FAMILIES AND FOES: ETHNIC CIVIL WAR DURATION

by

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Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

List of Appendices

List of Abbreviations

DOM	*Daerah Operasi Militar*; an area of military operations (Indonesia)
EGP	*Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres*, Guerrilla Army of the Poor (Guatemala)
FMLN	*Farabundo Martí Liberación Nacional*, Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (El Salvador)
GAM	*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka*; Free Aceh Movement (Indonesia)
GCE	General Certificate of Education (Sri Lanka)
IRA	Irish Republican Army
JVP	*Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna*, People's Liberation Front (Sri Lanka)
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or Tamil Tigers (Sri Lanka)
MAR	Minorities at Risk project and data, based at the University of Maryland
OPM	*Organisasi Papua Merdeka*; Free Papua Organization (Indonesia)
PA	Palestinian Authority
PMR	Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (Transnistria)
PNG	Papua New Guinea
PRIO	International Peace Research Institute
TULF	Tamil United Liberation Front (Sri Lanka)
UNP	United National Party (Sri Lanka)
URNG	*Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca*, Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity

Abstract

When do ethnic civil wars last especially long? This dissertation examines when, why, and how ethnicity affects the length of civil wars. Two-thirds of civil wars pit ethnic combatants against each other; the duration of these conflicts varies considerably. Existing work on ethnicity in civil wars is effectively stalemated on the questions of how or even whether ethnicity influences the lengths of these wars. Yet the answer has vital normative, policy, and research implications. In this dissertation, I argue that ethnicity will prolong civil wars under two conditions. First, when information derived from ethnic interactions exacerbates combatants' fears of the future, conflicts will last longer. Second, when support from ethnic kin in other states alters the balance of capabilities or introduces uncertainty into wars, conflicts will be protracted. Using duration analysis of a new dataset of all ethnic civil wars from 1945 to 2004, I show that both of these dynamics prolong ethnic civil wars. Case studies from two post-Soviet republics demonstrate that ethnic interactions are especially likely to prolong conflicts when they exacerbate commitment or signaling problems. Two civil wars in Indonesia show that ethnic kin are especially influential when they influence the balance of capabilities. Case studies of civil wars in Central America and Sri Lanka indicate that these findings also may have implications for both variation within non-ethnic civil wars and between ethnic and non-ethnic civil wars.

Chapter 1. Introduction

1.0 Introduction

   Why do some civil wars last so much longer than others? Sri Lanka's

government defeated a 1971 insurgency by the militant Sinhalese Janatha Vimukthi

Peramuna (JVP) in two months, but has fought ethnic Tamil rebels for over 25 years.

Hutus and Tutsis in Burundi fought each other in the 1970s and 1980s for only a few

months at a time. In the 1990s, however, they began a war lasting over 10 years. Civil

wars such as these are the most prevalent and deadly form of large-scale political

violence today: between 1945 and 1999, 127 civil wars killed over 16 million people.[1]

Two-thirds of these wars pit ethnic combatants against each other. Despite their frequent

occurrence, however, we still do not when, why, how – or even if – ethnicity affects the

length of civil wars.

   The conventional wisdom tells us that some civil wars last so much longer than

others because of ethnicity: civil wars pitting ethnic combatants against each other are

inherently fought over irreconcilable aims, according to this perception. But the evidence

suggests the picture is more complex. Cases such as the wars in Burundi and Sri Lanka

vividly illustrate two patterns. First, ethnic civil wars often last much longer than those

only fought over ideology or resources, as the Sri Lankan case illustrates. However,

there is tremendous variation between ethnic civil wars, as Burundi's wars make clear.

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[1] During the same period, 25 interstate wars produced 3.3 million fatalities (Fearon and Laitin 2003).

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Existing studies cannot explain these phenomena, but instead offer opposing views of the role of ethnicity. What is it about ethnicity that prolongs so many – but not all – of these wars? In this dissertation, I derive and test a theory of when and how ethnicity prolongs civil wars. The central insight is that ethnicity affects the capabilities of combatants and their beliefs about their opponents. Ethnicity prolongs civil wars when patterns of inter-ethnic relations produce commitment and signaling problems and when ethnic group members in other countries participate in the conflicts.

Ethnicity provides information to participants in civil wars. Interactions with members of ethnic groups help individuals to predict the relative costs and benefits of continuing to fight, in comparison to ending the conflict. When the costs of ending conflict seem especially high, group members will continue fighting. In other words, when ethnic interactions yield information that leads individuals to foresee severely restricted opportunities, if not annihilation, they believe they have little to gain – and potentially much to lose – from surrendering their arms. Civil wars last longer under these conditions.

Co-ethnics, or ethnic kin, increase rebels' capabilities when they provide sustained and reliable support. Military, financial, or logistic support from co-ethnics who often feel deep sympathy, guilt, or responsibility for their kin's welfare helps rebels to continue fighting long after they otherwise would be overwhelmed. This support also can encourage rebels to continue fighting to exact a better deal, or it can complicate bargaining, stymieing a settlement. External support also increases an insurgency's viability and facilitates recruiting. However, it rarely is enough to ensure victory. Thus, it simply prolongs conflicts.

This dissertation answers two central puzzles. First, when and why do ethnic civil wars last especially long? I answer this question by elaborating *how* ethnicity affects combatants' resolve and capabilities. Second, why does the existing literature offer contradictory answers to this question? By focusing on specific effects of ethnicity interactions and by gathering data that measure those effects, I reconcile the contradictory portraits of ethnicity in civil war.

In the remainder of this chapter, I outline these two puzzles in more detail. I first present empirical data demonstrating that while most ethnic wars last longer than non-ethnic wars, this pattern is far from uniform. I then discuss the existing literature and its explanations of these trends. I will argue that previous work has fallen short in two areas. First, by aggregating all civil wars, studies have assumed that variables operate similarly in very diverse contexts. Recent work suggests this assumption is not valid and obscures important differences between types of civil wars. Second, I will argue that because they use rough proxies for ethnicity that do not reflect theoretical arguments on the role of ethnicity in civil, these studies cannot tell us whether or how ethnicity affects the length of civil wars.

1.1 The Empirical Puzzle

A brief survey of civil wars suggests that ethnicity is critical to understanding war duration (See Figure 1). Short wars are equally likely to be ethnic or non-ethnic: approximately half of wars lasting less than two years include an ethnic component.[2]

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[2] Data from Fearon and Laitin (2003). Civil wars often are categorized according to 'type,' that is, whether the war is ethnic, ideological, and resource-based. Of course, most conflicts include elements of multiple types. Thus, some wars' categorization is controversial; however, there is broad consensus on the

However, ethnic rebellions are much more likely to drag on for years, if not decades: 80% of wars longer than 15 years are ethnic conflicts.[3] Despite this, almost one-third of ethnic wars are relatively short.[4] Yet existing research provides no clear answer regarding when and how ethnicity affects conflict duration. In the remainder of this dissertation, I answer this question.

Figure 1. The Proportion of Ethnic and Non-Ethnic Wars, Grouped by Duration

1.2 Implications for Future Research and for Policymakers

Why should we care about the answer to this question? Given the prevalence of civil wars, and especially of ethnic civil wars, political scientists should know when and why these conflicts last especially long. The stark divide between those who argue that

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descriptions of most conflicts. See Chapter Three for more discussion of how I operationalize this distinction.
[3] Data from my dataset; see Chapter Three.
[4] Lasting less than three years.

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ethnicity plays a central role in intrastate conflicts and those who find little evidence for ethnicity's effect signals a larger disconnect in the research on civil wars. This dissertation begins to bridge that divide. In the following pages, I will argue that both sets of findings miss critical elements and thus fail to accurately evaluate the role of ethnicity in civil wars. By showing how ethnicity can exacerbate or alleviate other factors, I draw together these disparate research projects to provide a more nuanced and comprehensive portrait of when ethnic civil wars become especially long. Although ethnic conflicts are the main focus of this research, my findings have implications for all civil wars, regardless of type. I begin to explore these implications in the final empirical chapter.

Understanding why civil wars last especially long has both normative and policy implications. War devastates standards of living and social patterns, and long wars generally have greater impact. For instance, a war lasting two years kills, on average, 14,000 people. Wars lasting between 25 and 30 years, on the other hand, kill an average of 621,500 people.[5] Civil wars have long-lasting physical and mental health consequences as well, which often are more severe as the scope of the conflict increases (Ghobarah et al. 2003; Macksoud and Aber 1996; Somasundaram 1998). Moreover, civil wars often create thousands of refugees and internally displaced persons, infrastructure destruction, economic collapse, and environmental devastation (Kalyvas 2007; Murdoch and Sandler 2002). Ultimately, understanding the factors that contribute to variation in conflict duration can provide a window to better conflict management strategies, both in the short and long terms. Although ethnicity itself is not easily influenced, policies *can*

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[5] There are, of course, always exceptions of long, low intensity conflicts and short, very deadly ones. Thus, these represent broad trends. Data from my dataset (see Chapter Three).

address the unique dilemmas that ethnic interactions often produce. These strategies

include institutional design, economic policy, border controls, media laws, educational

platforms, roles for the international community, and long-term civil society goals.[6]

2.0 Existing Literature on Civil War Duration

Why do some wars last longer than others? Are certain conflicts particularly

difficult to resolve? A few years ago, Sambanis noted that

> civil war represents the most poorly understood system failure in domestic
> political processes. It is a disruption of social norms that is unparalleled in
> domestic politics and has important implications for the stability of regional
> systems and the maintenance of international security (2002).

Research on civil war and ethnic conflict has progressed since that point, but still offers

few concrete insights to explain the empirical patterns detailed above.

A multitude of models focus on civil war onset – that is, explaining why intrastate

conflicts start.[7] However, models of war onset cannot just be applied to questions of

duration. Compelling theoretical and empirical evidence demonstrates that although

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[6] For example, integrated professional associations promote Hindu-Muslim peace in India (Varshney 2002). This suggests that one long-term strategy is to promote such organizations. Other studies suggest that federalism frequently is successful for managing tensions in multiethnic states (Horowitz 2000), providing insight into institutional design approaches.

[7] The causes of conflicts sometimes are framed in terms of 'greed vs. grievance'; that is, rebels fight either for loot or for more lofty goals, like equality and justice (e.g., Collier 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Gurr 1970, 1993). This dichotomy is overly simplistic, however, since most civil wars incorporate aspects of both (Sambanis 2004a). Moreover, insurgency viability is a critical determinant of conflicts, including factors such as terrain, the balance of forces, and whether rebels are based in rural or concentrated areas (Bapat 2005; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Wealth, political instability, institutions such as federalism, previous wars, population size, and ethnic fractionalization all may affect whether intrastate conflict breaks out, as well (Bermeo 2002; Besançon 2005; De Soysa 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Sambanis 2004b). Many of these findings are not robust across models, in part because concepts are operationalized multiple ways. Regan and Norton (2005) also suggest that different models may apply to different stages of conflict. In one of the most comprehensive studies to date, Hegre and Sambanis (2006) test multiple proxies for common variables included in models of civil war onset. They find that a large population, low income, low economic growth, recent political instability, inconsistent democratic institutions, a small military, rough terrain, and war-prone and undemocratic neighbors are robust determinants of conflict onset. Especially fragile variables include the level of democracy, political system, centralization, the neighborhood political economy, economic policy, social welfare, and resource distribution. Ethnic dominance and fractionalization are salient for the onset of lower-level conflicts only.

onset and duration share some common features, models of one of these outcomes do not predict the other well. One reason is that conflicts often generate dynamics that affect their subsequent length. For example, atrocities or shifting control, which can affect duration, both evolve only during a conflict (Brandt et al. 2005; Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2004; Kalyvas 2006); variables such as lootable resources also affect duration but not onset (de Soysa and Neumayer 2007; Ross 2004). Thus, in this dissertation, I focus on duration only.

There is broad consensus on the significance and role of a few factors influencing conflict duration. Poor countries tend to have longer wars (Collier 2000; Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2004; Fearon 2004b). Resources matter, especially when rebels can use lootable resources or contraband such as alluvial diamonds, drugs, or timber to fund their struggle (Buhaug and Lujala 2004; Ross 2004, 2006). Specific terrain features such as forests or mountains sometimes lengthen wars, as well.[8] Third party intervention has complicated effects, depending on its form, timing, and neutrality (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce 2008; Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2004; Eldabawi and Sambanis 2000; Regan 2002).

A striking lack of consensus surrounds the role of ethnicity.[9] Large-n studies find that under most circumstances, neither the fact of a war being identity-based nor a

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[8] Fearon and Laitin (2003) find no effect, but Buhaug and Lujala (2004), using more fine-grained, sub-national data, find that while forest cover is significant, mountains do not lengthen conflict. Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom (2004) conclude that wars are shorter in countries with more mountains but less forest coverage.

[9] The intrastate conflict literature suffers an especially stark lack of consensus on the role of ethnicity. In this dissertation, I focus on this factor. I do not deny the vital importance of individuals' many other motivations to fight in ethnic civil wars or to support a specific group of combatants. Nor do I argue that ethnicity will necessarily outweigh the effects of these other factors. Rather, my primary goal is to reconcile the disjuncture on the role of ethnicity. By too quickly dismissing the role of, or too closely focusing on the role of, ethnicity, many studies have failed to closely show how ethnicity works in conjunction with other factors like revenge, resources, or terrain.

country's ethnic fractionalization affect war duration (Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2004; Fearon 2004b; Licklider 1995).[10] However, the large body of case-based work – along with the conventional wisdom in the press and among the public – reaches the opposite conclusion (Azar and Farah 1981; Crighton and MacIver 1991; Ellingsen 2000; Kaufman 2006; Kaufmann 1996; Rothman 1997; Stavenhagen 1996; Waterman 1993). Some authors even argue that protracted conflicts almost always involve ethnicity or identity. Stavenhagen (1996), for instance, asserts that ethnic conflicts

> tend to be protracted [due to] collective historical memories … suffused with highly charged emotions and passions, imbued with myths and fears and perceived threats, entwined with deeply held beliefs and aspirations, [making them] … much more difficult to reduce to the ordinary give-and-take of political bargaining or negotiation (132).

These disparate portraits of ethnicity stem from one fundamental problem: while ethnic civil wars may be likely to last longer, ethnicity itself, as operationalized in quantitative studies, is too blunt a measure to capture the relevant mechanisms. I resolve this problem through two methodological strategies.

First, I collect data that reflect theoretical arguments about how ethnicity affects conflict. Most projects operationalize ethnicity using either ethnic heterogeneity or ethnic fractionalization indices. These measure the number and relative size of ethnic groups in a given country and require strong assumptions about how the number of groups correlates with the nature of inter-ethnic relations. Recent studies empirically and theoretically challenge this operationalization on two grounds. First, models incorporating ethnic fractionalization may fail to estimate the *indirect* effects of fractionalization operating through intervening variables such as poverty (Blimes 2006;

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[10] See below for more on fractionalization measures.

Quinn, Hechter, and Wibbels 2004). Second, ethnic fractionalization is time-invariant,[11] and more importantly, does not measure more salient theoretical concepts and causal mechanisms relating ethnicity to conflict, such as polarization and groups' relationship with the state.[12] Often, multiple mechanisms could drive the relationship, but these are not tested (Beger and Moore 2007; Cederman and Girardin 2007; Fearon et al. 2007; Green and Seher 2003; Humphreys 2001, 2005; Laitin and Posner 2001; Sambanis 2004b).

Those models that do attempt to test mechanisms often employ very rough proxies. Polarization measures improve upon fractionalization but still rely on strong assumptions about group size and interactions.[13] Some scholars use Polity scores to proxy political grievances and the Gini index to measure economic grievances. These variables conflate inequality with discrimination; fail to capture key theoretical arguments linking ethnic grievances to conflict duration; and commit an ecological fallacy by assuming that the group in question is affected by political or economic discrimination.[14]

I show how ethnicity affects conflict duration using insights derived from the qualitative literature. This literature offers a more nuanced view of ethnicity, but one that

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[11] See Alesina et al. (2003) for one study demonstrating the limitations of traditional fractionalization indices.

[12] Buhaug (2006) suggests a different approach based on his finding that if one accounts for rebel goals, ethnic fractionalization can predict the onset of separatist conflicts.

[13] The most widely used are Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) and Esteban and Ray (1994). Bhavnani and Miodownik (2009) also have developed a new model that adds a dimension of ethnic salience to the polarization measure.

[14] Several authors discuss various manifestations of the proxy problem, both in terms of operationalization and leaving mechanisms untested. Sambanis (2003) offers a general critique of many operationalizations, primarily in relation to the Collier and Hoeffler model, but also touching on a number of other influential studies; Humphreys (2005) focuses on the multiple, typically untested, mechanisms that could potentially link the variables. Ross (2004, 2006) and Humphreys (2001) further explore issues associated with resource proxies. Alesina et al. (2003), Ellingsen (2000), Laitin and Posner (2001), and Matuszski and Schneider (2006) specifically address heterogeneity and the ethnic fractionalization proxy. De Soysa (2002) and Fearon (2005) critique the primary commodity exports measure.

is also incomplete. Case studies often focus on particularly vicious conflicts, effectively showing a selection bias for longer civil wars. Thus, they are unable to situate these long-running conflicts into the larger picture of all civil wars (Geddes 1990). Moreover, case studies rarely test the hypothesized mechanisms systematically against additional cases. I measure concrete ways that ethnicity affects civil wars based on these case studies.[15] In doing so, I address the shortcomings of this literature by deriving testable hypotheses from existing studies and applying them against a broad sample of cases.

Second, while my results have implications that can be tested against other types of intrastate conflict, in order to gain tractability on the primary question, I focus on ethnic wars in the majority of this dissertation. Recent research demonstrates that civil wars are not one, homogeneous category of political violence. Economics, politics, and resources systematically produce different effects in ethnic and non-ethnic wars (Besançon 2005; Blomberg and Hess 2002; Buhaug, Gates, and Lujala 2005; DeRouen and Sobek 2004; Hegre 2004; Lujala, Gleditsch, and Gilmore 2004; Sambanis 2001). Thus, the first step in this project is to test my argument against ethnic civil wars. The statistical analyses and case studies I present in the first two empirical chapters include only ethnic civil wars, allowing me to directly focus on the relevant mechanisms. Since almost 65% of civil wars since 1945 involve ethnicity, this yields a significant contribution to our understanding of civil war duration. In Chapter Six, I use four case studies of paired ethnic and non-ethnic wars to examine ways in which my research could apply to civil wars as a broader form of political violence.

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[15] Indivisible issues – also referred to as stakes or symbolic issues – are one of the most common of factors put forth in these studies (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Brandt et al. 2005; Buhaug, Gates, and Lujala 2005; Gershenson and Grossman 2000; Hegre 2004; Walter 2003, 2006a). This is a vague term, however, and difficult to operationalize. Thus, I focus on more concrete arguments in this project.

3.0 Definitions

Civil War

What is a civil war? Following the previous literature, I define a civil war as an

armed conflict within the boundaries of a sovereign state. A civil war is fought between

organized groups fighting over control of the government, of its policies, or of a region.

More technically, I adopt a threshold level of fatalities to distinguish between low-level

violence and more sustained combat. A conflict must kill at least 1,000 people, with a

yearly average of 100 deaths, and each side must suffer at least 100 fatalities, to be

classified as a civil war.[16]

Ethnicity

I define ethnic groups as those whose members are linked by common descent

and identify with each other on the basis of one or more of the following traits: myths of

common ancestry; shared historical memories; ancestral homeland; race; and cultural

traits such as language, religion, or customs.[17] Some ethnic markers may be mutable –

for instance, one can learn a new language or convert to a different religion – but

ethnicity is essentially an ascriptive trait.[18] Note that this definition says nothing about

the relative durability or age of ethnic identification. Ethnicity is neither wholly

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[16] This definition is derived from Kalyvas (2007) and Fearon (2003). Forms of political violence share
many similarities, regardless of their severity; however, they also often embody different dynamics (Regan
and Norton 2005), and thus I analyze only more severe episodes here.

[17] This encompasses variants that sometimes are called communal, sectarian, or confessional, recognizing
that these embody similar phenomenon, albeit with different names. The definition is derived from Fearon
(2003).

[18] Fearon (2004a) articulates the point as: "becoming fluent in the language, manners, and customs of
Armenia will not make me 'ethnically Armenian'" (1).

primordial nor wholly instrumental.[19] Although malleable to a degree, ethnic identities

are not created or destroyed overnight. Ethnicity is only one potential source of identity,

along with class, gender, citizenship, and a host of other relationships. Thus, while

ethnicity contributes to an individual's self-image, it is not always an individual's

primary identification or the primary determinant of behavior.[20] In this dissertation, I

focus on those situations in which ethnicity *is* a salient cleavage dividing societies.[21]

Ethnic Civil War

　　　Thus, ethnic, or identity-based, civil wars[22] are conflicts in which groups are

organized primarily along ethnic lines, victims or enemies are identified based on their

ethnicity, and recruitment efforts make at least some appeal to ethnic solidarity – even if

the fundamental end of the rebellion is not a specifically 'ethnic' goal such as freedom

for cultural practice or language instruction. This definition includes many conflicts that

might be considered 'religious,' in which divisions are along religious lines and religious

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[19] Geertz is often considered the prototypical primordialist. Others take a slightly more flexible stance, but in (perhaps over-) emphasizing the deep, emotional of ethnic attachments and ethnic violence, typify what many scholars imply is the primordialist perspective. See Connor (1994), Kaufmann (1996), and Smith (1991). Social psychological perspectives sometimes feature in primordialist explanations; see Hewstone (2001), McCauley (2001), and Tajfel (1971). Some instrumentalist arguments can be found in Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1997), Brass (1985), Caselli and Coleman (2002), Fearon (1999), and Hardin (1995). One variant of instrumentalist arguments focuses on the effects of modernization on ethnic identity; see Fearon (2006) for a review of these theories. See Horowitz (2000) for general discussion on malleable identities; Brown (1996) and Petersen (2002) specifically address the role of elites. Caselli and Coleman (2002) and Fearon (1999) focus on the role of ethnicity as an ordering device.
[20] This is similar to what Lake and Rothchild (1998) call the constructivist perspective and Oberschall (2001) terms 'constructionist'. It is the dominant approach in most current work on ethnicity. See also Byman (2002).
[21] I do not argue that ethnic identities cannot be reinforced during conflict; in fact, that is a salient mechanism linking duration to some of the factors on which I focus. See Chapter Two.
[22] 'Ethnic wars' is the more common terminology; both will be used interchangeably throughout.

identity behaves like ethnic identity, but the conflict itself is not about religious doctrine.[23]

Most conflicts have multiple goals; ethnic wars are not necessarily only about ethnicity. Rather, ethnic civil wars are conflicts in which the combatants perceive ethnicity to be at least one cleavage distinguishing them from their adversaries. This does not preclude other identifications along narrower lines such as a tribe or clan or along broader lines such as class.[24] Nor does it make a judgment as to how individuals come to perceive ethnicity as a salient cleavage in the conflict. This perspective may pre-date the war by decades. Or it may be partly a factor of the conflict itself, either because inter-group conflict solidifies identities or because elites and ethnic entrepreneurs highlight ethnicity and deliberately polarize groups.

4.0 Overview of the Remaining Chapters

In the next chapter, I elaborate how ethnicity prolongs civil wars. I focus on the ways that ethnicity affects combatants' determination to continue fighting and their ability to do so. I argue that ethnic interactions can provide vital information. Sometimes, this information leads group members to foresee death or low quality of life if they trust their adversaries and negotiate a settlement. This type of information thus encourages combatants to continue fighting for autonomy or independence. Civil wars last longer when adversaries fear ill-treatment after laying down their weapons.

Rebels organized along ethnic lines often receive sustained support from sympathetic co-ethnics abroad. When they do, this support can complicate bargaining or

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[23] This characterization is based in part on Fearon and Laitin (2000). See Smith (1991) for further discussion on the relation between religious identity and ethnicity
[24] See Kalyvas (2007) for some discussion on the complexity of this identification.

it can encourage a group to continue fighting and pressure the government for more concessions. At the same time, support from ethnic kin can allow a group to continue fighting after it would otherwise be defeated; however, this aid rarely is substantial enough to produce a swift victory. Civil wars last longer when co-ethnics abroad intervene.

In Chapter Three, I discuss how I test this theory. First, I introduce duration models and the dataset I construct of all ethnic civil wars from 1945 to 2004. I then discuss how I code the independent variables used in the analysis. Second, I discuss the comparative case study methods I use and the criteria based on which I selected cases for the analyses in the following chapters. By combining quantitative and qualitative approaches, I make my conclusions generalizable to a wide variety of civil wars while also specifying the mechanisms tying information and co-ethnic support to the length of a war.

Chapter Four demonstrates how information affects commitment and signaling problems that encourage combatants to continue fighting. I present statistical results on how information from five different types of interactions influences the length of ethnic civil wars. In the second part of the chapter, I focus on wars in two former Soviet Republics in the early 1990s to illustrate how information from these sources shaped expectations about future relations. In Moldova, the civil war lasted only a few months; Azerbaijan became embroiled in a much longer conflict. I argue that combatants' information about each other, and the predictions that information generated, played a critical role in these different outcomes. In particular, ethnic Armenians and Azeris

harbored deep fears of each others' intentions, which have led them to resist a settlement. These fears were much less severe in Moldova.

In Chapter Five, I focus on how third parties affect the length of civil wars. The statistical analysis details the roles of support from both ethnic kin in neighboring states and further abroad, comparing this to support from unrelated third parties. I use the conflicts in Indonesia's regions of West Papua and Aceh to enrich this picture of how co-ethnic support affects civil wars. The Acehnese had few sources of outside aid. Their supporters trained militants and helped them to escape Indonesian pursuit, but they could not influence the balance of capabilities or stave off an Indonesian victory. In West Papua, on the other hand, support from cross border kin in Papua New Guinea has helped rebels to lobby foreign governments for intervention, escape army pursuit, train, resupply, and recruit. While this support has not been substantial enough to win West Papuan independence, it has prolonged the conflict.

Chapters Four and Five focus specifically on ethnic civil wars, enabling me to both test my theory statistically and explore the mechanisms in these types of conflicts. In Chapter Six, I suggest several insights of my theory into wars in which combatants are not organized along ethnic lines. I do this using case studies from Guatemala and El Salvador and from Sri Lanka. These cases demonstrate that many of the elements of my theory also apply to non-ethnic civil wars, albeit in slightly different shapes. The cases also provide some indications that ethnicity is different, especially in its relative fixedness.[25] This may exacerbate the effects of threatening information and may more deeply motivate ethnic kin. The theory I lay out in the following pages explains why

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[25] For example, while ethnicity is malleable, it is usually much more difficult to change one's ethnicity than to change one's affiliation with a political party.

some ethnic civil wars are longer than others. If the tentative conclusions I advance in

Chapter Six are true, the theory also may explain why ethnic civil war are likely to last so

much longer than other types of civil wars.

Chapter Seven draws together the three sets of empirical findings. I discuss the

main insights of the dissertation, focusing on the theoretical and methodological

contributions, as well as the main results of both the quantitative and qualitative analyses.

I conclude with a brief discussion of some policy implications of these findings and

directions for future research.

Chapter 2. A Theory of Ethnic Civil War Duration

1.0 Introduction

Why and when are some ethnic wars much longer than others? I argue that ethnicity affects two factors, each of which can prolong ethnic civil wars. First, ethnic interactions provide combatants with *information that can exacerbate commitment and signaling problems*. When this information is present, combatants prefer to continue fighting, rather than to negotiate a settlement ending the war. Second, combatants in ethnic civil wars sometimes draw on *substantial, sustained third party support* from their ethnic kin. When this aid changes the balance of capabilities or complicates bargaining, it prevents swift resolution of the war. Ethnic wars with these dynamics also last longer.

Below, I elaborate on the role of each of these factors. I offer concrete examples to illustrate theoretical points, and I derive testable hypotheses on how each type of interaction and source of aid affect ethnic civil war duration. In the following chapters, I test these theoretical propositions using both large-n statistical methods and detailed case studies.

2.0 Information in Ethnic Civil Wars

Civil war combatants' post-war vulnerability gives information a critical role in conflicts. Combatants are vulnerable because to end the war, one group of combatants must disarm and live alongside the other group. This produces intense commitment and signaling problems. Commitment problems occur when combatants are unsure whether

their opponent will uphold the terms of a peace deal if future circumstances change. Signaling problems occur when combatants are unsure whether the other party will uphold the terms of a peace deal, regardless of what happens in the future.[26]

Knowing your enemy is vital in civil wars. To alleviate commitment and signaling problems, combatants must have reliable information about whether disarmament is safe before they will lay down their weapons and stop fighting (Walter 2002). Information that helps combatants to gauge their adversaries' intentions and predict their behavior after a settlement is especially valuable.[27] In other words, information influences the relative attractiveness of continuing to fight, compared to signing a settlement that will end the conflict.

The relative attractiveness of different outcomes, or expected utility, is a function of both the predicted *probability* and *costs* of different outcomes.[28] In more concrete terms: when the probability or costs of a broken settlement rise, commitment problems also increase. Adversaries hesitate to surrender their weapons when commitment problems are high. Although parties try to gather as much reliable information as possible on the likelihood or costs of their opponents reneging on a peace deal, this often is difficult. When combatants face a signaling problem in which they simply cannot judge between the options, they prefer to fight, retaining their weapons as an 'insurance policy' against any future danger. Thus, both uncertainty and credible fears about adversaries' intentions prolong ethnic civil wars.

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[26] This is called a signaling problem because trustworthy parties cannot signal this fact to their opponents.
[27] The relative capabilities of the combatants are rarely in doubt in civil wars, unlike information about intentions (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Saleyhan n.d.).
[28] Since the costs of settlement can be nearly equal to the costs of continuing to wage war, any information that indicates increased costs of a settlement makes fighting more attractive, all else equal.

I argue here that ethnic interactions provide information to combatants about their adversaries. This informs predictions about what their adversaries are likely to do in the future. I do not claim that all ethnic wars are affected by these dynamics. Rather, ethnic interactions drive commitment and signaling problems *under some circumstances*. When these circumstances are present, ethnic wars become especially long. In the following pages, I discuss each of these conditions and the specific ways each can prolong ethnic civil wars.

My argument rests on two fundamental assumptions. First, combatants would like to settle a conflict with an adversary who will not renege on the settlement; after all, war is costly. Second, however, combatants prefer to continue fighting if the alternative is to settle a conflict with an opponent who may renege and leave them worse off. Combatants' key difficulty lies in determining which kind of adversary they are facing. Therefore, combatants who know their enemies can more confidently judge which option provides the best outcome.

Below, I will briefly define commitment and signaling problems. I will then discuss how five types of ethnic interactions affect the information available to combatants. In doing so, each influences commitment and signaling problems in ethnic civil wars. For each type of ethnic interaction and its relevant commitment or signaling problem, I will offer hypotheses on the expected effect on conflict duration. In Chapter Four, I will test these hypotheses using both large-n quantitative methods and case studies. I do not suggest that the interactions I describe occur only in ethnic conflicts – although that may be the case for some of them. In Chapter Six, I will focus on some

ways that information sources vary across ethnic and non-ethnic wars and will offer

suggestions as to how this affects the duration of different types of civil wars.

2.1 Commitment and Signaling Problems in Civil Wars

Are adversaries likely to implement a peace settlement? This is the central

dilemma for combatants in civil wars. Signaling problems emerge when combatants

cannot discern whether their adversary is trustworthy or has little intention of

implementing a peace deal. This trustworthiness, also known as the adversary's type or

nature, is consistent regardless of changing circumstances or incentives. The key

problem is that the same actions often could be interpreted to indicate either type of

adversary.[29] For example, in the early stages of the Oslo Process, Palestinian terrorist

groups launched several attacks against Israelis. Israelis did not know whether Arafat

and the Palestinian Authority (PA) genuinely wished, but were unable, to implement their

security commitments, or whether the PA was not making a genuine effort to crack down

on terrorism (Kydd and Walter 2002). Under such uncertain conditions, individuals are

loathe to make a potentially deadly gamble by trusting their enemies. Therefore, wars

last longer when signaling problems prevail because combatants prefer to retain their

weapons.

Commitment problems are closely related to signaling problems but focus on

whether a settlement can be enforced in the long term.[30] In particular, combatants fear

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[29] These are called 'pooling' actions. 'Separating' actions are those which only one type of actor would take.

[30] In many conflicts, commitment and signaling problems occur together, although political scientists often separate them for theoretical clarity. Prevalent signaling problems often make commitment problems unlikely because combatants will not sign a peace deal if they cannot ascertain whether their adversary is likely trustworthy. In that case, post-settlement behavior becomes moot.

that if circumstances change in the future, their adversaries will renew the conflict (see

Figure 2).[31] The chief challenge in a commitment problem is that even trustworthy actors

who intend to implement a deal fully may not be able to convince their opponents that

they will remain trustworthy in the future. The existence of incentives to defect, such as

changes in relative power, leadership, or public opinion, makes it impossible for

individuals to credibly commit to respect the agreement. Commitment problems often

plague ethnic wars in new states because majority groups cannot credibly promise not to

exploit minorities after consolidating control (Fearon 1995; Weingast 1998). For

example, Armenians in Azerbaijan believed that if they relinquished their weaponry and

control of Nagorno-Karabakh, the Azerbaijani government would not protect Armenians'

political, economic, or cultural interests and might launch a military campaign against

Armenian towns (Herzig 2000; Yamskov 1991).

     As in cases where signaling problems prevail, individuals prefer to retain their

weapons when they do not trust their opponents to uphold the terms of a peace

settlement. Conflicts thus will last longer. As I will argue below, even if the probability

of this outcome is low, high costs of an adversary reneging on a peace agreement can

produce the same outcome.

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[31] Combatants in civil wars rarely face *no* commitment problems. Often, both sides anticipate this problem
but cannot convince each other that they are trustworthy. In such cases, they may create settlement
provisions such as power-sharing mechanisms or third-party guarantees to help guard against being
exploited (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Walter 2002). For more on commitment problems, see Fearon (1994)
and Powell (2006).

Figure 2. Commitment and Signaling Problems in Civil Wars

No Deal

Untrustworthy

Is the opponent
trustworthy or
untrustworthy?*

Signaling
Problem:
Don't
Know

No Deal

No Deal

Likely to renege
High cost of reneging

Trustworthy

Commitment
Problem:
If circumstances
change, will the
opponent renege?*
If the opponent
reneges, will the cost
be high?*

Unlikely to renege
Low cost of reneging

Deal Possible

*Note that these are not dichotomous outcomes; the figure represents only the extreme values for each.

What do commitment and signaling problems imply for the duration of civil wars? For disarmed combatants, the risks associated with their former adversary reneging on a peace deal are particularly high. By disarming, combatants relinquish any protection or insurance policy in the case of an opponent's return to war. The central dilemma for combatants facing commitment or signaling problems in civil wars, therefore, is that if they trust an adversary who then renews the conflict after the settlement, they will be left defenseless and easily exploited or even wiped out. Given the risks of misjudging an opponent, commitment or signaling problems make combatants less likely to sign a peace deal and cease fighting.

As these risks rise, combatants may resist even negotiating, believing the effort

will be fruitless at best, and perhaps even deadly. Continuing the war seems like a safer

option when combatants are unsure if their adversary will adhere to the terms of a peace

deal. Therefore, *information about adversaries' intentions that affects commitment or*

signaling problems also shapes strategic decisions to keep fighting or to settle the

conflict.

Below, I elaborate on how five types of ethnic interactions provide combatants

with information that can exacerbate commitment or signaling problems. These

interactions are discrimination, a history of conflict between the groups of combatants,

ethnically-targeted atrocities, the strength of ethnic markers, and segregation.

2.2 Discrimination and Commitment Problems

An Iraqi Kurdish leader recently summarized Kurds' dilemma over whether to

remain in a unified Iraq or to seek an independent state: 'If we can live in this country

with proper rights, why not? But who can guarantee our future?' (in Cockburn 2005: 54).

This man's calculation vividly illustrates how ethnic interactions shape individuals'

predictions about the future. Other Iraqi group members' past behavior makes Kurds

wary of these groups' intentions.[32] Given this deep mistrust, many Kurds prefer to

continue seeking independence rather than to trust their fates in a unified Iraq. The Iraqi

Kurds, who have at times pursued violent means to this end, make the same calculation

that prolongs many ethnic civil wars around the world.

Combatants' reputations shape predictions both about the probability that they

will renege on a peace deal and the potential costs of a betrayal. Reputations that indicate

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[32] See Schelling (1966) for more on how past behavior influences reputations.

either an increased chance or price of the adversary reneging on a peace settlement

exacerbate commitment problems. High commitment problems make signing a peace

deal more risky, compared to continuing to fight for greater autonomy or independence.

