

"Competitive Individualism and
the Persistence of Minority
Disadvantage"

By Suzanne Model

September 1984

#320

COMPETITIVE INDIVIDUALISM AND THE PERSISTENCE OF MINORITY
DISADVANTAGE

Suzanne Model
28 Buttonwood Drive
Dix Hills, N.Y. 11746

Revised version of a paper presented at the CRSO symposium honoring Charles Tilly on July 20, 1984 at the University of Michigan.

Curious to learn whether our nation has served as an historic "land of opportunity", Stephan Thernstrom opened the door to American "history from below". Using the innovative technique of tracing individuals through nineteenth century census manuscripts, he uncovered modest but perceptible improvement among the residents of Newburyport, Massachusetts (Thernstrom, 1964). Following his methodological example, a host of community studies have examined occupational mobility from Boston to San Francisco and back again (Decker, 1978; Knights, 1971; Thernstrom, 1973). Much of this research has focused on the question of ethnic opportunity. Blacks, it has been universally concluded, participated unequally in the American dream. White immigrants, on the other hand, experienced a steady improvement, though the rate of advance varied across backgrounds.

Yet, if one sought to fit these early explorations of "The Great Ethnic Derby" (Gorelick, 1981) into some kind of theoretical framework, one would have to classify them as status attainment research. Proceeding on the individual level of analysis, many students of ethnic mobility tended to view their subjects as isolated actors, or at best, isolated families.

Today, ethnic stratification analysts are more likely to stress the implications of group membership for ethnic individuals. Not surprisingly, Chuck and Louise Tilly have encouraged many scholars in this direction. Zunz's (1982) work, as well as that of Bodnar, Weber, and Simon (1982)

show great sensitivity to the collective events that stand behind ethnic mobility.

As a student in the Tilly tradition, I too question the usefulness of regarding ethnic minorities as atomized individuals. My particular emphasis, however, is on the impact of collective activity on employment outcome. Being familiar with Chuck's contributions to political sociology, I began to wonder whether his theory, that categories, networks, and resources combine to inform collective action, might hold some relevance to ethnic economic success.

My presentation today falls far short of formal model construction. However, I do present a general picture of ethnic advance based on Chuck's variables. Specifically, I will argue that when members of ethnic categories obtain job related resources, they dispense these resources to their compatriots through social networks. The distribution process is strongly oriented along ascriptive lines and operates independently of qualifications. The result is ethnic mobility, collective style.

On the other hand, if members of an ethnic category cannot obtain adequate job related resources, they have little to dispense through their networks. I call this situation "competitive individualism", by which I mean a process of job procurement and advancement that operates devoid of personal or organizational interventions. The very necessity of an ethnic category to have to practice competitive individualism itself signifies massive

discrimination. Moreover, competitive individualism generates a feedback effect. By weakening the bonds between group members, the resourceless are isolated from the resourceful. The result is ethnic stagnation, individual style.

In this paper, I limit my attention to four groups: Poles, Italians, Jews, and blacks. I do so to simplify the argument while focusing on the major contenders for "a piece of the pie", as Lieberman (1980) so aptly puts it. The discussion is further confined to the urban non-South, the scene of most of the action. In terms of time, I stretch rather grandiosely from around 1880 to the present.

In exploring the significance of the types of jobs these migrants secured, I focus on industries rather than occupations. Industrial units of analysis come closer to capturing the collective effects I wish to address. Of course, ideally, one would want observations at the firm level, the level where workers collectively interact. Unfortunately, firm level data are always hard to assemble, especially for historical investigation. Since firms usually contain workers within a single industry, in my argument today, I substitute industrial units for firms.

Additionally, in drawing inferences about the relative advantage of industrial locations, I rely on an expanded version of the dichotomy of labor market segmentationists. These theorists, as you know, divide industries into two sectors: capital intensive and monopolistic industries: the core, and labor intensive and competitive undertakings: the

periphery (Edwards, et al., 1975). Core industries are believed to offer higher pay, more stable jobs, and greater possibility for advancement than peripheral endeavors. Segmentationists believe that a bifurcation of the economy was in the making before the turn of the century, but major differences between sectors did not emerge until around 1930 (Gordon, et al., 1982). Moreover, a trickle down effect to labor took approximately another decade, when the union movement finally triumphed in capital intensive industry.

Since sectorial affiliation has important consequences for the economic welfare of laboring groups, I feel it necessary to incorporate these categories into parts of my analysis. However, I amend the usual division of the economy into two sectors by including a third option: the ethnic enclave or small business sector. This sector consists of a subset of the small, competitive firms that segmentationists would ordinarily relegate to the industrial periphery. A number of studies have suggested that when such firms are ethnically homogeneous, they offer exceptional opportunities for security and advancement (Light, 1972; Portes and Bach, 1980; Wilson and Portes, 1980). Whether employees in this sector are also consistently well paid appears less likely (Waldinger, 1983). Still, I feel it appropriate to distinguish this third option from the other two, as have several previous investigators (Wilson and Portes, 1980; Wilson and Martin, 1982).

In the first part of my presentation, I concentrate on the job procurement process during the period of heavy white immigration: before the First World War. I argue that all migrant groups showed substantial industrial segregation, and propose some reasons why. I then move to the post World War I era, and examine ethnic employment patterns as thousands of blacks surged Northward. As Lichtenstein (1975) also discovered, I find that white groups tend to persist in their earlier niches, while blacks are substantially dispersed across industries. I then discuss the causes and implications of this state of affairs. Finally, in a short concluding section, I take up the question of whether public employment is a suitable substitute for the earlier spheres of influence enjoyed by white ethnics.

1880-1915

For the next few moments, I consider how ethnic categories came to be associated with industrial categories. I will argue that some, though not all employees were channeled into jobs on the basis of their pre-migration work experience. For white ethnics, however, the demand for workers was so great that skill soon had little to do with the recruitment process. Rather, jobs were secured primarily on the basis of personal ties to the labor supply. These networks tended to reproduce earlier, ethnically specific, industrial preferences.

For black Americans, job selection was quite a

different process. I will show that, with the exception of a demand for strike breakers, Afro-Americans were rarely the labor force of choice in the more desirable industries. Indeed, as the century turned, more and more blacks were found in the personal services. Anecdotal data suggest that black applicants had to convince employers again and again that they could perform acceptably on the job. Success was more often a triumph in competitive individualism than a by-product of mutual assistance.

* * *

Because industrialization proceeded unevenly across the globe, it stimulated a massive redistribution of the world's population. Employers in developing areas welcomed hands to mine the coal and lay the rails of the industrial infrastructure and to labor in the factories that produced the new manufactured goods (Piore, 1979). These undertakings, in turn, expanded the need for distributors of products and services, particularly in the new centers of population.

In the United States, most of the workers arriving to fill these new jobs originated from the less favored regions of the globe, and not only because such nationals had the greatest incentive to emigrate. By the late nineteenth century, improvements in technology were decreasing the proportion of highly skilled 'aristocrats' required in many industries. American employers found they could diminish their dependency on organized, high wage labor by relying on larger numbers of cheaper, more placid newcomers

(Erickson, 1957). The least developed sections of Europe proved the most likely sources for such a labor force.

Contrary to popular opinion, most American industries did not deal with the problem of recruiting labor directly from abroad. According to Charlotte Erickson (1957), who has made a detailed inquiry into the subject, most employers relied first on urban labor bureaus that specialized in the distribution of workers. These bureaus varied from a large public office at Castle Garden in New York, to small operations run by businessmen or philanthropists in many parts of the country. Surprisingly, the apportionment of labor that emanated from these sources proceeded across heavily ethnic lines. In some cases, of course, the agencies themselves were organized under ethnic auspices. The padrone, or Italian labor agent who operated out of a small Italian saloon or bank, was an especially notorious example. But, even ethnically impartial bureaus received requests from employers for specific nationalities. By the early twentieth century, Sheridan (1907) reports that order blanks passing between employers and labor bureaus contained a printed entry next to which employers specified the desired background of their future employees.

This situation evolved because employers had quite definite ethnic preferences in hiring. Though wage levels were often the primary determinant, in a few cases, pre-migration job experience had something to do with ethnic priorities. For example, some of the earlier arrivals from

Poland had previously found employment in heavy industry in Western Poland and Eastern Germany (Golab, 1977). Italians were known for their abilities as construction workers in Central Europe and North Africa (Foerster, 1919). Bohemian skill in cigar making is yet another example (Korman, 1969). These stereotypes operated to admit as well as exclude job applicants. Thus, most industrial employers believed that blacks and Italians performed poorly in factory jobs, and preferred to employ Hunkies, as both Slavic and Hungarian speaking immigrants came to be called (Fitch, 1910; Carpenter, 1927). Jews were considered too feeble for heavy labor of any variety, but performed admirably in the sweatshop.

Over time, these ethnic employment patterns solidified further, despite the fact that employers shifted away from urban labor bureaus as sources of employees. Social networks provided the new foundation for recruitment. Personal contacts proved cheaper than formal middlemen, and often more reliable. Not surprisingly, these networks rarely crossed ethnic boundaries.

In large work environments, the employee himself was the key actor. When supervisors or foremen encountered the need for labor, the following exchange was typical:

"How do you like your job here?"

"Pretty well."

"Have you not a brother or a cousin or some friends in your home that you would like to bring out?"

"Yes."

"If they come here, we think we can put them to work..."

Description by NY Contract Labor Inspector, 1899 quoted in Erickson, 1957: 45)

Less common, but not unknown was a situation in which foreman colluded with immigrants to "sell" a compatriot a job. The fee paid by the greenhorn would then be split between the two conspirators (Fitch, 1910).

In smaller firms such as garment factories and commercial enterprises, personal ties to the employer might supplement the human resources that employees could mobilize themselves. As Epstein (1950) explains: "One of the common devices for the contractor in all branches of the clothing industry was to seek out his landslite (sic) and, in the guise of benefactor, take them into his shop where they worked at a lower rate. Landsman ties resulted in a number of shops being filled with the home folk of the employers."

