

WORKING PAPERS OF THE
CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Paper #75

October, 1971

Copies Available Through:

Center for Research on
Social Organization
University of Michigan
219 Perry Building
330 Packard Street
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104

No P.A.

OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY AND POLITICAL PARTISANSHIP:

ADDITIVE VS. INTERACTIVE MODELS*

David Knoke
University of Michigan

*I thank Otis Dudley Duncan and David R. Segal for their assistance in the research from which this article is drawn.

OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY AND POLITICAL PARTISANSHIP:

ADDITIVE VS. INTERACTIVE MODELS

For generations thought about the socially mobile individual has emphasized his deviant nature. Whether depicted as the marginal man of Park (1928) or the "skidder" of Wilensky and Edwards (1959), men mobile in sociological space have been seen as participants in a process which sets them apart. The overwhelming bulk of literature dealing with behaviors presumed to be consequences of social mobility has dwelt upon the grand negative themes of disruption and uprooting: alienation, prejudice, suicide and cultural depletion (cf. Durkheim, 1897; Sorokin, 1927; Bettelheim and Janowitz, 1964; and Tumin, 1957).

Not surprisingly, the perspective of negative consequences of mobility has been predominant--explicitly or implicitly--in the findings on the political consequences of mobility within or between generations. Wilensky and Edwards found their working-class skidders to express an ideological conservatism deriving from their rejection of social integration into the class of destination and a desire to escape factory life and return to the middle-class from which they had fallen. Bendix and Lipset's views on the political behavior of upwardly mobile American and European men are widely known and have had perhaps the most pervasive influence on conceptualization of problems in this area. In Social Mobility and Industrial Society, based on the comparative analysis of a number of sample surveys, they conclude that while Europeans are likely to retain the leftist orientations of their class of origin, "in America the successfully mobile members of the

middle class are more conservative (that is, more often Republican) than those class members who are in a social position comparable to that of their parents" (1959: 66). Lopreato, accepting this basic finding for American data, calls it the "over-conformity" hypothesis in which political behaviors derive from an emulation of higher destination status and a cult-of-gratitude toward the system that made such mobility possible (1967: 591-92).

In recent years a number of authors have questioned the conventional wisdom that the socially mobile are excessively more conservative than both their class of origin and destination. Taking their cue from Blau's (1956) "acculturation" concept where both origin and destination groups continue to exert some influence over the life styles of socially mobiles, these authors have amassed considerable empirical evidence in contradiction of the Lipset hypothesis. Thompson (1971b) separately compared the voting and party identifications of upwardly mobile men and women to their stable working- and middle-class counterparts across six American presidential elections. He found a level of Republican party identification among mobiles intermediate between the two class-stable groups. For voting among the men, however, "the upwardly mobiles tend to be indistinguishable from middle-class stables and much more Republican as a group than are the working-class stable men" (1971b: 229). In another article Thompson compared the party choices of survey respondents in four Western European nations and the United States (1971a). He found in all cases that both upwardly and downwardly mobiles expressed levels of support for left-wing parties that were intermediate to those of the class stables. Further empirical support for the intermediate hypothesis can be found in Segal and Knoke (1968) and

Konzak and Liebman (1971).

In most previous studies of the political consequences of social mobility, whether supporting an "over-conformity" or "acculturation" process, explanations of the effects have been couched in terms of the social contacts which have been broken, re-formed or frustrated. Thus Bendix and Lipset suggest that the ease with which American workers, as opposed to their European counterparts, can integrate their social and residential statuses with their new occupational positions is the source of the conservative gratitude among the mobiles. Lopreato contends that mobile Europeans face greater social rejection from the stables in the class of destination and therefore do not emulate the middle-class but retain a partisanship intermediate to middle-class conservatism and working-class leftism. Likewise, Thompson offers a number of plausible explanations involving pre- and post-mobility socialization of mobile men and women into politically divergent social settings.

One of the major shortcomings of past research on political consequences of mobility (apart from obvious contradictions of each other) is the thoroughly unsystematic manner in which they have attempted to unravel the various and complex forces at work. The piecemeal fashion in which the problems have been raised and addressed has left a number of questions unanswered. Precisely what is meant by an "effect of mobility"? How do such effects differ from other processes of stratification which affect political attitudes and behavior? Are the behaviors of upwardly and downwardly mobiles--too often viewed as separate, causally unconnected processes--related, at least analytically, to similar causes? These

are among the main questions to be investigated and hopefully resolved in the present research.