But how can combatants gauge what an individual or group's reputation is? Past

behavior is one important source of information. A history of discrimination influences

reputations[33] (Brubaker and Laitin 1998; DeFigueiredo and Weingast 1999; Kaufmann

1996; Lake and Rothchild 1998). Discrimination, which can be on political, economic,

security, or cultural grounds, most often helps individuals to gauge the costs of a potential

betrayal. It demonstrates to group members that if they sign a deal that collapses, they

likely will face a drastically reduced quality of life. In some cases, discrimination also

increases the perceived probability of a future betrayal by signaling to group members

that their adversaries do not value them as full, equal citizens. When discrimination

suggests either an increased probability or an increased cost of a peace settlement

collapsing, it feeds commitment problems that make continuing to fight more attractive,

compared to other options.

What potential costs does discrimination indicate are likely if the adversary

reneges? Past political or economic discrimination that recurs in the future threatens

group members' ability to protect their interests. The Kurds are not the only group to

draw lessons from past marginalization by their neighbors. For instance, the Lebanese

political system that made Maronite Christians dominant, at the expense of the majority

Muslims (especially the Shi'ite community), shaped the country's 15-year civil war by

giving Muslims little reason to believe they could nonviolently alter their political

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[33] To control for endogeneity, I focus on discrimination during the 10 years prior to the war. See Chapter Three for more details on how this variable is operationalized.

fortunes (Crighton and MacIver 1991; Halawi 1992). In Sri Lanka, restrictions on Tamil as an official language and university admission quotas that limited Tamil educational opportunities led many Tamils to believe their prospects were drastically limited under a Sinhalese-led state. The civil war has lasted 26 years because these individuals believe that they have much to gain by continuing to fight for independence (de Silva 1998; Hyndman 1988).

If individuals predict that future security discrimination – that is, unequal military or police representation – is likely, they will foresee ongoing repression. For instance, Protestants constituted the majority of the Royal Ulster Constabulary in Northern Ireland. Catholics felt especially threatened by the perceived partiality of the police force, and many believed the IRA was their only available source of protection. Their belief that only dramatic institutional change spurred by violence would guarantee their future security helped to prolong the conflict there (Holland 1999; Reilly 1994).

Past cultural discrimination such as an official language policy, restrictions on dress, or banned religious observances may privilege one group's beliefs and practices over another's, signal that group status and interests will be threatened if a future deal is abrogated, or tap into visceral fears of forced assimilation if a peace deal is broken. In doing so, cultural discrimination raises both the probability and the costs of an adversary reneging. In the 1950s, China deliberately undermined the authority of Tibetan clergy and sent young Tibetans to schools that taught only Chinese language and customs and that openly ridiculed Tibetan religion and customs. This led many Tibetans to believe that they would continue to be repressed by remaining under Chinese rule and that the costs of that repression would be high (Ginsburg and Mathos 1964; Lakshmi 2003).

Discrimination, in the cases described above and countless others, threatens group members' ability to protect their interests and signals that if an opponent breaks its commitments in a peace agreement, more discrimination likely will follow. In other words, discrimination magnifies commitment problems, encouraging combatants to continue fighting for autonomy or independence.[34]

Not only are group members more likely to continue fighting, but those who are not actively fighting have incentives to support rebel movements, since discrimination demonstrates that the state will not ensure their security (DeRouen and Sobek 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Their support can prolong conflict by facilitating recruiting and augmenting the combatants' resources.

> **Hypothesis 1a:** Pre-war discrimination against members of an ethnically-organized rebel group will increase war duration.

Discrimination prolongs wars when it exacerbates commitment problems. However, in some cases, discrimination profoundly limits capabilities, which also affects war duration (Blainey 1973; Brandt et al. 2005; Sislin and Pearson 2001; Slantchev 2004).[35] Very severe discrimination can decrease a rebellion's viability. This is especially true of economic discrimination which can limit the ability to buy weapons or food; security discrimination also can hamper capabilities if group members have little military or police experience to draw on. This suggests that:

> **Hypothesis 1b:** Extreme pre-war discrimination against members of an ethnically-organized rebel group will decrease war duration.

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[34] This is true as long as independence or increased autonomy has some probability greater than zero.
[35] Below, I elaborate other ways in which ethnicity, especially aid from co-ethnics abroad, also affects the balance of capabilities.

2.3 Past Conflicts and Commitment Problems

Discrimination affects combatants' reputations; combatants also use past conflicts
to make predictions about their opponents' future behavior (Byman 2002; DeFigueiredo
and Weingast 1999; Kaufmann 1996; Lake and Rothchild 1998). When wars are part of
a repeated, violent interaction, combatants gain a reputation for bellicose behavior.
Under these conditions, combatants believe their adversaries will exploit any chance to
renew the conflict.[36]

This calculation plays a prominent role in many civil wars. In Sri Lanka, it was
only after six major riots targeted Tamils that the LTTE gained widespread support to
launch its secessionist campaign; many Tamils had come to believe that independence
was the only way to prevent future deadly riots (de Silva 1998). Israelis often
categorically state, 'You can't make peace with the Palestinians,' and the Palestinians
believe the same about Israelis. They cite their history of violent interactions to prove
that peaceful overtures will be followed by more violence (Grossman 1988, 2004; Oz
1983).

In repeated ethnic conflicts such as those in Sri Lanka and Israel/Palestine, both
combatants and non-combatant group members distrust conflict resolution attempts,
believing that their opponents will never let them live in peace. What does this mean for
the length of wars like these? Past conflicts exacerbate commitment problems. Because
adversaries seem more likely to succumb to temptations to renew the conflict,
compromise and eventual disarmament seem to be a particularly deadly gamble. Thus,
combatants judge that continuing to fight for autonomy or independence is relatively

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[36] This may be especially true in ethnic civil wars when the groups fighting are repeatedly divided along the
same (ethnic) cleavage. Individuals expect that to remain the case in the future. I explore this further in
Chapter Six.

more attractive. Therefore, wars that are preceded by a history of violence will be longer.
To summarize:

> **Hypothesis 2a:** War duration will increase when the groups fighting have fought in the past.

This effect should increase when past conflicts were more deadly for two reasons. First, individuals feel more vulnerable as the potential *costs* of future exploitation and victimization rise[37] (Byman 2002; DeFigueiredo and Weingast 1999). As the scope and severity of past clashes increases, the projected cost of renewed conflict also will rise. This will exacerbate commitment problems. Second, severe past clashes affect a larger proportion of the population. This increases commitment problems for many more group members. Determined to prevent a repeat of the past, these individuals will continue to fight or to support armed combatants, prolonging the current conflict. Therefore,

> **Hypothesis 2b:** War duration will increase as the severity of past clashes between the groups fighting increases.

However, this effect is not unlimited. Past conflicts that approach genocidal levels may leave few group members to continue fighting. In this case, diminished capabilities can shorten the war. Therefore,

> **Hypothesis 2c:** War duration will decrease when past clashes between the groups fighting were extremely severe.

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[37] This is true even if the actual probability of adversaries reneging after signing a deal seems low (DeFigueiredo and Weingast 1999).

2.4 Atrocities and Commitment Problems

Civil war combatants form perceptions of their adversaries based on past behavior, but current behavior undoubtedly also provides information. Atrocities during a war, particularly indiscriminate atrocities targeted only according to victims' ethnicities, are especially salient.[38] They solidify victims' ethnic identity and eliminate any lingering doubts about adversaries' malign intentions (Byman 2002; Kalyvas 2006; Kaufmann 1996).

Widespread atrocities strongly influence combatants' predictions about their adversaries. For instance, Indonesian repression of Timorese and Papuan civilians fueled fears of the government's intentions for the regions. Ultimately, atrocities led citizens to believe that their only hope for survival lay with the rebels and pushed thousands to support those rebel movements (Carey and Bentley 1995; Chauvel 2005). In Guatemala, it was only after the government began indiscriminately targeting Maya villages that tens of thousands of indigenous citizens joined the insurgency, believing they had little to lose if they would be killed anyway (Carmack 1988).

I argue that atrocities such as these affect conflict duration in two ways. First, enemies who commit atrocities signal that they do not value the victims' lives.[39] This leads victims to believe that their adversaries are likely to renege on a future peace deal,

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[38] See Chapter Three for how I define atrocities in operational terms.
Atrocities are a part of many civil wars, and I do not claim that atrocities occur only in ethnic wars. However, because of the relative impermeability of identity and forced group identification, atrocities may differently affect combatants' perceptions and behavior in ethnic wars. I discuss this point in more detail in Chapter Six.

[39] Atrocities could hypothetically create a signaling problem if individuals are not sure whether they are officially sanctioned or merely the actions of a few renegades, as is sometimes the effect of atrocities in interstate wars (Morrow 2001). However, the mass nature of most ethnic civil wars means that combatants are likely to assume the worst, discounting the possibility that atrocities are committed by only a few individuals. One notable example is during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, when Palestinians widely believed that massacres such as Deir Yassin were official Israeli policy, despite indications to the contrary (Tessler 1994).

with disastrous consequences. Atrocities thus dramatically heighten commitment

problems, producing protracted conflicts. Combatants have few incentives to negotiate a

settlement when atrocities indicate that both the probability and costs of their adversary

renewing the conflict are high. Thus, atrocities affect reputations and increase

commitment problems in much the same ways as do conflict history or discrimination.

Second, atrocities strengthen group identity. When individuals are targeted solely

because of their identity, they share a common experience with other group members –

even if they seemingly had little in common with each other in the past. Moreover,

individuals may come to believe that identifying with the group is their best source of

security. By widening and strengthening rebels' base of support, atrocities increase

rebels' capabilities. This allows them to continue fighting longer than would otherwise

be possible. Both mechanisms indicate that

> **Hypothesis 3a:** Atrocities targeted on a group-wide basis will increase war
> duration.

Although there is not a precise threshold, this effect cannot be unlimited. If

atrocities approach the level of genocide, there will be few group members left to

continue fighting or to shelter and support rebels.[40] As rebel capabilities erode, conflict

will be shorter. Ultimately, this is what happened in Guatemala, as the government

raised rebels' costs of continuing to fight so high that they were willing to negotiate (Stoll

1999). Therefore,

> **Hypothesis 3b:** Very severe atrocities targeted on a group-wide basis will
> decrease war duration.

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[40] Lyall (2009) suggests that in addition to reducing rebel capabilities, indiscriminate violence can create a
backlash from the local population.

2.5 Identifiability and Commitment Problems

In many ethnic civil wars, combatants and their potential supporters look, sound, or act distinctively. Moreover, individuals' ethnic identity often is used as a marker to indicate their allegiance and likely future behavior (Kalyvas 2006; Kaufmann 1996).[41] This is true whether or not individuals would like to or actually do support 'their' group of combatants. Thus, individuals who are easily identifiable as members of an ethnic group are assumed to play a specific role in the conflict. This distinctiveness, or identifiability, increases the *personal* cost of conflict.

Individuals who cannot blend into the larger population risk being dragged into the conflict (Brandt et al. 2005). For instance, in Sri Lankan riots, Sinhalese thugs have used multiple strategies to target Tamils, including ear piercing, accents, and inability to recite Buddhist verses, as well as census lists and neighbors' testimony. This has made many Tamils unwitting participants in the conflict, even if only as victims (Claiborne 1983; Hyndman 1988; Vittachi 1959).

Ethnic identifiability affects conflict duration in two ways. First, increased identifiability exacerbates commitment problems. Individuals who cannot easily 'pass' as belonging to another group are more likely to be targeted if the other side reneges on a peace settlement.[42] Thus, they fear a broken agreement more. Group members who

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[41] Local knowledge may supplement this cue, as I discuss below.

[42] Group members who attempt to cross inter-ethnic boundaries during conflict often are punished by members both of their own group and of others. The logic I present here is especially relevant for situations other than in-group policing. I assume that within group networks are extensive enough that identifiability does not play a major role in that situation. Lacina (2006) finds that more homogenous combatants face more deadly conflicts, speculating that a similar mechanism to the one I detail drives the finding. See Humphreys, Posner, and Weinstein (2002) and Horowitz (2000) for more on ethnic identifiability.

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know they will be easy targets in this event have a greater incentive to continue

fighting.[43]

Second, individuals who fear being targeted based solely on their ethnic identity

align with their group for self-protection (Kalyvas 2006). This increases support for the

rebels and may facilitate recruitment, allowing a group to continue fighting after they

would otherwise be defeated.

> **Hypothesis 4:** Easy identifiability of rebel group members based on language,
> skin color, or other features difficult to hide will increase war duration.

2.6 Segregation, Commitment Problems, and Signaling Problems

Discrimination, past conflicts, atrocities, and identifiability all help group

members to predict either the costs or the chance that their adversaries will renege on a

peace settlement. Segregation, conversely, limits information on opponents' nature and

prospective behavior (Brubaker and Laitin 1998).[44] In other words, segregation

exacerbates signaling problems by making it difficult to gauge adversaries' intentions.

When signaling problems are high, group members rely more heavily on stereotypes to

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[43] It is also possible that the opposite mechanism operates in some conflicts. Rather than individuals fearing that they will be targeted and therefore continuing to fight, identifiability may facilitate counter-insurgency, allowing the government to root out rebels and crush the rebellion more quickly. In some conflicts where this might be the case, local knowledge could substitute for physical features, language, or religion. There also is a possibility that identifiability interacts with group size. In other words, a small group that is easily identifiable may be more likely to be victims of extreme repression – even genocide – as it is easier to find and kill a large proportion of the group. Clearly, this will limit a war's length. Thus, the mechanism I hypothesize may be most applicable for groups above a certain size. I discuss these possibilities further in Chapter Four.

[44] In effect, segregation moderates the cues that other interactions provide
Although segregation often is endogenous to conflict, it clearly fuels misperceptions and mistrust. I control for the possibility of endogeneity by focusing on segregation before the conflict begins; see Chapter Three. A number of authors also suggest that intermixing prolongs conflict by heightening the security dilemma and fueling hatred. See Horowitz (2000); Kaufmann (1996); Posen (1993). I implicitly address this contention above, suggesting specific kinds of interactions that have this effect. It also is possible that the effects of segregation and intermixing cancel each other out. I discuss this possibility in more detail in Chapter Four.

predict their adversaries' behavior. They also may assign more significance to combatants' reputations.[45]

Segregation and conflict are closely linked in many countries. For example, interethnic interactions significantly diminish Hindu-Muslim violence in India by providing information and facilitating communication, which calm inflammatory situations (Varshney 2002). In Guatemala, segregation that fueled stereotypes facilitated genocide during the civil war. Widespread perceptions of Maya as deceitful and semi-human made them seem more likely to become guerrilla recruits, and soldiers saw little harm in killing them (Falla 1994).

These two examples describe how segregation might affect the intensity of conflicts. But it also can prolong civil wars. Segregation increases group members' uncertainty about their adversaries' likely future behavior. Under high uncertainty with the potential for great losses, people often are loath to gamble (Byman 2002; Fearon 1995). Together, these two dynamics suggest that when group members cannot reliably predict whether their opponents intend to implement a peace deal, they view armed rebels as an insurance policy. Because they will be reluctant to relinquish this protection,

Hypothesis 5a: Pre-war ethnic segregation will increase war duration.

Segregation limits information. When group members have few sources of information to interpret their adversaries' behavior, they rely more heavily on existing information. This may be limited to a few interactions, anecdotes, or stereotypes (DeFigueiredo and Weingast 1999; Oberschall 2001). In ethnic conflicts, stereotypes

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[45] Segregation also may increase commitment problems if combatants are segregated into isolated and easily targeted pockets of territory. I do not focus on that mechanism here, largely because of limited data on the distribution of groups within each country.

often make adversaries seem more dangerous.[46] For instance, Israeli and Palestinian children who have never met members of the other group often see each other as having tails, as part human and part animal, or as monsters ready to attack if they misbehave (Grossman 1988).

These types of threatening stereotypes heighten commitment problems because individuals believe that their opponents are more likely to renege on a peace deal, and stereotypes should have especially pernicious effects when they are widespread and seem authoritative. Thus, when extremist politicians or the media propagate stereotypes to bolster group solidarity and support for combatants, people fear their adversaries' intentions more. Thus,

> **Hypothesis 5b:** Extremist media or politicians in societies with pre-war ethnic segregation will increase war duration.

Segregation also prevents individuals from updating their prior beliefs about their opponents (Lake and Rothchild 1996). Limited new information increases the weight of combatants' reputations. Thus, reputations become especially salient for combatants predicting their adversaries' behavior in segregated societies. In other words, discrimination before the war or past conflict between the combatants will have a greater effect in segregated societies:

> **Hypothesis 5c:** Pre-war discrimination in societies with pre-war ethnic segregation will increase war duration.

> **Hypothesis 5d:** Past clashes between groups in societies with pre-war ethnic segregation will increase war duration.

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[46] Conflict also can fuel stereotypes. I control for this potential endogeneity by measuring interactions before the war begins. See Chapter Three.

3.0 Third Party Support in Ethnic Civil Wars

Commitment and signaling problems affect combatants' determination to continue fighting. But are combatants able to continue fighting? The balance of capabilities between combatants – who has what – affects both who wins a war and how long it takes them to do so (Blainey 1973; Brandt et al. 2005; Sislin and Pearson 2001; Slantchev 2004).[47] Combatants increase their chances of victory by improving their relative capabilities, and obtaining aid from third parties is one of the most potent ways to do this.

Below, I focus on three questions. First, who are the main actors providing support to combatants in ethnic civil wars? I will discuss both actors who are ethnically related to the combatants and those who are not. Second, how do actors' motives for becoming involved in a conflict affect the support they offer? I will argue that support from ethnic kin is distinct because of both emotional ties and the ways in which it is provided. Finally, how does third party aid affect the course of ethnic civil wars in which combatants receive support? Although it increases rebels' relative capabilities, I will argue that in most cases external support prolongs conflicts for three reasons. First, it usually is not substantial enough to ensure victory; instead, it merely prevents the defeat of the weaker side. Second, it can encourage rebels to continue fighting, believing they will exact a better deal. Finally, support from co-ethnics can stymie negotiations by introducing uncertainty into the bargaining relationship between the combatants. Throughout the following sections, I will offer testable hypotheses on the effects of aid from different actors. I explore these further in Chapter Five using both quantitative and qualitative approaches.

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[47] Capabilities encompass both the quantity and quality of personnel and weaponry.

3.1 Who Supports Combatants in Civil Wars

Multiple actors may support the combatants in civil wars. I focus on aid from three groups. Co-ethnics, or ethnic kin, have blood ties to the combatants.[48] Refugees, migrants, or members of the same group that settled in another country long ago are all ethnic kin. Co-ethnics can be grouped into two main categories, based on geographical location: *diasporas* abroad and *cross-border kin* in a neighboring state. Shain and Barth (2003) define a diaspora as

> a people with a common origin who reside … outside the borders of their ethnic or religious homeland – whether that homeland is real or symbolic, independent or under foreign control (452).

In this dissertation, I refer to co-ethnics as a diaspora if the homeland and residence states are not contiguous. I define cross-border kin as members of the same ethnic group living in neighboring countries.[49] The final group of supporters is everyone else, in other words, those who do *not* have ethnic ties to a group of combatants. The Rwandan civil war in the 1990s provides examples of how each of these three groups might intervene. Rwandans in the Democratic Republic of Congo provided cross-border support to both Hutus and Tutsis. Rwandans living in the diaspora in Belgium financially aided the combatants, and France supplied weapons to the Hutu government (Gourevitch 1998).

My argument rests on one key assumption: combatants do not have equal capabilities at the beginning of most civil wars. If this assumption is not true, then

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[48] I do not assume that co-ethnics have unified interests. I measure all support for different actors in the conflict.

[49] Some recent literature (e.g., Salehyan 2007) refers to cross-border kin as transnational rebels. I retain the original term because it does not by definition imply that the kin are involved in the conflict.
In the statistical analysis, I do not distinguish between co-ethnic communities caused by refugee flows and those originating from migrations unrelated to the conflict. This is primarily because there is no reliable data to distinguish refugee flows across time or space with the precision to usefully make this distinction in this analysis. For some specific issues associated with refugee populations, see Adelman (1998) or Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006). The case studies also suggest some ways in which refugee populations may play a unique role in ethnic civil wars.

outside aid likely will allow one side to declare victory early in the war. I make this

assumption because in most civil wars, one side controls the state apparatus – no matter

how weak that state is (Eldabawi and Sambanis 2000; Sislin and Pearson 2001). Thus, at

the onset of almost every war, one group of combatants has an established army and

some stock of weapons, usually including heavy weapons. Although I assume that the

combatants do not have equal capabilities, the discrepancy need not be especially large.

Outright victory is relatively rare in civil wars; to fuel conflict, each side needs only to

believe that it can impose high enough costs to exact its preferred outcome.

I also adopt one terminological convention for simplicity's sake: I will refer to the

weaker party as the rebels throughout most of the theoretical discussion. In most wars,

the rebels begin with a disadvantage because by definition, they do not control the state

apparatus (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2005; Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Sislin and

Pearson 2006). Some conflicts, particularly those in new states, have no clear

'government' or 'rebel' side. When this is relevant to the discussion, I clarify these

terms. This terminology does *not* affect any of the hypotheses, data, or tests I conduct. I

measure the level of support for all parties, and I do not make a judgment as to which

party is stronger.

3.2 Why and How Third Parties Support Combatants in Civil Wars

Why would a third party back combatants in a civil war? First and foremost,

external supporters must have an interest in the outcome of the conflict (Altfeld and

Bueno de Mesquita 1979). Non-related supporters' interests often include potential

financial, territorial, or strategic gains (Regan 2000). For instance, Russia has intervened

in the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia to retain military bases which give it influence and a strategic advantage in the Caucasus and Central Asia (Herzig 2000). Alternatively, an actor may be pursuing ideological goals. During the Cold War, for example, the USSR supported Marxist combatants in Angola and Mozambique, while the US allied with their opponents (Chachiua and Malan 1998; Ciment 1997).

Combatants in civil wars also may draw on aid from their ethnic kin. Three primary motivations drive this support.[50] First, ethnic networks often provide copious and detailed information about events in the homeland. By its very existence, this information can increase interest in and support for co-ethnics (Davis and Moore 1997). Second, sympathy often prompts co-ethnic aid, especially when group members abroad face better conditions (Byman et al. 2001; Davis and Moore 1997; Saideman 1997; Sislin and Pearson 2001). Finally, co-ethnic support may come from those who feel guilty for having escaped the conflict. This is especially true for refugees and recent migrants (Byman et al. 2001). All three of these motives are compatible, and in many conflicts they co-exist. For example, the Tamil Tigers have a sophisticated public relations program and receive extensive aid from Tamils in Canada, Europe, and India. Most of these supporters have left Sri Lanka since the civil war began in 1983, but continue to be deeply concerned about the fate of those who remain behind (Byman et al. 2001; Sislin and Pearson 2001).

What does support from these actors look like? Non-related supporters can intervene in several ways, the form of which may be shaped by either domestic or

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[50] These motives, especially sympathy or humanitarian concerns, also sometimes influence supporters who are *not* ethnic kin. Below, I also discuss support that is coerced from ethnic kin.

international constraints.[51] Military interventions often include advisors, intelligence-sharing, or covert operations, but may also involve weapons shipments or troop deployments. Economic interventions often incorporate loans or aid programs. Sanctions can fall into either category of intervention, depending on their form and target (Regan 2000). Often, actors employ multiple strategies to influence a conflict. For instance, South Africa and the US supported rebels in Mozambique and Angola with covert operatives, intelligence, weapons, and sanctions on the opposing combatants (Chachiua and Malan 1998; Ciment 1997).

Co-ethnics may provide these types of support, but they also commonly employ other tools. Far-flung diasporas most often provide financial assistance and lobby international organizations or their home states. Other contributions may include direct military aid[52], training, and weapons purchases (Bercovitch 2007; Byman et al. 2001; Saideman 2002; Shain and Barth 2003).

Cross-border kin have a unique position that allows them to supplement these forms of assistance with safe havens, weapons caches, training sites, and routes to smuggle contraband out or supplies and weapons in. In many conflicts, this support requires relatively little effort; it can be effective simply because rebels are hard to distinguish from citizens of the neighboring state (Kalyvas 2006; Regan 2000; Salehyan 2007; Sislin and Pearson 2001). Cross-border kin who control the neighboring state can marshal even more resources. Even when the government does not intervene, sympathetic officials, border guards, or police often 'turn a blind eye' to rebel activities along the border (Marsh 2007; Woodwell 2004). For instance, militias frequently move

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[51] I leave aside diplomatic intervention in the form of mediation, as this often has unique dynamics. See Regan (2000).
[52] States may send troops; individuals might volunteer to fight in the conflict.

between Rwanda, Uganda, and Zaire / Congo to evade pursuit and to regroup. This cross-border activity is facilitated by porous borders and sympathizers in nearby towns and refugee camps (Gourevitch 1998). Similarly, Kurds in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey have at various times provided their kin with weapons, training, and safe havens – aid facilitated by close proximity (Ciment 1996; Sislin and Pearson 2001).

3.3 The Effects of Support for Combatants in Civil Wars

3.3.1 General Effects

External support for combatants can dramatically change the balance of capabilities, increasing rebels' viability and capacity to challenge the government. While local supporters can provide shelter, some supplies, and recruits, they often are not able to offer weapons, leaving this vital need to outside backers (Abdel Gadir Ali et al. 2005; Marsh 2007). This is true regardless of the motives behind that support.

Third parties can affect the course of a civil war fairly easily. In civil wars, small arms are the most common weapons, and conventional large battles are rare.[53] This means that small amounts of external support can procure large numbers of weapons, arming more combatants and allowing them to wage war over a larger territory (Byman et al. 2001; Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Karp 1993; Sislin and Pearson 2001). In *ethnic* civil wars, external support to purchase light weapons is even more useful because combatants' primary goal often is "the slaughter or the intimidation of members of another group and their forced abandonment of homes and villages," which does not require heavy weapons (Klare 1997: 174). Thus, I argue that:

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[53] Small arms or light weapons are conventional arms which are easily portable; i.e., not weapons such as tanks or airplanes. They include revolvers, machine guns, grenades, mines, and anti-tank weapons. See Sislin et al. (1998: 400) for other definitions.

Hypothesis 6a: Third party support for at least one group of combatants will increase war duration.

The logic here assumes that third party support promotes parity between the combatants.[54] But does it matter how many actors receive aid? If multiple actors receive support, there may be little overall effect on the balance of capabilities. But bargaining efforts may become substantially more complicated, since uncertainty will be further heightened, as I discuss in more detail below. I do not have a strong theoretical reason to expect one of these mechanisms to have a greater effect; indeed, I suspect the relative effects are heavily dependent on conflict-specific factors. However, I do expect that when only one group of combatants receives support, there should be a distinct effect on the length of civil wars. That is, a conflict in which third party aid is merely present will look different than a conflict in which one and only one party receives outside support.

Hypothesis 6b: Third party support for only one group of combatants will have a distinct effect on war duration

3.3.2 Support from Co-Ethnics

Support from co-ethnics has unique characteristics. I do not claim that the dynamics I describe below never apply to aid from unrelated parties, and I return to this question in more detail in Chapter Six. Rather, because co-ethnic support often is sustained and unconditional, it has a distinct effect on capabilities.

Co-ethnics typically direct their support to a specific group of combatants. Thus, this support often is unconditional, even when supporters' goals conflict with those of the

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[54] See Regan (2002), who makes this argument but also finds that biased interventions prolong conflicts less than do neutral efforts. His conceptualization of the motives and form of intervention is substantially different than mine, however.

combatants (Byman et al. 2001). For example, both the Republic of Armenia and the Armenian diaspora have provided wide-ranging aid to ethnic Armenians fighting for independence in Karabakh. Despite serious differences of opinion on the utility of compromise with Azerbaijan, this support has continued (Cornell 2001; Tölölyan 2007).

Unconditional aid also can derive from less altruistic motives. When rebels use co-ethnic networks to coerce aid,[55] the resulting support can be used for whatever purposes the combatants desire. This has been the case among Tamils in Canada, for instance, where the Tamil Tigers have a sophisticated operation that both spreads information on the conflict and pressures community members for donations (Human Rights Watch 2006; Sislin and Pearson 2006).

Co-ethnic aid also tends to be sustained. Strong emotional ties between ethnic kin abroad and in the homeland lead individuals to offer support at levels that would seem irrational to most unrelated supporters (Byman et al. 2001; Horowitz 2000; Karp 1993; Saideman 2002; Sislin and Pearson 2001). For example, many American Jews strongly support Israel because they feel bound to the fates of their co-ethnics by common experiences like the Holocaust. Some go so far as to immigrate and join the Israel Defense Forces. Others routinely contact their elected representatives regarding Middle East policy and donate hundreds of dollars a year to the State of Israel, Israeli non-governmental organizations, and lobbying groups (Sheffer 2003; Spiegel 1985).

Support from ethnic kin affects the duration of civil wars in three ways. First, it directly influences the military balance. This both facilitates recruiting and allows rebels to continue fighting after they would otherwise be defeated. Second, co-ethnic support

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[55] See Byman et al. (2001), Karp (1993), or Kinsella (2004) for discussion of how rebels can use co-ethnic networks in their search for support.

may embolden rebels to continue fighting in the hope they can strike a better bargain when the war does end. Finally, support can introduce uncertainty into bargaining between groups of combatants. This can complicate conflict resolution attempts, prolonging the conflict. Below, I elaborate on each effect.

Co-ethnic support most directly affects rebels' resources and their ability to continue fighting. Financial support or weapons purchases, as detailed above, can dramatically boost combatants' capabilities. Support from cross-border kin protects leaders and combatants, allows escape routes, and provides places to rest, train, and plan outside the reach of government forces (Byman et al. 2001; Gleditsch 2007; Salehyan 2007). After all, if the government cannot find or reach rebels, it is unlikely to be able to defeat them. For instance, rebels in West Papua, Indonesia, have bases, training sites, and escape routes in neighboring Papua New Guinea (PNG). The permeability of the border and support from PNG citizens has helped these groups to continue fighting for decades against a vastly superior military force (Chauvel 2005).

Support from ethnic kin also may increase the perceived viability of a rebellion. Rebels who seem likely to succeed face lower collective action problems, facilitating recruiting (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Kalyvas 2006; Shain and Barth 2003). By increasing the number of rebels, therefore, external support further changes the balance of capabilities. For example, after the battle of Karameh in 1968, Palestinians flocked to join Fatah, which had definitively demonstrated its effectiveness in fighting Israel. This, in turn, revived the movement and helped it to become the dominant organization in Palestinian politics for decades (Tessler 1994).[56]

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[56] If rebels control an area, they are likely to have support from the local population. As the rebels' capabilities increase, they may capture more territory, and therefore may also win more support and recruits

So why does aid from co-ethnics not simply lead governments to negotiate a settlement? Co-ethnic aid encourages a stalemate (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Horowitz 2000; Marsh 2007; Regan 2000; Sislin and Pearson 2001). The government knows that aid from co-ethnics rarely is substantial enough to ensure rebels' victory. Therefore, it does not have a strong enough incentive to negotiate a settlement that will be acceptable to all combatants. In the end, co-ethnic support simply allows combatants to continue fighting when they would otherwise be defeated, preventing a swift resolution to the war. For instance, in Cyprus, Greek and Turkish involvement has prevented either side from imposing its will on the other. In the long term, however, this has divided the island and helped to impede a resolution to the conflict (Dodd 1998).

Support from co-ethnics also can prolong conflict if shifts in relative capabilities affect combatants' beliefs about the final settlement. Rebels may believe that by continuing to fight, they can either exact higher costs and force the government's hand or better signal their resolve, even if they do not expect victory (Cetinyan 2002; Jenne, Saideman, and Lowe 2007; Sislin and Pearson 2001). Thus, outside support both emboldens rebels and allows them to act on this more aggressive policy. For instance, support from Russian politicians and the former Soviet 14th Army made Transnistrian rebels in Moldova more bellicose. Because they believed that Russia would continue to back their claims, they pursued a violent secessionist campaign to redress their grievances (Kaufman 1996; Kolstø and Malgin 1998).

Co-ethnic aid affects the length of civil wars in one additional way when it introduces uncertainty over the terms of an acceptable settlement (Salehyan 2007). Both

from the population. (Kalyvas 2006). Thus, in some cases, aid from third parties may compound rebels' capabilities many times over. This may be less true in ethnic civil wars where loyalties are fixed, however. See above for some reasons why combatants may have little choice in which side they support.

sides want to offer the minimum amount of concessions necessary to reach a deal. When

co-ethnic involvement casts doubt on the nature or level of these concessions, combatants

are unsure what they must offer to successfully end the conflict. Uncertainty over these

questions can arise when co-ethnics with autonomous interests actively participate in

negotiations or when they pressure the parties to follow a certain policy. This type of

involvement adds more interests that must be satisfied to reach a settlement (Cunningham

2006). Simply put, it makes the conflict more complicated and therefore harder to

resolve. In the conflict between Azerbaijan and ethnic Armenians in Karabakh, for

example, Armenians in Karabakh, the Republic of Armenia, and the diaspora have

different interests. All three groups have participated in negotiations either directly or

indirectly, and the inability to resolve all of their concerns has stymied multiple rounds of

negotiations (Cornell 2001; Tölölyan 2007).

Co-ethnics also can fuel uncertainty over the potential role of new actors or the

balance of capabilities. When combatants do not know how other actors might behave,

they cannot accurately gauge the costs of continuing to fight, compared to settling the

conflict.   For instance, ethnic kin often lobby politicians to take a specific stance or

simply become involved in a situation they would otherwise ignore. This, in turn, can

influence international diplomacy, weapons sales, and military or economic intervention

by states or international organizations. Questions over whether these politicians will

become involved, the shape of their intervention, and its effects all may be unknown

(Bercovitch 2007; Carment and James 1995; Saideman 1997; Sambanis 2004a; Shain and

Barth 2003). Uncertainty over the roles of new actors can prolong wars when combatants

mistakenly calculate that negotiating a settlement is not in their interest. For example, the

international community refused to intervene in East Timor during much of the Cold War. In the early 1990s, however, extensive lobbying by the East Timorese diaspora in Australia and Europe produced intense international pressure on Indonesia, forcing it to allow the 1999 referendum on Timorese independence. Had Indonesia anticipated the international community's new position, it might have adopted a different policy in Timor in the 1990s (Gorjão 2001; Jannisa 1997).

Although the broad effects of support from cross-border kin and diasporas are similar, as I argue above, these groups offer distinct types of support. Thus, I distinguish the roles of these actors:

> **Hypothesis 7a:** Support for at least one group of combatants from cross-border kin will increase war duration.
>
> **Hypothesis 8a:** Support for at least one group of combatants from a diaspora will increase war duration.

And, as I argue above, I expect one-sided aid to have a unique effect on conflicts, distinct from the general effect of aid being present. Therefore,

> **Hypothesis 7b:** Third party support for only one group of combatants from cross-border kin will have a distinct effect on war duration.
>
> **Hypothesis 8b:** Third party support for only one group of combatants from a diaspora will have a distinct effect on war duration.

4.0 Conclusions

In this chapter, I have argued that ethnicity can create two unique situations for civil war combatants. These are summarized in Table 1, along with the specific hypotheses I advance.

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First, ethnic interactions provide information. When this information increases commitment and signaling problems, combatants conclude that continuing to fight for independence or autonomy will produce the best future prospects. Thus, ethnic interactions that exacerbate commitment or signaling problems prolong ethnic civil wars.

I focused on five kinds of information derived from ethnic interactions. Segregation reduces the available information, creating a signaling problem and making combatants especially wary of trusting their adversaries. To overcome signaling problems, combatants may turn to stereotypes propagated by the media or politicians or to past interactions, both of which can fuel mistrust and heighten commitment problems. Discrimination, past conflicts, atrocities, and high ethnic identifiability all may indicate to combatants that a negotiated settlement is dangerous because the probability or the costs of their opponents reneging are heightened. By exacerbating commitment problems, these ethnic interactions make continuing to fight more attractive than negotiating a peace settlement, prolonging ethnic civil wars.

Second, outside support for combatants changes the balance of capabilities. I claimed that aid from co-ethnics is likely to be sustained and unconditional. This aid increases a rebellion's viability, allowing rebels to avoid defeat and facilitating recruitment. However, this support rarely ensures victory, merely prolonging the inevitable. Thus, outside aid increases the duration of ethnic civil wars. Support from co-ethnics also may encourage rebels to continue fighting to secure a better bargain and provide them with the means to do so. Finally, when outside aid introduces uncertainty into bargaining, combatants are unsure what terms will constitute an acceptable peace settlement. This stymies conflict resolution efforts.