An enormous number of contemporary and retrospective accounts of turn-of-the-century hiring practices confirm a pervasive reliance on compatriot networks of recruitment among white ethnics (Barnes, 1915; Bodnar, et al., 1982; Epstein, 1950; Hareven, 1975; Juliani, 1973; Korman, 1969; MacDonald and MacDonald, 1964; N.Y. Immigration Commission, 1909) While originally some employers may have sought certain nationalities because of their familiarity with certain tasks, over time it was the nationality rather than the familiarity that emerged paramount. Workers with no relevant experience or other relevant experience were indiscriminately shunted into the clothing trades, the construction industry, or the steel mills simply on the basis of their ethnic heritage. Critics began writing books about the disgracefully inefficient mechanisms for

distributing labor (Leiserson, 1924).

The opportunity confronting the growing Northern black population during this period of industrial expansion paralleled white immigrants in its segregation. But the arenas reserved for blacks were very different. A satisfactory explanation is still lacking for the exclusion of this ostensibly cheapest labor force from most Northern manufacturing and commercial ventures. Michael Reich (1981) has shown that such exclusion was a profitable policy for white capitalists. But, he is the first to admit that it is not at all obvious that white employers were consciously motivated by this fact. More common were expressions of fear by employers that inter-racial strife would accompany an integrated work place. Such fears were fueled by the occasional importation of black strike breakers and the establishment of a split labor market of unequal pay for equal work (Spear, 1967; Bonacich, 1976).

Certainly the supply of black labor before World War I was so small that an early industrial absorption of blacks would have meant some racial integration. The lack of well developed North-South rail linkages (Golab, 1977), and the contrasting profitability of the trans-Atlantic steamship trade offer partial explanations for the greater immigrant labor supply. Within the South, rural class relations did much to keep the black population "down home" (Reich, 1981; Fligstein, 1980).

Blacks, however, were not only handicapped because they

entered industry too late, as Robert Blauner (1972) has maintained. A number of excellent community studies on conditions among those blacks already in the North during the period of industrial take-off concur that black economic welfare declined as the century turned (Bloch, 1969; Kuzmer, 1976; Spear, 1967). While the majority of blacks always sat low in the occupational structure, their employment as craftsmen and operatives fell in this period, as did their concentrations in small business. Whether the increase in menial jobs affected primarily new Southern migrants is not clear, and may have varied from place to place. But racial discrimination grew worse everywhere.

Racist sentiment appeared more virulent not only among manufacturing foremen who worried about labor relations, but also among members of craft unions, whose interest in excluding immigrants meshed easily with an opposition to blacks. Landlords added to the trend by raising rents on black commercial leases in white-owned buildings, while white customers became less eager to cross the color line when parting with cash (Haynes, 1912). As black entrepreneurship among whites became unprofitable, black businessmen retreated to the ghetto, if they chose to continue at all.

The growing discrimination increased black proportions in service and transportation. Again, these sorts of jobs were associated in the mind of the public with black employment patterns in the South. Yet, because blacks were a much higher proportion of the labor force there, in

actuality urban Southern blacks were less confined to service and transportation jobs than their Northern counterparts (Lieberson, 1980). The comparatively large proportions of white immigrants in the North pushed the less favored blacks into the less prestigious industries.

Although the industrial affiliations that statisticians have assigned to service work has varied over the century, these jobs usually share several characteristics. As Braverman (1974) has pointed out, they require little skill, offer virtually no ladder for advancement, and are among the most poorly paid occupations in the economy. His analysis requires qualification though, because service occupations in small business served many migrants differently. Within the ethnically homogeneous firm, jobs as waiters and barbers could prove stepping stones to greater authority and eventual self-employment. The overwhelming majority of black employment in this area, however, proceeded under the direction of whites. Braverman's negative depiction is therefore a quite accurate account of the service opportunities afforded most blacks, opportunities that, in today's language, would be relegated to the industrial periphery.

Because service workers are denied careers and because a large proportion of service work occurs in small firms, the chance for these employees to serve as intermediaries in employment is limited. Service opportunities rarely develop vacancy chains unless workers resign voluntarily.

When service industries expand, they share with other small businesses a tendency to expand through the establishment of new firms, rather than the growth of old ones. As a result, employees in service occupations are less able to serve as contacts for employment than either manufacturing or enclave workers.

Although just before the First World War approximately a quarter of black urban males labored in the services, a roughly equivalent proportion found a place in transportation. The possibility of co-ethnic sponsorship into these jobs was probably greater than in the personal services. Early conditions in this field were oppressive (Dubofsky, 1968), but the industry did eventually become part of the more desirable core. However, as I shall point out shortly, the proportion of black transport workers declined over time, as the industry underwent major changes in structure.

Most of the evidence we have on job search strategy among early black migrants to the North is suggestive of competitive individualism. Bodnar, Simon and Weber's (1982) fine study of turn-of-the-century Pittsburgh makes this point very clearly. Bethel (1982) also emphasizes that most blacks arriving in the North prior to the First World War received little assistance from others. Kiser relates the following typical anecdote: "When John Gables tried to obtain work in New York in 1910, he was "bitterly disappointed". He had received training in several crafts, but employers to whom he applied were not impressed. He

finally secured a job as porter in a small hotel..." (Kiser, 1967: 193-4) Like many black pioneers to the North, John Gables found work on his own.

Some notion of the degree of ethnic industrial segregation manifest at the turn-of-the-century can be gleaned from Table 1. (N.B. All tables appear together at the conclusion of the paper.) These statistics are based on occupational data on male family heads in seven Northern cities, provided by the U.S. Immigration Commission (1911a).¹ The sample is intended to represent the most deprived members of migrant backgrounds and is thus not representative. Unfortunately, black residents from only two cities, Philadelphia and New York, were included. However, it is one of the few early sources that differentiates Jews from Gentiles.

Half of all blacks appear in only two industries, transportation and personal service. The metal industry absorbs the highest percentage of Poles, 8.6%, while Italians are most often found in trade, 13.3%, or construction, 7.2%. Nearly two-thirds of Jews appear in just two industries, apparel and trade, with another 9.2% in construction. These figures probably understate segregation patterns among Gentiles because most of these groups contain a very large number of laborers, who comprise overwhelming proportions of the unclassified category near the bottom of the table.²

Still, several supplementary studies offer some clues.

In the Italian case, for instance, it is likely that a very large proportion of the unclassified laborers were associated with various forms of construction. Frank Sheridan's (1907) studies of New York labor bureaus, a major dispatching point for Italians, observed that 85% of all Italian laborers sent to employers throughout the North filled jobs in construction. Among Poles, another study by the Immigration Commission (1911b), this one a survey of workers in selected industries, reported 17% of Poles in metal and steel, and 19% in other heavy industry. Unfortunately, there is little available information from which to glean the industrial affiliations of black laborers. However, 1900 census data in more industrial cities than New York and Philadelphia do indicate greater proportions of blacks in industrial pursuits.

These data suggest that industrial segregation among migrant groups was substantial, a finding duplicated by other observers (Hutchinson, 1956; Conk, 1978). But, as Kuznets (1960) has warned, "unless the industry as a whole represents a highly advantageous sector of the economy, relative to others, no economic advantage attaches to the dominance of a minority."

Yet another way of evaluating the economic condition of migrant groups is to examine their class affiliation. If the "ethnic enclave" hypothesis has merit, the extent to which groups generate their own opportunities has important consequences for their economic status. Bonacich and Modell have offered a tentative definition of the enclave as

"...self-employment and working for the self-employed within the ethnic group..." (1980:23) However, without detailed information from individuals or firms, enclave classification on these grounds is extremely difficult to verify. In this analysis I, therefore, rely on only a rough index of the potential for enclave involvement: the proportion of self-employed. The data in Table 1 also permit aggregation along this dimension, as the last row indicates.

Here we see that Jews have very high levels of economic independence, 43.3% and Italians, too, exhibit very respectable proportions, 18.9%. Poles and blacks, on the other hand, are overwhelmingly proletarians.³ Unfortunately, the data do not separate those individuals who employ others from those who merely employ themselves. Some light on this question comes from data I have collected from 1910 census manuscripts for New York City. These show that 64% of Jewish entrepreneurs, 66% of Italian independents, and 80% of black businessmen had no employees whatever. Hence, we might conclude that black enterprise was especially fragile.

As we shall see shortly, the early distribution of groups within sectors had significance for members' economic well-being as the century progressed. The opportunities open to whites became more rewarding in every respect than those available to blacks. Before turning to a consideration of these later developments, let me again

emphasize that the fundamental process responsible for the segregated patterns reported here was specific employer preference for certain backgrounds. While these preferences occasionally had some weak justification, the increasing division of labor and mechanization of tasks would have permitted most workers to master most jobs in a short span of time. Hence, from the point of view of doing an adequate job, there was little to differentiate one applicant from another. But, the operation of social networks assured the persistence of a kind of unwritten "affirmative action".

World War I and Beyond

Of course, before World War I, Afro-Americans had not entered Northern labor markets in very large numbers. Many scholars have attributed black disadvantage to this delayed entry (Handlin, 1959). The rural backgrounds of new arrivals purportedly combined with racist sentiment to deny them equal opportunity. This formulation is not incorrect so much as incomplete. In this section I will argue that an open competition for jobs did not obtain even among white ethnics. Rather white groups tended to persist in the ways of the past. In some spheres, network ties alone provided assured continuity. In others, unions eventually formalized patterns previously negotiated in more casual fashion. Either way, the result reinforced an industrially stratified "cultural division of labor"

Yet, the sorts of jobs blacks held before the War were both too insufficient and too inadequate to nourish a mass

migration. Rather, blacks entered Northern jobs in a wide variety of undertakings, and invariably at the bottom. No employers in the needle trades, steel plants, or construction industry extended favoritism to the black employee. Almost every arena that blacks entered already contained specific white ethnic groups whose superiority was not questioned. Their favorable position had little to do with skill or merit, but suffered no loss in legitimacy as a consequence. Equally important, neither did significant new undertakings emerge that specifically favored black labor. The inferior positions accorded blacks across the industrial structure translate into an occupationally stratified, "cultural division of labor." In the next few minutes, I shall spend some time documenting these racial differences.

