





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POLITICAL REPRESSION
IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD:
DOES THE MILITARY PLAY A ROLE?

by Patrick M. Regan

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Political Repression in the Developing World:

Does the Military Play a Role?

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The abuse of human rights is a problem that pervades most societies of the world. In the industrialized countries of the West, it is often charged that the rights of individuals are violated through the institutionalized nature of racism, unemployment and homelessness. The Eastern bloc countries have been charged with the violation of the right to free speech, freedom of religion, and freedom of thought. In the developing sector of the world, however, the abuse of human rights takes on a more pernicious form. Disappearances, arbitrary arrests, torture, and political killings are a common feature of the political landscape in many developing countries. These forms of human rights abuse are directed at subverting the participation of the masses in the political processes of the elites, in large part, by instilling fear in those who might be moved into political action (Stohl 1984).

This article will concern itself with political repression in the developing countries of Asia and Latin America. In both academic and social circles it is commonly held that it is the military that serves as the repressive agents in these countries; the assumption being that the greater the size of the military the more likely it is that this military capability will be used against the civilian population. After detailing a rigorous and operational procedure for measuring levels of political repression, a model is tested which postulates that increases in the number of military personnel within a particular country will lead to increases in the level of political repression. This relationship is controlled for the extent of political association permitted by the ruling coalition, and the existence of IMF imposed austerity measures. The results of a pooled time-series analysis suggests a counter-intuitive relationship: increases in the number of military personnel will lead to a decrease in the level of political repression.

One of the problems that must be faced in any attempt to describe the magnitude of the abuses, the potential causal mechanisms, and possible policy alternatives is the limited knowledge base from which both researchers and policymakers operate. As scientists we are acutely aware of the need for systematic research into the causes and

correlates of various social phenomenon before we are able to suggest alternative actions or potential solutions. The study of human rights abuse is particularly deficient in this regard. There is little by way of unbiased and systematic reporting of the number of incidents of abuse, or the most persistent offenders. Without such a comprehensive source of data it is difficult for researchers to develop generalizable patterns of behavior across various regime types, sources of external assistance, level of internal threat, or any number of other national attributes which may co-vary with levels of political repression.

In an effort to move forward our understanding of the causes of political repression, I have built on the work of David Cingranelli & Thomas Pasquarello (1985) to develop a method of content analyzing the human rights reports of both Amnesty International and the US Department of State. The purpose of the research effort was twofold: a) to develop a replicable data base that relies on systematic reporting and rigorous and operational coding procedures, and b) to test a model suggested by Ted Gurr (1970), Guillermo O'Donnell (1973), and James Zwick (1984), among others, who argue that the increased influence of the military in civilian affairs will lead to an increase in the repression of political opponents.

As various studies have aptly pointed out, the obstacles to rigorous research into human rights violations revolve around problems of conceptual definition and data acquisition (Goldstein 1986; Stohl, et al., 1984; McNitt 1986). Relatively recent attempts have been made to identify the relationship between US foreign aid and human rights abuse in Latin America (Cingranelli & Pasquarello, 1985; Schoultz 1981; Stohl, et al. 1984), but the results remain ambiguous. Much of the problem lies in the development of a satisfactory conceptual definition and the development of a replicable data base from which scholars can draw. The first problem, a conceptual definition, has been addressed fairly rigorously by Christopher Mitchell and a group of colleagues (Mitchell, et al. 1986), though the second, a reliable and replicable data base, has been far from pinned down (Goldstein 1986). In developing a working definition, Mitchell came to rest upon the

concept of "state terror" (1986); a rather specific way of conceptualizing what is commonly understood to be forms of political repression. And while many will claim that political repression is by no means limited to the domain of the developing world, this segment of the global population seems to have cornered the market on a unique method of carrying out their programs.

Rationale

The question of why the masses rise up against the state has been addressed elsewhere (Tanter & Midlarsky 1966; Gurr 1970), but there is little empirical evidence that addresses the question of the state's response to mass demonstrations of discontent. There are a few researchers who have posed this question (Falk 1977; Henderson 1982; Zwick 1982; Stohl & Lopez 1984; 1986), but none have done the systematic, rigorous work necessary to be able to develop valid generalizations. The models proposed by Falk and Zwick, respectively, would posit that as militarization increases, political violence follows suit. The extractive nature of military spending may not only increase the level of violence within these developing countries, but it may also help to institutionalize it.

There is agreement among researchers into the correlates of human rights violations that the most formidable barrier they have to cross is the inadequacy of available data (Goldstein 1986; Mitchell, et al., 1986; McNitt 1986; King 1989). There are at least two relatively sophisticated compilations of human rights violations on a country by country basis, Amnesty International's *Annual Report* and the U.S. State Department's *Country Reports*. And although both of these sources offer broad and detailed accounts of the human rights records of each country, both are filled with ambiguities and inconsistencies. Charges are made that the State Department's reporting is too politically biased to stand on its own (Goldstein 1986; Stohl 1984), while the Amnesty report is admittedly and intentionally ambiguous (Stohl 1984).

Amnesty International's *Annual Report* is generally considered the most reliable and unbiased source of data, despite its inconsistencies and ambiguities. Their policy, however, is to make a conscious effort to inhibit the quantifying and ranking of country records due to the second hand nature of most of the reported violations and the incomparability of data between nations. Amnesty also questions the political wisdom of making data available for the ranking of nations according to their levels of abuse (Stohl & Lopez 1986). For any particular country the absolute numbers of prisoners or torture victims will fluctuate wildly between consecutive years, although Amnesty will report no change in the overall level of abuse within the country.

The State Department's annual *Country Report* is generally considered more suspect due to the overtly political nature of the authors' intentions, but it does constitute in-depth reporting on violations. Although the *Country Reports* have been used in the study of human rights abuse, it is generally acknowledged that they serve more as a supplemental source of data than a primary source (Stohl, et al. 1984, Cingranelli, 1988). In this analysis the Department of State reports was used as both a pretest sample and as a check on the reliability of the resulting political repression scores derived through the content analysis of the Amnesty International country reports.

