

POLITICAL TRUST IN LATIN AMERICA

by

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To my daughters Ignacia and Sofía.

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ABSTRACT

Political trust –the trust that people place in political institutions- seems to be critical for democracy. However, there is no agreement as to what the origins of trust are. What makes citizens trust or distrust their main political institutions? How can we explain the differences found across and within countries? These are the main questions driving this dissertation.

The central hypotheses of this study are (1) that we can find differences in levels of political trust both within and across countries, (2) that, at the individual level, political trust is related mainly to perceptions of fairness and competence of national governing institutions, and (3) that, at the country level, political trust is mostly explained by different levels of corruption.

In order to evaluate these claims, I analyzed political trust data from the World Values Survey of 50 democracies of the industrialized world, Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America. To evaluate country differences I used these 50 democracies. To evaluate individual differences and the individual-level correlates of trust, I focused on seven Latin American countries.

The results show that, at the country-level, political trust is higher among the most developed democracies and in those countries with longer democratic traditions, parliamentary governments and majoritarian electoral systems. These variables loose

relevance and statistical power, however, when the country level of corruption is introduced. Corruption is, according to the results obtained, the major factor in explaining average levels of political trust.

At the individual level data, in an analysis of Latin American citizens, we found that the most important factors explaining variations in political trust are those related to the perceptions of fairness and competence of their government institutions. Trust is considerably higher when institutions are considered fair and competent in their actions.

Political trust is important for governments. And citizens decide when to grant trust to their political institutions as a response to a multiplicity of factors, of which the level of corruption and the perceptions of institutional fairness and competence are among the most important ones.

CHAPTER 1:
POLITICAL TRUST AND INSTITUTIONAL TRUSTWORTHINESS

“Chile debe hacer un gran esfuerzo por recuperar confianzas, confianzas que han sido melladas. Confianza en las instituciones públicas, confianza en el mundo de la empresa y de los negocios, confianza en el mundo de los sindicatos y los trabajadores, confianza de los chilenos entre sí.” (President Ricardo Lagos, May 21 2003).

“Porque la corrupción quita legitimidad a los gobiernos y despoja a las instituciones de los recursos necesarios para entregarles servicios esenciales.[...] Se trata de un daño que perdura en el tiempo más allá de sus orígenes pues es también un problema de imagen: una vez que la población se ha formado la convicción de que sus autoridades son corruptas, cuesta mucho más deshacer esa imagen que lo que costó crearla a través de dos o tres hechos de corrupción” (José Miguel Insulza, Secretario General de la OEA, 31 de Enero de 2008).

Most Latin Americans faced, during the last ten or fifteen years of the Twentieth Century, new economic and political conditions that brought about important changes in their government structures and in their day-to-day lives. Some countries –including Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Chile- went through processes of transitions to democracy from previous military regimes. Others –such as Peru and Argentina- faced important changes in their economic policies, moving towards more open and market-driven policies. These developments pose important challenges to the ways that governments are handled and to the way they relate with their citizens. It is not

surprising, then, that political leaders would make important efforts to increase and improve trust relationships from the people, as the quote from former Chilean President Ricardo Lagos clearly denotes. It is not surprising either that besides all of these new political and economic challenges, another issue has come to the front: the increasing rejection of corruption in governmental affairs, not only as expressed by public opinion surveys, but also indicated by the actions that people claim from their governments (such as the impeachment and resignation of Collor de Melo in Brazil). Trust in government and corruption, then, are the two issues driving this dissertation.

Political trust –the trust that people place in political institutions- seems to be critical for democracy. It links citizens with governments and the institutions that represent them, thereby enhancing the legitimacy and stability of democratic government (Bianco 1994; Levi and Stoker 2000; Citrin and Muste 1999). Trust can be said to be both a resource for citizens as well as for governments. For citizens, trust reduces the complexity of choice and allows them to relax the need of constantly monitor governmental institutions. For governments, trust is beneficial by providing them with the certainty that they will be obeyed, relaxing the need for use of coercive force. Trust is, for governments, a source of power (Citrin and Muste 1999; Bianco 1998).

However, there is no agreement as to what the origins of trust are. What makes citizens trust or distrust their main political institutions? How can we explain the differences across and within countries? The central hypothesis of this study is that trust is related and originated in the perceived trustworthiness of institutions. Although the relevance of trustworthiness appears at least implicitly in most accounts of trust, it has seldom been considered in empirical research. By trustworthiness I mean the capacity

and willingness of the other to fulfill trust (Hardin 2001; Sztopka 1999).

What makes for trustworthy institutions? I propose two main features of an institution that would make it trustworthy. First, trustworthy institutions should be *fair* both in the process of policy making and in the outcomes those policies have; the belief in government fairness is related to perceptions that all interests have been considered, that their actions are neutral and lack of bias (Levi 1998; Tyler 1998, 2001; Levi and Stoker 2000). Second, trustworthy institutions should be *competent*. Institutions should not betray trust because of incompetence (Hardin 2001; Levi 1998; Levi and Stoker 2000). It is in the evaluation of these two elements, I argue, that citizens would decide whether or not to trust political institutions. Thus, citizens' trust should be a function of how trustworthy institutions are perceived; specifically, citizens will trust institutions when they consider that institutions are fair, and when they consider institutions to be competent.

A review of the literature about trust in political institutions shows that there are other –and competing- theories that could explain citizens' trust or distrust in institutions. As we will see later on, we can group those theories in three alternative explanations: cultural, institutional and economic theories of political trust. Although I am not arguing that these factors are irrelevant to explain trust in Latin America, I do expect them to have a smaller impact in political trust than the one produced by corruption and perceptions of fairness and competence. The relevance of each one, however, remains an empirical question –one that is to be tested in subsequent chapters of this dissertation.

Assessing the impact of the different factors that might affect levels of political trust at the individual- and the country-level of analysis requires both aggregate measures

of the institutional setting, economic performance, trustworthiness, and survey data about political trust, values and cultural characteristics, perceptions of economic performance, perceptions about the institutional setting and perceptions of the trustworthiness of institutions. In order to do this, I constructed a data set which includes variables that can be used to measure all of these factors. The survey data to be analyzed comes from the World Values Survey in the following period: 1995-1997, and 1999-2001, and includes 50 democracies from Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, and Industrialized nations. These data will be used in chapter 2, which presents an analysis of Latin American data on a broad comparative perspective. Chapters 3 and 4, take on a closer look to seven Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. In order to test the different hypotheses, I will pool the survey data in a single file. In addition, a variety of aggregate measures were added to the merged data set in order to test the impact of country-level factors on political trust. These measures come from different sources, and they are explained in detail in chapter 2.

This dissertation focuses the analysis in Latin America for a number of reasons. First, it is probably the least studied region with respect to the question on political trust. Therefore, it allows us to test the hypotheses on a relatively new environment. Second, the countries included present different political, economic and institutional trajectories making this region a relatively heterogeneous one. Furthermore, although there are important variations in their levels of trust among Latin American countries, this region presents, on average, the lowest levels of political trust, making it a good setting to study the origins of trust as well as its potential consequences for democratic governments.

The proposed project advances current research on political trust in the following

ways. First, it provides an analysis of a seldom studied region, testing current hypotheses about the origins of trust in developing nations. Second, it provides an alternative explanation of trust which, although proposing new elements for analysis, it allows also for the incorporation of the major hypotheses under a new frame of analysis. Third, knowing what makes citizens trust political institutions is essential for a better understanding of how those levels of trust could make a difference for democratic governance. Finally, it also provides lessons in policy-making. If we understand what makes citizens trust their governments and if trust can indeed be linked to the trustworthiness of these institutions, trust can be attained and eventually increased with the establishment of better and trustworthy governments.

The remainder of this chapter continues as follows. The first section presents a discussion on the concept of political trust to be used in this dissertation, and the second one presents the strategy used to measure trust in political institutions. The third and fourth sections present the theoretical debate over the origins of political trust. The third section discusses the main theories used to explain political trust in the literature, and the fourth section presents and discuss the role and relevance of institutional trustworthiness as determinant of political trust. The final sections present the research and the dissertation plans.

1. Defining Political Trust

For an understanding of why Latin American's public trust or don't trust their main political institutions, two main issues need to be considered. First, it is important to provide a definition of political trust. This is the task in this first section. Second, it is

necessary to discuss and present the way that trust in political institutions will be measured. This point will be addressed in the second section of this chapter.

Research on political trust appeared at the end of the 1960s, used as a crucial element for the definition of support for the political system in the works of Easton (1965, 1975) and Gamson (1968), and it was empirically tested and promoted with the publications of Miller (1974a, 1974b) and Citrin (1974). This tradition of research focused on political trust as one of the components of support, and shared the attention of researchers with other related components such as alienation and cynicism (Levi and Stoker 2000). The main problem from these works is the lack of a clear definition, where political trust was considered to be what was measured by “the NES (National Election Study) Political Trust index” (Levi and Stoker 2000). Following the publication of *Trust*, edited by Diego Gambetta in 1988, and of Putnam’s *Making Democracy Work* (1993), however, a new interest in trust appears and renewed attempts to provide with a definition have been made, as well as new empirically based research has appeared (Levi and Stoker 2000).

Scholars have usually avoided the task of formally defining trust (Misztal 1996; Seligman 1997; Sztompka 1999). The concept is, at the same time, simple and complex: it is used in everyday language and the social sciences have attempted to incorporate it to explain a broad range of social phenomena. Due in part to the common and ordinary use of the concept, “social theories tend to conceive of trust by pointing to the range of benefits that trust provides [...] The omnipresence of trust and its problematic and multiple meanings have resulted in an unimpressive record on the part of the social sciences in grasping its essence” (Misztal 1996: 13-14). It is possible, nevertheless, to

find in the literature definitions of trust and political trust. Thus, it might be helpful to start this discussion providing two different definitions of trust that have been offered:

Political trust can be defined as the probability... that the political system (or some part of it) will produce preferred outcomes even if left untended. In other words, it is the probability of getting preferred outcomes without the group doing anything to bring them about (Gamson 1968: 54).

Trust is the *belief* concerning the action that is to be expected from others. The belief refers to probabilities that (certain categories of) others will do certain things or refrain from doing certain things, which in either case affects the well-being of the holder of the belief, as well as possibly the well-being of others or a relevant collectivity. Trust is the belief that others, through their action or inaction, will contribute to my/our *well-being* and refrain from inflicting damage upon me/us (Offe 1999: 47) (italics in the original).

With over thirty years between them, notice the similarities in these definitions. Gamson (1968) was writing about political trust, while Offe refers to trust more generally. However, both definitions, as well as most accounts of trust, highlight the following elements: trust is considered to be a belief, a belief about the future actions of others; and, trust is risky, because, when given, there is no certainty about the outcomes.

Trust, then, emerges only in the contest of social relations (Sztompka 1999; Hardin 1998; Luhmann 1988, 1996). That is, we need a relationship between at least two for trust to appear. This is so because trust is related to human action (Sztompka 1999; Offe 1999; Misztal 1996). Trust, then, cannot be said to exist between unanimated objects: we cannot trust the sun to rise every morning (although we do expect it). For trust to exist purposeful action has to be present (Sztompka 1999; Offe 1999; Hardin 2001). In other words, a trust relationship is one where two strategic actors are involved.

Formally, we can state this relationship in the following way: A trusts B (to do X). In the context of this dissertation, this means that a person can trust an institution to

do what is expected to do, or to behave according to the parameters that it is expected to behave.

While interpersonal trust –the trust we place in other individuals- has seldom been questioned, several arguments have been made against the notion that people can trust institutions. Consider, for example, the argument made by Hardin (1998, 1999, 2000, 2001). According to Hardin, trust in institutions is possible only if one of the following two conditions is satisfied: we know every member of a given institution, or we know to the details the role and authority structure of the institution. Since we cannot expect citizens to have that kind of knowledge, Hardin concludes, trust in institutions is not possible (1998).

I will argue here, however, that trust in institutions is possible as long as people have at least some level of knowledge of the institution she is asked to trust. For trust to appear, even in a relationship between two individuals, there is no need for such a high level of knowledge that Hardin assumes. In fact, trust does not need to be based on knowledge because it emerges in situations of risk; in other words, trust emerges in situations of incomplete information (Sztompka 1999; Tyler 1998; Mansbridge 1999; Blackburn 1998; Braithwaite 1998; Brennan 1998; Offe 1999; Luhmann 1988). Moreover, citizens do have some knowledge. They have knowledge of policy outputs and leaders, and they relate to institutions all the time in their daily routine.

The first element that appears in any definition of trust is the idea that trust is a belief: when we trust someone we are expressing a belief about her future actions. Trust is a belief about what the other will or will not do and the outcomes of that action (Sztompka 1999; Hardin 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001; Luhmann 1988, 1996; Offe 1999;

Misztal 1996; Gambetta 1988). This belief might be grounded on different reasons or assumptions: for example, trust might be based on knowledge (Hardin 2001) or it might result from empathy or from a principle intended to benefit others (Mansbridge 1999). The bases for trust, however, are directly related to the object, person, or group of people to which trust is directed to (Levi and Stoker 2000; Citrin and Muste 1999).

Since trust is a belief about future actions and their outcomes, the second main characteristic of any trust relation is that it is a risky type of relation. When we trust others we are not certain of the outcomes, we expect something from the actions of others without knowing what the final outcome will be. Moreover, the person trusting is aware of the risk, making herself vulnerable to the other (Luhmann 1988; Offe 1999; Levi and Stoker 2000; Sztompka 1999; Gambetta 1988).

Trust, then, arises as a way to reduce uncertainty about future actions and, at the same time, increases the risk that we face in any social relation (Luhmann 1988; Offe 1999; Levi and Stoker 2000; Sztompka 1999).

The third major element of trust is that it depends in some evaluation of the trustworthiness of the other. Although the relevance of trustworthiness appears at least implicitly in most accounts of trust, it has seldom being considered in empirical research (Levi and Stoker 2000). By trustworthiness I mean the capacity of the other to fulfill my trust. These evaluations make us reduce the uncertainty we face, and provide a base for trusting relations to appear: “even when there is no call for trust, a person or institution can possess the attributes of trustworthiness, which assure potential trusters that the trusted party will not betray trust” (Levi and Stoker 2000). Trustworthy institutions are expected to fulfill the expectations for two reasons: because they *should* do it and because

they *can* do it (Hardin 2001; Sztompka 1999; Levi and Stoker 2000). A more thorough discussion of trustworthiness will be provided in section 4 of this chapter.

Not explicit in these definitions, but also an important part of most accounts of trust is the idea that, by expressing trust, the person trusting is supporting the other: there is an expectation that the other will act in a certain way and by trusting we forgo the need of control (Bianco 1994, 1998; Levi and Stoker 2000; Pettit 1998; Blackburn 1998).

Political Trust: Types and Objects of Political Support

Most accounts of political trust consider trust to be a form of support directed to political objects or actors. Bianco (1994, 1998), for example, argues that by expressing trust, citizens defer to the judgment of elected officials (Norris 1999; Klingemann 1999; Dalton 2000; Miller 1974; Citrin 1974; Citrin and Muste 1999; Levi and Stoker 2000). But what type of support is the one being offered? The discussion has been based on the classification of types of support offered by Easton (Easton 1965, 1975).

David Easton (1965, 1975) provided the most useful and used definition and classification of types of support for the political system. In his theory, Easton defines a political system that is constantly being affected by two types of inputs: demands and support. Support is generally defined as “an attitude by which a person orients himself to an object either favorable or unfavorably, positively or negatively” (Easton 1975: 436). In processing those demands and support, the political system results in policy outputs, which in turn, affect subsequent demands and support. And support, in this framework, is considered a major factor in the functioning and survival of the political system. He distinguishes further between two types of support: specific and diffuse.

Specific support is related to what the authorities do and how they do it. It refers to people's satisfaction with perceived outcomes and performance of political authorities. Specific support, in other words, is defined as containing two elements: it is directed toward political authorities, and is an evaluation of the performance of those authorities. In Easton words "the uniqueness of specific support lies in its relationship to the satisfactions that members of a system feel they obtain from the *perceived outputs and performance of the political authorities*" (Easton 1975: 437, italics added). As such, specific support is deemed to change constantly. As new outputs and policies are produced by incumbent authorities, citizens would evaluate those outcomes, and generate different levels of support for them. Specific support, then, is directly related to the day-to-day activities of the political system and its authorities.

Diffuse support, on the other hand, refers to what a political object means or represents for the members of the system, and not to what the object does. Easton defines diffuse support as "the reservoir of favorable attitudes and good will that would help members to accept and tolerate outputs that are damaging to their wants" (Easton 1965: 273). Diffuse support, then, is related to generalized attitudes and attachments to the objects of the political system.

There are two components to diffuse support: trust and legitimacy. Following Gamson's (1968) definition, Easton understands trust as the feelings that the political system would generate preferred outcomes even in conditions of low or absent scrutiny. Trust, then, would signal long-established feeling of attachments to the political system, as opposed to specific forms of support which are a direct response to the outcomes of the system.

Summarizing then, Easton argues that trust is a form of support directed to the political regime. This form of support is, further, diffuse; that is, is linked not to what the regime does (the outcomes of the process), but to what the regime means and represents to citizens.

The results of empirical research have produced several sets of arguments against this classification of types of support, two of which are relevant for the discussion here. The first objection to this framework is whether it is relevant and necessary to distinguish between specific and diffuse support. Even though there is a difference at the theoretical level between specific and diffuse support, to separate them in practice has proved to be a very difficult task. Moreover, it appears that what matters most is the classification of types of support based on the *object* to which support is directed to. The second objection is related to how we should measure political trust. I will return to this later point in the next section.

The first objection to Easton's theory, then, is whether it is relevant and necessary to distinguish between specific and diffuse support. According to some researchers (Norris 1999; Klingemann 1999; Dalton 1999; Canache 2002), it would be better to change the focus from the *types* of support for the *objects* of support. Instead of focusing in specific and diffuse support, it seems more relevant to focus on the objects to which support is directed. As Citrin and Muste (1999) argue

“Like other attitudes, political trust and support have specific *objects*. One does not simply support or trust; one supports or trusts some politician, political group, process, or institution. In characterizing the individual's orientations toward government, therefore, one needs to specify what aspect of government is being evaluated.” (Citrin and Muste 1999: 467, italics in the original).

In addition, empirical research does, as I'll show later, support this claim.¹ This approach is not new, however. Even Easton (1965) distinguished between support directed toward the political community, the regime and incumbent authorities, the three objects of the political system that he defines. Support for the community is generally understood as a basic attachment to the nation. The regime, in turn, is defined by Easton as the basic framework for governing the country. The authorities, finally, are politicians and public officials or, more generally, those who occupy authority positions in the regime (Easton 1965).

It is this distinction between objects of support the one that appears to offer more valuable insights in the analysis of support, and the distinction between the regime and the political authorities is the one that has been more intensively studied, because it reflects the distinction between specific and diffuse support (Canache 2002). In effect, according to Easton, "specific support in response to authorities; it is only indirectly relevant, if at all, to the input of support for the regime or the political community" (Easton 1975: 437).

The problem with this classification, however, is that the "regime" as defined by Easton, is a wide category that encompasses several elements, and it would be better to further distinguish between different objects within the regime (Norris 1999a). According to Norris, "In Easton's conception the regime constituted the basic framework for governing the country. People could not pick and choose between different elements of the regime, approving some parts while rejecting others. Yet in practice citizens do seem to distinguish between different elements of the regime" (Norris 1999: 9).

¹ Levels of trust usually change from institution to institution, for example.

As an answer to this problem, then, Norris and her colleagues (1999) expanded the classification into a fivefold framework, “distinguishing between political support for the community, regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions, and political actors” (9). Similarly, Canache (2002) also argues that support for the regime can be expanded, and she distinguishes between trust in institutions, support for incumbent authorities, and support for democracy as a form of government in her study of structures of support in Venezuela (see also Klingemann 1999; Dalton 1999). Within the regime, therefore, we could distinguish between support for democracy and trust in institutions.

I agree that to understand structures of support we should focus the attention on the object to which support is directed, rather than in the type of support provided (as is the emphasis in the Eastonian framework). Thus, we could distinguish between support for the political community, support for democracy as a form of government, support for the regime’s institutions, and support for authorities. In other words, trust in political institutions can be defined and understood as a distinct dimension of support, and not as “a measure expressing something else”.

Summarizing then, in this dissertation I’ll understand political trust as the belief that institutions will behave in such a way that they “will contribute to my/our well-being, and refrain from inflicting damage upon me/us” (Offe 1999:47). In other words, political trust is based on a normative expectation about the behavior from the other. This belief implies a risk to the person trusting, making this belief a conditional one: trust is not guarantee for every institution at any given point in time. The bases used to grant trust is what I’ll discuss in this dissertation. Finally, trust should be understood as a form of support, in this case, directed to the main political institutions of the countries

considered in the analyses.

2. Measuring Political Trust

The second issue that we need to consider before turning to the question of why people trust or don't trust their political institutions is the question of measurement of political trust. In this section I briefly present the methodological discussion about how to measure political trust and I present the Political Trust scale to be used in the following chapters.

Measuring Political Trust: What has been done?

Support for the regime's institutions, which is the focus of attention in this dissertation, is based on people's trust of the institutions governing the country. Following Easton's argument that trust is a form of support for the political regime, researchers in the United States developed a battery of questions designed to measure trust in the regime: the Trust in Government Index from the National Election Study (NES, hereafter) (Levi and Stoker 2000). The results obtained from this index, however, have generated a wide and known controversy over whether it is measuring support for the regime or the incumbent authorities. I'll argue that the NES index in fact measures support for the incumbent authorities, and that we need to construct another index in order to measure trust in the regime's institutions.

The controversy between Miller (1974a, 1974b) and Citrin (1974) over the meaning of this index is widely known and needs only to be mentioned here: it is not clear whether the index is tapping support for incumbent governments or support for the

political regime. Miller (1974a) argued that declining levels of trust in government in the United States signaled a pervasive and enduring discontent with government "... thereby increasing the potential for radical change" (Miller, 1974a: 951). Citrin (1974), in a direct response to this article argued that this decline in the levels of trust expressed no more than discontent with current governments and politicians' actions; showing, therefore, short-term attitudes that can not be associated with crisis of legitimacy or the potential for radical change of the regime.

The first hint on how to interpret these questions is provided by the researchers who developed this set of measures. According to Stokes "The criteria of judgment implicit in these questions were partly ethical, that is, the honesty and other ethical qualities of *public officials* were part of what the sample was asked to judge. But the criteria extended to other qualities as well, including the ability and efficiency of *government officials* and the correctness of their policy decisions" (Stokes 1962: 64; Hetherington 1999). Several scholars have joined this controversy (Muller and Juckam 1977; Abramson and Finifter 1981; Muller, Juckam, and Seligson 1982; Feldman 1983; Seligson 1983; Erber and Lau 1990), attempting to assess the meaning of the index (see Citrin and Muste 1999 and Levi and Stoker 2000 for a review of the debate). Even Easton, who defines trust as a form of diffuse support, acknowledges that this index may indeed be related to specific support more than diffuse support (Easton, 1975).

The core of the problem is on how the questions are asked. The Trust in Government Index is composed of the following four items (*italics added*):

- Do you think that *people in the government* waste a lot of money we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or don't waste much of it?

- Do you think that quite a few of *the people running the government* are a little crooked, not very many are, or do you think hardly any of them are crooked at all?
- How much of the time do you think you can trust *government in Washington to do what is right* –just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time?
- Would you say the *government* is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?

Looking at how the questions are asked two problems arise. First, these questions ask people to evaluate “the people in government”, and not the institutions. That is, the focus is on the authorities and not the regime’s institutions. Second, these questions make references to how the government acts, that is, they ask respondents to evaluate authorities in terms of their performance. Thus, these questions better represent support for authorities or, in Easton’s framework, specific support, rather than support for the regime’s institutions (Citrin and Muste 1999; Muller and Juckam 1977; Seligson 1983). What we need, therefore, in order to measure support for the regime’s institutions, or political trust, is another set of questions that, first, do not refer to authorities and, second, do not ask respondents to evaluate performance.

The Political Trust Scale

As we have seen, the traditional battery of questions used to measure trust or support for the regime’s institutions is in fact measuring support for incumbent authorities. These measures directly ask respondents to evaluate authorities in terms of their performance. Thus, what we need is to construct a measure of political trust, or

trust in political institutions, that is in fact measuring trust oriented to the regime's institutions.

We need, therefore, to provide a reliable and valid measure of trust in the regime's institutions. This measure should have the following properties: first, it needs to specify the object of trust unambiguously; in other words, it needs to name the institutions to be included in the index. Second, a measure of political trust should be distinguishable from measures of support for other objects of the political system.

I measure trust in institutions using the following battery of questions available in the World Values Survey: "I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?" The institutions included are the Church, Armed Forces, Legal System, Press, Television, Police, Labor Unions, National Government, Political Parties, Parliament, Civil Service and Major Companies.