MODELS OF MOBILITY EFFECTS

The review of theoretical literature on effects of social mobility suggests a number of models of consequences of the mobility process for political behavior. By considering the subjective orientation of the mobile person to his class of origin and destination and the difficulty of assimilating new life styles, four such analytic models may be generated.

1. EMULATION. Individuals universally desire to emulate the behavior of their social superiors, regardless of their direction of mobility. But, lacking communication and social support, assimilation of new patterns may prove difficult. For the upwardly mobile, emulation results in a partisanship identical to the class of destination and uncertainty may produce "over-conformity". For the downwardly mobiles, emulation also results in a retention of norms and patterns of the class of origin.
2. REJECTION. Mobile persons are oriented to retain ties to the social groups in the class of origin. Barriers to adopting new life styles reinforce the pattern of partisanship socialized at the origins. In the reverse of the emulation pattern, upwardly mobiles retain party affiliations indistinguishable from the class of origin. Downwardly mobiles do likewise, as they would under the emulation model.
3. RESOCIALIZATION. Mobile individuals are oriented towards affiliating with the class of destination, regardless of

direction of mobility, and serious barriers to adopting new life styles do not arise. As in the emulation model, upwardly mobiles identify with the class of destination. The downwardly mobiles foreswear their loyalties to their origins, unlike either the emulation or rejection patterns.

4. AVERAGING. Mobile persons do not behave essentially different from non-mobile persons at various points in the stratification system. They take their cues to political behaviors as with other life style aspects from a variety of class sources, directly combining or blending elements of the origin and destination class patterns. Subjective attitudes do not favor affiliation with one group over the other and barriers do not deflect them into one behavioral camp. In purest form, the averaging model predicts a "halfway hypothesis" for aggregate levels of behavior: mobiles as a group express political preferences halfway between those of the classes of origin and destination.

The averaging model is strongly suggested by the use of statistical models of additive effects which have come into use in the analysis of mobility effects. Duncan, analyzing mobility and fertility, comments:

The gist of the argument is that one is not entitled to discuss "effects" of mobility (or other status discrepancy measures) until he has established that the apparent effect cannot be due merely to a simple combination of effects of the variables used to define mobility (1966: 91).

Since the political, child-bearing and other social behaviors of non-mobile couples also varies with social class position, collapsing these

groups into a single "non-mobile" group to be contrasted to the "mobiles" effectively suppresses the statistical information contained in the separate class positions. Duncan shows that an additive model fits the fertility data in the mobility matrix and that "mobility" produces no differences in fertility: "The 'consequence' of mobility is membership in two classes, and one's behavior is best accounted for on the assumption that one combines the patterns of both" (1966: 95). The averaging model of mobility effects, then, and its statistical representation, the additive model, becomes the null-test against which the utility of the other three models may be assessed. By the rule of parsimony, if the additive model is adequate to explain the political behavior of both mobiles and non-mobiles, it is to be preferred to more elaborate models which must postulate unique causes of deviant behavior of the mobiles. On the other hand, if significant statistical interactions are detected in the data which the model of additive effects does not predict, then the averaging model may be rejected and the remaining models inspected for a better fit to the empirical situation.

THE DATA AND THE STATISTICAL MODEL

Data for the present study were drawn from the 1960, 1964 and 1968 election year national cross-sectional sample surveys of the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan. Eliminated from the analyses were women, students and any males whose occupational status at the time of the survey or whose latest occupation if retired was not ascertained. The resulting sample sizes were: 1960: 881; 1964: 703; and 1968: 683. In determining

class position, occupational categories alone were used, first because this was the criterion used in all the previous studies mentioned, and second, because it was the only stratification variable asked for the father in the samples. Rather than use the simple manual/nonmanual dichotomy employed in most mobility-and-politics studies, intra-class variations were preserved by utilizing five broad strata of occupational origins and destinations. These were: (1) Upper nonmanual: professional, technical and kindred, business and managerial; (2) Lower nonmanual: clerical, sales and kindred; (3) Upper manual: craftsmen, foremen and kindred; (4) Lower manual: operatives, service workers and laborers, except farm and mine; and (5) Farm: farmers and farm laborers. These five categories, the occupations that comprise them and relevant socio-economic characteristics are presented in Table 1.