Two other sources are generally available for those studying human rights violations, though these, too, are of questionable reliability. Freedom House (Gastil 1983-84, 1988) publishes a ranking of countries as to their degree of freedom, ranging from one to seven, including in this scale not only political but civil rights as well. Charges have been made that the assigning of scores is based on impressionistic data with the scales being "obscure, confusing, inconsistent, and change from year to year" (Goldstein 1986, pg 620); others argue that *Freedom in the World* is little more than a scaling of countries as to their pro-Western sentiments (McNitt 1986)

The World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (Taylor and Jodice, 1983) is another commonly used source for data on human rights abuse. The *Handbook* contains

measures of "state coercive behavior" on a yearly basis, including data on political executions. But this data, too, falls prey to questions of definition and is considered to be built on "soft" evidence. An example of the limitations due to inadequate definitions by the authors can be seen in the number of political executions reported in El Salvador (0) and Guatemala (35) during the thirty years covered by the *Handbook* (Goldstein 1986, p. 621).

Theoretical Model

Ted Gurr, in his analysis of why men rebel, suggests that the level of "relative deprivation" will explain the propensity of citizens to engage in violence against the state (1970). In developing his argument he outlines nine hypotheses which would account for political violence directed at the state. One hypothesis that is central to his model is that the extent of political violence against the state is related to the size and resources of the military sector (pg 236). His reasoning follows that at low levels of military manpower and resources the masses are relatively free to express their demands to the elites. The state, being in a relatively weak position, has few alternatives other than to respond through opening a dialog. Political discontent is channeled toward solutions based on political compromise. But as the size of the armed forces controlled by the state increases, the level of violence in their response to popular demands increases correspondingly. The ruling coalition is no longer limited to political dialog in its attempts to resolve the discontent within the masses. The brutality of the state directed response to expressions of political disaffection further incites the masses to violently express their demands. As state directed violence against the citizenry escalates, so does the level of violence directed at the state. But at a very high level of military manpower and resources, according to Gurr, the brutality of the response by the state to expressions of popular discontent is particularly harsh, causing the masses to retreat out of fear for personal safety.

If we accept Gurr's argument as an empirical assumption, then the hypothesis that can be extracted from his analysis is that as the level of military manpower and resources within a nation increase, the level of repression directed against the political opposition will

show a corresponding increase. The thesis that changes in the level of militarization will lead to changes in political repression fits with the basic theme of Falk, Zwick, and O'Donnell. According to Falk and Zwick, the diversion of resources to the military sector will deprive citizens of social needs, possibly leading to the relative deprivation trigger addressed in Gurr's model. O'Donnell's analysis argues that in response to an economic crisis, the civilian elites will turn to the military for support in the implementation of orthodox economic reforms. The reforms deemed necessary to reorient the economy generally hit hardest on the working and lower class sectors of the population; wages are cut and subsidies removed. When the masses rise up to express disaffection, the civilian elite relies on the military to repress the demonstrations (O'Donnell 1972). The common theme that runs through all of these analyses is that of a positive relationship between the extent of military involvement in civilian affairs of state and the level of political repression.

But arguing that there is a positive linear relationship between the level of military involvement in civilian affairs and the extent of political repression, is far too simplistic a model of the referent world. Control variables are needed to account for political and economic factors that serve as either triggers or mediating influences.

In a very interesting and suggestive piece of analysis, David Pion-Berlin (1984) has argued that there is a positive relationship between political repression and the implementation of orthodox economic stabilization policies in Argentina. His model is very similar to that of Guillermo O'Donnell's work on bureaucratic-authoritarianism. He argues that as Argentina faced an economic crisis of inflation, foreign currency depletion, and an inability to acquire external credit, they turned to orthodox stabilization programs to salvage the economy. Such programs entail currency devaluation, wage freezes, cuts in government expenditures, and an increase in taxes. The orthodox doctrines are designed to appease the laissez-faire orientation of the international lending institutions which require the implementation of austerity measures before granting a "line of credit".

According to Pion-Berlin, the distribution of costs attributed to the orthodox stabilization programs are generally unequal, effecting the worker more than the owner of capital (pg 102). As government programs are cut the effects on health, education and housing are felt most severely by the working class. It is also the wage earners who are most severely effected by wage freezes and a currency devaluation. In an effort to quell resistance to this decrease in the standard of living, and suppress the effects of labor union organizing in hampering implementation of the austerity measures, the government resorts to political repression.

Furthermore, I would also argue that as the level of political development of a nation increases, its tolerance of political dissent increases, regardless of the extent of its military burden. This would follow from a cursory glance at most of the more developed nations of the world. There has been an increase in the defense burden experienced by the United States, Great Britain and Japan in recent years, yet one would be hardpressed to identify an increase in the level of political repression (as operationalized in this project). While drawing comparisons between industrialized nations and developing countries can be misleading, one might expect that the level of political development would affect a governments response to dissent, regardless of the level of economic development.

The model that was tested in this analysis, therefore, postulates that when controlled for the level of political development, increases in the amount of resources devoted to the military and the existence of orthodox economic policies, will lead to increases in the level of political repression.¹

1. Because of the way Freedom House coded their measure of civil liberties, from 1 to 7, with 7 being the least free, we would expect to find a positive coefficient associated with the POLDEV variable. Although this at first seems confusing, the interpretation is that as the level of political freedoms decrease political repression increases. This is used solely as a control variable, and its ordinal ranking is not meant to convey that changes in the Freedom House scaling will affect the level of political repression scoring. If anything the reverse should be true.

Concepts and Definitions

Having outlined a theoretical model, and before moving on to a discussion of research methods, it is necessary to define concepts and identify operational indicators. First and foremost, is the narrow category of "political repression" that falls under the rubric of human rights abuse. The problem of definition is in dire need of refinement; how broadly one defines human rights will virtually predetermine the results of a study. In part the definition employed is matter of a particular scholar's objectives, but it is also a result of an all-encompassing definition which has been incorporated into international law. *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, unanimously adopted by the United Nations in 1948, consists of 30 articles ranging from the right to employment to the freedom from arbitrary detention and torture. In 1976 the *Universal Declaration* was subsequently adopted as the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, which transformed the principles into treaty. It seems evident that before one can put to productive use the vast amount of inconsistent and ambiguous data that does exist, what is needed is a conceptual framework for the idea of human rights which will permit the collating and integrating of the various sources. Until such a definition is formed and agreed upon, human rights research will be a scattershot of attempts with very little cumulativeness.

