

The "Over-Educated" Kibbutz: Shifting Relations Between Social Reproduction and Individual Development on the Kibbutz

Zelda F. Gamson/Center for the Study of Higher Education, University of Michigan, and Michal Palgi/Kibbutz Nir David and Kibbutz Research Institute, Haifa University

Most societies reproduce themselves biologically and socially through their young, but this does not happen automatically. Instruction, both formal and informal, helps each generation learn the attitudes, skills, and social relationships that more or less correspond to their adult roles (Inkeles, 1966). In societies where the economy is separated from kinship and community, formal schooling becomes critical in preparing young people for future economic activities. This point applies particularly in advanced industrial societies which rely on schooling to teach attitudes and competencies that families cannot be depended upon to inculcate.

"Correspondence" theory sees educational institutions as having little autonomy. The manifest content and latent structure of schools in industrial societies increasingly correspond to the needs of the economy (Bowles and Gintis, 1979). But this correspondence can be exaggerated, especially when either is undergoing rapid change. Adaptations of schooling to society may no longer promote reproduction of the existing order (Levin, 1980). The schools may produce new generations who are ill-prepared to function in a society that has undergone rapid change.

Higher Education and Social Reproduction

Parts of the education system such as colleges and universities often have unpredictable, even volatile, relations with the surrounding society. In addition supplying manpower for professions and other elite positions (Ben-David, 1972; Rudolph, 1962; Larson, 1977), higher education has another side. The trained minds and the up-to-date research, for which modern societies depend on universities, often generate fundamental social criticism. Thus the process of social reproduction engenders contradictions between the need for educated manpower and individual fulfillment, between the need for new knowledge and challenges to the existing order.

A university degree as a credential for access to the professions (and increasingly to the semi-professions) has been extended broadly in the United States and in many other industrialized countries (Collins, 1979). This fact, combined with greater public investment in higher education and a large post-World War II baby boom, led to expansion of higher education in many nations. In the early period of expansion, college graduates were able to find challenging, well-paid jobs commensurate with their training; in the late 1970s, this was no longer true (Carnegie Commission, 1973; Freeman, 1976). A serious mismatch between the economy and higher education began to appear (Levin, 1980). With

economic decline, many college graduates entering the labor market could not find work which matched their expectations. This problem was exacerbated by the promise engendered by higher education for economic mobility and self-fulfillment in work (O'Toole, 1975; Yankelovich, 1974). Recently, young people have tended to place more stress on the intrinsic aspects of work: "work which will be useful to society and of benefit to others, will allow them to express individuality, and will enhance individual growth" (U.S. Department of Labor, 1974, p. 4).

This issue has also come up in the kibbutz as more young people have begun to attend postsecondary institutions. In this paper, we trace the shifting relations between the kibbutz and higher education as the kibbutz economy has become industrialized. We look at the way in which individual self-development as an ideology has expressed and shaped this relationship. The paper analyzes generational conflict in the kibbutz over the issue of higher education, and attempts to explain the conflict in terms of a balance between social reproduction and individual development.

The Kibbutz as a Context

The question of reproduction is a serious one for collective societies. Collective societies place heavy demands on members to pursue their lives in a particular way. The number of connections between individuals and the community is much greater than in other settings. Individuals must embrace kibbutz life willingly by committing themselves to it emotionally; behavioral conformity is not enough. Collective societies also are very vulnerable should commitment weaken (Kanter, 1972). Emigration is relatively easy, and therefore the community must offer benefits that offset the lure of the outside world. Because they demand more from their members but must compete with other alternatives for their allegiance, collective communities are very conscious about social reproduction. They try to control the influence of competing ideologies and ways of life. Through their schools and training programs, they put much effort into socializing the young. And these pressures operate in the kibbutz as it confronts the issues of higher education.

