Book Reviews

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Editor

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Stuart C. Gilman

Public Integrity, by J. Patrick Dobel. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999, 260 pp., $38.00.

With apologies to Dickens, *Public Integrity* is the best of books and it is the worst of books. This characterization has less to do with the author's acumen and intellect than the reviewer's rather peculiar background.

This year marks a midpoint for me. I have now spent exactly half of my professional life as a university academic and half as a government policymaker. So, in reading this book I was torn (figuratively) in half. My academic sympathies read the manuscript one way, while my practitioner side reacted completely differently. The editor's instructions to write to all parts of the readership, including "academics—who teach and do research on public policy issues—and practitioners at all levels of government and in public and private firms dealing with public policy," ensured an apparent Janus-faced dilemma. My solution is to write two reviews: one as an academic, the other as a practitioner.

THE ACADEMIC'S POINT OF VIEW

Patrick Dobel has produced a fine work in the tradition of "applied political theory." Rather than dealing with abstruse and often fruitless discourses on the meaning of justice, democracy, or freedom, he has provided a text that allows those in policy, political science, and public administration—and their students—to *get at* the theoretical tissue of what we understand as integrity in public office. In the tradition of Amy Guttman, Dennis Thompson, and Andrew Stark, Dobel offers the reader a roadmap of the vital questions that should be asked in order to understand public integrity and why it seems so important to democratic institutions and democratic legitimacy.

Although one might disagree with the order of topics (I would have put chapters 3 and 4 before 1 and 2), Dobel does cover the issue of public integrity from every reasonable facet: integrity in office, power, moral reality and moral degeneration,

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the ethical commitment to stay in office as well as the moral commitment to leave, issues of "sleaze and honor," obligations to the art of compromise, obligations of prudence, and the fascinating question of the role of private lives for public office holders. The author devotes a chapter to each, applying a deft hand and a critically insightful mind.

I would especially recommend the chapters on the commitment to stay and the decision to resign (chapters 5 and 6) for professors who teach policy or public administration. It will absolutely engage students interested in public service. These two chapters are among the best discussions of ethical obligations in office that I have read, and they deal with a number of threads not generally found in the policy or administration literature. Examples include the detrimental role of being the "house moralist," the moral cost of dissent, the promise of public office, the value of prudent effectiveness, and the moral use of the threat of resignation. Dobel's treatment is both insightful and exhaustive, and is an excellent example of bridging issues of interest to academics and policymakers.

THE PRACTITIONER'S POINT OF VIEW

For the practitioner, chapters 5 and 6 are the most accessible. Their more pragmatic treatment does not reflect the kinds of issues dealt with elsewhere. At first blush the topics covered seem to brim with relevance to people who actually work in this area. However, although not as arcane as much of the academic literature in applied ethics, the text will disappoint practitioners. There is far too much wrestling with what might be thought of as definitional squabbles or academic navel gazing. As an example, Dobel writes, "People in liberal society reconcile moral dilemmas by adopting roles and organizing loyalties in a way that gives some coherence to personal integrity" (p. 74). This is true in any society, not only liberal society. And from a practitioner's point of view the distinctions drawn in the rest of the discussion are more confusing than illuminating.

What is missing from this book from a practitioner's point of view? The author should have treated the peculiar relationship between the political appointee and the career civil servant, drawing the tension in the notion of public integrity between the two. It would have been relevant to talk about the relationship between compliance standards (now ubiquitous at the federal, state, and local levels in the United States, Canada, and Europe) and the pragmatic virtues reflected in the book. It would have been interesting to find out the author's disposition on the public integrity issues that develop out of the tension between policy and administration—what is often an argument about ends and means. It would have been beneficial if the author had discussed the dynamic of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) like Transparency International that advocate greater openness in government, and their effect on the issue of privacy. An ethical issue that should have been treated is the appointment of tens of thousands of often poorly qualified people to political positions in the United States, especially given most Americans' fundamental belief that the government bureaucracy is merit based. A multitude of other questions go unanswered for the practitioner but, perhaps, these are saved for another book.

In fairness to Professor Dobel, practitioners are seldom asked to be critical readers for policy manuscripts. Publishers seldom turn to such people—independent from the author—for input. The apparent determining factor is the "market," because the ultimate product is designed for the classroom. For that reason alone, a sensible and accomplished scholar writes to a conservative academic audience accustomed to reading works with a particular form and content. Such a critique tends to be a bit

harsh, but it accurately reflects the continuing tension between the academic's and the practitioner's side of the policy "house."

A Small Quibble

In a country where the President has been impeached and almost removed from office because he left his DNA on the clothing of a young volunteer (who subsequently kept it as a souvenir), it seems bizarre to argue that fiction is the best place to gather examples on the problems of public integrity. I found Dobel's argument for the use of fiction as exemplars both gratuitous and unconvincing (pp. 48–50). It is almost a postmodern rite of passage to illustrate arguments with examples from literature, which also serves to show that you are part of the "cutting edge." Unfortunately, much of the allusion to fiction in this work renders the author's arguments less clear and in some cases confusing. *Billy Budd* is again dragged out as a hackneyed example. (Melville's *Benito Cereno* would have made the question of moral tension clearer.)

However, the most distracting use of literary examples comes from the author's fixation with the work of John Le Carré. Smiley dominates Dobel's book, and he is not alone in his affection for Le Carré. Recently *The Spy Novels of John Le Carré: Balancing Ethics and Politics* (Aronoff, 1999) was published touting the same qualities in the works of Le Carré (and reviewed by Professor Dobel in a recent issue of the journal *Public Integrity* [Dobel, 2000]). The free-wheeling world of Smiley—one that would make my CIA colleagues envious—is about as unrelated to day-to-day policymaking as I can imagine. The "straw man" examples that result from using this genre create a feeling of unreality. First, because they are unfamiliar to so many readers that it sometimes takes several paragraphs to set up. And second, because the magnitude of the decisions and the clarity of the tradeoffs have little to do with the public integrity issues that involve policy practitioners.

CONCLUSION

Dobel has written a wonderful academic book that will work well in the classroom. He raises critical issues in a thoughtful, interesting way. It is also a book well worth reading (for all my misgivings). My academic side read *Public Integrity* with pleasure. However, I know that Professor Dobel has served for several years as a practitioner in the area of public integrity, and if he wrote a book for his practitioner colleagues it would be truly worthy. Just as Machiavelli wrote two works on just governing—*The Prince* (written for tyrants) and *The Discourses*. . . (written for republicans)—I think Professor Dobel owes practitioners another book. The two works together would give a more balanced, "republican" view of the issue of public integrity.

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Peter Edelman

The Gentleman from Georgia: The Biography of Newt Gingrich, by Mel Steely. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2000, 431 pp., $29.95.

This biography of Newt Gingrich is written by one of his closest associates. It is perhaps rough justice then that I, clearly no fan of Gingrich, have been asked to review it. I am torn between saying we need a biography of Gingrich by a dispassionate scholar and asking why we need a book about Gingrich at all. But, at least in the absence of a more objective book, and assuming anyone cares, this book is somewhat helpful. Steely shares Gingrich's world view, but that doesn't stop him from pointing out some of the man's weaknesses and mistakes. And the recounting of Gingrich's rise and fall, even if told from an overly friendly perspective, is interesting.

Here is a man who spent two decades in an ultimately successful quest for party control and personal leadership in the House of Representatives, and then lasted barely 4 years once he attained the power he had sought so long. Why?

The bottom line, I think, is that this is a centrist country. People with far-out views and sharp edges gain power from time to time, but they don't last. Joe McCarthy was a menace and did terrible damage but, in retrospect anyway, he fell rather quickly. Gingrich didn't get it, on two counts. He really believed the American people had elected the Republican Congress to dismantle the federal government in all respects except defense and law enforcement. And he couldn't help slipping into hard-edged rhetoric and invective often enough that people started getting scared of him. Plus, he is not the first politician in history to prove that the talents involved in obtaining power are different from those needed to use it effectively.

Gingrich believed he understood the sweep of history, and thought America had to change radically in a conservative direction to remain great. Some would say his penchant for broad pronouncements was more about the fact that he loved to hear himself talk, and that the real point was always his agenda for personal power. But taking his vision at face value, much of it entailed changes in culture and values in ways that could not be legislated. If these were what he promised, he had set himself up for failure. When he translated the vision into the 10 bills comprising his Contract With America, a major part of it turned out to be a big business and special interest agenda to cut off regulation and litigation that exist mainly to protect people of less power and means. It didn't take long for people to figure this out.

Too many Democrats saw the 1994 election as a watershed and were all too ready to accede to many of the basic premises of the Contract With America in order to save their own skins. Perhaps they had the perspective to see that it was smart to lay low and let the Republicans overreach, but it didn't seem that way at the time. It seemed to me that it was more the good luck of dumb Republican strategy that gave the high ground back to the Democrats in late 1995 than it was the Democrats' smart planning.

I happened to be present at the now-famous incident when Gingrich was "made" to walk down the back steps of the plane. The First Lady had invited me to go on Air Force One to Prime Minister Rabin's funeral because of my previous involvement in Americans for Peace Now, the support group for the Israeli peace movement. Professor Steely says Senator Dole was as exercised as Speaker Gingrich at the failure of the President to engage the Republican leadership in budget talks on the plane. (Put aside whether that would have been appropriate anyway, in light of the tragedy that had brought everyone together.) I was sitting in the same compartment as Dole and Gingrich on the way over. What I saw was Gingrich talking and talking to Dole, and

Dole looking for all the world as though all he wanted was to go to sleep. Maybe he would have liked to engage in budget talks on the way back, but he wasn't too interested in the subject on the way over.

Then, about the back steps of the plane: That's the way one exits that part of the plane. If Gingrich and Dole were disrespected, so were Senator Daschle and Congressman Gephardt and Elie Wiesel and former Secretary of State George Shultz. Steely, so personally identified with his subject, fails to ask what it is about Gingrich that could let him get so emotionally involved and upset, resulting in a serious error in judgment that kept compounding itself in the following days.

The weakness of the book is evident in Steely's account of the ensuing budget negotiations. He says "a serious problem [was] the willingness of the president and his team to lie repeatedly and fail to negotiate in good faith." Not a very objective or measured statement, I would say. Then Steely says that Gingrich, the one who was negotiating in good faith, failed to see that the Clinton team was setting him up to take the blame for the failure of the negotiations and therefore was "in audition for the role of British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain in his dealings with the Germans during the period leading up the Second World War." His editor should have made him take that sentence out. A bit later we find out that shutting down the government was Clinton's idea. "Clinton and Dick Morris, his advisor, had planned the shutdown since August and it had worked beautifully in November when the trap was sprung." Poor Newt.

