

COLLECTIVE ACTION AND
VIOLENCE IN IRAN: 1951-1981

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339

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Recent theories of revolution have moved away from a concern with general political violence (Goldstone, 1980), to a focus on structural factors and international conditions that lead to the collapse of certain states (Paige, 1975 ; Skocpol, 1979). The Iranian revolution has once again renewed interest in theories of political violence. Part of this shift is perhaps due to the fact that, in contrast to other modern revolutions, the Iranian revolution was largely mobilized through religious channels and resulted in a theocracy. This outcome has led some scholars to explain the revolution in terms of rapid modernization and erosion of traditional authority, revival of religious sentiments and values, along with cultural and religious factors, such as Shi'ite millenarianism, and the glorification of martyrdom. These analyses attempt to explain the factors that generated the collective actions against the Shah's regime. However, these explanations have some troubling limitations that suggest that an alternative hypothesis based on resource mobilization may better account for the Iranian case. We shall examine these theories in light of data from the revolution in order to determine which provides the better explanation.

Said Arjomand (1981) argued that the Shah's regime systematically undermined the position of the clergy after the 1963 reforms. This policy antagonized the clergy who "came to lead the first successful traditionalist revolution in modern history." Furthermore, in assuming the leadership of the revolution, "the clergy were crucially aided by the long-established historical alliance between the bazaar and the mosque. Equally crucial was the vitality of religion during the 1960s and 1970s. The religious revival enabled the clergy to harness the intensification of traditional religious sentiments, especially those nurtured by Shi'ite millenarianism and the Shi'ite theodicy of misfortune." Arjomand rejected the postulation of a world-wide secularization of culture, arguing that in Iran a religious revival was underway. From the mid-1960s onwards, Shi'ite traditionalism gained impressive momentum. Religious periodicals and books attained ever-wider circulation. The number of pilgrims to Mecca, visits and donations to religious shrines also multiplied. During this period, "Religious Associations" sprang up in astonishing numbers, often formed by poorer segments of the urban population. Finally, "Religious Societies" were established in the universities by religious elements of the expanding middle

class, engineers and physicians. This religious revival was partly a consequence of urbanization as new migrants, suffering from anomic disorientation, found in Islamic ideology a cognitive map of the world. Modern segments of the middle class also embraced this religious revival because of the "alienating modern world." This led them "to consolidate their attachment to the Islamic tradition and to reaffirm their collective cultural identity." Finally, Arjomand noted that specific features of Shi'ite Islam were especially suitable for mobilizing the masses. The utopian concept of an Islamic government was modeled on the four-year reign of Ali, the first Shi'ite Imam. Another feature, the Shi'ite theodicy of suffering, was rooted in the martyrdom of Husayn, the Third Imam, and his family in Karbala in the seventh century. Arjomand suggested that Khomeini astutely played on Shi'ite millenarianism, which awaited the arrival of Mahdi, the last Imam who had gone into hiding. "Without claiming to be the returning Mahdi, Khomeini ingeniously exploited this Messianic yearning by assuming, from about 1970 onwards, the philologically polyvalent title of Imam."

Theda Skocpol (1982) departed somewhat from her earlier theory of revolution and presented a similar analysis of the Iranian case. Like the ancient regimes in France, Russia, and China, the Shah's regime was basically weak because he did not rule in alliance with an independent social class. Yet the Iranian revolution was unique for it departed from these earlier revolutions. Although in her earlier work, Skocpol refuted a model of revolution based on ideological explanation, she argued that the Iranian case followed a purposive model. More specifically, Skocpol elaborated on the possible role of "ideas systems and cultural understandings in the shaping of political action." Ultimately, according to Skocpol, the force behind the Shah's downfall lay "in traditional centers of urban communal life and in networks of Islamic communication and leadership," that is, in bazaars and mosques. Bazaars have historically been the center of urban life, connecting artisans and merchants to agricultural producers. By the mid 1970s, "the Shah seemed determined to attack the traditional aspects of bazaar life." This was carried out through control over self-regulating merchants' councils, state involvement in trade, and an "anti-corruption" campaign launched against alleged profiteering in the bazaar. These activities coincided with the Shah's steady efforts to exclude the Islamic clergy, leaders of the bazaar, from educational, legal, and welfare activities. The clergy, trained to interpret Islamic law for believers, could

claim, "as well or better than the monarchs, to represent authentically the will of the Hidden Imam." According to Skocpol, these authorities provided leadership, networks, and symbols of communication against the Shah during the revolution. Even more important, she argued, was Shi'ite belief system in sustaining the struggles. In particular, the story of Husayn's willing martyrdom in the just cause of resisting the usurper caliph, Yazid, inspired devout Shi'ites to continue their opposition against the Shah in the face of repression and death.

These analyses rely on two interrelated variables: the authority of the Shi'ite clergy to judge temporal government, and the obedience of the Iranian people to traditional religious authority. When the clergy regarded a political leader as illegitimate, they had the power to issue fatwas, or orders to believers to take collective action against him. The population, which was predominantly Shi'ite, obeyed their religious leaders and thereby maintained the integrity of their Islamic communities. In short, these analyses rest upon what might be termed an "authority-adherence" explanation for the revolution: the political authority of Shi'ite clergy, combined with the traditional obedience of the population.

These explanations ignore or downplay the significance of formation of coalition, conflicts of interests, and the structure of opportunities available to the political actors during the 1977-79 period. In contrast, we shall present an alternative hypothesis based on resource mobilization. According to this hypothesis, the collapse of the monarchy was brought about by a coalition among bazaaris, industrial workers, and white collar-professional employees led by a segment of the clergy. Although segments of these groups and classes were undeniably traditional and religious, their collective actions against the government derived from their pursuit of rational economic interests, which were jeopardized by state economic policies. Repression, divisions, and lack of autonomous organizations reduced the capacity of each group for collective action and thus left them no alternative for mobilization but the mosque. These collectivities coalesced in opposition against the Shah, but their alliance broke down shortly after the downfall of the monarchy.

To test the validity of these contrasting explanations, we shall examine them in light of the collective actions undertaken by these collectivities during the political conflicts that unfolded between 1951 and 1981. If the collective actions of these groups consistently followed the exhortations of the

clergy, we would have strong reason to take the "authority-adherence" hypothesis seriously. Significantly, however, this would not preclude the existence of other reasons than religious adherence for following clerical leadership. On the other hand, if collective actions by these groups diverged from the lead of the clergy, the authority-adherence hypothesis would be seriously undermined, and we would need to look closely at a model based on resource mobilization.

Our analysis will precede through an historical investigation relying on primary data to shed light on the previous politics of these classes. The years between 1951 and 1981 were selected because during this time these classes and groups engaged in a number of collective actions with clear political implications. In the early 1950s, royalists repeatedly opposed the nationalist supporters of the prime minister, Dr. Mosaddegh, a liberal, European-educated modernizer, who was eventually defeated. In the early 1960s, the clergy were drawn into conflict with the state over reforms introduced by the Shah; despite strenuous clerical objection, the state prevailed. In 1975, a rebellion of clerical students was forcibly put down by the state. The turbulent period from 1977 to 1979 eventually resulted in the downfall of the monarchy. Finally, in the post-revolutionary period, political conflicts emerged during which these groups acted collectively to influence the political development of the country. An examination of the actions of these groups during these events will help determine the validity of the two contrasting hypothesis.

Royalists Versus Modernizers

In the early 1950s, Iranian society was marked by intense conflicts over issues such as the power of the monarchy and the landed upper class, economic development and inequality, and civil rights. The monarchy, supported by privileged classes and groups, sought to monopolize power, develop the nation economically through Western markets and capital, and restrict the formation of strong labor organizations. These policies had an adverse impact on broad segments of the population.

After World War Two, large stocks of products were imported from abroad, flooding the Iranian market and causing an economic recession that lasted from 1947 until 1952 (Bharier, 1971:183). The recession had adverse effects on major parts of society. Bazaaris, a term that encompasses merchants, shopkeepers, and artisans, were hardest hit by competition with foreign goods, declining sales, and

bankruptcies among small producers. Industrial workers were also adversely affected by restrictions outlawing leftist unions, factory closings, rising unemployment, and reduced wages and salaries. Finally, white collar employees were jeopardized by rising inflation and cost of living, stagnant or declining salaries, and the government's decision to fire many of its employees in the late 1940s.

These adverse economic conditions eventually gave rise to a nationalist movement advocating parliamentary democracy, independent nationalist economic development, and greater social equality. The leader of this movement was Dr. Mosaddegh, a Western-educated lawyer and liberal modernizer, who became a central force behind the nationalization of oil. He established the National Front, which gained the backing of large segments of the population including bazaaris, white collar employees, and the industrial working class. Following the nationalization of oil major social conflicts emerged, exacerbated by a Western boycott of Iranian oil that brought about a severe economic crisis. Political confrontation between nationalists and royalists came to a head in 1953 with other social groups joining sides. Eventually, an alliance of the landed upper class and the monarchy, combined with CIA intervention, resulted in a coup d'etat that removed Mosaddegh from office. Let us examine the politics of clergy, bazaaris, white collar employees, and the industrial working class in these conflicts.

The Clergy

During the initial part of this period, the clergy were divided, with a majority who were non-active in politics and a minority who were politically active. The latter group was further subdivided into pro-Shah and pro-Mosaddegh factions. Among those clerics remaining loyal to Mosaddegh were Ayatollahs Taleghani, Zanjani, and Milani. Although most politicized clergy actively supported the nationalization of oil, the ensuing crisis prompted most of them to leave Mosaddegh's National Front.¹ Among those who deserted Mosaddegh and supported the monarchy was Ayatollah Kashani, influential speaker of the Majlis, or parliament, from 1952 to 1953. He had joined Mosaddegh's National Front and played an important role in the nationalization of oil, but later opposed the prime minister. Kashani maintained that although Iranians had fought against the British to improve their situation, Mosaddegh actually worsened economic conditions. He further charged that Mosaddegh violated the constitution and ruled the country in a dictatorial fashion. In a meeting, he told Mosaddegh, "Our economy is bankrupt, our

villages are destroyed, our sons have become communists, and our schools have taken red colors; what are you doing?" (Kayhan, September 14, 1953). Regarding the Shah, Kashani remarked, "Our king is different from Farouk....The Iranian king is neither corrupt or greedy like Farouk, nor a dictatorial autocrat. The Shah is an educated and wise man." He also commented, "My disagreement with the Shah was over the constitution alone; such disputes should not generate apprehension because they have always existed between kings and governments" (Ettelaat, March 30, 1953). Toward the end of 1952, he refused to attend and preside over the Majlis in an attempt to obstruct the passage of Mosaddegh's policies. On January 8, 1953, when Mosaddegh requested an extension of his emergency powers in order to resolve the country's crisis, Kashani refused to go along, stating that as long as he remained in the Majlis, he would prevent the passage of such bills. In February, the Shah was pressured by Mosaddegh to leave the country for a period of time, but Kashani intervened and prevented his departure. In April, Kashani refused to convene the Majlis to pass the report of the Eight-Member Committee designed to curb the monarch's power, which liberals argued interfered unconstitutionally in all aspects of Iranian society.

During the crucial confrontation over the fate of parliament in 1953, Kashani opposed Mosaddegh's referendum, labeling it illegal and dictatorial. When the parliament recessed at the end of July, to await the voting, he invited opposition politicians to anti-Mosaddegh meetings in his home. Two days before the voting, Kashani led the right-wing opposition in a call for a boycott of the referendum (Ettelaat, August 1, 1953). During the coup d'etat that followed, he helped Ayatollah Behbahani organize gangs of hoodlums who, along with segments of the army, looted National Front headquarters, the homes of the prime minister's supporters, and even the house of Mosaddegh himself. After the coup, Kashani praised General Zahedi, the new prime minister under the coup administration, for his willingness to sacrifice whatever was necessary to defend the country (Kayhan, October 2, 1953). Ayatollah Behbahani also consistently opposed Mosaddegh and supported the royalist position. He, too, condemned Mosaddegh's referendum on the Majlis, and played an important part in the coup d'etat against Mosaddegh. Afterward, Behbahani gathered a score of bazaaris to form a pro-government merchants' guild (Ettelaat, August 23, 1953).

