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TO LIVE IN CONCORD WITH A SOCIETY:

TWO EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF PRIMARY RELATIONS

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It is hard to live with a society and intolerable to live without one. For many people society or a society **is** more than necessary. It is for them a distinct and precious thing. It is a living order that binds people to one another and fulfills individuals and groups. On fulfillment through a society, consider paragraphs that might have been written by Durkheim[1] but that actually **were** written by Jacques Maritain[2]:

> The end of society is the good of the community, of the social body. ...the good of the social body is understood to be a common good of human persons, just as the social body itself is a whole of human persons....
>
> .   .   .   .
>
> ...that which constitutes the common good of... society is not only: the collection of public commodities and services--the roads, ports, schools, etc., which the organization of common life presupposes; a sound fiscal condition of the state and its military power; the body of just laws, good customs and wise institutions, which provide the nation with its structure; the heritage of its great historical remembrances, its symbols and its glories, its living traditions and cultural treasures. The common good includes all of these and something much more besides-- something more profound, more concrete and more human. For it includes also, and above all, the whole sum itself of these.... It includes the sum...of all the civic conscience, political virtues and sense of right and liberty, of all the activity, material prosperity and spiritual riches, of unconsciously operative hereditary wisdom, of moral rectitude, justice, friendship, happiness, virtue and heroism in the individual lives of its members. For these things all are, in a certain measure, communicable and so revert to each member, helping him to perfect his life and liberty of person.

And then, passing beyond what Maritain tells us, we discover that a society not only may nurture men as persons but it may be known to them as if it were a person--a

greater person with whom they nonetheless are intimate and toward whom they often are ambivalent.

These personalized relations with a society can be experiences as like "an intimate face-to-face association" and as producing:

> a certain fusion of individualities in a common whole, so that one's very self, for many purposes at least, is the common life and purpose.... Perhaps the simplest way of describing this whole-ness is by saying that it is a "we"; it involves the sort of sympathy and mutual identification for which "we" is the natural expression. One lives in the feeling of the whole and finds the chief aims of his will in that feeling.

> It is not to be supposed that...[our relation with a society] is one of mere harmony and love. It is always a differentiated and usually a com-petitive unity, admitting of self-assertion and various appropriative passions; but these passions are socialized by sympathy, and come, or tend to come, under the discipline of a common spirit. ...

Every sociologist has read the paragraphs just quoted. They are taken, with only minor modifications, from Cooley's book Social Organization and are his description of a primary group or primary relationship[3].

Would Cooley have rejected the idea that men can have a primary relationship with their own societies? Perhaps he would--at first. He wrote of social intimacy among friends and in informal groups of peers and in families. But, we might reasonably ask of him, why not include a concept of intimacy with God? A personality remains a personality for all its being divine. For many people in many cultures no experience is more salient than their

careers of companionship with deity. It is true that, in Western societies God is called a judge of men and the governor of history, but he is experienced also as men's father, defender, and confidant. In being love himself, he needs men as they need him and he needs their integrity, their freedom, and their answering love. As we read Cooley it seems clear that he means by intimacy what we ordinarily call love and he would be satisfied with intimacy's being described as we usually describe loving: as an effort knowingly, freely, and responsibly to enhance the life and growth of others in whatever ways one can. Love seems exactly what God is often believed to give men and what he seeks from them.

But what has deity to do with our relations to a society? I have shown in two cross-cultural studies that conceptions of spirits and gods and of their characteristics seem to arise from experiences with corporate groups, the nature of the group determining beliefs about the nature of the gods[4]. If we think of a society as a corporate group-- a decision-making body with its own distinctive life and purposes and having boundaries that separate it from other societies and from the other groups to which its own members may belong--we then will find a society's character sym- bolized in one or more spirits.

If their gods are any indication, we can say that people are not always intimate with corporate groups but that sometimes their intimacy with those groups may pass

beyond mere companionship and into a full community of feeling. Some gods are indifferent or austere. Others are sadistic. But many gods are believed to seek men as companions. They sorrow with and over them. They work in earthly fields and roister in the streets. They share men's battles and their meals, their games and their songs, and even their beds.

As Cooley says, primary relations are not "mere harmony and love." Men can more readily exploit their intimates than they can persons less open to them and less available. Love is a foundation for jealousy and selfish ambition as for nurture and justice. Hatred, shame and guilt, exploitation and pride, competition and ambivalence are all a part of intimacy. The fact that all these are relations of men to their gods suggests that all may also characterize their primary relations with corporate groups and, among those groups, with their society.

Cooley closes his statement on love's darker side by saying, "but these passions are socialized by sympathy, and come, or tend to come, under the discipline of a common spirit." That discipline presumably is what we see when men do penance for offending the spirits or seek reconciliation with them. They seek renewed concord with deity and thus with the organizations in their society or with the particular organization which is their society.

It is this last observation that I want to pursue:

the observation of a process by which primary relations
if disturbed are reestablished between a society and its
members. A proper analysis leads us far into Cooley's
thought and out into the whole of sociology.

One key to our analysis is already in hand. I want
only to describe it more generally than before: Social
intimacy is possible between personalities and not other-
wise. Corporate groups are readily experienced as having
a kind of personality or character. They engage in instru-
mental activity toward an environment: moving toward goals,
implementing programs, developing customary ways of conduct-
ing their affairs, choosing, withdrawing, seeking to
influence and being themselves influenced. In all these
senses, and in others, their life is a process of instrumental
activity and their organization and integrity takes on the
character of a collective personality, of a collective actor.
Thus, to the extent an organization is a corporate group,
one condition is met for the appearance of primary relations
between the organization and individuals. I assume this
principle holds true regardless of the type of organization
being considered, as, for example, a community or a cor-
poration or a college or a lodge or a police department or
a whole society. And if we recall the devotion, even the
passionate affection, which some people give these and other
corporate groups and the nurture, the guidance, and the
selfless help people may feel they gain from a group itself

and not just from their several fellow members, we can then
appreciate better why men feel obligated to their collective
partner, why they are guilty or embarrassed or fearful when
they disappoint it, and how they may even come to seek
evidence of its forgiveness and try to enter with it into
an interpenetrating communion.

Cooley's Analysis of Social Organization

It happens that Cooley does not think of a society
as a corporate group. We shall find it is precisely for
that reason that his ideas advance our understanding of
the tensions and reconciliations between a society and
its members.

The vision of society that unfolds in the pages of
Cooley's <u>Social Organization</u> is the grand vision of in-
dividuals and groups, each one having its own character
and its needs, a vision of all these actors bound together
in endlessly ramified interdependence. A society, Cooley
likes to remind us, is not a system of mechanical inter-
dependencies. Its constituent actors shape one another.
Their natures change as they participate in the ceaseless
flux of their interweaving existences and, as these changes
occur, the participants' relations to one another take on
new forms. To distinguish this growing, shifting system
from the mechanical models of Enlightenment thought
Spencer Cooley calls it an organic order. "Mind," he says

in the first paragraphs of <u>Social Organization</u>[5]:

> is an organic whole made up of cooperating individual-
> ities, in somewhat the same way that the music of an
> orchestra is made up of divergent but related sounds.
> No one would think it necessary or reasonable to
> divide the music into two kinds, that made by the
> whole and that of particular instruments, and no
> more are there two kinds of mind, the social mind
> and the individual mind. When we study the social
> mind we merely fix our attention on larger aspects
> and relations rather than on the narrower ones of
> ordinary psychology.
>
> .   o   .   .   .   .
>   The unity of the social mind consists not in
> agreement but in organization, in the fact of
> reciprocal influence of causation among its parts,
> by virtue of which everything that takes place in
> it is connected with everything else, and so is an
> outcome of the whole.
>
>   This differentiated unity of mental or social
> life, present in the simplest intercourse but capable
> of infinite growth and adaptation, is what I mean
> in this work by social organization. ...

The nature of the unity in a group or a society is often

in Cooley's thoughts and in his chapter on "Institutions

and the Individual" appears a particularly striking summary

of his views[6]:

> ...if one thinks closely about the question he will
> find it no easy matter to say in just what solidarity
> consists. Not in mere likeness, certainly, since
> the difference of individuals and parts is not only
> consistent with but essential to a harmonious whole....
> We want what Burke described as "that action and
> counteraction, which in the natural and in the
> political world, from the reciprocal struggle of
> discordant powers draws out the harmony of the
> universe."

For some reason, Cooley at this point does not mention his

own contribution to explanations of social solidarity: his

proposals concerning human nature and the universality of

essential moral rules.

"By human nature," Cooley wrote[7]:

> I suppose, we may understand those sentiments and
> impulses that are human in being superior to those
> of lower animals, and also in the sense that they
> belong to mankind at large, and not to any
> particular race or time. It means, particularly,
> sympathy and the innumerable sentiments into which
> sympathy enters, such as love, resentment, ambition,
> vality, hero-worship, and the feeling of social right
> and wrong.

In this conception, human nature refers to a feeling of oneness
and kinship with others as human personalities and to such
associated feelings as aspiration, admiration, guilt, or
jealousy that accompany a sense of belonging with other
people and of being positively dependent upon them. Cooley
calls these feelings "sentiments" and designates them as
containing cognitive, attitudinal, and motivational elements.
And then he tells us that the aggregation of these sentiments--
human nature[8]:

> is not something existing separately in the
> individual, but a group-nature or primary phase
> of society, a relatively simple and general
> condition of the social mind. ... It is the
> nature which is developed and expressed in
> those simple, face-to-face groups that are
> somewhat alike in all societies; groups of the
> family, the playground, and the neighborhood. In
> the essential similarity of these is to be found
> the basis, in experience, for similar ideas and
> sentiments in the humand mind. ....

Human nature consists, then, in those elementary feelings
and appreciations and in those skills for relating positively
to others which are inherent in intimate social relations
and generated by them. Human nature includes the reactions,
both positive and negative, which accompany the vicissitudes

of such relations. So conceived, human nature is a great

resource for social life. It is a set of highly general

skills, attitudes, and cognitions which can be used to

found and formulate new and more specialized forms of

social organization. Human nature is the representation

in an individual of the patterns of intimate relationship

he has experienced and which, through learning, he has

incorporated as a personal characteristic.

But human nature is not simply a resource. It embodies

standards and objectives and these, says Cooley, are a

perpetual source of criticism and reconstruction in social

affairs. He terms them "the motive and test of social

progress." "Under all systems," Cooley insists, "men strive,

however blindly, to realize objects suggested by the

familiar experience of primary association," and, he asks

theoretically[9]:

> Where do we get out notions of love, freedom,
> justice, and the like which we are ever applying to
> social institutions? Not from abstract philosophy,
> surely, just from the actual life of simple and wide-
> spread forms of society, like the family or the play-
> group. In these relations mankind realizes itself,
> gratifies its primary needs...and from the experience
> forms standards of what it is to expect from more
> elaborate association. ...groups of this sort are
> never obliterated from human experience, but flourish
> more or less under all kinds of institutions, they
> remain an enduring criterion by which the latter are
> ultimately judged.
>
>   .   .   .   .
>
> The ideal that grows up in familiar association
> may be said to be a part of human nature itself. In
> its most general form it is that of a moral whole or
> community....
>
>   .   .   .   .
>
> The improvement of society does not call for any
> essential change in human nature, but, chiefly, for a
> larger and higher application of its familiar impulses.
>
>   .   .   .   .

