpo 2	100	1	2	2	
		11 Chuncheon	100	1	1	1	
		11 Jongno	300000	2	3	1	
		11 Dong Nam 2		1	0	3	Gwangju
		12 Jeonju 1	500	1	1	1	
		15 Goseong	10	1	0	3	Goseong; Sacheon
	16 Yuseong 2	200	1	1	1		
	18 Jongno	5	1	0	3	Nationwide	

	18	Jeju 2	700	1	1	1	
	18	Dong Nam 2	5000	1	1	1	
	20	Jongno		1	2	1	
	21	Asan 1	20	1	0	2	
	22	Jongno	200	1	2	1	
	25	Jongno	100	1	1	3	
	25	Jeju 2	800	1	1	1	
	27	Jongno	500000	1	2	1	
	27	Hongseong	25	1	0	2	
	28	Yeongdeungpo 2	10	1	0	2	
March	4	Jongno	400	1	1	2	Nationwide
	4	Dong Nam 2	30000	1	1	1	
	6	Uichang	1000	1	1	1	
	10	Jongno	20000	1	2	1	
	11	Damyang	200	1	1	1	
	21	Jeju 1	50	1	0	2	
	22	Dong Nam 2	30	1	0	2	
	31	Yeonje	15	1	0	2	
April	11	Yeonje	18	1	0	2	Busan; Gwangju; Daejeon; Chung
	15	Danwon 2	1000	1	1	2	Ansan
	15	Dong Nam 2	500	1	1	1	
	15	Jongno	50000	1	2	1	
	16	Dangjin	200	1	1	1	
	16	Wonju 1	22	1	0	3	Wonju
	16	Seosan	300	1	1	1	
	19	Gangbuk 1	10	1	0	3	
	27	Dong Nam 2	25	1	0	2	Gwangju
	29	Jongno	30000	1	1	1	
	30	Jongno		1	2	1	
May	1	Bupyeong 1	1800	1	2	1	
	9	Jongno	200	1	2	1	
	9	Nationwide					Nationwide 18000
	9	Jongno	100	1	1	3	
	17	Jongno		1	2	1	
June	10	Jung, Seoul	10	1	0	3	
	19	Mapo	700	1	1	1	
	21	Seo 1, Gwangju	7	1	0	3	
July	15	Jung, Seoul	50000	1	2	1	
	18		20	1	0	3	Bucheon
	22	Jung, Seoul					
	28						Goyang
August	2	Jongno	1000	1	2	1	
	4	Suwon 5	80	11	1	2	
	9	Jongno	2500	1	2	2	
	9	Jeju 1	20	1	0	2	
	14	Seongsan					Seongsan
	15	Jongno	3	1	0	3	
	15	Jung, Seoul	5000	1	1	1	
	16	Jongno		1	2	1	
	21						Jongno
	30	Jongno	100	1	2	1	Gwangju
September	6	Jongno	100	1	2	1	
	26	Yeongdeungpo 2	30	1	1	2	
October	12	Jongno	100	1	2	1	
	18	Asan					Nationwide
	23						Busan
	25	Jongno	1000	1	2	1	
	28	Jongno	20	1	0	3	Nationwide
	28	Jongno	20000	1	1	1	
	29	Jinju 2	10	1	0	1	
November	2	Jongno	25	1	1	3	Nationwide
	2	Yeongdeungpo 2	15	1	1	3	Nationwide
	2	Suwon 3	15	1	0	3	Gyeonggi
	4	Seo 2, Daejeon	150	1	1	1	
	12						Gunsan

	22	Jongno	30	1	0	3	
	22	Yeongdeungpo 2		1	1	2	
	25	Busanjin 1	25	1	0	3	Busan
December	2	Jongno	15	1	0	2	Seocheon
	2	Jongno	400	1	2	1	
	11	Uichang	10	1	0	3	Gyeongnam
	14	Jongno	10	1	0	3	Nationwide
	19	Boseong	50	1	0	3	Boseong
	22	Yeongdeungpo 2		1	1	2	
	27	Jongno	400	1	2	1	
	28	Hoengseong	6	1	0	3	
2018 January	2	Jongno	250	1	2	1	
	11	Yeongdeungpo 2	20	1	0	3	Nationwide
	13	Jongno	12	1	0	3	Nationwide
	13	Seongsan	40	3	1	3	Gyeongnam
	26	Mapo 2	20	1	0	3	
	29	Guro 2	450	1	1	3	
February	1	Yeongdeungpo 2	12	1	0	3	Nationwide
	1	Gumi 1	30	1	0	3	Gumi
	11	Seongsan	30	1	0	3	Gyeongnam
	21	Jongno				1	
	22	Suyeong	12	1	0	2	Busan
	25	Jongno	400	1	2	1	
	28	Jongno	100	1	2	1	
March	1	Eunpyeong 2	50	10	1	2	
	1	Jeju 1	20	1	0	3	Jeju
	1	Dong Nam 2					Gwangju
	1	Jongno					
	4	Jongno	400	1	1	1	
	8	Yeongdeungpo 2	10	1	1	2	
	14	Jeju 2	6	1	0	2	
	21	Yeongdeungpo 2	50	1	0	3	Nationwide
	22	Yeongdeungpo 2	50	43	3	3	Nationwide
	21	Yeongdeungpo 2	50	1	0	3	Nationwide
April	7	Jung, Daegu	50	1	0	1	
	10	Yeongdeungpo 2	5	1	1	3	Nationwide
	11	Yeongdeungpo 2	20	1	0	3	Nationwide
	14	Yeongdeungpo 2	200	1	1	2	
	16						Haman
	18	Gunsan	300	1	1	3	Gunsan
	19	Gangbuk 1	15	1	0	3	Nationwide
	24	Yeongdeungpo 2	20	2	1	3	Nationwide
	30	Yeongdeungpo 2	5	1	0	3	Nationwide
May	2	Jongno					
	7	Jongno					
	10	Yeongdeungpo 2	20	1	1	2	
	25	Jongno	15	1	0	2	Nationwide
	25	Gwangsan 1	8	1	0	3	Gwangsan
	27	Yeongdeungpo 2	10	1	1	2	
	28	Dong Nam 2	4000	1	1	2	Gwangju
June	2	Seongsan	10	1	0	3	
	6	Jongno					
	6	Mapo					
	10	Dongnae	400	2	2	3	Dongnae
	13	Jongno	500	1	2	1	
	13	Jongno	30	1	0	3	
	30	Jongno	50	1	1	1	
July	7	Jongno	2500	1	2	1	
	18	Jongno	200	1	2	1	
August	3	Jongno	3000	1	2	1	
	6	Dong Nam 2	20	1	0	1	
	8	Jongno	200	1	2	1	
	9	Jeju 2					
	15	Jongno	30	1	0	2	
September	10	Dong, Incheon					

660
780

	10 Jongno	20	1	0	2	
	15 Nowon 3					
	15 Bupyeong 1					
	15 Cheongju					
	26 Jeju 1	20	1	0	2	Jeju
October	3 Jongno	500	1	2	1	
	3 Yeonsu 2	100	1	1	3	
	8 Jinju 2	20	1	1	3	
	13					Nationwide
	13 Haeundae 1					
November	2 Jongno	20	1	0	3	Nationwide
	2					Geumcheon
	3 Jongno	200	1	1	3	
	15 Jongno					
	18 Jung, Daegu	100	1	1	3	
	22 Uichang	10	1	0	2	
	28 Jeju 1	30	1	0	2	Jeju
December	1 Yeongdeungpo 2	12000	1	2	1	
	10 Jung, Seoul		1	2	1	
	10 Yeongdeungpo 2	8	1	0	2	
	27 Namdong 1	50	1	0	2	
2019 January	3 Uichang	10	1	1	3	Gyeongnam
	4 Jongno	10	1	0	3	
	11 Jongno					Yangpyeong
	22 Yeongdeungpo 2	100	1	2	2	
	29 Yeongdeungpo 2	70	1	0	3	Nationwide
February	1 Jongno	500	1	2	1	
	13 Jongno	100	1	2	1	
	14 Yeongdeungpo 2	12	1	0	3	Nationwide
	15 Uichang	20	1	0	3	Gyeongnam
	16 Jongno	150	1	1	3	
	17 Dong Nam 2	5000	1	1	1	
	20 Jongno					
	25 Jongno					
March	1 Yongsan					
	9 Uichang	20	1	0	3	Gyeongnam
	15 Uichang	10	1	0	3	Gyeongnam
	15 Jongno	300	1	2	3	
	21 Uichang	30	1	0	3	Gyeongnam
	27					Buan
	29 Uichang					
April	10 Jongno	100	1	2	1	
	15 Uichang	500	1	2	3	
	15 Dangjin	200	1	1	3	
May	4 Jongno	100	1	1	2	Nationwide
	13 Uichang	8	3	1	3	Gyeongnam
	17 Gangnam 1	200	1	1	1	
	20 Gwanak 1	15	1	0	3	Gwanak 1
	21 Yeongdeungpo 2	20	1	0	3	Nationwide
	23	20	1	0	3	Jinju
	23 Uichang	10	1	0	3	Gyeongnam
	24 Jongno	200	1	1	3	
	25 Hwaseong 2	20	1	0	2	Hwaseong
June	1 Jung, Seoul	15000	1	2	1	
	6 Jeju 1	18	1	0	3	
	10 Gwacheon	6	1	0	3	
	19 Jongno					
	26 Jongno					
July	4 Uichang	2000	1	2	1	
	14 Uichang	60	1	0	3	Gyeongnam
	20 WonJu 1	30	1	0	2	
	21 Jongno	5000	1	1	1	
	23 Gapyeong	13	1	0	3	Gapyeong
	23	15	1	0	3	Pyeongtaek
	25 Masanhappo	18	1	0	2	