The conservative, non-activist clergy led by the preeminent cleric in the country, Ayatollah Boroujerdi, also supported the Shah. During the nationalization of oil, he and royalist members of the Majlis held demonstrations in Qom seminary, Madreseh-e Faizieh, rejecting nationalization as a violation of property and contrary to the laws of Islam. In July 1952, during the conflict between Mosaddegh and the Shah over the control of the army, the conservative clerics of Qom sent their representative to Tehran to support the Shah. For these clerics, Mosaddegh was moving the country toward communism. When the monarch left the country on August 16, 1953, Boroujerdi sent him a telegram that read, "Return because Shi'ism and Islam need you. You are the Shi'ite King." He and other high ranking clerics in Qom held prayer sessions for the Shah's return. Shortly after the coup, on the religious holiday of Aid-e Ghadier, Ayatollah Boroujerdi telegraphed his congratulations to General Zahedi, wishing him luck in the great responsibility he had accepted to serve Islam (Ettelaat, September 1, 1953). Other important clerics, including Ayatollah Shariat-Madari, also continued to support the Shah.

Workers and White Collar Employees

Most industrial workers during the early 1950s were organized by the National Front and the communist Tudeh Party, and hence, their politics pursued secular and nationalistic objectives. Oil workers were the leading segments of organized labor whose actions were generally followed by other workers. In March, 1951, the government passed a bill to nationalize oil. The bill's passage was greeted by a wave of strikes in the oil region. The strikes were partly in response to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's decision to eliminate the compensation of 30% in extra wages paid to workers in the harsh climate of parts of Khuzestan. Three thousand oil workers in Bandar-e Mashoor in Khuzestan struck against the oil company. Immediately oil workers throughout Abadan and Ahvaz, some thirty thousand in all, walked off the job in sympathy with the striking workers in Bandar-e Mashoor. Within few days, oil workers in Masjed Solayman, Khorramshahr, and Agha-Jari also joined the strike. In response, the government imposed martial law throughout the entire region and urged strikers to resume working. Two weeks after the walk-outs began, the Majlis sent a message asking the strikers to

return to work so that the government could insist that the company restore the paycuts (Ettelaat, April 4, 1951). Nevertheless, the strikes continued.

From the beginning, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company claimed that the strikes were illegal and that workers must return to work. As a precaution, British naval vessels were dispatched to the Persian Gulf to defend their interests. The workers refused to back down, leading the company to reverse its position and agree to some of the strikers' demands, including paying salaries and meeting other obligations. As a result, some workers in Masjed Soleyman went back to work. In Abadan, however, where the vast majority of oil workers were concentrated, the strike continued. When the government ordered the army to arrest some of the labor leaders, workers defied the army, and in the subsequent clashes, nine workers were killed and 60 injured. In retaliation, workers attacked British employees, killing three of them (Ettelaat, April 13, 1951). This led the British to evacuate women and children from Abadan; thirty Americans working for the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company also left.

On April 15, Abadan oil workers held a large rally to demand the immediate nationalization of oil. The following day at another rally, 35,000 strikers declared that their walk-out was a protest against British imperialism and in support of other strikers in the region. They acknowledged the widespread popular support they had received and vowed to fulfill their obligations to the people "until final victory." (Ettelaat, April 19, 1951). Workers' intransigence and telephone threats against British employees led the government to reinforce martial law and send additional soldiers to Abadan. More clashes followed in which upwards of 30 workers were killed by the military. In the fifth week of the strike, the government began arresting labor leaders. Within a few days, several hundred workers were jailed.

The communist Tudeh Party organized demonstrations and sympathy strikes on behalf of oil workers in major cities, including Isfahan where demonstrators were killed in a strike. Rallies were also held in smaller, northern cities where the Tudeh Party had a strong base of support. These combined actions strengthened those who urged the government to cease procrastinating and implement the nationalization of oil. On April 25, a special Majlis committee headed by Dr. Mosaddegh, then a member of parliament, voted unanimously to proceed with nationalization. The next day, Prime

Minister Hossein Ala resigned although he had been in office only a short time. He admitted having failed to deal with strikes that had spread throughout the country and noted that the committee's vote had been in violation of executive powers as well as an expression of lack of trust in his government (Ettelaat, April 28, 1951). The Majlis offered the premiership to Mosaddegh who agreed to accept only if parliament immediately acted to nationalize oil. After being approved by 70 of the 100 members of the Majlis, the new prime minister quickly moved to implement nationalization.

Thus, workers' strikes played an important role in the nationalization of oil. Industrial workers were able to act collectively in major industrial enterprises to pursue secular-nationalistic interests. After the nationalization of oil, workers continued to support Mosaddegh. When he resigned the premiership in July, 1952, because of a dispute with the Shah over the control of the army, workers throughout the country backed his stand against the monarch. In Abadan, Kermanshah, and Isfahan, thousands of oil workers struck for several days. In Abadan 14 persons were killed in demonstrations (Ettelaat, July 23, 1952). In Tehran, workers struck and participated in demonstrations on July 21. On that historic day, some 200 people were killed in anti-monarchy protests. The next day the Shah reappointed Mosaddegh, and the strikes ceased. In April 1953, when the Majlis refused to convene to pass the report of the Eight-member Committee, workers again struck in support of Mosaddegh. On April 16, workers throughout the country rallied against the Majlis, demanding that anti-Shah legislation be approved. On the anniversary of the July 21 massacre workers everywhere, including the religious center of Qom, joined political rallies and demonstrations in support of the prime minister against the royal court and the Majlis (Ettelaat, July 22, 1953).

Throughout these conflicts white collar employees and professionals also strongly backed Dr. Mosaddegh. Most followed either the National Front or the Tudeh Party and thus pursued either liberal or leftist politics. Faced with a choice between the prime minister and the court, they chose Mosaddegh overwhelmingly. Even when the majority of the clergy broke with Mosaddegh, white collar employees and professionals rallied and demonstrated in favor of the prime minister. For example, upon hearing news of the massacre of Mosaddegh supporters on July 21, 1952, most government employees in Tehran stopped work and left their offices in protest (Ettelaat, July 23, 1952). Along with industrial

workers, they joined demonstrations in April, 1953, to demand passage of the bill to limit the monarch's power. On the anniversary of the massacre of July 21, white collar employees throughout the country took part in pro-Mosaddegh rallies (Ettelaat, July 23, 1953).

Bazaaris

Although a tiny minority of Tehran bazaaris joined those clergy who opposed Mosaddegh, the majority of bazaar merchants, shopkeepers, and artisans repeatedly demonstrated their support for the prime minister on crucial occasions. When Mosaddegh's government lacked sufficient revenue to pay salaries to government employees, merchants and shopkeepers lined up to buy special government bonds issued to ease the financial crisis. When shortages of basic commodities drove up consumer prices, Mosaddegh intervened to lower prices and was backed even by merchants in sectors such as sugar, who volunteered to sell at a loss. On July 17, 1952, when the prime minister resigned to protest the Shah's control over the army, Tehran bazaaris immediately struck and took to the streets in anti-Shah protests. Soon bazaaris elsewhere followed suit, closing their shops and holding sit-ins. On July 21, bazaaris across the country demonstrated in response to a call by the National Front to support the prime minister, and forced the Shah to reinstate him. When Ayatollah Kashani and other clerics broke with Mosaddegh's National Front, the Society of Tehran Merchants, Shopkeepers, and Artisans continued to back the prime minister. On April 14, they published a statement in Ettelaat newspaper, condemning the opponents of Mosaddegh and demanding approval of a bill to curb the power of the Shah. On April 16, they demonstrated in overwhelming numbers (New York Times, April 16, 1953). On the first anniversary of the July 21 massacre, bazaaris throughout the country again closed down to attend pro-Mosaddegh rallies (Ettelaat, July 23, 1953). Even in the religious center of Qom, shopkeepers and merchants struck in support of Mosaddegh (Ettelaat, July 14, 1953).

The Downfall of Mosaddegh

During the final round of conflict that preceded the coup d'etat, bazaaris, industrial workers, and white collar employees sided with Mosaddegh once again. The central issue was the prime minister's attempt to dissolve the Majlis, which was dominated by royalists, landlords, and clerics. In August, 1953, Mosaddegh called for a referendum to dissolve the parliament. Royalists and clerics led by Ayatollah

Kashani boycotted the referendum. In contrast, bazaaris, workers, and white collar employees sided with Mosaddegh. Bazaaris shut down their businesses to indicate support for Mosaddegh. Popular support for the prime minister on this issue was overwhelming. In Tehran, the vote to dissolve parliament was 155,544 in favor and only 115 against (Ettelaat, August 4, 1953). Nationwide, 2,043,380 voted to dismiss parliament, while only 1,207 voted to retain it (Ettelaat, August 15, 1953). On August 15, the Shah was obliged to dissolve the Majlis and order new parliamentary elections.

On August 16, a group of royalist officers attempted a coup d'etat against the prime minister who, in turn, ordered their arrest. Bazaaris and workers rallied in large numbers to condemn the Shah, who was obliged to flee the country. When a second coup finally succeeded on August 19, severe repression ensued and many labor leaders were immediately arrested. As news of the coup spread, bazaaris struck in protest (New York Times, August 21, 22, 1953). Despite assurances by the government that they would not be arrested nor their shops attacked, bazaaris refused to reopen out of loyalty to the prime minister. Colonel Dadsetan, military governor of Tehran, publicly complained that merchants declined to resume business (Ettelaat, August 23, 1953). Finally, the government forced them to reopen under duress (New York Times, August 25, 1953), and General Zahedi threatened to destroy the roof of the bazaar if the strikes were repeated (Binder, 1962:295).

In sum, the evidence fails to support the authority-adherence hypothesis. Rather, the data for this period indicate that the clergy were clearly divided into two factions in the political conflicts of the early 1950s. The conservative majority sided with royalists, while only a small minority continued to back Mosaddegh. In contrast, most workers, white collar employees, and bazaaris actively supported the prime minister. Faced with a choice between the preeminent religious leaders, such as Ayatollahs Boroujerdi and Kashani, and secular, reformist leaders like Mosaddegh, the people overwhelmingly chose the latter, a modernizer who advocated independent economic development, greater equality and freedom, and reforms that challenged the power of traditional groups and powers.

The White Revolution and the Clergy

The situation changed in the early 1960s when the Shah began to speak of social reform, especially land reform, a volatile political issue. In May, 1961, the Shah dissolved the Majlis, which was

dominated by landlords and their supporters who opposed his land reform bill. A year and a half later, on January 26, 1963, a national referendum was held to ratify a six-point package that the Shah labeled a "white revolution." After the votes were tallied, the Shah announced that his reforms had been overwhelmingly endorsed by the people. But six months later, protests and anti-government demonstrations broke out in several major cities. Some leading clerics, including Ayatollah Khomeini, were arrested, and many people were slain as a result of the repression that followed.

During this period, clerical ranks were again divided. But in contrast to 1953, the Shah and his reforms were supported by only a small clerical minority, including Ayatollah Mahdavi, Allamah Vahidi, and the Imam Jumah of Tehran (Akhavi, 1980:103). Most of the clergy, however, opposed the Shah's reforms, specifically land reform and women's suffrage. Opposition to land reform by conservative clerics was partly based on their economic interests. Some clerics in Isfahan, Azerbaijan, and Kerman owned huge amounts of land that would have to be relinquished. The land reform program also stipulated that lands held by the mosques would be redistributed. Other clerics opposed women's franchise. Ayatollahs Shariat-Madari and Golpaygani, for instance, telegrammed the Shah and specifically asked him to withdraw the vote for women. Others, including Ayatollahs Taleghani and Mahallati Shirazi, adopted a radical position. They criticized the Shah for acting in a dictatorial manner, granting capitulation rights to the U.S., and failing to insure justice for the poor (Akhavi, 1980:101). Ayatollah Khomeini also criticized the government's capitulation laws. He attacked what he considered the regime's attacks on Islam and the clergy, and condemned the Shah's referendum as "contrary to all the interests of the Iranian nation." Because of his outspoken criticism, Khomeini was arrested on June 5, 1963. After his release, he continued to denounce government policies.

Within a few hours of Khomeini's arrest, protests broke out in Tehran, Qom, Mashhad, Isfahan, Shiraz, Tabriz, and Kashan.² When demonstrators entered Tehran's central bazaar, merchants and shopkeepers closed down, and many joined the demonstrators. Once shooting began, bazaaris retreated after suffering only a few casualties. They returned to their shops after several days when tensions ceased. In contrast, industrial workers and white collar employees took no part in the demonstrations. No strikes or work stoppages occurred in workplaces.