> To break up the ideal of a moral whole into par-
> ticular ideals is an artifical process.... Perhaps,
> however, the most salient principles are loyalty,
> lawfulness, and freedom.

What are the consequences of these primary ideals? For

one, society will never be without a saving remnant and

that at its heart. The whole of a society becomes a moral

order to the extent men can apply the ideals they have

learned imperishably in small, face-to-face groups. This

means men must be as free as possible to behave toward one

another in the large as they do in primary groups. They must

be able to interact freely, spontaneously, and as complete

persons. Fortunatley, Cooley says, children tend to relate

to one another and to adults in just that fashion and the

masses of the population, as contrasted with the elites,

are "closer to the springs of human nature, and so more

under the control of its primary impulses[10]." Fortunately,

also, no formal social arrangements, no institutions, can

persist unless consonant with human nature. In the competition

among institutional forms, the most consonant will survive,

thus assuring that what has value for survival is identical

with what gives value to survival. And, Cooley proposes, we

are right in thinking that "the two systems that have the

most vitality at the present time--democracy and Christianity"

are exactly "those systems of larger idealism which are most

human and so of most enduring value... [because] based upon

the ideals of primary groups[11]." He observes that the

American "spirit" is "much at one with the general spirit of

human nature....[12]"

Much has been said of primary groups. What of groupings and associations of other kinds? What of voluntary associations? Communities? The state? The church? Social classes? Each is, in his analysis, an independent part of the social whole yet dependent upon that whole. All are tied together in an organic reciprocity. How much, one observes, is Cooley like Malinowski[13]. And the resemblance is even more striking when one considers Cooley's view of the origin and nature of these many associations and institutions[14]:

> ...communication, including its organization into literature, art, and institutions, is truly the outside or visible structure of thought, as much cause as effect of the inside or conscious life of men. All is one growth: the symbols, the traditions, the institutions are projected from the mind,... thereafter they react upon it....
>
> An institution is simply a definite and established phase of the public mind, not different in its ultimate nature from public opinion, though often seeming, on account of its permanance and the visible customs and symbols in which it is clothed, to have a somewhat distinct and independent existence. ...
>
> The great institutions are the outcome of that organization which human thought naturally takes on when it is directed for age after age upon a particular subject, and so gradually crystallizes in definite forms.... Language, government, the church, laws and customs of property and of the family, systems of industry and education, are institutions because they are working out of permanent needs of human nature.

As Cooley sees it, associations other than primary groups have an inherent difficulty. By their very nature they are specialized. Men are allowed to function in them not as whole persons but only as specialists[15].

> ...this defect of all definite social structures... gives rise to an irrepressible conflict between

them and the freer and larger impulses of human
nature. Just in proportion as they achieve an
effective special mechanism for a narrow purpose,
they lose humanness, breadth and adaptability.

.   .   .   .

   Of course the institutional element is equally
essential with the personal. The mechanical working
of tradition and convention pours into the mind the
tried wisdom of the race....   On this foundation we
build, and it needs no argument to show that we could
accomplish nothing without it.

.   .   .   .

   Thus it is from the interaction of personality
and institutions that progress comes. ...

These, then, are the essentials of Cooley's analysis.

From the contingencies of human biology, especially our

helplessness in infancy, we are dependent upon one another

and are thrown together in the prolonged and progressively

more intimate relations of family and siblings and peers

and neighbors. We learn our need for one another and, in

these first surroundings, come to find our fulfillment as

persons only through giving and receiving love as whole

persons. And, in order to pursue the concerns of our

acquired human nature, we band together in larger units

for special purposes. These units are both indispensible

and inherently defective. They tend inescapably to ossify;

to promote their partial views of life at the expense

of the full range demanded by human nature. In dialectical

terms, primary relations as embodied in human nature provide

Cooley's thesis, secondary associations or institutions

his antithesis, and the organic whole of society is his

ceaselessly changing synthesis.

Social Organization: Collectivity and Social System

Up to this point I, like Cooley, have tolerated many ambiguities. What is society? What is a society? What, concretely, could be meant by knowing a society's forgiveness or by feeling responsible toward it? We must look again, and this time more analytically, at Cooley's picture of a society.

From acquaintance without professional literature, we know that much of that picture predominates in work by American sociologists from the nineteenth century to the present. It offers us society as a collectivity, not as a social system[16]. Let me explain.

Before us is the whole of human interaction now in process: all the exchanges, struggles, and collaborations among men. In regions of this whole, if not in the whole itself, we observe certain patterns, we sense a greater coherence. Everywhere in the whole are interdependencies and mutual influences. If, here and there, we detect at least activities that prevent the interruption of certain interdependencies or that renew bonds already weakened, we say that boundaries are present within interaction and we speak of the patterns of interaction so bounded as particular social organizations; of each as a social organization.

In the minimal case, each organization consists of individuals or subsidiary organizations, all bound together in social interaction, this as a consequence of the need

each has for one or more of the others. This organization
may be enduring or ephemeral. It may be simple or highly
complex. The relations within its compass may vary in
legitimacy, that depending on the degree to which they are
undertaken for the benefits they afford rather than for
escape from deprivations that otherwise would be imposed.
The legitimacy of these relations varies also with the
extent participants judge equitable the cost of their
association. The rights and obligations that arise among
participants emerge from their exchanges, from their statuses
as the producers and consumers of benefits they provide one
another.

The internal structure of this organization consists,
then, of chains of exchanges, direct and indirect, among its
participants. These chains gain further structure from the
fact that some exchanges are symbiotic and others commensal.
Across time, the patterns of exchange may exhibit such
processes as centralization, invasion, succession, competition
and dominance. The organization is bounded in the sense
that participants which, for whatever reason, disrupt the
interaction presently in force are excluded from it and
potential participants are admitted according to the con-
tribution they seem able to offer current participants.

Earlier writers, including Cooley, spoke of each society
as like a web. This image catches the condition I have just
sketched, reflecting the judgment that a society is social
and patterned and bounded but that it also is headless.

Cooley is not extreme in this respect. For him, each society consists of participants, many of which would exist despite great variation in the form of the larger society. Indeed, many would exist were that society destroyed. They are individuals, primary groups, voluntary associations, and all manner of privately established group. And all of Cooley's talk about organic relations must not obscure the sturdy integrity he attributes to persons and to private groups as they deal with institutions and with society at large. He says that although human nature may be supressed it never dies. He observes primary groups surviving all efforts to extirpate them. He sees private associations constantly emerging from the flux of interaction. And we, like Cooley, can see how, in Europe under the barbarian invasions, in Germany during the Thirty Years War, or in other lands suffering great chaos, these participants in society constituted and reconstituted societies, creating institutions and facilities that were needed, and recreating forms of collective life despite all manner of difficulties.

But the formation of new societies often points to a further complication and one that begins to move our attention beyond Cooley's vision. Observe in early medieval times the vassals of a feudal lord, each one dependent on him for protection and for land and he dependent on each of them for support. Observe that over time, and sometimes only at the lord's prodding, the vassals find that they have concerns which can be pursued only through joint undertakings. By

one means or another they allocate resources for those undertakings and acknowledge as proper those claims made upon them, and those assignments given them, on behalf of their common enterprise.

Many new and important developments are embodied in events like these, events we constantly see in the formation of new groups. Participants now are tied not only to one another individually but to an apparatus which actively promotes their common undertakings. Their affairs have come to have a corporate character. In the sense just described, their relationship has developed the qualities of a collective actor rather than merely a web of participants. Agents speak in its name, choices are made on its behalf, and, for it, resources are amassed and expended. We still have a social organization in view but, in addition to its character as a web of relations among participants, that is in addition to its character as a collectivity, it has gained the properties of a collective actor, that is the properties of a social system[17].

Social organizations are, minimally, collectivities. In most of the empirical cases we study, they to some extent are social systems as well. To the extent an organization is a social system--a collective actor--participants can develop attachments to the organization as such and not merely to fellow participants in it; they can be attached to the organization's purposes and character and not just to its facilities and appurtenances. And

Cooley knew that. He described such attachments in discussing the growing sense of "we" through participation in the life of "a common whole" such that "one's very self, for many purposes at least, is the common life and purpose." Cooley tends, however, to restrict this observation to voluntary, private, and primary groups. He tends not to analyze as social systems either institutions or the whole of any society[18]. As a consequence, he cannot visualize men's experiencing their relations with a society as primary relations--as relations of intimacy and love.

Cooley's omission is easily remedied. From Aquinas to Hegel to Marx, Durkheim, and many contemporary thinkers, the social system of a society is identified with its political process as broadly conceived. This process is crystallized in government but is itself the whole of those interactions by which a population arrives at ultimate and legitimately authoritative decisions. To the extent a society has such a process it is a collective actor and can become a participant in primary relations.

Collectivity versus Social System

Any person or group participating in a society's collectivity and in its social system will experience conflicts. For participants in the collectivity, the social system is a tool necessary for the attainment of their several ends, a means by which each participant exploits the world in the

service of his own requirements. But, to create and operate
a social system, these same participants in the collectivity
must subject themselves to that system's requirements, must
become its agents: the bearers and executors of its purposes,
subjected to its routines, and supportive of its cause. As
founders and exploiters of a social system, participants
want to get from it what they can. As agents and maintainers
of a social system, they want to provide conditions favorable
to the system's continued operation. It is inevitable that
these two roles should clash. Because the same groups and
individuals are the founders and exploiters of the social
system and are its agents, subjects, and supporters, the
clash is internal to each of them--an inherent conflict among
their own persisting commitments[19].

How can the demands of the society as a collectivity be
reconciled with the demands of the society as a social system?
Neither collectivity nor social system can be extirpated.
The opposition of their requirements seems as intrinsic
as is their interdependence[20]. How can the individuals and
groups that constitute both collectivity and social system
come to live in concord with their society and with the
division which their society's dual nature creates in each
of them?

There are only limited possibilities. For one, the
collectivity can limit the social system's functions and
requirements to the bare necessities and develop institution-
alized means for insuring that the system operates within these

constraints. Thus it can exercise a particular watch-
fulness over persons who make their careers as agents of
the social system--a watchfulness over the clergy, the
military, and the governmental bureaucracy, and over the
teachers and social workers--curbing any tendencies on their
part to promote the social system beyond the collectivity's
need. Participants in the collectivity can further thwart
undesired demands by the social system through their engaging
in evasion, slow-downs, minimal acquiescence, and revolt.

But, however necessary and effective these curbs on a
social system, they do not provide a viable relationship.
Individuals and societies can thrive only if they attain
their objectives. If a social system is indispensable for
that purpose, if it comes itself to be one of the most desired
of objectives, it must have its members; respect and affection.
A positive solution, a reocnciliation, must come from actions
of the social system toward its constituent collectivity, actions
that stress the fulfillments which the social system affords.