At the same time, economic developments on the kibbutz have paralleled those in other Western societies. Industrialization and an expanding economy brought increased affluence to the kibbutz in the 1960s and 1970s, with improved personal and collective consumption as one result: as more money for consumption became available, more personal choice could be exercised by members. By the 1970s, kibbutzim were able to offer their members almost anything a middle-class Israeli could have — and during periods of general economic instability, they could do better. With the success of their industries, many kibbutz members received goods and services that would have been inconceivable a few years earlier — private TVs and air-conditioners, vacations abroad, yoga, and psychotherapy. At the same time, the influence of the family began to grow stronger as the kibbutzim produced an adult second generation and the beginnings of a third generation.

While making these changes, the kibbutzim retained many of their basic features: equality of rewards, collective ownership of property, governance by membership, rotation of jobs and civic positions, collective child-rearing, and pooling of basic services and consumption. The kibbutz still required high levels of commitment. Some of the sacrifices of living on the kibbutz — whether it was letting the collectivity share in determining how children were to be raised or doing unpleasant jobs — had to be compensated with something else besides material comforts.

The mixture of socialism and Zionism that shaped the founding of the kibbutz provided meaning for the pioneers. It still does for recruits from outside the kibbutz. But for young people born and bred on the kibbutz, the old ideologies have lost much of their appeal. As the differences between the generations began to be discussed in kibbutz forums, attention was directed to other ways of creating meaning for the second generation. The decline of socialism and Zionism as explicit ideologies, both within the kibbutz and in the surrounding society, together with the differentiation of the kibbutz into age groups, work groups, families, and social cliques, provided a background for the second generation's search for meaning (Cohen and Rosner, 1970). How could the kibbutz provide opportunities for self-development in a way that would also reproduce the conditions for its continuation? The kibbutz encouraged young people to assess the meaning of kibbutz life by insisting that they go through a substantial period of reflection before becoming members and by encouraging them to aid struggling kibbutzim or to found new ones. But this was not enough for many members of the second generation.

Self-Development Through Work and Education

Before looking at the ways in which the kibbutzim responded to the second generation, we must try to understand the nature of the young people's desire for self-development. "Self-development" can mean many things. Certainly, the sphere in which "self" is to be "developed" varies among individuals, among old and young, and between the sexes. For some, family relations and leisure activities become the source of personal meaning. For others, it is involvement in cultural pursuits or social relationships. The kibbutzim have been able to provide opportunities for these kinds of self-development fairly easily. But providing other kinds has been more problematic — for example, educational and occupational opportunities. And these are the very spheres that have taken on a fateful significance for the second generation, as they have for youth in other countries (O'Toole, 1975).

For many kibbutz young people, work has become inextricably tied to self-development. A 1969 survey showed that more than half of the second generation would choose different work if they were free to do so.³ Of qualities that could be exercised in work, intelligence and organizational skills were ranked highest — more highly than working in a cohesive group or having responsibility (Rosner et al., 1978). Many young kibbutz members connect self-development with education and with the opportunities that education provides for more interesting, challenging work.¹ Ninety percent of the second generation said they wanted to pursue some form of study and, of these, almost two-thirds wanted to study for at least one year and one-third wished to begin as soon as possible.² Such hopes should not be surprising, given the stress on education in Jewish culture in general and in the kibbutz in particular where the older generation has always valued knowledge and intelligence. The extension of secondary education to all kibbutz youth, when secondary education was not universal in Israel, produced a second generation with high aspirations and a sense of entitlement.

To understand the significance of pressures for self-development through education, we should look particularly at those for whom access to education was very important, since they were the ones most likely to press for a response from the kibbutz. The 1969 survey provides an opportunity to compare second generation members with the strongest and most immediate educational aspirations with those less ambitious members.⁴ Responses of members of the first

generation are also available, thus permitting an assessment of discontinuities between the two second generation groups and the first generation. Table 1 presents the averaged responses of these groups to thirteen questions about social status, ideology, perceived advantages and opportunities of kibbutz life, and attitudes toward education and work.³ Three demographic characteristics — age, gender, and marital status — are also included.