Bazaar opposition to the government can be explained in terms of a combination of their economic interests and an organizational vacuum. Bazaaris had supported Mosaddegh's nationalistic economic policies designed to halt growing international penetration of Iranian markets. Following the coup d'etat, bazaar interests were adversely affected by the Shah's economic program, which encouraged foreign imports and development of modern banking and industries. The economic position of shopkeepers and artisans was further undermined by two years of recession that resulted from the imposition of a stabilization program recommended by the International Monetary Fund (Bharier, 1971:53, 95). Bankruptcies spread in the bazaars (Ettelaat, May 7, 1961), and bazaaris complained that the government did nothing to promote commerce (Ettelaat, May 21, 1963).

Shopkeepers and artisans also protested against a taxation scheme designed in 1961 by their guilds. They objected that the guild leaders paid little taxes themselves and shifted the burden to poorer segments of the bazaar (Ettelaat, April 30, 1961). They refused to pay taxes for more than two years until the government began an investigation. In April, 1963, investigators uncovered 300,000 cases of refusal to pay taxes in Tehran alone, most of which involved small shopkeepers and artisans (Ettelaat, May 19, 1963).

Although their economic interest was adversely affected by the government, bazaaris lacked both leadership and cohesive organizations to undertake unified collective action. Bazaar leadership was weakened by the imprisonment of the leaders of the second National Front. The new Merchants' Guild, founded after the coup d'etat was controlled by the government and left no autonomy to the bazaar. Finally, the government attempted to strengthen its own position within the bazaar. For example, during Muharram, an important Islamic mourning observance, the prime minister attended religious services in a bazaar mosque and made contact with some merchants and shopkeepers (Ettelaat, June 4, 1963). New divisions within the bazaar also prevented shopkeepers from engaging in independent and sustained collective action. Tehran merchants and shopkeepers outside the central bazaar took no part in the protests and, as a result, some stores were smashed and even looted (Ettelaat, June 6, 1963; New York Times, June 9, 1963; Christian Science Monitor, June 6, 1963). In much of the rest of the

country, shopkeepers and merchants refrained from anti-government protests in sharp contrast to their active support of Prime Minister Mosaddegh a decade earlier.

In sum, the vast majority of the clergy actively opposed the Shah during this period, although from different political standpoints. Some bazaaris opposed the regime as well, and their demonstrations in a half dozen major cities coincided with the clergy's opposition. However, bazaaris' actions can be understood in terms of the factors we have specified. Government policies had adversely affected the economic interests of the bazaar and bazaaris had already opposed the regime through their tax revolt. Clerical protest provided an opportunity for bazaaris to oppose the regime, because they lacked an independent organization through which they could mobilize for collective action. The absence of organization also accounts for the fact that the vast majority of bazaaris throughout the country failed to act collectively against the government, despite persistent clerical opposition to the Shah's policies. If bazaar politics followed traditional values or leadership, shopkeepers in the rest of the country should have engaged in collective action against the regime. Their failure to do so can be attributed to weak collective capacity and organization.

The absence of industrial workers and white collar employees from these events can also be explained in terms of interests and the lack of organization. Although some individual members of these classes joined in the protests, the vast majority remained uninvolved. Repression had a devastating effect on the capacity of these classes for collective action. Strikes were banned, and unions, which were mostly pro-communist, were dissolved. After the coup d'etat, the government executed 53 leaders of the Tudeh Party and outlawed the organization. Another factor bearing on workers' inaction was the fact that the Shah's reforms promised profit-sharing for industrial workers. According to government claims several industrial sectors had been already covered by this plan in early 1963 (Ettelaat, May 20, 1963). Finally, repression aimed at the National Front drastically weakened the capacity of white collar employees to act collectively against the government. If the authority-adherence hypothesis were valid, both white collar employees and industrial workers should have engaged in anti-Shah protests. However, the evidence indicates that this did not occur.

The Uprising of Clerical Students

The position of the clergy was undermined by the reforms of 1963 and subsequent bureaucratic changes establishing the Endowments Organization, which controlled religious educational establishments and land donated to religious institutions. Despite this erosion of clerical influence, the clergy were not uniformly opposed to the regime. Although most remained inactive politically, a minority always supported the Shah and received generous subsidies in return. A third, small group of clerics, including Ayatollahs Taleghani and Montazeri, opposed the government and ended up in jail. Some 60 pro-Khomeini clerics were in jail by the mid-1970s.

In 1975, another incident occurred that challenged the Shah's regime. On June 5, the twelfth anniversary of the 1963 uprising following the arrest of Ayatollah Khomeini, more than one thousand tullah, or clerical students, took over the Madrased Faizieh Qom, the most important educational establishment for training clerics. The timing and place were obviously well chosen. The location was near the shrine of Fatima, a pilgrimage site for Shia Moslems from all over the country. The protests were joined by clerical students from the Madrased-e Khan, an adjacent school, and lasted for three consecutive days and nights. The rebels raised a red flag, symbol of Shia martyrdom, high enough to be seen throughout the city of Qom, and began broadcasting tapes of Khomeini's fiery speeches against the Shah. When the uprising broke out, the government shut down the school's water and electricity. Police surrounded the school and attempted to rout the students with tear gas and high pressure water hoses, but the protesters defended themselves with bricks and sticks. The rebellion was finally put down by several units of army commandos dispatched from Tehran. By the second day, more than 500 students had been arrested, 45 killed, and many more injured. Following the collapse of the insurrection, the Savak shut down the school, which remained closed throughout the rest of the Shah's rule.

Clerical response to the student revolt varied. Ayatollah Khomeini acted swiftly to endorse the tullah's cause. On the third day of the insurrection, he sent a message of condolence on behalf of the "martyrs of the Madrased Faizieh Qom," congratulating them and the Iranian people for their struggle against the Shah's dictatorship and U.S. imperialism. He denounced the government's order to refuse

the injured admission to Qom hospitals. Most clergy, however, remained aloof. At one point during the rebellion, the clerical students called upon Qom's religious leaders for assistance, but received none. When the revolt was finally crushed, Ayatollahs Shariat-Madari and Marashi-Najafi offered no explanation or defense of their actions, although they publicly denied the government's charge that the tullahs had been communist agents.

In Mashhad, two clerics organized a rally at the seminary and encouraged clerical students to support the rebellious Qom tullah. After the rally, clerical students demonstrated in the streets, shouting pro-Khomeini slogans. The government arrested both clerics and more than 30 students. Some Tehran university students also protested in support of Ayatollah Khomeini and the Qom rebels. The national press reported the uprising shortly after it had ended (Kayhan, June 14, 1975; Ettelaat, June 10, 1975). However, the general public offered no support for the rebellious tullah. There were no other protests, strikes, or bazaar shutdowns anywhere in the country. The closing of the most important clerical school in Qom precipitated no response by any social class. No national day of mourning was called to commemorate the deaths of the martyred tullahs, nor was there any serious political condemnation of the government's actions at all except by Khomeini. These significant events seem to have gone completely unnoticed by the public. If the authority-adherence hypothesis were valid, we should have expected at least some backing for the clerical students, especially after Ayatollah Khomeini called for support.

The lack of action by bazaaris can be explained in terms of interest and economic prosperity brought about by the oil boom of 1973. Although some segments of the bazaar, including blacksmiths, silversmiths, shoemakers, and moneylenders, had been adversely affected by economic development policies, the oil boom created a unique occasion for many bazaaris to increase their assets. The sudden increase in national investment and consumption gave a boost to domestic trade. The bazaar still controlled more than two-thirds of the domestic trade and more than 30 percent of the nation's imports. As a result, bazaaris in various sectors were in an advantageous position to benefit from the boom, and some undoubtedly improved their economic position.³ Some bazaaris even transferred a portion of their capital into the booming construction sector to make additional profits.

The Revolutionary Period, 1977-1979

To understand the revolution of 1979, we must examine those changes that occurred between August, 1975, and 1977. The oil boom and Iran's subsequent economic growth opened new opportunities for those who could take advantage of them. However, the oil boom also engendered the conditions for the fall of monarchy. To comprehend the political events that preceded the revolution, we must analyze the development policies of the Shah's state and their impact upon various social classes and political interests. This requires an examination of the impact of oil.

Following the oil boom, the economy witnessed a two-year period of unprecedented growth that intensified existing uneven development. The urban/rural income differential, which had decreased from 2.13 in 1959 to 1.91 in 1965 thanks to land reform, rose to 3.21 in 1972. Urban inequality also increased. In a study of income distribution, the International Labor Organization concluded that the Gini Coefficient for Iran in 1969-70 was higher than any country in the Middle East and southeast Asia, considerably higher than Western countries, and probably as high or higher than Latin American countries for which data were available. Government taxation policies worsened the inequalities. The poorest ten percent of the population paid 11 percent of their income in taxes, whereas the richest ten percent paid only eight percent in taxes. Many of the wealthy did not even bother to pay any taxes (Kayhan, October 23, 1978). Not until the end of summer in 1978 did the government begin to ask the richest to pay their taxes.

Government development policies were directly responsible for the rise of inequality and subsequent social conflicts. Import-substitution policies favored the growth of monopolies in the industrial sector. Profits of 30 to 50 percent were normal, while returns of 100 to 200 percent were not unknown. Banking policies provided the small, dominant class with cheap credit, while denying it to the middle and poor segments of the population. Industrial development was capital-intensive and restricted through limited licensing, thus preventing medium-sized capital from entering the most profitable sector. The capital-intensive nature of development adversely affected the working class by utilizing primarily skilled labor, which created a labor aristocracy. The pool of unskilled labor further expanded due to the government's neglect of agriculture and the consequent peasant migration. As a result, stratification

within the labor force increased. A major problem confronting the government during this period was rising inflation, which reduced the purchasing power of all who lived on fixed incomes. The government attempted to check inflation by controlling prices on the one hand, and lifting tariffs to increase imports on the other. This price control policy had far-reaching consequences for it led to a direct confrontation with the bazaar.

Bazaaris and the State

After 1975, bazaaris as a whole experienced economic pressures. For example, small artisans and shopkeepers in the carpet sector were adversely affected by inflation, which increased the price of raw materials. In addition, children had been important historically in the production of traditional Persian rugs because of their small fingers. Government prohibition of child labor increased labor costs, making these rugs less competitive in the world market.

With the economic crisis caused by declining oil revenues, the government imposed new demands on merchants. To balance the budget and finance unfinished projects, the regime imposed higher taxes on this class and reduced bank loans to shopkeepers (Ettelaat, August 23, 29, 1977). Toward the end of 1977, the state further extended its control by making shopkeepers' licenses contingent on two new conditions: first, merchants' guilds were required to guarantee that licensees would not violate the law; and second, landlords who rented space to shopkeepers were obliged to write a formal letter of consent to the government on their behalf. These restrictions severely constrained license-seekers, for the guilds were unwilling to police their membership. Furthermore, license-seekers who disagreed with landlords over rents or other matters were automatically at a severe disadvantage. The passage of this law sharply reduced the number of licenses issued (Ettelaat, December 3, 1977).

Of all the state's policies affecting shopkeepers, the most damaging were price controls and the "anti-profiteering campaign." In August, 1975, the government rolled back prices of 16,000 items to their January levels. The profit rate was set at 14 percent even though inflation, according to the government's own reports, was at least twice that level. Prices were fixed at the retail market level where merchants and shopkeepers operated, but no controls were imposed on factories that produced and priced commodities, nor were restrictions placed on the small number of large importers.

Throughout this uneven campaign, very few industrialists were arrested for violating price restrictions. Those who were prosecuted were often outsiders, such as Elghanian, a Jewish industrialist, or Habib Sabet, a Baha'i who refused to return from Paris after being summoned for profiteering.

The impact of price controls on the bazaar was disastrous. In the first few days of the campaign, 7,750 shopkeepers were arrested (Kayhan International, August 8, 1975). By October, 1977, approximately 109,800 Tehran shopkeepers, out of a total of 200,000, had been investigated for price control violations (Ettelaat, October 27, 1977). According to the Ministry of the Interior, by the end of 1977, 20,000 shopkeepers had been jailed. By fall, 1978, the nationwide total of shopkeepers in violation of the controls was 220,000 (Ettelaat, September 26, 1978). The manner in which the regime carried out its campaign was humiliating. When special courts found a person guilty, the shop was closed, a fine levied, and the owner was subject to arrest or exile. A large banner was hung from the doorway of the shop proclaiming that the store would be closed for a period of time because the owner had been fined for profiteering. The courts also published names and localities of arrested merchants in daily national newspapers.