The point comes at which further adjustments and modifi-
cations of the social system are unprofitable. Participants
must either accept it for what it is and for its benefits or
must withdraw from it. Because the problems to be solved by
the social system rarely are solved one and for all, it is
most likely that participants who want to cope with those
problems will accept the system. (They actually may never
question its value.) Thereafter they feel pressed to adjust
their conduct as members of the collectivity to that required

by their relation to the social system. Durkheim made some
of these same points in saying that individuals felt them-
selves of drastically lesser moral worth and power than the
social systems in which they were involved, and in insisting
that conflicts between the two must finally end in acquies-
cence by individuals[21].

Socialization and Social Control

As we know from studies of parents and children, there
are two general processes in which recurrent conflicts
between intimates, one of whom is preponderant, will come to
be resolved. These processes are socialization and social
control. I propose that both processes are found in relations
between social systems and their participants. I propose,
further, that in many societies, perhaps in most, either
socialization or social control comes normatively to be
defined as the more appropriate and efficacious. I develop
these ideas by distinguishing between socialization and
social control, by characterizing societies in which relations
between individuals and the social system should come to be
defined as more congruent with one process rather than the
other, and by applying my characterization to two samples of
societies. In each sample I shall consider whether those
features of societies that I shall specify are associated,
as expected, with norms which define the moral careers of
individuals either as processes of socialization or as

process of acceptance and fulfillment under social control.
I begin by distinguishing the concepts themselves.

Both socialization and social control are activities
designed to bring behavior into conformity with the structure
and purposes of a social system[22]. Both are initiated and
guided by agents of that system. Both processes are legiti-
mated by the benefits they confer onthe social organization
from which they spring and on the participants toward whom they
are directed.

The objective in socialization is so to train an in-
dividual that he can participate fully in social interaction,
that is so he can relate with facility to the minds of others
and to his own. He must, among other things, learn of his
dependence on these others and of the existence of their
skills, knowledge, and intentions, and of the requirement
that he adapt his conduct not merely to the externals of their
behavior but to their inner lives as well. In the process,
he finds it necessary to be aware of his conduct and of its
dynamics and to control both. For real facility in interaction,
he must learn, accept, and make his own the norms which define
the scope and purpose of the relationship--the social system,
employing those norms as the standard for developing or
modifying his behavior.

The climax of successful socialization is full and easy
communion with others, skilled contribution to their

requirements, and ready access to the benefits they are
prepared to confer. All these results are founded on
thorough knowledge of the others' minds and of the one's
own in relation to theirs: on thorough knowledge about,
and acceptance of, the common enterprises and social system
to which all are committed.

Socialization is possible only on the assumption that
the prospective subject can be trained for the kind of
relation contemplated. He must not be incapable or unwill-
ing to develop an increasing competence and commitment. He
must potentially be able fully to accept the social system's
purposes as his own.

The course of social control is different. It begins
with the assumption of menalready socialized to the point
of strong commitment to support a social system but who yet
retain ineradicable desires and interests that are at variance
with that system. The objective of social control is to
elicit support for the system when it otherwise would not
be given and to suppress conduct that subverts the system.
The problem in social control is that of making salient a
set of standards and concerns to which people are already
committed; of getting them to see the world and relate to it
in terms of those standards and concerns; of persuading
them to believe that through acceptance of the system's
normative order they will reach the fulfillment of their true
interests despite the seemingly important and competing claims

of deviant desires.   There is in this situation no possibility
of obtaining such acceptance once and for all or of obtaining
it, at any time, without reservation.   The deviant desires are
indeed ineradicable.

Social control is a viable procedure only if it need
be applied occasionally rather than constantly: it is viable
only if applied to partly socialized individuals who there-
fore may usually be counted on to behave in accord with the
system's normative prescriptions.

The Penetration of a Society's Social System by Deviant Interests

All the persons and groups in a collectivity make use
of the social system they create.   We have seen that their
status and interests are in part independent of that social
system and, in some measure, incompatible with it.   One might
judge from this that, in all societies, people as participants
in the collectivity would be normatively required to submit
to social control.   I shall show, however, that this is not
the case.   How can we account for this seeming discrepancy?
The key, I believe, will be found in the form of actors'
relations with a social system.   However incompatiable with
their social system the purposes of some men and some groups,
they may find it possible to relate effectively to that system
only in their capacity as its subjects and agents.   In some
societies, however, men and groups come legitimately to serve
as executives and agents of their social system because of

their special positions in the collectivity. Before explain-
ing further and more generally what I have in mind, I will
give two illustrations:

In the sixteenth century, Venice was an independent city-
state and the supreme authority in Venice was its Great Council.
This council had to approve all important policies of govern-
ment. It served as the highest legislature and highest
court. It also served as the highest executive, selecting all
important officers of the state, requiring that they be respon-
sible to it, defining, on occasion, the policies which those
officers might pursue, and allowing most important officials
to hold office for very short and non-renewable terms--terms of
from two to twelve months. The point significant for us is
that all males who were full citizens of Venice were members
of the Great Council. I think this point important because it
indicates that participation in the operation of the Venetian
social system was open to men in their capacity as members of
the society at large and not because of any traits thought
peculiarly theirs as individuals or as individuals or as
representatives of particular groups in the collectivity.

Consider, for contrast, another city-state of the same
period, the Swiss canton of Zurich. In Zurich, the supreme
authority was again a council, its powers closely resembling
those of the Great Council in Venice. Its membership, however,
consisted of representatives elected by the several mercan-
tile and artisan guilds into which the whole population of

of male citizens was divided. Under this system, a role in the central operation of the social system was open to men only in their capacity as representatives of organized groups, those groups not being themselves agents of the system but, rather, constituent bodies in the collectivity.

Consider now the relevance of socialization and social control for these contrasts between Venice and Zurich. In Venice, men participated in government on the ground of what they had in common with all other members of the collectivity and it was exactly the purposes they had in common that had given rise to the social system itself. Moreover, in Venice, certain formal controls were applied to insure that persons in responsible positions would not use those positions for personal rather than common advantage. Among those controls were short non-renewable terms of office and the responsibility of the officials to the Council. It is perfectly true that in Venice as everywhere else, each member of the collectivity had some interests and purposes peculiarly his. In this sense there were special or selfish interests rather than common interests. But, in Venice, the institutional structure provided no legitimate place for the exercise of those special interests in determining who would govern or in what cause government would be conducted. The Venetian social system was, in this sense, insulated from the effects of special interests. Moreover, in their operation of the social system participants were defined by this system as essentially

sympathetic to it. They had much to learn about its needs.
They would need to be trained and corrected. They must
discriminate with increasing precision between the system's
requirements and their own. But given their basic commitment,
their continued life within the system and their service to
it and from it would produce steady improvement in these
matters. This steady improvement, I suggest, is appropriately
considered a process of socialization.

In Zurich, matters were different. Men participated in
government to support the common undertakings on which all
depended, but they participated only if they also served and
supported special interests in the collectivity--the guilds--
making certain that the social system served those special
interests as well as the common interest. Let it be clear
that important common enterprises were present in Zurich,
else the state would not have survived. But men legitimately
related to the social system in a manner which indicated that
their special interests were not foregone in pursuing the
common undertakings. Indeed this structure recognized that
those interests were organized, perpetuated, and fueled by
groups in the collectivity, groups having a considerable
autonomy. I suggest that processes then emerged which may
appropriately be considered processes of social control.
Participants in operating the social system might, in its name,
coerce and encourage and implore and seduce one another's
support for the system and, as the system was important to all,
they often were successful. On the other hand, they had to

reckon always with the presence in their fellows of persistent, ineradicable special interests and with the likelihood that such interests would conflict with those of the common enterprise. The coherence between the individuals' purposes and those of the system would never be complete. The most that could be achieved would be an ever-strengthened accomodation between the two concerns founded on an increase in the individual's commitment to the importance for him of the common interest and in his determination and skill in helping to control such of his own desires as conflicted with the common interest.

But speculations are not enough. I want now to exhibit the potentialities of this line of reasoning about collectivities and social systems and about socialization and social control. I want to express some implications of this reasoning for the form of primary relations between individuals and the social system in their society. I shall also offer some data as a test of those implications.

Catholic and Protestant Views of the Christian's Career

The first data to be examined come from Europe in the sixteenth century. In research aimed at explaining why some societies adopted Protestantism as their official creed whereas others remained Catholic, I developed a typology of governments designed to reveal the extent to which the operation of a society's central regime was penetrated by

special as contrasted with common interests. I understand that regime to be an index of a society's social system and collectivity.

I have described the typology in detail elsewhere and presented detailed findings from its application[23]. Its importance for our present interest is this: Catholicism views man's essential nature as, from birth, compatible with God's will. At the Reformation, all major Protestant groups viewed man's essential nature as, from birth, fundamentally incompatible with God's will and irremediably so. I found that, almost invariably, societies which adopted Protestantism had somewhat earlier developed a form of political regime like that in Zurich in the sense that men gained important positions in the operation of the central state as a consequence of their constituting or representing somewhat autonomous special interests. I found that, without exception, societies remained Catholic if, like Venice, they permitted individuals a role in operating the central regime only in their capacity as members of the commonalty.

I found that a simple five-fold typology enabled one to express the major relevant differences among European societies in early modern times, those societies being classified according to the means, if any, by which members of each society's collectivity could legitimately shape actions by that society's social system. Again, each society's national political regime was employed as an index of relations between its social system and collectivity.

The essentials of this typology are easily grasped. I begin with the types of political structure, that is of regime, illustrated by Venice and by Zurich. Regimes like the Venetian I have called commensal. As we have seen, they provide persons with legitimate participation in the social system only as members at large. Regimes like that at Zurich, I have called heterarchic. Legitimate participation in the regime is available to persons only because of their status in organizations that are not themselves agencies or creatures of the regime. In Zurich, these agencies were the city's guilds, but such other organizations in a population as regional subdivisions would do as well. In short, it is the existence of organizations as independent of the social system which is crucial and not their own characteristics.

The three remaining types of regime are all characterized by being headed by a governor. I mean by a governor an individual or small group exercising the executive and perhaps the judicial and legislative functions of government. This exercise of authority is legitimated when defined as conducted only on behalf of the social system. Thus it is commonly defined as conducted only for the common good or in the common interest. It specifically is not legitimate if conducted for other interests, let us call them special interests.

In what I shall call a centralist regime, the governor alone may legitimately formulate executive and administrative

policies and implement them. For example, the governor may
on its own authority appoint major administrative and judi-
cial officers, raise armies and militia and direct their use,
decide upon the proper expenditure of taxes and aids, establish
and operate a system of courts, and direct foreign affairs.
These were among the conventional powers of a feudal kind or
a so-called "absolute" monarch.

