"The Process and Payoffs of Political Mobilization:

The Nazis in 1930"

Dee R. Wernette

Kean College of New Jersey

July 1976

"The Process and Payoffs of Political Mobilization:
The Nazis in 1930"

Dee R. Wernette
Kean College of New Jersey

"The Process and Payoffs of Political Mobilization:
The Nazis in 1930"

Abstract

Previous studies of the Nazi Party have focused on the social
bases of Nazi support. Much less attention has been given to the
process of the creation of that support. Through analysis of violent
and non-violent political events during the 1930 election campaign,
as reported in a national daily newspaper, this study examines the
process resulting in the Nazis' first national election victory.
The Nazis are the most active of all parties, combining violence
with electoral activities. The Communists, the other major parti-
cipant in these events, concentrate their efforts in political
violence, and focus their attacks on the Nazis. Increases in votes
for both parties are positively correlated with both violent and
non-violent political activities. These findings suggest a reevalu-
ation of both the process of the Nazi rise to power, and of the
relationship between collective political violence and more routine
forms of political action.

THE PROCESS AND PAYOFFS OF POLITICAL MOBILIZATION:
THE NAZIS IN 1930

Theorists have traditionally explained the appearance and characteristics of social movements in terms of structures and changes on the macro-societal level. From Kornhauser and Smelser to Gurr and Davies[2], macro-societal changes are seen as creating the social conditions and individual motivations which result in various forms of collective action. This approach has also been predominant in the sociological literature on Hitler's Nazi party. Lipset, in summarizing this literature, explains Nazi support in terms of individuals' structural positions and reactions to macro-societal changes. "The ideal-typical Nazi voter in 1932 was a middle-class self-employed Protestant who lived either on a farm or in a small community..."[3] Such individuals voted Nazi in reaction to rising unemployment, the increasing bureaucratization of modern industrial society, and the growth in political and economic support of big labor and big business.

This macro-societal approach has precluded the study of the process of growth and political mobilization of social movements. For this growth is implicitly seen as inevitable, given the macro-societal conditions and forces at work. The only information on the growth process of the Nazis comes from the historical literature. Bracher presents a good picture of the national-level strategies and alliances of the Nazis prior to 1933.[4] Noakes describes the Nazi use of opinion leaders and the Nazi methods for gaining control over middle-class interest groups in one region of Germany.[5] The only information on the Nazi methods of political mobilization on the community-level comes from Allen's excellent study of Northeim.[6] Like

all case studies of individual communities, Allen's is limited in terms of generalizing to the larger society. Consequently, we have no clear, national-level picture of the methods and processes of political mobilization which characterized the Nazi rise to power.

This gap in the literature is of more than just theoretical and historical interest. The question of the relative efficacy for political mobilization of various kinds of collective action has been of practical interest in both pre-Nazi Germany, and in the U.S. in the last decade. The German Left was divided in their tactical response to the initial Nazi growth. The Socialists (SPD) argued for avoiding violent confrontations with the Nazis whenever possible. Violence, by reenforcing middle-class fears of a Leftist Revolution, could only drive such voters to the Nazis.[7] The Communists (KPD) assumed the opposite: to the victor of violent confrontations go the votes. Undecided voters choose to back whichever party they preceive as the strongest: they want to "bet on a winning horse".[8] To fail to meet the Nazi challenge in the streets would only show the weakness of the Left, and thus result in a Nazi victory at the polls. Although cast in different political contexts, similar arguments divided the anti-war and civil rights movements in this country in the 1960s. Our study of Nazi political mobilization should shed light on this and similar questions.

Our data on the political activities of the various parties comes from coded articles of the national, German, daily newspaper, Die Koelnische Zeitung. We coded all articles describing political events occurring in the two months preceeding the Sept. 14, 1930 election to the National Parliament. This election campaign produced the first large Nazi electoral victory. The political nature of the

event was established by either a clear political identity of one of the participants, or by the nature of the activity, such as election meetings. Four main kinds of political activities were studied: non-violent, organized political activities; acts of terror and attacks of property; collective violence; and repressive acts by the state. Operational definitions and examples of these kinds of activities will be presented in the discussion below.