These questions ask respondents to say how much confidence they grant to a large number of institutions, allowing us to distinguish between political and non-political institutions. The distinction between political and non-political institutions, however, is likely to vary from country to country, depending on the characteristics and roles that those institutions play in society.

To avoid this kind of problems, I use a restricted definition of political institutions, and, in constructing an index of political trust I will only use responses to the questions of trust in the National Government, Political Parties, Parliament and the Civil

Service.²

Important characteristics of these questions are that trust in institutions (a) is asked without any reference to the performance of institutions, and (b) without any reference to specific leaders or roles within those institutions. They avoid, therefore, the problems identified with respect to the NES Trust Index. Moreover, they satisfy one of the requirements mentioned before: they explicitly specify the political object to which trust is directed. Because of these characteristics, these questions are less likely to present any bias in the responses toward either a specific theory of trust or toward the evaluation of a specific leader or group of leaders, which are the problems identified in the NES index (Mishler and Rose 2001).³

A final advantage of using this set of questions is that it allows us to be part of the tradition of measurement of political trust in comparative research, where different versions of the same index have been used to measure and compare levels of trust in political institutions across different countries.

Having discussed the notion of political trust and its measurement, we need now to evaluate the possible explanations for trust. When will individuals trust or distrust governmental institutions? That is the issue we'll address now.

² Due to differences in data availability, the index of trust will be limited to confidence in parliament and the civil service when we consider all 50 countries, and the full 4-item index when considering Latin American countries.

³ It might be argued that this measure of trust in institutions doesn't completely eliminate the incumbent effect. Research has shown, however, that levels of trust in institutions are consistently and significantly different from trust in the incumbents. See Patterson and Magleby (1992) for the case of Congress.

3. What Explains Political Trust? Three Major Explanations

In the previous section, I discussed the concept and measurement of political trust. I argued that political trust can be defined as a risky belief on the trustworthiness of the regime's institutions, and that this belief expresses support for those institutions. But what makes people trust or distrust political institutions? What are the sources of such a belief? What makes people take the risk to put themselves on the hands of other and express trust on them? These are the questions I address in the following two sections of this chapter.

The first and maybe tempting answer to the question of why people trust is because *that is what some people do*: trust, in this theory, would be a personality trait formed in the early stages of the psychological development of individuals, and that endures through adult life (Newton and Norris 2000). As Newton and Norris (2000) show, in this theory some individuals

“[...] have an optimistic view of life and are willing to help others, cooperate, and trust. Because of their own early life experiences, others are more pessimistic and misanthropic. They are thus inclined to be guarded or alienated, more distrustful and cautious of others, and pessimistic about social and political affairs and about people and politicians in general. In this regard trust is an affective orientation that forms part of our basic personality and is *largely independent of our experience of the external political world*” (Newton and Norris 2000: 59; italics added).

Several problems arise from such an approach. First, if trust is a personality trait, we should expect to find a very close relationship at the individual-level between the levels of trust granted to different objects in every social context. A quick look at trust data, however, shows that this is not the case (Newton 1999). Second, if this were true, it would be difficult to explain variations over time. If one is prone to trust, then we should

expect trust to remain unaltered through the years. Finally, and more important, this approach contends that “our experience of the world” is irrelevant. As I’ll discuss below, however, there are very important reasons to believe that this is not the case. So there must be some other explanation other than just personality to explain why people trust or distrust political institutions.

Three different theoretical traditions that explain trust in political institutions have been developed and they will be explored and presented in the remaining of this section. These three traditions place the emphasis for the explanation of political trust in different aspects and are linked to the main theoretical traditions in political science research.

Cultural Explanations of Political Trust

The basic assumption on this tradition is that individuals will tend to trust or distrust others and their governments differently according to the prevalent norms of sociability in their societies, and according to the prevalence or absence of certain values. Both macro- and micro-level explanations can be found under this tradition, that is, explanations for differences in the levels of trust across countries as well as among individuals within one nation. Thus, we should expect some cultures to provide more grounds for trusting relations to appear than others do, and some cultural or value-related individual characteristics that would explain differences in trust for individuals. Here, I will focus on two major hypotheses that have been proposed: first, that there is a relationship between social capital –interpersonal trust and participation in social organizations- and political trust and, second, that the emergence of postmaterialist values can depress levels of trust in political institutions.

Almond and Verba (1963) argued in *The Civic Culture* that citizens relate differently to the different objects of the political system, configuring the nation's political culture. They defined political culture as "the political system as internalized in the cognitions, feelings, and evaluations of its population" (Almond and Verba 1963: 13) and argued that a "civic culture" –that is, a political culture suitable for democratic systems- is characterized by a knowledgeable, trusting, and participatory citizenry (Almond and Verba 1963). Political trust, in this frame, then, relates to the evaluations of the population of its political institutions.

Recent developments of the political culture arguments can be found in the theory of social capital as developed by Putnam (1993, 1995, 2000) and in the theory of cultural change and postmaterial values developed by Inglehart (1997, 1999, 2000). Both theories emphasize the role of trust in a democratic political culture, but their arguments, hypothesis, and implications vary. I'll discuss here both of them.

The concept of "social capital" first appeared in Pierre Bourdieu's (1986) and Coleman's (1988, 1990) writings, although the concept did not gain the wide attention it has now until the publication of Putnam's *Making Democracy Work* in 1993. In this book Putnam argued that a major cause for the different rates of success of Italian regions –both economic and political success- is due to the different levels of social capital observed on those communities. Social capital has been defined by Putnam as "features of social life –networks, norms and trust- that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives" (Putnam 1995: 664-665).

Although there have been important criticism to this work (Levi 1996; Portes 1998; Tarrow 1996), the relevance of social capital has been quickly incorporated into the

study of patterns of support for democratic regimes. The question is whether social capital is at all related to political support and whether “civic communities” and citizens with a high stock on social capital would tend to express more or less support for their regime institutions. Specifically with respect to trust, Almond and Verba (1963) already noted an apparent correlation between social trust and political trust, and “surmised that trusting publics were a key facet of regime legitimacy” (Power and Clarke 2001: 53). And Putnam argues that although social trust and political trust might be empirically correlated, “they are logically quite distinct” (Putnam 1995: 665). In general terms, moreover, the empirical evidence is inconclusive. Let’s consider the arguments and results for the potential impact of social trust and civic engagement on political trust.

The relationship between interpersonal and political trust is probably one of the most debated ones. For some researchers both phenomena are independent and different ones, not related to each other, and where different explanations have to be built (Newton 1999; Putnam 1993, 2000; Inglehart 1997, 1999). Thus, according to Newton (1999) “social and political trust are not necessarily related, and may not be closely related at all in any given place or at any given time [...] the reason seems to be that social and political trust are related to different sets of social, economic and political variables” (Newton 1999: 180).

For others, there is a relationship: both interpersonal and political trust corresponds to the same type of belief, although oriented toward different objects. If there is a relation between them, then, it is from interpersonal to political trust: those who trust in others will tend to trust in institutions (Della Porta 2000; Brehm and Rahn 1997; Levi 1998).

The same ambivalence can be found with respect to the impact of civic engagement, on political trust. While membership in secondary organizations has been proposed as the first step on trusting others (Brehm and Rahn 1997) (joining leads to trust), it has also been argued that it is not necessarily related to political trust (Putnam 1993). There are, however, reasons to believe that civic engagement can be related to political trust; according to Brehm and Rahn (1997), we should expect “a negative relationship between membership in associations and confidence in national institutions” (Brehm and Rahn 1997: 1004). This is so, they argue, because these organizations create a civic space that is different and opposed to the political sphere (Cohen 1999).

Hall (2002) reviewing the British case, on the other hand, shows that membership in associations is not associated to political trust at the aggregate level or at the individual level. Overall, then, current research shows evidence on both types of arguments. As Hall (2002) states “the lines of causation remain elusive. Declining social trust may erode political trust or vice versa, or a common set of factors may depress both” (Hall 2002: 52). The direction of the effect, if any, then, remains as an empirical question.

Values are also expected to influence trust in political institutions, because they are used as standards for the evaluation of political objects (Dalton 2000; Inglehart 1997, 1999; Gabriel 1995; Orren 1997). According to Gabriel (1995), “since values are used as standards in evaluating political situations and objects, a strong relationship can be expected between value orientations and feelings of trust [...] feelings of distrust will emerge when there is a perceived discrepancy between people’s normative expectations and the conduct of public affairs” (Gabriel 1995: 367).

More specifically, a second version of the cultural theories of political trust can be

found in Inglehart's work. According to Inglehart (1997), contemporary societies are experiencing a fundamental change in their predominant set of values together with their change in economic and political conditions. Together with the changes in economic growth and societal conditions of post-modern societies, an important shift in terms of the preferences and values of their citizens can be observed. These changes involve a shift from material values –those emphasizing security and survival- toward postmaterial values –those emphasizing quality of life and self-expression-.

In terms of the relationship between postmaterial values and trust in political institutions, Inglehart argues that the appearance and development of more postmaterialist publics will tend to depress the levels of confidence in public institutions, because there is a growing skepticism and rejection of authority figures and structures. The postmodern shift is a “more away from both traditional authority and state authority. It reflects a declining emphasis on authority in general. [...] This leads to declining confidence in hierarchical institutions” (Inglehart 1997: 79, 1999; Dalton 1999, 2000). At the same time, however, post-material values go together with interpersonal trust: societies with higher percentages of people expressing post-material priorities present higher levels of interpersonal trust (Inglehart 1999).

Empirical research in developed societies has found evidence of this relationship: Dalton, for example argues that there is “clear evidence of a link between postmaterial values and a lack of confidence in political institutions for most Trilateral nations” (Dalton 2000: 259). More importantly, Dalton interprets this finding not as a challenge to political legitimacy, but as a changing on the sources of legitimacy in all major institutions: “legitimacy based on inclusion is replacing legitimacy based on hierarchical

authority” (Dalton 2000: 261; Inglehart 1999, 1997). This process, characterized by a growing emphasis on self-expression and political participation, is therefore, a challenge to traditional and modern forms of authority and “inherently conducive to democratization” (Inglehart 1997: 79).

Trust and Institutional Design

An alternative approach to political trust argues that political trust is endogenously created. The characteristics of the institutional setting can, according to this theory, foster or depress the levels of political trust. This theory, as well as the others discussed here, has both micro- and macro-level variations: that is, we find arguments about the aggregate effects of institutions on average levels of trust across nations and argument about the effects of institutions on individual levels of trust. The general argument, however, remains the same: institutions matter, since they shape the structure of behavior of individuals in coherent and predictable ways, generating more or less trust, depending on the characteristics of the institutional setting.

How can institutions affect the way people relate to their governments and how can they “produce” more or less trusting individuals? A first way to look at this is to evaluate the ability of institutions to make credible commitments and its effect on trust.

The ability to make credible commitments refers to the capacity to honor agreements and/or to act according to certain standards. This ability makes institutions relatively predictable, and “significantly reduces the citizen’s need to make a personal investment in monitoring and enforcing government and thus enhance citizen trust of government” (Levi 1998: 86).

How can institutions establish such commitments? According to North and Weingast (1989) there are two ways to assure this commitment: “one is by setting a precedent of responsible behavior, appearing to be committed to a set of rules that he will consistently enforce” (North and Weingast 1989: 804).⁴ The second form to assure commitment, according to North and Weingast is “by being constrained to obey a set of rules that do not permit leeway for violating commitment” (North and Weingast 1989: 804), pointing, then, to the relevance of institutions and their design as to be able to anticipate incentives problems. Thus, credible commitments require institutional arrangements that will produce the feared sanctions if need be (Daunton 1998; Greif 1994). Institutional and constitutional arrangements can, in this view, structure behavior and attitudes. Certain institutional features would increase trust from the part of citizens, because they would provide incentives for politicians to be more responsive to citizen’s demands and, therefore, citizens will have incentives to trust and support them in their decisions and actions (Jackman and Miller 1996).

Anderson and his colleagues, for example, argue that the same set of democratic institutions “can have different consequences for different groups among those governed by them, and in particular for those in the political minority and majority” (Anderson and Guillory 1997: 68). This is so because different democratic institutions treat the winners and the losers differently.

Winners, to be sure, will always be more compelled to be satisfied with the government’s performance and with the way democracy and its institutions work.

⁴ North and Weingast consider this alternative to be less effective than the second one. The problem, according to the authors is that “the pressures and continual strain of fiscal necessity eventually led rulers to ‘irresponsible behavior’ and the violation of agreements” (North and Weingast 1989: 804).

Listhaug (1995), for example, shows that voters who are politically close to the incumbent party are more trusting of governing institutions and politicians than those in the opposition. On the same vein of analysis Norris (1999) argues that institutional arrangements are not neutral, ruling out or in some specific groups of the decision-making process; and she shows that winners “are more likely to believe that the political system is responsive to their needs” (Norris 1999: 234).

But, as Anderson and Guillory (1997) show, winners and losers in consensual and majoritarian systems will show different levels of satisfaction in these two types of democracy (see also Lijphart 1999). In their research they find that the level of satisfaction with democracy and the level of trust in political institutions are influenced by whether people belong to the majority or minority groups. More importantly, they also show that political institutions matter: “the more consensual the democracy, the more likely it is that loser are satisfied with the functioning of democracy and the less likely it is that winners are satisfied” (1997: 78). In majoritarian system, on the other hand, satisfaction is higher among winners.

One important contribution of this work is that they focused on the –up to then– neglected relationship between institutional arrangements and public support. They avoid the problem of little variation at the institutional level using a comparative perspective that allow them to evaluate the different effects that institutions might have on citizens and the support they express to the political system. They also give an important step in research by linking individual characteristics and macro-level factors.

Several problems arise from their research, however, that need to be addressed. First, they focused the analysis only on European countries, so the study was restricted to

a limited range of established democracies. We need, however, to expand the scope of the comparison, in order to have more confidence on the results obtained. Second, by using the classification of consensual/majoritarian system as their independent variable, it is not clear which specific institution within those systems influenced levels of public support. We need, therefore, to research on the specific institutions within systems in order to disentangle the specific effect of each institution; moreover, since there is considerable variation within each “ideal type”, more specification on the institutions or constitutional arrangements is essential. Some researchers have addressed these issues.

Which institutional features, then, might increase trust among citizens? In other words, which are the specific characteristics of the institutional setting that might explain differences in the levels trust expressed by individuals?

Norris (1999b) evaluates the impact of different institutional arrangements on the confidence in five major political and civic institutions, in a wider number of 25 major democracies, and including respondents from the Americas, Central and Eastern Europe, Asia, and Western Europe. Besides the impact on trust of the winners/losers status of the respondents, she also includes a number a variables in the analysis to test the impact of different institutions.

First, Norris argues that within democracies public support should be higher among those democracies with a “widespread political rights and civil liberties” (Norris 1999: 223). In other words, she contends that political trust will be higher in countries with “better democracies”. This claim is supported by the results she reports: countries with better-quality of democracy –as measured by the Freedom House ratings on political rights and civil liberties- do show higher levels of political support.

In this same vein of argumentation, Torcal (2003) shows, that the democratic history of nations is important to explain both country-level and individual-level variations in the level of trust. Countries with longer democratic traditions, he argues, do present higher levels of political trust.

Second, Norris also includes the distinction between presidential and parliamentary systems, claiming that parliamentary systems should generate greater levels of trust, given that in these systems “all parties continue to have a stake on the policy-making process” (Norris 1999: 223), as opposed to the winner-take-all presidential systems.

Third, and with respect to party systems, there is also disagreement as to what the specific impact of the number of parties would have on political trust. Miller and Listhaug (1990), for example, had proposed as hypothesis: “that a smaller number of parties in a system is correlated with popular disaffection with democratic governance because there are fewer policy choices for citizens” (Miller and Listhaug 1990 quoted in Anderson 1998: 575). In their analysis of the levels of trust in the US, Sweden, and Norway, Miller and Listhaug show that political trust is higher in Norway a country with a proportional system of representation which yields a larger number of parties and that trust levels of lower in the US with a majoritarian system and a corresponding two party system.

Weil (1989), on the other hand, argued that dissatisfaction might arise in cases with high polarization and fragmentation of the party system, and in cases of cabinet instability. Together these elements configure a setting where the opposition presents an unresponsive structure that generates impasse and gridlock among political actors, and a

decline in trust in political institutions and democratic legitimacy. Weil focus his research on six countries (US, Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, and Spain), increasing, therefore, the comparison group used by Miller and Listhaug. His analysis, finally, provide with ample evidence supporting his hypothesis.

Norris, finally, argues that “countries with two-party and moderate multi-party systems should have the highest levels of institutional support” (Norris 1999: 225). This is so because “fragmented party systems are characterized by ideological polarization, weak and unstable coalition governments, and bidding war, whereas systems with a few broadly based and centrist parties are better placed to aggregate interests into broad social and ideological coalitions. In contrast, we expect two-party and moderate multi-party systems to function more effectively as a mechanism for translating electoral choices into government policy” (Norris 1999: 224-225). This is corroborated by the evidence.

Fourth, electoral systems are also expected to play a major role in levels of support. Norris classifies electoral systems as proportional or majoritarian, and argued that majoritarian systems should produce less institutional support than proportional systems. This expectation is supported by results obtained by Anderson (1998), who in an analysis of the effects of electoral rules and what he calls “party and party systems performance” on satisfaction with democracy in Europe, shows that the proportionality of the electoral system has the strongest correlation with democracy satisfaction: “the more proportional the electoral system, the higher the level of satisfaction” (Anderson 1998: 585). This expectation is not corroborated by the evidence Norris presents, however, where institutional confidence appears to be highest in democracies characterized by plurality electoral systems.

Finally, Norris argues that federal systems should elicit greater support than unitary systems, “because federalism manages to accommodate simultaneously the needs of different regions, and different groups in the electorate, whereas unitary states allow less flexibility and produce more losers from the system” (Norris 1999: 225). The data, however, proves her wrong, indicating that political trust is higher in unitary states.

According to these results, then, we should expect citizens to grant different levels of trust to their main political institutions, mediated by the institutional context in which they live. The direction of the effect or, in other words, which institutions increase levels of trust, however, is not clear from the evidence reviewed before, leaving us with no clear expectations as to which institutional features might increase or decrease support for political institutions. Given that institutions tend to change very slowly, the characteristics of the institutional setting and their effect on political support need to be measure in a comparative way, and including the largest number of countries as possible in order to avoid problems associated with little or none variation.

Moreover, it is important to consider specific aspects of the constitutional arrangements, in order to better explain the specific effects of each institution on trust. Especially if no sufficient cases are available, using variables such as the majoritarian/consensual systems will tend to only show that there are differences between countries, but it would be difficult to disentangle whether those differences are associated to institutional characteristics or other national factors.

Political Trust and Economic Performance

A third explanation of political trust argues that trust is a function of the economic

performance of governments. Contrary to what we observed regarding institutional theories of trust, the research tradition on the effect of the economy on diverse aspects of public opinion in general, and on public support specifically, is large, and will be briefly summarized here. Furthermore, we can also distinguish in this tradition explanations about, first, the impact of economic performance indicators at the aggregate level and, second, about the impact of *perceptions* about how the economy is doing at the individual level.

The main argument in both types of explanations is that citizens would trust their governmental institutions as long as the economy runs well. This is so, the argument goes, because “although the decline in performance is not necessarily attributable to inappropriate government activities [...] the observed correlation between government approval ratings and measures of economic performance indicates that governments are generally held accountable by voters for the state of the economy” (Alesina and Wacziarg 2000: 170).

The literature in this area started with the discussion of economic voting. The question was whether citizens voted in elections based on the evaluation of economic conditions and their impact on their pockets. Research on retrospective voting, for example, has shown that national economic conditions (such as economic growth, unemployment and inflation rates) are strong predictors of elections: when the economy is doing well, governing parties tend to win the elections (Clarke et al 1993; Cusack 1999).

The same conclusion can be reached when reviewing the research on the impact of economic conditions at the national level with the average level of political trust.

Holmberg (1997), for example, shows that economic conditions are important in explaining trends of trust in government in Sweden and Listhaug and Wiberg (1995) show that confidence in government is negatively related to unemployment in Western Europe (See also Lipset and Schneider 1987; Bok 1997; Putnam, Pharr, and Dalton 2000; Newton 2006). On the other hand, McAllister (1999) shows that national GDP is negatively related to institutional confidence and argued that “electorates of the established democracies had higher expectations in their systems than those in new democracies” (McAllister 1999: 201).

This approach, however, presents a major disadvantage: it does not allow for explanations of the variation of political trust at the individual level and when it does, the results are usually weaker than when comparing aggregate data on trust; therefore it has been used mainly in cross-country evaluations (Miller and Listhaug 1999; McAllister 1999; Tóka 1995; Newton 2006).

Given this limitation, then, researchers have also investigated the effect of perceptions of economic performance (Holmberg 1999; Orren 1997; Levi 1998; Alesina and Wacziarg 2000). The results in this area show that –at least in developed democracies- levels of trust are higher among those respondents that consider that the economy is doing well, either for the society or their own pockets (Putnam, Pharr and Dalton 2000; Orren 1997; Levi 1998; Lipset and Schneider 1987). Catterberg and Moreno (2005), for example, found, in an analysis comparing new and established democracies, that financial satisfaction is significantly and positively related to trust (Kelly 2003; Espinal et al 2006).

The main problem with either version of the economic performance hypotheses is

that they do not consider other ways in which people can evaluate that performance. Although the economy can be a strong predictor of trust, other elements of the institution's performance should also be included.

4. Political Trust and Institutional Trustworthiness: The Impact of Corruption

So far, we have presented a review of the main hypotheses that have been used to explain variations in political trust, both within and across countries. In this section, I will present a new way to think about the origins of political trust. It is based on some specific characteristics of the entity being trusted: on the trustworthiness of the other. This approach includes many of the elements we have discussed earlier, but combines them in a new way, allowing for a new explanation of trust as well as to bridge the differences between the different theories presented before.

As suggested when we discussed the definition of trust, trust is relational: somebody expects something from somebody else. And this relationship is based on the evaluation of the other's trustworthiness. Thus, individuals will decide whether to trust or not according to the level of trustworthiness of the other, that is, according to the evaluation of the willingness and the capacity of the other to fulfill trust (Levi, 1998).

Trustworthy institutions (or persons) are expected to fulfill the expectations for two reasons: because they *should* do it and because they *can* do it. Thus, even though trustworthiness is related to performance, to what the other can do, it has also a moral dimension attached to it. Two elements, then, characterizes trustworthy institutions: fairness and competence.

Fairness. To be judged as a trustworthy actor, "individuals need to have evidence

that government is relatively fair [...] if they are to have confidence that the state will harmonize the interests of otherwise competitive parties. The belief in government fairness requires the perception that all relevant interests have been considered, that the game is not rigged” (Levi 1998:90; Tyler 1998, 2001; Tyler and Huo 2002). Fairness, then, is related to the idea that institutions fulfill the expectations of the trusting person, because they should do it.

Fairness can be considered here both as procedural and as related to the outcomes of institutions’ actions. In the first case, institutions need to establish a set of fair procedures for decision making, assuring that the process would provide the same opportunities for all those involved on it. If institutions grant and establish this set of fair procedures, then, citizens can trust them: their interaction will be based on known and fair procedures that guarantee equal access and equal opportunities of positive outcomes.

Fairness in the outcomes of policy making is also important. The outcomes of policy making do not necessarily affect everyone in the same way, and we should expect that those disappointed with the outcomes to present lower levels of trust than those who are benefited (in the same sense that winner in politics would present higher levels of trust, or that people with a positive evaluation of economic performance would).

The problem, as Tyler and Huo (2002) argue in the case of legal authorities, is that “Because [...] authorities must often deliver unsatisfactory outcomes, they cannot be confident that they will always secure public compliance with their decisions and directives” (Tyler and Huo 2002: 6). However, what matters most here is the perception that outcomes are not always benefiting a specific group, but that they would produce different benefits for different groups at different times. In this context, even if citizens

consider themselves as not been benefited by the outcome of a certain policy measure, they can still consider the institution fair if they evaluate the outcome in terms of what is more important for a society to achieve. Thus, both personal and societal benefits are considered in the evaluation of fairness of an institution.

Competence. The second characteristic of a trustworthy institution is competence. Trustworthy institutions should be able to do what they are expected to do. Thus, citizens would trust an institution that demonstrates that it can achieve the objectives they have posed, and that they can effectively solve the problems that they are supposed to solve. The previous discussion about economic performance is related to competence, in that competence is easily evaluated by the perceived success on economic policy. Judgments on competence, however, are more than just related to economic performance: they are also a political judgment about the general political performance of institutions. This is so because not every institution has as a duty the development and achievement of economic goals.

Note that evaluations of trustworthiness can be related to the political culture and institutional arrangements of societies: both culture and institutions can structure what is expected of institutions (what they *should* do) and what are the competences of institutions (what they *can* do). Thus, institutional arrangements and the prevalence of certain values can be a significant element when evaluating the commitments of public officials (North and Weingast, 1989; Daunton, 1998). At the same time, evaluations of economic performance will also be related to the evaluation of institutional trustworthiness: economic performance relates to what institutions *can* do.

