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FERTILITY TRANSITION

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China has both the world's largest population (1.008 billion, according to the census carried out in that country in 1982) and perhaps the most strict and systematic family planning program. Concerted family planning efforts began in the People's Republic of China during the mid-1950s but were periodically disrupted by political campaigns, particularly the "Great Leap Forward" in 1958-60 and the Cultural Revolution of 1966-69. Since 1970, however, there has been a sustained and increasingly ambitious effort to lower the number of babies born.¹ Initially this drive involved the use of a variety of mechanisms and sanctions to try to foster late marriage and to get urban couples to have only two children, and rural parents three children. Even though, as we will detail shortly, this family planning effort was very successful in reducing China's birth rate, the authorities decided in 1979 that even more strict measures were needed to deal with the population problem. They were influenced in part by projections of the increasing numbers of young people, products of a "baby boom" in the early 1960s, who would soon be entering the marriageable ages. An expected "marriage boom" was likely to push the birth rate back up and keep China from keeping below its proclaimed "target population" in the year 2000 of 1.2 billion.

In response, the authorities initiated a new "one child" family planning program.² Young couples would be encouraged to make a pledge to have only one child, regardless of sex. Those who made the pledge would be issued "one child certificates," and these would entitle them to a variety of benefits, including pay bonuses, extended paid maternity leave, and promised preference in later schooling and job-placement for that child. Those parents who did not take the pledge, and particularly those who went ahead and had a third or higher parity child, would suffer a comparable range of penalties, as would their children. Couples who received the certificate but who subsequently went ahead and had another child were liable for repayment of the value of all of the benefits already received under the program. Parents who were already past the one child target were to be induced by any means possible not to have more children, preferably by having

1. No systematic account of the various family planning efforts in China will be offered here. Readers should consult, among other works, H. Yuan Tien, *China's Population Struggle*, Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1969; Pi-chao Chen and Adrienne Kols, "Population and Birth Planning in the People's Republic of China," *Population Reports*, Vol. X, no. 1, Jan.-Feb. 1982.

2. We use the term "one child program" as a shorthand reference, even though this phrase oversimplifies the nature of the family planning policy recently.

one of them sterilized. Since 1979 a Chinese-style campaign to enforce the one child program has been underway, with a peak of family planning enforcement efforts being reached in 1983. Since then there has been a slight easing of the policy, and a very modest increase in the circumstances under which at least rural parents can receive approval to have a second child, but the one child policy has not been withdrawn.³

Many interesting issues are raised by the Chinese family planning efforts, and by the one child program in particular. To what extent is it possible, as the Chinese program attempts, to produce very low fertility levels not by transition to an advanced industrial society but by an administered birth control enforcement program?⁴ To what extent has the "one child" program been effective? Insofar as the policy has been effective, is this simply due to the vigor of enforcement, rather than public acceptance, so that if that enforcement effort was removed a dramatic new "baby boom" would occur? Or have the authorities been able to induce changes in the childbearing desires of the Chinese population, so that the traditional features of this population--a strong value on large families and a strong preference for sons--are no longer visible? Or to put it in simpler terms, how acceptable or unacceptable to the population is the current one child policy?

One other question involves the relationship between the one child policy and China's "four modernizations" reform effort launched in 1978. While China's leaders make every effort to stress the close links between family planning and the reforms, with reduced population growth making it easier to increase income levels, there is at least one aspect of the reforms that is in

3. Again, there is not space enough here to present a full discussion of the one child campaign. A good general overview is provided in E. Croll, D. Davin, and P. Kane, eds., *China's One-Child Family Policy*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985. On the subsequent modest easing of the campaign, see Susan Greenhalgh, "Shifts in China's Population Policy, 1984-86: Views from the Central, Provincial, and Local Levels," *Population and Development Review*, Vol. 12, 1986, pp. 491-515. The Chinese used the term, "open a small hole" to characterize this modification, since it specified a limited number of restrictive conditions under which a second child would be approved. In the latter part of 1986, however, official policy showed signs of reversing again, with the possibility that a new and stricter one child drive would be initiated. (Susan Greenhalgh, personal communication.)

4. Many demographic authorities have argued that only economic development can produce substantial reductions in a society's birth rate, and that an attempt to produce such reductions administratively can only result in popular alienation and resistance, as occurred in India during the 1970s. See, for example, Kingsley Davis, "Population Policy: Will Current Programs Succeed?" *Science*, no. 158, 1967, pp. 730-39; P. Van den Berghe, *Human Family Systems: An Evolutionary View*, New York: Elsevier, 1979. Contrary arguments have also been voiced. See, for example, Ronald Freedman, "Theories of Fertility Decline: A Reappraisal," *Social Forces*, Vol. 58 (1979), pp. 1-7. We are aware, of course, that recent research has shown that declines in birth rates began to occur in some Western countries before appreciable modernization. However, these decreases were extremely small compared to what is being attempted in China, which involves essentially the completion of a demographic transition with only modest economic development.

potential conflict with the one child policy. Prior to about 1980 China's peasants operated within communes, China's form of collectivized agriculture, and these organizations provided a means to enforce family planning and other policies. But since then the communes have been dismantled, and replaced by the "household responsibility system." Instead of working as laborers on the commune's fields, peasants now have reverted to working in family production units, with the fields divided up and "contracted out" to the various families. These peasant families generally have to deliver contracted quantities of grain or other products to the state, but after fulfilling their contract they can dispose of any surplus themselves. Specialization of peasant families in non-agricultural activities, such as handicrafts, commerce, or the food trade, is now actively encouraged, and a sizeable minority of peasant laborers have now left the land to engage in work in the towns and cities.⁵

This dramatic reform of China's agricultural system has several potential consequences for the one child program, and foreign analysts have seen most of these as harmful. For example, rural leaders (called "cadres" in the political jargon used) should have more difficulty now controlling the activities of a more footloose peasantry, including their reproductive activities.⁶ In addition, now that the peasant family is the main unit of production once again, parents should have an added incentive to have more children--in order to increase their family labor force and make possible more ambitious undertakings. (Regulations implemented as part of the rural reforms that limit the number of non-family members who can be hired to work in a family's enterprises--generally to 3 at most--should also reinforce this effect.)⁷ In other words, in the Chinese countryside it would appear that what the government is trying to do with one hand, through the one child campaign, it is undermining with the other, through the household

5. General accounts of the household responsibility system and related reforms can be found in Thomas Bernstein, "Reforming China's Agriculture," unpublished conference paper, 1984; Andrew Watson, "New Structures in the Organization of Chinese Agriculture: A Variable Model," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 57 (1984-85), pp. 621-645; and Jonathan Unger, "The Decollectivization of the Chinese Countryside: A Survey of Twenty-eight Villages," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 58, 1986, pp. 585-600.