The emerging economic crisis, due in part to reduced oil revenues, greatly diminished the capital available for borrowing. By the end of summer, 1977, Tehran's bazaar merchants had met at least twice with officials of the Rastakhiz Party, the country's only political party, to express their dissatisfaction with the Chamber of Guilds, the government's credit policy, and the new taxation scheme (Ettelaat, August 23 and 29, 1977). As usual, the government was unresponsive and changed none of its policies. The regime's refusal to satisfy at least some of the demands of the bazaar eliminated the possibility of compromise and other nonviolent alternatives to conflict.

Conflicts of interests and the absence of viable options are not, of course, sufficient for collective action. To challenge the state, bazaaris needed to mobilize their resources and develop solidarity structures and allies. But the events that followed the coup d'etat against Mosaddegh undermined the collective capacity of the bazaar. Divisions that began after 1953, deepened during the 1960s and 1970s. Economic development diversified the bazaar, and a number of successful merchants left to deal in luxury goods. Because they benefitted from state protection and limited licensing, they did not oppose

the regime's actions. Among those who stayed in the bazaar, a minority continued to support the government. This was true even in the most traditional sector of the bazaar, namely, rug dealers.⁴ Bazaar organizations were also undermined. Though some merchants and shopkeepers remained loyal to Mosaddegh's National Front, this organization was practically nonexistent due to repression. The Merchants' Guild was still controlled by the government and never regained its independence. Religious bazaaris, too, were characterized by divergent political orientations. Of those bazaaris who were religious, the upper echelon paid their religious taxes to Ayatollahs Shariat-Madari and Khoie, while some middle and lower level shopkeepers paid taxes to Ayatollah Khomeini.⁵ These different religious leaders did not pursue the same political ends, as we shall see. Still other bazaaris supported the Freedom Movement,⁶ a liberal-religious organization led by Mehdi Bazargan, a supporter of Dr. Mosaddegh. Some of the poorer shopkeepers and artisans supported the Islamic Mojahedeen, an organization with socialist leanings. Finally, the vast majority of shopkeepers in the country had become nonpolitical after years of repression.

These divisions within the bazaar were offset by several factors that facilitated collective action. Most important was the price control policy that was instrumental in uniting many of the factions and interests. In addition, because they were geographically concentrated in specific centers across the country, bazaaris possessed a national trading network to expedite communication, express grievances, and mobilize for collective action. Shopkeepers could shut down bazaars on short notice to protest government actions. Finally, the government's unwillingness to modify its policies left no alternative but collective action and confrontation.

In Tehran, the confrontation between the bazaar and the state began in March, 1977, a year before the second uprising and massacre of Qom clerical students. Bazaaris began by supporting striking university professors who were protesting the government's decision to move their campus from Tehran to Isfahan. In retaliation, the government cut faculty salaries. Bazaaris, along with university people, responded quickly by establishing funds to pay faculty salaries in full. In July, merchants and shopkeepers publicly denounced the Rastakhiz Party for "strangling" them through the price control campaign. In October, Tehran bazaaris illegally reestablished the Society of Tehran Bazaar Merchants,

Shopkeepers, and Artisans, an organization affiliated with the National Front and outlawed since the coup d'etat of 1953 (Zamimeh # 16:31).

On November 16, an overnight sit-in occurred following a poetry night where, Saeed Soultanpour, a leftist poet, spoke of repression. The next day When students at the sit-in took their demonstration to the streets, nearby shopkeepers joined in and shouted anti-Shah slogans. After a student was killed during the protest, Tehran University students called for a national day of mourning on November 21. The Tehran bazaar responded by shutting down completely to support the protest (Zamimeh, # 8:12-13). The following day, bazaaris gathered to celebrate Aid-e Ghorban, a religious holiday. In addition to a religious speaker, they invited leaders of the National Front. When the Savak discovered the political nature of the meeting, 750 agents were dispatched to break up the gathering. Many participants were injured, including Mahmoud Maniyan, a founder of the Society of Tehran Bazaar Merchants, Shopkeepers, and Artisans.

Following the mysterious death of Ayatollah Khomeini's son in Iraq in 1977, Maniyan and Lebaschi from the Society of Tehran Bazaar Merchants, Shopkeepers, and Artisans, along with a number of National Front leaders, announced a mourning ceremony on October 29 to mark the seventh day of his death. Asgar Oladi, Labbani, and Rafiqh-Doust, three bazaari supporters of Khomeini, also called for participation in the ceremony. Tehran shopkeepers and merchants took part in the commemorations marking the seventh day of his death. A few weeks later, they also took part in two days of religious mourning in Tasoua and Ashoura, which were marked by anti-Shah slogans. When troops attacked rebellious students during the second Qom uprising some three weeks later, Tehran merchants immediately closed down the bazaar and issued a formal statement condemning the government. A few days later, on January 19, 1978, they closed again for one day to mark the end of a week of mourning called by Ayatollah Khomeini.

A similar pattern of bazaar protests took place during this period in ten other cities, including Mashhad, Isfahan, Shiraz, Abadan, Khorramshahr, and Qom where several shopkeepers and merchants were arrested and exiled to different parts of the country (Kayhan, October 26, 1978). Forty days after the tullab's massacre in Qom, on February 18, shopkeepers in over 30 cities shut down and joined the

mourning ceremonies. On this day, many people were killed in Tabriz in new protests. Forty days later, in March, mourning ceremonies was held to honor the martyrs of Tabriz. In over fifty cities, bazaaris closed their shops and took part. On this day, more people were killed in Yazd, Qom, and Ahvaz. To commemorate their deaths, another day of mourning day was announced for May. In over 30 cities, the bazaaris once again shut their businesses to participate in the ceremonies. That year the anniversary of the uprising of June 5, 1963, was spectacular. In most cities, bazaars closed down completely (Zamimeh, # 16:52). This contrasts sharply with the original protests in 1963, which drew demonstrators in only a few cities.

From the beginning, the regime responded to bazaaris' protests by arresting their leaders, who were sometimes publicly beaten as an additional humiliation. Some merchant leaders were exiled to distant areas. The Savak also burned and destroyed property of shopkeepers active in opposition politics and mosque affairs. In February, 1978, several well-known merchants and shopkeepers were arrested in Tabriz (Kayhan, March 1, 1978). Two months later, the house of Mahmoud Maniyan was bombed (Zamimeh, # 14:33). The Chamber of Guilds stepped up arrests of politically active merchants on the pretext that they had violated price regulations. After the Tehran bazaar closed down to commemorate the uprising of June 5, 1963, the Chamber of Guilds and the police harassed members of this class still further. They prohibited shopkeepers from displaying goods outside their shops near the doors, as was their customary habit. Next, they forbade peddlers from spreading their wares on the bazaar floor. Trucks were prohibited from entering the bazaar to load and unload except between midnight and 6 a.m., a most inconvenient time (Zamimeh, # 16:49, 51). In some cities more extensive measures were enacted. In Mashhad on the anniversary of the June 5, uprising, police marked doors and smashed locks of many shops that had closed down. The next day, the governor of the state of Khorasan ordered water and electricity shut off for all bazaars in Mashhad. Despite complaints, he refused to rescind his order, thereby provoking shopkeepers to strike once again (Zamimeh, # 16:53). Not even a nationwide wave of arrests during the summer of 1978 slowed bazaaris' mounting protests (Zamimeh, # 20:59).

Government repression was ineffective in stopping the protests, and the regime turned instead to reform. On August 26, the Shah replaced Prime Minister Amuzgar with Shariff-Emami who formed a

new cabinet and promised full freedom of the press, permission for all political parties--except communists--to operate, reinstatement of expelled students, and prosecution of the perpetrators of recent violent incidents. He designated his administration a government of national reconciliation and announced that his most important task would be to establish communication with opposition groups. To appease shopkeepers and merchants, the administration embarked upon a new strategy. Fifteen regional heads of the Chamber of Guilds were dismissed, and some were arrested. The government even filed charges against the Bureau's deputy who promptly fled (Ettelaat, September 20, 21, 1978). To further mitigate conflicts with bazaaris, the new prime minister announced that charges would be dropped against thousands of shopkeepers with files pending court investigation, provided they promised to observe price controls.

Nevertheless, bazaaris continued their opposition against the government. Early in the fall of 1978, Ayatollah Khomeini was expelled from Iraq, where he had lived in exile since 1964, for inciting opposition to the Shah. In an unprecedented protest, shopkeepers in more than 100 cities went on strike. Significantly, no comparable action took place when Khomeini was initially exiled from his homeland fourteen years earlier. Bazaaris also expressed solidarity with other groups who opposed the government. They supported university strikes in the fall of 1978 and protested the arrests of activist clerics (Zamimeh, # 18:48; Abouzar, 1979:143-44, 203). When workers' strikes spread, bazaaris collected money for them. On October 10, when the entire national press went on strike for the first time to protest government censorship, bazaaris publicly endorsed their walkout. Mahmoud Maniyan, head of the Society of Tehran Bazaar Merchants, Shopkeepers, and Artisans, and a member of the National Front, called up representatives of the press and promised assistance (Ettelaat, October 15, 1978).

In the latter days of Shariff-Emami's administration, the government organized hooligans to loot and burn shops. By the end of his regime, hooligans had attacked more 20 cities, burning and looting shops. In response to these attacks, bazaaris in several cities closed down and organized demonstrations to demand that hooligans and their organizers be punished. Elsewhere, merchants organized their own defenses to protect their stores. In Amol, bazaaris mounted guards to watch over the business area. At

night, armed with clubs, they stood guard over their own shops (Kayhan, October 30, 1978). In Zanjan on October 31, five shopkeepers who were guarding the Ghaisarieh bazaar were injured in an attack by thugs. In Ardebil, 50 young men took over the responsibility of guarding shops at night. In Bandar Abbas, Hamedan, and Meshkin-Shahr similar measures were taken. In Damghan, bazaaris decided to guard their own shops and warned that if government officials were discovered engaged in violations of life and property, they would be punished (Kayhan, January 15, 1979).

In many other cities shopkeepers and merchants closed down the bazaars for long periods of time in response to the violence. Bazaar shut downs intensified with the imposition of the military administration, on November 6. Immediately, bazaars closed down throughout the country. The bazaar in Yazd went on strike for three weeks; at the end of the second week, people in the city began to raise funds to support striking shopkeepers (Akhbar, # 1, November 20, 1978; and # 3, November 27, 1978). In Ghazvin and Kazroun, the bazaars shut down for more than 50 days, while the Isfahan bazaar remained closed for more than 75 days. In Shiraz, the central bazaar was closed for more than two months. Bazaars in Zanjan, Arak, and Qom shut down for more than 45 days. Shortly after the military came to power, the central bazaar in Kashan struck and on January 13, 1979, bazaaris announced that they would not resume work until final victory (Kayhan, January 13, 1979). The central bazaar in Tabriz, which had closed two weeks before the military administration took over, remained on strike for more than 4 months. In Khomein, the birthplace of Ayatollah Khomeini, all shops and stores closed for more than four months (Kayhan, January 17, 1979). The central bazaar in Tehran struck for more than four months and did not reopen until February 17, 1979, six days after the collapse of the regime.

The Industrial Working Class and White Collar Employees

In the midst of bazaari protests and reforms of the Shariff-Emami administration, workers began to make their own demands. Since 1953, strikes had been illegal and workers had been prevented from forming independent labor organizations. Hit hard by rising inflation, workers responded with only a few wild-cat strikes prior to the revolutionary period. The number of walkouts increased from a mere handful between 1970 and 1973, to more than 20 in 1977 alone. During the first three months of 1978,

more than 10 new strikes were called. In the spring and summer of 1978, three more strikes occurred, mainly over economic issues.

Shariff-Emani's reforms announced in late August completely ignored workers. As a consequence, less than a week after the new administration took office, strikes broke out across the country. On September 2, 2,700 workers in the Tabriz auto plant struck, as did 700 employees of Iran Transfor in Tehran. On September 5, 4,000 workers in an Ahvaz steel factory went out on strike, and a government-run union organization demanded the expulsion of unnecessary foreign workers and the development of heavy industry within the country. The next day, workers in the Arak auto plant struck. On September 8, employees in water installations in the state of Fars and the city of Mashhad walked out. On the same day, workers in the Tehran oil refinery raised tents in front of their work place to dramatize their plight in obtaining housing. Two days later they, too, went on strike. On September 10, workers and technicians in an Isfahan iron refinery struck. A few days later, thousands of oil drillers went on strike. They were joined on September 24 by oil workers in Ahvaz.