In the next chapter, I discuss how I test each part of this theory. I first introduce a new dataset of all ethnic civil wars between 1945 and 2004. This dataset both extends the time-span of previous efforts and introduces new variables that allow me to test the specific hypotheses I advance in this dissertation. The second part of the chapter reviews the case comparison method I use in order to examine more closely the salient mechanisms affecting war duration. I discuss how this enriches the statistical analysis and how I selected the cases I use in subsequent chapters.

Table 1. Summary of the Main Variables and Mechanisms

Variable	Hypotheses	Mechanisms
Ethnic Interactions		
Discrimination	H_{1a}: Pre-war discrimination against members of an ethnically-organized rebel group will increase war duration. H_{1b}: Extreme pre-war discrimination against members of an ethnically-organized rebel group will decrease war duration.	- Commitment problems - Recruiting, popular support -High level reduces capabilities
Past Conflict	H_{2a}: War duration will increase when the groups fighting have fought in the past. H_{2b}: War duration will increase as the severity of past clashes between the groups fighting increases. H_{2c}: War duration will decrease when past clashes between the groups fighting were extremely severe.	- Commitment problems - More severe clashes increase perceived costs of reneging, affect more people -High level reduces capabilities
Atrocities	H_{3a}: Atrocities targeted on a group-wide basis will increase war duration. H_{3b}: Very severe atrocities targeted on a group-wide basis will decrease war duration.	- Commitment problems -Solidify identity - Recruiting, popular support -High levels reduce capabilities
Identifiability	H_4: Easy identifiability of rebel group members based on language, skin color, or other features difficult to hide will increase war duration.	- Commitment problems - Recruiting
Segregation	H_{5a}: Pre-war ethnic segregation will increase war duration. H_{5b}: Extremist media or politicians in societies with pre-war ethnic segregation will increase war duration. H_{5c}: Pre-war discrimination in societies with pre-war ethnic segregation will increase war duration. H_{5d}: Past clashes between groups in societies with pre-war ethnic segregation will increase war duration	- Signaling problems - Credibility for extremists and stereotypes -Prevents updating information from discrimination and past conflict
Ethnic Kin		
Aid from Third Parties	H_{6a}: Third party support for at least one group of combatants will increase war duration. H_{6b}: Third party support for only one group of combatants will have a distinct effect on war duration.	- Balance of capabilities
Aid from Cross Border Kin	H_{7a}: Support for at least one group of combatants from cross-border kin will increase war duration. H_{7b}: Third party support for only one group of combatants from cross-border kin will have a distinct effect on war duration.	- Balance of capabilities - Recruitment - Seek better deal - Complicates bargaining
Aid from Diaspora	H_{8a}: Support for at least one group of combatants from a diaspora will increase war duration. H_{8b}: Third party support for only one group of combatants from a diaspora will have a distinct effect on war duration	- Balance of capabilities -Recruitment - Seek better deal -Complicates bargaining

Chapter 3. Methods

1.0 Introduction

When and why do some ethnic civil wars last especially long? This question is

fundamentally about time. Analyzing time, however, presents unique challenges. In the

following pages, I will briefly discuss some of these challenges and introduce the

statistical techniques I use to address them. I follow that with a detailed description of

the dataset I have constructed and use for quantitative analyses in Chapters Four and

Five. In the second half of the chapter, I discuss the comparative case studies that I use to

complement the large-n analyses. I then briefly introduce the eight cases I will analyze in

following chapters, discussing why I selected each pair of conflicts and how its analysis

will enrich our understanding of civil war duration.

2.0 Quantitative analysis

Quantitative analysis allows me to test the hypotheses I advanced in Chapter Two

against a broad range of cases. In other words, are the dynamics I theorize applicable

only to circumstances in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1965 or to Lebanon in

1979? If so, I can explain elements of those conflicts, but I cannot tell us much about

ethnic civil wars in general. Large-n analysis can show the effect of changes in a variable

under a range of circumstances. It can also compare the magnitude of this effect to that

of other factors.

2.1 Duration Models

Survival, also known as hazard or duration, analysis originated in medical studies

to determine how a treatment affected patients' prospects for survival.[57] This is directly

analogous to conflict studies: how does a certain factor – discrimination, for example –

affect a war's 'survival', or how long it will last? More precisely, survival analysis

assesses how a factor influences the chance that conflict will end in a given period.

Survival analysis accounts for three unique facets of this situation. First, it surely

is important that a 'patient' has survived up until the point of measurement. That is,

survival is conditional. In terms of a war, we can say that some of the factors allowing a

conflict to persist past the one year mark, for instance, influence its persistence. Thus,

each estimate is conditioned on the individual (or war, in this case) having survived to

that point in time. Second, failure times – in this case, when a conflict ends – are highly

skewed. The majority of civil wars end within one or two years. If we do not account for

this skewness, the results may be misleading, under- or over-stating the effects of

variables. Finally, some wars do not end in the period covered by the data. This means

that the statistical model must account for a significant number of right-censored cases.

If we simply consider these observations to end when the dataset does, the results will be

misleading because our estimates will be based on cases that appear shorter than they are.

And if we simply drop these cases from the dataset, we are losing valuable information

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[57] More generically, these are occasionally known as failure time processes. These terms generally are used interchangeably, which I also will do throughout this and the following chapters.

on war duration and effectively biasing the data (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).

Duration models account for all three of these features.

Hazard or duration models come in several shapes and sizes. Parametric models, particularly those based on a Weibull distribution, are common in studies of war duration. However, parametric models rely on assumptions about the shape of the baseline hazard. In particular, models such as the Weibull assume that the hazard of war termination rises (or falls) monotonically over time.

Cox models, on the other hand, leave unspecified the distribution of duration times. In other words, they require no assumptions about how long ethnic civil wars last. Thus, they are especially flexible. Since incorrect assumptions about the shape of the hazard function can produce biased and inaccurate results, the Cox model is preferable unless there are strong theoretical reasons to assume a specific distribution of duration times (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). Because I do not have a strong theoretical reason to make a claim on this subject, I use Cox proportional hazards regression to test how ethnic interactions and support from ethnic kin affect the duration of ethnic civil wars.[58] However, the results are robust to the choice of model specification.

In the Cox model, the hazard rate for the individual i is expressed as

$$H_i(t) = h_0(t)\exp(\beta'x)$$

where $h_0(t)$ is the baseline hazard function and $\beta'x$ are the covariates. This estimates the effect of a change in each independent variable on the chance that the war will end in a

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[58] In each chapter, I confirm that the model meets the proportional hazards assumption on which the analysis rests.

given time period, usually a month or a year. In other words, what is the change in the probability of conflict ending at time t_1, given that it is ongoing at t_0?

In the following chapters, I will be presenting the results of my model tests in several different formats. First, I will present coefficients for the estimated model. This is the most familiar way to interpret the results of an analysis. In survival analyses, negative values of the coefficient indicate that an increase in the variable of interest decreases the relative hazard of war termination. In other words, the factor makes the war longer. Positive coefficients indicate that higher levels of a factor increase the hazard of war termination – it causes the war to end sooner.

However, coefficients do not speak clearly to the magnitude of the change in duration that a change in the independent variable causes. Therefore, I interpret these coefficients in terms of hazard ratios. I will discuss how each variable in the model changes the hazard, or chance, of war termination.[59] If increases in a variable *increase* the hazard, it makes the war shorter. Conversely, higher levels of a variable that decreases the hazard of the war ending prolong conflict. To reiterate, positive coefficients and hazard rates indicate shorter wars.

Finally, I will present results graphically. Figures in the following chapters will have two critical features. First, they will include the baseline hazard, or the chance the war will end in each time period if all covariates in the model equal zero. Second, the figure will include one or more lines representing the hazard at different levels of the key independent variable. This will graphically represent both the direction and magnitude of the effect. In these graphs, a line below the baseline hazard indicates that the variable

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[59] The standard interpretation of the estimates is as influences on the expected time until the end of the conflict. Although this is not strictly accurate, statistically speaking, it is intuitively analogous.

prolongs fighting; a line above the baseline hazard will show that increases in the variable shorten wars.

2.2 Dataset

To carry out the quantitative analyses in Chapters Four and Five, I have created a new dataset of all ethnic civil wars from 1945 to 2004. In the following section, I discuss how I created this dataset and introduce my key independent variables.

2.2.1 Case Identification and the Dependent Variable

The cases are identified based on Fearon's (2004) dataset. These data have three main advantages. First, a careful rationale defines start and end dates for the conflicts (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Fearon 2004b). Determining these dates raises complex issues, given that civil wars often are long-running but with periods of very low intensity fighting. These data use a two-year window to allow for the possibility that fighting may resume after a lull. This coding captures both periods of low-intensity fighting and settlements that break down after several months.

Fearon's data also meet widely-accepted criteria for a 'medium' level of conflict severity. The conflict must kill at least 1,000 people, with a yearly average of 100 deaths. Each side must suffer at least 100 fatalities, ruling out completely one-sided massacres. Finally, the dataset uses multiple imputation to deal with missing data, avoiding the bias that can be caused by listwise deletion (Ross 2004). Although I draw only a few independent variables from the original data, I still want to ensure the lowest possible level of bias; thus, Fearon's data is the logical starting point.

Fearon's dataset extends through 1999. I made three modifications to these existing data.

The first step was to recode the variable identifying ethnic wars. The original dataset

categorized wars as 'ethnic', 'not ethnic', or 'mixed'. I confirmed the coding of conflicts

in the first two categories, comparing them against the definition of ethnic wars I

introduced in Chapter One. I then reviewed all the conflicts in the 'mixed' category,

using secondary sources and journalistic accounts, to determine whether or not they

included a substantial ethnic dimension. Again, I relied on my definition of ethnic wars

to make this distinction, especially the conditions that the combatants in these conflicts

must perceive ethnicity to be a major fault line separating them from their adversaries and

that recruitment must make at least some appeal to ethnic solidarity.

Second, I extended the data four years to analyze the entire period 1945-2004. I

chose December 2004 as the endpoint for two reasons. First, I wanted to ensure that each

war truly was over. Civil wars often wax and wane, with periods of very low intensity

fighting punctuated by more violent spells. Moreover, many do not formally 'end' with a

peace settlement. Therefore, most datasets (including Fearon's original data) allow for at

least a two-year lull in fighting before considering a war to be 'over'. If conflict restarts

after this point, it is considered to be a new war. For instance, Russia's conflict in

Chechnya is treated as two separate conflicts, one from mid-1994 through the end of

1996, and another that began in the middle of 1999. Thus, I needed at least two years

between when the cases were identified and the endpoint of the data to ensure the

conflicts had ended. Second, I wanted to ensure a reasonable amount of time for

materials on the conflict to be published, so that I could gather as much data as possible

for coding the independent variables. Coding began in early 2007; thus, this offered just over two years for relevant studies to be published.

Extending the time period necessitated two steps. First, I evaluated whether conflicts that were ongoing in 1999 had since ended. Second, I determined whether any new conflicts broke out in the following four years. I relied on two main sources for these tasks. First, I turned to the PRIO / Uppsala dataset on civil wars (Gleditsch et al. 2002). These data also measure conflicts of substantially lower intensity than Fearon's data.[60] Therefore, I included only those conflicts with what the PRIO data consider a moderate or high level of deaths; these levels are approximately equivalent to Fearon's coding. To supplement the PRIO data and clarify some of its coding, I turned to two news databases, *Keesing's Record of World Events* and *Proquest Historical Newspapers*.

Keesing's Record of World Events summarizes events around the world on a monthly basis, drawing from a wide variety of local and international sources. It is especially useful for data on death tolls, atrocities, clashes, and elites' actions or statements. *Proquest Historical Newspapers* is a searchable archive of all material in *The Chicago Tribune, The Chicago Defender, The Los Angeles Times, The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and The Washington Post*. It contains much of the same information as *Keesing's* but also includes more data on intervention and on the background to conflicts.

The final major change I made to the existing data was to recode the dependent variable, war duration, as a monthly measure. Annual data would code as equal in length a war that began on January 1 and one that began on December 31. However, the first of these conflicts actually would have lasted 12 months longer. Therefore, by coding

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[60] They employ a threshold of 25 annual deaths.

duration as a monthly measure, I can conduct more fine-grained analysis than is possible with annual data. There is one important drawback to this approach. This change forces me to make narrower distinctions in coding: that is, I cannot simply say that a conflict ended in 1956 and not 1957, for example, but must make a judgment as to whether the conflict ended in February or March 1956. Thus, this change introduces new uncertainty into the dataset: most civil wars do not end precisely at one point, but rather, violence gradually peters out, even if a settlement is signed. However, I believe the tradeoff is worthwhile; a six month 'error' is still more precise than a 12-month one.[61] For this task, I used media accounts, the State Failure dataset (Marshall, Gurr, and Harff 2006), and the PRIO / Uppsala dataset.

The final dataset includes 68 wars, listed in Appendix A. The first cases are the conflicts in the aftermath of World War Two between the Soviet Union and Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Ukraine. The final conflicts are two wars which began in 1999: the second Russian war in Chechnya and the second war in Aceh, Indonesia. Of the 68 wars, 12 – or 17.6% of the total – lasted one year or less. The shortest wars are the violent clashes in Tibet in 1950, Burundi in 1988, and Cyprus in 1974. Another eight conflicts lasted between one and three years. Thirty-one of the remaining 48 wars, or 45.6% of the total, persisted for over 10 years. The longest conflicts are the ongoing, overlapping series of rebellions in Northeast India and Burma/Myanmar, which began in 1952 and 1948, respectively. Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of conflict durations graphically.

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[61] When there was no reliable monthly information, I coded the date as June of the year, based on this logic.

Figure 3. The Lengths of Ethnic Civil Wars, 1945-2004

These wars also cover a wide geographical range. In Western Europe and the Americas, the period saw only one ethnic civil war in each region. East Asia and the Pacific also experienced a relatively low number of conflicts: six wars occurred in those countries. Nine civil wars broke out in the Middle East and North Africa. Southeast Asia and the Soviet Union and former Communist states in Eastern Europe had relatively high numbers of conflicts, with 14 and 12 wars, respectively. Sub-Saharan Africa experienced the greatest number of conflicts: 25 civil wars occurred in that region.

2.2.2 New Variables

In order to directly test the hypotheses on information and third party aid that I advanced in Chapter Two, I added several variables to the original dataset. Data for these variables is drawn from sources that include *Keesing's Record of World Events*, *Proquest Historical Newspapers*, and both primary and secondary sources on each conflict.

Below, I describe how each variable was coded (see also Appendix B). If I drew heavily on specific sources in coding, I also discuss those.

Discrimination measures average policies for ten years before the war began, based on data from the Minorities at Risk project (MAR) on discriminatory policies and inequalities in several sectors (2005). This group-level variable more accurately reflects theoretical arguments about the role of discrimination than do state-level measures such as the Polity or Gini scores. Where two or more groups are involved in the rebellion, or when the civil war is a contest between multiple groups who have each recently been in power, I take the average of the scores to code the variable.

As a number of authors (e.g. Brancati 2006; Saideman 2002) have pointed out, the MAR data are not random. There are thousands of minorities in the world, and the dataset does not include information for the vast majority of these groups. This can create bias if one is focusing on, for example, the prevalence of discrimination against minorities. However, I am not using the data for that type of analysis. Rather, I identify groups based on Fearon's list of civil wars, and then use MAR data about those specific groups (for example, on discrimination they might experience). Therefore, selection bias concerns associated with the MAR data are not a problem here.

Discrimination is an ordinal variable, accounting for neglect with or without remedial policies and either neutral or repressive exclusionary policies. The MAR dataset includes variables for political and economic discrimination. Based on detailed research on the cases, I have added similarly coded measures for both cultural and security discrimination. There is high correlation between the four forms of

discrimination,[62] and robustness checks suggest they can be interchanged with little effect on the results. Thus, I use the average discrimination across all four types. Extreme discrimination is measured using the squared term.[63]

> 0 No discrimination
> 1 Neglect/Remedial policies
> 2 Neglect/No remedial policies
> 3 Social exclusion/Neutral policy
> 4 Exclusion/Repressive policy

Past Conflict records 1) whether the groups in the current war have fought each other in the past and 2) the chance that living group members are affected by these past conflicts. A value of zero is assigned to conflicts in which groups have not fought in the past 50 years. Levels of the variable from one to three measure the severity of conflicts less than 50 and more than 20 years ago. Conflicts in this time range likely involved the parents and/or grandparents of current combatants. Thus, combatants are more likely to have strong perceptions based on first-hand accounts from family members. I include a measure of severity to reflect the probability that current combatants do have a personal connection: the more widespread the fighting, the more likely an individual is to be personally affected. For example, there is a much higher probability that Tamils in Sri Lanka were personally touched by the 1983 riots, which killed 2,000 people, than that they have a personal connection to the 1956 riots, which only claimed 150 lives.

More specifically, this variable is assigned a value of one if the conflict occurred between 20 and 50 years ago and killed less than 100 people. If the conflict occurred between 20 and 50 years ago and killed between 100 and 1,000 individuals, the variable is coded as a two; it is a 'three' if the conflict killed more than 1,000 people. Ranges of

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[62] Ranging from 11 to 71%.
[63] See Wonnacott and Wonnacott (1990) for more on determining the functional form of models.

the variable from four to six reflect the severity of conflicts more than one[64] and less than

20 years ago. Current combatants likely personally experienced this violence. I therefore

expect that individuals' perceptions of their adversaries will be stronger when based on

personal experience in these conflicts.

> 0 No conflicts in the last 50 years
> 1 Conflict less than 50 and more than 20 years ago that killed less than 100
> 2 Conflict less than 50 and more than 20 years ago that killed 100 – 1000
> 3 Conflict less than 50 and more than 20 years ago that killed more than 1000
> 4 Conflict less than 20 years ago that killed less than 100
> 5 Conflict less than 20 years ago that killed 100 – 1000
> 6 Conflict less than 20 years ago that killed more than 1000

Atrocities reflects the prevalence and timing of arbitrary arrests, disappearances,

torture, extrajudicial executions, massacres of either civilians or prisoners of war, and the

use of chemical or biological weapons. These data are drawn primarily from the news

indices, with supplementary information from secondary sources. The variable records

no (or very limited) atrocities, occasional atrocities, frequent atrocities (six to eight a

year), and very extensive atrocities that occur at least monthly. I weight this with a

measure of the timing of atrocities, where one represents conflicts with few atrocities in

the first year of the conflict and two is coded for wars with widespread atrocities early in

the fighting. I account for timing in this way based on the assumption that atrocities early

in the war send a stronger signal regarding adversaries' intentions.

Thus, the final variable is a seven-point scale. A value of three, for example,

represents frequent atrocities (six to eight a year) that do not begin until at least a year

into the conflict; four is assigned to cases with frequent atrocities that do begin early in

the conflict. Atrocities are distinct from conflict intensity (see below) in that one might

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[64] This eliminates slow escalation of violence that culminates in the war I am coding.

observe a war, for example, with a high numbers of deaths that occur almost exclusively

on the battlefield or due to illness. In this case, the conflict intensity might be high, but

atrocities would be low. Exceptionally high atrocities (Hypothesis 3b) are measured

using the squared term (Wonnacott and Wonnacott 1990).

0 None or very limited
1 Occasional (1-2 / year), not in first year of conflict
2 Occasional (1-2 / year), in first year of conflict
3 Frequent (6-8 / year), not in first year of conflict
4 Frequent (6-8 / year), in first year of conflict
5 Very extensive (at least monthly), not in first year of conflict
6 Very extensive (at least monthly), in first year of conflict

Identifiability is a composite index ranging from zero to eighteen. The coding is

drawn from MAR data and reflects whether group members speak a distinct language,

practice distinct social customs, follow a different religion, and are of a different race.

The original data are coded on two-, three-, or four-point scales, depending on the

variable. I have recoded the measures to reflect an increasing scale from

indistinguishable to highly distinct from other groups on each dimension. In the final,

additive index, language and race are weighted more heavily, reflecting the fact that these

characteristics are especially difficult to conceal.[65] Where two or more groups are

involved in the rebellion, or when the civil war is a contest between multiple groups who

have each recently been in power, I take the average of the scores to code the variable.

I also tested a model using the MAR variable for ethnic differences which

measures a similar phenomenon.[66] The results were not substantially different, and since

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[65] I tested each variable individually, as well, finding that *belief* has a strong, statistically significant effect on duration. The hazard decreases by 30%, p = .034
[66] Ethnic difference index (ethdifxx), *lang + custom + belief + race*, is constructed as follows: If all *lang, custom, belief,* and *race* are not coded, score *ethdifxx* =0. If *lang* is coded 1, *ethdifxx* = +3. If *lang* is coded

identifiability most accurately reflects my theoretical argument, I use it in all subsequent

analyses.[67]

    0 Groups have no significant racial, linguistic, religious or custom-related
       differences
    1-17 Groups have some racial, linguistic, religious or custom-related differences.
       Higher values reflect a larger number of differences.
    18 Groups are of distinct races with little or no intermixture; groups speak
       different languages; groups belong to different religions; and groups practice
       different social customs

The variable *Segregation* is coded using secondary sources on each case in the

dataset.[68] Segregation might result from ongoing conflict, raising endogeneity concerns.

To control for this, I focus on relationships ten years before the beginning of war. In

each conflict, I assess whether members of the ethnic groups in question were

geographically concentrated, whether they lived in ethnically-exclusive neighborhoods in

major cities, whether they attended the same religious institutions and schools, and

whether employment was ethnically segregated.

The variable is a three-category ordinal measure, where 0 represents little or no

segregation, 1 represents some limited interaction, and 2 represents high segregation. For

example, the conflict in Cabinda (Angola) has a value of two (high segregation), since

Cabinda is an exclave and I found no indications that most Cabindans interact with other

Angolans. The wars in Rwanda, on the other hand, are coded as a zero (low segregation),

since Hutus and Tutsis lived intermixed throughout most of the country, and

intermarriage was fairly common (Gourevitch 1998).

2, *ethdifxx* = +2. If *lang* is coded 3, *ethdifxx* = +1. If *custom* is coded 1, *ethdifxx* = +2. When adding *belief*
and *race* into the equation for *ethdifxx*, *ethdifxx* increases by the coded values of these two variables (e.g.,
If *belief* = 2, then *ethdifxx* = +2) (Minorities at Risk 2005).

[67] Although the MAR measure was not statistically significant, the hazard rates differed by only 4%.

[68] This variable often was coded based on only a few pieces of information, unfortunately, since most
sources do not record this type of data. Thus, the estimates for the effect of segregation may be slightly
more uncertain than are estimates for other factors.

0 Extensive interaction / low segregation
1 Some limited interaction
2 Little to no interaction / high segregation

To test the hypotheses on *incitement*, which I argue interacts with segregation, I focus on rhetoric both by politicians and in the media in the 24 months preceding the conflict. The variable measures the frequency of negative stereotypes, nationalistic appeals emphasizing ingroup-outgroup differences, and calls for individuals to attack or kill members of other groups. The frequency of these appeals is measured on a three point scale for each outlet, with values representing never, sometimes, and fairly often. The values for political and media incitement are then added to generate a comprehensive index of extremist rhetoric.

0 Neither the media nor politicians propagate negative messages about members of other groups
1 The media or politicians sometimes propagate negative messages about members of other groups
2 The media and politicians sometimes propagate negative messages about members of other groups
3 The media or politicians frequently propagate negative messages about members of other groups
4 The media and politicians frequently propagate negative messages about members of other groups

Aid from *Unrelated Third Parties* measures whether actors who are not ethnically affiliated with the combatants supported one or more groups of combatants. Data for this variable was drawn from case studies of the individual conflicts in the dataset and from Byman et al. (2001), Regan (2002), and Sislin and Pearson (2001). This measure – and all subsequent ones on aid – reflects biased intervention on behalf of a group of combatants. This is not the same as intervention as it is sometimes used in the literature, which is a broader concept that can include mediation, peacekeeping, and similar efforts.

The variable is coded on a four point scale, measuring no support, limited aid, substantial aid, and clear and extensive support. Limited aid, for instance, represents reports that combatants were allowed to cross international borders or that supporters occasionally lobbied on their behalf. For example, Tibetan dissidents received some diplomatic aid from India and were allowed to cross the border; Ethiopian Oromo leaders press their case from homes in exile. Substantial aid reflects situations in which third parties provide military or economic aid, and reports indicate this aid is transferred for approximately 25%-50%[69] of the conflict. Alternatively, a value of two on this measure also could reflect a situation in which multiple actors provide lower levels of aid. For example, Uighurs in Xinjiang Province (China) have received some weapons and training from Afghanistan and other Muslim states and diplomatic support from members of the diaspora in Europe and Turkey. Finally, a value of three indicates that combatants have received sustained and substantial flows of money or weapons from third parties; they may also draw volunteers from other areas, and multiple external actors may provide support. For example, Indians in Tamilnadu have helped the LTTE to train and smuggle weapons into Sri Lanka, and Tamils in the diaspora make large financial contributions.

I do not distinguish between aid from states and non-state actors for three reasons. First, while the level of aid may be correlated with the size or power of the donor, this relationship has many exceptions. For example, non-state third parties provided substantial support to combatants in Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, and the Kurdish combatants in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey. I suspect that states are more likely to

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[69] I cannot precisely assess the frequency of transfers. But often, sources indicate that aid occurs for a sustained period that is some fraction of the total war. For example, a source might indicate that combatants received several semi-regular weapons shipments in the early 1980s. If a conflict lasted 10 years, I would code this aid as a '2'.

support combatants for non-ethnic motives. Moreover, ethnically organized combatants quite commonly draw on support from non-state actors. Yet since my primary focus here is on the effects of support for these groups, the distinction in motives or patterns of support between state and non-state actors is less salient. Second, the measures of aid I use already capture this distinction to a degree. That is, if we assume that one reason to distinguish state and non-state supporters is because they provide different amount of aid, the data already capture differences in the level of aid. Thus, these data are, in a respect, more precise than a measure of who is supporting the combatants. Third, in many cases, states route aid through non-state actors. A few examples of this dynamic are Pakistan's involvement in Kashmir, Armenian intervention in Karabakh, and support for Kurdish separatists by Iraq and Iran. While sometimes clear, the trail of aid in these situations often is convoluted and secret. Practically, it is often beyond my means to untangle with reasonable confidence. Moreover, it involves making judgments about charges that may be highly contested, in conflicts that are extremely politicized. This further distorts the data that is available.[70]

This measure, and the following variables which assess other aspects of third party aid, are fairly imprecise. Based on the data currently available, however, I believe that, while broad, this measure is the most defensible. Perhaps more importantly, it is a substantial improvement over proxies currently used, which rest on strong assumptions about the size of diasporas or refugee populations and the support they provide to combatants.

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[70] Sometimes, of course, it is quite clear that a state is funding a given group of combatants, even when the state denies it. In other cases, however, it is much murkier. For example, despite evidence of ties, it is not at all clear to what extent Iran funds Hamas. It was much less clear as little as three or four years ago.

0 No support from unrelated third parties
1 Some evidence of support from unrelated third parties
2 Fairly extensive support from unrelated third parties
3 Very extensive support from unrelated third parties

Aid from Cross-border Kin is coded on the same four point scale, and measures

whether co-ethnics in a neighboring country provide smuggling routes, training sites, safe

havens, arms, money, or fighters. It also records instances of diplomatic assistance, such

as lobbying. I distinguish this variable based on the source of and motive for support.

That is, if a neighboring state supported combatants with whom it had ethnic ties for

purely strategic reasons, I code this as non-ethnic support. This represents a more

stringent test of my assertion that aid motivated by ethnic ties is distinct. India and

Pakistan provide an excellent example of one type of difficulty associated with coding

this variable (and that measuring aid from the diaspora). Both have supported

insurgencies in the other state for both ethnic and strategic reasons. Only detailed case

studies can tease apart this sort of interaction, and more precise data is nearly impossible

to find.

Data on this variable were notably imprecise, as well. Support from co-ethnics is

very often illegal or at least very dangerous and thus difficult to gain concrete

information on.[71] Existing data on arms importations often focus only on state purchasers

or on the type of weapons, but not their source. When the source can be identified, the

motives for supply often remain unclear (Sislin and Pearson 2001, 2006). In addition to

media sources and secondary studies of the conflict, I drew heavily on Byman et al.

(2001) and Sislin and Pearson (2001) to code this variable.

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[71] See Karp (1993) or Sheffer (2003) for elaboration on some reasons these data are notoriously hard to gather.

0 No support from cross-border kin
1 Some evidence of support from cross-border kin
2 Fairly extensive support from cross-border kin
3 Very extensive support from cross-border kin

Aid from the Diaspora is coded similarly and measures the extent to which ethnic

kin outside the immediate region of the conflict provide weapons, money, fighters, or

diplomatic support to one or more groups of combatants.

0 No support from the diaspora
1 Some evidence of support from the diaspora
2 Fairly extensive support from the diaspora
3 Very extensive support from the diaspora

I added four dichotomous variables to each of the support measures. Due to the

imprecision of the original data, I could not code these more finely. *One-sided* reflects

whether only one group of combatants received third party support from each of the three

sources. I use this measure to test Hypotheses 6b, 7b, and 8b. *Bases and Shelter*

measures whether a group provided bases, safe havens, smuggling routes, or training sites

to combatants. *Weapons and Money* represents the transfer of military aid, financial

assistance, and the presence of volunteers from other states. Finally, *Diplomatic Aid*

measures whether third parties were involved in lobbying, negotiating, or disseminating

information about a conflict.

2.2.3 Control Variables

In Chapters Four and Five, I apply duration analysis to test the relative importance

of information and third party support in prolonging ethnic civil wars. In both sets of

analyses, I include several additional variables to control for prominent alternative

explanations. These represent other factors we might plausibly believe are affecting war

length as much as, or more than, those variables central to my theory.

Loot is a dichotomous variable measuring whether lootable resources such as

local gems, timber, or narcotics are a significant source of financing for combatants. It is

coded based on the original dataset, supplemented with information from case studies and

from Ross (2004, 2006). Several studies find that lootable resources can significantly

prolong rebellions by increasing combatants' capabilities – and in some cases, their

motivation to continue fighting (Buhaug and Lujala 2004; Ross 2004, 2006).

Wealth is measured as the log of GDP per capita at the beginning of the conflict.[72]

Poor countries tend to have longer wars (Collier 2000; Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom

2004; Fearon 2004b), although the reasons are not entirely clear. For instance,

grievances or discontent may be higher, spurring rebel recruitment, or the opportunity

costs of rebellion may be lower. Alternatively, poverty may proxy for weak state

capacity, in which case the government may be unable to effectively fight a rebellion.

I also include a variable from the original data measuring the log of *population* at

the beginning of the conflict.[73] A larger population is theorized to increase conflict

duration by providing a larger pool of rebel recruits and increasing the number of

potentially disaffected citizens in the country (Fearon 2004b; Hegre and Sambanis 2006).

This should affect rebel capabilities and therefore the length of a civil war.

Intensity measures the number of deaths per month of conflict. This is based on

the original dataset, with updated figures for 2000-2004 based on reports in *Keesing's*

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[72] Civil war can cause tremendous damage to infrastructure and the economy; thus, I use the figure from the year the conflict began to mitigate endogeneity concerns.
[73] This eliminates endogeneity concerns associated with measuring the number of people who have been killed in the conflict.

Record and *Proquest Historical Newspapers*. Following Sambanis (2004), I weight the measure by the size of the population. This reflects the reality that if 15 people die each month in Vanuatu (pop 218,500), it is likely to impact perceptions and resolve far more than if 15 people die each month in China (population 1.3 billion). Some authors (e.g. Fearon 2004b) suggest that long conflicts are likely to be low-intensity struggles that do not impose high enough costs to force a negotiated solution.

Cold War is a dichotomous variable measuring whether the conflict occurred during the Cold War. This variable is used only in the analysis in Chapter Five, since intervention often was driven by ideological positions during this period.

I do not control for the aims of the conflict because separatist aims are highly correlated with ethnic wars. Almost 75% of the conflicts in the dataset include separatist goals.

3.0 Qualitative Analysis

Large-n quantitative analyses are especially useful for comparing general dynamics across a wide range of cases. They can show not only the approximate magnitude of an effect, but its impact relative to other factors. However, these methods usually cannot show mechanisms or more detailed and complex relationships between variables. Thus, I employ qualitative analyses in each chapter to complement the statistical analysis.[74] Case studies delve deeply into one or a few conflicts, enriching the statistical analysis and providing a more comprehensive and complex picture of when and how ethnicity prolongs civil wars. Below, I discuss the advantages and drawbacks of

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[74] For some perspectives on triangulating between multiple methods, see Collier 1991; Collier, Hoeffler, and Sambanis 2005; or George and Bennett 2005.

comparative case analyses. I then describe the specific aims I have for these case studies

and the criteria by which I chose the cases included in each chapter.

3.1 Case Studies

Case studies can serve several goals, including interpreting results, generating

hypotheses, either confirming or 'infirming' theory, and examining deviant cases

(Lijphart 1971).[75] I use the comparative case studies in the next three chapters toward

several of these ends. They help me to flesh out my theory and better understand how

ethnic interactions and third parties influence the length of civil wars. Although they are

not designed as a definitive test of my theory, they can lend support to or cast doubt on it.

And, the case studies may identify new variables or hypotheses that might be salient.

Below, I elaborate on each of these goals.

First, the case studies in the following chapters provide a weak test of the

hypotheses detailed in Chapter Two. This is the primary reason I use the case

comparisons in each chapter. Each pair of wars has different values on key independent

variables. If they also produce different outcomes, and these are consistent with the

theory, it will lend support to my hypotheses. I compare each conflict to another that is

alike on as many dimensions as possible. This ensures to the greatest extent possible that

I am not comparing apples and oranges, isolating the effects of the specific variables in

my theory as much as possible. The criteria for selecting cases thus reduce the chance

that the conflicts' durations are driven by other factors. In the real world, of course, there

rarely is a perfect pair of most-similar cases that can entirely alleviate this concern, but I

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[75] See also King, Keohane, and Verba 1994.

believe the approach here is at least a step in the right direction (Collier 1993; George and Bennett 2005; Lijphart 1971; Przeworski and Teune 1970).

This method of "structured, focused comparison" (George 1979) alleviates two problems common to case studies.[76] First, they can produce overdetermined outcomes. Moreover, since there always are more potential explanations than cases, we cannot be positive that the relationships are not driven by other factors (Collier 1991; Przeworski and Teune 1970).

However, between-case comparisons also are not a panacea. Detailed within-case studies are especially important for ameliorating some of the drawbacks of these analyses, notably the reality that no two cases are likely to be exactly the same on all variables except the one of interest (George and Bennett 2005). The within-case analyses thus serve three more functions. First, they illuminate the mechanisms and causal paths through which key independent variables influence civil war duration. Statistical analyses often cannot distinguish between complex multi-causal relationships and interactions between variables. Nor can they distinguish between multiple pathways that may link the same independent and dependent variables (Sambanis 2004b). And in this research, the statistical analyses cannot show whether the hypothesized mechanisms are salient or whether some are more important than others. The rich detail of case studies, therefore, is a particularly useful complement to large-n analysis in this regard.

The case studies also suggest refinements to the theory, most notably whether omitted variables should be included in future analyses. This process is a direct result of the previous goal: better understanding complex relationships and pathways almost

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[76] The analysis I carry out could also be considered what George and Bennett (2005) refer to as the 'congruence' method, which assesses how well a case matches a model's predictions. Because I include multiple cases, however, I refer to it as a comparison method.

always suggests additional factors that might be broadly applicable. Thus, these cases feed into what Skocpol and Somers call a 'research cycle', in which different approaches remedy weaknesses in other areas, continually refining theories (Collier 1991).

Finally, the case studies can suggest ways in which key independent variables are endogenous to conflicts by detailing sequences of events. Case studies help to identify and trace these contingent processes. I do *not* conduct rigorous process-tracing; however, the analysis can be considered a more general form of the method (George and Bennett 2005; Sambanis 2004b). This also is a function of other goals. Concerns about complex interactions and sequential processes are not easily addressed in statistical analyses, and thus do not usually modify models in the way that omitted variables might. Yet the insights this process generates do help to detail specific aspects of the complicated relationship between independent variables and war duration, giving us a much richer picture of when and how ethnic civil wars last especially long.