I have always been struck by the fact that Gingrich's welfare diagnosis contained a measure of truth. He overstated it, and his remedy was wrong, but it is unfortunate that it was not possible to have a serious conversation about the remedy, given that the premise reflected some profound truth. Gingrich's mantra was, "It is impossible to maintain civilization with 12-year-olds having babies, 15-year-olds killing each other, 17-year-olds dying of AIDS, and 18-year-olds receiving diplomas they cannot read." I wish more people on the liberal side would take an interest in these awful facts and help develop new remedies that emphasize jobs at decent incomes, school reform, and rebuilding a sense of community solidarity and responsibility. But the radical Republican remedy was to tell people to sink or swim. Remove cash assistance, they said, and people will take responsibility for themselves. Allied propositions included: The killing will stop if we put young people into adult prisons at ever-younger ages, and the bad schooling will be remedied if we subject children to high-stakes tests and then push them out of school when, not having been taught, they flunk the tests.

Despite its lack of objectivity, Steely's book is a cautionary tale. Human nature is such that Newt Gingrich won't be the last person to gain power and use it poorly. Nor, even understanding how the House Democrats' behavior helped Gingrich and his allies gain power, can we be sure that people who hold power for a long time will learn to behave as responsibly as they should. Nonetheless, reminding ourselves how the radical Republican takeover of Congress in 1994 was accomplished and why it failed is useful, and this biography, flawed as it is, helps us do that.

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Harold A. Pollack

HIV and the Blood Supply: An Analysis of Crisis Decisionmaking, edited by Lauren B. Leveton, Harold C. Sox Jr., and Michael A. Stoto, Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1995, 352 pp., $47.95.

Blood Feuds: AIDS, Blood, and the Politics of Medical Disaster, edited by Eric Feldman and Ronald Bayer, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, 375 pp., $49.50 cloth, $29.95 paper.

The Ritual of Rights in Japan: Law, Society, and Health Policy, by Eric Feldman, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2000, 219 pp., $64.95 cloth, $23.95 paper.

More than 430,000 Americans have died of AIDS. Most contracted HIV through unprotected sex or injection drug use. Yet perhaps the most intricate chapter of the HIV story concerns those infected by our health care system itself, through contaminated blood products.

Such infections began in earnest in the late 1970s, when HIV became prevalent among gay men and injection drug users. Such infections became rare after 1985, due to the development of heat treatment and reliable blood tests. By then, though, the damage had been done: 10,000 hemophiliacs, including 90 percent of Americans with severe hemophilia, were infected; 12,000 other Americans were infected through whole blood transfusions or other blood products.

Most hemophiliacs were infected through antihemophiliac factor concentrate, or AHF. Because AHF is made from pooled plasma from thousands of donors, use of these products rapidly produced endemic HIV prevalence. In shattering so many lives, the resulting outbreak shattered the credibility of the National Hemophilia Foundation (NHF). It shattered the public standing of leading blood researchers. It damaged the reputation of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which had allowed the blood industry essentially to police itself. It shattered the reputation of the Red Cross and suppliers, who remain subject to court order and costly litigation.

The Institute of Medicine's (IOM) *HIV and the Blood Supply* offers the best analysis of the clinical and organizational failures that permitted many needless infections. In judicious but ultimately damning prose, the IOM describes (p. 218) the "failure of leadership" in the critical period between mid-1982 and 1984:

> when confronted with a range of options… blood bank officials and federal authorities consistently chose the least aggressive option that was justifiable.

Thus, in evaluating the NHF, the most trusted advisor to hemophilia patients, the

> …. financial and other relationships between the NHF and the plasma fractionation industry created a conflict of interest that seriously compromised the perceived independence of NHF's recommendations.

Most baffling was the failure to implement basic public health measures: the 1983 failure to institute "automatic recall" of plasma products linked to an infected donor, the failure until 1989 to require the recall of untreated AHF, the failure to trace blood recipients when contamination became known.

The IOM's painstaking reconstruction shows that regulators and blood suppliers addressed these issues by relying upon generally implicit risk-benefit calculations that proved misconceived. Worse than any specific error, the FDA failed to develop the organizational capacity needed to address medical and organizational complexities of blood provision. In critical matters, the FDA failed to do its own analysis, instead relying upon questionable advice from the blood industry itself. As the IOM concluded

(p. 128), "There was an apparent inability to rethink, or to gather the necessary factual basis for rethinking, advice from outside parties …."

HIV policy analysts have long recommended prompt notification of individuals who were unknowingly exposed to the virus. Yet until 1991, the FDA did not recommend "lookback" policies to trace the recipients of blood products from infected donors.

Did other industrial democracies do better in the same critical years? Comparative research is now emerging to address this question. Their diverse responses are best explored in *Blood Feuds: AIDS, Blood, and the Politics of Medical Disaster*. Edited by my former colleague Eric Feldman and by the noted AIDS analyst Ronald Bayer, *Blood Feuds* describes the response of clinicians, suppliers, and public health authorities in Canada, the United States, Japan, France, Italy, Germany, Denmark, and Australia.

The most striking commonality is that virtually no country successfully confronted the crisis in its early days, when a hidden virus of unknown prevalence rapidly penetrated the supply of donated blood. The eight countries possessed diverse cultures and health care systems. Some distributed blood through a unified system, others through decentralized approaches. Some accepted blood from paid "donors." Others relied solely on volunteers. Some imported blood products. Others did not. Despite important differences in outcome, all eight experienced high HIV prevalence among users of AHF, particularly among severe hemophiliacs.

It is especially telling that many hemophiliacs were infected before mid-1982 when the first hemophiliac cases were publicly reported. *Blood Feuds* does not provide comparable data for every country, but the data presented, as well as data from other sources, are daunting. One study of U.S. hemophilia treatment centers indicates that half of all infections occurred between September 1980 and October 1982. In Canada, a retrospective study of 1982 samples indicates that 56 percent of hemophiliacs were HIV-infected. In Denmark, a spring 1984 study indicates that 14 of 22 tested hemophiliacs were HIV-infected. Such findings suggest that widespread HIV infection from contaminated blood was largely unavoidable.

Like many catastrophes, however, the HIV epidemic was driven by political and organizational logic that made it worse than it had to be. In almost every wealthy country, blood suppliers, physicians, and even hemophilia advocacy organizations falsely reassured patients about blood safety, long after experts had reason to know better. In most nations, authorities failed to effectively prevent donation by sexually active gay men and by injection drug users. Until recently, many nations collected blood plasma from donors in prison.

Monica Steffan's account of France is a remarkable story of high-level recklessness. In early 1985, epidemiologists concluded that "the probability of not having contaminated stocks is very slight" (p. 108). Yet a high official indicated that use of untreated products should remain "standard procedure except for specific requests" (p. 108). When unheated products were eventually recalled, those already distributed to patients or to health care facilities were not collected.

Norbert Gilmore and Margaret Somerville tell the Canadian story, which differs in detail but reaches similar conclusions. As in France, authorities holding large, potentially contaminated inventories yielded to "the temptation to use up existing stocks" (p. XX). When stocks were recalled within the Canadian Red Cross Society, portions already held by treatment centers or by patients were—again—uncollected. Other chapters document similar examples in many countries.

Some advocates conclude from these stories that paid blood donation and for-profit blood manufacture made the epidemic worse. Following Richard Titmuss' (1971) classic *The Gift Relationship*, many policymakers believed that a nonprofit system grounded in the foundation of the altruistic donor offers the best protection. The accounts in *Blood Feuds* suggest that this romantic conflation of social solidarity

with blood safety was misguided. Although paid donation created public health risks, voluntary self-deferral among unpaid donors proved inadequate. In the critical period before HIV antibody tests, the symbolic identification of blood donation with equal citizenship became an important obstacle to sensible measures to restrict donation by gay men at high risk for HIV infection.

Both for-profit and non-profit organizations faced—in some cases acted upon—financial incentives to downplay HIV risk or to dispense unsafe products. American non-profits responded sluggishly to patient demand for heightened safety. As documented by Sherry Glied in *Blood Feuds*, this lethargy compared poorly with the best of their for-profit competitors, who were spurred by market pressures to take such swift steps as the creation of female-only donor plasma pools and the refusal of blood from high-prevalence locations.

If non-profits were partly shielded from market pressure, they proved all too vulnerable to bad luck and bureaucratic timidity. Failure of imagination likely played a large role. In 1983 when many bad decisions were made, HIV prevalence was basically unknown. Few hemophiliacs were in AIDS treatment, while thousands enjoyed better lives because of AHF. Infection and subsequent death of so many at the hands of life-saving medication was perhaps impossible to comprehend.

Yet the same history gives equally little comfort to the for-profit blood industry. Protected by "shield" laws and by a high threshold of legal negligence, the blood industry faced inadequate incentives to implement safety innovations. Glied's otherwise trenchant analysis downplays the strong role of tort liability, and thereby overlooks many precautions that for-profit producers might have, but did not, implement under permissive FDA regulation.

Unethical behavior proved surprisingly widespread, and surprisingly important. It is especially depressing that misconduct was often committed by physicians and by capable officials strangely impervious to basic ethical concerns. Too often, strong norms that animate physicians in direct clinical care failed to influence behavior in other institutional roles. With important exceptions, the collective failure of physicians to advocate swift action or to warn publicly of the danger remains palpable. Private firms also violated important norms. In France, Japan, and elsewhere, firms used their political leverage to exclude safer products manufactured by competitors, and to stall safety innovations. Especially when public officials knowingly collaborated in such efforts, attention from prosecutors appears richly warranted.

Can we do better? One clear lesson is that blood products must be produced and distributed in accordance with best-practice infectious disease control. Before HIV, blood policies fell within the purview of a narrow blood elite with little public oversight and with little collaboration with public health practitioners with relevant expertise.

In the United States, the FDA and other blood regulators were openly estranged from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the main agency charged with controlling infectious disease. Events such as the swine flu epidemic undermined the self-confidence and external credibility of CDC officials who first recognized the HIV threat.

At one widely cited meeting in January 1983, CDC virologist Donald Francis recommended that blood banks question donors about their sexual behavior. He also recommended that blood banks use surrogate testing for hepatitis B, a condition known to be present in most AIDS patients. Gay activists and others bitterly opposed these suggestions. Although plasma fractionators favored more aggressive questioning, blood bank officials and the Red Cross "were far more concerned about the legal and political ramifications of direct questioning" (p. 112). These organizations declared that "direct or indirect questions about a donor's sexual preference are inappropriate" (p. 115). They proved less solicitous to Haitians, although existing data indicated that Haitians were less likely to be HIV positive than were gay men.