Christopher Mitchell and others (1986) have developed the outline of a working conceptual definition that could enable coherent research in this field to progress. What they have settled on is a concept of "state terrorism", of which the main components are, a) that the intent of the act of violence is to influence the behavior of a target population, b) the means involve the act or threat of violence to some members with whom the target population will identify, c) the effects of the violence are to induce fear or terror in the target population, and d) the actor is the state, its agents or an approved surrogate group. (Mitchell 1986, pg 14). While this definition moves us much closer to an operational framework, it has some limiting drawbacks that must be addressed. As a first step I will move away from their use of the term "state terror" and adopt a more familiar expression,

political repression. There are several reasons for this shift, though at the root of political repression lies the general tenor of what Mitchell was targeting.

In requiring that any act of political violence be, a) designed to instill fear or terror, and b) have as its intended target a population which identifies with the victim, rather than the victim itself, their definition becomes very limiting for the purpose of both developing a data base and investigating the correlates of human rights. Such a definition excludes the abuse of an individual or group if they are the sole target of attack. It also requires the researcher to discern the intentions of the state's actions in carrying out an act of violence. Requiring the identification of intention on the part of the attacker, and the existence of terror or fear on the part of victims makes virtually any source of information unusable.

In following both the dictates of my model and the limitations involved in adopting the concept of "state terror", I have used political repression as my outcome variable, defined as follows: any act of political violence carried out against an individual or group within a particular country. The act is political if it appears to be the result of organized group behavior. The types of violence of central concern to this research effort will be confined to arbitrary detention, physical or mental torture, disappearances, arbitrary executions, the use of political exile, political trials, and the excessive use of force against groups of citizens (i.e., aerial bombings, live ammunition against political demonstrators, the massacre of entire villages, etc). In short political repression is the use of coercive means that has as its effect the control or elimination of political opposition. A measure of political repression will be derived through the application of content analytic procedures to Amnesty International's and the US Department of State's annual reports on human rights. (This will be discussed more fully below.)

My predictor variable, the change in the level of militarization experienced by a country, also poses problems of definition and measurement. There are a number of different methods by which one can identify the extent to which the military sector has

permeated a society. Henderson (1982) used the military regime as his indicator of the military's influence in a country, but it can be argued that the form of the ruling coalition does not necessarily determine the influence of the military; William Dixon and Bruce Moon (1987) used a combination of military manpower and the percent of the Gross National Product (GNP) spent on the military as their predictor variable; and Richard Hofferbert (1988), in an effort to identify the policy choices of a government, used military spending as a percent of Central Government Expenditures (CGE) as his indicator. My concern, however, is with military resources available to a state, and therefore I will use as my indicators of changing militarization the percent of GNP taken up by the military and the military participation ratio (Andreski, 1968). Focusing on policy choices (CGE) would be insufficient because it would not be possible to identify whether the changing ratio was a result of increased military spending or decreased social spending. For example, reductions in overall government spending that came solely from that portion of the budget designated for social programs, would appear as increases in the percent of CGE devoted to the military. One such mechanism that could have this effect would be the privatization of government run industries. Two arguments can be made for my choice of indicators of militarization: a) the percent of GNP spent on the military is the most commonly used indicator of a military burden (Rosh 1986) and is arguably the most inclusive indicator presently available (Maoz, nd), and b) Gurr's thesis on the relationship between political violence and the military is built on the number of military personnel per total male population and the "resources available to the state" (Gurr 1970: pg 239)

In an attempt to control for the effects of economic austerity measures on the level of political repression, I have included a dichotomous variable in the model which indicates whether or not a country subscribed to an IMF loan package in each particular year. The assumption here is that adherence to IMF imposed austerity measures is an integral component of the agreement between the lende and the lender. The indicator is coded 1 if an IMF loan was dispersed, and 0 if there was no IMF loan in each particular year.

A reliable measure of political development remains on the "wish list" of many social scientists. The tax ratio was used as an indicator of political development in a study of the causes and consequences of international war (Organski & Kugler, 1980), but these author's used their measure to suggest the level of political development of the state. Conceivably one could identify a well organized and developed state apparatus, that achieves its level of development through repressive policies of extraction. The type of development that needs to be controlled for in the present model is the extent of organizational affiliation by the general population. If there existed a measure of the number of secondary associations to which the average citizen of a developing country belongs, this would come close to capturing the type of political development that would tend to mediate against the use of political repression. Data on secondary associations in the developing world, however, are not readily available. A second best option was to use the rankings on civil liberties generated by Freedom House as the control variable for the extent of freedom of political association. Under the rubric of "civil liberties", Freedom House includes such categories as: a) freedom of assembly and demonstration, b) freedom of political or quasi-political organization, c) freedom to form trade union, peasant organizations, or equivalents, d) freedom to organize business cooperatives, and e) freedom for professional or other private organizations. The author ranks each country on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being the most free and 7 the least free (Gastil 1988, p. 54-65).

Data Generation and Sources

In order to derive a reliable measure of the level of political repression in each country, the annual reports on human rights abuse of both Amnesty International and the US Department of State were subjected to a rigorous procedure of content analysis. My sample consisted of 32 countries in Latin America and Asia for the reporting period of 1976 to 1987 (see appendix for list of countries and rules for exclusion). Data for military personnel (per 1000 population) and military expenditures (as a percent of GNP) were

taken from the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's (ACDA) *World Military Expenditures* 1987 & 1988 Editions. The existence of a program of orthodox economic policies was inferred from data on whether a country had purchased adjustment loans from the IMF in each particular year. This data was culled from the *United Nations Yearbook of Financial Statistics*, 1988, under the line item of "loan purchases". In using this data as an indicator of orthodox economic programs the assumption was made that one of the requirements for an IMF loan is the implementation of an economic reform package. Ordinal rankings of the level of political development were taken from the *Freedom in the World, 1987-88* compilation published by Freedom House (Gastil 1988).

Research Design

Before a model could be tested that would identify a relationship between the level of militarization and political repression, it was first necessary to tackle that seemingly intractable problem of measuring the outcome variable. As the discussion above made clear, the sources for data on political repression are such that any attempt to derive a rigorous and operational measure would entail a substantial amount of effort. The content analytic procedure employed for this purpose required the coding of 736 individual country reports. The resulting data consists of political repression scores for 32 countries over a 12 year period, derived from two separate sources.