Especially important in the evaluation of institutional trustworthiness is the impact

that corruption has on a society. Corruption, has been shown, reduces the fairness of institutional activity by given some people or groups of people more access to institutions or to better outcomes resulting from the institutions' activity. Corruption, too, worsens institutional competence (Della Porta 2000).

What is the Impact of Corruption on Political Trust?

Earlier research on corruption saw it as a “necessary evil”: based on functionalist theory, researchers argued that corruption was necessary in governments, especially to redistribute economic resources (Huntington 1968; Nye 1967). According to Huntington, for example, “corruption provides immediate, specific, and concrete benefits to groups which might otherwise be thoroughly alienated from society. Corruption may thus be functional to the maintenance of a political system.” (Huntington 1968: 64). From the point of view of this perspective, corruption can increase political trust and support in governing institutions. By redistributing economic resources and giving access to government to certain groups, governments not only avoid their alienation from society, but they also create a network of support and clientelistic ties that will increase trust in political institutions.

Although this characterization and interpretation of corruption has been changed in the last two decades, there is some research that still argues that corrupt governments can increase –or, at least, maintain- their levels of support. Manzetti and Wilson (2007), for example, argue that corrupt governments can maintain their levels of citizens' support where government institutions and weak and patron-client relationships are strong. As a consequence, then, governments that can maintain their clientelistic networks will

maintain their levels of trust.

Besides these arguments, however, most of current research has shown that corruption produces negative consequences for the economy and the polity. In the economic realm, corruption is said to reduce investment and slow growth, to deny public services to those who do not pay bribes; to ignore quality standards and offer goods or services which are of a lower quality, and to weaken the rule of law. Overall, then, research has shown that corruption has negative economic consequences (Seligson 2002).

What about the effects of corruption on the polity? Although there is less empirical evidence on this regard, research has shown that corruption, under democracy, lowers confidence in the political system and political legitimacy. This result holds for different regional contexts (Seligson 2002; Rose-Ackerman 1999; Della Porta 2000; Pharr 2000; Camp, Coleman and Davids 2000; Mishler and Rose 2001). According to Della Porta (2000), for example, “political corruption worsens governmental performance [...] reducing trust in the government’s capacity to address citizens’ demands” (Della Porta 2000). We should expect, then, that trust will be lower when corruption is perceived to be widespread (Anderson and Tverdova 2003).

As it happens with other theories, one of the main points of debate nowadays related to the measurement of corruption. On the one side, we found that some researchers focus on the impact of national levels of corruption as measured by indices such as the one provided by Transparency International or by the World Bank. On the other side, others focus on the impact that citizens “perception of corruption” might have on political trust at the individual level. What is interesting here is that perceived levels of corruption are not necessarily related to country-level measures of corruption. In fact,

it is not strange to find countries with, for example, low levels of corruption but, at the same time with citizens that perceive a high level of corruption. Or, to find countries with high levels of corruption but where citizens perceive low levels of corruption. Which measure is more important to explain political trust? I'll attempt to provide an answer to this question in the analyses to be presented in the next chapters.

Overall, then, we expect to find a strong and negative relationship between political trust and corruption: the lower the level of corruption (or perception of corruption), the higher the level of political trust.

5. Methods and Research Plan

Summarizing, then, the main purpose of this dissertation is to evaluate the origins of political trust in Latin America during the 1990s. As we have seen, several hypotheses attempt to explain the bases of trust, and we need to evaluate those hypotheses for the Latin American case. Moreover, it has been argued that political trust in Latin America is expected to be primarily influenced by the perceived levels of trustworthiness of those institutions in which trust is placed. If what we have proposed so far is correct, we should expect the effect of corruption to be the most important one, out setting the effects of culture, institutional settings, and economic performance.

More specifically, if the theory proposed here about the origins of political trust, we should find the following:

1. There should be substantial differences in the levels of political trust both within and across countries. In other words, countries will differ in their mean levels of trust in institutions, and individuals will vary in their levels of confidence.

2. From a cross-country perspective, we should find that countries where institutions are less corrupt will be granted with higher levels of mean political trust. On the other side, countries where institutions are more corrupt will present, on average, lower levels of trust in institutions. These results should keep constant when comparing a large number of countries that belong to different regions of the world, as well as when looking more specifically to the Latin American countries analyzed here.
3. From the perspective of individual-level correlates of trust, we should find that, within any country, political trust is higher among individuals who perceive their institutions as fair, competent and less corrupt, and lower among individuals who perceive their national institutions as unfair, incompetent and more corrupt.

Methods and Data

What sort of evidence do we need to assess these claims? The strategy of this dissertation is comparative, making comparisons at different levels and between different and multiple units. In general, assessing the different explanations of political trust offered requires both aggregate *and* individual-level measures of political trust, values and interpersonal trust, the characteristics of the institutional setting, economic performance, and institutional corruption.

The survey data to be analyzed here comes from data collected in the region by the World Values Survey (WVS hereafter) in the following periods: 1995-1997, and 2000-2002. The data was pooled together and, in the countries where 2 surveys were done, the latest one was used. The WVS provides individual-level data for variables

measuring values, interpersonal trust, perceptions on economic performance, winners and losers, and citizen's perceptions of institutional trustworthiness. The specific countries that would be included in the analyses depend on the comparisons and analyses to be done.

In one case, a cross-country analysis based on data for 50 democracies was performed. The results are reported in chapter 2. These 50 democracies –defined as such by Cheibub and Gandhi (2004) for the year the survey was taken- belong to one of three regions of the world: they belong to industrialized nations (covering mostly western European democracies, North America, and some countries from the Asia-pacific region), Central and Eastern Europe, and Latin American countries.

Why the focus only in democracies? Political trust data from the WVS is available for a number of other non-democratic countries. They will not be included here primarily because of the difficulty in interpreting their results and answers to the questions of confidence. Political trust in these countries appear to be extremely high: in Vietnam, for example, the mean level of political trust is 3.4, in Uganda 3.0, in Tanzania 3.1 and in Pakistan 2.8. Can we assume these data to provide us with reliable data on confidence in political institutions? I presume the answer is “no”. In contexts of limited freedom to express one's political ideas, it should be expected to have large percentages of the citizens who will not be willing to face the problems of having negative views on governments, making them express favorable attitudes. The data seems to confirm that. In effect, the levels of trust are very close to the higher end of the scale and present very low levels of variance, indicating some problems with these questions. For this reason is that I don't consider these cases in the analyses to come.

In the other case, when we go on to the specific analysis of Latin America, the countries included are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. These countries provide a rich environment in which to explore the origins of political trust.

In addition to this individual-level data, I compiled a number of country-level indicators of the economic level and economic performance of countries, institutional corruption, and the institutional features of countries included in the analysis.

With these data I develop a number of tests and analyses that allows for the following comparisons:

a) Comparisons across countries: In most chapters, but mostly in chapters 2 and 4 I do cross-national comparisons taking countries as the unit of analysis.

b) Comparisons across individuals: Especially in chapter 3, the focus of analysis is the individual-level correlates of trust.

Plan of the Dissertation

In the chapters that follow I test and discuss the main hypotheses proposed here. All of the chapters present and discuss comparative data, although the level of analysis and the cases included in the comparisons are different, as explained in the previous section, each one providing with supporting evidence to the general argument presented so far.

Chapter 2 takes a look at country-level comparative data. This analysis is directed to test the macro-level implications of each theory that attempts to explain political trust, and shows that institutional trustworthiness, measured by the level of corruption, is the strongest predictor of trust in institutions among 50 democracies.

Chapters 3 and 4 go into deeply detailed on Latin American data. Chapter 3 shows the impact of individual-level correlates of trust in the region. Chapter 4 includes into the analysis country-level factors in a multi-level or hierarchical linear model.

Chapter 5 discusses and presents evidence on the potential consequences of low levels of political trust in two important dimensions: satisfaction and preferences for democratic governments, and political participation. The question about the consequences of trust is important and I explore some of the implications in this chapter.

Chapter 6, finally, summarizes the results obtained and presents the main conclusions of this research and on the policy implications for Latin American democracies.

CHAPTER 2:
GEOGRAPHIES OF TRUST. LATIN AMERICA IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE

How do levels of trust in political institutions vary across countries and regions of the world? How do levels of political trust in Latin America compare to the ones observed in countries of the industrialized world and the Central and Eastern Europe region? How can we explain the variation on the levels of trust at this country-level of analysis? These are the questions that will guide this chapter. This chapter starts with the examination of the empirical evidence available by presenting and analyzing the trust the citizens express in their political institutions for a large number of countries, placing the emphasis on how Latin American countries compare to other regions. Accordingly, in this chapter, I present data on trust for a large number of countries, placing the Latin American ones in a larger setting, and discuss the potential factors that can help us explain the variations that we can observe across countries and across regions.

In section 1, I present descriptive statistics for levels of political trust in different democracies across the world. These data will allow us to set the stage for the next section, which attempts to provide with empirical evidence on the possible explanations for those different patterns. In section 2, I present a summary of the hypotheses that we

could use to explain variations across countries, present the methods used to test them, and the results obtained. Section 3, finally, concludes.

One important advantage of the analysis to be presented here is that involves a larger number of countries than what is usually being used in other research. In effect, most of the comparative research in the area tends to focus in a very limited number of countries: usually developed democracies. In here, the number of countries is larger, allowing for greater variation in the independent and dependent variables than ever before.

The data to be used in this chapter comes from 50 democracies including countries from the industrialized world, Central and Eastern Europe, and Latin America. The countries were defined as democracies if they were so classified by Cheibub and Gandhi (2004) for the year the survey was taken in each country.⁵

1. Trust in the World: Descriptive Statistics

How do levels of trust compare among different regions and types of society? Is there a common trend across countries or regions? Previous research has focused attention on the trends on political trust. Basically, the reason is that given that only comparative data for a small number of countries has been available, the evaluation of levels of trust has been done over time in a limited number of countries. The main conclusion extracted from here is that levels of trust have, overall, declined (Levi and Stoker 2000; Holmberg 1999).

⁵ The countries included and a summary of the data used in this chapter is presented in Appendix A of this dissertation.

We now have available, however, data on political trust for 50 democracies around the world. These data allow us to evaluate levels of trust across countries and can help us define the problem of “how high is high” and “how low is low”.

Let’s start by considering the current levels of trust in institutions. To measure political trust I use the 2-item index of trust which measures the mean level of confidence in Parliament and the Civil Service⁶. Figure 2.1 presents the average levels of trust observed in different societies of the world for the index of trust in political institutions, for the 1995-2001 waves of the World Values Survey.⁷

The index is computed as the mean between the level of confidence in Parliament and the Civil Service. It goes from 1, representing no confidence at all, to 4 representing a lot of confidence.⁸ The Cronbach’s alpha for the whole sample is $\alpha = 0.725$, and $\alpha = 0.690$, $\alpha = 0.733$, $\alpha = 0.732$ for industrialized democracies, eastern and central Europe and Latin America respectively. Overall, the mean level of political trust in these 50 democracies is 2.21 with a standard deviation of 0.717. Figure 2.1 shows the average for each of the 50 countries included.

As we can see in Figure 2.1, there is wide variation within regions, but Latin American countries usually present lower levels of trust and rich countries obtain higher levels of trust. More generally, most of the countries included in the analysis have publics with low levels of trust in their political institutions (average below 2.5): only 8% of the countries included present a trust level over 2.5. High levels of distrust are more


⁶ Trust in political parties and government has not been asked in all of the countries. Thus, in order to increase the number of observations I will use this more restricted version of the index.

⁷ If a country has data for both the 1995-1997 and 1999-2001 waves of the survey, the latest data is considered.

⁸ Levels of trust in each institution are presented in Appendix A of the dissertation.

common: countries with an average below 2 represent 20% of the countries included. High levels of trust (with an average over 3 in the index) are, on the other hand, nonexistent for the sample of countries available here.

Figure 2.1: Average levels of political trust in 50 democracies



Source: World Values Survey, 1995-2001.

More specifically, countries from the industrialized world present higher levels of trust, occupying the first 16 places in the ranking of trust. Among them, countries with the higher levels of trust are Iceland (with an average of 2.71), Luxembourg (2.63), Norway (2.61) and Denmark (2.51), corroborating previous results that indicated that countries from the Scandinavian region tend to show higher levels of trust than countries from central-western Europe and the Southern region of the continent (Katzenstein 2000). Within this set of industrialized democracies, the lowest levels of trust in political institutions are found in Japan (2.10), New Zealand (2.04) and Greece (1.89), confirming evidence available elsewhere (Otake 2000; Pharr 1997, 2000; Inoguchi 2002).

For countries from Central and Eastern Europe, the higher levels of political trust are observed in Hungary (2.29), Albania (2.28), Slovakia (2.27) and Moldova (2.26), while the lowest is Macedonia (1.67). Overall, trust within this set of democracies appears to be lower than what is found in the industrialized world, as has been suggested in some other research (Mishler and Rose 1997, 2001).

Latin American countries, finally, present the lowest levels of trust in their political institutions, with Mexico (1.85), Peru (1.84), the Dominican Republic (1.79) and Argentina (1.63), occupying the lowest places in the rating. The highest level of trust within the region is in Uruguay (2.27), followed by Brazil (2.23) and Chile (2.23).

To be able to make a more systematic analysis of these data, Table 2.1 compares mean levels of political trust for countries categorized as industrialized, Central and Eastern Europe, and Latin American countries.

Table 2.1: Trust in Political Institutions by Region

	Mean	Std. Deviation	Number of respondents	Number of countries
Industrialized	2.36	0.67	33,769	24
Central and Eastern Europe	2.10	0.71	23,110	17
Latin America	2.00	0.77	12,838	9
TOTAL	2.21	0.72	69,716	50

As can be seen in the table, there is a wide and statistically significant disparity in the levels of trust observed across regions. The t-statistics obtained in the comparison of mean levels of political trust across regions are as follows: $t = 44.484$ ($p=0.000$) for the differences between Industrialized countries and Central and Eastern Europe; $t = 49.602$ ($p=0.000$) for the differences between Industrialized countries and Latin America; and $t = 12.082$ ($p=0.000$) for the differences between Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe. Using ANOVA to test the differences in political trust in all three regions gives us a F statistic equals to 1620.985 ($p=0.000$). Most notably, Latin American countries have, on average, the lowest levels of trust in political institutions. They are followed by East and Central European countries. The highest levels of trust can be found in Industrialized Nations.

How can we explain these differences? What makes some publics more trusting of their institutions than others? Why do Latin American citizens are, on average, less trusting than the average citizens in other regions of the world? These are the question I'll attempt to start answering in the next section.

2. Explaining Cross-Country Differences in Political Trust

How can we explain country-level differences in political trust? More specifically, what makes Latin America the most distrusting region? As I argued in the previous chapter, I expect political trust to be a function of the institutional trustworthiness of each country; in other words, trust should be higher among those countries that score higher on institutional fairness and competence and, at the same time, are perceived as such by their citizenry. But there are also other explanations that we need to check in order to provide evidence that institutional trustworthiness might be the most important factor in explaining political trust at this aggregated-level of analysis. In order to do so, I'll examine bivariate relationships between the variables of interest first, and then I'll move to multivariate analysis of the data. Since the main objective in this chapter is to evaluate factors associated to political trust at the country-level, the analysis will be done considering countries as the unit of analysis. Individual-level data will be examined in the following chapters.

The Impact of Cultural Factors on Trust

Let's start by considering the cultural factors that might be related to political trust. As should be remembered from the previous discussion, there are two main explanations for political trust at this level. For one thing, political trust is expected to be related to social capital: although the direction of the relationship is not clear from the arguments presented, it can be expected that societies with higher stocks of social capital will also present higher levels of political trust.

To measure interpersonal trust, one of the components of social capital (Putnam

1993), I use the question “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” and take the percentage in each country that says that “people can be trusted”.⁹ On average, 39% of the citizens in the industrialized world, 21% in Central and Eastern Europe and 16% in Latin America, say that most people can be trusted. In other words, Latin Americans are the less trusting citizenry, a pattern that at first sight mirrors the results obtained for trust in political institutions.

This is corroborated when plotting the two variables together. As can be observed in Figure 2.2, there seems to be a positive relationship between interpersonal and political trust as the aggregate level. In other words, countries with higher percentages of citizens saying that most people can be trusted are, on average, countries with higher levels of trust in their political institutions (correlation’s $r = 0.522$, $p = 0.000$). Thus, trust, regardless to the object to which is directed, seems to present common trajectories across countries.

A similar relationship is also present if we consider the bivariate relationship between political trust and participation in secondary associations, the second component of social capital (Putnam 1993). In fact, when using the mean number of voluntary organizations that people belongs to, to measure this dimension of social capital, we also find a positive relationship to political trust ($r = 0.440$, $p = 0.001$).


The pattern that emerges here, however, differs slightly from the one reported about interpersonal trust: the region with higher level of associational life is again the industrialized world (with an average of 1.05 organizations that people belong to); but Latin Americans present higher levels association than the citizens from Central and

⁹ Detailed data for each variables used here can be found in Appendix A of the dissertation.

Eastern Europe (0.71 and 0.44 organizations respectively). Nevertheless, the general pattern remains: the higher the associational life of citizens, the higher the level of political trust that they express.

Overall, then, at the country-level of analysis, social capital appears to be positively related to political trust.

Figure 2.2: Political and Interpersonal Trust




A second set of cultural factors that might be related to political trust refers to the distributions of values within countries. People holding materialists values –those values related to personal and national security- should present higher levels of trust in their

political institutions than those holding post-materialists values –those values related to self-expression- (Inglehart 1997). This is so, according to Inglehart, because materialists will give more relevance to authority figures who can guarantee that security.

To measure values I computed the 4-item index of materialist/postmaterialists values developed by Inglehart (1997 and elsewhere), and use the country mean in this index. The index goes from 1 to 3, with 1 indicating materialist values, 2 indicating mixed values, and 3 indicating postmaterialist values. Overall, the mean of the industrialized world is 2.01, 1.67 for Central and Eastern Europe and 1.93 for Latin Americans.

As can be seen in Figure 2.3, at this bivariate level the results indicate, contrary to what was expected, that political trust is higher in those countries where the proportion of people expressing “post-materialist values” is higher. However, the relationship does not appear to be a very strong one: the correlation between the mean level of Political Trust and the mean level of materialist/postmaterialists values scale is 0.224 ($p = .122$) and is not statistically significant.

Figure 2.3: Political Trust and Materialist Publics



Overall, cultural factors might have some bearing on political trust at this cross-country level of analysis, especially when considering the impact of social capital on political trust. It is important to remember, however, that these factors might have an important effect in the expected direction at the individual-level of analysis, an effect that will be evaluated in the next section for this cross-section of countries and more specifically for Latin American countries in the next chapter. At the country-level, nevertheless, the evidence presented so far is not as conclusive as one could expect, suggesting that there are other factors that might be affecting cross-country differences in political trust.

The Impact of Institutional Arrangements on Trust

Another set of factors that might explain political trust relates to the institutional arrangements under which citizens live and politics is done. As we saw in chapter 1, it might be expected to find higher levels of trust in countries with longer democratic traditions, in countries with parliamentary governments, a limited number of parties, proportional electoral systems and a federal structure of the state.


To evaluate the impact of democratic history or tradition on political trust, I used two measures. The first is the combined and reversed Freedom House Rating for the year in which the survey was taken in each country, which indicates the level of democracy at one point in time. It should be remembered here, that the Freedom House rating is a 7 point-scale, and that for the purposes of the analysis it was reversed so that 7 would indicate “most free” and 1 “least free”. Using this scale, industrialized countries have an average of 6.3, followed by Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America, with an average of 5.4 in each case, for the year the survey was taken

The second measure used is the average combined and reversed Freedom House Rating for the period 1972-2000, which represents the depth and longevity of democracy in each country. To compute this measure I took the value obtained by each country in all the years covered between 1972 and 2000, I reversed them (so 7 would indicate “most free” and 1 “least free”) and then averaged the values for the period. Values equal or close to 7 in this case would indicate that the country has been considered as democratic for most of the years covered, and values equal or close to 1 would indicate that the country has been categorized as “least free” during this 27-year period. As the region means indicate, there is wide disparity in this measure, with industrialized nations scoring

6.73, Latin American countries 4.83 and Central and Eastern European countries 3.11, reflecting the longer authoritarian tradition in this last region. These two measures, then, allow us to evaluate democracy at a single point of time and the political history of the countries under consideration.

As can be seen in Figure 2.4, the democratic status, measured with the combined and reversed score of political and civil rights for the year of the survey provided by Freedom House, seems to be positively related to the level of political trust. In fact, countries with “better” democracies tend to present higher levels of political trust than those countries with lower scores ($r=0.547$, $p=0.000$). This is corroborated if we consider the mean Freedom House rating between 1972 and 2000. In fact, countries with longer democratic traditions do present higher levels of trust than those countries that have experienced democracy for a shorter period ($r=0.534$, $p=0.000$).

Figure 2.4: Political Trust and Freedom House Rating




As to the impact of specific institutional arrangements, there is some supporting evidence too. Figure 2.5 summarizes these findings. As can be observed, the only factor that clearly distinguishes between levels of political trust corresponds to the executive type of system. In effect, parliamentary systems present a significantly higher level of political trust (a mean level of political trust of 2.27) than presidential systems (with a mean level of political trust of 2.07), and mixed systems with a mean level of political trust of 2.19.

It is worth remembering, in this context, that Latin American countries are, without exceptions, presidential democracies. In industrialized countries 79% of

countries are parliamentary democracies, 13% are mixed systems and 8% are presidential democracies. In Central and Eastern Europe, 53% countries have a parliamentary regime and 47% have a mixed regime.

Figure 2.5: Political Trust and Institutional Arrangements



The electoral system also has some relevance, with majoritarian systems presenting higher levels of trust than proportional ones (with a mean level of political trust of 2.34 and 2.22 respectively). This finding corroborates what was found by Norris (1999) who argued that proportional electoral systems decrease political trust. Majoritarian systems have more trusting citizens than do proportional electoral systems. When looking at the countries we found that in the Industrialized countries, 63% have PR systems, 21% Majoritarian systems and 17% combined systems. In Central and Eastern Europe, we found that 65% have PR systems and 35% combined systems. In Latin

America, finally, 78% have PR systems and 22% have combined systems.

The number of parties and state structure, finally, do not show significant differences in their levels of political trust. In effect, the correlation of the effective number of parties with political trust is barely 0.052 with a significance level of $p = 0.722$. The mean number of parties for each region is as follows: 3.6, 4.5 and 3.7 for industrialized countries, Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America respectively.

The type of state, finally, is not correlated with political trust. Overall, 60% of countries analyzed here have a unitary form of state, while a 40% have a non-unitary form of state. Levels of political trust, however, do not appear to be statistically different: unitary states have, on average, a 2.20 mean level of trust in political institutions, and non-unitary states have a mean level of political trust of 2.21 ($t = 1.581$, $p = 0.114$).


The Impact of Economic Performance on Trust

A third set of explanations links political trust to economic performance. Given the requirement for comparable data across countries, I'll use here two variables to measure economic performance: the Human Development Index developed by the UNDP which measures not only economic but social development and well, and the GDP per capita growth, which measures economic growth.

The Human Development Index appears to be highly related to the region a country belongs to. In fact, Human Development Index is significantly higher in Industrialized nations (with an average of 0.924), than in Latin America (with an average of 0.786) and Central and Eastern Europe (with an average of 0.795) As can be seen in

Figure 2.6, the Human Development Index appears to be highly related to the level of political trust, with a correlation of 0.603 ($p=0.000$), indicating that the higher the level of human development, the higher the level of political trust to be found.


Figure 2.6: Political Trust and Human Development Index



GDP per capita growth, on the other hand, also appears to be highly related to region. In fact, the average annual change on GDP per capita is the same for industrialized countries (2.3%) and Latin American countries (2.4%), while significantly different for Central and Eastern Europe (-0.97%). As can be observed in figure 2.7, this measure of economic performance is not highly related to political trust, showing, in

general, that countries with higher economic growth tend to present higher levels of political trust ($r=0.252$, $p=0.078$).

Figure 2.7: Political Trust and GDP per capita growth



Overall, then, we found that economic development is positively and statistically significantly related to political trust: the higher the level of economic development, the higher the level of political trust. Economic growth, on the other hand, does not appear to be related to trust. I'll return to this point latter.

Corruption and Political Trust


As I argued previously, I expect corruption be the most important factor in explaining political trust in Latin America. In subsequent chapters I'll evaluate this hypothesis for Latin American countries, but let's first evaluate whether corruption might be a relevant factor in explaining trust in political institutions in a wider number of countries.

As I argued earlier, there are two dimensions of institutional trustworthiness: fairness and competence. Institutions, according to this view are trustworthy because they want to and because they can. Both dimensions are captured by the level of corruption in a given society. Less corrupt institutions should be more trusted by citizens than more corrupt ones.

