Protest Mobilization, Concessions, and Policy Change in Autocracies

by

Sasha de Vogel

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Doctoral Committee:

Professor Pauline Jones, Chair
Professor Mary Gallagher
Professor Anne Pitcher
Professor Dan Slater

Sasha de Vogel

sldv@umich.edu

ORCID iD: 0000-0003-1612-5206

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF APPENDICES

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACLED: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data
KPRF: Communist Party of the Russian Federation
MGU: *Moskovskiy gosudarstvennyy universitet imeni M. V. Lomonosova* (Moscow State University)
MM: Mass Mobilization Protest Data Project
NAVCO: Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes
PCoM: Protest Campaigns of Moscow Database
RWP: Revolutionary Workers' Party RFE/RL: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
UR: United Russia
V-Dem: Varieties of Democracy

ABSTRACT

Concessions are the crucially important benefits that individuals seek when they decide to participate in collective action, yet they are poorly understood. In particular, it remains unclear why authoritarian governments, which rely on coercion to maintain control, promise concessions to protests that do not pose a revolutionary threat, despite the frequency with which this occurs. Even less is understood about the extent to which those promises are fulfilled once protest ends. In this dissertation, I advance our understanding of when protest campaigns achieve the promise of concessions from autocratic governments and when those promises produce real-world policy change. To do so, I address three questions: (1) Under what conditions do autocratic governments concede to protesters' demands?; (2) How do concessions affect mobilization? and (3) How does reneging occur and how does it affect protest campaigns?

In Chapter 2, I provide an original conceptualization of concessions that defines concessions as a response to collective action that occurs when an agent of authority makes a public commitment to initiate a policy change that will potentially yield some benefit to protesters. I establish concessions as a process of policy change, rather than an instantaneous event. The lags in this process can allow for the government to renege, or deliberately fail to implement the promised concession. Though previously overlooked, reneging is a key element of how authoritarian governments use concessions, particularly given the weakness of commitment mechanisms in these settings. To understand how concessions are used, I shift focus from commonly-studied revolutionary protest campaigns to what I call everyday protest campaigns, which driven by policy-specific demands.

Chapter 3 covers my novel approach to collecting quantitative data on concessions. I also present my original database, the Protest Campaigns of Moscow database, which contains data about everyday protest campaigns operating in Moscow, Russia, from 2013-2018, that made demands of the local government.

I present empirical analysis in chapters four through six. In Chapter 4, I consider the conditions under which the Moscow government responds to protest with concessions and repression. I find that when everyday protest campaigns convey new information about grievances to the government, repression is less severe, concessions are common and reneging is rare. In contrast, when the government has sufficient information to anticipate protest, it deploys more severe repression and reneging is common. I illustrate these campaign types with empirical examples, and use regression

analysis to test hypotheses.

In Chapter 5 I motivate new theories about the link between concessions and demobilization. I find strong evidence that these concessions are associated with an immediate decline in mobilization, and that concessions are more demobilizing than detentions. This association is stronger when concessions correspond more closely to the campaign's core demands. This demobilizing effect also appears conditioned on the campaign event history prior to the concession, which is in turn likely tied to the government's motivations in making concessionary promises.

Chapter 6 focuses on reneging. In most cases, reneging is immediate and the concession is never implemented. To illuminate this dynamic, I present a case study of the protest campaign to prevent construction near a park. Last, I analyze interviews that I conducted with urban activists in Moscow in 2018 and 2019 to demonstrate that they largely distrust the Moscow government and see its promises as a manipulation, though they believe the general public feels differently.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

> Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did and it never will. Find out just what any people will quietly submit to, and you have found out the exact amount of injustice and wrong which will be imposed upon them.
> — *Frederick Douglass, An Address on West India Emancipation, 1857*

> My overall opinion on people's problems is that one must always aspire to help them. The reason the state exists is to help people.
> — *Vladimir Putin, Direct Line with Vladimir Putin, 2015*

Concessions are the crucially important benefits that individuals seek when they decide to participate in collective action. For citizens and other subjects of authoritarian rule, this decision requires more than just a consideration of time, money and resources: would-be protesters must weigh the risk that they will experience repression against the likelihood that they will win a concession. Yet despite the importance of concessions to the dynamics of contention, they are poorly understood. In particular, it remains unclear why authoritarian governments, which rely on coercion to maintain control, promise concessions to protests that do not pose a revolutionary threat, despite the frequency with which this occurs. Even less is understood about the extent to which those promises are fulfilled once protest ends.

This gap in knowledge persists for three reasons. The first is selection bias: Most studies of protest select cases of exceptionally large, politically threatening movements that are unlikely to receive concessions. The second is focus: Repression is the state response that yields the greatest interest, given its potentially severe consequences and its intersection with human rights. The third concerns data limitations: Concessions are largely unobserved in the daily news reports typically

1

used to compile protest datasets. As a result, there has also been insufficient attention to the long-term implications of concessions for policy change, and we know little about the true impact of collective action in authoritarian settings.

This dissertation addresses this gap. In doing so, it makes three important contributions. First, I provide a robust and original conceptualization of concessions that takes into account the real-world possibility of reneging. I define concessions as a response to collective action that occurs when an agent of authority makes a public commitment to initiate a policy change that will potentially yield some benefit to protesters. Further, I establish concessions as a process of policy change that takes place over time, rather than an instantaneous event. The lag between when the concession is promised and the realization of policy change can allow for the government to *renege*, which I define as deliberately failing to fulfill the promised concession. Though previously overlooked, reneging is a key element of how authoritarian governments use concessions, as this strategy allows them to demobilize protest without truly submitting to protesters' demands.

Second, to understand how concessions are used, I shift focus from commonly-studied revolutionary protest campaigns to what I call *everyday protest campaigns.* Everyday protest campaigns are policy-driven. They arise in response to a policy grievance—an issue with a rule, law, regulation, program or enforcement decision issued by the government— and their demands pertain to policy changes that would redress that grievance. Everyday protest campaigns therefore stand in contrast to revolutionary protest campaigns, which pertain to regime change or other major social, economic or political transformations. Because everyday protests are not existentially threatening, the regime has a reduced need to rely on repression and can respond with concessions, if desired. Thus, while everyday protests provide insight into a lesser studied yet common form of contention, they are also an optimal case for studying the dynamics of concessions.

Third, I develop a systematic and replicable approach to compiling data on concessions. Until now, scholars studying protest politics have lacked comprehensive quantitative data on concessions. For my analysis, I piloted a method to collect this information. I collected an original database focused on protest campaigns against the government of Moscow, Russia, from 2013-

2018, from online Russian-language sources. This database consists of three interrelated datasets of protest campaigns, the individual protest events those campaigns organized, and the concessions those campaigns were promised. To catalogue and track concessions, I created an original strategy to consistently identify the issuance of a concessionary promise, rate its quality, and evaluate its implementation over the longer term.

This introductory chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, I begin by elaborating on everyday protests. I then review why autocratic response to these types of campaigns, especially the use of concessions, constitutes a puzzle, and briefly summarize my theoretical intervention. The remainder of the chapter establishes scope conditions for this study and justifying why Moscow, Russia, is an appropriate case for this study.

1.1 Everyday Protest

Everyday protest campaigns are a form of protest campaign[1] that originates around a specific policy grievance[2] and make demands related to that policy grievance. These campaigns may ask that the government intervene to enforce the rights of protesters, provide them with services, or incorporate their opinions into its programs. This focus on *how state power is used* distinguishes everyday protest campaigns from revolutionary campaigns that are concerned with *the existence of state power, who wields it and why.* Revolutionary protests are inherently ideological: their grievance is the existence of the regime and their core demand is regime change. In keeping with this, revolutionary protests may not be tied to specific policies or even a particular precipitating event. In contrast, everyday protests often center on social or economic grievances, the extent to which they are politicized varies. Everyday protest can also emerge against policies that are

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[1]Per Tilly (2004, 3), a campaign is a "sustained, organized public effort making collective claims on target authorities," that links a group of claimants (protesters), the object of their claim and a public. A protest campaign is lower capacity and more limited in scope than a social movement.

[2]It is well-established that grievances alone, also known as the relative deprivation hypothesis (Gurr, 1970) are insufficient to explain the emergence of mobilization, see e.g. McCarthy and Zald (1977); Tilly (1978); Skocpol (1979); McAdam et al. (1996). Explaining how mobilization happens or when protest emerges is beyond the scope of the present work.

political in the sense that they pertain to individual freedoms, the use of state power, national identity, corruption and so on. However, when everyday protest campaigns challenge political policies, the focus remains on policy change, rather than revolutionary transformation or other ideological goals. As a result, political everyday protest campaigns are more likely to focus on a lower-level or local manifestation of political power, as campaigns that are national in target and scale usually have revolutionary aims.

The everyday protest distinction is not founded on the politically moderate attitudes of participants. It is common in studies of revolutionary conflict and collective action to identify organizers as radicals and others as moderates (for instance Lichbach, 1998; DeNardo, 1985; Bueno de Mesquita, 2010). Everyday protesters may be radical critics of the regime, or they may be regime supporters who simply object to the actions of a particular official and do not see their demands as political. Often, anti-regime politics are not incorporated into the campaign's framing or demands. This can be strategic, to avoid attracting the ire of the government, but not necessarily. After all, the resolution of policy grievances requires that the government retain the power to determine policy, at least in the short-term. Everyday protest campaigns are also not distinguished by moderate tactics: everyday protesters may use more confrontational tactics, like blockades and hunger strikes, than many oppositionists would dare.

This policy focus renders everyday protest campaigns inherently unlikely to existentially threaten the regime. That existential threat is further checked by the fact that the pool of potential everyday protesters is often limited to individuals affected by the policy grievance. For instance, a policy might only affect residents of a certain neighborhood or members of a certain professional group. Thus, although their policy grievances may be legible to a wider sympathetic audience, the risk that an everyday protest could escalate into a broad-based campaign is low.[3]

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[3]Some everyday protest campaigns do scale into broader movements. A notable example is the movement to defend Istanbul's Taksim Gezi Park in 2013, which escalated into a national conflict marked by extreme state violence. Solidarity protests supporting prominent campaigns in other cities occur with some regularity in Russia, the case I consider here. However, these are exceptional cases that are unusually visible to observers, rather than the norm. For example, of the 66 everyday protest campaigns in Moscow that I collected data on, none of the neighborhood-level campaigns attracted significant turnout at their events from participants not directly affected by the grievance. The campaigns that drew support from across the city were mainly against policies that affected upwards of tens of thousands of people from dozens of neighborhoods simultaneously, for example a new housing tax or the implementation

1.2 The Puzzle of Authoritarian Response to Everyday Protest

If everyday protests have both limited intent and limited ability to existentially threaten the regime, as revolutionary protests do, how should the regime react to them? While ignoring protests (Bishara, 2015) or delaying response (Chen, 2012) are strategic options, the regime's repertoire is commonly understood to include two approaches: repression and concession.

The strategic use of repression is founded in the fact that protests in general are undesirable to authoritarian regimes. Frantz and Kendall-Taylor (2014) demonstrate that popular revolution is an increasingly common avenue by which autocrats leave office, and some of these originate as everyday protests. Repression is often seen as the first line of defense against protest, given that it is inherent to autocracies (Wintrobe, 1998; Escribà-Folch, 2013), and it is consistently observed to increase in response to dissent (Davenport, 2007a). But cracking down on less threatening protest can create the appearance of weakness on the part of the regime, and repressing "average citizens"—like those who often make up the ranks of everyday protests—can increase dissent (Francisco, 1995; Rasler, 1996). On the local level where everyday protests often originate, control over the repressive apparatus may be less uncertain (Earl, 2011). That can lead to the use of "softer" forms of repression that are easier to control (Fu, 2018), or the use of non-state actors to execute it, which can undermine state legitimacy (Ong, 2018).

On the other hand, the regime can respond to protests with concessions, but the costs and benefits of doing so are unclear. Concessions are conventionally associated with the cooptation of regime challengers, most often through sharing spoils, redistribution or patronage (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010), or via incorporation into authoritarian institutions such as legislatures (Lust-Okar, 2005; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007). Lipsky (1968) classifies such concessions as protest bargaining, and underscores that they can only occur when the protesters have political resources the government wants. Everyday protest campaigns would therefore appear poor candidates for such bargaining, given that they are may have few political resources at their disposal and are only sometimes organized by political parties. In fact, the political representation that

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of paid street parking in residential neighborhoods.

cooptation can entail often falls beyond the bounds of their demands: these protesters want the government to change a policy, not to join the government and change it themselves.

If everyday protest campaigns are offered concessions, the question remains as to how those concessions impact the underlying policy grievance over the longer term. For the most part, concessions cannot be accomplished instantly. They characteristically entail policy changes or bureaucratic procedures that take days, if not weeks or months, to accomplish. This means, as I will argue, that concessions are subject to a credible commitment problem. The credible commitment problem arises when actors must be bound to agreements over time when incentives vary over time (North, 1993). If incentives change, fulfilling that agreement may no longer be in one actor's interest.

Credible commitment problems are especially common in autocracies, due to the weakness of enforcement mechanisms external to actors who must be bound by agreements, and the imbalance of coercive power between actors. Credible commitment problems have largely been identified in the autocrat's relations with the elites whose support he requires to retain power, but who lose the power to constrain him once they furnish that support (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Myerson, 2008; Magaloni, 2008; Svolik, 2012). Institutions are seen as the solution to this problem, by ensuring elites retain some ability to compel the autocrat (e.g. North and Weingast, 1989; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009; Magaloni and Kricheli, 2010; Boix and Svolik, 2013; Brancati, 2014).

But the credible commitment problem that arises in response to popular protest differs significantly from that with elites. First, elites have inherent structural power—the very thing that makes them elites also means that the autocrat requires their support. In contrast, an autocrat does not require popular support from the masses, because he is not elected, and only with extraordinary effort can they remove him from office. Second, the exclusive nature of elite status allows elites to coordinate at comparatively low cost (Olson, 1965), which for citizens at large, the coordination of mobilization is costly, fleeing and sporadic. Successful collective action today is no guarantee of successful collective action tomorrow, as Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) have famously

6

noted. In their model of democratization, the masses recognize their limited capacity to organize over the long term and the lack of incentives for elites to follow through on their promises of redistribution—in other words, a concession. The masses therefore demand democratic institutions to ensure that those promises are fulfilled. While Acemoglu and Robinson recognize part of the credible commitment problem, they fail to observe that the establishment of institutions is a slow, frequently elite-driven process that is rife with opportunities for reneging. in fact, the agreement to establish these institutions can also be a concessionary promise that may or may not be fulfilled.

It is clear, then, that promises made to protesters lack inherent credibility in autocracies and reneging is possible. Moreover, reneging may make concessions a potentially optimal strategy for autocrats in some settings. Reneging can allow them to reap the benefits of appearing conciliatory without having to implement undesirable policy changes. Yet at the same time, if reneging is prevalent, concessions should be wary of concessions, and they should be less effective at demobilizing protest. Understanding this dimension of concessions is essential to understanding the extent to which everyday protesters can compel non-consultative governments to incorporate their views into policy.

In this dissertation, I advance our understanding of when protest campaigns achieve the promise of concessions from autocratic governments and when those promises produce real-world policy change. To do so, I address three questions: (1) Under what conditions do autocratic governments concede to protesters' demands?; (2) How do concessions affect mobilization? and (3) How does reneging occur and how does it affect protest campaigns?

1.3   Taking Concessions Seriously

To answer these questions, I argue that concessions are far more than a simplistic victory for protesters. Just as repression can, concessions encourage or inhibit mobilization, and reinforce or undermine regime stability. In the first of three empirical chapters, I adopt the perspective of the authoritarian regime to examine how the same institutional processes that produce the pol-

7

icy grievances that catalyze everyday protest, also shape how the government responds to those protests. The government's reaction to protest is determined by, first, whether the grievance emerged against a policy that the government was actively modifying, and second, the level of information available to the government about popular opinion related to that policy.

Variation in these institutional factors produces two ideal types of everyday protest campaigns. First, some everyday protests provide a forum for citizens to provide feedback about policies to the government, where institutionalized methods for collecting such information are weak, misused or absent. These campaigns simultaneously constitute a venue in which the government can respond to that feedback and use concessions to bring policies in line with popular needs or respond to other deficiencies that could create longer-term problems. A similar informational role has been attributed to protests in China by Lorentzen (2013) and O'Brien and Li (2006), as well as to other forms of contentious behavior such as the online submission of complaints (Chen, Pan and Xu, 2016), individualized challenges (Fu, 2018) and the creation of civil society organizations (Teets, 2014). This phenomenon, sometimes called authoritarian responsiveness, is less well-explored outside the context of China. I examine it in Russia, a regime that is not normally considered consultative. Whereas protest may traditionally be viewed as a font of contention that threatens to undermine the regime, this type of everyday protest campaign is in fact part of what makes autocracy work.

The fact that everyday protest *can* be complementary to regime goals does not mean that it necessarily is. While some protests convey important missing information to the government, this is a stop-gap measure that should arise only in situations where more institutionalized modes of information collection have failed. In the many cases of everyday protest, the members of the government have reasonably good information about opinion on its policies, so protests communicate little new information. These everyday protests simply obstruct policy change that the government desires. In studies of large social movements with maximalist demands, Tarrow (2011), Piven and Cloward (1978) and McAdam (1983) all observe that the goal of collective action is the disruption of status quo politics; I demonstrate that these dynamics are at play even when the

8

campaign is lower capacity and lacks the potential to existentially threaten the regime. The government's treatment of these types of everyday protests, which is characterized by reneging on promised concessions and higher-intensity violence, demonstrates the limitations of authoritarian responsiveness.

While institutional factors influence the government's response to everyday protest campaigns, the state does not solely determine how everyday protest campaigns unfold: Contention is a dynamic interaction between the state and protesters. As such, it is not enough to say that the state uses concessions to demobilize; we also need to understand how those concessions affect protest campaigns. This is especially important when it comes to reneging: if protesters learn that the state's promises are not credible and that concessionary promises are not secure, reneging would become an ineffective strategy. In the second and third empirical chapters, I focus on theory development. In the second empirical chapter, I examine how concessions that are not undermined by reneging impact mobilization. Concessions do appear to be associated with a comparative decrease in protest activity. Not all concessions are have an equal effect, however. Concessions that hew more closely to the campaign's stated aims are more demobilizing. In this section, I also look at how the timing of concessions may be driven by the government's objectives to pre-empt campaigns before they develop the capacity for more enduring conflicts. In the third empirical chapter, I analyze data on reneging and show that the majority of reneging happens immediately. To understand why this occurs and its effect on campaigns, I review transcript evidence from interviews I conducted with activists in Moscow. This data suggests that although activists do not trust the government to fulfill its concessionary promises, more casual members of the campaign whose support is essential to hold demonstrations and other larger protest events, tend to see the government's promises as credible.

1.4 Consolidated, High-Capacity Autocracies

I analyze the implications of this theory in the context of consolidated autocracies with high-capacity states. These scope conditions put the strategic choice between repressing and using concessions into sharpest relief.

Consolidated autocracies by definition include features that make repression highly feasible. *Consolidated authoritarianism* is a designation used by Freedom House to indicate states where political leaders "prevent political competition and pluralism, and are responsible for widespread violations of basic political, civil, and human rights."[4]

Like all autocracies, consolidated autocracies rely on coercion to maintain political control (Wintrobe, 1998) and have the capacity to deploy repression at any level. They are also more likely to have entrusted political power to coercive agents, which may increase repression (Gurr, 1986). Moreover, many consolidated autocracies have successfully weathered existential threats "from below," including anti-regime protest, terrorism and insurgency. This means that they have experience reacting with violence to these types of events and are more likely to have cultivated a unified, loyal security service (Greitens, 2016) and a more authoritarian elite (Slater, 2010). It is also worth noting, however, that Davenport (2007*b*) finds that single party regimes, many of which are consolidated autocracies, are actually less likely to violate civil liberties and personal integrity, with comparison to other types of authoritarian regimes.

I have chosen the term consolidated autocracy (and, interchangeably, consolidated authoritarian regime) here because it captures canonically authoritarian features such as the absence of free and fair elections as well as undemocratic practices that are particularly important to the study of collective action, specifically regarding civil society and the judiciary. I am not interested purely in cases where Robert Dahl's (1971) conditions of polyarchy are violated, but in cases where political competition and constraint are absent *and* that absence is reinforced by highly constrained civil and

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[4]Freedom House identifies consolidated autocracies regimes using expert evaluations of national democratic governance, electoral process, civil society, independent media, local democratic governance, judicial framework and independence, and corruption; consolidated authoritarian regimes perform consistently poorly across these measures (Freedom House, 2021).

human rights. Generally speaking, regimes classified as consolidated autocracies are also coded as the most autocratic in other regime datasets.[5]

An equally important condition is that the state must be high capacity. The state must be able to implement policy and distribute public goods in order to make the concessions that everyday protesters demand. I define state capacity as the capability of the government to formulate and implement official objectives.[6] This approach echoes Skocpol (1979) and Mann's (1984) "infrastructural power."

High state capacity is an essential scope condition for three reasons. First, it ensures that the state can make concessionary promises that are plausible and concievably persuasive to protesters. Second, it enables the state to fully implement those promised policy changes if so desired. Third, it likewise enables the state to deliberately manipulate the policy change process to avoid implementing those promises, if desired. These last two conditions are necessary to justify the assumption that if concessions are not realized, it is the result of deliberate reneging, rather than a lack of resources, insufficient logistical ability or another source of non-purposive failure.

However, imposing restrictive criteria for state capacity imperils external validity. Relatively few authoritarian states can be unequivocally classified as high capacity, particularly if coercive capacity is excluded (Andersen et al., 2014). Common measures of state capacity calculate taxes as a share GDP, yet states with economies driven by natural resource extraction are not dependent on taxation (Ross, 2001) and nonetheless have the ability to penetrate society, distribute benefits, and coerce (Okruhlik, 1999). Further, as Ding (2020) underscores, capacity is relative and significant variation in bureaucratic capacity exists within states. Even a high-capacity state like China exhibits weaker capacity in some areas, like pollution. That subnational variation matters when it comes to everyday protest, because policy is often implemented locally.

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[5]POLITY-V's similar designation "institutionalized autocracy" (Marshall and Gurr, 2020) corresponds highly to "consolidated autocracy". Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) ranks regimes based on combined polyarchy index and liberalism index but leaves it to the researcher to impose cutoffs to determine regime type. The cases I consider here typically fall in the bottom quartile of V-Dem's liberal democracy index.

[6]For more detailed reviews of the state capacity literature, see Soifer (2008); Williams (2018). An alternative approach to state capacity, in the tradition of Charles Tilly (1975), holds that the monopoly on violence is a key element of state capacity. Indeed, investment into coercion is also an investment in capacity (Bellin, 2004; Andersen et al., 2014; Yom, 2015).

To address these issues, I focus this study on subnational regions of consolidated autocracies that are typically the highest capacity areas of the state: capital cities. Capitals tend to be the wealthiest, most densely governed and politically salient areas in the country. They are also disproportionately important for contention, given that they are home to high concentrations of middle class citizens whose participation is believed central to civic revolutions (Moore (1966); Huntington (1991); Wallace (2014); Ong and Han (2019) but see Rosenfeld (2020)). These types of urban uprisings are increasingly common (Frantz and Kendall-Taylor, 2014), but for several decades have been a particular concern of autocrats in a region where Color Revolution is a regular occurrence (Bunce and Wolchik, 2011).

Capital cities offer a few additional benefits to this study in particular. First, in the post-Soviet region, most capital cities are also independent administrative regions, meaning that the city or municipal government is the regional government. Whereas other regions may encompass many municipalities and smaller administrative units with local governments with unique dynamics—including variation in capacity—the government of the capital is centralized and in principle, protest anywhere are subject to the same government response.

Second, the capital city helps control for the alternative explanation that the use of concessions and reneging may be a function of principle-agent problems. There is some evidence that in China, where the central government struggles to monitor the performance of its agents in far-flung areas, citizens use protest to demand that the central government hold local officials accountable (O'Brien and Li, 2006). In this context, concessions may be the result of dynamics arising from the hierarchical state. Relatedly, reneging may be a form of shirking. While monitoring dynamics demand close scrutiny, they are not the subject of the present study. In the capital, the national government's ability to monitor its local agent is at its highest. Not only do the municipal and national governments often work closely together, national government officials spend significant time in the capital and can directly monitor issues there. Additionally, in autocracies, where the risk of popular revolution is always keenly felt, governing the capital is normally entrusted to a close ally of the autocrat, no doubt in part to address monitoring issues.

1.4.1 External Validity

The scope conditions of this dissertation were set to ensure that concessions were observed and to isolate conditions where reneging would be the likely cause of the failure to implement a concession as promised. However, high-capacity, consolidated autocracies are only one setting in which concessions may be used. Of particular interest to scholars of authoritarianism are regimes where governing capacity is weak. These states may struggle with the provision of basic services, like electricity or water. In these cases, the use of concessions is conditioned on the availability of finite resources, and the state's delivery of those concessions is more likely to be a function of an inability to implement promises rather than strategic choice. These constraints mean that the concessionary dynamics in a lower-capacity states will differ from those in high-capacity states. Nonetheless, this dissertation can builds our understanding of concessions in lower-capacity states as follows. The conceptualization of concessions that I advance in Chapter 2 is generally applicable. Regarding reneging, lower-capacity states are also capable of deliberately failing to implement concessions as promised. In these settings, however, reneging may not be the most common way in which concessions are not fully realized. Still, further research into how concessions are used in lower-capacity states is needed to understand the conditions in which they are used, their effect on mobilization, and the incidence of reneging as compared to other causes of failed implementation.

A key difference between high- and low-capacity states is the availability of resources. Lower-capacity states are more likely to be resource-constrained. I have argued that high-capacity authoritarian capitals have the necessary resources to enact the policy changes they promise. Below, I describe the resources of the City of Moscow, which has one of the largest municipal budgets in the world. This does not mean, however, that high-capacity governments are not constrained in what they can promise. Even for a well-financed government, resources are finite. For instance, Iza Ding's (2020) work on environmental activism in China notes that the government has limited leeway to address environmental concerns because they are so difficult to resolve, leading agents to limit the promises they make to complainants. Similarly, the Moscow government, despite its enormous budget, is strategic about concessions. Several interview subjects expressed that they felt

that the government of Moscow did not promise concessions that were beyond its capacity to implement. Similarly, there is no evidence that the government was inclined to promised concessions that would tax the municipal budget. It is therefore possible that a more constrained government may simply be less inclined to promise concessions, or to make promises that are less financially costly, for instance holding meetings with protesters. Likewise, further research on how concessions are used in lower-capacity settings would help clarify how constrained resources affect the use of this strategy across cases.

1.5 Moscow under Sergei Sobyanin

1.5.1 Case Selection

Prior to data collection, I considered it possible that concessions would be used very rarely, consistent with the expectations of studies of protest under autocracy. The lack of detailed data about concessions and the absence of data about reneging constituted a problem for case selection, as there was limited basis on which to select a case where the phenomenon of interest could be observed. In light of this, I established additional criteria that would allow me to select a case where concessions would be most likely:

1. Restrictions on freedom of assembly and the use of repression must not be so severe that protest is rare or only revolutionary protests are observed. The regime must be sufficiently tolerant of protest that everyday protesters, whose demands are lower stakes and who often have alternative paths to conflict resolution, still engage in collective action. This excludes the most repressive autocracies.

2. There must be evidence that government responses to protest varies and sometimes includes concessions.

3. To make data collection about a range of campaigns feasible, information about protest events must be available at online. To be able to monitor the implementation of conces-

sions, a reasonable level of online freedom that would allow reporting and discussion on government policies was also necessary.

Based on these scope conditions and selection criteria, I evaluated a dataset that I created of protest in post-Soviet autocracies from 2000-2017, as reported in Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's near-daily Newsline.[7] Of these, the consolidated autocracies were Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The first criterion excludes Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Among the remaining capital cities, Moscow was home to the most protest activity. Qualitative data indicated that the Russia government used concessions with some frequency. I conducted additional research into prominent cases of socio-economic protest in Moscow and interviewed experts to corroborate this. Finally, internet penetration in Moscow is extremely high, with widespread use of social media and a limited but robust independent media.

Moscow[8] is the political, economic and cultural capital of Russia. It is the seat of the government of the Russian Federation, and home to all federal ministries except the Constitutional Court. The country's top universities, world-famous museums and theaters, most iconic historical sites and financial, tech and scientific industries are located in Moscow. The city regularly hosts events of national and global importance, from presidential inaugurations to serving as the primary host city of the 2018 World Cup. It is home to over 12 million people; 20 million people, or around 13% of Russia's population, reside in the broader metropolitan aren. By territory, Moscow is one of the largest cities on earth.

Per the Russian Constitution, Moscow is designated a federal city, meaning that its executive serves a function equivalent to a governor. The city has its own legislature, the Moscow City Duma, as well as its own constitution and legislation. The city is subdivided into 12 administrative

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[7]Newsline summarizes news for 23 post-Soviet and Eurasian states and is published on most business days, see https://www.rferl.org/Newsline. Data was collected on protests of an estimated 25 participants or more for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Years collected for each country vary.

[8]Moscow City is surrounded by Moscow Oblast'. The City and Oblast' are distinct federal subjects that together constitute the Moscow metropolitan area, or capitol region. Though closely linked, these units have separate governments, constitutions, and regional executives. Throughout I use Moscow to refer to the city of Moscow, not Moscow Oblast' or the Moscow metropolitan area.

okrugs and 125 districts.[9]

1.5.2   Local Authoritarianism in Moscow

Nationally, Russia is a consolidated autocracy, but locally, the Moscow government is authoritarian as well. Although not subject to election monitoring, elections in Moscow cannot be considered free and fair, and political competition is limited. At all three levels of elected government in Moscow (local, legislative and mayoral), the Moscow City Election Commission uses candidate registration procedures to exclude non-systemic opposition candidates from elections. In recent years opposition parties have largely failed to achieve representation at the legislative level and struggled to win representation at the local level at which municipal deputies are chosen. While largely politically powerless, municipal deputies are instrumental in the management of the mayoral elections. In Russia, to appear on the gubernational ballot, a candidate must pass the "municipal filter" by collecting the signatures of 6% of representatives from 75% of municipalities. The municipal filter was established when direct election of governor-level offices (including the Mayor in Moscow) were restored throughout Russia in 2013. Its purpose is to limit competition (Golosov, 2012). Because municipal representatives can only support one candidate, and are largely members of the dominant party United Russia (or United Russia partisans posing as independents), the municipal filter effectively allows the regime to choose who competes in regional elections. In Moscow, the municipal deputies, who represent districts equivalent to neighborhoods, fill this role.

The current mayor of Moscow, Sergei Sobyanin, entered office by appointment by then-President Dmitri Medvedev in 2010. He previously served as a Deputy Prime Minister under Prime Minister Vladimir Putin as well as the Chief of Putin's Presidential Administration. In 2013, Sobyanin called an early mayoral election, the first in which he would compete. Alexei Navalny, a prominent anti-corruption activist, was vocal about his intention to run, however he was only able to acquire the required endorsements of municipal deputies when Sobyanin instructed

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[9]In 2012, the city annexed 1,420 square kilometers from the surrounding oblast'. This new land included small cities and towns that became administrative units of Moscow City while retaining some aspects of local self-government, essentially classified as towns within the City of Moscow.

United Russia deputies to support his candidacy (The Interpreter, 2013). Though Sobyanin only narrowly avoided a run-off election with Navalny in 2013, he won the 2018 election handily, in party by excluding any legitimate opposition candidate from competing.

Moscow has been the stage for the majority of Russia's protest activity, much of which is directed to the national government and to President Vladimir Putin (Robertson, 2009; Lankina, 2015). The city also hosted a revolutionary protest wave in 2011-2012. The Moscow Police are the largest police force in the country. They are supplemented by the country's largest unit of OMON, a riot police-*cum*-gendarmerie that operates under the motto "We know no mercy and do not ask for any" and is known for brutal crowd control techniques and human rights abuses. The Moscow OMON includes the Zubr Detachment, a special force believed to be designed to respond to revolutionary collective action. Unsurprisingly, repression of protesters is common in Moscow. Protest watchdog OVD-Info documents that, from 2011 to 2017, between 23.6 to 57.1% of all charges filed in Russia for illegal protest behavior occurred in Moscow, with indictment rates as high as 91% (OVD-Info, 2016*a*). Further, despite the healthy size of the police force, it is often unable or unwilling to defend activist citizens from harassment, threats and violence by non-state actors such as private security, motorcycle gangs, right-wing religious thugs or groups identified only as "Chechens." Indeed, the police themselves terrorize activists with midnight raids, searches and seizures, threats to child custody and more.

In recent years, the most severe protest repression in Moscow has been directed to opposition protests, particularly those organized by Navalny and his cohort. Navalny's events specifically see high rates of detention as the city refuses to issue permits that the organizers are willing to accept. However, outside of these events, the city is not maximally repressive of protest. It regularly issues protest permits[10] to demonstrations, large and small, and has also established a few "Hyde Parks" where larger protests can be held without requesting a permit.[11] The law also stipulates

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[10]Technically, and in line with international human rights standards, the government does not permit protests. Citizens and other subjects submit notifications of the intent to hold a demonstration or similar gathering, and the relevant administration agrees, refuses, requests changes or fails to respond. Functionally, this system operates like a permit system. Throughout this work, for clarity, I refer to protest permits, although they are technically agreements *soglasovaniye*.

[11]OVD-Info, an NGO that supports individuals detained at protest, has documented the locations of Hyde Parks and

that meetings with elected officials, including municipal deputies, cannot be broken up as long as they do not display placards or other signifiers of protest. These meetings are often used to skirt permitting requirements.

1.5.3 Governing Capacity in Moscow

By any metric, local state capacity in Moscow is very high. Moscow has one of the largest municipal budgets in the world. Between 2013 and 2018, Sobyanin oversaw annual budget expenditures ranging between $23 and $35 billion USD. The city generates around one fifth of of Russia's GDP; most of this is generated by taxes. In terms of bureaucratic capacity, the municipal government's ability to implement city-wide policy is very high. Most government services, such as the police and transportation system, are centralized. Beginning in 2014, dozens of multi-service centers have been constructed around the city, providing a one-stop shop for government services. One of the objectives of this initiative is to "promote greater openness of public authorities, establish a dialogue and strengthen mutual understanding between citizens and the government" (mos.ru, 2021). The city's ability to implement policy is perhaps best demonstrated by the so-called renovation project, which will see a considerable portion of the city's low-rise housing stock[12] demolished and residents resettled in state-constructed high-rise apartment complexes.

The city has significant resources to collect information about policy grievances. Since 2012, a network of over 1,500 elected municipal deputies represent constituents at the micro-neighborhood level. These municipal deputies, some of whom belong to opposition parties, lack real political power but among other functions, serve to identify grievances before they escalate. An online portal for Muscovites to vote in opinion polls[13] boasts of having registered nearly 160 million opinions in 4,873 unique polls as of March 2021. Another portal[14] allows Muscovites to easily re-

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areas where protest is categorically banned in Moscow and other cities, see *Territoriya Nelz'ya* (Forbidden Territory), https://tn.ovdinfo.org/msk.

[12]Initially the program aimed to replace ten percent of the city's housing stock, essentially all five- and nine-story apartment buildings constructed under Khrushchev. The first list of included buildings numbered around 8,000, but subsequently fluctuated and eventually settled around 5,000 buildings in 85 districts.

[13]*Aktivny Grazhdanin* (Active Citizens), https://ag.mos.ru

[14]*Moskva Nash Gorod* (Our City Moscow), https://gorod.mos.ru/

port problems with city facilities, from poorly maintained housing to potholes; a response from the responsible city authority is promised within 8 days. Users can also rate city services like health clinics and transportation. The government regularly holds roundtables with citizens. Public hearings about construction over a certain budgetary limit—the source of many protest grievances—are required by law.

Temporally, I limited my scope to the full second mayoral term of Sergei Sobyanin, from his inauguration on September 12, 2013 to the inauguration for his third term on September 18, 2018. Sobyanin was appointed mayor in October 2010 and called an early election for September 2013. Sobyanin's second term is therefore his first complete term for which he competed in an election, but his three prior years in that position by appointment means that continuity around the 2013 election can be assumed. In 2011-2012 unprecedented opposition protests against fraudulent elections, United Russia and the Putin regime rocked Moscow and the country. These protests transformed the culture of opposition mobilization in Moscow. By late 2013, with the passage of a spate of new repressive laws and Navalny's defeat in the 2013 mayoral election, opposition protest activity had subsided. Sobyanin's second term therefore corresponds to a "re-normalization" of protest in Moscow.

1.5.4 Is Moscow Russia?

Although Moscow was chosen as a case because it is comparable to other authoritarian capitals, it is worth asking to what extent Moscow is representative of Russia's other regions. The most direct response to this is, not at all. As most Russians will emphatically argue, Moscow is not Russia.[15] It is significantly more developed, wealthier, better educated, and more liberal than rest of the country. An expert survey conducted (McMann and Petrov, 2000) found Moscow to be among Russia's most democratic regions—though to be sure, this is a "best of the worst" designation.

Finding a region representative of a state as enormous and diverse as Russia is impossible. Russia is a federal state constituted by 85 subjects of eight different types.[16] Subjects vary widely

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[15]See, for example, "Why Moscow and St. Petersburg aren't Russia" Sinelschikova (2018).

[16]The Russian Federation consists of oblasts, ethnic republics, krais, autonomous okrugs, federal cities and au-

in population, size, climate, distance from Moscow, economic development, infrastructure, and natural resource extraction. Local respect for human rights and civic liberties, the use of repression, salience of ethnic politics and independence from the center also vary. Moreover, as Natalia Zubarevich (2013) has argued, Russia's large territory has produced marked differences in economic development and ways of life. Zubarevich proposes four cross-regional "Russias" defined by development. The Russia of post-industrial cities is dominated by Moscow and St. Petersburg, but it includes an additional 73 cities to which Moscow could be compared.

Setting aside representativeness, understanding Moscow is important for understanding politics in the rest of Russia. In recent years, policies piloted in Moscow, such as the 200 Churches initiative and the renovation project, have been exported to the regions (Zupan, Smirnova and Zadorian, 2021), meaning that it is possible that conflicts similar to those that occur in Moscow may be echoed elsewhere. Further, national protest campaigns normally unfold in Moscow, and residents from other regions may travel to Moscow to protest about regional issues at offices of the federal government like the Presidential Administration or high-profile locations like Red Square (Robertson, 2010; Lankina, 2015). This means that Moscow authorities, particularly repressive agents, are sometimes the responsive agents even when protest originates elsewhere. Greater insight into municipal-level protest dynamics can also bring clarity to national-level campaigns.

Last, this work advances the study of collective action in Putin's Russia. The notion that Russians do not like to protest has persisted since the 1990s, despite inconsistent evidence to support that claim (Robertson, 2010). Partly as a result, when large, anti-regime protests broke out in December 2011, a number of studies followed seeking to understand who mobilized and why (e.g. Volkov, 2012; Koesel and Bunce, 2012; Rosenfeld, 2017). In the years since these protests, Smyth and Soboleva (2016) have shown that the opposition reoriented toward electoral strategies, even as Russians seem to be more engaged in civic activism and more politicized (Lankina, 2015). Less is known about the effect on policy-oriented protests. Russia may in fact be an ideal setting to observe everyday protest as, policy-driven protests traditionally frame themselves as "social" rather than

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tonomous oblasts. In 2014, territories of the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol were classified as federal subjects of Russia.

"political" because foregrounding political motives makes them vulnerable to cooptation that undermines their demands and repression (Gabowitsch, 2018). When it comes to managing protest, Russian governors have a mandate to keep regime-challenging protests in check, especially following 2011 (Golosov, 2012), but when it comes to other types of protest their responses are more varied. Greene (2014) profiles several civil society movements in Russia, and shows that the often chaotic response of state and its disengagement with civil society have made it difficult for these movements to succeed. I propose that what may seem like inconsistency may in fact be the result of competing objectives and the deliberate failure to deliver promised policy changes.

1.6 Plan of Dissertation

This dissertation consists of six chapters in addition to this introduction. In the second chapter, I develop my theory of concessions. In presenting a new definition of concessions, I underscore that they must be understood as a process that takes place over time and are inherently vulnerable to reneging. Chapter three concerns data and measurement. I detail my approach to collecting systematic quantitative data on concessions, including the measurement of policy change implementation and present the Protest Campaigns of Moscow database, on which the empirical chapters are based.

I present my empirical analysis in chapters four through six. In Chapter 4, I consider the conditions under which the Moscow government responds to protest with concessions and repression. I find that when everyday protest campaigns convey new information about grievances to the government, repression is less severe, concessions are common and reneging is rare. In contrast, when the government has sufficient information to anticipate protest, it deploys more severe repression and reneging is common. I illustrate these two ideal campaign types with empirical examples, and then use regression analysis to test related hypotheses.

In Chapter 5, I leverage my uniquely detailed dataset to motivate new theories about the link between concessions and demobilization. Do concessions demobilize protest campaigns? If so,

what makes demobilization more or less likely? How do features of the concession, such as how closely the promise hews to the campaign's demands, affect mobilization? To develop answers to these questions, I examine cases of concession where reneging did not occur. I find strong evidence that these concessions are associated with a decline in mobilization, particularly in the first thirty days after a concession is promised, and that concessions are more demobilizing than detentions, a very common form of repression. This association is stronger when concessions correspond more closely to the campaign's core demands. This demobilizing effect also appears conditioned on the campaign event history prior to the concession, which is in turn likely tied to the government's motivations in making concessionary promises.

In the final empirical chapter, I focus on reneging. This chapter combines aggregate quantitative analysis of the concessions data to determine what features of concessions are most associated with reneging. I determine that in the majority of cases, reneging is immediate: the concession is never implemented, as opposed to being undermined after implementation. To illuminate this dynamic of immediate reneging and its relationship to mobilization, I present a case study of the protest campaign Save Park Dubki! which sought to prevent the construction of an apartment building on the edge of a park. Construction-related grievances are the most commonly documented in PCoM, and this campaign in context can be considered higher-capacity. Still, it was unable to prevent immediate reneging on all five concessions it was promised. Last, I seek to understand how activists understand concessions and reneging. I analyze interviews that I conducted with urban activists in Moscow in 2018 and 2019 to demonstrate that they largely distrust the Moscow government and see its promises as a manipulation, though they believe the general public feels differently. This variation in beliefs about the government may contribute to the difficulty of resisting reneging.