Toward the end of September, white collar employees joined the strikes. These employees also lacked independent organizations and were adversely affected by inflation. Furthermore, government policies systematically favoring the bureaucratic bourgeoisie generated strife between lower and middle echelons of the bureaucracy and the state. In most cities, teachers were among the first to walk out. Schools and universities reopened on September 23, the first day of autumn, but within a week teachers began to strike. By October 7, the walkout was nationwide. The next day in retaliation, the government arrested Drakhshesh, former minister of education and then president of the Teachers' Society. A group calling itself "The Society of Government Employees," called for government employees to report to their job on October 7, but not work. On October 1, employees of the government-owned Bank Melli of Iran struck throughout the country. On October 4, postal employees went on a nation-wide walk-out. That same day employees struck such diverse institutions as the Vanak Hospital, Shiraz medical school, Sari regional electricity works, the bank of Eatebarat, the state-owned tobacco monopoly, electricity installations in Tehran and smaller neighboring cities, Azarabadgan University Hospital in Tabriz, and the regional electricity works in Arak.

The number of strikes mounted daily. On October 8, 65 new strikes were reported. The next day, more than 110 additional strikes were reported, while two days later, there were more than 125 new strikes. On October 10, employees of the three national newspapers, Ettelaat, Kayhan, and Ayandegan joined the strikers in protest against government censorship. That day, the Tehran Journal reported that some 60,000 employees in various ministries and state agencies were on strike, awaiting a response from the new government to their demands. All this took place in little over a month in a country where strikes were illegal.

An analysis of the conflicts and demands of strikers during this period reveals that with few exceptions, the most important issues were economic, with job-related problems close behind. All strikers demanded increases in wages and salaries, while most insisted on allowances or loans for housing expenses and medical insurance. Many complained of inequalities in wages and job classifications, especially where foreign workers were employed. Some protested arbitrary promotion rules and secret "rewards" by heads of bureaucracies. In a few cases, strikers pressed for the dismissal of corporate directors or heads of government offices. Oil workers during their second strike, striking employees of the Isfahan iron refinery, a mine in Central Alborz, a railway in Zahedan, and Iran General Motors in Tehran, all demanded the expulsion of various department chiefs. Some, including water installation employees in Mashhad, court clerks in Shahy, Komak hospital employees in Tehran, and postal employees throughout the country, claimed their rights had been violated for up to 18 years (Ettelaat, September 7, October 9, 15, 1978).

To prevent issues from being politicized, the government agreed to some demands relatively quickly. Bank employees, for example, struck for two days but resumed work on the third day when the government acceded to their demands. Telegraph workers walked out for four days, returning when their demands were met. During the first oil workers' strike, some workers dragged their feet for a few days after the government had given in, but all finally returned to work. As the scale of strikes increased, the regime decided to deal with them on the national level and proceed with concessions, rather than repression. Thus, on October 10, the government announced that within six months, the salary of government employees would be raised by 25 percent in two stages (Ettelaat, October 10,

1978). On October 15, 20,000 government employees were promised housing loans (Ettelaat, October 15, 1978).

Workers' response varied. While some returned to work, others remained skeptical about government promises. Some strikers complained that although they had been on strike for days, authorities had not even investigated their grievances. Most strikers were dissatisfied with the government's concessions, which they regarded as insufficient. Many government employees demanded 50-100 percent salary increases along with additional benefits (Tehran Journal, October 11, 1978). Concessions offered industrial workers were not as favorable as those given white collar workers. The latter were promised housing loans, while industrial workers were to be given low rent housing by their employers who, in turn, were subsidized through government loans. This plan meant that workers would never own their own houses and would therefore be even more dependent on their employers. Because of these inadequacies, major segments of the work force remained dissatisfied with the settlements.

Toward the end of Prime Minister Shariff-Emami's administration, more strikers began to press for political as well as economic demands. University faculty and students across the country were very active in seeking political freedoms. Employees of the Bank Melli of Iran struck for a second time, claiming that the government had not kept its promise to increase salaries. They also added political demands, such as the release of all political prisoners and the dissolution of martial law. Striking oil workers and employees of Iran Air announced their solidarity with the popular struggles and demanded unconditional release of all political prisoners, dissolution of martial law, and expulsion of foreigners from their respective sectors.

The government's reforms provided an opportunity for workers and white collage employees to act collectively and influence their social and economic situation. More importantly, the protests and strikes created new solidarity structures that were not easily dissolved. Demonstrations and rallies intensified, while strikes grew more lengthy and increasingly politicized.

In response, the Shah suspended reforms and returned to a course of repression. On November 6, any possibility of compromise was precluded when General Azhari assumed power at the head of a

"law and order" military government. Almost immediately, the army tried to force employees back to work by occupying all strategic installations including newspapers, which had just successfully concluded a strike, radio and television stations, and oil installations. Initially, the military administration brought about some degree of order. The second oil workers' strike in the south was broken up by armed coercion. Employees of the Ministry of Post and Telegraph were forced back to work, as were employees of the State Tobacco Monopoly. The Tabriz auto strike, which had just begun on October 4, was halted three days later by the arrival of soldiers at the factory. Even teachers reported back to work briefly.

The order imposed by the army proved illusory. Instead of dissolving the strikers' solidarity, military violence strengthened it. Employees in the banks of Melli and Markazi pulled down statues of the Shah and organized rallies at their work places. Protesting university professors and students organized anti-military sit-ins to demand the reopening of colleges and universities, which had been closed by students themselves since the beginning of the school year. Industrial workers at the Tehran Oil Refinery, Arak Auto, and Tabriz Tractor continued their strikes despite military rule. They were joined by the Tabriz lift-truck factory the day after the military assumed power. In late November, electrical workers regularly shut off electricity at 8:30 p.m. to prevent the broadcast of government news programs over radio and television. On December 2, oil workers struck in the south. Soon workers in the Bandar Abbas Steel Complex, Isfahan Iron Refinery, Kerman Copper and Coal mines, and railways throughout the country walked out (Kayhan, January 11, and 15, 1979). Workers in other factories such as Arj Factory, Iran National Automobile Factory, Benz-e Khavar Auto, Bafandeh-e Souzani Knitting Factory, General Factory, and Tobacco Monopoly joined in the strikes. When military repression widened to include attacks on hospital employees in many cities, the National Organization of Physicians stopped accepting insurance for military personnel (Hambastegi, # 6).

The imposition of a military administration and martial law had several consequences. Most importantly, once the military assumed power, those segments of the working class and new middle class that had not yet been politicized began to demand political freedom and the dissolution of the "illegal" military administration. In addition, as the army was increasingly utilized to repress the

population, soldiers grew more unreliable. Finally, self-defense groups, formed in many cities to fight off hooligans, aggressively struck back to confront the armed forces (Vaghaye-a-e .1979: 103, 105 110; Akhbar, # 8). In one extreme case, military officers in Kazroun grew so frightened that they evacuated their homes and took refuge in the army barracks (Vaghaye-a-e.1979:127).

At this stage of the conflict, when freedom became the main cry, the industrial work force and new middle class joined bazaaris in acknowledging Ayatollah Khomeini's leadership. On December 31, a central council composed of 23 government ministries and organizations from the private sector was organized to coordinate the strikes. They issued a statement formally recognizing Khomeini as leader of the people's "anti-imperialist, anti-autocratic" movement (Hambastegi, #9). The coordinating council rejected any compromise with Bakhtiar, the Shah's last prime minister, who represented "imperialism and dictatorship (Hambastegi, #10)." By mid-January, according to the Chamber of Commerce, 3.5 million workers, including 1.5 industrial workers, were out of work (Kayhan, January 20, 1979) and demanding political change.

Within the coordinating council, oil employees played an important role in the fight against the regime. Workers in the Tehran oil refinery struck on November 6 as the military assumed power. On December 2, oil workers in the south struck for the third time. Within a few days, oil exports were reduced to zero. Because of the state's dependence on oil revenues, the military administration warned that the strike was illegal and that strikers would be dismissed. In response, oil workers began to resign. By the end of the year, more than three thousand had quit their jobs. All production ceased by December 26 in protest against government threats and reports of torture of oil workers (Hambastegi, # 8). After negotiating with Bazargan, Khomeini's representative, oil workers resumed production for domestic consumption, but vowed to fight behind Khomeini until the final victory. In their first newsletter they stated, "We have struck along with other Iranians to destroy autocracy and sever imperialist influence in our country; and to build an independent, free, progressive, and developed Iran. This is the imperishable right of the Iranian people, and to attain it, they will not hold back from any sacrifice." On January 30, 1979, a group of oil workers announced that they wanted representation on

the Islamic Revolutionary Council (Vaghaye-a-e, 1979:153). In a matter of days the monarchy collapsed, and a new era began.

The Clergy and Their Politics

Throughout this revolutionary period, clergy were divided over political issues. A minority continued to support the regime and were sometimes physically attacked by the Shah's opponents (Payam-e Mojahed, # 53, and 54; Zamimeh, # 16:80; Akhbar, # 6, December 9, 1978). Nonpolitical clergy, led by Ayatollahs Shariat-Madari, Golpaygani, and Marashi-Najafi of Qom, repudiated political protests, calling instead for calm and traditional mourning ceremonies (Zamimeh, 1978, various issues). Shariat-Madari, the preeminent Ayatollah in the country, joined other religious leaders in rejecting a popular request for a national strike when the second Qom student rebellion was crushed in January 1978 (Washington Post, January 11, 1978). Between July and mid-August of 1978, many others were slain in Isfahan, Shiraz, Mashhad, and Hamedan, but these three clerical leaders refrained from calling for mourning ceremonies. Finally, on August 14, they publicly condemned the government massacres in these cities. They warned against "imperialists and enemies of Islam" who wished to misrepresent the popular struggles; it was better, they recommended, to pursue these struggles using a "choice of strategies that have greater results with the least damage." Significantly, they did not call for any mourning ceremonies.

The contrast between nonpolitical clergy and the fundamentalist opponents to the Shah is instructive. In August, 1978, when Shariff-Emami was appointed prime minister, Ayatollah Khomeini categorically rejected his administration, whereas Ayatollah Shariat-Madari gave him three months to prove his administration could meet the criteria of a just Islamic government. When Khomeini asked for the sacrifice of more lives that autumn, Shariat-Madari rejected attempts to obtain arms to use against the army, declaring instead that alternative should be chosen only when all other avenues were blocked (Kayhan, October 29; Ettelaat, November 2, 1978). In December, when Khomeini called for "rivers of blood," Shariat-Madari threatened a jihad only if the government did not dismiss the existing parliament and call for new, genuinely free elections.

Ayatollahs Shariat-Madari, Golpaygani, and Marashi-Najafi all believed that Islam would be satisfied if the constitution were only implemented as written. Shariat-Madari repudiated "fanaticism" such as the burning of cinemas, for he did not regard all movies as necessarily anti-Islamic. When asked in May, 1978, about the need for an Islamic Republic, he replied that such a society was their long-term goal, but that for the time being, the strict observance of the constitution would give the people all that was necessary (Kayhan, November 2, 1978). As late as August 29, Ayatollah Shirazi and the clerical community of Mashhad called for changes that stopped short of overthrowing the monarchy (Kayhan, August 30, 1978). These clerics were sharply criticized by the radical religious opposition for their failure to take a more aggressive stand against the regime (Zamimeh, # 19, August 17, 1978; Abouzar, 1979: 21, and 65-69).

The third clerical faction, small in numbers, followed Ayatollah Khomeini in pressing radical demands and, as a result, were repressed, imprisoned, and exiled. Their first important public act was a mourning ceremony held in Qom on December 2, 1977, the fortieth day after the death of Khomeini's son. Four of the organizers were arrested and exiled for speaking at the ceremony, while a fifth was arrested in Mashhad.⁷ The day after the second massacre of Qom tullaabs, Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi and six other clerics were jailed. Repression continued until by mid-summer, 1978, some 70 of the best-known, hardline supporters of Khomeini had been arrested and exiled (Abouzar, 1979:67; Zamimeh, # 18:27).