In sum, by conducting both comparisons between cases and case studies of individual conflicts, I can draw several types of inferences. First, the cases allow me to test (albeit weakly) whether the independent variables in my theory produce the predicted outcome: that is, do inter-group interactions and third party aid affect the duration of civil wars? Second, the within-case analysis allows me to assess the theoretical validity of my measures; to explore more deeply how the concepts I hypothesize operate in real conflicts;[77] and to ascertain whether the hypothesized mechanisms do indeed link the independent and dependent variables. Finally, both within and between case analyses help me to identify new variables and hypotheses (George and Bennett 2005).

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[77] In more technical terms, case studies have high conceptual validity.

3.2 Cases

3.2.1 Selection Criteria

I did not deliberately select these cases as critical cases. However, they also were not randomly selected, as would be most important if my goal was theory-testing. Rather, I chose these cases to illustrate the effects of a range of values on key independent variables. This avoids selection bias and allows me to see the mechanisms at play and identify different causal patterns (George and Bennett 2005). This approach often is the "best intentional" research design (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994: 140).

Taken as a whole, the cases were chosen to cover a wide geographical area (South and Southeast Asia, post-Soviet republics, and Latin America), providing an added measure of generalizability. There are no perfect pairs: countries and wars always differ in key ways. Wherever possible, I compared conflicts in the same state, to decrease the potential alternative explanations. When that was not feasible, I compared conflicts that are similar on as many dimensions – aside from the independent variable of interest – as possible.

Each pair was matched on five common alternative explanations for civil war duration, increasing the confidence that any variation in the dependent variable is due to the independent variable of interest. The cases have comparable GDPs, since poverty can prolong wars (Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2004). In each pair, lootable resources such as alluvial diamonds or timber play a similar role; such resources can substantially lengthen civil wars (Ross 2004, 2006). I pair conflicts in countries with similar sized populations to eliminate the possibility that more citizens are providing recruits and thereby prolonging the conflict (Fearon 2004b; Hegre and Sambanis 2006). Each set of

conflicts has similar goals, as defined in the original dataset, where goals can include control of the central government, autonomy or secession, or mixed motives (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Buhaug 2005; Walter 2004). Finally, the cases are matched by region and time period, which controls for a variety of other factors.[78] In the following chapters, I elaborate on each of these areas.

3.2.2 Cases Selected

Once paired on all these dimensions, I selected cases that vary on the key independent variable. In Chapter Four, I compare two cases with similar levels of external support but wide discrepancy in the ethnic interactions that might provide combatants with information about each other. These cases are Moldova and Azerbaijan. The statistical analysis in this chapter can demonstrate whether ethnic interactions influence conflict duration. However, hazard models cannot confirm whether commitment and signaling problems are the mechanism tying together these variables. Thus, the wars in these two states allow me to examine the ways that information affects fears of and beliefs about adversaries, and in turn, shapes the length of the two conflicts.

In Chapter Five, I compare cases with similar ethnic interactions but distinct amounts and forms of external support for the combatants. The two rebellions are those in Aceh and West Papua. This pair is particularly well-matched since both cases are in Indonesia. Thus, I also can control for a host of regime policies and relationships with outside actors. These cases are especially helpful since reliable, comparable quantitative data on third-party support for combatants is notoriously difficult to gather. Thus, the

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[78] These may include colonial legacy, time since independence, the role of regional powers, international positions on intervention, and economic development.

two wars in Indonesia not only illustrate the ways in which third parties can influence war duration, they also provide a rich picture of what this aid looks like.

In Chapter Six, I use four cases to examine the ways in which information and third-party support vary between ethnic and non-ethnic wars. The goals of this analysis are slightly different. Since my theory focuses primarily on the mechanisms through which information and third-party support influence the length of *ethnic* wars, these cases help me to develop hypotheses on the differences between these independent variables in ethnic and non-ethnic wars. Second, they are a very preliminary and contingent test of two questions. First, might the elements of my theory also explain differences in the lengths of non-ethnic wars? And second, might the theory explain why ethnic civil wars are likely to last much longer than non-ethnic wars? I do not have quantitative data to evaluate these differences. Therefore, I include four case studies, to generate more hypotheses about these two questions and to increase confidence in the tentative conclusions I draw.

First, I compare the civil wars in Guatemala and El Salvador. These wars both were fought for ideological goals, pitting Marxist rebellions against US-supported right-wing governments. In Guatemala, however, the rebellion also mobilized tens of thousands of indigenous Maya during the second half of the conflict. During this period, ethnicity became a central cleavage dividing the groups of combatants. These two conflicts are especially useful for beginning to examine the ways in which interactions along different cleavages shape commitment and signaling problems. The Guatemalan case has the added – and entirely unintended – benefit of also being a potentially deviant case, in that it is an outlier on most of the third party support measures. Thus, this case

study also suggests some situations in which third party support is less salient in determining the length of civil wars.

Second, I examine two civil wars in Sri Lanka. The first is a 1971 insurgency by the militant group Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP); the second is the long-running conflict between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Sinhalese-dominated government. These two wars also illustrate the variations in commitment and signaling problems between ethnic and non-ethnic wars. Moreover, they show how variation in third party support affects the duration of civil wars, since the LTTE has drawn on considerable aid from external actors, while the JVP had little such support.

In the next chapter, I analyze how ethnic interactions influence the length of civil wars. I first present the results of a hazard model and then turn to the comparison of conflicts in Moldova and Azerbaijan.

Chapter 4. Knowing Your Enemy: Information and War Duration

1.0 Introduction

Knowing your enemy shapes your strategy. Information about adversaries is especially important in civil wars because combatants must disarm to end the war. The vulnerability this engenders creates intense commitment and signaling problems. Commitment problems occur when combatants are unsure whether their opponent will uphold the terms of a peace deal if circumstances change. Signaling problems occur when combatants are unsure whether the other party will uphold the terms of a peace deal, regardless of what happens in the future. When information exacerbates commitment and signaling problems, combatants see less to lose by continuing to fight for autonomy or independence. As I will demonstrate below, ethnic interactions that exacerbate commitment or signaling problems therefore prolong civil wars.

In Chapter Two, I derived specific hypotheses on how five types of ethnic interactions affect civil war duration. Each does so by influencing the information combatants use to predict their adversaries' behavior in the event of a peace settlement. I review these briefly below. In this chapter, I set aside the question of whether inter-group interactions affect combatants' predictions about their adversaries in non-ethnic wars. I do this in order to gain traction on what features of ethnicity influence the length of civil wars and the mechanisms through which they operate. In Chapter Six, I will

discuss some ways that inter-group interactions and information compare across ethnic and non-ethnic wars.

2.0 Hypotheses

Discrimination against members of an ethnic group affects civil war duration in three ways. First, I argue that discrimination influences combatants' reputations. Prevalent discrimination increases mistrust and commitment problems by leading combatants to believe that their adversary is more likely to discriminate against them in the future and that the costs of that discrimination will be high. By making combatants less certain that adversaries should be trusted, discrimination encourages group members to continue fighting. Discrimination also increases popular support for rebel movements and may facilitate recruiting. In doing so, it allows rebels to continue fighting longer. This can be restated as follows:

Hypothesis 1a: Pre-war discrimination against members of an ethnically-organized rebel group will increase war duration.

Very high discrimination, however, limits rebels' capabilities. When this is the case,

Hypothesis 1b: Extreme pre-war discrimination against members of an ethnically-organized rebel group will decrease war duration.

A history of violence between the combatants prior to the current war also shapes reputations. Past conflicts lead combatants to predict that their adversaries are more likely to renew the conflict in the future; the perceived costs of a future clash also rise. A history of conflict between the combatants therefore makes them more wary of signing a peace settlement and disarming. This suggests two hypotheses:

Hypothesis 2a: War duration will increase when the groups fighting have fought in the past.

Hypothesis 2b: War duration will increase as the severity of past clashes between the groups fighting increases.

However, past conflicts that killed a large proportion of the group's members can restrict combatants' capabilities. In this case,

Hypothesis 2c: War duration will decrease when past clashes between the groups fighting were extremely severe.

Atrocities during a conflict also influence combatants' predictions about their adversaries' likely behavior. In particular, atrocities indicate higher costs and an increased probability of adversaries exploiting changing circumstances and renewing the war. This makes combatants reluctant to negotiate a settlement and disarm. Atrocities also solidify their victims' ethnic identities and increase popular support for rebels. These dynamics indicate that:

Hypothesis 3a: Atrocities targeted on a group-wide basis will increase war duration.

Particularly widespread atrocities, however, can kill a large enough proportion of the population to curtail rebels' capabilities. In this case,

Hypothesis 3b: Very severe atrocities targeted on a group-wide basis will decrease war duration.

Ethnic distinctiveness raises an individual's risk of being targeted in the event of a broken peace settlement. Thus, increased identifiability heightens commitment problems.

By forcing non-combatant or neutral members of the group to participate in the conflict, it also may facilitate recruiting and increase popular support for rebel movements. If this is the case:

> **Hypothesis 4:** Easy identifiability of rebel group members based on language, skin color, or other features difficult to hide will increase war duration.

Finally, in segregated societies, individuals do not work, play, worship, or live together. Group members therefore face a signaling problem because they have too little information to confidently predict whether their adversary is likely to renege on a settlement ending the conflict. In this case, combatants prefer to retain the security provided by armed rebels:

> **Hypothesis 5a:** Pre-war ethnic segregation will increase war duration.

In segregated societies, individuals may rely on seemingly authoritative information provided by politicians and the media to help predict their adversaries' future behavior. However, when these sources propagate negative stereotypes of other groups, individuals predict that negotiating a settlement and relinquishing their weapons will be dangerous. In this case,

> **Hypothesis 5b:** Extremist media or politicians in societies with pre-war ethnic segregation will increase war duration.

Segregation also makes it difficult for group members to update long-held beliefs about their adversaries' intentions. Past interactions therefore acquire more salience:

Hypothesis 5c: Pre-war discrimination in societies with pre-war ethnic segregation will increase war duration.

Hypothesis 5d: Past clashes between groups in societies with pre-war ethnic segregation will increase war duration.

In the next section, I present results of a statistical model that uses duration analysis to test each of these claims. The analysis demonstrates that several types of ethnic interactions prolong ethnic civil wars. The following section examines in detail how these ethnic interactions affected commitment and signaling problems and conflict duration in two former Soviet republics. Separatists in both Azerbaijan and Moldova launched civil wars in the early 1990s. I will argue that higher commitment and signaling problems prolonged Azerbaijan's war, compared to Moldova's. The final section of the chapter draws together the two analyses, reviewing conditions under which ethnic interactions provide information that prolongs ethnic civil wars.

3.0 Statistical Analysis

I use Cox proportional hazards regression to test how information affects the duration of ethnic civil wars. Cox models leave unspecified the distribution of duration times and are preferable to parametric models which rely on often unreasonable assumptions about the shape of the baseline hazard. Since incorrect specification of parametric models can produce biased and inaccurate results, the Cox model is preferable unless there are strong theoretical reasons to assume a specific distribution of duration times (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).

Hazard models estimate each type of interethnic interaction's effect on the chance that the war will end in a given month. Negative values of the coefficient indicate that a

given interaction decreases the relative hazard of war termination (i.e., an increase in the variable makes the war longer). Positive values indicate that the source of information increases the hazard of war termination. In other words, the interaction causes the war to end sooner.

3.1 Results and Discussion

3.1.1 General Findings

The results of the statistical analysis are shown in Table 2. I test three models. The first is a conventional model of civil war duration focusing only on the roles of lootable resources, population, wealth, conflict intensity and ethnic fractionalization.[79] Model Two includes only those variables I use to test my hypotheses. The third model includes both sets of variables. This model is superior to the other two[80], and I refer to it throughout the remainder of the statistical analysis.

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[79] I do not control for the parties' aims, another prominent explanation for conflict duration, because of high correlation between ethnic wars and the combatants' goals. Over 72% of the conflicts in the dataset included separatist aims.

[80] $p = .0001$ for the likelihood ratio test comparing Models Two and Three; $p = .005$ for the test comparing Models One and Three.

Table 2. Effects of Inter-Ethnic Interactions on the Duration of Ethnic Civil Wars

	Model 1	*Model 2*	*Model 3*
Discrimination		-3.114 (.930)***	-3.138 (.992)***
High Discrimination		0.428 (.192)***	0.538 (.197)***
Presence of Past Conflict		0.577 (2.81)	2.614 (3.06)
Past Conflict Level		0.048 (1.26)	-0.803 (1.41)
Severe Past Conflict		-0.036 (.141)	0.061 (.159)
Atrocities		-0.471 (.454)	-0.928 (.481)**
High Atrocities		0.092 (.061)	0.143 (.067)**
Ethnic Identifiability		-0.102 (.051)**	-0.088 (.052)*
Segregation[†]		-2.970 (1.10)***	-1.863 (1.13)*
Lootable Resources	-2.570 (1.02)**		-2.888 (1.11)***
Log Population	0.024 (.099)		-0.010 (.120)
Log GDP per Capita	0.043 (.186)		-0.033 (.235)
Conflict Intensity	0.380 (.099)***		0.363 (.113)***
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.145 (.652)		-0.703 (.786)
N	67	67	67
Likelihood ratio	-161.36	-159.13	-146.40

Estimates from Cox model with Efron method for ties. Results shown are the coefficients, not hazard ratios. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*p<0.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01
[†] The estimated models include all interaction terms used to test Hypotheses 5b, 5c, and 5d; those coefficients are not reported here because they offer very little information on their own. I discuss substantive interpretations of the interaction terms' effects below. See Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2005) or Kam and Franzese (2007) for more discussion of interaction terms.

Robustness checks confirm that the proportional hazards assumption on which the analysis rests is valid.[81] Most of the results are robust to changes in model specification, as well: both the directions and significance levels on most coefficients are similar between the three models. The third model does not have any significant omitted variable bias[82], and tests confirm that the theoretical predictions regarding functional form of the variables are accurate.[83] Tests for outliers showed that only one case, the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo / Zaire in 1996-97, was driving results for

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[81] p = .722 using the test based on the Schoenfeld residuals. Rejection of the null hypothesis would indicate that the assumption is not valid. Graphical tests confirm this result.
[82] This was tested using a link test. The coefficient on the squared linear predictor should be insignificant if the model is correctly specified. p=.541
[83] These graphical tests compare each variable to the Martingale residuals.

several variables.[84] Some outliers can provide valuable information about a model's fit

and suggest refinements to a model. However, the conflict in the DRC is an outlier most

likely due to poor data availability.[85] Therefore, it does not provide information that

could revise the model I detailed in Chapter Two, and I omit it from the analysis.

Lootable resources substantially lengthen ethnic civil wars, consistent with other

studies on the role of gems, drugs, and resources such as timber in prolonging conflicts

(Ross 2004, 2006). Civil wars with higher death tolls end sooner. This is consistent with

Fearon's (2004) finding that low-intensity conflicts often last longer.

Other commonly cited variables, including population, wealth, and ethnic

fractionalization, do not explain when ethnic civil wars last a long time.[86] Variables that

directly measure theoretical arguments about the role of ethnicity in civil wars *do*,

however, demonstrate the conditions under which ethnicity prolongs conflict. In

particular, this analysis shows which types of ethnic interactions influence the duration of

civil wars. In the remainder of this chapter, I focus on these conditions.

3.1.2 Commitment and Signaling Problems

Civil wars in societies with persistent ethnic discrimination last a long time. I

argue that discrimination shapes reputations, leading combatants to predict an increased

probability and cost of their adversary reneging on a peace deal. In doing so, it lengthens

civil wars. The findings strongly support Hypothesis 1a, which argues that

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[84] These were graphical tests using the dfbeta statistics. Four other cases were outliers on at least four variables (the civil war in Cyprus, Angola's war against UNITA, the Lebanese civil war in 1958, and the Guatemalan civil war). Dropping any of these four cases, either alone or in any possible combination with each other, did not significantly affect the results.

[85] Many of the variables for this case either have missing values or are coded based on only a few pieces of information.

[86] Ethnic fractionalization is commonly used to test the effect of ethnicity. The variable reflects the number and relative size of ethnic groups in a country. I discuss this measure further in Chapter One.

discrimination prolongs ethnic civil wars (see Figure 4). As the Figure shows, the

baseline hazard – the chance that war will end in a given month when all variables in the

model equal zero – is much higher than the hazard at even low levels of discrimination.

In other words, discrimination reduces the chance that a civil war will end.

Figure 4. Effect of Discrimination[87]

Each one-unit increase in pre-war discrimination, from none to low, low to moderate, and

moderate to substantial, against group members decreases by 96% the chance that

fighting will end in a given month. In other words, if a war already has a 30% chance of

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[87] This graph and all others are truncated at 500 months since the two observations beyond that point do not provide a great deal of information. These observations *are* included in the model estimates.

ending in a given month, even very low levels of discrimination reduce that to about a 1.2% chance of the conflict ending.

I argue that especially high levels of pre-war discrimination shorten conflict by curtailing a group's capabilities. There is no concrete threshold for this effect, probably because it depends on a host of other factors. As Figure 5 illustrates, however, very high discrimination does shorten ethnic civil wars. Severe discrimination increases the chance that a conflict will end in a given month by 71%. Together with the result displayed in Figure 4, then, this indicates that discrimination has an inverted-U shaped relationship with war duration.

Figure 5. Effect of Very High Discrimination

Hypothesis 2b rests on the assumption that discrimination limits military capabilities. Economic or security discrimination may be especially influential in this regard. I tested

this logic using a model with each type of discrimination measured separately. None of the coefficients reached conventional levels of statistical significance, nor is there any significant difference in the magnitude of the coefficients, suggesting that the measures of discrimination often are interchangeable.[88] Since discrimination usually occurs on several dimensions simultaneously, this is not surprising.

Past conflicts between groups influence reputations and should lead combatants to predict a higher probability and cost of future conflict. By exacerbating commitment problems, past conflicts should lengthen ethnic civil wars. However, past conflict history does not affect the duration of the current conflict in the manner I predicted.

Four issues – two statistical and two theoretical – may be driving these results. First, the variables measuring past conflict history are highly correlated, and they may be obscuring each others' effects.[89] This does not seem to impact the other combinations of variables in the model, but three such variables may compound the effects. Second, the proportion of repeated conflicts is very high. Over 75% of the wars in the dataset were preceded by a previous conflict; 63% experienced those conflicts in the past 20 years. In fact, one-third of the wars in the dataset were preceded by conflicts less than 20 years prior that killed over 1,000 people. Thus, there simply may not be enough variation on this measure to produce strong results.

Two substantive dynamics also could be driving this result. Once a conflict begins, inter-ethnic trust may erode so fast that combatants almost always assume that there is a probability of their adversary breaking future commitments. Past experiences

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[88] The lowest p-value was .132.
[89] Correlations range from 0.75 to 0.97 for different combinations of the variables. This is not surprising since the severity variable was used to construct the other two measures.

would not substantially influence predictions in this case.[90] Second, members of ethnic

groups may discount historical experience as a reliable source of information since

reputations often are limited to both a specific time period and actor (Huth 1999).

Although these two explanations are not necessarily incompatible, case study evidence

from ethnic civil wars – including those I discuss in the latter half of this chapter – often

supports the first explanation and undermines the second.[91]

Atrocities during a war produce deep mistrust of opponents' likely behavior after

a negotiated settlement. Consistent with Hypothesis 3a, the statistical results indicate that

ethnically-targeted atrocities substantially prolong civil wars (see Figure 6).[92]

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[90] Note that if true, this would not have a strong effect on discrimination because discrimination primarily drives predictions about the costs of a broken settlement, rather than its probability.

[91] Other illustrative recent examples are conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Burundi, Israel-Palestine, Iraq, and Sri Lanka.

[92] The effect of atrocities is not statistically distinguishable from zero in Model 2. In Model 3, atrocities are statistically significant; this is most likely due to the addition of the conflict intensity measure. See Chapter Three for details on how I operationalize this variable.

Figure 6. Effect of Atrocities

Even one or two atrocities a year influence combatants' beliefs about their adversaries, decreasing the chance of peace in a given month by 60%. Several atrocities in a year decrease this figure by another 60%, and frequent atrocities further compound the effect. Compared to conflicts with a very low rate of atrocities, wars with atrocities at least once a month have a 94% lower chance of ending in a given month.

I argued above that when atrocities become especially widespread, they can curtail a group's capabilities and force combatants to lay down their weapons. The results support this argument (see Figure 7).

Figure 7. Effect of Very Widespread Atrocities

Very extensive atrocities increase the chance the war will end in a given month by about 15%, compared to a war with few atrocities. This suggests that scorched earth policies ultimately can be effective: when a high proportion of group members are exterminated, few remain to continue fighting.

Members of ethnic groups who are easily distinguishable from their adversaries fear that they will be targeted if their adversaries return to war in the future. Therefore, these individuals are less likely to lay down their weapons and negotiate a peaceful settlement to the conflict. When ethnic identifiability leads to targeting of non-combatant or neutral members of the group, it also facilitates recruiting and increases popular

support for rebel movements. Therefore, civil wars that pit easily identifiable combatants

against each other last longer (see Figure 8).[93]

Figure 8. Effect of Identifiability

Each one-unit increase in the 18-point identifiability scale decreases the chance that

fighting will end in a given month by 9%. The overall effect of ethnic identifiability is

substantial: conflicts with very easily identifiable group members have an 80% lower

chance of ending in a given month than those wars in which combatants cannot be easily

distinguished from other members of the population.

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[93] Identifiability also might shorten wars by facilitating genocide. Neither the statistical analyses nor the case studies below indicate that this is a common dynamic. However, the argument could be evaluated statistically in the future by interacting group size with identifiability to see how 'easy' it would be to kill a large proportion of a group's members. (Data limitations make this impossible to test right now.) If true, this dynamic could also be dampening the positive effect of identifiability on conflict duration. That is, ethnic identifiability may have a larger effect than these results indicate.

In segregated societies, individuals have few interactions with members of other groups. This heightens signaling problems because group members have too little information to confidently predict whether their adversary is likely to renege on a settlement ending the conflict. I argue that combatants therefore choose to retain the security provided by armed combatants. The results support this argument: ethnically segregated societies experience substantially longer civil wars (see Figure 9).

Figure 9. Effect of Segregation

The chance of war ending in a given month in moderately segregated societies is 85% lower than in integrated societies. This decreases another 85% in highly segregated societies. Some authors argue that intermixing can fuel grievances and prolong wars (Horowitz 2000; Kaufmann 1996; Posen 1993). This result suggests that the specific

types of ethic interactions I measure – especially discrimination – capture that dynamic, isolating the opposing effect of segregation.

Segregation also magnifies the influence of other information on the length of civil wars. Below, I use graphical methods and predicted effects to examine how incitement, discrimination, and past conflicts affect civil war duration in segregated societies. These results are not all statistically significant; where that is the case, I note it and focus discussion on the direction and magnitude of the effect.

In segregated societies, extremists have more credibility because there are few alternate narratives with which to interpret adversaries' behavior. Extremists' messages heighten mistrust and commitment problems, however, making combatants reluctant to relinquish their weapons. Consistent with Hypothesis 5b, incitement by extremist media or politicians lengthens ethnic civil wars in segregated societies (see Figure 10).

Figure 10. Effect of Incitement in Segregated Societies

Incitement has a greater effect on the length of conflict in more segregated

societies. For instance, conflicts with low incitement in *highly* segregated societies are

87% less likely to end in a given month than conflicts with low incitement in *moderately*

segregated societies. The effect of each one-unit change in incitement also increases in

more segregated societies. In a society with moderate segregation, incitement reduces by

almost 21% the chance that a conflict will end in a given month. In societies with high

segregation, each one-unit increase in incitement reduces the hazard by 34%.[94]

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[94] The hazard ratio varies very slightly for each combination of the variables; 20.7% is the average effect of
a one-unit change in moderately segregated societies. The average effect is 34.2% in highly segregated
societies. Increasing from low to high incitement in moderately segregated societies (that is, from the
lowest to highest level of the variable) reduces the chance that conflict will end in a given month by
approximately 50%. In highly segregated societies, the overall decrease is approximately 71%.
These results are statistically significant at the 90% confidence level.

Incitement in integrated societies does not affect the length of civil wars,[95] consistent with Hypothesis 5b. In integrated societies, incitement does not cause group members to fear their adversaries' intentions because they have other sources of information. However, as these results indicate, extremists' messages can deeply resonate for individuals who have few alternate narratives to help them predict whether their adversaries will adhere to the terms of a peace settlement in either the short or long terms.

I argue that segregation also heightens the salience of reputations: combatants' past behavior becomes more significant when it cannot be tempered by current interactions. Discrimination has an especially pernicious effect on the length of conflicts in segregated societies, consistent with Hypothesis 5c (see Figure 11).[96]

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[95] The hazard rate decreases 4.4% for each one-unit increase in incitement in integrated societies; however, this result is not statistically significant.
[96] The effects are statistically distinguishable from zero at the .01 level for almost all levels of the variable (p<.10 for low discrimination, regardless of the level of incitement).

Figure 11. Effect of Discrimination in Segregated Societies

Discrimination has a slightly lower effect in more segregated societies, although the difference is not statistically significant. Under low segregation, a one-unit increase in discrimination diminishes the hazard by 95.7%; the effect is 92.2% under moderate segregation, and 86% in highly segregated societies. These results indicate that discrimination is an influential signal for group members who lack other information to predict their adversaries' future behavior.

Finally, I argued that past conflicts should affect the duration of current conflicts in segregated societies. The presence of past conflict in a society, regardless of its level of segregation, shortens civil wars. Although this result is not statistically significant, the direction of the effect is contrary to my prediction.

Although the effect of past conflicts is not statistically significant, its magnitude is much lower in highly segregated societies. For instance, in societies with moderate segregation, past conflicts more than double the chance that a war will end in a given month. In highly segregated countries, past conflicts only increase the hazard by 48%. Thus, in highly segregated societies, past conflicts have an effect closer to the one I hypothesized.

This result, especially coupled with the above findings on the effect of past conflict independent of segregation, suggests that past conflicts do not influence combatants' beliefs in the manner I hypothesized. As I discussed above, however, this result may reflect the rapid erosion of trust in many ethnic civil wars and the high proportion of conflicts that are part of repeated, violent interactions.

The above results are summarized in Table 3. In the next section, I use detailed case studies to focus on the mechanisms through which each of these ethnic interactions influences the duration of ethnic civil wars.

Table 3. Summary of the Effects of Inter-Ethnic Interactions

Variable	Predicted Effect on War Duration	Effect on War Duration
Discrimination	Lengthen	Lengthens
High Discrimination	Shorten	Shortens
Presence of Past Conflict	Lengthen	No effect
Past Conflict Level	Lengthen	No effect
Severe Past Conflict	Shorten	No effect
Atrocities	Lengthen	Lengthens
High Atrocities	Shorten	Shortens
Ethnic Identifiability	Lengthen	Lengthens
Segregation	Lengthen	Lengthens
Incitement and Segregation	Lengthen	Lengthens
Discrimination and Segregation	Lengthen	Lengthens
Past Conflict and Segregation	Lengthen	No effect
Lootable Resources		Lengthens
Log Population		No effect
Log GDP per capita		No effect
Conflict Intensity		Shortens
Ethnic Fractionalization		No effect

4.0 Commitment and Signaling Problems in the Former Soviet Union

In the early 1990s, analysts issued dire predictions of a wave of conflicts that would soon engulf the former Soviet Republics.[97] Civil wars did erupt in the Caucasus, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Russia itself. Most of these conflicts ended relatively quickly, but some of the new states were not so fortunate. Two civil wars represent well the diverse path that post-Soviet conflicts have followed. In Moldova, Transnistrian separatists clashed with Moldovan forces in 1990-91. A ceasefire ended the fighting after about seven months. In Azerbaijan, ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh also

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[97] For some perspectives on this question, see Bremmer and Taras (1993), Linz and Stepan (1996), and Smolar (1997).

launched a separatist campaign.[98] The bloody fighting continued for over two years until

a ceasefire in May 1994.[99]

These conflicts have much in common, yet Azerbaijan's civil war lasted over four

times as long as Moldova's. Why is this? In the remainder of this chapter, I offer one

explanation for these two different outcomes. In addition to applying the theory I

elaborate in Chapter Two to explain the conflicts' duration, I use these cases to illustrate

mechanisms through which ethnic interactions do (or do not) affect ethnic civil war

duration. The cases also highlight complex relationships that the statistical analysis

cannot uncover. These cases, however, are not intended to be a definitive test of the

theory laid out above.

In the following sections, I first briefly describe each conflict and then focus more

closely on how inter-ethnic interactions provided information that influenced

commitment and signaling problems in each war. I will demonstrate that while

commitment problems fueled the early stages of the civil war in Moldova, these were

limited from the outset and waned as the conflict progressed. The converse was true in

Azerbaijan: commitment and signaling problems were relatively high at the beginning of

the war and continued to rise during its course. I argue that the substantially higher

commitment and signaling problems in Azerbaijan explain why that war lasted so much

longer than the conflict in Moldova.

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[98] This region is referred to most commonly as Nagorny-Karabakh, Nagorno-Karabakh, or simply
Karabakh. I will use the latter two throughout this chapter.
[99] The conflict is coded in my dataset as lasting 28 months; in fact, it was substantially longer since fighting
broke out before Azerbaijani independence.

4.1 Overview of the Conflicts[100]

4.1.1 Moldova and Transnistria

Language, geography, and history are the main markers dividing ethnic Moldovans and Slavs, or Russian-speakers. Ethnic Moldovans, who are culturally and linguistically similar to Romanians, are a majority on the right bank of the Dniestr River. This region was part of Romania between 1918 and 1940 and was occupied again by Romania between 1941 and 1944. In the area of Moldova on the left bank of the Dniestr, Russian-speakers[101] are much more prevalent, representing just over half the population[102] (Kolstø and Malgin 1998). This area, known as Trans-Dniestr or Transnistria, remained in the USSR throughout its modern history.

As the USSR collapsed, leaders in the two regions espoused different cultural and political visions.[103] When Moldova declared independence in August 1991, Transnistrians overwhelmingly voted to create the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic, or PMR (Kolstø, Edemsky, and Kalashnikova 1993).[104] Moldova refused to accept Transnistrian independence, and violence rapidly escalated. After Russian intervention, the parties signed a ceasefire in July 1992. In total, the conflict killed about 1,000 people and displaced 100,000 in the five months of heaviest fighting (Dailey 1993).[105] The

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[100] Maps of the two countries and the separatist regions are in Appendix C.

[101] Usually defined as ethnic Russians and Ukrainians

[102] Compared to about 27% in Moldova overall (Crowther 1998).

[103] In particular, Transnistrians tended to back Communist parties and politicians, and their leadership supported the 1991 coup in Moscow. Moldovans, on the other hand, were more likely to oppose the old Soviet system, and Moldovan politicians opposed the coup (Katchanovski 2006). I discuss the cultural differences below.

[104] Over 75% of the population supported the measure. The vote was considered free but not fair (Kolstø, Edemsky, and Kalashnikova 1993). A 1990 referendum on territorial autonomy had passed with 96% support (Roper 2005).

[105] Between March 2 and August 2, 1992. Although most analysts agree that 1,000 is a reasonably accurate – perhaps even slightly high – estimate of the dead, those displaced likely were much more numerous than official figures represent (Dailey 1993).

ceasefire has held despite a few, limited clashes; however, a more comprehensive

solution remains elusive (Chinn and Roper 1996; King 1997).

4.1.2 Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh

In 1924, Stalin assigned Nagorno-Karabakh, an ethnic Armenian enclave, to

Azerbaijan. Sporadic discontent over the region's status resurfaced in 1987 with

demonstrations of up to 500,000 protesters demanding unification with Armenia (Rutland

1994). The protests soon turned violent, and Karabakh began demanding self-

determination as the USSR collapsed.

By 1990, violence was spreading rapidly throughout Karabakh and other regions

of Azerbaijan and soon escalated into a brutal war lasting several years. Approximately

20,000 individuals died, and the war produced well over a million refugees before the

leaders reached a ceasefire in 1994. Although fighting flared up in 1997, the ceasefire

has successfully limited other violence. However, multiple rounds of negotiations have

failed to produce a comprehensive settlement to the conflict (Laitin and Suny 1999).

4.2 Analysis

The conflicts in Transnistria and Karabakh are especially useful in a paired

comparison, since many potential determinants of duration can be eliminated as possible

causes of the wars' courses. Below, I briefly discuss several of these factors. In Chapter

Five, I examine how external support for combatants affects ethnic civil war duration.

Moldovan and Azerbaijani actors drew on comparable levels of support. Since this is a

key set of independent variables in my theory, however, I discuss this variable in slightly

more detail below. I then turn to the roles of ethnic interactions and information in shaping each conflict's duration.

4.2.1 Alternative Explanations

The causes of both conflicts were similar. Both wars began as the USSR collapsed and stemmed, in part, from Soviet policies in demarcating the boundaries of its Republics. These borders created dilemmas for the new states as they constructed national identities in the early 1990s. In several cases, including Azerbaijan and Moldova, the search for a new identity provoked violent conflicts.   These similarities suggest that the factors provoking the wars cannot explain their varying lengths. This is consistent with studies demonstrating that onset and duration are separate outcomes with different determinants (Brandt et al. 2005; Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2004).

State capacity can influence war length (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan n.d.; DeRouen and Sobek 2004). However, *both* Moldova and Azerbaijan were brand new states – in fact, the conflicts started even before independence – and both were extremely weak states. This institutional weakness meant that in both wars, the balance of military capabilities actually lay in favor of the separatists, who were fighting hastily organized national militaries and police forces. This military advantage was further bolstered by outside support, which in both conflicts was overwhelmingly directed to the separatists. Thus, neither weak state capacity nor the balance of capabilities can explain the variation in the two wars' durations.

Poverty may prolong civil wars (Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2004).[106]

However, poverty cannot explain why the conflict in Azerbaijan was over four times as

long as that in Moldova. Moldova's GDP per capita was $2,472 when the conflict began;

Azerbaijan's was $2,039. This puts both among the wealthiest 25% of all states to

experience civil wars since 1945.[107] Compared to other ethnic civil wars, therefore,

wealth can explain these two conflicts' relatively short duration.[108] However, since both

countries were relatively well-off, poverty cannot explain the variation *between* the two

wars.

Some authors argue that population size also influences conflict duration by

affecting collective action problems and the number of potentially dissatisfied citizens

who might support a rebellion (Fearon 2004b; Hegre and Sambanis 2006). Since the two

states had populations of similar sizes, this also is an unsatisfying explanation for the

variation in conflict duration.[109]

The goals or aims of a rebel movement also may affect the length of a conflict

(Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Buhaug 2005; Walter 2004). However, both

territories fought for independence, or extensive autonomy at the least. Thus,

Azerbaijan's war did not last longer because the central government was more

threatened.

Walter (2006) argues that when governments face multiple potential insurgencies,

they are less willing to make concessions for fear of signaling they will bow to violence.

However, neither the Moldovan nor Azerbaijani governments faced this situation. Brief

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[106] Several potential mechanisms may drive this relationship, including state capacity. In this case, the new institutions are a better measure of state weakness.

[107] Wealth is measured at the outset of conflict to control for endogeneity.

[108] Both are among the shortest 25% of conflicts in the dataset.

[109] The log of population – the most common measure – in Azerbaijan was 8.91; in Moldova it was 8.38.

unrest had broken out in ethnic Gagauz regions of Moldova, but this was peacefully resolved before the Transnistrian conflict escalated. Even if we considered this evidence of potential additional challenges, it would predict the opposite outcome – that the war in Moldova should be *longer* than that in Azerbaijan.

Finally, resources prolong many civil wars (Ross 2004, 2006). Lootable resources, however, were not significant factors in either conflict. Although rebel movements in both Transnistria and Karabakh have become involved more recently in smuggling and other illicit activities, these began after active hostilities ended.

4.2.2 Third Party Support

Outside support influences the length of many civil wars, and both of these conflicts involved extensive external aid for the combatants. I focus directly on the effects of third party involvement in ethnic civil wars in Chapter Five. In this section, I briefly elaborate on support in these two conflicts. Third party aid was driven by a complex web of motivations: some assistance was strategic or mercenary, motivated primarily by financial gain or the desire for regional influence. Other support stemmed from co-ethnic solidarity, especially fears of co-ethnics' cultural and/or physical extinction. This third party intervention had several effects. Even massive amounts of aid did not allow the rebel forces to win outright, although it did help them fight to a stalemate.[110] At the same time, external aid exacerbated commitment problems, making the combatants especially wary of negotiated compromise.