Table 1
High Aspiration Group, Other Second Generation Members, and First Generation in 1969

	<i>Second Generation</i>		<i>First Generation</i>
	<i>High Aspirations</i>	<i>Others</i>	
<i>Social Status</i>			
Parents' status within kibbutz	2.33	2.27	—
Parents' status outside kibbutz	1.41	1.32	—
Own social status	3.01	2.99	3.05
<i>Ideology</i>			
Emphasis on collective needs	2.81	2.76	2.93
Emphasis on collective child-rearing	1.85	1.95	2.41
<i>Advantages and Opportunities</i>			
Advantages of kibbutz social life	3.50	3.65	3.99
Professional opportunities on the kibbutz	1.67	1.77	1.88
Educational opportunities on the kibbutz	1.87	2.04	2.13
<i>Work and Education</i>			
Importance of current job	5.14	5.33	5.66
Importance of education	4.57	4.05	4.15
Importance of occupational challenge	3.04	2.74	2.70
Satisfaction from work compared to other spheres of life	2.84	2.51	2.13
<i>Demographic Questions</i>			
Average age	25.98	26.75	44.80
Percent female	51%	50%	50%
Percent married	44%	54%	80%
N	235	665	395

Note: All variables scored from low to high

Both second generation groups were less likely than the first generation to embrace collective values and practices: they were somewhat more willing to say that the kibbutz should take individual rather than collective needs into account in making decisions and they were much more favorable toward having children sleep in their parents' quarters than in the children's houses. Compared to the first generation, the second generation saw fewer advantages and opportunities in kibbutz life. They ranked their current jobs as less important, but they had stronger desires for occupational challenge and they derived more satisfaction from work compared to other spheres of life.

The two second generation groups differed less from each other than from the first generation. Both second generation groups answered the ideological questions similarly. But they were divided in their perceptions of kibbutz social relations and educational opportunities: the high aspiration group perceived fewer social advantages and educational opportunities than did the rest of the second generation. The group with high educational aspirations also attributed less importance to their current jobs, and they weighed work more heavily in general. Compared to other members of the second generation, they wanted more occupational challenge, and they derived more satisfaction from work compared to other activities.

Lower collective commitment among the second generation, combined with greater dissatisfaction with opportunities on the kibbutz and stronger investment in work among those with higher educational aspirations, created a potential threat to the social reproduction of the kibbutz.

The Response of the Kibbutz

Until the late 1960s, the kibbutz restricted access to institutions of higher education. Decisions about who could study beyond secondary school, often hammered out at tempestuous meetings of the whole membership, were *ad hoc* and personal. Applicants tried to justify their desire for more education in pragmatic terms acceptable to other members: they wanted to study engineering so they could help perfect the new plastics factory; the kibbutz was big enough now to need its own nurse; managing different work branches required some grounding in economics and sociology. In time, however, kibbutz members began to question these restrictive practices when interest in post-secondary education was increasing among young Israelis generally, and these outsiders undoubtedly influenced kibbutz young people during army service, an age when decisions about the future are made.⁴

In 1967-68, there were 440 kibbutz members in Israeli universities and 710 in community colleges, teachers colleges, and short-run programs run by the kibbutzim. By the early 1970s, attitudes among kibbutz members had changed dramatically (see Blasi, 1978). Most kibbutzim were guaranteeing three years of support — the time it takes to complete a B.A. in Israel — for every kibbutz member. As a result in 1971-72 enrollment of kibbutzniks was 1,115 in the universities and 1,500 in other postsecondary institutions, more than double the 1967-68 figures.

The new policy had both ideological and economic implications. At the time it was formulated, many kibbutzim were experiencing labor shortages which led some to hire labor — anathema to the kibbutz ideal of “self-labor.”

If members were to be permitted to study, sacrifices would have to be made by the kibbutz as a whole: tuition and other expenses would have to be covered and the labor power and earnings from some of its most able-bodied members foregone. In the longer run, however, some kibbutz planners recognized that providing more opportunities for higher education could bring collective benefits as well as individual ones. They argued that the increased economic and social complexity of the kibbutz that came with industrialization required a more educated work force able to deal with advanced technology, to take on more specialized occupational roles, and to participate in a more sophisticated cultural and social life. The economic opportunities to justify the expanded investment in higher education were only partly present, but it was assumed that the kibbutzim would find ways of accommodating the returning graduates.

