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"New Directions in the Study of Elites"*

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ABSTRACT

After briefly characterizing recent work in the study of community decision-making, the authors conclude that there appears to be some convergence on a number of common methodological strategies and theoretical and empirical assumptions. There still remain, however, important weaknesses in the overall theoretical framework and its implied methodology in directing research efforts. Attention is directed to a theoretically informed structural analysis of the community influence system that derives from a Parsonsian perspective. Several critical questions are raised concerning the identification of the relevant set of community influentials, the systematic description of their attributes as influentials (including their institutional locations, influence resource bases, and selected attitudes and values), and the ties that bind them into shifting coalitions depending on the functional issue confronted. Recent methodological advances in graph theory and smallest space analysis are seen to provide means of examining the consensus-cleavage structure of community influence. Appropriate illustrations are drawn from the authors' case study of the community influence system in Altneustadt, a small city in West Germany. Highlights include a theoretically meaningful interpretation of a smallest space solution for the distribution of community influence resource bases, the development of a rationale for describing differentiated social structures which are constructed from sociometric information on business/professional, social, and community affairs discussion partners within the elite, and some systematic hypotheses about the linkages among the three structures and between them and five selected issue outcomes.

New directions in the study of elites

Even a cursory review of three recent compilations of theoretical statements and research reports on community decision-making systems (cf. Clark, 1968a; Aiken and Mott, 1970; Bonjean, Clark, and Lineberry, 1971) impresses the reader with the number of new and promising developments and directions in the field. For years, the field was beset with rancorous conflict on methodological issues concerning the best way to identify and study a community elite (cf. Walton, 1966a, 1966b) and on theoretical/empirical arguments concerning the relative merits of a ruling elite or pluralist model of community power structures. Conflict has diminished somewhat as investigators have begun to assess and assimilate the advantages and disadvantages of alternative theoretical and research strategies in designing new studies.

A definite shift has taken place from the emphasis of the 1950s and early 1960s on comprehensive and intensive qualitative case studies of communities, usually taken one at a time and at one point in time following the classic leads of Hunter (1953) and Dahl (1961). The new accent is strongly comparative and quantitative. The objective is to include as many communities as possible as one's units of analysis, utilizing a wide range of comparable quantitative data usually derived from published sources (e.g., The County and City Data Book). Time series or longitudinal data are preferred in order to permit analysis of social change. The emphasis tends at times to be excessively empirical, paying insufficient attention to theoretical issues in the quest for indicator variables on as many communities as possible.

Nevertheless, a fairly explicit theoretical model underlies contemporary efforts -- namely, an open-ended system or input-throughput-output model of community decision-making (cf. Clark, 1968b, 1968d; Bonjean, Clark, and Lineberry, 1971: 306-7). Figure 1 reflects reasonably well the account-

Insert Figure 1 about here


ing scheme employed in a number of recent and ongoing studies (see, e.g., Clark 1968: 18; Downs 1968: 295). This open-ended model posits that certain features of communities, such as their population size, regional location, age, industrial and economic base, population stability, and economic and ethnoreligious heterogeneity (i.e., "inputs"), are associated or determine, together with attributes of their political institutions, certain features of their decision-making apparatus, such as the degree of centralization or diffusion of decision-making (i.e., "throughput"). These, in turn, determine which issues will be brought to decision and the decision outcome (i.e., "outputs"). Since the availability of data is such that there is much more "hard" and readily available information on the inputs and outputs and since data are more ambiguous or difficult to obtain regarding the nature of the decision-making apparatus itself, there has been some quite understandable tendency to treat the throughput or "elite decision-making core" -- the central object of concern in earlier case studies -- as a relatively unobservable "black box" about which only certain inferences or approximations concerning the contents are to be made.

Figure 1 . A frame of references for the analysis of community influence systems.

CHARACTERISTIC OF
SOCIAL POSITION
(Inputs)

STRATIFIED
INFLUENCE STRUCTURE
(Throughput)

OUTCOMES
(effects, "functions")
(Outputs)



We propose to make the contents of this black box the central concern of our discussion. We must, therefore, be more careful than sociologists normally are in conceptualizing and measuring social structure -- in this instance, the influence structure on the elite level of a community social system.

Structure and various descriptive terms about structure such as hierarchy, dominance, structural differentiation, structural change, power or class structure, etc., are probably the most popular concepts in the sociological lexicon. Despite the many differences in nuance associated with the term "structure" by various authors, the root meaning seems to refer to a persisting order or pattern of relationships among some units of sociological analysis, be they individual actors, classes of actors, or even behavioral patterns (cf. Nadel, 1957: 1-19; Mayhew, 1971). The apparent consensus in the usage of the term masks the unfortunate fact that there is little agreement on the concepts in terms of which and the methodology whereby one is going to measure, or perhaps more modestly, describe given "social structures". But unless one can develop some way of adequately describing the structure of a system, he can hardly turn to the perhaps more fascinating problem of describing structural change in that system.

A TOPICAL OVERVIEW

From the vantage point of much current research activity then, our approach appears to be a step backwards inasmuch as we want to describe some of the theoretical and research strategies employed in an intensive case study of one small city, Altneustadt (a pseudonym) in West Germany. By redirecting some attention to the black box, we hope to strengthen our

understanding of the mechanisms whereby inputs are converted into outputs. Although we present some specific results, we wish to stress the more general implications of our theoretical and methodological approach for community elite research. Consequently, we may sometimes be overly brief about the detailed empirical procedures used.

The discussion will proceed in two parts. First, we shall sketch a frame of reference for the delineation of community influence systems. In it, the community elite is viewed as a set of incumbents of theoretically identified categories of social positions. The description of the structure which results when these positions are linked in a pattern of specified relationships will be of focal concern. Four features of individual elite members will be noted: (1) their primary and secondary locations in functionally defined institutional sectors, (2) their relative influence statuses, (3) their influence resource bases, and (4) selected value orientations and goal preferences. Some systematic propositions about their respective distributions in the influence structure will be advanced. Premised on some notions derived from graph theory in combination with smallest space analysis, a methodology will be described that is designed to generate a theoretically relevant description of the influence structure. Second, we shall discuss the structure of conflict in community influence systems. It is difficult to imagine a community comprised of a socially and economically heterogeneous population that lacks disagreements regarding the allocation of scarce community resources for alternative purposes. More formally, a central premise of our analysis, being good Parsonsians, is that conflict is an endemic, necessary feature of any community decision-making apparatus and poses the fundamental functional problem of integration

for such structures, that is, the problematical process of establishing binding priorities among competing goals. Consequently, we shall devote some attention to how conflict or cleavage patterns are superimposed on our picture of the elite structure by proposing a theoretically grounded strategy for identifying community issues and tracing their impact on the formation of oppositional factions and coalitions. Before turning to these matters, however, we shall briefly describe the community context which will provide the empirical basis for our discussion.

The Community Context: Altneustadt

Altneustadt is a town of 20,000 inhabitants which is not dominated by a nearby larger city. The town is in rich farming country and serves the needs of a large agricultural hinterland. It is the district (county) headquarters for a range of governmental agencies with a correspondingly large number of public officials and bureaucrats. It also has a number of small and intermediate light manufacturing plants owned by local businessmen. Thus, the town has long had a fairly diversified, mainly "middle class" occupational composition. About fifteen years ago, the State Government decided to build one of Germany's largest natural science research centers in Altneustadt. This center is now the largest and most important employer in the community.

The founding of the Research Center engendered a major migration of population into Altneustadt. Now, approximately one-third of the inhabitants are Neubürger. These Neubürger obviously have very distinctive status characteristics considerably different from those of the Altbürger.