The fundamentalist clergy were largely concentrated in a few religious centers and large cities. Data on clerical arrests during the first six months of their protests indicate that roughly 25 percent were from Qom, 13 percent from Tehran, seven percent from Mashhad and Hamedan respectively, five percent each from Isfahan and Semnan, four percent from Shiraz, four percent from Rezaieh, and the rest from other cities. The data show a high level of concentration: fully a quarter of all arrests took place in the religious center of Qom, while an additional 45 percent occurred in seven other cities.⁸

The advent of a new prime minister, Shariff-Emami, promising reform only intensified street protests and enhanced the position of the pro-Khomeini clerics. A few demonstrations took place that drew several hundred thousand people each. On September 4, a religious holiday known as Aid-e Fetr,

a huge anti-government demonstration was held in Tehran. Three days later, on an ordinary Thursday, an even bigger demonstration and march were organized, leading the regime to impose martial law in 12 major cities. At the same time, the government continued to promise further reforms and even released some pro-Khomeini clerics from prison, notably Ayatollahs Taleghani and Montazeri. Their release greatly enhanced the position of the pro-Khomeini faction. Ayatollah Taleghani called for several demonstrations in which millions of people took part. By the end of the revolutionary conflicts, the pro-Khomeini clergy had organized a council of 200 persons including clerics, bazaaris, university faculty, and lawyers to coordinate all popular activities in Tehran. This council gave commands to ten groups of committees, each having about 2,000 persons in their command, who took the orders to the mosques to be carried out. No other political organization developed such a network for action and, as a result, the clergy were able to assume power.

To sum up the argument thus far, the revolution was achieved through a coalition of bazaaris, industrial workers, and white collar employees led by a segment of the clergy. Conflict between the state and these social groups and classes was generated by disadvantageous economic policies, rather than the state's attempt to achieve rapid modernization per se. Bazaaris mobilized through mosques because state repression and lack of autonomy of the Merchants' Guilds left them no alternative. Their collective action against the regime and participation in mourning ceremonies disrupted the distribution of goods. Their closings publicly signified their discontent with the state as well as indicated the possibility of opposing it. The actions of bazaaris provided an opportunity for other social classes with weaker solidarity structures to engage in conflict against the state. Workers' conflict sprang from economic and political concerns. Their actions were not influenced by a desire to achieve martyrdom or maintain a traditional social order and religious values, nor were they dissatisfied with the pace of modernization. When the government failed to respond to their original demands, workers joined the call for revolutionary change. Strikes by industrial workers disrupted production and reduced state oil revenues. Eventually, white collar employees and professionals, most of whom were government employees, were also adversely affected by the government's economic policies. They joined in the strikes and disrupted all public services. The coalition of these classes sealed the fate of the monarchy.

Finally, the available data demonstrate that Shia clergy were far from homogeneous. Religious authorities represented a spectrum of political attitudes and, in fact, the preeminent clerics called neither for martyrdom nor the overthrow of the Shah's regime. Instead, they maintained a relatively moderate political position and discouraged radical confrontation.

In sum, it is evident that the vast majority of our principal actors supported Khomeini's leadership during the revolution. However, this does not constitute proof of the authority-adherence hypothesis. Adverse state economic policies led broad segments of the population to oppose the regime. Bazaaris opposed the government over taxation, credit allocation, price controls, and the anti-profiteering campaign. Industrial workers and white collar employees did not respond when Khomeini and other clerics began to call for mourning ceremonies as protests. They opposed the regime only after Shariff-Emami became prime minister and promised reforms, but ignored workers. At that time, workers and white collar employees demanded greater economic concessions and improvements in living conditions. Not until the government failed to satisfy their demands, did they take a political stand against the regime, express support for Ayatollah Khomeini, and call for the overthrow of the regime. If the authority-adherence hypothesis were valid, they should have joined the opposition at least several months earlier. Once again, the resource mobilization hypothesis based on interest, opportunity structures, and formation of coalitions better explains the collective actions of bazaaris, workers, and white collar employees during the revolution.

The Post-Revolutionary Period

Shortly after the revolution, the coalitions that overthrew the monarchy began to dissolve because of conflicts of interest, rise of new organizations, and opportunities for action. Given the broad spectrum of opposition to the Shah, it would have been extremely difficult to maintain the revolutionary alliances intact. However, a regime can be kept in power by a narrower coalition than is necessary to bring it down, because of new repressive capabilities. Let us turn now to the post-revolutionary politics of the social classes that were crucial in overthrowing the monarchy.

The Industrial Working Class

Following the revolution, collective action by workers centered around economic conflicts and the formation of independent organizations. However, a combination of factors including repression, divisions, and constant rise in unemployment, reduced the capacity of workers to act collectively. Lack of national labor organizations and divisions among leftist organizations prevented the consolidation of workers' struggles. Nevertheless, workers in most industrial establishments engaged in collective actions to improve their conditions.

Immediately following the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini asked workers and other groups to end their strikes and resume work; continued strikes and marches, he argued, would only weaken the Islamic regime and benefit the enemies of the revolution (Kayhan, February 14, 1979). Within three days, all factories reportedly had reopened (Kayhan, February 17, 1979). However, persistent conflicts soon led workers to resume strikes and sit-ins. During the first year of the Islamic Republic, an average of more than one new strike broke out each day. As strikes and collective action continued, Ayatollah Khomeini condemned those involved:

In these days after the revolution when all social strata should cooperate to reconstruct the country...strike after strike, sit-in after sit-in, march after march, and lies after lies are prevailing attempts to weaken the government with deceit and rumors. Those who incite others to strike and sit in in order to weaken the government are opponents of our movement and supporters of foreigners (Ayatollah Khomeini, Kayhan, August 8, 1979).

Most of the strikes and collective action were led by a small group of militant workers who demanded workers' control and participation in decision-making in all large factories. With the collapse of the old regime and departure of employers, workers in many factories immediately formed councils and assumed control of factory affairs. Oil workers, along with employees of Tabriz Auto and Tractor, were among the first to form councils. The council of oil workers, whose membership was 35 percent Marxist (Washington Post, February 26, 1979), demanded participation in decision-making and the

expulsion of officials who had acted against the "interests of the people" during the previous regime. Their pressure at one point led to the resignation of ten members of the company's executive board (Kayhan, April 20, 1979).

The formation of workers' councils in factories was so wide-spread in the early days of the revolution that Ayatollah Beheshti, head of the Supreme Court and leader of the Islamic Republic Party, advised employers, "If factories could be better organized with councils, they should be accepted....It is not possible to run a factory with bayonets (Kayhan, April 29, 1979)." He suggested that councils be composed of representatives from workers, management, and owners of industry. In a large May Day rally, he reaffirmed the commitment of the Islamic Republic to workers' participation in decision-making (Kayhan, May 2, 1979).

In actuality, both the liberal and clerical factions of the government opposed independent workers' councils. Bani-Sadr maintained that intervention by councils in management decisions disrupted production and that they should be dismantled. The Islamic Republic Party also opposed workers' councils. During the summer of 1979, workers' councils came under growing attack, and during the hostage crisis most were dismantled in purges that removed "agents of East and West" from factories. After June, 1981, when the clergy actively repressed their opponents, more than 200 workers who either advocated workers' control or who had joined leftist organizations were executed (Mojahed, #261, September 6, 1985).

As an alternative to independent workers' councils, the Islamic Republic Party promoted the formation of Islamic Associations, which became vehicles for strengthening the clergy's position within the organized working class. The associations were intended to encourage cooperation between employees and management, and prevent the growth of counterrevolution in factories. At the same time, the associations pursued policies in the interests of workers. After participating in a three-day seminar organized by the Ministry of Labor, workers rejected the ministry's proposed labor law, complaining "The new labor law ignores the future of workers and leaves employers' hands free for ever greater exploitation of workers." They demanded that Islamic Associations be allowed to participate in

decisions regarding hiring and dismissal of workers, planning for production and distribution, and setting wages and prices (Kayhan, March 5, 1983).

Government disapproval of the associations, combined with their ineffectiveness, led to their decline. By 1982, only 80 of 300 associations survived, and most of these remained inactive. However, the continued presence of leftist and secular trends within the working class has led government officials to encourage the associations to continue their activities. Prime Minister Mousavi told a group of association representatives that the enemies of the revolution constantly try to generate conflicts within factories. Islamic Associations should continue their work to prevent such deviations, "because as the result of 50 years of the Pahlavi regime, people have been kept away from Islam (Kayhan, March 12, 1983)." Similarly, on May Day, 1985, the Minister of Labor declared that the best way to prevent the influence of elements opposed to the government was by strengthening the Islamic Associations (Kayhan, May 1, 1985).

The Bazaar and the Islamic Republic

Upon assuming power, the new regime instituted significant changes in the organization and leadership of bazaars. A campaign was launched to strengthen the position of the clergy and the Islamic Republic Party among bazaaris. Khamoushi, a bazaari and member of parliament declared in the Majlis in his defense, "After the revolution it was felt that, politically, the bazaar had to come under the control of the Hezb-Ollah." (Kayhan, April 14, 1983) Ayatollah Khomeini ordered the formation of a treasury, headed by a cleric and two bazaaris, to assist merchant guilds by extending interest-free loans to needy shopkeepers and merchants. Another agency, the Imam's Committee for Guild Affairs, was organized to guide and regulate economic activities of the guilds, select and supervise guild leaders, and prevent violations and "infiltration by counterrevolutionaries and their conspiracies." (Jumhuri-e Eslami, August 16, 1982). In this way, highly committed supporters of Khomeini and the Islamic Republic Party came to occupy all positions of power in the guilds. In turn, guilds were given the important responsibility of granting and revoking licenses, receiving goods--including all imports--from the Ministry of Commerce, and redistributing them to bazaar outlets.

The impact of government economic policies on bazaars were inconsistent. On many occasions, Ayatollah Khomeini criticized big merchants and opportunists for profiteering and taking advantage of the poor (Iranshahr, January 31, 1983). Government attacks on moneylenders angered the segment of the bazaar that had historically benefitted from lending money. Radical Islamic clerics, bolstered by public pressure, succeeded in incorporating a measure nationalizing foreign trade into the new constitution and obtaining approval from the Majlis.⁹ This measure was regarded by big merchants as a threat to their businesses. In addition, the government set restrictions on rug exports, which had become an important means of circumventing limits on foreign exchange. The new policy further jeopardized both artisans and merchants throughout the entire rug industry which, according to officials, supports some five million people nationwide (Kayhan, August 6, 1984). In 1972, Iran exported 14,000 tons of rugs. Ten years later, rug exports totaled little more than 1,000 tons (Kayhan, June 4, 1984). Some rug artisans reportedly moved to other countries in the region and, with the help of big Iranian exporters operating abroad, have continued to manufacture and export rugs.

At the same time, the government jeopardized small shopkeepers by instituting rationing to insure the availability of basic foodstuffs at stable prices. The Islamic Association of the Bazaar criticized the government's commerce policies, charging unfair competition from cooperatives and government distribution of basic goods to the public. These policies, the association claimed, severely squeezed the distribution system (Ettelaat, September 19, 1984. Ayatollah Montazeri also criticized government interference in commerce; see Kayhan, July 30, and August 29, 1984). Several months after the revolution, public outcry against inflation led the government to establish special courts to control prices and punish violators. Sanctions against shopkeepers included monetary fines and sometimes public flogging. In rare cases, violators were jailed or exiled for short period of time.

Despite these constraints, a segment of the bazaar with important connections was able to prosper. Several clerics serving as government officials complained that after the revolution, wealth tended to concentrate in the hands of a few merchants and shopkeepers.¹⁰ Other government officials openly pointed to ties between wealthy bazaaris and the Islamic Republic Party.¹¹ Karimi, a Majlis representative from Ahvaz, charged that while Khamoushi was serving as head of the Imam's

Committee for Guild Affairs, he allocated and monopolized the most profitable imports among his friends and relatives; they engaged in numerous, highly profitable dealings, compiling huge fortunes that harmed the public and the government (Kayhan, April 14, 1983). According to Azat Ollah Sahabi, head of the Majlis Planning and Budget Committee, in the two years following the revolution, the Tehran bazaar enjoyed the highest rate of profit in the country's history (Kayhan, April 7, 1981). He claimed that some importers charged the public four times the wholesale costs of goods (Kayhan, May 3, 1981). Referring to the Iran-Iraq war, Hasan-Zadeh, a member of parliament, charged, "Unfortunately the Ministry of Commerce has been converted into the Ministry of the Bazaar and bazaar capitalists have been taking advantage of the war situation to make millions of tomans (Ettelaat, May 7, 1984). Other prominent officials of the regime made similar statements, including Hashemi Rafsanjani, speaker of the parliament, and Prime Minister Mousavi (Kayhan, March 5, 1983; Iranshahr, July 18, 1983).