The information for each coded event consists of the date and location, (by city or township), of occurrence; the type(s) of activit(y/ies) occurring as part of the event, and the identities of the participants in each type of activity. In some kinds of activities, such as terrorist attacks, one actor clearly initiates the activity against the second party. In such cases the identities of both initiator and target are also included in the coded record. The numbers of participants, arrested, killed, or wounded for the various parties to the events were rarely reported in the articles. Consequently this information is not included in the coded reports.[9] To illustrate the kinds of events under study and the amount of information reported, we briefly turn to a fairly typical event from the Koelnische Zeitung. The setting is the central market square of Stuttgart, a large city in southern Germany. It is a Thursday afternoon, three days before the Sept. 14, 1930 elections. A group of Nazis are handing out election leaflets, which a number of Communists try to stop. A fist-fight develops. The traffic police, who try to restore order, are threatened with knives. One officer is injured by blows. The police are pelted with stones thrown from the windows of houses on the Hauptstaetter street. They finally have to "make use of their drawn weapons", and call the riot police for assistance. Six arrests

have been made.[10]

The analysis of this campaign proceeds from the general to the specific. The general nature of the campaign is studied in terms of the relative frequencies of various kinds of activities occurring in both all events and in combinations within the same event. The over-all strategies of the various parties are reflected in their levels of participation in the different kinds of activities. On a more specific level, we focus on the interactions of the two most active parties, and on the police response to violent actions by these parties. The history of the campaign is then analyzed in terms of the temporal distribution of the various kinds of events. The analysis concludes with a discussion of the relationships between various kinds of political actions and changes in voter support for the participants.

The analysis of this campaign was presented as the study of the process of Nazi mobilization. By mobilization we mean the creation of political support of and commitment to a party.[11] Our measure of the mobilization process is the two non-violent types of action presented in Table 1.[12] Included in non-violent actions are public meetings, parades, and handing-out or displaying in public places literature, posters, flags, or other political materials. The action is coded as election-oriented when the report provides a clear electoral context, e.g. eine Wahlkundgebung, or election mass-meeting. When this context or connection is lacking or unclear the action is coded as "other non-violent actions". It is clear from Table 1 that most mobilization has this electoral context, and that attempts at mobilization occur in at least a third of all events reported. While not surprising, this supports the choice of this

TABLE 1

FREQUENCIES AND PERCENTS OF EVENTS WITH TYPES OF ACTION, 1930

Type of Action[a]	No. of Events With This Type of Action	% of All Events With This Type of Action
Non-violent Actions		
Election-Oriented	104	33%[b]
Other	13	4%
Terrorism		
Acts of Terror	24	8%
Attacks on Property	29	9%
Collective Violence		
Guns Used	4	1%
Weapons Other Than Guns Used	58	18%
No Mention of Weapons	49	16%
Initiated by One Party	65	21%
Initiator not Identified/ "Spontaneous"	40	13%
Total Collective Violence	86	27%
State Actions		
Police Investigations	20	6%
Arrests	55	17%
Reports of Trials	59	19%
Bans on Organizations	8	2%
Bans on Activities	27	8%
Total Number of Events	316[c]	

[a]The kinds of activities included under each of these types of action are briefly described in the accompanying text.

[b]Since a given event may have more than one type of action occurring in it, these percentages do not add to 100%.

[c]Since a given event can have more than one type of action occurring in it, this total is not the sum of the numbers in this column.

data source in studying the mobilization process.

Non-violent mobilization is clearly not the only activity

occurring in this campaign. Collective violence occurs with almost the same frequency as non-violent actions. Collective violence includes both inter-personal and inter-group violence, (defined as an attempt to physically harm another individual), in a face-to-face setting. In many cases the newspaper clearly states that one party attacks another. Such actions are coded as "initiated". The violent action is coded as "spontaneous" when this information is unclear or lacking. No minimum number of participants is necessary for a fight to be coded as collective violence, since such detailed information is lacking in most articles. Distinctions between types of collective violence were made in terms of the use of guns, weapons other than guns, or no weapons mentioned. Although guns are rarely used, over half of all collective violence incidents include the use of some other weapons. Likewise one party clearly attacks the other is the majority of events with collective violence. It is clear that in many cases at least some of the participants in collective violence are neither surprised by nor unprepared for the fight.