A second type of regime having a governor I shall call
limited-centralist. In these regimes the governor has the
powers described above, but is normatively required to employ
as its agents persons representing groups to which the gover-
nor's policies are applied. Such, for example, was the regime
in Prussia under Frederick the Great. The monarch was required
to accept as major local agencies of his policy persons and
groups designated by the nobility in each Prussian county.
These persons and groups were, therefore, not simply agents
of the governor, that is of the social system. They came to
play a significant role in the national regime's local activit-
ies because they constituted or represented significant and
independently powerful local authorities. Their official
role thus gave them a mixed position: members of the collect-
ivity and agents of the social system[24].

The last type of regime having a governor I shall call
balanced. In this regime, some individuals or groups in the
society have significant autonomous powers and normatively,
as a consequence of those powers, have a share in the
governor's central operation of the government. At some

periods, the Hungarian and Polish monarchies were of this
sort, the king being forced to share his executive and
judicial powers with representatives of nobles, the latter
being organized by county and forming a national Diet. In
these cases the national diets chose officials responsible to
them. The monarch was obligated to share most important
aspects of government with those officials. In a balanced
regime, then, persons share the central and local administra-
tion with the governor and they do so legitimately as instances
or representatives of power in the collectivity, and not as
agents of the social system.

To recapitulate the chief finding from employing typology:
With almost no exceptions, European societies having commensal
or centralist regimes remained Catholic whereas these having
limited-centralist, balanced, or heterarchic regimes adopted
Protestantism. To recapitulate the relevance of this finding
for primary relations and for socialization and social control:
I have taken theological doctrines about the relations between
man and God to symbolize relations between men and their
society. I have suggested that those relations can take the
form of socialization when men are able to participate legiti-
mately in their society's social system only as members and
agents of that system. On the other hand, I proposed that
relations between men are able to participate legitimately
in their society's social system only as members and agents
of that system. On the other hand, I proposed that relations
between men and God will take the form of social control to the

degree men are able to participate in their society's social
system as a consequence of their status, not as that system's
members or agents, but as members of their society's collectivity.
Finally, I proposed that commensal and centralist regimes allow
participation in the form just described as congenial to
socialization whereas limited-centralist, balanced, and heter-
archic regimes allow participation in the manner suggested as
consistent with the development of social control. What remains
is to indicate how Catholicism's view of man's salvation pictures
it as a process of socialization and how Protestantism's view
pictures it as a process of social control.

Careers in Catholicism and Protestantism

There is, I believe, no doubt that Catholicism pictures
man's spiritual career as a process of socialization;
Protestantism describing it rather as a progressive accept-
ance of social control. These are, of course, differences
in emphasis and controlling theme, not total disparities
in approach. The differences appear in the views of man
and in the problem of salvation as found in these faiths.
They appear also in doctrinal formulations about the accept-
able proofs of devotion and about procedures appropriate for
coping with deviation and defection.

In the Catholic doctrines of will and reason and of
the effects of baptism and confirmation we have assertions
that individuals, by nature and grace, are perfectable. In
the doctrine of beatification we learn that individuals can

totally overcome their resistance to God's will, entering at last into a completely harmonious communion with him. The road to beatification is a series of steps of growing sanctification--growing purity. It begins with reasoned assent to God's nature and man's need for him. This faith, assensus, is a product of experiences of God's gracious love and of knowledge of his will and purpose as revealed by Christ and taught by Christ in the Church. These steps to sanctification continue beyond the grave. That is the meaning of Purgatory--a realm where any remaining debts from sin are purged from the soul.

The Catholic's spiritual life is a long novitiate, the life of a learner, a trainee. And in that life, from birth through Purgatory, he is sponsored and disciplined, tutored and protected. Parents and God-parents, Church and Christ, the saints and the Mother of God, the angels and the Holy Spirit, the prayers of his own children, close relatives and others, each and all perfect his soul for that moment when, supple and sinless, it steps free to celebrate forever, a participant in God's inner life.

The whole course of this career is charted in well-marked stages. Some points on the way are identified by sacraments: baptism, confirmation, narriage, extreme unction. Other points will be identified by the priest as among the five stages of spiritual growth from the Awakening of the Self to the culminating Unitive Way of a self at one with God. And, at each point, there will be certain known and specific things

to be done and guidance will be provided and support given.

We must not suppose that this or any socialization is easy or undemanding. It does, however, provide the assurance of advancing down a marked path toward a known goal with the certainty, joyous outcome if one keeps to the task.

The Protestant's spiritual career takes shape in correspondence with his soul's intractable resistance to accepting its own limitations and God's love. Men are saved only because God freely accepts them in love despite their unworthiness and because he freely gives them faith. This faith Luther called _fiducia_. It is the awakening in a man of an indelible commitment to interact with God and, insofar as his character may permit, to grow into deeper, loving communion with his divine companion. He is now and forever God's man. He also is, and remains, his independent self. He is, therefore, deeply ambivalent, acknowledging that he has received gifts he does not deserve yet ever resisting his lack of worth, responding to God with an answering, grateful trust and confidence yet following his own desires.

The career itself has no well-posted stages and the only assurance of a successful outcome is the sense of faith itself. But there is growth in faith. It comes from the continuous effort to do God's will in the world and toward one's self. It is a growing assurance not in one's perfectability but in the existence and persistence within one of that commitment, that faith, by which men are saved. It is an increasing appreciation of God's presence and power and

an increasing gratitude for his companionship. It is men

so committed whom God takes into Heaven as his own and, by

means unknown, perfects at once.

Kierkegaard once said that Luther invented a religion

"for the adult man[25]." This does not imply that Catholicism

is childish or suited only for adults who want to be treated

as children. It means that the Protestant relation of man

and God is analogous to the relations among adults. It is

a love between persons totally dependent on one another yet

also free and possessing each is independent integrity. The

freedom of each requires from both a willingness to take

risks and to bear uncertainty. The course of this love,

like that of a close friendship or an ideal marriage, is

not well charted in advance, consisting rather of each

participant's doing for the other what seems required as

they cope with whatever contingencies each day brings.

Luther rejoiced in this spiritual relation. He de-

plored man's sin, but thanked God for man's freedom and for

God's full companionship. He saw in Catholicism a view

of God as offering man full communion only when man was

spiritually perfect--even as parental love however great

is yet limited by the parental role, that is by the exercise

of superordinate authority and judgment over the children.

Man possessed of _fiducia_ may relate to God as to a close

friend each irrevocably committed to the other. God, said

Luther, gives to the elect the greatest of gifts, that is

his full companionship. He gives them that at once. Eternity

has no meaning other than this companionship. Therefore,
Eternity is now.

The tests of one's acceptance of Catholicism, as of any
process of socialization, are continued willingness to expose
oneself to that process and to make one's own the standards
it promotes. The tests of one's acceptance of Protestantism,
as of any process of social control, are continued willingness
to expose oneself to that process and the taking of such
initiatives as one can to promote the interests of fellow
participants. As Richard Niebuhr suggests, in Catholicism,
human culture and society are to be accepted and appreciated
as God's gift whereas in Protestantism they are to be con-
verted to God's will as a tribute to his goodness[26].

In socialization, and in Catholicism, certain spiritual
dangers are especially common: greediness; a taking of nur-
turance for granted; a wooden, minimal conformity; a transfer
of ultimate responsibility to higher authority. In social
control, and in Protestantism, there similarly are special
dangers: a forgetting of one's dependence on one's partner;
a confusion of one's will with his desire or of one's powers
with his; a reduction of interaction to superficialities; a
compulsive or perfectionistic effort to please or to justify
oneself. In both socialization and social control, in
Catholicism and Protestantism, men fail God and he forgives
them, but in socialization the trainee can also forgive him-
self by performing acts of restitution and penance and,
especially, by sensing that he himself has changed and that

deviance is less probable in the future. Under social

control self-forgiveness is more difficult because no

fundamental change of the self is possible. One cannot

see himself as truly as meriting forgiveness. One can only

indicate by further initiatives and efforts the depth of

one's commitments to one's friend[27].

The Father and the Mother

Thus far I have described conditions that permit a

primary relation with one's society and have shown that

some of our conflicts with society are inherent in society's

dual nature as a collectivity and a social system. I have

proposed that our concord with society and ourselves is

restored through processes of socialization or social

control. I then suggested conditions determining which of

these processes would be the more likely in a given society

and applied those conditions to the case of the Reformation.

In that application, God was interpreted as a symbol for a

society's social system and doctrines of salvation were

seen as symbols of the processes for reconciling difficulties

between the social system and men, the latter being viewed

in their capacity as members of the society's collectivity.

I want now to go one step further. We need more support

for the typology just applied to the Reformation. We need

more evidence that it indeed embodies conditions in a

society relevant for socialization and social control and

not conditions irrelevant for those phenomena yet somehow

associated with the Reformation. To help determine the
typology's relevance for our present concerns, I have also
applied it to a sample of primitive societies. I predicted
that the same political arrangements associated with Cathol-
icism would be found in primitive societies having a matri-
lineal rule of descent. I expected an association between the
political arrangements that relate to Protestantism and the
presence in a primitive society of a patrilineal rule of
descent. The possibility of such findings first occurred
to me when considering the near absence from Protestant
theology of the Virgin and Mother of God.

The governing image in the Catholic theology of
salvation is that of the Heavenly Family. In that family
are God, the august and loving Father; Christ, his son,
our lord and brother; the Holy Spirit, our companion,
inspiriter, and friend. There also is Mary, Christ's
mother and ours and there is the Church[28]. In one aspect
the Church is Christ's immortal natural body, in another
aspect it is our mother and teacher, and, in yet a third,
the Church is Christ's bride[29]. We see at once that the
Protestant image contains no bride or wife or mother. It
is an image/of the Trinity, and, for Luther and Calvin,
only
an image especially of God the Father and God the Son[30].

How might the imagery of salvation be thought linked
to rules of descent? My reasoning began with facts known
about the roles of men and women.

Systematic study has shown that women are everywhere

the chief socializers of the young[31]. This does not mean
that men fail to love children and to share in their
training. It means that in all societies women, most
obviously mothers, sisters, grandmothers, and aunts, are
held especially responsible for the early care and training
of children. They also have special responsibility for
reintegrating dissident members of the family, for making
them wholly at one with their kin. These seem to me tasks
of socialization.

The special tasks of adult males are what Bales has called
the work of "task leadership[32]." A part of that work is the
relating of the family or of other groups to the environment
from which they must obtain their resources. A second part
of task leadership is legitimated by the first. It consists
of the exercise of necessary discipline over members of the
group--encouraging, altering, directing, cajoling, coercing.
That discipline cannot be exercised as socialization. The
group must be coordinated and effective despite deviant
desires among members. Socialization may be employed over
the long run and may serve to decrease the amount of dis-
cipline required, but, in the short run, the discipline
exercised has primarily the character of social control.

These observations lead to a suggestion about rules of
descent: Matrilineal rules of descent arise in societies in
which the social system relates to individuals through social-
ization, the rule symbolizing the system as socializer. Patri-
lineal rules of descent arise in societies in which the social

system relates to individuals through social control, the rule symbolizing the system as an exerciser of social control.