Therefore, to measure corruption at the country level I used the Control of Corruption index developed by the World Bank. The Control of Corruption index measures "the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests" (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2007: 4).

I use here the average for each country in the 10-year period covered by this measure: 1996-2006. The index goes from -2.5 to 2.5 points, with higher numbers indicating a better control of corruption, and lower number indicating more corruption. According to the data, industrialized nations are the one that score better in control of corruption with an average of 1.75, followed by Central and Eastern Europe with an average of -0.09, and Latin America with an average of -0.11. Figure 2.8 shows the bivariate correlation between corruption and political trust.

Figure 2.8: Political Trust and Mean Control of Corruption



As can be observed, there is a very strong relationship between these two variables ($r=0.706$, $p=0.000$) as was expected, indicating that trust in political institutions is higher when corruption is low. The level of corruption, then, seems to be the most significant factor associated to political trust.

Multivariate Analysis

So far we have considered the country-level correlates of political trust at the bivariate level of analysis. Do the conclusions reached earlier remain the same if we run a multivariate model? What are the main determinants of trust in political institutions at

this country-level of analysis? Do factors related to institutional trustworthiness help explain the level of trust in political institutions?

In order to provide an answer to these questions, I ran a number of regression models that will be used to test the effect of different sets of factors in political trust. It is important to remember that the number of cases in these models is small (50) restricting the numbers of variables to be included and also making coefficients not very significant.

Table 2.2 shows the OLS regression results obtained for the models run. The dependent variable in each model is the mean level of political trust found in each country considered. The independent variables are the same as the ones already shown, which measure cultural, institutional, economic, and institutional trustworthiness measures. The tables include OLS coefficients, standard errors in parentheses and significance levels for each variable.

Models 1 through 5 in table 2.2 show the results obtained when we regress the factors measuring different theories separately on political trust. Model 1 shows the impact of corruption on trust in institutions. As can be observed, the coefficient is positive and highly significant indicating that political trust is higher when there is less corruption, and is lower when there is more corruption in each country.

Table 2.2: Regression results

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Constant	2.084*** (0.030)	0.481 (0.360)	2.060*** (0.290)	1.402*** (0.216)	1.856*** (0.088)	3.655*** (0.787)	2.794*** (0.256)
Interpersonal Trust			0.865*** (0.229)			-0.024 (0.256)	
Materialit/Postmat. values			-0.056 (0.168)			-0.425* (0.201)	-0.398** (0.142)
Level of democracy (FH year of survey)				0.063 (0.040)			
Democratic History (FH 1972-2000)				0.064* (0.025)	0.078*** (0.016)	0.046 (0.033)	
Presidential Regime				-0.186* (0.090)	-0.184** (0.065)	-0.052 (0.083)	
Parliamentary Regime				-0.075 (0.077)			
Majoritarian System				0.068 (0.112)			
Proportional System				0.045 (0.072)			
Number of parties				0.028 (0.018)			
Type of state (1 = unitary)				0.043 (0.071)			
HDI 2000		2.024*** (0.427)				-1.222 (1.066)	
Economic Growth (1990-2000)		-0.005 (0.011)				-0.002 (0.011)	
Control of Corruption	0.155*** (0.022)					0.225** (0.065)	0.204*** (0.027)
Adj. R ²	0.488	0.339	0.243	0.382	0.362	0.526	0.552
N	50	50	49	50	50	49	50

*** p < 0.001; ** P < 0.01; * P < 0.05

Model 2 shows the impact of the economic factors on political trust. As can be observed, the level of Human Development presents a positive and significant coefficient, ceteris paribus, indicating that trust in institutions in democratic countries is

higher when the level of Human Development is higher. The coefficient for economic growth, however, is non-significant, and confirms the evidence presented earlier as to the null effect of economic growth on trust.

Model 3 shows the impact of cultural factors on political trust. As can be seen, and corroborating previous results, the coefficient for interpersonal trust is positive and significant, indicating that trust in institutions is higher in countries where trust in others is widespread. The average for each country on the materialism-postmaterialism scale, however, is negative indicating more trust in institutions in those countries with a higher level of materialist values. The coefficient is non-significant, nevertheless, when controlling for interpersonal trust.

Models 4 and 5 show the impact of institutional characteristics on political trust. As can be observed, only two variables appear to have significant effects on trust, *ceteris paribus*: the democratic history of countries, as measured by the mean Freedom House score for the period covered between 1972 and 2000, and the dummy variable indicating presidential systems. These results indicate that trust in political institutions will be higher in those countries that have experienced longer periods of democratic rule, and where there are systems of government with either parliamentary or combined forms for the executive office.

Other institutional factors such as the level of democracy for the year of the survey, the electoral rule, the effective number of parliamentary parties, and the type of state are, non-significant for this set of nations.

Overall, and as the adjusted R^2 indicates, our measure of institutional trustworthiness –control of corruption- is the one that better performs, explaining a

significantly higher proportion of the variance in political trust among these 50 countries.

Models 6 and 7, finally, show the results when we include factors associated to different theories together. As can be seen, when controlling for other factors the results indicate that only two of the variables are important to explain political trust at the country-level of analysis: control of corruption and the materialism-postmaterialism index. In effect, the coefficient for the variable measuring control of corruption is positive, indicating more trust when there is lower corruption, and highly significant. On the other hand, the index measuring value priorities present a negative coefficient, showing that trust in institutions is, as expected, significantly higher in countries with higher proportions of materialists.


The fact that in Model 6 variables measuring institutional and economic factors become insignificant might be related to a somewhat more complex story, where those factors explain corruption levels and corruption affects political trust. For example, human development might explain corruption, indirectly affecting mean levels of political trust. In other words, those factors might explain political trust indirectly.

In order to test the possibility that there are indirect factors affecting political trust levels, I ran a path analysis, where political trust, materialist/postmaterialist values and control of corruption are the dependent variables, and democratic history, presidentialism, majoritarian electoral systems, and human development are the independent variables. The results are shown in Figure 2.9. The figure shows the relationships hypothesized, the estimates obtained and the level of confidence associate to those estimates. The model has a chi-square = 20.50, $p=0.02$.

As can be seen, the effects of corruption and materialist/postmaterialist values on

trust remain highly significant in this model, indicating that they do have an independent effect on political trust. Regarding the independent variables used, we observed that only two of the factors included have significant effects: Human Development does in fact have an important effect on corruption, and democratic history has an effect on values. These results indicate, therefore, that both democratic history and human development have an indirect effect on trust, although not a direct effect. Their impact is mediated through the distribution of values and the levels of corruption observed in the 50 democracies considered here.

Figure 2.9. A Path Analysis Model of Political Trust



*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.

3. Summary and Conclusions

The results presented so far indicates that there is variation across countries in their levels of political trust. These differences are evident when comparing regions and countries within regions. Regionally, political trust is higher in industrialized nations and significantly lower in countries from Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe.

When exploring the correlates of trust at the country level we found that, at the bivariate level, interpersonal trust and membership in secondary associations –the two dimensions of social capital- appear to be positively related to political trust: that political trust and social capital present the same trajectory. When I included interpersonal trust into a regression model the effect remains, but only on a restricted version, and not when controlling for other types of variables in the equation.

In the case of variables measuring the institutional context, we found that there is mixed evidence about the role of institutions. The only variables that appear to be significantly associated to political trust are regime type (as measured by the presidential dummy) and democratic history. These results suggest that trust is higher among nations with longer democratic traditions and among those with parliamentary types of regimes. Presidential regimes lower significantly political trust, and this is crucial for Latin American countries, which have this kind of system.

Regarding the economic variables considered we found that level of development matters for trust: political trust is higher among countries that have achieved high levels of economic development. Economic growth, on the other hand, does not seem to be related to trust and, although the coefficients are not significant they indicate the

possibility of a negative relationship: in other words, that trust is lower with higher levels of economic growth. Although this need to be confirmed, it can be suggested by trusting societies appear once the level of economic development is high, but not when the country is going through a process of growth.

Finally, there is ample evidence regarding the relevance of corruption for political trust. In effect, the effect of corruption is important, even when controlling for other variables, and having a larger effect than any other variable. Mean levels of political trust at the country level are, therefore, related to corruption. This result gives us the first evidence in the direction expected. In the next chapters will continue to evaluate the effect of corruption at other levels of analysis.

CHAPTER 3:
**EXPLAINING POLITICAL TRUST IN LATIN AMERICA. THE INDIVIDUAL-
LEVEL CORRELATES OF TRUST**

In the previous chapter I investigated the country-level correlates of trust in political institutions for a number of 50 countries around the world. In this chapter I start with a more detailed analysis of trust in political institutions in Latin America. Here, I'll consider the individual-level correlates of trust in political institutions and in the next chapter I'll evaluate the impact of both individual- and country-level factors on trust in the region.

The first section of the chapter presents and evaluates levels of trust in different institutions in Latin America. Next, I present data and methodological considerations for the analysis to be presented. The third section presents the main results obtained. The final section discusses those results and concludes.


1. Trust in Latin America in the 1990s

How much do Latin American citizens trust in their institutions? From the results presented in the previous chapter we know that trust in political institutions in the region is low compared to other regions. How do these levels of trust compare to trust in other

institutions? Figure 3.1 shows the percentage of people in the region that say that they trust “a great deal” or “quite a lot” eleven national institutions.

As we can observe, trust in the region is usually low. The only institution that gets more than 50% of people expressing trust in them are the Churches, with 71% of Latin Americans saying they have “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in them. The churches are followed by the press, television, big companies and the armed forces, all those institutions with medium level of trust close to 50%. A third group of institutions is composed by labor unions, the police, the civil service, and government with levels of trust between 30% and 40%. At the very end, with less than a third of the respondents expressing their confidence, we find the national parliament and political parties.

Figure 3.1. Trust in Eleven Institutions in Latin America
(% saying they have “a great deal” and “quite a lot” of confidence)



As Table 3.1 shows, there is also considerable variation in the levels of trust across countries. The countries that present the lowest levels of trust in the region are Argentina and Peru, where less than 20% expresses trust in their major political institutions. In both countries, the institution that gets the higher level of trust is the Government; while trust in the other three institutions is considerably lower (only about 10% of their respondents say they have confidence in these institutions).

Chile and Venezuela, on the other hand, are the countries that, on average, present higher levels of trust, showing a similar pattern: trust in government is higher, with more than 50% of the respondents expressing confidence, followed by civil service, parliament and political parties. The only country where government is not the most trusted political institution is Brazil, where there is a wider deference to the civil service. Uruguay, finally, shows similar and relatively high levels of trust in all of its institutions.


Table 3.1. Trust in Political Institutions in 7 Latin American Countries
(% saying they have “a great deal” and “quite a lot” of confidence)

	Parliament	Civil Service	Government	Political Parties
Argentina	11.3	6.8	19.4	7.3
Brazil	33.6	59.1	48.6	32.5
Chile	35.0	40.4	57.6	27.7
Mexico	22.9	22.3	37.1	24.6
Peru	9.6	9.1	19.4	8.0
Uruguay	41.8	44.8	41.7	36.5
Venezuela	34.4	37.7	56.1	20.1

How have these levels of trust evolved around time? We can compare these results with the ones obtained at the beginning of the 1990s for Argentina, Chile and

Mexico. These data are shown in Figure 3.2. In a period covering over a decade, trust in political institutions in Chile has decreased by 17.7%, in Mexico there has been a decline of 9.8% and in Argentina the decline is of about 3.6%. For these countries, then, there has been a wide and clear decline in the public confidence.

Figure 3.2. Changes in the Level of Political Trust, 1990-2000. (% of change)



This decline, however, seems to be related to the relatively high levels of trust expressed at the beginning of the 1990s, and not to a general trend of decline in the region. This is corroborated by the data provided by Latinobarometer between 1995 and 2006 about trust in government, congress and political parties, for 18 Latin American countries, as shown in Table 3.2. In effect, these data show that trust in government has increased in about 15 percentage points between 1998 and 2006; and that trust in Congress and political parties has remained stable over this 10-year period (Corporación Latinobarómetro 2006).

Table 3.2. Trust in Political Institutions in Latin America, 1996-2006

Year of survey	Government	Congress	Political Parties
1996	-	27	20
1997	-	36	28
1998	28	27	21
1999-2000	-	28	20
2001	-	24	19
2002	25	23	14
2003	24	17	11
2004	30	24	18
2005	36	28	18
2006	43	27	22
Change (in percentage points)	+15	0	+2

Source: Informe Latinobarómetro 2006.

2. Explaining Trust in Latin America: Data and Methods

As we previously discussed there are a number of theories that attempt to explain levels of political trust in different geographic settings. Unfortunately, research based on Latin American countries is not very common (with some exception), leaving us with the task of evaluate them in this “new” context. Just to summarize, I argued that we could organize the literature on political trust on 4 major theories: (a) cultural theories of trust, (b) economic theories, (c) institutional theories and (d) the impact of corruption and perception of fairness and competence on trust. Each one of these theories provides us with expectations about the impact of different factors on the national or aggregate-level of analysis and on the individual-level of analysis. In this chapter, I’ll concentrate on the individual-level bases of trust in political institutions in Latin America.

The data source to be used here is, following what was previously presented, the data coming from the World Values Survey for 7 Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, México, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. As we did in chapter 2, I'll consider for the analysis the latest survey available for each country. In other words, for some of these countries (Brazil and Uruguay) the analysis will be based on the 1995-1997 wave of the WVS; the data for the rest of the countries will be based on the 1999-2001 wave of the WVS.

This difference in the data source for the countries implies that we'll have different sets of questions and variables available for the analyses, since questionnaires vary in important ways from one wave to the other. The main task, then, is to attempt to have variables measuring the same concepts, even though the exact questions may differ.

Therefore, the analysis will be presented separately for those countries with data for 1995-1997 and for those countries with data for 1999-2000. Also, a common model with variables present in all cases will also be presented.

If we consider those variables available for all of the countries considered here, the model to be computed can be read in equation number 1, and will be detailed in the following paragraphs.


$$\text{Political Trust} = a + B_1 * \text{Trusted} + B_2 * \text{Belong} + B_3 * \text{Respect} + B_4 * \text{Materialism} + \quad [1]$$

$$B_5 * \text{Financial} + B_6 * \text{Winner} + B_7 * \text{Office} + B_8 * \text{Runby} + B_i * \text{Control Variables} + e$$

As can be seen, the equation includes the variables measuring all of the theories discussed earlier. The dependent variable, Political Trust, is the 4-item index of trust in

political institution, which is computed as the mean level of trust in Parliament, Civil Service, Government and Political Parties. The mean value of the index for all countries included is 2.04 with a standard deviation = 0.73 and Cronbach's alpha = 0.827.

Figure 3.3. Mean level of political trust.



The independent variables are organized as follows.¹⁰ The first two variables in the equation, Trusted and Belong measure different aspects of social capital: interpersonal trust and membership in voluntary organizations respectively. Interpersonal trust is a dummy variable measured with the question “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted (1) or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people (0)?”

The questions used to measure membership in voluntary associations changed from the 1995-1997 to the 1999-2001 waves of the WVS. For countries measured in

¹⁰ The complete wording of the items used as well as the computation of indices are presented in Appendix B of the dissertation.


1995-1997, the question used is the following: “Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary organizations; for each one, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization?” In this case, I coded 1 if the respondent says “active member” and 0 otherwise. For the countries measured in 1999-2001, the question used is the following: “Please look carefully at the following list of voluntary organizations and activities and say which, if any, do you belong to? In this case 1 is coded when the respondent says that she belongs to that organization and 0 otherwise. The index is constructed in the same manner for both waves of the WVS: it adds the responses to the question of membership in the following organizations: Churches, cultural activities, labor unions, political parties, environmental organizations, professional associations, and sports or recreational groups. The index, then, goes from 0 ‘belong to none organization’ to 7 ‘belong to all seven organizations’. Given the discussion in Chapter 1, I expect political trust to be higher among those who trust in other people and among those who exhibit a greater involvement in social organizations.

As we can see in Figure 3.4, there is ample variation in these variables across Latin American countries. With respect to the variable measuring interpersonal trust, the country that shows the lowest percentage of people saying that “most people can be trusted” is Brazil with a low of 2.8%¹¹, while the most trusting country in the region is Chile with 22.8% of the respondents. With respect to membership, Uruguay is where less people belong to at least 1 organization (31.5%), while the maximum level of membership is found in Brazil (51%). The mean values for these variables in the region

¹¹ Brazil is the country that exhibits the lowest level of interpersonal trust considering all the countries included in the World Values Survey.

are 15.8% and 42.0% respectively.

Figure 3.4. Social Capital in Latin America




The next two variables in the equation, Respect and Materialism, measure the impact of values on political trust. The question used to measure Respect is the following: “I’m going to read out a list of various changes in our way of life that might take place in the near future. Please tell me for each one, if it were to happen, whether you think it would be a good thing (3), a bad thing (1), or don’t you mind (2)?: Greater respect for authority”.

To measure values I used the 4-item materialist/post-materialist values index, which is coded (1) materialist (2) mixed and (3) post-materialist values. See Inglehart (1997) for computing instructions. Given the arguments shown in Chapter 1, we should expect that political trust will be higher among those that express that “a greater respect

for authority” is a good thing, and among those who can be classified as “materialists” in Inglehart’s materialism-postmaterialism 4-item index.

Figure 3.5 shows the results obtained in these two variables for the region. On average, about a quarter of the region’s respondents can be classified as having “materialists” values (with a low of about 19% in Argentina and Uruguay and a high of about 30% in Brazil), and about three-quarters of them say that they consider that greater respect for authorities would be a good thing (with a low of 56% in Chile and a high of 91% in Venezuela).


Figure 3.5. Materialists Values in Latin America



Measuring economic theories of trust, we have a variable measuring the satisfaction with the financial situation of the household. The question used reads as follows: “”How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household? If ‘1’ means you are completely dissatisfied on this scale, and ‘10’ means you are completely

satisfied, where would you put your satisfaction with your household's financial situation?" This variable could be categorized as a pocket-book consideration of the economic situation. Although it would be of interest to include also measures of sociotropic evaluations, there are no such measures included in the survey. Figure 3.6 shows the distributional pattern of the responses to this question in Latin America.

Figure 3.6. Satisfaction with Financial Situation of Household (% very satisfied)




Measuring the impact of the institutional setting, I included a dummy variable measuring the winners/losers status of the respondents (Anderson 1997; Norris 1999). In the WVS there is a question about which party the respondent would vote. The question used is the following: "If there were a national election tomorrow, for which party on this list would you vote? Which party appeals to you most?" Based on the results to this question, and considering the governing party/parties at the time of the survey in each country, I computed a dummy variable of winners and losers for each one of them, with "winners" being all those who mentioned parties in government.

At the time the surveys were done in each of the countries included here, parties in government (the president’s party or the president’s coalition) were the following. In Argentina, the president at the time was Carlos Menem from the Justicialist Party. In Brazil, the president was Cardoso from the PSDB, governing in coalition with PMDB, PSDB and PFL. In Chile the President was Ricardo Lagos from the Socialist Party and a governing coalition of PDC, PS, PPD and PRSD. In Mexico, at the time of the survey the president was Carlos Zedillo from PRI. In Peru, the president was Toledo and his party Perú Posible. In Uruguay, the president at the time was Sanguinetti from the Colorado Party. Finally, the president in Venezuela was at the time Hugo Chavez from the Movimiento V República.

Respondents in each country mentioning these parties as their option were, then, coded as 1, indicating the status of winner and respondents mentioning any other party were coded as 0. It is expected that winners will present higher levels of trust in political institutions. Figure 3.7 presents the percentage of winners in the region.


Figure 3.7. “Winners” in Latin America
(% who would vote for the governing party or parties)



Finally, measuring perceptions of competence and fairness, the model includes two variables. The first one measures the level of satisfaction with people in office - “How satisfied are you with the way the people now in national office are handling the country’s affairs? Would you say you are very satisfied (4), fairly satisfied (3), fairly dissatisfied (2) or very dissatisfied (1)? The second one measures the perception of fairness as the perception of the country being run for the benefit of all -“Generally speaking, would you say that this country is run by a few big interests looking out for themselves (0), or that it is run for the benefit of all the people (1)? -.

I expect these two variables to be of great importance in explaining political trust in the region, with people more satisfied, and those that consider that the country is run for the benefit of all, to exhibit a greater level of trust in political institutions. Figure 3.8 shows the results obtained in these two variables. As can be observed, the publics of Venezuela are those showing greater satisfaction with the institutional performance of their government, while Argentines are those less satisfied with their institutions.

Figure 3.8. Perceptions of Competence and Fairness in Latin America



Also included are a number of control variables. These include a variable measuring self-positioning of the respondent on the left-right scale¹², the importance attributed to politics¹³ and interest in politics¹⁴. Also, the usual variables measuring gender¹⁵, age¹⁶, income¹⁷, level of education¹⁸, employment status¹⁹, and religion²⁰ were also included. Descriptive statistics for all these variables can be found in Appendix B.

The models for 1995-1997 and 1999-2001 are presented in equations 2 and 3 respectively. All of the variables mentioned in equation 1 are included. The differences correspond to a number of “new” variables that we are allowed to include given their availability in their respective surveys. In both cases, these new variables attempt to measure different dimensions of institutional trustworthiness.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Political Trust} = & a + B_1 * \text{Trusted} + B_2 * \text{Belong} + B_3 * \text{Respect} + B_4 * \text{Materialism} + \quad [2] \\ & B_5 * \text{Financial} + B_6 * \text{Winner} + B_7 * \text{Office} + B_8 * \text{Runby} + B_9 * \text{Corruption} \\ & B_{10} * \text{Control Variables} + e \end{aligned}$$

¹² “In political matters, people talk of “the left” and “the right”. How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?” (10-point scale, 1 indicating ‘left’ and 10 indicating ‘right’).

¹³ Please say, for each of the following, how important it is in your life: Politics. Would you say politics is very important (4), rather important (3), not very important (2) or not important at all (1) in your life?”

¹⁴ “How interested would you say you are in politics? Very interested (4), somewhat interested (3), not very interested (2), not at all interested (1).

¹⁵ Dummy variable, 1 indicating female.

¹⁶ Age in years.

¹⁷ “Here is a scale of incomes. We would like to know in what group your household is, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that comes in”. This is a 10 point scale.

¹⁸ “What is the highest educational level that you have attained?”

¹⁹ Dummy variable, 1 indicating employed.

²⁰ Dummy variable, 1 indicating “catholic”.

$$\text{Political Trust} = a + B_1 * \text{Trusted} + B_2 * \text{Belong} + B_3 * \text{Respect} + B_4 * \text{Materialism} + \quad [3]$$

$$B_5 * \text{Financial} + B_6 * \text{Winner} + B_7 * \text{Office} + B_8 * \text{Runby} + B_9 * \text{Hrights} +$$

$$B_{10} * \text{Satdemoc} + B_i * \text{Control Variables} + e$$

Therefore, the model for 1995-1997 includes a measure of perception of corruption²¹. The model for 1999-2001, in turn, adds a variable measuring perception of respect to human rights in the country²². These new variables, then, allow us to measure more than just general satisfaction with the way governments are handled, but also more specific issues like corruption and respect for human rights that speaks of the perceived fairness of government.

3. Empirical Results

Before turning to the discussion of the results obtained in regression analysis let me briefly consider the bivariate relationships between political trust and the variables of interest here. Table 3.3 presents mean levels of political trust for the main categories of the independent variables included.

²¹ “How widespread do you think bribe taking and corruption is in this country? (4) Almost no public officials are engaged in it; (3) a few public officials are engaged in it; (2) Most public officials are engaged in it; and (1) Almost all public officials are engaged in it”.

²² “How much respect is there for individual human rights nowadays in (COUNTRY)? Do you feel there is: a lot of respect for individual human rights (4); some respect (3), not much respect (2), or not respect at all (1)?”

Table 3.3. Comparing Mean Levels of Trust by Independent Variables

		Mean 4-item Trust	Mean differences	T	p- value
Winners and losers	Winners	2.24	0.29	18.09	0.000
	Losers	1.95			
Extent political corruption	Most	2.07	0.34	11.86	0.000
	None	2.41			
Financial satisfaction	Satisfied	2.07	0.08	4.958	0.000
	Dissatisfied	1.98			
Materialism/Postmaterialism	Materialists	2.10	0.09	3.964	0.000
	Postmaterialists	2.00			
Interpersonal Trust	Trusted	2.19	0.17	8.598	0.000
	Careful	2.02			
Greater respect for Authorities	Good	2.18	0.37	22.665	0.000
	Bad/don't mind	1.80			
Respect for Human Rights	A lot of respect	2.18	0.36	21.676	0.000
	None respect	1.82			
Satisfaction with People in Office	Satisfied	2.28	0.43	30.629	0.000
	Dissatisfied	1.85			
Country run for the benefit of...	For all the people	2.27	0.34	21.390	0.000
	For few big interests	1.94			
Membership in secondary associations	1 or more	2.12	0.13	8.644	0.000
	None	1.99			

As can be seen, at least at the bivariate setup, there is strong support for the hypotheses proposed earlier. Political trust appears to be significantly higher among those with a higher stock in social capital, among those holding materialist values and those who consider a good thing a greater respect for authority. Political trust is also higher among those more satisfied with the financial situation of their household, and among winners.