Being for the most part University- educated and highly paid salaried workers, often of urban origin, the Neubürger have strong cosmopolitan and urban values and perspectives. They even tend to have different religious backgrounds, compared to the dominant Catholicism of the Altbürger. These basic differences in world views and life styles between the Alt- and Neubürger have almost inevitably led to many conflicts and tensions in accommodating (if not assimilating) the newcomers. These conflicts have generated a dynamic political situation with clearly delineated and perceived coalitions and interest structures. This provides a setting to study a conflict structure very much concerned with what Lipset and others have called "status politics" rather than "class politics" (cf. Lipset, 1963) since most major groups share roughly "middle-class" socioeconomic status positions but differ fundamentally in their conceptions of appropriate status behavior and styles of life. This, in fact, is the basis of our expectation that the central axis of structural cleavage in Altneustadt will be in the pattern-maintenance sector rather than in the economic or adaptive sector.

Of particular interest is the fact that the SPD (German Social Democratic Party), historically a party rooted in a working-class and predominantly Marxist world view, has been co-opted by the Neubürger as the vehicle for expressing their urban, secular and middle-class demands for social change in Altneustadt. Natural scientists and engineers have not been traditional recruits for the SPD. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU), on the other hand, has proved to be a reliable vehicle of control for the Altbürger. They manage to remain, albeit increasingly insecurely, the dominant political coalition.

SOCIAL POSITIONS AND INCUMBENTS

A. The identification of community influentials and their respective
institutional sectors

For our purposes, the unit of structural analysis will be the individual actor (or a set of actors) in a particular kind of social position (cf. Parsons, 1951). We thus come to the first crucial question to be answered: how are we to identify the domain of relevant social positions for the community influence system? The objections against the reputational and issue approaches as methods of identifying elite personnel are well known. They mainly raise questions of validity and are less methodological than theoretical in nature. The adherent^s of the reputational technique argue that the issue approach has a conservative bias insofar as it is impossible to detect the major impact of nondecisions on the status quo. The adherents of the issue approach retort that the reputationalists only measure reputations for power. Despite these differences, both groups are asking the same question: who governs? This is the main difference between these two techniques and the structuralist, or positional, approach. The positional approach does not ask "who are the powerful people?" but "which positions possess authority or generalized influence in the sense that their incumbents can make binding decisions in their respective institutional sectors or will be consequential in the resolution of community-level issues?" Without being clear about how these several approaches differ in their initial questions, nothing is to be gained by recommending, as has been done, some simple combination of these three techniques as the best procedure for identifying community elites. ¹

Generally following Talcott Parsons' theoretical perspective on the structural-functional differentiation of the community treated as a territorially grounded social system embracing all aspects of social life (cf. Davis, 1948: 312; Parsons, 1960: 250-79), we identified prospective community influentials as the incumbents of the highest positions of authority in organized collectivities whose primary functional responsibilities are in one of the four functionally specialized institutional subsectors at the community level of analysis (see Clark, 1968d, for a recent exposition of the AGIL paradigm applied to community institutions; also D'Antonio *et. al.*, 1961, for a less theoretically grounded, more "commonsensical" listing of types of community leadership personnel).²

As Parsons argues in his paper on a general theory of formal organization (1960: 59-69), there are three levels in the hierarchical structure of organizations: the technical, the managerial, and the institutional. It is this last level of organizational positions that is concerned with the articulation of the organization to its larger institutional environment, both in securing the organization's legitimacy in the more inclusive system and in making its claims on scarce community resources, often, we might add, at the potential or actual expense of other organizations' claims. It is precisely on these grounds that we can analytically treat the community influence structure as the focus of the integrative subsystem of the community.

Not all community institutional subsystems, however, are equally likely to be completely organized into a structure of full institutionalized and

functionally specialized organizations with a full complement of explicitly identified organizational leaders. This is especially true in the integrative and pattern-maintenance sectors of the community which tend to have less crystallized, more fluid organization. We attempted to compensate for this bias of the positional approach by supplementing our list of prospective influentials with nominations by well-informed community informants of persons reputed to be community influentials who were not occupants of formally recognized positions.

We wish to maintain a crucial analytic distinction between a social position and the particular actor who occupies that position. In general, incumbents of "influential" positions spend most of their time devoted to the tasks associated with these positions. But empirical analysis is complicated by the fact that a given actor may simultaneously occupy several "influential" positions in the determination of community decision-making -- that is, he may wear several hats. We propose to deal with multiple role occupancy operationally by distinguishing an individual's primary institutional location or position from his secondary position(s) on the basis of the amount of time he spends performing the duties of each. ³

B. The rank order of influence

Once we obtained a list of 51 community influentials in Altneustadt (of whom 46, or 90 percent, were successfully interviewed) according to the principles outlined above, we were in the position to ask: what is the relative influence status of these influentials? That is, can they be differentiated into a hierarchy of influence? This has been a classic concern, especially

among those utilizing the reputational approach. Procedurally, we simply asked our influentials to indicate those on the list whom they considered "now in general very influential in Altneustadt and rank-ordered the number of votes received by each person on the list."⁴ There is remarkable consensus among the 46 respondents concerning the top seven influentials, the top two of whom received 46 and 37 votes respectively. When we asked Herr K., who was unanimously regarded as "very influential", to name the most influential person in the community, he replied, "Das bin ich."

In an effort to devise at least an indirect validation of this influence rank-order, we considered the following evidence. At the beginning of the interview before any mention of our list of influentials, respondents were asked to name persons and groups who were perceived to be on the supporting and opposing sides of five different major community issues. Most people mentioned frequently were on the influentials list. Thirty-eight persons were mentioned who were not included in that list. However, all of them were mentioned only for one issue and even then infrequently. We simply multiplied the number of times each person was mentioned as being on one or the other side of an issue by his influence rank (assigning a rank-order of 55 to persons not included in the original list), summed the resulting numbers for each side, and divided by the total number of mentions on the respective side. This number can be regarded as the average influence status of proponents or opponents -- the lower the number, the higher the average influence status. (See Table 1.) We were able to pre-

Insert Table 1 about here

Table 1. The average influence status of proponents and opponents on five community issues, with their winning sides indicated by asterisks.

Issue	Proponents Average Influence Status	Opponents Average Influence Status
Adaptive issue primacy Industrial resettlement	13.7*	18.9
Goal-attainment issue primacy Construction of new city hall	7.4*	22.5
Integrative issue primacy Community annexation	10.6*	50.5
Pattern-maintenance issue primacy Secular vs. confessional school	26.6*	28.3
Permission to hold Pop-festival	29.2	15.8*

dict the correct winning side for all five issues ($p = .03125$) by picking the side with the highest average influence status. ⁵

C. Resource bases of influence

We have considered the influence rank order within the elite and certain of its consequences for decision-making. Influence is not, however, an inherent characteristic, but is based on convertible resources an individual has. We now consider the nature of the resource bases upon which each member's influence rests and how they are implicated in determining the relative rank, scope, and domain of his influence. There is a voluminous literature attempting to develop systematic distinctions among resource bases and to link them to the influence process. Examples are Parsons' four media of exchange (viz., money, power, influence, and commitment) at the societal level of analysis and his "influence paradigm" (cf. Parsons, 1969a,), French and Raven's (1959) five bases of power (including reward, coercive, referent, legitimate, and expert) with special reference to interpersonal influence processes, and Clark's (1968: 57-67) list of thirteen resources for power, prestige, and norm formation. ⁶

All of these enjoy a considerable degree of plausibility. Unfortunately, there have been virtually no empirical studies that have systematically attempted to assess resource bases and build propositions about their distributions and consequences with special reference to community social systems. (There are resource studies in experimental social psychology (cf. Cartwright, 1965), but their referent is the small group.)