With the advent of World War I, blacks began their "Great Migration" out of the Southern agriculture and into Northern industry. Most researchers have credited war caused labor shortages for the volume of the exodus, shortages further aggravated by the reduction, and eventual halt of additional immigration from abroad. Fligstein (1981), on the other hand, has argued that changes in the organization of Southern agriculture provided the more fundamental incentive.

From our point of view, the important point is that for the next six decades blacks sought admittance to the industrial and commercial economy of the non-South. The beginnings of this transition proceeded favorably, as

factory orders boomed and the white labor supply waned. The South was swamped by recruiters, independent agents, and advertisements for manufacturing positions in Cleveland, New York, and other urban centers (Henri, 1976; Marks, 1983). The Chicago Urban League reported its employment office swamped with requests for men (Chicago Race Commission, 1920). This effort paralleled the early demand for European labor, but now recruitment proceeded more directly under industrial auspices. It looked as if blacks were going to penetrate the more desirable labor markets, after all.

The Twenties also saw a vast increase in small businesses among blacks, a change that superficially suggested the beginnings of a viable enclave economy. But black shopkeepers differed sharply from those of other groups in that they overwhelmingly served a compatriot constituency. Moreover, because blacks entered residential domains previously inhabited by other entrepreneurial groups, they faced stiff competition for customers. A lack of backward linkages to suppliers probably exacerbated the situation. Some accounts that I have collected indicate that blacks could not obtain merchandise at fair prices when the distribution of that merchandise lay in the hands of other groups (Model, forthcoming). Hence, most black entrepreneurs offered services, and these in areas where social convention inhibited white entry: as undertaker or barber, for instance. Services had the additional cost-saving advantage of requiring little in the way of inventory.

However, black prosperity both in manufacturing and entrepreneurship was short lived. Already at the war's end, returning white veterans were permitted to assume their old jobs. Thus began the now familiar cycle of blacks last hired, first fired, a policy that the Supreme Court reaffirmed only a few weeks ago by favoring seniority over minority prerogative. By the close of the Roaring Twenties, the Depression dealt blacks an even greater blow than peace. Black entrepreneurs, marginal by any standard, fell by the dozens. Nor did industrial employees fare any better. In 1929 the Chicago Urban League stated, "every week we receive information regarding the discharge of additional race workers who are being replaced by workers of other races." (Drake and Cayton, 1945) Data cited by Lieberman (1980) confirm that urban unemployment took its highest toll among blacks. Another war was needed before Afro-Americans could begin to recover.

There was however, at least one important exception to this state of affairs, the sleeping car porters. It is valuable to digress briefly and examine the porters' experience because their history shows that blacks could profit from advantageous industrial locations in the same way as white groups, given the chance.

When George Pullman sought a labor force to service the customers traveling in his famous pullman cars in the late nineteenth century, he hit upon the idea of relying on former slaves. Certainly, the idea of an ethnically

homogeneous work force was in keeping with the times. And, colored labor met two of his most important requirements: parsimony and subservience. Porters worked long hours and relied mostly on tips to supplement their meager salaries. When their jobs took porters far away from home, the company fed and housed them in special dormitory quarters (Anderson, 1973).

Recruitment may have begun impersonally, but expansion and ethnic preference soon encouraged the network style personal sponsorship so typical of manufacturing industries. I have been told that workers were even permitted to offer free rail transport to friends who sought employment, if it was likely that supervisors in a distant city had openings to fill.⁴ As any disciple of Charles Tilly can quickly detect, conditions among this segment of black workers were conducive to collective action.

In the mid-Twenties leaders of the nascent and troubled Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters approached A. Philip Randolph and asked him to serve as their president. Previously, Randolph had unsuccessfully sought to mobilize two other heavily black occupations: waiters and elevator operators. Although he was probably unaware of it, the porters held much greater potential for organization. Of course, the sleeping car porters were no more successful than other labor organizations of the period. Only after the Supreme Court upheld the right of collective bargaining in 1938 did the Pullman Company come to the negotiating table in good faith. Nonetheless, the ability of the union

to survive a dozen years of harassment and struggle flies in the face of the popular assertion that a legacy of slavery hindered the black capacity for organization (Spero and Harris, 1931). Neither blacks nor whites could organize effectively in the absence of facilitating conditions.

And for the most part blacks did not experience conditions conducive to separatist mobilization. The case of the sleeping car porters to the contrary, most blacks entered integrated industrial environments. The broader transportation industry, long a stronghold of black employ, suffered a decline in precisely those jobs most likely to be filled by blacks. Rather, growth in transport occurred primarily in trucking and air travel, enterprises offering a dearth of menial jobs and an abundance of discrimination (Northrup, et al., 1971).

Table 2 presents data describing the black industrial distribution at mid-century. The data are aggregated only in broad terms, in order to facilitate comparability with the accompanying figures I present on white ethnics. Unfortunately the first available employment data on white ethnics, in 1950, are categorized by occupation. My attempts to aggregate those figures into industries resulted in only six categories, less than sufficient for a fair comparison.⁶ Nonetheless, I am less interested in the exact figures than in the trends within the statistics.

We see that black opportunities in service have declined. Now, manufacturing absorbs the largest number,

29.8%. Significant too is the decline in the percentage in transportation, from 25.4% in 1908 to 12% in 1950.

The lower portion of the table deals exclusively with the question of differences between populations as seen through the index of dissimilarity. Given two groups, the index reports the proportion of workers from either group who would have to change industries for the two populations to display identical industrial distributions. Looking now just at the column for blacks, the table reports that 41% of blacks in 1908 would have changed their industrial affiliation by 1950. Of course such a literal interpretation makes no sense, since the populations within the two distributions are vastly different. Still, I believe these figures make plausible a view that the industrial distribution of migrant blacks showed little continuity over the century. Note the greater similarity within the white ethnic industrial distributions across the same time frame.

Another way of showing the differences between black and white ethnics is to compare their respective industrial distributions to that of the population as a whole. This information is presented in the last row of Table 2. We see that, for the six industry comparison, the index of dissimilarity for blacks is 7.6. This figure indicates greater similarity to the population as a whole than is displayed by any of the other migrant groups.

Since industrial data on blacks are directly available from the census, I was also able to run this comparison across 26 categories for 1950 (not shown). In this case,

blacks pick up more differences with the entire labor force, generating an index of 14.3. By 1970, however, black male industrial proclivities appear even closer to those of the total labor force, with an index of dissimilarity of 10.6 across 32 industrial categories (not shown). In sum, the industrial dispersion of Afro-Americans has been characterized by declining segregation and is approximating the distribution of the broader American population.

Labor market segmentationists have given us more tools with which to pursue this comparative analysis. Here, I wish to consider two related hypotheses offered by thinkers in this tradition. The first is that blacks are more likely to be located in the undesirable periphery than in the advantaged core (Gordon, et al., 1982). The second is that whites gain greater benefits from advantageous sectorial locations than do blacks (Beck, et al; 1978).

I do not concur that blacks are more likely to be located in the periphery than in core, if one examines black non-farm males. It is true that, from a sectorial point of view, these blacks are slightly underrepresented in the core and slightly overrepresented in the periphery. In this sense their industrial dispersion is somewhat skewed. But if we want to investigate the role of sector in differential ethnic outcome, we need also to examine the sectorial distribution of the group. Table 3 shows that, when sector is defined following the taxonomy of Beck, et al. (1978), more than half of all non-farm black males are situated in

the core already in 1950.⁴ By 1970, two-thirds of these men hold the more advantageous industrial location. At the same time, the 1970 census reports the self-employment of black males at an extremely low 4.5% (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1973a., not shown). Obviously, blacks do not profit from a vigorous enclave sector.

Still, if we want to understand black handicap, we need to acknowledge that sectorial location is a relatively minor portion of the problem, at least in so far as participation in the core is concerned. In their recent work, Wallace and Kalleberg also express surprise when they discover that "blacks may tend to be employed in large, profitable firms..." They go on to suggest that "this is somewhat offset by the existence of occupations in such firms that are not conducive to the employment of blacks." (1981:111) In other words, sectorial location is less of a problem than we thought. But, we still need to consider whether blacks are not reaping their fair share of advantages from primary sector affiliation.

Historical studies on black industrial employment have long drawn this conclusion (Foner, 1974). For instance Marshall puts it this way: "Perhaps the most serious problems for Negroes in CIO unions were the racially segregated jobs in most basic industries. These seniority arrangements were primarily the responsibility of the employers and local customs...but few unions did anything actively to break down job segregation at the plant level" (1965:41).

Studies by contemporary labor market segmentationists are suggestive but not definitive. Beck et al. (1978) reported that blacks faced discrimination in the primary sector but not in the periphery. However, they have been accused of a methodological error, and recalculations of their results find a black disadvantage that is not statistically significant (Hauser, 1980). Zucker and Rosenstein's (1981) careful reworking of four different sectorial taxonomies makes an important but unrecognized contribution. They find blacks receive consistently negative returns that elude significance in three of the taxonomies. However, under Randy Hodson's trichotomy that disaggregates a state sector from the core, blacks do experience a significant earnings deficit in core industries. As for the state sector, blacks here incur an advantage nearly as large as their disadvantage in the core, but it is not significant, probably because of the small sample size in this sector (N=137).