The IOM reports that FDA officials and others expressed a dim view of the CDC's performance and motives, citing CDC's incentive to promote public alarm. (An unfortunate 1983 Red Cross memo complained that "CDC is likely to continue to play up AIDS" [IOM, 2000]). Case tracing, epidemiological surveillance, and the handling of sensitive civil liberties concerns are well-trodden areas of public health practice. It is not surprising that these functions were performed poorly by blood suppliers and FDA regulators with limited experience in these areas.

A second lesson is the value of rigorous, transparent, politically legitimate policy analysis when confronting unfamiliar public health threats. Around the world, blood suppliers and blood regulators failed to apply disciplined analysis that might have alerted them to their own complacency. Ironically, as noted by David Kirp in *Blood Feuds*, authorities are now quite risk-averse, spending large sums screening for rare antigens that pose little threat to population health. Much of this screening is markedly cost-ineffective. After *Blood Feuds* was published, a subsequent IOM report criticized sensitive but costly p24 screening of donated blood, which is estimated to cost more than $7 million per averted HIV infection (IOM, 2000). Israel discarded blood donated by Ethiopian immigrants, a policy estimated to have almost no public health benefit (Israel, 1998).

The irony of the situation is that although such extreme caution is inefficient, it is also necessary and right to regain public confidence in our blood distribution system. This predicament offers a timely reminder that economic policy analysis requires more than substantive merit. It also requires political legitimacy to be used in public policy. Regulators and industry officials resisted surrogate screening and other costly measures based upon an implicit cost-benefit calculus—analysis largely conducted from the perspective of the industry itself. This analysis was wrong. Yet even if it had been right, the lack of transparency or democratic authority to act on such analysis would still have attracted deserved public scorn.

A third lesson is the importance of proper risk communication that meets the needs of a diverse population. The IOM's skillful presentation may be the most lasting contribution of their report. In a misguided effort to avoid public alarm, the NHF and others sought to reassure patients, when a far better response would have been to candidly inform patients of pertinent risks and to consider how specific patients could reduce their own HIV risks.

Ron Bayer and David Kirp both describe, in *Blood Feuds*, the sense of betrayal among many patients who would have willingly reduced their AHF use, had their doctors, public officials, or the NHF told they to do so. Had blood experts properly used sensitivity analysis or other decision analysis tools to communicate pertinent tradeoffs, they might have more quickly detected errors in their own recommendations. Given the best available information, many individuals would have taken tragic risks. Hemophilia is painful, debilitating, and dangerous, so, many hemophiliacs would have reasonably, though wrongly, gambled on AHF. However, many others, especially those with mild or moderate disorders, would have made other choices to greatly reduce their personal risk. A similar account applies to whole blood recipients. Fully informed, some would have delayed elective surgery or used autologous donation.

Are such measures sufficient to prevent another blood-borne epidemic? How much safety can we reasonably afford? Blood experts do not agree about these issues, even among themselves. Sadly, but perhaps most important, what can we do once tragedy occurs?

It is here that comparative analysis such as *Blood Feuds* and Feldman's recent *The Ritual of Rights in Japan* are most helpful. Although the IOM's intricate policy analysis offers the best guidance for prevention, comparative analysis shows how nations might respond once bad events occur. Such analysis should temper many stereotypes about many countries, including our own.

One might think, for example, that litigious America would have entertained thousands of lawsuits. One might think that Japan would have resolved the controversy with minimal litigation or overt conflict. One might think that French social democracy would permit social and policy consensus. Nearly the opposite occurred. Especially surprising was the spate of criminal prosecutions. French and Japanese authorities prosecuted, often successfully, top blood officials on charges ranging from fraud and criminal negligence to poisoning. These Byzantine legal battles are apparently unresolved.

Meanwhile, American hemophiliacs encountered great difficulty in the courts (Author, 19XX). In November 1998 (!), President Clinton signed the Ricky Ray Hemophilia Relief Fund Act to compensate hemophiliacs who were infected during the 1980s. Yet resulting compensation was below traditional payments to Americans who suffer comparably severe medical harm. Non-hemophiliacs infected through contaminated blood received no Ricky Ray dollars.

If there is any silver lining, it is in efforts to use the HIV tragedy to enact needed policy reforms. Feldman vividly describes Kan Naoto, an entrepreneurial politician who won acclaim as Japan's Health and Welfare Minister in 1996. Kan battled his own ministry to expose long-suppressed memos that documented both the dangers of unheated blood and agency inaction. Unlike his predecessors, Kan offered "heartfelt apology" for both the high rate of infection and his ministry's belated admission of its own culpability. Japanese hemophiliacs subsequently won a substantial settlement. They also secured unequivocal apologies from the leading manufacturers. Feldman describes the most important apology:

> Kawano got down on his hands and knees, and bowed so deeply that his forehead touched the floor. It was the defining moment of the conflict: a display of physical and psychological vulnerability from the president of Greed Cross, a company that had its start in blood banking, dominated the domestic pharmaceutical industry, exerted influence on government policy, and was accused of infecting thousands of the most vulnerable Japanese with a fatal disease.

Perhaps this is the best one can do. For if tragedy is sometimes unavoidable, we can still do much in assisting its victims. We can provide health care and other needed services. We can protect individuals from financial consequences of medical injury. We can evaluate existing policy to remedy technical and administrative failure. When all else fails, those who failed to prevent the tragedy can apologize and explain their actions. Those who were knowingly reckless can be held to account. Our country has accomplished few, if any, of these tasks.

No one can say how many people could have been saved through smarter and more vigilant blood policies. This much we do know: The lack of justice or compassion in response to medical disaster was an utterly avoidable chapter in the history of a terrible epidemic.

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Bruce Western

Race to Incarcerate, by Marc Mauer, New York: New Press, 1999.
Reform in the Making: The Implementation of Social Policy in Prison, by Ann Chih Lin, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000.

Two new books on American prisons present readers with different, yet striking, public policy puzzles. The first, by Marc Mauer, traces the growth in the U.S. penal system over the last 30 years. The second, by Ann Chih Lin, studies the implementation of drug treatment and training programs in five state and federal prisons.

Mauer's *Race to Incarcerate* superbly summarizes much of his work at the Sentencing Project, a leading nonprofit in the cause of criminal justice reform. Like the Sentencing Project itself, Mauer's book provides an excellent public information function, largely allowing the astonishing facts of American prison growth to speak for themselves. In 1972, some 200,000 people were housed in U.S. prisons. By the end of the 1990s the prison population had grown to include around 1.25 million inmates. If jail inmates are added to this count, the total penal population includes 1.86 million, mostly young, poor, and minority, inmates. The United States has the largest penal population of any country in the world. There are 350,000 more inmates in the United States than in China, despite China's massive population and history of political repression. In coming second only to Russia, the U.S. incarceration rate also exceeds that of historically authoritarian countries like South Africa, Singapore, Poland, and South Korea.

How did we arrive at these extraordinary levels of punishment? Mauer begins to answer this question by considering and rejecting the most obvious hypothesis—that the high U.S. incarceration rate reflects the high level of crime in America. U.S. rates of criminal victimization, except in the area of violent crime, are largely similar to those overseas. What's more, trends in crime rates are not closely linked to trends in incarceration rates.

The historical variability of incarceration rates and their weak relationship to patterns of criminal offending underlines Mauer's central thesis: The size of the penal population in the United States is the product of deliberate policy choice. Two initiatives—the war on crime and the war on drugs—expanded the penal population in a way that targeted disadvantaged and minority men.

The Nixon administration first promoted the war on crime in response to social unrest of the 1960s. As criminal justice policy became politicized, sentences were lengthened, judicial discretion was reduced, and parole was increasingly abandoned as a tool for rehabilitation. From the early 1980s, tough-on-crime sentencing policy was supplemented by the intensified arrest, prosecution, and sentencing of drug offenders.

Even more than the war on crime, the war on drugs incarcerated young black men on a massive scale. Expansion of the street trade in crack cocaine through the 1980s provided a seemingly endless supply of African American youth to fill the cells of American prisons. Drug crimes in the current period are commonly crimes of poverty, rooted more in urban ecology than the dangerous behavior of small-time users and dealers. As Mauer convincingly challenges, it is simply unimaginable that the weight of sentencing policy and policing could ever have fallen so heavily on the young adults of the white middle class.

While much of this story is familiar to students of the American penal system, Mauer's great skill lies in cogently distilling the key facts and findings from government statistics, criminological research, and media reports. His compact but wide-ranging

account reminds us that alternatives to America's experiment in incarceration are well within the control of the policymaking process. The final result is a powerful book that will be of broad interest to academics and general readers alike.

The growth of incarceration stemmed partly from growing disappointment among policymakers with the modest rehabilitative success of the prison. A number of influential reports in the 1970s argued forcefully that prisons had failed to reduce recidivism. In this context, Ann Chih Lin, in *Reform in the Making,* examines the implementation of prison programs. Through intensive observation and interviews with prison staff and inmates in five state and federal correctional facilities, Lin paints a detailed picture of the implementation of school, drug treatment, and vocational programs in diverse organizational settings.

In Lin's analysis, the rehabilitative potential of prisons depends substantially on how program implementation is shaped by institutional values and histories specific to different correctional facilities. Successful implementation requires that the rehabilitative purposes of a program complement prison staff's overriding interest in maintaining order. On the other hand, programs are poorly implemented where they are viewed as obstacles to the custody function of the prison.

Lin finds successful implementation in two of the five prisons she studied. These two facilities share a value of communication in which inmates are given some voice in their relationships with prison staff. The institutional value of communication also permeates relationships among staff members, reducing tensions between correctional officers and those administering programs. Communication is important, it seems, not because it allows the rehabilitative ideal to flourish, but because it contributes to maintaining order. In this context, programs facilitate security and safety while also assisting with the professional development of officers. As Lin observes, however, a strong norm of communication will not by itself create successful implementation. In one state prison, relations between inmates and staff were relatively informal, but in that case there were insufficient resources to enroll large numbers of prisoners in programs.

Although this analysis emphasizes the dominating influence of prisons' custody objectives, Lin also finds that such objectives can impair communication among staff and between inmates and staff. Under these conditions, found in two federal prisons, the rehabilitative aspirations of programs are abandoned almost entirely. Program staff themselves embrace a law enforcement function, and correctional officers view prison programs as impediments to effective prison management. Program implementation thus seems to involve a delicate balancing act in which prison security remains the preeminent goal, but rehabilitative objectives retain some validity.

Taken together, these case studies provide good evidence for the simple but compelling idea that practitioners on the ground play a vital role in making policy in America's prisons. For some, *Reform in the Making* may be a frustrating book that resists a focus on policy outcomes and generalizations about successful implementation. Still, Lin makes a strong contribution to current debate about the role of prisons in criminal justice policy. Prison programs must be designed in a way that promotes adaptation to local context. Rehabilitative objectives must be sensitive to correctional staff's immediate interests in custody and safety. These ideas challenge the conventional wisdom that prison programs have failed. Because program implementation has been neglected, the rehabilitative potential of prison programs has barely been tapped. Although the policy debates now seem tired and well-rehearsed, Lin, like Mauer, shows that there is both room and an urgent need for fresh thinking about incarceration.