6. Even peasants who have not left the land are no longer working under direct cadre supervision in their day-to-day labor, as they were under the commune system.

7. We wish to stress that these are added incentives produced by the reforms. Other structural features that produced a pronatal tendency even under the commune system, such as the virtually universal tendency of daughters to marry out of the household and the absence in all but a very few wealthy suburban locales of any sort of retirement pension system, still remain salient.

responsibility system.⁸ So the final major question of interest here is the extent to which this analysis is correct--are the reforms undermining the one child program in the countryside?

We will not be able to satisfactorily resolve all of these questions here. But through data from a number of surveys conducted in recent years in China, many of them by the Chinese co-authors of this article, we hope to be able to gain some insights into the way the one child program is working. What we will attempt to do here is to present as much as possible of the available data from these recent surveys to provide descriptive information on the Chinese family planning program. The first section that follows briefly reviews indicators of actual trends in fertility in China since 1970, but in subsequent sections we will focus primarily upon data that deal with the preferred family size of various segments of the Chinese population. Our assumption is that such data give us at least rough, and perhaps conservative, indicators of the number of babies people would like to have.⁹ The emphasis here will remain at the level of description and rather simple analysis because that is all that is possible at the moment; the original data upon which to carry out more complex kinds of analyses are not available yet outside of China.

China's Fertility Transition

In terms of standard economic indicators, China still remains quite an underdeveloped country. Her estimated GNP per capita in 1984 of US\$310 placed China in the upper ranges of the low income countries of the world.¹⁰ However, in terms of birth and fertility rates, China now looks very different from other low income countries. Birth rates fluctuated erratically during the 1950s and 1960s, but the decade of the 1970s saw a precipitous decline in the childbearing rates of China's population. Table 1 presents figures on the total fertility rate in China for selected

8. The urban reforms have produced so far only a small number of new household production units, with the vast bulk of urbanites still employed by large-scale organizations. So the potential conflict between the reforms and the one child policy should not be so apparent in China's cities.

9. Given the presence and constant official publicity for the one child campaign, and risks involved in opposing it publicly, one may wonder whether people responded to questions about their preferred number of children honestly. We assume, therefore, that there may be some understating of true preferences, and hence a conservative bias in our figures. However, as will soon become apparent, the studies reported here do not show people simply responding that their preference is to have only one child. It might also be noted that including preferred family size measures in a questionnaire is still somewhat difficult to do in China. One Western researcher who was given permission to conduct a local fertility survey in China in 1981 was told that his preferred family size questions had to be taken out or the study would not proceed.

10. The World Bank, World Development Report 1986, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 180.

years since 1950. These numbers tell a dramatic story. In 1970 the total fertility rate, an estimate of how many children a woman would have in her lifetime based upon fertility behavior in that year, was no lower than the figure for 1950. Over the next decade there was a drop of more than 60% in the total fertility rate and, in spite of recent fluctuations, low levels of fertility have been maintained. In the 1980s China's birth rate figures resemble those from developed countries much more than those from lower income countries.¹¹ Given China's still low level of development, and sluggish economic performance in the 1970s, it is clear that this dramatic transformation cannot have been produced by economic modernization. At least a major part of the explanation of this "early demographic transition" must lie in China's family planning campaign.¹²

Table 1 about here

This dramatic change in fertility behavior has sometimes been interpreted in the West as a result of the "one child campaign." However, it is clear from the figures in Table 1 that this is not the case. The substantial reduction in fertility preceded the introduction of the one child policy in 1979, and that policy, as indicated earlier, was more an effort to keep the birth rate from shooting back upward. Some commentators have also assumed that because of this campaign, now and in the future most Chinese will only be able to have a single child. However, in spite of the vigor with which the campaign has been enforced, about half of all births in recent years have been second or higher parity children, as the figures in Table 2 show. There are no figures available for 1983 which was, as indicated earlier, the "high tide" of enforcement of the one child program. But the figures in the table do indicate rising compliance with the one child program in the early 1980s, but a modest relaxation, and somewhat more higher parity births, by 1985. This table also illustrates again the gap between the behavior of urbanites and villagers. In 1982 an

11. Table 1 tells another story as well. In earlier years there was only a small difference between rural and urban fertility rates, and indeed in 1960 the urban rate was higher--no doubt a consequence of the way in which the Great Leap-induced famine was more severely felt in the countryside. But in recent times rural fertility rates have been about twice the urban rates. So the "town and country gap" in fertility behavior has widened during this period.

12. See also W. R. Lavelly, "The Rural Chinese Fertility Transition: A Report from Shifang Xian, Sichuan," *Population Studies*, Vol. 38, 1984, pp. 365-84.

extraordinary 93% of all babies born in urban China were first births, but in no year (with the possible exception of the missing year, 1983) did China's villagers have more than 51% first births.¹³ In sum, in spite of the vigor of the Chinese family planning effort in general, and of the "one child campaign" in particular, only about half of the babies born in recent years were, in fact, first children.¹⁴ A dramatic fertility transition has occurred in China, and it has occurred prior to substantial economic development, but there is still much less than full compliance with the one child goal the government has stressed in recent years.

Table 2 about here

How Many Children Do Chinese Want to Have?

The figures presented above make it clear that Chinese are having many fewer children today than they were a decade or more ago. What is not clear, however, is whether this change has been the result simply of massive government pressure and enforcement, or whether people have begun to desire fewer children than in the past. A major part of the family planning program has been the effort to persuade the population that traditional attitudes such as "the more children the better" and "more sons, more prosperity" are outmoded, and that "fewer is better." Since 1979, of course, this persuasion effort has tried to argue for acceptance of the norm that one child is enough, no matter whether the child is a boy or a girl. To what extent has this educational effort had an effect?

No definitive answer to this question is possible here. But we think some insights into the question can be gained by examining the results of various local studies that have been conducted in China in recent years which inquired about preferred family size. The procedures used in these studies varied somewhat and were often less than ideal. For example, strict probability sampling

13. It may be objected that there may be some biases in such statistics from China because of the official family planning program. However, even modest levels of under- and overstatement would not substantially alter the conclusions offered here.