Committees worked out rules-of-thumb for deciding who would be allowed to study, what could be studied, when, and where. Only 5-8 per cent of all members could study at any one time. Most would be studying “functional” subjects — farming, technical and managerial courses, education in kibbutz-operated technical and teachers’ seminaries. These seminaries are located close to concentrations of kibbutzim, and the programs take less time to complete than non-kibbutz programs. The seminaries are staffed by kibbutz members who understand the problems of the kibbutz and share its values. Through these programs the kibbutzim were able to insure a close match between their manpower needs and values and members’ desires for further education.

Initially, only one or two people on each kibbutz were allowed to study "non-functional" subjects. But more young people wanted to study these subjects, and many wished to attend non-kibbutz institutions. There was serious discussion with prominent Israeli, European, and American academics about starting a kibbutz university that would offer a curriculum consistent with the ideals of the kibbutz (Pax, 1971). But this proposal never gained approval from all of the kibbutz federations. It was not clear in any case that kibbutz youth wanted such a university. Many claimed that a kibbutz university could not possibly be the "real thing"; they wanted the challenge of something entirely different, a regular university. Persisting in their efforts to keep the second generation close, the kibbutzim put their weight behind the formation of community colleges in Israel and, later, an open university patterned on the United Kingdom's (Gamson and Horowitz, forthcoming; Schramm *et al.*, 1972). But fewer young kibbutz members attended the community colleges than anticipated, and it is still too early to gauge reaction to the Open University, started in 1977.

As the kibbutz university idea faltered, kibbutz leaders negotiated arrangements with Israeli universities. An agricultural and economics institute attached to Hebrew University offered a bachelor's degree tailored especially to kibbutz needs. Community colleges, under kibbutz leadership, initiated joint B.A. degrees with several universities. Even kibbutz-operated institutions, which had long prided themselves on resisting pressures to "academicize," began to offer degrees: a school for kibbutz managers designed a bachelor's degree and a kibbutz teachers' college arranged a joint degree with Haifa University.

Eventually, the distinction between functional and non-functional study was dropped, and kibbutz members were permitted to study almost any subject they wished, with the understanding that they wait until the kibbutz could spare them. In a 1973 survey of second generation kibbutz members with high educational aspirations, only one-third said that the functionalism of proposed fields of study was a crucial consideration for their kibbutz in decisions about whom to support for further education. Almost half thought that concern with the fit between the subject studied and the needs of the kibbutz had declined. Only 5 per cent in this sample said that their kibbutz had turned down their request to be allowed to study. Practically everyone who did study was supported financially by the kibbutz, including 30 per cent who lived away from the kibbutz. In responding to pressure for higher education, the kibbutz was providing for the self-development of its younger generation at the risk of losing control over its social reproduction.

In 1973, a survey repeating questions in the 1969 survey was used to gauge the impact of higher education. The longitudinal design employed in this survey shows changes over time, but it does not permit us to attribute them to experiences related to studying, since changes could be due to maturational or historical forces operating on non-students during the same period. Comparing students with non-students helps to control for this problem; thus, all of the questions repeated in 1973 from 1969 were addressed to non-students as well as to students. But still other factors may account for differential change between the two groups,⁵ one being answers given to the questions in 1969 and another being sex — since men were more likely to attend universities than women (Gamson, 1975). Controlling for sex, Table 2 shows that studying *per se* had little impact on kibbutz students.⁶ To be sure, changes were occurring over the four years, but non-students were changing in similar ways.