Studies of Rules of Descent

We may notice first a meaning of these two rules of descent. In employing one rule or the other, each member of a society is declared more closely related to the kin of one of his parents than to the kin of his other parent. Usually, but far from always, each person then has other special relations with these closer kin. It may be from them that he inherits or gets assistance or receives orders. It may be they whom he can command and with whom he resides. It is common, but not inevitable, that in matrilineal societies a newly married couple goes to live with or near the wife's maternal relatives; in patrilineal societies with the husband's paternal relatives[33].

A second noteworthy point concerning these rules is the failure thus far of explanations which attribute a society's use of one or the other principle to the role in that society of males or females[34]. In recent times the dominant line of explanation for matrilineal descent has stressed its association with the exceptional importance of women in a society's economy or in providing stability in society. It is argued, for example, that if women's work provides a society's members with their primary food supply there will be an increased likelihood of the society's adopting matriliny.

Similarly, if war or trade or hunting makes the life chances of adult males especially hazardous, it is argued that a society's stability must be provided by the wives and mothers and again that matriliny will be adopted. Analogous arguments are made to account for the appearance of patriliny. To state only one of these: The predominance of patriliny in societies in which the raising of large animals is important is often explained on the grounds that such animal husbandry requires masculine strength.

The number of exceptions to these theories has been distressingly great. Indeed, it seems that knowledge of the many exceptions has discouraged any large-scale systematic test of theories usefulness. Instead, anthropologists have turned to other lines of explanation[35].

These new lines of work have an affinity with the old. They too conceive rules of descent as symbolizing the relative importance of the sexes in a given society. But they also are ingeniously different. They seek to make a case for the inherently greater organizational strengths of localized, extended families founded on matriliny and they then predict the rise of matriliny if a need for those strengths appears. Goodenough, Schneider, and others seem to have discovered important features of matrilineal and patrilineal families as a result of explorations along these lines. On the other hand, the organizational strengths to which they point presumably occur only in extended families or in still larger organized units based on kinship whereas a matrilineal or

patrilineal rule of descent is often found in societies in which the nuclear family is the largest organized kinship group. No test has yet been made of these new theories even in the societies for which they might be relevant.

A tabulation of Aberle's reminds one of a third consideration[36]. Employing Murdock's sample of the world's societies he finds that 44 per cent are patrilineal and 15 per cent matrilineal. Another five per cent are duolineal and 36 per cent are bilateral.

There is no well-established explanation for a society's adoption of a unilinear rule of descent instead of bilaterality. I also cannot explain that adoption. My proposal deals only with the conditions under which matriliny or patriliny will be adopted if a unilinear pattern rather than bilaterality is the choice. The proposal before us, then, is that unilinear rules of descent symbalize the process by which members of a society's collectivity are reconciled with their society's social system; matriliny symbolizing a process of socialization and patriliny a process of social control. For reasons already given, I believe the typology of social systems employed in studying the Reformation is appropriate for this task. The next step is to apply that typology to a new sample of societies.

This sample consists of 40 societies chosen from those listed in Murdock's World Ethnographic Sample[37]. Ten come from each of four regions: Africa, the Pacific Islands, North America, and South America. Each area is represented

by five matrilineal and five patrilineal societies. Other
regions of the world have too few matrilineal societies to
permit investigation.

In an exploratory study such as this a further limit-
ation was necessary. Matrilineal societies are dispropor-
tionately less frequent among these employing plough agri-
culture or pastoralism. There may well be some direct,
instrumental connection between a given line of descent and
these types of economy. I, however, wanted to explore the
influence of political regime and chose to control variations
possibly due to economic customs. Because matrilineal societies
are (comprising 84 cases in Murdock's sample of 564) descent
systems relatively rare among the world's societies I chose
all societies for my sample from the levels of economy in which
matriliny is most frequent[38]. These levels are what Aberle
defines as "dominant horticulture" and "other horticulture,"
the former being much the more common[39]. The societies so
classified lack the plough and do not depend on the rearing
of large animals as a major source of subsistence. They do
depend onthe cultivation of crops either as their chief
source of good or as one of their most important means of
subsistence. In Murdock's total sample, 62 per cent of all
matrilineal societies have one of these economies (56 per cent
being "dominant horticulture" and 6 per cent "other horti-
culture"). In the four regions of the world containing enough
matrilineal societies to permit comparative study, 72 per cent
of such societies have these types of economy (54 our of 75
cases).

--Insert Table 1 about here--

Table 1 reveals a further problem in sampling. If,
within these types of economy, one wants matrilineal societies
that are relatively independent of each other, he hopes to
take each society from a different "culture area" within
each region of the world. It happens, however, that, in each
region, only about half of the culture areas have at least
one matrilineal society and less than half contain at least
one matrilineal and one patrilineal society. And there is
a final complication: many of the societies appropriate in
region, economy, culture area, and rule of descent cannot be
considered for a sample because their patterns of govern-
ment are not well enough described.

Faced with all these complexities, I decided on the
following procedure for sampling: Within every culture area
having both a matrilineal and patrilineal society with the
appropriate kind of economic system, I chose one society of
each type. I employed a table of random numbers in making
those choices. I then chose at random one matrilineal society
from culture areas having at least one but not a suitable
patrilineal society. I then added by random means sufficient
additional societies from those that remained to complete
the sample desired. When I found necessary information
lacking for a society, I replaced it with another according
to the priorities just described.

The sample that results is not a random sample of
societies having these economies and rules of descent, even

as Murdock's sample is not randomly selected from all known
societies. My sample does provide such independence of cases
and such geographic diversity as present knowledge seems to
permit.

--Insert Table 2 about here--

Table 2 presents the findings. The appended Ethno-
graphic Bibliography lists the sources on which those find-
ings are based. The Ethnographic Summaries state the
relevant facts about the government of each society. The
classification of rules of descent is Murdock's. That
classification and my classification of forms of government
refer to patterns which seem indigenous to these societies,
indigenous at least by the definition that neither rule of
descent or pattern of government shall be known to have been
imposed by some other and superordinate society.

The definitions of type of regime as given earlier in
this paper and elaborated elsewhere were generally applicable[40].
I found it desirable to specify for primitives only two con-
siderations not evident in my studies of Europe at the
Reformation: In some of the primitive societies there is
a kind of heterarchy of individuals and families. The signs
of this are observers' statements that there is no formal
means of government in evidence or that such government
lacks any means of making binding decisions or of enforcing
decisions that are made. Such reports frequently contain the
further observation that the people are highly individualistic,

Table 1

"DOMINANT" AND "OTHER" HORTICULTURAL SOCIETIES BY REGION AND THE PRESENCE OF MATRILINY

Region	Number of societies	Number of matrilineal societies	Number of culture areas	Culture areas having at least one society with:	
				Matriliny	Matriliny and one with patriliny
Africa	38	17	10	6	4
Insular Pacific	45	22	10	5	3
North America	26	24	10	3	2
South America	25	12	10	5	3

Table 2

REGIMES AND LINEALITY

Rule of Descent	Type of Regime				
	Commensal	Centralist	Limited Centralist	Balanced	Heterarchic
Matri- lineal	Apinaye Bush Negroes Creek Delaware Navaho New Ireland Talamanca	Arawak Bemba Buka Goajiro Kongo Lamba Lesa Marshal- lese Trobriands Truk Yao Zuni			Mandan
	N = 7	N = 12	N = 0	N = 0	N = 1
Patri- lineal		Azande Omaha Sherente		Atayal Fang Mende	*Araucanians *Aymara Fox *Jivaro Kapauku *Malekulans *Maricopa *Nuer *Orokaiva Shawnee Tikopia Tiv *Tucuna Winnebago
	N = 0	N = 3	N = 0	N = 3	N = 14

perhaps irascibly so. This kind of heterarchic society is marked with an asterisk in Table 2. One must distinguish these simplest heterarchic societies from certain commensal societies, in both of which decisions may be made by direct democracy. I counted a society employing direct democracy as commensal if the adult citizens or the older men met as needed to decide important matters, their decisions being binding and enforceable.

I found, second, that the ethnographic accounts never provided data for a confident judgment that a primitive regime was limited-centralist. One can say that in early modern times certain European states were of this sort, there being clear evidence of: a). a substantial program developed by a governor, b). the implementation of that program in the activities of local groups, and c). the required employ- ment of somewhat autonomous local powers as the governor's agents in effecting this implementation, these powers then coming to some degree under the governor's supervision. Among my sample of primitive societies, however, either this com- plex pattern does not exist or the published reports are too imprecise to permit its being identified. When in doubt, I have called a regime centralist rather than limited-centralist.

As Table 2 shows, the relationship between type of regime and rule of descent is very strong and in the direction ex- pected: 19 out of 22 commensal and centralist regimes are matrilineal and 17 of 18 limited-centralist, balanced, and heterarchic regimes are patrilineal. The relationship is

sufficiently striking to dismiss any fear one might have that
it occurs on only certain continents. I interpret these
results as supporting the judgment that certain types of regime,
hence certain types of interaction between collectivity and
social system, are experienced by their participants as
relating to those participants after the manner of socializa-
tion whereas others so relate after the manner of social
control. It would be desirable to have for primitive
societies the evidence we have for the Reformation, evidence
showing that an emphasis on socialization or one social con-
trol is embodied respectively in the ideologies of matrilineal
and patrilineal societies[41]. That would require new research.

Conclusion

Most people, I have urged, have a primary relationship
with their society and those who do must necessarily cope
with the strains of this intimacy even as they enjoy its
nurturance. The logic of Cooley's argument prepares us to
see further even than he, guiding our attention to the unity
of intimacy and love however large or abstract the partners
who undertake it. I have said that Cooley was a typically
American sociologist in presenting to us society as a collect-
ivity and have proposed that we can penetrate certain mysteries
of our experience only when this view is complemented by
traditions of thought which see society not only as a social
system but as also a social system. The explication of that
view has been a principal task of American Sociologists of
the present generation. Ours is an outcome toward which

Cooley looked in the closing chapter of his last major book, Social Process[42]:

> Perhaps the greatest weakness of our idealism
> is that it does not imagine living social wholes.
> So strong is the individualist tradition in America
> and England that we hardly permit ourselves to aspire
> toward an ideal society directly, but think that we
> must approach it by some distributive formula, like
> "the greatest good of the greatest number." Such
> formulas are unsatisfying to human nature.... The
> ideal society must be an organic whole...requiring to
> be so conceived if it is to lay hold on our
> imaginations. ...
>
> ... We need a conception more affirmative and in-
> spiring, which shall above all give us something
> worth while to live for, something that appeals
> to imagination, hope, and love.

Footnotes

1. See, for example, Emile Durkheim, <u>The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life</u> (Joseph W. Swaine, translator), Gordon: Allen and Unevine, 1926; <u>Moral Education</u>, (Everett K. Wilson and Herman Schnurer, translators), New York: The Free Press, 1961).

2. <u>The Person and the Common Good</u> (John J. Fitzgerald, translator, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947, pp. 39, 42-43.

3. Charles H. Cooley, <u>Social Organization, A Study of the Larger Mind</u>, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1919, p. 23.