A less frequent type of violence in this campaign is terrorism. Acts of terror consist of either arson, bombings, or shootings from ambush. The target of such acts is people, whether on the street, in a meeting, or at their homes. In some cases arson or bombings occur late at night with minimal chances of personal injury. The late-night bombing or arson of the headquarters or meeting-place of a party is consequently coded as an attack on property if the building is unoccupied. Defacing property and stones thrown through windows are also included under attacks on property. Over 15% of all events include either acts of terror or attacks on property. While not as frequent as collective violence, these more premeditated and organized forms

of violence are clearly an important part of this campaign.

Arrests and political trials are the most frequent state actions reported in this campaign. Our analysis will focus only on arrests, since they are most closely related to the other kinds of actions under study. The police are clearly not asleep, since they make arrests in 17% of all events. It is clear, however, that they aren't able to arrest all participants in violence, since some form of collective violence occurs in 27% of all events.

From table 1 it is clear that the mobilization process in this campaign occurs in the context of both terrorist and collective violence, and arrests by the police. How are these types of activities related to one another? Specifically, to what extent do we find different kinds of activities occurring in the same event? Generalizing from the event in Stuttgart described above, we would expect mobilization attempts to frequently lead to collective violence. Allen's findings likewise support this prediction: collective violence peaked in frequency during the election campaigns in this period, and often accompanied election activities.[13] In contrast to this prediction the frustration-aggression theory would predict that collective violence would be rarely found in combination with electoral activities. For electoral activities and collective violence are two "competing" channels for the release of frustration and aggression. In the words of one of the leading theorists of this school: "These electoral examples suggest that voting and other forms of political participation provide for the expression of discontent in relatively nondestructive ways. It is likely ... that discontent is more violently expressed in the absence of such procedures."[14]

The data presented in Table 2 allows us to test these conflicting

TABLE 2

PERCENT OF EACH TYPE OF EVENT HAVING A SECOND CHARACTERISTIC, 1930

Types of Events	Acts of Second Characteristic						
	Arrests	Acts of Terror	Attacks on Property	T Initia Collect Violence	T Sponta Collect Violence	Election-oriented	N
Election-oriented	12%[a]	5%	5%	26%	20%	. .	104
Other Non-violent	31%	8%	8%	62%	38%	15%	13
Arrests	. .	18%	27%	42%	38%	23%	55
Acts of Terror	42%	. .	17%	21%	17%	22%	24
Attacks on Property	52%	14%	. .	31%	10%	18%	29
Total Initiated Collective Violence	35%	8%	14%	. .	26%	42%	65
Total Spontaneous Collective Violence	52%	10%	8%	42%	. .	52%	40

[a]These percentages are of the total number of events with types of action identified in the rows, which also have the type of action identified in the column. Since more than two types of action can occur in the same event, these percentages do not add to 100 per cent.

hypotheses. For the entries in this table show the percentages of
events with one type of action which also have a second type of
action in combination. The percentages are computed by row, with
the number of events at the end of each row used as the base.
Examining the row for election-oriented activities, it is clear
that these rarely occur in combination with any single other type
of activity. When they do occur in combination, however, they are
most likely to be found with initiated and/or spontaneous collective
violence. Examining the rows for initiated and spontaneous collective
violence, we find that respectively 42% and 52% of all events with
these types of action also are characterized by election-oriented
activities. Although election-oriented activities don't always lead
to collective violence, roughly 50% of all cases of collective vio-
lence are found in the context of election activities. This supports
Allen's findings, and casts doubt on the validity of the frustration-
aggression hypothesis.

Election activities, while a frequent context for collective
violence, are much less frequently found in combination with arrests,
acts of terror, or attacks on property. Acts of terror and attacks
on property are only found in frequent combination with arrests.
The two types of collective violence are found in frequent combina-
tions with each other, with arrests, and with election-oriented
activities as noted above. Arrests are made most frequently in the
context of the two types of collective violence (42% and 38% in the
"arrests" row). Attacks on property and spontaneous collective
violence are the forms of violent action most likely to lead to
arrests, however (52% for both in the "arrests" column).