Table 2

**High Aspiration Group: Impact of Studying on Response to Questions Repeated From 1969 to 1973
(Initial Position and Sex controlled)**

Politics and Ideology

Desirability of:

— political interest/involvement	NS
— democracy on the kibbutz	NS
— equality on the kibbutz	NS
— Israeli economy based on socialist principles	NS
— individual and family authority over consumption	NS
— reliance on professional vs. democratic decisions	NS

Cohesiveness

— readiness to be active in the social life of the kibbutz	NS	
— social ties to kibbutz age group	NS	
— social ties to other second-generation members	NS	
— social ties to founders	*	Students higher than non-students
— social ties to members of work branch	**	Students lower than non-students
— social ties to other young people on other kibbutzim	NS	
— social ties to non-kibbutz young people	NS	
— centrality in the kibbutz as a whole	NS	
— centrality in kibbutz age group	*	Students higher than non-students

— willingness to convince hesitant friend to stay on kibbutz

NS

Satisfaction

— satisfaction with own social situation	NS
— satisfaction with general social situation on the kibbutz	NS

Civic Involvement

— readiness to be active in administrative duties	NS	
— readiness to be active in political life	*	Students higher than non-students
— readiness to be active in cultural life	NS	
— attendance at general meetings	NS	

Opportunities and Self-Development

— desirability of opportunities for self-development	NS
— veterans' willingness to let youth advance	NS

Work and Education Policies

— desirability of work outside the kibbutz	NS	
— desirability of hired labor	NS	
— desirability of non-physical work	**	Students higher than non-students
— desirability of taking members' wishes into account in making work assignments	NS	
— desirability of higher education	NS	

Desired Work Characteristics

— achieve something at work	NS
— do interesting work	NS
— use skills, knowledge, ability	NS
— determine the pace of work	NS
— work in a cohesive group	NS
— have authority over others	NS
— be free of worries	NS

*p < .05 **p < .01

Nevertheless, some significant changes did occur. On the negative side, studying diminished contact with a student's original work branch — which was not surprising since many students did not hold their regular kibbutz jobs. But on other measures on contact with the kibbutz, studying had an enhancing effect. Students saw themselves as more central in their age group than non-students,⁷ and they reported more social ties to founders of the kibbutz. They were more ready to be active politically. They were more approving of the shift, already under way, from physical to non-physical jobs on the kibbutz.

Table 3

**Impact of Type of Institution Attended on Responses to Questions Repeated From 1969 to 1973
(Initial Position and Sex controlled)**

	Institution Effect	
Politics and Ideology		
Desirability of:		
— political interest	*	University students higher than non-university students
— democracy on the kibbutz	NS	
— equality on the kibbutz	NS	
— Israeli economy based on socialist principles	*	University students lower than non-university students
— individual and family authority over consumption	NS	
— reliance on professional vs. democratic decisions	NS	
Cohesiveness		
— readiness to be active in the social life of the kibbutz	*	University students higher than non-university students
— social ties to kibbutz age group	NS	
— social ties to other second-generation members	NS	
— social ties to founders	NS	
— social ties to members of work branch	NS	
— social ties to other young people on other kibbutzim	NS	
— social ties to non-kibbutz young people	NS	
— centrality in the kibbutz as a whole	NS	
— centrality in kibbutz age group	NS	
— willingness to convince hesitant friend to stay on the kibbutz	*	University students lower than non-university students
Satisfaction		
— satisfaction with own social situation	NS	
— satisfaction with general social situation on the kibbutz	*	University students lower than non-university students
Civic Involvement		
— readiness to be active in administrative duties	*	University students higher than non-university students
— readiness to be active in political life	NS	
— readiness to be active in cultural life	NS	
— attendance at general meetings	NS	

Table 3 Continued

Opportunities and Self-Development

— desirability of opportunities for self-development	NS
— veterans' willingness to let youth advance	NS

Work and Education Policies

— desirability of work outside the kibbutz	**	University students higher than non-university students
— desirability of hired labor	NS	
— desirability of non-physical work	NS	
— desirability of taking members' wishes into account in making work assignments	NS	
— desirability of higher education	NS	

Desired Work Characteristics

— achieve something at work	NS	
— do interesting work	NS	
— use skills, knowledge, ability	NS	
— determine the pace of work	NS	
— work in a cohesive group	*	University students lower than non-university students
— have authority over others	NS	
— be free of worries	NS	

*Statistical significance of the F-statistic for this effect at $p < .05$.