Since the revolution, bazaar politics have become more diverse. Initially, all segments of the bazaar supported the revolution and the leadership of the fundamentalist clergy. As social conflicts intensified, bazaar politics rapidly differentiated. The Imam's Committee for Guild Affairs, controlled by supporters of the Islamic Republic Party, continued to support the fundamentalist clergy by circulating petitions, organizing rallies, and participating in demonstrations. In contrast other organizations, including the Society of Tehran Bazaar Merchants, Shopkeepers, and Artisans, opposed clerical policies. This organization, which was tied to the liberal National Front, was strengthened after the revolution, and its members stepped up their participation in National Front activities (Ettelaat, October 17, 1979). In summer, 1979, a merchant and a shopkeeper were elected to the Central Council of the National Front. Bazaaris' participation in the opposition was denounced by a member of the Majlis and leader of the fundamentalist Islamic Republic Party: "Rich, monopolistic bazaaris and moneylenders who sucked the blood of the people are continuing these practices today while hiding behind political organizations such as the National Front" (Ettelaat, July 6, 1981). Another bazaar organization, the Society of Islamic Associations, was established and supported Bazargan's liberal Freedom Movement against the clerical party, the Islamic Republic Party. Still less wealthy shopkeepers who favored the Islamic

Mojahedeen formed the Traders' Towhidi Guild and joined the above-mentioned organizations to support the liberals, led by President Bani-Sadr.

The politics of these bazaar organizations were revealed in a succession of conflicts between liberals and the clergy. On November 7, 1980, Ayatollah Ghoddusi, revolutionary prosecutor of the Islamic Republic, ordered the arrest of Ghotb-Zadeh, the former foreign minister under Bani-Sadr. Because vast bazaaris opposed the ruling fundamentalist clergy, they organized protests in Ghotb-Zadeh's favor and gathered 30,000 signatures on a petition pressing for his release. Four days later Ayatollah Ghoddusi ordered his discharge.¹² A few days later, Ahmad Salamatian, the representative from Isfahan, spoke in Mashhad to condemn clerical repression. After supporters of the Islamic Republic Party disrupted his talk, bazaaris of Mashhad protested by striking the next day.

According to the foreign press, the clergy then forced bazaaris in five major cities to shut their shops to show solidarity with the clergy (Christian Science Monitor, December 8, 1980). In Tehran, a group of pro-Islamic Republic Party bazaaris led by Khamoushi marched to the office of Ettelaat newspaper, where they read a strong statement supporting the fundamentalist clergy (Ettelaat, December 2, 1980). In Isfahan Ayatollah Taheri, Khomeini's representative, organized a large rally on a Friday to demand the dismissal of Isfahan's representative in the Majlis. Two days later the Isfahan bazaar, the oldest and largest national center for Persian handicraft, responded by closing down for two days to support their parliamentary representative, who came from a well-known merchant family. Ayatollah Taheri found this outrageous and reacted to the mounting conflicts by leaving the city in protest against alleged insults against Islam and the Valayat-e Faghieh, the supreme cleric.

The conflicts soon intensified. In January, 1981, Lebaschi, a member of both the National Front and the Society of Tehran Bazaar Merchants, Shopkeepers, and Artisans, publicly declared that Prime Minister Rajai's cabinet, which represented the ruling fundamentalist clergy, lacked the political and economic experience to solve the nation's problems. He announced that the bazaar would attempt to bring down the government (Ettelaat, January 4, 1981). Early in March, the Imam's Committee for Guild Affairs called upon the bazaar to close down to protest President Bani-Sadr's attacks upon the Islamic Republic Party at Tehran University. In turn, Bani-Sadr asked merchants and shopkeepers to

keep their shops open and not contribute unnecessarily to the tensions. On the morning of the announced shutdown, Ettelaat newspaper reported that some Tehran bazaars were closed, others remained opened, and still other merchants tended their shops behind closed doors, indicating a preference for carrying out business. Enghelab-e Eslami, Bani-Sadr's newspaper, reported that bazaars were open throughout most of the country except where hooligans forced them to close down. The next day, the London Times reported that in Qom, fundamentalists showed their support for the rulling clergy by marching on the residences of preeminent clerics, but failed to close the bazaar.

In another round of conflict, the clerical faction of the government arrested Dr. Reza Sadr, the executive of Mizan newspaper, which belonged to Bazargan who opposed the policies of the rulling clergy. A special investigative court set Sadr's bail at five million rials. The Society of the Islamic Association of the Bazaar intervned on his behalf and provided money for his release. The society threatened to condemn the authorities if they refused the money and chose instead to make a political campaign of the issue (Kayhan, April 19, 1981). Eighteen Islamic Associations of the Bazaar signed a petition in support of Dr. Sadr and denounced the abuse of laws regulating the press. In response, the Special Prosecutor's office announced that 20,000 signatures of bazaaris and Islamic Associations of the Bazaar had been gathered on petitions backing Sadr's arrest, but the names of the participating associations were not revealed (Kayhan, April 19, 1981).

Throughout these conflicts, broad segments of the bazaar supported the liberals against the rulling clergy, including the Society of Tehran Bazaar Merchants, Shopkeepers, and Artisans, the Society of Islamic Associations, and the Traders' Towhidi Guild, which backed the Mojahedeen. As a result, the fundamentalist clergy quickly moved to dismiss Bani-Sadr and repress the bazaar's opposition. The data on sanctions and executions meted out to shopkeepers and merchants after the president's ouster is revealing. A few days before Bani-Sadr was replaced, the Majlis discussed prices, profiteering, and speculation, unanimously concluding, "There must be a determined and revolutionary struggle against these corrupt acts committed against the people and against Islam (Kayhan, June 20, 1981)." On June 21, the day before Bani-Sadr was dismissed, Zehtabchi, a bazaari activist and supporter of the Mojahedeen, was executed for "counterrevolutionary" activities (Ettelaat, June 22,

1981). Three weeks later, two more bazaaris--Dastmalchi, a leading member of the Society of Tehran Bazaar Merchants, Shopkeepers, and Artisans, and Javaherian, a supporter of the Mojahedeen--were also executed after being charged with "rebellion in the Moslem bazaar leading to its closing (Kayhan and Ettelaat, July 12, 1981)." Following the arrests of additional shopkeepers and merchants, several others fled the country, including Labaschi, a member of the National Front, and Ebrahim Mazandrani, a supporter of the Mojahedeen. Mahmoud Maniyan withdrew from public life and politics. In the wake of these conflicts between ruling clerics and opposition groups, more than 100 shopkeepers and merchants were killed or executed throughout the country (Mojahed # 219, September 6, 1985).

The regime's anti-profiteering campaign, which had intensified during the conflict with Bani-Sadr, escalated even further after he was removed from office. Within a short time, the number of fines against shopkeepers increased dramatically.¹³ Between November, 1980, and April, 1982, 25,000 shopkeepers and merchants were fined, jailed, flogged, and exiled (Iran Times, April 23, 1982). Nazem-Zadeh, a cleric in charge of the special court prosecuting price violations, asked citizens to report profiteers to his office in the same way that counterrevolutionaries were exposed. Although the terms of imprisonment and exile were usually not long, sizable monetary fines were levied (Ettelaat, July 7, and December 1, 1981). Government officials also threatened to execute those speculators and profiteers who withheld goods from market or increased prices out of political motives to cause general dissatisfaction.¹⁴

The Clergy and Their Politics

With the establishment of the Islamic Republic, divisions appeared within the ranks of the clergy. Almost immediately, the new government launched a campaign against clerics who had supported the Shah or cooperated with the Savak. People were asked to present evidence in special courts of clerical cooperation with the previous regime. Within a few months, some 70 clerics were defrocked, and others were exiled, imprisoned, and even executed.¹⁵ According to Ayatollah Beheshti, those clerics who promised to cease their opposition to the revolution and the people were not punished (Kayhan, May 27, 1981).

Major ideological disagreements surfaced among the clergy over the make-up of the Islamic Republic. Although Ayatollah Khomeini espoused democracy during the revolutionary period, he subsequently advocated the establishment of a theocratic state under a supreme clerical leader, the Valayat-e Faghih.¹⁶ In contrast, Ayatollah Taleghani, while acknowledging Khomeini's leadership, argued for popular democracy and the election of city and state councils. He envisioned a socialistic Islam that favored workers' councils and community control over politics. Taleghani also sympathized with the aspirations of national minorities to determine their own destiny. When his two sons, both Marxists, were arrested by the clerical Revolutionary Committee, Taleghani protested by closing his office in Tehran and withdrawing from public life for a few days. He received the most votes in Tehran to the Assembly of Experts, convened to formulate the constitution of the Islamic Republic. Yet he participated only once, boycotting the assembly on the second day. In Taleghani's last public speech, he reiterated that the only solution for Iran's problems was to give people responsibility for governing themselves through councils. Those in power opposed the formation of councils, he suggested, because they feared losing their position. He stressed the importance of being accountable to the electorate by saying, "Some of our friends might criticize me and ask why I say such things in these places. We have to say these things here because these people have elected us; we have to talk to them about their pain and problems." Taleghani ended his sermon on a wishful note, expressing the hope that, "all of us become alert, accept responsibility....put aside sectarianism, opportunism, and ideological domination; and may God forbid autocracy under the cover of religion. Let us join our voices with the people and the suffering masses (Ettelaat, September 9, 1979)." Ayatollah Taleghani died three days later.

Yet another point of view was expressed by Ayatollah Shariat-Madari who advocated a system similar to parliamentary democracy to allow people to rule themselves. He opposed direct political participation by high-ranking clerical leaders, though lower echelon clergy with the knowledge and expertise could participate (Kayhan, August 31, 1979). Clerics following Shariat-Madari established an independent political party, arguing that a one-party system might lead to party dictatorship, which would be worse than personal dictatorship (Kayhan, May 6, 1979). Not all clergy approved of an alternative Islamic party. Ayatollah Khalkhali argued that such a party would create confusion among

Moslems and provide a platform for former supporters of the Shah, Savak agents, and other counterrevolutionaries to attack the Islamic government. He suggested that Shariat-Madari voluntarily dissolve the independent party (Ettelaat, May 2, 1979). The publication of Khalkhali's criticisms in Ettelaat newspaper triggered protests in Tehran, Qom, and other cities. In Tabriz, bazaaris and government employees who supported Shariat-Madari shut down the city and organized large demonstrations (Kayhan, April 24, 1979), while in Mashhad, the clerical school also closed. Eventually, Ayatollah Khalkhali apologized.

During the referendum for the Islamic Constitution, Ayatollah Shariat-Madari argued that Shia religious doctrine had no provision for a Valayat-e Faghieh, or supreme clerical leader, as advocated by Khomeini. Shariat-Madari also contended that two constitutional provisions establishing the Valayat-e Faghieh contradicted other provisions granting power to the people. This criticism, coupled with growing support for Shariat-Madari in the state of Azerbaijan, led the government to ban his alternative party. After President Bani-Sadr was dismissed, the former foreign minister, Ghotb-Zadeh, was arrested and executed for conspiring against the Islamic Republic. The government provided evidence linking Shariat-Madari to Ghotb-Zadeh and also charged that Shariat-Madari had cooperated with the Shah and the Savak for 30 years (Jumhuri-e Eslami, April 24, 29, 1982). Shariat-Madari was placed under house arrest for some time and has subsequently withdrawn from public life.