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[110] As these conflicts highlight, even when the balance of capabilities is in favor of rebel forces, it is exceedingly difficult for them to formally 'win' a conflict. Both wars remain in a gray area of 'no war, no peace,' despite the separatist regions' *de facto* independence. See King (2005) or Kolstø (2006) for discussion of why this status quo has been stable.

Russia was the most extensively involved third party in the Transnistrian conflict. Russian support for the separatists began with weapons transfers as early as 1990 (Kaufman 2001) and soon escalated. The former Soviet 14th Army, stationed in the area, included a large proportion of local conscripts and troops with long-standing local ties. This facilitated massive weapons transfers; troops from the 14th Army often fought in the Transnistrian guard as well (Chinn and Roper 1995; Dailey 1993; Kaufman 1996; Kolstø, Edemsky, and Kalashnikova 1993; Way 2003). Officers from the 14th Army also offered high-profile aid. The heads of the armed forces and the defense ministry in the separatist government were both commanders of the 14th Army, and a number of other officers joined the separatists (Katchanovski 2006; Kaufman 2001). Alexander Lebed, the Commander of the 14th Army, provided the most outspoken support for Transnistria, repeatedly asserting, for example, that Russia needed to protect local residents from Moldovan 'genocide' (King 2000). The Army, however, did not officially intervene until the vicious June 1992 fighting.

Geostrategic concerns and the search for regional influence were important motivations for Russia's involvement. In particular, Russia has an ongoing interest in what it terms the 'near abroad' – the states that formerly made up the Soviet Union. Some analysts suggest that Russia's desire to retain its military bases in the region influenced its policies toward the combatants, as well (Dailey 1993; Kaufman 1996). Co-ethnic solidarity also prompted Russian intervention. Russian officials and the press often cited their obligation to aid ethnic Russians in Transnistria. Some Russian officials used this merely as an excuse to maintain influence in the region. However, other

individuals appear to have felt genuine concern for Slavs' and Russian-speakers' future in Moldova (Chinn and Roper 1995; Dailey 1993).

Cossacks also provided troops and other aid to the separatists. In some cases, they served as paid mercenaries. In others, their involvement also was motivated by concern for fellow Slavs perceived as threatened by Moldovan policies (Lynch 2002).

Russian support for the Transnistrians, particularly support from the 14th Army, provided important material and psychological benefits. The conflict sharply escalated shortly after an influx of heavy weapons in May 1992 (Sislin and Pearson 2001). By influencing the balance of capabilities, military aid also helped the Transnistrians to avoid defeat and fight to a stalemate that left them with *de facto* independence. The outspoken support of top commanders, especially Lebed, appears to have created a moral hazard problem as well. Transnistrian leaders became more bellicose since they were confident that Russian troops would support their cause (Kaufman 1996; Kolstø and Malgin 1998).

Both Ukraine and Romania also became involved in the conflict, although they played much less central roles than did Russia. While the Ukrainian government adopted a neutral stance, weapons and fighters moved freely through Ukrainian territory. Some Ukrainians also formed militias to provide manpower, equipment, and money to the separatists (Dailey 1993; King 1997).

Several influential groups in Romania advocated unification with Moldova in the early 1990s. These lobbies became more vocal and radical as the conflict escalated and provided weapons and other aid to the Moldovan government (Chinn and Roper 1995;

Kolstø, Edemsky, and Kalashnikova 1993).   As I discuss below, this aid sharply raised

the conflict's stakes for Transnistrians.

Third parties were deeply involved in the conflict in Karabakh as well.

Azerbaijan drew on support from two groups. Turkish leaders interested in expanding

Ankara's influence in Muslim Central Asia were receptive to Azerbaijan's requests for

aid, often couched in terms of the two states' ethnolinguistic ties. Turkey provided low-

profile support such as training troops for much of the war and offered diplomatic support

in some phases of the conflict. Over 1,000 Afghan mujahedin also fought with

Azerbaijani forces; their primary motivation was financial, but solidarity with fellow

Muslims fighting a Christian force influenced many as well (Croissant 1998; Herzig

2000).

Armenia was Karabakh's major supporter.[111] Armenian aid included massive

transfers of money and weapons, volunteers, and covert involvement of the armed forces

in many battles.[112] The large Armenian diaspora also offered extensive aid, especially

financial support. Lobbying by diaspora communities in the US and Europe also affected

Western states' policies (Cornell 2001; Herzig 2000; Lynch 2002; Tölölyan 2007).[113]

Armenian aid stemmed from both co-ethnic affinity and the perception of

Karabakh as vital to Armenia's interests. Officials often emphasized this second

interpretation; for instance, Karabakh's Foreign Minister stated that:

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[111] The Republic remained officially neutral.

[112] Russian troops stationed in the Republic of Armenia also fought with the Armenians at several points in the conflict. Russian involvement stemmed from both strategic and ethnic motives. First, Russia sought to retain influence in its 'near abroad.' Moreover, although the religious differences between Muslim Azerbaijanis and Christian Armenians were not emphasized by most combatants, they occasionally surfaced, especially in the search for aid from co-religionists. Russian policy often seemed influenced by the desire to support a fellow Christian nation (Croissant 1998; Herzig 2000; Kaufman 2001; Laitin and Suny 1999).

[113] Lobbying was especially effective in influencing financial support.

After a history of tragedy, we have won a war at last! ... History gave Armenia so little territory – We cannot make any concessions that would threaten *Armenia and* Nagorno-Karabakh" (Lynch 2002: 839; emphasis added).

Many Armenians accepted this reading of the situation, seeing Karabakh and its army as the only protection against another genocide and believing that "If we lose Karabakh, we will be turning the last page of Armenian history" (Laitin and Suny 1999: 152).

The extensive external support for Karabakh prolonged the conflict. It dramatically shifted the military balance, making the civil war an international conflict in all but name. This, coupled with the Azerbaijani forces' inept performance, helped the separatists to continue fighting for years and to gain *de facto* independence for Karabakh. Outside aid also produced a complex web of relationships that further prolonged the conflict, above and beyond the direct military effects. In particular, Armenia and the Armenian diaspora have complicated the Karabakh-Azerbaijan relationship, creating additional sets of interests that must necessarily be solved in any successful mediation. The diaspora has been especially hardline, stymieing more than one round of negotiations (Cornell 2001; Lynch 2002).

In both wars, the identity of adversaries' supporters increased commitment problems. In Moldova, Russian support for Transnistrians bolstered fears that Russia would try to annex the new state. Transnistrians, on the other hand, were deeply threatened by Romanian support for Moldova, which they saw as presaging unification[114] (Dailey 1993; Kaufman 2001; Sislin and Pearson 2001). Many Azerbaijanis were more threatened by the possibility of Karabakh unifying with Armenia than the region becoming independent. The massive Armenian support, therefore, increased their

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[114] The threat of Moldovan-Romanian unification was one of Transnistrians' greatest concerns in this conflict. I discuss this in more detail below.

determination to prevent the region from breaking away. Armenians, on the other hand, believed that Turkish aid for Azerbaijan made genocide more likely if the territory surrendered (Croissant 1998).

In Chapter Two, I argued that third party support can prolong ethnic civil wars by affecting capabilities and complicating bargaining. These cases suggest that external support also may influence the length of some wars by heightening commitment problems. I return to this question in the next chapter; in the remainder of this chapter, I focus on how ethnic interactions influenced conflict duration.

4.2.3 Commitment and Signaling Problems in Moldova and Azerbaijan

When do combatants mistrust their adversaries' intentions? Commitment and signaling problems describe fears and mistrust over either short or long-term intentions. Although commitment and signaling problems exist in almost every civil war, specific factors can dramatically exacerbate these concerns. Below, I focus on how ethnic interactions influenced combatants' perceptions of their adversaries in Moldova and Azerbaijan.

Discrimination

Discrimination can exacerbate commitment problems when it suggests to individuals that only by fighting for independence or extensive autonomy can they protect their interests. The wars in both Moldova and Azerbaijan demonstrate how powerfully discrimination affects commitment problems.

In Transnistria, language-based discrimination was the single most important factor driving the conflict. In 1989, a movement known as the Popular Front began emphasizing Moldova's historical and cultural ties to Romania. In a set of policies known as Romanianization, Popular Front politicians enacted language laws, instituted name changes, and adopted the Romanian national anthem and a flag similar to the Romanian one (Kaufman 2001; King 1997; Kolstø, Edemsky, and Kalashnikova 1993).

Romanianization was initially popular among many Moldovans. Under Soviet rule, ethnic Moldovans were discriminated against in both employment and education, and Moldovans often perceived Romanianization to be a type of affirmative action (Chinn and Roper 1995; Kaufman 1996; Way 2003). Many also believed that state protection of Moldovan language and culture would protect vital interests. As one Moldovan leader argued: "either we return to the Latin script and get [Moldovan designated] the state language, or else we shall disappear as a language and a nationality" (in Kaufman 1996: 124).

Russian-speaking residents of Moldova, on the other hand, saw Romanianization as presaging Moldovan unification with Romania, a move that would dramatically undermine Russian-speakers' political, economic, and cultural rights (Kaufman 2001; King 1997; Kolstø, Edemsky, and Kalashnikova 1993).[115] Even if this extreme outcome did not occur, Romanianization still threatened Russian-speakers' livelihood and culture. Many Popular Front leaders explicitly believed that "the rebirth of the Moldovan people would necessarily come at the expense of those who had long oppressed them" (in King 2000: 138). This was not mere rhetoric. Mircea Druc, the leader of the Popular Front,

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[115] The significance of Romanianization was enhanced since language had been highly politicized under both Romanian and Soviet rule. Many citizens thus perceived language to be a key marker of larger issues and policies (Katchanovski 2006).

became Prime Minister after independence, and Moldova's first cabinet consisted almost exclusively of ethnic Moldovans (Roper 2005). This first post-independence government purged non-Moldovans from cultural institutions. The government aggressively enforced the new language laws through measures such as surprise inspections to ensure compliance. Although the law left in place protections for other languages and minority rights, loopholes allowed it to be arbitrarily applied with sweeping effects. For instance, Russian-language schools lost substantial funding, and parents' legally protected decision about where to educate their children was constrained by numerous school closings (Dailey 1993; King 2000; Kolstø, Edemsky, and Kalashnikova 1993; Way 2003).

Romanianization clearly shaped Transnistrians' predictions about their future prospects in Moldova. Therefore, this discrimination should have lengthened the civil war. So why was Moldova's war so short, if cultural discrimination was so pernicious?

First, discrimination decreased over the course of the conflict. As the Popular Front and supporters of Romanian unification adopted more extreme positions, they lost considerable public support. The Popular Front won 40% of the vote in elections to the Supreme Soviet in 1990 and had approximately 100 Parliamentary deputies in its coalition in 1992 (Kolstø, Edemsky, and Kalashnikova 1993; King 2000). By mid-1992, support for Romanianization, especially in its more extreme forms, was dropping dramatically. Most Moldovans saw themselves as distinct from Romanians, albeit with cultural similarities, and they feared for their rights if unification occurred.[116] By the end of the year, polls consistently indicated that only 7-10% of Moldovans supported unification (King 1997). Waning public support for Romanianization had several

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[116] Surveys in the mid-1990s found that 87% of Moldovans identified as such, given the choice between that or Romanian. In particular, Moldovans saw themselves as more tolerant and liberal than Romanians (King 2000).

repercussions. The Popular Front's supporters in Parliament dropped to only about 30 deputies, and in 1992, Mircea Druc was replaced as Prime Minister by Andrei Sangheli, who took a more moderate stance (Way 2003). By 1993, most Moldovan politicians had substantially toned down their rhetoric, issuing numerous signals that unification was off the table and that the language law would not be aggressively enforced (Chinn and Roper 1995; Crowther 1998).

Second, these policies threatened cultural survival and economic power, but not physical survival.[117] This lowered the relative costs of a settlement to the conflict, compared to continuing to fight. Therefore, both changes in public opinion and the stakes lowered the costs of a settlement ending the fighting. Transnistrians were willing to fight for their rights, but not indefinitely or at very high cost. And they did not have to, since the region had *de facto* independence by late 1992. This protected Transnistrians' rights and further diminished their incentives to continue fighting for full independence.

Discrimination also fueled the civil war in Karabakh. Armenians in Karabakh were concerned that state-sponsored in-migration to the region would shut them out of political power in the future. Economic discrimination also led many Armenians to believe that Azerbaijan would marginalize Karabakh in the future. Although the enclave was economically advantaged within Azerbaijan, the higher status of the Republic of Armenia signaled to many that Azerbaijan was under-investing in the region. Armenians in Karabakh also saw threats to their cultural survival, since despite legal protections, Armenian language education and media were extremely limited (Herzig 2000; Kaufman 2001; Suny 1999-2000; Yamskov 1991). Discrimination in all three of these spheres led

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[117] The statistical results indicate that the different forms of discrimination (political, economic, security, or cultural; see Chapter Two) are interchangeable. However, the dynamics in Moldova indicate that this is not always the case.

Armenians in Karabakh to believe that Azerbaijan was unlikely to protect their rights. By increasing the separatists' determination to continue fighting for autonomy or unification with Armenia, discrimination thus prolonged the war in Karabakh.

Past Conflict

In Moldova, the two groups had not fought each other in the past. Therefore, their reputations did not indicate that renewed violence was likely. However, reputations influenced the combatants' predictions about other types of abuses. Russian-speakers often saw Moldovans who supported unification through the lens of fascist movements prominent in Romania in the 1940s. Ethnic Moldovans, on the other hand, saw Russian-speakers as Communists who wanted to return to Soviet policies (Kaufman 2001). Thus, by influencing their predictions about life in a united Moldova, historical reputations may have influenced combatants' will to fight in a manner I did not predict.

Past conflicts were especially important in shaping Armenians' and Azerbaijanis' predictions about the likelihood and costs of future conflict. The two groups clashed violently in both 1905 and 1918.[118] In the 1905 violence, hundreds of villages were destroyed, and thousands of people were killed (Croissant 1998; Kaufman 2001). This violence unified the Muslim community and was a critical stage in Azeris' national narrative (Cornell 2001). In 1918, when Azerbaijan and its Turkish allies took over Karabakh, Armenians launched a guerrilla war after mass arrests, public hangings, and the execution and expulsion of the Armenians in Shusha (Croissant 1998; Kaufman 2001). At least 20 percent of the population in Karabakh died in the 1918-19 violence. The effects of these clashes were so widespread that "… virtually every Armenian and

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[118] There also were smaller clashes in 1968, 1977, and in the early 1980s (Kaufman 2001).

114

many Azeri families retain living memories of close relatives who died during the massacres" (Yamskov 1991). Many Armenians also saw Azeris as Turks; therefore, the 1915 Turkish genocide further exacerbated Azeris' untrustworthy reputation (Herzig 2000; Kaufman 1996).

Both sides explicitly referenced these past clashes to explain their deep mistrust of each other's intentions (Herzig 2000; Kaufman 1996; Suny 1999-2000). Because individuals on both sides saw the post-Soviet war as merely another round in a century-old conflict, they believed that any resolution would be temporary, and their current adversaries would remain a threat in the future. This made the combatants extremely reluctant to trust their opponents enough to negotiate a settlement to the conflict.

Atrocities

Atrocities during war also fuel conflict by leading combatants to predict that their adversary cannot be trusted to uphold a peace agreement, or that the costs of the adversary reneging will be especially high. Atrocities were relatively rare during the conflict in Moldova: the death toll was low, and the majority of those killed were combatants, rather than civilians (Dailey 1993; Kolstø, Edemsky, and Kalashnikova 1993). Early clashes and the attacks on civilians that did occur demonstrate how inflammatory even limited atrocities can be. These events escalated the early stages of the war and continue to influence the 'no war, no peace' status of the conflict. However, atrocities were limited enough that they did not lead most individuals to believe they would be massacred by their erstwhile adversaries if they reached a settlement that the

other party reneged on (King 1997). Therefore, the atrocities that occurred increased commitment problems, but not enough to prolong active hostilities.[119]

Azerbaijanis and Armenians' threatening reputations were not improved by their treatment of each other in the 1980s and 1990s. Massacres in Sumgait in 1988 and Baku in 1990 were especially influential sources of perceptions for ethnic Armenians who were

> singled out for beatings, even murder…Armenians were set upon by neighbors, hacked to death before the eyes of family members, several set afire. For Armenians the pogroms of Sumgait and Baku were bloody proof that Armenians could never live under Azerbaijani rule and feel safe. Armenian accounts refer to these events as evidence of Azerbaijani ethnic hatred, of the genocidal tendency among 'Turks' that Armenians experienced in the Ottoman Empire in 1915 and which now Azerbaijani 'Turks' were reviving (Laitin and Suny 1999: 152).

Both sides continued to target civilians throughout the war. For instance, Operation Ring involved the ethnic cleansing, burning, and looting of Armenian villages in 1991. The following year, Armenians massacred civilians in Khojaly (Croissant 1998; Kaufman 2001).

Frequent atrocities helped to perpetuate this conflict in two ways. First, they created a radicalized refugee population that later became one of the key constituencies stymieing a peace agreement. Second, consistent with Hypothesis 3a, these atrocities dramatically heightened commitment problems, prolonging the conflict. The passive police support for the rioters in Sumgait and Baku compounded Armenians' sense of insecurity and their belief that they could not rely on the Azerbaijani state to ensure their security (Herzig 2000; Suny 1999-2000). This made them even more reluctant to negotiate a resolution to the conflict that did not give them full independence. In

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[119] The region's *de facto* independence has further alleviated commitment problems stemming from atrocities.

Armenia itself, the Sumgait and Baku massacres convinced many that if Azerbaijan were allowed to retake control of Karabakh, its inhabitants would be massacred – and Armenia would likely face the same fate. This increased their determination to defend the enclave (Kaufman 2001). By making individuals on both sides, but especially Armenians, fear that they would be massacred if they disarmed, atrocities significantly lengthened the civil war in Azerbaijan.

Identifiability

The groups in these two conflicts were not distinguished by strong ethnic markers. In Moldova, language is a notably imperfect marker of both identity and allegiance on both banks of the Dniestr. For instance, more Russian-speakers in Moldova live on the right bank than in Transnistria, and ethnic Moldovans comprise 40% of the Transnistrian population (Kolstø and Malgin 1998). The two groups are not distinguishable by any ethnic markers other than language. Thus, neither ethnic Moldovans nor Russian-speakers faced widespread commitment problems based on their adversaries' ability to easily target them if conflict broke out in the future.

There is no evidence that ethnic identifiability fueled commitment problems in Azerbaijan. The two groups have distinct religions and customs, but they do not speak different languages, nor are most individuals physically distinct. Thus, most group members did not expect that they could be identified based on visible ethnic markers if conflict were renewed in the future.

Instead of the weak markers that distinguished ethnic Azeris and Armenians, local knowledge was often used to identify group members during the conflict.[120] For instance, Armenian militias often relied on local Armenians for information when they attacked Azerbaijani villages and homes (Laitin and Suny 1999). Moreover, ethnic cleansing was so extensive in the conflict that residence often was a more reliable indicator of ethnicity than anything else.[121]

Segregation

In Chapter Two, I argued that segregation prolongs wars by creating a signaling problem, making combatants unsure whether their adversaries are trustworthy. Therefore, individuals are more likely to rely on past behavior or to believe stereotypes and incitement by extremist media and politicians as they attempt to predict their adversaries' behavior.

Segregation by itself appears to have only weakly affected participants' perceptions of either of these wars. Moldovan society was ethnically integrated: inter-marriage rates are relatively high (Katchanovski 2006; Williams 1999), and other interactions were common. Thus, there were few, if any, signaling problems.[122] Yet this war illustrates how politicians and the media can escalate and perpetuate conflict even in integrated societies. Many Moldovan leaders tried to calm violence and adopted

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[120] This is consistent with arguments focusing on vulnerable islands of a population that exacerbate security dilemmas (e.g., Posen 1993). Data limitations currently prevent me from testing this in the large-n analysis, but further case studies could illuminate whether this mechanism is widespread.

[121] In the statistical model, I measure only segregation *before* the conflict, to control for precisely this sort of endogenous relationship: does segregation fuel conflict, or does conflict fuel segregation? Case studies are especially useful in untangling these endogeneity issues.

[122] The extent of interactions did affect perceptions, but the result varied by the group. Among the majority Moldovan-speakers, inter-ethnic interactions increased support for the Popular Front and other nationalist groups. Among Russian-speakers and other minorities, conversely, inter-ethnic interactions *decreased* support for extreme nationalist movements (Crowther 1998).

118

conciliatory stances as Russian-speakers became more troubled over the language laws. However, the intelligentsia tended to be pro-Romanian and played a prominent role on government media outlets. Therefore, many Russian-speakers believed that government support for extreme Romanianization and unification was substantially higher than it actually was (Kaufman 2001; Way 2003).

Transnistrian elites who benefitted from escalating the crisis further magnified commitment problems and public fears of Moldovan intentions. The media amplified elites' messages through extensive use of nationalist symbols, playing up threats, and emphasizing the ethnic nature of the conflict. Together, these sources increased support for secession among many Russian-speakers in Transnistria (Chinn and Roper 1995; Lynch 2002; Kaufman 1996, 2001).[123]

Segregation was fairly high in Azerbaijan. Before the conflict, Armenians and Azeris rarely intermarried or interacted in non-economic spheres. Signaling problems were low, however, because individuals relied heavily on stereotypes to interpret their adversaries' behavior. These were usually negative: while many individuals recalled positive things about members of the opposing group, they seemed to divorce those evaluations from behavior in the conflict (Laitin and Suny 1999; Suny 1999-2000).

Armenians' and Azeris' fears of each other also were exacerbated by extremist media and politicians. Rumors and inflammatory media reports contributed to the rapid escalation of violence by demonizing the 'other' and increasing fears of adversaries' malign intentions. Politicians played an even more active role. Although explicit nationalist rhetoric did not become a salient factor until the conflict was under way, once

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[123] Hardline rhetoric and an education system that plays up the sacrificed lives in the civil war continued to make many Transnistrians reluctant to compromise with Moldovans for years after active hostilities ended (King 2000).

unleashed, it dramatically escalated tensions and hardened each side's position (Cornell 2001; Kaufman 2001). Thus, by painting adversaries in the most dangerous light, extremists in Azerbaijan's segregated society fueled commitment problems, prolonging the fighting.[124]

In summary, segregation did not create a signaling problem in either Azerbaijan or Moldova. Segregation was low in Moldova, and individuals in Azerbaijan used other sources of information, such as stereotypes, to interpret their adversaries' behavior. Incitement operated largely independently of the level of segregation. In both societies, extremist politicians and media provided threatening narratives to individuals, heightening fears that prolonged the conflicts.

5.0 Conclusions

Knowing your enemy shapes your strategy. When combatants predict that the probability or costs of their adversary breaking a peace agreement will be very high, they see less to lose by continuing to fight for autonomy or independence. Ethnic interactions can provide information that affects this calculation. In particular, discrimination, atrocities, and ethnic identifiability all significantly increase commitment problems for participants in ethnic civil wars. Segregation can exacerbate signaling problems by increasing uncertainty about adversaries' intentions, and it further fuels commitment problems when coupled with incitement or discrimination.

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[124] This rhetoric continues to hamper conflict resolution efforts. Prominent politicians (particularly in Azerbaijan) have used refugees and internally displaced persons as a reason to avoid compromise; these groups also have formed a vocal constituency with maximal demands for a peace settlement. Both sides' politicians also have continued to harden their positions over time. For instance, after Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrossian suggested a compromise to the conflict, he was accused of 'betraying the national cause' by his opponents and was forced to resign. He was replaced by Robert Kocharian, who is from Karabakh and who returned to a more hardline approach (Herzig 2000).

Discrimination substantially prolongs civil wars. Even if deliberate discrimination is not present, *the belief that it is occurring* can fuel conflict, as the conflict between Azerbaijan and Karabakh Armenians illustrates. Despite the region's relative wealth compared to Azerbaijan, Karabakh Armenians measured their status against citizens in the Republic of Armenia. High levels of discrimination, however, can restrict capabilities and shorten conflicts.

Past conflicts also can exacerbate commitment problems, although they were not a significant predictor in the statistical model. As the war in Azerbaijan demonstrates, however, deep-seated historical memories can profoundly influence predictions. In fact, this case suggests that the statistical analysis may underestimate the role of past conflict: the dataset measures only conflicts that occurred within the past 50 years, however, past conflicts can shape combatants' beliefs about their adversaries for generations.[125]

Trust erodes very quickly in many conflicts. Therefore, current behavior often is just as salient as past interactions for combatants as they decide whether to negotiate a peace settlement or to continue fighting. Atrocities are especially important in this regard. Even a few incidents powerfully shape group members' perceptions of their adversaries, as the effect of a few clashes in Moldova illustrates. Very extensive atrocities, however, may shorten conflicts by curtailing a group's capabilities.

Group members who are easily identifiable as such fear the costs if their adversary reneges on a peace deal. Civil wars with highly identifiable combatants thus last longer. As the conflict in Azerbaijan demonstrates, however, local knowledge and segregation can substitute for ethnic markers.

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[125] This coding rule was adopted to capture the proportion of group members who had direct experience in the past conflict. See Chapter Three for further details.

Segregation creates a signaling problem in some conflicts, prolonging fighting because combatants are especially uncertain whether their adversaries intend to implement a negotiated settlement. However, as the case studies illustrate, combatants can draw on a wealth of other sources to help predict their adversaries' behavior. For instance, historical experiences such as discrimination and messages propagated by extremists often help combatants overcome the informational constraints in segregated societies.

Ethnicity matters for understanding civil war duration. Testing mechanisms identified in case study literature across a broad sample of ethnic civil wars confirms this contention. Commonly used operationalizations of ethnicity such as fractionalization and proxy variables such as democracy have obscured this result, by not testing these specific processes through which ethnicity shapes civil wars. The results above confirm that when theoretical predictions are directly tested, proxy variables such as fractionalization, population size, and wealth have no effect on the length of ethnic civil wars.

Informational cues are one crucial way in which ethnicity affects civil war duration. In particular, ethnic interactions provide specific information about an adversary's future behavior. This information, in turn, influences commitment problems, shaping strategic decisions about whether to continue fighting. The outcome of these decisions critically shapes the length of ethnic civil wars.

Chapter 5. When Grandma Doesn't Just Knit You a Sweater: Ethnic Kin and War Duration

1.0 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I showed that ethnic interactions can prolong civil wars when they provide combatants with information that heightens mistrust of their adversaries. But no matter how much combatants *wish* to continue fighting, sometimes they simply are unable to do so. Conversely, sometimes combatants may wish to *stop* fighting, but find themselves unable to do so. In this chapter, I show how ethnicity both can affect combatants' capabilities and complicate efforts to resolve conflict, even when all parties desire a compromise. In particular, ethnicity can influence both of these outcomes through the role of third parties. On one hand, assistance from third parties rarely is substantial enough to ensure one side's victory. Instead, it merely prevents the defeat of the weaker side, prolonging the conflict. On the other hand, support from third parties also can encourage rebels to continue fighting, believing they will exact a better deal. Or, external supporters can stymie negotiations by introducing uncertainty into bargaining. Both of these also prolong civil wars. Thus, when ethnicity leads third parties to intervene in ethnic civil wars, it often prolongs these conflicts.

Below, I briefly review the hypotheses I derived in Chapter Two on the effects of support from third parties, especially ethnic kin, on the length of ethnic civil wars. I will then present the results of a large-n hazard model which tests these hypotheses against all ethnic civil wars between 1945 and 2004. In the following section, I will use the conflicts in West Papua and Aceh, Indonesia to further explore these relationships and the mechanisms through which support from third parties can prolong intrastate conflicts.

2.0 Hypotheses

External support for the combatants in civil wars most directly affects the balance of capabilities. This often produces a military stalemate. Although a stalemate is most likely when external support benefits the weaker party, the parties' relative strengths can be difficult to determine precisely. Therefore, I argue that:

> **Hypothesis 6a:** Third party support for at least one group of combatants will increase war duration.

Support to only one group of combatants should have a distinct effect, although I do not have a strong theoretical reason to expect a specific outcome.

> **Hypothesis 6b:** Third party support for only one group of combatants will have a distinct effect on war duration.

Aid from ethnic kin, whether in a neighboring country ('cross-border kin') or further afield ('the diaspora'), is distinct due to both its emotional motivations and the ways in which it is provided. Most notably, this aid often is sustained and unconditional.

These two groups of co-ethnics may offer different forms of support. Both cross-border kin and members of the diaspora can provide financial aid, weapons, and diplomatic support. However, only cross-border kin can offer safe havens, training sites, and smuggling routes.

Support from ethnic kin can enhance one side's capabilities. This facilitates recruiting and allows a group to continue fighting after it would otherwise be defeated. Co-ethnic support also may embolden rebels to continue fighting, hoping to strike a better bargain when the war does end. Finally, support can introduce uncertainty into bargaining between groups of combatants. This can complicate conflict resolution attempts, prolonging the conflict. All three mechanisms suggest that:

> **Hypothesis 7a:** Support for at least one group of combatants from cross-border kin will increase war duration.

> **Hypothesis 8a:** Support for at least one group of combatants from a diaspora will increase war duration.

And, as I argue above, I expect conflicts in which only one group receives aid to follow a different path than those wars in which support is merely present. Therefore,

> **Hypothesis 7b:** Third party support for only one group of combatants from cross-border kin will have a distinct effect on war duration.

> **Hypothesis 8b:** Third party support for only one group of combatants from a diaspora will have a distinct effect on war duration.

3.0 Statistical Analysis

As in Chapter Four, I use Cox proportional hazards regression to evaluate how third party support affects the duration of ethnic civil wars. Negative values of the coefficient indicate that higher levels of support from a given source or of a given type decreases the relative hazard of war termination (i.e., an increase in support makes the war longer). Positive values indicate that the aid increases the hazard of war termination. In other words, more support causes the war to end sooner.

3.1 Results and Discussion

3.1.1 General Findings

The results of the statistical analyses are shown in Table 4. The first model is a conventional explanation of civil war duration focusing only on the roles of lootable resources, population, wealth, conflict intensity and ethnic fractionalization.[126] I also include a control for the Cold War, since strategic aims heavily influenced intervention during this period. Model Two adds a measure of the average aid level from all external supporters.[127] Model Three examines the relative effects of support from ethnic kin and from unrelated supporters. Model Four further refines support from ethnic kin to test the

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[126] I do not control for the combatants' aims, another prominent explanation for conflict duration, because of high correlation between ethnic wars and the combatants' goals. Over 72% of the conflicts in my dataset included separatist aims.

[127] Aid is measured on an ordinal scale, from no aid, to some limited aid, to substantial aid, to extensive aid. See Chapter Three for more details.

This measure – and all subsequent ones on aid – reflects biased intervention on behalf of a group of combatants. This is *not* the same as intervention as it is sometimes used in the literature, which is a broader concept that can include mediation, peacekeeping, and similar efforts.

effects of aid both from cross-border kin and from the diaspora. Since this model

provides the most information, I refer to it below unless otherwise noted.[128]

Table 4. Effects of Aid from Third Parties on the Duration of Ethnic Civil Wars†

	Model 1	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*
Third Party Aid		-1.187 (.265)***		
Aid from Ethnic Kin			-0.830 (.219)***	
Aid from Cross Border Kin				-0.467 (.184)***
Aid from Diaspora				-0.360 (.190)*
Aid from Other Third Parties			-0.353 (.167)**	-0.340 (.170)**
Lootable Resources	-2.072 (.744)***	-2.026 (.777)***	-2.040 (.778)***	-2.048 (.777)***
Log Population	0.005 (.112)	-0.200 (.114)*	-0.197 (.115)*	-0.214 (.124)*
Log GDP per Capita	0.128 (.194)	0.463 (.224)**	0.473 (.228)**	0.452 (.236)*
Conflict Intensity	0.346 (.085)***	0.364 (.080)***	0.362 (.080)***	0.360 (.080)***
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.022 (.633)	-0.364 (.621)	-0.454 (.689)	-0.488 (.697)
Cold War	-0.407 (.652)	-0.554 (.379)	-0.586 (.395)	-0.585 (.395)
N	66	66	66	66
Likelihood ratio	-161.36	-145.29	-145.24	-145.18

Estimates from Cox model with Efron method for ties. Results shown are the coefficients, not hazard ratios. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*p<0.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01
† I do not present models with one-sided aid here, in the interests of space. I discuss them in the text below.

Robustness checks confirm that the proportional hazards assumption on which the

analysis rests is valid.[129] The intervention variables are robust to changes in model

specification, as well. The fourth model does not have any significant omitted variable

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[128] A likelihood ratio test confirms that Model Four is superior to Model One (p = .000). Because the other models are not nested with Model Four, they cannot be compared using this test. However, the log likelihoods indicate that they explain approximately the same total amount of variation in duration as Model Four; this is not surprising since the measures of third party aid capture the same data.
[129] p = .805 using the test based on the Schoenfeld residuals. Rejection of the null hypothesis would indicate that the assumption is not valid. Graphical tests confirm this result.

bias[130], and tests confirm that the theoretical predictions regarding functional form of the variables are accurate.[131] Tests for outliers showed that two cases, the civil war in Guatemala and the civil war that began in 1965 in Chad, were driving results for several variables.[132] Some outliers can provide valuable information about a model's fit and suggest refinements to a model. The conflict in Chad is an outlier most likely due to poor data availability.[133] Therefore, it does not provide information that could revise the model I detailed in Chapter Two, and I omit it from the analysis. Although I also omit the Guatemalan case, for which data is considerably more reliable, I investigate this conflict in more detail in Chapter Six.[134] The Guatemalan combatants enjoyed relatively little foreign support, especially given how long the conflict lasted. The US provided the most substantial aid, which was targeted to the government. This makes it especially interesting that the conflict lasted as long as it did, since the government was the stronger party. As I will show in the analysis, indigenous rebel recruitment and the low morale and training of the army helped to counteract the effects of American support.

These results confirm the findings in Chapter Four that lootable resources substantially lengthen ethnic civil wars (Ross 2004, 2006) and that civil wars with higher death tolls end sooner (Fearon 2004b). This model also finds that states with larger populations experience longer wars (Fearon 2004b; Hegre and Sambanis 2006), and that national wealth shortens wars (Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2004). As I will discuss

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[130] This was tested using a link test. The coefficient on the squared linear predictor should be insignificant if the model is correctly specified. $p = .726$

[131] These graphical tests compare each variable to the Martingale residuals.

[132] These were graphical tests using the dfbeta statistics. One other case – the conflict in Burundi in the 1990s – was an outlier on several variables. Dropping this case, either alone or in any possible combination with the other two, did not significantly affect the results.

[133] Many of the variables for this case either have missing values or are coded based on only a few pieces of information.

[134] This case study, therefore, also serves as an investigation of a deviant case (George and Bennett 2005).

below, however, these latter two results are not robust to changes in model specification, suggesting that we should view them with some skepticism. Ethnic fractionalization[135] does not affect the length of ethnic civil wars, nor were conflicts during the Cold War substantially longer. Particularly in terms of the ethnic fractionalization measure, this further reinforces the argument I advanced in Chapter One: existing studies have missed critical facets of the relationship between ethnicity and conflict duration by using rough proxies such as this one. When the effect of ethnicity is directly tested – in this case, through its impact on third party intervention – it is both statistically and substantively significant.

These results demonstrate that intervention from any source substantially prolongs ethnic civil wars. However, there are key differences in the effects on conflict duration of support from different groups. In the remainder of this chapter, I explore these relationships further.

3.1.2 Third Party Support

In Chapter Two, I argued that support from third parties prolongs conflicts by promoting a military stalemate and changing the parameters of a feasible settlement. As Table 4 indicates, the results are consistent with this argument. As Model 3 shows, even fairly small increases in outside aid[136] – no matter the source – decrease the chance a civil war will end in a given month by 70%.

When aid overwhelmingly benefits only one side, I expect the relationship with conflict duration to become more complicated. This is because two different, opposing,

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[135] Ethnic fractionalization is commonly used to test the effect of ethnicity. The variable reflects the number and relative size of ethnic groups in a country. I discuss this measure further in Chapter One.
[136] See Chapter Three for more details on how I operationalize this measure.

mechanisms may plausibly be at work. If only one side (particularly the weaker side)

receives military aid, a stalemate is more likely. In other words, one-sided military aid

should prolong conflict. If only one side benefits from diplomatic support or lobbying,

bargaining should be *less* complicated than if multiple groups have external supporters.

Thus, one-sided diplomatic aid should prolong conflict less than diplomacy on behalf of

multiple actors. If these mechanisms cancel each other out, we would observe little or no

change in the length of wars in which only party receives outside aid.