Table 1 about here

The ranking of the categories is preserved in median education and the Duncan Scio-Economic Index scores. Although the Census income data indicate the upper manual group exceeds the lower nonmanual, the ordering on expected family income by sample respondents maintains the stratification hierarchy. The other substantial departure from an ordered hierarchy occurs in the prestige of farmers, which is equivalent to the lower nonmanual occupations. The criteria for prestige evaluations are honorific and not the direct result of educational investments and income rewards of the occupational pursuits (see Siegel, 1971). Since farmers receive prestige in excess of the structural characteristics of their occupations, the movement of farmers' sons into manual occupations may be "upward" mobility in an economic

sense, but "downward" in social standing. The meaning of mobility into and out of the farm category is further confounded by the shift in geographic sectors that movement entails. In any event, the location of the farm category at the lower end of the occupational hierarchy is to be interpreted cautiously; fortunately, the precise ordering of the five categories is not crucial to the statistical analysis.

The model to be used in the present analysis is known as multiple classification analysis (MCA) and has been presented in detail elsewhere (Hill, 1959; Andrews, et. al., 1967; Blau and Duncan, 1967: 128-132). MCA requires the dependent variable to be quantitative and the two or more independent variables to be qualitative or classificatory (as in the above measures of occupational origin and destination). In obtaining solutions, no assumption is made about the ordering of categories of the classificatory variables, although such information, as in Table 1, may be useful in interpreting results. One of the virtues of MCA is that it takes into account correlations likely to be present in survey data among origin and destination statuses in estimating their effects on the dependent variable.

MCA requires a crucial assumption about the nature of the multiple relationship of the independent to dependent variables: that the independent variables are strictly additive in their effects. Thus in an A-by-B classification, the cell means for each origin (A) and destination (B) combination may be written:

$$\bar{Y}_{ij} = \bar{Y}_{..} + a_i + b_j \quad \text{Eq. 1.}$$

where $\bar{Y}_{..}$ is a constant applying to all cells; a_i is a constant for

**Missing
Page**

**Missing
Page**

Since the SRC questionnaires contain a standard party-preference item, it was decided to use this data, provided a substantive interpretation could be attached to the scale. The five-point scale selected seems most strongly related to an underlying propensity to vote for the party's candidate for president, as shown in Table 2.

Table 2 about here

The temptation to interpret the partisanship scale as a liberal-conservative dimension must be resisted. Work elsewhere has suggested that the location of self-identified independents and independent party leaners in a position between the strong partisans does not fully reflect the ideological attachments of the polity (Stokes, 1966; Segal and Hikel, 1970). However, as an interval measure of behavioral propensity, the five-point scale is useful in the mobility analysis.

Before determining the existence of mobility effects, the separate effects of occupational origins and destinations on partisanship must be assessed. In Table 3, the means on the five-point scale are

Table 3 about here

presented for each occupational category of origin and destination, both by separate election years and for the total sample. These

Figs. 1a and 1b here

means are displayed in Figs. 1a and 1b. From the frequency distributions in panels one and three it is apparent that over time the

nonmanual and upper manual categories have grown in size, the lower manual has remained stable and the farm category has lost members. For the system as a whole, these movements have resulted in net upward mobility. These observations parallel the more detailed findings of Blau and Duncan (1967: 76-80).

For occupational origins, the mean partisanship for the total sample shows a monotonic relationship with the ordering of the categories. A similar relationship occurs for urban occupational destinations, i.e., higher status is associated with higher partisanship means in the Republican direction. But the farmers are almost as Republican as the lower nonmanual category (fig. 1b). The high Republican affiliation among farmers apparently derives from historical tradition as well as current party agricultural policies and economic pressures mitigating against Democratic partisanship (Campbell, 1960: 409-416). The political involvement of farmers is believed to be weak and unstable compared to urban workers. Perhaps this instability explains why farmers' sons, the majority of whom enter the working-class, relinquish the partisan pattern of the stable farm group for a pattern indistinguishable from men with nonmanual backgrounds (Fig. 1a).

An inspection of the partisan means for occupational categories within each election year reveals fluctuations and deviation from the aggregate pattern. The two most divergent sets of means (lower nonmanual origins and farm destinations) are the groups with the smallest frequencies. The grand means for each of the three election years are also different (Table 3). The question arises whether it is justifiable to aggregate all three samples and treat

them as though they were drawn from the same population, when in fact there may be differential effects of election campaigns and interactions of election year with origin and destination categories. No such assumptions shall be made but the hypotheses will be tested.