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The Shadow Welfare State: Labor, Business, and the Politics of Health Care in the United States, by Marie Gottschalk. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press of Cornell University, 2000, 288 pp., $45 cloth, $18.95 paper.
The Politics of Medicare (2nd edition), by Theodore R. Marmor. New York: Aldine De Gruyter, 2000, 228 pp., $35.95 cloth, $16.25 paper.

Among the world's advanced industrialized democracies, the United States stands out in the degree to which a significant proportion of its population lacks health insurance. Analysts have persistently sought to fathom the political origins of this circumstance, the demise of the Clinton health plan in the early 1990s recently attracting attention. However, more basic insight into this persistent social problem requires a longer historical perspective. In this regard, Marie Gottschalk and Theodore Marmor have peered through different lenses to provide lucid, insightful, and often provocative analyses of key dimensions of health care politics and policy since World War II. Marmor targets Medicare, the United States' primary venture into a "social insurance" approach to health care, while Gottschalk examines the private safety net and the behavior of organized labor and business in the medical arena.

Marmor anchors his work in the politics of the policy process—both the grand ideological politics of legislative decision as well as the highly technical, but nonetheless critically important, politics of more incremental policy evolution. With slight editing, the first part of this second edition replicates Marmor's earlier book (1973), which assayed the forces in play during the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations leading to the passage of Medicare in July 1965. It is no small tribute to that earlier volume that I found it to be well worth rereading after more than two decades. The second part of Marmor's book breaks new ground as he reviews the politics of Medicare (most of it a kind of complex, insider politics) from the program's inception through the 1990s. After providing a historical overview of key developments, he dissects the ideological context of Medicare politics, the political puzzles that the program presents, and the relevance of political science for policy analyses focused on Medicare.

Marmor's book possesses many strengths. He conveys how broader political factors have shaped Medicare politics, explicating in particular three general forces—declining trust in government, the emergence of deficit politics during the Reagan and Bush years, and the subsequent arrival of baby boomer politics with its concomitant focus on issues of intergenerational equity. These broader contextual forces have fueled the concern with cost control that so rapidly surfaced in the period immediately following Medicare's birth. These cost concerns have dimmed the hopes of many of Medicare's supporters that the program would provide the stepping stone for incremental movement toward guaranteed health insurance for all citizens. Marmor perceptively probes the political uses of deficits and baby boom statistics by those who seek to "reform" or otherwise cut Medicare noting their occasional propensity to use "distorted argument" and "fear-mongering" (pp. 124, 139).

Marmor also elucidates how institutions have influenced Medicare politics. His insight here goes beyond recognition that the separation of powers, federalism, and other centrifugal factors create a structure of "hobbled majoritarianism" in the United States that makes major change difficult (p. 174). He also conveys how Medicare's specific institutional features shape politics, especially the Part A trust fund that subsidizes hospital payments. The initial designers used the trust fund to win political support by making the program resemble Social Security. But this program feature has come back to haunt Medicare as reports from the trust fund regularly raise the

specter of fiscal insolvency. This has led to a circumstance where "the same social-insurance financing of hospital services that was so critical to gaining political support for Medicare in the first place has—through its artifact, the trust fund—become one of its greatest political vulnerabilities and the nominal foundation to support the attacks of the program's harshest critics" (p. 137). In Marmor's view, the "crisis talk" generated by trust fund reports rests on a spurious comparison to the operation of these funds in the private sector.

Marmor's assessment of the politics of "procompetitive" reform proposals for Medicare should command the attention of any serious student of health policy. This procompetitive perspective rests on three general dictums—markets over government, competition over regulation, and individual choice over collective security. Its manifestations have assumed many guises—managed care, medical savings accounts, a shift to vouchers for insurance, antitrust action to reduce the market power of providers, and more. Marmor offers a multifaceted critique of the procompetitive perspective. Among other things, he stresses a point that others have emphasized (e.g., Kettl, 1993) but that political leaders and many policy analysts have chronically ignored—that the success of procompetitive market reforms requires high-capacity government. It necessitates a government that is smart about policy design and well-resourced administratively to monitor program performance and assure accountability.

Marmor's critique of the procompetitive approach in some respects carries over into his concluding chapter where he notes the pitfalls of the intellectual division of labor between political and policy analysis. Marmor contends that policy analysts frequently fail to incorporate political factors into their studies and that "the result is unrealistic—both in the 'overview' of how the program developed and in what the future portends" (p. 189). He is equally concerned about policy analysis that takes political considerations into account but presents these factors "as self-evident when in fact they are contestable" (p. 189).

Valuable as Marmor's book is, it misses one opportunity to contribute even more. His decision to reprint the original case concerning how Medicare became a law heightens the utility of the book not only for classroom purposes, but as a refresher for seasoned students of health policy and politics. However, his decision to leave the analytic chapter from the first volume untouched in the new edition is less compelling. Marmor's original book drew on conceptual frameworks and propositions from the 1960s to interpret his case materials. Although this conceptual underpinning continues to yield insights and may yet offer the best vehicle for elucidating Medicare politics, an array of alternative or complementary analytic perspectives have emerged over the last three decades (e.g., Kingdon, 1984; Skocpol, 1992). A more integrated interpretation of Medicare's enactment and evolution, drawing on a more current conceptual base, might have allowed the book to achieve greater theoretical force.

While Marmor's book rivets attention on the policy process, Marie Gottschalk's *The Shadow Welfare State* perceptively assesses the role of organized labor and business in the health policy sphere. In particular she focuses on their role in shaping an inhospitable context for a "single-payer" comprehensive health system like that found in Canada. (Under such a system, government collects funds for health insurance and adopts a uniform benefits plan for everyone in a nation or a geographic subdivision.) The central contextual factor in Gottschalk's book is the "shadow welfare state ... that is anchored in the private sector but backed by government policy" (p. 1). This private sector safety net provides an array of fringe benefits including, of course, health insurance. Gottschalk shows that, beginning in the 1970s, the private safety net became increasingly tattered as employers

turned to temporary or part-time employees, cut health insurance benefits, and generally attempted to reduce labor costs.

The core theme of Gottschalk's work is that organized labor has not been effective either in defending the private sector safety net or in advancing the goal of a single-payer system. Gottschalk rejects the view that this has occurred because organized labor lacks the political muscle to mold health care policies significantly. In this regard, she stresses the limits to union membership as a yardstick for calibrating labor's potential power arguing that "the connection between union density, political mobilization, and political success is neither a simple nor a direct one in the United States or elsewhere" (p. 27). She suggests that retired union workers must also be factored into estimations of union strength, as well as relatively favorable public opinion toward unions and their critical financial and grassroots role in the Democratic Party.

Having made the case that labor is far from an anemic player in American politics, Gottschalk argues that labor's ineffectiveness has stemmed from its "dogged embrace of private-sector solutions in the health-care debate" especially as manifested in its abandonment of support for a single-payer plan and its endorsement of an employer-mandate approach to comprehensive health reform. Gottschalk sees the failings of organized labor as emanating from institutional factors, internal divisions within the unions and health reform groups, excessive faith in business as a partner in reforming health care, and a "general lack of political imagination" among union leaders (p. 158).

Gottschalk is at her best in dissecting the three "institutional" factors that weakened labor's commitment to a single-payer system. First, the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 effectively turned over to unions the control of multi-billion dollar health, pension, and welfare trust funds, thereby giving them a stake in preserving the private safety net from government incursion. Second, the emergence of the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act (ERISA) in 1974 substantially exempted the Taft-Hartley plans and self-insured employers from regulation by the 50 states. Business and labor have cooperated to preserve this exemption, thereby weakening the capacity of the states to achieve certain health care reforms. Third, the unions again joined with business in helping to create and sustain the institution of experience-based rather than community-rated premiums.

Gottschalk also excels in her assessment of the role of business in the politics of health care reform. Many labor leaders as well as liberal reformers became convinced in the early 1980s and 1990s that business would play a constructive role in moving the country toward universal coverage. But Gottschalk argues that the history of comprehensive health insurance in other countries provides scant support for this sanguine view and documents how business leaders ultimately turned their back on the Clinton health plan. Gottschalk believes that labor's misplaced faith in the business community prevented union leaders from developing a broader critique of the health care system and domestic political economy.

Although Gottschalk significantly advances understanding of health care politics, certain features of her analysis gave me pause. Gottschalk is right to assert the importance of juxtaposing developments with respect to the private and public sector safety nets. But the phrase, the "shadow welfare *state*" [italics are mine], may well fuel the linguistic entropy that already bedevils social scientists far too frequently. A more pointed and coherent definition of the "state"—one more consistent with general usage—combined with a continued focus on the private sector safety net would provide a stronger conceptual foundation. On a more general level, Gottschalk's book at times veers toward a tone so critical of organized labor as to lack sufficient empathy for union leaders as they faced the need to make hard choices about goals and strategies

in the health care arena. Assuming Gottschalk is right about the superiority of a single-payer system, the fact remains that during the 1980s and early 1990s the employer mandate was the only option for comprehensive reform that looked even remotely feasible. Union endorsement of this approach can be read as an understandable preference on labor's part not to let the "best" become the enemy of the "good."

In broad perspective, both Gottschalk and Marmor testify to the importance of policy legacies, or feedbacks—that just as politics creates policies, these same policies engender a new politics that galvanizes or impedes further enhancement of the state's role in a policy sphere and that shapes the character of that involvement (Skocpol, 1992, pp. 57–60). Through their focus on Medicare and such measures as the Taft-Hartley Act and ERISA, both volumes provide extremely useful case materials for those seeking to develop more refined theories of policy legacies. In considering how the legacies described in these volumes shaped the quest for universal health insurance, Marmor's observation about the role of Congressman Wilbur Mills in the passage of Medicare looms large. It was Mills who saw the simultaneous approval of Medicaid (a state-administered health insurance program for the poor) as a means of "building a fence" around Medicare undercutting future demands that the federal government expand this social insurance approach to other age cohorts (p. 60). Given Mills' prescience, it is no accident that the primary development in the 1990s with respect to providing insurance to a new age group (children under 19) occurred through Medicaid and its companion program the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP).