	26 Jongno				Uijeongbu		
August	29 Jongno	5000	1	1	1		
	5 Hongcheon						
	5 Jongno						
	7 Jongno	300	1	2	1		
	8 Jongno	30	1	1	2		
	10 Jongno	30	1	1	3	Nationwide	1000
	11 Dong Nam 2	1000	1	1	1		
	12 Jongno	15	1	0	3	Nationwide	
	14 Jongno	1500	1	3	1	Chuncheon	
	14 Cheonan 1	50	1	0	2	Cheonan; Asan	
	15 Jeju 1	20	1	0	3	Jeju	
	15 Sangdang	300	1	2	1		
	15 Jongno	100000	1	2	1		
	15 Yeosu 1	1500	1	1	1		
	24 Jongno	3000	1	1	1		
	25 Gangseo 2	15	1	0	3	Songpa	
	26 Yesan	150	1	1	3	Yesan	
September	31 Bupyeong 1	1000	1	2	1		
	4 Jung, Seoul	50	1	0	1		
	21 Haeundae 1	200	1	1	1		
	21 Jongno	4000	1	1	3	Nationwide	2000
	25 Jongno	10	1	1	1		
	26 Mapo 2	10	1	0	3		
	27 Jongno	300	1	1	3	Nationwide	
	28 Seocho 2	200000	1	2	1		
	October	3 Jongno	400000	1	2	1	
		4				Nationwide	15
November	12 Jung, Daegu						
	25 Gwanak 1	5	1	0	2		
	3 Jongno	30	1	0	3	Nationwide	
December	23 Yeongdeungpo 2		1	1	1		
	29 Jongno	10	1	0	3		
	1 Yeongdeungpo 2	10	1	0	3	Nationwide	1234
	1 Uichang						
	4 Jongno	200	1	2	1		
	7 Jongno	1500	1	1	1		
	8 Jongno						
	13 Jeju1	15	1	0	2		
December	16				Gimpo	10	
	18 Jongno						
	20 Yeongdeungpo 2	8	1	0	2		
	23 Seongsan	30	1	0	3	Gyeongnam	
	26	30	1	1	2		
	27 Yeongdeungpo 2	5	1	1	3		
	31 Yeongdeungpo 2	20	1	0	3	Nationwide	

Across-politician Study

				Youth Popul	Voter Popul	Youth:Voter	Youth Invol	Support
19th								
Chung Sye-kyun	D	Seoul	Jongno	8534	134151	0.06361488	94	1
Chyung Ho-joon	D→P		Jung	5442	111048	0.04900584	23	0
Chin Young	L→D		Yongsan	11247	200267	0.05616003	0	0
Choi Jae-cheon	D→I		Seongdong 1	7549	133091	0.05672059	0	0
Hong Ihk-pyo	D		Seongdong 2	7117	115905	0.06140374	0	0
Kim Han-gil	D→P		Gwangjin 1	11144	152054	0.07328975	0	3
Choo Mi-ae	D		Gwangjin 2	9158	153045	0.05983861	0	0
Ahn Gyu-baek	D		Dongdaemun 1	8573	160735	0.05333624	0	0
Min Bynug-doo	D		Dongdaemun 2	9188	147428	0.06232195	0	0
Seo Young-kyo	D		Jungnang 1	9594	161289	0.05948329	0	1
Park Hong-keun	D		Jungnang 2	12623	192161	0.06568971	0	3
You Seung-hee	D		Seongbuk 1	12973	200390	0.06473876	0	0
Shin Gye-ryoon	D		Seongbuk 2	11760	186857	0.06293583	0	0
Oh Young-sik	D		Gangbuk 1	8306	140208	0.05924056	0	0
You Dae-won	D		Gangbuk 2	9394	143013	0.06568634	0	0
In Jae-keun	D		Dobong 1	10547	142308	0.07411389	0	0
Yoo Ihn-tae	D		Dobong 2	10659	151659	0.07028267	0	0
Lee No-keun	L		Nowon 1	9370	141348	0.06629029	0	-1
Woo Won-shik	D		Nowon 2	19750	167314	0.11804153	0	0
Roh Hoe-chan	U→J		Nowon 3					
Ahn Cheol-soo	I→D→P			12852	160153	0.08024826	0	0
Lee Mi-kyung	D		Eunpyeong 1	11069	170772	0.06481742	0	1
Lee Jae-oh	L→I		Eunpyeong 2	17212	241878	0.07115984	0	0
Woo Sang-ho	D		Seodaemun 1	7334	126944	0.05777351	0	0
Chung Doo-un	L		Seodaemun 2	9158	134819	0.06792811	2	0
Noh Woong-rae	D		Mapo 1	7318	131409	0.05568873	0	0
Jung Cheong-rae	D		Mapo 2	11670	190627	0.06121903	0	0
Kil Jeong-woo	L		Yangcheon 1	23727	201479	0.11776413	0	0
Kim Yong-tae	L		Yangcheon 2	13394	186895	0.07166591	0	0
Shin Ki-nam	D		Gangseo 1	17553	256901	0.06832593	0	0
Kim Sung-tae	L		Gangseo 2	13947	226281	0.06163575	0	0
Lee In-young	D		Guro 1	12414	196276	0.06324767	0	0
Park Young-sun	D		Guro 2	8389	156590	0.05357303	0	0
Rhee Mok-hee	D		Geumcheon	12377	202448	0.06113669	0	2
Kim Young-joon	D		Yeongdeungpo 1	8699	173896	0.05002415	0	0
Shin Kyoung-min	D		Yeongdeungpo 2	9159	149505	0.06126217	2	1
Jun Byung-hun	D		Dongjak 1	11716	178311	0.06570542	0	0
Chung Mong-joon	L		Dongjak 2	7630	165276	0.0461652	0	0
Na Kyung-won	L			7630	165276	0.0461652	0	0
Yoo Ki-hong	D		Gwanak 1	11159	234236	0.04763999	1	0
Lee Sang-kyu	U		Gwanak 2	10902	209177	0.05211854	1	0
Oh Shin-whan	L							
Kim Hoe-sun	L		Seocho 1	14894	166015	0.08971478	0	0
Kang Seog-hoon	L		Seocho 2	13132	194657	0.06746225	1	0
Shim Yoon-joe	L		Gangnam 1	17987	250221	0.07188445	1	0
Kim Jong-hoon	L		Gangnam 2	23645	221573	0.10220108	1	0
Park In-sook	L		Songpa 1	12721	167969	0.07573421	0	1
Yoo Il-ho	L		Songpa 2	11904	164787	0.07223871	0	0
Kim Eul-dong	L		Songpa 3	16033	208289	0.07697478	1	0
Shin Dong-woo	L		Gangdong 1	16806	214183	0.07846561	0	0
Shim Jae-kwon	D		Gangdong 2	11321	178721	0.06334454	0	0
Chung Ui-hwa	L	Busan	Jung Dong	6440	124170	0.05186438	0	0
Yoo Ki-Jnue	L		Seo	6185	102328	0.06044289	0	0
Lee Jae-kyun	L		Yeongdo					
Kim Moo-sung	L			6741	114201	0.0590275	0	-2
Na Seong-jin	L		Busanjin 1	10479	166971	0.0627594	0	0
Lee Hun-seong	L		Busanjin 2	9111	161896	0.05627687	0	0
Lee Jin-bok	L		Dongnae	17348	228810	0.07581836	0	0
Kim Jung-hoon	L		Nam 1	7759	121049	0.06409801	0	0
Seo Yong-gyo	L		Nam 2	8727	118085	0.07390439	0	0
Park Min-shik	L		Buk Gangseo 1	9037	131180	0.06899007	0	0
Kim Do-eup	L		Buk Gangseo 2	14818	185682	0.0798031	0	0
Suh Byung-soo	L		Haeundae Gijang 1	19459	248277	0.07837617	2	0
Bae Duk-kwang	L		Haeundae Gijang 2	19459	248277	0.07837617	0	0
Ha Tae-keung	L			16620	207100	0.08025109	0	1
Moon Dae-sung	L		Saha 1	8676	124694	0.06957833	0	1
Cho Kyoung-tae	D→L		Saha 2	12143	158812	0.07646148	0	0
Kim Se-yeon	L		Geumjeong	14459	211253	0.068444	0	1
Kim Hee-jung	L		Yeonje	11677	173901	0.0671474	2	0
Yoo Jae-jung	L		Suyeong	9079	152617	0.05948879	0	0
Moon Jae-in	D		Sasang	13481	204200	0.06601861	1	2
Kim Hee-kuk	L	Daegu	Jung Nam	11582	209205	0.05536197	0	0
Yoo Sung-kull	L→I		Dong 1	6253	111726	0.05596728	0	0
Yoo Seong-min	L→I		Dong 2	12198	176096	0.06926904	0	1
Kim Sang-hoon	L		Seo	11472	181101	0.06334587	0	0
Kwon Eun-hee	L→I		Buk 1	8459	121754	0.06947616	0	0
Suh Sang-hee	L		Buk 2	23299	229424	0.10155433	0	0
Lee Hahn-woo	L		Suseong 1	26169	201566	0.12982844	0	0
Joo Ho-young	L→I		Suseong 2	13013	155819	0.08351356	0	0
Hong Ji-man	L		Dalseo 1	15301	149218	0.10254125	0	0
Yoo Jae-ok	L		Dalseo 2	19196	191443	0.10027005	0	0
Cho Won-jin	L		Dalseo 3	10521	141826	0.07418245	0	0
Lee Jong-jin	L		Dalseong	11815	145887	0.08098734	0	0
Park Sang-eun	L	Incheon	Jung Dong Ongjin	10448	169838	0.06151745	3	0
Hong Il-pyo	L		Nam 1	10282	167775	0.06128446	3	0
Yoon Sang-hyun	L→I		Nam 2	12498	171627	0.07282071	2	-1
Hwang Woo-yea	L		Yeonsu	23036	242422	0.09502438	2	0
Park Nam-choon	D		Namdong 1	19959	244854	0.08151388	3	0
Youn Kwan-suk	D		Namdong 2	12611	165564	0.07616994	2	1