Finally, and more important for the hypotheses presented here, trust in political institutions is significantly higher among those who consider that the government is

doing a good work, among those who believe government to be run for the benefit of all, among those who do not consider corruption to be problem, and among those who believe that there is respect for human rights in their country. In other words, as expected, political trust is higher in respondents that express a good perception of the competence and fairness of their country's institutions.

Do these factors remain relevant when we consider the multivariate models proposed earlier? The results obtained for model 1 can be observed in Table 3.4. Here, I present the results obtained for this model, computed for the whole sample –that is, for all seven countries- and for each of the waves separately. The table shows OLS coefficients and standard errors for each of the variables included in the model. Dummy variables indicating countries were also included in the computing of the model, but they are omitted in the table. Detailed data for each country in each one of the models presented can be observed in Appendix B.

Table 3.4. Determinants of Political Trust in Latin America. Model 1.

	Model 1 All Countries		Model 1 1995-1997 wave of WVS		Model 1 1999-2001 wave of WVS	
	B	Std. Error	B	Std. Error	B	Std. Error
Interpersonal Trust	.104***	.022	.236***	.046	.059*	.025
Membership in Secondary Organizations	.039***	.008	.060***	.014	.025**	.010
Respect for Authorities	.045***	.014	.051*	.026	.039*	.017
Materialist/Postmaterialist Index	-.021	.013	.004	.025	-.028	.015
Financial Satisfaction	.008**	.003	.000	.006	.011**	.004
Winners	.131***	.017	.120***	.036	.130***	.020
Satisfaction with People in Office	.159***	.010	.162***	.018	.155***	.012
Government is run for the benefit of all	.170***	.019	.167***	.038	.174***	.022
Self-Positioning in Left-Right scale	.019***	.003	.030***	.006	.014***	.004
Importance of Politics	.079***	.009	.080***	.017	.077***	.010
Interested in Politics	.092***	.010	.135***	.019	.073***	.011
Religion (1= catholic, 0=else)	.024	.018	.063	.033	.005	.022
Church attendance	-.013***	.004	-.019**	.008	-.013**	.004
Sex	-.021	.017	.036	.032	-.045*	.020
Age	.001	.001	.001	.001	.001	.001
Education	-.010	.005	-.013	.009	-.007	.005
Employment Status (1=employed)	-.019	.017	-.027	.032	-.018	.020
Level of Income	-.007	.004	-.025***	.008	-.002	.004
Constant	1.124***	.071	.928***	.129	.893***	.085
Adj R ²	.269		.262		.254	
N	5,905		1,777		4,127	

*** p ≤ 0.001; ** p ≤ 0.01; * p ≤ 0.05

Dummies indicating countries were also included. They were omitted for clarity's sake.

Let's start with the examination of the results for variables measuring the impact of cultural factors on political trust. As can be seen in the table, with the exception of the variable measuring materialist/postmaterialist values, all the other variables present

positive and significant coefficients that go in the expected direction. In other words, the results show that, controlling for other factors, citizens who trust others, who actively engage in voluntary organizations and who consider respect for authorities to be a good thing, tend to show, as expected, higher levels of political trust. The coefficient for the materialist / postmaterialist values is insignificant, and has the “wrong sign” for the equation involving countries measured in the 1995-1997 wave of the WVS.

With respect to the factors measuring economic perceptions, let’s first remember that we only have a pocketbook evaluation of the economy. This variable shows a positive sign, indicating that the higher the satisfaction with the financial situation of the household, the higher the level of political trust, *ceteris paribus*. The coefficient for the equation 2, however, is insignificant, indicating that this appears to be a relevant factor only for those countries measured at the turn of the millennium.

The variable measuring the winner/loser status of the respondent appears to be a strong predictor, keeping other variables constant, of political trust. In effect, the coefficients are positive (indicating an increase of trust for those on the winning side) and highly significant in every case.

The variables measuring institutional fairness and competence appear to be the most important ones in these equations. The coefficients are positive in all cases, indicating that trust in political institutions increases as respondents express a better evaluation of institutional competence and fairness. Moreover, the coefficients are highly significant in each case.

With respect to the control variables included in the equations a few comments are in order. First, notice that both the importance attached to politics and the level of

interest in politics present positive signs indicating that the more involved the citizens is with respect to politics, the higher the level of political trust that she expresses. These coefficients, moreover, are highly significant. The variable measuring ideological positioning of the respondent also shows a positive and significant coefficient, indicating that trust is higher as we move from left to right in the ideological spectrum.

With respect to religion, being catholic seems to have no significant effect on political trust, although the level of involvement with one's religion does: those that say that attend religious services frequently present higher levels of political trust than those that are more detached from religion and their churches.

The variables measuring socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents are generally non-significant in the equations presented. The only exceptions are the variable indicating sex in the equation for countries measured in 1999-2001, which shows that trust is higher among men; and level of income which appears to be relevant for the countries measured in 1995-1997, and which shows that trust is higher among those with lower levels of income.

The results presented so far show a very consistent pattern. First, all of the theoretical expectations –as proposed by different theories- seem to find at least some confirming evidence to support them for the case of Latin America. The only exception is, maybe, economic theories of political trust. It is important to remember, however, that we are only measuring economic self-interest, or pocketbook evaluations, leaving the question of whether sociotropic attitudes might be more important.

Second, the evaluation of institutional competence and fairness is, by far, the most important factor in explaining trust in political institutions in Latin America. Their

effects on trust are very important and highly significant in all cases.

With the data available, we can improve our understanding of institutional performance. To do so, I estimated new models for each one of the waves. The models are estimated here in a separate fashion given that variables are different in each case. These new models, moreover, are based on the previous ones: in other words, they keep the same variables introduced earlier and include new ones that allow us to measure new dimensions of the institutional performance of the countries included. Table 3.5 presents the results obtained.

The results obtained for models 2 and 3 are interesting for a number of reasons. First, the coefficients for the variables already included in model 1, vary very little and remained to be significant (if they were so in model 1). This is important in terms of the robustness of the data presented.

Second, the new variables included are also highly significant and their coefficients go in the expected direction. The perception of corruption, in 1995-1997, and respect for human rights –in 1999-2001-, appear to have a very important and significant impact on political trust, *ceteris paribus*. This is an important result for two reasons. First, it gives support for the idea of different dimensions of institutional trustworthiness that we need to include in the analysis. Second, it shows that institutional competence and fairness seems to be the most important factor in explaining political trust in Latin America.

Finally, the inclusion of these new variables significantly increases the predictive power of model 1.

Table 3.5. Determinants of Political Trust in Latin America. Models 2 and 3.

	Model 2 1995-1997 wave of WVS		Model 3 1999-2001 wave of WVS	
	B	Std. Error	B	Std. Error
Interpersonal Trust	.214***	.048	.062**	.025
Membership in Secondary Organizations	.057***	.015	.027**	.010
Respect for Authorities	.067**	.027	.027	.017
Materialist/Postmaterialist Index	.012	.026	-.026	.015
Financial Satisfaction	.003	.006	.010**	.004
Winners	.124***	.036	.112***	.020
Satisfaction with People in Office	.143***	.019	.103***	.013
Government is run for the benefit of all	.166***	.039	.148***	.022
Perception of Corruption	.127***	.020	-	-
Respect for Human Rights	-	-	.084***	.011
Self-Positioning in Left-Right scale	.026***	.006	.014***	.004
Importance of Politics	.064***	.018	.077***	.010
Interested in Politics	.140***	.019	.062***	.011
Religion (1= catholic, 0=else)	.082*	.034	-.005	.022
Church attendance	-.019*	.008	-.011*	.004
Sex	.047	.033	-.041*	.020
Age	.001	.001	.001	.001
Education	-.012	.009	-.008	.005
Employment Status (1=employed)	-.014	.033	-.019	.020
Level of Income	-.027***	.008	-.003	.004
Constant	.726***	.134	.727***	.087
Adj R ²	.286		.271	
N	1,639		4,057	

*** $p \leq 0.001$; ** $p \leq 0.01$; * $p \leq 0.05$

Dummies indicating countries were also included. They were omitted for clarity's sake.

Another way to test the robustness of these results is to evaluate the predictive power of these models when considering their impact on trust in the specific institutions

that compose the index. In other words, do we find different results if we consider as dependent variables trust in government, trust in parliament, trust in political parties and trust in the civil service separately? Table 3.6 through Table 3.9 shows these results.

Overall there are no major deviations from the results presented and discussed earlier. When considering trust in specific institutions as the dependent variables – as oppose to the general index of political trust- the coefficients for each variable in the models remain basically the same in terms of magnitude, direction and significance level. In other words, trust in political institutions does seem to be a general phenomenon. It does not appear to be very important specificities regarding different institutions.

Table 3.6. Determinants of Trust in Government

	Model 1		Model 2 1995-1997 wave of WVS		Model 3 1999-2001 wave of WVS	
	B	Std. Error	B	Std. Error	B	Std. Error
Interpersonal Trust	0.084**	0.029	0.203**	0.065	0.049	0.033
Membership in Secondary Organizations	0.042***	0.011	0.054**	0.019	0.036**	0.013
Respect for Authorities	0.088***	0.019	0.110**	0.036	0.066**	0.022
Materialist/Postmaterialist Index	-0.015	0.017	0.006	0.035	-0.022	0.020
Financial Satisfaction	0.009*	0.004	0.004	0.008	0.009	0.005
Winners	0.252***	0.023	0.185***	0.048	0.222***	0.027
Satisfaction with People in Office	0.274***	0.013	0.234***	0.025	0.186***	0.018
Government is run for the benefit of all	0.225***	0.025	0.144**	0.052	0.210***	0.029
Perception of Corruption	NA	NA	0.147***	0.027	NA	NA
Respect for Human Rights	NA	NA	NA	NA	0.095***	0.015
Self-Positioning in Left-Right scale	0.024***	0.004	0.057***	0.009	0.009	0.005
Importance of Politics	0.054***	0.012	0.045	0.024	0.053***	0.013
Interested in Politics	0.070***	0.013	0.101***	0.026	0.043**	0.015
Religion (1= catholic, 0=else)	0.068**	0.024	0.187***	0.045	0.019	0.029
Church attendance	-0.006	0.005	-0.016	0.010	-0.002	0.006
Sex	-0.027	0.023	-0.005	0.044	-0.022	0.027
Age	0.003***	0.001	0.003	0.002	0.003**	0.001
Education	-0.021**	0.006	-0.038**	0.013	-0.012	0.007
Employment Status (1=employed)	-0.024	0.022	0.000	0.044	-0.027	0.026
Level of Income	-0.003	0.005	-0.013	0.010	-0.004	0.006
Constant	0.720***	0.095	0.314	0.179	0.400**	0.117
Adj R ²	0.269		0.292		0.290	
N	6,029		1,645		4,171	

*** $p \leq 0.001$; ** $p \leq 0.01$; * $p \leq 0.05$

Dummies indicating countries were also included. They were omitted for clarity's sake.

Table 3.7. Determinants of Trust in Parliament

	Model 1		Model 2 1995-1997 wave of WVS		Model 3 1999-2001 wave of WVS	
	B	Std. Error	B	Std. Error	B	Std. Error
Interpersonal Trust	0.099***	0.028	0.217***	0.063	0.053	0.032
Membership in Secondary Organizations	0.044***	0.011	0.067***	0.019	0.024	0.013
Respect for Authorities	0.042*	0.018	0.066	0.035	0.020	0.022
Materialist/Postmaterialist Index	-0.029	0.017	-0.010	0.034	-0.023	0.020
Financial Satisfaction	0.006	0.004	0.002	0.008	0.009	0.005
Winners	0.123***	0.022	0.117*	0.047	0.103***	0.026
Satisfaction with People in Office	0.157***	0.013	0.145***	0.024	0.099***	0.017
Government is run for the benefit of all	0.191***	0.024	0.220***	0.051	0.157***	0.028
Perception of Corruption	NA	NA	0.111***	0.026	NA	NA
Respect for Human Rights	NA	NA	NA	NA	0.080***	0.015
Self-Positioning in Left-Right scale	0.017***	0.004	0.025**	0.008	0.011*	0.005
Importance of Politics	0.092***	0.011	0.066**	0.023	0.093***	0.013
Interested in Politics	0.108***	0.013	0.180***	0.025	0.072***	0.015
Religion (1= catholic, 0=else)	0.012	0.024	0.062	0.044	-0.016	0.028
Church attendance	-0.015**	0.005	-0.023*	0.010	-0.013*	0.006
Sex	0.001	0.022	0.163***	0.044	-0.056*	0.026
Age	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.000	0.001
Education	-0.003	0.006	-0.010	0.012	0.000	0.007
Employment Status (1=employed)	-0.005	0.022	0.012	0.043	-0.010	0.026
Level of Income	-0.006	0.005	-0.022*	0.010	-0.005	0.005
Constant	0.850***	0.092	0.380*	0.175	0.675***	0.113
Adj R2	0.182		0.237		0.171	
N	5,978		1,641		4,127	

*** $p \leq 0.001$; ** $p \leq 0.01$; * $p \leq 0.05$

Dummies indicating countries were also included. They were omitted for clarity's sake.

Table 3.8. Determinants of Trust in Political Parties

	Model 1		Model 2 1995-1997 wave of WVS		Model 3 1999-2001 wave of WVS	
	B	Std. Error	B	Std. Error	B	Std. Error
Interpersonal Trust	0.151***	0.028	0.341***	0.064	0.075*	0.031
Membership in Secondary Organizations	0.035**	0.010	0.059**	0.019	0.018	0.012
Respect for Authorities	0.011	0.018	0.004	0.035	0.005	0.021
Materialist/Postmaterialist Index	-0.035*	0.016	0.028	0.034	-0.059**	0.019
Financial Satisfaction	0.006	0.004	-0.003	0.008	0.010*	0.005
Winners	0.071**	0.022	0.090	0.048	0.064*	0.025
Satisfaction with People in Office	0.096***	0.013	0.111***	0.024	0.056**	0.017
Government is run for the benefit of all	0.142***	0.024	0.168**	0.052	0.116***	0.027
Perception of Corruption	NA	NA	0.162***	0.026	NA	NA
Respect for Human Rights	NA	NA	NA	NA	0.085***	0.014
Self-Positioning in Left-Right scale	0.016***	0.004	0.012	0.008	0.015**	0.005
Importance of Politics	0.112***	0.011	0.121***	0.023	0.102***	0.013
Interested in Politics	0.156***	0.012	0.202***	0.025	0.124***	0.014
Religion (1= catholic, 0=else)	0.002	0.023	-0.008	0.045	0.000	0.027
Church attendance	-0.018***	0.005	-0.035**	0.010	-0.011*	0.006
Sex	-0.025	0.021	0.047	0.044	-0.039	0.025
Age	0.000	0.001	0.002	0.002	-0.001	0.001
Education	-0.013*	0.006	-0.012	0.012	-0.014*	0.007
Employment Status (1=employed)	-0.003	0.021	0.002	0.043	-0.003	0.025
Level of Income	-0.008	0.005	-0.037***	0.010	0.000	0.005
Constant	1.065***	0.090	0.606**	0.176	0.887***	0.109
Adj R ²	0.176		0.243		0.140	
N	6,021		1,645		4,164	

*** $p \leq 0.001$; ** $p \leq 0.01$; * $p \leq 0.05$

Dummies indicating countries were also included. They were omitted for clarity's sake.

Table 3.9. Determinants of Trust in the Civil Service

	Model 1		Model 2 1995-1997 wave of WVS		Model 3 1999-2001 wave of WVS	
	B	Std. Error	B	Std. Error	B	Std. Error
Interpersonal Trust	0.062*	0.028	0.094	0.065	0.052	0.032
Membership in Secondary Organizations	0.038***	0.011	0.051**	0.019	0.030*	0.013
Respect for Authorities	0.045*	0.018	0.088*	0.036	0.025	0.021
Materialist/Postmaterialist Index	-0.004	0.017	0.025	0.035	-0.004	0.019
Financial Satisfaction	0.011**	0.004	0.009	0.008	0.012**	0.005
Winners	0.077***	0.022	0.102*	0.049	0.061*	0.026
Satisfaction with People in Office	0.112***	0.013	0.087***	0.025	0.079***	0.017
Government is run for the benefit of all	0.124***	0.024	0.131*	0.053	0.104***	0.028
Perception of Corruption	NA	NA	0.087**	0.027	NA	NA
Respect for Human Rights	NA	NA	NA	NA	0.074***	0.015
Self-Positioning in Left-Right scale	0.017***	0.004	0.012	0.009	0.020***	0.005
Importance of Politics	0.059***	0.011	0.026	0.024	0.062***	0.013
Interested in Politics	0.029*	0.012	0.076**	0.026	0.004	0.015
Religion (1= catholic, 0=else)	0.016	0.023	0.080	0.046	-0.012	0.028
Church attendance	-0.016**	0.005	-0.001	0.011	-0.020**	0.006
Sex	-0.044*	0.022	-0.014	0.045	-0.057*	0.025
Age	0.000	0.001	-0.002	0.002	0.001	0.001
Education	-0.002	0.006	0.012	0.013	-0.006	0.007
Employment Status (1=employed)	-0.039	0.022	-0.069	0.044	-0.030	0.025
Level of Income	-0.009*	0.005	-0.037***	0.010	-0.001	0.005
Constant	1.858***	0.091	1.567***	0.179	0.965***	0.111
Adj R2	0.198		0.099		0.175	
N	5,992		1,646		4,136	

*** $p \leq 0.001$; ** $p \leq 0.01$; * $p \leq 0.05$

Dummies indicating countries were also included. They were omitted for clarity's sake.

4. Summary and Conclusions

The results presented in this chapter are consistent with the ones previously presented in Chapter 2 and provide more evidence as to the relevance of corruption and perceptions of fairness and competence as important determinants of political trust in Latin America.

In effect, in all the different models run in this chapter we get confirming evidence as to the individual-level impact of perceptions about the extent of corruption and perceptions about fairness and competence of governments on political trust. In other words, these factors are important to explain the low mean levels of political trust found in Latin America.

To be sure, other factors are also important to explain political trust. Interpersonal trust, financial satisfaction, and the winner status of respondents are also significantly related to trust in political institutions.

What we need to do now, in order to complete this exploration on the determinants of political trust in Latin America, is to compute the effect of country-levels measures of corruption together with individual-level variables in order to assess the relevance of each one in a single model. This is the task of next chapter.

CHAPTER 4:
POLITICAL TRUST AND INSTITUTIONAL TRUSTWORTHINESS IN LATIN
AMERICA. A HIERARCHICAL LINEAL MODEL

The previous two chapters have investigated, respectively, the country-level correlates of trust in 50 democracies around the world and the individual-level correlates of political trust in Latin America. The aim of this chapter is to build a model that could include both levels of analysis: one that considers both the country- and individual-level correlates of trust and the interactions among them in Latin American countries. The question here, then, is how does national levels of corruption and the perception of fairness and competence relate? And, how well can they explain trust in political institutions in the region?

In order to be able to answer these questions I re-examined the results obtained previously, and combined them in a hierarchical lineal model (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002; Goldstein 1999; Steenbergen and Jones 2002) that allow me to include both levels of analysis. Section 1 presents the data and methods to be used in this chapter. Section 2 presents and discusses the results obtained, and section 3, finally, concludes.

1. Data and Methods

As we have seen so far, then, there is a wide variation in the levels of political trust across regions and across countries. Moreover, we have also found variation within each country. In this section, I'll introduce the methodological considerations and data to be used in the analysis of political trust based on the 1995-1997 and 1999-2000 WVS data for Latin America.

As I argued in the previous chapters, trust in political institutions is expected to be related to the trustworthiness of the institutions asking for that trust. And we defined trustworthiness as being composed of two major elements: trust, according to this theory, should be related, first, to their levels of fairness; and, second, to their competence. These two elements of trustworthiness, moreover, should affect trust both as aggregated characteristics of societies and as perceptions of those characteristics held by individuals. In other words, what matters for trust is, first, that institutions are trustworthy and, second, that the individuals perceive those institutions as trustworthy. Thus, individuals will trust institutions if they are trustworthy and if they are perceived as such.

Accordingly, countries with better scores on measures of corruption should present, according to this argument, higher levels of trust than countries with lower scores on those measures. At the same time, we should expect within-country variation on the levels of trust, related to the perceived level of competence and fairness of institutions: that is, people will grant more or less trust within a given country depending on how fair and competent those institutions appear to them.

Formally, we could set these hypotheses in the following way:

H₁: Between-country variation in the levels of political trust is positively related

to aggregated levels of corruption; and,

H₂: Within-country variation in the levels of political trust is positively related to individual's perceptions of institutional fairness and competence.

The results obtained in the previous two chapters confirmed these two hypotheses. However, these hypotheses present us with the problem of evaluating effects both at the individual- and country-level of analysis, where one unit of analysis (individuals) is nested within the other (countries). As has been considered in the methodological literature, several options are available to solve this problem. The most appropriate, however, and the one that provides elements to solve the problems that arise with those other options, is to develop a model that would explicitly consider hierarchical or multilevel structures, and that allow us to measure the effect of different variables to explain variation both within and between countries (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002; Goldstein 1999; Steenbergen and Jones 2002). Here, then, I'll present the results obtained using what has been called a hierarchical or multilevel linear model.²³

The first step in this analysis is to run an ANOVA analysis to evaluate whether there is in fact variation in the levels of trust both at the individual and country-levels of analysis. The one-way ANOVA with random effects provides useful preliminary information about how much variation in the outcome –in this case in the levels of political trust- lies within and between countries. If considerable variation occurs at the individual- and the country-level a hierarchical analysis that could model those variations is in order. Equations 1, 2 and 3 shows the way that this model is set up and table 4.1 presents the results of the ANOVA analysis for the Latin American data.

²³ I will follow the notation used by Raudenbush and Bryk (2002). The program used for all of the analyses to be presented here was HLM6.0.2.

The level-1 or individual-level model is

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + r_{ij} \quad [1]$$

Notice that this model characterizes levels of political trust for each individual with just an intercept β_{0j} , which in this case is the country mean. In other words, the level of political trust for a given individual, i , within a given country, j , is equal to the mean level of political trust for that country plus an error term, r_{ij} .

At level-2 or the country-level, each country's mean political trust, β_{0j} , is represented as a function of the grand mean –that is, the mean across individuals and countries-, γ_{00} , plus a random error, u_{0j} :

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + u_{0j} \quad [2]$$

This yields a combined model, also often referred to as a mixed model with fixed effect γ_{00} , and random effects u_{0j} and r_{ij} :

$$Y_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + u_{0j} + r_{ij} \quad [3]$$

Is there significant variation in political trust at the individual and country levels? The ANOVA model presented before was estimated and its results are presented in Table 4.1. The results presented show that the weighted least squares estimate for the grand-mean political trust is 2.06, with a corresponding standard error of 0.08 ($p = 0.000$).

Table 4.1 also lists the restricted maximum likelihood estimates of the variance components. At the individual level, the variance is 0.48. At the country level the

estimated variability of these country means is 0.05.

How can we interpret these results? First, we may wish to test formally whether the estimated value of the variance is significantly greater than zero. If not, it may be sensible to assume that all countries have the same mean. This test statistic has a large-sample χ^2 distribution with J-1 degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis. In our case, the test statistic takes on a value of 684.59 with 6 degrees of freedom. The null hypothesis is highly implausible ($p = 0.000$) indicating that significant variation does exist among countries in their levels of political trust. In other words, there is evidence that the multilevel character of the political trust data should not be ignored.

Table 4.1.: One-Way ANOVA

Fixed Effect	Coefficient	Standard Error	T-ratio	Approx. d.f.	p-value
Mean Political Trust	2.06	0.08	27.213	6	0.000
Random Effect	Standard Deviation	Variance Component	df	Chi-square	p-value
Country-Level	0.21	0.05	6	684.59	0.000
Individual-Level	0.69	0.48			

In order to obtain a better sense of the relevance of each of the levels of analysis we consider the intra-class correlation, which allow us to show the proportion of the total variance in political trust that is related to variation between countries. The intra-class correlation, which represents the proportion of variance in trust between countries, indicates that about 9% of the variance in trust is between countries.²⁴ Since the

²⁴ The intra-class correlation is equal to the percentage of each variance component to the total variance in political trust. Intra-class correlation = $u_{oj} / u_{oj} + r_{ij}$. The same procedure can be used to evaluate other

dependent variable is measured at the individual level, it is to be expected that most of the variance will be accounted for by individual-level factors. Thus, the results presented before do indeed show that there is still an important percentage of the variance that should be explained at the country-level of analysis, and that to ignore these sources of variance is to miss out important aspects of political trust, which could lead to erroneous conclusions about it.