In order to generate a comprehensive analytic scheme that would help us specify the relevant range of community influence resources to be considered, we identified two fundamental aspects of influence resources that have often been seen to be relevant. As Weber first suggested, the locus of influence base distinguishes between resources that inhere in the social position itself (e.g., the authority of office) and those that inhere in the personal characteristics of the actor exercising influence (e.g., personal charisma). The second aspect of resource bases of special interest concerns their effective scope, generality, or convertability. Here we distinguish between resources that can be utilized in a wide variety of concrete influence situations as positive or negative inducements, e.g., money, and those that are more restricted (or particularized) in their efficacy to a limited range of appropriate situations in which they can be utilized. (Note the paralellism of this distinction to Parsons' universalism-particularism, Clark's generality of resources, and Dahl's influence domain.) Treating these as dichotomous variables, we cross-tabulated them to yield a fourfold table. (See Table 2.) The eight resource bases were chosen so that two of them would fall into each of the four cells.

Insert Table 2 about here.

We made a first approximation at the empirical assessment of influence bases of our influentials by asking our respondents to indicate one of eight resources for each influential whom they knew well enough to judge on that aspect. Each respondent also indicated what he believed to be his

Table 2. Analytical Scheme for Classifying Influence Resources

Locus of influence base

Positional (institutionalized role)

Personal characteristics of incumbent

Generalized

Effective scope
or convertability

Specific

<p>a. Official decision-making authority as elected public official or occupant of a high position in public service</p> <p>b. Power of disposal over fluid economic resources, possible giver of credit</p>	<p>d. General respect as someone who can mobilize the public for good proposals in the interest of the city as a whole</p> <p>e. Honorable broker who can mediate in a nonpartisan way points at issue</p>
<p>f. Power of disposal over less fluid economic resources such as land or jobs</p> <p>g. Special expert knowledge of certain limited fields of community interest</p>	<p>h. Good connections with influential persons in and outside of Altneustadt.</p> <p>i. Influence in certain subgroups of the population such as voters of a particular party, members of a voluntary association, and so on.</p>

own resource base.⁷ The list of resource bases is an attempt to synthesize the previously mentioned lists, formulating them in terms that our "lay" respondents would find meaningful. Apparently we were reasonably successful in this effort since none of the respondents had any difficulties in understanding what was wanted or in doing the task. There was a strong tendency for the respondents to attribute resources more frequently for persons in the higher reaches of the influence hierarchy where members are more visible. Respondents neglected somewhat the less influential members of the elite. There was consensus (in the sense of at least 50 percent of the judges attributing the same base) for more than 64 percent of the influentials with regard to their putative influence base. Where individuals were attributed more than one influence base, this usually was justifiable given these individuals' overall profiles of characteristics -- that is, they actually possessed several bases of influence.

Since the question proved to yield meaningful responses from the respondents, we could now ask whether there was a systematic pattern in the distribution of resources among the influentials. It should be noted that we did not have any theoretical expectation of a correspondence between the analytical scheme we used to specify the domain of influence resources and the differential allocation of these resources among the influentials. On the contrary, we expected the resources to be differentially allocated among influentials according to their institutional specialization, following Parsons.

We adopted a frankly exploratory strategy to study the differential allocation of resources by treating our list of community influentials as

a set of common stimuli to which our respondents could respond with eight alternative responses. Indexes of dissimilarity were calculated for all possible pairs of influence resources by the expedient of percentaging within resource categories across the 50 stimuli. These indexes were uniformly high, ranging between 52.8 and 97.5, suggesting considerable differential allocation of influence resources across the elite "stimuli". A smallest space analysis of this matrix of indexes of dissimilarity (cf. Guttman, 1968, McFarland and Brown, 1972; Laumann and Guttman, 1966; Laumann 1969, 1972) yielded a good fit of the original matrix in two dimensions (coefficient of alienation = .108), which is portrayed in Figure 2. The farther away two resources are in the space, the more dissimilar they are in their patterns of distribution across the elite sample.

Insert Figure 2 about here.

The first axis neatly divides the resources into three categories: economic or adaptive resources, informal influence or integrative resources, and an authority or goal-attainment resource. The second axis seems to arrange these resources along a generality-specificity dimension, that is, from (universalistic) resources that can be utilized in a wide range of situations, such as money or general respect as an "honorable broker" capable of composing differences, to more restrictively utilizable (particularistic) resources, such as land or jobs and "good connections".

TWO-DIMENSIONAL SMALLEST-SPACE
 ANALYSIS OF INFLUENCE RESOURCE BASES.
 GUTTMAN - LINGOES COEFFICIENT
 OF ALIENATION = .108.




Figure 2

"Authority" appears to be intermediate in its generalizability (perhaps reflecting the legally prescribed boundaries of authority domains).⁸

D. Value orientations and goal priorities as individual characteristics of community leaders

Most studies of community decision-making have primarily focused on the structure of influence in the decision process while relatively neglecting the systematic study of individual leaders' attitudes and values (cf. Bonjean et.al., 1971: 217-19). This neglect is all the more remarkable when one considers the central role that arguments regarding value homophily have played for both the elitist and pluralist lines of reasoning (cf. Perrucci and Pilisuk, 1970). When investigators have attended to attitudes and values of leaders, they have naturally tended to devise scales of special relevance to the American scene and, as a result, of limited utility in cross-national comparative research (cf. Agger et.al., 1964).

Since our main theoretical frame of reference for structural analysis treats the community social system decomposable into four subsystems with different functional primacies, we concluded that the content of attitudes and values should also be systematically linked to the same perspective in order to facilitate the development of meaningful hypotheses regarding value homophily within institutional sectors.

One can usefully distinguish among three levels of attitudes differentiated on the basis of their level of abstraction from highly general value orientations (i.e., very general

conceptions about the desirable society or community), to somewhat more specific conceptions of the priorities among alternative, generally stated community goals, to concrete preferences on specific issues confronting the community at a particular point in time. Since there is considerable slippage in logical and empirical integration as one moves from one level of abstraction to another, we do not expect there to be anything but a rather general constraint exercised by an individual's more abstract orientations on his more concrete propensities to act (cf. Converse, 1964; Mayhew, 1971: 40-43) Given the limited time, we shall focus the discussion around two themes: first, on the general value orientations concerning the necessity of the hierarchical nature of society and community in the various functional sectors, and second, on the analysis of community goal priorities.

The best single dimension for ordering political ideologies of various kinds is still the left-right dimension, not in the narrow sense of the intervention of the State in the economy (cf. Downs, 1957), but in the broader sense of egalitarianism versus elitism as these terms are treated by Lipset and others (cf. Lipset, 1963b; Klingemann and Pappi, 1972). With the contemporary counter-trends of economic, political, civil, and social egalitarianism as a result of the diminishing importance of ascription in societal role allocation and the rise of egalitarian political ideologies, on the one hand, and the rise of new inequalities arising out of differences in functional competence and achievement between incumbents of different positions (cf. Parsons, 1970; Laumann et al., 1970: 723-5), on the other, it is obvious that the values of the elite with respect to egalitarianism will be important sources of consensus and cleavage in the decisionmaking system as they

provide important sources of legitimation for their more specific attitudes on issues. Since one cannot assume a priori that the sector-specific values in a functionally differentiated social system are in complete harmony with one another, we developed scales of egalitarianism for each of the four functional sectors. For the analysis of value homophily, it is then possible to distinguish between sector-specific homophily and value homophily in the different coalitions irrespective of the primary sectoral locations of their members.

Where it was possible, we chose scales which were already tested. As a measure of the value system legitimizing status differences in society, we administered a slightly revised version of the Index of Social Egalitarianism which was originally developed by Melvin Seeman and used by Wendell Bell and James Duke (cf. Duke, 1967). The items of this scale give rationalizations for social inequalities, which are in large part still determined by ascriptive criteria, in terms of competence and equality of opportunity. For the political sector we chose a short version of the Political Equality Scale developed by McClosky (1964), and for the economic sector we used only one item measuring the attitude toward the current issue in Germany of co-determination of workers in managerial decisions in industry. As sex and age are the last important ascriptive criteria on the value level of Western societies, we included three items measuring traditionalism regarding youth and two items measuring traditionalism regarding husband--wife relationships. All five items are concerned with the right to participate in decisionmaking of persons of lower ascriptive status.