Moon Byeong-ho	D→P		Bubyeong 1	15253	234141	0.06514451	2	1	
Hong Young-pyo	D		Bubyeong 2	19774	219494	0.09008902	2	1	
Shin Hak-young	D→P		Gyeyang 1	11487	129587	0.08864315	2	0	
Choi Won-sik	D→P		Gyeyang 2	12010	143639	0.08361239	2	2	
Lee Hag-jae	L		Seo Ganghwa 1	23284	276464	0.08422073	2	0	
Ahn Deok-su	L		Seo Ganghwa 2	13789	168117	0.08202026	2	0	
Ahn Sang-soo	L→I								
Park Joo-sun	I→D→P	Gwangju	Dong	5549	85607	0.06481947	8	0	
Park Hae-ja	D		Seo 1	11025	118850	0.09276399	3	0	
Oh Byung-yoon	U		Seo 2	14013	122918	0.11400283	2	0	
Chun Jung-bae	D→P								
Chang Byoung-wan	D→P		Nam	16588	175347	0.09460099	2	0	
Kang Gi-jung	D		Buk 1	9884	127837	0.07731721	2	1	
Lim Nae-hyun	D→P		Buk 2	23581	227271	0.10375719	2	0	
Kim Dong-cheol	D→P		Gwangsan 1	12629	128051	0.09862477	2	0	
Lee Yong-sup	D		Gwangsan 2	20893	161180	0.12962526	2	1	
Kwon Eun-hee	D→P			20893	161180	0.12962526	2	0	
Lee Jang-woo	L	Daejeon	Dong	14082	200225	0.07033088	0	0	
Kang Chang-hee	L		Jung	16811	211481	0.07949177	1	0	
Park Byeong-seong	D		Seo 1	17514	195051	0.0897919	0	0	
Park Beom-lye	D		Seo 2	19615	241412	0.08125114	0	1	
Lee Sang-min	D		Yuseong	23789	246906	0.09634841	0	0	
Park Seong-hyo	L		Dadeok	14677	160910	0.09121248	0	0	
Jeong Yong-ki	L			14677	160910	0.09121248	0	0	
Jeong Kab-yoon	L	Ulsan	Jung	16156	193256	0.08359896	0	0	
Lee Chae-ik	L		Nam 1	15327	150491	0.10184662	2	0	
Kim Gi-hyeon	L		Nam 2	10995	126955	0.08660549	0	0	
Bak Maeng-woo	L			10995	126955	0.08660549	0	0	
Ahn Hyo-dae	L		Dong	11536	140296	0.08222615	0	0	
Park Dae-dong	L		Buk	14607	141994	0.10287054	0	0	
Kang Ghil-boo	L→I		Ulju	14638	168329	0.08696065	0	0	
Lee Hae-chan	D	Sejong		8393	121130	0.06928919	0	1	
Lee Chan-yeol	D	Gyeonggi	Suwon 1	21983	237514	0.09255454	1	1	
Shin Jang-yong	D		Suwon 2	19734	235641	0.08374604	2	0	
Chung Mi-kyung	L			19734	235641	0.08374604	1	0	
Nam Kyung-pil	L		Suwon 3	14672	202687	0.07238747	1	0	
Kim Yong-nam	L			14672	202687	0.07238747	1	-1	
Kim Jin-pyo	D		Suwon 4	25066	247141	0.10142388	1	0	
Park Kwang-on	D			25066	247141	0.10142388	0	0	
Kim Tae-nyeon	D		Seongnam	Sujeong	11598	188620	0.06148871	0	2
Kim Mi-hyul	U			Jungwon					
Shin Sang-jin	L				14380	209510	0.06863634	0	0
Rhee Chong-hoon	L			Bundang 1	17499	185798	0.09418293	0	0
Jhun Ha-jin	L			Bundang 2	18749	205862	0.09107557	0	0
Moon Hee-sang	D		Uiyeongbu 1	11743	169473	0.06929127	2	0	
Hong Moon-jong	L		Uiyeongbu 2	17028	177203	0.09609318	0	0	
Lee Jong-kul	D		Anyang	Manan	14575	205131	0.07105216	0	0
Lee Seok-hyun	D			Dongan 1	11616	144694	0.08027976	0	0
Shim Jae-chul	L			Dongan 2	14460	134765	0.10729789	0	0
Kim Kyung-kyub	D		Bucheon	Wonmi 1					
Sul Hoon	D			Wonmi 2					
Kim Sang-hee	D			Sosa	13114	185957	0.07052168	0	1
Won Hye-young	D			Ojeong	12908	151583	0.08515467	0	1
Baek Jae-hyun	D		Gwangmyeong 1	9458	129697	0.07292381	0	5	
Lee Un-ju	D		Gwangmyeong 2	12524	146509	0.0854828	0	1	
Won Yoo-chul	L		Pyeongtaek 1	13090	185790	0.07045589	0	-1	
Lee Jae-young	L		Pyeongtaek 2	17359	204720	0.08479386	0	1	
Yu Eui-dong	L			17359	204720	0.08479386	0	1	
Jung Sung-ho	D		Yangju Dongducheon	19140	236843	0.08081303	0	0	
Jeon Hae-cheol	D			16850	168972	0.09972066	0	1	
Kim Young-hwan	D→P			Sangnok 1	12464	132296	0.09421298	0	0
Kim Myung-yeon	L			Sangnok 2	12843	143377	0.08957504	0	0
Boo Jwa-hyun	D→P			Danwon 1	11719	114344	0.10248898	2	1
Sim Sang-jung	U→J	Goyang		14948	190469	0.07847996	0	3	
Kim Tae-won	L			Deogyang 1	11874	149915	0.07987193	0	0
Yoo Eun-hae	D			Deogyang 2	21170	226621	0.09341588	0	1
Kim Hyun-mee	D			Ilсандong	24459	230226	0.10623909	0	0
Song Ho-chang	D		Uiwang Gwacheon	15564	182353	0.08535094	0	1	
Yun Ho-jung	D		Guri	12884	149265	0.08631628	0	3	
Choi Jae-sung	D		Namyangju 1	20122	229469	0.0876894	0	1	
Park Ki-choon	D→I		Namyangju 2	21913	263957	0.08301731	0	0	
An Min-suk	D		Osan	13095	156727	0.08355293	0	0	
Ko Hee-sun	L		Hwaseong 1						
Suh Chung-won	L			14126	194756	0.07253178	0	0	
Lee Won-wook	D		Hwaseong 2	20696	206889	0.10003432	0	1	
Ham Jin-gyu	L		Siheung 1	13719	136861	0.10024039	0	0	
Cho Jeong-sik	D		Siheung 2	16070	169772	0.09465636	0	2	
Lee Hack-young	D		Gunpo	18680	227612	0.08206949	0	0	
Lee Hyun-jae	L		Hanam	8505	121501	0.06999942	0	0	
Yoon Hu-duk	D		Paju 1	14907	168820	0.08830115	0	3	
Hwang Jun-ha	L		Paju 2	10892	151345	0.07196802	0	0	
Lee Woo-hyun	L		Yongin 1	22407	250554	0.08942982	0	0	
Kim Min-gi	D		Yongin 2	21321	249030	0.08561619	0	0	
Han Sun-kyo	L		Yongin 3	22423	232177	0.09657718	0	0	
Kim Hack-yong	L		Anseong	11155	144562	0.07716412	0	-1	
Yoo Jeong-bok	L		Gimpo	20349	262922	0.07739558	0	0	
Hong Chul-ho	L			20349	262922	0.07739558	0	0	
Roh Chul-rae	L		Gwangju	17203	237647	0.07238888	2	0	