4. Guy E. Swanson, <u>The Birth of the Gods, The Origin of Primitive Beliefs</u>, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960; "On the Immanence of Ultimate Value: Evidence from the Reformation," dittoed report, Center for Research on Social Organization, Department of Sociology, University of Michigan, 1965.

5. Cooley, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 3-4; It was explicitly the mechanistic properties of Spencer's thought which led Cooley to reject it; "I imagine that nearly all of us who took up sociology between 1870, say, and 1890 did so at the instigation of Spencer. ... My own defection...was one of the earliest and most complete...." See Cooley's "Reflections upon the Sociology of Herbert Spencer," <u>The American Journal of Sociology</u>, 26 (September, 1920), pp. 129-145, especially pp. 138-144.

6. Cooley, <u>Social Organization</u>, p. 330.

7. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 28.

8. <u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 29-30.

9. <u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 32-33, 35, 37-38.

10. <u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 135, 137, 318.

11. <u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 51, 318.

12. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 331.

13. Bronislaw Malinowski, <u>Crime and Custom in Savage Society</u>, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., Inc., 1926, Part I.

14. Cooley, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 64, 313-314.

15. <u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 320-321, 324. Cooley tended to treat primary relations between participants in large groups as extensions of, or as generalizations from, their experiences in small, informal groups. This approach is not radically different from that of Freud or of Kardiner, both of whom concluded that many large-scale social relations are only "projections" of their participants' experiences in the family. I, personally, think it more profitable to identify the qualities have formally similar consequences in either situation. For a discussion, see: Guy E. Swanson, "The Routinization of Love, Structure and Process in Primary Relations," in Samuel Z. Klausner, Editor, <u>The Quest for Self Control: Classical Philosophies and Scientific Research</u>, New York: The Free Press, 1965, pp   .

16. Some political sources of American scholars' reservations about society as a social system are reviewed by Merle Curti (with particular reference to the psychologist Floyd Allport). See Curti's <u>The Roots of American Loyalty</u>, New York: Columbia University's Press, 1946, pp. 241-242. See also: Leon D. Bramson, <u>The Political Context of Sociology</u>, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961, Chapters 4 and 5.

17. Many of the classic debates over the nature of the social contract turn on the difference between society as a collectivity and as a social system. (See, for example: John W. Gough, <u>The Social Contract, A Critical Study of Its Development</u>, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1957). I believe, however, that Werner Stark leads us astray in identifying this basic difference in conception with mechanical as contrasted with organismic ideas of social life. Cooley's view of organic social relations is only one instance of a theory which rejects both mechanistic and organismic theories. In this it is typical of American sociologists. (See: Stark's <u>The Fundamental Forms of Social Thought</u>, London: Routledge, 1962.) Hegel made the interesting suggestion that formulations of social life as contractual apply to a collectivity (his term was "society") but not to a social system (his term was "the state"). On Hegel's conceptions see: Herbert Marcuse, <u>Reason and Revolution, Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory</u>, New York: Oxford University Press, 1941, Chapter 6.

18. Sociologists will appreciate that the analytic emphasis which today is usually called "functionalism" takes as its premise the existence of a social system and seeks to derive implications from that premise--the implications of participants' getting some of their resources and facilities and assignments and authority only in consequence of their status as agents of a collective effort. Sociologists will also understand that the larger, and better-developed

portion of their concepts and theories refer primarily to implications of participation in a collectivity. In contrast to functionalism, we might term this better-established mode of analysis, "interactionalism."

19. It may be that the current controversy about the appropriateness of a "reinforcement" or "exchange" interpretation of interpersonal relations as contrasted with a "balance-theory" interpretation would be resolved by distinguishing between such relations as collectivities and such relations as social systems. Whereas the predictions of reinforcement or exchange theorists seem to hold under both conditions, those of balance theorists appear to specify additional phenomena that would occur only were people tied together as a social system. The contending positions are reviewed with exceptional clarity by J. Alan Winter in his as yet unpublished doctoral dissertation: "Cognitive Balance, Strategic Balance, and Discomfort in a Competitive Situation," Doctoral Program in Social Psychology, The University of Michigan, 1964.

20. The exact nature of this conflict can be further clarified by indicating what it is not. It is not: a). The conflict between biological impulsivity and social constraints; b). that conflict mentioned by Cooley between "all definite social structures: and the "larger impulses of human nature"; c). a clash due to multiple-group memberships-- only one group is involved here; d). the conflict between the individual and society--an antimony connoting that the individual's requirements are selfish or illegitimate or of a secondary importance or of a lesser moral worth. In this last connection, a particular value of Cooley's analysis of society is his stress on the moralization of relations in collectivities as well as in social systems and the legitimation in the former of many demands which participants make on the latter.

21. Durkheim, op. cit.

22. A point important in the interpretations by Mead and by Parsons. See: George H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1934, pp. 152-163; Talcott Parsons, "Social Structure and the Development of Personality: Freud's Contribution to the Integration of Psychology and Sociology," Psychiatry, 21 (November, 1958), pp. 321-340.

23. Swanson, "On the Immanence of Ultimate Values...," cited above.

24. A formal dualism which I believe is not unrelated to the dualism of Lutheran doctrine. And I have shown that Lutheranism was most likely to become established under

limited-centralist regimes. On Lutheran dualism consult: H. Richard Niebuhr, <u>Christ and Culture</u>, New York: Harper and Bros., 1951.

25. Quoted in Erik H. Erikson, <u>Young Man Luther, A Study in Psychoanalysis and History</u>, New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1958, p. 71.

26. Niebuhr, <u>op. cit</u>. See also: Paul Tillich, <u>The Protestant Era</u> (James Luther Adams, translator), Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948; Henry R. Van Til, <u>The Calvinistic Concept of Culture</u>,Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1959.

27. A point not overlooked by Catholic controversialists. See, for example: Joseph Pohle, "Justification," in <u>The Catholic Encyclopedia</u>, vol. 8, 1910, pp. 573-578; Etienne Gilson, <u>The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy</u> (A. H. C. Downs, translator), New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940, pp. 125, 321-322, 421-422.

    Many social scientists seem to confuse Protestant views and Jansenist views. Jansenism meant a formal belief in the Catholic sacraments and in the Catholic Church as Christ's mystical body; these beliefs coupled with the conviction that man's nature was hopelessly corrupted. Neither the Church and sacraments, as in Catholicism, nor any certainty of justification, as in Luther and Calvin, were held doctrinally to offer any hope for salvation. A particularly trenchant review of these matters is found in Robert R. Palmer's <u>Catholics and Unbelievers in Eighteenth Century France</u>, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939, pp. 23-52.

28. Two recent and helpful works on Mariology are: Hilda Graef, <u>Mary, A History of Doctrine and Devotion</u>, vol. 1, London: Sheed and Ward, 1963; E.L. Mascall and H.S. Box (editors), <u>The Blessed Virgin Mary, Essays by Anglican Writers</u>, London: Darton, Longman and Todd, Ltd., 1963.

29. There is a substantial literature by social scientists concerning the emphasis in Protestantism on God the Father and Son in contrast with the Catholic emphasis on the Virgin and the Mother Church. As one would expect, psychoanalytic writers have been especially sensitive to this point. See, for example: Erikson, <u>op. cit</u>., pp. 71-73, 115-125, 208, 213-214, 216-217, 220-222, 254-260; Erich Fromm, <u>The Dogma of Christ and Other Essays on Religion, Psychology and Culture</u>, New York, Hold, Rinehart and Winston, 1963, pp. 67-71, 90-91; Carl G. Jung, "A Psychological Approach to the Dogma of the Trinity," in Herbert Read and Others (editors), <u>The Collected Works of C.G. Jung</u>, Vol. 11, New York: Pantheon Books, Inc., 1958, pp. 107-200. For a recent discussion by a social anthropologist, see: W. Lloyd Warner, <u>The Living and the</u>

Dead, A Study of the Symbolic Life of Americans, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959, pp. 336-338, 341-342, 491-492.

Warner's view is that the sacred personae of Catholic theology symbolize not only the family as a normative social organization, but also men and women as biological organisms, that is as males and females. Because organic sexuality is one aspect of man's "nature as a complex animal, with all faculties and 'instincts' to which he is born" (p. 105), Warner speaks of the divine Father and of the Mother of God as being, in part, "species" symbols. He reminds us that "The term species emphasizes the group character of man's animal nature and behavior rather than the individual. It emphasizes the unconscious, non-rational and adaptive aspects of human thought, emotion, and behavior.... [This social aspect of animal nature] holds human beings together and is creative...." (p. 105) In interpreting the doctrines on the Virgin, he writes: "...the Virgin...expresses the central and focal point of species life: the procreative, fecund woman sexually conceiving, bearing, and caring for her child. Her sacred symbols...greatly strengthen the masculine symbols of species existence. ... Her presence as the Divine woman more fully involves men as males in the sacred world; the male aspects of God functioning as procreator and procreated are more clearly stated, thus providing a more unified emotional experience for the morally trained organism. ..." (p. 338)

30. Henry P. Van Dusen, Spirit, Son, and Father, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958.

31. Morris Zelditch, Jr., "Role Differentiation in the Nuclear Family: A Comparative Study," in Talcott Parsons and Robert F. Bales (editors), Family, Socializationand Interaction Process, Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1955, pp. 307-351.

32. Robert F. Bales and Philip E. Slater, "Role Differentiation in Small Decision-Making Groups," in Ibid., pp. 259-306.

33. The classic review of these matters in George P. Murdock's Social Structure, New York: The Macmillan Co., 1949.

34. Older theories of descent are reviewed in Ibid. and by David F. Aberle in his "Matrilineal Descent in Cross-Cultural Perspective," in David M. Schneider and Kathleen Gough (editors), Matrilineal Kinship, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962, pp. 655-727.

35. The newer approaches are considered in: Schneider and Gough, op. cit.: Ward H. Goodenough's review of Ibid. in American Anthropologist, 65 (August, 1963), pp. 923-928; Audrey I. Richards, "Some Types of Family Structure Amongst the Central Bantu," in A. R. Radcliffe-Brown and Daryll

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36. Aberle, _op. cit._, p. 663.

37. George P. Murdock, "World Ethnographic Sample," _American Anthropologist_, 59 (August, 1957), 664-687. I am grateful to Mary G.B. Swanson who helped me locate and abstract the ethnographic materials.

38. Aberle, _op. cit._, p. 677.

39. _Ibid._

40. I found that on Truk two systems of descent are in force. There are corporate lineages which govern their members and these are matrilineal. Several lineages are organized into a superordinate corporate group, a subsib. Subsibs also are matrilineal. But lineages are further organized into districts, a separately governing organization, and districts are patrilineal. Because Truk entered my sample as a matrilineal society (for so Murdock codes it), the data I report refer to the subsibs and lineages, not the districts. Interestingly, however, the patrilineal district organization is that of a balanced regime.

41. Having first linked the typology of regimes to the extent to which ultimate values are experienced as immanent in a society, it would be interesting to see whether matrilineal societies differ from patrilineal in this respect as well.