14. It should be noted, though, that in comparative perspective these figures on percentages of first births are very high, particularly in view of China's low level of economic development. In 1982 in Taiwan only 38% of the babies born were first births, and in 1981 in the United States the comparable figure was only 43%. See Ronald Freedman, Xiao Zhenyu, Li Bohua, and William Lavelly, "Local Area Variations in Reproductive Behavior in the People's Republic of China, 1973-1982," unpublished paper, p. 5.

procedures were not used in most studies, the exact wording of the questions varied somewhat, and the populations are not always comparable. Perhaps more important, given the official nature of the one child policy and the lack of guarantees of confidentiality, one might expect that respondents in these surveys would understate their family size preferences. Finally, in several cases not enough information is presented in the sources available to us to be sure what methods were used.¹⁵ In spite of such problems with the data to be reported here, we still think they are of considerable interest.

Table 3 about here

In Table 3 we present the results from a variety of family size preference surveys in different locales in China. In general the question used was something like, "How many children do you feel it is best to have?" Except where noted, the respondents were generally women of childbearing age (15-49). Several conclusions can be drawn from the figures in the table. First, with the exception of the 1980 survey of soldiers in Beijing and the 1984 urban survey in Zhejiang province, in no case did a majority of respondents reply that having one child was the best, and in many rural areas only a small minority favored one child. On the other hand, with the exception of the minority area in Guizhou Province and the fishing village in Fujian Province, in none of the studies did a majority of the respondents say they preferred three or more children. Or to put things in another way, with a few exceptions it appears that in both rural and urban areas two children is the most commonly stated preference, rather than either the officially espoused one child or the traditional large family. The figures in the table also testify to other expected features of family size preferences. In general family size preferences seem to be somewhat higher in rural than in urban areas, and the highest figures of all come from the minority area studied in Guizhou.¹⁶

15. This last feature is characteristic of many Chinese survey reports in recent years. Publications present results but are often silent about the methods used to produce those results. As more Chinese social scientists receive high level methodological training we can hope that this situation will change.

16. Minority groups have been at least partly exempted from meeting the official family planning program goals, so people living in minority areas have been exposed to less birth control propaganda than have Han Chinese. The high levels shown for the Fujian fishing community may be due to a combination of the marginal and low-status nature of fishermen in China traditionally and the fact that it is hard to do family planning work among people who are not sedentary.

Table 4 about here

These sorts of regional variations in preferred family size can be seen more clearly in the figures in Table 4. The figures reported there come from surveys conducted in various parts of Hubei Province by students in training classes run by Gu Shengzu. Teams of students went to the counties listed and carried out surveys of the women of child-bearing age in a non-random but diverse selection of rural brigades in each county.¹⁷ These figures again reveal that few respondents mentioned one child as their preference, and that two children was almost always the predominant choice. But the degree of acceptance of two children as the best family size varies widely. In the most developed counties included, more than three-quarters of all respondents said that two children were best. But in outlying, less developed, and hilly or minority-group counties, considerable numbers of respondents favored three or more children, and in mountainous Chongyang County more than 70% of those interviewed wanted at least three children.

The figures reviewed in Tables 3 and 4 suggest that while there may have been marked success in promoting the idea that small families are good, still there has been less success (at least outside of the army) in gaining acceptance of the idea that having only one child is desirable.¹⁸ Still, if people could be induced to want two and only two children this would be a considerable accomplishment. Indeed, some analysts argue that if there were appropriate spacing between children, the same low national population growth rate the government is trying to achieve with its one child policy could be achieved with people having two children.¹⁹ Does this

17. Brigades are units within the commune system that generally correspond to large villages. Although formally the communes have now been disbanded, the term brigade is still often used in referring to the village level of rural administration. In selection of brigades, the main concern was to see that the economic and terrain variations within each county were represented. Generally all of the women in the brigade were interviewed.

18. We assume that the figures in these tables represent considerable reductions from the family size preferences that Chinese would have chosen in earlier decades or centuries, although we lack earlier family size preference surveys to prove this point. We do know that in studies of women of child-bearing ages in Taiwan the mean number preferred has dropped from about 4 in the mid-1960s to just under 3 today--in other words, to a level higher than reported in most communities studied in the Mainland. See Ming-Cheng Chang, Ronald Freedman, and Te-Hsiung Sun, "Trends in Fertility, Family Size Preferences, and Family Planning Practice: Taiwan, 1961-80," Studies in Family Planning, Vol. 12, 1981, p. 217. In addition, a survey of 210 women aged 50-81 in four Hubei counties in 1981 found that these women, who on the average had borne 6.5 children, responded with an average preferred number of children of 4.1. In other words, these responses hint that even older women would prefer to have somewhat fewer children than they have actually had, implying some success in inducing a reduction in preferred family sizes. See Gu Shengzu, "An Exploration into Rural Fertility Desires," (in Chinese), Shehuixue Yanjiu, (Sociological Research), no. 5, 1986.

19. See John Bongaarts and Susan Greenhalgh, "An Alternative to the One-Child Policy in China," Population and Development Review, Vol. 11, 1985, pp. 585-617.

mean, then, that it should be possible soon to relax the administrative enforcement of the one child policy, since most people in China would be quite willing to stop at two children?

There are reasons to doubt that the matter is so simple. For one thing, of course, there is the fact that we suspect there may be some systematic understating of family size preferences in these studies, so that "true" answers would reveal a higher percentage of third or higher parity preferences. But an additional problem involves the fact that these data all concern simply statements about what is the best number of children, with nothing specified about the gender of those children. Clearly in any population feelings about how many children are best are contingent upon what the sexes of the existing child or children are. There have only been a few studies in China which have asked about family size preferences with the various gender and parity possibilities specified, but those studies that have been conducted tell an interesting story.

Table 5 about here

In Table 5 we present results from interviews carried out in 1986 in rural and urban areas of Danjiang County, one of the well developed counties in Hubei Province included in the data described in Table 4. The respondents were 750 men and women in selected rural areas of that county and 350 men and women in urban areas of that county. The data in the table reveal that in both rural and urban areas less than a quarter of the respondents claimed that they preferred to have two children, no matter what the sexes of those children were. The overwhelming preference for two children, as far as most people interviewed in this study went, meant a preference for a boy and a girl. In other words, even if we don't assume understatement of family size preferences in this study and in others, we have to conclude that most of those who had had two boys or two girls (as well as those with only one child) would be unhappy with their situation.²⁰ Biology being what it is, a nicely matched pair with a boy and a girl cannot be

guaranteed.²¹ On the average about half of those who have a second child will not have had one of each sex, and some portion of them are likely to want to go on and have a third child. Indeed, one analysis using the 1982 one-in-one-thousand fertility survey data calculated that, at the rates of fertility that existed in 1981, about 48% of the women who had had two boys could be expected to go on and have a third child, while about 76% of the women who had had two girls could be expected to go on and have a third child.²² So the least acceptable situation is to end up with two daughters, but a considerable share of those who have had two sons are likely to want to try to right the balance by trying again for a daughter. It would be misleading, then, to conclude that the modal family size preference, as revealed in Chinese survey data, is two children. Instead, the most common situation seems to be a desire to have at least one son and at least one daughter. Given this sort of underlying preference, a considerable number of families could be expected to have not only two but even three or four children, if there were not inducements in the family planning program that inhibited them from doing so.