Could these initiatives, which depart sharply from the Medicare and single-payer models, fuel the next major incremental step toward reducing the number of uninsured? Many would say "no," contending in the tradition of those who ran the Social Security system that "a program for the poor is a poor program" (Derthick, 1979, p. 217). In this view, initiatives that rely on means tests for benefits almost invariably face stigmatization and lack the political support needed to command a substantial share of government resources. This dictum may still apply as serious questions persist about the capacity and commitment of the states to insure more children (e.g., Thompson and DiIulio, 1998). However, the changing context of "welfare medicine" in the states deserves note. The welfare reform act of 1996 ushered in an era where work has become a major goal of the welfare system with the added stipulation that those no longer on cash assistance should not suffer the loss of health insurance and other benefits. This new emphasis on aiding "working families" could conceivably help destigmatize means-tested programs targeted at children and make them somewhat less vulnerable politically.

Given the potency of federalism in the American political system and the legacy of the Medicaid "fence" that Wilbur Mills helped build some 35 years ago, any further efforts to reduce the ranks of the uninsured will likely flow from a messy, fragmented, complex, confusing cluster of programs using an array of policy tools, financed from many sources, and administered at all levels of the federal system. But as Gottschalk and Marmor so ably demonstrate, the political and economic forces shaping the shadow safety net and Medicare will be at center stage in affecting the scope and character of health insurance coverage.

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Paul A. Jargowsky

The spatial context of poverty matters, both for understanding the origins of poverty and for thinking about policies to address it. If the spatial context did not matter, there would be no logic to having separate lines of research and entire academic programs devoted to spatial subdivisions of the poverty domain—urban poverty, rural poverty, and a newly emerging literature on suburban poverty. The study of urban poverty, in particular, has been motivated by an assumption that the geographic, political, social, and economic characteristics of metropolitan areas contribute in important ways to the level of poverty of the area's residents. A person with a given set of personal characteristics will of course have a higher probability of being poor in a city with a slumping economy than in one with a vibrant economy. Beyond that, the degree of racial and economic segregation, the location of jobs and people, the characteristics of the city's transportation system, and a myriad of other idiosyncratic local factors could also play a role in determining economic outcomes. Despite a long history of empirical research into these questions, however, a great deal of uncertainty remains regarding the strength of these effects and their relative importance.

This perplexing state of affairs is exemplified by the now-famous Gautreaux Program and the ongoing evaluations of the Moving to Opportunity Program (MTO). In the Gautreaux Program, residents of Chicago public housing were moved to less poor neighborhoods in both city and suburban locations as part of a court settlement. James Rosenbaum and his colleagues found important effects on the employment and educational outcomes of those who were moved to suburban locations. The MTO program was designed to provide a rigorous test of Gautreaux-type effects using a

true experimental design. As in Gautreaux, the effects seem powerful, especially for young children. But in both programs the treatment is so multifaceted that it is hard to know how to regard the results. The families move from poverty-stricken neighborhoods to less poor neighborhoods; from central cities to suburbs; from segregated minority neighborhoods to mixed or mostly white neighborhoods; from fiscally strapped inner-city school districts to wealthy suburban school districts. While many take these studies to support spatial mismatch, many of the participants report that lower crime rates are the most important advantage of their new location rather than job proximity. After moving, they aren't afraid to take jobs that require them to return home after dark.

Four new books on U.S. metropolitan areas have the capacity to fundamentally improve our understanding of these questions. They are the result of the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality (MCSUI), sponsored jointly by the Russell Sage and Ford Foundations. A key feature of the project is a set of linked surveys. The first survey explores the labor market experience and racial perceptions of a random sample of persons in four cities: Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, and Los Angeles. The second survey interviews employers who hire workers with less than a college degree. This sample begins with the employers of those in the household survey, providing a rare integrated view of both sides of the employment equation.

Each of these volumes is a substantial work in its own right. They all incorporate data and analyses from a wide variety of sources, not just the MCSUI surveys. Breadth is a strength these volumes share, an attempt to see the whole elephant rather than disconnected fragments of it. Moreover, two of the volumes are collections of essays. A full review of all four books would greatly exceed the available space. In this review, I focus for the most part on the findings that flow from linked surveys or from the specific spacial context of the four metropolitan areas. These are the features that differentiate the MCSUI project, and the books that flow from it, from much of the previous research, and that have the potential to advance our understanding of urban poverty.

The Atlanta Paradox, edited by David Sjoquist, is an exciting volume. So much of the research on poverty and economic mobility has failed to come to terms with the role of idiosyncratic local factors, including the spatial organization of the metropolitan area and institutional arrangements. This volume is a collection of essays by a broadly interdisciplinary team. The divergent viewpoints and methods in this volume complement each other well, at the cost of some unevenness in the tone and accessibility of the book's chapters.

The key chapter in the volume, written by Sjoquist and Keith Ihlanfeldt, concerns the geographic mismatch between jobs and housing. An increasing number of studies have found evidence for a spatial mismatch that lowers the wages or employment probabilities of inner-city minorities. Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist, however, go beyond this finding to investigate four specific mechanisms through which this effect is produced. First, the distance between jobs and housing may impose excessive commuting costs, reducing the effective suburban wage rate and discouraging inner-city residents in general from seeking or holding suburban jobs. Second, information about suburban jobs may not be available to inner-city residents, so that they never hear about the jobs in the first place. Third, inner-city blacks may face more discrimination in the suburbs, either because suburban employers are discriminatory or because suburban employers acquiesce to their customers' racism. Finally, inner-city blacks may fear that they will be treated poorly in the largely white suburbs, either by bosses, co-workers, or local police. Drawing on a wide variety of data sources, they find some support for all four explanations. The MCSUI surveys are particularly

useful in evaluating the information version of the spatial mismatch hypothesis. Respondents to the household survey were asked to rate six different employment centers in the Atlanta area in terms of the number of jobs available to workers without a college degree. These responses were then compared with the employers' answers, and with other sources of objective data on job availability. Blacks responding to the household survey were mistaken about the location of available jobs. For example, the area black respondents ranked lowest actually had the most available jobs. Whites have more accurate information about job availability than blacks, but the authors argue that this difference is driven primarily by residential location, not race. Once central-city vs. suburban location is taken into account, the black–white information gap disappears.

The survey data are also used to address the hypothesis that suburban employers discriminate on the basis of race. Both distance from black residential areas and the percentage of customers that is white affect the probability that a black was hired for the last job, even after controlling for a wide variety of firm and job characteristics. In the household survey, blacks confirmed that they do have concerns about how they would be received in all-white suburbs, and the strength of these concerns affects the probability that they will apply for jobs in such areas, even after controlling for distance to the area. The chapter also explores the reasons why blacks remain in central city locations, despite the labor market disadvantages, which perpetuate the spatial mismatch.

Other chapters in the Atlanta volume explore the spatial development of the metropolitan area over time, racial attitudes and perceptions, job search strategies of disadvantaged workers, and a variety of other topics. A fascinating chapter by Hewitt explores how the racial composition of job niches has evolved over time, as groups fight over and try to dominate desirable jobs and occupations; however, this chapter employs a complex conceptual apparatus that makes it less accessible than most of the other chapters. As a whole, the volume presents a thorough and for the most part readable examination of poverty and inequality in Atlanta.

The paradox referenced in the title is that Atlanta is considered a Mecca for blacks, and yet continues to experience high levels of black poverty. Collectively the essays in this volume resolve the paradox by elaborating the mechanisms that perpetuate black poverty in the city. In Sjoquist's concluding chapter (p. 282), he states it well:

> Urban inequality of minorities in Atlanta grew out of the mistreatment of blacks by the white community. The continuation of urban inequality can be linked to the continuation of structural arrangements and urban decisions whose historical roots are based on race. On the surface, these structures and processes appear racially neutral, but their operations prevent minorities from reaching equal status in employment and housing.

What *The Atlanta Paradox* establishes beyond doubt is that an important part of the legacy of Atlanta's history is the segmented racial residential pattern, with most job growth in prosperous suburbs that are relatively inaccessible to the city's black population.

Detroit has for many years been the poster child of urban decay. Once a vibrant city fueled by a dynamic industrial base, Detroit's precipitous decline resulted from the unhappy coincidence of several different societal trends. While all of these trends are well known, seldom has the whole story been told so comprehensively or so well as in *Detroit Divided,* by Reynolds Farley, Sheldon Danziger, and Harry J. Holzer. In the manner of a Michener novel, they start at the very beginning in 1701 when Antoine Cadillac founded Detroit, and trace the demographic, economic, and social development of the city over three centuries.

The racial conflict at the heart of the Detroit's problems was not something that began in the 1960s. In fact, the city's African-American population has its roots in the days before the Civil War, when Detroit was a terminus for the Underground Railroad—the first race riot in the city occurred in 1831 in connection with an attempt to return runaway slaves. However, the city's current racial profile stems from a massive migration of Southern blacks to the city between 1900 and 1970, in search of industrial employment.

The City of Detroit's share of total employment in the metropolitan area has declined steeply in recent decades. As John Kain pointed out many years ago, this trend is only a problem for African Americans if their residential mobility is constrained. Segregation by race grew steadily between 1900 and 1970, as Southern blacks arrived and native whites moved to the suburbs or out of the region entirely. Since 1970, the segregation of blacks from whites has remained distinct in Detroit even as many other regions of the nation have come to experience non-trivial declines. The flight of employers to the suburbs, a common theme of these volumes, is cited as a problem but not really systematically examined. To some extent, in these cities we observe a growing metropolitan area superimposed on a set of political boundaries that were fixed in an earlier era. Even if there were no systematic suburban tilt in employment, the central city's share of jobs would shrink over time simply because the central city's share of the area's physical and economic space has declined. But the change in employment patterns has been much more rapid than can be accounted for by the fixed boundary issue. Detroit per se contained 44 percent of the metropolitan area's population in 1960, compared with 26 percent in 1990. At the same time, the city's share of employment fell from 54 percent in 1960 to 21 percent in 1990. Where the city once imported workers from the suburbs, there is now a net outflow.

A myriad of factors is at work to produce this decentralized pattern. The importance of access to centrally located rail junctions has waned in comparison to peripherally located points of access to the interstate highway system; now distribution of at least some classes of products over the Internet further weakens the need for centrality. Employers may have moved to suburbs to chase their middle class customers, or to increase their attractiveness to high-skill employees in the suburbs, or to flee the crime and high costs of the central city, or to avoid hiring blacks because of negative perceptions about inner-city residents' skills and work habits. Perhaps all of these factors and more have played a role. It is frustrating how little we know about the relative importance of these factors in the changing geographic pattern of employment.