Measuring Political Repression

In an effort to develop a reliable measure of the level of political repression for each country and year, I followed a two-pronged approach. The first step entailed content analyzing the human rights reports from the U.S. Department of State, coding data on both the subjective level of repression -- from the perspective of the coder -- and on the specific number of reported instances of abuse in each of the identified categories. The categories of repression for which subjective and actual numbers of incidents were coded

are: disappearances, torture, arbitrary arrests, political prisoners, and political killings. Three other categories were coded dichotomously: the use of political exile, existence of death squads, and the existence of incidents of gross violations of human rights. The reporting is rather inconsistent, varying both by country and by year. In many instances the actual number of reported violations is specified, requiring the coder to simply add the figures across each category. But in an equal number of cases the reporting consists of a textual discussion, using descriptions such as "massive arrests", "a large number of victims", or "thousands of people detained". If the data are presented as actual numbers, they were recorded as such; if data were presented in the latter fashion, a subjective evaluation was used to record abuses in that particular category. A probability density plot was generated from data on actual numbers of reported cases in each category. Tri-modal distributions were then used to suggest cutoff points for the subjective coding aspect of the Amnesty International reports.

The same procedure was then applied to the annual reports of Amnesty International, coding both subjective levels and actual numbers of reported incidents. This time, however, the subjective levels were guided by the distribution of reported cases based on the State Department's analysis. As a check on the cutoff points suggested by the Department of State reporting, a similar probability density function was plotted for the actual number of reported cases based on Amnesty's analysis. The tri-modal distributions for each category were remarkably similar when the plots developed with Amnesty International data were compared to those generated from State Department data.

The end result of this procedure was a four-level scale on the extent of the reported violation of each of five forms of political repression. The levels were: none, several, many and numerous; each was assigned a numerical value of zero, one, two and three, respectively. The three dichotomously recorded types of repression were assigned a zero (no reported cases) and one (reported cases) value. The scores across all eight indicators

were summed to form a political repression score (POLREP) for each country/year.² Although reports were available for nearly every country and year, there were instances of missing data. Of the possible 384 cases, 27 country/years went unreported by Amnesty International. The summary statistics on the political repression variable can be found in Table 1. Inter-coder tests were performed to check the reliability of this procedure, using both different coders and recoding by the principle investigator four months after the original coding was performed. These inter-coder tests achieved a reliability of .95 against the summed political repression score, and a mean inter-coder score of .90 against the five individual indicators.

Table 1: Summary Statistics on Political Repression Score

<u>N</u>	<u>Min</u>	<u>Max</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Standard Deviation</u>
357	0	15	5.3	3.25

Due to questions of reporting biases and concerns about validity, the composite political repression score used in the analysis was based solely on data generated from the Amnesty International reports. There seemed to be little theoretical justification for simply combining the data from the two sources into one composite score, and concerns about the overtly political nature of the State Department reporting process argued against relying primarily on their reports for the analysis of the data. Since the State Department's reports were also used as a pretest to help perfect the procedure, the

² The result is a somewhat sophisticated measure of the level of state directed violence. It is not always clear, however, who committed a particular act, say, the appearance of bodies on the side of the road. But such ambiguous reports were recorded as state repression nonetheless. A fair argument can be made that most of the reported and coded instances of repression were committed by the state: ie, political prisoners, arbitrary arrests, disappearances, exile, and torture are generally state sponsored acts of terror. Political killings are much less clear. The results of the pooled analysis are virtually the same when data political killings were deleted from the POLREP score.

resulting data is arguably less reliable. The correlation between composite scores derived from each source was .70.

Coding Criteria

An integral element in making content analysis a useful tool for the development of theory in the social sciences is the employment of strict operational criteria by which data are coded. It is primarily through the use of operational criteria that research becomes replicable, biases and assumptions are made known, and knowledge becomes cumulative. Therefore, I will take the necessary space to make explicit the operational criteria by which cases of abuse were coded.

1. **Disappearances:** A disappearance is an unexplained absence of a citizen that can or has been attributed to the activities of the government or actors on the behalf of the government. Kidnapping is distinct from disappearance in that kidnapping is the holding of a person for ransom or some other demand to be met. The fact that the kidnapped person has been "apprehended" is acknowledged, whereas in the case of a disappearance there is no word as to the persons whereabouts, although it is suspected that the person has been "apprehended".

2. **Arbitrary Arrest:** Arbitrary arrest is when a person is held without the filing of charges. Persons detained during general sweeps of an area by government forces, are considered to be arbitrary arrestees. Any time a person is "briefly detained" or held for a "few hours and released", held in detention for long periods of time without charges, or "abducted" by "plainclothed men in vehicles" and subsequently taken to a prison and held in detention, can be considered as an arbitrarily arrest if no charges are filed. Coding should consist of both the number of people detained in each year and the number who are held without charges from previous years.

3. **Torture:** Torture is considered physical, mental, or emotional abuse by those holding a prisoner in detention. Rape, deprivation, and mock executions are classified as torture, as are beatings or other methods used to break the will of the prisoner. A person who is subjected to harsh or brutal conditions while in prison is not considered to be a torture victim. The distinction between harsh treatment and torture revolves around whether it is an ongoing situation while under detention or a deliberate policy to break the prisoner. The arrest itself, even if there is a pattern to the harassment, is not considered torture. Only those reported cases for the particular year under examination are valid.

4. **Political Killings:** Political killings are deaths resulting from torture while a prisoner is in detention, summary executions, assassinations of political opponents, random murder of villagers by government forces or by opposition forces, or any other killings related to political violence or rioting. If the actions cannot be distinguished from murder as a crime then it must be classified as a political killing. Deaths resulting from direct confrontations between opposing military forces, such as an insurgent group and the government army are not considered political killings. However the indiscriminate killing

of civilians "caught in the crossfire" of a government/insurgent battle, is considered political killings. The reasoning being that we cannot distinguish whether or not it was intentional, or in fact whether there really was a military battle. Only killings that have taken place in the current year are valid.

5. Political Prisoners: A political prisoner is a person who is incarcerated and charged with an offense for his/her political views and/or the expression thereof. People who are charged with a criminal offense carried out for political reasons can be considered a political prisoner if they are deemed so by the relevant source. A political prisoner is distinct from a person who is "arbitrarily arrested" in that the former has been officially charged with a crime, and if tried, sentenced to a term in prison; the latter is someone who has not been tried or charged. This is a cumulative category, including both those charged in the current year and those serving sentences from past convictions.