Ideal Family Size and the Chinese Rural Reforms

The data reviewed so far indicate little underlying support for having only one child, and even some difficulties making a two child limit, regardless of the sex of the children, acceptable. It seems apparent that, without the administrative measures of the family planning program, many people would go ahead and have a second or even a third or fourth child.²³ Does this suggest, then, a sort of demographic "pressure cooker," in which an accumulation of suppressed childbearing desires could break out if allowed to? Or are there reasons to think that over time the problem will be eased as more and more Chinese shift to lower family size preferences? Again

20. Similar conclusions can be reached from another survey of the family size preferences of young people surveyed in seven Chinese cities in 1983. See Current State of Young Workers in Contemporary China, (in Chinese), Beijing: Workers' Press, 1984.

21. Prenatal testing to determine the gender of the child is rarely available in China, but if it becomes available interesting questions and problems will be raised.

22. See Griffith Feeney, Yu Jingyuan, and Chi-hsien Tuan, "Parity Progression Measures of Fertility in China," unpublished paper, 1985, p. 17.

23. This statement assumes that many people would be able to have more children--i.e. that they wouldn't have been sterilized. This seems a safe assumption. To our knowledge, sterilization is not advocated or practiced after one child, but only after a second child, and with increasing vigor after higher parity births. Overall in 1982 the percentage of all contraceptive use that involved sterilization was 36%, which is lower than the figure for the United States--41% for all married women 15-44 in 1981. See R. Freedman, et al., *op. cit.*, p. 6.

we cannot offer a definitive answer to these questions here. But by analyzing recent social trends in China and their demographic implications, we hope to be able to offer some preliminary thoughts on the issue.

Discussing the implications of social trends is fundamentally a matter of considering what is happening in the Chinese countryside. Urban areas constitute only about 20% of China's total population, and we have already seen that both fertility and family size preferences are substantially lower in the cities than in rural areas. Indeed, everything we know about urban life in China suggests that it presents an environment that is decidedly favorable to low fertility, and even to the one child family.²⁴ The social structure of Chinese villages is quite different, however, and seems likely to foster at least moderately high fertility. And the reforms that have dismantled collectivized agriculture in rural China and revived family farming have been seen by many analysts as leading to even higher fertility aspirations, as we noted at the beginning of this article. However, a number of articles published in China present a contrary view.²⁵ These articles argue that rather than conflicting head-on with official family planning goals, the rural reforms are actually contributing to a lowering of fertility aspirations, thus making it easier in the future to realize the goals of the one child campaign. We wish to summarize this second set of arguments here and see to what extent they are supported by the available local survey data.

As we discussed earlier, the advocates of the "pronatal impact of the rural reforms" argument contend that the restoration of the peasant family as a production unit fosters higher fertility, both by giving families stronger reasons for wanting to build up a large and differentiated family labor force and by making the supervision of peasant lives and activities (including childbearing) more indirect and difficult. The contrary set of arguments about the "anti-natal impact of the rural reforms" is quite different. These arguments focus not on the operation of family farms, but on the general economic and opinion trends that the rural reforms have

24. See the discussion in Martin K. Whyte and William L. Parish, Urban Life in Contemporary China, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984, pp. 160-67.

25. See, for example, Mu Aipin, "A Family's Smallness is its Strength," Beijing Review, no. 48, Dec. 1, 1986, pp. 19-20.

unleashed. Essentially these arguments pin their hopes on a modernization of fertility aspirations--on trying to get peasants to think about the number of children to have in a manner that has long been associated with urbanites, but not with peasants.

Under the reform policies, becoming wealthy is officially encouraged, and conspicuous consumption is no longer frowned upon, as it was when Mao Zedong was alive. The mass media are full of articles about peasants buying televisions, sewing machines, and trucks and building fancy new houses. Press accounts of the "specialized households" and "10,000 yuan households" who are prospering in the reform era do not, for obvious reasons, stress their successful mobilization of a large family labor force. Instead, in addition to hard work, emphasis is placed upon education and technical skills as the primary ways to rise above the lot of an ordinary peasant. More and more village dwellers are leaving the land and taking jobs in town factories and shops, but again education and specialized skills are seen as primary requirements for this upward mobility. Peasants (or former peasants) who succeed in this competition are portrayed as having both the time and resources to engage in a variety of cultural and leisure time pursuits and hobbies, and these activities again set them apart from their neighbors.

The message being conveyed to China's rural dwellers is fairly simple. Under the reform program, individuals and families can now become rich ahead of others and even leave the peasantry entirely, rather than being stuck within the egalitarian confines of the commune system. The way to succeed in this competition is not, in fact, to have a large number of children, as this would only depress family income (in the short run, at least) and make it difficult to invest sufficiently in any family member to produce the hoped for prosperity and mobility. Instead, it makes most sense in the reform era to have very few children, and to invest in the development of the human capital of members of a small family. Such investment is likely to lead to prosperity and success, and success will, in turn, bring the ability to expend family funds on consumer goods and leisure activities, rather than simply on feeding the family. And if the parents are willing to go as far as to pledge to have only one child, that child is supposed to receive preferential

treatment in developing his or her human capital in both schooling and jobs, making upward mobility even more likely.