Kim Young-woo	L		Pocheon Yeoncheon		12246	165700	0.07390465	0	0
Yoo Seung-woo	L→I		Icheon		13806	160191	0.08618462	0	0
Choung Byoung-gug	L		Yeouju Yangpyeong Gapyeong		14981	230278	0.06505615	0	1
Kim Jin-tae	L	Gangwon	Chuncheon		18724	221560	0.08450984	1	0
Kim Ki-sun	L		Wonju 1		10712	131908	0.08120811	1	0
Lee Kang-hoo	L		Wonju 2		12279	127434	0.09635576	0	0
Kweon Seong-dong	L		Gangneung		13999	176917	0.0791275	0	0
Lee Yi-jae	L		Donghae Samcheok		10247	137216	0.07467788	0	0
Chung Moon-hun	L		Sokcho Goseong Yangyang		8444	116716	0.07234655	1	1
Hwang Yong-cheul	L		Hongcheon Hoengseong		6639	97780	0.06789732	0	1
Yeom Dong-yeol	L		Taebaek Yeongwol Pyeongchang Jeongseon		9082	145379	0.0624712	0	0
Han Ki-ho	L		Cheorwon Hwacheon Yanggu Inje		7426	107270	0.06922718	1	0
Chung Woo-taik	L	Chungbuk	Cheongju	Sangdang	12284	120714	0.10176119	0	0
Oh Jae-sae	D			Heungdeok 1	15888	165476	0.09601392	0	0
Noh Young-min	D			Heungdeok 2	15710	162274	0.09681157	0	0
Yoon Jin-sik	L		Chungju		13750	169957	0.08090282	0	0
Lee Jong-bae	L				13750	169957	0.08090282	0	0
Song Kwang-ho	L		Jecheon Danyang		10341	138951	0.07442192	1	0
Byun Jae-il	D		Cheongwon		13546	184966	0.07323508	0	0
Park Duk-hyum	L		Boeun Okcheon Yeongdong		7110	117821	0.06034578	0	0
Kyung Dae-soo	L		Jeungpyeong Jincheon Goesan Eumseong		9194	192162	0.04784505	0	0
Yang Seoung-jo	D	Chungnam	Cheonan 1		21028	237165	0.08866401	3	0
Park Wan-ju	D		Cheonan 2		21215	227279	0.09334342	2	0
Park Soo-hyun	D		Gongju		6723	95091	0.0707007	2	1
Kim Tae-heum	L		Boryeong Seocheon		8972	136575	0.06569284	1	0
Lee Myoung-su	L		Asan		17989	225202	0.0798794	1	0
Sung Woan-jong	L		Seosan Taean		13906	185840	0.07482781	1	0
Kim Je-sik	L				13906	185840	0.07482781	1	0
Lee In-je	L		Nonsan Gyeryong Geumsan		14043	180426	0.07783246	1	0
Kim Geun-tae	L		Buyeo Cheongyang						
Lee Wan-koo	L				5645	89475	0.06309025	1	0
Hong Moon-pyo	L		Hongseong Yesan		9968	148133	0.06729088	1	0
Kim Dong-wan	L		Dangjin		8861	129975	0.06817465	1	0
Kim Yun-duk	D	Jeonbuk	Jeonju	Wansan 1	10541	122769	0.08586044	1	0
Lee Sang-jik	D			Wansan 2	18721	162343	0.11531757	2	0
Kim sung-ju	D			Deokjin	21799	224382	0.09715129	2	0
Kim Kwan-young	D→P		Gunsan		18256	221310	0.08249062	1	0
Lee Choon-suak	D		Iksan 1		8462	117865	0.071794	1	1
Jeon Jeong-hee	D→P		Iksan 2		12404	126190	0.09829622	1	0
Yoo Sung-yop	D→P		Jeongeup		7484	96680	0.07741001	1	1
Kang Dong-won	U→J→D		Namwon Sunchang		6937	96140	0.07215519	1	2
Choi Gyu-sung	D		Gimje Wanju		9474	149716	0.06327981	1	1
Park Min-soo	D		Jinan Muju Jangsu Imsil		4606	90516	0.05088603	1	0
Kim Choon-jin	D		Gochang Buan		6400	100483	0.06369237	1	0
Park Jie-won	D→P	Jeonnam	Mokpo		17898	186149	0.09614878	0	0
Kim Sung-gon	D		Yeosu 1		7494	101517	0.07382015	0	1
Joo Seung-yong	D→P		Yeosu 2		12494	132258	0.09446688	0	1
Kim Sun-dong	U		Suncheon Gokseong		23551	243179	0.09584636	0	1
Lee Jung-hyun	L				23551	243179	0.09584636	0	0
Bae Ki-woon	D		Naju Hwasun		8960	131643	0.06806287	0	4
Shin Jeung-hoon	D				8960	131643	0.06806287	0	0
Woo Yoon-keun	D		Gwangyang Gurye		13745	140036	0.09815333	0	0
Lee Nak-yeon	D		Damyang Hampyeong Yeonggwang Jangseong		9576	158010	0.06060376	0	0
Lee Kai-ho	D				9576	158010	0.06060376	0	0
Kim Seung-nam	D→P→D		Goheung Boseong		5316	100986	0.05264096	0	1
Hwang Ju-hong	D→P		Jangheung Gangjin Yeongam		7804	118583	0.06581045	0	0
Kim Yung-rok	D		Haenam Wando Jindo		8430	137777	0.06118583	0	0
Lee Yoon-seok	D→C		Muan Sinan		7022	103689	0.06772174	0	1
Lee Byung-suk	L	Gyeongbuk	Pohang	Buk	18427	218318	0.0844044	0	0
Kim Hyung-tae	L			Nam Ulleung					
Park Myung-jae	L				16156	209728	0.07703311	0	0
Jung Soo-sung	L		Gyeongju		16061	216698	0.07411697	0	0
Lee Cheol-woo	L		Gimcheon		8004	112512	0.07113908	0	0
Kim Gwang-ilim	L		Andong		9554	139149	0.06866021	0	0
Sim Hag-bong	L		Gumi 1		18316	174960	0.10468679	0	0
Kim Tae-whan	L→I		Gumi 2		12409	147799	0.08395862	0	0
Chang Yoon-seok	L		Yeongju		6759	92077	0.07340595	0	-2
Chung Hee-soo	L		Yeongcheon		4942	86583	0.05707818	0	0
Kim Jong-tae	L		Sangju		5553	87713	0.06330875	0	0
Lee Han-sung	L		Mungyeong Yecheon		5980	103680	0.05767747	0	0
Choi Kyoung-hwan	L		Gyeongsan Cheongdo		16721	245864	0.06800914	0	0
Yi Wan-young	L		Goryeong Seongju Chilgok		10883	166480	0.06537122	0	0
Kim Jae-won	L		Gunwi Uiseong Cheongsong		3764	95690	0.03933535	0	0
Kang Seok-ho	L		Yeongyang Yeongdeok Bonghwa Uljin		6721	124401	0.0540269	0	0
Park Seong-ho	L	Gyeongnam	Changwon	Uichang	18622	207547	0.08972426	2	0
Kang Gi-yun	L			Seongsan	19882	184814	0.10757843	3	0
Lee Ju-young	L			Masanhappo	10328	152372	0.06778148	2	0
Ahn Hong-joon	L			Masanhoewon	13848	173603	0.07976821	2	0
Kim Sung-chan	L			Jinhae	10914	140015	0.07794879	1	0
Park Dae-chul	L		Jinju 1						
Kim Jae-kyung	L		Jinju 2						
Lee Koon-kyon	L		Tongyeong Goseong		10969	159501	0.06877073	1	0
Yeo Sang-kyoo	L		Sacheon Namhae Hadong		11500	177831	0.06466814	0	0
Min Hong-chul	D		Gimhae 1		16633	170287	0.09767628	0	2
Kim Tae-ho	L		Gimhae 2		23540	231584	0.10164778	0	-1
Cho Hae-jin	L		Miryang Changnyeong		9078	146559	0.06194092	1	0

Kim Han-pyo	L	Geoje	16820	188467	0.08924639	0	0
Yoon Young-seok	L	Yangsan	18935	229347	0.08256049	0	0
Cho Hyun-yong	L	Uiryeong Haman Hapcheon	7450	126484	0.05890073	0	0
Shin Sung-bum	L	Sancheong Hamyang Geochang	7785	118241	0.06584011	0	0
Kang Chang-il	D	Jeju	16986	184236	0.09219696	0	1
Kim Woo-nam	D	Jeju 2	15371	162557	0.0945576	2	0
Kim Jae-yun	D	Seogwipo	10104	128416	0.07868178	3	1
Min Byung-joo	L	Proportional Rep.	3257771	41455574	0.07858463	24	0
Kim Jung-rok	L						0
Yoon Myung-hee	L						0
Cho Myung-chul	L						0
Kang Eun-hee	L						1
Joo Young-soon	L						0
Shin Yee-jin	L						0
Lee Sang-il	L						0
Lee Ailesa	L						0
Lee Man-woo	L						0
Park Geun-hye	L						0
An Chong-bum	L						0
Kim Hyun-sook	L						0
Kim Jang-shil	L						0
Lee Jasmine	L						1
Choi Bong-hong	L						0
Yoo Lee-young	L						0
Song Young-keun	L						0
Min Hyun-joo	L						1
Park Chang-sik	L						0
Shon In-chun	L						0
Kim Sang-min	L						0
Hyun Young-hee	L						0
Lee Jae-young	L						0
Shin Kyung-rim	L						0
Lee Un-ryong	L						0
Park Yoon-ok	L						0
Yang Chang-young	L						0
Jang Jung-eun	L						0
Jung Youn-suk	L						0
Moon Jeong-lim	L						0
Kim Young-joo	L						0
Hwang In-ja	L						0
Chun Soon-ok	D						1
Choi Dong-ic	D						1
Eun Soo-mi	D						0
Hong Jong-haak	D						0
Jin Sun-mee	D						0
Kim Yong-ik	D						0
Bae Jae-jeung	D						1
Baek Kun-ki	D						0
Nam In-soon	D						1
Kim Kwang-jin	D						2
Han Jeoung-ae	D						1
Kim Gi-juhn	D						0
Chang Ha-na	D						3
Kim Ki-sik	D						0
Han Myeong-sook	D						1
Do Jong-hwan	D						0
Kim Hyun	D						1
Jin Sung-joon	D						0
Choi Min-hee	D						0
Hong Eui-rak	D						1
Lim Su-kyung	D						1
Shin Moon-sik	D						0
Lee Seoki	U						0
Kim Jae-yeon	U						0
Jeong Jin-hoo	U→J						2
Kim Je-nam	U→J						2
Park Won-suk	U→J						1
Seo Gi-ho	U→J						1
20th							
Chung Sye-kyun	D	Seoul	6848	134673	0.05084909	119	5
Hong Ikh-pyo	D	Jongno	9376	194024	0.04832392	0	2
Ji Sang-wook	L→B	Jung Seongdong 1	7215	177591	0.04062706	9	0
Chin Young	D	Jung Seongdong 2	9499	198065	0.047959	2	1
Jeon Hye-sook	D	Yongsan	8966	153350	0.05846756	0	4
Choo Mi-ae	D	Gwangjin 1	7309	153430	0.04763736	0	2
Ahn Gyu-baek	D	Gwangjin 2	6764	155682	0.04344754	0	3
Min Byung-doo	D	Dongdaemun 1	7766	147324	0.05271375	0	1
Seo Young-kyo	D	Dongdaemun 2	7359	158416	0.04645364	0	2
Park Hong-keun	D	Jungnang 1	10159	193567	0.05248312	0	2
You Seung-hee	D	Jungnang 2	11999	201468	0.05955785	0	3
Ki Dong-min	D	Seongbuk 1	9711	172427	0.05631949	0	8
Cheong Yang-seog	L→B→L	Seongbuk 2	6447	141115	0.04568614	2	1
Park Yong-jin	D	Gangbuk 1	7980	139687	0.05712772	0	1
In Jae-keun	D	Gangbuk 2	8524	142685	0.05979999	0	2
Kim Seon-dong	L	Dobong 1	8598	150342	0.05718961	0	0
Koh Yong-jin	D	Dobong 2	7990	138601	0.05764749	0	1
Woo Won-shik	D	Nowon 1	16480	165508	0.09957223	0	10
Ahn Cheol-soo	P	Nowon 2	10459	153149	0.06829297	1	4
		Nowon 3					