Having showed that political trust can and should be explained by individual- as well as country-level factors, we now turn to the question of how we can account for the variance in political trust. In other words, which are the factors that explain different levels of trust at the individual and country levels? Equation 4 shows the individual-level model to be estimated:

$$\begin{aligned}
 Y_{ij} = & \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j} \text{Trusted}_{ij} + \beta_{2j} \text{Belong}_{ij} + \beta_{3j} \text{Respect}_{ij} + \beta_{4j} \text{Materialism}_{ij} + \\
 & \beta_{5j} \text{Financial}_{ij} + \beta_{6j} \text{Winner}_{ij} + \beta_{7j} \text{Office}_{ij} + \beta_{8j} \text{Runby}_{ij} + \\
 & \beta_{i_j} \text{Control Variables}_{ij} + r_{ij}
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{4}$$

Where Y_{ij} is the level of political trust for an individual i within a country j ; β_{0j} is the average level of trust for a given country; β_{xj} are the effects of the individual variables in the outcome; and r_{ij} is the error term. As can be seen in the equation, the model –at the individual level- to be estimated resembles the basic model (or model 1) presented in the previous chapter. Therefore, there is no need to reconsider the variables introduced.²⁵

levels of analysis. Since we only have two levels here –individuals and countries- to do it would be redundant.

²⁵ Basic statistics for all of the variables used can be seen in the appendix.

The country-level model is shown in equation 5,

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}\text{Corrupt}_j + u_{0j} \quad [5]$$

Where β_{0j} is the mean average of trust for country j ; γ are the effects of the country-level variables included in the model and u_{0j} is the error term. As we can see, in this model intercepts for different countries are allowed to vary, as a function of the variables included, plus an error term. In other words, individuals members of different countries will present different levels of trust depending not only of their own perceptions of competence and fairness (or the other variables included in the individual-level model), but those levels of trust will also vary as a function of specific characteristics of their countries.


As an indicator of trustworthiness, we used a measure of corruption developed by the World Bank (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton 1999; Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton 1999). This variable goes from -2.5 (more corrupt) to 2.5 (less corrupt). This seems to be a good measure of corruption and it has the advantage (compared to the Transparency International's measure) that is available for a larger number of countries. Since the data to be estimated only considers 6 countries, only one factor is introduced in this level, in order to avoid problems of high multi-collinearity.

The mixed model can be seen in equation 6,

$$\begin{aligned}
Y_{ij} = & \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} \text{Corrupt}_j + \gamma_{10} \text{Trusted}_{ij} + \gamma_{20} \text{Belong}_{ij} + \gamma_{30} \text{Respect}_{ij} + \\
& \gamma_{40} \text{Materialism}_{ij} + \gamma_{50} \text{Financial}_{ij} + \gamma_{60} \text{Winner}_{ij} + \gamma_{70} \text{Office}_{ij} + \gamma_{80} \text{Runby}_{ij} + \\
& \gamma_{90} \text{Control Variables}_{ij} + u_{0j} + r_{ij}
\end{aligned}
\tag{6}$$

The impact of corruption for this set of countries, finally, is expected to be high and higher than other variables, given the theoretical argument made previously and the results shown in chapter 2. Figure 4.1 shows the bivariate relationship of political trust and corruption in Latin America, with a correlation level of $r = .561$ ($p = 0.190$). The fact that this coefficient is not significant should not worry us given the small number of countries.

Figure 4.1. Political Trust and Corruption in Latin America



2. Empirical Results

The results of the analysis are presented in Table 4.2. The first model estimated includes only the individual-level variables. The second model includes both the individual- and country-level models.

Table 4.2: Determinants of Political Trust in Latin America

	Model 1			Model 2		
	Coeff.	Std. Error	P-Value	Coeff.	Std. Error	P-Value
Fixed Effects						
Constant	2.10	0.07	.000	2.09	0.06	.000
Corruption				0.20	0.09	.070
Most people can be trusted	0.10	0.02	.000	0.10	0.02	.000
Sum belong institutions	0.04	0.01	.000	0.04	0.01	.000
Post materialism	-0.02	0.01	.142	-0.02	0.01	.139
Greater respect for authority	0.04	0.02	.004	0.05	0.02	.004
Financial Satisfaction	0.01	0.00	.022	0.01	0.00	.023
Winners and losers	0.13	0.02	.000	0.13	0.02	.000
Satisfaction with office	0.16	0.01	.000	0.16	0.01	.000
Run by few interests	0.17	0.02	.000	0.17	0.02	.000
Left-Right scale	0.02	0.00	.000	0.02	0.00	.000
Politics important	0.08	0.01	.000	0.08	0.01	.000
Interest in politics	0.09	0.01	.000	0.09	0.01	.000
Religious Denomination	0.02	0.02	.268	0.02	0.02	.252
Attend religious services	-0.01	0.00	.003	-0.01	0.00	.002
Sex	-0.02	0.02	.274	-0.02	0.02	.262
Age	0.00	0.00	.158	0.00	0.00	.171
Education	-0.01	0.01	.049	-0.01	0.01	.049
Employed	-0.02	0.02	.318	-0.02	0.02	.312
Income	-0.07	0.00	.085	-0.01	0.00	.008
Variance Components						
Country Level, u_0	0.05			0.03		
Individual Level, r	0.36			0.36		
χ^2	644.30			377.67		
p Value	0.000			0.000		

The results of model 1 resemble those estimated in the previous chapter with some minor changes –although none of them significant- due to the different estimation

methods used. Overall, the conclusions remain the same. What happens when we introduce the level of corruption as an explanatory factor in the country-level of analysis?

First of all, the impact of the individual-level variables remains unaltered as compare to the results obtained in model 1. At the individual level we observe a powerful effect of the variables measuring perceptions of trustworthiness. This effect, moreover, is in the direction that we predicted: people perceiving institutions as trustworthy do present higher levels of trust than those who consider them untrustworthy. Thus, the level of trust at the individual level will be positively related to perceptions of people in office and perceptions of fairness of the political system.

The same is true regarding the results obtained for the variable measuring the countries' levels of corruption. The level of corruption, in effect, is a strong predictor of political trust, and the effect is in the direction predicted: countries with higher levels of corruption have lower amounts of trusting citizens. To be sure, the coefficient obtained for the levels of corruption has a p-value of 0.07, which indicates that corruption is a significant factor explaining trust in political institutions in Latin America at the 90% confidence level. Given that only seven countries are included here this might be taken as a sufficient, although not completely satisfactory, level of statistical confidence.

To further evaluate the impact of corruption on political trust, I re-run this model, but this time using all 50 countries included in Chapter 2. Table 4.3 shows that results of the ANOVA analysis and Table 4.4 shows the results of the full model. What do these results tell us?

First, as we can see in Table 4.3, the weighted least square estimate for the grand-mean political trust is 2.20, with a corresponding standard error of 0.04 ($p = 0.000$).

Considering all 50 countries, the variance at the individual level is 0.46, and at the country level the estimated variability of these country means is 0.06. The large x-square obtained indicates, furthermore, that significant variation does exist among countries in their levels of political trust.

Table 4.3: One-Way ANOVA in 50 Democracies

Fixed Effect	Coefficient	Standard Error	T-ratio	Approx. d.f.	p-value
Mean Political Trust	2.20	0.04	54.030	49	0.000
Random Effect	Standard Deviation	Variance Component	df	Chi-square	p-value
Country-Level	0.25	0.06	49	7966.98	0.000
Individual-Level	0.68	0.46			

Second, the intra-class correlation, which represents the proportion of variance between countries, indicates that about 12% of the variance in trust is between countries. The results show, therefore, that there is an important percentage of the variance that should be explained at the country-level of analysis.

Table 4.4. Determinants of Trust in 50 Democracies


	50 Democracies	
	Coeff.	Std. Error
Fixed Effects		
Constant	2.22***	0.03
Corruption	0.16***	0.03
Most people can be trusted	0.12***	0.01
Sum belong institutions	0.03***	0.01
Post materialism	-0.04***	0.01
Greater respect for authority	0.09***	0.01
Left-Right scale	0.01*	0.00
Politics important	0.10***	0.01
Sex	-0.02	0.01
Age	0.00***	0.00
Education	-0.00	0.01
Variance Components		
Country Level, u_0	0.03	
Individual Level, r	0.42	
χ^2	2715.47	
p Value	0.000	

Third, as presented in Table 4.4, I estimated a model of political trust for all 50 countries. In this case, the number of variables introduced at the individual-level of analysis is reduced, given differences in data availability. At the country level, control of corruption was included. In this case, the coefficient obtained for the impact of corruption on political trust is 0.16 ($p = 0.000$), corroborating the impact that this factor has on political trust.

Using the coefficients obtained, as can be seen in Figure 4.2, and keeping other variables constant, we find that a typical Latin American respondent in a country where corruption is low scores a 2.39 on the scale measuring political trust. In contrast, the average respondents in a country in with high level of corruption score a 1.92. If we consider all 50 democracies, in turn, and keeping other variables constant, an average respondent in a country where corruption is low scores a 2.49 on political trust. In

contrast, the average individual in a country in the most corrupt category scores a 1.97.

Figure 4.2: Effects of Corruption on Political Trust




The effects of corruption on political trust can also be observed in their relationship with other variables in the models. I'll consider these effects on three factors included as individual-level predictors of trust: interpersonal trust, satisfaction with people in office, and the perception that the government is run for the benefit of all (other variables were kept constant at their means). We could, of course, evaluate the effects on every variable included in the model, and that is something that future research should address in detail in the future. In the meantime, I chose the three variables that go to the core of the argument and results presented in this dissertation.

Figure 4.3 shows the impact of corruption in the levels of political trust expressed by people who consider that we can trust others and by those who consider that “we need to be careful in dealing with people”. As can be observed, trust in political institutions is considerably higher among those who trust others and who live in countries with low

levels of corruption. Citizens in countries with low and mid levels of corruption present very similar levels of political trust.

Figure 4.3. The Effects of Corruption and Interpersonal Trust on Political Trust



Figures 4.4 and 4.5, in turn, show the effects of two variables measuring the perceptions of competence and fairness in countries with varying levels of corruption. The results in both cases indicate that citizens who live in countries where corruption is a minor problem do in fact trust more in their political institutions, even in the case of those citizens who perceive their government to be not fair, and those who are not satisfied with the people in government.

Figure 4.4. The Effects of Corruption and Satisfaction with Government on Political Trust





Figure 4.5. The Effects of Corruption and Perceptions of Fairness on Political Trust



In general terms, what these figures show us is that, to live in a country where corruption is low makes considerable differences in terms of the perceptions and evaluations that people make of their governing institutions. In effect, citizens who live in countries where corruption is low do present higher levels of political trust, even if those citizens have a negative evaluation of the competence and fairness of their governments.

Overall, the models perform well. The coefficients are consistent comparing both models. The χ^2 are highly significant, indicating that at least one of the variables included is different from zero. If we compare this results to the ones obtained in the ANOVA model for the Latin American case, we see that, at the individual level, the models explain around 25% of the variance, while at the country level, the model explains 40% of the variance. For the whole sample of 50 democracies, the model explains around 9% of the variance at the individual level, and 50% of the variance at the country-level.

3. Conclusions

The results obtained and shown in this chapter finish our inquiry into the determinants of political trust in Latin America. I have showed that political trust is strongly related to the level of corruption of those institutions, both when we consider 50 democracies around the world or, more specifically, the Latin American countries under analysis here.

With respect to the results of this chapter we can conclude the following. First, we have seen that levels of political trust vary both between and within countries. Thus, a multilevel technique seems more suitable to understand and explain levels of political trust cross-nationally. Second, the results also show that, as expected, the levels of trust

across countries respond to the different levels of corruption. That is, individuals in countries with higher levels of trust will on average trust less their political institutions than those that live in countries where corruption is not pervasive. Third, perceptions of competence and fairness are also important to explain trust. In effect, within countries, those who perceived their political institutions to be fair and competent will tend to grant them more trust than those individuals that perceived them as unfair and incompetent.

CHAPTER 5:
DOES IT MATTER? THE EFFECTS OF POLITICAL TRUST ON SUPPORT
FOR DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

The data and evidence presented so far strongly supports the main hypotheses presented at the beginning of this dissertation: that political trust is based on the actual and perceived fairness and competence of political institutions. Political trust is – although not exclusively- strongly related to levels of corruption at the country-level and to perceived fairness and corruption at the individual level. These results solve one of the problems that have been generally associated to the study of political trust: that researchers fail to explain the individual- and country-level origins or correlates of trust, leaving it mostly unexplained (Newton 2007).

A second question however arises and we need to consider it: does it matter? Do high or low levels of trust in political institutions have an effect on other beliefs or actions in the individuals? As Mishler and Rose (2005) argue, institutional trust is frequently hypothesized to have an important role. However, there is little systematic research that attempt to evaluate these on empirical grounds (with some exceptions, see for example Hetherington 1999; Hetherington 2005; Brehm and Rahn 1997; Mishler and Rose 2005; Norris 1999c). In this chapter I'll briefly explore into the effect of political

trust on two separate dimensions crucial for democracy: its –potential- effect on support for democracy (the attitudinal dimension) and on political participation (the behavioral dimension).

The next section briefly reviews the literature on support for democracy and political participation in terms of their relation with political trust. Then, I discuss the data to be used in the analysis and the measures of support and political participation used in this chapter. The third section presents the results obtained and discussed them. Finally I summarize the main results and conclude.

1. Support for Democracy, Political Participation and Political Trust

The explorations on the factors that explain support for democracy, on the one hand, and political participation, on the other, have a long pedigree in political science research. In both cases it is possible to find a wide number of researches relating to them, and it would be out of the purposes of this dissertation to review these vast literatures. Since the main objective of this chapter is to describe and evaluate the impact of political trust in support for democracy and political participation, the rest of this section will focus mainly on what other research has found about these relationships.

Support for Democracy and Political Trust

Although the evaluation of support for democracy has been present in the literature since the beginning of the political culture paradigm and more generally, seems to be at the core of political science research, more emphasis has been devoted to it as a result of the process called the “third wave of democratization” (Huntington 1991). In

this period, a large number of countries in the world experienced processes of democratic transition which lead to the question of whether these transitions would be successful and would be able to produce stable and consolidated democratic regimes in the long-run (Shin 2007).

The idea that democracy is consolidated when “it is the only game in town”(Linz and Stepan 1996) refers not only to institutional features (Przeworski et al. 2000), and elite-behavior (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986), but also to the way that citizens evaluate and value democracy (Linz and Stepan 1996; Shin 2007). The support that people express in democracy seems to be important as long as it represents the existence of a political culture that is congruent and supportive of this type of regime (Shin 2007). When such support does not exist, then, polities might face a difficult time in their survival, especially when they face hard economic, social or political times. More recently, support for democracy has been considered as one important dimension on the evaluations of the quality of democracy (Diamond and Morlino 2005; O'Donnell, Vargas Cullell, and Iazzetta 2004).

What do we mean by *support for democracy*? Support for democracy can be expressed and measured in different ways, and the consequences of low support might be different depending on the type of support that we are measuring. The literature on this area usually distinguishes between: (a) support for democracy as a form of government and (b) satisfaction with the way that democracies work (Norris 1999a; Dalton 1999; Klingemann 1999; Sarsfield and Echegaray 2005; Lagos 2003; Shin 2007). The first dimension refers to how citizens value democracy on itself and in comparison to other types of political regimes. When citizens consider that democracy is a good form of

government despite its problems or a better form of government than other types of regimes (what has been called the “Churchill’s hypothesis”), then democracies find themselves as having important levels of support (Shin 2007; Linz and Stepan 1996; Fuchs, Guidorossi, and Svensson 1995).

The second dimension, on the other hand, refers to more specific evaluations of democracy, and refers to how citizens evaluate the functioning of democracy in their countries (Sarsfield and Echegaray 2005; Lagos 2003; Dalton 1999). Satisfaction with democracy might be high or low depending on how citizens evaluate the state of democracy in their countries, and, although related to the evaluation of the regime –the first dimension- does not represent the same type of support. In effect we can expect to find countries where support for democracy as a regime is high, but satisfaction with its functioning is low, and vice versa. The relationship between both types of support, then, is an empirical question (Sarsfield and Echegaray 2005).

How does political trust relate to these two dimensions of support for democracy? Do higher levels of political trust produce higher levels of support for democracy? Trust and more specifically, political trust is expected to have direct effects on citizens’ support for democracy and the rejection of other, non-democratic alternatives (Mishler and Rose 2005; Muller, Juckam, and Seligson 1982; Norris 1999a, 1999c). Distrust of political institutions “not only undermines their legitimacy and stability but also threatens to increase support for undemocratic regimes” (Mishler and Rose 2005: 1053).

Political Participation and Political Trust

Political participation is crucial for democracy. In fact, democracies rest on the

assumption that citizens will, at least, vote every number of years to select their governments and leaders. Besides voting, however, there are a number of other ways in which citizens might get involve in order to transmit their preferences and demands to governments (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1987; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). This has led to the distinction in the literature between conventional and non-conventional or protest types of political participation.

Conventional forms of participation are characterized mainly because they are produced through a process of elite-directed mobilization (Inglehart and Catterberg 2002). These conventional forms of participation can be personal (such as the vote or to donate money for a campaign) or collective types of participation (such as belonging to a political party and participation in campaigning and “get-out-the-vote” activities).

Non-conventional or protest types of political participation are relatively new and have been developed most intensively in more developed or “old” democracies (Inglehart and Catterberg 2002). They are defined or characterized as all other forms or political ways to present demands and opinions to government leaders, other than “conventional forms of participation”. They are used by citizens mostly outside of the elections settings, they are somewhat more costly for the individual to engage in, they usually appear as a response to specific issues, and not regularly schedule as the voting.

Research has shown a dissimilar pattern of change between conventional and non-conventional forms of political participation: while conventional participation has been declining everywhere for the last 20 or 30 years, there seems to be an increase in non-conventional forms of participation, at least for long and stable democracies (Inglehart and Catterberg 2002; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000a, 2000b; Dalton 2000a; Wattenberg

2000; Scarrow 2000).

Does political trust have an effect on political participation? If so, what is the direction of such effect? Does political trust affect participation differently depending on the type of participation? According to Mishler and Rose (2005) we should expect political trust to promote the “quality and quantity of political involvement” (Mishler and Rose 2005: 1053), because trust “strengthens citizens’ beliefs that government is responsive and encourages citizens to express their demands via participation in activities from voting to joining organizations” (Mishler and Rose 2005: 1053).

These expectations have found some support in the empirical evidence presented by Brehm and Rahn (1997), Norris (1999c), and Putnam (2000). However, there is also research that shows that trust has no effect on participation. Considering the American case, for example, Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) have shown that “neither feelings of trust in government nor beliefs about government responsiveness have any effect whatsoever on the likelihood that citizens will vote or will take part in any form of campaign politics” (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993: 150).

This result might be due to, as the authors point out, to the measure used to evaluate trust in government, or to the fact that they are using only conventional forms of participation in their research. Using a similar scale of trust in institutions to the one I’ve been using in this work, Norris (1999c) has found, for example, that trust in institutions is *positively* related to involvement in conventional forms of political participation, and *negatively* related to non-conventional or protest types of participation (although the relationship is weak in both cases).

This result regarding the effect of trust on non-conventional participation has also

been replicated in a more specific analysis of protest politics in Latin America and countries belonging to the former Soviet orbit (Catterberg 2003). Catterberg shows that confidence in political institutions decreases the potential to participate in these types of activities in these nations, although the effect is weaker than the one produced by support for democracy.

Given these results, then, I expect to find a mixed result on the effect of trust on political participation: a positive effect on conventional forms of participation and a negative effect on non-conventional or protest types of activities.

2. Data and Methods

To evaluate and test these hypotheses I'll use de World Values Survey data – as previously- for 50 democracies in Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe and Industrialized countries. Before we turn to the presentation and discussion of the results obtained, however, we need to describe and discuss the measurement of our two dependent variables: support for democracy and political participation.

Measuring Support for Democracy

How to measure support for democracy? There are at least two different dimension of democracy that one might want to measure: the support for democracy as a form of government and the evaluation of the perceived performance of democracy in each country. In general, then, support for democracy consists of two different, and not necessarily related aspects: first, whether people consider democracy to be a good and better type of political regime, despite the potential problems or criticism that could arise

from its workings in a specific country, and, second, the evaluation of the performance of democracy in a given political and social context.

On the other hand, as has previously been shown, support for democracy is difficult to test, because questions that use the word “democracy” tend to get high levels of support and low variance due to the expectations that it produces among people: it is expected that people should value democracy, and people answer in that way (Canache, Mondak, and Seligson 2001; Catterberg 2003; Inglehart 2003). We need therefore to use questions that avoid this desirability effect in order to measure it. As a consequence, no single measure of support for democracy will do.

Given these considerations, I’ll use two different ways to measure support for democracy. The first one is related to support as a form of government or political regime (the Democracy/Autocracy Index), and the second one measures satisfaction with the performance of democracy in each country.

The Democracy/Autocracy Index. The index used to measure support for democracy as a form of government or type of political regime considers both overt support for other forms of regimes and the evaluation of democracy as a form of government. The index is composed of the following four items present in the WVS²⁶:

- a) Having a democratic political system is a good way of governing the country
- b) Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of government
- c) Having experts, not the government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country
- d) Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections.


²⁶ The complete wording of the items can be found in Appendix C.

To compute the index, the polarity of responses to the last two items (support for strong leader and experts) was reversed, and the index represents the mean answers obtained in the four questions, with 1 indicating strong support for other regimes and bad evaluation of democracy and 4 indicating strong support for democracy and no support for other forms of political regimes²⁷.

As can be seen in Figure 5.1, levels of support for democracy measured by this scale is, as expected, relatively high in all of the countries considered in this analysis. The general mean, considering respondents from all 50 countries, is 2.99, indicating substantive low support for other, non-democratic types of political regimes, and consequently high support for democracy. It is important to note, furthermore, that there are also important differences between industrialized countries (with a mean of 3.18), on the one hand, and Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe on the other (with means of 2.89 and 2.77 respectively). These differences are statistically significant at $p < 0.000$.

²⁷ This index is similar to the ones used by Inglehart (2003) and Catterberg (2003).

Figure 5.1. Mean Levels of Support for Democracy



It is important to note that what we are measuring here is the effect of political trust on support for democracy, and not the relationship between trust and level of democracy, such as the one measured by the Freedom House or other indicators. In Chapter 2, I considered the level of democracy as a possible factor that can help to explain varying degrees of political trust. This is so because trust in institutions might be

related to the institutional aspects of polities and the degree of democracy is the base under which political institutions work.


Can the level or degree of democracy be affected by the levels of political trust? It is difficult with the data available to directly respond to this question, but I presume the answer is no. If political trust can affect the level of democracy, we should find, for example, that an increase in the level of political trust is followed by an increase of the level of democracy. Considering the evidence we have this is unlikely: countries with long traditions of democracies have seen their levels of political trust decrease in the last 20 or 30 years; their democracies, on the other hand, remain strong and stable. Although trends within countries that have experienced democratic transitions are less common to find, there is some evidence that political trust was relatively high at the beginning of transitions –when democracies were still fable-, but that with the pass of time trust in institutions has decreased, together with an improvement in the level and quality of their democracies.

Satisfaction with Democracy. In order to measure satisfaction with democracy, I also included the level of satisfaction with how democracy works. Satisfaction with democracy is a question that asks people to say how “satisfied are” they with “they way democracy works” in their country. This question was asked in 42 out of the 50 countries considered here. As can be seen in Figure 5.2, the highest level of satisfaction with democracy appears in industrialized countries, with an average of 2.64, followed by Latin American countries with an average of 2.45, and Central and Eastern Europe with an average of 2.03. The differences in these means are also statistically significant for $p < 0.000$. It is also important to note that satisfaction with democracy is generally lower, as

expected, than support for democracy as a form of government. Figure 5.2 presents the results obtained for each country.

Finally, it is important to note that the two measures of support for democracy – the Democracy/autocracy Index and the question on Satisfaction with Democracy- are positively correlated at the individual level. If one considers the whole sample, this correlation goes up to $r = 0.257$ ($p < 0.000$). Within each region, however, the correlation between the two indexes is relatively smaller: for industrialized countries the correlation is $r = 0.143$, in Central and Eastern Europe is $r = 0.196$, and in Latin America is $r = 0.129$ (in all cases, $p < 0.000$). This is important for two reasons: first, a positive and significant relationship indicates that there is some consistency on what people are evaluating, showing that both forms of evaluating democracy are related. Second, the magnitude of the correlation is not very high, indicating that both indexes are not measuring exactly the same thing, and that democracy as a form of government and satisfaction with democracy are different dimensions.