The findings from Table 2 are summarized in Figure 1, which

election-oriented   initiated & spon-
non-violent   ----->   taneous collective
actions   violence   =====> arrests

                          Acts of terror

                          Attacks on
   Property

Figure 1: The sequential ordering of various kinds of activities,
          when found in combination in the same event.

suggests the sequences of the various kinds of activities when
found in the same event. The sequential ordering come from my know-
ledge of the data through reading and coding the newspaper articles.
The broken arrows indicate that in more than 33% of the events with
the "dependent", or sequentially second type of activity, one also
finds the "independent", or sequentially first type of activity.
Thus one finds election-oriented, non-violent actions in more than
33% of the events with either type of collective violence, and one
finds either initiated or spontaneous collective violence in more
than 33% of the events in which arrests are made. Solid arrows sig-
nify that more than 33% of the events with the independent form of
action also have the dependent form of action. Thus arrests occur
in more than 33% of events having collective violence, acts of
terror, or attacks on property.

Given this general picture of the campaign, what are the roles
of the various political parties, as measured by their rates of
participation in these various kinds of activities. Table 3 shows
the over-all strategies of the four political parties whose activi-
ties were reported in the newspaper articles. It is clear that the
Nazis and the Communists (KPD) are the most active parties, in terms
of the total number of events in which each party was involved.

TABLE 3

PERCENT OF TOTAL PARTY PARTICIPATION IN TYPES OF ACTION, BY IDENTITY OF PARTY, 1930

Types of Actions in which Parties Participated	Identity of Party Participating			
	Nazi %	DNVP %	SPD %	KPD %
Election-oriented Non-violent	21%[a]	53%	39%	4%
Other Non-violent	4%	• •	11%	3%
Placed under Arrest	13%	• •	• •	16%
Trials of Members	13%	20%	• •	20%
Engage in Terrorism	7%	• •	• •	9%
Target of Terrorism	7%	• •	6%	4%
Attack Property	6%	• •	6%	10%
Target of Attack on Property	4%	• •	• •	9%
Initiate Collective Violence	19%	• •	6%	28%
Spontaneous Collective Violence	25%	27%	33%	32%
Total Number of Events in which Party was Involved	135	15	18	88

[a]Because the same party can participate in more than one type of action in the same event, these percentages do not necessarily add to 100 per cent.

The participation of the Conservatives (DNVP) and Socialists (SPD) is limited to a small number of events with election activities or spontaneous collective violence. The Nazis and Communists, in contrast, participate in both larger numbers and in a broader range of types of actions. This being the case, the analysis will focus on these two extremist parties.

The Nazis pursue a mixed strategy, participating in roughly equal proportions in election activities and in the two types of collective violence. The Nazi involvement in terrorism and attacks

TABLE 4

**PERCENT OF ATTACKS BY PARTY HAVING OTHER PARTY
AS TARGET, BY TYPE OF ACTION AND IDENTITIES
OF INITIATOR AND TARGET, 1930**

Type of Action and Identity of Initiating Party	Party Receiving/Responding to Violent Types of Action[a]		
	Nazis %	KPD %	N[b]
Terror			
Nazis Engage in Terror		44%	9
KPD Engages in Terror	75%		8
Nazis Attack Property		38%	8
KPD Attacks Property	11%		9
Collective Violence			
Nazis Initiate with Weapons Other than Guns		20%	10
KPD Initiates with Weapons Other than Guns	50%		12
Nazis Initiate, No Weapons Mentioned		11%	9
KPD Initiates, No Weapons Mentioned	75%		12

[a]This does not imply that the receiving party either does or does not respond in kind, but only that the receiving party did not start the type of action, and that the other party did.

[b]These are the numbers of events in which the party initiates this type of action.

on property is proportionately similar to that of the Communists. In contrast to the Nazi strategy of mixing violent and non-violent activities, the Communists concentrate on violent actions at the expense of election-oriented activities. They engage in acts of terror more frequently than they receive terror attacks, and their involvement in both kinds of collective violence is, relative to their over-all level of participation, higher than that of the Nazis.

Thus while the Nazis participate in the various types of violence as frequently as the Communists, the Communists appear as the more violent party, since they concentrate more of their participation in these activities.