These data indicate that intervention on behalf of only one party indeed has a

distinct – and lower – effect than a general increase in third-party support. Each one-unit

increase in one-sided aid makes fighting 47% less likely to end in a given month.[137] This

may reflect two situations. First, as I discuss above, the effects on bargaining and the

military balance may create opposing effects that obscure each other's effects. Second,

this result could reflect unequal levels of different *types* of aid to the combatants. That is,

if the measure of one-sided aid is primarily capturing diplomatic activity, we would

expect it to have a lower effect on war duration. To illustrate, consider a war A, in which

W group of combatants receive a small amount of military aid and X group receives

substantial military aid. War A lasts five years. Now consider another war, B, in which

group Y receives extensive diplomatic aid and Z receives no aid. This pattern of support

would have a much smaller effect on the length of the war in country B. War B lasts 1

year. Both of these wars would receive the same value on the Third Party Aid measure (a

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[137] p = .003. This result is consistent with Regan (2002).
Models with only one-sided aid leave loot and conflict intensity as the only statistically significant control variables. One explanation for this finding is that aid to several groups increases the salience of other factors like population and wealth because the aid transfers cancel each other out.

score of 3), and we should see an average length of three years.[138] If the One-Sided Aid

measure is primarily capturing wars such as conflict B, the hazard estimate might not

reflect the effects of only one party receiving aid. Rather, it would be capturing the effect

of only one party receiving *diplomatic* aid. This test cannot distinguish which of these

scenarios best explains the result. Below, therefore, I use more refined measures of the

type of aid to assess these competing explanations. This analysis will suggest that both

processes are at work.

In Chapter Two, I asserted that aid from co-ethnics is often unconditional and

sustained. Since data on third party support often are secret, it is difficult to test directly

whether transfers from ethnic kin are more consistent over the span of a conflict.

However, the data do reveal that the overall effect of aid from co-ethnics is significantly

larger than that from unrelated parties (See Figure 12). In other words, while the

statistical analysis cannot reveal whether aid from co-ethnics is qualitatively different, its

overall effect is quantitatively larger than that of unrelated allies.

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[138] Note that this example simplifies the statistical analysis for expository purposes.

Figure 12. Effect of Aid from Third Parties[139]

Each one-unit increase in aid from unrelated supporters decreases the chance that conflict will end in a given month by 30%; very high levels of aid diminish the chances of a settlement by 65%. Even low levels of aid from ethnic kin decrease the hazard by 56%.[140] Extensive support from co-ethnics makes conflict 92% more likely to continue for another month.

Above, I investigated the effects of support directed to only one group of combatants. Consistent with Hypothesis 6b, the results indicated that one-sided support prolongs conflicts, but not as much as the presence of support (independent of the number of recipients). However, I could not distinguish between different explanations

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[139] This graph and all others in this chapter are truncated at 500 months since the two observations beyond that point do not provide a great deal of information. These observations *are* included in the model estimates.
[140] The difference between the two sources of aid is statistically significant (p = .095).

for this difference. One-sided aid differentiated by its source helps to illuminate the puzzle. When *ethnic kin* support only one group of combatants, the different mechanisms begin to cancel each other out. One-sided aid from co-ethnics decreases the chance that fighting will end in a given month by 36%.[141] In other words, the hazard is two-thirds as large when only one group of combatants receives aid from ethnic kin.

One-sided aid from supporters who are *not* ethnic kin does not significantly affect the length of civil wars. This may be due to two factors, either alone or in conjunction. First, four of the 25 cases of one-sided aid from unrelated supporters bolstered the stronger party's capabilities. These interventions might not substantially affect duration. Second, in seven of the other cases, the scale of support was very limited. Thus, the proportion of conflicts which might reveal a significant effect of this aid is low. I believe it most likely that these two patterns operate in concert to dampen the statistical effect.

Together, these two effects lend support to both of the processes detailed above. They suggest that the first dynamic is more likely in ethnic civil wars. That is, military and diplomatic aid have opposing effects that cancel each other out. The second scenario – that describing variation in the levels of types of aid – seems to influence the length of wars in which non-ethnic supporters aid the combatants.[142]

In Chapter Two, I distinguish between ethnic kin in a neighboring country – cross-border kin – and those who live in more distant states – a diaspora. However, the results indicate that support from these two groups similarly affects the length of conflicts (see Figure 13).

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[141] $p = .035$
[142] Note that these two processes are not incompatible. These results simply indicate that each scenario is driving at least some of the results.

Figure 13. Effect of Aid from Diasporas and Cross-Border Kin

Each one-unit increase in aid from cross-border kin decreases the chance that conflict will end in a given month by 37%. Aid from members of a diaspora has a slightly smaller effect – a 30% decrease in the hazard – but the difference is not statistically significant. Extensive aid from these groups decreases the hazard by 75% and 66%, respectively.

When only one group of combatants receives aid from a diaspora, the chance that conflict will end falls by 45%.[143] Why is this effect greater than the effect of any group receiving aid from a diaspora? Below, I attempt to disentangle the underlying process.

Co-ethnics' location often influences the type of aid they provide. For example, diasporas in developed countries often offer financial support, while cross-border kin can

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[143] p = .001. One-sided aid from cross-border kin has no significant effect on conflict duration.

134

provide bases and safe havens. In the following pages, I investigate further how different

types of support produce varying effects on the lengths of conflicts (see Table 5). I first

test a model which compares the effects of bases and safe havens, weapons and financial

transfers, and diplomatic assistance from co-ethnics and from non-related supporters. In

Model 2, I refine the analysis to assess the effects of each of these three forms of support

from cross-border kin, diasporas, and unrelated supporters.

Table 5. Effects of Different Forms of Aid from Third Parties

	Model 1	Model 2
All Ethnic Kin		
Bases and Shelter	-2.253 (.758)***	
Weapons and Money	-1.135 (.551)**	
Diplomatic Aid	-0.481 (.731)	
Cross-Border Kin		
Bases and Shelter		-1.081 (.391)***
Weapons and Money		0.177 (.465)
Diplomatic Aid		2.428 (.913)***
Diaspora		
Weapons and Money		-1.248 (.434)***
Diplomatic Aid		-0.608 (.391)
Non-ethnic Supporters		
Bases and Shelter	-0.334 (.443)	-0.874 (.535)*
Weapons and Money	-0.410 (.338)	-0.468 (.342)
Diplomatic Aid	-1.003 (.517)**	-1.301 (.540)**
Lootable Resources	-2.393 (.835)***	-2.777 (.860)***
Log Population	-0.116 (.123)	-0.005 (.123)
Log GDP per capita	0.387 (.242)	0.398 (.251)
Conflict Intensity	0.351 (0.082)***	0.386 (.090)***
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.069 (.751)	0.222 (.758)
Cold War	-0.389 (.394)	-0.411 (.405)
N	66	66
Likelihood ratio	-144.46	-145.29

Estimates from Cox model with Efron method for ties. Results shown are the
coefficients, not hazard ratios. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*p<0.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

First, note that the significant effects of population and GDP observed above disappear in these models. This indicates that these factors influence the length of civil wars only under very specific conditions.

The discussion above demonstrated that similar increases in the level of aid have a greater effect when they are provided by ethnic kin. When only one group of combatants receives aid from co-ethnics, the effect on war duration is smaller. Yet this dampening effect appears to be driven by two different processes. First, when only one group of combatants receives aid from *cross-border kin*, there is no effect on duration. When only one group of combatants receives aid from a *diaspora*, however, it decreases the chance the war will end. Thus, it appears that the effect of one-sided aid from cross-border kin obscures the effect of one-sided aid from a diaspora. But why is this? One reason might be that different groups (that is, cross-border kin, compared to diasporas) tend to provide different types of aid. Forms of support might influence war duration differently.

Indeed, these models reveal that different forms of support do yield starkly different effects. Bases, safe havens, or smuggling routes provided by third parties not motivated by ethnic affinity do not significantly prolong civil wars. However, when cross-border kin provide these forms of support, the chance that fighting will stop in a given month falls by 89% (see Figure 14). [144]

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[144] Diasporas are unable to provide this type of assistance by definition; thus, the entire effect is attributable to assistance of this type from co-ethnics in neighboring states.
I do not test the effects of one-sided aid in this model because each form of assistance is measured as a dummy variable and the data simply do not have this level of precision. For example, two participants in a conflict may receive aid from cross border kin, and that aid may include both weapons and bases. But determining which of the combatants received which type of aid from which supporter is only very rarely recorded in source materials.

Figure 14. Effect of Bases and Shelter from Third Parties

The difference in these effects might plausibly be due to two factors. First, co-ethnics

may be less likely to turn in their kin who are operating in the area. Second, it may be

more difficult for law enforcement to single out militant members of an ethnic group

from their non-combatant kin. Regardless of the reason, it is clear that bases, shelters,

and smuggling routes prolong ethnic civil wars much more when they are provided by

co-ethnics than when unrelated supporters offer this type of aid.

Material aid such as weapons and financial transfers has a somewhat smaller

effect (see Figure 15).

Figure 15. Effect of Weapons and Financial Transfers from Third Parties

Support of this type reduces the chance of a settlement in a given month by 68%.

Splitting this sort of aid even further by source reveals that money and weapons from the

diaspora deeply prolong conflicts, reducing the hazard by 72%. This effect is partially

cancelled out by an opposing effect of transfers from cross-border kin, which *increase* the

chance conflict will end by 19%. Although this latter result is not statistically significant,

it may reflect variation in the relative prevalence of weapons and financial transfers from

these two sources, or a lower risk of interdiction when support derives from a

geographically closer source.

Unfortunately, the data is simply not fine-grained enough to confidently

determine the source of this difference. However, this result may explain the above

discrepancy between the effect of one-sided aid from a diaspora and from cross-border

kin. It seems likely that at least part of this difference is driven by the large disparity in

the effect of money or weapons. Without more detailed data, determining whether this difference holds for transfers to only one party will have to wait.

At first glance, diplomatic support appears to have a significant effect on the length of civil wars only when provided by third parties who are *not* ethnic kin (see Figure 16). The effect of diplomatic aid from unrelated supporters is substantial, reducing the chance of an end to fighting by 63%.

Figure 16. Effect of Diplomatic Support and Lobbying by Third Parties

In fact, however, the effect of diplomacy by ethnic kin is driven by the only two cases of diplomacy by cross-border kin, in Azerbaijan (kin in Armenia) and Cyprus (kin in Turkey and Greece). These appear to shorten conflict since the two wars were relatively short. This result is misleading. In the conflict in Azerbaijan, Armenian involvement actually complicated bargaining and prolonged the conflict. In Cyprus, the

opposing Greek and Turkish efforts made it harder to resolve the conflict. Thus, these two cases obscure the significant prolongation of conflicts resulting from lobbying by the diaspora. If the two observations are dropped, diplomacy from the diaspora reduces the chance that conflict will end in a given month by 48%.[145]

As the discussion shows, although the underlying processes are not always clear, the primary hypotheses are consistently and strongly supported by the data. Aid from third parties lengthens ethnic civil wars. Moreover, when that aid is supplied by ethnic kin in a neighboring state or further abroad, it has a greater effect than aid supplied by unrelated supporters. Conflicts in which only one group of combatants receives aid follow a distinct path. These results are summarized in Table 6.

Table 6. Summary of the Effects of Aid from Third Parties

Variable	Predicted Effect on War Duration	Effect on War Duration
Third Party Aid	Lengthen	Lengthens
One-Sided Third Party Aid	Distinct	Distinct
Aid from Ethnic Kin	Lengthen	Lengthens
One-Sided Aid from Ethnic Kin	Distinct	Distinct
Aid from Cross-Border Kin	Lengthen	Lengthens
One-Sided Aid from Cross-Border Kin	Distinct	Distinct
Aid from Diaspora	Lengthen	Lengthens
One-Sided Aid from Diaspora	Distinct	Distinct
Aid from Other Third Parties	Lengthen	Lengthens
One-Sided Aid from Other Third Parties	Distinct	Distinct
Lootable Resources		Lengthens
Log Population		No effect
Log GDP per capita		No effect
Conflict Intensity		Shortens
Ethnic Fractionalization		No effect
Cold War		No effect

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[145] p = .103. This effect is still smaller than that of diplomatic aid from unrelated supporters.

Below, I investigate these broad effects in more detail, using the civil wars in Aceh and West Papua, Indonesia to illustrate the mechanisms through which third party aid can shape the length of ethnic civil wars.

4.0 Third Party Support in Indonesia

Indonesia has been involved in multiple civil wars since gaining independence. In the remainder of this chapter, I focus on two of these conflicts. In Aceh, separatists launched an armed rebellion in 1989. By the end of 1991, most of the rebellion's leaders and followers were dead, exiled, or in prison.[146] In West Papua, separatists violently contested Indonesian rule as early as 1965. The conflict has continued to the present.

These two wars illustrate several ways that third parties can affect the duration of ethnic civil wars. Most notably, while Libyan training helped the Acehnese to launch an armed rebellion, they could not sustain the conflict. The Acehnese had only limited support from other sources. The absence of significant external aid allowed the Indonesian military to defeat the rebellion in Aceh in a relatively short conflict. In West Papua, cross-border kin in Papua New Guinea have sheltered guerrillas, facilitated smuggling and escape routes, and supported training sites outside the reach of Indonesia. This aid helped the movement to evade military operations for decades and has helped to prolong the conflict.

Below, I briefly introduce each conflict. I then discuss why these two wars provide a good comparison, by virtue of their many similarities. I focus on both

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[146] The first rebellion in the province (1979-1982) is not included in the dataset because it did not meet the 1,000 deaths threshold. Conflict broke out again in 1998-1999 and lasted until shortly after the 2004 tsunami. This is coded as a separate war in the dataset because of the long break in the fighting. I focus on this second phase of the conflict rather than the final phase since the tsunami – in effect, an exogenous shock – makes it much more difficult to disentangle the elements of my theory.

prominent alternative explanations and the inter-ethnic interactions I investigated in the previous chapter. I then turn to the role of third parties in the duration of each war. I will argue that while support for the rebel movements has fluctuated, the conflict in Papua has lasted so much longer in large part because of the opportunities provided by escape into Papua New Guinea. Acehnese rebels were quickly defeated because they could not draw on any comparable base of external supporters.

4.1 Overview of the Conflicts[147]

4.1.1 Aceh

Aceh played a central role in Indonesia's fight for independence; however, the province was also the focal point of the Darul Islam rebellion, which sought a greater role for Islam in Indonesia. After the rebellion, Aceh was granted special status, but this steadily eroded under Suharto's New Order. In 1976, a local leader named Hasan di Tiro declared the province's independence, forming the *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (GAM), or Free Aceh Movement. The government responded with force. In 1979, di Tiro and many of his followers fled Indonesia, and violence had ended by 1982.

In 1989, however, conflict broke out in the province on a much wider scale. The following June, Indonesia designated the region an area of military operations (*Daerah Operasi Militar,* or DOM). Between 2,000 and 10,000 Acehnese died in the first two years of the DOM (Asia Watch 1990; Ross 2005).[148] By late 1991, most of the GAM's followers were captured, killed, or had fled abroad. I focus on this second rebellion in the following analysis.

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[147] Maps of Indonesia and the two separatist regions are in Appendix C.
[148] Davies (2006) argues that the presence of 100,000 war widows suggests the number of dead may be substantially higher than even the highest published estimates.

4.1.2 West Papua / Irian Jaya

In 1962, the New York Agreement transferred West Papua – also known as Irian Jaya – from Dutch rule to Indonesia. By 1965, Papuans were demanding independence under a movement known as *Organisasi Papua Merdeka* (OPM, or Free Papua Organization).[149] The struggle continued through both nonviolent and violent means after a 1969 referendum on the province's autonomy that was controlled by Indonesia (Chauvel 2005). Fighting escalated to especially deadly levels in 1977 and again in 1984.

After Suharto's fall, Indonesia liberalized its policies in Papua. For much of the conflict, supporting the OPM had been the only channel for dissatisfaction with the region's status. Activists responded to the new opportunities of the late 1990s with a greater emphasis on nonviolent strategies.[150] However, the brief 'Papuan Spring' ended with a government crackdown in 2000-2001. Although public opinion is even more in favor of independence than before, nonviolent methods have become much more prominent than the military approach which was more significant in earlier phases (Chauvel 2003; King 2004; MacLeod 2007). Most of the analysis below focuses on the first four decades of the conflict, although I also discuss current opinions and attitudes in the region when such information is available.[151] Although estimates are rudimentary at

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[149] Other forms of support for independence began several years earlier.
The OPM is far from a unified movement. Moreover, the term is often used as a euphemism to describe all pro-independence Papuans, or even more broadly, a mindset or aspiration for freedom. A more accurate term for the movement may be TPN or TPN-PN, which is often considered the armed wing of the independence movement (Chauvel 2009; Glazebrook 2009; MacLeod 2007). Since OPM is the more familiar term and individuals often have pursued both peaceful and violent strategies over the course of the conflict, I will continue to use OPM here to refer to the military/political institution and its supporters.
[150] See, for example, Chauvel (2003), who argues that *reformasi* added new strategies to West Papuan activists' repertoire, which previously were limited to joining the OPM or going into exile.
[151] This is primarily because there is very limited information currently available on the most recent developments and on opinions in Papua. Informal conversations indicate, however, that there is widespread desire for a settlement to the conflict (Anonymous n.d.). This is not inconsistent with my theory, which merely argues that fears for the future can prevent such desires from being realized and/or that external parties can help militant groups to continue waging a violent struggle.

best and vary widely, as many as 200,000 people may have been killed during this time, with many of those deaths resulting from policies such as the aerial strafing of villages[152] (Elmslie 2002; Osborne 1985; TAPOL 1983).

4.2 Analysis

Why has the conflict in Papua lasted four decades, while the war in Aceh ended after two years? Both civil wars were in the same state and thus are especially well-suited to a comparative case study because they already include natural 'controls' for a number of potential determinants of this variation. Below, I briefly discuss the key similarities between the two conflicts. In Chapter Four, I focused on how ethnic interactions influence commitment and signaling problems. Ethnic interactions played similar roles in Aceh and Papua. Since this is a key element of my theory, however, I discuss this factor in slightly more detail below. I then focus on the ways in which third party support influenced the durations of the two wars.

4.2.1 Alternative Explanations

The Indonesian military's strategy was similar in Aceh and West Papua, suggesting that this factor cannot adequately explain why the war in Papua has lasted so long.[153] Since both wars were in Indonesia, the difference in the two conflicts' lengths also cannot be explained by poverty (Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2004), state capacity (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan n.d.; DeRouen and Sobek 2004), or the

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[152] Internal displacement also is extremely high: Glazebrook (2008) estimates that 20,000 Papuans were displaced between 2001 and 2006 alone.
[153] This included the deployment of large numbers of troops who operated using tactics such as mass arrests, disappearances, coercion of local elites, and selective killings carried out to intimidate local residents.

possibility of other rebellions that might have increased Jakarta's reluctance to relinquish territory (Walter 2006). The goals or aims of a rebel movement may affect the length of a conflict (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Buhaug 2005; Walter 2004). However, both GAM and OPM have sought independence.[154]

The government's other incentives to retain the two provinces also were similar. Aceh has symbolic value for Jakarta as one of the centers of the independence movement against Dutch colonialism. The region also has economic value as the fourth largest contributor to the national revenue (Sulistiyanto 2001). Both the government and the military benefit from the province's abundant resources, which include natural gas, wood, fish, rubber, and coffee (Kingsbury and McCulloch 2006; Robinson 1998).

Papua was the last area of the Dutch East Indies to come under Indonesian control, giving it an ideological and symbolic value comparable to that of Aceh (Elmslie 2002). Moreover, Papua also contributes tremendous wealth to the military and the central government. The Freeport Copper and Gold Mine is Indonesia's largest taxpayer, and the hundreds of millions of dollars it contributes to Indonesia's budget each year are supplemented with revenues from oil, wood, and other minerals (Elmslie 2002; Global Witness 2005; Hedman 2007). In seems unlikely, then, that Indonesia expended more effort to defeat the GAM because it alone threatened central control or because Aceh was a more valuable region.

In both provinces, the military has strong economic incentives to resist peaceful settlements and thus retain a substantial presence on the ground. Individual soldiers benefit from promotions and combat pay. Even more important are the illegal benefits: in Aceh, these include marijuana trafficking and logging; in Papua, the military benefits

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[154] Both groups also have indicated that extensive autonomy might be an acceptable short-term solution.

from logging, smuggling wild animals, extortion, and human trafficking. The cases thus highlight how lootable resources can prolong conflict through many different mechanisms. In this case, resources have been less important for funding rebel movements. Instead, they have created perverse incentives for the army to retain control of separatist regions (Anonymous n.d.[155]; Global Witness 2005; Kingsbury and McCulloch 2006).

The balance of military capabilities also was similar in both conflicts. Concrete numbers are almost impossible to obtain, but in both Aceh and Papua, a relatively small number of poorly-armed rebels faced up to 15,000 military and police. Both the GAM and OPM positions were bolstered by widespread support from the local population, better knowledge of the local terrain, and defections from local Indonesian military units.[156] At the same time, both movements were divided by factionalization and in-fighting (Elmslie 2002; Kell 1995; MacLeod 2007; Nessen 2006; Osborne 1985; Schulze 2003; Siegel 2000). Therefore, the conflict in Papua has not lasted so much longer because the rebel forces were substantially stronger.

Low-intensity conflicts may last longer (Fearon 2004b). The conflict intensity was slightly higher in Aceh than in West Papua.[157] However, the difference is fairly small, and both conflicts are among the least intense 25% of wars in the dataset. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the war in Papua continues because the costs are more tolerable.

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[155] This information and all subsequent attributions to 'Anonymous' was reported to me by observers in the border area. I have kept the identity of the sources confidential to protect these individuals and their friends and contacts in the region.

[156] The OPM seems able to mobilize a larger number of supporters at certain times than the GAM could. Experts on the region unanimously acknowledge that firm numbers are impossible to gather, in part because many OPM fighters are 'part-time' guerrillas who only occasionally train or fight with the rebels.

[157] The intensity, or rate of deaths, was 83.3 in Aceh and 68.6 in Papua.

The populations in the two regions were of similar sizes,[158] suggesting that

Papua's rebellion was not longer because more potential recruits were available to fuel

the conflict (Fearon 2004b; Hegre and Sambanis 2006).

Finally, as I mentioned above, lootable resources can significantly prolong

conflicts when rebels use them to fund their struggles (Ross 2004, 2006). In Papua, the

OPM may benefit from gold and timber smuggling, although their revenues from this

source appear to be relatively small (Anonymous n.d.). Both the GAM and OPM most

likely raised some funds from marijuana cultivation. In both cases, the scope of the trade

appears to have been limited (Elmslie 2002; Glazebrook 2001; Kell 1995; Siegel 2000).

Thus, differences in access to financing from contraband cannot explain why Papua's war

lasted so much longer than the conflict in Aceh.

4.2.2 Ethnic Interactions

In both Aceh and Papua, discrimination was fairly high, and transmigration from

other regions of Indonesia further threatened the local populations' economic and

political rights (Elmslie 2002; Schulze 2003).[159] In Aceh, economic distribution was

especially contentious. Although the liquid natural gas boom in the territory benefitted

the local infrastructure, relatively few locals were employed in the industry, especially at

high levels (Ross 2005; Sulistiyanto 2001). Moreover, despite the fact that Aceh

contributed tremendous wealth to the central government, most of that wealth was not

returned to the province: Aceh had the highest percentage of poor villages among

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[158] The log of population in Papua in 1969 was 13.6; it rose to 14.8 by 2005. In 1980, the log population in Aceh was 14.9. If we consider this difference to be salient, Papua's slightly smaller population would suggest the opposite effect: the conflict should be *shorter* than the war in Aceh.
[159] Transmigration and socioeconomic divides between transmigrants and indigenous residents are likely somewhat higher in Papua (Chauvel 2009).

Indonesia's provinces in the late 1980s, and government spending on areas such as education was especially low (Davies 2006; Kell 1995).

In Papua, discrimination was most pernicious along cultural lines, through Indonesianization of the education system and forced adoption of Indonesian customs, especially among tribes such as the Dani (Osborne 1985; TAPOL 1983). Political repression and economic distribution also provoked resentment, as revenues from the Freeport mine and other extractive industries in the province accrued almost entirely to the central government. High rates of malnourishment and low education levels reflect Jakarta's low spending on human development in the province (Glazebrook 2008; King 2004; Scott and Tebay 2005). In sum, since discrimination on multiple dimensions fueled commitment problems and both the GAM and OPM platforms, it cannot satisfactorily explain why the conflict in Aceh ended so much more quickly.

The Darul Islam rebellion and conflicts in the 1970s exacerbated commitment problems for some Acehnese. In West Papua, there were no conflicts with Indonesia prior to the Dutch decolonization period. However, this difference should produce the opposing effect – that the war in *Papua* should have been shorter – and thus cannot explain why the war in Aceh was so much shorter.

Atrocities were high in both regions. The military regularly abducted and killed individuals on the mere suspicion of support for GAM or OPM. Family members were routinely tortured to encourage GAM or OPM members to surrender. Civilians were indiscriminately targeted. Bodies were publicly displayed as a message to potential rebel supporters in both regions. In both Aceh and West Papua, these atrocities increased hostility toward the central government and support for the rebel movements. Moreover,

they strengthened both Acehnese and Papuan senses of identity and produced profound distrust of government efforts to liberalize policy in the regions (Chauvel 2003; Glazebrook 2008; King 2004; Siegel 2000). Since atrocities occurred at similar rates with similar effects on perceptions, the variation in the two conflicts' lengths cannot derive from differences in the frequency or scope of atrocities.

In both cases, individuals defined their identity in opposition to being Indonesian or Javanese. West Papuans usually are easily identifiable as such; this is not the case for Acehnese. However, there is no evidence that this produced greater fears of being targeted among Papuans. This is most likely because both populations were segregated, and atrocities were indiscriminate within the regions. Indeed, simply being Papuan or Acehnese often was equated with being a guerrilla supporter. Most Papuans and Acehnese thus had similar chances of being victims in the conflicts (Chauvel 2005; Kirsch 2007; Scott and Tebay 2005).

Segregation also cannot satisfactorily explain why the war in West Papua has lasted so much longer. Most Acehnese and West Papuan interactions with other Indonesians were with transmigrants, bureaucrats, or the military. Relations with transmigrants in both regions were often cordial. In urban areas, Papuans interact economically with other Indonesians; they often attend the same churches as well. These relationships sometimes are marked by tensions, but rarely by outright violence. Inter-marriage between Papuans and settlers also occurs fairly frequently. There is little evidence that the frequency of interactions exacerbated signaling or commitment problems in either conflict, but it did shape predictions about future relations with the central government (Chauvel 2007, 2009; International Commission of Jurists 1985; Kell

1995). Yet since segregation appears to have had similar effects in the two regions, it also is not a convincing explanation for the differences between the two conflicts.

4.2.3 Third Party Support in Aceh and West Papua

When can combatants continue to wage war against a vastly superior military force? Outside support can critically bolster combatants' capabilities. However, this support rarely produces a swift victory. Three mechanisms each can produce this outcome. First, when third party support reduces disparities between the combatants and facilitates recruiting, it encourages a military stalemate. Second, aid can make combatants more bellicose, encouraging them to demand more concessions. Finally, third parties can complicate bargaining, preventing the parties from reaching a mutually acceptable settlement.

Aid from Unrelated Third Parties

Libya was the most notable supporter of the GAM. In 1986, Libya began training groups of Acehnese recruits.[160] Estimates of the numbers of GAM members sent to Libya vary, but at least 600, and possibly over 1,000, Acehnese trained there. Libya did not provide weapons to the trainees (Asia Watch 1991; Ross 2005; Schulze 2003). Between 150 and 800 of these recruits returned to Aceh in 1989, providing GAM with a qualitatively stronger force. The insurgency was renewed a few months later, largely due to this influx of trained fighters (Ross 2005). However, the recruits suffered heavy casualties almost immediately; their weak performance clearly shocked the GAM leadership (Nessen 2006).

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[160] The recruits also received ideological training from GAM leader di Tiro.

Although the Libyan aid may have slightly prolonged the civil war in Aceh, it was not substantial enough to produce a military stalemate. This may be partly because Indonesia bought weapons and received economic and diplomatic aid from the United States and Australia. More importantly, however, it seems that without material support, small amounts of training have little effect on a rebellion's viability.

The OPM has been unsuccessful in mobilizing significant support from third parties who do not share ethnic ties with Papuans. Attempts to garner military aid from the Soviet Union in the mid-1980s were unsuccessful. While there are solidarity groups in some European countries and in Australia, their activities have been limited for most of the conflict (Blaskett 1989; May 1986). In the post-Suharto era, several groups in these countries and in the United States have pressured the Indonesian government to limit repression and intimidation in West Papua (King 2004). While this has had little effect on the length of the conflict, it has helped to limit its severity. As I discuss below, Jakarta has become more sensitive to Western pressure in the last decade. This may reflect the realization that the Cold War-era unconditional support is over, and/or it may reveal pressures on the more democratic regimes in power (Anonymous n.d.).

Unrelated third parties did not affect the length of the wars either in Aceh or in Papua. However, they have limited the intensity of the conflict in Papua recently; insofar as this shapes duration, it may indirectly affect the length of the war. In Aceh, the moderate Libyan support was clearly not enough to significantly impact the military balance, as evidenced by the rapid defeat of the trainees. In fact, the support Indonesia drew from its allies probably made the conflict even shorter than it might have been. Thus, this conflict illustrates that third party support must be fairly substantial to

151

significantly affect conflict duration, especially when more than one actor receives outside aid.

Aid from the Diaspora

The Acehnese and Papuan diasporas played limited roles in the two rebellions. Prominent GAM leaders have lived in exile, primarily in Sweden, since they fled in 1979. Although they have spearheaded diplomatic efforts, these garnered little external support during the civil war. GAM solidarity and information offices in Australia, the US, and Europe also were unable to generate either material or diplomatic aid for the Acehnese cause in the 1980s and early 1990s (Kell 1995; Schulze 2003; Vatikiotis 1991). The failure of either Acehnese in the diaspora or unrelated third parties to supply significant amounts of aid facilitated the Indonesian army's relatively swift victory in the province.

The Papuan diaspora has not provided significant material support to the OPM either. Some attempts to smuggle weapons to Papua from Australia have been exposed, and it seems likely that some shipments have gotten through. However, these are almost certainly limited in scope (Elmslie 2002; May 1986; Osborne 1986). Given that the OPM continues to fight with very limited weapons – both in quantity and quality – these efforts seem to have had little effect on the length of the conflict.

The diaspora has been slightly more successful diplomatically. Many of the most prominent OPM leaders live in exile. In the last decade, the diaspora has finally been able to effectively mobilize solidarity movements in Europe, New Zealand, and Australia. Diaspora support has been most vocal in sympathetic Pacific Island states, especially Vanuatu, Nauru, and Tuvalu (Chauvel 2005, 2007; King 2004; von Stokirch 2001).

While these efforts have had little effect on the course of the conflict, diplomatic appeals have gained a wider audience and generated some limited pressure on Indonesia in the last few years. These have been especially important in limiting repression by the military, in concert with the solidarity movements based among unrelated supporters that I discussed above (Kirsch 2007; MacLeod 2007).

Both wars illustrate that diaspora lobbying often is unsuccessful, particularly when the diaspora is fairly small and cannot mobilize substantial resources on behalf of its kin. Unfortunately, these cases cannot speak to the role of financial aid or weapons, since neither diaspora provided this type of aid.

Aid from Cross-Border Kin

Cross-border kin play starkly different roles in these two wars. Acehnese in Singapore[161] primarily disseminated information about the conflict; however, this did not generate any pressure on Indonesia from the international community (Schulze 2003). The 10,000 Acehnese in Malaysia played a more active role. In particular, the community raised money for weapons and was a base for the operational leadership (Kell 1995; Schulze 2003). Given the near-total defeat of the GAM in Aceh itself, this aid seems to have been critical in preventing the total destruction of the movement itself in both 1982 and 1991.

Malaysia and Singapore also served as sanctuaries and transit routes for GAM guerrillas, especially as the Libyan trainees entered Aceh in 1989 (Ross 2005; Vatikiotis 1991). However, it proved relatively difficult for individuals to move frequently across

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[161] The Strait of Malacca is less than 50 miles across in some places; thus, I consider Acehnese in Singapore and Malaysia as cross-border kin.

the Straits, in part because Malaysian authorities cooperated with Indonesia to return Acehnese to Jakarta in several instances (Kell 1995; Robinson 1998; Vatikiotis 1991). This limited the role of Acehnese abroad in sustaining the rebellion.

The safe havens in Malaysia and Singapore thus operated primarily as a place where leaders could escape in 1979-1982 and in 1991. In each case, the GAM was only able to return with effective fighting capabilities almost a decade later. Thus, while cross-border kin helped to sustain the GAM as a movement, they could not provide enough support to prevent its military defeat and prolong the civil war.

Cross-border kin in Papua New Guinea (PNG) played a very different role in the conflict in Papua. The OPM has moved easily and frequently across the border for most of the conflict, facilitated by its ties with individuals in PNG. The border itself is approximately 500 miles long, and the region is sparsely populated and mostly inaccessible by roads, all of which also have facilitated the guerrilla campaign (May 1987). In addition to using PNG as a safe haven, the OPM has received some material and diplomatic aid from both native PNG citizens and West Papuans living in PNG, as I describe below. However, more passive forms of aid, especially shelter, have had an especially critical effect on the length of the war.

Thousands of West Papuans live in PNG. By 1979, 10,000 West Papuans lived in exile, most of them in PNG. Eleven thousand more West Papuans entered PNG between February 1984 and October 1985, representing over half the residents of the border region and dramatically altering the demographic balance in PNG.[162] In 2007, 13,500 Indonesian citizens still remained in PNG (Blaskett 1989; Hedman 2007; TAPOL 1983).

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[162] This mass movement was sparked by a failed uprising but individuals fled for complex reasons. The motives for flight also varied by region. While many feared Indonesian repression or simply fled to avoid

154

The OPM had an established and active presence in some of the refugee camps

and towns along the northern part of the border as early as 1966 (Blaskett 1989;

International Commission of Jurists 1985; May 1986). It retained and at times expanded

its influence southwards throughout the next four decades.[163] Guerrillas use these areas

for shelter and bases, to recruit members, and to re-supply, and they train in the

surrounding forest (Anonymous n.d.; International Commission of Jurists 1985; King

2004). There also are frequent – albeit undocumented – reports of a weapons trade across

the border, facilitated by both West Papuans and PNG citizens (Anonymous n.d.; Elmslie

2002; ICG 2002; May 1986). OPM leaders also have used PNG as a safe haven: they

have helped coordinate activities along the border from Port Moresby, and the 1977 West

Papuan cabinet in exile included several PNG residents (International Commission of

Jurists 1985; King 2004; May 1986).[164]

While the movement might have survived without support in PNG, the aid from

West Papuans there certainly contributed to the movement's survival over the last four

decades. OPM members' ability to protect their families from the military by sending

them to PNG facilitated recruitment in a number of cases, since active supporters did not

have to fear reprisals against their families. Less tangibly, the ability to escape pursuit

fighting, the OPM sometimes encouraged the refugees to leave in order to gain publicity and pressure PNG
for greater support for the movement. (Glazebrook 2008; King 2004). Kirsch (2007) aptly terms the
OPM's policy regarding these refugees as mobilizing the "politics of sympathy," following Keck and
Sikkink (1998). OPM fighters also have sent family members to the camps to shelter them from
Indonesian military operations (Anonymous n.d.)
A 1984 survey recorded that 48% of the population in the North Ok Tedi province and 30% of the
population in the Moian region were born in West Papua (May 1987).
[163] The areas of OPM influence and local support fluctuate over time. Support has been most consistent in
the north. Although the PNG government relocated several camps away from the border to curb this
assistance (Glazebrook 2008), it appears this effort was only partly successful.
[164] West Papuan elites in PNG have played a less active role in the conflict in recent years. Chauvel (2009)
suggests this may be because of the ease with which West Papuans have assimilated into PNG society.
This assimilation process also may have curbed OPM efforts to mobilize more concrete support from the
refugee and border-crosser communities. Notable tensions do remain. See Glazebrook (2008) or Kirsch
(2007).

and to rest and recuperate by crossing the border reduces the number of OPM supporters

killed; those who can get to PNG survive to continue their struggle another day (Chauvel

2009). In fact, this illustrates how important even passive assistance from co-ethnics can

be: merely by not turning in those coming from West Papua, cross-border kin can help

the OPM. The importance of this assistance was affirmed by the guerrillas' decision to

operate primarily within a short distance of three refugee camps in the north throughout

the 1980s, due to the shelter and support they provided (Elmslie 2002; Osborne 1986).[165]

The OPM has had tremendous difficulty obtaining weapons and makes many of

its own, supplementing them with weapons captured in raids on the Indonesian military.