Figure 5.2. Mean Levels of Satisfaction with Democracy




Measuring Political Participation

It has been argued that we can identify “conventional” forms of participation – mainly, voting but also other types such as giving money for campaign, and participation in political parties- and “non-conventional” or “protest” type of participation. In here I use two different measure of political participation: a scale measuring whether people belong to political parties, labor unions and professional organizations, and a scale measuring participation in non-conventional or protest activities.

Belonging to political organizations. Following Norris (1999d) and Dalton (2002), the first variable measuring conventional participation is a scale that sums up whether citizens belong to political parties, labor unions or professional organizations. The scale goes from 0, indicating people who don’t belong to any organization to 3, indicating people that belong to all three of them. Figure 5.3 shows the mean number of political organizations to which people belong to.

As can be observed, membership in this kind of political organizations is usually low in all countries considered, with an average of 79% of respondents saying that don’t belong to any organizations. Iceland, Sweden and Denmark have the largest country average of organizations that people belong to, while Portugal, Lithuania and Armenia have the lowest levels of membership.

Figure 5.3. Membership in Political Organizations




Non-Conventional forms of participation. The second variable I use to measure political participation is a scale which sums up the number of actions that people has engaged in, and that considers: signing a petition, take part in a demonstration, join

boycotts, join unofficial strikes and occupy buildings. The scale goes from 0 to 5, and indicates the number of activities in which people has engaged in. Figure 5.4 shows the results obtained: the bars indicate the percentage of people within each country that has engaged in at least one action.

The first interesting result here is that levels of non-conventional participation are much higher than membership in political parties, showing how these forms of participation have been successfully incorporated with the choices that people face nowadays. At the same time, however, we see a clear distinction between industrialized countries on the one side and Latin American and Central and Eastern Europe countries on the other. While in the first group an average of 65% of the people has engaged in at least one such action, only about a third of the population has engaged in at least one action in the other two regions.

Finally, it is important to note that the two measures of political participation are positively correlated ($r = 0.236$, $p < 0.000$), as expected, confirming that participation in one type of action makes other types of participation easier.

Figure 5.4. Participation in Non-Conventional Activities



3. Empirical Results

Does political trust have an effect on support for democracy and political participation? If yes, what is the direction of such an effect? In the first part I'll evaluate the effects on support for democracy, and in the second part the effects on political participation.

The Effect of Trust on Support for Democracy

Does political trust have an effect on support for democracy? As I described previously, the literature on this regard has found some evidence that trust might be an important factor to explain support for democracy, either at their regime preferences dimension or at their satisfaction dimension. Figure 5.5 shows the relationship between political trust and support for democracy as a form of government at the country-level. As can be seen, political trust does seem to be positively related to support for democracy at this aggregated or country level of analysis.


The figure shows that the relationship between the Democracy/Autocracy Index – which measure support for democracy as a political regime- and political trust is positive: the higher the level of political trust, the more support for democracy. The correlation between these two measures is 0.117 ($p < 0.000$) at the individual level, and 0.467 ($p < 0.001$) at the country-level. In other words, the more trust in political institutions the more support for democracy as a form of government.

This is an important result: the fears of transition reversals that have been present in third wave democracies might be diminished considering this data: for countries with high or relatively high levels of political trust, the potential calling for other types of

Figure 5.6, the relationship between political trust and satisfaction with democracy is positive and strong ($r = 0.345$, $p < 0.000$ at the individual level and 0.603 , $p < 0.000$ at the country-level).

In other words, political trust seems to be related not only to the evaluation of the regime as opposed to other ones, but also to how the performance of democracies is evaluated. In terms of Easton's distinction we could say that political trust is related to the diffuse and specific support for democracy.

Figure 5.6: Satisfaction with Democracy and Trust



Do these results remain when we consider individual-level data? Table 5.1 shows the results obtained in regression analysis for all 50 countries and Table 5.2 shows the results obtained for the seven Latin American countries considered previously, for the two dependent variables previously presented and discussed. Let's consider first the results obtained for all 50 democracies.

The two models presented, one for each dependent variables, were constructed based on the information available for all 50 democracies, and they include both individual and country-level variables that we can use in order to test for different hypothesis relating to the factors that affect the level of support for democracy.

At the individual level, I included, besides political trust which has been discussed in previous sections and which is the center of this chapter, the following variables: a measure of social capital, interpersonal trust, the materialist-postmaterialist scale, self-positioning of the respondents on a left-right scale, how important politics is for respondents, sex, age, and level of education.²⁸ At the country-level I included, the mean level of corruption, the Freedom House index for the year the survey was taken, the mean Freedom House score for the period 1972-2000, a dummy variable indicating presidential systems, a dummy variable indicating the use of proportional rule for elections, the number of parties, a dummy variable indicating the type of state, the 2000 Human Development Index, and the mean level of economic growth for the 1990-2000 period.²⁹

Does political trust affect the level of support for democracy at the individual level? What is the direction of such an effect? As can be seen in table 5.1, the results

²⁸ The wording of these questions, as well as the descriptive statistics for these variables can be found in the appendix.

²⁹ The sources and descriptive statistics for these variables can be found in the appendix.

show a consistent pattern of results related to these questions. When controlling for other factors, political trust does have a statistically significant effect on support for democracy. The coefficients are highly significant in the two models, and special important to explain satisfaction with how democracy works.

The direction of the effect, moreover, is consistent. In both cases the coefficient is positive, indicating that at the individual level, and controlling for other factors, political trust is positively related to support for democracy. In other words, when political trust is increased, so is the level of support for democracy, *ceteris paribus*.

Table 5.2 show the results obtained for the models estimated exclusively considering the 7 Latin American countries evaluated in previous chapters. In this case, I estimated the models considering the same individual-level variables, and using dummy variables for countries as opposed to country-level variables, given that the variation within the region is usually low, and that make difficult to determine whether the effect of any of these variables is due to that specific factor or is just an indication of a country-effect.

With respect to the results in the Latin American cases about the effect of political trust on support for democracy, we can comment as follows. The directions of the effect of political trust on support for democracy remain the same as founded in the context of 50 democracies. Controlling for other factors, however, the coefficient for the effect of political trust on the Democracy/Autocracy Index is not statistically significant, and does not seem to affect this form of evaluation of the democratic regimes. On the other hand, it is strong and statistically significantly associated to satisfaction with democracy, as before.

Table 5.1. The Effect of Political Trust on Support for Democracy.

	Democracy/Autocracy Index		Satisfaction with democracy	
	B (Std. Error)	Sig.	B (Std. Error)	Sig.
Constant	1.493 0.090	0.000	3.328 (0.153)	0.000
Poltrust2	0.039 0.003	0.000	0.299 (0.005)	0.000
Belong	0.008 0.002	0.000	-0.013 (0.003)	0.000
Trusted	0.085 0.005	0.000	0.086 (0.008)	0.000
Materialist4	0.089 0.004	0.000	-0.029 (0.006)	0.000
Left-right	-0.002 0.001	0.141	0.025 (0.002)	0.000
Politics Important	0.040 0.003	0.000	0.018 (0.004)	0.000
Sex	0.008 0.005	0.097	0.023 (0.007)	0.001
Age	0.002 0.000	0.000	-0.001 (0.000)	0.000
Education	0.052 0.002	0.000	0.005 (0.003)	0.073
Corruption	-0.059 0.007	0.000	0.142 (0.011)	0.000
FH Year	-0.020 0.005	0.000	0.055 (0.007)	0.000
FH Mean 72-00	0.100 0.003	0.000	0.128 (0.006)	0.000
Presidential	-0.090 0.008	0.000	0.075 (0.014)	0.000
Proportional	0.053 0.006	0.000	0.109 (0.009)	0.000
Enpp2000	-0.029 0.002	0.000	-0.032 (0.002)	0.000
Fedtype	0.118 0.007	0.000	-0.114 (0.011)	0.000
HDI2000	0.653 0.113	0.000	-3.163 (0.197)	0.000
Growth90-00	0.011 0.001	0.000	0.023 (0.002)	0.000
Adj. R2	0.173		0.249	
N	50673			

Table 5.2. The Effect of Political Trust on Support for Democracy in Latin America.

	Democracy/Autocracy Index		Satisfaction with democracy	
	B (Std. Error)	Sig.	B (Std. Error)	Sig.
Constant	2.569 0.040	0.000	2.125 0.078	0.000
Poltrust2	0.012 0.008	0.130	0.239 0.016	0.000
Belong	0.001 0.006	0.805	-0.001 0.012	0.919
Trusted	0.013 0.016	0.432	0.036 0.031	0.239
Materialist4	0.067 0.009	0.000	-0.004 0.018	0.834
Left-right	-0.017 0.002	0.000	-0.015 0.005	0.002
Politics Important	0.034 0.006	0.000	0.049 0.011	0.000
Sex	-0.029 0.012	0.012	0.007 0.023	0.769
Age	0.003 0.000	0.000	0.002 0.001	0.027
Education	0.053 0.005	0.000	-0.003 0.009	0.760
Argentina	0.056 0.023	0.016	-0.256 0.038	0.000
Brazil	-0.303 0.021	0.000		
Chile	-0.107 0.022	0.000	-0.130 0.036	0.000
Mexico	-0.242 0.023	0.000	-0.400 0.038	0.000
Peru	-0.129 0.021	0.000	-0.297 0.035	0.000
Uruguay	0.107 0.022	0.000		
Adj. R2	0.119		0.090	
N	7847			


Overall, the models perform relatively well and the results obtained go in the expected direction. Political trust is positively and significantly associated with support for democracy as a form of government and with satisfaction with the workings of democracy. I'll return later to the implications of this result. But, first, let's consider the effects of trust on political participation.

The Effect of Trust on Political Participation

Does political trust have an effect on political participation? If so, what's the direction of such an effect? In this section I'll examine these issues. Figures 5.7 and 5.8 show the country-level relationship between political trust and political participation.

In Figure 5.7 I plotted the mean level of political trust with the percentage of respondents in each country saying that they belong to a at least one political organization –the conventional form of participation used here-. Belonging to a political organizations, as we discussed earlier, is very rare as a form of participation, with a few exceptions. The relationship, then, at this cross-country level of analysis between the two variables is 0.458 indicating that the relationship is positive, as expected, and statistically significant ($p = 0.001$)


Figure 5.7: Membership in Political Organizations and Trust



The relationship between political trust and non-conventional forms of political participation, on the other hand, is stronger and statistically significant. The correlation between the percentage of respondents that have participated in at least one such an action and the mean level of political trust is 0.059, $p < 0.000$ at the individual level and $r = 0.451$, $p < 0.001$ at the country-level. In other words, trusting in political institutions is positively related to participation: the more trusting the more than people participate.

We'll see later on whether this result hold at the individual level, but for the moment it is good news and suggest that these new forms of participation do not necessarily imply protest or the desire of thrown-out governments, but just a new way to express opinions and demands, without meaning a threat to democratic governments.

Figure 5.8: Participation and Trust



To evaluate the impact of political trust on political participation at the individual level I computed models for all 50 countries, which are shown in Table 5.3, and for the 7 Latin American countries under analysis, shown in Table 5.4. The dependent variables are: the scale indicating the number of political organizations to which people belong to, and the scale indicating the number of non-conventional forms of political participation that respondents have engaged in.

Does political trust affects political participation? As we can see in Table 5.3, for all 50 countries included in the analysis, the answer is yes. The coefficients on political trust are highly significant in the two models, *ceteris paribus*, indicating that political trust does produce an effect on both conventional and non-conventional forms of political participation. In the Latin American case, as we can see in Table 5.4, political trust also has an important and significant effect on political participation.

What is the direction of the effects? For all 50 countries, political trust increases the level of belonging to political organizations. In effect, the more trust a respondent express, the more likely she is to belong to a political organization. On the contrary, political trust reduces the level of participation in non-conventional activities. As can be observed, a higher level of political trust reduces the number of activities in which respondents have participated.

Table 5.3. Effect of Political Trust on Political Participation.

	Participation in Political Organizations		Non-Conventional Political Participation	
	B (Std. Error)	Sig.	B (Std. Error)	Sig.
Constant	-0.634 0.116	0.000	-4.982 0.203	0.000
Poltrust2	0.043 0.004	0.000	-0.037 0.007	0.000
Trusted	0.078 0.006	0.000	0.138 0.011	0.000
Materialist4	0.010 0.005	0.025	0.156 0.008	0.000
Left-right	0.000 0.001	0.761	-0.041 0.002	0.000
Politics Important	0.062 0.003	0.000	0.137 0.005	0.000
Democracy-Autocracy	0.046 0.005	0.000	0.174 0.009	0.000
Satisfaction with democracy	-0.027 0.004	0.000	-0.063 0.007	0.000
Sex	0.093 0.005	0.000	0.085 0.009	0.000
Age	0.001 0.000	0.000	0.000 0.000	0.450
Education	0.065 0.002	0.000	0.110 0.004	0.000
Corruption	0.121 0.008	0.000	-0.088 0.014	0.000
FH Year	-0.039 0.005	0.000	-0.032 0.009	0.000
FH Mean 72-00	0.032 0.004	0.000	0.045 0.007	0.000
Presidential	0.095 0.010	0.000	0.065 0.018	0.000
Proportional	0.056 0.007	0.000	-0.022 0.012	0.071
Enpp2000	0.001 0.002	0.758	0.000 0.003	0.910
Fedtype	0.123 0.008	0.000	0.259 0.014	0.000
HDI2000	0.155 0.147	0.290	5.332 0.258	0.000
Growth90-00	-0.024 0.002	0.000	-0.030 0.003	0.000
Adj. R2	0.122		0.179	
N	41,560		41,125	

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

In the case of our seven Latin American countries, on the other hand, political trust increases the likelihood of a person to belong to a political organization, confirming the results obtained with a large number of countries. Political trust also has a significant effect in non-conventional forms of political participation. The coefficient in this case, however, is positive, indicating that higher levels political trust in Latin America produce an increase in non-conventional forms of participation.

Table 5.4. Effect of Political Trust on Political Participation in Latin America.

	Participation in Political Organizations		Non-Conventional Political Participation	
	B (Std. Error)	Sig.	B (Std. Error)	Sig.
Constant	-0.388 0.048	0.000	-0.540 0.101	0.000
Poltrust2	0.029 0.008	0.000	0.034 0.017	0.041
Trusted	0.032 0.015	0.032	0.160 0.031	0.000
Materialist4	0.011 0.009	0.219	0.079 0.019	0.000
Left-right	0.001 0.002	0.788	-0.030 0.005	0.000
Politics Important	0.042 0.006	0.000	0.073 0.012	0.000
Democracy-Autocracy	0.010 0.011	0.368	0.036 0.022	0.110
Satisfaction with democracy	0.008 0.007	0.232	-0.005 0.014	0.701
Sex	0.085 0.011	0.000	0.088 0.023	0.000
Age	0.003 0.000	0.000	0.005 0.001	0.000
Education	0.056 0.004	0.000	0.086 0.009	0.000
Adj. R2	0.077		0.075	
N	5,268		5,192	

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Overall, then, political trust increases the likelihood of participation, especially conventional participation, as measured by the percentage of people who belong to a political party. Since the active participation of citizens on the political sphere is a keystone for democracy, this result indicates that more trust is a good thing for democracies.

4. Does Trust Matter?

In general terms we have seen that political trust increases both support for democracy and political participation. Higher levels of political trust –both between and within countries- do produce higher levels of support for democracy and political participation, what I called the attitudinal and behavioral aspects of democracy.

These are important results for the implications they have on an analysis of the quality of democracies. Especially in the case of Latin American countries, were a number of those countries have experience transitions to democracy in the last 20 years, higher levels of support for democracy and higher levels of political participation increase the quality of democracy and can increase the pressure for better politics and a consolidation of democratic politics in the region.

There are, of course, important steps for this to happen. But the results show that political trust increase both support for democracy and political participation. If trust is related to corruption, then, producing better practices, decreasing levels of corruption can lead to higher levels of trust, and a higher quality of Latin American democracies.

CHAPTER 6:

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

I started this dissertation by arguing that: (a) political trust, or trust in political institutions, is important to democracies; (b) that political trust is a belief about future actions of others; (c) that we should expect, at least in the Latin American case, to be mostly explained by levels of corruption at the country-level, and by perceptions of institutional fairness and competence at the individual-level. The results presented previously provide confirming evidence in all of these issues, as I'll briefly summarize in the first section of this chapter.

These results have also important implications about (a) how and what we think of citizens in Latin American; (b) the future and quality of democracy in the region; and (c) about the prospects for policy-making. I'll consider all of these implications in the second section of this chapter.

1. Summary of Results

What have we learned through this work? What are the main results obtained in this dissertation? I can briefly summarize the results obtained as follows:

1. There are important variations in the levels of trust in political institutions expressed not only by citizens, but we also found important variations at the country

level. The trust granted to political institutions varies, then, among people and among countries indicating that questions of trust are not uniformly answered by people in different political and economic settings. This is an important result for two reasons. First, it shows that citizens can make sensitive judgments about their institutions, even under the assumption of low levels of specific knowledge about those institutions, and that those judgments are systematically related to a set of national factors as well as to the perceptions that citizens hold about the main political institutions that govern their countries. The level of knowledge that some scholars require of citizens to make trust decisions (see Hardin 1998), then, does not seem to be necessary. Trust questions can and should be asked to people.

On the other hand, this result confirms the need for an examination of the factors associated to the variations found both at the country- and at the individual level. Comparative research focusing only on individual level data –as is the case in the majority of research in this area- or only on country level data may produce incomplete results that won't allow us to get a complete picture of the variations and correlates of trust. Combining both levels of analysis as I did on Chapters 4 and 5 seems to be a better research strategy in this field.

2. At the country level, we found countries where levels of political trust are relatively high, mainly in most developed countries, and others where trust is very low. In terms of the regions that those countries belong to, trust is higher in developed, industrialized societies, while trust is at its lowest level in Latin American countries. These differences found between countries and regions allow us to make a better evaluation of “how high is high” and “how low is low” when we attempt to describe

levels of political trust.

Consider, for example, the results obtained by research done in the United States. The literature about trust in the U.S. tends to present a worrisome picture of the trends of trust in government (Miller 1974a; Levi and Stoker 2000; Hetherington 1998). In effect in the U.S. levels of trust in government have sharply decline since the mid-1960s. When comparing countries like the U.S. with other societies, however, we found that the American public still presents a much higher level of trust. If the trends for the U.S. are worrisome for scholars, the data for Latin America –where we found the lowest levels of trust- should really set the alarms.

3. With respect to the factors associated to different levels of political trust, I found that, at the country level, these variations in the levels of trust in political institutions can be well explained by a number of factors related to the countries' level of economic development, by some of their institutional characteristics, and by some of their cultural characteristics. In effect, political trust is higher among most developed societies, in those with higher levels of interpersonal trust, and in those countries with longer democratic traditions, with parliamentary governments and majoritarian electoral systems.

These variables by themselves can help us understand why Latin American countries show such a low average level of political trust: the region can be characterized as one where economic development has not been achieved, where levels of interpersonal trust and social capital are relatively low, with shorter democratic traditions and as having presidential regimes and a majority of countries with some sort of proportional electoral systems.

4. This is not the whole story, however. When I considered a multivariate model of political trust at this country level, trust appears to be mostly related to the level of corruption that exists in those societies. In effect, countries with lower levels of corruptions present, as expected, the higher levels of political trust. In those nations where corruption is more prevalent in their politics, as it occurs in Latin America, levels of trust are considerably lower.

This result is robust throughout the different tests used to measure the impact of corruption on political trust. Corruption appears to be highly related to political trust in the bivariate analyses, as well as when including other factor as controls. This result also holds when considering the impact of corruption on 50 democracies around the globe, as well as when considering its impact on the Latin American cases. Overall, then, country-level corruption is a major factor explaining average levels of political trust. This result support the hypothesis stated at the beginning of this dissertation about the relevance of corruption as a factor reducing levels of political trust.

5. At the individual level, in an analysis of Latin American citizens, we found that the most important factors explaining variations in political trust are those related to the perceptions of fairness and competence of their governmental institutions. When citizens consider that their institutions are fair in their treatment of people, when they think that governments are competent and doing a good job, when they believe that there is respect for human rights in the country, and when they perceive corruption to be a minor problem, they are more willing to grant their institutions with their trust. On the other side, trust is considerably lower when institutions are considered as unfair and incompetent in their actions.

This result holds true for the publics of Latin America in general, as well as for the publics of each country specifically. In the results obtained for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela, perceptions of institutional fairness and competence are the most important factors explaining political trust, *ceteris paribus*. Moreover, the relevance of the impact of these variables on trust is replicated when I considered trust in Governments, Parliaments, Civil Service and Political Parties separately. Overall, these results confirm the hypotheses of this dissertation related to the impact of individual perceptions about the institutions' fairness and competence on political trust.

6. Overall, when considering the factors associated to political trust I found that country-levels of corruption and individual perceptions about institutional fairness and competence are important determinants of trust in Latin America. Test after test, the results show that corruption and perceptions of corruption are the most important factors explaining trust in political institutions, confirming the hypotheses stated in Chapter 1. Future research on this area, then, should include corruption and perceptions of corruption in the analysis.

7. Finally, I also found that political trust matters. Controlling for other factors, political trust is a predictor on the levels of support for democracy and on the level of political participation that people declare, what I called the attitudinal and behavioral dimensions of democracy. Political trust increases support for democracy as a political regime and increases too the level of satisfaction that citizens expressed on the workings of their democracies. Thus, support at the level of institutions, increases support at the level of the regime. Political trust also increases significantly the probability of people

belonging to a political organization.

Again, these results are important when considering a set of 50 democracies from Industrialized, Central and Eastern Europe, and Latin American countries, as well as when considering the publics of Latin America alone. Overall, then, political trust matters in both the behavioral and attitudinal aspects of democracies. There are other dimensions in which political trust might be important too that have not been considered here, mainly for reasons related to data availability. Hetherington (1999), for example, has shown for the American case that trust matters for the vote choice that people make election after election and for the evaluations of incumbent presidents (Hetherington 1998). He has also shown that trust is an important determinant of support for different policy areas such as government spending and racial policy (Hetherington 2005). Whether these results can be replicated in other countries in general and in Latin America in particular is something that future research should address.

2. Implications and Concluding Remarks

Trust, and specifically political trust, is important for governments as it allows them to govern without resorting to other forms of compliance with their decisions. Trust grants them a minimum of legitimacy they need in order to function properly. Trust, however, is not given blindly: citizens are not fools and they are not willing to grant political institutions with their trust under any circumstances or in every period of time. As we have seen, citizens decide when to grant trust to their political institutions as a response to a multiplicity of factors, of which the level of corruption and the perceptions of institutional fairness and competence are among the most important ones.

That corruption is a major factor in explaining political trust is an important finding, with interesting implications for policy-making. In effect, even in those countries where corruption is a pervasive phenomenon, if political leaders are willing to take some actions it can be reduced. Better control and supervision systems of their institutions and workers, more transparency in the assignment of contracts, and so on, can reduce significantly the levels of political corruption, increasing the levels of political trust. These reforms, of course, need the willingness of political leaders, but it can be done. Placing incentives to avoid corrupt behavior can increase the level of trust and political legitimacy of governments.

These tasks seem particularly relevant for Latin American countries. Other factors associated to higher levels of trust –such as economic development or institutional characteristics of political regimes- are harder to achieve in the short run. Economic development, for example, can take a very long period of time, a period in which low and maybe declining levels of political trust could induce important political problems of legitimacy of democracy. Institutional reform, on the other hand, has proved to be very difficult to achieve, especially since current institutions always provides leaders with some certainties about their success in the electoral arena. Changing electoral institutions, although possible to do in a very short period of time, are more unlikely to be produced. In countries where authoritarian regimes are still in the memory of large proportions of their citizens, the temptation for changes in that direction could increase in regimes with sustained low levels of trust and legitimacy.

Now, to reduce levels of corruption at least some institutional reform should be produced. For example, the strengthening of an independent judicial system, or the

development of control agencies with the executive branch can have significant impact on reducing corruption by increasing the risks of punishment of corrupt actions and by reducing the spaces in which such actions are possible.

Improving or increasing levels of political trust have important consequences not only for the legitimacy of people currently in power, but also for the general question about the quality of democracy. As we have seen, citizens that express higher levels of political trust are also more supportive of democracy as a form of government, are more satisfied with the workings of democracy in their countries, and are more likely to be active participants in the political process. To be sure, to be considered as a “high-quality democracy” countries need to satisfy a number of criteria, most of them related to institutional aspects such as the rule of law, horizontal accountability, and a well developed system of civil rights (see, for example, Diamond and Morlino 2005). But a high-quality democracy also presents high levels of political participation, vertical accountability and forms of government responsiveness. As long as political trust increases participation and support for democracy, then, it can be said to have an important impact on the quality of democratic governments.