Given the pattern of job locations, whatever the cause, a second set of questions concerns the relative ability of central city workers to qualify for the jobs. A common misperception is that suburban jobs are inaccessible to inner-city minorities because they require higher levels of skill than central city jobs. In fact, Farley and colleagues show that the skill qualifications and wages of jobs are actually slightly higher in the central city than in the suburbs. Most jobs, regardless of location, require employees who can read paragraphs, do arithmetic, and interact with customers in person and on the phone. In Detroit, at least, the problem is that a disproportionate share of the jobs requiring lower levels of skill are located in the suburban ring. Presumably, black job-seekers in Detroit face the same obstacles to obtaining these jobs as their counterparts in Atlanta, but the evidence presented in *Detroit Divided* is far more equivocal. Table 4.7 shows the ratio of new hires to applicants for black males for a number of suburban jurisdictions; there seems to be no correlation with the percentage of whites in the suburb, or with the racial composition of the employer's customers. The hires-to-applicants ratios for black males are lower in the suburbs than in the city of Detroit, but they are also lower for whites, so it isn't clear how the authors

conclude that racial discrimination in hiring is greater in the suburbs, at least from the data presented. Moreover, the role of distance is not modeled explicitly. Even a map showing the location of the suburbs in the table would be helpful.

Detroit Divided also updates the path-breaking Detroit Area Study on attitudes toward segregation and integration. Detroit is one of the most segregated cities in the world, a dubious distinction achieved through overt, often legally sanctioned housing discrimination. Despite a vast change in the legal environment, the near total separation of whites and blacks has changed little, at least as of the 1990 census. It is therefore surprising to learn that there has been a tremendous increase in the willingness of whites to live in integrated neighborhoods. Legal and social changes have not led to decreases in segregation in Detroit that other cities have experienced for several reasons. The stagnation of the area's economy and the lack of population growth have suppressed housing construction and renovation. In addition, many residents lost equity in their homes in the 1970–1990 period, particularly black residents of the central city. Both factors had the effect of locking in the pre-1970 racial patterns. Given the stronger economy of the 1990s, the 2000 census will show whether Detroit's white population has really changed in their willingness to live in mixed-race neighborhoods, or merely in what they are willing to say to survey researchers.

In *The Boston Renaissance,* Barry Bluestone and Mary Huff Stevenson argue that Boston has undergone three concurrent revolutions. The first is a demographic revolution: Boston, long known for its white ethnic groups, has become far more racially and culturally diverse as waves of Hispanic, Asian, and Caribbean immigrants have arrived even as native-born whites were leaving the city. The second revolution is industrial: a transformation from a mill-based economy to a mind-based economy.

Bluestone and Stevenson argue that this transformation, while not unique to Boston, has been particularly strong there because of the confluence of research universities, defense contractors, leading hospitals, and skilled labor. The third revolution is a spatial revolution, the massive decentralization of both residences and employment. Bluestone and Stevenson argue that there has been a vast upgrading in the skills requirements of the labor market. For example, more than half of the non-college jobs in the Boston labor market involve daily contact with computers. As with many recent analyses, the authors assume that using computers on the job is a higher-order skill. This assumption flies in the face of the idea that capital and labor are substitutes in the production process. Computers, at least as employed in many lower-level occupations, are often used to reduce the level of skill necessary to complete a given job. They often reduce the degree of judgment necessary and limit the discretion of line workers ("I can't do that because the computer won't let me"). While many of the employers reported computerization of jobs, 40 percent reported no resulting increase in the skills needed. Bluestone and Stevenson report that black and Hispanic males are disadvantaged by the fact that they are disproportionately hired in jobs that don't require the use of computers. Yet black females do get hired in jobs that require the use of computers and have lower wages than black males, so it isn't clear how they reach this conclusion.

The Boston Renaissance is least successful in dealing with the implications of the spatial revolution. In the labor market simulations that are the core of the book, space is represented by a single dichotomous variable that indicates whether more than half the residents of a neighborhood are members of minority groups. As in the Gautreaux and MTO experiments, it is difficult to know how to interpret this variable. Since virtually all majority–minority neighborhoods are located in the central city, this variable could pick up spatial limitations on economic opportunity. But it could just as well represent the inadequacy of public services, particularly education, in

these neighborhoods, or "concentration effects" of the type hypothesized by William Julius Wilson. However, as they point out, Boston may have less of a problem with spatial mismatch than the other cities. As the region has grown, the Boston metropolitan area has enveloped older industrial towns and filled in the spaces between them. Communities throughout the Boston area are much more heterogeneous than those in Detroit or Atlanta, suggesting that in future research a comparative approach would be useful to assess the role of spatial mismatch.

Los Angeles is quite different from the other three cities. There is no central city per se, but rather a pastiche of employment centers and residential neighborhoods covering a vast area roughly 150 miles by 150 miles. LA has more demand for unskilled labor, less residential segregation, less concentration of poverty, and more cultural, racial, and ethnic diversity than the other MCSUI cities. In that sense the contrast between LA and the other cities should be instructive. Unfortunately, *Prismatic Metropolis: Inequality in Los Angeles* is so different from the other volumes in the series that this comparative element is not as valuable as it could be. For reasons not explained in the volume, none of the chapters use the linked survey of employers that was the source of some of the most interesting findings in the other volumes. Moreover, *Prismatic Metropolis* is the least integrated of the four, reading more like a collection of disparate essays, a feeling reinforced by the lack of a concluding chapter that tries to unify the analyses.

Michael Stoll's insightful chapter on spatial mismatch finds that low-skilled blacks in Los Angeles actually live closer to their place of employment and spend less time commuting to work than low-skilled whites. Generally, this would be seen as evidence against a spatial mismatch, but Stoll argues that space plays an important role in the job search process and job retention. Blacks have a hard time finding out about jobs in distant neighborhoods, and, in addition, high commuting costs dissuade them from taking suburban jobs. He shows that low-skill blacks spend more time searching for a job, are less likely to search in white suburban areas, and are less likely to be employed there. Stoll acknowledges that these results could stem from distance-related problems or higher levels of employment discrimination in the suburbs. This is an example of the kind of question that would have benefited from an analysis of the employer survey in combination with the household survey. Nevertheless, Stoll's chapter does an excellent job of examining how the particular spacial configuration of Los Angeles affects employment from the laborer's perspective. Julie Press's chapter on spatial mismatch is plagued by mis-specified models. She regresses earnings on, among other variables, use of public transportation; it seems likely that causality runs in the other direction.

Prismatic Metropolis does serve as an excellent survey of the dimensions of poverty and inequality in this fascinating and distinctive metropolis. Rapid immigration to the area has created a multi-racial and multi-ethnic environment, where competition for favored occupations among minority groups rivals in importance the competition between whites and minorities. In addition to inter-minority conflict, several chapters by Bobo et al. demonstrate that Asians, Hispanics, and African Americans continue to report encountering racial discrimination by whites in both housing and employment. If Los Angeles is a vision of what America is becoming, then greater racial and ethic diversity is no guarantee of a color-blind nation.

There is no reason that these four volumes should have a common approach and structure, but the differences among them are worth noting. *The Atlanta Paradox*, for the most part, and *Detroit Divided* are books that pull together and distill the results of previous research, much of which has been published previously in academic journal articles and research monographs. While rigorous thinking and analyses underlie

the authors' conclusions, they support their arguments in these books mainly with tables, charts, and maps. Hence, these volumes will be more accessible to a general audience of practitioners, policymakers, and students. *The Boston Renaissance* and *Prismatic Metropolis* will be better suited to readers comfortable with the academic writing style of economists and sociologists, respectively, and with more complex analyses, such as logistic regressions and simulation models.

Taken together, these volumes give a comprehensive picture of the opportunity structure of major metropolitan areas. While they provide compelling evidence about the role of race, class, and space in perpetuating urban poverty, they also leave unanswered the question posed at the beginning of this essay—What is the relative importance of these factors? It would be easier to disentangle the urban spatial dilemma if we could carry out an MTO-type experiment that enabled us to separate the various dimensions of spatial disadvantages. We would want to compare high- with low-poverty neighborhoods, mostly white with mostly minority neighborhoods, central city with suburban neighborhoods, and neighborhoods with good public schools with those with low-performing schools. We would also want to examine all the possible combinations of these categories to isolate the effect of each variable, but there are many empty cells in the matrix. For example, there just aren't many low-poverty, mostly white, suburban neighborhoods with rotten schools, or high-poverty, mostly white central city neighborhoods. As long as metropolitan areas continue to develop in ways that generate a spatially correlated pattern of race, income, and schooling, researchers will find it difficult to measure the independent effects of these variables and their interactions.

There is a sense in these volumes that the authors take for granted the current arrangement of rich suburbs at the edges of poorer central cities. The consequences of the pattern are explored in depth, but the institutional arrangements that feed and sustain this pattern are largely ignored. While the volumes are very explicit in addressing the historical role of overt discrimination in housing on the basis of race, they pay scant attention to the historical and current role of discrimination in housing based on income. Suburban jurisdictions continue to use zoning, land-use planning, and other means to create protected upper-middle and high-income enclaves over broad expanses of metropolitan America. This practice continues to shape the metropolitan geography of opportunity, to use James Rosenbaum's memorable phrase, and limits the scope of possible reforms. For example, all these volumes stress the need to improve the human capital of the poor. Segregating the poor from the rest of society, however, severely limits the potential of educational reforms to make a difference, regardless of whether they involve more money for public schools, vouchers, or anything in between.

Despite this caveat, these volumes demonstrate that the MCSUI project has advanced the state of the art of urban poverty research. These books contain a rich blending of quantitative and qualitative evidence. Hypotheses generated by looking at the perceptions and experiences of employees are tested against the perceptions and experiences of their employers, and vice versa. The simplistic dichotomy between central city and suburbs is broken down, and there is the beginning of a more finely drawn portrait of the geography of opportunity, especially in the Atlanta and Los Angeles volumes.

Another book in the series, Harry Holzer's excellent *What Employers Want,* was published previously and several more volumes will be published in the near future. The data collected in the matched employee and employer surveys is now available to other researchers. We can also look forward to learning from the 2000 census how employment, wages, and residential patterns have changed after years of a very strong

economy, possibly putting hypotheses advanced here to the test. The unavoidable conclusion is that the MCSUI project has contributed greatly to our understanding of how the spatial and institutional landscapes of metropolitan areas generate urban poverty and sustain racial inequality.

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Stefanie Chambers and Katherine Tate

A science fiction standard has space voyagers landing on Earth, which is destroyed after some apocalyptic disaster. Within this great destruction, however, remain the vestiges of the world's urban landscape. The science fiction space voyagers view these ruins with great admiration and wonder, as, even devastated, the urban landscape recalls a great and ornate civilization. Naturally, the space voyagers would wonder about the people who lived in these great cities. Imagine if left for them among the ashes were four books detailing urban life in Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, and Los Angeles at the end of the twentieth century. These were academic studies that included the work of the very best established and emerging young scholars. The Ford and Russell Sage Foundations of New York funded this Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality so that we might better understand the economic and social divisions that have become emblematic of American postindustrial cities. How accurate would these accounts be, and how, possibly, prophetic? Will our space travelers still find reified traces of a highly segregated and unequal society amidst the ruin of these urban civilizations?