Financial support from refugees, border crossers, permissive residents, and PNG citizens

has been extremely limited, at least in part due to their own limited resources. Some

rumors indicate that smuggling and drug and weapons trafficking among West Papuans

in PNG supports the OPM, but most of this is unsubstantiated.[166] Regardless, it seems to

generate at most a very limited source of income (Anonymous n.d.; May 1986).

Papua New Guineans also have aided the OPM. Co-ethnic ties are dense in the

border regions and often are accompanied by strong norms of kin solidarity and support

and sympathy for West Papuans (Blaskett 1989; Glazebrook 2008; King 2004).[167] This

has added another layer to the conflict. PNG citizens have harbored West Papuans and

hidden weapons. The task is made easier by the fact that West Papuans often cannot be

distinguished from PNG citizens even by other Papuans (Blaskett 1989; King 2004; May

1986). While West Papuan civilians usually are the beneficiaries of Papua New

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[165] The Green River, Kameratoro, and Blackwater camps.
[166] See also Glazebrook (2008) for details on a 1998 police raid at the East Awin camp.
[167] For example, one survey found that 50% of the West Papuans interviewed in PNG had blood relatives in PNG (Glazebrook 2001). Less altruistic motives – particularly fear of reprisals – also encourage support in some cases (Blaskett 1989; May 1986).

Guineans' support, PNG citizens also have sheltered OPM rebels. Several pieces of indirect evidence support this claim. Most notably, it is clear that active OPM members reside in the border area. For example, a 1983 survey of individuals living in the Middle Fly area of PNG revealed several who considered their "usual occupation" to be "OPM guerrillas" (Blaskett 1989).[168] As I discuss below, the PNG government has cracked down on OPM activities at several points. Their continued presence therefore indicates that, at a minimum, local residents are unwilling to turn them in. Moreover, although cross-border kin provide very little direct military aid to the OPM, PNG citizens have trained with the OPM (Anonymous n.d.).

Cross-border kin in PNG also have provided diplomatic support, although its effect has been limited. Many of the refugees and border crossers in PNG interpret their mere presence in political terms. Glazebrook (2004, 2008) has shown that many of these West Papuans remain in PNG because they believe that returning before *merdeka*, or independence, would render their suffering meaningless. Fear of retaliation by the military also encourages many to stay (Chauvel 2007; Glazebrook 2004, 2008; International Commission of Jurists 1985). The presence of this community sometimes has generated muted pressure on Indonesia to resolve the conflict. West Papuans also disseminate information about the conflict and mobilize support in Port Moresby and other towns, as well as in the refugee camps, despite this activity often violating the terms of their resident status (Blaskett 1989; Glazebrook 2004, 2008; King 2004; May 1986).[169] Although this support has had few concrete effects, it has been more successful in the last

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[168] I do not have access to the original survey, which appears to be a PNG government-sponsored census of the border region.
[169] See Glazebrook (2004, 2008) for further discussion on permissive resident status.

decade as West Papuans have joined forces with supporters in other Pacific states and in the United States.

The government of PNG has pursued several policies in response to the conflict. May (1986: 97) summarizes the dilemma as follows: "Papua New Guinea did not want to act against 'other Melanesians' but, at the same time, the government could not afford a falling-out with Indonesia." Indonesian-PNG relations have at times become quite strained as a result of cross-border raids, and some Papua New Guineans feared that an invasion was possible in the 1970s and 1980s. In response to pressure from its much stronger neighbor, PNG has deported border-crossers, tried PNG citizens for harboring border-crossers, and relocated many of the refugee camps away from the border (Blaskett 1989; King 2004; May 1986).[170]

The PNG government has had little direct influence on the length of the war. But this conflict highlights that combatants may benefit when co-ethnics control a government, even in the absence of official support. The OPM benefits from the border region's weak policing, and more importantly, from sympathetic local police forces. Local officials freely admit they have little desire to crack down on the OPM, either because they sympathize with its goals or because they fear retaliation (Blaskett 1989; King 2004). Many PNG officials have simply conceded that a military solution would be futile, given public opinion. For instance, the Commander of the Defense Forces argued that "support among Papua New Guineans near the border is so strong that no military campaign in Papua New Guinea against the guerrillas in its territory could succeed" (Blaskett 1989: 109). Furthermore, as Blaskett (1989) speculates, because PNG raids in

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[170] West Papuans in PNG clearly interpret many of the government's policies as driven by fear of Indonesia (Glazebrook 2008).

the 1970s and 1980s rarely caught OPM guerrillas, it was likely that they were being tipped off by sympathizers in the Defense Forces.

Public opinion in PNG has counteracted the pressure from Indonesia in some instances, although there is little evidence of a direct effect on the war itself. Particularly during the 1980s, major demonstrations in support of Papuan independence deeply disturbed the government, and PNG citizens even rioted over deportations of West Papuans (Glazebrook 2001; King 2004; May 1987; Osborne 1985). Many officials who sympathize with the West Papuans also have worked within the constraints of the Indonesian-PNG relationship to express this. The government also sporadically maintained contact with the OPM in the 1980s, believing that dialogue could more effectively influence the organization's behavior than a military solution (Blaskett 1989; Glazebrook 2001).[171]

In sum, support from Papua New Guineans and West Papuans living in PNG has influenced the conflict in several ways. First, it helped OPM members to escape the Indonesian military. This prevented the movement's defeat at several key junctures. Second, co-ethnic supporters facilitated training and provided recruits (at least as 'part-time' guerrillas). Third, they augmented OPM supplies, although there was little direct military aid. Finally, they have helped to publicize the conflict, although this too has had a limited effect on the course of the war. This support has helped the OPM to survive, even in the face of massive Indonesian military campaigns. Below, I review the insights of these two case studies and discuss them in light of the statistical analyses.

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[171] Some officials framed this approach as dealing with the conflict "in a Melanesian way" (Blaskett 1989: 101).

5.0 Conclusions

Third parties play central roles in many civil wars. This chapter has highlighted several effects of outside support in ethnic wars. First, when co-ethnics become involved in conflicts, they prolong the wars much more than do non-related supporters. Although the data cannot definitively show why this is the case, it seems likely that it is in part because co-ethnics offer sustained and unconditional support in many conflicts. Aid to only one party has a smaller, but distinct, effect.

The case studies bolster these findings and lend some support to the speculation on why we observe this pattern. In Aceh, Libyan aid helped to launch the rebellion but was not systematic enough to sustain the GAM. The OPM, on the other hand, has drawn on support from the West Papuan diaspora and Papuans in PNG for much of the last 40 years, although the magnitude and form of this support has fluctuated over time. This aid has helped the movement to survive and continue fighting. Throughout this period, Indonesia also received weapons and economic aid from unrelated third parties. In Aceh, this aid probably facilitated the GAM's defeat. In Papua, however, it has not been substantial enough to defeat the OPM. This indicates that even fairly low levels of aid from ethnic kin may help to balance an adversaries' military advantage.

Support from diasporas and cross-border kin similarly affect the length of conflicts. However, the *form* of this support matters. Cross-border kin who provide shelters and bases can substantially increase a rebellion's viability. The OPM's survival is testament to this effect, as ethnic kin in PNG have helped the militarily weak guerrillas to survive. The GAM case lends some weak support to this conclusion, as well. While shelters in Malaysia and Singapore could not help the GAM continue fighting, they did

allow the movement and its leaders to survive and renew the rebellion, albeit almost a decade later.

Moreover, when co-ethnics control a neighboring state, even unofficial support can help to sustain a rebellion. While the PNG government has been ambivalent, at best, toward the OPM, local officials have at times played a more salient role by refusing to crack down on guerrillas.[172] This has facilitated the OPM's transit and its cross-border activities in PNG.

So why did bases and shelters in a neighboring state help the OPM, while having relatively little effect on the GAM rebellion? Two factors seem important. First, the OPM moves back and forth across the border. The ability to re-enter West Papua allows them to continue fighting; because GAM members could not re-enter Aceh as easily, their escape essentially postponed the rebellion. Second, PNG turned OPM members over to Indonesia only infrequently; Malaysia cooperated more closely with Jakarta, which made the GAM's task more difficult.

Financial transfers and weapons from ethnic kin have a slightly smaller effect, but still prolong civil wars. And while diplomatic support has substantially less impact on the length of conflicts, it still significantly prolongs ethnic civil wars. Unfortunately, the case studies cannot illuminate the relative effects of different forms of support, since both the GAM and OPM primarily benefitted from shelters supplied by co-ethnics. Transfers of money or weapons were extremely limited in both cases. While ethnic kin provided some diplomatic aid to the combatants, the scope of this was extremely limited. What the cases do indicate is that diplomatic aid may have a compound effect. Indeed, it was only

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[172] As I discuss above, at least some of this is likely because of fear of OPM reprisals. It also appears to be motivated by genuine sympathy in many cases.

when Papuan supporters in several different areas joined forces that they had a demonstrable – albeit limited – effect on the conflict. As I discuss below, this almost certainly was a function of changes in Jakarta, too.

The aid the two movements received impacted the balances of capabilities, but had little influence on the combatants' bargaining relationships. Both the GAM and OPM demanded independence, or at a minimum, far-reaching autonomy. The goals of the two movements remained consistent throughout the conflicts.[173] There is no evidence that outside support created a moral hazard problem, leading the rebel movements to escalate their demands.

Outside parties also did not introduce significant uncertainty into the conflicts. In Aceh, the government likely did not know about Libyan aid for the GAM at the time of the conflict. Second, because the Malaysian government cooperated with Indonesia to curtail movement across the Straits of Molucca, the shelter offered by cross-border kin there also did not introduce any significant uncertainty into Indonesian perceptions of the conflict.[174] And, prominent GAM leaders did not advocate different solutions from local leaders. In West Papua, the Indonesian government was most concerned about cross-border kin in the early years of the conflict. Although the Indonesian government clearly was apprehensive about PNG's role in the conflict, as evidenced by the pressure it exerted on the PNG government, there is no evidence that this influenced its overall position on West Papua. More recently, Jakarta has seen little threat from West Papuans in PNG and elsewhere. Leaders in exile have not exercised significant leverage over the

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[173] Independence activists in West Papua *did* experiment with different tactics. It appears that these shifts were partly attempts to mobilize third party supporters. However, these changes appear to have had little effect on the length of the conflict (MacLeod 2007).

[174] If anything, this aid – along with the Libyan training – made the GAM leaders overconfident and may have contributed to their defeat. This suggests one way that external supporters may *shorten* civil wars.

OPM platform, and PNG has shown no desire to officially advocate for Papuan independence. Even after the 1999 referendum on East Timor's independence, Jakarta did not expect third parties to play a substantially different role in Papua, although it was more wary of potential American pressure (Anonymous n.d.).[175]

The cases also suggest that regime type may influence the length of ethnic civil wars, albeit via a complicated path. The post-Suharto opening in West Papua might well have ended the conflict, had the government continued to pursue a conciliatory stance. Many – if not most – Papuans embraced non-violent strategies and re-conceptualizations of *merdeka* that would have facilitated autonomy as a solution, rather than full independence. Thus, democratization could have helped to end the conflict several years ago. The diaspora also has become more active in recent years. The Timorese example raised hopes within West Papua and abroad of an imminent resolution to the conflict. Yet the diaspora also appears to have found an opening in the more liberal regimes over the last ten years.

These dynamics suggest that democracies might experience shorter conflicts under three conditions. First, if democratic institutions lead governments to favor a negotiated resolution to the conflict, wars might be shorter. Alternatively, if democracy increases opportunities for non-violent resistance, it may change the course of the conflict and perhaps promote a negotiated settlement – or at least end the violent phase of a conflict. Third, if some regimes are more sensitive to domestic or international pressures, conflicts might also be shorter (if these pressures are present).

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[175] This occurred after the end of the conflict in Aceh. The central government did clearly fear that it would lose control of the secessionist regions (King 2004). Even in this period, however, PNG showed little interest in intervening. More significantly, the concerns engendered by events in East Timor obviously did not drive Indonesian policy for the first 35 years of the conflict in West Papua.

Although I find little evidence that third party support exacerbated commitment problems, as it did in Azerbaijan and Moldova, perceptions do matter in other ways. The post-Suharto elite has little experience with PNG, which has shaped the government's policies toward the border regions (Chauvel 2009). PNG leaders, on the other hand, have eschewed a more active stance in support of West Papuans, in part because of how they perceive their relationships with both Indonesia and Australia. Neither dynamic directly affects the conflict's duration, but both certainly matter for the broader texture of relations.

The wars in Aceh and West Papua thus reinforce confidence that external supporters can prolong ethnic civil wars. In particular, third parties can help their allies to compensate for military weaknesses and to fight longer, and co-ethnics have an especially important effect. In the next chapter, I compare some ways that third parties and inter-group interactions influence the course of non-ethnic wars.

Chapter 6. Are Ethnic Civil Wars Different from Other Types of Civil Wars?

1.0 Introduction

In the previous two chapters, I demonstrated that ethnicity prolongs ethnic civil wars under two conditions. First, ethnic interactions that exacerbate mistrust and fears of the future fuel longer conflicts. Second, co-ethnics in other states prolong wars when they lend support to the combatants. These two factors explain much of the variation in the length of ethnic civil wars.

In the introduction, I introduced two empirical puzzles. In the last two chapters, I have explained when and why some ethnic civil wars become protracted. Yet ethnic civil wars also are likely to last much longer than wars in which the combatants are organized along other lines. Do the same factors also explain why ethnic civil wars last so much longer than other types of civil wars? In this chapter, I provide tentative answers to this question based on case studies of four civil wars. Two are ethnic conflicts, two are not.

Right-wing Central American governments and Marxist insurgents fought civil wars in the 1970s and 1980s. In El Salvador, the war that began in 1979 pitted wealthy elites, landowners, the government, and the military against a coalition of peasants, labor leaders, and academics. In Guatemala, civil war first broke out in the 1960s. By the late 1970s, tens of thousands of indigenous Maya supported the guerrilla movements fighting against the government and military, transforming the conflict into an ethnic civil war.

In Sri Lanka, the Marxist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP, or People's

Liberation Front) attempted to overthrow the government in 1971. The government

quickly defeated the "one-day revolution." Ethnic Tamil insurgents have posed a much

deeper challenge to the state. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Tamil Tigers or

LTTE) have fought for autonomy or independence since 1983.

In the following sections, I have two goals in comparing the wars in Guatemala

and El Salvador and the two civil wars within Sri Lanka. First, I use the conflicts to

investigate how the elements of my theory differ between ethnic and non-ethnic wars. I

find that many – but not all – of the concepts translate well. For instance, political and

economic discrimination can target any group in society, ethnic or not. Thus, these types

of discrimination can spur commitment problems – beliefs that the probability or costs of

an adversary reneging on a peace deal are high – in much the same fashion in ethnic and

non-ethnic conflicts.[176] Cultural discrimination, however, is unique to ethnically divided

societies. Identifiability can be based on many dimensions. Place of residence may

identify combatants in many different types of conflicts. But the participants in non-

ethnic wars do not fear a clear equivalent to physical traits that would single them out, in

the way that ethnically organized combatants may.

Second, I assess the fit of my theory to each conflict. This is not intended to be a

definitive test of the theory, but rather a preliminary exploration, especially for the non-

ethnic wars. I find that many of the same factors may explain when non-ethnic civil wars

become protracted. Discrimination before a war is especially influential in shaping

perceptions and fueling concerns about future prospects, regardless of how the

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[176] Commitment problems may mean that groups do not even attempt negotiations: that is, these fears
stymie compromise before individuals are even willing to sit at the table with each other. See Chapter Two
for a detailed discussion of commitment problems.

combatants are organized. Atrocities also play very similar roles across conflicts, powerfully influencing predictions about adversaries' future behavior and prolonging fighting. Yet there are crucial differences between ethnic and non-ethnic wars. The relative fixedness of ethnicity can exacerbate commitment problems in some ethnic civil wars. Moreover, while refugees may behave similarly to cross-border kin or to a diaspora, they are not necessarily driven by the same motivations, and they may have distinct effects on conflict duration.

Thus, it seems that these same factors – inter-group interactions and support from third parties – might explain both variation in the length of non-ethnic wars and why many ethnic civil wars last so much longer than civil wars in which the combatants are organized along other lines.

Below, I briefly introduce the Central American wars and then discuss how the conflicts were similar; that is, why are they useful in a comparative analysis? I then assess how intergroup interactions influenced the lengths of the conflicts. Next, I turn to the role of third party aid in Guatemala and El Salvador. In the second portion of the chapter, I analyze the civil wars in Sri Lanka. In the final section, I expand on the above discussion, drawing out the implications of these case comparisons for my theory of civil war duration.

2.0 Guatemala and El Salvador[177]

2.1 Overview of the Conflicts

2.1.1 Guatemala

The government of Guatemala faced significant opposition from guerrilla forces by 1962. In the next seven years of conflict, 30,000 Guatemalans died, many as victims of death squads in urban areas and aerial bombardments of rural villages (CIIDH 1996). The conflict entered a second phase when over 100 Kekchí peasants were killed at a demonstration in Panzós in 1978 and a group of Quiché Maya were killed at the Spanish Embassy in 1980[178] (Schirmer 1998). After these two incidents, Maya swelled the guerrilla forces to between 6,000 and 8,000 active combatants and 250,000-500,000[179] supporters (Jonas 2000; Le Bot 1992). Although the tide began to turn in 1983, peace accords were not signed until 1996.

2.1.2 El Salvador

Business elites and the military controlled El Salvador for much of the 20th century. In the 1970s, political mobilization expanded among both the rural and urban poor. A military coup, escalating repression and attacks on government opponents, and the assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero marked the early stages of the civil war that began in 1979. The civil war pitted leftist guerrilla organizations allied in the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) against the right-wing government.

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[177] Maps of the two countries are in Appendix C.
[178] The group had taken over the embassy to protest military repression.
[179] Indigenous Maya make up approximately 60% of the population in Guatemala; there are significant divisions between specific groups and classes (Jonas 2000). Ladinos – 'whites' or Guatemalans of Hispanic descent – are the other main group. Most Maya involved in the fighting supported the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres, or EGP), which was the most prominent faction in the highlands. The EGP later joined with several other factions to form the URNG, or Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity.

The conflict did not have an ethnic element; in fact, while indigenous communities do exist, they are not especially visible and most Salvadorans see their society as ethnically homogeneous. The FMLN had about 100,000 active supporters, and the number of guerrillas fluctuated between approximately 4,000 and 6,000. The combatants signed peace accords in 1992 (Americas Watch 1991; Bonner 1984; Ching and Tilley 1998; Danner 19993; Montgomery 1982; Wood 2003).

2.2 Analysis

Why did the war in Guatemala last just over twice as long as the conflict in El Salvador? By the early 1970s, the guerrilla groups were virtually defunct. But after the Panzós and Embassy massacres, support from Maya revitalized the rebels and allowed them to keep fighting. Had the guerrillas not been able to draw on the support of this group – which makes up about 60% of Guatemala's population – the war almost certainly would have ended in the 1970s. In essence, there would have been no second phase of the conflict. The rebels' strategy embraced the importance of Maya support to sustain the rebellion.[180] The effects of Maya recruitment bear out the guerrillas' analysis: the organizations more than doubled their reach. By mid-1982, they controlled parts of 16 of the 22 *departamentos* (provinces), half of which had "major" guerrilla support, and the government feared it was about to lose the highlands entirely, if not the war itself (Jonas 1991; Schirmer 1998; Stoll 1993). Thus, if nothing else, Maya support critically sustained the rebellion for this four to five year period.

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[180] At times they even provoked government retaliation in Maya communities to encourage residents to support the guerrillas (Jonas 2000; Le Bot 1992; Stoll 1993).

The crucial question, then, is what explains Maya support for the guerrillas. I focus on this question because the phases of the war are qualitatively distinct. Most datasets treat this conflict as one long war, because low-level violence continued between the two phases of the war. However, I believe it is most defensible and most analytically productive to treat these phases separately.[181] In discussing the duration of the war, then, I focus on the determinants and influence of Maya recruitment. Below, I will show that Maya-ladino relations were central to this mobilization by provoking commitment problems.

Below, I briefly discuss the key similarities between the conflicts in El Salvador and Guatemala, showing why prominent alternative explanations cannot satisfactorily explain why the Guatemalan war lasted so much longer. I then analyze how ethnic interactions affected the length of the war in Guatemala, and how those dynamics might translate to inter-group (non-ethnic) relations in El Salvador. I also discuss the roles of third parties in each of the conflicts.

2.2.1 Alternative Explanations

Poverty can prolong civil wars (Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2004); however, relative wealth was almost equal in Guatemala and El Salvador.[182] Thus, the war in El Salvador was not shorter because people were better off and had more to lose from ongoing violence.

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[181] In some ways, this better serves the purposes I elaborate above: it allows me to compare the non-ethnic war in El Salvador with the ethnic part of the war in Guatemala. In other ways, however, it actually presents a more demanding situation; a within-case comparison of the phases of the Guatemalan war would control for more potential alternative explanations.

[182] The log GDP per capita was 7.71 in El Salvador and 7.55 in Guatemala.

The goals or aims of a rebellion also may affect the length of a conflict (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Buhaug 2005; Walter 2004); however, the rebels in both these wars sought to replace the government with left-wing or Marxist regimes.[183] Walter (2006) asserts that wars may last longer if the government fears signaling weakness to other dissatisfied groups. This was not a concern for the governments of either El Salvador or Guatemala, both of which faced only one set of potential challengers. Thus, neither the goals of the combatants nor the number of potential rebel groups can explain why the war in Guatemala lasted so much longer.

Qualitative differences between the combatants shaped the balance of military capabilities in both wars. Despite international aid and (often) superior technology, the government forces in both Guatemala and El Salvador often were poorly trained. The Guatemalan military faced significant equipment shortages; more important was the low morale. High casualty rates, corruption that depleted military and medical supplies, and overuse of troops all contributed to fatigue and desertions (Jonas 1991; Schirmer 1998). The Salvadoran army sent troops into the field with little, if any, training. Officers did not command, and soldiers refused to leave their barracks after dusk, unless they were visiting the bar. The promotion system rewarded and shielded those who graduated from the Military Academy together, rather than those who were competent. The most important posts militarily were often the least politically valuable and so tended to go to the least competent officers. Moreover, the army faced serious shortages of equipment and troops, making it impossible to hold areas after a campaign. By 1984, the insurgents controlled well over one-third of the country (Americas Watch 1991; Danner 1993).

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[183] Thus, the Guatemalan conflict represents an example of an ethnic war which was not fought for 'ethnic' aims; see Chapter One.

In both countries, the military allied with paramilitary forces and created civilian militias to bolster its capabilities. However, as I discuss below, the quantitative balance of forces was one critical difference between the two conflicts, especially the ability of Guatemalan rebels to draw on support from the Maya population.

The technology of insurgency can influence civil war duration as well (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Both rebel movements operated in favorable terrain. About two-thirds of Guatemala is mountainous, compared to over three-quarters in El Salvador. El Salvador is somewhat less forested, however.[184] Both the FMLN and EGP used this territory to their advantage, operating in remote, difficult to access areas of the countryside.

Low-intensity conflicts – that is, those with a lower rate of deaths – may last longer (Fearon 2004b). However, the wars in Guatemala and El Salvador had almost identical conflict intensities: 8.55 in Guatemala and 8.59 in El Salvador. Thus, it seems unlikely that the Guatemalan civil war lasted longer because the costs of the conflict were more tolerable.

The populations in the two states also were of similar sizes: the population in Guatemala was 4.9 million, and there were 4.5 million Salvadorans when the war began. Therefore, neither of the guerrilla groups had more potential recruits (Fearon 2004b; Hegre and Sambanis 2006).

Finally, lootable resources can significantly prolong conflicts when rebels use them to fund their struggles (Ross 2004, 2006). However, since drugs, diamonds, or

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[184] Contemporary estimates of the forest cover in both countries vary widely. This may be because deforestation is progressing rapidly in much of the region.

other resources did not play a significant role in either of these conflicts, this also cannot provide a satisfactory explanation for the difference in the lengths of the two wars.

2.2.2 Intergroup Interactions

Discrimination

Maya in Guatemala faced sharply limited political and economic opportunities throughout much of the 20th century.[185] Some discrimination was enshrined in law; other disadvantages resulted from long-standing socio-economic patterns. For example, literacy often was used as a determinant of voting eligibility, yet about two-thirds of those disenfranchised under this criterion were Maya. Although the Christian Democrats made some overtures to the indigenous communities, Maya had little voice, and political parties did not truly represent either the poor or the indigenous (Jonas 1991). Political participation for all Guatemalans was restricted after the 1954 coup, meaning that all groups, including Maya, were increasingly alienated from the state (Adams n.d.; Arriola 2004).

Given the voting restrictions, it is perhaps not surprising that Maya had little power at any level of government for much of Guatemala's history. By the mid-1970s, this situation was beginning to change at the local level. Maya candidates captured two deputy positions in 1974 and won mayoral races in a few areas (Arriola 2004; Stoll 1993). Yet these gains were relatively minimal, and even among the ranks of the guerrillas, ladinos filled the leadership positions (Le Bot 1992).

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[185] Although rural ladinos also face barriers, conditions often are even more restrictive for indigenous individuals (Adams 1988).

In addition to the restrictions on political activity, Maya make up most of the rural poor in Guatemala, such that the 'indigenous problem' is almost synonymous with class problems. Economic growth and development in the 1960s and 1970s only widened the gap between rich and poor; in fact, economic and socioeconomic indicators *declined* in Maya communities between the 1950s and 1980s. Malnutrition rates before the civil war were significantly higher in Maya communities, where 84% of the population earned an income below the level necessary for basic subsistence (Le Bot 1992). When 39% of ladinos were illiterate, 61% of Maya were. Infant mortality was twice as high among Maya, whose life expectancy was 16 years lower than that of ladinos. Ladinos took over Maya land at an increasing rate throughout the 20th century, and many indigenous Guatemalans had to travel to coastal plantations for work.[186] Labor and human rights abuses were the norm there, pay often was below subsistence wages, and rape, pesticide poisoning, and extortion were common (Jonas 1991; Perera 1993).

Maya professionals remained rare in the 1970s, but the middle class was slowly growing. However, even those who managed to surmount the economic barriers to their success did not find expanded opportunities in most areas. The state's failure to accommodate this growing middle class contributed to the rising support for violence among indigenous Guatemalans[187] (Brockett 2005; Stoll 1993).

Maya also faced both state-sponsored and less systematic cultural discrimination. The state encouraged and even fostered ladinization, seen as a remedy for Maya backwardness and a path to building national identity. This included education in

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[186] At least 90% of rural families were landless by the mid-1960s or did not have enough land for subsistence (Handy 1984). One study estimates that in the 1960s, more than 300,000 people were migrating to coastal plantations for several months each year (Carmack 1988).
[187] Stoll (1993) believes that in some Ixil communities, these professionals were deliberately targeted during the violence.

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Spanish for children in Maya communities. Many Maya children also faced ridicule by their colleagues if they spoke in native languages or wore native dress. More subtle discrimination stemmed from the pervasive belief that Maya were 'culturally retarded' and technologically backward (Adams 1988, n.d.; Arriola 2004; Schirmer 1998).

Guatemala's social divisions were mirrored in the military. While both Maya and poor ladinos were conscripted into service, the officer corps was almost exclusively ladino (Montejo 1999). There is no indication that security discrimination affected fears of the future; however, it did influence the prevalence and effects of stereotypes in the military, as I discuss below.

Since the civil war in Guatemala was fundamentally a class war, it is not surprising that so many Maya supported the EGP, given their political and economic status. It is almost more surprising that it took so long for them to do so. One crucial change was the devastating 1976 earthquake that disproportionately affected Maya communities; longer-term trends in religious practice and theology also influenced Maya views of their potential to change their status (Carmack 1988).[188]

Since class and race were tied so closely together, discrimination became especially salient in Maya perceptions of the state. For most indigenous Guatemalans, political and economic discrimination created what they believed was permanent second-class citizenship with few avenues for peaceful advancement. This increased their support for the guerrillas as the only means to political access or economic development; armed insurgency was the last resort for many.

The primary effect of cultural discrimination was to increase segregation between Maya and ladinos. However, Maya who had joined the nascent cultural rights

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[188] The growth of the Catholic Action movement was especially important.

movements also were especially likely to join the guerrillas early stages in the conflict. Political, cultural, and economic discrimination, coupled with state violence, thus unified these discontented sectors of the indigenous population – who often saw little else in common with each other (Jonas 1991; Konefal 2003).

By both limiting Maya quality of life and restricting access to peaceful means of change, discrimination played a critical role in EGP recruiting in Maya communities. Moreover, because discrimination was so deeply entrenched in Guatemalan society and because peaceful protests had been brutally suppressed, many Maya believed that violent rebellion was the only means of change left to them.

El Salvador's poor also faced a desperate situation that seemed only to worsen in the decades before the civil war began. Land ownership was particularly contentious. Between 1950 and 1975, the proportion of rural Salvadorans who owned no land increased from 11.8% to 41%. By the late 1970s, 78% of the arable land belonged to only 10% of the population. Although the government planned land reforms in the mid-1970s, opposition from elites and the oligarchy stalled these measures before they had a widespread effect (Bonner 1984; Kincaid 1987; Montgomery 1982; Wood 2003).

Economic misery was exacerbated by a lack of political opportunities. The military took power after the 1972 election; elections two years later saw even more extensive manipulation to deny left-wing parties representation (Bonner 1984; Montgomery 1982). These fraudulent elections convinced many Salvadorans that violence was the only remaining option.

Neither cultural nor security discrimination played a significant role in the Salvadoran civil war. Indeed, it is hard to imagine how cultural discrimination would apply to interactions between groups divided on socioeconomic lines.

Thus, landlessness contributed to widespread suffering and exacerbated the peasants' poverty. The stymied reform process added to their frustration and lack of faith in peaceful reform movements. Coupled with the increasingly limited political access, economic policies drove thousands of Salvadorans to support the FMLN.

The guerrillas recruited primarily from the sectors most affected by discrimination. The guerrillas and their supporters were disproportionately likely to be the poor, rural Salvadorans who suffered most under the status quo. As one guerrilla supporter stated: "What was the war for? For the solution to the land problem…" (Wood 2003: 1). While some were drawn to the guerrillas by the promise of food and a place to sleep (Bonner 1984), many of the guerrillas and their supporters were motivated by a deep desire to redress social inequalities and to improve Salvadoran society. The sense of efficacy that the insurgency gave them was particularly important for many individuals who had no other avenues to influence their prospects (Wood 2003).

Past Conflict

In Guatemala, Maya uprisings had occurred at both local and regional levels in 1898, the 1930s, and from 1944 into the early 1950s. These past conflicts did not directly influence the length of the civil war, but they did play upon and exacerbate fears each community had of the other (Adams n.d.; Carmack 1988; Perera 1993).

Contrary to my prediction in Chapter Two, these past conflicts decreased Mayas' desire to rebel, since they were wary of the government's response (Handy 1984). This reaction was heightened by the violence between 1966 and 1970, when 10,000 Guatemalans were killed (Brockett 2005). Although most of these victims were labor leaders and ladino workers and peasants, Maya hesitated to join the renewed insurgency in 1979 (Jonas 1991).[189]

These conflicts did exacerbate fears of the future, as I predict they should. Why did they not also produce support for the guerrillas? There is little evidence to answer this question. But it seems likely that part of the answer stems from the fact that the victims of the most recent past conflicts were not Maya. This meant that many Maya did not feel directly affected, and did not consider the past conflicts as credible predictors of the government's future behavior toward *them*. In other words, the experience led many Maya to believe that the government would retaliate against rebellion, but neutrality might protect their communities. It was only when this position became untenable that Maya supported the EGP in large numbers.

Among their opponents, past conflicts *did* increase popular support for the war, by magnifying civilians' fears of their adversaries' intentions. In particular, the history of conflict increased elites' and landowners' fears of potential threats to their lives and their property. The 1944 uprising, in particular, created "a deep fear in the hearts of Guatemalans unaccustomed…to Indian [violence]" (Adams n.d.: 5). Thus, past conflicts influenced the war in a way I did not predict, intensifying the government's response to the conflict in the 1970s and 1980s. The past did not noticeably influence recruiting, but

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[189] Indiscriminate atrocities were the main factor that eventually outweighed these concerns for those who supported and fought with the guerrillas.

it heightened the perceived importance of a government victory and the determination to win at all costs.

In El Salvador, a 1932 rural uprising sparked the killing of between 10,000 and 40,000 peasants (Danner 1993). *La matanza* (the massacre), as it became known, deeply affected Salvadoran society.[190] In particular, the oligarchy was more wary of any attempts to organize rural peasants and wage workers after the uprising (Binford 1996). As one affluent Salvadoran noted about the demonstrations of the mid-1970s: "It scared me. They spoke of injustices, of class struggle. They were influencing people of little schooling with such things" (in Wood 2003: 93). Thus, much as it did in Guatemala, this experience heightened the government's response to opposition from those quarters in the 1970s.

Among the peasants, *la matanza*'s effect was the opposite of the one I predict, but for a slightly different reason than in Guatemala. In particular, those communities where the 1932 rebellion was especially popular did not support the FMLN (Danner 1993). This suggests that the repression following the uprising had eroded their interest in forcing social change through arms, rather than exacerbating commitment problems that increased their determination to fight. The 1932 uprising may have contributed to the violence of the civil war by intensifying the government's determination to defeat the FMLN, but it did not directly impact the length of the conflict.

Thus, past conflict magnified individuals' fears of their opponents in both wars. These fears did not necessarily prolong the conflicts. Historical experiences increased support for the government forces among the traditional elites of each country and

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[190] Indigenous communities were decimated during *la matanza*. Despite few visible signs of the indigenous culture afterwards – and contrary to popular perception – the Indian population appears to have survived the killing (Ching and Tilley 1998; Wood 2003).

probably contributed to the ferocity of the two armies' responses. Yet these same conflicts made some potential rebel supporters *more* wary of participating in the violence. In El Salvador, this was because they suffered such high costs of past violent conflicts. In Guatemala, Maya who had avoided violence in the past believed they could do so again.

This suggests that overwhelming one-sided violence may both reduce its victims' incentives to join rebel forces in the future and may have a demonstration effect, decreasing support for rebellion among *other* groups. This is, of course, the usual intent of its perpetrators. One important question for future research, then, is to explore further why this message is only sometimes received. The evidence here suggests that there may be a complex interaction of perceptions and fears that influences the interpretation individuals place on this sort of violence.

The role of past conflicts in Central America may also illuminate why the statistical estimates regarding past conflict were indeterminate. While past conflicts do seem to increase commitment problems, they may also hamper recruiting. This latter effect may be especially salient if potential recruits believe they can escape the fates of their predecessors by remaining neutral or if they suffered extremely high costs in the prior violence. Thus, the two mechanisms – the one observed here and the one I hypothesize is true and find support for in the post-Soviet republics – may cancel each other out, producing an inconclusive statistical result.

Atrocities

Between 1981 and 1984, 140 Guatemalan communities were completely

destroyed. Twenty percent of the population was displaced; 150,000 people were killed,

and 40,000 disappeared. In some areas, one-third of the population died or fled (Buckley

1984; CIIDH 1996).[191] Most of the victims were Maya, and most were killed by the

government (CEH 1999).[192]

Massacres by the military were the second factor that drove many Maya to

support the guerrillas. The Panzós and Spanish Embassy massacres were especially

salient, convincing many that there were no remaining peaceful options for protest. This

belief intensified over the following years. As I discuss above, most Maya preferred to

stay out of the war (Stoll 1993). But as the military came to view any peasant as a

potential guerrilla, Maya found it impossible even to be neutral and survive. After each

massacre, literally hundreds of recruits joined the guerrillas, believing this was their only

protection. Atrocities were common on a smaller scale, as well, and often were intended

to deter others from joining the guerrillas. For instance, public torture and the display of

mutilated bodies became common occurrences in many areas (Brockett 2005; Jonas

2000; Schirmer 1998).