Turning to the matter of goal priorities, we found a question originally formulated in a NORC survey⁹ to be a very useful measure for assessing goal priorities because the different goals included could easily be seen to be distributed across the four areas of functional primacy. Respondents were asked to rank order these community goals according to their relative importance. For the goals with integrative or pattern-maintenance primacy, the respondents could choose between a more traditional and a more change-oriented goal. Two pieces of information were generated by this question: first, a subjective measure of sectoral primacy for each individual, and second, a measure of his preference for stability or change in the integrative and pattern-maintenance sectors. The information on the ranking of the seven goals was reduced by a factor analysis to three factors, explaining 65 percent of the total variance. The hypothetically expected result came out quite clearly; the first factor standing for economic vs. political primacy, the second for traditional vs. non-traditional emphasis regarding pattern-maintenance problems, and the third for a participatory vs. consensual approach in solving problems of group conflict (integrative primacy).

SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS

A. The theoretical rationale for the description of community influence structures.

To this point in our discussion, we have been concerned with the problems of identifying the social positions and their incumbents who

play consequential roles in community decision-making and of describing attributes of these positions and incumbents. We have thus treated selected aspects of the basic units of elite analysis. When we consider how individual influentials interact with one another, we become interested in describing the structure of their interrelationships. It is to this latter matter, structural analysis, that we now want to turn our attention.

Social structure will be defined as a persisting pattern of social relationships among social positions (cf. Laumann, 1966; especially 1972 for an extended theoretical rationale). A social relationship is any linkage between incumbents of two social positions that involves mutual but not necessarily symmetric orientations, whether of a positive, neutral, or negative affect or whether of superordination-subordination or equality in the relative status of the participants (cf. Homans, 1951; Parsons, 1951; Blau, 1964). If social differentiation is defined as the differential allocation of socially relevant tasks and responsibilities among the set of positions in a social system, then a differentiated social structure is one in which there is a tendency for actors in these positions to confine their consensual relationships with others performing similar tasks. In other words, similar positions will tend to cluster, i.e., be in closer proximity in the structure, as a function of the higher density of their social ties relative to those with more dissimilar positions. One interesting implication of this definition is that the degree to which a social structure is differentiated into clusters of positions is itself a variable (cf. Laumann. 1972).

A more important implication is the fact that one's model of social structure will differ to the extent that he considers different social relationships as the linking mechanisms for the set of social positions, e.g., informal social contacts, professional advice contacts, and so on. We are, therefore, interested in devising a methodology that reveals how the pattern of social relationships is structurally differentiated along specifiable dimensions or facets (cf. Guttman, 1959).¹⁰ This usage of the term "structural differentiation" will be seen to parallel Parsons' (1966) usage.

In order for us to be in a position to interpret the underlying dimensionality of the structures in which we shall be especially interested, we must accept a crucial postulate or assumption:

Similarities in social positions, interests, attitudes, beliefs and behavior facilitate the formation of consensual relationships among incumbents of social positions.

The corollary to this postulate is that the more dissimilar two positions are in status, attitudes, beliefs and behavior of their incumbents, the less likely the formation of consensual relationships and, consequently, the "farther away" they are from one another in the structure. This postulate asserts the distance-generating mechanism among social positions and incumbents. There is ample theoretical and empirical justification for accepting such a postulate as a reasonable starting point for analysis (cf. Homans, 1951, 1961; Newcomb, 1961; Fararo and Sunshine, 1964; Laumann, 1966, 1972; and indeed nearly the entire corpus of the sociometric literature).

B. The methodology of structural analysis: Graph theory and smallest space analysis

We shall focus on three social relationships among our influentials that appear to us to provide critical vantage points from which to view a community's influence structure.¹¹ First, from an instrumental point of view, we want to be able to characterize the pattern of business-professional relationships among the influentials since they are seen in both the functionalist and Marxist literature on community decision-making to be important sources of common interests and claims on the polity and should, therefore, reflect the lines of coalition and cleavage in the community. Respondents were asked to report the three other persons on the list of influentials with whom they were most frequently in contact in the pursuit of their primary institutional responsibilities. These are the task-linked, or instrumental, relationships that tie various organizations and collectivities together. Second, we want to describe the pattern of "social" or expressive relationships among the influentials as it may be seen to reflect in part the common interests arising out of their instrumental activities in their respective primary institutional areas and in part shared values, attitudes and concerns arising from their participation in other aspects of community life. These latter derive from such secondary characteristics of the influentials as their religious and educational backgrounds and residence status (Alt vs. Neubürger). Finally, we want to describe the pattern of "community affairs" relationships which are coalitional linkages among persons with regard to commun-

ity affairs and may be hypothesized to be the "resultant" of three factors the business-professional and social structures and the distinctive political arrangements of the community (cf. Rossi, 1968). (See the bottom panel of Figure 1 for a path analytic model of these three structures.)

Obviously all these concerns derive quite directly from the sociometric approach to the study of community power structures beginning with Hunter's work. In a paper written in 1959, Peter Rossi (1968: 132) quite correctly observed:

...Similar amounts of thinking and effort have not been expended on invention of an appropriate methodology for studying other kinds of organized relationships among the members of a community. Although on the abstract level sociometric devices might seem useful tools in the study of large communities, on the empirical level they prove impractical.

But truly remarkable advances in the methodology of sociometric or network analysis for large systems have been made since 1959, rendering Rossi's judgment considerably less cogent for the situation today. (Cf. Coleman and McRae, 1960; McRae 1960; Rapoport and Horvath, 1961; Harary, Cartwright, and Norman, 1965; Hubbell, 1965; Alba and Kadushin, 1970; Holland and Leinhardt, 1970; Kadushin, 1970; Rosen and Abrams, 1970; Bonacich, 1971a, 1971b; Lorraine and White, 1971, and Levine, 1972). We shall briefly describe one such strategy applied to our data and some suggestive results that will serve to tie together the concerns of this and the concluding section of the paper.

A major objective of these recent efforts has been to develop theoretically grounded, routine procedures to identify the various cliques, defined according to varying criteria of interrelatedness or "choice" patterns, in a large set of persons. A corollary objective has been to develop graphic techniques by which one can describe how these cliques and unrelated persons (who belong to no cliques) are in turn interrelated.

The "sociogram" whereby individuals are represented by points and choice relations among individuals by (directed) lines was an early effort at graphic representation of the structure of interpersonal relationships (cf. Hunter, 1953; Moreno, 1953; Loomis and Beegle, 1951). But once the set of persons and number of choices (i.e., relationships) exceeded a rather small number, it was discovered that the resulting diagrams become far too complex to be readily interpreted. Indeed, two different investigators could come up with quite different but "equally justifiable" graphic representations of the same matrix of choices that in fact might suggest rather different interpretations of the "same" structure. The advent of the computer and the development of several mathematical and statistical techniques that require the computer's large computational resources for their successful application have spurred several strategies for analyzing large sociometric matrices (e.g., Bonacich, 1971a, 1971b; Alba and Kadushin, 1970).

We have combined two recent developments, graph theory and smallest space analysis, to describe our three "relational" structures.¹²

Systematic introduction to these developments and discussion of their merits are found in McFarland and Brown (1972) and Harary et al. (1965). We mention only several concepts from graph theory that play a central role in our analysis.

The mathematical theory of digraphs is concerned with the development of postulates and theorems relating to "abstract configurations called digraphs, which consist of 'points' and 'directed lines'." (Harary, et al. 1965). A graph consists of points and lines connecting them in which the direction of the lines is disregarded. Three graph theoretic ideas are of special interest to us: an adjacency matrix (from which all of our subsequent analysis proceeds), reachability, and path distance. Consider the following sociometric (adjacency) matrix in which the rows and columns represent three persons, v_1 , v_2 , and v_3 , and the entries in the cells are either "1" or "0" to indicate whether v_i (in rows) chooses (is in a relation with) v_j (in columns) or not.