Other research that I shall discuss shortly also points to government employment as beneficial for blacks. A core sector composed of public and private undertakings may blend advantage with discrimination, and so confound the results. In my view, we should not be too quick to abandon the hypothesis of the segmentationists, that white males profit significantly more in core industries. This would help explain why, even though non-farm black males are barely more likely to work in the periphery than other males,

aggregate black earnings remain inferior to white.

To summarize the discussion so far, I have argued first, that blacks are industrially dispersed, and second, that they are occupationally segregated, at the bottom. These two factors are obviously related, since the higher blacks can reach in an industry, the more of them can be accommodated therein. The fact that few endeavors absorb very many, shows how limited is black upward mobility.

The smaller numbers and early barriers to black penetration encourage an individualist response to minority deprivation. In terms of the job search, industrial dispersal means longer and more protracted effort for blacks. They must survey a larger number of contacts and a greater number of firms to uncover an opening. While white ethnics rely heavily on kin, blacks must cast wider nets. For example, interviews I held with elderly New York ethnics revealed that not one of the 15 black men with whom I spoke used kinship support to obtain a first job. On the other hand, in talking to the same number of Italians and of Jews, I learned that over half of these migrants were able to find a first job through the intervention of relatives (Model, forthcoming). Other investigators have reported that blacks are more likely to utilize formal employment agencies than are whites (Bain, 1975).

The possibility that personal sponsorship leads to better jobs has been reported by several investigators (Granovetter, 1974; Lin, et al., 1981). Among blue collar positions, Lipset, Bendix and Malm (1955) found that family

connections yielded the best jobs, while white collar employees seem to prosper better under "weak ties".

When a minority has only a weak ability to extend jobs to its compatriots, and the opportunities it can extend are decidedly inferior, an individualist strategy toward employment is utterly rational. Such individualism reflects the paucity of instrumental networks and the inadequacy of valuable resources available for collective advance. The problem, of course, is that the triumph over discrimination that an occasional individual achieves aggrandizes only him or herself. It does nothing to facilitate the collective advance of the group.

The results of status attainment research have confirmed this outcome. Black fathers have not been able to transfer their achievements to their sons at the same rates as whites, even though educational level is inherited similarly across the races (Duncan, 1969). An equally interesting finding comes from Hauser and Featherman's (1977) investigation of the intergenerational transmission of industry. They find a statistically significant inheritance of industry from father to son for white men only.

In a similar vein, my calculations based on cross-sectional data supplied by Lichtenstein (1975) for 1970 show that Southern born blacks experienced occupational advantages in 13 different industries. But in only 5 of these were Northern born blacks performing equally well. In other words, black industrial advantages are rather isolated

across generations. More recent research indicates that these racial differentials may be loosening, an issue to which I shall return shortly (Featherman and Hauser, 1976).

An extended assessment of the social impact of this deleterious state of affairs is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is quite obvious that both family and community leadership are adversely affected when those who seek positions of authority can dispense no perquisites to their constituents. As early as 1901 DuBois lamented the powerlessness of the black elite with these words: "...not being to any considerable extent themselves employers of colored labor, or bound to them by ties of industrial interest, they cannot easily assume leadership over their own people." (1901:29)

Since that time conditions have hardly changed. Contemporary observers now stress that black leaders are more strongly tied to the white establishment than to the black mass. Some of these analysts invoke phrases such as "internal colonialism" or "the creaming of black talent" to describe this state of affairs (Blauner, 1972; Mare and Winship, 1984). Yet, such polarity is the inevitable outcome of ethnic-industrial dispersal.

* * *

The employment conditions and associated social organization of white ethnics has proceeded very differently. Turning first to Polish Americans, I have already pointed to their very early disproportionate location in heavy industry. To improve matters further, many

Anglo-Saxon employees began to move out of these arenas because of a distaste for working among low status immigrants (Fitch, 1910). Many of those who left held positions of authority. Thus already in the twenties one researcher found that "...work supervisors and foremen in packinghouses and steel plants were generally European immigrants, particularly Poles, Austrians, and Lituanians." (quoted in Reisler, 1970)

Of special note was the ability of fathers to introduce their sons to their place of employment. Even though some of the largest companies began to introduce more bureaucratic personnel offices to administer the hiring process, the value of personal networks did not much diminish. The influence of kin did much to temper individualist strivings and to institutionalize a family economy. As Bodnar (1976) has implied, Slavic communities were able to achieve peasant ideals about family obligation and unity to a far greater degree in the new country than in the old. Immigrant fathers outdistanced their own parents, who had been unable to pass on a sufficiently lucrative trade or piece of land to forestall their childrens' emigration. The likelihood of a job at the plant, or a parental home to inherit, decreased the probability that white offspring would migrate again for work, as blacks were often forced to do. Perhaps less desirable, at least from an individual stand point, was the fact that prolonged educational investment was discouraged. Schooling made little difference in job opportunity, while

early introduction to the labor force enhanced the well-being of the family unit.

One might then ask, if immigrant communities were adjusting so well, why did worker unrest persist and big business have to capitulate to labor? According to Bodnar (1982) the answer lies in the Depression. The Depression undermined the job stability so central to the ethnic way of life. Collective action was the response. (But, see Piore, 1979, for another view.) Worker dissatisfaction, however, was hardly sufficient to introduce change. Several other factors proved crucial, especially the organization and profitability of core firms, and the sympathetic support granted organized labor by government. Accounts of these developments abound elsewhere, and I shall not recount them here (Edwards, 1979; Gordon, et al., 1982; Rosenblum, 1973). Significant to this discussion is that workers succeeded in improving conditions, while maintaining the same ethnically traditional jobs. Indeed, through union participation, white ethnics such as Poles could continue to control the allocation of employment. Their superior position allowed them to monitor the opportunities offered to blacks, Hispanics, and other late comers to the industrial scene.

The data on white ethnics in 1950 that I presented earlier in Table 2 help quantify the situation, though they are imperfect on a number of counts. Because Jews are interspersed across national backgrounds, the figures on Poles include Jews. There is also a large "other" category because of my inability to attach an industry to

every occupational entry. Nevertheless, manufacturing absorbs nearly one-third of Polish Americans, and possibly more.

In addition, Table 2 indicates that the Polish distribution underwent very little change as the century progressed. The index of dissimilarity for the six categories over the two time periods is only 17.1. Moreover, the index of dissimilarity between Poles and the total U.S. labor force is nearly twice that of blacks (14.4 versus 7.6).

Some insight into the more recent industrial proclivities of white ethnics is available from an effort by Scott Cummings (1980) to categorize the industrial affiliations of participants in Campbell and Schuman's 1968 study of Racial Attitudes in Fifteen American Cities. These data differentiate white ethnics by national origin as well as by religion. Unfortunately, Cummings does not provide breakdowns by sex. Still, these data, appearing in Table 4, show Poles continuing in their traditional arenas. Heavy industry, such as autos and steel absorbs about 42%.

At the bottom of the table again appear indices of dissimilarity between each group and the total United States labor force. Poles display the highest dissimilarity, 34.8, of all the groups here examined.

Table 5 aggregates Cummings' data by sectorial location and includes comparable data for blacks when the sexes are combined⁷. We find that 82.3% of Poles are in the core,

again the very highest proportion in the table.

Polish self-employment, a potential indicator of enclave participation, however, could not be determined from Campbell and Schuman's data. A reliance again on census materials means that Polish Gentiles appear together with Polish Jews. Yet, there is the advantage that the sexes can be disaggregated. The census reports that 10.9% of Polish American males were self-employed in 1970 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1973b). This figure may overestimate self-employment in the Polish Catholic population since Jews are disproportionately independents. Still, the Polish sectorial distribution is quite favorable irrespective of enclave activity, especially if we entertain the notion that white skin color is highly rewarded in core industries.

In one of the few studies of ethnic achievement to include Polish Catholics, Greeley (1976) documents that this group began to outdistance the national average in annual income by the early Seventies. Poles also improved their educational investments and heightened their occupational prestige. Greeley fervently maintains that his discovery turns Weber on his head. Catholic values appear more responsible for ethnic achievement than Protestant outlooks. However, a structural interpretation seems the more plausible explanation for Polish performance. The high proportion of Poles in core industries has brought substantial comfort. The secure and growing incomes available to this group of blue collar workers allows families so inclined to underwrite the education of

offspring, education that in turn increases occupational and financial returns. Once a modicum of financial security obtains, individualist job strategies become more profitable.

Of course, changes in the American industrial landscape may cut short this chain of events. But, such considerations are beyond the scope of this paper. My emphasis here is rather on showing that the fortuitous concentration of Polish Americans in core industries is a major factor in their move from poverty to respectability.

The analogous argument for the upgrading of Italian Americans is less straightforward because their industrial distribution was originally quite dispersed. But, Italian participation in construction and associated public works, held firm. Lopreato (1970:145) writes, "In the building trades especially, their early experience as laborers in construction gangs paid off...As construction boomed and the services of masons and bricklayers came to be in great demand, many a laborer who had kept his eyes open while carrying mortar and bricks to the craftsmen found it relatively easy to throw away the hod and take up the more profitable and respectable tools of a mason. Children became apprentices and swelled the ranks of the craft. More important still, for a few, success in craft sometimes provided a foothold in the contracting business."

Community studies that include Italians tend to show that they were relatively unsuccessful at gaining and

holding white collar positions, but continued to find strength in skilled trades. (Bodnar, et al., 1982; Thernstrom, 1973; Yans-McLaughlin, 1977) Those who settled in California outperformed Italian Americans in other regions, probably both because of the West Coast's weaker industrialization and paucity of other European immigrants. Agriculture, commerce, and fishing stimulated greater upward mobility than the factory (Cinell, 1983).

Even slum dwelling Italians have been able to bring a degree of social order to their communities. In his study of black, Hispanic, and Italian juvenile gangs in Chicago, Suttles (1968:117) points out that "Among the Italians, the major share of coercive power still remains in adult hands...it is the only case where the corporate power of the adolescents is tempered by that of the adults..Since many of the same adults have an active role in distributing some of the benefits that are held in store by the wider community, their power is further augmented." I would submit that such influence does not augment Italian authority, it produces that authority.