6. Gross Violations of Human Rights: A gross violation of human rights is an act by the government, or the military, in which large numbers of civilians are killed or injured during one incident. An example of this might be the military opening fire on a crowd of demonstrators, the indiscriminate bombardment of villages, or the mass executions of political opponents. Terrorist activities that kill large numbers of civilians can be considered a gross violation of human rights. The deaths that are included in this category should also fall into the count for political killings. Only incidents that have taken place in the current year are applicable.

7. Death Squad Activity: Any indication from the source that death squads are operating in the country, either with or without the consent of the government. Death squad activity cannot be inferred from reports of deaths or the disappearance of people, but must be explicitly referred to in the country report.

8. Political Exile: Political exile is the banishment of citizens of the particular country being coded to either remote internal locations or to another country, against the will of the exilee. Voluntary exile by political dissidents, or the expulsion of non-citizens is not to be considered political exile.

Data Analysis

A three step process was used to test both the direction and strength of the hypothesized relationships. The first was to run a pooled time-series analysis, based on a cross-sectionally heteroskedastic and time-wise autoregressive model, for an eleven year period and each of the 32 countries in the sample (see Table 2). If the hypothesis being tested is correct, then one would expect to find a positive linear relationship between the predictor variables, military expenditures, military personnel, and the purchase of IMF loans, and the outcome variable, political repression. The second step consisted of using time-series regression analysis, based on an ordinary least squares model corrected for autocorrelation (see Table 3). The results of this type of analysis would identify the

strength and direction of the relationship within each particular country, and would also highlight any changes in strength or direction that may suggest that another intervening variable needs to be taken into account. And finally, a cross-sectional model was tested, again using a least squares procedure (see Table 4). The results of the cross-sectional analysis would show if there were any global patterns specific to particular time periods that may have been negated by the pooling of data over the entire temporal domain. Conversely, it may be possible for a global trend in any one particular year, or the strength of the relationship in any one particular country to skew the strength and direction of the pooled analysis.

Findings

The results of the pooled time-series analysis, as the model was originally specified, suggest that the relationships are in the exact opposite direction of those hypothesized (Table 2). In the full model, using both indicators of military resources, the negative coefficients associated with military spending and military personnel would suggest that as the strength of the military increases, the level of political repression decreases. Likewise, the results convey that the subscription to IMF austerity measures serves to decrease the amount of reported political repression for that particular year.

The relationship between the Freedom House measure of civil liberties and the political repression score derived through content analysis, follows the hypothesized direction, though statistically the coefficient is indistinguishable from zero. With findings that run so highly counter to the theoretical arguments outlined above, one must first look for other, more definitive tests, before proclaiming that increases in military resources in the hands of political elites restrains their propensity to repress.

Table 2: Pooled Time-Series Regression, Outcome Variable: Political Repression, 1976-1987*

America:		Minus MILEX;	Asia:	Latin	
Parameter	Full Model ^a	Minus MILEX ^b	Lagged MILPER, IMF	Lagged Model	
Constant	4.22	2.65	2.76	3.50	4.71
MILPER	-.048 (-1.04)	-.12 (-4.6)	-.10 (-4.01)	-.05 (-2.26)	-.10 (-2.25)
MILEX	-.16 (-1.88)	-	-	-	-
IMF	-1.09 (-4.01)	.12 (.40)	.42 (1.33)	.41 (1.04)	-.90 (-2.47)
POLDEV	.075 (.58)	.40 (2.56)	.36 (3.74)	-.01 (-.17)	.18 (2.31)
Base R ²	-.024	.44	.45	.44	.29
Standard Error of the Estimate	.87	.85	.84	.94	.87
N	279	289	291	125	162
Time Periods	8	9	9	9	8

* Due to missing data the number of time periods will be less than the full twelve years. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.

^a Model as specified in text: $y = a + \beta_1 + \beta_2 + \beta_3 + \beta_4 + e$; where $\beta_1 = \text{MILPER}$, $\beta_2 = \text{MILEX}$, $\beta_3 = \text{IMF}$, $\beta_4 = \text{POLDEV}$.

^b Due to the highly co-linear relationship between MILEX and MILPER, MILEX was dropped from the equation. The decision to drop MILEX rather than MILPER was based on theoretical concerns.

Two factors come immediately to mind. The first is that military spending and military personnel are highly co-linear, causing the statistical procedure to be inefficient. After tests confirming an unacceptable level of co-linearity between the two military indicators, military spending was dropped from the equation (Table 1, column 2). The decision to drop military spending, rather than personnel, was based on theoretical grounds, stemming mainly from Gurr's analysis relating the number of military personnel to the level of political violence. Again the coefficient assigned to military personnel is

negative, though this time its statistical significance is quite high. The direction of the relationship between economic austerity measures and political repression reverts to the hypothesized direction, but it loses its statistical significance. Controlling for political development again confirms the hypothesized direction, though now it, too, becomes statistically significant. This, however, does little to answer the question of why the counter-intuitive results associated with the military participation variable.

The second place to look for a change in the direction of the findings might be in the time periods for which one expects to find a causal relationship. It would seem plausible to assume that an increase in military personnel at time 't' would not affect the level of political repression until some future date; the same argument could be made regarding the subscription to IMF austerity measures. It would seem reasonable to assume that the affects of economic stabilization measures and military personnel would become evident in the year following their implementation. That same argument, however, could not be made with regards to the political development score derived from the Freedom House rankings. When the military participation ratio and IMF loans are lagged one year, the findings for the pooled analysis do not change drastically in either strength or the direction (Table 2, column 3). The greatest change can be seen in the affect of economic austerity programs on political repression. The lagged coefficients convey that a one unit increase in the military participation ratio will lead to a .1 unit decline in the political repression score and the subscription to IMF austerity programs will lead to a .42 unit increase in political repression.

A time-series analysis of the data shows a somewhat less rigid relationship between the predictor and the outcome variables, though in most cases tests of statistical significance does not allow one to have much confidence in the strength and direction of the coefficients that are presented (Table 3). In certain countries, however, the model appears to be moderately supported by the data. For example Uruguay, Sri Lanka, Honduras, Colombia and Costa Rica all seem to suggest that an increase in military resources will

lead to an increase in political repression, though the effect of orthodox economic policies does not consistently follow the hypothesized model, even in these cases.