It is often argued that as the economy was transformed in the West, changes took place in the organization of work, family structure, and income levels, and that these produced heightened aspirations for mobility, consumption, and leisure. These heightened aspirations, in turn, led to a decline in desired family size, and these led finally to reduced fertility. What the publicity surrounding the rural reforms in China seems to be trying to do is to alter this causal chain. By directly altering mobility, consumption and leisure aspirations it is hoped that desired family sizes will be reduced, even among villagers whose social environments have not yet been substantially transformed or modernized.²⁶

Tables 6 and 7 about here

To what extent has this effort to change peasant aspirations, and thereby change preferred family size, been successful? We will review some data from Chinese surveys that touch upon this question. In Table 6 we present preferred family size data from a 1983 survey of 525 married women of child-bearing age in Hongan County, Hubei Province. These data show that there is a clear relationship between the educational level of the women interviewed and the responses they gave to the question about how many children would be best. Women who had had at least a senior high school education were more likely to consider one child, and much less likely to prefer three children or more, than were other women. In Table 7 we examine the preferred family sizes of these women, classified by the occupations of their husbands. Among the non-peasant occupations there is little differentiation, but women with peasant husbands were much more likely to prefer three or more children, and much less likely to consider having only one child, than were women whose husbands had non-agricultural occupations. These tables give at least some

26. To be sure, peasant incomes have increased markedly in recent years, but by any comparative standard they still remain at a very low level. And other structural elements of rural life, such as family organization and ritual life, have not in any meaningful sense been "modernized."

support to the idea that individuals with more "modern" personal characteristics will have lower preferred family sizes.²⁷

Tables 8 and 9 about here

Data from the same study dealing with family economic conditions, on the other hand, tell a somewhat different story. In Table 8 we examine responses of these same women, classified now in terms of the level of per capita family income of their families. This table reveals a curvilinear pattern. Women from families with moderately high income, in the range 151-250 yuan per capita, were likely to prefer smaller families than were very poor women, but the highest average family size preference was expressed by women from the richest families surveyed. A more unambiguous pattern is shown in Table 9. There we can see that there is a positive correlation between preferred family size and the amount of housing space the family has. People with the most spacious housing, who may be assumed to be relatively well off, want to have larger families than anyone else. There is some ambiguity about these patterns, since age may be a confounding factor, with both prosperity and larger preferred family sizes more often found at later stages of the life cycle.²⁸ In any case, it is clear that being better off than your neighbors, per se, is not something that leads automatically to lower fertility desires. The opposite may more nearly be the case.²⁹ But the critical factor, according to the "anti-natal impact of the reforms" argument, is not income, but rather consumption and other aspirations.

Tables 10 and 11 about here

Data from the same study can be used to examine the relationship between occupational and educational aspirations and preferred family size. In Table 10 we see the association between

27. The Hubei data also show that younger women, unmarried women, and women living in two generation rather than three generation families, express desires for smaller numbers of children than do other women (tables not shown here).

28. A separate table, not shown here, showed a positive relationship between age and preferred family size. However, since the data for this study are not available outside of China, we were not able to perform multivariate analysis to untangle these relationships.

29. Some Chinese demographers argue that in wealthy suburban villages the relationship between family income and preferred family size is being "reversed," so that better off families want fewer children than their neighbors. However, data are not yet available outside of China to substantiate this claim.

the hoped for occupation of one's child or children and preferred family size. In general there is a moderate association between hoping that a child will rise above the peasantry and preferring a smaller number of children. The association between educational aspirations for one's children and preferred family size, as shown in Table 11, is even more striking. In that table we can see not only a strong relationship between high educational aspirations and low preferred family size, but also that among those who hope that their child will attend college, a sizeable minority say that one child is best. So high aspirations for one's children do seem associated with acceptance of small family sizes, although it takes quite a high level of aspirations to win many converts for the one child ideal.

Tables 12 and 13 about here

We can gain further information about how rural people look upon having children by reviewing data from the 1986 survey in Danjiang County, Hubei Province, discussed earlier. In that study both rural and urban respondents were asked about the specific advantages and disadvantages of having more children. In Table 12 we present the responses dealing with the advantages. (Multiple responses were allowed.) For the most part these figures testify to rural residents not yet having developed very "modern" attitudes in regard to children. We see that significantly more rural respondents than urban ones mentioned old age support, continuity of the family line, family labor power, and the strength of the lineage as advantages of having more children, while significantly fewer rural respondents mentioned the children as helping to improve relations between the spouses or as being enjoyable to interact with per se. This pattern of responses must be profoundly troubling to advocates of the view that the reforms are generating modernized orientations in regard to children in rural areas.

The figures in Table 13 present a little more encouragement to such advocates, however. When asked what the disadvantages of having more children were, rural respondents again had somewhat different views than urban respondents. There are a number of interesting patterns visible in the table, including the fact that rural respondents were more concerned about the cost

of raising children. (Objectively it costs more to raise a child in the city, and it is usually argued that rural children can become net contributors to family income at a relatively early age.) But the figure that leaps out of the table at you is the fact that 70% of the rural respondents, but only 9% of the urban ones, mention concern over the future success of children as a major disadvantage of having more children. Taken together these tables suggest that, while peasants may continue to hold a number of traditional orientations in regard to childbearing, these may be at least partially counter-balanced by a very strong concern about the cost of raising children and the difficulty of ensuring their future success. If these concerns are general and strong enough, they may help to provide an attitudinal basis for smaller preferred family sizes.

Tables 14 and 15 about here

But how widespread in the Chinese countryside are elevated aspirations for children? If they are confined to only a small segment of the peasantry, perhaps only the new rich peasants, they cannot be expected to be very important in the overall effort to reduce the preferred family size of China's villagers. In Tables 14 and 15 we return to the 1983 study in Hongan County to examine this question. In Table 14 we report the responses to the question, "In the future, what kind of person would you wish your son (or daughter) to become?" (In Chinese the implication of occupational destination is clear.) We can see in that table that very few respondents wished their children to end up as peasants, particularly in the case of sons. Most want their children to at least rise into the ranks of the workers, but a significant minority wish for even higher mobility.³⁰ When the same women were asked, "How much schooling do you hope your son (or daughter) will receive?" their replies were even more ambitious. Clear majorities hoped that their children would go on to college, and for sons the figure was an astonishing 70%! Very few aspired to what has been the lot of most peasants up until now--to complete primary school at best. These tables

30. It might be argued that in socialist and egalitarian China the rhetoric of upward mobility is not appropriate, since all lines of work are seen of equal value. However, occupational prestige surveys conducted in China recently show clearly the same general rank ordering pattern as in other societies, with peasants being at, or near, the bottom. See Nan Lin and Wen Xie, "Occupational Prestige in Urban China," *American Journal of Sociology*, forthcoming.

demonstrate that high aspirations for one's children are not confined to a small number of peasant families, but are extraordinarily widespread, at least in Hongan County.