The analysis of mobility effects proceeds with the cross-tabulation of occupational origins and destinations and the calculation of means for each of the 25 cells formed. The frequencies and means are displayed in the upper two panels of Table 4. The means in the

Table 4 about here

five stable occupational categories of the main diagonal exhibit a U-shaped pattern, with declining Republicanism in the nonmanual and upper manual categories and increasing Republicanism in the lower manual and farm categories. The test to be employed for mobility effects involves fitting the additive model of Equation 1 to the data. The coefficients for each occupational category (the a_i and b_j) are expressed as deviations from the grand mean ($\bar{Y}_{..}$), adjusted for the distribution of the other independent variable. For the data in Table 4, the following set of gross and net coefficients were derived:

Occupational category	Gross Effect		Net Effect	
	Origin	Destination	Origin	Destination
Upper nonmanual	.32	.30	.21	.24
Lower nonmanual	.30	.19	.22	.16
Upper manual	-.05	-.22	-.01	-.20
Lower manual	-.08	-.23	-.02	-.21
Farm	-.12	.14	-.12	.23

The net effects are closer, with the exception of farm destinations, to zero than the gross effects, due in part to the intercorrelation

of independent variables; yet considerable variation remains even in the net coefficients. The appropriate net coefficients are combined with the grand mean ($\bar{Y}_{..} = 2.67$) to produce the set of calculated partisan means, Y_{ij} , implied by Equation L and shown in the third panel of Table 4. The fourth panel contains the deviations of the calculated scores from the actual cell observations. The size of the deviations tends to be inversely associated with cell frequency. Magnitude aside, one patterning of deviations is a tendency of the additive model to over-estimate the effects of upper manual destinations on partisanship for men from non-farm origins. The other deviations appear to be scattered about without pattern.

How well do origin and destination occupations, separately, account for variation in partisanship? Is there a difference between the grand mean for each election year? How well does the additive model account for the observed variation of mean partisanship within the cells? Are the patterns of origin and destination means different for each election year? Each of these questions may be answered by including a variable C for the year in which data was collected, forming the appropriate interactions and testing for significant increments to explained sums of squares of each term. The first model to be fitted to the data is:

$$\bar{Y}_{ijk} = \bar{Y}_{..} + a_i + b_j + c_k \quad \text{Eq. 3.}$$

where c_k is a constant applying to the k th year of variable C. First-order interactions among the three independent variables are formed by cross-multiplying the origin, destination and year-- AB, AC and BC. These terms are then included, separately, in

extensions of Equation 3 and tested for significant contributions, net of the main terms. Thus three more models are fitted:

$$\bar{Y}_{ijk} = \bar{Y}_{...} + a_i + b_j + c_k + (ab)_{ij} \quad \text{Eq. 4.}$$

$$\bar{Y}_{ijk} = \bar{Y}_{...} + a_i + b_j + c_k + (ac)_{ik} \quad \text{Eq. 5.}$$

$$\bar{Y}_{ijk} = \bar{Y}_{...} + a_i + b_j + c_k + (bc)_{jk} \quad \text{Eq. 6.}$$

The results of the various tests for the significance of main terms and their first-order interactions are shown in Table 5.

Table 5 about here

Net of the two other main variables, each independent variable explains a significant portion of the variance in partisanship. Origins and destinations in additive relationship (A,B) account for 3.90 per cent of the variance (3.45 %, adjusted for 8 degrees of freedom). Addition of the year variable adds another 0.82 per cent (0.72 % adjusted). The tests for interaction, however, show that the origin-by-destination (AB) combination does not add a significantly greater portion to explained variance than the additive effects of A and B. Although the sums of squares for AB is greater than for A,B, the former requires 15 additional degrees of freedom; its F-ratio indicates the difference may be due to sampling error. Thus the null hypothesis of no significant interactions of origins and destinations on partisanship cannot be rejected.

The hypotheses about significant interactions of election year and origin (AC) or destination (BC) fare no better. Thus, while

the aggregate mean partisanship differs between years (Test #1), the relationships between categories do not differ substantially from year to year. The aggregate category means shown in Figs. 1a and 1b are adequate to explain origin and destination effects. Based on these findings, it was decided to drop the variable for year (C) in subsequent analyses and treat the three election years as a single sample.

While in Equation 4 the increment to explained variance provided by the 24 cells of the AB interaction did not prove significant, the possibility remains that significant contributions might be added by terms for mobility that would not consume as many degrees of freedom. The model to be fitted in this case is:

$$\bar{Y}_{ijl} = \bar{Y} \dots + a_i + b_j + m_l \quad \text{Eq. 7.}$$

where m_l is a constant for category l of a constructed variable M which represents larger mobility aggregates than single cells of the A-by-B cross-classification. In the following tests, only a limited number of such possible groupings were used, opening up grounds for criticism that any significant interactions might arise from a chance search procedure, rather than from systematic and exhaustive hypothesis testing. However, the mobility codings (m_l 's) selected are ones that make some substantive sense in terms of plausible operations of "mobility effects". The four groupings chosen are shown in Fig. 2.