42. Charles H. Cooley, _Social Process_, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927, pp. 417-418.

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ETHNOGRAPHIC SUMMARIES

A. Key:

The purpose of these summaries is to present data essential
for arriving at a decision about each society's type of regime.
These are not all the relevant data, but I offer them as con-
sistent with the whole of the data I have examined and suffi-
cient to permit the classification needed. The data are
presented as answers to the four following questions:

1. What is the largest indigenous decision-making unit under
which these people live?

2. What significant but smaller indigenous decision-making
units are found in this population?

3. Who may legitimately play what role in shaping decisions
made by the unit specified under 1 above?

4. Who may legitimately play what role in shaping decisions
made by the units specified under 2 above, and, especially,
what role if any have such units with respect to decisions
of the unit specified under 1?

To avoid lengthy repetition, I sometimes use the words "general
administration" to refer to the exercise of all or most of the
following powers of government: deciding on war or peace,
establishing and operating a system of justice, preserving in-
ternal order, deploying armed forces, coordinating important
economic operations or supplying facilities for them.

B. Africa

Azande

1. Kingdom

2. Provinces, homesteads

3. King: Accedes through inheritance. Conducts general
administration. Reports characterize central government
as very strong.

4. King, provincial chiefs, and headmen: King appoints chiefs,
but usually chooses them from members of his own family.
Chiefs serve as his deputies in the provinces, but each
has a great measure of independence in the internal affairs
of his province. Chiefs appoint headmen.

Bemba

1. Paramount chieftainship

2. Districts, villages

3. King and ritual officers (bakabilo): All accede to office through inheritance. King has initiative in operating general government, but must consult ritual officers for advice. They, in turn, may withhold from king magical ceremonies necessary for his rule if they disapprove his decisions. Ritual officers do not represent political subdivisions in the country. They are, instead, priests. King is high priest, his ritual powers indispensable for the country's welfare.

4. District chiefs, headmen: King appoints district chiefs who appoint village headmen. Chiefs chosen from the king's family.

Fang

1. Village

2. Extended families

3. a. Village headman: Inherits position, providing council approves his accession. Alternatively, gains post by being the original settler in an area. He has only persuasive authority; not coercive powers. As head of the locally important ancestral cult, he has pre-eminence, but he is not predominant. Chairs village council.

   b. Village council: Consists of representatives of all minor lineages resident in the village, of representatives of ritual associations, and of the leading warriors and the richest men. Makes all important decisions about general administration.

4. Heads of families: Inherit their posts.

Kongo

1. Paramount chieftainship

2. Districts, villages

3. Paramount chief: Accedes to position as winner of a military and ritual struggle among major chiefs of districts upon the death of reigning Paramount. Once in, the office is the object of great deference. Is believed both personally, and as holder of the supreme office, to have great magical powers. His edicts cannot be questioned. He is the chief judge with powers of life and death to be used at his discretion. Anything he sees and wants must be given him, including married women. He selects his own councilors; may replace

incompetent district chiefs. He or his agents operate
the general administration. He ennobles for a large
fee and must confirm the heir to a noble title in his
inheritance.

4. a. District chiefs: Nobles who are empowered by the
paramount to act as local judges, collect taxes,
and perform other activities of general administra-
tion in areas assigned them.

   b. Village chiefs: Usually obtain office crescively
as people come to look to them for aid and advice.
Once formally approved in office by Paramount are
responsible to him and to District chief. Village
chiefs allot land to villagers, levy taxes, make
rules about internal order and child-rearing, act
as local magistrates, receive a portion of all
produce and all of the fines levied in their own
courts.

Lamba

1. Paramount chieftainship

2. Districts, villages

3. Paramount chief: Accedes through inheritance. Is
chief judge. Chooses as his councilors 4 or 5 commoners
from disparate clans. Appoints leaders for warfare.

4. a. District chief: An inherited post. Rules over
several villages. Sends frequent gifts to Paramount
but district is never taxed by Paramount. Obligated
to support Paramount in war. Is chief judge in
district, having power to inflict capital punishment
or slavery.

   b. Village headman: An inherited post. Relates to dis-
trict chief as latter does to Paramount but also is
responsible to Paramount for keeping good order in
his village. Magistrate of village with power to
levy fines. More serious cases must be referred to
District Chief or Paramount.

Lesa

1. Kingdom

2. Localized clans

3. King: An inherited post. Appoints kinsmen as his
provincial officials. Collects tithes from constituent
clans. Is supreme judge with powers of life and death.

Is described as having unlimited power--no disagreement with his edicts being permitted. He has magical power to punish the disobedient. He receives a part of all fines levied by local courts.

4. Clan chief: A post inherited by the oldest male member. Is paid tithes by members of other clans resident on his lands. Is local judge with power to order corporal and capital punishment.

Mende

1. Paramount chieftainship

2. Districts, villages

3. a. Paramount chief: Accedes through conquest or as the choice of his predecessor. Operates general administration. Is patron of the Poro society (see below). Is sponsor, but not officiant, at ceremonies of ancestral cult. Is supported by substantial labor services and tribute.

   b. Speaker: A chancellor chosen by Paramount from a family line other than his own but related to it. Most problems brought first to Speaker. Transmits Paramount's orders. Informs the people if Paramount departs from tradition.

   c. Council: Consists of Speaker, district chiefs, village headmen, and other notables. Paramount must consult it on all important matters and is responsible to it.

4. a. District chiefs and village headmen: Inherited offices. Operate general administration of their areas.

   b. Poro society: Organized only on a local basis although its elders may be summoned by Paramount for consultation. A secret society for males from wealthier families. Supports government's edicts and, when necessary, punishes offenders against those edicts. Sets dates for agricultural activities. Regulates trade and prices. Status of elder gained by seniority and by receiving training for higher degrees of membership.

Nuer

1. Tribal sections

2. Villages

3. a. All members of the maximal lineage: Have preeminence but no special privileges or powers.

   b. Each adult male resident individually: There are no councils or officials, nor are there any routinized procedures for general administration. All leadership is _ad_ _hoc_.

4. Village government repeats that just described.

Tiv

1. Strong but informal net of obligations among lineages and compounds.

2. Compounds

3. Informal council of influential men: These individuals have gained popularity and influence outside their own compounds. They usually are the heads of compounds who gain wealth sufficient to buy great titles and magic. Existing members of this elite must consent to the rise of a potential new member for they collectively have magical powers sufficient to counteract those of any individual. Members of this elite sit collectively or in small groups to conduct judicial proceedings and manage external affairs.

4. Compound head: Is oldest male. Financially responsible for all compound members. Receives from them a portion of all gains from economic transactions. Responsible for feeding members during months of hunger. Controls most of the locally important magical forces. Arbitrates disputes. Gives permission for the building of huts or the admission of new members to the compound.

Yao

1. Chiefdom

2. Districts, villages

3. Chief: Hereditary post. Conducts general administration Prays to his ancestors for rain or for permission to initiate the young men. Appoints councilors from among the headmen of the more important villages. These he empowers to exercise the higher justice and administration in their own and neighboring villages and generally to act as his deputies and advisors.

4. a. District chiefs: (see above)

   b. Village headmen: Each is a senior male descendent of the village's founder, selected by the villagers from

the roster of possible candidates. Is responsible to
the Chief for his village and represents it to him.

B. Insular Pacific

Atayal

1. Tribe

2. Clans

3. a. Chief: Designated by predecessor. Leads in war and
operates general administration. May fine clans for
disobeying orders.

b. Council: Consists of all clan chiefs and the greatest
warriors. Meet at the chief's call. Binding decisions
made by majority vote. Has power to tax, suspend
recalcitrant members of tribe, legislate, and sit
as a court.

4. a. Clan Chief: Designated by predecessor. (see above)

b. Clan council: Consists of heads of member families
plus all successful headhunters in those families.
Meets twice a year or additionally at chief's call.
Conducts legislative and judicial business. Assesses
members for clan's expenses. May suspend recalcitrant
members.

Buka

1. Lineage village

2. None

3. Lineage head: Accedes as the eldest male in lineage.
Leads in war. Makes alliances. Has powers of life
and death. Must consent to the undertaking of armed
conflict. Kinsmen enforce compliance with his orders.

4. None

Kapauku

1. Confederation of villages

2. Villages

3. Council: Consists of those village headmen who also
gained magical powers. Determines all policy.
Conducts foreign affairs.

4. Village headman: A village may have one or several head-
men. Gains office by gradually and competitively obtain-

ing wealth. People said to be very individualistic. All property individually owned. Keen competition for wealth. Rich men gain political influence by amassing retinue of debtors and benefactees.

Malekulans

1. Village

2. None

3. No chiefs, councils, or other formal government. Only ad hoc procedures are employed to effect collective action.

4. None.

Marshallese

1. Paramount chieftainship

2. Nobles, lineages

3. Paramount chiefs. An hereditary post. Controlled all the land and its produce. Led in war and sailing. Had great magical powers. Could impose terrible and arbitrary punishments. Had access to all commoner women. Could dispossess commoners of lands at will. At his discretion allocated to nobles rights to commoners' produce in return for nobles serving as his supervisors over agriculture.

4. a. Nobles: Hereditary post. (see above)

   b. Lineage heads: Hereditary heads of commoners' lineages. Direct agricultural work under supervision of those nobles designated by Paramount.

New Ireland

1. Hamlets

2. None

3. Clan elders: Older natural leaders recognized by each other and by clan's members as devoted to clan and skilled in promoting its interests. A man's rise to this position is crescive and informal. Elders meet frequently but informally to decide all questions of importance. Clan is an economic unit and elders guide its affairs.

4. None

Orokaiva

1. Clan village

2. None

3. Village chief: Oldest competent male who comes gradually
    and informally to be looked to for leadership. No
    regular machinery for decision-making, although there is
    a vague, general ascendency of the older men. No one
    has legitimate coercive powers or general public authority.
    Chief does allot land and set calendar for each year's
    cultivation cycle.

4. None

Tikopia

1. Island

2. Villages

3. Council of clan chiefs: Each is a hereditary head of his
    clan and of its leading village. Each totemically controls
    one of the island's major foodstuffs. For that foodstuff,
    each is responsible and may taboo its use as a conserva-
    tion measure. Council meets informally to consider
    joint problems.

4. a. Village chiefs: (See above for other powers) In his
        village, a chief grants land to members. He adjudi-
        cates quarrels among clan's members whatever their
        current village of residence. He selects agnatic
        relatives as his deputies and councilors, leads
        clan ritual. All of clan's land is at his disposal.
        Men who insult a chief must go into exile or abase
        themselves before him.

    b. Local clan spokesman: Clans are not localized. In
        each village the members of a given clan tacitly
        acknowledge some senior member as their spokesman in
        relations with the village chief.

    c. Paito heads: Clans are aggregates of paitor. Paitos
        are formal organizations of several families for
        economic pursuits. The head is elected by all
        members of the clan's chiefly lineage. Paito heads
        coordinate economic activities. From his paito,
        each citizen receives what rights he has to land,
        produce, a house site, and economic and ritual
        assistance.

Trobriands

1. Chiefly district

2. Subclan villages

3. District chief: Hereditary head of highest ranking sub-
   clan. Receives large gifts which he redistributes--
   these from headmen of other subclans. Can feed large
   war parties or work parties.