Chapter seven concludes and discusses directions for future research.

CHAPTER 2

A Theory of Concessions

In this theoretical chapter, I make several contributions. First, I provide theoretical clarity about concessions that resolves tension around how concessions seemingly constitute success for a protest campaign while undermining its capacity to mobilize. Second, many approaches to concessions envision them as a mode of elite cooptation, without taking into account that many campaigns are not elite-driven and that concessions can affect campaign participants without the mediation of an elite. I position concessions as a tool that affects authoritarian citizens directly. Finally, I emphasize that temporal elements must be taken into account to understand concessions. A concession requires that a policy change occur, but changing policy regularly takes weeks or longer. This period between when the government promises a concession and the realization of that policy change is critical, because in this window, the government may renege, or deliberately fail to implement the concession as promised. In authoritarian regimes, where institutional mechanisms for enforcing credibility are weak or absent, the risk of reneging is particularly high. Building on this theory, I compare concessions to repression and discuss the strategic tradeoff between the two responses. I argue that, although repression is at the disposal of every autocratic regime, everyday protests are in fact good candidates for concession, and there is some evidence to support that this occurs. Last, I briefly discuss what is meant by mobilization and demobilization.

2.1 A New Definition of Concessions

At the most basic level, a concession is a response to protest campaign. A concession is initiated when an agent in a position of authority makes a publicly observable commitment to undertake a policy change that will potentially yield some benefit to participants in that campaign. A concession is not characterized by the realization of a reform or the distribution of a benefit. Rather, it is the stated promise, or commitment to engage in policy change, that characterizes a concession.

Several important aspects of this definition that distinguish concessions from related phenomenon warrant expansion. First, concessions arise only in the context of pre-existing collective action, as characterized by a *protest campaign*. A protest campaign, as defined by Charles Tilly, is a "sustained, organized public effort making collective claims on target authorities." that links a group of claimants (protesters), the object of their claim and a public (Tilly, 2004, 3). These campaigns use protest to make those claims. I use *protest* to denote demonstrations, rallies, marches and similar events, of either group or individual participation, to express a grievance, opposition or other message to a target audience in a publicly observable manner. Campaigns use other forms of activism as well, for example legal challenges. In defining concessions as a response to protest campaigns, I distinguish them from benefits that authorities allocate in other contexts. For instance, populist policymaking is distinct from concessions. Similarly, policy change in response to popular opinion or the distribution of benefits for future political support, as characterized by patronage or clientelism, are not concessions. Policy changes to comply with legal rulings are typically not concessions. Further, because protest campaigns are inherently public, benefits allocated exclusively through covert lobbying or elite bargaining are not concessions.

Second, a concession must be initiated by *an agent in a position of authority*, meaning that the person or entity making the concession credibly embodies the authority to actually fulfill the commitment. The agent may speak on behalf of the state or on behalf of a private entity or other group, like a religious organization or company. In the following I assume that the agent speaks on behalf of the state, but this can easily be relaxed. In practice this means that some statements that seem like concessions are in fact simply empty words, because the agents behind them have

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no power to realize the concession. In other cases, informal networks may mean that an agent in fact has greater power than their official position grants them.

The statement of the concession must be *publicly observable*, in that it is commonly observed by the claimants of the protest campaign and by actors who would be responsible for implementing or overseeing the promised change. A concession should therefore be promised in a public setting, such as a press conference or open meeting with protesters, or, if made in a private setting, immediately publicly reported by the government in an official statement, or by other witnesses, including campaign participants and the media. In authoritarian settings, or others where few or no institution failsafes exist to enforce that commitment, the public performance of the commitment partly mitigates that institutional weakness by establishing the concession as common knowledge (Chwe, 2013).

The requirements that the agent speak on behalf of the authority that can fulfill the concession and that the statement be made publicly are necessary because concessions entail a *commitment to future action*. The agent who initiates the concession is in fact beginning a process of policy change. That process, which I elaborate on below, is almost never instantaneous. In fact, the concessionary process normally takes weeks, months or longer.

Finally, concessions only *potentially* yield a benefit to protesters. Intuitively, concessions are something positive, and are often seen in counterpoint to the negative experience of repression. At the same time, concessions often fall far short of unequivocal success. Even the positive impacts associated with a concession are difficult to objectively evaluate. Further complicating things is the fact that concessions often have consequences that may be considered adverse, such as interfering with mobilization or exacerbating divisions within a campaign. As I will show, concessions can also have a limited impact on policy in the longer term if reneging occurs. The notion of a concession as a potential, rather than realized, benefit is meant to address this.

That potential benefit takes the form of a *policy change*, a term I use broadly to capture a wide range of reforms. The policy change may be formal, as in a regulatory reform, or informal, as in an alteration to practice, enforcement or the distribution of a one-time benefit. It may establish an

on-going procedure or pertain to a single-case application of pre-existing rules. It may more or less closely adhere to the stated demands of the campaign. Last, the apparent benefit of the concession may accrue to all claimants, to some subset of claimants, or to the general public without exclusion. The following chapter explores measuring dimensions of concessions in greater detail.

2.2 Existing Approaches

2.2.1 Carrots and Cooperation

The above definition introduces much-needed nuance and complexity to concessions. Although concessions figure prominently into notions of successful collective action and are salient in some studies of protest campaigns, definitional work on this topic is sparse and suffers from variation without innovation. This is partly due to the aforementioned sense that concessions are a positive outcome, sometimes construed as the opposite of the state's use of repression. Indeed, often if a protest campaign is described as "successful", it is because it achieved concessions. As a result, some definitions of concessions focus exclusively on those positive outcomes; for example, Chen (2012) defines concessions as meeting demands. This simplification is particularly common in formal modeling, where concessions are represented as "positive incentives" or "carrots" (Svolik, 2012, 10), or moving closer to the opposition's ideal point (Pierskalla, 2010).

Yet even if concessions are an obvious improvement over repression, they may not constitute a truly positive outcome. Social movement scholars have understood that concessions more often arise out of the government's desire to coerce and control, than out of the benevolent intention to resolve grievances. To emphasize the strategic action of the state, some scholars eschew the word "concession" altogether. Tarrow (2011, 190) uses the term "facilitation," wherein the state "satisfies at least some of the claims of contenders" while others speak of accommodation (Rasler, 1996; Lichbach, 1998) of movement demands. Followers of Gamson (1975), including Davenport (2014), see concessions as grievance depletion, a strategy where the state meets demands to undermine the grievance motivating citizens to participate in contention. Mazur (2013) character-

izes the elimination of grievances as preemption. In some formal models of contention, a similar assumption defines concessions as cooperation with protest claimants (Moore, 2000; Carey, 2006).

While these definitions enhance our understanding of the underlying construct, in practice they are difficult to apply, because they rely on teleological reasoning that requires that the outcome of the concession to be observed in order for the concession to be identified. If concessions are defined based on their impact on protesters (e.g. satisfying protesters' claims), questions arise about what share of protesters must be satisfied and how much. Participants in protest campaigns regularly see concessions as unacceptable half-measures, hypocritical contradictions, or unrelated to their grievance. If a concession is characterized by the resolution of a grievance, one must know if the grievance is fully resolve, at what point in time that resolution occurs, and to whose satisfaction. Consider, for example, an environmental protest to which the government concedes the remediation of a toxic waste site and an end to environmental degradation. The former concession may take years to realize, which raises questions about when exactly the concession has occurred. Does partial remediation "count"? What about ten years of remediation, followed by a return to dumping? The second concession likely falls outside the scope of the government's ability to fully realize. It is unclear if policy changes designed to work toward that goal could be classified as concessions. Even more a simplistic focus on concessions as meeting demands raises similar issues when we consider that protest campaigns normally make numerous demands. How many should be resolved and to what extent?

Perhaps most importantly, outcome-focused definitions mean that it almost impossible to identify when a concession occurs in real-time, because they rely on information that will only become available months or years after the concession is initially promised. While this may be acceptable for scholars engaged in historical study, it is problematic for observers of campaigns in real-time. In particular, these definitions may not resonate with activists, oppositionists and protest participants—the subjects of research on protest, who deserve to benefit from its findings.

My definition addresses these issues in several ways. First, I capture the sense that a concession is an ostensibly good thing that can have adverse effects by representing it as a potential,

rather than actual, benefit. Second, I separate the government's intent in making concessions and protesters' evaluations from the definition of a concession. In doing so, I also create space for broader theoretical consideration of the purpose and impacts of concessions. Third, in underscoring that a concession is a statement followed by a policy change process, my definition makes it possible to identify concessions in real-time, as they happen, rather than years later. The definition also captures common intuitions about the nature of concessions with robust identification criteria that can be easily observed and operationalized for data collection.

2.2.2 Cooptation

Other approaches to concessions are less concerned with the popular response to the concession and instead see concessions as a form of political cooptation.[1] These works adopt an elite-politics focus that is common to the literature on comparative authoritarian institutions. In this view, protests are just one element of a larger threat to regime survival that is embodied by elites. Elites who amass excessive power can pose a critical danger to the autocrat (e.g. Wintrobe, 1998; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007; Svolik, 2012). Elites who can coordinate a larger public via opposition political parties or other similar organizations constitute one such threat. To defuse this threat, the autocrat tries to coopt elites via incorporation into authoritarian institutions (Smith, 2005; Blaydes, 2010; Frantz and Kendall-Taylor, 2014), most commonly legislatures (Lust-Okar, 2005; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007). Cooptation can also be achieved via economic means such as sharing spoils, redistribution or patronage (Boix, 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010).

It is important to establish concessions and cooptation as distinct phenomena. Cooptation is the formal representation of a group in the political process without the chance to meaningfully influence policy (Mazur, 2013). Describing bureaucratic authoritarianism, O'Donnell uses "encapsulation" in a similar sense to mean a political configuration where "[social] sectors were politically

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[1]Protest is not a pre-condition of cooptation, which has been observed in many other settings, including around elections (Magaloni, 2006), through state employment (Rosenfeld, 2020) or unions (Kim and Gandhi, 2010), via clientelism (Stokes et al., 2013; Ang, 2016) and patronage (Golden and Min, 2013), among others.

represented by organizations whose legal existence was dependent upon government authorization. Bargaining and interest representation would be limited to leaders at the top." (O'Donnell, 1979, 88). This system of relationships between a group, elites, and the state is the result of a variety of factors that accumulate over time. Concessions can enter into that process. For example, an opposition protest can win the concession of a new legislative election. But that concession is not equivalent to cooptation, even if it creates to conditions where cooptation is more likely. For that concession to lead to cooptation, a legislature must exist, the party or candidates must be registered, the election must occur relatively fairly, and delegates must be seated. Even then, cooptation may not occur. Thus although the risk of cooptation may loom over a concession, that outcome should not be conflated with the concession.

Elite-focused theories provide a compelling explanation for elite behavior, but if we widen our view to include the members of these movements, they do less well at explaining how concessions affect mobilization. In the elite-driven model of protest, opposition elites have with the power to coordinate others in collective action via political parties, other organizations or unique charisma and status. By implication, without elites, collective action does not occur at a salient level. Concessions are then used to co-opt those elites into the legislature, where they are rewarded with rents or limited access to policymaking in exchange for their collaboration with the regime (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007). Having achieved these and other personal benefits, elites become less likely to engage their supporters in protest (Reuter and Robertson, 2014). The existence of a legislature can also force opposition groups to compete for formal recognition or representation, which in turn obstructs intra-opposition collaboration and decreases the risk that broad-based protest emerges during economic crises (Lust-Okar, 2005). The benefits of cooptation for an opposition elite are clear. What is less apparent is why the participants in collective action should be satisfied with this outcome. Many citizens in authoritarian states are fully aware that opposition elites are subject to cooptation. Nothing prevents them from defecting from a coopted elite to other or newly established opposition figures. This is particularly true given that citizens might obtain few or even no side benefits from fraudulent representation that does nothing to advance their goals. This is

particularly true if the campaign's objective are related to socio-economic policies. For example, protesters against pension reform may not perceive legislative inclusion to be any kind of benefit, when they want a lower retirement age included in the bill that the legislature is voting on this month. Last, though many campaigns are elite-led, a significant share are not. Leaderless campaigns are a common occurrence. Although these campaigns have no elite to coopt, they still sometimes receive concessions.

2.3 Concessions as a Process

I have already hinted at the steps that constitute the concessionary process. First, a *public commitment* is made by a state agent to initiate a policy change. Second, the government undertakes some steps characteristic of changing that policy, during an *implementation period*. Last, the *outcome* represents the culmination of the policy change; even if the policy change may not be fully or even partially implemented, no further reform is made. I elaborate on these steps in turn.

The *commitment* is a public statement made by a state agent, establishing the intention to initiate a policy change that pertains to a grievance expressed by some participants in a protest campaign. The commitment establishes a shared expectation of future action by the government. To do so, it must be sufficiently specific to establish the nature of that future action. Conciliatory statements acknowledging the existence of the grievance are not concessions ("This is a very serious problem."), nor are most vague statements ("We'll resolve this.").[2] This public commitment to future action uniquely characterizes a concession. While the implementation of the promised change may never occur and the grievance may be affected in no way by the outcome, once this commitment is established, a concession has occurred. Conversely, a concession cannot occur without a public commitment. Intuitively, this emphasis on commitment matches up with common usage of "concession," as referring to the symbolic act of granting demands or recognizing a grievance.

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[2]An exception arises when the state agent is powerful enough such that their acknowledgment of the grievance is akin to escalating the issue's priority level. For instance, when the autocrat says, "This will be resolved," an expectation of its resolution is created that is not established when a low-ranked bureaucrat says the same.

Throughout I rely on the terms "commitment" or "promise", in normal parlance "concession" is often synonymous with these.

The *implementation period* is a span of time during which steps characteristic of the promised policy change may be taken. This is the period in which policy is actually changing, at least in principle: bank transfers of wage arrears are being arranged, the building permit is being reevaluated, a constitutional amendment is being drafted. Actions taken by the state during implementation are dependent on the type of policy change that has been promised. Ideally, all the steps necessary to enact a policy change will occur during implementation, but that need not be the case. Indeed, during the implementation period, it is possible that the state takes no steps consistent with changing policy, or only a few. For example, bank account information of unpaid workers may be collected though the funds are not transferred the planning commission may never reevaluate the permit, or the constitutional amendment may not contain the promised reform. Nonetheless, the implementation period coincides with an interval in which the process necessary to change policy would conceivably occur in order for the commitment to be completely fulfilled. Implementation may last days or months. Its duration depends on a variety of factors, most saliently the nature of the promised policy change and effort. State agents can deliberately extend the implementation period by procrastinating or delaying, though occasionally, they will establish a timeline for implementation of the concession by announcing a policy change by a certain date.

The concession process concludes with an *outcome*. The outcome arises when the policy in question becomes significantly more difficult to alter, such that changing it further would require a full re-engagement with the policy change process. In some cases, the outcome is obvious because the the initial commitment has clearly been fulfilled: the workers receive their back wages, for instance. Alternatively, action may be taken that makes fulfilling that commitment impossible: construction workers have irreversibly damaged the disputed building site, so the legality of the permit is no longer of consequence. The end of a policy change process may be difficult to identify, particularly as the government can extend the implementation process: the constitutional amendment requires additional legislation to take real effect. Context is necessary to identify when

a concession has been *de facto* abandoned by the state. Again, the outcome does not need to be satisfactory to claimants, nor must it meet the shared expectations for policy change established in the commitment.

2.4   Reneging and Time Inconsistency

It follows from this conceptualization of concessions that the shared expectation of policy change established by the initial commitment may not match the ultimate outcome. This failure can happen for a variety of reasons. In some cases, the state has over-promised and lacks the capacity to fulfill the commitment it set for itself, for instance if the state lacks financial resources. It may also occur where a third party, over whom the state has incomplete control, fails to comply with the state's demands. In still other cases, this failure may be deliberate. The state may establish a commitment with no intention of providing the outcome. In other words, the state may *renege*, or deliberately fail to fully implement the policy change.

Reneging can occur in a few different ways. Most obviously, the state may simply make no effort to implement the concession, proceeding as if no commitment had been established. This is a classic "cheap talk" situation where the commitment was truly nothing more than empty words. In other cases, some preliminary steps characteristic of the promised policy change can occur, though they fall short of the full commitment. The state can then stall the implementation process, either indefinitely or long enough to render the promised outcome unattainable. This can be achieved by adding consultation or feedback periods, holding investigations, requiring additional approvals and so on. The result is that the concession is never more than partly implemented. Alternatively, some progress may be taken toward changing policy, only to have those steps reversed. For example, the initial legal authorization to hold a referendum is granted, but a subsequent challenge in court revokes that authorization. A final option entails the technical completion or near completion of the promised policy change, coupled with its immediate undermining by another act that directly contradicts the aim of the concession. For instance, the state follows through on its promise to

cancel plans to construct a shopping mall in a park, but a few months later approves the construction of high rise condos in the same location.

The possibility of reneging has largely been ignored by most studies of collective action, but its impact on movement success cannot be overstated. A completed concession requires that the state do much more than make a public promise to change a policy; it must take steps to actually change that policy and realize the expected outcome. For this to occur, the state's incentives must remain aligned such that it prefers to change policy, from the commitment stage to the outcome. If its incentives change, the state can derail the concessions process and renege, ensuring the concession has no impact.

The difficulty of fulfilling commitments when incentives change over time is a form of the time inconsistency problem, and is not new to autocratic systems (North, 1993). One type of time incon- sistency problem—credible commitment problems,—have largely been identified in the autocrat's relations with the elites whose support he requires to retain power (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). Generally, the credibility problem theorized with respect to autocrat-elite interactions relates to the elite's inability to constrain the autocrat once they have ceded the power necessary for him to secure his position (Myerson, 2008; Magaloni, 2008; Svolik, 2012). Institutions are seen as the so- lution to this problem, in that they resolve information deficits by facilitating monitoring (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006, 2007; Boix and Svolik, 2013), by establishing judicial venues for dispute resolution (North and Weingast, 1989), or structures like parties and elections that make long-term spoils sharing credible (for example Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009; Magaloni and Kricheli, 2010; Brancati, 2014). In these cases, the autocrat has what Shepsle (1991) calls imperative credibility,[3] where the actor is coerced into fulfilling his promises and agreements become self-enforcing: the autocrat upholds his end of the agreement, because he knows the elite will punished him if he does not.

Imperative credibility only applies where actors on the receiving end of a commitment can

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[3]Shepsle (1991) argues that commitments made absent an external authority can be credible if there is motivational credibility, when incentives do not change over time so commitments become self-enforcing; or if there is imperative credibility. Absent one of these two forms of credibility, agreements fail.

reliably coerce the actor making the commitment. This dynamic is considerably rarer when the actors are an autocratic state and a group of citizens. Whereas elites have inherent structural power—the very thing that makes them elites generates imperative credibility—the masses must rely on continuous collective action to apply coercion. This is also a considerably greater challenge than that faced by elites, because collective action becomes more difficult with scale (Olson, 1965).

In their classic work on revolutionary mass mobilization, Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) note that as difficult as it is to achieve massive collective action in the present, sustaining it over time is nearly impossible. In their model of democratization, the disenfranchised masses recognize their limited capacity to organize over the long term and that, absent on-going rebellion, elites have no incentive to follow through on their promises to implement more populist policies. To correct this problem, the masses demand the immediate creation of democratic institutions to transfer power between groups and ensure redistribution in the future. Elites comply to forestall losses due to conflict. Though Acemoglu and Robinson capture several key temporal dynamics of protest and concession, their theory does not acknowledge that the elites' agreement to establish democratic institutions is also a concession that requires imperative credibility to be implemented; it is no more credible than elites' untrustworthy commitment to redistribute is. Democratic institutions cannot be created overnight and their complexity creates many opportunities for manipulation in favor of those with power. Nonetheless, Acemoglu and Robinson demonstrate that credible commitment and reneging are critical concerns when revolutionary movements face down authoritarian governments.

Recognizing this time inconsistency means recognizing that in some cases, concessions do not lead to a deviation from the government's preferred policy. To interpret this via a rational choice framework, there are cases where the government never pays the cost of the promised concession, and protesters (and free-riders) never reap the anticipated benefits of protesting. As I discuss in the next section, taking into account reneging affects how authoritarian governments react to protesters and protesters ability to organize.

2.5 Concessions versus Repression

The possibility of reneging can affect the strategic calculus of the government and citizens alike. Authoritarian governments are generally seen as selecting from two options,[4] when responding to protest: concessions and repression.[5] A popular line of inquiry in the rational choice tradition seeks to understand the trade-offs between the two strategies (e.g. Svolik, 2012).[6] This requires an estimation of their relative costs. Because autocrats have sunk costs into coercive capacity, which they rely on to retain office (Wintrobe, 1998; Escribà-Folch, 2013), repression is typically thought to be "cheap". In contrast, concessions are assumed to be "costly" and therefore a less desirable option for an efficient autocrat. Formal work has found that the simultaneous use of concessions and repression is irrational in that it sends mixed signals of the regime's willingness to meet protesters' demands (Rasler, 1996; Lichbach, 1987; Moore, 2000), or in that it maximizes the autocrat's cost of ending a conflict (Franklin, 2009). Empirically, that repression is consistently observed to increase in response to dissent (Davenport, 2007a) seems to support these assumptions — despite the fact that the incidence of repression tells us nothing about the incidence of concessions.

The idea that concessions are a costly undertaking is based on an underlying assumption that is seldom acknowledged: that concessions are credible and actually result in policy change. As I have argued, this is not necessarily the case, and the costs of a concession change over time. The initial promise may be very low-cost to the government, as all it requires is a publicly observable statement. The promised policy change, if implemented, may be costly, but if reneging occurs, that cost can be avoided. While costs may be incurred to achieve reneging, these can be limited. Just as autocrats invest resources in the coercive capacity that makes repression "cheap", they likewise direct significant resources into institutions and non-violent mechanisms of control. These sunk

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[4]Their actual repertoire is wider. See Chen (2012) on the wider repertoire, including the delay tactics, and Bishara (2015) on ignoring protest.

[5]For the purposes of this work, I follow Davenport (2007a, 2) and define repression as "the actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or organization, within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose of imposing a social cost on the target as well as deterring specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to government personnel, practices or institutions." For other definitions and typologies of repression, see Goldstein (1978); Earl (2003, 2011); Ritter (2014); della Porta (1997).

[6]Some social movement theorists argue that mixed responses that combine both costs and benefits are common (Tarrow, 2011, for example), but this approach has not gained traction elsewhere.

costs facilitate the manipulation of the concessionary process and mitigate its costs.

The direct implication of this is that repression is not strictly cheaper than concessions. There are cases where concessions may be preferable, particularly given that repression has an unpredictable effect on dissent.[7] There is evidence to suggest that when "average citizens" — such as those that participate in everyday protests — are targeted with repression, the resulting outrage increases mobilization (Francisco, 1995; Rasler, 1996). Moreover, as Johnston (2012) emphasizes, repression is hierarchical and administrative: the local agents that are typically tasked with the management of everyday protests likely do not have the same level of access to or control over repressive agents that the autocratic center does. This lack of control may make concessions more appealing than resource-intensive repression.

Further, many theories of the strategic tradeoff between repression and concession are both derived from and tested on a particular type of protest campaign: highly politicized campaigns that make transformational or existentially threatening demands of the regime. I call these revolutionary protests. Examples include regime-change movements such as those that emerged during the Arab Spring or around the fall of the Soviet Union; campaigns against election fraud, like the Color Revolutions; and mobilization for the observance of human rights, such as the US Civil Rights Movement or the campaign against apartheid. Given the demands of these campaigns, the regime is unlikely to make concessions if they can be avoided. That occurs when repression becomes untenable, either due to the size of the campaign or non-compliance of the security services. In other words, in these cases, the assumption that repression is much less costly than concessions is reasonable.

The rarity of highly politicized, very large, national protest campaigns in autocracies is what makes them compelling objects of study. When applying theories derived from and tested on these cases to other protest campaigns, we must consider the extent features of these campaigns lie outside the scope conditions of the original theory. First, everyday protest lack the opposi-

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[7]The effect that repression has on mobilization remains unclear. Work on the dissent-repression nexus has shown that repression increases mobilization, decreases mobilization and has an inverted U-shaped relationship to mobilization, see Hibbs (1973); Lichbach (1987); Muller and Opp (1986); Opp and Roehl (1990); Gartner and Regan (1996); Moore (1998); Carey (2006); Pierskalla (2010); Loyle, Sullivan and Davenport (2014).

tional, anti-regime framing of revolutionary protests. They do not question the foundations of the regime's power, but rather its specific application. For instance, in China, social protesters and petitioners regularly seek to appeal to the autocratic center to defend them against local predation (O'Brien and Li, 2006; Chen, 2012). Everyday protesters often believe that as framings become oppositional, they depart from the core policy concern and a successful outcome becomes less likely. Some campaigns adopt platforms that emphasize their "non-political" character. In Russia, policy-driven protests traditionally frame themselves as "social" rather than "political" because foregrounding political motives makes them vulnerable to cooptation that undermines their demands and repression (Gabowitsch, 2018). This was a sentiment that several urban activists I interviewed in Moscow corroborated. Also telling is the fact that none of the everyday protest campaigns I observe in Moscow allied themselves with opposition leader Alexey Navalny or his Anti-Corruption Foundation, despite the prevalence of concerns related to corruption, which would have instantly politicized their cause; in one case, Navalny was physically removed from the premises of a protest by its organizers to avoid undermining their demands.[8] The absence of a politicized framing allows both sides to potentially compromise on specific policy issues.

Second, everyday protest campaigns are less likely to reach the massive scale that successful revolutionary protests achieve. The scope of everyday protest campaigns is limited to a specific policy grievance, meaning that their pool of potential participants is likewise limited to individuals directly affected by or invested in that policy, so in most cases, the potential for an everyday protest campaign to scale into a national movement is low.[9] The absence of a threatening framing and the more limited scale of these campaigns complicate expectations of when the regime

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[8]Urban activists also avoided collaborating with Navalny and his various organizations because his political party is unregistered, meaning it cannot assist in the coordination of protest permits, which is the main utility that political parties provided to everyday protest campaigns in Moscow.

[9]The fact that this is unlikely does not mean it never occurs. Policies that policy affect a large swath of the population can generate mass protests; nationwide resistance to reforms to benefits for pensioners in Russia in 2005 and 2018 demonstrates this. Additionally, solidarity protests organized by individuals who are not directly impacted by the policy do occur; protests in support of a campaign for free and fair elections to the Moscow City Duma in 2019 were held across Russia. Finally, though the risk that an everyday protest escalates to a national campaign might be low, it is not zero. For instance, in 2013 a protest campaign against the destruction of Taksim Gezi Park in Istanbul, Turkey, evolved into a protracted, violent conflict that spawned national solidarity protests and attracted significant international attention.

will use repression or concessions. While repressing a revolutionary protest is expected, such a strategy can easily backfire against everyday protests. The disproportionate use of force against citizens who are making reasonable policy demands can make the regime appear weak or morally bankrupt—particularly as women, the elderly, and children often participate in these protests. On the other hand, if everyday protest campaigns are not threatening enough to warrant repression, they should likewise not warrant concessions. Yet as I show in Chapter 4, everyday protest campaigns are met with a range of repressive and concessionary responses. These responses, I will argue, are driven by goals related to the grievance, rather the need to defuse revolutionary threats.

I am not the first to suggest that protests are not inherently threatening to autocratic regimes. There is increasing recognition that grassroots protest is an important form of "pressure release" for authoritarian citizens (O'Brien and Li, 2006), and that it provides valuable information on dissatisfied citizens to the regime (Lorentzen, 2013). Moreover, it is well established that China has in some settings supported civic activism as a tool of informal control (Chen, 2012; Fu, 2018; Mattingly, 2019) and encouraged officials to respond to activists' concerns, so long as they were not politically sensitive (Truex, 2016).

Many of these studies have assessed strategies of protest management in China; in particular, China has been the subject of a burgeoning literature on authoritarian responsiveness. This may be partly due to the fact that China is a single-party state without direct elections above the local level, making other sources of responsiveness a greater necessity and of greater interest. By the same token, China is also a relatively unique political system and it differs from Russia in a number of ways. Russia holds multiparty elections from the local to the federal level, which generates some of the information that some of these strategies in China are compensating for. Russia is also not a single-party state, meaning that the legitimacy and stability of the regime is not as closely tied to ensuring that citizens are satisfied with the performance of a single party. Finally, for the majority of Putin's tenure, Russia has cultivated an image of itself as a democracy that upholds international human rights (though less so in recent years). While this image has not squared well with many policies and actions the government has undertaken, it is generally more tolerant

of protest, including anti-regime protest, than China. In a comparative study of environmental movements in Russia and China, Elizabeth Plantan (2018) finds that Russian activists have become more likely to choose mass protest tactics than their Chinese counterparts.

Still, the scholarly tendency to study authoritarian responsiveness in China and more conventional strategies of dealing with protest in Russia does not mean that Russia is not using such tactics.[10] The extent to which the Putin regime tolerates or manages non-political protest is less well understood. Civil society in Russia under Putin is considered weak and poorly consolidated (Evans, 2006; Henry, 2006). While civil society and protest campaigns are distinct, many civil society movements do engage in protest to advance their aims and so are worth briefly considering here. Greene (2014) analyzes the trajectories of several civil society movements from across Russia, including several that I would classify as everyday protest campaigns, and determines that the weak institutionalization of the state and prevalence of informal elite ties in Russia has produced a system that is fundamentally non-responsive to the demands of civil society. As a result, the state response to these movements is chaotic and driven by individuals seeking their own advantage. He identifies as the lack of success of civil society in achieving or consolidating their successes is a function of this institutional setting. While I do not dispute that governance in Russia is highly corrupt and weakly institutionalized, I contend that the government leverages the apparent success of a concession to undermine mobilizing capacity. The apparently erratic effect concessions have on long-term policy is therefore not simply evidence of the capriciousness of government officials, but rather representative of a lack of intention to implement changes.

2.6   What is Mobilization?

Thus far I have referred to concessions as a government strategy of demobilization. Before turning to data and analysis, it is necessary to establish what mobilization itself is. Mobilization and its inverse, demobilization, have been used in a range of ways by political scientists, sociologists, and

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[10]I am not aware of any evidence that the Russian government has learned from or deliberately adopted responsive strategies from China.

others who study protest and social movements. When I use the term mobilization, I refer to the willingness of individuals or groups to participate in acts that support a collective goal. Mobilization is therefore a question of *people* rather than of resources, ideology or consensus (Tarrow, 2011; Klandermans, 1988). This definition also emphasizes the undertaking of a particular action, rather potentially passive support for a campaign. In this way it differs from Gamson (1975, 15), who defines mobilization as the development of readiness to act collectively among a politically challenging group's constituency and activation as efforts to get those supporters to undertake a particular action.

The purpose of mobilization is to engage in acts that disrupt the status quo, in the hopes of achieving change. Disruption is a function of movement size (i.e. number of participants) and tactical choice (DeNardo, 1985).[11] The need to for disruption means that leaders of all contentious movements face a fundamental problem of recruitment. In writing about rebel movements, Lichbach (1998) terms this the Rebel's Dilemma, in which movement leaders and the regime dynamically compete for public support. This problem is particularly dramatized in insurgencies, which must recruit combatants to participate in violence (Fearon and Laitin, 2000; Wood, 2001; Weinstein, 2005), yet it is no less prevalent in non-violent movements. Because non-violent movements avoid using maximally disruptive, violent tactics, disruptive leverage is acquired with a larger number of supporters across society (Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008). Among transformative social movements or revolutionary protest campaigns, mass non-cooperation with the regime, such as strikes, boycotts or national protests, may be attainable. Even for smaller movements, such as the everyday protests considered here, size matters. A large demonstration or march elicits government attention, disrupts the flow of daily life, and attracts media coverage in a way that a small picket does not.

I refer to a campaign as mobilized when it has the capacity to engage individuals, who are outside the core of campaign organizers, in acts of protest. Campaign organizers form the core of leaders whose efforts make a campaign possible. They may be considered analogous to the rebels

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[11]See also Gamson (1975); Piven and Cloward (1978); McAdam (1983); Tarrow (2011); Franklin (2009).

or radicals of other models, but I eschew those terms here to avoid assumptions about protesters' political beliefs. Campaign organizers translate a grievance from a problem to a cause for protest. They manage the holding of protest events, including filing permits, negotiate safety concerns with the authorities, securing amplification and often delivering speeches. They run social media communities, manage digital outreach and develop linkages to the community and other activist groups. Campaign organizers are typically the authors of resolutions that formalize the campaign's demands, and they may arrange the use of other tactics, such as formal complaints, lawsuits or petitions. If the government chooses to negotiate, it negotiates with the campaign organizers. But campaign organizers are few in number; in an interview with a park defender, she recalled that the organizational core was around 25 people. Campaign organizers need to mobilize protest participants to be able to hold events like demonstrations and marches, as well as to support higher-intensity protests like hunger strikes if necessary. When this is possible, the campaign is mobilized.

Thus when an observable protest event is happening, it is easy to gauge the campaign's level of mobilization. Trouble arises when we recognize that most of the time, an observable protest event is *not* happening. Participation in an act of protest is normally short-lived, but this does not mean that an individual participant is "demobilized" once they put down their placard and head home from the square—although it can. Moreover, the everyday protests examined here generally hold protests sporadically, particularly when compared to higher-capacity national campaigns. Weeks or months may pass between events. Even everyday protest campaign organizers struggle to estimate their campaign's level of mobilization. As reported in a focus group of protesting Muscovites I held in 2019, one of the main reasons that everyday protest campaigns in Moscow hold demonstrations is to assess the level of commitment to their cause. They also obtain rough estimates from signature collection drives, and participation in online communities, including RSVP-ing to protest events on Facebook or VKontakte.

Further, observable protest events are not the only type of act that can be undertaken to benefit a collective goal. Some forms of protest are difficult to observe or deliberately covert, such as the everyday peasant resistance identified by Scott (1985). I was made aware during fieldwork that at

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least one campaign and potentially several had engaged in illegal acts. Additionally, the majority of campaign organizers' work occurs during periods where protest events are not observed, from apply to protest permits to filing lawsuits to meeting with government representatives. Campaign organizers often maintain vigilance during periods of demobilization, as they monitor the motivating grievance and the implementation of any promised concessions, which allows them to identify moments when further protest needs to be engaged.

This means that when a protest event is not observed, the campaign may be in a state of demobilization, wherein it *cannot* hold a protest that requires mass participation. Alternatively, the campaign may have the capacity to hold a protest, but it chooses not to, which could be described as inactive mobilization. These states are observationally equivalent. I revisit this issue in Chapter 5 when exploring the relationship of concessions and mobilization.

2.7 Conclusion

To summarize, I have advanced a definition of concessions as a potential benefit to protesters, characterized by a publicly issued promise by a figure in a position of authority. From the initiation of that promise, concessions take the form of a process, as the government takes steps to implement the concession. That level of implementation can vary over time, which creates a credible commitment problem and opens the door to reneging. Though novel, this definition is compatible with notions of concession that already in use in scholarship, such as the idea that concessions are a benefit or that concessions are a tool of cooptation.

An important innovation of my approach to concessions is that it produces observable implications that allow scholars and other observers of world events to identify a concession and stay attuned to its implementation in real time if necessary. In other words, this definition can be operationalized for data collection. Yet at the same time, collecting that data also demands innovation. First, the fact that change over time is fundamental to concessions means that it should be fundamental to how data is collected, yet this raises issues about how concessions data should comport

with the daily event catalogues collected about protest and data collected about campaigns, which is rarely panel data. Second, evaluating policy implementation consistently across a diverse range of issues is challenging. I turn to the topic of measurement and data collection in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 3

Data and Measurement

Although new protest event datasets are released each year, quality data on concessions is rarely collected. This is because neither the data-generating process nor the structure of daily event datasets are designed to include concessions. Concessions exist at a meso-level between the daily protest events to which they are a response and the campaigns that articulate grievances and demands and exhibit organizational capacity that affect the type of commitments and follow-through. As a corrective to this, and to produce data appropriate for my analysis, I developed an approach to protest data collection that produces linked datasets about protest events, concessions and campaigns. This approach allows concessions, which are not discrete events, to be connected to daily events, such as demonstrations and detentions, and to campaigns, which unfold over multiple years. I pilot this data collection approach by focusing on a single case: protest campaigns that targeted the municipal government of Moscow, Russia from 2013-2018. The resulting database is Protest Campaigns of Moscow, or PCoM.

This chapter reviews common approaches to collecting data on collective action and why these datasets fail to observe concessions. The next section elaborates on my original approach to collecting data about concessions. I present a typology of concessionary policy changes, a measure of proximity of the concession to campaign demands and a measure of the extent of policy change implementation that can be used to measure reneging. I then describe the datasets that constitute PCoM and explain how they were collected. A descriptive and quantitative overview of the database follows. I address the representativeness of PCoM, by comparing it to national protest

data from January 2016 to July 2017 collected by pro-government think tank, the St. Petersburg Politics Foundation for the Development of Public Relations

3.1   Why don't we have data on concessions?

The data that we collect is a function of the questions that we ask. These questions determine our sources, the structure of the data, and the information we record. When it comes to protest, most available datasets are a response to one of two questions: first, what is the relationship between dissent and repression? and second, how do people mobilize? The former requires the collection of daily event data, while investigating the latter often produces campaign-level data. Concessions, as I will argue, exist between these two observational levels: they are linked to daily event dynamics, but they cannot be quantified on a daily basis, and though they are also the result of campaign-level features, an individual concessions evolves over the course of a campaign. Concessions have fallen through the cracks of data collection projects that are simply not designed to observe them, and as a result, our ability to explore the dynamics of concession in a systematic, comparative, and quantitative fashion remains limited.

With datasets designed to investigate the repression-dissent nexus, scholars are typically trying to understand the relationship between the incidence of contentious events and the use of state repression. The resulting event data is ideal for observing protests and repressive responses that occur during them. These datasets are normally compiled from a corpus of daily news reports, usually international newswire services and databases like LexisNexis to maximize cross-national coverage[1] using keyword searches for terms relevant to protest types, such as *protest, rally, strike,* and *riot*. In studies of protest and contention in Russia, where media coverage may be censored or uneven, national daily event datasets have been compiled from special-interest websites such as *Marsh Nesoglasnikh* (March of the Dissenters, namarsh.ru) which focuses on the liberal opposition, *Konfederatsiya Truda Rossiya* (Confederation of Labor of Russia, ktr.su), which mainly

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[1]Bias in this source material is well-documented, including over-sampling of events in capitol cities and in areas of interest to Western media audience (Mueller, 1997).

covers labor protests, and The Institute of Collective Action (ikd.ru). Protest data has also been collected directly from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. This type of data typically provides a snapshot of an event. Reports of protest are usually filed during or immediately after a protest occurs, most often on the same day, and contain information about the topic of the protest, estimated turnout, and whether detentions or other more serious forms of repression occurred during the protest. Events that occur outside of this window (including longer-term repressions) are not systematically searched and recorded. As a result, these datasets cannot systematically observe concessions, because concessions are rarely made in during or shortly after a protest.

Concessions do not normally occur during protests. These are deliberative, bureaucratic actions. If an official were to want to interrupt a protest with the announcement of a concession, timing would make this difficult: protests only last a few hours, and, to maximize attendance, are not usually held during the work week. This means the concession would require an elaborate contingency plan, with the promised policy change prepared and authorized in advance, before the protest and any related information is observed. This might occur, if the government had an incentive to disrupt protests with concessions, but this is rarely the case. Submitting to popular demands makes the government appear weak, susceptible to popular challenge, and arbitrary. This does not mean that concessions are never mentioned in articles about protest, but varying journalistic house standards may mean that some news outlets never or always include government statements in their coverage of protests. Newswires may post multiple stories during a protest, but cover the following concessions separately, whereas a newspaper could summarize a week of protester-state interactions in a single article that is more likely to include concessions.

Perhaps in recognition of this, some contentious event datasets, like the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED)(ACLED, 2021) and PRIO's Urban Social Disorder dataset (Bahgat, Buhaug and Urdal, 2017) simply do not contain information about concessions. Some datasets do record when news reports mention concessions. For instance the Mass Mobilization Protest Data Project (Clark and Regan, 2016, hereafter, MM), includes the variable "Accommodation" which indicates "Accommodation of demands, indicated by agreeing, negotiating, etc.: this is indicated

by reports that the authorities met with protest leadership; that the demand was met or that the authorities agreed to take the protester demands up in a formal meeting." However, even when such variables are included, it is difficult to evaluate this information, because it is not the product of a search designed to systematically collect it. MM's data generation process uses the search string "Protest OR Demonstration OR Riot OR Mass Mobilization". These terms may be optimal to observe protest, but not concessions. The Central Asian Protest Tracker (Jardine, Khashimov and Lemon, 2020), produced from a wide array of region-specific sources not limited to newsmedia, includes separate variables for whether the protest target agrees to meet with protesters and whether the target promises to resolve the issue. Distinguishing these responses from concessions and from their potential effect on protesters is a welcome innovation and should be adopted by other data collection efforts.

It is not wholly fair to criticize these datasets for not doing what they were not designed to do. However given the fact that the literature often treats repressions and concessions as two sides of the same coin and regularly attempts to probe the relationship between them, it is significant that the datasets we use often do not contain meaningful information about one of the outcomes. Data about repression is collected in far greater exhaustiveness and detail than data about concessions. MM, for instance, separately records arrests, beatings, crowd dispersal, killings and shootings, without distinguishing between holding a meeting with protesters and meeting their demands. Though the turn toward automated coding has produced several large datasets in the last several years, these projects cannot correct for these problems. As a result, our assessments of the efficacy of protest in authoritarian regimes are likely inaccurate.

Correcting this data imbalance requires more than adding new sources and variables to contentious event data: it requires a different data structure. An individual concession should not be construed as the outcome of an isolated protest event—not least because, as discussed, concessions are rarely made in the middle of a demonstration. A concession is the result of the aggregate of previous events and activism. Events that immediately precede the commitment to concession may appear determinative, but concession are fundamentally linked to the smaller actions that precede

them and to the threat of continued future action as well as campaign-level features, like media attention and the size of the group affected by the grievance.