Fig. 2 about here

The numbers in the cells of the original A-by-B cross-classification indicate how cells were aggregated in each analysis. The up-stable-down coding trichotomizes the sample into non-movers and two types of

mobiles. The inter-class categories look at movement and stability across nonmanual-manual-farm boundaries. The diagonal coding asserts effects arising from the distance of mobility, assuming equal intervals between the five occupational categories. And the extreme mobility codings draw attention to long-distance upward and downward mobility effects.

The tests for these four types of mobility variables is to compare the variance explained by Equation 6 to Equation 1, adjusted by degrees of freedom. Neither the up-stable-down nor inter-class codings add to the sum of squares explained by A,B (in Table 6.).

Table 6 about here

While the diagonal and extreme mobility variables did raise the between-category sums of squares, deflation by 6 and 2 additional degrees of freedom rendered the increments non-significant.

The failure of these select models of mobility effects to be significant does not mean such interactions do not occur in the data. Indeed, a significant F-ratio for the increment of M can be obtained by aggregating cells 2,6 and 12 and cells 8,14 and 18 (number across rows) and the remainder, producing two mobility categories with means of 3.11 and 2.33, which add significantly to explained variance above that attributable to A,B. However, the substantive interpretation of this interaction is nebulous since the aggregated cells do not constitute any homogenous category of intergenerational mobility experience (other than being "one-step" off the diagonal, as defined by the categories used here). The case is further weakened by separately analyzing this pattern for

each election year, which revealed its significance only in 1964.

DISCUSSION

At this point it is quite evident that an additive model of occupational origins and destinations satisfactorily reproduces the partisanship means in the A-by-B mobility Table 4. What error remains in fitting calculated means is not systematic nor attributable to anything other than sampling error. The inability to reject the additive model lends preference to the averaging model over the other three discussed earlier. The averaging model has the advantage of not attributing any portion of political party identification to mobility per se. The mobile American men reflect in their party choices the influence of both origin and destination statuses. The goodness-of-fit of the additive statistical models suggests that Blau's "acculturation" effect of combining cues and patterns of behavior from both statuses may be operant in this context. While exactly mathematical mean values between origin and destination, as in the "halfway hypothesis", should not be expected, a preponderant number of partisan means intermediate to party means of occupational nonmobiles in Table 4 would lend credence to Blau's hypothesis. Exceptions can readily be noted; for example, upwardly mobile men from lower nonmanual origins into upper nonmanual destinations show a decidedly Republican preference of 3.45, in excess of both stable lower nonmanuals (2.57) and stable upper nonmanuals (3.10)--more supportive of Lipset's "overconformity" hypothesis than Blau's "acculturation" process. When

such inspections are carried out for the entire table, it turns out that only four of 10 upwardly mobile and two of 9 downwardly mobile cells have intermediate mean scores, the others being evenly split between excessive scores either higher or lower than the stables of their origin and destination pairs. Thus no systematic pattern emerges among the mobility groups defined in this analysis. Sometimes "over" identifying with destinations, at other times "under" identifying with origins, on the whole these propensities (or sampling errors) cancel each other out to produce a model of averaging effects without supporting an intermediate acculturation model.

The statistical analyses in this paper have attempted to sort out some of the controversies surrounding the imputed political consequences of social mobility. Support for additive models has been found, while interaction models, with their implicit special "mobility effects", have been rejected. The predictions of "over-conformity" by identification with the conservative political party have not been sustained, nor has the "intermediate" predictions of later researchers fared better when more detailed measures of social class than simple middle-class/working-class dichotomies are used.

Partisanship, to the extent it is related to socio-economic stratification (and the connection is limited, as witness the small proportion of explained variance), does not appear to be particularly susceptible to the normal processes of inter-generational change in occupational position. Movement in both directions has the effect of bringing men with divergent backgrounds and political orientations into contact with the apparent effect of mutually

constraining any tensions inherent in such social change. Upwardly mobile men bring a predominantly Democratic party identification into a middle-class where the prevailing independent and Republican orientation works a subtle conversion effect. Similarly, the downwardly mobile men seem to infuse a conservatism into manual work groups that tempers tendencies to political polarization along class lines (Wilensky and Edwards, 1959). The overall impression is that mobility in occupational space is a normal and expected process of the modern industrial state with little meaning for its participants independent of the stratification system itself. Rather than the deviant and outsider depicted in classical literature, the mobile man is integrated into two communities of opinion, creatively combining elements of both in his experience to synthesize a political orientation influenced by, and bridging, the two worlds of work.