Since the Nazis and Communists are the major participants in the various kinds of violence in this campaign, one would expect much of their violent activities to be directed at one another. Table 4 shows the extent to which the Nazis and KPD concentrate their violent attacks on each other. Although the numbers of cases are small, the general pattern in this table is clear: the KPD was more likely to concentrate its attacks on the Nazis, than vice versa. This is the case in three out of the four types of violent actions. It is difficult to determine the extent to which this pattern is the result of different intentions of the two parties; the result of differential reporting of the identity of the target of violence; or the result of differential visibility to political opponents. For the Nazis often wore uniforms, which made them visible to both attacking opponents and to newspaper reports. KPD members, in contrast, were more apt to blend in with the working-class population. In any case, the message received by readers of this newspaper is clear: although the Nazis and KPD are equal in the numbers of various kinds of violent attacks initiated, the KPD focuses more of its attacks on the Nazis than the Nazis do on the Communists.

The analysis thus far has focused in large part on the actions and interactions of the Nazis and Communists. As noted above, the police were also active in responding to political violence. Were they impartial in arresting Nazis and Communists? Table 5 shows the arrest rates for the Nazis and KPD, given their participation in the

TABLE 5

PERCENTAGES OF ACTIONS PRODUCING ARRESTS,
BY PARTY ATTACKED AND TOTAL, 1930

| Types of Actions | Identity of Party Attacked | | | | Total for All Parties Attacked | |
| | Nazis | | Communists | | | |
	%	(N)[a]	%	(N)[a]	%	(N)
Acts of Terror	30%	(10)	100%	(4)	42%	(24)
Attacks on Property	60%	(5)	38%	(8)	52%	(29)
Initiated Collective Violence, Weapons Other than Guns	31%	(16)	60%	(10)	40%	(43)
Initiated Collective Violence, No Weapons	25%	(12)	100%	(1)	25%	(28)

[a]These numbers are the totals of the events in which the party is attacked with this type of action, not the total number of times arrests are made when the party is attacked.

various kinds of violence. The overall rates for the two parties are roughly equal, which suggest police impartiality in responding to Nazi and KPD violence. Yet the Communists are more likely than the Nazis to be arrested when they attack property or initiate collective violence without weapons. The Nazis are more likely to be arrested when they engage in either type of spontaneous collective violence. These differences may be due to police discrimination. Comparing the Nazi and KPD arrest rates with the overall arrest rates for these types of violent actions, (shown in column three), the arrest rates for these two parties are generally below the general arrest rates. Perhaps part of belonging to political organizations active in violence is knowing when to "hoof it".

TABLE 6

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTIONS OF EVENTS WITH THE MAJOR TYPES OF ACTION, BY PERIOD OF OCCURRENCE IN THE CAMPAIGN, 1930

Type of Event	Time Periods, in Days							
	1-11 %	12-22 %	23-33 %	34-43 %	44-53 %	54-63 %	Total %	No.
Election Activities	5%	2%	7%	15%	40%	31%	100%	102
Acts of Terror	12%	25%	32%	16%	8%	12%	100%	25
Attacks on Property	14%	7%	17%	14%	14%	34%	100%	29
Initiated Collective Violence	9%	17%	13%	24%	13%	24%	101%	63
Spontaneous Collective Violence	10%	18%	12%	25%	12%	22%	99%	40
Nazis Participate in Event	11%	10%	14%	24%	20%	21%	100%	135
Nazis Initiate Collective Violence	19%	8%	12%	19%	27%	15%	100%	26
DNVP Participates in Event	26%	24%	9%	3%	15%	24%	101%	22
SPD Participates in Event	13%	17%	13%	9%	26%	22%	100%	18
KPD Participates in Event	11%	17%	13%	27%	10%	23%	101%	88
KPD Initiates Collective Violence	8%	24%	12%	32%	0%	24%	100%	25
All Events	13%	11%	12%	17%	23%	22%	98%	307

Our analysis thus far has considered the campaign as a static whole. To study the dynamics of the campaign the various kinds of events were aggregated, by date of occurrence, into six consecutive periods covering the 63 days from July 14 through Sept. 14, inclusive. By having computed the percentages across the rows in Table 6, we are able to study fluxuations in the frequency of occurrence of events of a given type, relative to the entire campaign. The frequency of election activities, for example, is relatively low in the first three periods, rises rapidly to the fifth period, and then declines slightly in the last ten days of the campaign. Similar concentrations of events in the last half of the campaign exist for All Events and for most of the other types of events. Only acts of terror and events with DNVP participation deviate from this general trend. This trend, although significant, is not overly dramatic in most cases. More interesting are the patterns of fluxuation around this trend.