4. Village chief: Hereditary head of localized subclan.
   Group's property and privileges vested in him. Directs
   local agriculture. Owns magic needed to make local crops
   prosper. Receives large gifts from each household.
   Village takes collective responsibility in feuds,
   mourning, economic pursuits, and ceremonies.

Truk

1. Lineages

2. None

3. Lineage head: Oldest male member. Lineage is a corporate
   group holding land. Authority and responsibility follow
   seniority among siblings. Head manages property, allocates
   land to junior members, must approve marriages of junior
   members before they can occur, consent must be obtained
   before members dispose of important property. Head
   also allocates the use of group's produce. Younger
   siblings must respect and obey the older; sisters must
   respect and obey brothers.

4. None

C. North America

Creek

1. Tribal village

2. Clans

3. a. Tribal chief: Selected by tribe's members. Served
      only as a spokesman for tribe and council. Could be
      removed for misfeasance or a run of bad luck. With
      council's approval could appoint assistants.

   b. Council: All important decisions made by council.
      Apparently consisted of all initiated males. Met
      every day.

4. Clan council: Apparently a ceremonial rather than a deli-
   berative meeting of all clan members. Designed to
   encourage or admonish membership.

Delaware

1. Clan

2. None

3. a. Chief: Position hereditary in chiefly extended
      family. Has little authority and no power except
      persuasion.

   b. Council: Consists of all old and wise men and all
      warriors. Decision binding. Levies taxes on
      population. Operates general administration.

Fox

1. Tribe

2. Tribal divisions, lineages

3. a. Chief: Elected by council to be its spokesman and
      to serve as a mediator. No other powers. Permanent
      tenure.

   b. Council: Consists of elected heads of divisions.
      Makes binding decisions on all important matters,
      but lacks means to enforce decisions so requires
      unanimous agreement of its members before action is
      taken.

4. Divisional councils: Consist of heads of constituent
   lineages. Elect divisional chief with powers like those
   of tribal chief. This council judged and punished all
   offenders.

Mandan

1. Village

2. Clans, extended families

3. a. Peace chief and war chief: Elected by council.
      Little of no authority. Both expected to conform
      strictly to custom and peace chief to be a
      mediator.

   b. Council: Consists of all older men who owned
      magical "bundles" and of priests. Council thus consists
      primarily of the gerontocracy of an economic and ritual
      elite. Operates the general administration.

4. a. Clans: Organized groups under an elected leader.
      Leader has little power. Clan conducts ceremonies and

cares for sick or indigent members. Avenges serious crimes against its members; assists at members' funerals.

    b. Extended families: Some families own magical bundles important for clan or tribal affairs. These bundles could be inherited, sold, or transferred. Family charges for instruction in rites relevant to a powerful bundle.

Maricopa

1. Tribe

2. Villages

3.   a. Chief: That person who comes informally to be looked to for advice and leadership. Has no coercive power. Usually chooses two or three councilors.

    b. Assembly of all males: Meets informally to discuss important affairs but cannot make binding decisions.

4. No formal machinery of government at village level. All collective actions organized on an ad hoc basis.

Navaho

1. Band

2. None

3.   a. Headman: Elected by all adult residents for life or good behavior. Has power only to consult and persuade.

    b. General assembly of all adults: Meets to decide all important issues. If consensus is achieved, decision is binding.

4. None

Omaha

1. Tribe

2. Gentes

3.   a. Council of Seven Chiefs: Selected by their predecessors to fill vacancies in this body. Decisions are binding on tribe's members but must be unanimous. Manage the general administration. Appoint deputies from among minor chiefs. There is no tribal assembly or council. The Seven alone have all power for decision and action.

They are supported by gifts from aspirants to their
number. They have the power to inflict capital pun-
ishment and control a police force of warriors.

b. Gentes: Lack chiefs, but several gentes have ex-
clusive rights to perform sacerdotal functions vital
in tribal life: calling a meeting of the Seven,
performing rites that give divine authority to the
Seven's acts, preparing the pipes necessary to any
authoritative proceedings.

c. Minor chiefs: Elected to this rank by the Seven from
among those men who give the Seven the gifts (usually
for redistribution) indicating the greatest bravery,
skill, industry, and devotion, and who are most
assiduous in ceremonies and in restoring the peace.

4. Gentes (see above for role in regime)

Shawnee

1. Tribe

2. Clans

3. a. Tribal chief: Hereditary post. Must be approved
unanimously by clan chiefs and other important men
before assuming office. Has no powers of coercion.
Is expected to perform role of a mediator.

b. War chief: Achieved role by leading four successful
forays. Can urge declarations of war and if
supported by a majority vote of the warriors, can
organize a campaign. In this circumstance, the
tribal chief temporarily recedes into the background.

c. Council: Consists of older men invited by chief.
Powers unspecified.

d. Clans: Each is under a hereditary chief. Each is
internally autonomous but has a special role in
tribal life: e.g., preserving order, conducting
ceremonies, healing.

4. Clans (see above) Clan council consists of older men who
could order the punishment of offenders, even their death.

Winnebago

1. Village

2. Clans

3. a. Chief: Selected from Thunderbird clan. His permission
        required for individuals or bands to go on warpath.
        Main function is to maintain internal harmony. Is
        forbidden to lead a war party.

    b. Council: A meeting of clans in the council lodge.
        Each clan is organized to function as a political
        unit with its spokesman taking the lead. Certain
        clans have particular public responsibilities and
        promote these in council: e.g., policing, communica-
        tion, warfare. There was no means of coercion except
        public opinion and private vengeance.

4. Clans: (see above) Organized bodies for ceremonial and
    other pursuits.

Zuni

1. Village

2. None

3. Chiefs: Six hereditary theocratic chiefs. They appoint
    and remove secular officials, the latter operating the
    general administration.

4. None

D. South America

Apinaye

1. Village

2. None

3. a. Chief: Hereditary official but people must consent
        to his accession. Irremoveable. Has no coercive
        powers except with people's consent on specific
        occasions. With consent can punish serious offenders.
        Leads in war.

    b. Council: Consists of all men aged 50 years and over.
        Appoints a counselor to superintend ceremonies and
        admonish villagers to preserve customs.

4. None

Araucanians

1. Extended polygynous family

2. None

3. Chief: Hereditary post, but the family must consent to his succession. Has only the power of persuasion. Family members often ignore chief's wishes. All leadership, whether by the chief or by another, is accepted on an <u>ad</u> <u>hoc</u> basis.

4. None

Arawak

1. Province

2. Districts, villages

3. a. Paramount chief: Position inherited. Rules a province of districts, each under a subchief. Is chief priest and in charge of general administration. Has judicial powers of life and death. Upon his death, his remains preserved as an idol. Chief operates a redistributional economy, requisitioning agriculture produce and services. Also requisitioning military service.

   b. Council: Consists of what are sometimes called nobles and sometimes "chief's assistants." There seems no record of the manner in which members obtained office. Members are said to participate in deciding such matters as war and peace. Council has certain unspecified judicial functions.

4. District chiefs: Position inherited. Each governs his own village and serves other villages much as paramount serves districts: operating a redistributional economy and directing local military activities. In his own village, a chief is an absolute authority, his commands having to be obeyed to the letter. The spirits he owns are locally the most powerful and he organizes the worship of them. Can not exact tribute from subordinate villages, but can requisition services from them. Adjudicates crimes and imposes punishments. District chiefs seem not to have a role in provincial government, the members of the council serve as the paramount's local representatives.

Aymara

1. Ayllu

2. Extended families

3. a. Headman: Selected informally by villagers for a term of one year. Has few powers. Main function is to mediate quarrels and organize rotation of crops. Receives a share of crops for latter service.

    b.   Ayllu council: An informal meeting of leading men.
           Advisory to headman, but, like him, has little or no
           formal power.

4. Families have little feeling for the ayllu and seldom
    operate with their neighbors as a unit. Most economic
    and religious activities are family enterprises.

Bush Negroes

1. Clan

2. Villages

3. a. Clan chief: Hereditary in chiefly family, but all
         male members of clan decide among potential heirs.
         Chief has powers only of mediation.

    b. Clan council: Older men of clan meet with chief to
         make all important decisions. Consult with all clan's
         members before coming to a final decision. That
         decision is binding.

4. Village structure duplicates that of clan. There seems
    to be considerable overlap between the two.

Goajiro

1. Clan

2. Village (usually the settlement of an extended family)

3. Clan chief: An hereditary office. Chief settles disputes,
    fixes bride price in marriages, represents clan in making
    payments to other groups or in seeking payments from
    them; determines how much each clan member must pay when
    group is raising funds. If chiefly line dies out an
    informally chosen council of elders selects a successor.

4. Family headman is village headman: Selected informally
    as people come to seek his advice and help. Powers are
    persuasive only. Post may come to be hereditary. Evidence
    on this vague and conflicting. In any case, headman shares
    leadership with all other maternal uncles, agreement by
    the group being necessary for action.
    Whole clan is responsible for its members' conduct.

Jivaro

1. Clan

2. Extended families

3. Clan: Feelings of solidarity are high, but all leadership
is popularly selected for particular tasks and is neither
generalizable nor transmissible. Moreover, leadership is
limited to functions of coordinative functions. The
clan's constituent families and its individual members
are described as fiercely independent.

4. Family head: Oldest male has this post. Role is advisory
only. Adult male members may, and often do, ignore advice.
But head has absolute power over his own wives.

Sherente

1. Tribe

2. Villages; men's associations

3. Council of chiefs: Consists of the village chiefs. Elects
war leaders, schedules festivals. On death of a village
chief, council appoints his successor. (Village elders
are always consulted before the choice is made.) Council
may depose a village chief for incompetence or for immoral
conduct.

4. a. Village chief: (See also above.) Had almost no coercive
power. Main function is to mediate the innumerable dis-
putes within villages and between them. He can order
the execution of a serious offender.

b. Men's associations: Consisted of all adult males.
Each boy assigned to one of the four associations by
his father. Association leaders are appointed,
but sources do not say by whom. We are told these are
the most important groups in the society: they per-
form the rituals on which economic life depends; they
are tactical units in war, pursue blood feuds on
their members' behalf, hunt collectively, clear land
for their members to plant, and perform their members'
burial services. Their members aged 45 and over are
given the title of Elder. It is these Elders who have
general charge of the associations' affairs.

Talamanca

1. Clan Village

2. None

3. a. Clan chief: Office hereditary. Successor
chosen by chiefly family from its own members.
Chiefs have great prestige but little or no power.

b. Clan council: Consists of the four to six oldest males. This group all powerful. Operates the general administration.

4. None

Tucuna

1. Locality

2. Households

3. Locality: No routinized government. Sources say people too individualistic to accept authority. When informal leaders arise, their powers extend only to advice and persuasion. Tucuna will not tolerate the intervention of a third party in a quarrel or personal problem. All collective action organized ad hoc by participants.

4. In the family, the authority of the father or grandfather is supreme. He owns the house and may dispose of it or change the family's residence at will.