The extent to which the additive model found in the analysis of cross-sectionally gathered data validly reflects the patterns occurring in the mobility process is a matter to be resolved by future research. On the aggregate level, the averaging model and the resocialization model cannot be empirically distinguished. At a given point in time, under the latter model individuals will be at various positions in which the influences of origin and destination exert unequal pulls and tugs. Some men, at the beginning of their work careers and still closely tied to the parental home, will reflect the political preferences into which they were socialized as children. Others, at or nearing the end of their own careers in which the recent and salient stratification influences

on current political preferences are the work groups and friendships drawn from occupational destinations, may well be indistinguishable from their compeers who are intergenerationally stable. On the aggregate, however, such a conversion process would be masked in a single sample survey. Whether the longitudinal study necessary to unravel the intricacies of the process is ever attempted is uncertain; possibly these findings may inspire its undertaking.

Table 1. Ranks of five occupational categories by socio-economic criteria.

Occupational category	Median ¹ Income	Median ¹ Education	Mean ² Duncan SEI	Mean ³ Prestige
I. Upper Nonmanual	\$6,893 [\$10,000]	14.2 [13.6]	75	
Professional, technical, kind.			75	59.6
Owners, managers, proprietors			57	50.4
II. Lower Nonmanual	\$5,117 [\$7,200]	12.6 [12.6]		
Clerical workers			45	39.4
Sales workers			49	33.6
III. Upper Manual	\$5,427 [\$6,300]	10.9 [10.2]	31	33.8
IV. Lower Manual	\$3,730 [\$5,400]	9.9 [9.3]		
Operatives			18	28.7
Service workers			17	25.2
Pvt. Hshld workers			8	19.6
Laborers, ex. farm			7	18.4
V. Farm	\$1,621 [\$3,700]	8.7 [7.6]		
Farmers			14	40.7
Farm laborers			9	18.7

1. Calculated from Census Bureau data for 1962, in Blau and Duncan, 1967: 27. Data from survey sample respondents in brackets [].
2. Reiss, 1961: 151.
3. Siegel, 1971: Ch. 2.

Table 2. Relation of party identification scale and reported vote for presidential candidate, 1960-1968.*

Partisanship Scale	PARTY OF CANDIDATE			Total	N
	Democrat	Republican	Other		
1. Strong Democrat	89	8	3	100 %	403
2. Not strong, indep. Democrat	72	20	8	100 %	516
3. Independent	41	45	14	100 %	133
4. Not strong, indep. Republican	14	80	6	100 %	397
5. Strong Republican	6	94	-	100 %	211
Total	51	43	6	100 %	1660

*Omitting non-partisans and non-voters.

Table 3. Means on partisanship scale for occupational origins and destinations, by election years and total.

ELECTION YEAR	OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY					
	Total	Upper Nonmanual	Lower Nonmanual	Upper Manual	Lower Manual	Farm
Number of Cases, Origins						
Total	2050	366	101	364	499	720
1960	817	126	35	151	194	311
1964	643	127	31	116	162	207
1968	590	113	35	97	143	202
Partisan Means, Origins						
Total	2.67	2.99	2.97	2.62	2.59	2.55
1960	2.77	3.10	2.83	2.71	2.78	2.64
1964	2.51	3.06	2.65	2.46	2.41	2.28
1968	2.71	2.81	3.40	2.69	2.52	2.68
Number of Cases, Destinations						
Total	2050	570	229	471	485	195
1960	817	195	90	195	247	90
1964	643	190	79	126	190	58
1968	590	185	60	150	148	47
Partisan Means, Destinations						
Total	2.67	2.97	2.86	2.45	2.44	2.81
1960	2.77	3.09	3.00	2.35	2.63	3.11
1964	2.51	2.85	2.67	2.35	2.25	2.43
1968	2.71	2.98	2.91	2.67	2.35	2.68

Table 4. Means on partisanship scale for occupational origins and destinations, combined samples from 1960, 1964 and 1968.