Insert Matrix 1 about here.


This matrix may be diagrammed, as in Figure 3, where points represent ~~persons~~ and directed lines (arcs) between two points represent whether there is a relation or not. A point v_j is reachable from point v_i if there is a path from v_i to v_j , that is, there is a set of directed lines from v_i to v_j . In our illustration, v_1 can reach v_2 in a path of

Insert Figure 3 about here.

Matrix 1. Adjacency matrix.

		Chosen		
		v_1	v_2	v_3
Chooser	v_1	0	1	0
	v_2	0	0	1
	v_3	0	0	0

Figure 3.



length "1" and v_3 in a path of length "2", and v_2 can reach v_3 in a path of length "1" but v_2 and v_3 cannot reach v_1 . The reachable set $R(v)$ of a point v is the collection of points reachable from v . The path distance between two points in a digraph is the minimum number of directed lines that must be traversed in order to reach the second point from the first. (The path distance between two points in a graph is the minimum number of lines disregarding direction (i.e., the adjacency matrix is symmetric) that must be traversed in order to reach the second point from the first.) Terry Gleason (1969) has devised a computer program called D.I.P. that computes the reachability and path distance matrices from adjacency matrices containing up to 200 points. Since we are interested in the presence of a particular relation between two persons, not its reciprocity, we decided to disregard the direction of choices by the simple expedient of symmetrizing the adjacency matrices.

An inspection of the reachability matrix (consisting of "1" if v_j is reachable from v_i in some number of steps and "0" if v_j is not reachable from v_i) immediately tells us which persons were disconnected from which others in the total set of influentials -- that is, their pattern of choosing and being chosen were such that they could not reach particular others in the structure. All of the respondents were reachable from all other respondents in the social and community affairs graphs in some finite number of steps, while five respondents in the business/professional structure were not reachable by some others. The maximum number of steps ^{along a shortest path} from one influential to any other was 6. One individual, Herr K., who ranks as the most influential

man in town, could reach in two or fewer steps 91 percent of the others in the community affairs structure and 73 percent of the others in the "social" structure and in the business/professional structure, respectively. Thus, from one point of view, we might conclude that our influence structure is highly integrated to the extent that essentially every leading influential can reach and be reached by every other influential in the community. If we observed many disconnected individuals or sets of individuals, this would indicate a less integrated influence structure, with consequently greater difficulties in coordinating community affairs or resolving issues.

C. Graphic representations of influence structures

But as interesting and suggestive as these and other results on reachability are, time constrains us to move on to what seems to us to be an especially fruitful analysis of the three matrices of path distances. By submitting each path distance matrix to a symmetric smallest space analysis (cf. Roskam and Lingoes, 1970), we obtain an acceptable Euclidean two-dimensional representation of each matrix. In each representation the derived Euclidean distances among the points (persons) are a monotonic function of the original path distances among the points. We propose to interpret these pictures according to the theoretical principles suggested in the introductory remarks concerning differentiated social structures in combination with our earlier discussion of certain selected characteristics of individual influentials, especially sector location and reputed influence.


Figures 4, 5, and 6 are the graphic representations of the smallest space

Insert Figures 4, 5, and 6 about here

solutions. Each person has been uniquely identified with a code providing information regarding his influence status, institutional sector responsibilities, influence resource base, religious preference and party membership. The number represents his rank position in the reputed influence status hierarchy. The first capital letter indicates the individual's primary institutional sector location while the following small letters indicate his secondary institutional sectors in which he plays some active role. The second capital letter indicates his party membership; the third capital letter indicates his religious preference and the final letter, his influence resource base (see Figure 2). (See legend of each figure for the complete explanation of the abbreviated code.)

In general, we shall employ two basic principles for interpreting the spaces: the principle of integrative centrality and the principle of sectoral differentiation. The principle of integrative centrality holds that persons playing key integrative or coordinating roles in the three structures will tend to be located in the "central region" of their respective spaces -- this will, on the average, minimize their distances (access) to any other person in the space -- while persons located in the peripheral regions (at some distance from the center) should be of declining functional importance in performing integrative activities for the community

EXAMPLE:



Influence

Respondent's influence rank in the entire elite of 51 persons. Based on question 25, a measure of influence depending on other respondents' votes. Subscripts serve to distinguish respondents who were tied, i. e. received the same number of votes.

Primary Sector, Secondary Sector

E - Economy (A - Sector)

A - Authority position in political system (G - Sector)

P - Political Party
 W - Economic Association
 V - Social Clubs, Sports } (I - Sector)

B - Education
 R - Religion
 C - Culture
 H - Health and Charity
 S - Science } (L - Sector)

N - Respondent could not be coded into any primary sector

SOCIAL RELATIONS NETWORK
SMALLEST SPACE ANALYSIS
EUCLIDEAN METRIC
TWO-DIMENSIONAL SOLUTION
GUTTMAN-LINGOES COEFFICIENT
OF ALIENATION = .150

EXAMPLE:





Figure 5

COMMUNITY AFFAIRS NETWORK

SMALLEST SPACE ANALYSIS

EUCLIDEAN METRIC

TWO-DIMENSIONAL SOLUTION

GUTTMAN-LINGOES COEFFICIENT

OF ALIENATION = .131

EXAMPLE:





Figure 6

social system and possibly of increasing importance in representing narrowly defined or interest-specific demands on the community system. Thus, this principle of interpreting the several spaces implies the identification of a coordinating center (delineated by a circle whose center is the centroid with a short radius) whose membership varies from one structure to another, depending on the nature of the relationship upon which it is constructed, and a series of increasingly large concentric rings reflecting, heuristically speaking, "zones" of declining integrative importance.

The principle of sectoral differentiation divides the space into relatively homogeneous regions radiating from the center and including personnel in the same institutional sector who share common concerns. These sectors represent potential, if not actual, "natural" coalition zones on community issues. Persons in a given functional (institutional) subsystem may at times appear on opposite sides of the center. When they do, they are likely to be in opposition to each other on some issues of common functional relevance. The less localized or regionalized a scatter of points (persons) sharing a common institutional locus, the more likely they will divide on issues of common institutional concern. The more localized a cluster of persons in a common institutional sector, the more homogeneous they will be in attitudes and values and the more they will function as a coordinated proactive or reactive claimant group (coalition) on community issues.

By combining these two principles, we can offer two additional speculations about the structure of the integrative center. First, we hypothesize that a position's actual location toward the center of the space but in a particular sector may be seen to reflect its potential integrative

role as a representative for that sectoral interest since, on the one hand, its position close to the center makes it influential, and, on the other hand, its location in a sector ties it to other positions in that sector. Second, integrative centers may be seen to be highly biased in their compositional make-up, "over-representing" certain sectors while under-representing or completely excluding others. To the extent that certain sectors are excluded from central zone locations (i.e., all their personnel are located in the periphery at considerable distance from the center), we may infer that their impact on decision-making outcomes will be minimized. In other words, the decision-making structure, while performing Almond's function of aggregating interests, has an aggregative bias in favor of some interests and against others (cf. Gamson, 1968: 53-4).

Looking at the three spaces (Figures 4, 5, and 6), we readily see that they do differ among themselves in important ways. The central core of the business/professional space includes only the top-ranked community influentials who occupy positions of authority at the city and county administrative level and personnel who control the largest economic and financial interests in the general area and who, incidentally, do not on the average enjoy as high reputed influence status as the governmental leaders. These two groups presumably have much common intercourse concerning the coordination of governmental decisions that have bearing on economic matters, such as zoning, housing policy, etc., and vice versa. Control over adaptive resources (money, land, and jobs) and authority (power) are

the principal influence resources represented in the center. Small businessmen, religious, educational, and Research Center personnel are relegated to the peripheral zones but in clearly demarcated sectors at some considerable distance from one another.