In addition to event history, then, features of the protest campaign are necessary to understanding when and why concessions are made. However, the complexity of studying campaigns, which may be sustained over periods of years and have national or even international reach, has made small-N or single case studies the methodological weapon of choice when analyzing protest campaigns. This has produced a large number of excellent, nuanced case studies but limited our ability to make cross-case inferences. Many of these cases are drawn from campaigns that successfully achieved their objectives, meaning we know less about the many ways in which campaigns fail. Further, many examine massive, national protests that can tell us little about lower capacity campaigns.

Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO), a dataset collected by Chenoweth, Pinckney and Lewis (2018), marks a great advance in this area. NAVCO contains data on maximalist resistance campaigns—such as those that sought regime change, the end to foreign occupation, self-determination and major social change—that used either violent or non-violent methods, from 1900-2019. NAVCO focuses on campaigns in part because "resistance campaigns involve much more than just events; the involve planning, recruiting, training, intelligence and other operations" that a focus on events would ignore (Chenoweth and Shay, 2020, 4). Campaigns are classified as failed, having limited success, or fully successful. Limited success is defined as achieving some "stated goals within a year of the peak of activities; the target makes concessions to the campaign or significant reforms short of complete campaign success", while success is defined as achieving "100% of its stated goals within a year of the peak of activities and the success was a direct result of campaign activities" (Chenoweth and Shay, 2020, 12). These variables are helpful for providing high-level perspective on concessions, but, as a necessity of campaign-level data, they obscure the more granular process by which those concessions were achieved.

In sum, concessions do not fit with daily event datasets, as they are not observed at the daily level, yet they are an outcome generated partly by protest events and that is highly linked to protest

events. Similarly, they do not fit into campaign-level datasets, as they unfold at a different temporal level, and may be constitutive of a campaign's success. Shoehorning concessions data into campaign or event datasets are second-best options, and systematic evaluation of campaigns success remains elusive.

3.2   Measuring Concessions

In recognition of this gap, I develop an original strategy for collecting and coding information about concessions. My approach takes into account that, first, concessions are inherently linked to both protest events and campaigns. As such, this strategy does not attempt to fold concessions into a pre-existing data structure, but rather produces one that is compatible with micro-level event data and macro-level campaign data. Second, my approach recognizes that the temporal dynamics of concessions demand that they be evaluated over time. As a result, this data structure is designed to take into account the potentiality of reneging.

Per my definition, a concession occurs when a government official makes a public or publicly reported statement in response to collective action that promises a policy change that would benefit protesters. Operationalizing this definition is relatively straightforward: a concession occurs when such a statement is observed. These statements can be observed in news articles (particularly if a campaign is large and has already received news coverage) but they are also visible in reports from activists to campaign participants, such as accounts of a meeting with officials, and in official government statements. Because identifying a concession does not require observing the outcome of the promise, making inferences about the government's purpose in making such a statement, or evaluating campaign success, it is possible to identify these concessions in "real time," as a campaign unfolds, as well as retroactively. In the following I elaborate on the criteria for observing a concession, then describe coding rules used to generate variables on the type of concession, proximity to campaign demands and policy implementation, from which reneging can be measured.

3.2.1 Identifying a Concession

Not every statement a government official makes can be classified as a concession. Statements must meet three criteria, which require additional knowledge of the context in which the campaign unfolds. First, the statement must be made in response to collective action. This may be evident from the content of the policy change being promised, because it addresses specific demands of the campaign, or from the context in which the promise is made, such as during a meeting with activists to resolve the grievance. In other cases, however, officials do not make a connection between a policy change and the campaign demanding that policy change, or may even deny that such a connection exists. In these cases, I recommend deferring to how campaign participants and observers with knowledge of the issue interpret the promise: if they understand it as a concession, it can be coded as such. I exclude the outcomes of legal action relevant to the grievance from this criterion, as well as government statements stating intentions to comply with legal rulings, as these are the outcome of judicial processes that operate differently from protest. However, depending on context, these might be included.

Second, a statement of concession must contain the promise of an actionable, specific policy change. This is necessary because it must be possible to identify what the government has obligated itself to do and whether or not it fulfills that obligation. This criterion distinguishes sympathetic acknowledgments of the grievance from concession. Generally, it also excludes vague promises to resolve the problem. There are, again, exceptions to this depending on context. First, there are instances where the words spoken by an official do not contain an explicit policy change but one is strongly implied by context, to the extent that it is generally believed by campaign participants that a specific policy change has been promised. For example, if in response to a direct question from an activist such as "Will you investigate the illegal construction permit?" the official replies "Yes", it can reasonably be understood as a commitment to undertake a specific action. Second, there are cases where the official promising the concession has exceptional power by virtue of their position and makes a general statement promising the full resolution of the grievance. This occurs most often when the grievance rises to the attention of the autocrat himself, and takes a form

similar to the vague statement previously described. For instance, in response to learning about the grievance, the autocrat may respond with "It will be taken care of" or similar. While not obligating the government to a specific policy change, it does obligate it to resolve the conflict and grievance.

Third, the government official delivering the statement must occupy a position that grants them the power to enact the promised policy change, or to speak on behalf of an entity that has such power. Members of opposition parties and officials at very low levels of government may be in fact unable to affect policies. Opposition politicians in particular may make promises to protesters that are very similar to a concession in form, but actually require that the politician to request members of the dominant party to make the concession. Another common issue pertains to conflicts that involve a non-government third-party that had a special relationship with the government, such as a religious body or a private companies that primarily hold government contracts. Commitments by these entities that are made as a direct result of negotiations involving the state, or at its direction, can be recorded as concessions. As always, knowledge of context is required.

3.2.2 A Typology of Concessionary Policy Change

Each concession is characterized by a specific promised policy change that may or may not ulti-mately occur. A policy change is an action that involves a typical series of steps and an observable result. Given the diversity of grievances, demands and possible government actions, the range of variation in promised policy changes is enormous. To aid in conceptualizing the common types of concessions, I identify five types of policy changes based on the core type of action required to effect the policy change. These types were developed inductively from demands made by protest campaigns in the former Soviet Union and concessions those campaigns were promised. The types of policy changes are *Reform, Enforcement, Investigation, Distribution*, and *Recognition*. Exam-ples of each type of policy change are available in appendix A.

- **Reform:** Formal modification, ratification or repeal of new or extant laws, policies, rules, or procedures. These are formal policy changes that relate to laws and policies as they are written, not as they are actually practiced or enforced.

51

- **Enforcement:** Change in how existing laws and policies are used or enforced, without altering how those rules are formally written. These concessions involve the informal use of rules, laws and policies, as well as decisions about when and to what degree enforcement of formal laws should occur and whom they should apply to.

- **Investigation:** Official investigative inquiry into events or persons, via administrative or criminal investigation and related outcomes such as indictment, tribunals, committees, special investigations, or reports.

- **Distribution:** Disbursement of material benefits, either directly, through changes to economic policies, or the enforcement of existing economic policies. These can be public goods that would benefit a large share of the population, or they can be particular to the protesters. They also encompass both micro- and macro-economic concerns.

- **Recognition:** Consult or hold meetings with affected citizens in the future.

3.2.3 Proximity of Concessions to Demands

In the course of analyzing the efficacy of collective action, it is often of interest to understand the extent to which the grievance that motivated the campaign is ultimately resolved. Concessions can be part of that resolution, when the concession addresses the heart of the campaign. This is not, however, always the case: many concessions do not resolve the underlying grievance. Some concessions address very minor elements of a grievance, leaving the overall problem unchanged, while others benefit campaign participants without altering the grievance in any way. Quantifying how closely the concession hews to addressing a campaign's demands allows us to answer questions about the extent to which the government submits to collective action, when it attempts half-measures, how often it makes unrelated but still beneficial commitments and so on. In this section, I explain how I classify the concessionary promise's proximity to campaign demands. This variable can be used to analyze the extent to which concessions are effective at resolving grievances.

First, the campaign's demands must be identified. Ideally, this can be done using official statements or resolutions put forth by the campaign, text on a campaign website, or transcripts of speeches at rallies. Using this information, the *core demand* can be identified and distinguished from other demands. The core demand is the central concern motivating the campaign, which, if addressed, would eliminate it. It is the one-sentence answer to the question, "What is this campaign about?" It may appear in the name the campaign uses to refer to itself, and is the demand that most commonly appears on placards at demonstrations.

Analyzing campaign demands is challenging because demands tend to evolve over the lifecycle of a campaign. Demands may grow more numerous as the campaigns develops, or can be scaled back to more attainable goals. This can be a response to changing prospects for "success" or to evolution in the grievance itself that displaces earlier demands. Further, there is variation by campaign in how formalized demands are. Some campaigns have a fixed set of specific demands, while others issue a new resolution with each event, lack formal agreement on a set of demands, or never publish an official list of demands. For this reason, although quantities such as the number of demands may be of interest, it is unlikely to capture meaningful variation.

Consider the hypothetical example of a campaign called "Against Raising the Pension Age," which issues a resolution demanding that the pension age not be increased, the head of the pension fund be removed, and that pensioners receive discounted fares on public transit. As evident in the campaign's name, its core demand is that the pension age not be increased. The two additional demands are ancillary to that core demand.

Using this information and knowledge of the motivating grievance, each concession based on three factors: 1) whether the concession addresses the core demand; 2) whether the concession addresses an ancillary element of the main grievance; and 3) whether the concession addresses an demand explicitly expressed by the campaign. These factors produce four observable types of concessions, represented in table **??**.

Core concessions are an answer to the core grievance that produced the campaign. A core concession, if fully implemented, would demobilize the campaign by eliminating or undermining

Table 3.1: Proximity of Concession to Demands

	Core Demand	Ancillary Demand	Expressed Demand
Core	✓		✓
Subcore		✓	✓
Adjacent		✓	
Wildcard			

its motivating grievance. Subcore concessions correspond to ancillary demands that are formally expressed by the campaign but would not eliminate its core grievance. Returning to the example of the hypothetical "Against Raising the Pension Age" campaign, a core concession would be a promise not to increase the pension age, whereas a subcore concession would be a promise to discount transit fares for pensioners. Adjacent concessions pertain to the grievance but do not correspond to a demand expressed by the campaign; they represent the state attempting to mitigate the grievance in its own way. For instance, a concession distributing a small monthly cash sum to pensioners that would pay for a limited number of transit journeys. Finally, wildcard concessions are in some manner beneficial to campaign participants but do not correspond to an expressed demand, and are tangentially related or not related to the grievance. A wildcard concession to "Against Raising the Pension Age" might be the organization of a Pensioners Appreciation Day.

A final caveat: Proximity to demands should not be interpreted as a measure of acceptability of concessions to campaign participants. "Acceptability", though interesting to consider, is difficult to operationalize and harder still to measure, not least because participants in protest are diverse and have heterogenous opinions on what is acceptable.

3.2.4 Measuring Policy Implementation and Reneging

A concession is not simply the promise of a future policy change; it also encompasses the implementation of that policy change. Assessing this is essential for understanding the contexts in which reneging occurs, but not only. Monitoring how the implementation of a concession unfolds can also generate insight into how the government manages obstacles to policy change made in

response to collective action, for instance internal opposition or capacity issues.

Implementing policy change is a process that takes place over time, meaning that it must be evaluated at multiple points in time. Moreover, because reneging can occur after a policy appears settled, the policy must be evaluated past the point where the outcome appears fixed. It is this temporal feature that truly makes a concessions-specific dataset, which can capture panel data, necessary.

To assess implementation over time, research into the promised policy change must be conducted. In many cases, this research must be conducted in addition to other efforts to observe collective action or the activities of a campaign. The objective is to assess what actions have been undertaken by the government to change the policy, with attention to the specific commitment that the government has made. This may entail recording actions undertaken by the government to make implementing the concession impossible. In particular it is important to collect the dates on which milestones of implementation occurred, or to form estimates of them.

It is common for campaign participants to attentively follow the implementation of the concession and report updates to each other. These individuals are deeply invested in their causes and in many cases communicate extensively about them on social media, from posting communications with government officials such as official letters or reports of conversations, to documenting with photographs of relevant sites, to checking in with each other about receipt of benefits. It is possible these sources are biased and under-estimate the extent of the government's effort or the implementation of the concession; indeed, it comes as no surprise that campaign participants are often highly critical of the government's response. When possible, their reports should be corroborated with other sources. Government documents are preferred, however news reports, data from online mapping services, reports from industry-specific outlets, NGOs such as labor watchdog organizations, or other sources as the concession demands, should also be used. When researching concessions to everyday protests, which are often centered on low-profile grievances, the media—including independent media—may not be particularly helpful, because policy change may lack a defined "event" that can be reported on. When campaign participants and government assessments of im-

plementation conflict and no additional information is available, I defer to campaign participants'.

For the data collected here, I researched policy change implementation for a period of up to four years whenever possible. This period was selected to provide sufficient time for the government to implement the policy change, which mainly occurs within the year following the promise, and to assess the longer-term maintenance of that policy change. In other words, observing this extended period it possible to observe reneging. In some cases, data was collected about concessionary promises that were still within the four year period; these were evaluated up to the time at which data collection occurred. All concessions had been promised at least one year prior to data collection. In some cases, the concessionary promise obligates the government to complete the policy change within a specific timeline. Unless the policy change is implemented within this window and later reneging is theoretically possible, I do not evaluate it moving forward. For example, commitments made to a campaign against the 2018 World Cup FanZone were not assessed after the end of the World Cup.

Based on this information, I generate panel data by evaluating the implementation of each concession at three-month intervals for the first year following the statement, and at yearly intervals thereafter. I selected the three-month interval for the first year because during that period, the most progress on the concession could be expected, yet at the same time daily or weekly information is often not available. At each interval the policy change is scored as having most, some, limited or negligible level of implementation or effect on real-world policy. Criteria are summarized in table 3.2. When the implementation score changes within a time period, the score that is in effect for the majority of the time period should be used.

0 and NA codings are used where implementation cannot be scored. This occurs in several scenarios. I do not score implementation where fulfilling the commitment made in the concession has become impossible. An example of this is a concession where the government promised to do something immediately, but did not do it for more than three months. After three months, a the "immediate" component of the concession is no longer achievable. As another illustration, if the government promises to prevent the destruction of a property or object, but the destruction subse-

Table 3.2: Evaluation of Policy Change Implementation

Score	Description
1	Concession has no or negligible implementation, no effect on policy. *No evidence suggests that the government is working to change the policy, or the government has taken steps to make the policy change impossible.*
2	Concession has limited implementation. *One or a few steps associated with the commitment have occurred.*
3	Concession has some implementation. *Considerable aspects of the commitment are realized.*
4	Concession is mostly or totally implemented, effects policy as promised. *Commitment is fully realized.*
0	Concession is clearly in progress and implementation cannot be assessed.
NA	Assessment of implementation not logically possible.

quently occurs, that concession is no longer scored. Conversely, concessions that were completed, such as the repayment of wage arrears, were not scored after that completion. Also, concessions that were invalidated by other concessions, making their fulfillment impossible, were not scored; promises from higher-ranking officials or with more accelerated timelines are two examples of concessions that might supplant others. Last, I do not score concessions where efforts to enact the concession were conceivably underway but could not be observed, and that unobservability did not violate the commitment in the concession itself. As an example, the campaign against the renovation project earned concessions that would alter the terms of the resettlement of citizens in new apartments, but it was several months before the program officially began and it was evident whether the government completed the changes as promised. On average, about 65% of concessions are scored for implementation in any given period.

This index has two important limitations. First, scoring implementation requires expert but to some extent subjective judgment. In practice, cases of full reneging or full implementation are easily identifiable: it is almost impossible to mistake one for the other. The border between the middle two scores, limited and partial implementation, is somewhat less clear—although it is likewise unlikely that concessions might mistakenly be coded at this level when they are in fact fully implemented or fully reneged on. As the coding of implementation relied on expert

knowledge that I acquired in researching these campaigns and Moscow City politics, I was the sole coder and unable to conduct any inter-coder reliability tests. For empirical analysis, these scores can be operationalized in a number of ways to correct for this, if desired, including rescaling to a three-level scale. Measures of reneging, discussed below, are designed to minimize this potential source of error.

Second, this scale does not capture deliberateness. Reneging, as I have defined it, is a deliberate strategy to avoid implementing promised concessions. To use this implementation data to measure reneging, then, I must assume that the level of implementation is also deliberate. This scale, and indeed the data available to researchers, cannot convey whether implementation is observed at a certain level because of a deliberate attempt to block the concession, or for some other reason, like a sluggish bureaucracy. The scope conditions of a high-capacity state were designed to minimize this issue, as the state has the resources to change policy and distribute public goods in principle. Moreover, in collecting data the concessions promised by the Moscow City government, I never encountered a commitment that the government did not have the power or capacity to implement, nor did I discover cases where campaign participants, the media or the government blamed the failure to implement a concession on overpromising beyond the government's capacity. Typically, its commitments were soundly achievable. Many concessions only require that an institution properly perform the function it was designed for. In interviews with activists in Moscow, subjects also believed that the government generally had the capacity to implement its promises; as one activist, who had served in local government and ran a program that trained others to become engaged in civic politics said, "I do not know of a single case when they sincerely wanted to do something and did not."[2] The assumption of deliberateness is highly plausible in Moscow.

In the following empirical analysis, I operationalize my data on implementation to measure reneging by creating an indicator of whether, at any time in up to four years following the concessionary promise, no or negligible elements of the concession were in effect (i.e. if at any point, the observed level of implementation was 1). This indicator was selected to avoid excessive reliance

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[2]Interview with civic activist, September 24 2019.

on the precision of measurement of implementation. This measure can be thought of as partitioning concessions where nothing or nearly nothing was done, and from those where some effort was evidenced. As such, it is among the weakest possible definitions of reneging. If officials were indeed making an effort to implement concessions but were prevented from doing so by exigent factors, the incidence of reneging, per this measure, would be relatively low, since it captures cases where the government has made no apparent attempt to implement the concession. In fact, as I demonstrate in the following chapters, that scenario is quite common.

3.3 Protest Campaigns of Moscow Database

In this section I introduce the three interrelated datasets, of protest events, concessions and campaigns, that together comprise the Protest Campaigns of Moscow Database (PCoM). PCoM covers events, concessions and campaigns held in Moscow, Russia, about grievances that the Moscow City government had the authority to resolve, from September 12, 2013 to September 18, 2018, a time period that corresponds to Mayor Sergei Sobyanin's second term in office. The three datasets are linked by a campaign identifier that allows the user to connect information across the three levels and aggregate or disaggregate as analysis demands. PCoM includes 66 campaigns, 122 concessions and 795 protests.[3] In focusing on a single, salient case over a limited time period, PCoM serves as a pilot for a larger data collection effort and a template for future expansion. In the following, I describe the method of searching for campaigns, concessions and protest events, coding, and then compare the data to other available data about protest in Russia.

3.3.1 Data Collection and Coding

To identify a sample of campaigns, I searched the websites of four news outlets that reported on protests in Moscow: *Marsh Nesoglasnikh* (March of Dissenters), a liberal opposition website;[4]

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[3]A number of protest events appear multiple times in the protest event data, a result of collaboration across campaigns. PCoM contains 677 unique events.

[4]*Marsh Nesoglasnikh* (March of Dissenters), http://namarsh.ru/

Kommunisti Stolitsi (Communists of the Capital), a site for non-KPRF leftists in Moscow;[5] articles tagged with the "Rallies and Marches" tag in the archives of the newspaper *Kommersant*[6] and *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty'*s (RFE/RL) English-language newswire.[7] A key purpose of both March of the Dissenters and Communists of the Capital is the promotion of protest events. These sources were selected to provide coverage of activism from the liberal-democratic and leftist extra-systemic opposition as well as from mainstream sources. From these four sources I created a preliminary database of all protests in Moscow during the period in question, which contained approximately 550 observations. I then grouped these protest events into campaigns, based on grievance. From this campaign list, I identified those organized around issues that the Moscow government had the authority to resolve independently of the national government and of private actors, based on my knowledge of the case and additional research as needed. This excludes campaigns over national policies, except when the grievance pertained to the city government's local implementation of national policy. In reality, the Moscow government does not operate independently of the national government or other private interests, however I impose this restriction to ensure that the full range of responses, specifically concessions, were available to the government in principle in each case. Campaigns that were solely against private or non-state entities were also excluded. This process yielded the 66 campaigns that appear in PCoM.

I then compiled timelines of the activities of each campaign and relevant events. My objective was to create as exhaustive a record as possible of each campaign during the 5-year period of concern. To do so, I did not rely on news sources. First, it had become clear during the first phase of data collection that formal news outlets reported on protest with considerable less frequency than activist-oriented websites. *Kommersant* and RFE/RL were both affected by this problem, suggesting that the issue is not censorship, but newsworthiness.[8] Many local protest events are

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[5]*Kommunisti Stolitsi* (Communists of the Capital), http://comstol.info

[6]textit"Arkhiv - Federal'nyye izdaniya - Mitingi i shestviya", Kommersant, https://www.kommersant.ru/archive/theme/366/month/2017-12-01

[7]"Newsline", *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, https://www.rferl.org/Newsline

[8]Major news outlets do not report on all protests. They are more likely to cover new movements, where a large turnout is expected, where violence seems likely and the participants are not typically seen at protests (Interview with Moscow correspondent from major American newspaper, July 2018).

simply too small and too niche to interest the general public. For example, the mass filing of complaints at government offices and single-person pickets constitute about one third of the events directed to the Moscow government, as observed in PCoM, but these are almost never reported by the media. Still, these events are visible to activists and the government, so their missingness from data may be problematic. In light of this I consulted a wider, more flexible set of online sources. I relied on digital venues where citizens congregated to discuss their grievance, organize collective action, and monitor the city's response. While these documents are not fact-checked as a newspaper article would be, they provide more comprehensive information about campaigns before they hit the media's radar. Where possible, I triangulated using multiple sources.

For each campaign I consulted approximately 25-200 Russian-language sources. I relied on those that served activists and citizens affected by specific grievances where possible. My primary sources of information were social networking communities on Facebook and VKontakte, blogs (mainly LiveJournal), websites set up by the campaign to chronicle their activities, and activist clearinghouse sites like Activatica.org and Mossovet.tv. I also used state affiliated and independent news media; interest group-specific news sources; neighborhood or topic-specific initiative group websites; message boards; online petitions such as Change.org and Demokrator.ru; OVD-Info, an independent organization that collects information about protest detentions; mapping services from Google and Yandex; and other sources. A full record of archived webpages will be available online when the data is released.

Digital censorship is a concern in Russia, however it likely had minimal effect on my source material. First, online censorship in Russia is less severe than in other authoritarian states such as China. While several concerning laws have been passed recently (Human Rights Watch, 2020) my data collection largely pre-dated these measures, as did most of the campaign activities I was researching. Online censorship in Russia is largely clustered around highly politicized issues, largely relating to political freedom. Everyday protests are both insufficiently politicized and likely too low-profile and low-capacity to warrant censoring. Second, the digital communities I observed rarely complained of censoring or information takedowns. Some did report online harassment,

such as DDoS attacks, but these are short-lived and did not impact my ability to view source material. In a focus group with protest participants conducted in December 2018, respondents actually complained that their online organizing was not subject to greater censorship by the state, because such repression would indicate that they had the government's attention.

Independent of censorship, several campaigns had set up websites to document their work but did not maintain the domain registration, which prevented me from accessing that information. In these cases, I was typically able to rely on social networking communities. Other campaigns organized in private groups on social media, which, given that they were small, neighborhood-focused groups, I did not attempt to join. These groups still promoted their events and discussed their activities on accessible websites about activism in Moscow.

Of course, I can never know what information I was unable to observe. Despite this PCoM still represents a significant improvement over datasets of protest in Moscow compiled from newsmedia sources, and is likely the most granular protest data ever collected for the city.

From these timelines, I coded three datasets: protest events, concessions and campaigns. The protest event dataset records events for each campaign, held between September 12, 2013 and September 18, 2018. My objective was exhaustive documentation of all events. No threshold for participation was imposed. Event types include the mass filing of complaints, demonstrations, marches, strikes, individual unsupported pickets, coordinated simultaneous individual pickets or serial individual pickets, full pickets,[9] sit-ins and occupations, blockades, riots, self-mutilation and hunger strikes, published open letters, physical signature collection campaigns, the in-person submission of petitions, leafletting, and bannering. Other events not fitting these categories but constituting protest were recorded. Where an event likely occurred but could not be verified (e.g. an event announcement but no documentation of its occurrence or cancellation could be located),

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[9]In Russia, single-person pickets are legal without a permit. Protesters exploit this by holding two types of events that I call coordinated simultaneous individual pickets or serial individual pickets. In a coordinated simultaneous individual picket, picketers stand 50 meters apart, relying on the legal definition of a single-person picket. At a serial individual pickets, protesters take turns being the picketer, sometimes queuing up for their chance to hold the sign. Coordinated simultaneous individual pickets and serial individual pickets are therefore actually collective events, whereas a single-person picket is not. A full picket, where multiple protesters stand close together holding placards typically in front of the entrance to a government building or other contested site, requires a protest permit. I classify these three types of pickets separately to capture this variation in legal status and coordination.

it was coded and indicated as unverified. While some campaigns held events before and after these dates, for many campaigns, most activity was concentrated in this five-year period. Information on each protest's participants, location, permit status, turnout, tactic, grievance and demand, as well as the incidence of over 20 forms of repression were also coded. The expansion of sources meant that the protest event dataset is significantly larger than the initial data collection: the number of observations rose from 170 local protest events to 795.

Concessions for each campaign were identified and evaluated per the process described in the previous section. Finally the campaign dataset aggregates information from both the protest event and concession dataset with additional variables such as the use of appeals to the president, mayor, deputy mayors or other officials; campaign use of legal action and petitions; the prosecution of participants on charges related to protest; and statements of support from government actors, and more.

3.4   Campaign Descriptives

In the next three empirical chapters, I provide multiple case studies and examples of the protest campaigns observed in this data. However, to contextualize that analysis I briefly describe the campaign-level data here to situate the types of grievances that generated everyday protest from 2013-2018. Table 3.3 summarizes the types of campaigns included in PCoM.

Under the mayoralty of Sergei Sobyanin, the government of Moscow has prioritized urban development by expanding the city's network of highways and roads, expanding the metro system, introducing paid parking, revitalizing public parks, developing new residential construction, and renovating degrading housing stock, which includes a massive program to demolish 5-story apartment buildings and resettle residents in newly constructed high rises. These initiatives gave rise to protest, most saliently where public land, for instance in parks or apartment building courtyards, was requisitioned for development. Additionally, the Moscow government is responsible for providing social services, which did not expand as rapidly as residential real estate. The city

has struggled to reduce a decades-long waitlist for subsidized housing, resolve conflicts over the de-privatization of industrial housing, and prevent its contractors from absconding with workers' wages. A spate of problems with wage arrears was ushered in by the financial crisis from 2014-2016 that followed the annexation of Crimea and international sanctions. Also during this period, the Moscow government implemented national policies on reorganizing the educational and medical sectors, which liquidated dozens of institutions.

There were few overtly political campaigns against the city government. Those campaigns classified as political were policy-oriented, for instance against the installation of a massive monument to St. Vladimir on a fragile hillside near Moscow State University. PCoM records no campaigns whose primary demands were the resignation of Sobyanin or the dissolution of his government for two reasons. First, anti-regime campaigns that would likely include such demands were classified as national and not coded. Muscovites tend to see Sobyanin as a local manifestation of the regime, rather than a personal locus of power, meaning that replacing him would change little. Second, while a few events were held under the banner of a lack of confidence in Sobyanin and other members of his government, under the period of consideration these events were never organized by a campaign devoted to this goal. These demonstrations were one-off gatherings that united smaller groups of urban activists on diverse issues from around the city to raise awareness for their campaigns; opposition to Sobyanin was their only common cause.

These everyday protests do not account for all protest that occurred in Moscow. PCoM excludes protests targeted to the national government. These protests constitute a major share of protest in Moscow, and certainly most (if not nearly all) of the city's larger protests from 2013-2018. These campaigns were organized around grievances such as the Putin regime and human rights in general, the conflict in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea, political prisoners, and repressive laws, such as those affecting internet censorship. On the socio-economic side, campaigns targeting the national government launched protests against the 2018 law raising the pension age. These are not included in this data. Local everyday protest campaigns are therefore unfolding in a broader environment of protest. At the same time, everyday protest campaigns are to some extent inde-

Table 3.3: Total of Concessions per Campaign by Type

Topic	Examples	Campaigns	
		n	%
City Labor	Non-payment of wages by City or its direct contract--ors; poor and/or unsafe working conditions	15	23%
Construction	Construction of apartment buildings in public parks; densification via construction in courtyards; demolition of architectural landmarks	26	39%
Healthcare	Closure of hospitals and clinics in healthcare sector restructuring	1	2%
Education	Difficulties enrolling children of non-registered parents in kindergarten; closure of school for the blind	3	5%
Highways	Construction of Northwest Chord highway; construction of roadway through local park	2	3%
Housing	Extremely long waiting lists for housing benefits; evictions associated with unresolved ownership of workers' hostels	6	9%
Political	Construction of Orthodox temples as part of 200 Churches program; harassment of street musicians using anti-protest laws	8	12%
Renovation	Demolition of Khrushchev-era apartments and re-settlement of residents into new high-rises	2	3%
Transportation	Elimination of historical trolleybus lines; introduction of paid parking in residential areas	3	5%

pendent of these campaigns. National campaigns typically protest at sites of significance to the national government, such as the State Duma, whereas local everyday protesters are more likely to protest at the Moscow City Duma. Local everyday protest is also more likely to be held at sites that are visible to Muscovites but not necessarily to the national media; there are a number of squares outside metro stations across the city that are common sites of permitted protest. Additionally, the responsive agents differ between these two types of protest. Definitionally, national protests require a response from the national government, while local protest does not. The repressive agents that respond to national protests are also more likely to be forces specialized in protest policing, while the agents responding to local protests are normally police.

3.5 Representativeness of PCoM

Though PCoM draws on a diverse set of sources and aims to capture the maximum number of everyday protest campaigns against the Moscow City government, some campaigns have inevitably been excluded. The representativeness of this sample therefore warrants examination. Further, although Moscow differs from the rest of Russia in important ways, it is worth considering the extent to which protest in Moscow is consistent with or departs from collective action in Russia at large.

The most comprehensive dataset on protest in Russia, the Lankina Russian Protest Event Dataset (Lankina, 2018), exploits a major datasource on which PCoM is built. In light of this I use protest data from a report issued by the St. Petersburg Politics Foundation for the Development of Public Relations, which covers January 2016-July 2017 (Vinogradov, 2017). The St. Petersburg Politics Foundation is a government-allied organization. The purpose of this report was to provide a survey of the major sources of discontent and protest around the country and the forms of government response that can be used to resolve it.

The report documents 737 protests over a roughly 18-month period. Each protest is classified in the report by topic and subtopic. To facilitate comparisons to PCoM, I recode the topic for each protest in Moscow in St. Petersburg Politics Foundation data to comport with the grievance types used in PCoM. Figure **??** graphs this comparison. First, the distribution of protests recorded in both datasets is roughly similar. PCoM includes a greater share of protests about construction than does the St. Petersburg Politics Foundation data, however this may be because PCoM covers a longer time period. PCoM also records more protests classified as political. The low share of political protests in the St. Petersburg Politics Foundation data is consistent with the fact that there were few overtly political protests in Moscow during the five-year period PCoM covers.

Figure 3.1: Comparison of protest in Moscow observed by PCoM and Pro-Government Think Tank

PCoM: September 2013 - September 2018; St. Petersburg Politics Foundation, January 2016 - July 2017

3.6 Conclusion

In this section I have demonstrated an approach to the systematic collection of data about concessions, an overlooked yet centrally important response to protest, and described the data collection for PCoM, a database about everyday protest activity in Moscow, Russia. In the next three empirical chapters, I analyze these three linked datasets. In Chapter 4, I present a theory of how the grievance-generating process structures the government's treatment of everyday protest campaigns. I test related hypotheses using the campaign-level data, with dependent variables generated from the concessions and protest-level datasets. In Chapter 5, I explore the relationship between concessions and mobilization. In order to do so, I demonstrate how the concessions data can be transformed to be incorporated into a daily event catalog when analysis requires it. Last, in Chapter

6, I focus on he concessions data, to identify which of the variables described here made be most associated with various outcomes of implementation.

CHAPTER 4

The Dynamics of Everyday Protest

A lot of situations could be avoided if the officials representing the Moscow Mayor's office could listen to the people who ask them to.

— *Interview with a park defender, Moscow, September 2019.*

What the Moscow authorities are really good at is systematically destroying what they have decided to destroy.

— *Tat'yana Vasil'yeva, correspondent for* Communists of the Capital, *writing about the optimization of health care in Moscow, 2015.*[1]

In Chapter 2, I argued that the strategic value of concessions and reneging to authoritarian governments has been under-recognized. Alongside this, less highly politicized protest campaigns about specific policy issues—which I call everyday protests—have been overlooked as well. Rather than making revolutionary demands, everyday protests often ask that the government protect the rights of protesters, provide them with services, or incorporate their opinions into its programs. These policy-driven protests constitute a distinct politics that supplements the consultative governance that is characteristically deficient in autocracies.

These gaps in our understanding are linked: everyday protests, with their concrete policy demands, are potentially favorable candidates for concessions, even in authoritarian settings that militate against the inclusion of public input into policies. Concessions provide several potential

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[1] Vasil'yeva (2015)

benefits to the government: the demobilization of a troublesome protest campaign; the opportunity to redress a grievances that could produce negative impacts longer term; an occasion to incorporate citizens' demands into policymaking without liberalizing elections or other potentially destabilizing reforms; and the enhancement of the image of the government or regime as "democratic" or responsive. Reneging provides its own strategic benefits. With reneging, the government reaps the benefits of a concession without actually deviating from its desired policy course. Essentially, reneging can allow the government to have its cake and eat it, too.

Despite these benefits, it is not clear how often this strategy is used. The report on protest from the St. Petersburg Politics Foundation referenced in the last chapter details the pros and cons of strategies that government agents in Russia can use to respond to protest. The argument against concessions states that "it is better that we demonstrate excessive strength and cruelty[2] than concede to some power. It is not terrible to look unpopular or to poll negatively [*prityagi-vayushchim antireyting*]. It is much worse to look weak." (Vinogradov, 2017) Repression may be more straightforward for the government to execute, though it risks inciting further protest. As the report notes, "increasing pressure" can forcefully demonstrate who holds power, but the downside is that "in Russia, the government itself usually creates the protest agenda itself" (Vinogradov, 2017). Further, high-capacity, consolidated authoritarian regimes continually develop and hone tools of popular control that allow them to coerce without violence. Other strategies discussed in the report include ignoring protest, "intercept the protest agenda through the imitation of dialogue," exacerbating splits among protesters[3] and delaying a decision on the issue (Vinogradov, 2017).

In this chapter, I ask how a high-capacity consolidated authoritarian government responds to everyday protest. How are concessions and repression used, and with what relative frequency? What underlying features of everyday protest explain variation in the government's response? Are everyday protests an effective avenue to resolve grievances under autocracy?

I begin by detailing my theory of everyday protests. I argue that everyday protest dynamics are determined by the institutional factors that generate different types of policy grievances. These

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[2]*zhest'kost* can also be translated as rigidity or inflexibility.
[3]Interestingly, the report notes that the have "neither the experience nor the leverage for this" (Vinogradov, 2017).

grievances, in turn, form the basis of protest campaigns. While not all policy grievances give rise to protest, those that do vary along two key dimensions: grievances related to new/changing policies, about which the government has higher information, and grievances related to status quo policies, about which the government has lower information. Protest campaigns that are organized in response to the former are about *policymaking exclusion*, and those that respond to the latter are campaigns about *policy performance*. Campaigns about policymaking exclusion form when the government deliberately limits public input in the formation of new policies and accepts the risk that doing so may cause protest. Campaigns about policy performance arise when an existing policy breaks down or fails.

Different types of protest campaigns elicit different responses from the government. Because campaigns about policy performance convey new information about issues with existing policies that can worsen if left unaddressed, concessions should actually redress those concerns. As the St. Petersburg Politics Foundation report recommends, concessions should be used when "[t]he protest action is a consequence of obvious shortcomings, which were not given due attention" (Vinogradov, 2017). Repression against these campaigns should be lighter, designed to signal the boundaries of acceptable protest behavior.

On the other hand, campaigns about policymaking exclusion emerge in cases where the government pursued a new policy regardless of popular support. Rather than conveying new information, protests against policymaking exclusion obstruct policy implementation. Concessions can be used to remove that obstruction, by undermining mobilization. Simultaneously, the use of comparatively more severe repression raises the costs of participation and further depresses mobilization. The government can then use this window of reduced mobilization to renege on promised concessions and implement the policy as initially planned. While the St. Petersburg Politics Foundation report does not discuss this strategy, it does recommend using delays in resolving a situation to "to wait for the concentration of protest activity to decrease, while taking all the necessary formal actions that will look neither like weakness [i.e. concessions] nor administrative pressure [i.e. repression]" (Vinogradov, 2017).

I assess this theory using a mixed methodology. I begin by classifying the protest campaigns in PCoM as policymaking exclusion or policy performance, and validate this classification with an analysis of campaign tactic choice. I then illustrate the campaign types with two empirical examples, which provide preliminary support for the hypothesized government responses. Next, I use regression analysis for hypothesis testing.

I find that concessions were promised to both types of campaigns with regularity: on average over the five-year period, the Moscow City government promised everyday protesters a concession approximately every two weeks. Many of these promises, however, went unfulfilled. Reneging affected 44.6% of all promised concessions. Campaigns about policymaking exclusion were significantly more likely to experience reneging, with almost half of the concessions promised to these campaigns having, at some point, no real impact. I also find that, in line with expectations, policy performance campaigns are met with less intensive coercion, characterized by threats and warnings. In contrast, policymaking exclusion campaigns face high intensity coercion, in the form of violence by police or non-state actors or via the police's failure to protect protesters from non-state actors.

4.1   A Theory of Everyday Protest

4.1.1   Policy Grievances and the Authoritarian Information Problem

Everyday protest campaigns are a response to policy grievances. These campaigns arise when a policy produces or threatens to produce an unacceptable outcome for a group of people, who then protest to demand that the policy be altered with a concession. The use of concessions is structured by the institutional settings that produce those policies and translate them into grievances. Two factors are key here: first, whether the policy is being altered by officials when the grievance arises, and second, whether the government has sufficient information to anticipate popular resistance to the policy.

In general, a policy cycles between a phase of *policymaking*, and a phase where the policy

is *status quo*. The policymaking phase includes any modification to the policy, such as the initial formulation, amendments and alteration, and ultimately, cancellation. In policymaking, the government could be regulating a new area, amending a law, moderating the reach of an existing policy, creating a new program, or taking a new position. Because it is a deliberate act, a policy only enters a policymaking phase when government officials choose to consider modifying it. Once policymaking is concluded, the policy becomes status quo, and is part of the day-to-day standard rules and procedures of governing. A policy might shift between these phases multiple times over its lifecycle.

In each phase, policy grievances arise from different sources. During policymaking, grievances often arise when citizens find proposed changes to the policy unacceptable. That may be due to a desire to preserve the current policy, to avoid anticipated negative outcomes, or to alter the policy in a way that better suits their preferences. Grievances against status quo policies typically center on issues of deficient policy performance. It is important to note that even in the absence of intentional policy modifications, status quo policies still evolve over time. This occurs because of institutional drift (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010), breakdowns in the enforcement, or other developments that cause a mismatch between the policy and real world conditions. While not a sufficient cause, the existence of a policy grievance is necessary for an everyday protest campaign to emerge, as these campaigns focus on policy-specific objectives. Put simply, policy grievances sometimes produce protest.

Before proceeding it is worth considering why the government may find everyday protests undesirable, if they are not regime-threatening, as I have argued. Everyday protests can still have negative effects, even if they are unlikely to destabilize the regime. Responding to protesters' concerns can require considerable time and resources. Protests are inconvenient: they interfere with policy change, obstruct policy implementation, and spotlight the government's failures. These consequences might cost officials their positions, affect elections, aggravate elite divisions, or even undermine regime legitimacy. Finally, though the risk that an everyday protest escalates to a national campaign might be low, it is not zero: in 2019 in Russia, protests in solidarity with opposition

73

candidates who were excluded from a municipal election in Moscow were held around the country.

Additionally, officials have a range of reasons to monitor policies that are unrelated to protests. First, even autocratic governments must provide a baseline of quality of governance to sustain the economy and mitigate political instability. This is important in high-capacity consolidated authoritarian regimes, for whom prestige as international economic and cultural power is increasingly important. Second, assessments of policy performance aids in the monitoring of lower-level agents. The need for this type of information has been identified as particularly acute in China (Lorentzen, 2013). Third, when policies go awry, they are grist for the mill of the opposition and may drive people to seek alternatives to the status quo. In the former Soviet Union, for instance, support for autocracy is regularly attributed to "performance legitimacy," or the government's ability to provide employment, social services and other goods (Cook and Dimitrov, 2017). Poor governance outcomes can undermine that legitimacy (Zhao, 2009).

To avoid these consequences, the government should attempt to determine when policy grievances and everyday protest might emerge. This anticipation allows the government to preemptively redress the grievance if it desires, including for the purposes of averting protest. Alternatively, anticipation allows the government to pursue a strategy of deliberate non-response and allow the grievance to persist, because the desired policy change is worth it. Forming these expectations, however, requires information about grievances and protest propensity. In autocracies, this type of information is notoriously difficult to observe, because the use of repression suppresses the regime's ability to collect it accurately.

Known as the authoritarian information problem, this issue arises from two sources. On the individual behavioral level, fear of sanction prevents some individual citizens from publicly expressing dissent, and leads them to falsely represent support for the regime in public, what Kuran (1997) terms "preference falsification." At the institutional level, the use of repression throttles institutional channels, such as elections and the independent media, that could function to aggregate information (Wintrobe, 1998). These conditions suppress the quality of information available about regime support, which makes it exceedingly difficult to anticipate revolutionary protest

74

campaigns. This is because support for the regime is among the most sensitive, and therefore dangerous, information that one might hope to gather in any autocracy.

While the authoritarian information problem is important, it is unlikely to seriously undermine a high-capacity regime's ability to collect information on policy grievances.. First, the extent to which preference falsification affects opinion polling may be limited in Russia. In 2015, Frye et al. (2017) used an anonymous list experiment to assess how much of Vladimir Putin's approval rating, which for the preceding 15 years had hovered between 65% and 90%, was falsified. They found that even when anonymity was assured, support for Putin was approximately 80%, which was within ten percentage points of the approval rating estimated with direct questioning. Moreover, preference falsification is a function of topic sensitivity: the more sensitive a topic, the more likely a survey respondent is to lie. Many policy issues that the government may wish to gather information are not sensitive. For instance, respondents to a survey about the planned implementation of paid street parking in their district have little reason to fear they might be repressed for answering honestly.