Kim Seong-hwan	D								
Park Joo-min	D		Eunpyeong 1	11504	201714	0.05703124	0	14	
Kang Byeong-won	D		Eunpyeong 2	12649	210129	0.06019636	1	3	
Woo Sang-ho	D		Seodaemun 1	6347	129698	0.04899676	0	11	
Kim Yeong-ho	D		Seodaemun 2	8036	137934	0.05825975	0	6	
Noh Woong-rae	D		Mapo 1	6243	130686	0.04777099	2	2	
Sohn Hye-won	D		Mapo 2	10085	187317	0.05383921	5	2	
Hwang Hee	D		Yangcheon 1	20061	203511	0.09857452	0	3	
Kim Yong-tae	L→B→L		Yangcheon 2	11016	179994	0.06120204	0	2	
Geum Tae-seop	D		Gangseo 1	10585	173315	0.06107377	0	1	
Kim Sung-tae	L→B→L		Gangseo 2	8163	176035	0.04637146	1	1	
Han Jeoung-ae	D		Gangseo 3	8472	157745	0.05370693	0	1	
Lee In-young	D		Guro 1	10768	196837	0.05470516	0	3	
Park Young-sun	D		Guro 2	6868	150045	0.04577293	1	1	
Lee Hoon	D		Geumcheon	9726	203999	0.0476767	1	2	
Kim Young-joo	D		Yeongdeungpo 1	7633	179245	0.04258417	0	1	
Shin Kyoung-min	D		Yeongdeungpo 2	6812	137971	0.04937269	37	2	
Kim Byung-kee	D		Dongjak 1	10086	181900	0.05544805	0	1	
Na Kyung-won	L		Dongjak 2	6126	157758	0.03883163	0	-1	
Kim Sung-shik	P→B		Gwanak 1	9234	234914	0.039308	3	2	
Oh Shin-hwan	L→B		Gwanak 2	8629	209490	0.04119051	0	1	
Lee Hye-hoon	L→B		Seocho 1	13284	162599	0.08169792	0	0	
Park Seoung-joong	L→B→L		Seocho 2	11430	196408	0.05819519	1	0	
Lee Jong-gu	L→B→L		Gangnam 1	9063	165697	0.05469622	1	2	
Jun Hyeon-hee	D		Gangnam 2	9477	142940	0.0630055	0	2	
Lee Eun-jae	L→B→L		Gangnam 3	15628	150784	0.10364495	0	0	
Park In-sook	L→B→L		Songpa 1	10293	164210	0.06268193	1	1	
Choi Myeong-gil	D→P		Songpa 2	10639	173160	0.06144029	1	0	
Choi Jae-seong	D								
Nam In-soon	D		Songpa 3	13762	213835	0.06435803	1	5	
Jin Sun-mee	D		Gangdong 1	13634	197954	0.06887459	0	6	
Shim Jae-kwon	D		Gangdong 2	8424	168187	0.05008711	0	1	
Kim Moo-sung	L→B→L	Busan	Jung Yeongdo	6769	148742	0.04550833	5	0	
Yoo Ki-june	L		Seo Dong	7913	176302	0.04488321	7	0	
Kim Young-choon	D		Busanjin 1	8514	162562	0.05237386	6	2	
Lee Hun-seung	L		Busanjin 2	7147	158762	0.04501707	12	0	
Lee Jin-bok	L→B→L		Dongnae	14693	226881	0.06476082	7	0	
Kim Jung-hoon	L		Nam 1	6577	118049	0.05571415	5	0	
Park Jae-ho	D		Nam 2	7266	113828	0.06383315	5	1	
Chun Jae-soo	D		Buk Gangseo 1	7254	144421	0.05022815	5	2	
Kim Do-eup	L		Buk Gangseo 2	12657	202391	0.06253737	5	0	
Ha Tae-keung	L→B		Haeundae 1	13276	184908	0.07179787	7	5	
Bae Duk-kwang	L		Haeundae 2	10455	156447	0.06682774	5	0	
Yun Jun-ho	D								
Choi In-ho	D		Saha 1	6996	123334	0.05672402	6	2	
Cho Kyoung-tae	L		Saha 2	9695	158274	0.06125453	6	0	
Kim Se-yeon	L→B→L		Geumjeong	11560	210704	0.0548637	6	2	
Kim Hae-young	D		Yeonje	9747	175168	0.05564372	9	4	
Yoo Jae-jung	L		Suyeong	7498	156376	0.04794853	7	-1	
Chang Jae-won	L→B→L		Sasang	10083	197267	0.05111347	6	2	
Yoon Sang-jik	L		Gijang	7952	126916	0.06265561	6	0	
Kwak Sang-do	L	Daegu	Jung Nam	9383	203096	0.04619983	13	0	
Chong Jong-sup	L		Dong 1	5967	128811	0.04632368	2	0	
Yoo Seoung-min	L→B		Dong 2	9893	164892	0.05999685	2	10	
Kim Sang-hoon	L		Seo	8328	169207	0.04921782	2	0	
Jeong Tae-ok	L		Buk 1	9585	161768	0.05925152	2	-4	
Hong Eui-rak	D		Buk 2	17654	197169	0.0895374	2	1	
Kim Boo-kyum	D		Suseong 1	22272	199863	0.11143633	2	1	
Joo Ho-young	L→B→L		Suseong 2	10705	153156	0.06898605	2	0	
Kwak Dae-hoon	L		Dalseo 1	11486	143365	0.08011718	2	0	
Yoon Jae-ok	L		Dalseo 2	16855	194291	0.08675132	3	0	
Cho Won-jin	L→O		Dalseo 3	7671	135285	0.05670252	2	0	
Choo Kyung-ho	L		Dalseong	11843	193493	0.06120635	2	0	
Ahn Sang-soo	L	Incheon	Jung Dong Ganghwa Ongjin	12215	235239	0.05192591	4	-1	
Hong Il-pyo	L→B→L		Nam 1	8445	170406	0.04955811	3	1	
Yoon Sang-hyun	L		Nam 2	11051	184244	0.05998024	3	0	
Park Chan-dae	D		Yeonsu 1	8654	130725	0.06519953	3	4	
Min Kyung-wook	L		Yeonsu 2	12525	134734	0.09296095	4	0	
Park Nam-choon	D		Namdong 1	14452	214170	0.06747911	5	10	
Maeng Seoung-kyu	D								
Youn Kwan-suk	D		Namdong 2	14446	223046	0.06476691	3	8	
Jung Yu-seok	L		Bupyeong 1	12613	238764	0.05286222	6	-2	
Hong Young-pyo	D		Bupyeong 2	15701	211905	0.07409452	3	3	
Yu Dong-su	D		Gyeong 1	8956	125048	0.0716205	3	1	
Song Young-gil	D		Gyeong 2	9327	144421	0.06458202	3	1	
Lee Hag-jae	L→B→L		Seo 1	14165	203371	0.06965103	3	1	
Shin Dong-kun	D		Seo 2	16462	206877	0.07957385	3	1	
Chang Byoung-wan	P	Gwangju	Dong Nam 1	11164	134028	0.08329603	8	7	
Park Joo-sun	P→B		Dong Nam 2	6942	125997	0.05509655	28	2	
Song Gi-seok	P		Seo 1	9432	125432	0.07519612	9	0	
Song Gap-seok	D								
Chun Jung-hae	P		Seo 2	11518	121888	0.09449659	8	6	
Kim Gyeong-jin	P→I		Buk 1	9508	156423	0.0607839	8	4	
Choi Gyeong-hwan	P		Buk 2	18010	200782	0.08969928	8	5	
Kim Dong-cheol	P→B		Gwangsan 1	10811	134796	0.08020268	10	4	
Gwon Eun-hui	P→B		Gwangsan 2	19576	170572	0.11476678	9	1	
Lee Jang-woo	L	Daejeon	Dong	11619	192460	0.06037099	2	0	
Lee Eun-gwon	L		Jung	14025	206839	0.06780636	2	0	