Returning to Table 2 for some empirical verification, we see that by mid-century, Italians had moved further into manufacturing, reaching 23.9%. However, they continued to have high proportions in construction, 10.9%, and trade, 10.8%. Table 2 also shows that the Italian industrial distribution paralleled the Polish with a relatively small shift, 14.0, between 1908 and 1950. On the other hand, in

1950 Italians had the industrial distribution closest to the total labor force among the white ethnics, 12.0.

The major differences in the Italian industrial distributions from 1950 (Table 2) to 1968 (Table 4) are that Italians are somewhat more concentrated in trade and transportation at the later date. Differences in sampling, a national versus a metropolitan population, may be responsible for these apparent temporal shifts. In addition, the last line in Table 4 shows that, among white ethnics, Italians continue to have an industrial distribution most similar to the total labor force. Still the Italian index, 25.4, is more than ten points higher than the black, a situation that disaggregation by sex would likely exacerbate.

Table 5 presents the sectorial participation of urban Italians in 1968. We see that Italians are relatively well placed, with 71% in the core. However, a separate investigation of their self-employment pattern shows a steep decline from their 18.9% level in 1908. Although 1950 census data do not give figures on total ethnic self-employment, the proportion of self-employed managers and proprietors among non-farm Italian males in that year was a meager 7.9% (Hutchinson, 1956). In 1970, the figure for all self-employed Italian males is 11.8% (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1973b). The data sources utilized here make it difficult to determine whether this drop is due to my reliance on an urban sample early in the century, or whether Italian entrepreneurship truly declined on a national scale.

Clearly, the issue merits further research.

Moreover, this lower rate of entrepreneurship likely brings Italians closer to Poles than Jews in their earnings. Again, by the Seventies, Greeley (1976) finds Italian incomes above the national average. But he notes that Italian educational and occupational measures are less impressive. Research on present day Italians by Reitz and his co-workers in Toronto draws a similar conclusion: Italians earn good incomes but hold relatively low prestige jobs (Reitz, et al., 1982). Again, the interpretation that they are advantageously located within the blue collar world appears justified. Indeed, Reitz and his colleagues attribute the current Italian prosperity to their early, continued segregation in the more lucrative manual trades.

The Jews are the final in-migrant group here under review. Because of their persistence as an entrepreneurial minority, their adjustment provides an intriguing comparison with the other three groups. The upward mobility of most middleman minorities: the Greeks, the Chinese, the Japanese, as well as the Jews, has been remarkable. But, the latter have achieved exceptional incomes.

It is important to note at the outset that any group with large proportions of self-employed workers is likely in an advantaged economic position, especially if many of these independents engage labor. However, we would expect such a situation to produce marked class polarity, were it not that many employees in ethnic establishments encounter

later opportunities to become employers themselves. Several factors appear responsible for this result. The small size of the ethnic firm, the relatively low capital barriers to entry, and the availability of a low wage compatriot labor force; all have facilitated the move from worker to employer (Light, 1972; Waldinger, 1983).

Regrettably, in the case of the Jews I know of no statistical study that has actually confirmed the evolution of this process. While many employers admit previous experience as employees in the same field, the proportion that escape the laboring classes remains a mystery. We do know that enough class polarity existed in the needle trades to motivate substantial collective action, action that bore fruit already before the First World War. With our data placing approximately a third of Jews in the garment industry in 1908, this victory had enormous consequence for proletarian Jews, even if apparel did not become a core industry. It is interesting that one observer credits the increased militance of Jewish clothing workers to a tightening up of the channels from employee to contractor (Rischin, 1962).

Still, large proportions of Jews were engaged in other Jewish controlled enterprises, particularly outside of New York City. Especially popular was the retail clothing business, which allowed dealers to rely on interpersonally comfortable, co-ethnic sources of supply. Any number of accounts emphasize that Jews were rarely dependent on Gentiles for jobs (Epstein, 1950; Rischin, 1962; Moore,

1981). In this sense, Jews duplicated their pre-migration employment patterns in the ghettos of Eastern Europe. The immigrants found that the American public exhibited little reluctance to trading with Jews, so long as a social segregation was maintained. This tolerance, of course, was extended to other migrant groups, so long as their skin was not black.

Another, more debateable advantage enjoyed by the Jews arriving from Eastern Europe was substantial assistance from the older German Jewish community. Initially, these seasoned Americans were no happier at the influx of their impoverished compatriots than were Northern Italians or Northern native blacks. The difference, however, was that the German Jews were both affluent and ready to absorb many of the new arrivals in their garment factories. Hence, in the effort to save themselves from slander by association, the German Jews initiated a variety of organizational offensives to assist their "Oriental" co-religionists. As Eastern European Jews became more successful, they joined in this "Americanization" effort (Gurock, 1979). The result was a host of programs that offered language instruction, vocational training, and even employment assistance. These competed with the multitudes of effective landsmanschaft and worker organizations that the Easterners had themselves established. However, as time passed, the greater resources of the assimilationists won the day. Radical militancy and religious orthodoxy yielded to middle class values and

achievements (Gorelick, 1981; Moore, 1981).

By mid-century, Jewish employment patterns had shifted a bit, and the changes reflect a decline in the working class. Table 2 displays 1950 job statistics on Russian-Americans, the common substitute for Jews in the absence of stronger data. Concentrations in trade remain high, but there are two significant changes. The proportion in manufacturing is vastly reduced, and a respectable 13% appear in the professions. Thus, it is not surprising that among the intra-ethnic industrial shifts from 1908 to 1950 reported at the bottom of the table, the Jewish score was second highest, 21.3. Yet, even as Jews shifted their industrial pursuits, they remained quite different from the total mid-century labor force. The last line on Table 2 shows that Jews had the highest index of dissimilarity from the total male labor force of any group in 1950, 17.0.

Turning to the more recent statistics of Table 4, we see further growth in Jewish participation in trade (34.2%) and the professions (15.2%), as well as strength in the public sector (13.2%). While not as highly segregated as Poles, the index of dissimilarity between Jews and the total labor force remains quite high (29.9).

While it may first appear that the sons of garment workers have become doctors, it is unlikely that the transition is so simple. Resources are vital for study, and the proportion of Jews from working class backgrounds who pursued advanced degrees is reportedly small (Berrol, 1967; Steinberg, 1979). A more plausible scenario is that the

proletarians moved increasingly into business as more of the business class drifted to the professions. Important regional differences remained, however, as manufacturing held the New York Jew longer than his co-religionists elsewhere in the nation.

Turning to Table 5, we see that Jews are the only group with a minority in the core sector in 1968, 47.7%. However, a conclusion that the remaining Jews are participants of a disadvantaged periphery would be erroneous. Available census data on the self-employment of Russian males in 1970 yield a figure of 20.2% (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1973b). Likely the figure for Jews alone is higher. While many of these are independent professionals, already in the core, another source for the self-employed is clearly the one-third of all Jews engaged in some form of trade, an industry assigned here to the periphery.

Further insights into the dynamics of Jewish mobility can be gleaned from status attainment research on Jews. Several studies, one from as long ago as 1935, reveal that Jewish sons translate their fathers' occupations and their own educations into higher occupational statuses than non-Jews (Fauman, 1958; Duncan, et al., 1972; Laumann, 1973). In addition, it has been found that Jews similarly convert their educational and occupational qualifications into earnings at higher than "normal" rates (Gockel, 1969; Chiswick, 1983). Not surprisingly, by the Seventies, investigators were reporting that Jews enjoy among the

highest incomes in the United States (Greeley, 1975; Sowell, 1978).

The most common explanation for Jewish success and particularly for their professional proclivities rests on the historically high position of education in Jewish religion. Yet, studies of the population at large indicate a similar, though less pronounced, tendency for proprietor fathers to produce professional sons and for professional families to reproduce themselves (Blau and Duncan, 1967).

In my view, Stephen Steinberg (1979) is correct when he argues that values reflect the opportunity structure. A confluence of unusually favorable circumstances nurtured Jewish opportunity. Among these circumstances I would stress the following: disproportionately entrepreneurial and professional forbears, various forms of assistance from the German Jewish community, and massive absorption into the expanding needle trades, an industry that offered both easy access to ownership, and somewhat later, the benefits of unionization. That these conditions stimulated exceptional Jewish "achievement motivation" hardly seems surprising.

Government: A New Horizon for Blacks?

In my remarks so far, I have emphasized that ethnic groups have succeeded by finding niches in the economy that they can call their own. Here, they secure influence and obtain resources that allow them to survive, to assist their compatriots, and extend to their children the promise of a similarly comfortable life. I have maintained that

mechanisms of assistance had little to do with education and formal job training, especially in their early stages.

I would like to close with a brief consideration of the impact that a new government mandated ethnic niche has had on black welfare. We call the government mandate, "affirmative action". While the directive ostensibly embraced all industries, state employment has become the ethnic niche most open to black penetration. I will argue that preferential employment of blacks by government is an inadequate compensatory device from the stand point of collective black betterment. This policy serves, rather, to exacerbate status differences within the black community. Thus, it will not parallel immigrant industrial concentrations by providing a broad based improvement in group well-being.

The black rebellion of the Sixties challenged the American government to remedy black economic disadvantage. Frightened politicians sought a mechanism that could offer redress, but they were leary of antagonizing established interests or of violating American beliefs in meritocracy. The Executive Order on Affirmative Action required all employers of 100 or more to show evidence of efforts to recruit, hire, and, promote persons of minority status (Feagin, 1978). However, this mandate was broadly interpreted to grant special consideration to those minority candidates whose job qualifications were equivalent to white applicants. Since the average minority applicant had relatively weak "qualifications", a long series of disputes

ensued about the nature of appropriate "qualifications", fair representation, quotas and so forth. These disputes continue to the present day.