Clerical divisions were especially evident during the conflicts between the clergy and the liberals. In Mashhad, Ayatollahs Qomi and Shirazi both criticized the rule of the Islamic Republic Party. Ayatollah Qomi attacked the clerical involvement in politics. These divisions were so intense that Ayatollah Khomeini issued repeated warnings to dissenting clerics in Tehran, Qom, and Mashhad clerical schools to "give up their satanic acts (Kayhan, April 16, 1981)." If they did not, he threatened to summon them to court. Nevertheless, some religious leaders supported nonclerical, secular groups that aimed to "break the monopoly of the Islamic Republic Party." Sayed Hossein Khomeini, grandson of Ayatollah Khomeini, stated that 90 percent of the clergy supported the liberal President Bani-Sadr in his conflict with the clergy but were powerless to act because they stood outside the political arena (Enghelab-e Eslami, March 16, 1981).¹⁷ Some clerics did openly oppose the Islamic Republic party,

backing Bani-Sadr and others. Sheikh Ali Tehrani, a student of Khomeini and brother-in-law of the current Iranian president, publicly endorsed Bani-Sadr and encouraged people to demand the dissolution of the Islamic Republic Party, "the party of club-wielders (Enghelab-e Eslami, March 9, 1981)." After Bani-Sadr's ouster, Tehrani was forced underground and eventually fled to Iraq. As Bani-Sadr's opponents intensified their attacks, they in turn were condemned by Ayatollah Alemi, who accused them of conspiring to monopolize power and repress all opposition (Mojahed, #125, June 17, 1981). Ayatollah Lahouti, a member of the first Islamic Majlis and one-time head of the Revolutionary Guards, also supported Bani-Sadr and objected to the clerical "monopoly of power" (Iran Times, December 12, 1980). Mohammad Al As-hagh, a faculty member of the Qom seminary, opposed the Islamic Republic Party; as a result, his classes were disrupted by party supporters (Enghelab-e Eslami, March 14, 1981). Ayatollah Zanjani refused nomination to run for election to the Assembly of Experts, choosing instead to cooperate with the National Front (Kayhan, May, 8, 1979). Other clerics who disagreed with the Islamic Republic Party backed the leftist Mojahedeen. One, Jalal Ganjehee, member of the Qom seminary faculty, criticized the elimination of stipends for clerical students who opposed the ruling clerical party. He was finally forced to flee to Paris. Ten other clerics were arrested and executed, according to Mojahedeen reports (Mojahed, #261, September 6, 1985).

As the data have shown, the coalition between the ruling clergy and large segments of the population broke down soon after the revolution. The clergy faced mounting opposition from various segments of the population and were forced to remove the liberals from power in June, 1981. Repression followed. More than two years after the overthrow of Bani-Sadr, Ayatollah Mousavi Ardebili, Prosecutor General of the Islamic Republic of Iran, spoke of the need for vigilance toward the regime's opponents:

We still have people in the bureaucracies who, if left alone, would violate the rules and damage the revolution....We have these people in all social strata, in the bazaar, bureaucracies, the private sector, everywhere (Ettelaat, August 3, 1983).

Conclusion

Our investigation began with two contrasting hypotheses: one emphasizing clerical authority and popular obedience to traditional religious precepts; the second focusing on interests, coalition and capacity for collective action, and opportunity structures. We have examined the collective actions and politics of various groups and classes for the period from 1951 to 1981. The data raise some troubling issues for the authority-adherence hypothesis, while lending support to the resource mobilization hypothesis. Let us summarize these findings.

The authority-adherence hypothesis assumes that the clergy are homogenous and unified in their politics. However, our data for the last few decades demonstrate that in their politics, the clergy were never a homogeneous social strata. Clerical divisions persisted during the 1950s, 1960s, and throughout the revolutionary conflicts of the late 1970s. During the revolution, the preeminent clerics including Ayatollah Shariat-Madari, Golpaygani, and Marashi-Najafi, pursued a course of political moderation, calling for the correct implementation of the constitution. They never exhorted the people to become martyrs. Ayatollah Khomeini, on the other hand, rejected any compromise with the Shah and repeatedly urged the overthrow of the monarchy. Contrary to what the authority-adherence hypothesis would lead us to expect, the population chose their leaders on the basis of their opposition to the Shah, rather than rank within the religious leadership. Thus Ayatollah Khomeini who was not among the highest ranking clerics attained the leadership of the opposition. After the establishment of the Islamic Republic, important schisms remained among the clergy, especially within the highest ranks. Ayatollahs Khomeini, Shariat-Madari, and Taleghani all had different visions of Islamic society. Evidence indicates that such differences still persist in the Islamic Republic.

Our two hypotheses also differ with regard to collective action: one emphasizes acting in response to clerical exhortations, while the other focuses on the interest, organization, and opportunity structures that underlay such actions. Let us review our findings regarding specific social groups and classes, beginning with the bazaar. Although segments of the bazaaris have always been traditional, their collective actions do not support the authority-adherence hypothesis. In the 1950s, while most clerics backed the royalists, bazaaris overwhelmingly endorsed the prime minister, Dr. Mosaddegh, a

progressive modernizer. In the 1960s, clergy withdrew support from the Shah and opposed his reforms. Bazaaris in a few major cities also joined the clerical opposition. Bazaari opposition can be explained in terms of their interest, lack of autonomous organization, and opportunity for action. Their interest had been adversely affected by the state's economic policies. The clerical opposition provided the bazaaris with an opportunity to act against the government. However, lacking autonomous organizations of their own, they could not initiate independent collective action. In fact, in most of the country, bazaaris failed to join the opposition.

For large segments of the bazaar, June, 1975, was a period of favorable economic opportunity. Accordingly, when Ayatollah Khomeini called for support for rebellious clerical students in Qom, bazaaris throughout the country took no action, although many tullah were arrested, injured, and killed. One segment of the bazaar had followed Khomeini's leadership for years, but they could not have acted without the support of the rest of the bazaar. During the 1977-79 conflicts, most bazaaris supported the leadership of the fundamentalist clergy. However, bazaaris' actions during this period were in response to the government's violations of their established rights and interests. These conflicts were aggravated by the anti-profiteering campaign initiated in August, 1975. During the revolutionary conflicts, bazaaris mobilized through mosques because state repression and lack of autonomy of the Merchants' Guilds left them no alternative.

A different situation emerged after the revolution when the regime established merchant guilds which supported the ruling clergy. The leaders of the guilds benefitted economically from interest-free loans and expanded control over the distribution of goods, and hence supported the regime. The vast majority of the bazaaris, however, opposed clerical rule. The ruling clergy instituted the nationalization of foreign trade, government distribution of essential goods and foodstuffs, restrictions on the export of Persian rugs, sanctions against bazaar moneylenders, an anti-profiteering campaign, and price controls. These economic policies adversely affected major segments of the bazaars, which had established organizations to promote their interests, including free trade and other liberal policies. Thus, most bazaaris supported liberals such as Bani-Sadr and Bazargan. These actions were consistent with their support for Dr. Mosaddegh three decades earlier. These data do not support the authority-adherence

hypothesis; instead, collective actions of bazaaris can best be explained in terms of a combination of interest, organization and capacity for action, and structure of opportunities.

The collective actions of the white collar employees and industrial working class does not support the authority-adherence hypothesis. During the 1950s, most industrial workers were organized by communists who pursued secular-nationalistic politics. In contrast to clerical politics at the time, white collar employees also supported liberal-leftist causes and stood behind Dr. Mosaddegh. During the 1960s, industrial workers and white collar employees did not join with the clergy who opposed the Shah's reforms. Collective action by industrial workers and white collar employees in the 1977-79 period was in response to the state's adverse economic policies. Repression since the downfall of Mosaddegh had banned all strikes and eliminated any independent organizations through which these classes could mobilize. Once the government began retreat and announced reforms toward the end of the summer of 1978, workers and white collar employees seized the opportunity to attack the state. In the initial stages, their demands were mostly economic. When the government failed to respond to their demands and resorted to repression, they threw their support behind Ayatollah Khomeini. In the post-revolutionary period, industrial workers continually acted to promote their economic interests and organizations, while most white collar employees supported the liberals. These actions do not lend support to the authority-adherence hypothesis, but do sustain the hypothesis based on resource mobilization.

In sum, during the 1950s bazaaris, industrial workers, and white collar employees all supported the liberal, modernizer Mosaddegh against the royal family, which was backed by landlords and most of the clergy. The coup d'etat resulted in repression of all independent organizations. In the late-1970s, adverse state economic policies led these groups and classes to oppose the government once again. This opposition had no alternative for mobilization except the mosque, where a segment of the clergy also radically opposed the state. The coalition of these groups and classes led to the downfall of the regime. By 1981 however, large segments of these groups and classes had come to oppose fundamentalist rule and sided with the liberals, and leftist organizations. Their actions were consistent with their support for liberals, and leftists during the 1950s.

In conclusion, our examination of conflict in Iran between 1951 and 1981 demonstrates that sociological theories must encompass a combination of factors if they are to explain collective action and social revolution. We must focus on state policies and the ways in which they affect interests, organization, capacity for collective action, and structures of opportunities. We must especially analyze the role of repression in reducing the capacity for collective action. Finally, we must examine factors that affect the opportunity structures for alliance formation. Investigation of these variables will enable us to develop a comprehensive theory of collective action and revolution.

¹ The National Front, a coalition of several liberal, nationalist political parties, was founded by Dr. Mosaddegh and dissolved after the coup d'état that removed him from office. The coalition was revived in 1977.

² There was little or no participation by university students, the industrial working class, the new middle class, or the National Front in these events.

³ In personal communications with the author, several bazaaris from Tehran and Tabriz indicated that during the initial stage of the oil boom the economic condition of merchants and shopkeepers in most sectors began to improve.

⁴ In a statement issued during the summer of 1978, rug dealers in the Tehran bazaar condemned this minority, whom they labeled sellouts.

⁵ The leading supporters of Khomeini in the bazaar included Khamoushi, Pour-Ostad, Amani, Shafiee, and Asgar-Oladi.

⁶ Hossein Mehdian was one of the leading bazaaris who supported this organization.

⁷ Those arrested were Sheikh Sadegh Khalkhali, Rabbanie Shirazi, Maadi-Khah, and Hojatie Kermani in Qom, and Ali Tehrani in Mashhad.

⁸ Arrests do not give a complete indication of the distribution of radical clergy, for many doubtless avoided arrest by moving underground. Living clandestinely, however, would have seriously limited their effectiveness in mobilizing opposition.

⁹ Following several years of debate, the powerful Guardian Council rejected the bill that would have nationalized foreign trade as non-Islamic, although both the Constitution and the Majlis approved it.

¹⁰ Khatami, Khomeini's representative in Azerbaijan, claimed that in the three or four years following the revolution, some people accumulated more capital than during the previous 40 years; see Ettelaat, April 12, 1983. Harandi, a member of the Majlis, charged that some merchants sold goods costing 400-500 tomans for 15,000-16,000 tomans, and thus made millions of tomans a year; see Ettelaat, April 26, 1983. Hasan-Zadeh, another member of the Majlis, claimed that in taking advantage

of the war, some bazaaris made millions of tomans; see Kayhan, May 7, 1983. Sahabi, also a member of the Majlis, made a similar charge in 1980.

¹¹ Borhani, a cleric and deputy of the special courts, suggested in an interview that big speculators and profiteers had supporters to protect them and prevent the courts from acting against them; see Ettelaat, December 22 and 25, 1982. To protest, Borhani resigned from his position. The head of the special courts also made similar statements, as did Ayatollah Jannatie; see Ettelaat, January 28, and March 4, 1983.

¹² Ettelaat, November 12, 1980. Lajvardi, Tehran's public prosecutor stated in an interview, "the pressures had come from liberals, and because we do not want more tensions in our society, we decided to release Ghotb-Zadeh for the time being.

¹³ In August, 1981, Nazem-Zadeh reported that in the preceding ten months, more than 8,000 merchants and shopkeepers had been fined, jailed, or exiled for profiteering; see Ettelaat, August 23, 1981.

¹⁴ See a statement by Sane-ie, a cleric and prosecutor, in Kayhan, July 18, 1983; another official made a similar remark in Ettelaat, July 21, 1983. Thus far, there have been no reports of any executions of profiteers.

¹⁵ For example, a cleric who was a faculty member of the Mashhad seminary was executed for longtime spying for the Savak; see Ettelaat, April 23, 1979. Another cleric was executed in Hamedan on charges of supporting the Shah; see Ettelaat, April 19, 1979.

¹⁶ Ayatollah Khomeini discussed the need for a Faghieh in an Islamic government in his book, Valayat-e Faghieh (Islamic Government), Tehran: Entesharat-e Amir Kabier, (originally published in 1971; republished in 1979).

¹⁷ Jalal Ganjehee also made a similar statement in an interview with Le Monde, February 23, 1983.

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