On an institutional level, although democratic-type institutions that gather citizen feedback are characteristically flawed in authoritarian regimes, some are more flawed than others. Some institutions may be fully repressed or coopted while others function relatively well, and this can change over time. For example, since 2008 the Beijing government has increasingly encouraged the development of non-oppositional civil society, as a supplementary source of consultation (Teets, 2013). High-capacity regimes are aware of the information problem and able to establish institutions and mechanisms to acquire information on important topics. Nathan (2003, 14) identifies "input institutions...that people can use to apprise the state of their concerns" as a key pillar of the enduring legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. These input institutions are often developed through local experimentation, based on the local government's needs (He and Thøgersen, 2010). Examples range from maintaining offices where citizens may submit individual complaints to conducting polls to holding regularized consultative meetings. In China, Teets (2014) has termed this system "consultative authoritarianism". All high-capacity authoritarian governments have the capacity to

assess the need for more information and choose when to activate these institutional solutions to address that need. Finally, flawed institutions still convey some information, just with added error. For instance, turnout at authoritarian elections often serves as a barometer of regime support, though the vote share may be fraudulent (Magaloni, 2006; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009). Greater density of institutions in a policy area can compensate for the flawed operation of any individual institution. When more institutions provide some information about opinion, the government can roughly estimate the level of negative opinion about a policy. In contrast, when institutions are sparse, the quality of information that each provides matters more. When sparse institutions are dysfunctional, the government is more likely to have insufficient information about policy grievances.

4.1.2 A Typology of Everyday Protest

Variation in citizens' willingness to report opinions, institutional effectiveness and institutional density means that in some — but not all — cases the government has sufficient information to anticipate policy grievances, and therefore everyday protest. If the government has sufficient information to identify a grievance with a status quo policy, it should generally intervene to address that issue before protest occurs. Grievances with status quo policies indicate governance approaches that were once adequate may no longer be so. These issues with policy performance will persist regardless of the occurrence of protest, and redressing them now allows the government to avert undesirable consequences in the future. The government may reevaluate a program, make personnel changes, take emergency measures or initiate a policy change to eliminate the problem. This kind of policy maintenance is a central part of governance in general, irrespective of regime type, but is especially common in high-capacity states, which have developed and well-resourced bureaucracies. As a result, fewer grievances with status quo policies should persist to the point that everyday protest emerges.

There are scenarios in which the government lacks sufficient information to anticipate grievances about status quo policies. Some business-as-usual policies are not closely monitored

and may be evaluated only when a problem demands attention. Even then, officials may suppress negative information to protect their positions. Further, institutions that collect information on grievances with existing policies frequently rely on citizens to initiate complaint processes that are complicated and resource-intense; moreover, complaining may incite retaliation. When citizens do file complaints, the government may not react until many complaints are received. Thus the information environment around status quo policies may be afflicted by missing information and sparser, lower quality information. Protest campaigns over a deficient status quo policy may break out before the government has identified the existence of a grievance. I call these *protest campaigns about policy performance*, as these protests focus on unrecognized problems with the performance of status quo policies.

Government officials do not always want to remedy a policy grievance. Authoritarian governments implement policies that run counter to subjects' preferences as a matter of course, not simply because of insufficient information. The associated risks may be tolerated if the policy serves higher priorities, for instance implementing the autocrat's agenda, retaining political control, or generating income for elites and allies. Given that failing to achieve these aims can lead to the loss of position and licit or illicit income for a government official, the decision to move forward with an unpopular policy may not be a difficult one.

During the policymaking stage, information about grievances is comparatively abundant. Policymaking is a deliberate process that the government initiates and manages. It requires officials to gather and assess information. Officials might use surveys, community meetings, consultations with experts and lower level officials, among other resources. If existing sources of information are insufficient, officials can allocate resources to improve that information or delay the policy change. Thus, during policymaking, information institutions are likely to be denser and higher quality, and that policy grievances are more likely to be observed and protest to be anticipated. That anticipation does not mean that an authoritarian government will catering to popular demands by eliminating the grievance. Instead, the government may actively exclude popular input from the policymaking process, and move forward allowing a known grievance to persist, even at the risk of protest. I call

these *protest campaigns about policymaking exclusion*, because they emerge when the government deliberately excludes citizens' opinions during the policy change process.

Table 4.1: Ideal types of everyday protest campaigns and expected incidence in high-capacity consolidated autocracies

	Information	
	Insufficient	**Sufficient**
New/Changing Policy	Few	Many
		Policymaking Exclusion
Status Quo Policy	Many	Few
	Policy Performance	

In sum, the grievances that produce everyday protest can emerge during policymaking or when the policy is part of the status quo. In some cases the government has sufficient information to identify the grievance and assess the risk of protest, whereas in other cases, information is insufficient. These institutional factors yield two ideal types of everyday protest campaigns: campaigns about policy performance and campaigns about policymaking exclusion. Table 4.1 summarizes expectations for the observed incidence of everyday protest campaigns. Note that these expectations apply in high-capacity consolidated autocracies, as these regimes have an advanced ability to detect and, if desired, correct policy grievances before protest is observed. In a lower capacity regimes, everyday protests may be distributed across the four quadrants of the typology, rather than concentrated in the diagonal.

4.1.3 Government Response to Everyday Protests

Just as distinct types of grievances produce these ideal types of protest campaigns, features of the grievance affect how the government responds. Though much work on autocratic response to protest emphasizes the goal of immediate demobilization, that goal depends on the assumption that protests are threatening. If protests serve other functions, the regime may use them as an opportunity to advance other objectives. After all, high-capacity regimes can pursue multiple goals simultaneously, and in complex ways. The actors who respond to protest balance the desire

to eliminate troublesome collective action with long-term regime objectives, such as maintaining a baseline quality of governance, and personal goals, like serving elite interests. This means the strategic use of repression, concessions, or both

4.1.3.1 Concessions

Policy performance campaigns serve an informational function: they convey new information about deficiencies with existing policies, that the government has difficulty observing otherwise. Depending on those deficiencies, their severity and long-term consequences, the government may wish to change the policy—in other words, to make a concession. While this has the effect of remedying the protest-generating grievance, it also protects the government's longer-term interests. Problems with policy performance may worsen down the road; addressing them early avoids later headaches. For example, when workers building Moscow's new metro lines went on strike to protest unsafe working conditions and construction shortcuts, meeting their demands potentially decreased the risk of later accidents once the line was operational—or at least reduced officials' exposure to later accusations of negligence; I return to this campaign later in the chapter. In other instances, making concessions over policy performance allows the government to correct earlier failures to meet its own standards and expectations. These campaigns expose instances where status quo policies have not performed as planned, providing embarrassing evidence of government incompetence. Overall, concessions to policy performance campaigns that eliminate the policy grievance should be common. They should be more likely to address the core grievance that motivated these campaigns, rather than an ancillary aspect of it. Finally, these promises should in fact be fulfilled as promised, rather than undermined by reneging, because they align with the government's long-term goals.

Policymaking exclusion campaigns arise against policies that the government has chosen to pursue in spite of anticipated opposition. When protest actually emerges, it confirms expectations, rather than conveying new information. This means that, generally speaking, policymaking exclusion protests do not impact the government's desire to pursue a given policy. Instead,

these protests obstruct the government's policy agenda. Eliminating this obstruction drives the government's desire for demobilization. Concessions can advance that goal in the short-term, because the promise of a concession—separate from its realization in policy — makes mobilization more difficult to sustain. Some protesters may believe a successful outcome has been reached, others may see it as a bargain that demands the suspension of protest, and yet others may be confused about whether further protest is needed.[4] Recruiting new participants to a campaign also becomes more challenging. This disruption means protests are less likely to interfere with the unpopular policy change that the government desired—the very policy it may have just promised not to implement. With protest weakened or suspended, the government can renege, or deliberately fail to implement the promised concession. Counterintuitively, by promising concessions, the government is better able to achieve the initial policy change as desired.

H1: Governments promise concessions at a similar rate to campaigns against policy performance and campaigns against policymaking exclusion.

H2: The concessions promised to policy performance campaigns are more likely to address the core grievance that motivated the protest.

H3: Concessions promised to policymaking exclusion campaigns are more likely to be undermined by reneging than concessions to policy performance campaigns.

4.1.3.2 Repression

How should the government's use of repression against everyday protest campaigns vary? Similarly, the severity of repression should vary by campaign type. I follow Way and Levitsky's (2006) distinction between high-intensity and low-intensity coercion. High-intensity coercion en-

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[4]Interviews with activists in Moscow corroborated this, see Chapter 6.

tails more visible and more violent acts of coercion against well-known figures or large groups, and more generally other acts involving highly visible anti-democratic behavior. To this I add that high-intensity coercion requires greater coordination among repressive actors, such as police, non-state actors, prosecutors, judges, the penal system and beyond. Examples of coordinated repression abound in the annals of authoritarianism, from the persecution of individual activists like Saudi Arabian women's rights activist Loujain al-Hathloul, to national crackdowns as in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square protests in China.

In contrast, low intensity coercion is characterized by less visible and generally less violent repression. It is designed to curb challenges before they escalate. Low intensity coercion includes surveillance, harassment and short-term detainment of the opposition. It also does not require significant coordination between repressive actors. For instance, a detention may be the result from the choices of a single police officer. This is particularly true in authoritarian regimes, where restrictions on freedom of assembly create myriad opportunities for police to identify violations of the law at protest events.

Because costs rise as repression becomes more intense, the government should use high-intensity coercion with discrimination.I assume that this decision is a function of expected duration of the campaign. Typically, policy performance campaigns have a limited lifespan, because the government intends to eliminate the underlying policy grievance. Still, protest may continue until that happens, so lower-intensity coercion ensures that protest does not escalate and remains within the bounds of acceptable dissent. In contrast, the government does not plan to eliminate the grievances that inspire policymaking exclusion campaigns. These campaigns are therefore potentially long-lasting. Concessions can achieve short-term demobilization, but they may not fully eliminate a campaign—an issue I elaborate on in the following section. Protest can return once concessionary promises are betrayed. Even if the campaign loses the capacity to hold demonstrations, tactics like blockades and hunger strikes only require a few participants to obstruct policy implementation and raise awareness of the campaign's cause. High-intensity coercion can be targeted to increase the costs that these stalwart activists pay for protesting.

H4: Governments use low intensity coercion against policy performance campaigns, and high intensity coercion against policymaking exclusion campaigns.

4.2   Classifying Everyday Protest Campaigns

The independent variable is campaign type, or whether a given campaign is about policymaking exclusion or policy performance. Per my theory, this classification is based on whether the grievance arose against a policy that was actively being altered, and the availability of information about that grievance to the government. In this section, I describe how I classify the 66 campaigns in PCoM as policymaking exclusion, policy performance or neither. This process yields 40 campaigns about policymaking exclusion, and 22 about policy performance. I then validate this classification by comparing the incidence of protest tactics designed to obstruct policy change and protest tactics meant to convey new information.

Grievances arise around policies that are in a phase of policymaking, or around policies that are part of the status quo. Identifying whether a policy is in a policymaking phase is relatively straightforward. A policy is in the policymaking phase when it is being drafted, amended, altered, cancelled, or otherwise subject to a deliberate change. Examples include the calibration and enforcement of a new utility tax for repairs to housing stock, the decision to close several health clinics, and the decision to permit construction at a particular site. This last example deserves further scrutiny, as construction generates a significant share of protesters' grievances. I classify the permitting of land development, land seizure, demolition, problems related to the particularities of planned construction and the actual construction itself as grievances arising in the policymaking phase. Though these issues are not normally considered policymaking per se, they do represent the government taking a deliberate action (e.g. making a decision about land use) that alters the status quo ante. The example in this chapter of the For Ramenki! campaign and the case study in

Chapter 6 of Save Park Dubki! both illustrate conflicts over land use and development.

I classify grievances as arising around status quo policies if the grievance pertained to the violation or insufficiency of an existing policy or issue, with no evidence of a recent government-initiated change in that policy, and no articulation by the campaign of a recent government-initiated change in that policy. For example, campaigns against the non-payment of wages or housing disputes were classified as arising against status quo policies.

Measuring the availability of information to the government is more complex. Uncovering what government agents knew what, when they knew it, and what they did with that knowledge is challenging for a single case, on a single issue, in an open government; PCoM contains 66 cases on diverse policy issues, from an authoritarian government. I use proxies to estimate the information available to the government. Because the institutional setting depending on whether a policy is being changed or in place as part of the status quo, I use different proxies to identify information in each phase of the policy's lifecycle.

When policies are changing, avenues for gathering information are abundant. Broad-purpose sources, like Moscow's polling website or surveys, are well suited to measuring support or opposition in direct questioning about new policies. New policies are also subject to approval processes that can entail consultation with working groups, citizen roundtables and other experts. For construction projects, public hearings are required for local residents to voice concerns. Many municipal policies, from construction to the allocation of social services, affect a known population, concentrated in a specific area or neighborhood. This makes localized survey work or focus groups possible. Municipal deputies from that district can monitor the sentiment and hold meetings with affected citizens. Other new policies affect well-defined and accessible populations, for example users of a particular transport network or members of a professional sector, who can easily be consulted. Overall, policy change is likely to occur in an information institution-dense environment.

However, this proliferation of consultative mechanisms can pose a problem for a government agent who wants to implement his desired policies without taking citizens' opinions into account. First, collecting information about citizens' opinions can be perceived by citizens as consultation,

which creates the expectation of government responsiveness. When that feedback is subsequently not incorporated into policy, it can generate an undesirable backlash. Second, consultative institutions give citizens advanced warning about the upcoming implementation of an unpopular policy, providing ample time to organize against it. Finally, the government learns from past opposition to its policies. There are situations where a negative response from the public should be expected as a baseline reaction, though questions about the intensity of opposition may remain. For instance, medical workers were unlikely to support a 2014 restructuring of the healthcare system that was planned to eliminate thousands of jobs, nor could residents of the Khoroshevo-Mnevniki neighborhood be expected to support the construction of a new highway under the windows of their apartments. If opposition is anticipated, the added investment of time and money into gathering information, given the aforementioned downsides, may not be pursued. In all these cases, the government may deliberately manipulate, misuse or avoid consultative institutions that interfere with their goal of policy implementation. By avoiding consultative institutions, the government can prevent citizens from learning of a new policy until it is in effect or irreversible, when resistance is significantly more difficult or even impossible. To be clear, the deliberate misuse or avoidance of consultative institutions does not indicate that the government lacks information; rather, it indicates that it has sufficient information to expect that the policy in question is unpopular enough to generate some opposition.

For each campaign in PCoM, I recorded whether protesters identified the absence of consultation or the abuse, manipulation and misuse of existing consultative institutions as part of the grievance. Many campaigns explicitly incorporated the absence of consultation into the overall framing of the campaign. Examples include barring citizens from entering the auditorium of a public hearing, changing the time and place of public hearings or failing to announce them so citizens cannot attend, claiming that permit hearings for a project were held ten years prior, conducting fraudulent surveys, and passing a policy that exclusively impacts a specific group of professionals without consulting them or organizations representing their interests. This operationalization risks including cases where consultation did occur as required and citizens disgruntled with the

result misrepresented the government's behavior. While I cannot be sure that this did not occur, I would expect that it affected a small number of campaigns. In many cases, documentary evidence, such as photos from public hearings where violations occurred, was circulated among campaign members. Moreover, these violations were discussed in detail on social media sites and sometimes multiple corroborating accounts were presented. I did not encounter any evidence that campaign members conspired to misrepresent the government's adequate use of information-gathering mechanisms. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine why a campaign would fraudulently use this framing, as it would be easy for the City to demonstrate that proper channels had been followed, and therefore to discredit the campaign.

Considering policies that are part of the status quo, the information environment is markedly different and widely varied. Status quo policies are incredibly numerous; they essentially constitute all laws, regulations, programs and so on that are not actively being updated at any given moment. Many status quo policies are monitored and evaluated on a regular basis. This is particularly true in a high capacity state. Thus in most cases, status quo policies are situated in a sufficient information environment that allows the government to resolve policy grievances before they produce protest.

Yet even the highest capacity state cannot fully eradicate policy grievances; it is unavoidable that some problems with status quo policies will slip through the cracks. That should happen particularly often when the institutional mechanism to collect information requires citizens to voluntarily report problems. These institutions can fail in a number of ways: citizens may not be aware of them; complaint processes can be complicated and resource-intensive; citizens may fear retaliation for complaining; the institution may fail to aggregate related complaints to identify a larger issue; and officials within the institution may deliberately conceal information that implicates themselves or their allies in misbehavior. These problems should be ameliorated when an organization exists to advocate for complainants. Organizations, such as unions or advocacy groups, help reduce the cost that individuals are subjected to for reporting problems, from providing guidance on navigating the process to protecting individuals from retaliation. These groups can also aggregate complaints themselves, negotiate with the government, and support collective

bargaining.

In light of this, I assume that the government should have sufficient information about status quo policies when at least one organization exists that both the government and the affected group see as legitimate to aggregate grievances. This criteria is violated in one of three ways. First, an organization exists that is recognized by citizens but not by the state; for example, people involved in housing disputes often turn to the Movement of Moscow Hostels for support, which lacks legal status and therefore is not an entity the government collaborates with. Second, the organization is state-approved but illegitimate in the eyes of citizens. Most official labor unions fall into this category; for instance, the Trade Union of Healthcare Workers of the Russian Federation is the largest and oldest registered union for healthcare workers, however it offers little resistance to government policies, even when they violate workers' interests. The campaign against the restructuring of healthcare in Moscow was organized by the independent Interregional Professional Union of Health Workers "Action". Finally, no organization may exist, meaning that information is only collected when citizens volunteer it to the government. A campaign over the difficulty of enrolling children without local residence permits in kindergartens across the city is an example.

Table 4.2: Classification of observed everyday protest campaigns (n=66)

	Information	
	Insufficient	**Sufficient**
New/Changing Policy	3	40
		Policymaking Exclusion
Status Quo Policy	22	1
	Policy Performance	

Using these operationalizations, I classify the 66 campaigns in PCoM. Table 4.2 shows the distribution of campaign types. As expected, most campaigns were classified as about policymaking exclusion or policy performance. One campaign[5] was observed in the status quo policy/sufficient information condition. Three campaigns[6] were classified as changing policy/insufficient informa-

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[5]This campaign was a strike by ambulance drivers that involved their official union.

[6]Of these campaigns, two strongly resemble policy exclusion campaigns, but activists never explicitly complained about consultation (in one case because the campaign held only one event). The remaining campaign was against a political firing at a university.

tion. The four campaigns are dropped from analysis.

4.2.1   Validation of Campaign Types

I have contended that everyday protest campaigns about policymaking exclusion and policy performance arise in meaningfully different informational settings. If this is the case, everyday protesters—who are incredibly well informed about their grievances—should be aware of how those conditions influenced their policy grievance and calibrate their tactics accordingly. Thus, to validate whether these types capture salient variation, I consider the campaigns' choice of protest tactics.

Policy performance campaigns occur when the government lacks sufficient information about grievances to redress them. If this missing information problem is truly at the root of these campaigns, protesters should use tactics that exploit institutional pathways to increase government information. The most direct avenue to doing so is filing complaints with government offices *en masse*. This tactic entails a group of aggrieved individuals visiting a local or federal government office and demanding to be seen by an official who can formally record or resolve their complaint, or provide an update about its progress. A mass complaint is distinct from filing a petition, in that the complainants are physically present in the space in a manner that is purposefully confrontational. Several dozen affected individuals may gather at once. They often refuse to leave until their complaints are submitted, sometimes leading to a sit-in, or attempts to overcome security and forcibly enter the building. These collective events aim to overcome the institutions that failed to detect the policy grievance and to provide a physical demonstration of the extent to which the policy has failed. Often, the targets are institutions that require engagement with arduous, individual filing processes for a complaint to be registered, like the Housing Inspectorate or the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection. Occasionally officials escape their offices through windows or backdoors to avoid dealing with the issue.

Meanwhile, policymaking exclusion campaigns arise in high information conditions. Tactics that convey information about the grievance are less necessary, because campaign members should

87

expect that the governments has disregarded their opposition to the changing policy. Instead of using tactics like complaint-filing, policymaking exclusion campaigns should use tactics that obstruct the implementation of the policy change. Blockades are particularly effective at impeding construction projects, as protesters place their bodies between crews and worksites; in several cases these tactics have delayed construction for years. Protesters also use blockades to stop traffic on major streets outside prominent government offices.

The difference in usage of these tactics across campaign types is striking. The 22 policy performance campaigns held 38.3% of protest events overall, but accounted for 80.7% of the mass complaints. Policy performance campaigns deployed this tactic 167 times in the five year period that the data covers. Policymaking exclusion campaigns were far more likely to blockade. These campaigns were responsible for 61.7% of all events, but held 88.6% of all blockades. Policy performance campaigns held only five blockades over five years.

This difference in choice of protest tactic is also statistically significant. Figure 4.1 is a coefficient plot of a series of negative binomial regressions assessing the relationship between everyday protest campaign type and counts of the incidence of each tactic. Controls were also included for the total number of events that the campaign held and the logged average turnout at demonstrations, marches, strikes and pickets. (See appendix B for full regressions results.) Policymaking exclusion campaigns were significantly less likely than policy performance campaigns to use the mass complaint tactic, the focus of which is conveying information to the government. Instead, policymaking exclusion campaigns were significantly more likely to resort to blockades to interfere with the implementation of unsupported policies.

The differential use of tactics by these campaigns supports the proposition that fundamentally different process produce the policy grievances that underlie them. Policy performance campaigns, which are a response to a policy about which the government has limited information, are significantly more likely to try address that deficiency by filing mass complaints. Conversely, policymaking exclusion campaigns are far more likely to use tactics that obstruct because these campaigns object to the government's attempt to implement an unacceptable policy change.

88

Figure 4.1: Everyday Protest Campaign Type is Correlated with Tactic Choice

Policymaking exclusion campaigns are more likely to use blockades than policy performance campaigns. Negative binomial regressions with 95% confidence intervals. Reference campaign type is Policymaking Exclusion. For full results see Appendix B.

* Models include control variables for total number of events and log of average turnout at demonstrations, marches, strikes and pickets.

4.3 Everyday Protest Campaigns: For Ramenki! and the workers of Mosmetrostroy

To illustrate the variation in the ideal campaign types and to provide preliminary support for the hypothesized government responses, I provide examples of each campaign type here. For Ramenki!, a policymaking exclusion campaign, began in 2014 in opposition to the city's decision to construct a multi-lane roadway through a local park. The strike at Mosmetrostroy—whose name is an acronym of "Moscow Metro Builders"—broke out in 2014 over wage arrears and is a typical policy performance campaign.[7]These examples draw on the case histories I compiled that are the basis of the coding in PCoM. Both campaigns received a fair amount of coverage in the media, but the sources I use here are largely from activists themselves. The case study of For Ramenki! relies on the LiveJournal blog the campaign maintained; many posts were written by the local municipal deputy who led the campaign. In presenting the strike at Mosmetrostroy, I draw on updates from a

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[7]Mosmetrostroy was privatized in 2010, however its primary client is the city of Moscow and the company holds billions of rubles in government contracts (Liauv, 2011). As one worker explained, "Metrostroy is Moscow, is [Mayor Sergei] Sobyanin!" (Torocheshnikova, 2016).

site that monitors social and labor conflicts, run by the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia and the St. Petersburg Humanitarian University of Trade Unions[8] as well as accounts from liberal-opposition media.

4.3.1 Policymaking Exclusion: For Ramenki!

Ramenki is a neighborhood located in Moscow's Western district, near Moscow State University (MGU). In 2013, local residents discovered a plan to construct a multilane roadway through a small park when the tender for the project was posted (Arkaun, 2013). The proposed road was in the vicinity of five kindergartens and three schools, and the fact that many children crossed through the park to get to school, but would now have to cross a multilane road led the campaign to coin the project the "killer road" (*doroga-ubiytsa*). This location also made the area subject to special urban planning regulations that activists believed disallowed the construction of the road (Arkaun, 2015*d*).

Activists noted violations in the legally-required public hearing process. By June 2014, the campaign was sufficiently concerned that hearings would be held during the summer holidays that they began submitting requests to the prefecture administration and the mayor's office that they guarantee the hearings would not be held until September(Arkaun, 2014). Through 2014, the campaign filed complaints and requests at the City Prosecutor's Office, the City Property Department, the City Department of Construction, the Mayor's Office, the Ministry of Construction and the Presidential Administration, and filed a petition with over 2,000 signatures (This list is not exhaustive, additional complaints were filed later with other agencies). After some delays, public hearings were announced on July 16, 2015, again during the summer holidays when many residents were away (Arkaun, 2015*e*). The timing was ultimately irrelevant because these hearings were not in fact held. Their absence became central complaint of the campaign.

Construction equipment was moved onto the site on August 4, although permits had not been issued and proper land surveying had not occurred (Arkaun, 2015*c*). Members of the campaign

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[8]*Sotsial'no-Trudoviye Konflikti* (Social-Labor Conflicts), industrialconflicts.ru

demanded that workers produce permits (a common tactic for delaying construction, as it requires work to stop until police can verify the documents) and were shown permit documents for a different plot of land (Arkaun, 2015c). Construction began at the end of August, although according to the campaign no hearings had been held, no permit secured, no approval from the district prefect had been issued, and no sign-off from the Department of Education on the proximity of the road to the schools has been made (Arkaun, 2015b). Any one of these issues would make the project illegal.

In sum, then, by the time construction began on the killer road, the city had two years' worth of information about local opposition to this project. During that time, it had also taken steps to avoid gathering more information, by preventing the holding of public hearings where locals would have the opportunity to detail their opposition to this project. This is typical of a policymaking exclusion campaign.

By September, residents had organized a round-the-clock watch to ensure that illegal construction did not proceed (this common tactic is discussed in greater detail in Chapters 5 and 6), and blockaded the site with their bodies on several occasions. Additional protests were also held. In response, dozens of private security agents dressed in black paramilitary uniforms began patrolling the site (Arkaun, 2015a).

Shortly thereafter, the campaign received a response to the complaint it had filed with the Presidential Administration that officially suspended construction "until the issue is resolved" (Regnum, 2015). However, the campaign did not report evidence of any kind of investigation or effort to cancel the construction during this period. Activists were invited to a meeting with the developer and the "Moscow Urban Development Policy Complex", but ultimately, this was used as an opportunity to present the project, not to discuss the opposition or work out a compromise (Ramenki_Men, 2015a).

In an innovative turn, during this pause, the campaign funded and constructed a memorial monument to the neighborhood's heroes of the Great Patriotic War (World War II) in the park, and held a well-attended consecration ceremony (Ramenki_Men, 2015c). While the monument did appear

to have great value to the community, it could plausibly have been a strategy to delay construction. Victory in the Great Patriotic War and the sacrifices made to achieve it continue to be keenly important to Russian national identity and for many Muscovites.[9] For Ramenki! may have expected that the government would be hesitant to destroy a popular monument such as this. It is also telling that although Ramenki has many parks, the monument was built in the only one slated for destruction.

By November 2015, although the conflict had not been resolved per the Presidential Administration's commitment and no permit had been issued, the construction company returned to the site. Their strategy was to approach the park from a different geographic entry point that was less well-patrolled by residents (anna_nik0laeva, 2015). This initiated a two-month long stand-off between the builders, who attempted to move equipment onto the site and begin construction, and residents, who used blockades and flash gatherings to prevent them. The campaign did not receive the support of the authorities in ensuring that construction remained suspended; in fact, in December the local official responsible for construction in the district told activists that he had never heard of the order from the Presidential Administration (Ramenki_Men, 2015b). The official then called the police to assist in removing protesters from the site, rather than the builders who were there illegally.

The stalemate continued until February 2016, when activists were violently attacked. The incident began when workers refused to present permits, but according to a leader of the campaign, claimed that they had been "given a command from the city...to start construction and crush people" (Ramenki_Men, 2015a). Activists also reported that the police were apparently no longer interested in checking documents on the legality of construction (Ramenki_Men, 2016b). Several protesters blockading the site were hit with construction equipment, and two were hospitalized, while others were beaten by plain-clothes individuals that activists identified as private security. Activists reported the presence of 20 plain-clothes security agents and 40 police, against 30 activists (Ra-

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[9]In polling conducted from 1999 to 2017, victory in the Great Patriotic War was a source of pride for 82-89% of Russians, far more than any other achievement(Levada-Tsentr, 2017). Around the time that For Ramenki! installed the memorial, 68% of Russians identified as having a relative who died during the war (Levada-Tsentr, 2018). Additionally, during interviews I conducted with activists in Moscow, it was not uncommon for subjects to recount where in Moscow their relatives had died during the war.

menki_Men, 2015a). Police did not intervene to protect activists (Ramenki_Men, 2016b). Instead, four activists were detained.

By March, construction was proceeding. At a roundtable (without activists' presence) was held on March 3 on the fate of the citizen-funded monument to the Great Patriotic War, and a decision was made to relocate the memorial to a nearby military office (Ramenki_Men, 2016a). At this point, ceremonies had been held at the site of the monument and it had been recognized by the Commission for Monumental Architecture (Ramenki_Men, 2016a). Activists feared this meant the destruction of the memorial was imminent and prepared to organize an overnight watch to protect it, but construction crews surprised them by demolishing it in broad daylight, the following day (Ramenki_Men, 2016a; anna_nik0laeva, 2016e). Following this, residents mounted a few more protests, but construction had reached a point where locals felt the cause was lost.

The government's response to this policymaking exclusion campaign, launched in concert with the developer, featured promises of concessions with no evident effort to actually implement those promises, as well as high-intensity repression. A municipal deputy attributed the intensity of the repressive response and the city's investment in the road to another major development in the area (Radio Svoboda, 2016). Ramenki was formally targeted for the creation of a "tech valley" associated with MGU and at the instruction of President Vladimir Putin in 2015 (MSU.ru, 2019). Although the killer road predates the official start of the "tech valley" project, a representative of the Department of Construction admitted in Fall 2015 that the road would connect an elite residential housing to the "tech valley" (anna_nik0laeva, 2015). It bears mention that the company responsible for building the "tech valley" is associated Katerina Tikhonova, who is widely believed to be Vladimir Putin's daughter (Radio Svoboda, 2016).

4.3.2   Policy Performance: Strike at Mosmetrostroy

On July 20, 2017, approximately 70 laborers engaged in building the new Petrovsko-Razumovskaya metro station halted work in a one-day warning strike. Most to all of the strikers were employed by Mosmetrostroy. Strikers complained that they had not been paid for two

months of work, arrears had become a chronic problem, and they were responsible for work-related expenses like tools (Sotsial'no-trudoviyte konflikti, 2015c). These issues, coupled with other on-going issues with metro working conditions, threatened to create unsafe conditions for passengers (Torocheshnikova, 2016). Workers said that if their arrears were not resolved, a longer strike would be called.

Prior to the strike, Mosmetrostroy workers had filed a report with the Prosecutor's Office but did not receive a response (Vesti-Moskva, 2015). Additionally, workers reported that the trade union had been ineffectual in responding to the conflict, despite a union representative attempting to settle the dispute once the strike began. Workers stated, "This is all the initiative of the workers, not the trade union. And the trade union simply doesn't exist. It only collects contributions from us" (Vesti-Moskva, 2015). This is thus a case where both an existing policy—labor protections—and information-gathering institutions—the Prosecutor's Office and the union—failed to identify a grievance. Moreover, if unresolved, that grievance had potential to lead to negative consequences beyond the labor dispute itself, in generating safety issues and construction delays in the Moscow metro, which is one of the busiest in the world and which Mayor Sergei Sobyanin has prioritized expanding. The first deputy head of the Moscow Construction Department identified the situation as an emergency (Marsh Nesoglasnikh, 2015). These features are typical of policy performance campaigns.

The response to the strike was immediate. The General Director of Mosmetrostroy promised to pay the arrears in a televised interview (Vesti-Moskva, 2015). The city government held a meeting with representatives of the striking workers the following day (Sotsial'no-trudoviyte konflikti, 2015a). The Moscow Prosecutor's Office launched an investigation that identified unpaid wages to 900 employees and other violations of labor law, and ultimately compelled Mosmetrostroy to pay 52 million rubles in back wages along with 253,000 rubles in additional compensation (Sotsial'no-trudoviyte konflikti, 2015b). Mosmetrostry paid these back wages, although they failed to meet the delivery schedule. (Marsh Nesoglasnikh, 2015). Mosmetrostroy's ongoing financial difficulties (and eventual bankruptcy in 2018) made arrears a recurrent problem and led workers to attempt

to affiliate with independent trade unions to advocate for their interests (Torocheshnikova, 2016). Still, the specific promises that the workers received—that their wages would be repaid and investigation would be held—were fulfilled, even if they failed to eliminate the problem of arrears. Striking workers were not met with repression from the government, although some felt their wages were later cut in retaliation for the strike (Marsh Nesoglasnikh, 2015).

Though this campaign held only one protest event before receiving a concession, this is not unusual for strikes of government employees or employees of state-owned enterprises and major city contractors. In fact, it is consistent with the features of policy performance campaigns that I theorized above: these campaigns emerge around problems that the government would prefer to solve, had it had prior knowledge of them, to avoid escalating negative consequences in the future. A quick resolution obviates the need for more intense repression. However, the case of Mosmetrostroy also demonstrates that while the government uses concessions to resolve the immediate problem, that does not mean it takes steps to correct the underlying systemic issue. The strike at Mosmetrostroy occurred at a time when wage arrears were rampant (due to the financial crisis provoked by Russia's annexation of Crimea and subsequent sanctions) and were known to have affected many companies engaged in city-funded construction projects (NewsRu.com, 2015). The city's failure to address this problem likely stems from the fact that these companies are owned by oligarchs and in at times, former officials, and these construction contracts, which can be billions of rubles, generate enormous illicit income (RBK, 2015).

4.4   Quantitative Analysis

The case studies of For Ramenki! and Mosmetrostroy provide support for the hypothesized relationship between government response to protest campaigns and campaign type. I now turn to quantitative analysis to interrogate this relationship.

4.4.1 Dependent Variables and Controls

To aggregate data about concessions to the campaign level, I use the count of concessions that the campaign was promised between 2013 and 2018. To assess the quality of concessionary promises, I use a binary indicator to identify core concessions, which address the central demand expressed by the campaign (see 3.2.3). I measure reneging with an indicator of whether at any time in up to four years following the concessionary promise, no or negligible elements of the concession were in effect (see 3.2.4). To aggregate to the campaign level, the concession variables are summed.

To test hypotheses related to repression, I operationalize low and high intensity coercion as follows. Lower-intensity coercive acts are less violent and less visible, and do not involve the coordination of actors at multiple levels of government to achieve. To capture low intensity coercion, I use the count of protest events at which campaign participants were verbally threatened (e.g. reminded that they may be arrested if action continues) or implicitly threatened (e.g. disproportionate police presence) at least one event. (Note that this excludes intimidation that occur outside of protest events.) This variable relies on protesters' sense of threat or intimidation, as reported in their accounts of their events. It therefore captures a subjective impression of events. If no written account is available, I also identify a threat as occurring if posted photos emphasize police presence, such as photos of police watching protesters or photos of vans or buses for transporting detainees. These threats can be considered the lowest possible bar of repression; indeed, most other datasets do not document them despite collecting a large number of variables about repression.

To capture high intensity coercion, I consider forms of repression that result in visible acts of violence and/or require the coordination of multiple actors. First, I use the count of protest events at which a protester was injured. Injuries resulted from beatings by police, from aggressive detention tactics, and from attacks by non-state actors, for instance hitting protesters with cars or construction equipment. Second, I use a count of protest events at which police did not intervene to prevent non-state actors from harming or harassing protesters. Non-state actors include soccer hooligans, motorcycle gangs, counter-protesters, religious gangs, or private security forces. These groups may or may not be paid, and can appear at the request of the government, a third party to

the conflict, or under their own initiative.

Third, I use a binary indicator of whether a campaign member was indicted on a charge related to protesting at any point in the period covered by PCoM. Because detention is often used synonymously with prosecution or conviction, it bears underscoring that these are different phenomena. A detention occurs when an individual is taken into the custody of the police. The decision to prosecute a detained individual is a separate act, entailing collaboration between police and prosecutors. Many detentions do not lead to prosecution.[10] Normally prosecution relates to administrative charges that pertain to the legality of the protest event (e.g. holding or attending an illegal event) or disobeying police orders.[11] Penalties are typically fines but more severe consequences involve, for example, brief custodial sentences. Consequences escalate for repeat offenders, protest organizers and protest permit-holders, who may bear responsibility for the behavior of other protesters.[12] While it would be preferable to have more granular data about prosecutions, such as the number of individuals charged, the timing of those charges, and sentencing, collecting consistent data about prosecution is challenging. While the cases of political or anti-regime detainees are often closely observed, everyday protesters do not attract the same attention and may not publicize their case, seeing it as a private matter.

Although detentions are a common measure of repression and PCoM records the detention of approximately 500 individuals, I do not use detentions in this analysis. While detentions can indicate repression in general, my hypothesis requires that I discriminate between low intensity and high intensity coercion. This is impossible. Detentions can result from an of-the-moment, unsuper-

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[10]Many detainees are processed and released without charges, meaning the major consequence of the detention is a few hours spent at a police station and what Russian activists often call a "corrective conversation" or warning. Some activists, especially campaign organizers, are detained repeatedly, held for longer periods in worse conditions and subsequently prosecuted.

[11]The primary articles under which protesters were charged—Article 20.2 of the Administrative Code (20.2 KoAP RF), which governs violations of procedure for organizing or holding a demonstration, march or picket or similar event, or prosecution under other articles, and Article 19.3 (19.3 KoAP RF), which pertains to refusing to comply with orders from police or similar authorities—allow for significant discretion in sentencing. For instance, penalties associated with Article 19.3 are either a fine of 500-1000 rubles (less than $15) or two weeks of detention. Article 20.2 allows fines up to hundreds of thousands of rubles, but not detention. Both include escalating consequences for repeat offenders.

[12]In 2014, the consequences for violations of 19.3 and 20.2 were increased, see Federal'nyy Zakon ot 21.07.2014 N 258-FZ "O Vnesenii Izmeneniy V Otdel'nyye Zakonodatel'nyye Akty Rossiyskoy Federatsii V Chasti Sovershenstvovaniya Zakonodatel'stva O Publichnykh"

vised decision by police on the scene, which suggests low intensity coercion. They can also be part of a coordinated, sustained effort to repress a campaign or persecute certain individuals—evidence of high intensity coercion. Finally, detentions can arise from protesters' actions, such as the tactics that antagonize police or that deliberately violate the law. Here a detention would be better considered evidence of the enforcement of law and order rather than political repression. Appendix **??** presents regression results that support the absence of a defined relationship between the campaign type and detentions.

I control for factors that could contribute to concessionary or repressive state responses. First, the number of events the campaign organized during the five-year period, the log average turnout at events that require mass participation (demonstrations, strikes, marches and full pickets)[13] and the number of years the campaign conducted protests during the five-year period control for the campaign's overall organizational capacity and the number of people affected by the grievance. Binary variables indicate whether the campaign has held an illegal (non-permitted) demonstration and whether it organized at least one blockade or sit-in. (While policymaking exclusion campaigns blockade more often, policy performance campaigns held the majority of sit-ins.) To capture the salience of the campaign, I control for whether the campaign held at least one event at the Moscow City Duma, the seat of the Moscow City government. Finally, I include an indicator of the participation of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF). The KPRF is a sanctioned opposition party and the country's second most popular political party, with representation at every level of government. The participation of the KPRF in a protest could make concessions more likely, as it may lead to the elevation of citizens' grievances, and it may affect repression, particularly as the attendance of an elected politician at a protest in some conditions grants the gathering legal status. In models where the unit of observation is the concession, I also control for the total number of concessions the campaign was promised.

To investigate how features of the grievance affect contention, I use regression analysis. Unless otherwise indicated, I use quasi-poisson regression, as the dependent variables are counts with

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[13]To account for protest campaigns that never held an event that requires mass participation, meaning that the un-logged value of this variable is 0, I take the log of average turnout plus one.

limited dispersion. The independent variable, campaign type, is categorical. Throughout, the reference category is campaigns about policymaking exclusion.

4.4.2 Analysis and Results

4.4.2.1 Concessions

Above, I argue that everyday protest campaigns about policymaking exclusion and policy performance should be promised concessions at a similar rate; however concessions made to policy performance campaigns should be more likely to meet the campaign's primary demands, and should be less likely to be undermined with reneging.

Considering first the rate at which campaigns won the promise of concession, overall, 43 of the 62 campaigns were promised a total of 121 concessions. Eighty four, or 69.4% of these concessions were made to campaigns against policymaking exclusion, with the remaining 37, or 30.5% going to campaigns against policy performance. Of the 40 policymaking exclusion campaigns, 32.5% did not achieve the promise of a concession, whereas this number is slightly lower for policy performance campaigns, where 27.3% of the 22 campaigns were not promised concessions. The maximum number of concessions a single campaign received was nine, promised to a policymaking exclusion campaign against a city-wide housing renovation program. Figure 4.2 and table 4.3 provide summary information about the number of concessions promised to each campaign type.

Table 4.3: Total of Concessions per Campaign by Type

	Policymaking Exclusion	Policy Performance
n Campaigns	22	40
n Campaigns Promised Concessions	16 (72.7%)	27 (67.5%)
n Concessions	37	84
Avg Concessions per Campaign		
all campaigns	1.7	2.1
receiving 1+ concessions	2.3	3.1

Figure 4.2: Number of Concessions per Campaign by Type

At first glance, these data support the proposition that policymaking exclusion and policy performance campaigns are promised concessions at a similar rate. Policymaking exclusion campaigns on average received 2.1 concessions each, while policy performance campaigns on average received 1.7 concessions each. Pearson's Chi-squared test of the relationship between campaign type and the number of concessions does not suggest an association between these variables (χ^2 (7, N = 62) = 4.44, p = .73), nor for the binary indicator of receipt of a concession (χ^2 (1, N = 62) = 0.02, p = .89).