**Statistical significance of the F-statistic for this effect at $p < .01$.

Since kibbutz members were attending a variety of postsecondary institutions, combining them may mask differential impacts. Another analysis of covariance compares those who attended universities with those who attended mostly kibbutz-operated institutions in the 1969-1973 period, again controlling for sex and initial response.

Six of the thirty-six questions show significant institutional effects. On the one hand, attending a university enhanced political interest. University students were also more ready than non-university students in 1973 to be active in the social life of the kibbutz and to take on administrative tasks. On the other hand, university students appeared to be less integrated into the kibbutz than those who attended more kibbutz-oriented schools. University students were less willing to convince a hesitant friend to stay on the kibbutz. They were less interested in working in a cohesive group and more willing to endorse policies which allowed members to work outside the kibbutz. And they were less favorable toward applying socialist principles to the Israeli economy as a whole.

Crisis or Opportunity?

The extent to which the above indicators imply a mismatch between the kibbutz and its educated second generation depends on how the kibbutz satisfies its young people's aspirations for occupational expression and civic involvement. In the early years, the kibbutz occupational structure could absorb those who studied: 75 per cent of students in the 1973 survey had definite work commitments when they finished their studies, most in their home kibbutzim or in an outside organization in the kibbutz world. More than half of those who had completed studies by 1973 returned to their original workplaces (Gamson, 1975).

But in later years as more students returned, the capacity of the kibbutz to honor members' job preferences was limited by the narrow range of work options and by a shortage of labor. Furthermore, while the kibbutz occupational structure has permitted the elaboration of more technical and administrative jobs, these are limited by the small size of any single kibbutz and by the commitment to minimizing power and status differences among members. More possibilities have been generated by regional and federation organizations; many highly educated members are located here (Leviatan, 1979). More kibbutz members also work in organizations unconnected with the kibbutz such as universities, human service agencies, and government. But these alternatives have not kept pace with the appetite of the second generation for interesting work.⁸ It is doubtful whether the kibbutz can allow too much expansion in this direction without jeopardizing the principles of equal sharing of unpleasant tasks like kitchen work, the regular rotation of jobs, and the equalization of privilege. The last thing that the kibbutz can allow is a two-class system based on mental vs. manual labor or "home" vs. outside jobs.

It is clear that the appetite for challenging work cannot be satisfied. But unlike most societies, the kibbutz offers its well-educated members — along with its less well-educated members — the opportunity to exercise their skills, knowledge and judgement in their daily lives by participating in the economic, civic and cultural activities of their community. If the content of work cannot be as interesting as highly trained people would always like, the context of work — its democratic, communal organization — is as challenging and difficult as one will find in any major enterprise around the world.

The Relevance of the Kibbutz Experience

We have seen that even in a highly planned society like the kibbutz, some mismatch occurs between the desire of the younger generation for self-fulfillment through higher education and work and the reproduction needs of the community. The kibbutz has attempted to control the effects of these contradictions in a self-conscious way. At first, it responded in small steps designed to keep young people close to the community. From opposing higher education in general, it specified the institutions its second generation members could attend and the range of subjects they could study. When this failed to satisfy its young, the kibbutz bent a little more by attempting to found its own university. When this alternative proved unattractive, the kibbutz took the bold step of letting its second generation attend institutions which were beyond its control and whose values and practices were likely to be in conflict with its own.

But it turned out that the outside world and the university were not as alluring as many kibbutz planners had feared.⁷ Most of the young people who studied returned to the kibbutz as committed to kibbutz ideals as those who did not study, and university students in particular were eager to take on leadership roles within the kibbutz. Whether or not these members continue to remain within the kibbutz framework depends on the provision of a challenging work context and community life. The kibbutz exemplifies the kind of democratic work environment and community life advocated by those who recognize the limits of occupational expansion in industrialized societies but who do not seek to solve "over-education" by reducing educational opportunity (Levin, 1980; Bowles and Gintis, 1979). Even though highly educated members may not find their work as intrinsically challenging as they would ideally prefer, participation in determining the work process and investment decisions calls on complex judgements and group skills. In this way the desire for self-development can be

harnessed to social reproduction. Participation in community life also requires qualities that are rarely exercised by other citizens.