Since government itself had initiated the directive and since the public sector has been expanding more rapidly than the private sector, state employment assumed the primary responsibility for minority improvement. In 1960, 12% of government workers were black; by 1982 that figure had enlarged to 23% (Collins, 1983). At first glance, the preferential treatment that blacks have received in this growing arena resembles the experience of the white ethnic groups I have analyzed in this paper. Job access is indeed a function of ethnicity. However, there is an important difference between past and present recruitment practices.

Formal qualifications had little to do with the very early distribution of Poles, Italians, and Jews in a small number of industries. Government does not operate in this fashion, especially within its white collar stratum. And, Hout (1984) reports that white collar jobs are not only a larger percentage of public than private openings, but that within the public sector, blacks are disproportionately represented in white collar positions. On these grounds alone, we would expect black public employment to be more selective than earlier, ascriptively based industrial concentrations. While ethnicity and perhaps even social networks play a part in job attainment, proper credentials are a prerequisite for consideration.

If the blacks who profit most from the implementation of affirmative action are the more educated and talented of the race, what happens to the "unqualified"? The decline in menial opportunities across the economic structure and the reported unwillingness of blacks even to assume dead-end jobs suggest an increasing gap between the Afro-American haves and have-nots (Jencks, 1983).

A growing literature has begun to address this problem. Perhaps the best known statement comes from William J. Wilson (1978), who maintains that class has outdistanced race as the stumbling block to racial equality. In effect, he argues that the new opportunities have disproportionately benefited those blacks who were already in relatively better circumstances. Conversely, there is little upgrading possible for a black underclass of underemployed and discouraged workers.

In an article that appeared only last month, Hout (1984) tests Wilson's hypothesis that the more talented have profited most from the new commitment to black employment. Using data from the Occupational Changes in a Generation for both 1962 and 1973, he finds that "...the new opportunities that opened up for blacks during the 1962-1973 period benefited men from relatively advantaged backgrounds more than it benefited other men." Likewise, he presents evidence that the contribution of public employment in producing this outcome is substantial. The fact that the increase in opportunity was disproportionately in higher status occupations seems also to play a role.

Hout's findings parallel the work of those status attainment theorists who have found evidence of increasing convergence in intra and inter-generational mobility patterns between the races. But, good reasons for pessimism remain, and Hout himself acknowledges them. Of special concern are the low rates of labor force participation among black males and the growing number of black female-headed families (Farley and Bianchi, 1982). The association of single parent families with poverty is well known. Approximately half of all black children today can doubt "the relative advantage" of their background.

Even as some blacks have moved ahead, they can do nothing for those they leave behind. Few interpersonal channels of influence can obtain a decent job for a school drop-out or an unskilled laborer. In her case study of black poverty, Carol Stack (1974) discovered that once black families began to move ahead, they had to distance themselves from their more deprived cousins. If they did not, the informal system of black kinship obligations would soon deplete all their resources. How different is this scenario from the ability of the more successful Pole, Italian, or Jew to assist his less fortunate relatives.

Another flaw in the affirmative action strategy is the political rather than market oriented foundation to government employ (Collins, 1983). Even now, the commitment to affirmative action is declining and the public sector faces labor reductions. While the possibility that some

black workers could successfully shift from public to private employers exists, Hout's research concludes that blacks are much more vulnerable to downward mobility in the private sector.

To summarize, while current policy has improved black well-being, it has done so differentially, discriminating against those most in need of help. While there are greater numbers of blacks in the middle class than ever before, these individuals are as estranged from the black underclass as they were in DuBois' time. Now, it is the members of the underclass who must practice competitive individualism, a strategy that benefits them least. The more qualified black candidate, on the other hand, receives an ethnically based advantage as a bonus for his/her qualifications.

Conclusions

I have traced the history of several migrant groups from their arrival in industrial America until the Seventies. I have maintained that the ethnic preferences of employers and their willingness to rely on informal modes of recruiting resulted in persisting patterns of industrial concentration among white immigrants. These groups were disproportionately represented both within those industries where unions eventually protected their livelihoods, and within the ethnic enclave, where security and advancement were even more favorable.

In varying degrees, these ethnics began to practice more individualized job strategies, but only after they had

achieved substantial success as groups. Their stable jobs, families, and community lives became associated with greater educational investments. The upgrading of the occupational structure dovetailed with the growing qualifications of these new ethnic applicants to encourage their white collar employment.

Northern Blacks, on the other hand, lost their meager occupational advantages and were shunted into the least desirable industries by the arrival of immigrants. When their numbers began to swell they found no especially favorable arena. Instead, they were dispersed across the industrial environment and segregated into especially unattractive occupations. This development blocked channels for collective self-help. Successful blacks achieved on their own, through luck, skill, and perseverance. Even fathers could do little to assist their sons in finding employment.

Politically motivated federal concern has attempted to rectify this situation by mandating affirmative action. But at this late date, no expanding arena can provide unskilled workers with attractive, secure jobs. The willingness of government to grant black applicants special consideration is commendable, but the entry requirements for federal jobs disqualify those most in need. The black underclass continues neglected and may be expanding.

Neo-conservatives such as Sowell (1982) and Glazer (1975) have warned, just as I do now, about the dangers of affirmative action. Let me distance myself from these

proponents of laissez-faire right now. Men like these, who argue that the free market will loosen ascriptive inequalities, ignore that the forefathers of the 'successful' white ethnics of today obtained their jobs on the basis of ethnicity, not qualifications. Nor was the decision of employers to rely on informal recruiting networks irrational. Networks recruitment is cheap. Moreover, research on contemporary job adjustment shows that workers who obtain jobs through personal networks have greater job commitment. They are less likely to quit, and may feel obligated to perform better than workers who enter anonymously (Granovetter, 1974; Waldinger, 1983).

The notion that capitalism operates under principles of universalism and individualism has fallen into increasing disrepute among sociologists and economists. More and more research is showing that market relations do not proceed devoid of social content. The history I have recounted here suggests that ordinary social processes permit ethnic categories to forge a collective advance once their members secure the necessary resources. Certainly some individuals are left behind. But given adequate social and economic incentives the majority choose to conform. Policy makers would do well to take into account the power of social influence when attempting to remedy minority deficiencies. Given meaningful opportunities and a chance to help their friends, even the most disaffected may be won over.

On the other hand, prescriptions for bureaucratic,

credentialistic improvement leave too many behind. But unlike conservative advocates of benign neglect, I believe government can do better by doing more, not less. In order to do better though, our leaders would do well to pay more attention to ethnic "history from below", collective style.

FOOTNOTES

N.B. The author wishes to thank Charles Tilly and the members of the Sociology Workshop at SUNY - Stony Brook for comments on an earlier version of this paper.

¹The cities surveyed were New York, Philadelphia, Boston, Buffalo, Cleveland, Chicago, and Milwaukee. Not all groups, however, appeared in the data for each city.

The failure of any column in any table to sum to 100% is due to rounding error.

²It is very unfortunate that in 1910, when the Census Bureau finally decided to include a question on industry, it simultaneously decided not to publish employment statistics aggregated by nationality. As a result, just at the point when we can determine the industrial location of most laborers, we are no longer able to discern their national origin.

³In an attempt to determine the generalizability of the statistics on self-employment that I calculated from data published by the Immigration Commission, I compared these ethnic breakdowns on New York City male household heads in 1908 with a sample of all males that I had drawn from the 1910 federal manuscript census for Manhattan. The data compare quite well. For blacks, the published 1908 cases sum to 3.4% of the black sample. The comparable 1910 figure is 3.5%. Among Italians, the Immigration Commission data yield 17.2% self-employed, a figure duplicated precisely by the manuscript sample in 1910. Only among Jews is there a

wide discrepancy, with 30.6% of New York Jews self-employed among the Immigration Commission respondents and only 21.8% surfacing in the 1910 data. Since the Immigration Commission focused particularly on the less advantaged household, this disparity suggests that the less affluent Jew may have been more likely to be self-employed than his relatively successful co-religionist.

⁴Personal interview obtained in December, 1982.

⁵The determination of industry from occupation that was necessary in the case of 1950 white ethnics is described below. Construction included self-employed construction managers, as well as carpenters, cranemen, electricians, masons, painters, plumbers, miscellaneous building craftsmen, and construction laborers. Manufacture encompassed self-employed manufacturing managers, bakers, machinists, printers, tailors, toolmakers, miscellaneous metal craftsmen, welders, and both operators and laborers in manufacturing. Transport contained bus and taxi drivers, truck drivers, and transportation laborers. Trade covered salaried managers in wholesale and retail trade, self-employed managers in wholesale trade, in food stores, in eating and drinking places, and in other retail trade, as well as sales and clerical workers in retail trade, and meatcutters other than slaughter and packing house. Personal services held self-employed managers in personal service, and laundry operatives, private household workers, as well as all service workers. Professional services cover all professional, technical, and kindred workers.

4In 1950, core industries included mining; construction; metal manufacture; machine manufacture; electrical machinery; transport manufacture; paper manufacture; printing; chemicals; coal and petroleum products; stone, glass, and clay; transportation, communication, and utilities; finance, real estate, and insurance; professional services and public administration. In 1970, the core included all these, as well as the manufacture of professional equipment, ordnance, rubber, and wholesale trade.

7Cummings' (1980) data do not exactly duplicate the industrial categories of the census. Given the data, the core was interpreted to include: mining; construction; metal and steel manufacture; transport manufacture; other durable manufacture; pulp and paper; printing; chemicals; petroleum products; rubber; transportation, communication, and utilities; finance, real estate, and insurance; professional services; and public administration.