We don't have comparable figures from many other areas, but the limited data available seem to present a similar picture. For example, in four other Hubei counties surveyed in 1981 61% of the rural respondents hoped their children could attend college, 38% hoped they could finish secondary school, and only 1% said they would be satisfied with primary schooling.³¹ The other data we have on aspirations for children all come from urban areas, but they suggest if anything even higher levels of aspirations in the cities.³²

We do not have detailed data on other forms of aspirations, such as for consumption and leisure activities. But the limited data available on aspirations for children suggest an interesting interpretation. First, the figures reviewed here do lend some credibility to the "anti-natal impact of the reforms" argument. For example, the figures in Tables 14 and 15 do suggest that having lofty aspirations for one's children is very common among peasants in China in the reform era. And we have already seen that having high aspirations for children, particularly high educational aspirations, is associated with stating a preference for a small family, and even for the approved single child family. So there seem to be elements in rural opinion trends that are conducive toward reduced family size preferences.³³

On the other hand, what these surveys also suggest is that the peasants interviewed were being wildly unrealistic, even if one makes the most optimistic assessments of the prospects for

31. Gu Shengzu, "An Exploration into Rural Fertility Desires," op. cit.

32. For example, a Shanghai study of 158 parents of only children found that 1% hoped their child would graduate from secondary school, 83% hoped for college degrees, and 16% aspired to advanced degrees. See Xue Suzhen, et al., "The Family Education of Only Children," in Chen Kewen and Qu Qingyun, eds., Collected Essays on the One Child Question, (in Chinese), Beijing: Chinese Population Problems Research Group, 1985, pp. 197-8. A survey of 401 parents of only children in Qizhou, a county town in Hubei, found an astounding 48% who wanted their children to go on to graduate school. In the Shanghai and Qizhou studies only 1-11% of the parents of only children chose "worker" as the desired occupation for their child, and even for parents with more than one child over 70% were hoping for prestigious white collar occupations. (Qizhou data from Gu Shengzu's survey file.)

33. To be sure, we don't have comparable survey data for earlier points in time, and we can't be certain of how the levels of aspirations reported here would compare with what would have been found, say, in the 1960s or 1970s. And there are lots of traditional Chinese sayings that encourage lofty aspirations—for example, "Hope a son can become a dragon, and hope a daughter can become a phoenix" (wang zi cheng long, wang nu cheng feng). But we doubt that the average peasant ever had the sort of high hopes testified to in these tables, and there is some evidence that expectations in the immediately preceding period were much lower. For example, one ethnographic study of a Guangdong village at the end of the 1970s argued that the policies pursued during the Cultural Revolution had largely eliminated the thirst for education in rural areas. See Steven Mosher, Broken Earth, New York: The Free Press, 1983, Chap. 5.

China's reform program. This is, after all, a society in which about 80% of the population are peasants, and that figure is not very likely to be reduced to 25% within a generation. It is also a society in which less than 4% of young people of college age are admitted to a university, with most of these being graduates of urban schools, and it is highly improbable that a generation from now 65% of rural youths will be admitted to college.

The unrealistic nature of these aspirations suggests that the Chinese government is taking what may be a risky gamble. The authorities are encouraging rural people to develop high aspirations for themselves and their children. Such aspirations do have a number of positive consequences. They are seen as motivating peasants to work hard and be innovative economically and encouraging their children to study hard in school and strive to get ahead. And they also are expected to promote a desire for fewer children. High aspirations may make small family size preferences possible, but in order to try to make having only one or two children acceptable, no matter what the sex of those children, a level of aspirations is being fostered that cannot realistically be satisfied. In the short run these heightened aspirations may help to counteract the pronatal impact of the revival of family farming and make small family sizes more acceptable. But in the long run there is considerable danger that when aspirations are not satisfied problems will arise. For example, given aspirations of this sort, where will the diligent peasants and highly-motivated factory workers of the next generation come from? So the enforcement of the one child policy may be made somewhat easier by these opinion trends, but the cost, in terms of mass dissatisfaction in later years, may be considerable.

Conclusions

The data reviewed in this paper are from scattered locales, and many of the studies did not use the best research methodology. Still, the studies reviewed here are suggestive of several conclusions. We noted clear evidence that in only a decade China had made the transition from levels of fertility typical of the third world to levels much closer to those of advanced industrial societies, and we commented that this shift offered proof, if evidence is still needed, of the

possibility of bringing about a "demographic transition" long before high levels of "modernization" have been reached. We also noted that in the 1980s there has been much less than full compliance with the official one child policy, although the percentage of single parity births is quite high in comparative terms. In part this lack of full compliance reflects the fact that although family size preferences have no doubt decreased, still very few people, even in urban areas, would prefer to have only a single child. Two children would be acceptable to most people in both rural and urban areas, but only if those two were a boy and a girl. Thus if underlying family size preferences were the only influence on fertility behavior, we can assume that considerably more women than are currently doing so would be having not only second children, but also third and higher parity births.

The effort to promote the one child goal consists not only of applying administrative measures to keep underlying family size preferences from being expressed. In addition, there are strenuous efforts to change these underlying preferences. These involve primarily convincing families that their interests can be best advanced by having small, rather than large, numbers of children, and particularly by having only one. And the central element of this strategy is the effort to raise popular aspirations for social mobility, education, consumption, and leisure.

From the data reviewed here it appears that some success has been achieved in this effort. The level of aspirations visible, at least in regard to the future lives of one's children, seems extraordinarily high, and those people who do have high aspirations are more likely to feel that one child or two is best. In a sense, the challenge these developments present to the standard sort of modernization-induced demographic transition argument is even greater than previously implied. It is not simply the case that fertility has dropped sharply in advance of substantial economic development. It also appears that some success has been achieved in changing the attitudes and aspirations of even Chinese peasants so that these have been at least partially "modernized," again prior to the accomplishment of economic development.³⁴ Both the fertility

34. The major work on the modernization of attitudes is A. Inkeles and D. Smith, Becoming Modern, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974.

change and the attitudinal transformation provide testimony to the sort of social engineering that is possible in an extraordinarily tightly organized society such as China.

Still, there are troubling issues raised by these unprecedented changes. On the one hand, even with the major efforts that have been made, it has not been possible yet to reduce the underlying preferences of the great majority of Chinese below two, and so the one child campaign remains difficult to enforce. And this strategy has run into a dead end, since it is hard to imagine aspirations being raised even further in order to induce lower fertility. In addition, it is unclear what consequences will flow from the high levels of aspirations that the reform policies have engendered. If people perceive that they are having to make sacrifices by bearing fewer children than they would prefer, and if they later discover that the rewards that were supposed to come to those who made such sacrifices don't materialize, then the grounds will have been prepared for widespread disenchantment and anger. So in addition to having to worry about how to manage the negative feelings generated by the one child program itself in the short run, the authorities will have to worry about how in the long run to manage the expectation levels that have been built up as part of the effort to make the one child policy more acceptable.