The imagery of an apocalyptic devastation is still a fitting one to apply to American cities. Not so long ago, urbanists worried about the obsolescence of cities as their industrial sector relocated and simultaneously contracted. To urban analysts, it was a massive and possibly irreversible crisis. Cities that were once centers of production and magnets of growth saw by century's end great population decline and physical decay, concentrated poverty, and entrenched racial segregation. Detroit, Michigan, was among the hardest hit by postindustrialism, suburbanization, and social change. In the 1980s, one in six of its residents moved out, according to Farley, Danzinger, and Holtzer in *Detroit Divided*. Detroit today still has the nation's highest poverty rate with one third of its population living below the poverty line. As if destroyed by falling debris from a collapsing meteor, vast tracts of land became decrepit ghettos, whose inhabitants were mostly black, immigrant, poor, and socially disconnected from the rest of the metropolitan region. The authors of *Detroit Divided* note that one housing unit in 11 was vacant in 1990, noting that so "[much] of the housing stock in the city of Detroit is old and unattractive ... [it] has come to the end of its useful life" (p. 248).

As terrible as conditions remain in the central cities, economic conditions had improved in the 1990s. Cities overcame the crisis to emerge as centers of high technology. Timing was key, and thus these books are not as dramatically grim as previous social science accounts of the central cities. Not that they would know it, but our space travelers would be spared a detailed listing and analysis of the social pathologies of urban residents, specifically their disproportionately high rates of poverty, unemployment, and crime, welfare dependency, teenage pregnancy, and gang violence.

For all four books, the key question is: What accounted for this spatial inequality and how might the isolated urban poor be re-connected to the thriving fate of the metropolitan whole? These books, written principally by sociologists and economists, appear almost coolly clinical in the wealth of data the authors collected and dissected. As extremely unequal as living conditions are for those in metropolitan regions, these are very good times for the nation. America is in the midst of the longest peacetime economic expansion in its history. Miraculously, the poverty rate dropped in the late 1990s. Welfare reform thus far is seen as a huge success given the dramatic declines in state welfare rolls. But even before these events took place, all cities in this multi-city study were experiencing an economic resurrection in the early and mid-1990s when the data collection began. In Boston, for example, unemployment was found not to be the central problem confronting the urban poor. The authors of *The Boston Renaissance* found high rates of labor force participation for minority low-skilled workers, meeting, and even exceeding, those of their white counterparts. These findings are reproduced in the other metropolitan regions, including Los Angeles and Detroit. For example, in chapter 7, "Earnings Inequality," in *The Atlanta Paradox,* Keith R. Ihlanfeldt and David Sjoquist report a massive employment growth between 1980 and 1990. Such findings, nevertheless, would still be assigned different meanings. While Barry Bluestone and Mary Huff Stevenson would label Boston's economic rebound a "renaissance" from the economic contraction of the 1970s and its recession in the late 1980s, Sjoquist calls Atlanta's tremendous economic growth a "paradox," since its poor black community was virtually untouched by this growth. Still, the longstanding fear that cities have become obsolescent was not referenced in any way by any of the contributors. Indeed, all four books equally assume that urban centers still occupy a prominent place in American society.

Overall, these are important works. The books bring not just updated analyses of the urban problem. In nearly all aspects, new techniques and questions are employed that go far beyond the old, familiar data used to understand urban problems. Indeed, the research reported is state-of-the-art; it creates a new standard that invites replication in different venues. For example, conscious of the data limitations of the Census Bureau's U.S. decennial census or its Current Population Surveys, new survey instruments were developed that included questions covering the respondent's criminal history and social contacts. Equally noteworthy, as cities draw new Latino and Asian immigrants, the studies go beyond the standard black–white analysis of the problem to investigate how the multi-ethnic and multi-racial character of cities is changing employment and residential patterns and race relations. Detroit is the sole exception to these newer patterns of migration. Not quite part of the globalization, the city remains the paradigmatic "chocolate city, vanilla suburbs" (Farley et al., 1978). Another clear departure is equal treatment that women received in the four volumes, breaking a longstanding research tradition in labor market economics that has focused exclusively on the labor force participation of inner-city males. Here, even "overlapping" categories, such as Hispanic and black women, receive separate attention. The central question that ties all four volumes together is: What accounts for the racial and ethnic inequalities reproduced and so entrenched in metropolitan regions? There are three principal foci: urban labor markets, residential segregation, and race relations.

THE URBAN LABOR MARKET

Many analysts link the high unemployment rate for the urban poor to central cities' transformation from centers of production and distribution to centers of information

exchange and service. Low-skilled jobs were being replaced by high-skilled ones, with the obviously negative consequences for urban minorities seeking jobs. The "spatial mismatch hypothesis," as it is called, based on John Kain's (1968) pioneering article, is empirically well documented. To gain employment, urban minorities would benefit from better schooling, special training in technology, and even relocation. It assumes, however, that properly trained and relocated, employers would be willing to hire minority low-skilled workers on a nondiscriminatory basis. Because federal and state laws prohibit racial discrimination and because white racial attitudes toward blacks have greatly liberalized since the 1960s, the degree to which employers would still discriminate was a contested, controversial, but empirically open question.

The Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality conducted surveys of employers in all four cities. These were interviews with typically two of the firm's management team, i.e., an executive, human resource official, or manager. The surveys strongly established that employers harbor negative attitudes toward people of color as potential workers. The degree of distaste that employers revealed toward minority workers was apparently less extreme in Boston than in the other cities whose percentages of minorities was higher. Employers in Boston also expressed strongly negative attitudes about communities of color, implicating racial hostility in firms' locational decisions as well as hiring practices.

Bluestone and Stevenson's study of Boston's labor market provides the most statistical detail of the four volumes in determining what explains the earnings differential between comparably educated white and minority low-skilled workers. Their book, in fact, is noteworthy in many respects for its intriguing innovation in econometric analysis and should be consulted first by readers who engage in or closely track such research. In addition to the low unemployment rates for minority workers, a strong and uplifting finding that Bluestone and Stevenson report is the slight difference in the hourly wages of minority workers that could be explained outside of "human capital factors," such as education and age. Here one wonders whether, like unemployment rates, timing was key, and that increases in the minimum wage help account for this positive finding. After all, the minimum wage was $3.35 in 1981 where it stayed until 1991 when Congress finally raised it to $4.25. With a rising minimum wage along with a tight labor market, paying white low-skilled workers more than minorities became difficult.

Like the Atlanta investigators, Bluestone and Stevenson find that in spite of Boston's transformed and improved economy, minorities are still far from achieving parity where it really counts: in annual earnings. And contrary to what they report for hourly wages, based on the results of other simulation regression models, they report that equalizing rates of high school graduation and age do not result in more equal earnings among the groups. Only adding the full suite of their "human capital" measures, including occupational experience, nativity status, veteran and health status, is the earnings gap between white and Hispanic males eliminated, while the gap improves modestly, from 0.55 to 0.68 for black males. Occupational experience and union membership, however, are so clearly endogenous, relating as they do to one's race (and gender), that the improvements still do not truly rule out racial discrimination. As much as they attempted to control for every conceivable factor related to earnings to rule out race discrimination in their statistical models, Bluestone and Stevenson still underestimated it.

Race, to use a now overworked phrase, still matters. Indeed, in one important simulation model Bluestone and Stevenson assigned minority male workers the same job characteristics found typically for white workers—the same average number of jobs, the same years of occupational experience, the same proportions in sales and

service occupations, the same percentage using computers regularly on the job. They find that if minorities had "white male job characteristics," the annual earning ratios would improve more than improvements in human capital. Furthermore, they report that if these same black and Hispanic male workers resided in majority-white neighborhoods, their annual earnings gap would move from 0.55 to 0.72.

Curiously, the same effect for "white job characteristics" and geography was not apparent in the annual earnings of minority women. Their effect was comparable to that for human capital measures. Family structure was the greatest single influence on female earnings. Single mothers earned the least, while married women with no children earned the most. Beyond making these neat and important comparisons between the economic gains in improving human capital and residency, the authors offer few additional interpretations of the simulation model results. Obviously, black workers, even if they came with the same job characteristics as white workers, won't be treated and compensated the same as their white counterparts. And in Atlanta, 75 percent of all families are headed by women. In the contribution by Irene Browne and Leann M. Tigges in *The Atlanta Paradox,* the authors' most comprehensive discussion effectively addresses the intersection of race, class, gender, and family structure. As fine and impressive as the statistical analysis provided in *The Boston Renaissance,* the authors shortchange readers in terms of interpretation. Readers are ultimately left to ponder what to make of the large statistical impact single-parent status has on the earnings of women in Boston. Other contributors, however, probe more carefully into such issues, such as child care costs and how social networks constrain the employment opportunities of women (see the Johnson et al. chapter in *Prismatic Metropolis*). This said, *The Boston Renaissance* presents innovative, well-documented, and provocative research.

All the volumes go beyond the black–white dichotomy to examine the employment and earnings of urban Latino workers. In general, the findings as they relate to Latinos are more positive. While, like blacks, Latinos remain vastly unequal in earning power compared to whites, there is hope for improvement. In Bluestone and Stevenson's simulation model, closing the human capital gap eliminates the annual earnings deficit entirely for Latino male workers (in contrast to blacks). In chapter 6 of *Prismatic Metropolis,* Abel Valenzuela Jr. and Elizabeth Gonzalez go beyond the race-ethnic comparisons to determine what effect immigration status has on Latino earnings. Latino earnings improve with length of residency in the United States. The real question, however, is whether Latino immigrants can escape the urban ghettoization that American blacks could not. In both Bluestone and Stevenson's as well as Valenzuela and Gonzalez's research, living in segregated and poor census tracts significantly diminished earnings and employment opportunities. In a related vein, Tarry Hum found in his contribution to *Prismatic Metropolis* that segregated labor markets or "ethnic niches" provided vastly unequal and inferior means of economic advancement for Asian immigrants in Los Angeles than did the mainstream labor market. Jobs in immigrant-owned businesses were typically menial, providing few worker benefits and opportunities for occupational mobility.

The spatial mismatch hypothesis assumes that employers are willing to hire minority workers today, an assumption the results from the employer survey challenges. It also assumes that unemployed minorities are sincerely seeking jobs. Low-skilled minorities who are employed should be found commuting longer distances than do comparably skilled white workers. Several contributions in Atlanta and Los Angeles volumes examine the commuting patterns of inner-city workers. Michael Stoll and Julie Press in separate chapters in *Prismatic Metropolis* report contradictory findings pertaining to the racial gap in commuting time for minority men. However, upon closer examination, it appears that if one disaggregates the sample by geography, the

minority men in heavily minority areas have shorter commutes than white men, which Stoll then discusses and attempts to reconcile with the spatial mismatch theory. In the aggregate, minorities commute longer distances than whites.