The central core of the social space is composed of a rather different set of personnel, almost all of whom are long resident, Catholic members of the dominant CDU coalition in the city that has run the community for many years. It is noteworthy that high reputed influence is not concentrated in the center. Influence resources in the center are primarily authority and influence -- no adaptive resources are represented in this core group. The differentiation of the economic sector is almost the precise reverse to the business/professional space as it moves from the center which includes small downtown businessmen and merchants to the periphery area which includes managers and owners of large manufacturing, financial, and agricultural enterprises located outside the city limits. The Research personnel are located by themselves at some considerable distance from the center and from the other sectors, reflecting their highly segregated existence in the "social life" of the community. The traditional religious and educational elite are located opposite them in the space. Herr B., 12SabCKI, is the only Research Center person who has been fully assimilated in the sense of being located in the central zone of the social space, but he differs from his colleagues at the Research Center on nearly every key count -- he is a Catholic rather

than a Protestant, a political economist rather than a natural scientist, and a convert from the SPD to the CDU since his arrival in Altneustadt.

Finally, the central core of the community affairs space includes a higher density of personnel than the other spaces who are recruited from much more heterogeneous institutional sectors, political and religious backgrounds, and among whom all the types of influence resources are represented. As one should expect, center personnel are more homogeneous on the reputed influence status in that they tend to be seen as belonging in the upper reaches of the influence hierarchy. The sectoral divisions, especially toward the periphery, are very similar in character to those of the other two spaces.


If we correlate reputed influence status as a community influential with distance from the centroid of each of three spaces, we find significant correlations for the business/professional structure (.403) and the community affairs structure (.298) but an insignificant correlation of .174 for the social structure. If we are prepared to regard reputed influence status as a crude indicator of relative "integrative" status in the community social system, then we can take these correlations as at least consistent with but by no means dramatic confirmation of our principle of integrative centrality. We might speculate further that integrative status may mean rather different things in these three relational contexts. Reputed influence status as a community influential is clearly more relevant to the community affairs and business/professional structures but is not especially relevant for the social integration of the community

elite. If we had assessed "social prominence and esteem" in the sense of Robert Dahl's (1961) "social notables", we might well have found that this was a more appropriate indicator of integrative status in the social structure and was significantly associated with centrality in that structure.

How are these three structures related to one another? We have already implied that they are similar to one another but are not by any means identical since they reflect rather different processes for forming social relationships. In our discussion of Figure 1 outlining our general theoretical model, we offered in the bottom panel a path model of the three structures in which we argued that the community affairs structure was a joint product of the business/professional and social structures, with the social structure being a resultant in part of the business/professional structure. We attempted a crude evaluation of this model by considering the product-moment correlations of the Euclidean distances of all pairs of points $\binom{41}{2} = 820$ in the three spaces. This strategy preserves the relative locations of all points across the three spaces even though the axes themselves may arbitrarily flip-flop from one space to the next. Figure 7 presents the path coefficients for this model. The multiple R is .459, which means that 21.1 percent of the variance in the community affairs structure is accounted by the other two structures. What is striking is that the business/professional structure, has no direct effect on the community affairs structure -- it is mediated entirely through the social structure on which it has a rather strong impact.

Insert Figure 7 about here

Figure 7. A path model of the structural determinants of the community affairs structure



THE OUTCOME OF INFLUENCE STRUCTURES

A. Community issues

Persons who are concerned with the analysis of dissensus and conflict over the resolution of various community issues may well ask how our structural analysis deals with such matters. Our emphasis on describing the structure of the black box responsible for community integration from a Parsonsian standpoint seems to confirm the often repeated charge that the framework is simply too static and cannot adequately handle conflict and change (cf. Dahrendorf, 1961: 77-82; Gouldner, 1970: 353-55). Although we cannot hope to answer satisfactorily all these objections, we would like to consider these questions.

Recall our discussion of Figure 1 which schematized our theoretical framework. We wanted first to open the black box of "throughput" to analyze its internal contents. We wanted then to use knowledge of the structure to clarify (a) the structure of consensus and cleavage in the integrative system and (b) the resulting outcomes in binding collective decisions on particular issues and the extent and sources of community tensions.

In order to specify a bit more precisely the nature of these outcomes and tensions, it is useful to distinguish between two broad types of issues and their related outcomes. On the one hand, instrumental issues are concerned with controversies over the differential allocation of scarce resources, such as land, jobs, and money, and find their particular focus in the adap-

tive and integrative sectors of community concern. Lipset (1963a) and others have spoken somewhat more narrowly of "class politics" when discussing such issues. For such issues there usually is a fairly obvious calculus of costs and benefits to various interested parties. As a result, a fairly straightforward, even quantitative, analysis of objective interest differentiation is facilitated. Conflict over such issues tends to be moderate, often characterized by bargaining and compromise among the contending parties. The specific outcome is the direct result of their relative power or influence. Some political scientists have even thought it possible to devise means for the "rational" or "optimal" resolution of such controversies.

Consummatory or expressive issues, on the other hand, are concerned with controversies regarding the maintenance or change in the organization of basic values, commitments, and orientations that shall guide or control community affairs. Such controversies, sometimes termed "status politics" (cf. Lipset, 1963a), are usually highly charged with emotional affect and have an "all or none" nature that usually precludes or makes very difficult negotiated settlements among the contending parties. Thus, the nature of the outcome and the level of community tensions often directly depends upon how a given issue comes to be defined as one or the other type of issue. As we shall see, this distinction is closely related to the functional perspective on community issues elaborated below.

In our view, one of the most unsatisfactory aspects of the literature on community decision-making has been the basically atheoretical, ad hoc selection of community issues for analysis such that comparative study of

community decision-making is difficult if not impossible.¹³ One can identify two favored strategies for the identification and selection of community issues. In the first strategy, the investigator identifies a set of recent issues in a community from newspaper accounts and community informants and selects those for intensive study that meet some criterion of "importance to the community," such as the level of public controversy and mobilization (cf. Dahl, 1961; Polsby, 1963; Freeman et al., 1968). In the second strategy, the investigator selects an issue in which he already has some interest, perhaps because of his interest in a preferred outcome, such as fluoridation of the water supply (cf. Gamson, 1966; Rosenthal and Crain, 1966) or urban renewal (Hawley, 1963; Clark, 1968e), and which has come up for resolution in a number of communities. He wants to ascertain what factors determine a particular outcome. While both strategies enjoy the obvious advantage of relatively clear, unambiguous operational procedures, they both suffer from being heavily tied to all the historical particularities of the specific issues studied and pose serious problems, especially in the first strategy, for comparative analysis.

As Polsby (1963: 96) pointed out some years ago, "there seem to be no satisfactory criteria which would identify a universe of all decisions (issues) in the community" and Wolfinger (1971: 1078) is equally skeptical in a more recent article. The problem of defining the universe of content from which to sample issues is especially important when one wants to identify "non-issues" or check whether the actual issues are a biased sample. We think that it is impossible to define a universe of content without an

adequate frame of reference for studying community power. At present only two frames of reference seem to be available: the interest group approach and the functional approach. The interest group approach looks for possible partisan groups in a community and identifies possible issues according to some notion of the objective interests of these groups. Since we used the functional approach for analyzing the decision-making structure, it follows that we should use the same approach to define the universe of content of possible issues. ¹⁴

While it may sound hopelessly ambitious at this stage of development, a theoretically grounded scheme for defining and classifying community issues is needed that permits: (1) a definition of the universe of content of possible community issues; (2) a means of defining the biases in the set of issues that actually arise in a community during a given period (that is, communities confront issues sequentially and, therefore, for any period of time may not face issues from the full range of the issue space); (3) a translation of the historical individuality of a given issue into a more theoretically meaningful category that permits comparative analysis; and (4) the generation of systematic hypotheses linking the type of issue to structural characteristics of the community decision-making system. We hope that a very modest step toward constructing such a scheme was taken by our decision to classify community issues according to their functional primacy in the AGIL paradigm of functions confronting any social system (cf. Parsons, 1951, 1961; Clark, 1968d; Mayhew, 1971).