Park Byeong-seog	D		Seo 1	15141	204688	0.07397112	3	2
Park Beom-kye	D		Seo 2	15471	189224	0.08176024	10	1
Jo Seung-rae	D		Yuseong 1	9156	142566	0.06422289	2	1
Lee Sang-min	D		Yuseong 2	12358	128985	0.09580959	3	2
Jeong Yong-ki	L		Dadeok	11270	154613	0.07289167	2	-1
Jeong Kab-yeon	L	Ulsan	Jung	12958	196657	0.06589137	0	0
Lee Chae-ik	L		Nam 1	11965	149365	0.08010578	1	0
Bak Maeng-woo	L		Nam 2	8619	126022	0.06839282	3	0
Kim Jong-hoon	I→M		Dong	8719	135890	0.06416219	0	4
Yoon Jong-oh	I→M		Buk	11999	155172	0.0773271	0	1
Lee Sang-heon	D							
Kang Ghil-boo	L→B→L		Ulju	13190	178169	0.07403084	0	0
Lee Hae-chan	D	Sejong		14969	210567	0.07108901	1	2
Lee Chan-yeol	L→B→L	Gyeonggi	Suwon 1	15673	202809	0.07727961	2	2
Baek Hye-ryun	D		Suwon 2	13428	195967	0.06852174	2	2
Kim Yeong-jin	D		Suwon 3	9593	164467	0.05832781	4	5
Park Kwang-on	D		Suwon 4					
Kim Jin-pyo	D		Suwon 5					
Kim Tae-nyeon	D		Seongnam					
Shin Sang-jin	L		Sujeong	10221	202546	0.05046261	1	2
Kim Byung-gwan	D		Jungwon	11116	195443	0.05687592	1	0
Kim Byung-uk	D		Bundang 1	16441	206177	0.07974216	1	6
Moon Hee-sang	D		Bundang 2	15272	195293	0.07820045	1	2
Hong Mun-jong	L→O		Uiyeongbu 1	9871	171166	0.05766916	2	1
Lee Jong-kul	D		Uiyeongbu 2	15409	192724	0.07995372	2	0
Lee Seok-hyun	D		Anyang	12497	216066	0.05788881	1	2
Shim Jae-chul	L		Manan	9940	145059	0.06852384	1	1
Kim Gyeong-hyeop	D		Dongan 1	11339	124167	0.09132056	1	-1
Sul Hoon	D		Dongan 2	7302	141909	0.05145551	2	4
Kim Sang-hee	D	Bucheon	Wonmi 1	15766	218394	0.07219063	2	2
Won Hye-young	D		Wonmi 2	11202	218394	0.05129262	2	5
Baek Jae-hyun	D		Sosa	10071	152536	0.06602376	2	4
Lee Jin-ju	D→P→B		Ojeong	7512	121685	0.06173316	1	5
Won Yoo-chul	L		Gwangmyeong 1	11605	148329	0.07823824	1	1
Yoo Ui-dong	L→B		Gwangmyeong 2	10753	149000	0.07216779	2	0
Kim Seong-won	L		Pyeongtaek 1	17175	237740	0.07224279	2	0
Jeon Hae-cheol	D		Pyeongtaek 2	7261	119000	0.06101681	1	0
Kim Cheol-min	D		Dongducheon Yeoncheon					
Kim Myung-yeon	L		Ansan	13554	170276	0.07960018	2	3
Park Sun-ja	L→B→L		Sangnok 1	9853	133815	0.07363151	2	1
Sim Sang-jung	J	Goyang 1	Sangnok 2	10157	135547	0.07493342	2	0
Jung Jae-ho	D	Goyang 2	Danwon 1	9724	114605	0.08484796	3	0
Yoo Eun-hae	D	Goyang 3	Danwon 2	18450	268444	0.06872942	2	28
Kim Hyun-mee	D	Goyang 4		7593	126015	0.06025473	2	2
Shin Chang-hyeon	D	Goyang 5		17126	233685	0.07328669	2	4
Yun Ho-jung	D	Gwangju		19749	222042	0.08894263	2	1
Cho Eung-chun	D	Uiwang Gwacheon		12429	175206	0.07093935	2	2
Kim Han-jeong	D	Guri		11414	163803	0.06968126	1	8
Joo Kwang-deok	L	Namyangju 1		13263	162768	0.08148408	1	1
An Min-suk	D	Namyangju 2		13926	188471	0.07388935	1	2
Ham Jin-kyu	L	Namyangju 3		12251	177778	0.06891179	1	-1
Cho Jeong-sik	D	Osan		12353	164626	0.07503675	1	2
Kim Jeong-woo	D	Siheung 1		14665	174040	0.08426224	1	0
Lee Hak-yeong	D	Siheung 2		11490	161638	0.07108477	1	2
Lee Hyun-jae	L	Gunpo 1		7383	114185	0.06465823	1	4
Lee Woo-hyun	L	Gunpo 2		8948	113951	0.07852498	2	1
Kim Min-gi	D	Hanam		10341	187871	0.05504309	1	1
Han Sun-kyo	L	Yongin 1		12907	188955	0.06830727	1	0
Pyo Chang-won	D	Yongin 2		13229	178614	0.07406474	1	2
Yoon Hu-duk	D	Yongin 3		18837	212321	0.08871944	1	0
Park Jeong	D	Yongin 4		17923	205554	0.08719363	1	12
Song Seok-jun	L	Paju 1		15620	192650	0.08107968	2	4
Kim Hak-yong	L→B→L	Paju 2		9425	154648	0.06094486	2	3
Kim Doo-kwan	D	Icheon		12541	170227	0.07367221	1	0
Hong Chul-ho	L→B→L	Anseong		10028	149052	0.06727853	1	1
Seo Chung-won	L→I	Gimpo 1		11479	151235	0.07590174	2	2
Lee Won-uk	D	Gimpo 2		8993	155079	0.05798898	2	0
Kwon Chil-seung	D	Hwaseong 1		9435	169222	0.0575516	2	0
So Byeong-hun	D	Hwaseong 2		15089	172688	0.08737724	3	1
Im Jong-seong	D	Hwaseong 3		14843	180773	0.0821085	2	2
Jung Sung-ho	D	Gwangju 1		8925	140670	0.06344636	1	6
Kim Young-woo	L→B→L	Gwangju 2		8128	140393	0.05789462	1	2
Choung Byoung-gug	L→B	Yangju		12660	170100	0.07442681	1	3
		Pocheon Gapyeong		11076	183092	0.06049418	3	0
		Yeouju Yangpyeong		10749	191871	0.05602201	2	2
Kim Jin-tae	L	Gangwon	Chuncheon	16268	230694	0.07051766	7	-1
Kim Ki-sun	L		Wonju 1	9187	135611	0.06774524	7	0
Song Ki-hun	D		Wonju 2	11252	141705	0.0794044	4	2
Kweon Seong-dong	L		Gangneung	11864	179736	0.06600792	1	-2
Lee Chul-gyu	L→B→L		Donghae Samcheok	8637	135272	0.06384913	0	0
Yeom Dong-yeol	L		Taebaek Hoengseong Yeongwol Pyeongchang Jeongseon	10077	185031	0.05446114	2	0
Lee Yang-su	L		Sokcho Goseong Yangyang	7210	118944	0.06061676	0	0
Hwang Young-cheul	L→B→L		Hongcheon Cheorwon Hwacheon Yanggu Inje	9648	168958	0.05710295	1	1
Chung Woo-taik	L	Chungbuk	Cheongju	10840	139460	0.0772838	9	0
Oh Jae-sae	D		Sangdam	13715	174761	0.07847861	3	3
Do Jong-hwan	D		Seowon	15212	203768	0.07465353	3	1
Byun Jae-il	D		Heungdeok	10264	152643	0.06724187	2	1
Lee Jong-bae	L		Cheongwon	11487	173813	0.06608827	2	0
Gwon Seok-chang	L		Chungju	8612	141270	0.06096128	1	0
Lee Hu-sam	D		Jecheon Danyang					

Park Deok-heum	L		Boeun Okcheon Yeongdong Goesan	7366	153979	0.04783769	1	-1
Kyung Dae-soo	L		Jeungpyeong Jincheon Eumseong	10363	172165	0.06019226	1	0
Park Chan-woo	L	Chungnam	Cheonan 1	9628	166617	0.05778522	5	0
Lee Gyu-hee	D							1
Park Wan-ju	D		Cheonan 2	15683	196173	0.07994474	3	5
Yang Seung-jo	D		Cheonan 3	12579	138779	0.09064051	3	2
Yun Il-gyu	D							
Chung Jin-suk	L		Gongju Buyeo Cheongyang	9787	182937	0.05349929	1	0
Kim Tae-heum	L		Boryeong Seocheon	8534	136160	0.06267626	1	0
Lee Myoung-soo	L		Asan 1	9541	125179	0.07621885	3	0
Kang Hun-sik	D		Asan 2	7583	117308	0.0646418	2	4
Sung Il-jong	L		Seosan Taeaen	12492	194140	0.06434532	2	-1
Kim Jong-min	D		Nonsan Gyeryong Geumsan	12426	183067	0.06787679	0	4
Eo Ki-kyu	D		Dangjin	8082	135292	0.05973746	3	3
Hong Moon-pyo	L→B→L		Hongseong Yesan	8801	154173	0.05708522	4	0
Kim Gwang-su	P	Jeonbuk	Jeonju 1	10935	146611	0.07458513	11	5
Chung Woon-chun	L→B		Jeonju 2	15958	169535	0.09412806	2	1
Chung Dong-young	P		Jeonju 3	16310	204256	0.07985078	2	9
Kim Kwan-young	P→B		Gunsan	15931	223306	0.07134157	6	9
Lee Choon-suak	D		Iksan 1	7013	119431	0.0587201	1	1
Cho Bae-sook	P		Iksan 2	10779	127664	0.08443257	1	3
You Sung-yop	P		Jeongeup Gochang	9403	148387	0.06326808	1	3
Lee Yong-ho	P→I		Namwon Imsil Sunchang	7033	121968	0.05766267	3	3
Kim Jong-hoe	P		Gimje Buan	6413	124095	0.05167815	3	3
An Ho-young	D		Wanju Jinan Muju Jangsu	7564	143216	0.05281533	2	1
Park Jie-won	P	Jeonnam	Mokpo	15225	186999	0.08141755	0	9
Lee Yong-ju	P		Yeosu 1	6982	116574	0.05989329	3	2
Joo Seung-yong	P		Yeosu 2	9792	118685	0.08250411	2	5
Lee Jung-hyun	L→I		Suncheon	18384	224182	0.0820048	0	-1
Son Kum-ju	P→D		Naju Hwasun	8370	146468	0.05714559	0	1
Jeong In-hwa	P→I		Gwangyang Gokseong Gurye	12658	174631	0.07248427	1	3
Lee Kai-ho	D		Damyang Hampyeong Yeonggwang Jangseong	7872	153484	0.05128873	1	1
Hwang Ju-hong	P		Goheung Boseong Jangheung Gangjin	7973	165070	0.04830072	1	3
Yoon Young-il	P		Haenam Wando Jindo	7184	135196	0.05313767	0	1
Park Jun-yeong	P		Yeongam Muan Sinan	8977	151348	0.05931363	0	1
Seo Sam-seok	D							
Kim Jeong-jae	L	Gyeongbuk	Pohang	15414	222587	0.06924933	2	0
Park Myung-jae	L							
Kim Seok-ki	L		Gyeongju	13178	218295	0.06036785	1	0
Lee Cheol-woo	L		Gimcheon	7107	119791	0.05932833	1	-1
Song Eon-seok	L							
Kim Kwang-lim	L		Andong	8411	139486	0.06029996	2	0
Baek Seung-joo	L		Gumi 1	15343	176777	0.08679297	4	0
Chang Seok-chun	L		Gumi 2	11409	154397	0.07389392	3	0
Choi Gyo-il	L		Yeongju Mungyeong Yecheon	11058	197292	0.0560489	1	0
Lee Man-hee	L		Yeongcheon Cheongdo	5482	127308	0.04306092	1	0
Kim Jong-tae	L		Sangju Gunwi Ulseong Cheongsong	7597	182244	0.04168587	1	0
Kim Jae-won	L							
Choi Kyoung-hwan	L		Gyeongsan	7597	182244	0.04168587	1	-1
Kang Seok-ho	L		Yeongsang Yeongdeok Bonghwa Uljin	13087	215007	0.06086779	1	0
Yi Wan-young	L		Goryeong Seongju Chilgok	5662	123091	0.04599849	1	0
				9541	167539	0.05694793	1	0
Park Wan-su	L	Gyeongnam	Changwon	14149	209198	0.06763449	31	0
Roh Hoe-chan	J							
Yeo Yeong-gug	J		Seongsan	15729	183250	0.08583356	19	10
Lee Ju-young	L							
Yoon Han-hong	L		Masanhappo	8348	154027	0.05419829	14	0
Kim Sung-chan	L		Masanhoewon	11286	168692	0.06690299	14	0
Park Dae-chul	L		Jinhae	10778	148455	0.07260112	13	1
Kim Jae-kyung	L→B→L		Jinju 1	11175	149892	0.07455368	14	0
Lee Gun-hyeon	L→B→L		Jinju 2	9388	131912	0.07116866	17	0
Jeong Jeom-sik	L		Tongyeong Goseong	9573	157514	0.06077555	15	0
Yeo Sang-gyu	L→B→L		Sacheon Namhae Hadong	9545	177414	0.05380071	15	0
Min Hong-chul	D		Gimhae 1	16957	227872	0.07441458	13	1
Kim Kyung-soo	D		Gimhae 2	18289	190244	0.09613444	14	1
Kim Jeong-ho	D							
Um Yong-su	L		Miryang Uiryeong Haman Changnyeong	12055	231174	0.05214687	14	0
Kim Han-pyo	L		Geoje	15346	195466	0.07850982	13	0
Yoon Young-suk	L		Yangsan 1	8781	140382	0.06255075	13	0
Seo Hyoung-soo	D		Yangsan 2	9275	130217	0.07122726	13	2
Kang Seok-jin	L		Sancheong Hamyang Geochang Hapcheon	8254	162607	0.05076042	15	0
Kang Chang-il	D	Jeju	Jeju 1	15487	198688	0.07794633	15	2
Oh Young-hun	D		Jeju 2	14325	180929	0.0791747	18	1
Wi Seong-gon	D		Seogwipo	9359	146722	0.0637873	8	5
Park Kyung-mi	D	Proportional Rep.		2808136	42678353	0.06579767	48	2
Kim Chong-in	D							0
Song Ok-ju	D							2
Choi Woon-yeol	D							2
Lee Jae-jeong	D							14
Kim Hyun-kwon	D							2
Moon Mi-ok	D							1
Lee Chul-hee	D							5
Je Youn-kyung	D							6
Kim Sung-soo	D							1
Kwon Mi-hyuk	D							2
Lee Yong-deuk	D							2
Jung Choun-sook	D							7