OCCUPATION OF ORIGIN	OCCUPATION OF DESTINATION					
	Total	Upper Nonmanual	Lower Nonmanual	Upper Manual	Lower Manual	Farm
Number of Cases						
Total	2050	570	229	471	585	195
Upper nonmanual	366	208	53	46	50	9
Lower nonmanual	101	47	23	12	19	-
Upper manual	364	94	46	130	87	7
Lower manual	499	103	58	127	204	7
Farm	720	118	49	156	225	172
Observed Score						
Total	2.67	2.97	2.86	2.45	2.44	2.81
Upper nonmanual	2.99	3.10	3.13	2.67	2.66	3.33
Lower nonmanual	2.97	3.45	2.57	2.33	2.68	--
Upper manual	2.62	3.03	3.00	2.41	2.37	1.86
Lower manual	2.59	2.70	2.79	2.39	2.54	4.00
Farm	2.55	2.76	2.67	2.47	2.30	2.77
Calculated Score						
Total						
Upper nonmanual		3.12	3.04	2.69	2.68	3.12
Lower nonmanual		3.12	3.04	2.69	2.68	--
Upper manual		2.90	2.82	2.47	2.46	2.89
Lower manual		2.89	2.81	2.46	2.45	2.88
Farm		2.79	2.71	2.36	2.35	2.78
Observed Minus Calculated Score						
Total						
Upper nonmanual		-.02	.09	-.02	-.02	.21
Lower nonmanual		.33	-.47	-.36	.00	--
Upper manual		.13	.18	-.06	-.08	-1.03
Lower manual		-.19	-.02	-.07	.09	1.12
Farm		-.03	-.04	.11	-.05	-.01




Fig. 1a. MEAN PARTISANSHIP BY OCCUPATIONAL ORIGINS, BY YEARS.




Fig. 1b. MEAN PARTISANSHIP BY OCCUPATIONAL DESTINATIONS, BY YEARS.

Table 5. Analysis of variance for partisanship by occupational origins, destinations and year of election.

Source of variation	Degrees of Freedom	Sum of Squares	Mean Squares
Total (T)	2049	3744.07	
One-way origin (A)	4	62.42	
One-way destination (B)	4	119.69	
One-way year (C)	2	24.30	
One-way origin-destination (AB)	23	184.58	
One-way origin-year (AC)	14	117.32	
One-way destination-year (BC)	14	174.24	
MCA origin, destination (A,B)	8	145.97	
MCA origin, year (A,C)	6	89.98	
MCA destination, year (B,C)	6	148.47	
MCA origin, destination, year (A,B,C)	10	176.78	
TESTS FOR MAIN EFFECTS			
I. Increment for Year (C)			
(A,B,C) - (A,B)	2	30.81	15.41
Remainder (T) - (A,B,C)	2039	3567.29	1.75
(F-ratio)***			(8.81)
II. Increment for Origin (A)			
(A,B,C) - (B,C)	4	28.31	7.08
Remainder (T) - (A,B,C)	2039	3567.29	1.75
(F-ratio)**			(4.04)
III. Increment for Destination (B)			
(A,B,C) - (A,C)	4	86.80	21.70
Remainder (T) - (A,B,C)	2039	3567.29	1.75
(F-ratio)***			(12.40)
TESTS FOR FIRST-ORDER INTERACTIONS			
IV. Increment for Origin-Destination (AB)			
(A,B,C + AB) - (A,B,C)	15	41.12	2.74
Remainder (T) - (A,B,C + AB)	2034	3526.17	1.73
(F-ratio)			(1.58)
V. Increment for Origin-Year (AC)			
(A,B,C + AC) - (A,B,C)	8	27.94	3.49
Remainder (T) - (A,B,C + AC)	2041	3539.35	1.73
(F-ratio)			(2.01)

Table 5 (Cont.)

VI. Increment for Destination-Year (BC)			
(A,B,C + BC) - (A,B,C)	8	26.63	3.33
Remainder (T) - (A,B,C + BC)	2041	3540.66	1.73
(F-ratio)			(1.92)

***p .001 **p .01

Table 6. Analysis of variance for various mobility codings, m_1 .

Source of variation	Degrees of Freedom	Sum of Squares	Mean Squares
Up-Stable-Down (M_1)	2	4.13	
Inter-Class (M_2)	7	145.17	
Diagonal (M_3)	6	14.55	
Extreme (M_4)	2	1.67	
MCA (A,B, M_1)	10	146.67	
MCA (A,B, M_2)	15	146.39	
MCA (A,B, M_3)	14	152.63	
MCA (A,B, M_4)	10	151.09	