Obviously issues will often have implications for several functional sectors of the community social system. Much in the same way that we pro-

posed to distinguish between primary and secondary functional foci for our influentials, issues may be seen to have primary and secondary impacts in different institutional sectors. Which of the possible functional definitions will depend on a series of considerations about its emergence of an issue becomes focal or primary in a particular community at a particular point in time with particular sponsors and opponents.¹⁵ If one can satisfactorily solve the operational problems of distinguishing among primary and secondary sectors for issues, then perhaps one can make some interesting predictions about which institutional sectors are most likely to be activated and participate in the resolution of given issues (these should differ according to the functional primacy of the issue) and what kinds of influence resources will be most relevant and effective (adaptive resources, such as money, jobs, and land, may be of little consequence in a pattern-maintenance issue where persons controlling commitment and integrative resources may have the competitive advantage).

With a prior structural analysis of influence (as in the preceding section), we should be able to predict how given issues will be resolved by determining the functionally specialized sectors likely to be activated by a given functional issue. We can also assess the likelihood of the sector being divided on the issue by examining the relative spread or clustering of personnel in a particular institutional sector in the spatial solutions and their locations with respect to the central integrative core. If there is significant sectoral or integrative differentiation, we can predict the winning coalition as the one which is favorably located relative to the in-

tegrative core, controls more "appropriate" influence resources, and includes a higher average level of reputed community influence.

With these general considerations in mind, we selected five issues for our study of Altneustadt's decision-making system according to two criteria. First, they must have had a major impact on community affairs within the past three or four years or might realistically be argued to have such an impact if they became matters for decision in the future. Second, they should be distributed across the four functional problem areas identified in the AGIL paradigm. The issues meeting these two criteria were as follows:

- (a) industrial re-settlement in Altneustadt (economic or adaptive primacy);
- (b) construction of a city hall (political or collective goal-attainment primacy);
- (c) incorporation of outlying communities into an expanded city administrative unit (integrative primacy);
- (d) establishment of a secular primary school as opposed to the existing confessional school (latent pattern-maintenance primacy -- education and religion); and
- (e) permission to hold a Pop Festival in Altneustadt (latent pattern-maintenance primacy, public morality, status of youth as a "minority" group with low access to center of power; intergenerational conflict). 16

The underlying notion here of sampling issues from various institutional sectors was to provide an opportunity to determine if the elite tended to be correspondingly differentiated into coalitions functionally specialized for "control" in specific sectors or if there was a functionally and structurally undifferentiated unitary elite core (dominant coalition) that made the crucial decisions for all institutional areas (perhaps with specialized

"lower-level" personnel to implement these decisions). (See Table 1 for average influence status of opponents and proponents on the five issues.)

B. Graphic representation of the cleavage structure

Figures 8, 9, and 10 present the same three spatial representations

Insert figures 8, 9, & 10 about here.

of the business/professional, social, and community affairs structures that we considered in the preceding section, only now we have drawn in "fault lines" for each of the five issues that more or less divide the respective spaces into proponents and opponents on each issue. Before discussing these consensus-cleavage structures in greater detail, observations must be made that bear on the operational independence of our various procedures. First, each respondent was asked at the beginning of the interview a series of questions about each issue concerning such matters as the individuals and groups he perceived to be most strongly in favor or opposed to the issue, his own position on the issue and degree of participation in the decision-process on the issue, as well as his estimate of the level of conflict over the issue and whether the conflict was public or confined to the "inner circle" of community influentials. The names of the participants, pro and con, were spontaneously generated by the respondents -- the list of influentials we had identified was not presented until much later in the interview. Second, in order for us to

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TWO DIMENSIONAL SOLUTION
GUTTMAN-LINGOES COEFFICIENT
OF ALIENATION = .158

F = for the proposal
 A = against the proposal
 = stand on the proposal
 could not be determined

EXAMPLE:





Figure 9

designate an influential as an active proponent or opponent on an issue, at least two respondents had to have spontaneously mentioned him in one or the other capacity. (In most cases attributed and self-reported position and involvement in the issue were the same, but in several important cases they were not. Persons on the losing side tended to report themselves on the winning side.)

It is readily apparent from an inspection of the several pictures, especially the social and community affairs pictures, that the fault lines of the oppositional structures and the personnel active on each of the issues do change from one functional issue to another about as expected and that some persons, most notably those in the central integrative zones, are likely to be active in more than one issue. In fact, only one person, the most influential man in town, was perceived to be involved in all five issues.

For illustrative purposes we can look more carefully at the social space (Figure 9). The fault lines are almost identical on the two pattern-maintenance issues, the school and the Pop Festival, with the newcomers at the Research Center and their allies opposed to nearly everyone else. These issues differ considerably in their substantive content. The integrative issue (community incorporation), on the other hand, unites all city factions against the county political leadership, while the polity issue of building a new city hall was an inner-elite controversy (there was low public controversy about this issue), arraigning the "city hall crowd" located in the central zone against the periphery who, of course, lost. Finally, the industrial resettlement issue split the economic sector

(which you will recall is rather widely scattered in the space) between the large employers who might be fearful of such a large competitor for a limited labor supply (at least in the short term) and possible disruption of their favorable location in the influence structure and the small retail tradesmen and business people who probably would welcome the expanded business opportunities arising from the substantial population growth likely to be generated by the new employer.

Thus, for even this relatively small community we see that structural differentiation has proceeded far enough to generate relatively stable coalitions that are activated differentially depending on the functional issue. Much more could be said about the internal structure of the varying coalitions, their influence resources, and preferred leadership strategies, which support some of the interpretations we have been making. Suffice it to say that we think this illustrative evidence provides sufficient indication of the ways in which our theoretical and methodological procedures greatly facilitate the systematic description of structural cleavage and consensus (e.g., it makes immediately obvious who would be "impossible" coalition partners) and corresponds in fair approximation to the explicit structural-functional model we have been developing. Consensus-cleavage structures do change over time. We believe that the techniques we have described are capable of generating meaningful snapshots at particular points in time that in turn may be juxtaposed to describe stability and change in community influence structures.

SUMMARY

After briefly characterizing recent work in the study of community decision-making, we conclude that there appears to be some convergence on a number of common methodological strategies and theoretical and empirical assumptions. There still remain, however, important weaknesses in the overall theoretical framework and its implied methodology in directing research efforts. Attention is directed to a theoretically informed structural analysis of the community influence system that derives from a Parsonsian perspective. Several critical questions are raised concerning the identification of the relevant set of community influentials, the systematic description of their attributes as influentials (including their institutional locations, influence resource bases, and attitudes and values), and the ties that bind them into shifting coalitions depending on the functional issue confronted. Recent methodological advances in graph theory and smallest space analysis are seen to provide means of examining the consensus-cleavage structure of community influence. Appropriate illustrations are drawn from the authors' case study of the community influence system in Altneustadt, a small city in West Germany. Highlights include a theoretically meaningful interpretation of a smallest space solution for the distribution of community influence resource bases, the development of a rationale for describing differentiated social structures which are constructed from sociometric information on business/professional, social, and community affairs discussion partners within the elite, and some systematic hypotheses about the linkages among the three structures and between them and five selected issue outcomes.

FOOTNOTES

¹Whether one uses individuals or positions as the primary units of analysis is not a problem peculiar to the study of elites. In some of the classic community studies social stratification was operationalized as the ranking of individuals or families along a common prestige continuum, whereas most structural approaches attempted to rank social positions, such as occupations (cf. Lepsius, 1961).