The frequencies of both types of collective violence rise and fall in a series of waves, with the peaks in the second, forth, and last periods. This pattern is even more pronounced for KPD participation in events and initiation of collective violence, which suggests that the Communists were largely responsible for determining the dynamics of the level of collective violence. Nazi initiation of collective violence peaks in the fifth period, the "trough" of the Communist violent activity, as illustrated in Figure 2. This suggests that in the last half of the campaign the Communists and Nazis alternated in taking the offensive in initiating collective violence. Yet the Nazis did not allow the KPD to turn the campaign into a street-fighting contest: levels of both Nazi participation

Figure 2 : Distribution of percentages of total collective
violence initiated by Nazis and Communists over
the course of the campaign, 1930.

in events and election activities are high in the last two periods.

Thus while the campaign does reach a crescendo of sorts at its end,

this is not merely the result of an escalation process in which

violence replaces election activities as the order of the day.

While KPD initiatives may determine the levels of collective violence

for most periods of the campaign, the Nazis pursue their mixed

strategy to the end.

In summary, the findings suggest contrasting images of the Nazis

and Communists. Both are highly active, leaving their competitors on

the Left and Right far behind in terms of levels of participation.

The Nazis maintain a higher level of activity than the Communists

in most periods and for the campaign as a whole. Both parties parti-

cipate frequently in various types of violence. The Nazis' strategy

combines election activities with participation in and initiation of various types of violence. The Communists, in contrast, engage primarily in violent activities. They determine the level of collective violence in most periods of the campaign, and concentrate their attacks on the Nazis.

The Nazi gains of over 5.5 million votes are the largest for any party in the 1930 election. The Communists, with an additional 1.3 million voters, are the only other party with substantial gains in this election. To what extent are the events analyzed above important in explaining these gains by the two extremist parties? To answer this question would entail correlation and regression analysis, controlling for all other factors affecting changes in the Nazi and Communist votes. That analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. The zero-order correlation coefficients presented in Table 7 suggest, however, that both Nazis and Communists have greater than average gains in cities and townships experiencing these types of events. The occurrence of political violence and Nazi mobilization efforts appears to be related, at least geographically, to the increased voter support for the two extremist parties in this election.

The analysis of this campaign suggests two general conclusions. The first conclusion concerns the nature of the Nazis as a political movement. Arendt, writing on this subject, states:

> "The pronounced activism of the totalitarian movements, their preference for terrorism over all other forms of political activity, attracted the intellectual elite and the mob alike, precisely because this terrorism was so utterly different from that of the earlier revolutionary societies. . . . What proved so attractive was that terrorism had become a kind of philosophy through which to express frustration, resentment, and blind hatred, a kind of political expressionism which used bombs to express

Table 7: Relationships between change in voter support and
the occurrence of various types of events, 1930

Types of Events	Change in Voter Support[a]	
	1930 Nazi	1930 KPD
Nazi election activities	+.21[b]	+.28
Nazis initiate collective violence	+.20	+.26
Nazis in spontaneous collective violence	+.18	+.27
KPD initiates collective violence	+.21	+.31
KPD in spontaneous collective violence	+.18	+.27

[a]These variables measure the changes in the number of votes
for these two parties from the 1928 to the 1930 elections
for the roughly 1000 cities and townships in Germany. These
variables were converted to the standardized form. The data
comes from the German Census series: Die Statistik des
Deutschen Reichs.

[b]All correlation coefficients presented in this table are
zero-order, and are statistically significant at well beyond
the .001 level. The cases for Berlin were excluded from the
data on which these coefficients are based. This was neces-
sary due to problems in assigning political events to the
sub-units within Berlin. It is unlikely that this has sub-
stantially affected the direction or strength of any of these
coefficients.

oneself, which watched delightedly the publicity given
to resounding deeds and was absolutely willing to pay
the price of life for having succeeded in forcing the
recognition of one's existence on the normal strata of
society." 15

Our analysis shows this view to be false in two respects. First,

although both the Nazis and Communists certainly qualify as totali-

tarian movements, neither concentrates most of its activities in

terrorism. Secondly, of all the political parties in Germany the

Nazis have the highest levels of participation in the institution-

alized, non-violent, legal, election-oriented activities. This is

to paint neither Nazis as pacifists nor Hitler as Gandhi -- the

Nazis are also very active in all types of violence. Yet to see the Nazi, or for that matter Communist, strategy as primarily terrorist is to oversimplify and distort a more complex picture.