RACIAL RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION

Massey and Denton's (1993) *American Apartheid* first brilliantly points to residential segregation as the direct cause of urban poverty. And while earnings, and not poverty, constitute the primary focus of these studies, these analysts establish that segregation imposes a large economic toll on central city residents. Thus, all of the volumes address residential segregation, but Camille Zubrinsky Charles' contribution in the Los Angeles book is especially noteworthy. She begins by reviewing the potential causes of residential segregation. On the one side are those suggesting that racial and ethnic segregation could simply reflect racial and ethnic inequalities in income. They could also be the end result of personal preference or different, ethnocentrically rooted taste in housing, mixed with inaccurate information about the actual costs of housing in predominantly white communities. On the other side are those contending that racial and ethnic segregation reflects the public's underlying unwillingness to live in integrated environments with members of stigmatized groups. Because the norms against expressing racial and ethnic intolerance have strengthened, the public's real attitudes were measured directly as well as unobtrusively. In direct measures, for example, those reported in *Detroit Divided,* eight of 10 whites reject statements that "white people have a right to keep blacks out of their neighborhoods if they want to and blacks should respect that right" (p. 215). Similarly, in *Atlanta Paradox,* Clayton, Geller, Patram, Patton, and Sjoquist find that most black respondents and many white respondents (particularly those with higher education) want to live in racially integrated neighborhoods. At the same time, census tract data from the areas where the respondents live show residential segregation, indicating a mismatch between respondents' comments and their actual residential decisions.

Indirect methods of determining the public's private views about integration reveal a contrasting side. Modifying the "show card" methodology developed by Reynolds Farley and his colleagues, Charles shows respondents a series of cards with 15 houses colored differently to represent the different groups—blacks, whites, Asians, and Latinos. One house in the center of the show card was marked with a "x" to represent the respondent's house. Respondents were asked their "comfort level" with residing in or willingness to move into a neighborhood with varying numbers of homes depicted to represent "whites," "blacks," "Latinos," and "Asians." Only 50 percent of the white respondents said they would move into a neighborhood of 15 homes where five (or one third) belonged to blacks. (Using the original Farley show card method depicting 14 houses, Farley, Danziger, and Holzer report a similar finding for Detroit, suggesting that whites in L.A. are not that different from whites in the Detroit area when it comes to living among blacks.) A majority of whites expressed their willingness to move into neighborhoods inhabited by more than one-third Latinos and Asians. Across all racial groups, blacks were the least-desired neighbors, Charles reports. Thus while Los Angeles has become truly a multi-racial, cosmopolitan city through continued immigration, blacks remain ranked at the bottom by immigrants as well as by dominant whites.

Blacks remain in many parts of the country "hyper-segregated," but cities are slightly less segregated since the 1970s. While some people still hope (even some of the contributors to these volumes) for the transformation of cities from majority-white European to a heterogeneous "people of color" population, and that this may spur

the racial integration of American blacks, Charles' piece leaves little room for that hope. Instead, racial integration may more reliably, yet more slowly, be achieved through new home construction, economic revitalization of the urban core, and urban education reform. The first seems a constant feature in southern California, while it is solely lacking in Detroit. New housing communities may be more penetrable to blacks because their costs are generally lower than existing homes in predominantly white communities with prized school systems. Racial steering may be less severe by real estate agents who lack a personal, economic stake in maintaining the new community's "racial exclusivity."

RACE RELATIONS

The urban riots of the late 1960s caught the academic community by surprise, although it could be said that any riot is likely to be an unanticipated event. The anger, frustration, and resentment of the minority community that exploded in the Watts riot and later in the 1992 riot that followed the acquittal of L.A. police officers in the Rodney King case cost Los Angeles dearly in dollars and in reputation. Blacks' perception of race relations—as well as those of whites, Latinos, and Asians—were surveyed by the principal investigators of the Multi-City Study. No one saw within these surveys of interracial and ethnic attitudes any basis for systematic outbreaks of racial conflict in the immediate future.

Nearly half of blacks and Latinos in the multi-city surveys claimed to have been discriminated against in the workplace. In the Detroit survey, Farley, Danziger, and Holzer report that more than half of the whites (57 percent) surveyed thought that blacks fared worse than whites economically because of racial discrimination. This is a significant turnabout from the 1940s when whites thought blacks had less as a group because of biology and "inborn" differences in their ability to learn. Today, the overwhelming majority of whites reject the argument that biology is the cause. And yet, a much higher percentage of blacks, 84 percent, identified discrimination as the reason their group lagged behind whites economically. In addition, while white racial attitudes have greatly liberalized on the last six decades, a majority continues to negatively stereotype blacks and minorities. In the Los Angeles survey, respondents were asked to rate their group and others on the basis of intelligence, welfare dependency, drug use, gang involvement, ability to get along with, and tendency to discrimination. These results reveal that all groups negatively stereotyped, but minorities tended to rate their group equally with whites, but always superior to the other minority out-groups. For instance, write Lawrence Bobo and Devon Johnson in chapter 3 of *Prismatic Metropolis*, "Asians see little difference between themselves and whites, but clearly rate themselves as superior to blacks and (especially) Latinos." Whites rated their group superior to all others, with Asians coming closest in having a favorable, overall rating.

The Los Angeles volume provides the most comprehensive, theoretically grounded treatment of race relations. Its theoretical premise for many of the contributors (but not all) is that race relations is hierarchically structured, with whites on top, blacks on the bottom, and Asians and Latinos somewhere in between. Write the editors in chapter 1 of *Prismatic Metropolis,* "urban inequality is still heavily racialized.... By racialization we mean the social inequality and the dynamics that produce (and reproduce) it are clearly related to racial and ethnic group distinctions" (p. 5). The authors go on to recognize the complexity of the problem. Race relations are not the sole cause of racial inequality in metropolitan areas. And yet, this "racial hierarchy" lessens the employment, education, and housing opportunities of negatively

stereotyped blacks and Latinos. Catching up with whites in high school graduation rates, blacks are still believed to lack the "soft skills" that employers in high-technology industries claim to be as critical as the "hard skills" of diplomas and job experience. Under constant suspicion of involvement in criminal activities, blacks find it harder to rent homes in white neighborhoods with good schools. Negative stereotypes, report Bobo and Johnson, increase opposition to affirmative action. If for some like Massey and Denton, racial segregation contributes to racial inequality, for the Los Angeles analysts, race relations is at the epicenter of inequality, itself the ultimate source of the metropolitan region's extreme racial segregation. The important finding reported in this volume is that in spite of the city's prismatic diversity, the structure of race relations has not been radically transformed by the new immigration. Blacks still remain at the bottom of the racial order, and whites remain at its top.

PUBLIC POLICY SCENARIOS

All said, the volumes collectively represent the best example of social science scholarship in developing new methods and comprehensive analysis. The books may overstate their case for positive change, however. The booming economy lifting all boats except those of the predominantly, black, Latino, and Asian residents living in segregated and poor neighborhoods leaves little hope for the future, that the inequalities so apparent today will be vanquished by the time the space travelers appear in our science fiction story. Still, the authors hold out some hope by making a number of the standard liberal policy recommendations to combat the persistent inequality in urban centers at the end of their books. The single glaring exception is the Los Angeles volume, which lacks a concluding chapter on public policies. For Atlanta in chapter 12, David Sjoquist proposes a wide range of reforms aimed at reducing residential segregation, ameliorating racial and gender discrimination in employment, and increasing human capital opportunities for the poor and minorities. The proposed solutions represent an ambitious attempt to conquer the roots of the Atlanta paradox. Some recommendations are overly optimistic, which the author acknowledges.

Missing from the four volumes is a thorough analysis, or even one contribution, of how politics intersects and complicates the urban economies and urban life. Explicit attention to the growing importance of local and state governments in urban public policy was critically absent in the volumes. Even before welfare reform, state and local governments created conditions that permitted the use of exclusionary zoning, which acerbated segregation and inequality. Moreover, local and state governments are the principal agents of public education. As much as race matters, politics matters. For the last half-century middle-class blacks and Atlanta's white business elite forged an important alliance (Stone, 1989). This alliance, albeit one in which blacks had electoral strength but limited economic leverage, has influenced decisionmaking in Atlanta (the Atlanta Compromise, MARTA decisions, land use). The unfortunate outcome of this alliance contributes to the Atlanta paradox because the selective benefits provided to middle-class blacks have largely isolated lower-class blacks in the process. In Los Angeles, a similar story could perhaps be told. We need to understand the conditions under which economically and racially disparate communities in the metropolitan region come together politically because effective public policy critically depends on such events. Bluestone and Stevenson touch lightly on one urban renewal program, which they believe is working, as well as note that regional partnerships are important for future urban economic development. The degree to which government in Boston is truly responsive to minority residents' needs and concerns, however, should be part of the story of Boston's glorious renaissance.

For our alien readers, having no emotional attachments to cities whatsoever, American cities of the late twentieth century represent unhealthy, even malignant, environments for blacks and Latinos. Since living in a segregated, poor neighborhood adversely affects not only employment opportunities, but schooling and housing opportunities as well, why, puzzle our space travelers, would a black or Latino choose to live there? Social conditions in New York (not one of the cities under study here) have improved dramatically since the crack epidemic, and yet the ultimate message presented in the brilliant Spike Lee movie "Clockers" (written by Richard Price; the title refers to drug dealers who are open for business 24 hours a day) still appears very valid. To have a future, young minorities must leave the urban environment. The central figure of the movie, a young drug dealer, gets out at the end of the movie, taking the train metaphorically west, even as it is revealed that his older brother who had managed to stay clear of crime heads to prison. Cities today and historically have served their residents best as transitional environments, places one initially landed and eventually left. The forces that prevent minorities from moving on are those that should be fought and changed.

Given the much improved urban economy and low unemployment rate, Farley, Danziger, and Holzer reject historian Thomas Sugrue's (1996) description of Detroit as no longer a magnet of opportunity but a "reservation for the poor" as an overstatement. But what will happen to the poor black residents of Detroit in a sharp economic downturn? What will happen to poor families now that the federal government no longer guarantees welfare support? In spite of the liberal, optimistic, prophetic tone of the volumes, it is highly doubtful that even by the time of intergalactic travel, the spatial and economic inequality in urban centers between the races will be history. America's biggest cities have managed the fearful leap into the postindustrial age, and have secured for themselves a vital future in the twenty-first century's global economy. Yet, in spite of this marvelous accomplishment, American cities remain the central source and breeding ground of racial inequality.

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