TABLE 1: PERIOD TOTAL FERTILITY RATE IN CHINA

	1950	1955	1960	1970	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
NATION	5.8	6.3	4.0	5.8	3.6	3.2	2.8	2.7	2.7	2.2	2.6
RURAL	6.0	6.4	4.0	6.4	4.0	3.6	3.1	3.0	3.0	2.5	3.0
URBAN	5.0	5.7	4.1	3.3	1.8	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.4	1.2	1.4

SOURCE: "Analysis of the National One-in-One Thousand Fertility Sample Survey," *Renkou yu Jingji*, (Population and Economy), 1983. p. 53-4.

TABLE 2: BIRTH PARITY ORDER AND MEAN NUMBER OF CHILDREN IN CHINA

REGION	YEAR	PERCENT FIRST BIRTHS	PERCENT SECOND BIRTHS	PERCENT THIRD OR HIGHER	MEAN
NATION	1970	20.7%	17.1%	62.2%	NA
	1977	30.9	24.6	44.6	NA
	1981	46.6	25.4	28.1	2.10
	1982	51.6	24.2	24.2	1.96
	1984	55.5	25.0	19.5	1.74
	1985	50.2	30.1	19.7	1.79
URBAN	1981	87.9%	10.4%	1.7%	1.14
	1982	93.4	5.8	0.8	1.07
	1984	75.2	14.9	9.9	1.35
	1985	77.3	15.9	6.8	1.29
RURAL	1981	42.0%	27.0%	31.0%	2.20
	1982	46.5	26.5	27.0	2.08
	1984	51.1	27.2	21.7	1.92
	1985	44.3	33.0	22.7	2.01

SOURCE: Social Statistics Section, State Statistical Bureau, *Materials on Chinese Social Statistics*, (in Chinese), Beijing: Chinese Statistical Press, 1985, p. 34; Cheng Du, "Changes in Fertility Desires and Fertility after the Economic Reform," (in Chinese), paper presented at the Workshop on the Impact of the Economic Reform on Population, 1986, p. 29.

TABLE 3: FAMILY SIZE PREFERENCES IN SELECTED AREAS OF CHINA

YEAR	REGION	NUMBER OF CHILDREN PREFERRED					MEAN	N
		NONE	ONE	TWO	THREE	FOUR+		
<u>Rural or Suburban</u>		<u>Percentage</u>						
1985	Jilin ¹		15.5	77.8	4.3	2.4	1.93	5405
1984	Hunan ²		1.9	77.6	17.4	3.1	2.22	2576
1982	Guangdong ²		6.7	90.3	3.1		1.96	148
1985	Shaanxi ²		22.0	74.0	4.0		1.82	
1984	Sichuan ³		16.1	80.8	3.1		1.88	839
1983-5	Jiangsu ²		44.8	55.2			1.56	2693
1983	Shandong ²		27.7	72.3			1.72	141
1983	Beijing ³		9.0	77.0	9.0	5.0	2.10	480
1985	Tianjin ²		5.0	80.0	15.0		2.10	549
1984	Shanghai ⁴		5.0	50.0	36.0	9.0	2.49	648

<u>Urban</u>								
1983	Beijing ³	3.0	25.0	70.0	2.0		1.71	370
1984	Wuhan ³		32.9	67.1			1.67	510
1983	Jiangsu ⁵	1.6	46.7	51.7			1.50	240
1984	Zhejiang ⁶	11.5	61.5	27.0			1.15	1079
1984	Sichuan ³		24.8	70.0	5.2		1.80	822
1985	Shanghai ⁴	0.5	30.0	59.5	8.0	2.0	1.81	861

<u>Special Populations</u>								
1984	Guizhou Minority ⁷		0.2	7.2	18.7	73.9	3.90	850
1982	Fujian Fishermen ⁸		0.7	12.1	46.5	40.8	3.24	282
1980	Beijing Military ⁹		90.0	10.0			1.10	12109
1980	Beijing Youth ¹⁰	1.9	23.5	72.7	1.9		1.75	1071

SOURCES: See Next Page

SOURCES: TABLE 3: (all in Chinese)

1. Chen Shengli, Research into the Relationship between Fertility and Living Standards in Jilin Province, unpublished report from the second collaborative research project between China and Japan, 1985.
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4. Liu Xian, "Analysis of the Internal Mechanisms Mediating between Fertility Desires and Income Levels," Renkou, (Population), no. 3, 1983.
5. Hong Lianghua, Chen Jialin, et al., "The Birth Motivations and Needs of Married Youths," Renkou yu Jingji, no. 1, 1984.
6. Chen Jialin and Luo Bowei, "Research on Birth Motivations and Needs of Unmarried Youths," Renkou yu Jingji, no. 3, 1985.
7. Hu Xuehui, "A Study of Multi-parity in Anxu District in Guizhou Province," unpublished MA thesis, Sociology Department, Beijing University, 1985.
8. Guo Shenyang, "The Population State in a Fishing Village and Family Size Desires of Fishing People," Xibei Renkou, (Northwest Population), no. 4, 1983.
9. "Investigation Report on the Family Planning Ideology of 12,000 Youths," Renkou yu Jingji, no. 2, 1981.
10. Zhang Ziyi, et al., Fertility Desires of Chinese Youths, Tianjin: Tianjin People's Press, 1982.

TABLE 4: FAMILY SIZE PREFERENCES OF HUBEI WOMEN OF CHILDBEARING AGE

YEAR	REGION	NUMBER OF CHILDREN PREFERRED				MEAN	N
		ONE	TWO	THREE	FOUR+		
1983-4	EASTERN HILL AREA (Hongan, Guangji and Qichun Counties)	1.9	<u>Percentage</u> 50.4	47.7		2.46	1525
1981	CENTRAL PLAIN AREA (Qianjiang and Jiangling Counties)	7.9	75.5	14.4	2.2	2.10	367
1984-5	WESTERN MINORITY AREA (Lichuan, Laifeng, Enshi Xianfeng, Jianshi, Badong and Xuanen Counties)	1.9	51.3	27.3	19.2	2.63	3192
1986	NORTHERN DEVELOPED AREA (Danjiang and Suizhou Counties)	5.9	82.7	9.1	2.3	2.08	1467
1981	SOUTHERN MOUNTAIN AREA (Chongyang County)	1.7	26.6	42.7	29.1	2.99	361
1981-6	TOTAL, ALL HUBEI LOCALITIES SURVEYED	3.1	57.8	28.1	11.0	2.47	6912

SOURCE:

Gu Shengzu's survey file. These surveys were conducted by students enrolled in the annual research practicums of the Training Class in Demography of the Population Institute, Wuhan University. Generally 8-12 students were sent as survey teams to each county, where they selected villages representing a diversity of conditions in the county and then interviewed all women of childbearing ages in those villages. The Hongan and Danjiang county studies also included some urbanites selected from local factories. The surveys in the Western Minority Areas and the Northern Developed Area (rows 3 and 4 in the table) included married men aged 15-49 as well as women in those ages.