Shim Gi-jun	D	1
Lee Su-hyeok	D	1
Jung Eun-hye	D	1
Song Hee-kyung	L	0
Lee Jong-myung	L	0
Lim Lee-ja	L	0
Moon Jin-guk	L	0
Choi Yeon-hye	L	0
Kim Gyu-hwan	L	0
Shin Bo-ra	L	1
Kim Sung-tae	L	0
Jeon Hee-gyeong	L	0
Kim Jong-suk	L	0
Kim Seung-hee	L	0
Yoo Min-bong	L	0
Yun Jong-pil	L	0
Cho Hoon-hyun	L	0
Kim Sun-rye	L	0
Kang Hyo-sang	L	0
Kim Hyun-ah	L	0
Shin Yong-hyeon	P	0
Oh Se-jung	P	1
Park Joo-hyun	P	3
Lee Sang-don	P	2
Park Sun-sook	P	1
Chae Yi-bae	P	5
Kim Su-min	P	-1
Lee Tae-gyu	P	-1
Kim San-hwa	P	0
Kim Jung-ro	P	-1
Chang Jeong-suk	P	6
Lee Dong-seop	P	2
Choi Do-ja	P	3
Lim Jae-hoon	P	1
Lee Jung-mi	J	11
Kim Jong-dae	J	4
Chu Hye-seon	J	4
Yun So-ha	J	7

Appendix B: Original Korean

Search Keywords

청소년 시위 Youth Protest

청소년 집회 Youth Rally

중/고등학생 시위 Middle / High School Student Protest

청소년 참여 Youth Involvement

청소년 단체 Youth Organization

Lawmaker Remarks

“그리고 실제로 거기 나와서 많은 문제 제기를 하는 우리 청년들, 18 세 이하의 학생들조차도 저보다 훨씬 나은 것 같아요, 학생들의 그 발언 내용이나 행동하는 거나 이런 것을 보면.”

“The questions raised by the youths [at protests], their speech and act are even better than mine.”

“촛불광장에서 우리 청소년들은 충분히 시민적 능력을 증명했다.”

“Youths have enough proven their civic capacity at the vigil.”

“이 법안은 국민의 참정권 확대를 위한 법안이다. 선거 룰을 대하듯 정치적 유불리를 따져 반대할 내용이 아니다.”

“This bill is about suffrage. This is not something you oppose because of your political interests, as if it is a change to a random election rule.”

Interview Questions and Responses

대한민국 국회 심상정 의원실 귀중

안녕하세요, 저는 미시간 대학교에서 “청소년 참여와 선거연령: 대한민국을 중심으로”를 주제로 졸업논문을 쓰고 있는 조성민이라고 합니다. 전대 국회에서 선거연령 하향 법안들을 꾸준히 지지하신 의원님께 몇 가지 질문을 여쭙고자 연락을 드립니다. 간단한 서면 인터뷰에 응해주실 수 있으시다면 회신해주시면 감사하겠습니다.

Hello, I am Sungmin Cho, a University of Michigan student writing a political science thesis “Youth Involvement and Voting Age: Evidence from South Korea.” Since you had advocated the bills lowering the voting age, I am reaching out to ask questions regarding this issue. If you are willing to participate in a short written interview, please feel free to respond to this email.

1. 선거권이 없는 청소년도 유권자로 생각하십니까? 만약 그렇다면 이유는 무엇입니까?

1. Do you consider youths (minors) as your constituents? Why or why not?

선거권이 없는 청소년은 법적으로 유권자는 아닙니다. 다만 이들도 예비 유권자이자 미래 유권자로서 앞 세대나 교사의 개입 없이 자치 조직을 결성하고 운영할 수 있는 잠재력을 갖추고 있습니다. 그런 잠재력이 발휘될 수 있도록 사회와 앞 세대가 지원해야 합니다. 이들도 학교 학생회 등을 통해 학생 자치를 경험하고, 학교 운영에 참여할 수 있어야 합니다. 민주주의의 기본 원칙은 자신이 속한 공동체의 운영에 구성원 모두가 참여하는 것이고, 그것을 청소년기부터 익히는 것이 미래의 적극적인 유권자가 되는 첫걸음입니다.

Legal minors are not constituents. However, as future constituents, they possess the potential to organize independently from the older generation or teachers. The older generation and society in general should encourage them to develop such potential.

Youths have to be able to experience student autonomy through student governments and participate in administrative activities. The basic principle of democracy is everyone engaging in the operation of their own communities, and actively participating from adolescence is the first step toward becoming an active future constituent.

2. 선거연령 하향을 지지하신 이유는 무엇입니까?

2. What were your reasons behind advocating the voting age bills?

저는 2017년 대선에 출마해 만 18세로 선거연령을 하향해야 한다고 역설했습니다. 그 이유는 다음과 같습니다. 첫째, 만 18세가 되면 국방, 납세, 근로, 교육의 의무가

부과되지만 참정권은 인정받지 못합니다. 이것은 의무와 권리의 비례원칙에 맞지 않습니다. 둘째, 청소년보호법은 18 세를 보호대상에서 제외하고, 병역법과 공무원 임용 시험령은 병역의무와 공무원임권을 부여하고 있는데 참정권은 부여하지 않았습니다. 이는 법규정의 일관성에도 어긋나는 일이었습니다. 셋째, 18 세 청소년에게 선거권을 주지 않는 것은 18 세의 정치적 권리를 침해하는 것은 물론이고 한국 민주주의의 발전에도 도움이 되지 않는다고 생각했습니다. 저희는 선거권과 피선거권의 확대야말로 민주주의 발전의 기본 조건이라고 생각합니다. 넷째, 고령화 시대에 노인인구의 과잉 대표와 청소년 인구의 과소 대표로 인한 세대불균형도 해소해야 한다고 생각했습니다.

As a presidential candidate in the 2017 election, I advocated that the voting age should be lowered to 18. Here's why. First, the duties of national defense, taxation, labor, and education are conferred upon 18th birthday, but not the political rights. Such a discrepancy violates the principle of proportionality of duties and rights. Second, the Youth Protection Act excludes 18-year-olds from youths. The Military Service Act and the Decree on Public Officials Appointment Examination respectively confer the obligation of military service and the right to hold public offices. Their disenfranchisement was also inconsistent with the existing laws. Third, disenfranchising the 18-year-olds not only infringes on their political rights but also undermines the advancement of our democracy. We think that the expansion of rights to vote and run for offices are the basic conditions of democratic advancement. Lastly, we thought that the overrepresentation of the old population and the underrepresentation of the youth population also had to be addressed, in light of aging South Korea today.

3. 집회 참가 등 청소년의 사회 참여가 활발할 때마다 어떤 경로로 이것을 알게 되셨습니까?
3. Through what channel did you learn about youth involvement, whenever prevalent?

저도 한때 청소년을 자녀로 둔 어른입니다. 미래 세대는 사회 변화를 위한 참신한 아이디어의 원천이고 사회 변화의 추진력 자체입니다. 정의당이 관계를 맺어온 다양한 청소년 단체들과 개인들, 제가 4선 국회의원으로 활동해오면서 지속적으로 관계를 맺어온 청소년 단체들과 개인들, 제 지역구인 덕양구의 다양한 청소년 단체들과 개인들로부터 청소년 세계를 배우고 이해할 수 있었습니다. 그들과 접하면서 세대 간의 차이와 소통 방법에 대해 배워왔습니다. 이런 네트워크를 통해 청소년들의 사회참여와 정치참여와 관련한 다양한 정보를 접해왔고, 이런 사회참여와 정치참여의 활성화 방안에 대해 같이 고민해왔습니다.