Figure 4.3 summarizes the results of regressing the campaign type on the number of concessions that each campaign was promised; full regression tables are presented in Appendix C. As expected, in no model specification is this relationship statistically significant. Of note is the fact that the rate of concessions appears unrelated to other control variables, with the exception of the number of events the campaign held, which is a positive and statistically significant effect. Turnout and the number of years the campaign was active did not have a significant effect. This suggests that concessions may partly be a function of a campaign's shorter-term capacity to mobilize and organize protest events, even if those events are not massive in scale.

Overall, concessionary promises hewed closely to campaign demands. 42.1%, the largest

Figure 4.3: Everyday Protest Campaign Type and n Concessions

There is no statistically significant difference in the number of concessions received by policymaking exclusion and policy performance campaigns. Dependent variable is the number of concessions. Quasipoisson regressions.

Reference campaign type is Policymaking Exclusion. For full results see Appendix C.

share of concessions promised to everyday protest campaigns, addressed the core demands of the protest campaign, with 33.1% addressing subcore demands, meaning that in total three quarters of promised concessions met a demand that the protest campaign specifically expressed. 21.5% of concessions promised policy changes that were adjacent to the campaign's demands and only 3.3% were largely unrelated to the campaign's concerns. This suggests that everyday protest campaigns indeed have the potential to affect governance in settings where traditional democratic forms of consultation are suppressed. Further, it demonstrates that concessions are distinct from patronage or transactional distribution: because everyday protest campaigns center on a specific problem, concessions that entail general financial or material benefits that did not redress the grievance were classified as wildcard concessions, which were rarely used. Last, the quality of these concessions provides perspective on the risk of protest diffusion. It is often assumed that the government should hesitate to grant concessions because other groups may be inspired to mobilize for similar benefits. This data indicates that the government of Moscow makes concessions that are tightly linked to

campaign demands, and therefore also particular settings and conflicts, rather than promising more generalized benefits. This likely lessens the risk of diffusion, by making concessions specific to unique features of the grievance, though more research is needed on this topic.

Which campaign is more likely to be promised concessions that actually address the underlying grievance? Figure 4.4 presents the relationship between everyday protest campaign type and quality of concession. 59.5% of the concessions promised to policy performance campaigns addressed the campaign's core demand, whereas only 34.5% of concessions promised to policymaking exclusion campaigns did so. Policy performance campaigns were about as likely to receive adjacent concessions that pertained to the grievance more broadly without corresponding to a specific campaign demand as they were to receive a core concession. Logistic regression models using a binary indicator of whether the campaign received a core concession (regressions are summarized in figure 4.5; full results are in Appendix C) also demonstrate that policymaking exclusion campaigns are indeed less likely to be promised core concessions, and that this relationship is statistically significant. In regression analysis on the 121 concessions, a concession to a policy performance campaign is more likely to be a core concession than a concession to a policymaking exclusion campaign; this relationship is also statistically significant (see Appendix C).

Table 4.4: Quality of Concessions per Campaign by Type

	Wildcard	Adjacent	Subcore	Core
Policy Performance	3	3	9	22
Policymaking Exclusion	1	23	31	29

Regardless of the quality of the promised concession, it will have little impact on real policies if reneging occurs. Broadly, reneging is common, affecting 54 of the 121 all concessions during this period, or 44.6%. Disaggregating by campaign type, 43 of the concessions promised to policymaking exclusion campaigns, or 52.1%, at some point had negligible impact on real policies. For policy performance campaigns, only 11 concessions, or 29.7%, were similarly affected by reneging.

Figure 4.4: Quality of Concessions per Campaign by Type

Percentage of all concessions that each campaign type received that addressed primary grievance that motivated the protest (core), secondary demands that the campaign expressed (subcore), aspects of the grievance about which the campaign did not make demands (adjacent), and unrelated issues (wildcard).

Regression analysis supports this relationship. I subset the data to include only the 43 campaigns that received at least one concession, as this is a necessary precondition for reneging to occur. Figure 4.6 summarizes regressions of campaign type on a count of concessions affected by reneging (for full results, see Appendix C). All model specifications point to a statistically significant relationship in the hypothesized direction. The total number of concessions that a campaign received is also positively and significantly correlated with reneging, indicating that as a campaign receives more concessionary promises, the less likely it is to see those promises realized. Similarly, in models analyzing the individual concessions, a concession to a policymaking exclusion campaign is more likely to have no real-world impact on policy and behavior, compared with a concession to a policy performance campaign; this finding is also statistically significant.

4.4.2.2 Repression

I expect that policymaking exclusion and policy performance campaigns experience repression at different levels of intensity. Policy performance campaigns, which arise around grievances the government intends to address, should be subject to low intensity coercion, as characterized by

Figure 4.5: Everyday Protest Campaign Type and n Core Concessions

Policymaking exclusion are less likely to receive core concessions than policy performance campaigns.
Dependent variable is an indicator of receipt of one or more core concession. Binomial logit regressions. Reference campaign type is Policymaking Exclusion. For full results see Appendix C.

threats and harassment. Policymaking exclusion campaigns, in contrast, should encounter high intensity coercion. These tactics include the use of violence against protesters, police inaction to protect protesters from non-state actors and the prosecution of activists on protest-related charges.

Figure 4.7 depicts the relative rates of repression used against the two types of campaigns, where the percentages capture the share of campaigns that encountered the use of that tactic at least once. Policy performance campaigns were most likely to receive threats or warnings, but these threats were comparatively unlikely to be followed by higher-intensity coercive methods. Policymaking exclusion campaigns were more likely to encounter two types of coercion that I identify as higher-intensity: the use of violence at protests, and the inaction of law enforcement to protect protesters from non-state actors. Both campaigns experienced the prosecution of campaign participants on protest-related charges at a similar rate, around one third. The experience of repression was not universal. Sixteen campaigns, about one quarter, encountered none of these four coercive responses, nor did they experience a detention.

Figure 4.6: Everyday Protest Campaign Type and n Reneged Concessions

Policymaking exclusion campaigns encounter reneging significantly more often than policy performance campaigns. Dependent variable is the number of concessions affected by reneging. Quasipoisson regressions. Reference campaign type is Policymaking Exclusion. For full results see Appendix C.

Figure 4.8 presents a coefficient plot summarizing regression analysis of the relationship between campaign type and these different forms of repression. Full regression results, using both binary and count variables where applicable, are presented in Appendix C.

I operationalize low intensity coercion as the occurrence of threats or warnings, which could be verbal, as in cues to disperse, or non-verbal, such as the presence of large number of police or transport for detainees at an event. Unsurprisingly given their low cost, threats are overall the most common form of repression, occurring at 95 of 677 individual protest events across all campaigns. 52 of these (54%) occurred at events organized by policy performance campaigns, which is disproportionate given that only 38% of the events in PCoM are associated with policy performance campaigns. In total, 37 campaigns encountered threats; of these 15 were policy performance campaigns and 22 were policymaking exclusion campaigns. All models demonstrate the relationship as theorized: policymaking exclusion campaigns are less likely to encounter threats than are policy performance campaigns.

Figure 4.7: Repression Rates by Campaign Type

While both policy performance and policymaking exclusion campaigns encountered threats and warnings, a greater share of policymaking exclusion campaigns experienced more intensive coercion in the form of instances of violence, the inaction of police to protect protesters, and prosecution on protest-related charges.

I measure high-intensity coercion in three ways: using the incidence of events involving violence, events where the police deliberately failed to intervene to protect protesters from other actors, and the incidence of prosecution of a member of the campaign on protest-related charges. Of the 30 violent events recorded in PCoM, 25 affected policymaking exclusion campaigns. This included 18 unique policymaking exclusion campaigns, but only 4 unique policy performance campaigns. Similarly, of the 22 instances where the police failed to protect protesters, 21 affected policymaking exclusion campaigns (15 unique campaigns). Regression analysis of binary measure of violent instances experienced by each campaign indicates that policymaking exclusion campaigns indeed encounter a higher rate of violence than policy performance campaigns, though the association using the count variable is weaker. Similarly, all model specifications point to the fact that policymaking exclusion campaigns were less likely to be protected by law enforcement when experiencing violence from non-state actors, at a statistically significant level.

The rate of prosecution between both campaigns is more comparable. An instance of prosecu-

tion affected about one third of both types of campaigns (8 policy performance campaigns and 13 policymaking exclusion campaigns). I run two sets of models with an indicator of prosecution as the dependent variable, one using the full dataset of 62 campaigns, and one using data subsetted to the 32 campaigns that experienced at least one detention at a protest.[14] Logistic regression analysis does not support a relationship between campaign type and prosecution. This null result potentially arises from the coarseness of the data, which does not measure the number of prosecutions nor the consequences. It is also possible that prosecution is driven by external trends, such as an increased city-wide emphasis on prosecuting protesters.

Figure 4.8: Coefficient plot summarizing relationship between everyday protest campaign type and repressive outcomes

Policymaking exclusion campaigns are less likely to experience threats or warnings than are policy performance campaigns, but are more likely to encounter violence and incidents where the police fail to protect protesters. There is no significant relationship between campaign types and prosecution.
*Notes: All models are bivariate, see regression tables for full model specification. Reference category is Policymaking Exclusion campaigns. Outer bars represent .95 confidence interval; inner bars represent .9 confidence interval. Unit of observation is the protest campaign except where * indicates that unit of observation is the concession.*

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[14]Two campaigns saw individuals prosecuted on protest-related charges but they were arrested after a protest event.

4.5 Alternative Explanations

In the foregoing, I have provided strong evidence to support the theory that underlying features of the grievance that motivates a protest campaign plays a decisive role in how the government response to that campaign, and policymaking exclusion and policy performance campaigns are met with different responses by the government. In this section, I discuss alternative explanations for the government's differential treatment of these campaigns.

4.5.1 Concessions as Political Distribution

Some approaches see concessions as political patronage— benefits distributed to supporters or potential supporters—yet it is unlikely that patronage is driving these dynamics. The groups receiving these concessions are generally far too small to represent any kind of an electoral force, and often, they are politically neutral or supporters of the government. Policy performance campaigns are more likely to actually receive the benefits associated with a concession, yet the members of these campaigns are often particularly politically disempowered. Labor disputes, like the one at Mosmetrostroy, are 14 of the 22 policy performance campaigns. The workers involved in these disputes are often migrant workers. If Russian, they are often not permanent residents of Moscow, meaning they do not vote locally. In some cases, they are not Russian citizens: two campaigns included the involvement of an organization to support Tajik migrant workers and one involved the local Kyrgyz embassy.

It is possible that concessions could be used to distribute benefits specifically to members of a governing coalition. While that may occur in other settings, it does not drive concessions in Moscow or likely anywhere in Russia. Russia is not governed by coalition, but by a dominant party, United Russia. United Russia also supports a significant number of independent candidates for local legislatures, a strategy that has become more common as the popularity of the party has declined. In the 2014 Moscow City Duma election, United Russia and UR-supported independents won 38 of 45 seats. On the national level, cooperation between parties is slightly more important,

as UR does not always hold a majority, but the so-called systemic opposition parties are generally compliant. Most of parties rarely participate in protest. The parties that do protest tend to be non-systemic communism or liberal-democratic, and do not hold seats in government outside of the municipal deputy level, the lowest-level office in the city. The exception to this is the KPRF, which is the largest systemic opposition party and does support protest in Moscow, however I included its involvement with the campaign as a control variable in regression analysis and it is not associated with receipt of concessions. Regardless, concessions to everyday protest would not be an efficient way to distribute benefits to those coalition members because the concessions typically do not entail high-value benefits.

Figure 4.9: Concessions and the Electoral Cycle

Concessionary promises do not appear linked with the electoral cycle in Moscow.

There is also little evidence to support the proposition that concessions are driven by the electoral cycle. In the five-year period I collected data for, Muscovites went to the polls five times, for three city-level races and two national elections. Figure 4.10 presents a density plot of concessions over time with the dates of these elections indicated. While there is a higher concentration of concessions beginning in late 2015 and lasting until late 2017, there is no evident increase of concessions around local or national elections. Surprisingly, in the lead-up to the two executive

109

elections, for president and mayor, the rate of concession declines. It is possible, however, that the decline in concessions in late 2017-2018 may be the result of a decline in protest that also occurred at this time.

Finally, alternative explanations that characterize concessions as a valuable benefit must be reconciled with reneging. If concessions are a form of patronage or the distribution of benefits to coalition partners, why would half of those benefits never be delivered? In fact the credibility problem would be alleviated if patronage or coalitions were driving these concessions, because those benefits are distributed to buy long-term political support. It is therefore in the government's interest to make sure the benefits are actually transmitted, to uphold their end of the exchange. Reneging would therefore be much rarer than it is. Last, these approaches to concessions do not explain the observed variation in repressive responses encountered by the different campaign types.

4.5.2   Campaign Capacity

It is possible that another campaign-level feature is responsible for the variation in government response: capacity. I control for the number of years the campaign was been active, the number of events it held, and the average turnout at mass events to capture capacity, but these are rough measures, as well as time invariant. Capacity might be measured in the ability to hold certain types of events, to attract media attention, to withstand repression, to mobilize financial resources, and more. Yet these is limited evidence that higher capacity is connected with more concessions or less reneging. Higher-capacity campaigns are able to hold more events, yet campaigns are much more likely to get a concession when they have held fewer, not more, events. Figure 4.10 is a density plot of the number of protest events held prior to a concession demonstrates this. One third of concessions are promised at a point when the campaign has held three or fewer protests. The high incidence of early concessions means that the government likely begins making concessions before a campaign has fully developed capacity. On the other hand, concessions also made to campaigns that have held more events: 9.8% were promised to campaigns that had held twenty or more protests. This suggests that sometimes capacity is important to the timing of concessions. In

the next chapter, I explore the timing of concessions in a campaign's lifecycle in more detail, as well as the campaign's ability to hold continuous events like strikes or round-the-clock watches.

Figure 4.10: Concessions and Event History

A significant share of concessions are made when campaigns are comparatively new, and have had less time to develop capacity.

Capacity might also matter in the presence or absence of a mobilizing structure or group. Most of these everyday protest campaigns involved some formalized mobilizing structure. There is variation in whether this structure pre-existed the campaign, but in the majority of cases, it did. Mobilizing structures included neighborhood initiative groups, independent unions, laborers' rights groups, tenants' rights groups and student organizations. (Political parties were generally not observed originating protest campaigns.) Many of these groups had already organized protest campaigns in the past. However, these groups are distributed fairly evenly across the distinct campaign types I identify, meaning that they are unlikely to explain variation betweem them.

4.6 Conclusion

How does a high-capacity authoritarian regime respond to everyday protest campaigns, which make policy-focused demands? Everyday protest occur even in repressive states, meaning that authoritarian subjects likely see them as a meaningful opportunity to affect policymaking in their

communities. At the same time, most approaches to concessions imply that these campaigns, which seldom threaten the foundations of the regime, should not be promised concessions and instead be ignored or repressed.

I have advanced a theory that the regime's response to everyday protest campaigns is determined by underlying features of the grievance that generated the protest campaign. These features are whether the policy is in an active state of change and the availability of information about opinion on the policy. Protest campaigns that arise against a status quo policy about which the government has limited information are policy performance campaigns, whereas policymaking exclusion campaigns occur when the government is aware that a new or changing policy is not popularly supported but chooses to pursue it anyway. To support this classification, I show that policy performance campaigns are more likely to use protest tactics that convey new information whereas policymaking exclusion campaigns are more likely to engage in protest that obstructs policy implementation.

I analyze an original dataset on campaigns, concessions and protests in Moscow to demonstrate that concessions are widely used. Yet in many cases, the promised concessions were not realized as intended, with policy exclusion campaigns bearing the brunt of reneging. Policy exclusion campaigns were also more likely to experience higher-intensity coercion than were policy erosion campaigns. These differences in response arise because, when faced with policy performance campaigns, the government has acquired new information about an on-going issue that it is in its interest to fix. Concessions are one avenue to make those policy modifications. At the same time, high intensity coercion is unnecessary because once the concession is completed, the grievance will be eliminated and the campaign can be suspended. With policymaking exclusion campaigns, the government has deliberately ignored what the protesters want to pursue its own agenda. It therefore has limited incentive to comply with protesters' demands. The promise of a concession to these campaigns is a diversionary tactic designed to undercut mobilizing capacity, rather than an attempt to resolve the grievance. For this reason, the rate of reneging is high. High intensity coercion is more common to raise the cost of on-going participation, to try to demobilize a campaign that is

potentially longer lasting.

In some cases, everyday protest is an effective way to escalate complaints, win government assistance and affect policymaking. However, this is conditional on the government having a pre-existing need—information—and interest in making that reform, as is the case with policy erosion campaigns. In other cases, protesters who have put themselves at great personal risk will struggle to see the concessions that they won bear fruit, as the regime reneges on its promises. In all cases, however, it is clear that concessions are not a strategy of last resort or a sign of regime weakness, but rather another tool of control at the disposal of authoritarian governments.

Throughout this chapter, I have assumed that concessions have a demobilizing effect on protest campaigns and that in some cases, this effect motivates the government's use of concessions. This assumption is critical: if concessions are not associated with demobilization, then I cannot argue that the government is using them to undermine policymaking exclusion campaigns. While examples of concessions leading to demobilization are abundant, the poor quality of concession data has prevented quantitative analysis of this association. In the next chapter, I turn to the relationship between concessions and mobilization, or demobilization.

CHAPTER 5

Concessions and Demobilization

Some of them, of course, get scared if they were detained one time, or fined....and they stop protesting. But if people are stubborn and do not get scared, and they continue to protest [at the site] no matter what, then there is a chance to win. There is a good chance to win if people don't give up, but stubbornly continue to protest.

— *Interview with an ecological protester, Moscow, September 2019.*

Governments make concessions with the goal of demobilizing protest. Protest is disruptive, even threatening, and government agents under any regime type generally prefer it not to occur. The extent to which concessions are *effective* at achieving that goal remains an open question. Do concessions, in fact, drive demobilization? If so, under what conditions do concessions diminish protest? Is that demobilizing effect conditioned on campaign-level features? Are there settings in which concessions do not contribute to demobilization, and why? My data provides insight into this relationship for the first time. In this chapter, I inductively theorize about the link between concessions and demobilization.

Analysis of demobilization, however, presents multiple challenges. First, demobilization is a multi-causal outcome. Multiple factors contribute to demobilization, making the effect of concessions difficult to isolate. Protest campaigns can demobilize out of success or failure, if resolving the grievance as desired becomes impossible. Individual-level factors, such as exhaustion or rising costs like those accrued through repression, contribute to demobilization, too. Perceived prospects of success or failure and individual commitment may have an effect. On the campaign level, lower-

capacity campaigns may never truly get off the ground, while higher-capacity campaigns may carry on after the resolution of the initial grievance to encompass other causes. It is unsurprising then that the large body of literature on the repression-dissent nexus, which seeks to understand repression's effect on mobilization, continues to grow. The main finding of that work is that repression does not have a straightforward or consistent effect on the level of protest: it can increase it, decrease it, or do either depending on the setting and intensity of the repression. Concessions should be no different. The objective of this chapter is to uncover potential regularities and patterns, rather than to develop a definitive theory.

Second, assessing demobilization requires its operationalization and measurement. At one extreme, demobilization can be defined as the total cessation of protest by a given campaign. Because my data does not include a lower-participation limit and therefore observes protest events with a single participant, this approach risks both conceptually stretching and over-identifying mobilization. Additionally, parsing demobilization—where a protest is not possible—from periods in which the campaign is able to hold a protest but does not presents challenges, because the everyday protests included in my data are relatively low-capacity and many are involved in years-long disputes. This means that long spells where no protests are held are common. In the next section, I discuss issues with measuring demobilization in greater depth, then motivate the operationalizations that I use through this and the following chapter. While these operationalizations are imperfect, they allow insight into two important aspects of demobilization: the comparative incidence of large protests before and after a concession, and the duration from a concession to the next large protest.

Using these measures, in section 5.2, I examine trends of demobilization. To do this, I bundle the concessions into concession-events that summarize all concessions received by an individual campaign on a specific day. I also set aside concessions that were undermined by reneging within the first three months, because the government's failure to fulfill its promises can aggravate mobilization and the purpose here is to understand the effect of the concessionary promise itself, rather than reneging. Chapter 6 takes up reneging in greater detail. Throughout the chapter, I also provide

115

empirical examples based on the histories I created for each campaign to allow additional insight into on-the-ground campaign dynamics that are not visible in aggregate analysis.

First, I show that in nearly half of all cases, concessions are associated with a comparative reduction in protest and are not followed by a large protest within thirty days. This demobilizing effect, however, declines with time. To contextualize this finding with other strategies of protest demobilization, I compare the demobilizing effect of concessions to that of detentions at a protest. An analysis of cases where the concession included a deadline for implementation illuminates how campaigns adjust their protest behavior in response to concessions. I then explore how facets of the campaign alter the demobilizing impact of concessions, using the campaign's prior event history as an indicator of campaign capacity. In section 5.5, I look at how the quality of the concession is associated with demobilization, specifically whether the concession addresses the campaign's core concern and whether the entity promising the speaker was affiliated with the national government, rather than the Moscow government. Finally, it is clear throughout this analysis that the demobilizing effects of concessions are highly time-dependent. Thus, in section 5.6, I use case analysis to unpack cases where a concession was followed by another protest in less than a week and cases where the campaign demobilized at the time of the concession, but re-mobilized after six or more months. To conclude, I summarize these findings with an eye to future hypothesis testing.

5.1   Data and Analysis

While in section **??** I described approaches to conceptualizing mobilization, the following analysis requires that concept to be operationalized. To achieve this, I first create an event catalog for each protest campaign that chronologically combines protest events and concessions.[1] In the event that a protest and a concession occur on the same date, I assume that the protest precedes the concession. For four concessions and 11 protests, the event date could not be determined. These are estimated

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[1] Petitions and open letters are excluded from the event catalog, as they do not require the physical presence of protesters.

116

to the first of the month. For two protests, neither date nor month was available; these are dropped. These corrections should have a limited effect on understanding mobilization for these campaigns, as six of the 11 protests with missing dates and both excluded protests did not meet the threshold for mobilization described below.

5.1.1   Concession Events

In order to render the concession-level data compatible with the format of the event catalog, I aggregate concessions that occur on the same day, for a given campaign, into a single *concession event*. In the case of seven campaigns, the Moscow City government promised protesters concessions on two separate dates although no intervening protest had occurred. This issue affected 18 concessions, with on average just over 15 days elapsing between concessions. In all but one instance, the concessions were promised within 30 days of each other and in several cases, on successive days. As my concern here is time from concession to the next large protest, I aggregate these concessions into a single concession-event occurring on the earliest date. This process reduced the 122 observed concessions to 85 concession-events.

In this chapter, I am interested in how the initial concessionary promise impacts mobilization, rather than the effect of its realization or implementation. For that reason, I exclude concession-events where reneging later occurred, to focus on cases where the demobilizing effect of the concession was not mitigated by reneging. The concessions data in PCoM contains an evaluation of the concessions implementation over four three-month periods for the first year following the promise. In the majority of this chapter, I look at mobilization in the 90 days following the concession-event. I therefore exclude concession-events that included a concession that was rated as having no or minimal effect on policy in the first three month-period. This reduces the 85 concession-events to 53. When I examine mobilization at six months and one year after the concession-event, I exclude concession-events that had no impact in either of the first two periods, or in any of the four periods as needed. Last, it is not uncommon for a single campaign to experience multiple concession-events. Fourteen campaigns had from two to five concession-events; 33 campaigns had only one.

This means that some campaigns are observed multiple times in the data; I also include analysis for the first concession-event to eliminate this.

5.1.2 Operationalizing Demobilization

Measuring mobilization is difficult, as discussed in 2.6. Observing turnout at a protest can provide an instantaneous snapshot of mobilization. Often turnout is included in protest event catalogues, but this data is frequently missing, and estimates can range widely depending on the source. The fact that periods in which a campaign has the capacity to hold a large protest, but chooses not to, are observationally equivalent to periods in which the campaign does not have that capacity and does not attempt to hold a protest, creates an additional wrinkle. In other words, we cannot distinguish days of demobilization from days of non-mass mobilization. I use the term demobilization for simplicity here.

I assume that mobilization is observed on a day in which a large protest event occurs. I define a large protest as 1) any protest event of 20 or more estimated participants, or 2) if no turnout estimate is available, an event that took the form of a demonstration, march, strike or full picket. The threshold of 20 participants is set with the aim of identifying events that attracted the attendance beyond the core of campaign organizers, though this may not always be the case.[2] It also includes protests where turnout was described non-numerically in sources as "a few dozen" or "a small crowd" as well as some cases where turnout at small gatherings was determined from photographs; such events are recorded in PCoM as having 24.9 participants. I identify demonstrations, marches, strikes and full pickets as mobilization because to be successful, these events require more participants (although they can be held with just a few protesters).

I do not imply that no campaign activity occurs during a period of demobilization. In fact, a variety of different actions may be taking place. Most notably, small protests may occur. Small protests are those that have estimated turnout under 20 participants or have no turnout estimate

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[2]For instance, in an interview, an activist who had been involved in a campaign to protect a public park said that 25-26 individuals organized the campaign.

but take the form of a single person or relay-single person picket, sit-in, blockade, self-mutilation, leafletting or hanging banners, or were categorized as "other". Per my approach, the small size of these events means that they cannot be used to infer that the campaign has mobilized participants who are not campaign organizers. Small events are excluded from the analysis here. This reduces the number of events from 795 to 415.

It is also worth noting that my data does not account for every action a campaign could possibly undertake to elicit a reaction from the government. Campaigns also organized legal challenges, petitions, social media campaigns, media coverage, collaboration with international NGOs, direct appeals to various government actors, including the President, and other tactics. I do not consider these types of actions as mobilization here for a few reasons. The first relates to data availability. I only collected data on tactics that were documented online in venues that were accessible to me. Information on these strategies was not consistently available across cases. For instance, some campaigns posted on their social media communities asking supporters to call or write to a government office using a form complaint, but I cannot know how many members undertook this action nor if other campaigns that did not publicly post such calls did not undertake this action. Second, throughout this dissertation I have focused on physical protest as an event of salient concern to the government. Although I have argued that everyday protests are not as threatening as campaigns with revolutionary or transformational aims, they are still an undesirable event for an authoritarian regime and risk escalation into more regime-challenging movements. I therefore assume that the regime would rather that protest not occur, even if the campaign is engaging in the other forms of activism listed above. Last, this chapter does not look at determinants of concessions, but rather the effect of concessions on the incidence of physical protest. Whether concessions depress the rate of protest is of interest regardless of the factors that produced the concession itself.

5.1.3 Evaluating Relative Demobilization

I employ two methods in this chapter of measuring the demobilization of a campaign around a concession-event. First, I compare event counts of large protests in periods of 30, 60, and 90

days before and after the concession event. This measure is useful in that it facilitates within-campaign comparisons. This is important given that the wide variety of campaigns in this data depletes the value of more generalized comparisons, for instance comparing the level of protest in a single campaign to the average across all campaigns. When using this measure, I drop campaigns for which protest data was not collected for the full 30, 60 or 90 day period before or after the concession-event. I identify demobilization as occurring when the total incidence of protest decreases following the concession, with comparison to the preceding period of the same length.

This measure is not without issue. Within-case comparison assumes that the campaign would have behaved similarly in the next thirty days as it had in the previous thirty, had the concession not occurred. That assumption does not apply in all cases, because many campaigns receive concessions very early in their lifecycle, after just a few events. Eight campaigns received a concession after only one protest. In these cases, it is not clear what the comparison is indicative of, and particularly as the window of comparison grows, it may appear that concessions cause mobilization here. I look at these cases of early concessions more closely later in the chapter. Second, 17 concession-events went to campaigns that had not held a protest in over thirty days, and of those, 12 had not held a protest in at least 90 days. Lags between protest of this nature are not unusual in this data. Some campaigns do not hold an event for over a year before reactivating. Bearing in mind that demobilization and non-mobilization are observationally equivalent in this event catalogue, these concessions are likely happening during periods where the campaign is engaged in activism outside of mass protest. They could also be cases where the government simply took more time to formulate a concession. Regardless, the meaning of comparison in these cases is again unclear. Finally, there are cases where protest was frequent before and after the concession event, so an observed reduction or increase of protest may in fact be random. Because of these issues, I focus on the 30-day comparison in the text and present the 60 and 90 day results in tables, unless relevant.

To complement this within-case comparison, I also measure demobilization by calculating the duration in days from the concession-event to the next protest. This measure captures the demo-

bilizing outcome the government likely prefers: the cessation of large protests. Using the raw duration (i.e. the count of days to the next large protest) is complicated by the issue of censoring, to use the language of survival analysis. I collected protest data through September 18, 2018. This means that for concession-events that had not been followed by a large protest at that point, the duration to the next protest is calculated using the date of the end of data collection. This is equivalent to observing a large protest on September 18, 2018. While statistical analysis can compensate for such cases, here I am employing a descriptive approach. I correct for these inflated durations manually by creating binary indicators for whether the campaign held at least one large protest within 30, 60 and 90 days, six months (183 days) and one year after the concession. Concession-events for which sufficient data was not collected are dropped as needed. This measure is allows for cross-case comparisons, at the expense of some campaign-specific context.

5.2 Do concessions contribute to demobilization?

It seems straightforward that promising benefits to protesters would contribute to demobilization by eliminating the need to protest. However this outcome remains uncertain. In particular, it is often argued that concessions can produce adverse effects from the government's perspective: by demonstrating the effectiveness of protest, concessions actually encourage mobilization. Per this argument, protesters are like mice who have been given cookies: once rewarded, their demands rapidly escalate.[3] Further, scant data has been deployed in service of this question. Here, I explore how often concessions are associated with demobilization, and if a demobilizing effect seems to exist, how long it persists.

Overall, the data suggests that concessions are associated with demobilization, although the strength and duration of this effect varies. First, I compare protest event incidence before and after a concession-event. Table 5.1 presents the percentage of concessions associated with an increase,

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[3]To my knowledge this argument has not been formally theorized and tested. This protest diffusion argument usually takes two forms. First, concessions encourage a single campaign to escalate its demands, which I can consider here. Second, concessions encourage activists in other campaigns to use protest tactics, which I cannot address.

Table 5.1: Comparative Rate of Protest, 30-, 60- and 90-Day Periods around a Concession

		30 Days	60 Days	90 Days
All Concession-Events	*Increase*	17.0%	20.4%	20.8%
	No Change	32.1%	20.4%	20.8%
	Decrease	50.9%	59.2%	58.3%
		n=53	n=49	n=48
First Concession	*Increase*	18.2%	24.1%	42.9%
	No Change	39.4%	27.6%	28.6%
	Decrease	42.4%	48.3%	28.6%
		n=33	n=29	n=24
Later Concessions	*Increase*	15.0%	15.0%	10.0%
	No Change	20.0%	10.0%	10.0%
	Decrease	65.0%	75.0%	80.0%
		n=20	n=20	n=20

decrease or no change in protest in the 30, 60 and 90-day window around the concession. Of the 53 concession-events for which a thirty-day assessment of protest around the concession was possible, 50.9% are associated with a decrease in the number of protests. Protest was only increased in 17.0% of cases. For a large share of cases (32.1%) the protest incidence was unaltered by the concession. This is largely driven by concessions to campaigns that were already demobilized, which includes 11 of those 17 cases. The demobilizing effect increases over time. When comparing the incidence of protest in the 60 days before and after a concession-event, 59.2% of concession-events were associated with a comparative reduction of protest.

The demobilizing effect also holds when the data is restricted to the campaign's first recorded concession-event (table 5.1). 42.4% of first concessions are associated with a decrease in protest within 30 days, and 18.2% with an increase. Concessions that were not the first concession a campaign experienced were considerably more demobilizing. 65.0% of later concessions were linked to a 30-day decrease in protest. Further, that figure continues to grow as the period of analysis extends: by 90 days of the concession, 80% of later concessions are associated with a decrease of protest, while only 42.9% of first concessions are. It is somewhat surprising that first concessions appear somewhat less demobilizing than the full sample, as one might imagine that

122

earlier in a protest campaign, participants and organizers would be more likely to trust authorities to resolve their grievances. However, as I explore further below, it may be that the government adopts a bargaining approach, and initially offers more minimal concessions, and only with more sustained mobilization can protest campaigns win satisfying concessions.

Table 5.2: Duration from Concessions to Next Protest

	30 Days	60 Days	90 Days	6 Months	1 Year
Protest	47.2%	60.4%	62.3%	69.4%	81.0%
No Protest	52.8%	39.6%	37.7%	30.6%	19.0%
	n=53	n=53	n=53	n=49	n=42

To what extent are concessions associated with the total suspension of protest? Table 5.2 presents the share of concessions that were or were not followed by a protest within five intervals after the concession. Again, there is strongly suggestive evidence that concessions are linked with demobilization. 28 of the 53 concession-events, or 52.8%, were not followed by a large protest within 30 days. Strikingly, in 24 of those 28 cases (45.3% of all observed cases), no protest of any size occurred within 30 days after the concession. This suggests that concessions do not merely undermine a campaign's ability to hold mass events, but smaller events as well. Yet by the same token, these figures indicate that 47.2% of concession-events fail to demobilization. Moreover, the immediate demobilizing effect declines with time. Within 60 days of a concession-event, the majority of campaigns, 60.4%, have remobilized, with only 39.6% not holding protest. By 90 days, 62.3% have protested; within six months, 69.4% and at one year, 83.3% of concession-events have been followed by another large protest.

Concessions do appear to have an immediate demobilizing effect within 30 days of the concession-event. From the comparison of event incidence in periods preceding and following the concessionary promise, concessions mitigate a campaign's capacity to escalate protest or to sustain protest at the prior level. At the same time, some protest campaigns appear to ramp up their activity when a concession is promised—a phenomenon I explore below. However, this does not occur in a significant portion of cases. Setting aside within-case comparison and examining

the duration to the next protest provides support for an immediate demobilizing effect, but this declines sharply as time passes.

The immediate suspension of protest coupled with its longer-term resurgence suggests that concessions may not provide enduring, satisfactory redress for protesters' grievances. It is possible that campaign organizers adopt a "wait and see" approach to concessions, maintaining vigilance and, ideally, capacity to mobilize while allowing the government to begin implementing the concession. I explore this possibility in section 5.2.2 by looking at protest behavior when a concession includes a timeline by which it must be implemented. Alternatively, the suspension of protest and longer-term resurgence could be driven by exhaustion effects. Regardless of the mechanism, these results do militate against the argument that concessions cause the escalation of protest. If campaigns responded to concessions by demanding additional concessions, one would expect an immediate increase in protest after a concession to be more common, as protesters attempt to strike while the iron is hot. Finally, it is worth noting that, because concessions affected by reneging are excluded from this analysis, failure to implement promised policy changes is not driving the later shift back toward mobilization. It is likely spurred by the continued failure to fully resolve the grievance or escalating issues related to it. These findings also suggest that, although these everyday campaigns are relatively low capacity, organizers are able to achieve remobilization after months of inactivity.

5.2.1   Comparison to Detentions and Demobilization

Concessions seem to contribute to demobilization in around half of cases, and likewise fail to do so in half of cases. With these figures alone, it is not possible to say whether concessions are effective at demobilizing protest or not. To put this effect in context with other governmental responses to protest, I compare it to the demobilizing effect of detentions. I discuss in the previous chapter that detentions are not necessarily indicative of a concerted effort to eradicate a campaign with repression, meaning that the purpose of every detention is not necessarily demobilization. Nonetheless, detentions are a good benchmark for comparison for a few reasons. First, detentions

are one of the most common forms of protest repression. PCoM records detentions at 79 protest events, 9.9% of all recorded events. Second, while the government has other strategic responses to protest at its disposal, such as ignoring protest, detentions are events, and they are highly observable, which facilitates comparison to concession-events. Last, the relative efficacy of concessions and repressions in demobilizing protest has been a lasting question in the literature.

Table 5.3: Comparative Rate of Protest, 30-, 60- and 90-Day Periods around a Detention

		30 Days	60 Days	90 Days
All Detentions	*Increase*	23.1%	39.7%	41.6%
	No Change	47.4%	21.8%	19.5%
	Decrease	29.5%	38.5%	39.0%
		n=78	n=78	n=77
First Detention	*Increase*	33.3%	54.5%	56.2%
	No Change	51.5%	21.2%	15.6%
	Decrease	15.2%	24.2%	28.1%
		n=33	n=33	n=32

Table 5.4: Duration from Detention to Next Protest

	30 Days	60 Days	90 Days	6 Months	1 Year
Protest	53.7%	68.7%	74.6%	84.4%	85.0%
No Protest	44.8%	29.9%	23.9%	14.1%	13.3%
	n=66	n=66	n=66	n=63	n=59

I isolate the 79 protest events at which a detention occurred, and again compare event counts of large protests in periods before and after the detention (table 5.3). Within 30-days, a detention was followed by a reduction of large protest in only 29.5% of cases—21.4 percentage points fewer than concession-events. 23.1% of detentions are associated with an increase of protest over 30 days, about 5% more than concessions. The majority of detentions had no effect on the level of protest within the first 30 days. When considering a campaign's first detention, the demobilizing effect is even weaker: first detentions reduced protest within 30 days in only 15.2% of cases—roughly one third the figure for first concessions. A first detention increases mobilization within thirty

125

days in 33.3% of cases. Looking at the 60 days before and after a detention, the evidence for a demobilizing effect remains limited. An equal share of detentions were associated with increasing and decreasing protest (39.7% and 38.5%). This balance remains similar in the 90-day period, with 39.0% of detentions associated with decreasing protest and 41.6% with increasing protest.

I also calculate the duration from a detention to the next protest (table 5.4). 44.8% of detentions are not followed by a large protest within 30 days—8% lower than the comparable number for concessions. By 60 days, only 29.9% of detentions are demobilizing, compared with 39.6% of concession-events. Within 90 days, only 23.9% of detentions have not been followed by a large protest, while 37.7% of concessions continue to have a demobilizing effect. By 6 months, only 14.1% of detentions are linked with demobilization, less than half the comparable rate for concession-events. Within one year, however, these figures converge: 13.3% of detentions and 19.0% of concession-events are demobilizing after one year.

Overall, both the within-campaign comparisons and duration analysis provide strongly suggestive evidence that the demobilizing effect of concessions is greater than that of detentions. Concessions reduce protest more often and extend the time to the next protest. Further, the comparative ineffectiveness of detentions at achieving demobilization of everyday protest campaigns deserves greater exploration. Not only are detentions unlikely to immediately reduce protest, they are associated with increased protest over time. This is somewhat surprising, given that most everyday protesters are not professional activists, and they would therefore seem to be less prepared to face detention and its consequences. On the other hand, many everyday protesters see their demands as legitimate and reasonable; often, they envision themselves as asking the government to act "normally", that is, in compliance with the rule of law and in the best interest of its citizens. In this context, arrests of peaceful protesters may be seen as morally outrageous, which contributes to the escalation of the campaign.

Finally, the comparison to detentions suggests that among campaigns that are demobilized by concessions, the period between six months and one year is potentially critical. The duration data indicates that a good share of campaigns remobilize between 30 and 60 days after the concession,

but thereafter the decline slows. The rate of demobilized campaigns is 37.7% after 60 days and falls to only 30.6% over the following four months. However, by the end of that year, only 19.0% of campaigns are demobilized. This is a drop of 11.6%. The detention data does not replicate this drop-off after 6 months. In fact, only one campaign remobilized between 6 months and one year after a detention. Below, I examine this dynamic of late remobilization in greater detail.

5.2.2 Concessions on a Timeline

While the aggregate data show that concessions associated with demobilization in many cases, case study analysis can build insight into *how* concessions demobilize. How do protesters and campaign organizers think about concessions and demobilization? Do they suspend protest while waiting for the government to implement the concession? Or do they believe that sustained protest is needed for the concession to be realized? In an attempt to gain some insight into these dynamics, I look at concession-events where the government specified a date by which the concession would be implemented. With these concessions, the government establishes its intention to implement the concession by a certain date in the near future. This means that campaigns are more likely to set a particular strategy for their actions during that period, and that the strategy may change when the period ends. Here, I am looking only at concessions that were implemented, so I would expect protest to end around the date established by the concession, if it continues at all.

Concessions can include a timeline in two ways: the exact date can be set or the date can be implied. The latter includes language such as "in the coming days" or "within a few months". I estimate these as two weeks or two months. Concessions in which timelines were specified and that were not affected by reneging are relatively rare. There are only eight cases of this occurring, and two were concessions to a single campaign. All but one of these campaigns were about labor disputes with the city of Moscow, meaning that these concessions were largely about the payment of back wages, layoffs and working conditions. Also, they were almost exclusively core concessions, which, as discussed below, are much more strongly correlated with demobilization than other concessions.

Overall, campaigns that were promised a concession with a timeline had three reactions. The largest group of four campaigns demobilize for the specified period. A few hold lower-stakes events, such as distributing leaflets or participating in protests to support other causes. For example, ambulance workers demanding improved working conditions and higher pay attended a protest against the reform of the Moscow healthcare system. Given that the timelines for these concessions was usually just a few days to weeks, it is unlikely that exhaustion would explain this pause in protest. It seems probable that these campaigns suspended protest while the government worked to fulfill its promises. This "wait and see" approach may explain the immediate decrease in activism following a concession.

Another set of campaigns carried on with their previous protest activity for the duration of the specified period, then ceased. These two campaigns were construction workers who had been denied their wages by a major city contractor and metro workers who were threatened with layoffs. The construction workers had been regularly filing complaints at various offices meant to protect workers' rights, and they continued to do this while their concession was being implemented, while the metro workers reliably continued holding pickets every two weeks until the specified deadline, then stopped. This may be suggestive of a lack of trust in authorities to fulfill the concession if the campaign reduces pressure.

Last, there is one case where a campaign received a concession that members deemed unsatisfactory. Construction workers employed by a city contractor were attempting to reclaim four months of unpaid wages by threatening to strike. They were first promised that their wages would be paid within a few months, a timeline that was evidently unacceptable. This concession kicked off a strike that lasted nearly a month, and ultimately led to the promise that their wages would be repaid within a week. Here, the first concession failed to resolve the conflict and perhaps inflamed it. While I do not have an overall measure of the "acceptability" of a concession to the campaign, this example makes it clear that there are cases where the concession may contribute to the conflict's escalation rather than resolution.