TABLE 5: CHILD PREFERENCES IN DANJIANG COUNTY, HUBEI, 1986

NUMBER AND SEX OF CHILDREN PREFERRED	RURAL	URBAN	TOTAL
		<u>Percentage</u>	
One, don't care about sex	3.7%	7.2%	4.8%
One girl	0.7	2.2	1.2
One boy	0.8	0.8	0.8
Two, don't care about sex	24.3	24.4	24.3
Two girls	1.6	0.3	1.2
Two boys	0.3	0.3	0.3
One girl, one boy	50.2	62.5	54.1
Three, don't care about sex	6.3	0.8	4.6
Two boys, one girl	6.2	0.6	4.4
Two girls, one boy	1.4	0.6	1.1
More than three	4.3	0.3	3.0
TOTAL	99.8%	100%	99.8%
(N)	(750)	(350)	(1100)

SOURCE:

The interviews included in Table 4 for Danjiang County, which were conducted in 12 villages and 9 urban workshops in that county. The figures in this table include 661 married women and 439 married men of childbearing ages (15-49). From the survey file of Gu Shengzu.

TABLE 6: PREFERRED NUMBER OF CHILDREN, BY MOTHER'S EDUCATIONAL LEVEL

EDUCATION	PREFERRED NUMBER OF CHILDREN				MEAN
	ONE	TWO	THREE	FOUR+	
		<u>Percentage</u>			
Senior high or more	11	85	4		1.9
Junior high school	6	79	15		2.1
Primary school	4	71	24	1	2.2
No schooling	4	71	22	3	2.3

SOURCE:

The interviews included in Table 4 from Hongan County, which were conducted with 525 randomly selected married women of childbearing age in 18 villages and 7 urban enterprises in that county in 1983. From the survey file of Gu Shengzu.

TABLE 7: PREFERRED NUMBER OF CHILDREN, BY HUSBAND'S OCCUPATION

OCCUPATION	PREFERRED NUMBER OF CHILDREN				MEAN
	ONE	TWO	THREE	FOUR+	
		<u>Percentage</u>			
Intellectual	13	78	9		2.0
Cadre	10	80	10		2.0
Worker	8	80	12		2.0
Peasant	3	62	31	4	2.4

SOURCE:

Same as Table 6.

TABLE 8: PREFERRED NUMBER OF CHILDREN, BY FAMILY PER CAPITA INCOME

FAMILY INCOME (Yuan)	PREFERRED NUMBER OF CHILDREN				MEAN
	ONE	TWO	THREE	FOUR+	
		<u>Percentage</u>			
50-80	5	73	13	9	2.2
81-150	9	80	11		2.0
151-250	14	83	3		1.9
250+	4	70	16	10	2.3

SOURCE:
Same as Table 6.

TABLE 9: PREFERRED NUMBER OF CHILDREN BY HOUSING SPACE

HOUSING SPACE (Per capita)*	PREFERRED NUMBER OF CHILDREN				MEAN
	ONE	TWO	THREE	FOUR+	
		<u>Percentage</u>			
.61 rooms +	4	78	10	9	2.3
.51-.60 rooms	11	79	10		2.0
.31-.50 rooms	15	80	4	1	1.9
.20-.30 rooms	15	83	1	1	1.9

*One room is approximately 22 square meters.

SOURCE:
Same as Table 6.

TABLE 10: PREFERRED NUMBER OF CHILDREN BY CHILD OCCUPATION DESIRED

DESIRED OCCUPATION FOR CHILDREN	PREFERRED NUMBER OF CHILDREN				MEAN
	ONE	TWO	THREE	FOUR+	
		<u>Percentage</u>			
Technician	6	73	20	1	2.1
Worker	5	69	23	3	2.2
Peasant	2	57	34	7	2.5

SOURCE:
Same as Table 6.

TABLE 11: PREFERRED NUMBER OF CHILDREN BY DESIRES FOR CHILD EDUCATION

DESIRED EDUCATION FOR CHILDREN	PREFERRED NUMBER OF CHILDREN				MEAN
	ONE	TWO	THREE	FOUR+	
		<u>Percentage</u>			
College	31	67	2		1.7
High School	9	82	9		2.0
Primary School	12	73	10	5	2.1
No Schooling		56	31	13	2.6

SOURCE:
Same as Table 6.

TABLE 12: PERCEIVED ADVANTAGES OF MORE CHILDREN, BY RESIDENCE

ADVANTAGES	RURAL	URBAN
	****Percentage****	
Economic support in old age	82%	43%
Continuity of family line	58	33
To increase labor force	48	21
To add power to kin group	22	11
To add to spouse bond	28	54
For enjoyment of parents	28	89
(N)	(750)	(350)

Note: Multiple choices allowed.

SOURCE:

Same as Table 5.

TABLE 13: PERCEIVED DISADVANTAGES OF MORE CHILDREN, BY RESIDENCE

DISADVANTAGES	RURAL	URBAN
	****Percentage****	
Financial cost	78%	64%
Fatigue	56	69
Less time for spouse	8	9
Health hazards	30	42
Problems in neighborhood	8	17
Concern for children's future	70	9
Concern for overpopulation	24	52
(N)	(750)	(350)

Note: Multiple choices allowed.

SOURCE:

Same as Table 5.

TABLE 14: DESIRED FUTURE OCCUPATION FOR CHILDREN OF RURAL WOMEN

DESIRED OCCUPATION	SEX OF CHILD	
	BOY	GIRL
	*****Percentage*****	
Technician	33%	19%
Worker	53	51
Peasant	14	30

SOURCE:
Same as Table 6, 400 rural women only

TABLE 15: DESIRED EDUCATION FOR CHILDREN OF RURAL WOMEN

DESIRED EDUCATION	SEX OF CHILD	
	BOY	GIRL
	*****Percentage*****	
College	70%	58%
High School	15	14
Primary School	11	13
No Schooling	4	15

SOURCE:
Same as Table 6, 400 rural women only.

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