The second general conclusion concerns the relationship between political violence, especially collective violence, and institutionalized political processes such as elections. Our findings cast doubt on theories which see political collective violence as primarily expressive, and as antithetical to routine political processes. Rather, political collective violence appears closely related to election activities in two ways. First, as we have seen, roughly half of the collective violence incidents reported here occur in the context of election activities. Second, what is often at stake in such violent confrontations is the right to use public spaces for purposes of political mobilization. This instrumental character of collective violence is well illustrated by the incident from Stuttgart cited above. The study of such incidents, I suggest, offers important insights into the nature and dynamics of social movements, and their place in the political arena.

FOOTNOTES

1. The research reported here was conducted in meeting the require-
ments for the Ph.D. at the University of Michigan. The United States
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency provided funding for part of
this research. Josef van Almsick, Nancy Rondo, and Patrick McDaniel
aided in the stages of microfilming and coding the data. Prof. R.
Tilly was most generous with advice and assistance during the summer
I spent gathering data in Muenster. E. Daniel Ayres gave a great
deal of advice and assistance in the computer manipulation and analy-
sis of the data. The members of my dissertation committee -- Profs.
Charles Tilly, Wm. Gamson, Max Heirich, and Charles Bright -- gave
invaluable suggestions and criticisms at earlier stages of this
research. I owe special thanks to Chuck Tilly, who provided at all
stages of the research guidance, advice, and support in ways too
numerous to mention. The responsibility for any shortcomings in the
research is, of course, solely my own.

2. Kornhauser, Wm. The Politics of Mass Society, New York: Free
   Press, 1959; Smelser, Neil Theory of Collective Behavior,
   New York: Free Press, 1963; Gurr, Ted Robert Why Men Rebel,
   Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970; Davies,
   James C. "The J-Curve of Rising and Declining Satisfactions
   as a Cause of some Great Revolutions and a Contained Rebellion"
   in Violence in America (Graham & Gurr, eds.), New York: New
   American Library, 1969

3. Lipset, S.M. "'Fascism' -- Left, Right, and Center", in S. M.
   Lipset, Political Man, Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co.,
   1963

4. Bracher, Karl Dietrich, Die Deutsche Diktatur, Berlin, Germany:
   Verlag Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1969

5. Noakes, Jeremy, The Nazi Party in Lower Saxony, 1921-1933,
   Oxford, England: Oxford University Press

6. Allen, Wm. S. The Nazi Seizure of Power, Chicago: Quadrangle
   Books, Inc., 1965

7. This is the SPD position as reported by Ernest Mandel in his
   Introduction to Leon Trotsky's The Struggle against Fascism
   in Germany, New York: Pathfinder Press, Inc., 1971

8. Trotsky, Struggle Against Fascism, p. 19

9. For a more complete description of the data, the methods used
   in gathering and analyzing it, and its limitations, see Dee
   R. Wernette, "Quantitative Methods in Studying Political
   Mobilization in Late Weimar Germany", 1975, submitted for
   publication to the Historical Methods Newsletter

10. Koelnische Zeitung, Koeln, Germany, Sept. 12, 1930. Edition
    No. 499. The translation is my own.

11. This definition corresponds to and was taken from Gamson,
    Wm. A., The Strategy of Social Protest, Homewood, Ill.:
    The Dorsey Press, 1975, p. 15

Footnotes, cont.

12. These are clearly not the only measures of mobilization attempts which one could use. These measures ignore for the most part the use of the mass media in political mobilization. They were chosen because they best reflect mobilization attempts at the community level. This was important since I wanted to measure the impact of mobilization attempts on changes in voter support on the local level.

13. Allen, _op. cit._ see especially pages 291-297.

14. Gurr, _op. cit._, p. 310.

15. Arendt, Hannah, _Totalitarianism_, New York: Hartcourt, Brace, & World, Inc., 1968, pp. 30-31.