5.3 Campaign Capacity and Event History

What is the relationship between campaign capacity and demobilization around concessions? This relationship is difficult to assess directly, because turnout and the number of events are usually used to measure capacity as well as mobilization. Higher capacity campaigns may be more likely to get concessions and are also able to hold large events more easily. At the same time, if concessions are used as a demobilizing tool, then they may be deployed to prevent newer campaigns from developing and enhancing their capacity. In light of this, I look at campaigns that got concessions when they had held very few events, and campaigns that were promised concessions after a high number of events.

I start by considering how the number of events that a campaign held prior to the concession event might condition the demobilizing effect. I use a count of all events (of any size and type) that the campaign held. About half of all concession-events I consider here, or 50.9%, occur when the campaign has held fewer than five events. 15.1% of concession-events happened when the campaign had held only one event. Further, because these prior event counts include all events, not just the large protests I have identified as mass mobilization, some of these concessions have been made after events with very low turnout. This is interesting in its own right because it runs against the theory that protests are more successful, or more likely to get concessions, when they are more disruptive. Instead, it would seem that concessions are being used when campaigns are still in an early phase, perhaps as a pre-emptive strategy to curtail mobilization and the development of the capacity to sustain a longer campaign. Additionally, the high incidence of early concessions bodes poorly for most campaigns in PCoM: the average number of events per campaign overall is 12, while on average, concessions that are not affected by reneging occur after 8.8 protests, with a median of 5 and mode of 1. This suggests that campaigns continue holding events when the likelihood of getting a concession is low.

Higher prior event count can also be understood as an indicator of high campaign capacity. A large prior event count can occur in three ways: the campaign has been protesting for a long time, if not necessarily frequently; the campaign protests very frequently, or the grievance that

motivated the campaign affects an unusually large number of people. These are all features typically associated with higher capacity. Comparing event rates pre and post-concession is of limited value here, so I look at duration to the next large protest. Figure 5.1 presents coefficient plots of bivariate regressions of the relationship between the number of events the campaign held prior to the concession-event and the number of days from the concession to the next large protest. These regressions show that campaigns that have held fewer events prior to the concession are less likely to hold events within 30, 60 or 90 days after its announcement. After the first three months, this relationship is no longer statistically significant, but the direction of the effect remains the same.

This suggests two conclusions. First, concessions are effective at disrupting mobilization when campaigns are new. An early concession can win the government up to three months or more of suspended protest, and in some cases, pre-empt a campaign. Second, concessions are potentially less effective at diminishing protest when the campaign has held a large number of prior events. This suggests that higher capacity campaigns are perhaps more likely to understand that the promise of a concession is not its delivery. Alternatively, this may simply be path dependence: campaigns that hold more events, particularly those that affect a large number of people, continue to hold events. Last, some of these higher-event count campaigns are focused on grievances that have proven difficult for government to resolve—thus the need for continued protesting. These may therefore be cases where the promised concession is simply unacceptable to protesters, whereas earlier concessions are either addressing situations that are easier for the government to resolve. To gain clarity on these dynamics, I examine cases of early and late concessions more closely next.

5.3.1 Early Concessions

In what kinds of cases do early concessions occur, and what is their effect? To understand this, I look at cases where the campaign had held one or two events before the first concession. As a precaution, I exclude campaigns that won concessions in the fall of 2013, because they were likely active before the period of data collection. The ten remaining campaigns received 11 early concessions. Six were about labor disputes with the city, two about construction issues, one about

Figure 5.1: Campaign Event History and the Duration to the Next Protest

Concessions received earlier in a campaign's lifecycle are associated with a lower incidence of protest within one and two months. Inner bars represent 95% confidence interval; outer bars represent 90% confidence interval.

a housing conflict, and one about the 2018 World Cup.

To begin with, it seems that early concessions work in two potential ways. In some cases, early concessions are providing an early resolution to a grievance that the government wishes to remedy. The over-representation of labor disputes in the set of early concessions illustrates this. About half of concessions made to campaigns about labor disputes (6 of 13) were made after only one or two events. (In two cases, those early events were strikes.) This is more frequently than for other grievance types. Labor conflicts, particularly the threat of strike, are a serious problem for the government, which relies on construction workers, ambulance drivers, medical workers, snowplow drivers, janitors and others whose labor rights have been violated to keep important systems and services up and running. Allowing these workers to enter into extended strikes is undesirable. Additionally, the potential for collective bargaining and the fact that these demands often do not require formal policy changes to be satisfied contribute to a speedier resolution. In most of these cases, the concessions were followed by demobilization.

In other cases, concessions were likely used to pre-empt a conflict that the government expected to escalate into a longer or more disruptive campaign. The housing dispute that received an early concession provides an example. This campaign pertained to the privatization of a workers' dor-

mitory (also called a hostel), instead of transferring the dormitory's ownership to the municipality, which would have allowed residents the opportunity to purchase their rooms or receive compensation.[4] Instead, they were facing eviction. This particular dispute, which related to a building on Stavropol Street, began when the city was already dealing with several protracted conflicts of the same nature. Residents of Stavropol Street received their concession after joining forces with preexisting campaigns representing other dormitories (several of which are included in PCoM) and a non-systemic Communist party, the Revolutionary Workers' Party (RWP). RWP leads a number of groups that assist workers in holding protests to defend their rights, including the Movement of Moscow Hostels, which was involved in every campaign related to these privatization issues around the privatization of workers' dormitories. This early concession—which took the form of an official meeting between residents, the Movement of Moscow Hostels, and the Federal Property Management Agency—may have been an attempt to forestall the escalation of the problem at Stavropol Street into a protracted conflict. It was not, however, successful, and Stavropol Street remained the site of active protest for the duration of the period I collected data for. I discuss these housing privatization issues, including why they are so difficult to resolve, in further detail below.

Another clear case of attempted pre-emption is presented by an early concession to the campaign organized by Moscow State University (MGU) students against the decision to install Moscow's World Cup Fan Zone, a festival-like area where soccer matches would air on a big screen, adjacent to the university's campus, because the World Cup would overlap with the exam period. This movement, coordinated by university students who made for zealous protesters, began nearly a year before the 2018 World Cup and received concessions almost immediately. The capacity of the Fan Zone would be reduced from 42,000 to 20,000, it would be placed an additional 310 meters further from the main university building, and fans would be prevented from entering the campus. The fact that these concessions were made so quickly and about an event of such national

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[4]The conflicting ownership of the workers' dormitories stems from the privatization of property in the 1990s. To simplify a complex issue, these dormitories continued to be managed by the companies (often state-owned enterprises) whose workers lived there, though ultimately the rooms in which the workers should have acquired ownership of their own residences. For this privatization to occur, the city had to designate the buildings as city property, which it had not done. This allowed the dormitories to be sold to private developers, who wanted to evict residents.

importance suggests that the government desired to preempt this campaign as much as possible. Indeed, when protest returned in the following winter, a number of additional concessions were made about the Fan Zone, and the government seemed to exhibit a special interest in generating support for it among MGU's student body, by distributing free tickets and raffling meetings with star players.

5.3.2 Late Concessions

In what scenarios do late-arriving concessions occur? Because few concessions that are not affected by early reneging are made to campaigns that have held more than ten protests, and because most campaigns hold more than ten protests, understanding when these concession happen is important.

Above, I suggested that there are a few conditions that produce higher event counts before a concession. One of these conditions is a grievance that affects a larger number of people. Many of the campaigns in PCoM are relevant to a small group, such as residents of a certain neighborhood, employees of a specific firm, or even residents of particular building. There are other campaigns, however, that affect populations that are an order of magnitude or more greater. Two examples are a campaign against the implementation of paid street and courtyard parking in residential areas, and a campaign against a policy known as the renovation project, wherein the government would exercise a form of eminent domain to seize apartment buildings it classifies as in poor condition, demolish them, and resettle residents in newly constructed high rises. The average turnout at demonstrations for both these campaigns was over 800 people, and this average is more impressive considering that the parking campaign held 23 events and the renovation campaign, 57, the maximum that I observed. At the same time, both campaigns were relatively atomized and although both had an organizational group, it only coordinated the largest protest actions. Many protests were organized by specific neighborhoods, by individual municipal deputies, or by residents of a certain block of apartments. The campaigns thus rapidly accrued event numbers. By the same token, they were not demobilized by concessions. The renovation campaign received the most

133

concessions of any campaign, but they did not have a particularly demobilizing effect. Instead, protest eventually declined as the legal process to seize the apartment buildings proceeded, and residents who opposed it either gave up or were defeated. (Many who resided in affected buildings welcomed the renovation project.) Similarly, the campaign against paid parking exhibited no decrease in mobilization following its concession, as events continued in districts across the city.

I also theorized that campaigns that receive late concessions center on grievances that are difficult to resolve. In several cases, this is clearly true. Three of the campaigns that received concessions after a greater number of events were about housing issues that the city had struggled for years to resolve. Two of these were related to the privatization of workers' dormitories, and the third was organized by the so-called "line-waiters" (*ocheredniki*) who had spent years on waiting list for city-subsidized housing. These housing conflicts are some of the most persistent that I observed. That can partly be attributed to the desperation of the affected protesters: they were facing homelessness, family separation and other severe consequences; some had already experienced these outcomes. Residents of hostels faced extensive abuse and harassment from the ostensible owners of the properties that went beyond conventional repression, including beatings, arson attempts, lack of access to heat and running water, and the welding shut of the doors of their residences. Further, it was obvious that the government did not want to resolve these conflicts in favor of the protesters. It attempted to address the line-waiters' concerns on an individual level, but this is a slippery slope: many thousands of people are waiting for housing in Moscow, some for more than a decade. Particularistic distribution to squeaky wheels (rather those who are willing to bribe to grease the wheels) could lead to bigger problems. Similarly, the dormitory residents were requesting that the city maintain possession of buildings that were generally in poor condition and which it had already sold for a profit, meaning that there was a strong financial incentive against a resolution that would satisfy protesters.

5.3.3 Sustained Events

The foregoing suggests that higher commitment by protesters affects concessions, and that this may be an aspect of capacity. For another perspective on commitment, I look at campaigns that held a continuous protest that lasted two weeks or more. While these events are coded in PCoM as taking place on a single day (conventional for protest-event datasets), I unpack them here. Fifteen campaigns held strikes, sit-ins, encampments, blockades, hunger strikes, and what protesters refer to as round-the-clock watches (*kruglosutochnoye dezhurtstvo*). These events require continuous commitment and often support, and many entail physical sacrifices. Five strikes were held, about wage disputes and the restructuring of the healthcare system. Two separate groups with housing demands held month-long hunger strikes, in an encampment outside the headquarters of United Russia. One of these groups were state-employed medical workers and teachers who demanded to be allowed to purchase their government-issued apartments, as stipulated in their contracts, instead of being evicted, and the other was the previously discussed line-waiters movement.

The third, most common and longest lasting type of continuous event occurred at construction sites and combined watches with sit-ins and blockades. Protesters involved in disputes about construction in public parks often do not trust the government to suspend construction when it claims to do so. There are numerous cases of irreparable harm befalling a contested site in the middle of the night, or when attention flagged; this is the fate that befell the monument to the Great Patriotic War constructed by residents of Ramenki, as discussed in Chapter 4. Once that damage occurs, it is usually irreversible and signals defeat for the campaign. To prevent this, park defenders developed a strategy of round-the-clock watches, where small teams maintain 24-hour monitoring of the site. This can be done from a van parked nearby or from overlooking apartment buildings. If construction appears to be beginning, other campaign members are alerted and congregate at the site to demand proper permits and if necessary position themselves between the site and construction equipment. Many watches are sustained for a few weeks or months; one has been continuously monitored its site for several years.

The ability to hold these sustained events demonstrates the campaign's high capacity. They are

difficult to coordinate, and require the continuous commitment and support of a large number of individuals. Generally, these events also provoke unusually vicious harassment and violence from state and non-state actors. Protesters have been deliberately hit with construction equipment, their camps have been destroyed, and they are regularly attacked by private security forces. (Violence is significantly less common against strikes.) Withstanding these attacks requires high commitment from protesters, but it also tests the government, for whom these highly public, egregious conflicts are undesirable. Beyond the violence, sustained events are also extremely inconvenient from the government's perspective: they disrupt workflows, publicly shame members of the government, and in some cases, make it impossible to resolve the conflict.

How do concessions affect these highly committed, high-capacity campaigns? Seven of the 15 long-duration events received concessions that were not immediately impacted by reneging. In the cases of the three labor strikes, those concessions appeared to satisfy the campaign and are tightly linked to the end of the strike. Concessions had a mixed effect on the three park defense protests that were operating watches. At Torfyanka Park, where park defenders sought to prevent the construction of a Russian Orthodox temple, a concession was made after about one month of watch; it had no effect, and the watch continued at this site at least until 2020. In the case of Park Druzhbi, a concession was made two months into a watch that lasted 118 days; the watch was ultimately terminated by escalating repression and the clearing of the camp by police.

The cases of Torfyanka and Park Druzhbi are noteworthy for other reasons. Defenders of Torfyanka Park were the first to hold a round-the-clock watch and are credited with developing this tactic. Park Druzhbi implemented the strategy two months after Torfyanka. Activists from these campaigns trained other park defenders in setting up a watch. They were thus disproportionately unlikely to believe the government would make good on its promises. Defenders of Torfyanka are also highly skeptical of the government's ability to control the Russian Orthodox Church, whose desire to build a temple in the park has only intensified given locals' resistance. Part of the reason their watch continued so long was that Orthodox counter-protesters were as vigilant as the opponents of the temple construction.

Not all sustained events end this way. At another park, a concession did end the watch after about three weeks. It also initiated a comparative decline in protest, from daily to monthly and then even more sporadically. The line-waiters movement did not receive concessions in their first 30-day hunger strike and encampment, but several months later, five days into a second hunger strike, they were promised a concession and halted the strike in response. Thus, in some cases, these sustained events, which rely on high campaign capacity, can be demobilized by concessions, although in others, mobilization continues almost unchanged.

5.4   Campaign Type

In Chapter 4, I argued that everyday protest campaigns can be sorted into two ideal types, campaigns about policy performance and campaigns about policymaking exclusion. Campaigns about policy performance bring the government's attention to issues it is motivated to resolve, while policymaking exclusion campaigns arise in situations where the government has deliberately ignored public feedback. Here, I consider whether these campaign-level features affect the extent to which a concession is associated with demobilization. It bears repeating that the concession-events I examine here are not affected by reneging, and that reneging is more likely to impact policymaking exclusion campaigns. The restricted sample in this chapter contains 32 concessions to policymaking exclusion campaigns and 20 concessions to policy performance campaigns.

When comparing the 30 days before and after a concession, both campaigns reduce the level of protest. 50% of concessions to policymaking exclusion campaigns are associated with decreased protest, and 18.8%, with increased protest. For policy performance campaigns, the immediate demobilizing effect is greater: 55% of concessions decrease protest, and 15% increase it. For both campaign types, the percentage of concessions associated with demobilization increases over time. This is likely due to the fact that these concessions were not affected by reneging and therefore may actually provide resolution of the grievance. Table 5.5 presents these results.

Looking at the duration to the next protest supports the proposition that concessions are more ef-

Table 5.5: Comparative Rate of Protest, 30-, 60- and 90-Day Periods by Campaign Type

| | 30 Days | | 60 Days | | 90 Days | |
	Exclusion	*Performance*	*Exclusion*	*Performance*	*Exclusion*	*Performance*
Increase	18.8%	15.0%	24.1%	15.0%	21.4%	20.0%
No Change	31.2%	30.0%	17.2%	25.0%	21.4%	20.0%
Decrease	50.0%	55.0%	58.6%	60.0%	57.1%	60.0%
	n=32	n=20	n=29	n=20	n=28	n=20

fective against policy performance campaigns. 60% of concession-events that involved policy performance campaigns were not followed by a large protest in the first 30 days, whereas only 46.9% policymaking exclusion campaigns suspended protest in that period. Within 60 days, 50% of concessions to policy performance campaigns were still demobilizing, compared to 31.2% of concessions to policymaking exclusion campaigns. This asymmetric demobilization persists through the 6-month period, but by one year, the behavior of both campaign types converge: 84% of concessions to policymaking exclusion and 76.5% of concessions to policy performance campaigns have lost their demobilizing effect. Interestingly, the share of policy performance campaigns that remobilize in the last 6-months of the 1-year period is twice that of policymaking exclusion campaigns. This, coupled with the above observation about declining protest by policy performance campaigns within the first three months after a concession suggests solutions to conflicts about policy performance that are effective in the short-term are not long-term satisfying. This may be because policy performance campaigns regularly ask for and win particularistic concessions that do not entail lasting reforms. For instance, the labor disputes are generally resolved by the repayment of stolen wages or a raise; they do not lead to changes that prevent wage theft or ensure that workers will earn a living wage in the future.

5.5   Higher Quality Concessions

Given that this chapter examines cases of concession that were not affected by reneging, it provides an opportunity to gain insight into how satisfaction with the concession affects mobilization. To

do so, I look at concession-events that included at least one concession coded as *core*. These concessions address one of the campaign's top demands, and they comprise 27 of the 53 concession-events. It seems straightforward that if a concession promises to resolve a core grievance that motivates the campaign, protest should decline, particularly if reneging does not occur. This effect is also called grievance depletion (Gamson, 1975). I explore the strength and persistence of this effect here.

First, I compare the protest incidence in the 30 days before and after a core concession (table 5.6). Core concessions are associated with a decrease of protest in 55.6% of cases, compared with 46.2% of other concession-events. Yet they are also associated with an increase of protest in 18.5% of cases. This share is higher than that for lower quality concessions, which increase protest in only 15.4% instances. Accordingly, a comparatively lower share of campaigns maintain protest at the same level following a core concession (25.9%) than following other concessions (38.5%). Campaigns thus appear more reactive to higher quality concessions, either escalating protest or demobilizing. This phenomenon persists in the 60 and 90-day periods, with the share of campaigns increasing and decreasing protest activity both grow. By the end of the 90-day window, 70.8% of core concessions are associated with demobilization, compared with 45.8% other concessions.

Table 5.6: Comparative Rate of Protest, 30-, 60- and 90-Day Periods by Quality

	30 Days		60 Days		90 Days	
	Core	*Other*	*Core*	*Other*	*Core*	*Other*
Increase	18.5%	15.4%	20.8%	20.0%	20.8%	20.8%
No Change	25.9%	38.5%	4.2%	36.0%	8.3%	33.3%
Decrease	55.6%	46.2%	75.0%	44.0%	70.8%	45.8%
	n=27	n=26	n=24	n=25	n=24	n=24

Core concessions also associated the subsequent suspension of protest (see 5.7). Only 33.3% of core concessions were followed by a large protest within 30 days, compared to 61.5% of other concessions. This striking relationship is statistically significant at p<0.1 level in a Chi square-test.[5] Yet this demobilizing effect declines within 60 days: where previously two thirds of campaigns

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[5] χ^2 (1, N = 53) = 3.17, p = .075

Table 5.7: Duration from Concession to Next Protest, by Quality

	30 Days		60 Days		90 Days		6 months		1 year	
	Core	*Other*	*Core*	*Other*	*Core*	*Other*	*Core*	*Other*	*Core*	*Other*
Protest	33.3%	61.5%	55.6%	65.4%	55.6%	69.2%	61.5%	78.3%	68.2%	95.0%
No Protest	66.7%	38.5%	44.0%	34.6%	44.4%	30.8%	38.5%	21.7%	31.8%	5.0%
	n=27	n=26	n=24	n=25	n=24	n=24	n-32	n=23	n=22	n=20

were demobilized, at 60 days, only 44.4% have not held a protest. For core concessions, these numbers remain roughly similar through the 6-month mark, then again drop dramatically. At one year, 31.8% of core concessions have forestalled a subsequent large protests. This is significantly higher than the comparable figure for other concessions: only 5% of non-core concessions—accounting for a single concession—were still associated with the suspension of protest after one year. This relationship at the one-year mark is also significant at p<0.1 in a Chi square-test.[6] Still, this again points to a dynamic of later-remobilization.

Overall, it seems that core concessions are a major driver of the demobilizing effect of concessions. This makes intuitive sense: core concessions come close to giving protesters what they asked for, so they seem bound to be more satisfying. Non-core concessions still have some demobilizing effect, but it is less robust, particularly in the long-term. This finding underscores that concessions are more than the simple transmission of benefits from the government to the population. Specifically, concessions are sometimes assumed to be equivalent to financial or material benefits, meaning that making concessions is the same as paying off protesters or engaging in patronal politics. It is clear here that if the government's goal is demobilization, concessions of that nature are unlikely to work. Although everyday protest campaigns are generally motivated by concrete concerns, these protesters did not demand material or financial compensation (outside of recovering losses or money owed, for example in labor disputes), which means that concessions of that nature would not be considered core. Incidentally, the Moscow government rarely made concessions that entailed distribution unrelated to the demands of the campaign, probably due to the fact that such concessions would offer little strategic advantage.

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[6]χ^2 (1, N = 50) = 3.26, p = .071

5.5.1 Who concedes?

Analysis of the effect of core concession shows that the quality is an important driver of demobilization. Do other aspects of concession quality operate in the same way? To explore this, I consider concessions that were made by an individual holding national-level office or representative of a national-level institution. Examples of national-level figures who made concessions include President Vladimir Putin, the Presidential Administration, the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers, the chairman or other members of the State Duma, and leaders of national universities. Local figures include members of the Moscow City government, including Mayor Sergei Sobyanin, Deputy Mayors, Moscow-level institutional bodies like the City Property Office, and members of the City Duma, as well as district-level officials and state-owned or affiliated enterprises. National-level concessions were considerably less common than local concessions. Only 10 are included in this data, and this small sample size is evident in the following analysis.

First, it bears discussing whether concessions from national-level actors are truly higher quality. Because these everyday protests are about local issues, they are often seen as caused by the local government. The Moscow government is widely considered corrupt, and protesters understand many of the conflicts that appear in PCoM as fundamentally related to that corruption. Protesters often have limited faith in the ability of the local government to resolve conflicts of its own making in the public interest. In that context, a concession from a national-level authority could have the effect of intercession from above; indeed, the tradition of the highest power in the land disciplining bad local officials is as old as Russia itself.

At the same time, these national-level actors are also seen as corrupt. Their investment in the public interest, rather than elite allies, is dubious. In Moscow, national-level actors are embedded in the same corrupt networks as local politicians. As an illustration of this, Marat Khusnullin, who served as Moscow's Deputy Mayor for Urban Development and Construction from 2010 to 2020, was often targeted by protesters with construction-related grievances.[7] These are conflicts

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[7]Khusnullin was likely one of the least popular political figures in the city during this period. However, in interviews, it was clear that part of protesters' animus against Marat Khusnullin and Sergei Sobyanin is that are "not from Moscow" and are attempting to change the city without a legitimate claim to it or an understanding of it. Defenders

in which hundreds of million dollars are regularly at stake, given the cost of land and real estate in Moscow. Several development projects Khusnullin oversaw directly benefited national-level elites, such as the MGU "tech valley" project discussed in Chapter 4, which produced multiple land disputes and likely directly benefited Putin's family.[8] In 2020, Khusnullin became the Deputy Prime Minister of Russia for Construction and Regional Development, an equivalent national-level office. In sum, concessions from national-level actors can be interpreted as higher-quality, but certainly not universally.

Within the first 30 days after a concession from a national-level actor, the effect on demobilization is almost indistinguishable from local concessions (see 5.8). Both decrease protest compared to the previous 30 days in 40-50% of cases, and leave protest unchanged in around one third of cases. National level concessions were more likely to increase the incidence of protest; this occurred in 20% of cases, as opposed to 16.3% of local concessions. When turning to data on time to the next protest, however, it is evident that national-level concessions are considerably less likely to contribute to demobilization. In no period that I assess do national-level concessions delay large protests more than local-level concessions (see 5.9). Within 30 days, 60% of national-level concessions have been followed by a large protest, whereas only 44.2% of local concessions have failed to demobilize. By 60 days, that figure rises to 80%. The demobilizing effect of local concessions appears to decline less quickly, too. By 6 months, only one of the observed nine national-level concessions has forestalled another protest, whereas 35.0% of local concessions had not been followed by another large protest. After one year, 20.0% of the local concessions were still associated with demobilization.

What might be producing this effect? It may be the result of a selection issue: the campaigns

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of Moscow's architecture, parks and other urban features often mentioned this, and often brought up them up together (For instance, *"Khusnullin is a swindler, a thief, a corrupt official. He's not from Moscow at all. Well, Sobyanin is not from Moscow either. They all came here and are building these skyscrapers over our heads."*) However, many members of the Moscow government are not from the city. In the case of Khusnullin and Sobyanin, there is an ethnic dimension to this complaint. Khusnullin is ethnically Tatar and made his name in Kazan, the capital of the Republic of Tatarstan. Sobyanin is from the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Ethnic Republic and is of Mansi heritage.

[8]Khusnullin's projects also directly benefitted himself, his family, and allies from his home city of Kazan. In 2016, Khusnullin was the subject of an investigation by Transparency International, at the request of defenders of Dubki Park (a case study of this campaign is included in the next chapter), which found evidence of corruption and conflict of interest, and was submitted to Moscow's Prosecutor's Office (Transparency International Russia, 2016).

Table 5.8: Comparative Rate of Protest, 30-, 60-, and 90-Day Periods around a Concession, by Speaker

	30 Days		60 Days		90 Days	
	Local	National	Local	National	Local	National
Increase	16.3%	20.0%	23.1%	10.0%	23.7%	10.0%
No Change	32.6%	30.0%	17.9%	30.0%	15.8%	40.0%
Decrease	51.2%	40.0%	59.0%	60.0%	60.5%	50.0%
	n=43	n=10	n=39	n=10	n=38	n=10

Table 5.9: Duration from Concession to Next Protest, by Speaker

	30 Days		60 Days		90 Days		6 months		1 year	
	Local	National	Local	National	Local	National	Local	National	Local	National
Protest	44.2%	60.0%	55.8%	80.0%	58.1%	80.0%	65.0%	88.9%	80.0%	85.7%
No Protest	55.8%	40.0%	44.2%	20.0%	41.9%	20.0%	35.0%	11.1%	20.0%	14.3%
	n=43	n=10	n=43	n=10	n=43	n=10	n=40	n=9	n=35	n=7

that attract national attention are also higher capacity and better able to sustain protest regardless of the concession. On average, national-level concessions went to campaigns that had held more prior events (9.8 compared with 8.67 events to local concessions), and these campaigns are less likely to be demobilized by concessions. Additionally, it is possible that increased attention associated with a concession by national-level actors incentivized an uptick in protest.

Finally, concessions from these higher-ranking sources may not effectively resolve grievances. Only half of national-level concessions address the campaign's core concern. For instance, in the Khoroshevo-Mnevniki neighborhood of northwestern Moscow, a park defense campaign formed to prevent the construction of high-rise apartment buildings on the banks of the Moscow River. Not only was this area designated as open space, its geology was too unstable to support large buildings, which was an issue given that it was also situated closer to nuclear and high-pressure gas facilities than was permitted for residential construction. After a round-the-clock watch forced a halt to the project, a State Duma Deputy visited the site to meet with protesters. He promised to officially stop construction until the permits were verified. As park defenders were aware, such a commitment has little long-term impact, because the body that issues the permits, the Planning Commission, rarely

reverses its decisions and operates without oversight. Eventually, the Presidential Administration declared the permits legal, and the facility was completed by 2019.

5.6   Early and Late Remobilization

Throughout this exploration of demobilization, it has become evident that some campaigns hold protests almost immediately after receiving a concession, while others wait months. To understand why this occurs, I look more closely at these cases of "failed demobilization" and late remobilization.

There are 14 concession-events, affecting nine campaigns, where the next protest occurred within a week of the concession. In several of those instances, protest happened the following day. For some of these campaigns, the continuation of mobilization appears to be the result of unsatisfactory concessions. Only six of the 14 concessions were core concessions, and protesters mainly carried on as before. In one instance of a workers' dormitory protest, residents fighting for their right to stay in their homes were told that if they voluntarily moved out, they would be resettled in new apartments. This greatly angered protesters and initiated a sharp increase of protest. In other cases, the campaign appears to have had an event previously planned and simply did not cancel it after the concession, although protest subsequently tapered off. Last, as discussed above, very large campaigns like the opposition to the renovation project, are weakly coordinated and demobilization occurred unevenly.

As an illustration, consider the example of the Mitino district of northwest Moscow, where locals hoping to prevent the development of a shopping mall-hockey rink complex in a local park "failed" to demobilize after concessions twice. On the first occasion, the concession only committed the government to organizing a public council of local initiative group leaders, residents and municipal deputies to discuss the issue of construction. Not only does this concession in no way address the core grievance, it is an attempt at cooptation, by drawing campaign organizers into meetings with officials who are essentially unable to affect policy. A few days later, the campaign

held a park clean-up in support of their cause. This event required a fair amount of preplanning, as it was coordinated with the local district administration, and it had goals outside the expression of dissent. Thus, even if the concession had been acceptable, the event would likely have been held. The Mitino campaign continued protesting and was promised another concession two months after the first. This second concession was significantly more satisfying. A Moscow City Duma Deputy told a local newspaper that construction of retail space in the park would be banned in the near future. While this would not prohibit all development in the park—indeed, about a year later attempts to develop the real estate resumed—it would prevent the construction of the shopping center at minimum. Despite this promising development, the campaign held demonstration five days later. This protest would be their last event for several months, concluding weeks of sustained activism. Organizing this protest took notably more effort than most of Mitino's previous events. First, because it was expected to be a larger demonstration, in the weeks prior to the event, organizers had submitted notification to the government of their intention to hold a demonstration. This request was denied. To avoid holding an illegal demonstration, the organizers recruited sympathetic municipal deputies to attend, as the presence of an elected official technically qualifies a gathering as a meeting with constituents. Additionally, one of the motivations for holding this event was to celebrate the union of all citizens' groups in Mitino into a single group, Our Mitino. This was therefore a high-effort event that organizers worked hard to coordinate and were disinclined to cancel because of the concession.

Why might some campaigns demobilize following a concession, only to protest again months later? There are nine cases where this occurred, and in all of them, the remobilization was driven by a resurgence in the importance of the grievance. In some cases this looks similar to reneging. For construction disputes, there appear to be cases where the government reels back its efforts to develop a plot of land, potentially in the hope that activism subsides and it can execute a similar, but slightly different development. It is this phenomenon that leads to the round-the-clock-watches I describe above. It also led to the late remobilization of the Mitino campaign, when the focus of development shifted from a shopping mall-hockey rink to apartments and a hockey rink. Similarly,

145

there are two cases of resurgent labor protests, in one instance because wage theft had occurred again and in the other, workers wanted improvements over the earlier concession. The line-waiters campaign for subsidized housing, however, remobilized for different reasons: the campaign began to direct its energy into joining a national campaign about housing rights, and its demands evolve from resolving the protesters' immediate concerns to the prosecution of local government officials who have violated their rights.

5.7 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have explored the extent to which concessions, when actually implemented, are associated with the demobilization of everyday protest campaigns. By comparing the incidence of large protests before and after a concession-event and by analyzing the duration to the next protest, I have shown that concessions do appear to inhibit mobilization. Moreover, this association with demobilization is stronger than that of detentions and demobilization. However, this effect of concessions on demobilization declines over time: 81% of protest campaigns have held another protest within a year of experience a concession-event. This is striking, given that concessions that were undermined by reneging were not included in this analysis.

Why might this effect be short-lived? The findings from this chapter provide some insight. First, as suggested by the analysis of concessions that entailed a timeline, campaigns may adopt a wait-and-see approach and pause protest while the government implements concessions. Later, however, they may feel that those concessions were unsatisfactory or the grievance may evolve, spurring renewed protest. Second, the analysis of campaign event history suggests that the government may use concessions in the very early stages of a protest campaign to contain it before the campaign acquires the capacity to make greater demands. This does not appear to be effective in most cases: it might forestall protest but does not seem to eliminate it longer-term, possibly because the earlier-arriving concessions are less likely to tackle the campaign's core concern. Third, it is likely that the demobilizing effect of concessions arises from how closely the concession matches

the campaign's core goals. This factor was the most persistently associated with demobilization of any that I considered here. Unsatisfactory concessions seem to be ignored by protesters. This suggests that in some instances when core concessions are used, conflicts truly are resolved: the central grievance is addressed and protest subsides.

Although the concessions considered in this chapter were not affected by reneging, they can still tell us about the dynamics of concessions that are eventually undermined. It is clear that the promise of concessions is linked to an immediate drop in protest, particularly in the first 30 days. During this period, protesters may not do not know whether the government intends to renege (though in some cases they do, as I discuss in the case study in Chapter 6). This means that a similar dynamic of immediate demobilization would likely occur in many cases where the government reneges later on. This supports the theory I advanced in Chapter 4, that the government makes empty promises to protesters in order to secure a few weeks of reduced protest. In the next chapter, I set the question of mobilization aside to focus squarely on reneging.

CHAPTER 6

Concessions and Reneging

> Well, if they promise something, as a rule, they usually deliver it.
>
> — *Interview with an ecological protester, September 19, 2019*

> We don't have final victories here.
>
> — *Interview with park defender, September 22, 2019*

The previous chapter examines concessions that were implemented, at least in large part, within the first few months after they were made. This is not the fate of every concession. The city promised protesting residents of dormitories owned by the Salyut Aircraft Engine Factory, the Trekhgorny Factory, Centrotransstroy and other enterprises that these dormitories would be transferred to the city's ownership so that their housing rights would be recognized, yet the city then declined to accept the transfer that it had itself requested, extending these housing disputes. In response to opposition to the restructuring of the healthcare system, the city guaranteed job search assistance, access to training programs and a salary during retraining for laid-off workers, but despite the fact that thousands of people should have qualified for these benefits, the city only managed to distribute them to a few hundred. The campaign against park construction in Mitino was promised that city authorities would not construct a hockey center in the park; the hockey rink is due to be completed in 2021. These are all examples of reneging, or the deliberate failure to full implement concessions as promised. 45.1% of all concessions are subject to reneging within four years.

In this chapter, I analyze dynamics in the implementation of concessionary promises to derive theoretical implications of how, when and why reneging occurs. Although it is widely acknowledged that commitments by autocrats to future behavior lack inherent credibility and are subject to reneging, this phenomenon has rarely been examined when it comes to protest, and never examined when it comes to protest by low-capacity campaigns on less politicized issues. How does reneging happen? What features of a concession are associated with an increased or decreased chance of reneging? What features are associated with a higher chance that the concession will be fully implemented as promised? How does the level of government that makes the concession affect reneging or full implementation? I address these questions using descriptive analysis of the aggregate concessions data in the next section.

In the previous chapter, I exclusively focused on the relationship between mobilization and concessions that were not affected by reneging in hopes of isolating how concessions themselves, rather than reneging, influences mobilization. Identifying the relationship between reneging and mobilization is not as straightforward. The implementation data I collected for each concession is not optimally suited to disentangling the nature of this relationship. The implementation data is observed on a different scale than the daily event data I used in the last chapter. Because of the difficulty of associating implementation of a policy with a specific date, instead I score implementation over a certain period, the shortest of which is three months. This means that the first three months after a concession has a single implementation score. Based on the analysis in the last chapter, protest activity varies greatly in that period. Aggregating that protest activity to match the level of measurement of implementation will mask a lot of theoretically important protest dynamics.

In light of this, I present a case study of Save Park Dubki!, a campaign against the construction of an apartment complex on the edge of a park. This campaign received five concessions, all of which the government reneged on, in some cases virtually instantly. These concessions also failed to demobilize the campaign. This case allows me to more closely examine the link between reneging and mobilization in the context of a higher-capacity campaign against construction, which is the modal grievance in PCoM.

Next, I analyze data from 22 interviews that I conducted with urban activists in Moscow in 2018 and 2019 to clarify how activists perceive concessionary promises, the credibility of the government, the need to sustaining mobilization after a concession and obstacles to doing so. These interviews illustrate the difficult position in which activists find themselves: they seek concessionary promises from a government they believe is fundamentally untrustworthy, and to prevent reneging, they must convince more credulous campaign members that their understanding of their political system is wrong.

6.1 Quantitative Aggregate Analysis of Concessions and Reneging

6.1.1 Data and Methodology

In this section, I analyze the dataset of 122 individual concessions that were made to protesters in Moscow from September 12 2013 to September 18 2018. To be clear, these are not the concession-events of the previous chapter; each concession is distinct. For each concession, I identify the speaker or entity that issued the concessionary promise, the type of action promised in the concession and whether the promise corresponds to a core demand, which motivated the campaign and was expressed by the campaign. Greater detail of the concessions coding is available in section 3.2.

Section 3.2.4 discusses the measurement of implementation of concessions and reneging, but I briefly review these measures here. I assessed implementation in seven periods: first, in four three-month quarters for the first year, and then for three additional one-year periods. Implementation is scored on a four-point scale. Concessions scored as a 1 have no impact or a negligible impact, with no evidence that any subcomponents of the concession have an influence on actual policies or behavior consistent with the promise, or that any steps have been taken by the government to put the concession into place. Descriptively, I refer to this score as reneging or full reneging, because

there is no observable effort by the government to enact the promised concession. This is the level of implementation used to generate the reneging variable in Chapter 4 and to exclude concession-events in Chapter 5. Concessions scored as a 2 have a limited effect or the government has fulfilled about 25-50% of the elements of the commitment. A score of 3 represents some or partial effect, where more than half of the elements or steps of the concession have been implemented, but it falls short of affecting actual policy and/or behavior as promised. This score can be thought of as 50-75% implementation. Last, concessions scored at 4 are mostly or fully implemented. The majority of or all steps associated with implementing the concession are completed. Concessions at this level have the real, intended effect on policy and/or behavior of actors that is consistent with the initial promise. In the following, I focus on comparing the frequency of concessions that were scored at 1, full reneging, and 4, full implementation, because these are the two outcomes of greatest interest. They also facilitate comparison, as I rely on descriptive methods here.

In addition to these implementation scores, in each period I identify concessions for which implementation cannot be observed (also discussed in section 3.2.4). This occurs in several scenarios. I do not score implementation where fulfilling the commitment made in the concession has become impossible, or where the concessions was completed in an earlier period and requires no maintenance to be sustained. Also, concessions that were invalidated by other concessions, making their fulfillment impossible, were not scored; promises from higher-ranking officials or with more accelerated timelines are two examples of concessions that might supplant others. Last, I do not score concessions where efforts to enact the concession were plausibly underway but could not be observed, and that unobservability did not violate the commitment in the concession itself. These missing observations mean that only about 65% of concessions are scored for implementation in any given period, and the sample ranges from 54-70% of the 122 concessions. In other words, some concessions are observed at the beginning, some only later, and some for periods in the middle.

To evaluate which concessions are more or less subject to reneging, I use frequency tables. Of the concessions that are observed in each period, I calculate the percentage of those conces-

sions that are at each category of implementation. When disaggregating by concession feature, I calculate the percentage of concessions with that feature at each category of implementation.

6.1.2 An Overview of Aggregate Data on Reneging

How common is reneging? How does the quality of implementation of concessions change over time? In this section I conduct an aggregate analysis of all concessions and their implementation level over time. This data is presented in table 6.1 and summarized in figure 6.1.

First, regardless of temporal variation, the majority of concessions are either fully implemented (4) or have no impact (1). Relatively few concessions are at a partial or limited level of implementation (2 or 3) at any given time. The government therefore appears to use an all-or-nothing strategy when using concessions. This supports the proposition in Chapter 4, that in some cases concessions are used to remedy grievances but in others, they are a strategy to distract protesters and undermine mobilization. This bifurcation of concessions between the highest and lowest level of implementation is potentially characteristic of a high-capacity autocracy that has the ability to implement concessions and to use them as a form of manipulation. Were the government attempting and failing to implement concessions, the incidence of these middling levels of implementation would be higher, since virtually any evidence of the government making an effort to implement a concession was sufficient to classify implementation as partial.

Table 6.1: Implementation of Concessions over Time

	1		2		3		4		n Scored	0	NA
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%		n	n
0-3 months	36	41.9%	9	10.5%	6	7.0%	35	40.7%	86	24	12
3-6 months	30	37.5%	12	15.0%	7	8.8%	31	38.8%	80	19	23
6-9 months	30	37.5%	15	18.8%	8	10.0%	27	33.8%	80	18	24
9-12 months	32	37.2%	17	19.8%	8	9.3%	29	33.7%	86	11	25
Year 2	32	39.5%	17	21.0%	8	9.9%	24	29.6%	81	2	39
Year 3	32	42.1%	16	21.1%	9	11.8%	19	25.0%	76	3	43
Year 4	30	46.2%	10	15.4%	6	9.2%	19	29.2%	65	3	54

Figure 6.1: Implementation of Concessions over Time

Percentage of concessions scored in each time period at each level of implementation

Looking at concessions that are not implemented, the share begins high, with 41.9% of all concessions that are observed within the first three months. Though it appears that comparatively fewer concessions have no impact at 6 months, this is likely an artifact of the sample. Seven of the 34 concessions that initially have no impact are not observed in the next quarter, mainly because they pertain to actions the government promised would be undertaken immediately or that were no longer relevant after three months due to developments in the conflict. In the following periods, the share of concessions that were fully undermined by reneging consistently grows—again, despite the reduction in sample size—until by three or more years out, 46.2% of concessions have no impact. Concessions that were completely fulfilled in the first three months consistently decline over the period of observation, from 40.7% to 25-29%.

Further, significant changes in the level of implementation are rare over time, particularly when it comes to improving implementation. Of the 36 cases where a concession had no effect within the first three months, none was ever fully implemented at any point. Only two of those concessions ever reached partial implementation (score of 3). Concessions that were initially fully realized are more likely to decline. Thirty five concessions were first observed at full implementation, but four

of these ultimately had no effect and five eventually had limited effect (score of 2).

Taken together, this suggests that reneging has three core features. First, the majority of reneging is immediate. Second, in the cases where reneging is not immediate, the quality of implementation can decline with time, both with a higher incidence of reneging and a lower incidence of full implementation, meaning that the apparent victory of a concession is challenging for a campaign to hold onto. Even concessions that appear robustly implemented at the outset may not necessarily be secure. Third, once total reneging has occurred, it is not reversed—though it may be supplanted by a different concession.