My son was once a youth as well. The future generation is the pool of fresh ideas for reforms and the momentum of social change by itself. [I] was able to learn and understand the world of youths from the various youth organizations and individuals the Justice Party and I have been interacting with as a fourth-term National Assembly member, and in my constituency Deogyang.¹ Interacting with them, I have learned about the generational differences and ways to communicate. Such networks provided diverse information on youth involvement, and I have been working together with them to further promote youth involvement.

4. 사회에 참여하는 청소년과 어떤 교류를 하셨습니까?

4. How had you communicated with youths that were involved in social movements?

제 의원실과 제 지역 사무소로 다양한 청소년 단체들과 개인들이 여러 사안들과 관련해서, 요청을 보내옵니다. 청소년 선거권 단체, 청소년 환경 단체, 청소년 인권 단체, 청소년 이주노동자 지원 단체, 청소년 노동권 단체 등등 여러 단체들이 저의 의견을 묻기도 하고, 자신들의 요구사항을 전하기도 하고, 자신들의 활동에 대한 지지를 요청하기도 합니다.

청소년 개인이 직접 메일이나 편지를 보내거나 저의 사무실을 직접 방문해서 자신들의 제안을 전하기도 합니다.

A wide variety of youth organizations and individuals contact my National Assembly and district offices regarding many issues. The youth suffrage organizations, youth-led environmental organizations, youth rights organizations, youth-led immigrant support groups, and youth labor rights organizations ask for my opinion, exert their opinion, and ask for my support. Youth individuals sometimes email or mail me or visit my offices with their suggestions.

5. 청소년의 사회 참여가 선거연령 하향에 대한 생각에 어떤 영향을 주었습니까?

5. How had youth involvement influenced your thoughts on lowering the voting age?

청소년의 사회참여와 정치참여는 선거연령 하향에 아주 큰 영향을 미쳤습니다. 지금의 40 대와 50 대 성인들은, 자신들이 청소년이었던 80 년대 후반기와 90 년대 전반기에 고등학교 학생회를 자율적으로 구성하고, 학생회를 직접 운영해본 첫 번째 세대입니다. 87년 민주화 이후에 민주주의가 사회적으로 확산되어가는 데 기여한 세대인 것입니다. 이들은 한국 민주주의의 지지기반이자, 청소년들의 사회참여와 정치참여에 대한 강력한 지지세력이기도 합니다. 현재의 청소년들도 2016년 말과 2017년 초의 촛불 혁명에 직접 참여하거나 강력한 지지를 보냈습니다. 그들의 사회참여가 결국 18세로 선거연령을 하향하는 데 결정적으로 기여했습니다.

Youth involvement significantly affected the lowering of the voting age. South Koreans in their 40s and 50s are the first generation that ran the autonomously organized student governments from the late 1980s to the early 1990s when they were youths themselves. They contributed to the spread of democracy to the entire society after the democratization in 1987. They are the bedrock of South Korean democracy and youth

involvement. Youths today also directly participated in or sent strong support to the 2016-2017 vigils. Their involvement eventually contributed to lowering the voting age in a decisive manner.

6. 제 19~20 대 국회에서 발의된 선거연령 하향 법안 20 건 중 마지막인 2019 년 안만 유일하게 본회의를 통과했습니다. 당시 통과를 이끌어낸 특수한 요인이 무엇이라고 생각하십니까?

6. Among the 20 voting age bills introduced by the 19th and 20th National Assembly, only the final 2019 bill passed. What do you think were the factors that led to the passage?

저와 정의당은 2000 년 창당 이래로 일관되게 선거연령 하향을 주장해왔습니다. 그런데 2019 년 말에 선거연령 하향에 관한 법이 통과된 것에는 두 가지 이유가 있습니다. 첫째, 국민들이 선거연령 하향에 대해 높은 지지를 보냈다는 것입니다. 당시 국민들의 지지가 높았던 이유는 무엇보다도 촛불 혁명 때문이었습니다. 국민들의 정치적 관심이 매우 높아졌고, 당사자인 청소년들의 사회와 정치에 대한 관심도 높았기 때문에 보수정당의 반대를 극복하고 법안을 통과시킬 수 있었습니다. 둘째, 2018 년과 2019 년 동안에 제가 국회 정치개혁특별위원회의 위원장을 맡았기 때문이었습니다. 정의당 소속 의원이 국회에서 상설위원회나 특별위원회의 위원장을 맡은 것은 그것이 처음이자 마지막이었습니다. 당시 저는 정치학자들과 청소년단체들과의 긴밀한 네트워크를 만들고, 전국적인 선거연령하향 캠페인에 동참했습니다. 국회 내에서는 특별위원회 위원장이었지만, 정의당은 당시 전체 300 석 가운데 6 석의 소수 의석 정당에 불과했습니다. 따라서 국회에서 부족한 정치적 힘을 국회 밖의 국민들의 지지로 보완해야 했습니다.

The Party and I had consistently demanded to lower the voting age ever since it was founded in 2000. But there are two main reasons the bill was passed in late 2019. First, the public support toward lowering the voting age was high. This was due to the 2016-

2017 vigils. Because the general public as well as the youths (*dangsaja*) had become extremely politically active, we were able to pass it despite the conservative resistance. Second, I was the Special Committee on Political Reform Chair between 2018 and 2019. This was the first and last time a Justice Party member chaired a committee, special or standing. At that time, I built a close network with political scientists and youth organizations and joined the nationwide campaign to lower the voting age. Although I was the Chair of a special committee, Justice Party had only six seats. Therefore, we had to complement the lacking political party within the National Assembly with the extra-legislative support from the general public.

Notes

Introduction

1. Unlike most political science literature that defines youths as young adults, typically in their early twenties, youth in this study always refers to anyone below the voting age. This study concerns genuinely spontaneous, politically active youths.
2. Unlike the US, the voting age is determined by a statute called the Public Official Election Act in South Korea. The South Korean Constitution once stipulated voting age, but the 1987 amendment which stands as of December 2019 excluded this clause (NLIC 1960). This conferred the authority to set the voting age to the statutory level.
3. Contemporary South Korean names will be written in the original order, the family name followed by the hyphenated given name, which is now conventional for English speakers. This does not apply to the bibliography and some exceptions.
4. The term “lawmaker” is intended to translate *gukhoe-uiwon* [National Assembly member], suited to reflect the unicameral characteristics. Besides when it concerns distinct South Korean contexts, this study uses political terms that are most familiar to English speakers.
5. The Republic of Korea does not officially endorse the prevalent English name “South Korea” because Article 3 of the Constitution recognizes that the territory “shall consist of the Korean peninsula and its adjacent islands.” The name “South Korea” implicitly legitimizes North Korea, which is an unconstitutional institution. However, this study uses this name which is familiar to English speakers.

I. Background

1. While this is about the National Assembly election, a similar change was adopted to the gubernatorial level two years earlier, due to 2000HeonMa91, 112, 134; Supreme Court (2001)

that struck down the previous one-person-one-vote principle. This is neither the most recent version: the National Assembly election moved to quasi-mixed-member in 2020.

2. Then Unified Progressive Party. The Constitutional Court of Korea disbanded the UPP in 2014 over its pro-North Korea scandal. Some UPP lawmakers retired, others joined the Minjung Party, and the others joined the Justice Party, which was the mainstream. Therefore, this study considers that Justice de facto succeeded the UPP.

3. Then Democratic United Party. Name changes are very frequent among South Korean political parties. For the sake of brevity, this study addresses parties based on their names on December 27, 2019, when the voting age bill eventually passed.

4. Then Saenuri, the majority party controlling both the presidency and the National Assembly.

5. Democrats were divided into largely two wings: pro-Kim Dae-jung and pro-Roh Moo-hyun, of which leaders respectively served as the 15th and 16th Presidents of South Korea. The pro-Roh wing had been the Democratic mainstream since the Roh Administration (2003). The pro-Kim wing is associated with Honam, the southwestern region including Jeollabuk-do, Jeollanam-do, and Gwangju (Kang and Bae 2018). Their support for Democrats, however, has to do with the backlash against the authoritarian vestige in the LKP rather than ideology: the military regime had historically excluded Honam from development and violently oppressed its democratization movements. People's provided a centrist alternative and focused on Honam's regional interest.

6. Then Bareun.

7. This is the point where Saenuri changed its name to LKP. This, however, did not make the LKP solely pro-Park. The LKP remained neutral, and a few extremist lawmakers left to found their own pro-Park party, which was too insignificant to be relevant to this study.

8. In fact, People's and Bareun merged to the BMP, and the pro-Kim minority left to found the Party for Democracy and Peace. However, since the PDP is the ideological continuity of People's, this study concisely explains that the People's mainstream joined the BMP, and People's persisted.

9. All 20 voting age bills were introduced by lawmakers, not the government.

II. Lowering the Voting Age

1. Then Democratic Liberal Party.

2. While the English term “bipartisan” refers to two parties in accord, the Anglo-American two-party context implies that the more comprehensive meaning should be *all* parties in accord. The term “bipartisan” here is intended to translate a Korean term *chodang* [beyond partisanship], which is a more accurate usage referring to the situation which requires consensus of more than two parties.

III. Youth Involvement in Social Movements

1. The term “modern” refers to the post-medieval time period as a whole, not limited to the current South Korean regime or the post-1987 liberal democracy.

2. His name is written in the common English order since he was known to the Western world before the establishment of the Romanization of Korean.

3. This study adopts the Revised Romanization of Korean released by the South Korean government in 2000. Revised Romanization allows exceptions for names.

IV. Across-time Study

1. For instance, a 3.1 memorial event does not count as a social movement by itself, but it does once it contains a political statement regarding diplomacy.

V. Across-politician Study

1. Unlike the US, South Korean lawmakers lose their party membership upon their internal election to the National Assembly Speaker although they typically remain partisan. Chung Sye-kyun was technically an independent at the time, but this study disregards this temporary change.

Appendix

1. Her constituency during the 19th National Assembly term Deogyang 1 was redistricted to Goyang 1 prior to the 20th National Assembly election.

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