REFERENCES

- Anderson, Jervis
1973 A. Philip Randolph. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich.
- Bain, Trevor
1975 Labor Market Analysis: A Review and Analysis of Manpower Research and Development. New York: Center for Policy Research, mimeo.
- Barnes, Charles
1977 The Longshoremen. New York: Arno Press (c. 1915).
- Beck, E.M., Patrick Horan, and Charles Tolbert II.
1978 "Stratification in a Dual Economy: A Sectorial Model of Earnings Determination." American Sociological Review 43 (October): 704-20.
- Berrol, Selma Cantor
1967 Immigrants at School: New York City 1898-1914. Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, City University of New York.
- Bethel, Elizabeth
1981 Promiseland. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Blau, Peter and Otis Dudley Duncan
1967 The American Occupational Structure. New York: The Free Press.
- Blauner, Robert
1972 Racial Oppression in America. New York: Harper and Row.
- Bloch, Herman
1969 The Circle of Discrimination: An Economic and Social Study of the Black Man in New York. New York: New York University Press.
- Bonacich, Edna
1976 "Advanced Capitalism and Black/White Race Relations in the United States: A Split Labor Market Interpretation." American Sociological Review 41 (February): 34-51.
- Bonacich, Edna and John Modell
1980 The Economic Basis of Ethnic Solidarity. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press.

- Bodnar, John
 1976 "Immigration and Modernization: The Case of Slavic Peasants in Industrial America". Journal of Social History 10 (Fall):44-71.
- 1982 Workers' World: Kinship, Community, and Protest in an Industrial Society, 1900-1949. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press.
- Bodnar, John, Roger Simon, and Michael Weber
 1982 Lives of Their Own: Blacks, Italians, and Poles in Pittsburgh. Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press.
- Braverman, Harry
 1974 Labor and Monopoly Capital. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Carpenter, Niles
 1970 Nationality, Color, and Economic Opportunity in the City of Buffalo. Westport, Conn.: Negro Universities Press (c. 1927).
- Chicago Race Commission
 1920 The Negro in Chicago. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Chiswick, Barry
 1983 "The Earnings and Human Capital of American Jews." Journal of Human Resources 18 (Summer): 313-36.
- Cinel, Dino
 1982 From Italy to San Francisco. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University press.
- Collins, Sharon
 1983 "The Making of the Black Middle Class." Social Problems 30 (April): 369-382.
- Conk, Margo
 1978 The United States Census and Labor Force Change. Ann Arbor, Mich.: UMI Research Press.
- Cummings, Scott
 1980 Self Help in Urban America. Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat.
- Decker, Peter
 1978 Fortunes and Failures: White Collar Mobility in Nineteenth Century San Francisco. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Drake, St. Claire and Horace Cayton
 1945 Black Metropolis. New York: Harcourt, Brace.

- Dubofsky, Melvyn
1968 When Workers Organize. Amherst, Mass.: University of Massachusetts Press.
- Du Bois, W.E.
1969 The Black North in 1901. New York: Arno Press (c. 1901)
- Duncan, Otis Dudley
1969 "Inheritance of Poverty or Inheritance of Race?" In D. Moynihan (ed.) On Understanding Poverty. New York: Basic Books.
- Duncan, Otis Dudley, David Featherman, and Beverly Duncan
1972 Socioeconomic Background and Achievement. New York: Seminar Press.
- Edwards, Richard, Michael Reich, and David Gordon
1975 Labor Market Segmentation. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath.
- Edwards, Richard
1979 Contested Terrain. New York: Basic Books.
- Epstein, Melech
1950 Jewish Labor in the U. S. A. New York: Trade Union Sponsoring Committee.
- Erickson, Charlotte
1957 American Industry and the European Immigrant, 1860-1885. New York: Russell and Russell.
- Farley, Reynolds and Suzanne M. Bianchi
1982 "Social and Economic Polarization: Is it Occurring Among Blacks? Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco.
- Fauman, S. Joseph
1958 "Occupational Selection Among Detroit Jews." In M. Sklare (ed) The Jews: Social Patterns of an American Group. New York: The Free Press.
- Feagin, Joe R.
1978 Racial and Ethnic Relations. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall.
- Featherman, David and Robert Hauser
1976 "Changes in the Socioeconomic Stratification of the Races." American Journal of Sociology 82: 621-51.
- Fitch, John
1969 The Steel Workers. New York: Arno Press (c. 1911).

- Fligstein, Neil
 1980 Going North: Migration of Blacks and Whites Out of the South, 1900-1950. New York: Academic Press.
- Foerster, Robert
 1969 The Italian Immigration of Our Times. New York: Arno Press (c. 1919).
- Foner, Philip
 1974 Organized Labor and the Black Worker, 1619-1973. New York: Praeger.
- Glazer, Nathan
 1975 Affirmative Discrimination: Ethnic Inequality and Public Policy. New York: Basic Books.
- Gockel, Galen
 1969 "Income and Religious Affiliation: A Regression Analysis." American Journal of Sociology 74 (May): 632-49.
- Golab, Caroline
 1977 Immigrant Destinations. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Gordon, David, Richard Edwards, and Michael Reich
 1982 Segmented Work, Divided Workers. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Gorelick, Sherry
 1981 City College and the Jewish Poor: Education in New York 1880-1924. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press.
- Granovetter, Mark
 1974 Getting a Job. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Greeley, Andrew
 1976 Ethnicity, Discrimination, and Inequality. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications.
- Gurock, Jeffrey
 1979 When Harlem was Jewish, 1870-1930. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Handlin, Oscar
 1959 The Newcomers. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Hareven, Tamara
 1975 "Family Time and Industrial Time: Family and Work in a Planned Corporation Town, 1900-1924". Journal of Urban History 1 (May):365-89.

- Hauser, Robert
1980 "On Stratification in a Dual Economy". American Sociological Review 45 (August): 702-712.
- Hauser, Robert and David Featherman
1977 The Process of Stratification: Trends and Analyses. New York: Academic Press.
- Haynes, George
1968 The Negro at Work in New York City. New York: Arno Press (c. 1912).
- Henri, Florette
1976 Black Migration: Movement North 1900-1920. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books.
- Hout, Michael
1984 "Occupational Mobility of Black Men." American Sociological Review 49 (June): 308-322.
- Hutchinson, E.P.
1956 Immigrants and Their Children, 1850-1959. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
- Jencks, Christopher
1983 "Discrimination and Thomas Sowell." New York Review of Books 30 (March 3): 33-38.
- Juliani, Richard
1973 "The Origin and Development of the Italian Community in Philadelphia." In John Bodnar (ed.) The Ethnic Experience in Pennsylvania. Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell University Press.
- Kiser, Clyde Vernon
1967 Sea Island to City New York: AMS Press (c. 1932).
- Knights, Peter R.
1971 The Plain People of Boston, 1830-1860. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Korman, Gird
1967 Industrialization, Immigrants, and Americanization: The View from Milwaukee, 1866-1921. Madison, Wis.: The State Historical Society.
- Kusmer, Kenneth L.
1976 A Ghetto Takes Shape: Black Cleveland, 1870-1930. Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press.
- Kuznets, Simon
1960 "Economic Structure and Life of the Jews." In Louis Finkelstein (ed.) The Jews: Their History, Culture, and Religion. Vol. II. New York: Harper and Bros.

- Laumann, Edward
1973 Bonds of Pluralism. New York: John Wiley.
- Leiserson, William M.
1969 Adjusting Immigrants and Industry. New York: Arno Press (c. 1924).
- Lichtenstein, Jules Herbert
1975 White Ethnic and Black Economic Assimilation and Mobility: A Study of Employment Patterns and Determinants in Selected SMSA's. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Dissertations in Planning.
- Lieberson, Stanley
1980 A Piece of the Pie. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press.
- Light, Ivan
1972 Ethnic Enterprise in America. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press.
- Lin, Nan, Walter Ensel and John Vaughn
1981 "Social Resources and Strength of Ties." American Sociological Review 46 (August): 393-405.
- Lipset, S. M., R. Bendix, and T. Malm
1955 "Job Plans and Entry into the Labor Market." Social Forces 33 (March): 224-32.
- Lopreato, Joseph
1970 Italian Americans. New York: Random House.
- MacDonald, John and Leatrice MacDonald
1964 "Chain Migration, Ethnic Neighborhood Formation, and Social Networks." Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly 52 (January): 82-97.
- Mare, Robert and Christopher Winship
1984 "Racial Inequality and Joblessness." American Sociological Review 49 (February): 39-55.
- Marks, Carole
1983 "Lines of Communication, Recruitment Mechanisms, and the Great Migration of 1916-1918." Social Problems 31 (October): 73-83.
- Marshall, Ray
1965 The Negro and Organized Labor. New York: John Wiley.
- Model, Suzanne
forthcoming Ethnic Bonds in the Workplace: Minorities in Turn-of-the-Century New York City. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Michigan.

- Moore, Deborah Dash
 1981 At Home in America: Second Generation New York Jews. New York: Columbia University Press.
- New York Immigration Commission
 1909 Report of the Commission of Immigration of the State of New York. Albany, N.Y.: J. B. Lyon.
- Northrup, Herbert, H. Risher, Jr., R. Leone, and P. Jeffress
 1971 Negro Employment in Land and Air Transport. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Piore, Michael
 1979 Birds of Passage. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Portes, Alejandro and Robert Bach
 1980 "Immigrant Earnings: Cuban and Mexican Immigrants in the United States." International Migration Review 14 (Fall): 315-41.
- Reich, Michael
 1981 Racial Inequality. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Reisler, Mark
 1976 By the Sweat of Their Brow: Mexican Immigrant Labor in the United States, 1900-1940. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.
- Reitz, Jeffrey, Liviana Calzavera, and Donna Desko
 1981 "Ethnic Inequality and Segregation in Jobs." Center for Urban and Community Studies, University of Toronto, mimeo.
- Rischin, Moses
 1962 The Promised City: New York's Jews 1870-1914. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Rosenblum, Gerald
 1973 Immigrant Workers. New York: Basic Books.
- Sheridan, Frank
 1907 "Italian, Slavic and Hungarian Unskilled Immigrant Laborers in the United States." Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor No. 72 (September).
- Sowell, Thomas
 1978 Essays and Data on American Ethnic Groups. Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute.
 1981 Markets and Minorities. New York: Basic Books.