Table 3: Time-Series Regression Model^a

Country D.W.	MILPER	IMF	POLDEV	Constant	R ²	S.E.E.	
Argentina	.22 (.17)	-1.20 (-.53)	1.89 (2.45)	-.55	.73	2.46	1.61 (DF=6)
Bangladesh	-3.50 (-2.34)	-.52 (-.32)	-.54 (-.88)	12.5	.19	1.79	1.83 (DF=6)
Bolivia	1.84 (.68)	1.39 (.80)	2.42 (2.50)	-13.1	.41	2.37	1.50 (DF=6)
Brazil	10.28 (1.63)	-1.34 (-1.0)	-1.18 (-1.21)	-28.1	.41	1.45	1.66 (DF=6)
Burma	-.69 (-1.03)	-.72 (-1.21)	.37 (.61)	5.49	.29	.74	1.76 (DF=5)
Chile	.65 (.18)	b	.25 (.42)	.76	-.18	2.2	2.10 (DF=8)
Colombia	10.1 (1.85)	b	-.82 (-1.68)	-13.5	.19	1.64	1.97 (DF=8)
Costa Rica	1.08 (1.61)	b	-1.46 (.00)	0.0	.10	.51	2.35 (DF=3)
Cuba	-.02 (-.33)	b	.36 (1.01)	.66	-.11	.95	2.00 (DF=8)
Ecuador*	2.24 (.47)	3.84 (2.69)	.99 (1.04)	-10.0	.70	1.29	2.35 (DF=1)
Guatemala*	-.44 (-.94)	.17 (.09)	1.74 (2.48)	4.54	.58	.88	2.08 (DF=6)
Guyana	-.02 (-.04)	2.21 (1.56)	1.17 (1.04)	-4.56	.31	.93	1.92 (DF=5)
Haiti	6.99 (1.13)	.65 (.46)	-3.72 (-3.21)	16.5	.24	1.90	1.59 (DF=6)
Honduras	3.13 (3.77)	2.19 (3.06)	b	-8.6	.48	1.39	2.58 (DF=7)
India	3.06 (.34)	-2.24 (-.92)	5.37 (2.99)	-11.2	.64	1.73	1.93 (DF=6)
Indonesia	31.19 (5.56)	-.94 (-1.32)	3.16 (3.67)	-61.5	.81	.95	1.73 (DF=6)
N. Korea	.23 (3.05)	b	b	-7.53	.46	.86	2.16 (DF=8)
S. Korea	-.37 (-.72)	.00 (.00)	-.63 (-.73)	13.77	.05	1.31	2.33 (DF=6)
Malaysia	.51 (.95)	-1.61 (-6.71)	-2.57 (-7.79)	10.59	.93	.40	2.07 (DF=6)
Mexico	9.52 (.78)	-6.18 (-3.21)	5.62 (1.37)	-27.3	.41	2.39	2.18 (DF=6)
Nepal	-6.74 (-1.44)	1.87 (4.17)	6.11 (1.37)	-11.7	.65	.86	2.25 (DF=6)

Table 3 (continued)

Country D.W.	MILPER	IMF	POLDEV	Constant	R ²	S.E.E.	
Nicaragua	.16 (2.37)	7.99 (5.04)	.46 (.30)	.35	.74	1.25	2.03 (DF=5)
Pakistan	-1.72 (-1.76)	-.55 (-.71)	-.43 (-.37)	19.7	.23	1.47	1.91 (DF=6)
Panama	Insufficient degrees of freedom due to missing data						
Paraguay	.34 (.28)	^b	.56 (1.30)	1.18	-.05	1.44	2.09 (DF=8)
Peru	-2.54 (-1.92)	2.43 (.86)	-3.82 (-1.30)	39.04	.33	2.49	1.73 (DF=6)
Phillippines	9.43 (1.71)	-1.54 (-.53)	-1.35 (-1.38)	-13.9	-.11	2.35	1.53 (DF=6)
Sri Lanka	10.55 (1.79)	.17 (.08)	4.11 (3.10)	-20.98	.71	2.28	1.93 (DF=6)
Taiwan	.01 (.09)	^b	.23 (.84)	1.42	-.09	.98	2.18 (DF=8)
Thailand*	-.22 (-.17)	.36 (.61)	-.27 (-.59)	4.74	-.38	.32	1.85 (DF=6)
Uruguay	5.77 (1.87)	1.81 (1.36)	2.77 (4.32)	-64.7	.80	1.36	2.04 (DF=6)
Venezuela	-4.17 (-1.05)	^b	^b	20.14	.01	1.01	2.19 (DF=7)

^a Unless otherwise indicated, the model was corrected for timewise autocorrelation using the Corchrane-Orcutt procedure.

^b Complete model could not be estimated due to a lack of variance in the indicated variable.

* Model estimated using a Generalized Least Squares estimation procedure to correct for heteroskedasticity associated with MILPER.

The results of the cross-sectional analysis do not substantially alter the picture that seems to be taking shape regarding the direction of the hypothesized relationships (Table 4). In all years there is a negative coefficient associated with the military participation ratio, and in seven of the eleven years the relationship is significant at the .05 level or better. The strength and direction of the effect of economic austerity measures on political repression levels is less consistent than that of military participation ratios. In only one of the years is the coefficient associated with IMF loans statistically significant, and in three

of the eleven years a positive relationship is identified. The level of political development showed a consistent positive relationship to political repression, but again, only a few of the coefficients were statistically significant at the .05 level.