Finally, a note of caution. As we have seen, higher levels of political trust seem desirable for countries in general and, in particular, for those countries that have face democratic transitions and where their democracies are still under development. Complete trust, however, does not seem to be equally desirable (Clearly and Stokes 2006). It is very likely that a certain amount of distrust or skepticism might be also important for democracies (Clearly and Stokes 2006; Norris 1999a). This skepticism make people to be alert to changes in the political environments they live in, and make

leaders remember that they won't count with people's support in every circumstance, providing incentives for good behavior and the improvement of societies.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A:
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 2

Table A.1. Countries included and year of survey

<i>Industrialized Countries</i>	<i>Year of Survey</i>	<i>Central and Eastern Europe</i>	<i>Year of Survey</i>	<i>Latin America</i>	<i>Year of Survey</i>
Australia	1995	Albania	2002	Argentina	1999
Austria	1999	Armenia	1997	Brazil	1997
Belgium	1999	Bulgaria	1999	Chile	2000
Canada	2000	Croatia	1999	Colombia	1997
Denmark	1999	Czech Republic	1999	Dominican Rep.	1996
Finland	2000	Estonia	1999	Mexico	2000
France	1999	Hungary	1999	Peru	2001
Germany	1999	Latvia	1999	Uruguay	1996
Greece	1999	Lithuania	1999	Venezuela	2000
Iceland	1999	Moldova	2002		
Ireland	1999	Poland	1999		
Italy	1999	Romania	1999		
Japan	2000	Russia	1999		
Luxembourg	1999	Slovakia	1999		
Malta	1999	Slovenia	1999		
Netherlands	1999	Ukraine	1999		
New Zealand	1998	Macedonia	2001		
Norway	1996				
Portugal	1999				
Spain	1999				
Sweden	1999				
Switzerland	1996				
United Kingdom	1999				
United States	1999				

Table A.2. Data Sources

Variable	Description	Sources
Control of Corruption (Mean 1996-2006)	Control of Corruption Index. I used the mean for the period 1996-2006. The index goes from -2.5 (indicating more corruption) to 2.5 (indicating less corruption).	World Bank: Governance Indicators
FH Year of Survey	Freedom House index for the year the survey was done in each country. The index was reversed, and goes from 1 "least free" to 7 "most free".	Freedom House
FH Mean 1972-2000	Freedom House index averaged for the period between 1972 and 2000. The index was reversed, and goes from 1 "least free" to 7 "most free".	Freedom House
Type of Executive	Type of executive for the year the survey was done in each country.	Database of Political Institutions 2004
Electoral Family	Electoral Family (majoritarian, proportional or mixed electoral systems)	IDEA. 2005. Electoral System Design.
Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties 2000	Effective number of parliamentary parties for the year the survey was done in each country.	Database of Political Institutions
Type of State	Dummy variable indicating unitary (1) and non-unitary type of state	Norris, Pippa.
HDI 2000	Human development Index.	UNDP: Human Development Report 2002
GDP per capita (PPP) 2000	GDP per capita (PPP) in 2000	UNDP: Human Development Report 2002
GDP per capita annual growth rate (%) 1990-2000	GDP per capita annual growth rate for the period 1990-2000	UNDP: Human Development Report 2002

Table A.3. Descriptive Statistics (Mean and Standard Deviation)

	Industrialized Countries	Central and Eastern Europe	Latin America	TOTAL
Political Trust (2-item Index)	2.36 (0.18)	2.10 (0.17)	2.00 (0.23)	2.21 (0.24)
Materialism/Postmaterialism (4-item index)	2.01 (0.15)	1.67 (0.16)	1.93 (0.09)	1.88 (0.21)
Most people can be trusted	0.39 (0.15)	0.21 (0.05)	0.16 (0.07)	0.29 (0.15)
Number of organizations to which people belong to	1.05 (0.64)	0.44 (0.22)	0.71 (0.25)	0.78 (0.54)
Mean Control of Corruption (1996- 2006)	1.75 (0.54)	-0.09 (0.57)	-0.11 (0.69)	0.79 (1.09)
FH Year of Survey (reversed)	6.81 (0.29)	5.44 (1.20)	5.44 (0.81)	6.10 (1.04)
FH mean 1972-2000 (reversed)	6.73 (0.37)	3.11 (0.55)	4.83 (0.64)	5.16 (1.71)
Dummy Parliamentary	0.79 (0.41)	0.53 (0.51)	0.00 (0.00)	0.56 (0.50)
Dummy Mixed	0.13 (0.34)	0.47 (0.51)	0.00 (0.00)	0.22 (0.42)
Dummy Presidential	0.08 (0.28)	0.00 (0.00)	1.00 (0.00)	0.22 (0.42)
Majoritarian electoral system	0.21 (0.41)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.10 (0.30)
Combined electoral system	0.17 (0.38)	0.35 (0.49)	0.22 (0.44)	0.24 (0.43)
PR electoral system	0.63 (0.49)	0.65 (0.49)	0.78 (0.44)	0.66 (0.48)
Effective number of parliamentary parties	3.62 (1.53)	4.54 (1.98)	3.70 (1.60)	3.95 (1.73)
Type of unitary-federal state	0.46 (0.51)	0.88 (0.33)	0.44 (0.53)	0.60 (0.49)
Human Development Index	0.92 (0.02)	0.80 (0.05)	0.79 (0.04)	0.86 (0.07)
GDP per capita (ppp) 2000	26091 (6739)	7880 (4175)	7817 (2376)	16610 (10611)
GDP per capita annual growth rate (%)	2.25 (1.25)	-0.96 (3.92)	2.37 (1.74)	1.18 (2.94)

APPENDIX B:

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 3

Table B.1. Question Wording

	Question Wording
Political Trust (4-item index)	<p>I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence (4), quite a lot of confidence (3), not very much confidence (2) or none at all (1)?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Government ○ Parliament ○ Civil Service ○ Political Parties
Most people can be trusted	<p>Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted (1) or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people (0)?</p>
Participation in organizations	<p>For 1995-1997:</p> <p>Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary organizations; for each one, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization?</p> <p>For 1999-2002:</p> <p>Please look carefully at the following list of voluntary organizations and activities and say which, if any, do you belong to?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Churches ○ Cultural activities ○ Labor unions ○ Political parties ○ Environmental organizations ○ Professional associations ○ Sports or recreational groups

	Question Wording
Greater respect for Authority	I'm going to read out a list of various changes in our way of life that might take place in the near future. Please tell me for each one, if it were to happen, whether you think it would be a good thing (3), a bad thing (1), or don't you mind (2)?: Greater respect for authority
Financial Satisfaction	How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household? If '1' means you are completely dissatisfied on this scale, and '10' means you are completely satisfied, where would you put your satisfaction with your household's financial situation?
Winners and Losers	If there were a national election tomorrow, for which party on this list would you vote? Which party appeals to you most?
Satisfaction with people in office	How satisfied are you with the way the people now in national office are handling the country's affairs? Would you say you are very satisfied (4), fairly satisfied (3), fairly dissatisfied (2) or very dissatisfied (1)?
Country is run by...	Generally speaking, would you say that this country is run by a few big interests looking out for themselves (0), or that it is run for the benefit of all the people (1)?
Extent of corruption	How widespread do you think bribe taking and corruption is in this country? (4) Almost no public officials are engaged in it; (3) a few public officials are engaged in it; (2) Most public officials are engaged in it; and (1) Almost all public officials are engaged in it
Respect for human rights	How much respect is there for individual human rights nowadays in (COUNTRY)? Do you feel there is: a lot of respect for individual human rights (4); some respect (3), not much respect (2), or not respect at all (1)?
Left-right scale	In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right". How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?

	Question Wording
Politics Important	Please say, for each of the following, how important it is in your life: Politics. Would you say politics is very important (4), rather important (3), not very important (2) or not important at all (1) in your life?
Interested in politics	How interested would you say you are in politics? Very interested (4), somewhat interested (3), not very interested (2), not at all interested (1)
Religion	Dummy variable, 1 indicating “catholic”.
Sex	Dummy variable, 1 indicating female
Age	Age in years
Education	What is the highest educational level that you have attained?
Employment	Dummy variable, 1 indicating employed
Scale of income	Here is a scale of incomes. We would like to know in what group your household is, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that comes in

Table B.2. Summary Statistics (Mean and Standard Deviation)

	Argentina	Brazil	Chile	Mexico	Peru	Uruguay	Venezuela	Total
Political Trust (4-item index)	1.67 (0.59)	2.16 (0.77)	2.25 (0.67)	1.93 (0.76)	1.89 (0.55)	2.24 (0.73)	2.13 (0.77)	2.04 (0.73)
Most people can be trusted	0.15 (0.36)	0.03 (0.17)	0.23 (0.42)	0.21 (0.41)	0.11 (0.31)	0.22 (0.42)	0.16 (0.37)	0.16 (0.36)
Participation in organizations	0.43 (0.68)	0.89 (1.16)	0.56 (0.83)	0.57 (0.90)	0.68 (0.90)	0.49 (0.89)	0.90 (1.17)	0.65 (0.96)
Materislit/Postm aterialist Index	2.07 (0.67)	1.81 (0.62)	1.89 (0.66)	1.85 (0.63)	1.94 (0.59)	2.05 (0.66)	1.89 (0.62)	1.93 (0.64)
Greater respect for Authority	2.65 (0.61)	2.78 (0.51)	2.49 (0.63)	2.69 (0.58)	2.78 (0.47)	2.47 (0.69)	2.86 (0.48)	2.68 (0.59)
Financial Satisfaction	5.51 (2.54)	5.48 (2.89)	5.66 (2.46)	6.54 (3.03)	5.11 (2.64)	6.70 (2.53)	6.19 (2.78)	5.88 (2.76)
Winners and Losers	0.38 (0.48)	0.43 (0.50)	0.45 (0.50)	0.45 (0.50)	0.49 (0.50)	0.23 (0.42)	0.40 (0.49)	0.41 (0.49)
Satisfaction with people in office	2.02 (0.79)	2.48 (0.99)	2.67 (0.80)	2.34 (0.89)	2.36 (0.78)	2.06 (0.88)	2.61 (0.94)	2.37 (0.90)
Country is run by...	0.10 (0.30)	0.25 (0.43)	0.35 (0.48)	0.29 (0.45)	0.43 (0.50)	0.24 (0.43)	0.63 (0.48)	0.33 (0.47)
Extent of corruption		1.64 (0.84)				2.44 (0.77)		2.02 (0.91)
Respect for human rights	2.02 (0.78)		2.62 (0.89)	2.45 (0.89)	2.38 (0.84)		2.47 (0.92)	2.39 (0.89)
Left-right scale	5.99 (2.13)	5.90 (2.89)	5.23 (2.15)	6.65 (2.90)	5.69 (2.34)	5.67 (2.44)	6.32 (2.65)	5.89 (2.55)
Politics Important	1.86 (0.98)	2.48 (1.10)	1.97 (1.01)	2.37 (1.07)	2.46 (1.02)	2.19 (1.03)	2.10 (1.10)	2.20 (1.07)
Interested in politics	1.75 (0.90)	2.13 (1.00)	1.88 (0.92)	2.11 (0.93)	2.41 (0.93)	2.13 (1.04)	1.80 (0.95)	2.03 (0.98)
Religion	0.78 (0.41)	0.70 (0.46)	0.54 (0.50)	0.74 (0.44)	0.82 (0.38)	0.40 (0.49)	0.66 (0.48)	0.66 (0.47)
Attend religious services	4.90 (2.58)	3.23 (1.85)	4.67 (2.61)	3.04 (1.95)	3.16 (1.97)	6.25 (2.41)	4.33 (2.38)	4.22 (2.52)
Sex	0.53 (0.50)	0.50 (0.50)	0.53 (0.50)	0.53 (0.50)	0.51 (0.50)	0.57 (0.49)	0.50 (0.50)	0.52 (0.50)
Age	41.87 (17.36)	36.11 (13.59)	41.47 (15.30)	38.86 (15.46)	35.50 (12.96)	47.15 (17.44)	36.22 (14.51)	39.60 (15.80)
Education	3.47 (1.88)	4.07 (2.11)	4.16 (2.14)	3.25 (2.21)	5.27 (2.09)	3.40 (2.14)	4.89 (2.10)	4.07 (2.22)
Employment	0.51 (0.50)	0.57 (0.50)	0.54 (0.50)	0.55 (0.50)	0.49 (0.50)	0.54 (0.50)	0.52 (0.50)	0.53 (0.50)
Scale of income	5.49 (2.87)	2.59 (2.02)	4.13 (2.65)	4.98 (2.67)	3.22 (1.82)	4.92 (2.53)	5.39 (2.88)	4.35 (2.72)

Table B.3. Regression Results. Argentina

	Model 1		Model 2 or 3	
	B	Std. Error	B	Std. Error
Interpersonal Trust	-0.001	0.051	-0.022	0.051
Membership in Secondary Organizations	0.045	0.028	0.040	0.028
Respect for Authorities	0.049	0.01	0.043	0.031
Materialist/Postmaterialist Index	0.016	0.031	0.031	0.031
Financial Satisfaction	0.010	0.008	0.007	0.008
Winners	0.195***	0.045	0.195***	0.045
Satisfaction with People in Office	0.267***	0.027	0.247***	0.028
Government is run for the benefit of all	0.206**	0.066	0.180**	0.066
Perception of Corruption	-	-	-	-
Respect for Human Rights	-	-	0.089**	0.027
Self-Positioning in Left-Right scale	0.007	0.009	0.005	0.009
Importance of Politics	0.049	0.025	0.041	0.025
Interested in Politics	0.095***	0.027	0.092**	0.027
Religion (1= catholic, 0=else)	0.019	0.051	0.009	0.051
Church attendance	-0.022**	0.008	-0.023**	0.008
Sex	-0.014	0.041	0.004	0.042
Age	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Education	-0.014	0.012	-0.018	0.012
Employment Status (1=employed)	0.022	0.042	0.029	0.042
Level of Income	0.007	0.008	0.007	0.008
Constant	0.590**	0.171	0.508**	0.173
Adj R ²	0.355		0.363	

Table B.4. Regression Results. Brazil

	Model 1		Model 2 or 3	
	B	Std. Error	B	Std. Error
Interpersonal Trust	0.151	0.117	0.152	0.117
Membership in Secondary Organizations	0.043*	0.019	0.043*	0.019
Respect for Authorities	0.129**	0.045	0.111**	0.045
Materialist/Postmaterialist Index	0.072	0.039	0.055	0.038
Financial Satisfaction	0.016	0.008	0.013	0.008
Winners	0.133**	0.047	0.115**	0.047
Satisfaction with People in Office	0.141***	0.025	0.143***	0.024
Government is run for the benefit of all	0.214***	0.056	0.191**	0.056
Perception of Corruption	-	-	0.136***	0.028
Respect for Human Rights	-	-	-	-
Self-Positioning in Left-Right scale	0.025**	0.008	0.022**	0.008
Importance of Politics	0.066**	0.025	0.071**	0.025
Interested in Politics	0.112***	0.029	0.099**	0.028
Religion (1= catholic, 0=else)	0.081	0.051	0.097	0.050
Church attendance	-0.020	0.013	-0.020	0.013
Sex	0.064	0.049	0.060	0.048
Age	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.002
Education	-0.012	0.013	-0.016	0.013
Employment Status (1=employed)	-0.037	0.048	-0.030	0.047
Level of Income	-0.046***	0.013	-0.042**	0.012
Constant	0.701**	0.201	0.622**	0.199
Adj R ²	0.203		0.231	

Table B.5. Regression Results. Chile

	Model 1		Model 2 or 3	
	B	Std. Error	B	Std. Error
Interpersonal Trust	0.145**	0.049	0.146**	0.049
Membership in Secondary Organizations	0.011	0.025	0.014	0.025
Respect for Authorities	0.048	0.033	0.049	0.033
Materialist/Postmaterialist Index	-0.044	0.031	-0.048	0.031
Financial Satisfaction	0.028**	0.009	0.028**	0.009
Winners	0.041	0.046	0.038	0.046
Satisfaction with People in Office	0.102***	0.028	0.093**	0.030
Government is run for the benefit of all	0.209***	0.044	0.203***	0.044
Perception of Corruption	-	-	-	-
Respect for Human Rights	-	-	0.036	0.024
Self-Positioning in Left-Right scale	0.005	0.011	0.003	0.011
Importance of Politics	0.114***	0.023	0.116***	0.022
Interested in Politics	0.040	0.026	0.038	0.026
Religion (1= catholic, 0=else)	0.052	0.042	0.043	0.042
Church attendance	-0.026**	0.009	-0.026**	0.009
Sex	0.060	0.044	0.067	0.044
Age	0.003*	0.001	0.003*	0.001
Education	0.002	0.012	0.002	0.012
Employment Status (1=employed)	-0.014	0.043	-0.007	0.043
Level of Income	-0.006	0.009	-0.007	0.009
Constant	1.319***	0.190	1.270***	0.191
Adj R ²	0.177		0.181	

Table B.6. Regression Results. Mexico

	Model 1		Model 2 or 3	
	B	Std. Error	B	Std. Error
Interpersonal Trust	0.122	0.066	0.131*	0.065
Membership in Secondary Organizations	0.055	0.028	0.046	0.028
Respect for Authorities	0.095*	0.046	0.089	0.046
Materialist/Postmaterialist Index	-0.030	0.045	-0.023	0.045
Financial Satisfaction	-0.001	0.009	-0.005	0.009
Winners	0.086	0.058	0.044	0.059
Satisfaction with People in Office	0.150***	0.033	0.111**	0.033
Government is run for the benefit of all	0.185**	0.064	0.153*	0.064
Perception of Corruption	-	-	-	-
Respect for Human Rights	-	-	0.154***	0.033
Self-Positioning in Left-Right scale	0.010	0.010	0.014	0.010
Importance of Politics	0.087**	0.028	0.091**	0.028
Interested in Politics	0.092**	0.034	0.089**	0.033
Religion (1= catholic, 0=else)	-0.032	0.065	-0.028	0.064
Church attendance	0.004	0.015	0.007	0.015
Sex	-0.096	0.058	-0.104	0.058
Age	-0.002	0.002	-0.002	0.002
Education	-0.014	0.016	-0.012	0.015
Employment Status (1=employed)	0.081	0.061	0.071	0.061
Level of Income	0.002	0.012	0.000	0.012
Constant	0.873***	0.235	0.622*	0.243
Adj R ²	0.127		0.156	

Table B.7. Regression Results. Peru

	Model 1		Model 2 or 3	
	B	Std. Error	B	Std. Error
Interpersonal Trust	0.063	0.053	0.074	0.052
Membership in Secondary Organizations	0.004	0.018	0.004	0.017
Respect for Authorities	0.063	0.035	0.059	0.034
Materialist/Postmaterialist Index	0.004	0.027	0.006	0.026
Financial Satisfaction	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006
Winners	0.145***	0.032	0.142***	0.032
Satisfaction with People in Office	0.125***	0.021	0.101***	0.021
Government is run for the benefit of all	0.04**	0.033	0.070*	0.033
Perception of Corruption	-	-	-	-
Respect for Human Rights	-	-	0.108***	0.019
Self-Positioning in Left-Right scale	-0.003	0.007	-0.003	0.007
Importance of Politics	0.032	0.017	0.035*	0.016
Interested in Politics	0.022	0.019	0.018	0.019
Religion (1= catholic, 0=else)	0.010	0.042	-0.003	0.042
Church attendance	0.001	0.009	0.002	0.008
Sex	-0.067*	0.034	-0.058	0.033
Age	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Education	-0.002	0.009	-0.003	0.009
Employment Status (1=employed)	-0.085*	0.033	-0.081*	0.033
Level of Income	-0.009	0.010	-0.010	0.010
Constant	1.207***	0.158	1.044***	0.158
Adj R ²	0.090		0.117	

Table B.8. Regression Results. Uruguay

	Model 1		Model 2 or 3	
	B	Std. Error	B	Std. Error
Interpersonal Trust	0.241***	0.047	0.223***	0.049
Membership in Secondary Organizations	0.101***	0.023	0.106***	0.023
Respect for Authorities	-0.007	0.031	0.002	0.032
Materialist/Postmaterialist Index	-0.045	0.033	-0.044	0.035
Financial Satisfaction	-0.024**	0.008	-0.025**	0.009
Winners	0.107	0.056	0.113	0.059
Satisfaction with People in Office	0.18***	0.028	0.174***	0.029
Government is run for the benefit of all	0.080	0.053	0.078	0.056
Perception of Corruption	-	-	0.108***	0.029
Respect for Human Rights	-	-	-	-
Self-Positioning in Left-Right scale	0.041***	0.010	0.046***	0.011
Importance of Politics	0.093***	0.024	0.089***	0.025
Interested in Politics	0.161***	0.025	0.156***	0.026
Religion (1= catholic, 0=else)	0.018	0.043	0.029	0.046
Church attendance	-0.019*	0.009	-0.016	0.009
Sex	0.025	0.043	0.041	0.045
Age	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Education	-0.018	0.013	-0.022	0.014
Employment Status (1=employed)	-0.012	0.043	-0.016	0.045
Level of Income	-0.005	0.010	-0.004	0.010
Constant	1.303***	0.177	1.112***	0.189
Adj R ²	0.349		0.351	

Table B.9. Regression Results. Venezuela

	Model 1		Model 2 or 3	
	B	Std. Error	B	Std. Error
Interpersonal Trust	-0.083	0.061	-0.096	0.061
Membership in Secondary Organizations	0.020	0.020	0.019	0.019
Respect for Authorities	-0.094*	0.047	-0.109*	0.047
Materialist/Postmaterialist Index	-0.026	0.037	-0.013	0.037
Financial Satisfaction	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.009
Winners	0.172**	0.053	0.191***	0.053
Satisfaction with People in Office	0.160***	0.029	0.139***	0.029
Government is run for the benefit of all	0.180**	0.055	0.141**	0.056
Perception of Corruption	-	-	-	-
Respect for Human Rights	-	-	0.102***	0.026
Self-Positioning in Left-Right scale	0.028**	0.008	0.028**	0.008
Importance of Politics	0.096***	0.024	0.099***	0.023
Interested in Politics	0.137***	0.027	0.126***	0.027
Religion (1= catholic, 0=else)	-0.024	0.051	-0.023	0.051
Church attendance	-0.001	0.011	0.004	0.011
Sex	-0.081	0.050	-0.072	0.050
Age	0.000	0.002	0.000	0.002
Education	-0.019	0.013	-0.017	0.013
Employment Status (1=employed)	-0.016	0.047	-0.010	0.047
Level of Income	-0.003	0.009	-0.004	0.009
Constant	1.386***	0.204	1.193***	0.208
Adj R ²	0.246		0.258	

APPENDIX C:

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 4

Table C.1. Summary Statistics (Mean and Standard Deviation)

	Latin America	50 Democracies
Political Trust	2.04 (0.73)	2.21 (0.72)
Control of Corruption	-0.01 (0.76)	0.79 (1.09)
Most people can be trusted	0.16 (0.37)	0.29 (0.45)
Participation in organizations	0.65 (0.96)	0.78 (1.10)
Materislit/Postmaterialist Index	1.93 (0.64)	1.88 (0.63)
Greater respect for Authority	2.68 (0.59)	2.41 (0.75)
Financial Satisfaction	5.88 (2.76)	
Satisfaction with people in office	2.37 (0.90)	
Country is run by...	0.33 (0.47)	
Left-right scale	5.89 (2.55)	5.53 (2.18)
Politics Important	2.20 (1.01)	2.22 (0.92)
Interested in politics	2.03 (0.98)	
Religion	0.67 (0.47)	
Attend religious services	4.78 (2.52)	
Sex	0.48 (0.50)	0.48 (0.50)
Age	39.60 (15.80)	43.28 (16.98)
Education	3.24 (1.45)	3.54 (1.39)
Employment	0.53 (0.50)	
Scale of income	4.35 (2.72)	

APPENDIX D:

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 5

Table D.1. Question Wording

	Question Wording
Democracy/Autocracy Index	<p>I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?</p> <p>a) Having a democratic political system is a good way of governing the country</p> <p>b) Having experts, not the government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country</p> <p>c) Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections.</p> <p>I'm going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly, after I read each one of them?</p> <p>a) Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government</p>
Satisfaction with Democracy	<p>On the whole are you very satisfied, rather satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing in our country?</p>

	Question Wording
Participation in political organizations	<p>Please look carefully at the following list of voluntary organizations and activities and say which, if any, do you belong to?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Labor unions ○ Political parties ○ Professional associations
Participation in non-conventional activities	<p>Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never, under any circumstances, do it.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) signing a petition b) take part in a demonstration c) join boycotts d) join unofficial strikes e) occupy buildings

Table D.2. Summary Statistics (Mean and Standard Deviation)

	Latin America	50 Democracies
Democracy/Autocracy Index	2.89 (0.56)	2.99 (0.59)
Satisfaction with Democracy	2.45 (0.87)	2.37 (0.79)
Participation in political organizations	0.14 (0.43)	0.25 (0.54)
Participation in non-conventional activities	0.50 (0.89)	0.78 (1.01)

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