- Spear, Allan
 1967 Black Chicago: The Making of a Negro Ghetto, 1890-1920. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Spero, Sterling and Abram Harris
 1931 The Black Worker: The Negro and the Labor Movement. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Stack, Carol
 1974 All Our Kin. New York: Harper and Row.
- Steinberg, Stephen
 1981 The Ethnic Myth. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Suttles, Gerald
 1968 The Social Order of the Slum. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Thernstrom, Stephan
 1964 Poverty and Progress: Social Mobility in a Nineteenth Century City. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- 1973 The Other Bostonians. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- U.S. Bureau of the Census
 1955 Census of Population: 1950. Vol. IV., Special Reports, Part 1, Chapter D, Industrial Characteristics. Washington, D.C.: G.P.O.
- 1973a Census of Population: 1970. Vol. I., Characteristics of the Population: Part 1, United States Summary, Section 2. Washington, D.C.: G.P.O.
- 1973b Census of Population: 1970. Special Reports, Final Report PC(2)-1A. National Origin and Language. Washington, D.C.: G.P.O.
- U.S. Immigration Commission
 1911a Reports. Vol. 27 Immigrants in Cities, Vol. 2. Washington, D.C.: G.P.O.
- 1911b Reports. Vol. 23 Immigrants in Industry, Vol. 2. Washington, D.C.: G.P.O.
- Waldinger, Roger
 1983 "Ethnic Enterprise: A Critique and Reformulation." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, Detroit.

- Wallace, Michael and Arne Kalleberg
 1981 "Economic Organization of Firms and Labor Market Consequences: Toward a Specification of Dual Economy Theory. In Ivar Berg (ed.) Sociological Perspectives on Labor Markets. New York: Academic Press.
- Wilson, Kenneth and Alejandro Portes
 1980 "Immigrant Enclaves: An Analysis of the Labor Market Experiences of Cubans in Miami." American Journal of Sociology 86 (September): 295-319.
- Wilson, Kenneth and W. Martin
 1982 "Ethnic Enclaves: A Comparison of the Cuban and Black Economies in Miami." American Journal of Sociology 88 (July): 135-160.
- Wilson, William J.
 1978 The Declining Significance of Race. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Yans-McLaughlin, Virginia
 1977 Family and Community: Italian Immigrants in Buffalo, 1880-1930. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
- Zucker, Lynne and Carolyn Rosenstein
 1981 "Taxonomies of Institutional Structure: Dual Economy Reconsidered". American Sociological Review 46 (December): 869-884.
- Zunz, Olivier
 1982 The Changing Face of Inequality. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

TABLE 1

PERCENTAGE INDUSTRIAL DISTRIBUTION OF MALE URBAN HOUSEHOLD
HEADS BY ETHNICITY, 1908

Industry	Ethnic Group			
	Blacks	Poles	Italians	Jews
Agriculture	0.5	0.1	0.1	0
Mining	0	0.2	0	0
Construction	2.2	5.8	7.2	9.2
Metal Manufacture	0	8.6	1.1	2.0
Other Durable	0.2	2.7	1.0	1.5
Printing	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.6
Pulp & Paper	0	0.5	0.1	0.1
Food & Tobacco	1.7	1.0	1.8	2.1
Apparel & Textiles	0	1.7	4.0	32.2
Leather	0	1.9	2.0	2.8
Other Non-Durable	0	0.1	0.5	0.3
Transport & Comm	25.4	3.3	2.2	3.4
Trade	3.2	4.7	13.3	32.9
Finance	0	0	0.3	0.4
Business Services	0.5	0.6	0.1	0.3
Personal Services	24.2	1.9	9.1	4.1
Entertainment	0	0.1	0.4	0
Prof Services	1.5	0.3	1.9	2.7
Public Admin	0.5	0.1	0.2	0.1
Unclassified	39.7	66.4	54.7	5.2
Self-Employed	5.7	4.5	18.9	43.3

Source: U.S. Immigration Reports, 1911a.

TABLE 2

PERCENTAGE INDUSTRIAL DISTRIBUTIONS OF NON-FARM MALES
BY ETHNICITY, 1950

Industry	Ethnicity				Total Labor Force
	Blacks	Poles	Italians	Russians	
Construction	10.9	6.6	10.9	6.6	9.8
Manufacture	29.8	32.7	23.9	16.6	27.0
Transport & Comm	12.0	4.9	7.6	4.0	10.8
Trade	16.1	9.9	10.8	23.9	20.4
Personal Services	9.1	6.6	9.5	5.3	3.4
Prof Services	5.6	6.1	4.8	13.0	5.7
Public Admin	5.2	na	na	na	5.4
Other	9.2	31.6	30.7	29.0	16.0
Not Reported	2.1	1.6	1.8	1.6	1.5

Indices of Dissimilarity (based on six industries)

1908 vs. 1950	41.0	17.1	14.0	24.8	na
Each group vs. all U.S. males in 1950	7.6	14.4	12.0	17.0	-

Sources: Hutchinson, 1956.
U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1955.

TABLE 3

INDUSTRIAL SECTOR OF NON-FARM MALES BY RACE AND YEAR*

Race and Year	Sector		
	Core	Periphery	Unclassifiable
Blacks			
1950	53.5%	42.9%	2.8%
1970	66.6%	29.2%	4.4%
Total Labor Force			
1950	57.8%	38.7%	2.6%
1970	69.6%	27.8%	2.4%

*Based on sectorial taxonomy of Beck, et al., 1978.

Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1955; 1973a.

TABLE 4

PERCENTAGE INDUSTRIAL DISTRIBUTION OF ETHNIC GROUPS*

Industry	Ethnic Group				Total U.S.
	Blacks	Poles	Italians	Jews	
Mining ^b	0.3	0.6	0	0	0.8
Construction	5.5	6.2	10.4	2.9	6.2
Metal & Steel	3.2	9.9	8.5	1.2	3.2
Transp Manuf	3.0	16.1	4.4	0	2.9
Other Durable	7.7	16.1	8.8	2.1	9.1
Pulp & Paper	0.7	1.2	0.9	0.4	0.9
Printing	0.8	2.5	4.1	2.1	1.6
Chemicals	1.1	0.6	1.6	0.8	1.3
Petroleum	0.2	0	0	0	2.5
Rubber	0.6	0	0.9	0.4	0.7
Food & Tobacco	2.4	1.2	1.9	1.2	2.0
Textiles & Apparel	3.3	1.2	4.1	7.4	2.9
Leather	0.2	0	0.3	1.2	0.4
Other Non-Durable	1.2	0.6	0.3	0.4	0.6
Trans,Comm,Util	7.0	6.7	10.9	3.6	6.9
Fin, Ins, R.E.	3.1	2.5	3.8	5.8	5.2
Trade	14.3	9.9	14.5	34.2	20.8
Business Services	2.7	1.9	3.5	5.3	3.2
Personal Services	13.9	2.5	3.2	1.6	4.8
Entertainment	0.7	0	0.9	0.8	0.8
Prof Services	20.2	8.1	5.7	15.2	18.3
Public Admin	6.9	11.8	11.0	13.2	5.7
Unclassifiable	0.7	-	-	-	0.8

Indices of Dissimilarity

Each group versus total labor force	Blacks	Poles	Italians	Jews	Total U.S.
	14.7	34.8	25.4	29.9	-

*All figures combine both sexes. Figures for blacks and total labor force are based on all 1970 non-farm workers. Figures on white ethnics are from a survey of 13 cities undertaken in 1968.

^bFigures on white ethnics combine workers in mining and agriculture.

Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1973a
Cummings, 1980.

TABLE 5

SECTORIAL DISTRIBUTION BY ETHNICITY*

Ethnic Group	Sector	
	Core	Periphery
Blacks	60.3%	38.7%
Poles	82.3%	17.3%
Italians	71.0%	28.7%
Jews	47.7%	52.1%
Total U.S. Labor Force	65.3%	35.5%

*Based on sectorial taxonomy of Beck, et al., 1978.

Sources: See Table 4.

CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON SOCIAL ORGANIZATION
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
WORKING PAPER SERIES

The Center for Research on Social Organization is a facility of the Department of Sociology, University of Michigan. Its primary mission is to support the research of faculty and students in the department's Social Organization graduate program. CRSO Working papers report current research and reflection by affiliates of the Center; many of them are published later elsewhere after revision. Working Papers which are still in print are available from the Center for a fee of \$1.00 plus the number of pages in the paper (\$1.33 for a 33-page paper, etc.). The Center will photocopy out-of-print Working Papers at cost (approximately five cents per page). Request copies of Working Papers, the list of other Center reprints, or further information about Center activities from: Center for Research on Social Organization, University of Michigan, 330 Packard Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109.

- 314 "Reading Gramsci in English: Some Observations on the Reception of Antonio Gramsci in the English-Speaking World, 1957-1982," by Geoff Eley, March 1984, 78 pages.
- 315 "Participation and Control: New Trends in Labor Relations in the Auto Industry," by Robert J. Thomas, April 1984, 16 pages.
- 316 "Dilemmas of Providing Help in a Crisis: The Role of Friends with Parents of Children with Cancer," by Mark A. Chesler and Oscar A. Barbarin, April 1984, 41 pages.
- 317 "Shrugging off the Nineteenth-Century Incubus," by Charles Tilly, June 1984, 35 pages.
- 318 "Retrieving European Lives," by Charles Tilly, June 1984, 81 pages.
- 319 "Cotton and Revolution in Nicaragua," by Jeffery M. Paige, August 1984, 34 pages.

Request copies of these papers, the complete list of Center Working Papers and further information about the Center activities from:

Center for Research on Social Organization
University of Michigan
330 Packard Street
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48103