Table 4: Cross-Sectional Regression Model*

Year	MILPER	IMF	POLDEV	Constant	R ²	S.E.E.
1977	-.22 (-2.54)	-2.33 (-1.86)	.98 (1.82)	3.07	.22	3.25
1978	-.24 (-3.39)	-2.25 (-1.86)	.88 (1.65)	4.31	.30	2.88
1979	-.18 (-2.84)	-1.20 (-1.26)	.80 (1.92)	3.60	.22	2.50
1980	-.23 (-3.28)	.22 (.23)	1.15 (2.85)	1.72	.28	2.52
1981	-.21 (-3.16)	-1.15 (-1.23)	.88 (2.08)	3.51	.35	2.60
1982	-.03 (-.59)	-.03 (-.03)	.16 (.48)	4.73	.09	2.43
1983	-.10 (-1.34)	2.14 (1.65)	.42 (.87)	3.40	.08	3.24
1984	-.15 (-2.03)	-1.73 (-1.26)	.11 (.24)	6.59	.08	3.36
1985	-.16 (-2.06)	.34 (-.26)	.21 (.48)	5.68	.06	3.36
1986	-.10 (-1.44)	-1.46 (-1.13)	.31 (.75)	5.89	.16	3.19

* Based on 32 countries, but due to missing data the actual number of countries in any one period may be less than 32. T-ratios are in parentheses.

The interpretation of the cross-sectional analysis does not change much from that of the pooled time-series evaluation. Again, in any one year it would appear that an

increase in military personnel will lead to a decrease in the level of political repression; the implementation of orthodox economic stabilization policies does not trigger a repressive response from the state; and the level of political development does not appear to constrain the behavior of the state.

Tables 5 and 6 show the results of cross-tabular analysis between a collapsed version of the political repression indicator and both military personnel data (again, collapsed to facilitate contingency table analysis) and a three-category typology of regime type. Both a visual examination of the tables, and the supporting statistics, confirm the findings of the regression analysis. The cross-tabular relationship between regime type and political repression, however, suggests that the greater the military involvement in the ruling coalition the greater the level of political repression (Table 6).³ With so much empirical evidence running counter to the hypothesized relationships, what can be made of the analysis presented above? Is the problem in the theoretical model, the tools of analysis, or in the choice of indicators and their subsequent measurement?

Discussion

Assuming for a moment that the model is correct, and that an increase in the military resources available to the state will lead to an increase in the level of political repression. Similarly, the imposition of economic austerity measures will lead to increasing discontent within the populace and a repressive response by the state. Then the results of this analysis suggest that the first place to look for an answer to our counter-intuitive results must be to the indicators used to measure the constructs in question.

While it is generally acknowledged that the level of militarization of a state is a tricky concept to operationalize and measure, the most common indicators employed are

3. See Conway Henderson (1982), *Military Regimes and Rights in Developing Countries: A Comparative Perspective*, for a discussion about the relationship between regime type and human rights.

military spending/GNP and military participation ratios (Dye and Zeigler, 1989). But neither of these measures sufficiently tap the depth to which the military sector and its accompanying attitudes have permeated the society. As we have seen in a number of contemporary examples, the existence of a large military does not always equate with the ability to repress. During both the

Table 5: Crosstabular Analysis of POLREP by MILPER

count row% column%	POLREP*					Row Total	
	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0		
M	1.0	27 27.8 19.1	30 30.9 28.3	28 28.9 42.4	8 8.2 26.7	4 4.1 44.4	97 27.6
I	2.0	42 36.8 29.8	41 36.0 38.6	18 15.8 27.3	10 8.8 33.3	3 2.6 33.3	114 32.4
L	3.0	39 48.8 27.7	19 23.8 17.9	11 13.8 16.7	9 11.3 30.0	2 2.5 22.2	80 22.7
P	4.0	5 20.0 3.5	10 40.0 9.4	7 28.0 10.6	3 12.0 10.0		25 7.1
E	5.0	28 77.8 19.9	6 16.7 5.7	2 5.6 3.0			36 10.2
R							
* *							
Column Total		141 40.1	106 30.1	66 18.8	30 8.5	9 2.6	352 100.0
Chi-Square	44.09	DF=16		p < .0002			
Kendal's Tau b	-.17			p < .0000			
Pearson's R	-.24			p < .0000			

* Political Repression score collapsed into five categories: 0,1,2,3 = 1; 4,5,6 = 2; 7,8,9 = 3; 10,11,12 = 4; 13,14,15 = 5.

** Military Personnel/1000 collapsed into five categories: 0 to 1.99 = 1; 2.0 to 4.99 = 2; 5.0 to 9.99 = 3; 10 to 15.99 = 4; 16 and up = 5.

Table 6: Crosstabular Analysis of Regime Type by POLREP

Count Row % Column	Regime Type*			Row Total
	Civilian	Mixed	Military	
	56	9	7	69
1.0	77.8	12.5	9.7	33.7
	42.4	18.4	29.2	
	43	19	4	66
P	65.2	28.8	6.1	32.2
O	32.6	38.8	16.7	
	24	18	7	49
L	49.0	36.7	14.3	23.9
R	18.2	36.7	29.2	
	6	3	3	12
E	50.0	25.05	25.0	5.9
P	4.5	6.1	6.1	
	3		3	6
*	50.0		50.0	2.9
*	2.3		12.5	
Column Total	132	49	24	205
	64.4	23.9	11.7	100.0
Chi-Square	25.3	DF=8		
Kendal's Tau c	.20		p < .000	
Pearson's R	.24		p < .000	

* Data on Regime Type taken from Ted Gurr's "Polity II" data set (Gurr et al., 1989).

** Political Repression score collapsed into five categories: 0,1,2,3 = 1; 4,5,6 = 2; 7,8,9 = 3; 10,11,12 = 4; 13,14,15 = 5.

Filipino and Romanian political revolutions the military chose not to put down the popular uprisings, while the people of El Salvador and China have witnessed the slaughter of civilians by the military. So it is not necessarily the size of the military that dictates its ability to repress, but there is an attitudinal component that must be incorporated into the construct (Finer 1988). The extent to which the society has become militarized, and therefore military repression is viewed as an acceptable tool in maintaining order, may tell us more about the extent to which the state can rely on the military to subvert the political process. It becomes incumbent on researchers who seek answers to questions regarding the effect of militarization on societies to dig deeper than a mere reliance on available aggregate data, data which was collected for widely different purposes.

The measure of political repression offered in this analysis may also be in need of refinement. A four-level categorization of such a varying concept as political repression is bound to limit precise discrimination. The potential variance in the scope of repression in each level and category can certainly cause problems when one is looking to identify the effects of changing patterns. It could be that the hypothesized effect is taking place but it could only be picked up by a much more discriminating measure of repression. There is an obvious trade-off, however, between the breadth of the scale developed and its reliability.