TESTS FOR INCREMENTS OF M_1 's

I. Increment for Up-Stable-Down (M_1)			
(A,B, M_1) - (A,B)	2	0.70	0.35
Remainder ₁ (T) - (A,B, M_1)	2039	3597.40	1.76
(F-ratio)			(0.20)
II. Increment for Inter-Class (M_2)			
(A,B, M_2) - (A,B)	7	0.42	0.06
Remainder (T) - (A,B, M_2)	2034	3597.68	1.76
(F-ratio)			(0.03)
III. Increment for Diagonal (M_3)			
(A,B, M_3) - (A,B)	6	6.65	1.11
Remainder (T) - (A,B, M_3)	2035	3591.44	1.76
(F-ratio)			(0.63)
IV. Increment for Extreme (M_4)			
(A,B, M_4) - (A,B)	2	5.03	2.52
Remainder (T) - (A,B, M_4)	2039	3593.00	1.76
(F-ratio)			(1.43)

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24	25

A-by-B

1	2	2	2	2
3	1	2	2	2
3	3	1	2	2
3	3	3	1	2
3	3	3	3	1

Up-Stable-Down (M_1)

1	1	2	2	5
1	1	2	2	5
3	3	4	4	5
3	3	4	4	5
6	6	7	7	8

Inter-Class (M_2)

4	3	2	1	1
5	4	3	2	1
6	5	4	3	2
7	6	5	4	3
7	7	6	5	4

Diagonal (M_3)

2	2	2	1	1
2	2	2	2	1
2	2	2	2	2
3	2	2	2	2
3	3	2	2	2

Extreme (M_4)

Fig 2. Codings for Aggregated mobility variables M_1 .

REFERENCES

- Andrews, Frank, James N. Morgan and John Sonquist, 1967. Multiple Classification Analysis. Ann Arbor, Michigan: ISR.
- Bendix, Reinhard and Seymour Martin Lipset, 1959. Social Mobility in Industrial Society. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Bettelheim, Bruno and Morris Janowitz, 1964. Social Change and Prejudice. London: Free Press.
- Blau, Peter M., 1956. "Social mobility and interpersonal relations". American Sociological Review 21 (June): 290-295.
- Blau, Peter M., and Otis Dudley Duncan, 1967. The American Occupational Structure. New York: Wiley.
- Brownlee, K.A., 1960. Statistical Theory and Methodology in Science and Engineering. New York: Wiley.
- Campbell, Angus, Philip Converse, Warren Miller and Donald Stokes, 1960. The American Voter. New York: Wiley.
- Duncan, Otis Dudley, 1966. "Methodological issues in the analysis of social mobility". In Smelser, N.J. and Lipset, S.M. (eds.), Social Structure and Mobility in Economic Development. Chicago: Aldine.
- Durkheim, Emile, 1897. Le Suicide. Paris: F. Alcan.
- Hill, T.P., 1959. "An analysis of the distribution of wages and salaries in Great Britain", Econometrica 27: 355-381.
- Konzak, Bert and Arthur Liebman, 1971. "Political consequences of social mobility: a cross-national study". Paper read at American Sociological Association meetings, Denver, Colo.
- Lopreato, Joseph, 1967. "Upward social mobility and political orientation". American Sociological Review 32 (August): 586-592.
- Park, Robert E., 1928. "Human migration and the marginal man". American Journal of Sociology 33 (May): 881-893.
- Reiss, Albert J., Jr., 1961. Occupations and Social Structure. Glencoe: Free Press.

- Segal, David R., and David Knoke, 1968. "Status inconsistency, social mobility and partisan identification in the United States". *Social Forces* 46 (December): 154-157.
- Segal, David R. and Gerald Kent Hikel, 1970. "The spatial distribution of the electoral market". Working Paper 56 (June). Ann Arbor, Michigan: Center for Research on Social Organization.
- Siegel, Paul M., 1971. *Prestige in the American Occupational Structure*. Chicago: Unpubl. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago.
- Sorokin, Pitirim, 1927. *Social Mobility*. New York: Harper.
- Stokes, Donald, 1966. "Spatial models of party competition". In Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes (eds). *Elections and the Political Order*. New York: Wiley.
- Thompson, Kenneth, 1971a. "A cross-national analysis of inter-generational social mobility and political orientation". *Comparative Political Studies* (April): 3-20.
- _____, _____, 1971b, "Upward social mobility and political orientation: a re-evaluation of the evidence". *American Sociological Review* 36 (April): 223-235.
- Tumin, Melvin M., 1957. "Some unapplauded consequences of social mobility in a mass society." *Social Forces* 36 (October): 32-37.
- Wilensky, Harold L. and Hugh Edwards, 1959. "The skidder: ideological adjustments of downwardly mobile workers". *American Sociological Review* 24 (April): 215-231.