On a world-wide basis, research is needed on precisely how the work environment can provide opportunities for self-development, especially for highly educated workers, when the intrinsic nature of work may not be especially challenging. This means looking into the nature of the educational experiences such workers have had and into the aspirations such experiences have engendered, as well as the work settings they enter. Settings such as the kibbutzim can be informative as they attempt to cope with this problem.

Notes

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1. Eighty per cent of those who wanted different work said their desire was connected to educational aspirations. The two chief reasons for educational study among these members of the second generation were to gain new ideas and to prepare for specific jobs (Gamson, 1975).

2. Those who said in 1969 that they wanted to study for at least a year and to start as soon as possible were identified as the high aspiration group.

3. The *social status* variables include two questions on the number of roles filled by parents both within and outside the kibbutz in work, politics, and administration. Four levels were coded. In addition, respondents reported their own social status on a five-point scale ranging from low to high.

To measure *ideology*, members were queried about their attitudes on two critical issues of kibbutz life. The first question asked respondents how much emphasis the kibbutz should place on collective vs. individual needs in making decisions; this was scored on a five-point scale, with the low end indicating less emphasis on collective needs. The second question asked respondents to assess the importance of having children sleep in collective children's houses (a typical arrangement) as opposed to having them sleep in their parent's quarters (a possibility under debate on the kibbutz at the time); this was also scored on a five-point scale, with lower numbers indicating less approval of collective sleeping arrangements.

The *advantages* and *opportunities* questions include an assessment of the advantages and the disadvantages of kibbutz social relations, scored on a five-point scale with lower numbers indicating more disadvantages of kibbutz life. Using a three-point scale, respondents were also asked to rate the kibbutz on professional and educational opportunities; low numbers indicate fewer perceived opportunities on the kibbutz.


Finally, the *work* and *education* section includes two general questions on the importance of current jobs and education — assessed on a six-point scale, with lower numbers indicating less importance. Respondents were also asked two more specific questions about work: how demanding they wanted their occupations to be (four-point scale, with lower numbers indicating less demanding work); and how much satisfaction they derived from work compared to other spheres of life (six-point scale, with lower numbers indicating more satisfaction from work).

4. Enrollments in higher education in Israel from 1950 to 1968 rose faster than the general population and faster than the population of school-goers. For statistics and a discussion of higher education in Israel, see Aranne (1970) and Klineberger (1969).

5. The measurement of change and the attribution of causality for any change is a difficult matter. A longitudinal design like the one employed here begins to solve some of the problems. For an intelligent, non-technical discussion of the difficulties in assessing impact in college populations, see Feldman and Newcomb (1969).

6. We must exercise great caution in interpreting the results from this analysis, since those who went to study were not randomly selected. It is reasonable to assume from what we know that they diverged in 1969 in ways that increased their likelihood of attending an educational institution in the next four years. Thus, we shall speak of the impact of studying more in terms of enhancing or reducing responses to the questions repeated rather than in terms of causing major shifts. For a thorough discussion of the use of analysis of covariance techniques in education research, see Elahoff (1969).

7. "Centrality" was determined by the following question: Let's assume that the circles symbolize your kibbutz. The central kibbutz members (kibbutz age group) are in circle no. 1 (the small one). Where are you in this? (Circle the number that fits.)



8. In their study of young kibbutz-born dropouts from nine kibbutzim, Leviatan et al. (1977) found that the largest percentage (60 per cent) said that curiosity and fascination with the outside world drew them away. The second most important reason focused on under-utilization of capabilities (48 per cent) and unfit occupations (24 per cent). The 1973 survey showed that a disproportionate number of kibbutz dropouts in the sample attended a university.

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