²Parsons' AGIL paradigm was used as the analytic framework for classifying organized collectivities according to their primary functional contributions to the community social system. Given the rather abstract character of the original formulations, there are some minor operational difficulties in coding organizations as belonging primarily in one of the four sectors. We coded business firms and banks as economic organizations with adaptive primacy; top governmental administrative positions, judges, and legislative decision-making bodies as having goal-attainment primacy to the extent that they make binding decisions for the community as a whole; voluntary associations including unions and political parties as having integrative primacy as foci of interest group demands on the polity; and positions in educational, health, religious and cultural organizations as having pattern-maintenance primacy. Notars in Germany are a specialty in the legal profession concerned with economically relevant activities, such as the preparation of contracts and property transfers, and, consequently, were treated as in the adaptive sector. Although the Natural Science Reserach Center is the largest employer

in Altneustadt, having many important ramifying economic consequences, we decided to code it as a pattern-maintenance collectivity, both because its goal objectives are themselves distinctively cultural in their focus and consequences and because, from the community's point of view, it poses the distinctive problem of the assimilation of its personnel with their distinctive cultural characteristics into a more inclusive pattern of community life.

³People who spent most of their time in non-authority positions are coded separately, thereby distinguishing them from individuals whose primary positions of authority are in economic, political, voluntary association, science center, religious or educational/cultural organizations.

⁴Two different questions were asked to measure the general influence rank. First, as already discussed, the respondents were asked to name all the persons of which they would say "that they are now in general very influential in Altneustadt." Second, they were asked to indicate the top three persons from those they had identified in order of their community influence. The rank-order correlation between influence status on the basis of the simple number of mentions and on the basis of a weighted sum of nominations for the top three influentials is .837 (N = 31). Given the very high correlation between the two procedures and the fact that the "simple mentions" method provide an order for the entire sample while the "top three" method covered only the top 31 persons, we have decided to use the simpler measure for our measure of influence status.

We also note that each respondent was asked to name other people whom he felt should be included in our list of community influentials. While a number of suggested additions were made, all but one were mentioned only once. The exception received five nominations and was, consequently, added to our list and interviewed.

⁵By looking at means and variances in the influence ranks attached to an issue, we are also able to assess the degree to which a given issue tended to be confined to the higher reaches of the set of influentials (so to speak, an internal elite disagreement) or was a broader-based community issue which involved the mobilization of personnel outside of the top influential group.

⁶Clark's thirteen resources include money and credit, control over jobs, control of mass media, high social status, knowledge and specialized technical skills, popularity and esteemed personal qualities, legality, subsystem solidarity, the right to vote, social access to community leaders, commitments of followers, manpower and control of organizations, and control over the interpretation of values (see also Gamson, 1968: 59-109).

⁷The actual text of the question was as follows:

Q. 40. Usually persons are regarded as significant and influential in a community because of certain personal characteristics or resources. We have written down here some such possibilities. (Hand over the list.) One can, for example, be influential on the basis of an official position in the city administration or as an elected public official, which corresponds to our first point, or because one has at his disposal economic resources such as money, land, or jobs. This would correspond to our points 2 and 3 which

we have differentiated according to the fluidity of the resource, that is, between money on the one side and land and jobs on the other. Then there are experts in specific fields which are influential because of their expertise -- that is our point 4 -- or persons who can accomplish a great deal through their good connections with other influential people in and outside of the city -- that is our point 5. One can also be influential in a community because he is known as someone who makes good suggestions and who can mobilize the people for these proposals as a good speaker. This is our point 6. Our point 7 describes the honorable broker and point 8 the representative of specific subgroups of the population. Could you please indicate for the persons on our list for whom you believe yourself capable of an exact judgment, the most important characteristics or resources which this person possesses? In the case of a person for whom several possibilities are relevant, please give me the characteristic or resource which you regard as the most important.

- (1) Official decision-making authority as an elected public official or occupant of a high position in the public service.
- (2) Power of disposal over fluid capital, possible giver of credit.
- (3) Power of disposal over less fluid economic resources such as land or jobs.
- (4) Special expert knowledge of certain delimited fields of community interest.
- (5) Good connections with influential persons in and outside of Altneustadt.
- (6) General respect as someone who can mobilize the public for good proposals in the interest of the city as a whole.
- (7) Honorable (widely respected) broker who can mediate in a non-partisan way points at issue.

- (8) Influence in certain subgroups of the population such as voters of a particular party, members of a voluntary association, and so on.
- (9) Other (please get exact particulars).

⁸A cautionary note should be interjected here: given the wide scatter of points and the fact that there are only eight points, interpretation of the underlying structure cannot be as confident as when there are many points in a given region to help define its "meaning". But with that caveat in mind, there is nevertheless a remarkable correspondence between our theoretical expectations and the empirical results.

⁹"Interview schedule for panel of community elites," question 14, National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, undated. (cf. Clark, 1968c).

¹⁰You may have noticed by now that our treatment of the question of describing social structures rests on a fairly explicit physical analogy. There are always a number of pitfalls in taking any analogy too literally. Certainly one must be warned against assuming that he shall be able to make such statements as the following: In Structure Z, Position A is twice the distance from Position B as from Position C. We can, however, assert that, assuming a reasonably good smallest space solution, Position B, is, relatively speaking, farther from Position A than Position C. In short, we can make statements at the level of the rank-order of positions.

¹¹Three questions are the source of information on these relationships:

- Q33. Would you please indicate the three persons from the list with whom you most frequently meet socially (privately)?
- Q37. Could you now indicate the three persons out of our list with whom you have the closest business or professional contact?
- Q38. Could you please indicate the three persons with whom you most frequently discuss community affairs?

¹²See Alba and Kadushin (1970) for a rather similar approach based on graph theoretic notions but using a different graphic technique.

¹³Often assuming a ruling elite model of community decision-making, critics of the issue approach (cf. Bachrach and Boratz, 1962, 1963) have identified another important criticism by pointing to the "non-issue" problem in communities dominated by a ruling faction that so controls the community agenda that "important" and consequential matters never come up for general community discussion and decision.

¹⁴We are inclined to agree with such commentators as Ossowski (1963), Lenski (1966), and Stinchcombe (1968) that Marxian and functionally oriented perspectives are by no means as radically incompatible as has sometimes been assumed. There are, of course, obvious differences of emphasis and concern between them. One important difference is the tendency for Marxian oriented analysts to see instrumental issues as forming the fundamental substrate of community controversy, whether actual or potential; while functionalists tend to accord expressive issues pride of place, seeing disagreements among groups concerning fundamental values to arise from considerations other than simply their different relations to the economic structure.

¹⁵The coding of an issue into its appropriate functional sector is not a simple matter of identifying the institutional sector of the collectivities most likely to be affected. For example, a school bond issue is obviously concerned at some level with the educational system, which is usually treated

as an entity functionally specialized with regard to pattern maintenance. But the issue may develop in two quite different directions. It may be regarded as a purely instrumental issue whether the community can afford to pay for another school, given its other current obligations. Its functional locus is, therefore, integrative as it concerns the establishment of its claim of priority in the allocative scheme (budget) of scarce community resources among competing alternatives. But the issue may become a consummatory or expressive issue by focusing not on costs but on what type of school program is to be implemented in the proposed new building. In this case, prospective changes in the organization of pattern-maintenance activities are at issue.

¹⁶Altneustadt actually confronted issues b, c, and d in the past several years. But because it had not confronted issues having special relevance to the economic subsystem in the recent past and because we saw the city as having especially acute pattern-maintenance problems due to the rapid in-migration of distinctive newcomers, we decided to develop two hypothetical issues (a and e) for these two sectors. (See Perrucci and Pilisuk, 1970, for another recent study employing hypothetical issues.) Both of these issues were quite realistic in that they could easily become matters of public or elite debate in the immediately foreseeable future.

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