6.1.3 Core Concessions

The quality of a concession—whether or not it corresponds to one of the campaign's core demands—is clearly important for demobilizing protest. Core concessions comprise 52 of the 122 total concessions, and just under half (31 of 66) campaigns received a core concession. To what extent are these concessions impacted by reneging? In Chapter 5, I found these concessions were most associated with diminished mobilization when they are fully implemented, but how often does that occur? In table E.1, I compare the implementation of core concessions to other types of concessions over time.

Figure 6.2: Comparison of Implementation over Time, by Concession Quality

Percentage of concessions scored in each time period at each level of implementation. Wildcard concessions (n=4) are omitted.

154

Table 6.2: Comparison of Implementation over Time, by Concession Quality

	Quality	1	2	3	4
0-3 months	Core	33.3%	15.4%	7.7%	43.6%
	Other	48.9%	6.4%	6.4%	38.3%
3-6 months	Core	33.3%	17.9%	12.8%	35.9%
	Other	41.5%	12.2%	4.9%	41.5%
6-9 months	Core	34.2%	21.1%	15.8%	28.9%
	Other	40.5%	16.7%	4.8%	38.1%
9-12 months	Core	34.1%	19.5%	17.1%	29.3%
	Other	40.0%	20.0%	2.2%	37.8%
Year 2	Core	28.2%	20.5%	15.4%	35.9%
	Other	50.0%	21.4%	4.8%	23.8%
Year 3	Core	30.8%	23.1%	17.9%	28.2%
	Other	54.1%	18.9%	5.4%	21.6%
Year 4	Core	36.4%	12.1%	12.1%	39.4%
	Other	56.3%	18.8%	6.3%	18.8%

For a table comparing all levels of quality, see Appendix E.

Core concessions are both more likely to be subject to initial reneging and more likely to be fully implemented. In the first three months, only 33.3% of core concessions were reneged on, whereas 48.9% of other concessions are immediately undermined by reneging. Beyond the first three months, the share of core concessions that were not implemented holds steady over time, between 28-36%, while the share of non-core concessions increases fairly consistently. Ultimately, the government reneged on 56.3% of non-core concessions that were observed after four years. Turning to full implementation, there is considerably more fluctuation overtime. In the first quarter, 43.6% of concessions are fully implemented, compared to 38.3% of other concessions, yet in the second quarter, this ratio is reversed: 35.9% of core concessions were fully implemented, compared to the 41.5% of non-core concessions. This effect may be driven by the fact that a large number of non-core concessions are dropped from the sample: 10 non-core concessions are dropped from the sample at 6 months, compared to 3 core concessions. This is likely because non-core concessions tend to be shorter-term, and may pertain to temporary measures to pause the conflict pending its resolution, for instance suspending construction at a contested site, compared with cancelling it

altogether. The share of non-core concessions at full implementation steadily declines, hitting 18.8% at four years.

After four years, almost the same share of core concessions are fully implemented as have no real-world effect. Why might this be? Some core concessions are in fact intended to resolve the grievance: the concessions themselves address the motivating grievance of the campaign and in a number of cases, those concessions were actually did what was promised. Yet in a large share of cases of core concession, the government evidently does not intend for the concession to address the motivating grievance, because it does not implement the promised change. In the previous chapter, I showed that core concessions that were not affected by reneging were much more likely to be associated with demobilization. *Ex ante*, of course, a campaign cannot know for certain if a given concession will be undermined by reneging, meaning that demobilization can occur. In sum, it seems likely that the government may falsely promise core concessions, without intention of implementing them, to discourage mobilization.

If this is true, however, it begs an additional question: why does the government ever use non-core concessions? First, a fair number of non-core concessions address an expressed, secondary demand of the campaign, but not its core grievance. I call these "subcore" concessions. Subcore concessions are neither a strict victory for protesters nor defeat for the government. They represent a kind of compromise, where the government concedes to some of the campaign demands without committing to resolving the grievance in their favor. They may therefore occur in cases where the government is particularly unwilling to make a core concession, even if reneging is possible, perhaps if the campaign is very high capacity. Subcore concessions are slightly less common than core concessions (32.8% of all concessions are subcore, versus 42.6% core) and they constitute the majority of non-core concessions that were used as a comparison group for the demobilization analysis in the last chapter. In other words, the last chapter also demonstrates that subcore concessions are less demobilizing than core concessions. Figure 6.2 depicts the comparison between core, subcore and adjacent concessions; the full table is available in appendix E . While subcore concessions suffer from a high rate of reneging—higher than core concessions in every

period and often around 50%—in some periods that are more likely to be fully implemented than core concessions, particularly in the first year. Further, the share of subcore concessions that are fully implemented changes little in the first year (36-37%), while the full implementation of core concessions declines.

From this it seems that subcore concessions serve a few purposes. First, they can be an attempt to resolve a conflict where the government is unwilling to make a core concession. These would be cases where reneging might be less common. Alternatively, subcore concessions may be an effort to disrupt mobilization with a concession that resonates with the campaign's demands. Here, reneging would be expected. It is possible that, because subcore concessions represent a compromise, that they are used as a kind of bargaining process. If the government offers subcore concessions in an effort to compromise with a campaign, but protest continues because the concession is seen as insufficient, the government could choose not to implement the concession in response.

Last, it is notable that adjacent concessions—which do not correspond to a demand expressed by the campaign but still pertain to the grievance—are the most vulnerable to problems with implementation. The high incidence of reneging suggests that adjacent concessions are more of a gesture at responsiveness than a genuine compromise.

6.1.4 Official Rank

As the dissertation thus far has shown, concessions are not inherently credible. I argued in Chapter 4 that this absence of credibility is a feature of authoritarian regimes, where the weakness of institutions that represent the public interest means that citizens have limited means to hold the government to its promises. While this is the case overall, the government itself is a hierarchical structure. Within that structure, higher-level authorities do have the power to enforce commitments implemented by lower-level officials. Higher-ranking government roles are increasingly managerial, in that a greater bulk of their work is instructing lower-ranking officers in making and implementing policies. It is fair to assume, for instance, that when the Mayor of Moscow promises

the residents of the workers' dormitory at Simferopol Street that they will be provided housing, the Mayor will not be providing that housing himself, but is functionally instructing, in public, his subordinates to resolve the issue. The threat of negative consequences for failing to complete an assigned project should provide an impetus for those subordinates to fulfill the concession.

Additionally, in fieldwork interviews and in the course of reading hundreds of digital accounts by protesters, it was clear that members of these campaigns see Moscow's officials and bureaucrats as corrupt, self-interested, dishonest and even criminal. After all, it is not uncommon for a campaign to have to appeal for a concession to the same officials that they viewed as responsible for the grievance in the first place. As I discussed in the last chapter, this may create the impression of national-level actors as more credible, because they are potentially less enmeshed in the conflicts that spawned these protest campaigns in the first place, and therefore better able to resolve them. All this would suggest that concessions made by higher-ranking officials are less likely to be affected by reneging, and lower-level officials are more likely to make false promises.

Yet the reality is likely less straightforward. Generally speaking, I cannot know if a lower-ranking official makes a concession at the behest of a superior—in effect, an instruction issued behind the scenes. Further, analysis of the data in the last chapter provided strong evidence that concessions from national-level actors are not particularly demobilizing, even when reneging does not occur. Moreover, national-level actors often made concessions that failed to resolve the underlying grievance, which based on the foregoing analysis of on quality, may mean national-level concessions are also subject to reneging more often. Also, as previously discussed, national elites, particularly national elites in Moscow, participate in local corruption. Corruption in Russia is also hierarchical, with profits shared up the ladder as officials pay off the superior officials who protect them. In this light, lower- and higher-level officials are situated in dual principal-agent relationships: one where intervention by the principal may be used to force a lower-level agent to serve the public interest, and another where the principal and agent are united in serving their private interests.

Adding a final layer of complexity is the possibility of fragmentation or competition within the

government. The foregoing explanations assume that either the interests of government agents are aligned, or singular, or that they are diverse but higher-ranking agents can discipline lower-ranking agents. This may not be the case if factions within the government have divergent interests. It may be possible that some members of government promises a concession without intent to renege, but other members who prefer that the concession not be implemented force reneging to occur. These dynamics may plausibly arise in China, where the government is known to be highly fragmented along center-local lines. While I cannot test with my data whether fragmentation or rivalry within government drives concessionary dynamics, these phenomenon are less likely to be at play in Moscow, where fragmentation is not known to be a common problem. Also, given that it is the capital city, the problems associated with monitoring and disciplining agents far from the center, which have contributed to fragmentation in China, are less likely.

How, then, does government hierarchy affect reneging? Do lower-ranking agents renege more often? Are concessions from national-level actors in fact more credible? Local-level officials make the gross majority of concessions, given that PCoM focuses on local issue. Of local actors, whose concessions are most likely to be fully implemented? Are concessions made by the highest-ranking executive—Mayor Sergei Sobyanin—actually implemented?

I begin by categorizing the individual or entity promising the concession as local or national and comparing the frequency of each level of implementation, during each time period. Initially, national-level concessions are less likely to suffer from reneging, with 23.5% having no impact in the first three months, compared to 46.1% of local concessions. Over time, however, reneging rises for national concessions. The share of national-level concessions with no impact steadily increases, until, by four years after the concession, 44.4% of national-level concessions are fully undermined by reneging. A different trend applies to local-level concessions. The share of local concessions that were rated as having no impact decreases within six months to around 40% and holds at that level. Interestingly, national-level concessions were not consistently more likely to be fully implemented than local-level concessions. Instead, a higher share of national-level concessions attain a middling level of implementation, where some or partial elements of the concession have

159

Table 6.3: Comparison of Implementation over Time, by Concession Speaker

	Speaker	1	2	3	4
0-3 months	Local	46.4%	8.7%	4.3%	40.6%
	National	23.5%	17.6%	17.6%	41.2%
3-6 months	Local	40.6%	14.1%	7.8%	37.5%
	National	25.0%	18.8%	12.5%	43.8%
6-9 months	Local	40.3%	17.7%	8.1%	33.9%
	National	27.8%	22.2%	16.7%	33.3%
9-12 months	Local	38.8%	17.9%	9.0%	34.3%
	National	31.6%	26.3%	10.5%	31.6%
Year 2	Local	40.0%	20.0%	10.0%	30.0%
	National	36.4%	27.3%	9.1%	27.3%
Year 3	Local	43.1%	18.5%	12.3%	26.2%
	National	36.4%	36.4%	9.1%	18.2%
Year 4	Local	46.4%	14.3%	10.7%	28.6%
	National	44.4%	22.2%	NA	33.3%

an impact, but it falls short of full implementation.

I draw the following implications from these figures. First, concessions from national-level actors are more likely to affect real-world policies, which is consistent with the notion of national concessions as directives to local government. Yet at the same time, reneging on those concessions steadily increases and they are more likely to be only partly implemented. This potentially points to a principal-agent relationship where national-level principals attempt to force local agents to comply with policy changes that are not in the interests of those local agents. Otherwise, if national and local-actors' priorities were aligned, one would expect a higher incidence of full implementation of national actors' concessions and less attrition over time. This dynamic warrants further research. Second, the decline over time in implementation of national-level concessions may explain the last chapter's finding that these concessions lose their demobilizing power within a year. At that point, the share of national-level concessions that are fully implemented is actually lower than the same figure for local-level concessions, and equal to the share of national-level concessions that have no impact. It may be possible that protesters initially have greater faith in national-concessions but that this erodes with time and diminishes the demobilizing effect. Third, protesters have good

Figure 6.3: Comparison of Implementation over Time, by Speaker

Percentage of concessions scored in each time period at each level of implementation, by local and national government.

reason to feel that concessions from local-level actors are low-credibility. Although many local concessions are fully implemented at first, it becomes increasingly rare over time and total reneging is common.

To dig into the local dynamics more deeply, I disaggregate the local speakers into district agents or institutions (neighborhood-level representatives like municipal deputies, prefects of Moscow's subdistricts, known as *okrugs*), city government agents (representatives of the Moscow Government including Deputy Mayors, members of the Moscow City Duma, and representatives of city-wide organizations, like the Department of City Property), and the city's executive, the Mayor. These findings are summarized in figure 6.4 and the full table is available in Appendix E. Within the first year, concessions made by Mayor Sergei Sobyanin were implemented significantly better than concessions by other municipal officials. 50-80% of his concessions were in full effect during that period, and 12.5-20% had no effect. These figures make concessions from the Mayor among the best performing of any dimension of concessions I examine—but only within that first year. Following that, there is a striking reversal. After the first year, only around 10% of Sobyanin's

concessions are fully implemented, and around 55% have no effect on real policy or behavior. In fact, after the first year, Sobyanin's concessions are the worst performing of any local or national actor. The fact that Sobyanin's concessions are the worst-performing is not an artifact of a high rate of implementation by other officials. Concessions from district officials are more likely to be reneged on than implemented in every period. Concessions by district-level agents in particular are markedly unlikely to be fully implemented; after one year, only 12.5% of their concessions are fully in effect. For city-level officials, this is generally true as well, though a higher share of municipal-level officials are fully implemented, compared with other local officials.

Figure 6.4: Comparison of Implementation over Time, by Local Speaker

Percentage of concessions scored in each time period at each level of implementation, by level of office-holder in Moscow.

Given the high incidence of reneging on local concessions, why are local concessions more demobilizing than national concessions, as discussed in the previous chapter? This may be because local concessions are much more likely to be core concessions: 43.5% of local concessions are core, but only 24.2% of national concessions.

6.1.5   Type of Promise

Officials can obligate the government to take different types of actions when making a concession. Throughout, I have been referring to these commitments as policy change. In reality, there is

significant variation in what the government is actually promising when making a concession. This has already been clear in the analysis of concession quality in this and the previous chapter: what is considered a "good" concession depends on the campaign and its specific demands. Still, variation in the type of action may be linked to reneging. In this section, I assess how different types of concession—distribution, enforcement, investigation, recognition or reform. Are some types of commitments more likely to be realized than others? Over time, does the government renege on some types of promises more than others?

To begin, I briefly review my typology of concessionary policy change, which is also described in 3.2.2. *Recognition* of the campaign or the grievance involves holding roundtables, sets up advisory councils or working groups, or pledges to consult the affected population in the future. In other words, these are meetings between citizens and government representatives that in some fashion formally recognize the grievance. Next, *investigation* entails opening a criminal or civil case by the Prosecutor's Office or the verification of compliance with legislation by another institution. *Enforcement* pertains to how existing laws and policies are put to use and where they apply. Whereas investigation is about culpability or violation of the law, enforcement is about whether a particular policy should govern the given situation. Next, *reform* requires formal changes to a law, policy or rule. Reforms affect not only the grievance at hand, but potentially other conflicts as well and can constrain the behavior of actors into the future. Last, when committing to *distribution*, the government promises to disseminate material benefits, in the form of public or private goods.

Figure 6.5 compares the implementation over time of concessions by the type of promised policy change; the full table of results is available in Appendix E. Of these types of concessions, investigations are overall the least likely to be affected by reneging. Two thirds of investigations are fully implemented within three months, with the government reneging in only 11.1% of cases. In fact, of any dimension of concessions that I look at in this chapter, investigations were the most likely to be associated with the full realization of the concession: campaigns promised an investigation are more likely to see that concession implemented within three months than campaigns promised a concession by Vladimir Putin. There is also limited change in the fulfillment of com-

Figure 6.5: Comparison of Implementation over Time, by Type

Percentage of concessions scored in each time period at each level of implementation, by promised policy change.

mitments to investigate over time. This is partly because investigations normally wrap up fairly quickly: of the nine cases of investigation that were initially observed, six were no longer observed after the first year. (Several investigations were scored for the first time at six or nine months.)

Concessions promising recognition were also implemented comparatively often. 44.4% of these concessions were fully implemented within the first three months. However an equal share of recognition concessions were not implemented at all in the same period. Over the first two years, the implementation of recognition concessions slightly improves, in that fewer such concessions have been completely reneged on, and the share that is fully implemented remains strong.

Reneging was most common in concessions about enforcement and reform. 42.4-51.5% of concessions about enforcement had no impact on real-world policies in any given period. The rate of reneging on enforcement-related concessions decreases slightly after the first three months, but after two years, it rises again. A third or fewer of these concessions were fully implemented at any

point. Concessions about reform are likewise subject to reneging in the first three months: for half of these concessions, the government took no steps to implement the reform within the first three months. There is, however, a decrease over time in the incidence of total reneging on concessions about reform, reaching 33.3% by the end of four years. Yet this decrease was not accompanied by an increase in fully implemented reforms. Initially, the share of fully implemented reforms is high—42.9%— within two years it drops to 15.4% and continues to decline. Interestingly, a large share of reforms were implemented incompletely; after the first two years, 46.2-53.8% of reforms were implemented at the limited or partial level (2 or 3).

What might explain this variation? To begin with a caveat, while it may be tempting to compare the types of concession using the language of cost, I avoid doing so here. In a monetary sense, I cannot observe the cost of virtually any concessions. Further, even if I had significantly more financial information, the meaning of cost in this setting is unclear. Cost may refer to money invested by the government in resolving the concession, but in many cases, the opportunity cost is actually much higher; in the many conflicts over development, *not* developing the land is conceivably cheaper but foregoes potentially enormous profits. Cost could also refer to the time and resources of individual actors spent implementing the promise. Given that the Russian government is a highly corrupt system that runs on informal networks (Ledeneva, 2013), members of government often rely on personal resources, such as calling in favors (*blat'*), to get things done. Opportunity cost applies to these individuals too: in resolving a conflict they might be foregoing personal income from kickbacks and embezzlement, or depriving their allies of the same. These difficult-to-observe features make anything more than a relative estimation of cost, in general, untenable.

One key vector of variation that appears important is the extent to which the concession constrains the government's behavior long-term. Concessions like reform and enforcement affect more than the conflict at hand. Reforms create new laws and policies that the government must comply with in the future. Enforcement decisions are less restrictive than reforms, but can still constrain later behavior. For instance, decisions about which zoning laws apply on a plot of land determine the ways that land can be used in the future, even if they do not alter zoning laws in

165

general. Fully implementing reform and enforcement may therefore be particularly undesirable to the government, because they can affect its behavior in other settings as well.

In contrast, concessions related to investigation and recognition do not constrain the government's behavior beyond the immediate conflict. Investigations have a specific target and the outcome of an investigation has a limited effect on future action, as Russia does not have a precedent legal system. Further, an investigation can always find that no wrongdoing has occurred or that the alleged perpetrator of a criminal act is innocent—particularly in a country, like Russia, where rule of law is weak. Thus technically, reneging would not have occurred although the outcome of the investigation may be unsatisfactory to protesters. Of course, investigations can reveal wrongdoing that the government acts on, but this allocates blame to a specific bad actor, rather than the government as a whole. This could be productive for the government, because it corresponds to how individuals who are more trusting of the state understand their conflicts, as I discuss further using interview data below.

Similarly, recognition—meetings with protesters or affected populations and the acknowledgement of their grievances—does not entail an obligation to meaningfully incorporate that feedback into policy. Despite this, meetings can create the appearance of consultation, which the government may find advantageous in the midst of a conflict; this provides another incentive for the government to fulfill these concessions rather than renege. In an interview, one park defender described these meetings as a "steam release valve" that lower-level government agents use when they think a campaign is preparing to hold another large protest (and that they are alerted to that intention by permit applications).[1] In line with this, concessions related to recognition went almost exclusively to protest campaigns that I identify as policymaking exclusion campaigns, where the government's deliberate disregard for citizen feedback generated the grievance. One campaign against construction developments in the Trinity Forest—territory that had been newly incorporated into Moscow City from the Oblast—was promised recognition on three separate occasions. Prior to these concessions, citizens had so thoroughly been prevented from participating in public

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[1]Interview with park defender, September 22 2019.

166

hearings that a State Duma Deputy from the Communist Party officially requested that the federal Prosecutor General investigate the violations.

6.1.6   Conclusions from the Aggregate Analysis

Overall, the aggregate analysis of concessions and reneging presents the following implications. Reneging, as indicated by previous analysis, is quite common. The bulk of concessions are either fully implemented or never implemented at all, with limited movement between these categories. This means that for many concessions, the immediate level of implementation, within the first three months or the first period in which it can be implemented, is key in determining its effect on real-world policy and behavior. This is particularly important for reneging, because when reneging is immediate, a concession never reaches full implementation. In a smaller set of cases, the concession is fully implemented at first, but that implementation is eroded over time, so that ultimately it has a diminished impact or no impact on policy.

Disaggregating the data to look at specific features of individual concessions presents mixed results. Most features of a concession that are associated with full implementation are also associated with reneging. For instance, even though 43.6% of core concessions are fully implemented in the first three months, reneging still occurs in one third of cases, which is still a significant share. This supports the proposition that reneging is a strategic choice that the government pursues in some cases and not in others. Generally, concessions that pertained to investigation and recognition, core concessions, and concessions by national-level actors were the least likely to have no effect (i.e. least likely to be at an implementation score of 1). Reneging was most likely to impact non-core concessions, concessions by local actors, and concessions about enforcement and reform. These same features are associated with the lowest incidence of full implementation (i.e. they were also least likely to be scored at implementation level of 4). Concessions about investigation and recognition were the most likely overall to be fully implemented, but there are few other features that are consistently associated with full implementation. Perhaps the most remarkable finding here is that in the short term, concessions by Mayor Sergei Sobyanin were very unlikely to have

no effect and most likely to be fully implemented, but after one year, this is totally reversed: the Mayor's concessions are least likely to be fully implemented and among the most likely to have no real-world effect on policy or behavior.

These figures demonstrate that reneging is indeed prevalent and much of it is rapid, occurring within the first three months after the concession is promised. This three-month window therefore appears critical to determining the concessions subsequent effect on policy as well as the government's strategic use of concessions. To understand how this dynamic occurs, and the relationship between concessions, mobilization and immediate reneging, I present a case study in the next section.

6.2   Save Park Dubki! and Immediate Reneging

The aggregate concessions data points to several regularities that may make reneging more or less likely, but cannot unpack the potential link between fulfilled concessions and demobilization, due to reverse causality: reneging can affect demobilization or mobilization, and the level of mobilization can affect reneging. To illuminate how reneging occurs and how it affects and is affected by mobilization, I construct a detailed case study of the campaign Save Park Dubki!.

The campaign at Park Dubki opposed the construction of a 24-story apartment building on the park's border. It is an interesting case to consider for a few reasons. First, the campaign received five concessions, none of which were implemented in any way. It therefore provides several examples of the immediate reneging that the aggregate analysis indicates is most common. Second, one of these was a core concession. Chapter 5 indicated that when core concessions are implemented, they are closely linked with demobilization, yet the aggregate analysis suggests that core concessions are roughly split between fully implemented and never implemented. The core concession to Save Park Dubki! can illuminate the dynamic between core concessions, reneging and mobilization. Third, by the standards I have employed throughout, this was a high-capacity campaign: it held numerous events, some of which were reasonably large given the neighborhood-

level conflict, and it held a round-the-clock watch for eight months. The capacity of the campaign means that it is more likely to react to concessions strategically and to make a choice to continue to protest or not, while with lower capacity campaigns, the abatement of protest may arise from lack of coordination or exhaustion. Fourth, Save Park Dubki! is representative of anti-construction park protests that were so common at this time. The following case study is based on online sources that I used to code this campaign for PCoM.

The conflict at Park Dubki, in the Timiryazev district of northern Moscow began in early 2016. Local residents feared that not only would the high-rise just outside the park destroy the natural atmosphere, it would impinge on the park's cultural and historical value as a monument to the neighborhood's past as a settlement of dachas (anna_nik0laeva, 2016*d*). The underground parking was also expected to damage the ground water that fed the park's hundred-year oak trees, after which it was named (Park of Oaks) (Activatica, 2016). At this time, in-fill development (*tochech-naya zastroika*) had notably increased around the city, with small parks, courtyards and other areas rezoned without public consultation for high-rise construction. Opponents of these projects, often known as park defenders, sought to protect the city's already limited green space and prevent densification. In the Timiryazev district, local residents organized a campaign under the name Save Park Dubki! The campaign initially expressed their grievance as violations related to Moscow's land use laws, the lack of public hearings for this development (hearings that included the specific land plot had been held in 2004 about a different project and were not reconvened), and that the building's height violated regulations (anna_nik0laeva, 2016*d*).

Efforts in the first two months of 2016 did not delay construction, which began on March 1 under cover of night (anna_nik0laeva, 2016*a*). The area was fenced, and construction equipment and materials arrived, along with a team of private security. Thirty-five trees were also destroyed. The campaign held a protest against the beginning of construction that attracted several hundred people later that week. After this protest, participants remained at the site in an attempt to prevent construction; this was the beginning of a round-the-clock watch that would last until late November 2016 as residents sought to physically obstruct construction (Alla Che, 2016*c*).

Private security[2] employed by the developer quickly used violence to disperse the watch. In the next two weeks, they twice attempted the forcible dispersal of the watch, once injuring a woman (Marsh Nesoglasnikh, 2016), and hit a campaign organizer with construction equipment (anna_nik0laeva, 2016*a*). Additionally, the government held a fraudulent public meeting without informing local residents; the hall was filled with individuals paid 500r (around $7.50 USD) for their presence (Kasparov.ru, 2016*a*).

The first concession that Save Park Dubki! was promised came soon after, in mid-March 2016, when Anton Kulbachevsky, head of Moscow's Department of Nature Management and Environmental Protection, visited protesters at the contested site.[3] At this point, the round-the-clock watch had been in session for two weeks, and a recent demonstration had attracted between 300 and 1000 people—the largest the campaign had held and large for a park defense protest. Kulbachevsky affirmed the general legality of the construction and that he was unable to affect the developer's plans for the area; these comments seemed designed to convince protesters of the futility of their campaign. This was likely strategic: several interview subjects cited "learned helplessness", understood as a perceived inability to effect change and a pessimistic perspective on protest, as a major deterrent to mobilizing communities impacted by a grievance, and complained that the government cultivated this worldview. Kulbachevsky then promised that the city would plant twice as many trees as the developer cut down.

Protesters immediately objected to equating newly planted trees with hundred-year oaks, and also did not see this as resolution to important aspects of the grievance pertaining to public hearings, permitting procedures and long-term environmental damage. An observer who documented this meeting for an activist networking website and who had participated in multiple environmental defense campaigns described the meeting as having "failed to achieve any result". Despite the perceived insufficiency of this concession, protesters do appear to have understood the meeting with Kulbachevsky as an attempt to demobilize the campaign. After the meeting, park defend-

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[2]Known as ChOP in Russian, short for *chastnoye okhrannoye predpriyatniye*, many of these agents wear blue camouflage fatigues like those of the riot police, and are often able to commit violence against protesters with impunity.

[3]This account of meeting draws on reporting and video from Alla Che (2016*a*).

ers were quoted as saying "We are not going to wrap up the protest and round-the-clock watch at the construction site."[4] As promised, the watch continued, and a few days later, another large demonstration was held. There is no evidence that the promised trees were ever planted, nor that any efforts to document the number of damaged trees were undertaken. The continued to affirm that the health of the park would not be affected, contra to the expectation of non-state ecologists (Kantor, 2016).

This opening concession illustrates why non-core concessions fail to demobilize. This promise was woefully far from satisfying the campaign's stated demands, yet it was also presented as the best the government could do against the developer. The purpose in offering it may have been to convey to protesters that their likelihood of success is vanishingly low. If so, this concession failed: the round-the-clock watch continued for around 250 more days.

On the last day of March, the conflict at the construction site escalated into violence. The previous day, in a meeting with the developer, the Department of Nature Management and Environmental Protection, the Department of Environmental Expertise in the Northern Administrative District, and some locals, the government stated that the park would remain untouched and that the project complied with building and ecological regulations (Ruzmanova, 2016). Rather than a concession, which would entail the promise to change an element of the project, this meeting affirmed the pre-existing boundaries of the development, which was technically outside the borders of the park. One activist called this meeting a "profanation" (*profanatsiya*) (Ruzmanova, 2016). On March 31, in an effort to resume construction, the developer and the head of the Department of Internal Affairs of the Northern Administrative District called the organizing team to the construction site for negotiations. According to an activist involved in this meeting, "The developer was asked to create a conciliation commission and declare a moratorium on construction during the negotiations. The head of the Department of Internal Affairs of the [Northern Administrative District] even promised us that he would lead the [private security forces] outside the gates [of the construction site], close them and remove the [technical construction equipment]."[5] Despite these

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[4]*"Svorachivat' protest i kruglosutochnyye dezhurstva u stroyki my ne sobirayemsya."*
[5]*"Zastroyshchiku bylo predlozheno sozdat' soglasitel'nuyu komissiyu, a na vremya peregovorov ob'yavit' mora-*

concessions, negotiations broke down.

Due to the rapid escalation of the conflict, there are no accounts of the negotiations or how protesters perceived these concessions. It is plausible, however, that activists were not persuaded by the commitment to form a commission to negotiate the issue—a concession of recognition—as they had already conveyed their grievances to the government in numerous ways. While the incidence of reneging on concessions of recognition is low, these concessions are unlikely to resolve a conflict and are non-binding. The concession from the Department of Internal Affairs to enforce the immediate suspension of construction during these negotiations is a concession of enforcement, which are particularly vulnerable to reneging. This may have led park defenders to view the concession with suspicion.

If they had, that suspicion would have been well-founded. The negotiations ended when a physical conflict was initiated by private security forces, who attacked protesters. Park defenders were beaten, and three were hospitalized (Domovoi Sovet, 2016). Police present at the site did not protect protesters, and intervened only to detain 15 protesters, including two minors and several elected officials; some of these detentions were themselves violent (OVD-Info, 2016*b*; anna_nik0laeva, 2016*c*; Kasparov.ru, 2016*b*) All but the minors were detained overnight, which is both unusual and a violation of protesters' civil rights (anna_nik0laeva, 2016*f*). In response, Moscow City Duma Deputy Leonid Zyuganov (KPRF) formally requested that the Prosecutor's Office investigate the event (anna_nik0laeva, 2016*c*). This also brought increased attention from the city's Commissioner for Human Rights, who expressed a desire to resolve the conflict (Domovoi Sovet, 2016). Nonetheless, violence at the site continued to escalate. One defender was hit by a car, several were beaten, another had his car vandalized, and members of the blockade were threatened with being hit by construction equipment (anna_nik0laeva, 2016*b*).

For the next few months, protest continued regularly. In addition to the round-the-clock watch, Save Park Dubki! held demonstrations and pickets, and supported other park defenders from around Moscow with advice and in attending their events. They also pursued non-protest forms

toriy na stroyku. Glava OVD SAO dazhe obeshchal nam, chto vot pryamo seychas zavedet ChOP za vorota, zakroyet ikh i otpravit vosvoyasi tekhniku" (anna_nik0laeva, 2016*f*).

172

of activism, such as filing appeals to investigate with the Prosecutor's Office, collecting signatures for petition and 1,800 residents wrote letters to the Mayor's Office. In June 2016, the group requested that Transparency International, the most prominent anti-corruption international NGO, to investigate corruption related to the construction at Park Dubki. The resulting investigation (Transparency International Russia, 2016) focuses on Marat Khusnullin, Deputy Mayor for Urban Development and Construction, and was made public on August 11. Transparency International also filed a request with the Prosecutor's Office to investigate Khusnullin for violating anti-corruption legislation, although the date of that filing could not be verified.

At this time, two additional concessions were promised to the defenders of Save Park Dubki! First, the Department of Cultural Heritage agreed to assess the building of a former kindergarten, constructed in 1958, on the premises of the park for recognition as a historically valuable object (Alla Che, 2016*b*). The assessment entailed a 90-day suspension of the construction permit, but there were no reported efforts to enforce it. Reporters noted that sounds of construction could be heard at the site (MosLenta, 2016). As a result, the watch and intermittent blockades continued. Also at this time, the Public Council of the State Duma Committee on Housing Policy and Housing and Communal Services attempted to investigate the situation at Dubki, but were not presented with documentation by Khusnullin's office (MosLenta, 2016). It also became known that the Chairman of the Presidential Human Rights Council had expressed to Mayor Sergei Sobyanin that the conflict at Dubki and another similarly contested park must be resolved (Kantor, 2016). Although neither body is vested with the power to change policy and therefore make concessions, these events were seen as contributing to the alleged suspension of construction.

At the same time, activists were able to prompt a response from Khusnullin himself about the situation at Park Dubki by waiting for him outside his office (Makarova, 2016). Though Khusnullin admitted no prior knowledge of activists' grievance, he ordered, via an assistant, that the problem would be "urgently sorted out," as an eyewitness reported to the Save Park Dubki! Facebook group. This was a core concession. While this wording is vague, Khusnullin's status in the city government—and his probable informal affiliation with this particular construction project—give

him the power to in fact sort out the conflict. By one month later, September 1, a response had been received and was discussed at a rally held at the construction site, in the shadow of the already-6 story building. Khusnullin's office affirmed that additional hearings and environmental surveys were unnecessary, and that the building permit was issued legally (Kantor, 2016). To protesters, who believed hearings and ecological surveys were both necessary and legally required, and held evidence that the permit violated local and federal law, this response did not constitute a "sorting out" of the problem. Additionally, there was no evidence, reported by the campaign, that Khusnullin's office attempted to consult with them, which would have been a sign that a real assessment of the issue were underway.

Though protest persisted at Park Dubki through the fall and the round-the-clock watch was sustained until at least late November 2016, it was evident by that point that the campaign had lost. While construction had been delayed by their blockade, new floors were continuously added to the building—though some activists held onto the hope that it might be dismantled. Members of the Save Park Dubki! campaign eventually shifted focus to supporting other campaigns in Moscow.[6] The apartment complex was completed in December 2018.

In the case of Park Dubki, concessions were clearly used as a demobilizing strategy, rather than an attempt to actually resolve the grievance. The earliest concession—the promise to plan trees—seemed designed to discourage optimism that a good outcome was achievable. Two subsequent concessions promised a short-term pause to construction—in one case to be strictly enforced by the Internal Ministry—which would in principle obviate the need for the round-the-clock watch and efforts to blockade, which had repeatedly delayed the project. The campaign to save Park Dubki, however, could be considered unusually unlikely to demobilize. The organizers were highly

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[6]One organizer, Yuliya Galyamina, went on to become an important figure in Moscow politics. Following the Park Dubki campaign, she became increasingly involved the politics of the Northern Administrative District of Moscow, published an independent district newspaper, created a union of residents in the Timiryazev district, and was elected to the Council of Deputies for that district. She also co-founded the School of Local Self-Government (Shkola mestnogo samoupravleniya), which trains people from around Russia in local activism and competing in local elections. In 2019, Galyamina attempted to run for election to the Moscow City Duma, but was illegally excluded from the ballot, along with other opposition candidates. This provoked the largest protests the city had seen in years, which were sustained over two months. These protests made Galyamina a national figure in the liberal-democratic opposition. In December 2020, she was sentenced to two years probation for repeatedly organizing unauthorized mass protests aimed at changing the constitutional order.

committed, well-educated, and morally outraged by their treatment at the hands of the government. Further, they had already been successful at gathering support from federal-level institutions, like the Presidential Human Rights Council, and international organizations like Greenpeace and Transparency International. They were thus unlikely to mistake these concessions for a full resolution of their grievance and at least in the cases of the alleged suspension of construction, seemed to expect reneging.

From the government's perspective, the failure of these concessions to contribute to demobilization was immediately evident: organizers told them as much and protesters were at the construction site continuously. Conceivably, there would be little point in implementing the promised concessions if the protesters would not back down. All these factors likely contributed to the prevalence of immediate reneging in this case.

6.3   Activists' Views of Concessions and Reneging

The case study of Park Dubki provides an example where concessions had no effect on demobilization and were subject to virtually immediate reneging. At the same time, it is also clear that in some settings concessions do lead to demobilization and provide at least some resolution for grievances, even though reneging is both common and difficult to predict. How, then, do participants in protest campaigns interpret concessions? Do they see these promises as potentially credible? Do they understand concessions as a successful outcome? Why do they believe the government makes concessions? And how do they understand the link between concessions, reneging and mobilization?

To address these questions, I analyze interviews that I conducted with 22 urban activists in Moscow in 2018 and 2019. Interview subjects were recruited via snowball sampling and by direct outreach. My objective was to speak with individuals who had participated in the campaigns represented in PCoM, although several had participated in multiple campaigns, including those not represented in my dataset. Most interview subjects were associated with campaigns about

construction (park defense, opposition to the construction of churches in parks, resistance to high-way expansion, protecting green spaces, and architectural preservation) and about the renovation project. Also represented were housing activists, a campaign against a capital repair tax, and a campaign against the expansion of paid parking. Although labor activism is an important source of protest in Moscow, I did not succeed in making contact with participants in labor campaigns. Interview subjects had been involved in campaign organization, such as running social media groups, conducting public relations and media outreach, organizing round-the-clock watches, filing legal proceedings, and participating in roundtables and meetings with government representatives, in addition to arranging and participating in protest. At least five held or had held elected office as municipal deputies and one was a career activist at a systemic opposition party.

I met most interview subjects in public; a minority I met at the subject's home or office, one preferred to speak over Skype and one provided additional responses over Facebook Messenger. I asked interview subjects to reflect on the achievements of their campaigns, if any, and where possible to comment on specific promises I observed in data collection. I also asked them to comment on why the government makes promises to protesters, and whether these promises are trustworthy. I used the word promise (*obeshchaniye*) rather than concession (*ustupka*) to avoid biasing responses and because my definition of concession as any promised benefit differs from the sense of concessions as the full achievement of campaign goals. It is important to note that in almost all cases, the campaigns in question had concluded several years earlier, meaning that these are retroactive evaluations. The language of conversation was at the subject's discretion. Most were conducted in Russian, in some I asked questions in English and they responded in Russian, and in a few, subjects spoke a mix of Russian and English. On several occasions, the subject's spouse was present and contributed occasional comments. Interviews were recorded with the subjects' consent.

6.3.1 Activist Trust in Government Promises

Do urban activists feel they can trust the Moscow government when they make promises to protesters? Generally, at the point at which I spoke with them, most subjects did not feel the government was trustworthy when it came to making promises. As one activist against the renovation program succinctly put it, "I CATEGORICALLY do not trust the government of Moscow."[7] After providing several examples of the government's failure to implement promised programs and changes in her neighborhood, she added "How can you trust the mayor and the government of Moscow if it is so openly deceiving you [*obmanyvayet*]?" A seasoned park activist when asked about government promises said, "In most cases, they are disingenuous [*lukavyat*]".[8] One activist protecting a forest from development, when asked about a promise her campaign had been made, forcefully said "This is a lie. This is just a downright lie. This is just an absolute lie. There is nothing to even talk about here."[9]. Other activists felt that such promises were never made, despite the fact that several were discussed in conversation, which may be due to the rarity of satisfying concessions or to the low esteem in which subjects held the government. An interview subject who trains citizens to engage in civic activism and run for local office asserted that this lack of trust was common among protesters: "I think that no one has any illusions. I think that, specifically, those who are protesting, they understand that the authorities cannot be trusted and they always cheat."[10]

However, many interview subjects also agreed that sometimes the government does fulfill its promises. The park activist admitted that "there are, as it were, cases when promises really correspond to the truth" even if "nine times out of ten they are deceitful."[11] Another veteran defender of the environment said, "Well, if they promise something, usually they deliver."[12] However, this subject viewed such promises as rare, and the result of a strong campaign that the government could not ignore, which was their preference. She also considered that the threat of remobilization

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[7]Renovation activist, via Facebook Messenger, November 1 2019.
[8]Skype interview with park defender, September 25 2019.
[9]Interview with forest activist, October 31 2019
[10]Interview with civic activist, September 24 2019.
[11]Skype interview with park defender, September 25 2019.
[12]Interview with ecological protester, September 19 2019

enhanced the credibility of these promises.[13]

Other protesters were able to think back to their feelings when their campaigns first received promises from the government and recounted having believed them at the time. The activist for forest protection who now considered promises to be lies initially felt that the government would work with them, and participated in several roundtables with the government to discuss the grievance. When asked if members of the campaign thought these meetings were legitimate, she said, "We all thought so at first."[14] In an interview with an active opponent of the construction of a church in Park Torfyanka and his wife, I asked how it felt to receive a promise from the district prefect that the construction would be cancelled and the fence and religious paraphernalia at the site removed. The activist's wife immediately said, "We didn't believe it," but he admitted "No, well, we did believe that it would be so. But then the day passed, no one removed anything. Two days, no one removed anything. A week, a month. And we understood that we had been deceived."[15] When asked why he trusted that prefect would fulfill this promise,[16] he explained, "We all believed he would do something. It's the prefect, after all. We believed that, after all, we live in a state governed by the rule of law and we have laws, and not the decisions of the patriarch [of the Russian Orthodox Church]."[17]

For some activists, particularly those new to politics, this loss of faith in the government occurred over time. An activist against the expansion of a highway in her neighborhood, who identi-

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[13]"Well, most likely, if they have already said that there will be no construction, yes, when they have already been forced to say that there will be no construction, they were made to say this, then, most likely, there will not be. Well, because they will probably be afraid that people will arrange [opposition to it] again. If they come there again with this one, the construction will start again, then they will already be afraid that people will come again. That is, they are afraid of a scandal, in fact." Interview with ecological protester, September 19 2019.

[14]Interview with forest activist, October 31 2019

[15]Interview with Park Torfyanka defender and wife, September 29 2019.

[16]The activists did not believe that the prefect had the power to fulfill this promise. Prefects, appointed executives for Moscow's regional districts (*okrugs*), often make concessions, and interview subjects' response to these varied. Several emphasized that their grievance could not be resolved by a prefect. For instance, the conflict at Park Torfyanka involved the Russian Orthodox Church, which the prefect has no authority over. Several statements by prefects were seen as throwaway remarks attempting to defuse tension. At the same time, participants in construction-related campaigns often understood prefects to be representatives and mouthpieces for the real holders of power in Moscow, Mayor Sergei Sobyanin and then-Deputy Mayor for Urban Development and Construction Marat Khusnullin. Promises from prefects were thus both seen as commitments the prefect had no ability to implement personally and as decisions made by the true power-players.