An under-specified model is another potential source for the counter intuitive findings. Gurr's hypothesis of a curvilinear relationship between the military manpower and resources of the state and the violence against it, was predicated on the existence of political violence. Although Falk and Zwick's analysis, respectively, is not violence based, it is possible the current model under analysis needs to be controlled for the present of violence against the state. The state with a perfectly peaceful and contented populace may find little reason to engage in repressive activities, regardless of the amount of resources it diverts to its military sector. And though a cursory glance at the countries included in this analysis would suggest that most experience at least a modicum of political violence, a control variable for either the existence or level of violence within the state, or the

existence of "radical" political parties may help to discriminate between military resources devoted inwardly for those with an external orientation.

Controlling for the existence of either an external threat or external violence may also be a necessary component of an adequately specified model. A country engaged in external hostilities is very likely to increase the size and resources of its military sector. At the same time, domestic opposition may decrease in response to the external threat. The security dilemma, as it is commonly understood, argues that an increase in the military capabilities of an antagonist country will lead to a reciprocal response from the country under observation. Likewise, if the ruling coalition generates a sense of nationalism in response to the perceived external threat, one would expect to observe simultaneously both an increase in military resources and a decrease in political violence.

A further case can be made that it is not primarily the military that is the instrument of repression, but rather paramilitary forces that operate at the behest of the military (Janowitz, 1977). There are problems -- both analytical and practical -- that inhibit adopting this approach to the analysis. The practical issues revolve around access to adequate sources of data; analytical problems stem from the discrimination of the military from the paramilitary. As Janowitz puts it, "the military often supply the weapons and training for paramilitary forces and carry out inspections. Frequently personnel are interchanged, especially at the higher levels, and such exchanges are designed to reinforce the dominance of the armed forces (Janowitz, 1977:31).

Now if we relax for a moment the assumption that the model is correct, if not misspecified, there may be an alternative hypothesis that could be offered. Langton (1984) has examined the influence of military service on the social consciousness and propensity to protest of Peruvian mine workers. His conclusions are that "military service retards the development of class awareness..[and] reduces their participation in strikes and political demonstrations, and eases their insertion into the hierarchy and discipline of the work place" (p. 497). From these findings he suggests that for "those elites interested

in political order and labor discipline, these data must be reassuring and the policy implication obvious -- draft greater number of workers into the military" (ibid.). If Langton is correct, and military service serves to decrease the protest behavior of veterans, then one might expect that the higher the military participation ratio the more veterans in the workforce; the more veterans in the workforce, the lower the level of protests and labor strikes; and the lower the level of political violence against the state, the less repression by the state. Following this line of reasoning, one would suggest that an alternative hypothesis to the model tested here would posit that increases in the military participation ratio would lead to a decrease in political repression. For the most part, a relationship confirmed by this analysis.

The conclusions to be drawn in light of the disconfirmation of the model should not, however, immediately gravitate toward the stabilizing role of the military. Disconfirming any model is not the definitive test of causal relationship. Rather, science can only progress through the cumulative knowledge generated by subjecting hypotheses to multiple tests and retests, adapting the model where necessary and generating new data where possible. The real strength of the analysis presented in this paper lies in the development of a rigorous and operational measure of political repression. Further analysis is required to be confident in the identification of the factors that determine the scope and intensity of repression.

Conclusion

The analysis presented here tested a pooled time-series model of the relationship between the change in political repression, on the one hand, and changes in military participation ratios, economic austerity measures, and political development on the other. The hypothesized model posited that increases in the military participation ratio and the existence of IMF imposed austerity measures would predict to an increase in the levels of

political repression; increases in the level of political association would lead to a decrease in political repression.

A political repression score was developed by content analyzing the annual human rights reports of both Amnesty International and the US Department of State. Thirty two countries were coded for a twelve year period, 1976 to 1987. Pooled time-series, cross-sectional and time-series regression analysis was used to identify the strength and direction of the hypothesized relationship. The results suggest that the mechanisms run in the opposite direction of theoretical model as it was proposed. The pooled time-series data argues that an increase in military personnel will lead to a decrease in the level of political repression. Further analysis tentatively confirmed the direction of the relationship.

A number of factors were identified which may have had a confounding affect on the model. A more precise operationalization and measurement of the predictor variables may contribute to analysis that confides greater confidence in the results. Similarly, an outcome variable that allows for a greater discrimination between levels of political repression should be a necessary component of any retest. The model, as it was specified, may have been missing critical control variables. And finally, an alternative model was offered that may suggest that the empirical results identified the correct relationship. Increases in military participation may lead to a decrease in political protest, and subsequently the motivation for state repression.

Appendix

The sample used in this analysis consisted of 32 developing countries in Asia and Latin America. Thirty two countries clearly does not include all of the countries in these two regions. Countries were excluded for three main reasons: a) size, b) lack of data, and c) because the country was either occupied by foreign troops or engaged in a civil war.

The smaller countries, such as the island nations of the Caribbean or the "city states" of Asia, were excluded for theoretical reasons, even though in many instances human rights reports were available. Many, if not most, of these countries, have little or no military establishment. Internal security is generally handled by national police forces.

In some instances, such as Vietnam, Bhutan, and Suriname, there was not enough data available from either the human rights or the military personnel source. When this problem was encountered the case was simple dropped from the analysis.

For a number of countries, the existence of either a full scale civil war or the presence of an invasion force confounded the theoretical inferences that could be drawn from the analysis of military data. Examples are Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and El Salvador. McCormick and Mitchell (1988) argue that El Salvador should be included in any such analysis of human rights, but for reasons of the extent and source of their military resources, El Salvador was dropped from the sample.

China may be an unfortunate instance of excluding a country for all the wrong reasons. China was originally dropped from the analysis because although it can be categorized as a developing country, it is also considered to be one of the major powers by many analysts. In hindsight this may have been an oversight, but the strength of the pooled findings are such that it is doubtful that the inclusion or exclusion of one country would alter the direction of the results.

The countries included are:

Argentina
Bangladesh
Bolivia
Brazil
Haiti
Honduras
India
Indonesia
North Korea
South Korea
Malaysia

Burma
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Mexico
Nepal
Nicaragua
Pakistan
Panama
Paraguay
Peru

Cuba
Ecuador
Guatemala
Guyana
Philippines
Sri Lanka
Taiwan
Thailand
Uruguay
Venezuela

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