[17]Interview with Park Torfyanka defender and wife, September 29 2019.

fied herself as someone who "had nothing to do with politics, nothing at all"[18] before this campaign, described her experience of working with the local government similarly. Initially, she described her first encounter of government obstruction as "horrible, I was in shock at first," but added, "That is, for us the shock was constant, gradual." She describes how she gradually understood that regardless of what the government told them, the campaign would not be successful. The forest-protection activist, who considered her reasons for activism "not political" described this process of disillusionment:

> And then little by little, we began to cooperate with public organizations, and with political parties, and participate in some events, and we understood how all this is done. We understood about the corruption of officials, and about how decisions are made, and about how laws are not respected. When that is increasing every day, like a snowball, well, you become a different person. Your thinking changes, you begin to see more broadly, to evaluate things differently.[19]

6.3.2   Activist Perception of Public Trust in Government Promises

Most—if not all—interview subjects felt that the general public tended to believe the government's promises. As the civic activist explained, "People generally tend to believe in good things." She elaborated that people often responded to her descriptions of "what is actually happening in Russia" with disbelief: "They say, 'Well, [government officials] can't lie like that. They can't really act like that, can they? They can't really be so cynical?' Yes, they can be!"[20] Several activists complained that Russians suffer from learned helplessness—a tendency, supported by the government, to feel that everything is decided for them and their actions are both unnecessary and incapable of having an impact. The seasoned park activist noted there are civic protesters, particularly those who are pro-government, who see individual officials as responsible for their grievances, reminis-

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[18]Interview with highway activist, July 3 2019.
[19]Interview with forest activist, October 31 2019
[20]Interview with civic activist, September 24 2019.

cent of a feudal dynamic where the "tsar finds out and punish the [bad] boyars."[21] "For them the enemy is not the system itself, which gave rise to all this, but a specific official who gave some kind of signature. That is, it is very difficult to explain to people that it is this system—this constructed system—in which this is possible."[22] One urban activist attributed the widespread acceptance of limited changes to the renovation program to a similarly low level of political consciousness: "That people are being deceived in such very primitive ways—this is, well, evidence that people still do not have enough experience, education, knowledge in order not to be deceived. But you cannot blame them for this. You can't blame the victim for being a victim."[23] Another anti-renovation program activist put it more bluntly: "People are idiots."[24]

The seasoned park activist elaborated on the role of politicization in these campaigns affects this dynamic. According to him, many participants in these campaigns are not opponents of the regime and are actively fearful of revolutionary-type politics.[25] This was substantiated by several of my interviews as well as the online data collection. When the government betrays its promises and the people are disappointed, these people tend to blame the organizers who had tried to sustain mobilization after the concession, which can fracture the movement. A similar experience was also reported by the forest defender. Further, the seasoned park activist added, the members of a campaign who best understand the political situation are also most likely to run for elected office or transition into more oppositional politics, leaving a higher concentration of more trusting campaign participants behind.

6.3.3   Activist Perception of Concessions

In addition to not seeing promises of concession as credible, activists also do not particularly associate them with campaign success. Although my data records at least one concession to each of the campaigns associated with interview subjects, few of them could be considered successful in

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[21]Skype interview with park defender, September 25 2019.

[22]Skype interview with park defender, September 25 2019.

[23]Interview with urban activist, November 14 2019

[24]Interview with renovation activist, October 26 2019

[25]Skype interview with park defender, September 25 2019.

the sense of having fully achieved their demands. Even those campaigns that were comparatively closer to that milestone (having achieved at least most of their demands) were often not remembered as such by activists. One park defender reflecting on a campaign that managed to prevent the construction of metro exits in the park, but could not fend off the construction of a commercial building, said, "Part of the territory was stolen from us anyway. That is, it is not a 100% victory, but it is an 80% victory. And taking into account what is going on in Moscow in general, this is a direct one hundred percent victory."[26] The activist from Park Torfyanka, where the fenced area and religious paraphernalia remain although the construction of the church has been cancelled was also equivocal: "Yes, I think it was successful, because we defended the park, nothing was built in the park. But there is [still] a fence, a construction trailer, a cross. They promise to remove everything in the near future, except the cross...but we're against that too."[27] An architectural preservationist likewise called a campaign to protect a radio broadcast tower from the 1920s from demolition as a "victory" only to clarify that in addition to leaving the tower in place, the government had committed to preserving and restoring it, but years later, only emergency measures had been taken.[28]

Campaigns that were less successful at achieving meaningful concessions, unsurprisingly, had a more dismal view on the concessions they did receive. An opponent of paid parking expansion, when asked about whether her campaign—which had delayed the program's expansion—was successful, said, "No, where's the success? We didn't want paid parking at all. What is there to be glad about that we don't have it in our courtyards yet? I don't see any [success] here. I don't know, [I should I say] thank you for not killing me, but only cutting off my arms and legs?"[29] The opponent of highway construction reflected that concessions were mainly made on "little things" because "on the main positions, they don't let us get anywhere."[30]

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[26]Interview with park defender, September 22 2019.
[27]Interview with Park Torfyanka defender and wife, September 29 2019.
[28]Interview with architectural preservationist, October 16 2019.
[29]interview with parking activist, September 28 2019.
[30]Interview with highway activist, July 3 2019.

6.3.4 Activist Perception of Concessions as a Strategy

If activists do not see these promises as credible commitments to future behavior and they do not associate them with campaign victories, why do they believe the government bothers to make these promises? Several activists expressed that they understood concessions as a manipulation designed to reduce tension, calm people down and convince protesters to disperse. Others described concessions as a method to split protesters. An opponent of the renovation program saw the proposed changes to the law governing the program as an effort to atomize opposition to the program from a city-wide campaign to the level of individual buildings.[31] The seasoned park defender noted that concessions also give the government an opportunity to smear activists in the media or to other members of the campaign.[32] An activist from Park Torfyanka, where the conflict had been continuous for several years at the point of our meeting, noted that concessions allow the government to appear as if it is preemptively extinguishing conflict.[33]

Many activists saw concessions as a strategy of delay, which is consistent with reneging. "They freeze the process so that at any moment, as soon as someone relaxes, they can resume it," one urban activists said.[34] Two defenders of Park Torfyanka expressed similar skepticism. One said that "We are partly successful because they are not building [the church] at the moment. But if you look at the big picture and if you look in future, I don't think we are the winners...I have no good forecast for the situation."[35] Another expressed that the campaign, which included a round-the-clock watch, had to continue because "if we stopped, then they would say that everything is extinguished there, there is no conflict, and they can continue what they were doing. But we are trying to show that this is not the case."[36]

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[31]Interview with renovation activist, October 26 2019

[32]Skype interview with park defender, September 25 2019.

[33]Interview with Park Torfyanka defender and wife, September 29 2019.

[34]Interview with urban activist, November 14 2019

[35]Interview with Park Torfyanka defender and husband, September 30 2019.

[36]Interview with Park Torfyanka defender and wife, September 29 2019.

6.3.5 Analysis

Activists must depend on the government to make concessions to resolve grievances in their favor. Yet simultaneously, either by their political opinions or experience in protest campaigns, they generally have little faith that the government's promises are credible, or that, if enacted, those promises are enduring resolutions to grievances. Even beyond concessions to protest, activists seriously doubted the government's ability or intention to fulfill any sort of commitment to the public. Many cited the prevalence of corruption at all levels of government as the cause of this. At the same time, many subjects felt that members of their campaign along with the general public were far more likely to put faith in the government's words, as some of them had themselves in the past. Typically this was attributed to a perceived lack of personal efficacy or efficacy of protest methods, as well as to naïvité. Activists generally believed that if their aims were to be achieved, it required far more continuous commitment than these credulous participants were willing to engage in. Urban defense activists felt almost uniformly that once protest flagged, the government would proceed with its original plans. Taken together, this findings suggest that reneging is both the result of a lack of government intention to fulfill concessionary promises, and the limited ability of campaigns to sustain mobilization at a level of commitment that might prevent the government from reneging.

6.4 Conclusion

The findings presented in this chapter suggest overwhelmingly that promises made to protest campaigns in Moscow are not credible. Even if in some situations, concessions are fully implemented and may resolve the grievance, in many cases, the government uses concessions as a diversionary tactic and deliberately betrays its promises. The case study of Save Park Dubki! demonstrates this dynamic in action, as concessions to that campaign appeared designed to convince protesters to clear the site and stop obstructing construction. This is again consistent with the theory advanced in Chapter 4, of how the government attempts to use concessions to disrupt the organization of

campaigns about policymaking exclusion. Evidence provided from interviews I conducted with urban activists in Moscow only underscores this point.

If concessions are not credible in the majority of situations, and in particular, some campaigns are likely never to achieve significant change from the outset, why do these activists engage in protest in the first place? The activists I interviewed found organizing these campaigns valuable regardless of their outcomes. A member of Save Park Dubki! reflected that even though the campaign was unsuccessful, thinking about it in the terms of success or the lack thereof was fundamentally wrong. The value of the campaign was in developing a sense of civic empowerment that was the antidote to learned helplessness: "In terms of the formation of civic responsibility, I believe that it was successful, because in my area there are a lot of people who no longer live on the principle that someone will come and do something, but begin to take initiative into their own hands."[37] This sentiment was widely shared. Many others felt that because Russia's tradition of civic activism is so weak, even the small achievements of their campaigns are meaningful. The disillusioned subject who opposed the construction of the highway noted that members of her neighborhood have since banded together and achieved other goals without protest, like the improvement of a local park, and they regularly talk with activists from neighboring districts; "Our story continues, just on a smaller level," she said.[38] An activist engaged in campaigns about parking admitted she knew that others felt that her achievements were limited, but that in the face of the political system, small victories now were meaningful: "It may not be possible [to remove the Mayor] for 10, 20 years. Maybe I won't even live to see the moment when everything will change in earnest. But why wait for that, when the issue [with parking] can be resolved now?"[39]

Finally, most activists also felt forcefully compelled to speak out against the injustices around them. One woman, describing how her daughter begged her to stop organizing out of fear of repression, said, "I can't help but do it. I really can't. Otherwise I will really feel like a pig, the way [the government] sees us—as pigs, as slaves. Well, I'll feel like a slave then. I'm not a slave.

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[37]Skype interview with park defender, September 25 2019.

[38]Interview with highway activist, July 3 2019.

[39]interview with parking activist, September 28 2019.

I would be happy to sit and rest, to do nothing, to grow flowers, to bake pirogi. But I can't just. I

can't, inside."[40]

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[40]Interview with park defender, September 22 2019.

CHAPTER 7

Conclusion

Concessions are more than simplistic benefits, compromise or cooptation. They are a strategic response to protest that a high-capacity, authoritarian government can wield with precision. In this dissertation, I have clarified the foundations of the strategic use of concessions with three main contributions. First, I outlined an original conceptualization of concessions as a publicly observed promise of a potential benefit to participants in protest—a benefit that may or may not be delivered. Once that promise is issued, the concessionary process unfolds over time, as the government purportedly takes the steps associated with implementing that benefit. The fact that this process unfolds over time means that concessions are vulnerable to reneging, or the deliberate failure to implement the concession as promised.

Second, in focusing on everyday protests targeted to the local government in Moscow, Russia, I have shed light on how an authoritarian government responds to protests that are not existentially threatening. Only the most severely repressive regimes manage to fully suppress protest; in other words, most autocracies experience protest regularly, and many of these protests are everyday protests. I have shown that there is good reason for this: in Moscow, everyday protests were often promised concessions, and a considerable share never encountered severe repression. The concessions that these everyday protests receive deserve attention. In some cases, as I demonstrated in Chapter 4, these promises do compensate for deficiencies with information-gathering institutions and allow the government to identify and resolve grievances. In these cases everyday protest may constitute an alternative politics in a setting where authoritarian constrictions have weakened feed-

back institutions. On the other hand, for a large share of campaigns, protest does not operate this way. If the government wishes to ignore public opinion, it can use concessions as a diversionary tactic, only to renege later.

Third, I have developed and demonstrated an original approach to collecting data about concessions. I have also presented examples of how the concessions-level data can be used with daily event data and campaign-level data. Concessions have been overlooked in datasets about collective action, which typically contain observations at the protest-event or campaign level; the measures in these datasets are either rough or absent entirely. This means that limited quantitative testing of the effect of concessions on conflict, protest, and collective action has been done. Beyond the theories I have explored here, there are numerous approaches to concessions that seem to be conventional wisdom that have not, to my knowledge, been tested. The most salient of these is the alleged trade-off between repression and concessions. Studies of this tend to take a nuanced view of repression and a simplistic view of concessions. As another example, it is often suggested that concessions lead to protest diffusion, by incentivizing other campaigns to mobilize for similar demands, and that they lead to escalating demands within a single campaign. While I do not directly address these theories, in data collection and exploratory data analysis, I found no evidence that either phenomenon occurred. My approach to collecting data about concessions can help remedy this issue.

In three empirical chapters, I have shown the following. In Chapter 4, I demonstrate that the government's response to everyday protest campaigns is conditioned on the institutional factors that gave rise to the campaign's grievance. As a result, in some cases concessions really do resolve the grievance, while in others, they are an attempt to undermine mobilization. In Chapter 5, I interrogate the mechanism underlying that theory by assessing whether concessions really do contribute to demobilization. I find that they are associated with a reduction of protest and an extended period to the next protest, but that this effect diminishes after about a year. In Chapter 6, I focus on reneging. The majority of reneging takes place within the first three months and is never reversed. I explored how this immediate reneging arises with a case study that showed

that in high-capacity, highly committed campaigns, the (justifiable) lack of trust in authorities to fulfill concessionary promises diminishes their demobilizing effect. Then, using data from interviews that I conducted in Moscow with urban activists, I show that even though activists are aware of reneging and are generally pessimistic about concessions, many protesters—including some activists themselves—at some point believe in them.

7.1 Directions for Future Research

7.1.1 Other Responses to Protest and Broken Promises

Throughout this work, I have positioned concessions and repression as the two state responses to protest of interest. While they are the responses that have elicited the greatest scholarly interest, they are certainly not the only options the state has. The report from the pro-regime think tank discussed in Chapter 4 includes other strategies, such as ignoring protest and attacks on organizers' reputations. Positioning concessions alongside these non-violent forms of coercion and influence is important because, as I have argued throughout, concessions are often used as a strategy of manipulation.

Relatedly, it bears mentioning that reneging, as I have defined it, is not the only way the government can betray protesters. I have defined a concession as the articulation of a specific promise of policy change. Often, those promises, at least as I observed them, were very circumscribed. One interview subject expressed that this was done so that future incursions could be made without technically breaking their word. There are numerous examples of this with construction disputes. The government will commit to not building a specific structure on a plot of land, but that rarely means the government has lost interest in developing that plot. Many urban defense protest campaigns have had to defend the same park or courtyard repeatedly, even though the government has not technically broken earlier promises and by my definition, has not reneged. This dynamic deserves further scrutiny.

7.1.2 Mechanism: Undermining Mobilization

Throughout the dissertation, I have argued that concessions demobilization in two key mechanism: through resolution of the grievance and by undermining coordination of the protest campaign. I have presented evidence, in the analysis of core concessions and reneging, that concessions can resolve grievances to the campaign's satisfaction and this reduces, if not eliminates, mobilization. The second mechanism is less well tested.

I believe the promise of concessions undermines mobilization when a sufficient portion of the campaign's supporters demobilize in response to the concession. Even if the activist-organizers of the campaign view concessions with suspicion—as interview evidence in Chapter 6 demonstrates—without supporters to participate in demonstrations and engage in other forms of activism, the campaign loses capacity. Campaign supporters might demobilize because they believe the government will make good on the concessions it promised; this was mentioned by several interview subjects. Alternatively, they might see unsatisfactory concessions as an indicator of the futility of protesting; this is consistent with the learned helplessness perspective that interview subjects mentioned. A third, slightly different possibility, also suggested by an interview subject, is that concessions lead to splits in campaigns about whether the concession is good enough and how to proceed afterwards. Fourth, campaigns may suspend protest to wait and see how the concession is implemented, although this risks losing the ability to mobilize altogether. This approach may be used by recipients of concessions on a timeline, discussed in Chapter 5.

Overall, then the data supports the proposition that concessions make coordinating protest campaigns more difficult, but outstanding questions remain about how this occurs. What conditions make concessions more likely to undermine mobilization? Who is more likely to demobilize after the promise of concession, and what factors are associated with that decision? How can campaigns prevent this?

Understanding of how less committed protesters or non-protesting individuals feel about concessions is essential to gain insight into these questions, because these individuals are the audience of protest organizers, yet their political outlooks are potentially very different. To address this, I am

preparing a survey of Muscovites that will present them with vignettes of concessionary promises to protest campaigns and ask them what the campaign should do next. The population of interest is what might be called casual protesters or potential protesters: individuals who have gone to a protest or could see themselves doing so in the future. Because directly targeting these individuals in the current political environment in Russia is not possible and a very low percentage of Muscovites have participated in a protest, the sampling strategy is to over-sample from postal codes of Moscow that experienced a higher incidence of protest in the period PCoM documents and to use screening questions. The survey will be fielded in Fall 2021 or Winter 2022.

7.1.3 Power, Corruption, Lies

Across the three empirical chapters, I have used examples and case studies to illustrate the dynamics of these everyday protest campaigns. In all of these examples, I have alluded to the role of corruption in producing these conflicts. Corruption is at the root of many conflicts in PCoM, from wage theft to embezzlement from the sale of public assets, to kickbacks for construction development, to extortion. Many everyday protest activists and political activists I interviewed largely viewed the activities of the Moscow government through a lens of corruption. At the same time, pinpointing the impact of corruption on everyday protest campaigns, including their emergence, their framing, and the dynamic of the conflict including concessions and repression, is challenging, given the covert nature of corruption. Further work is likely needed to identify whether and how corruption structures these conflicts.

7.1.4 Nationally Targeted Protests in Moscow

Moving forward, a primary avenue for the development of this project is deepening my data to include protests in Moscow against the national government. In collecting the initial dataset of protest in Moscow upon which PCoM later built, I also compiled data about hundreds of protests targeted to the national government. These were mainly about highly politicized issues, such as political prisoners, human rights violations and so on, but a portion were consistent with the

everyday protests I discussed here. While the largest of these protests receive much attention, little is known about the small demonstrations against the national government that occur near-daily in Moscow. Examining these movements will clarify how the government strikes a balance between the management of threats and key functions of protests, such as the cultivation of a democratic facade and information collection.

There is some evidence that the national government uses concessions to different ends than the Moscow government. For example, in 2018, a reform of the pension system was announced that raised the pension age by several years; in some areas, the pension age for men was set beyond the average life expectancy. This led to protests around the country. Interestingly, many of these protests were organized by the Confederation of Trade Unions. The Confederation of Trade Unions is the largest labor organization in Russia, but it is not a body that engages in contentious politics (nor, in the view of many, does it engage in the defense of labor). The KPRF also organized many protests; this was less surprising in itself. The large number of protests these two groups organized, when most other organizations were blocked from getting protest permits on the same issues, suggested to many that the government was strategically allowing protest to gauge the level of opposition to raising the pension age. While they knew people would be opposed, raising the pension age was unavoidably necessary for the national budget. What they did not know was how high they could set the pension age and what exactly the level of outrage would be. The protests, organized by regime-allied groups, allowed them to gauge those levels. The subsequent concessions then calibrated the pension policy to match. This is not a strategy that I observed the Moscow government using.

However, collecting data on nationally-targeted campaigns and their protests will be significantly more challenging than compiling PCoM was. Most of them hold events around the country and some are about issues on which Russia is subject to pressure from international actors. It may be that case studies should be used rather than a quantitative data collection effort like PCoM.

7.1.5 Cross-National Data

The scope conditions for this project were (1) high-capacity states and (2) authoritarian regimes that still permitted some protest. How do concessions work outside these scope conditions? Are concessions used strategically in lower-capacity states, and is reneging more or less common? In more authoritarian regimes, are concessions rare, and are they more or less associated with demobilization? Additionally, other national-level factors may affect concessions, like personalization, and natural resource wealth. To address these questions, I plan to collect data on local everyday protests in the capital cities of Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. The basis of these datasets will be a protest dataset I compiled on regional protest from RFE/RL's Newslines from 2000-2017. Additionally, I had research assistants produce case histories for protest campaigns from approximately 2012-2017 which will serve as a jumping-off point.

APPENDIX A

Appendix: Types of Policy Change

Reform   Formal modification, ratification or repeal of new or extant laws, policies, rules, or procedures. These are formal policy changes that relate to laws and policies as they are written, not as they are actually practiced or enforced.

- Reverse or repeal a policy or law that already exists (ex. Lift ban on freedom of assembly, cancel law requiring Russian classes)

- Stop new policy or law from being implemented (ex. Do not ratify the new election law, Do not sign amnesty law)

- Amend constitution (ex. Modify a clause in the constitution)

- Reinstate a policy or law that has recently been repealed (ex. Restore Net Neutrality)

- Reverse a treaty ratification, formally withdraw from a treaty or decline to join new treaty (ex. Do not join NATO)

- Formally grant new or enhanced rights by passing new laws or policies or constitutional reforms enshrining those rights (ex. Introduce new electoral system)

- Alter policies or laws that already exist in some other way that relates to how they are written, rather than how they are enforced (ex. Legalize marijuana)

Enforcement Change in how existing laws and policies are used or enforced, without altering how those rules are formally written. These concessions involve the informal use of rules, laws and policies, as well as decisions about when and to what degree enforcement of formal laws should occur and whom they should apply to.

- Permit or allow an action or process (ex. Grant permit for rally, Allow opposition party to register, Appoint an individual to a government position)

- Stop the unfair enforcement of a law or policy (ex. Stop an eviction, Restore broadcasting license)

- Enforce existing laws, adhere to better practices (ex. Stop government corruption)

- Suspend the use of repression (ex. Stop police brutality, Stop harassing journalists, Stop illegal searches)

- Annul election result, call a new election or hold a referendum

- Resign, request resignation, remove, fire or dissolve a body (ex. Dismiss Election Commissioner, Hold new elections, Dissolve the government)

Note that investigation, prosecution and impeachment fall under Investigation. Enforcement of laws related to labor, utilities, social welfare, benefits, land tenure, taxes and fees are considered Distribution.

Investigation Official inquiry into events or persons, via criminal proceedings, trials, tribunals, committees, special investigations, or reports, including related process that take place within the judicial system such as release of political prisoners.

- Impeach or remove the head of state/government through legal means

- To acquit or clear of charges a person being prosecuted (ex. Clear opposition politician)

- Release political prisoners

- End an investigation (ex. Stop prosecuting opposition leader for tax fraud)

- Initiate an investigation (ex. Investigate election fraud)

- Prosecute or charge (ex. Charge police officers for shooting protesters)

- Establish a committee or tribunal, whose purpose is to investigate a recent event (Ex. Set up committee to investigate a recent assassination)

Distribution Disbursement of material benefits, either directly (ex. Run power lines to town without electricity), through changes to economic policies (ex. Increase electricity subsidies), or the enforcement of existing economic policies (ex. The law guarantees electricity provision, bring practice into line with law). These can be public goods that would benefit a large share of the population (ex. Increase the pension rate), or they can be particular to the protesters (ex. Payment of the protesters' back wages). They also encompass both micro- and macro-economic concerns.

- Pay unpaid or overdue wages or some other form of direct monetary compensation

- Increase subsidies for utilities or other goods

- Reverse new changes in subsidies or other benefits (ex. Repeal increase in utility rates, Restore old pension rate)

- Provide basic governance: suitable housing, electricity, water, security, TV coverage/communications technology

- Grant leases or ownership of private property such as apartments

- Reduce or alter taxes or fees

- Provide jobs, alleviate unemployment

- Reduce inflation, raise standard of living, end recession, end stagnation

195

Recognition   Consult or hold meetings with affected citizens in the future as publicly recognition of the legitimacy of a grievance, claim or group.

- Hold meetings, discussions, dialogues or negotiations with a group (ex. Meet with committee of soldiers' mothers)

- Take receipt of a petition or open letter

- Make a statement of condemnation (ex. Criticize new law on the media, Disavow recent police brutality)

- Make a statement of support (ex. Publicly affirm support for democracy, Support for new law on the media, Statement resisting Russian influence)

APPENDIX B

Campaign Type and Tactic Choice

Table B.1: Everyday Protest Campaign Type and Protest Tactic Choice

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | |
| | n_complaint | | n_blockade | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
iv_exclusion	−2.027***	−1.935***	1.456**	2.178***
	(0.395)	(0.346)	(0.632)	(0.814)
log(turnout_large_avg)		−0.010		0.035
		(0.118)		(0.250)
n_events		0.078***		0.099***
		(0.013)		(0.024)
Constant	2.027***	0.689	−1.482***	−3.762***
	(0.294)	(0.446)	(0.559)	(1.103)
Observations	62	62	62	62
Log Likelihood	−122.522	−108.547	−66.811	−60.592
θ	0.565*** (0.163)	1.676** (0.718)	0.404** (0.173)	0.595** (0.246)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	249.044	225.094	137.622	129.184

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Negative binomial regression

APPENDIX C

Everyday Protest Regression Tables

Table C.1: Everyday Protest Campaigns and the Promise of Concessions

	concession binary			n concessions		
	Dependent variable:					
	logistic			*glm: quasipoisson* *link = log*		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
iv_exclusion	−0.250	−0.609	−0.587	0.222	0.167	0.157
	(0.586)	(0.720)	(0.767)	(0.280)	(0.326)	(0.333)
log(turnout_large_avg)		0.280	0.251		0.115	0.134
		(0.218)	(0.236)		(0.118)	(0.132)
n_events		0.077	0.057		0.030***	0.034***
		(0.054)	(0.059)		(0.009)	(0.011)
years_active		0.162	0.112		0.072	0.088
		(0.327)	(0.336)		(0.086)	(0.095)
blockade_sit-in			0.494			−0.022
			(0.844)			(0.254)
illegal_event			0.766			0.583
			(0.816)			(0.443)
loc_cityhall			0.260			−0.070
			(0.772)			(0.317)
kprf			−0.678			−0.514*
			(0.703)			(0.278)
Constant	0.981**	−1.136	−1.189	0.520**	−0.622	−0.985
	(0.479)	(0.956)	(1.005)	(0.233)	(0.513)	(0.610)
Observations	62	62	62	62	62	62
Log Likelihood	−38.114	−32.799	−31.735			
Akaike Inf. Crit.	80.228	75.598	81.470			

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.2: Everyday Protest Campaigns and Core Concessions

	Dependent variable:					
	core concession			received core concession		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
iv_exclusion	−1.023**	−0.986*	−1.015*	−0.965*	−2.163**	−2.779**
	(0.406)	(0.527)	(0.575)	(0.548)	(0.919)	(1.126)
n_conc		−0.020	−0.059		1.152***	1.400***
		(0.130)	(0.145)		(0.330)	(0.422)
log(turnout_large_avg)		0.046	−0.038		0.238	0.020
		(0.176)	(0.232)		(0.289)	(0.289)
n_events		−0.057**	−0.049		−0.154***	−0.202***
		(0.024)	(0.030)		(0.055)	(0.071)
years_active		0.248*	0.231		0.758**	0.837**
		(0.148)	(0.152)		(0.347)	(0.408)
blockade_sitin			0.195			1.480
			(0.463)			(0.909)
illegal_event			0.771			0.421
			(0.874)			(1.015)
loc_cityhall			−0.251			−0.948
			(0.525)			(0.954)
kprf			−0.195			1.153
			(0.507)			(1.010)
Constant	0.383	0.449	0.384	0.560	−1.803	−1.392
	(0.335)	(0.818)	(0.864)	(0.443)	(1.186)	(1.268)
Observations	121	121	121	62	62	62
Log Likelihood	−79.114	−73.631	−72.987	−41.341	−26.100	−23.518
Akaike Inf. Crit.	162.228	159.262	165.973	86.682	64.201	67.036

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.3: Everyday Protest Campaigns and Reneging

	Dependent variable:					
	renege binary			n renege		
	logistic			*glm: quasipoisson*		
				link = log		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
iv_exclusion	0.908**	1.838***	2.172***	0.840**	1.020***	1.047**
	(0.421)	(0.622)	(0.694)	(0.346)	(0.368)	(0.386)
n_conc		−0.226*	−0.285*		0.200***	0.212**
		(0.131)	(0.153)		(0.069)	(0.082)
log(turnout_large_avg)		−0.403**	−0.643**		−0.219*	−0.311**
		(0.193)	(0.273)		(0.114)	(0.145)
n_events		0.053***	0.069***		0.017	0.019
		(0.020)	(0.026)		(0.011)	(0.014)
years_active		0.044	0.051		0.075	0.061
		(0.138)	(0.148)		(0.082)	(0.091)
blockade_sitin			−0.197			0.087
			(0.438)			(0.249)
illegal_event			1.021			0.465
			(0.988)			(0.580)
loc_cityhall			−0.580			−0.200
			(0.513)			(0.274)
kprf			0.271			0.156
			(0.547)			(0.314)
Constant	−0.860**	0.279	0.478	−0.375	−0.613	−0.651
	(0.360)	(0.810)	(0.877)	(0.309)	(0.449)	(0.494)
Observations	121	121	121	43	43	43
Log Likelihood	−80.717	−76.367	−75.085			
Akaike Inf. Crit.	165.434	164.734	170.170			

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.4: Everyday Protest Campaigns and Threats

	Dependent variable:					
	threat binary			n threat_events		
	logistic			*glm: quasipoisson* *link = log*		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
iv_exclusion	−0.417	−0.417	−0.706	−0.788**	−0.726**	−0.864**
	(0.708)	(0.708)	(0.769)	(0.297)	(0.323)	(0.347)
log(turnout_large_avg)	−0.113	−0.113	−0.179		0.090	0.091
	(0.209)	(0.209)	(0.223)		(0.123)	(0.138)
n_events	0.160**	0.160**	0.131*		0.044***	0.037***
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.071)		(0.009)	(0.011)
years_active	−0.031	−0.031	−0.006		0.125	0.017
	(0.323)	(0.323)	(0.337)		(0.079)	(0.096)
blockade_sitin			1.002			0.424*
			(0.805)			(0.248)
illegal_event			−0.061			0.080
			(0.832)			(0.399)
loc_cityhall			0.046			0.474
			(0.753)			(0.346)
kprf			0.494			0.170
			(0.671)			(0.308)
Constant	−0.378	−0.378	−0.158	0.860***	−0.666	−0.789
	(0.908)	(0.908)	(0.941)	(0.200)	(0.502)	(0.600)
Observations	62	62	62	62	62	62
Log Likelihood	−33.447	−33.447	−32.431			
Akaike Inf. Crit.	76.895	76.895	82.862			

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.5: Everyday Protest Campaigns and Violence

	Dependent variable:					
	violence binary			n violent_events		
	logistic			*glm: quasipoisson*		
				link = log		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
iv_exclusion	1.303**	2.301**	2.543**	1.012*	1.156*	1.179
	(0.638)	(1.029)	(1.218)	(0.515)	(0.585)	(0.734)
log(turnout_large_avg)		−0.018	−0.228		0.013	−0.085
		(0.285)	(0.294)		(0.178)	(0.207)
n_events		0.167***	0.186**		0.041***	0.041**
		(0.061)	(0.087)		(0.013)	(0.017)
years_active		−0.207	−0.212		0.103	0.038
		(0.320)	(0.367)		(0.137)	(0.183)
blockade_sitin			1.784**			0.897**
			(0.837)			(0.410)
illegal_event			−1.367			−0.655
			(1.079)			(0.656)
loc_cityhall			−0.629			0.206
			(1.004)			(0.499)
kprf			1.759**			0.866*
			(0.848)			(0.511)
Constant	−1.504***	−3.758***	−3.538**	−1.482***	−2.559***	−2.526**
	(0.553)	(1.428)	(1.542)	(0.470)	(0.819)	(0.990)
Observations	62	62	62	62	62	62
Log Likelihood	−37.957	−29.826	−25.172			
Akaike Inf. Crit.	79.913	69.653	68.344			

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.6: Everyday Protest Campaigns and Police Inaction

	Dependent variable:					
	inaction binary			n inaction_events		
	logistic			*glm: quasipoisson* *link = log*		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
iv_exclusion	2.534**	3.170**	6.276**	2.447**	2.404**	2.957***
	(1.074)	(1.399)	(2.527)	(1.109)	(1.000)	(1.066)
log(turnout_large_avg)		0.113	−0.385		0.161	−0.118
		(0.320)	(0.413)		(0.211)	(0.250)
n_events		0.071	0.047		0.031**	0.049**
		(0.044)	(0.051)		(0.014)	(0.020)
years_active		0.204	0.353		0.135	0.213
		(0.298)	(0.465)		(0.157)	(0.174)
blockade_sitin			4.814***			2.403***
			(1.534)			(0.500)
illegal_event			−2.160			−0.608
			(1.530)			(0.708)
loc_cityhall			0.893			−0.429
			(1.316)			(0.405)
kprf			2.167*			0.610
			(1.298)			(0.413)
Constant	−3.045***	−5.567***	−8.162***	−3.091***	−4.665***	−5.466***
	(1.023)	(1.925)	(3.045)	(1.084)	(1.247)	(1.418)
Observations	62	62	62	62	62	62
Log Likelihood	−30.530	−26.993	−14.782			
Akaike Inf. Crit.	65.061	63.985	47.564			

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.7: Everyday Protest Campaigns and Prosecution of Protesters

			Dependent variable:			
			prosecute			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
iv_exclusion	−0.171	0.272	0.317	0.164	1.009	1.075
	(0.557)	(0.801)	(0.844)	(0.725)	(1.201)	(1.210)
log(turnout_large_avg)		−0.025	−0.001		−0.355	−0.472
		(0.271)	(0.281)		(0.446)	(0.510)
n_events		−0.096	−0.098		−0.063	−0.064
		(0.075)	(0.080)		(0.075)	(0.079)
years_active		0.612*	0.598		0.487	0.446
		(0.346)	(0.370)		(0.431)	(0.479)
detention_events		1.174**	1.247***		0.681	0.719
		(0.456)	(0.479)		(0.460)	(0.481)
blockade_sitin			−0.340			−0.514
			(0.843)			(0.938)
illegal_event			−0.583			0.019
			(0.941)			(1.414)
loc_cityhall			0.300			−0.037
			(0.836)			(1.076)
kprf			0.392			0.709
			(0.748)			(1.076)
Constant	−0.560	−2.538**	−2.449**	0.288	−0.319	0.061
	(0.443)	(1.167)	(1.184)	(0.540)	(1.646)	(1.868)
Observations	62	62	62	32	32	32
Log Likelihood	−39.644	−28.952	−28.503	−21.589	−19.234	−18.810
Akaike Inf. Crit.	83.288	69.905	77.005	47.178	50.468	57.621

Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

APPENDIX D

Detentions and Everyday Protest Campaigns

Although a larger share of policy performance campaigns experienced at least one detention (figure D.1), the difference is not statistically significant in most regression analysis (table D.1).

Figure D.1: Policy Performance campaigns are more likely to experience at least one detention

Table D.1: Everyday Protest Campaigns and Detention

	Dependent variable:					
	detention binary			n detention_events		
	logistic			*glm: quasipoisson* *link = log*		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
iv_exclusion	−0.760	−1.472*	−1.546*	−0.296	−0.394	−0.589
	(0.545)	(0.864)	(0.907)	(0.391)	(0.373)	(0.380)
log(turnout_large_avg)		0.193	0.186		0.101	0.088
		(0.269)	(0.293)		(0.142)	(0.162)
n_events		0.223***	0.228**		0.059***	0.055***
		(0.078)	(0.088)		(0.008)	(0.010)
years_active		0.187	0.218		0.056	−0.059
		(0.361)	(0.373)		(0.086)	(0.101)
blockade_sitin			−0.055			0.537**
			(0.900)			(0.249)
illegal_event			−0.412			0.874
			(1.007)			(0.570)
loc_cityhall			0.011			0.301
			(0.859)			(0.342)
kprf			0.491			0.120
			(0.786)			(0.314)
Constant	0.560	−2.537**	−2.461**	0.435	−1.185**	−1.894**
	(0.443)	(1.186)	(1.208)	(0.297)	(0.580)	(0.798)
Observations	62	62	62	62	62	62
Log Likelihood	−41.946	−26.595	−26.328			
Akaike Inf. Crit.	87.892	63.191	70.656			

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

APPENDIX E

Additional Tables, Concessions and Mobilization

Table E.1: Comparison of Implementation over Time, by Concession Quality

	Quality	1	2	3	4
0-3 months	Core	33.3%	15.4%	7.7%	43.6%
	Subcore	57.1%	3.6%	3.6%	35.7%
	Adjacent	41.2%	11.8%	11.8%	35.3%
3-6 months	Core	33.3%	17.9%	12.8%	35.9%
	Subcore	45.5%	13.6%	4.5%	36.4%
	Adjacent	41.2%	11.8%	5.9%	41.2%
9-12 months	Core	34.2%	21.1%	15.8%	28.9%
	Subcore	40.9%	22.7%	NA	36.4%
	Adjacent	44.4%	11.1%	11.1%	33.3%
9-12 months	Core	34.1%	19.5%	17.1%	29.3%
	Subcore	40.9%	22.7%	NA	36.4%
	Adjacent	42.9%	19.0%	4.8%	33.3%
Year 2	Core	28.2%	20.5%	15.4%	35.9%
	Subcore	47.8%	21.7%	4.3%	26.1%
	Adjacent	50.0%	22.2%	5.6%	22.2%
Year 3	Core	30.8%	23.1%	17.9%	28.2%
	Subcore	52.6%	21.1%	5.3%	21.1%
	Adjacent	52.9%	17.6%	5.9%	23.5%
Year 4	Core	36.4%	12.1%	12.1%	39.4%
	Subcore	52.9%	17.6%	5.9%	23.5%
	Adjacent	60.0%	20.0%	6.7%	13.3%

Table E.2: Comparison of Implementation over Time, by Speaker

	Speaker	1	2	3	4
0-3 months	District agent or institution	42.1%	21.1%	NA	36.8%
	City government agent or institution	53.8%	5.1%	2.6%	38.5%
	Sobyanin	20.0%	NA	NA	80.0%
	National government agent or institution	20.0%	20.0%	20.0%	40.0%
	Putin	50.0%	NA	NA	50.0%
	Other	33.3%	NA	33.3%	33.3%
3-6 months	District agent or institution	35.3%	29.4%	5.9%	29.4%
	City government agent or institution	47.2%	5.6%	5.6%	41.7%
	Sobyanin	16.7%	33.3%	NA	50.0%
	National government agent or institution	21.4%	21.4%	14.3%	42.9%
	Putin	50.0%	NA	NA	50.0%
	Other	40.0%	NA	40.0%	20.0%
6-9 months	District agent or institution	38.9%	33.3%	5.6%	22.2%
	City government agent or institution	44.1%	8.8%	8.8%	38.2%
	Sobyanin	16.7%	33.3%	NA	50.0%
	National government agent or institution	25.0%	25.0%	18.8%	31.3%
	Putin	50.0%	NA	NA	50.0%
	Other	50.0%	NA	25.0%	25.0%
9-12 months	District agent or institution	41.2%	35.3%	5.9%	17.6%
	City government agent or institution	43.6%	10.3%	10.3%	35.9%
	Sobyanin	12.5%	25.0%	NA	62.5%
	National government agent or institution	29.4%	29.4%	11.8%	29.4%
	Putin	50.0%	NA	NA	50.0%
	Other	33.3%	NA	33.3%	33.3%
Year 2	District agent or institution	31.3%	37.5%	18.8%	12.5%
	City government agent or institution	39.0%	9.8%	9.8%	41.5%
	Sobyanin	54.5%	36.4%	NA	9.1%
	National government agent or institution	33.3%	33.3%	11.1%	22.2%
	Putin	50.0%	NA	NA	50.0%
	Other	50.0%	NA	NA	50.0%
Year 3	District agent or institution	35.7%	21.4%	35.7%	7.1%
	City government agent or institution	42.1%	13.2%	7.9%	36.8%
	Sobyanin	54.5%	36.4%	NA	9.1%
	National government agent or institution	33.3%	44.4%	11.1%	11.1%
	Putin	50.0%	NA	NA	50.0%
	Other	50.0%	NA	NA	50.0%
Year 4	District agent or institution	50.0%	14.3%	28.6%	7.1%
	City government agent or institution	41.9%	9.7%	6.5%	41.9%
	Sobyanin	55.6%	33.3%	NA	11.1%
	National government agent or institution	42.9%	28.6%	NA	28.6%
	Putin	50.0%	NA	NA	50.0%
	Other	50.0%	NA	NA	50.0%

Table E.3: Comparison of Implementation over Time, by Promised Policy Change

	Type	1	2	3	4
0-3 months	Distribution	30.0%	25.0%	5.0%	40.0%
	Enforcement	51.5%	6.1%	9.1%	33.3%
	Investigation	11.1%	11.1%	11.1%	66.7%
	Recognition	44.4%	11.1%	NA	44.4%
	Reform	50.0%	NA	7.1%	42.9%
3-6 months	Distribution	38.1%	23.8%	9.5%	28.6%
	Enforcement	43.3%	10.0%	10.0%	36.7%
	Investigation	12.5%	12.5%	12.5%	62.5%
	Recognition	25.0%	25.0%	NA	50.0%
	Reform	41.7%	8.3%	8.3%	41.7%
6-9 months	Distribution	39.1%	21.7%	8.7%	30.4%
	Enforcement	43.3%	13.3%	13.3%	30.0%
	Investigation	12.5%	25.0%	12.5%	50.0%
	Recognition	28.6%	28.6%	NA	42.9%
	Reform	41.7%	16.7%	8.3%	33.3%
9-12 months	Distribution	34.8%	21.7%	8.7%	34.8%
	Enforcement	42.4%	15.2%	15.2%	27.3%
	Investigation	12.5%	25.0%	12.5%	50.0%
	Recognition	28.6%	28.6%	NA	42.9%
	Reform	46.7%	20.0%	NA	33.3%
Year 2	Distribution	36.8%	31.6%	NA	31.6%
	Enforcement	50.0%	8.8%	14.7%	26.5%
	Investigation	12.5%	25.0%	12.5%	50.0%
	Recognition	28.6%	28.6%	NA	42.9%
	Reform	38.5%	30.8%	15.4%	15.4%
Year 3	Distribution	42.1%	26.3%	NA	31.6%
	Enforcement	48.4%	12.9%	19.4%	19.4%
	Investigation	14.3%	28.6%	14.3%	42.9%
	Recognition	50.0%	NA	NA	50.0%
	Reform	38.5%	38.5%	15.4%	7.7%
Year 4	Distribution	56.3%	6.3%	NA	37.5%
	Enforcement	46.4%	14.3%	14.3%	25.0%
	Investigation	25.0%	NA	25.0%	50.0%
	Recognition	60.0%	NA	NA	40.0%
	Reform	33.3%	41.7%	8.3%	16.7%

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