The killing became more systematic by mid-1982, and was coupled with a

"*Frijoles y Fusiles* [Beans and Bullets]" campaign and forced participation in civil

patrols. At about the same time (beginning in 1983), the EGP began killing more

civilians in contested regions. As a result of these changes, Guatemalans began to

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[191] At least 200,000 Guatemalans died during the civil war, most at the beginning of the 1980s (CEH 1999). During most of 1983, between 500 and 1,000 Maya were dying every month (Buckley 1984).

[192] Eighty-three percent of 42,275 victims fully identified by the official Commission for Historical Clarification report were Maya. The state and affiliated paramilitary organizations committed 93% of the violence (CEH 1999).

believe that they could conceivably be rewarded for their allegiance. Many concluded

that supporting the guerrillas had become more deadly than supporting the government.

By late 1983, the insurgency began to lose support in the highlands (Schirmer 1998; Stoll

1993).

The indiscriminate violence in Guatemala increased the length of the war. It

facilitated recruitment, especially in the Maya communities whose support was vital to

the guerrillas' success. Moreover, it made those who had taken up arms certain that they

had no viable alternatives to continuing to fight. Indeed, violence often was intended to

convince its victims that the other side could not protect them. Yet even the violence

deliberately intended to deter support for rebels did not have its desired influence for

several years.[193] In the long run, it was more effective (from the government's

perspective). The EGP's inability to protect its supporters worked in concert with shifts

in government strategy – especially the transition from indiscriminate to more

discriminate violence – to sap support for the rebels (Le Bot 1992).[194]

Atrocities played a similar role in El Salvador. Assassinations and attacks on

opposition leaders increased in the mid-1970s. By 1978, scores of religious leaders,

teachers, labor leaders, opposition politicians, journalists, health workers, and other

activists were dying each month (Americas Watch 1991; McClintock 1998; Montgomery

1982). In 1980, between 10,000 and 15,000 Salvadorans died, and by 1984, 50,000

civilians had been killed[195] (Byrne 1996; Wood 2003). The killings were almost

exclusively carried out by the army and paramilitary forces. For example, between mid-

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[193] This is in contrast to the uprisings in the latter part of the 19th century, when massacres in
Momostenango and San Juan Ixcoy deterred potential violence in other areas (Adams n.d.).
[194] This is consistent with Kalyvas (2006).
[195] Approximately 5,000 combatants from each side also died, and another 2,000 individuals disappeared.

1982 and the next summer, the FMLN killed 63 civilians. The government killed 4,867 (Bonner 1984).[196] As I discuss below, many – if not most – of these killings were targeted on the basis of little more than place of residence.

Massacres convinced Salvadorans of several things. First, peaceful protest was not an option for advocating socioeconomic or political reform. The attacks on activists, protesters, politicians, and other government opponents vividly illustrated that nonviolent opposition was not feasible. Second, as in Guatemala, even neutrality was dangerous if one lived in a 'red,' or guerrilla, zone. Staying out of the war seemed not to be an option. And even though the FMLN could not protect civilians from retaliation in many cases, individuals chose to join the guerrillas (Wood 2003). In other words, atrocities had a much deeper effect than merely provoking a search for security.

Atrocities spurred thousands of Salvadorans to join the insurgency, motivated by anger, fear, and a desire for revenge. As one local commander observed, "As the repression grew, rather than containing the mobilization, the hatred grew still more. People wanted to confront the security forces with only a machete" (Wood 2003: 116). And, as in Guatemala, public killings designed to deter peasants from joining the FMLN often had the opposite effect. As a direct result, the FMLN extended its reach through much of the country by 1983, sparking fears of an imminent takeover of state power (Bonner 1984; Danner 1993; Wood 2003).

Thus, atrocities in El Salvador almost certainly increased the length of the war by substantially increasing the numbers of both active guerrillas and FMLN supporters

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[196] Most of the FMLN atrocities targeted suspected informers (Wood 2003). This is consistent with Kalyvas' (2006) theory on why rebels target civilians when they rely on civilian support to survive. Wood (2003) makes explicit that although many civilians did feel trapped by the conflict and forced to join one side to survive, they viewed the two groups of combatants and their goals and strategies as qualitatively distinct.

among the civilian population.[197] Although more FMLN supporters were driven by anger (compared to fear) than in Guatemala, in conflicts, fear and mistrust of the government's intentions – commitment problems – facilitated rebel recruitment. That is, individuals came to believe that the government could not be trusted to protect them, and a new regime was needed.

Identifiability

In Guatemala, both the Maya and ladino communities were internally divided. However, the conflict was increasingly 'ethicized' by the late 1970s as the army targeted any Maya as a guerrilla or guerrilla supporter. Since the ethnic division was perceived as salient by many of the combatants, I focus on identifiable differences along this cleavage (Le Bot; Schirmer 1998; Stoll 1993).

Traditional dress, spiritual practices, and language are the major distinctions between Maya and ladinos in Guatemala. Thus, custom and culture separate the groups more than does race (Adams 1994; Green 1999; Reeves 2006). The racial similarities between the two groups should have made 'passing' somewhat easier, reducing Maya fears of being targeted. However, the language and economic barriers to passing were insurmountable for most individuals, and ladinos who identified individuals as Maya refused to allow them to pass (Adams 1998; Carmack 1988).

Thus, unless one had the resources to leave his or her community and spoke fluent Spanish, passing as ladino was extremely difficult, if not impossible (Early 1975;

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[197] Wood (2003) cites substantial first- and second-hand evidence that local residents provided tortillas and intelligence to the guerrillas, refused to give information to the military, and lied about the location of guerrilla forces in the area. For example, one old man stated that "We used to help [the guerrillas] by telling the military, 'No, haven't seen anyone'…" (126).

Grandin 1997). Because this often was impossible, place of residence became a reliable

cue to ethnicity and perceived loyalty. Living in a highland Maya community often was

enough to condemn an individual in the eyes of the military[198] (Schirmer 1999). The

consequences were especially serious under the Ríos Montt administration, which

"damned the indigenous as subversives to be killed" (CEH 1999) or terrorized into

passivity (Carmack 1988).

Identifiability – based on both location and physical traits – increased fears in

Maya communities. Maya came to believe they would be targeted by the army regardless

of their actual loyalties or their behavior. Many stopped wearing traditional dress as a

reaction to the violence (Jonas 1991). And the army's policy increased support for the

guerrillas, perceived to be the only credible means of protection. However, as I discuss

above, by 1983-1984, the government began to more closely target its campaign. Once

behavior trumped ethnicity as a determinant of one's fate, Maya support for the EGP

declined. Thus, identifiability did not necessarily influence Maya trust in the Guatemalan

government. However, as I argue it should in Chapter Two, it did lead Maya to calculate

that simply being identified as Maya was dangerous under the military regimes.

In El Salvador, identifiability played a similar role – at least on a practical level.

Few immediately obvious traits distinguished the groups of combatants. However, with

the exception of language, many of the same practical barriers prevented peasants from

'passing'. In particular, poverty precluded moving to another region of the country for

most individuals. As in Guatemala, the military considered residence and occupation

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[198] Military officers have confirmed that ethnicity often was used as a shortcut to determine loyalty
(Schirmer 1999).

reliable markers of allegiances, and assassinations and massacres often were targeted on no more than these grounds (Bonner 1984; Wood 2003).[199]

As in Guatemala, individuals' inability to be neutral helped the guerrillas recruit. When individuals saw little other way to escape from military massacres, they joined the FMLN. Thus, by increasing the guerrillas' capabilities, identifiability also increased the length of the war. Again, the link was individuals' probability of being targeted by one group of combatants that influenced their behavior in the conflict.

Segregation

Guatemala is a deeply segregated society, marked by ladino feelings of superiority (Green 1999). Endogamy within the Maya and ladino communities was widespread as early as the 1830s (Adams 1994), and modernization in the mid-20th century further widened both intra- and inter-group cleavages.[200] This cleavage was not always marked by hostility or violence; individual relations often were positive (Adams 1988; Stoll 1993). Contrary to my hypothesis, these divisions did not create a signaling problem: neither ladinos nor Maya were especially uncertain about each other's future behavior, because a wealth of information already increased their mistrust of each other.

I argue that segregation also makes individuals more likely to believe threatening stereotypes about their adversaries. Explicit rhetoric heightening inter-ethnic fears in the media or by politicians did not play a significant role in either war. However, stereotypes

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[199] These markers often were just as imperfect as ethnicity, leading to massacres in villages known to be neutral (Danner 1993).

[200] The increasing Maya-ladino contacts during this period also led some Maya to place more emphasis on distinguishing their communities and preserving their culture (Le Bot 1992; Jonas 2000).

were already prevalent in Guatemala, even without the prompting of influential

leaders.[201] Many ladinos believed that

> [a Maya is] a vile and despicable being, whose life is worth less than a normal
> person's and whom one can therefore exterminate without scruples to save the
> country from a great evil such as communism; that Indians lie and are by nature
> treacherous, so that even if an Indian is not lying the ladino suspects that he is
> deceiving him and thinks he does not need to prove it, even if the Indian's life is
> in the balance; and that Indians are like children – easy prey to the deceit of others
> (Falla 1994: 185).

Because ladinos often saw Maya as less than human and as especially dangerous,

this magnified the threat they perceived from Maya communities. In doing so, it

facilitated the military's genocidal campaign against the highland communities. Cultural

practices were deliberately undermined in some areas, as well, as part of a military

doctrine that saw any Maya organization as facilitating guerrilla recruiting (Adams n.d.;

Arriola 2004; Perera 1993).

The threatening stereotypes of indigenous Guatemalans fit well with the

government's counter-insurgency narrative, which painted the civil war as a battle

between good and evil. Together, these two dynamics fueled fears of a rebel victory (and

of Maya EGP supporters) among both soldiers and civilians and, more importantly,

facilitated genocide. As I discuss above, atrocities prolonged the war. Thus, stereotypes

indirectly influenced the duration of the conflict by bolstering rebel recruiting efforts in

Maya communities.

In El Salvador, segregation also was fairly high: most peasants who supported the

FMLN lived on small plots of land in rural areas and rarely interacted with members of

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[201] These views were propelled, in part, by fears of demographics and economic dependence on indigenous
workers (Le Bot 1992).

other classes (Bonner 1984). Segregation primarily influenced perceptions among

government supporters, who often were especially afraid of the consequences if the

FMLN won the war. This fear of the unknown – a signaling problem[202] – led some right-

wing combatants, in particular, to continue fighting when they might otherwise have

acquiesced to socioeconomic reforms.

Stereotypes also fueled atrocities in much the same manner as in Guatemala.

Some military officers saw peasant children as little more than guerrillas in waiting. As

one officer argued in regards to a group of people fleeing an Air Force bomber, "[they

must be bombed because] anything that moves is the enemy" (Wood 2003: 37). As in

Guatemala, this perception facilitated executions of even the youngest residents of some

villages in the guerrilla zone (Danner 1993). Thus, segregation interacted with

stereotypes, leading to especially intransigent and fearful views among those who knew

few members of the opposing group's supporters. The ensuing atrocities garnered

support for the FMLN, in particular.

2.2.3 Third Party Support

Aid from Unrelated Third Parties

United States aid to Guatemala fluctuated over the course of the war.[203] Since the

government was the stronger party, US aid did not promote a military stalemate. The

evidence suggests, however, that it also was not sustained or significant enough to allow

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[202]Signaling problems occur when individuals cannot ascertain whether their adversary intends to
implement a peace deal. In this context, signaling problems represent fears or apprehensions about an
unknown outcome, or the inability to confidently predict the future. I discuss commitment and signaling
problems in more detail in Chapter Two.
[203] The administration and the human rights situation largely determined the levels of aid and whether the
US provided direct military aid or assistance in other forms.

for a swift government victory. In fact, military equipment shortages effectively helped

the guerrillas at times by hampering the government's campaign (Jonas 1991). Despite

allegations to the contrary, there is little evidence of any significant aid to the guerrillas

from Cuba or Nicaragua (Perera 1993). As I argue above, a central reason the guerrillas

survived was their ability to re-invent themselves by drawing on Maya discontent to fuel

the ongoing rebellion.

In the Salvadoran war, the United States trained army officers and provided

millions of dollars in economic and military aid. By 1981, the US was supplying $35.5

million in military aid, and this more than doubled the following year (to $82 million),

before decreasing as a result of conditions on human rights (America's Watch 1991;

Binford 1996; Buckley 1984; Wood 2003).

The Salvadoran guerrillas received some training in Cuba and Nicaragua,

especially in the earliest stage of the conflict (Bonner 1984).[204] Several FMLN leaders

also lived in Nicaragua, facilitating the regular meetings they held with Nicaraguan and

Cuban leaders (McClintock 1998). Arms shipments from these actors began as early as

November 1980 and increased the following year, falling off again after 1983. However,

weapons transfers appear to have been substantially lower than alleged by some

supporters of the government (Byrne 1996; Danner 1993; McClintock 1998).

Third parties lengthened the war in El Salvador. Although the FMLN's

capabilities were strengthened by its ties abroad, the support likely had a relatively small

effect on the balance of capabilities, since the volume of arms from these sources appears

to have been low. Instead, the evidence suggests that the FMLN benefitted most from

three factors: support from the population, favorable terrain, and the poor quality of the

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[204] Bonner (1984) estimates that about 200 Salvadorans trained in Cuba before 1981.

Salvadoran army.[205] Aid to the Salvadoran government, on the other hand, *did*

significantly lengthen the war, by preventing an FMLN victory (Montgomery 1982). In

fact, analysts suggest that the FMLN offensive in 1983 was stemmed only by increases in

US military assistance (McClintock 1998; Wood 2003).

This is consistent with my theory: third party aid promotes a military stalemate.

Particularly in El Salvador, external supporters also influenced fears and beliefs about

adversaries. After the 1979 rebel victory in Nicaragua, right-wing regimes throughout

the region felt especially threatened by insurgencies. The involvement of both Cuba and

Nicaragua exacerbated the government's and its allies' fears of the consequences of an

FMLN victory. This further indicates that the dynamics observed in Moldova may tie

third party interventions to the duration of civil wars.

Aid from Co-Ethnics

Refugees and ethnic kin did not play a substantial role in either conflict. In the

early 1990s, there were at least 46,000 Guatemalan Maya living in Mexico; some authors

cite numbers as high as 150,000. The border was porous (refugees crossed back regularly

to check on their lands and harvest food through about 1983), and the Guatemalan

military seemed to view the refugees as a threat since it frequently crossed into Mexico to

pursue individuals or groups. However, there is no evidence that these refugees aided the

guerrillas in any way. Most of those in nearby states seemed concerned only with

returning home as soon as possible and protecting their rights while in exile. Moreover,

while Mexican Maya supported, sheltered, and sympathized with their ethnic kin, there

also are no indications that they helped the EGP (Earle 1988; Hanlon 1999; Montejo

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[205] Note that all of these factors also benefitted the EGP.

1999). It seems quite plausible that the EGP benefitted from its escape routes across the border. However, there is no evidence that combatants were aided in this by supporters in Mexico.

While some prominent Guatemalans in exile lobbied for indigenous rights and a resolution to the conflict (most notably, Rigoberta Menchú), this had little effect on the conflict or on international policy until the mid-1990s. Thus, the diaspora also did not affect the length of the war, either by influencing bargaining or the balance of capabilities.

Obviously, there are no co-ethnics of the Salvadoran peasants. Refugee communities could play an analogous role, and at least 244,000 refugees were scattered throughout Mexico and Central America (Byrne 1996). As in Guatemala, the rebels may have been sustained by their access to Honduras. There is no evidence that refugees helped the FMLN, however, either actively or passively.

2.3 Summary

Ethnic interactions in Guatemala closely parallel similar types of inter-group interactions in El Salvador. This is partly because ethnicity and class are so closely aligned in Guatemala, and class played such a central role in both wars. Discrimination influenced the length of both conflicts especially heavily. Besançon (2005) argues that while economic factors play a more salient role in nonethnic wars, political and human capital inequalities are more important in ethnic conflicts.[206] It is impossible to gauge the relative effect of different factors in these two wars. What is clear is that both political and economic discrimination were especially salient in motivating rebel recruits.

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[206] She focuses on conflict onset, but the theory could apply to duration, as well.

Atrocities also deeply influenced the courses of both wars. In both Guatemala and El Salvador, indiscriminate violence against civilians fueled fears of the government's intentions. It increased support for the guerrillas and facilitated their recruiting efforts. Even violence designed to deter rebel recruiting seemed to do little to stem the pattern. By changing the balance of capabilities, atrocities prolonged both these conflicts.

Past conflicts and identifiability had less salient effects. These factors influenced fears, individuals' beliefs about their safety, and their strategies to survive the war. But the link to duration is more tenuous. Segregation and its effects had a greater – albeit indirect – effect on the wars. In particular, the prevalence of threatening and dehumanizing stereotypes about Guatemalan Maya and Salvadoran peasants facilitated atrocities. In doing so, these views indirectly affected EGP and FMLN recruiting.

Third party aid also followed similar lines in the two conflicts, in part because both were so closely identified with the Cold War ideological struggle. In Guatemala, however, it played a less central role than in El Salvador, where US aid staved off an FMLN victory, prolonging the war.

Thus, this comparison demonstrates that my theory can explain why some non-ethnic civil wars last especially long. Obviously, I do not compare El Salvador to another non-ethnic civil war here, and I do not claim to definitively show why the length of this type of civil war varies. My goal here is simply to ascertain whether the variables in my theory might influence the length of non-ethnic civil wars.

But does the theory explain the differences between the two types of conflicts? Guatemala's civil war had already been in progress for over a decade when Maya began

to join the EGP in significant numbers. In doing so, they revitalized a moribund

movement and almost brought the government to defeat. It was only when the

government adopted a new counter-insurgency strategy deliberately designed to win

Maya support that the insurgency again began to lose momentum. Maya allegiances

shifted not just because of the 'Beans and Bullets' strategy, but because the government

forces killed fewer individuals who were unaffiliated with the insurgency, promoted

elections, and promised economic reforms. As people believed that their actions might

produce a consistent – and potentially safer – response, and as they had some faith in the

possibility of peacefully promoting reforms, they altered their behavior.

The FMLN did not have a similar constituency to draw on. Although the war in

El Salvador was shorter, it still lasted for a very long time. This indicates that when

similar factors promote commitment problems or influence the balance of capabilities,

they prolong wars, regardless of the combatants' motives. These cases cannot show

whether the factors are *more* likely to exacerbate fears of adversaries' intentions or

influence third party support in ethnic wars. Thus, these cases are not a strong test of

whether this theory explains why ethnic civil wars are likely to last longer than non-

ethnic conflicts. Since this is a probabilistic statement, of course, I cannot reject it on the

basis of these cases either.

In fact, I believe these two wars indicate that my theory *may* explain the

differences between types of civil wars. Ethnicity is hard to change, and thus, the effects

of ethnicity I detail in this dissertation may provoke stronger fears and deeper loyalties

under some conditions. Because the factors that motivated FMLN supporters also rested

on long-standing socioeconomic characteristics, they also were hard to influence in the

short term. Thus, class in El Salvador operated much like ethnicity in Guatemala.

Moreover, the Guatemalan government recognized and made a major effort to address

the most salient grievances in the Maya community. This mitigated the effect of

ethnicity, in essence, trumping Maya fears of never escaping future discrimination or

atrocities.

In sum, what these cases show is that my theory may explain differences between

non-ethnic civil wars, and it might explain why ethnic civil wars are likely to last much

longer than non-ethnic civil wars. But class in El Salvador operated like ethnicity (in the

short term, anyway), and the Guatemalan government deliberately tried to mitigate the

ethnic character of its conflict. Therefore, intergroup interactions played especially

complex roles in shaping the duration of these two wars.

For further evidence of how these factors vary in ethnic and nonethnic wars, and

their influence on the length of conflicts, I now turn to Sri Lanka.

3.0 Sri Lanka

3.1 Overview of the Conflicts[207]

3.1.1 The Tamil-Sinhalese Conflict

Tamils and Sinhalese, the two main ethnic groups in Sri Lanka, clashed in

increasingly deadly riots beginning in 1956. In 1983, the conflict became a full-blown

civil war between the Sinhalese-dominated government and Tamil guerrilla groups

fighting for an independent state. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Tamil Tigers,

or LTTE) have been the dominant militant group since the late 1980s. Support for the

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[207] A map of Sri Lanka is in Appendix C.

LTTE has steadily declined since the late 1990s, but many Tamils continue to believe that life in a unified Sri Lanka will offer little security. Several ceasefires have collapsed, and the conflict has continued for most of the last 26 years. Although open combat may be at an end as this chapter is written, many of the underlying issues remain unresolved.

3.1.2 The JVP Insurrection

In April 1971, a Marxist group known as the People's Liberation Front (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, or JVP) launched an insurrection against the Sri Lankan government. The group outnumbered the poorly prepared and equipped security forces and attacked 93 police stations in the first days of the insurrection. However, the government forces regrouped, and fighting was over within a few weeks in most places. Thousands of JVP supporters surrendered in two amnesties in May and June, and the insurrection was defeated throughout the island by late June.[208]

3.2 Analysis

Why has the same government that defeated the JVP insurgency so quickly been unable to end the war waged by Tamil groups? Below, I first show why existing explanations cannot provide a convincing answer to this question. I then turn to the roles of inter-group interactions and third parties.

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[208] The JVP renewed armed attacks in 1987; it took the government approximately two years to defeat that uprising. I do not focus on the second JVP insurrection because the ongoing civil war in the north makes it difficult to separate the factors central to my theory from the government's difficulties in simultaneously fighting two wars. This same argument could apply to my analysis of the Tamil-Sinhalese war, of course. However, even if we omit the two years of the JVP insurrection from the duration estimate, the conflict still has lasted 24 years.

3.2.1 Alternative Explanations

These cases are especially useful in a paired comparison, since both conflicts

occurred within the same state. This inherently controls for a number of country-level

variables that could influence the length of the wars, such as terrain (Fearon and Laitin

2003). Although the Tamil-Sinhalese conflict began approximately twelve years after the

JVP insurrection, relative poverty (Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2004) and the size of

the population (Fearon 2004b; Hegre and Sambanis 2006) were similar.[209] Thus, the

ethnic war did not last longer because individuals had less to lose, nor because there were

more potential recruits.

The aims of the two groups (Buhaug 2005; Walter 2004) did differ: the JVP

sought to overthrow the central government, while the LTTE has waged a secessionist

war. Although this cannot be discounted as a source of the different durations, it does not

seem plausible that the government would have resisted its overthrow by a radical

Marxist group so much more strongly than it did when it faced Tamil demands for

independence in the north and east.

Walter (2006) argues that the number of potential rebel groups can influence the

government's approach. During both of these wars, the government faced one other

potential conflict: according to Walter, then, the Sri Lankan government should not have

fought harder in one of the conflicts than in the other. The JVP remained a source of

concern for the government throughout much of the Tamil-Sinhalese conflict; during the

1971 insurrection, the government was beginning to grapple with rising Tamil discontent.

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[209] Log GDP per capita rose from 7.13 to 7.55 in the years between the conflicts. The log of population
was 9.44 in 1971 and 9.64 in 1983 (Fearon 2004b).

Thus, the ethnic war has not lasted so much longer because the government fears

signaling weakness to more groups than it did in 1971.

The balance of capabilities has fluctuated over the 26 years of the Tamil-

Sinhalese war. Throughout the 1990s, the LTTE drew on about 4,000-5,000 trained and

active members. The numbers may have risen as high as 13,000 at times. The army has

ranged in size from 20,000 to 40,000; because many join for financial motives, troops

tend to have low morale (Bush 2003; de Silva 1998; Mukarji 2000). The JVP had at least

10,000 members in fighting units; some sources estimate that as many as 70,000

participated in the insurrection. The Sri Lankan military, on the other hand, had only

about 20,000 police and army troops available (Arasaratnam 1972; Wickramasinghe

2006).[210] These numbers indicate that the JVP insurrection should have lasted

substantially longer than it did. It is clear, then, that the dynamics of the two wars cannot

be explained only the number or quality of troops involved. As I discuss below,

however, the balance of capabilities *was* deeply influenced by external supporters.

Neither the JVP nor the LTTE benefitted from lootable resources (Ross 2004,

2006). 'Loot' typically describes a situation in which groups exploit a local source of

drugs, gems, or other valuable locally-produced material to fund their rebellion. Both of

these groups engaged in criminal activity, which is distinct from loot, and which I discuss

in more detail below. However, the Tamil-Sinhalese war has not lasted so many times

longer because the LTTE finances the conflict through diamond mines, timber exports, or

local coca fields.

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[210] These represent the forces deployed in the conflict.

3.2.2 Intergroup Interactions

Discrimination

Economic, political, security and cultural discrimination all deeply influenced Sri Lankan Tamils' views of the state and of the Sinhalese-dominated government's intentions. Two policies played especially important roles in alienating Tamils from the state. First, in 1956, the government drafted the Official Language Act which mandated the use of Sinhala for all government-related business. Although the government then adopted conciliatory policies in response to Tamil pressure, these were later abandoned as a concession to Sinhalese chauvinists. In 1972, the new constitution formally designated Sinhala as the only official language of Sri Lanka; it also made Buddhism the state religion, further marginalizing the mostly Hindu Tamils. Although language status moved toward parity after the 1978 constitution and the government enacted further reforms 10 years later, the damage to Tamil perceptions was long since done.[211]

Many Tamils perceived the Sinhala Only Act as indicative of their status as second-class citizens. Tamils also saw the Sinhala Only movement as a deliberate attempt to prevent their advancement and to limit their opportunities. Recruitment of Tamils in the civil service and bureaucracy dropped steadily in the following years. Tamils also were disproportionately likely to be unemployed. The percentage of Tamils in the administrative services fell from 30% in 1956 to 20% in 1965 and 5% in 1970. Tamils made up 60% of engineers, doctors, and lecturers in 1956, 30% by 1965, and only 10% five years later. These trends reinforced the belief that the language policies were designed to limit Tamils' advancement (Sivarajah 1996; Somasundaram 1998).

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[211] This was exacerbated by the fact that many of the reforms designed to allay Tamils' concerns were never implemented. Other assimilationist rhetoric also was prevalent throughout the period (de Silva 1998; Hyndman 1988)

Moreover, the language policy affected not only Tamils' economic opportunities, but their ability to even communicate with bureaucrats, service agencies, and government representatives. In doing so, the Language Act both alienated individual Tamils and encouraged Tamil politicians to advocate linguistic autonomy or federalism as the only means to preserve their community's interests (de Silva 1999; DeVotta 2004; Hyndman 1988).[212]

University admissions policy further eroded Tamils' confidence in their prospects under a Sinhalese-dominated state. To address Sinhalese complaints about Tamil dominance in the sciences and engineering, a new examination system that disadvantaged Tamil applicants was adopted in 1970. In the sciences, Tamils made up 35.3% of students in 1970; this figure fell to 20.9% by 1974 and 19% in 1975. By 1975, Sinhalese also comprised 86% of the places in the humanities and social sciences, thus dominating all aspects of the island's higher education system (de Silva 1986, 1999). Access to a university education had deep implications for social mobility. Although the policy changed in 1978, the admissions system played a central role in the deteriorating relations, especially in terms of radicalizing Tamil youth (de Silva 1986, 1999; Hyndman 1988).

Other policies further increased Tamils' alienation from Sri Lanka and support for autonomy. In particular, state-sponsored colonization by Sinhalese into Tamil-majority areas in the north and east exacerbated both political and economic tensions. The balance of the population in several key districts in the region shifted markedly between 1946 and

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[212] De Votta (2004) asserts that the Language Act was in fact the "catalyst for the numerous anti-minority policies and ethnocracy that followed….[causing] Tamil mobilization" and the civil war (3).

the late 1960s.[213] This affected political representation by diluting the chance that Tamil

politicians could win office (Shashtri 1994; Somasundaram 1998). Development projects

also tended to disproportionately benefit the Sinhalese communities (DeVotta 2004).

The security forces became increasingly ethnicized during the same period.

Sinhalese police posted in Tamil areas historically were respected as neutral. In some

cases, they were even preferred to their Tamil compatriots because they were

independent of regional and caste rivalries. By the 1970s, the government increasingly

viewed Tamils as "unreliable," and more Sinhalese police were sent to the north. The

overall proportion of Tamils in the security forces also declined from 40% in 1956 to

20% in 1965 to 1% by 1970. The Sinhalese forces often were unable to communicate

with Tamils, and as attacks by Tamil militants increased, the police treated Tamil

civilians more brutally. By the late 1970s, police and military forces actively participated

in anti-Tamil violence and stood by as others targeted Tamils[214] (de Silva 1998;

Hyndman 1988; Mukarji 2000; Somasundaram 1998; Wickramasinghe 2006).

Thus, long before the civil war broke out, the security forces were seen as no

longer dispassionate and professional. In fact, they were perceived as actively hostile to

Tamils (DeVotta 2004). Tamils' belief that they could not rely on the state for even basic

physical security fueled convictions that secession was the only viable policy.

This belief was bolstered by Tamils' declining political voice. By the mid-1970s,

Tamil parties were steadily losing seats in Parliament. In addition to the obvious loss of

political power, this had economic repercussions since patronage determined the

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[213] One analyst estimates that approximately 250,000 Sinhalese settlers moved to the north and east
between 1931 and 1981 (Sabaratnam 2001).
[214] Hyndman (1988) notes that in the 1983 riots, it was not always clear whether the police were
sanctioning the violence or were simply unable to stem it.

opportunities available to most young Sri Lankans. With their representatives in opposition and losing influence, Tamils' prospects thus seemed even further restricted (de Silva 1998). In an attempt to address growing discontent, the government adopted plans to devolve some power to the districts in 1980. However, the policies were never fully implemented, eroding Tamils' faith in any solution short of independence (de Silva 1986). Finally, the government demanded that all parliamentarians take an oath of loyalty to a unified Sri Lanka following the 1983 riots. The Tamil MPs lost their seats after they refused to do so. Predictably, Tamils' confidence in the political system as a venue to address their concerns and fears further declined (Hyndman 1988; Little 1994).

Discrimination on all these dimensions played a central role in alienating Tamils from Sri Lanka. It convinced them that their economic prospects were limited, they had few means of political participation, and they were not even entitled to basic police protection. These convictions motivated Tamils to support secession as the only path to a more secure future. Moreover, the experience of discrimination continues to be a central reason many Tamils do not trust their future in a Sinhalese-majority state and have supported secessionist organizations for the past 26 years. And as I discuss below, the history of anti-Tamil discrimination in Sri Lanka drives many Tamils in the diaspora to support the LTTE.

Limited opportunities also were a critical motivation for the JVP's supporters. Sri Lanka's population grew rapidly in the late 1960s and early 1970s, yet the economy relied heavily on only a few export crops; moreover, prices rose steeply over just a few years. The government also was implementing austerity measures, including drastic cuts

in social spending and subsidies, to address its growing debt and other economic woes (de Silva 1998; Jeyasingham 1974; Politicus 1972; Wickramasinghe 2006).

The economic hardships affected most sectors of Sri Lankan society, but those who ultimately turned to the JVP faced further difficulties. Young, educated Sinhalese were disproportionately unemployed.[215] Free education in native languages dramatically increased the number of high school and university graduates. In 1952, 53,000 candidates took the General Certificate of Education (GCE) exam; 314,000 took the exam in 1967. Only a fraction of these individuals could find employment commensurate with their education. The problem was exacerbated because a disproportionate number studied humanities and social sciences, in which there were even fewer employment opportunities. Furthermore, since jobs and other privileges often depended on access to political power brokers and elites, most of the newly educated lower-class Sri Lankans faced virtually no employment prospects. Unemployment rose from 340,000, or 10.5% of the population, in 1959-60 to 546,000 (13.9%) in 1969-70. Unemployment was especially high among young Sri Lankans, and educated youths were the most likely to be unemployed (Kearney 1975; Obeyesekere 1974; Politicus 1972).

These economic pressures were the single most important factor motivating JVP supporters. Although there is little individual-level evidence showing the causal relationship, the insurgents were overwhelmingly young, educated, and under- or un-employed. Over a third (38%) of those detained after the insurrection had passed their GCE exam, and the education levels for the detainees were higher than their peers in

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[215] Although the JVP did not embrace an ethnic stance in 1970-71, its membership was almost exclusively Sinhalese (Kearney 1975).

every age bracket (Kearney 1975).[216] Most were also young: 92.8% were between 16

and 32 years old, and 77% were in the narrower range of 17 to 26 years old (Obeyesekere

1974). Most were from lower or lower-middle class backgrounds, and these young,

educated individuals faced tremendous expectations to lift their families' status (Alles

1977). Yet virtually none would be able to meet those expectations. Almost one-fifth

(17.5%) of the detainees were unemployed, another 12.5% were students facing grim

post-graduation prospects, and a further 35-40% of those detained after the insurrection

were underemployed or in menial jobs (Kearney 1975; Obeyesekere 1974). Thus,

roughly two-thirds of the participants in the uprising faced very limited economic

prospects; more importantly, these fell far short of what their training warranted.

Many of these discontented individuals also believed that they had few viable

approaches to address their grievances. While the peasants – the social base of most JVP

supporters – could vote, no party truly addressed their concerns, and they had little power

outside of election periods. A small, wealthy ruling elite controlled politics, the

government, business, and the professions. The sense of alienation this engendered

motivated many of the insurgency's supporters (Bush 2003; Obeyesekere 1974).

Moreover, many were disenchanted by the disunity of the traditional left-wing parties and

their focus on the urban working class' concerns, rather than those of the peasants

(Politicus 1972). JVP supporters also were disappointed in the government's slow

progress toward promised socioeconomic reforms, contrary to its electoral promises. At

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[216] The detainees may not represent an entirely random sample of JVP supporters. It is possible that those
who were killed, evaded capture, or rejected the amnesty were more likely to be from certain groups. For
instance, university graduates may have abandoned the insurrection earlier, and thus may be under-
represented in these figures. However, data on the detainees represent some of the trends and are the only
quantitative information available on the JVP supporters. See Kearney (1975).

least some of the JVP leaders also believed that the UNP government was on the verge of setting up a military dictatorship (Criminal Justice Commission 1976).

JVP members were not driven by security discrimination. The police and army drew heavily from the same sectors of society that the JVP members came from. Indeed, the groups' leaders even expected that members of the security forces would join the insurrection (Peiris 1999). As was true in El Salvador, cultural discrimination has no clear analogue in a non-ethnic war such as this one. In sum, the JVP members believed that the government was unlikely to address their concerns – especially if it became more autocratic, as they feared it might. Support for armed insurrection thus seemed the only viable path to improve their prospects.

Past Conflict

Increasingly frequent and deadly inter-ethnic riots drove thousands of Tamils to support an independent state and the guerrilla groups fighting for it. The first of these riots, in 1956 and 1958, killed about 150 and 500-600 individuals, respectively, mostly Tamils. Major clashes recurred in 1974, 1977, and 1981. The 1974 riots were especially influential in turning many Tamils to support secession. In particular, the pattern of repeated and increasingly severe violence lent an air of inevitability to the conflict, and, from Tamils' point of view, to their physical insecurity. Many Tamils became convinced that future violence could only be averted by secession. Increasing signs also pointed to state involvement in the violence, which I discuss in more detail below. The inter-ethnic clashes also solidified Tamils' and Sinhalese' mutually exclusive identities and reinforced intra-group solidarity (Bush 2003; Sabaratnam 2001; Somasundaram 1998).

Even the mainstream Tamil political parties came to endorse this view. By the late 1970s, the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) party began to advocate a separate state, in part citing this history of the government "permitting and unleashing communal violence and intimidation" (Sivarajah 1996: 124). A growing number of Tamils also joined one of the militant organizations forming to violently achieve this end (de Silva 1998). Thus, past conflict provoked fears of an insecure future, facilitating recruiting to Tamil secessionist organizations and increasing support for these groups among other community members. The violence also indirectly increased the length of the war by influencing diaspora Tamils' behavior. Tamils abroad often cite the history of Tamil-Sinhalese violence as motivation to support independence (Human Rights Watch 2006). As I discuss below, their support for the LTTE's campaign has played a central role in prolonging the civil war.

The JVP had not been involved in past conflicts with the government, so its members did not face any significant fears of future conflicts stemming from previous violent interactions.

Atrocities

Both sides have committed widespread atrocities in the Tamil-Sinhalese conflict. Several years before the civil war officially began, the government adopted the Prevention of Terrorism Act, which gave the security forces sweeping powers to arrest and detain individuals suspected of involvement with Tamil militant groups. The Act also sanctioned torture and restricted basic liberties (Little 1994). Implementation of the Act further alienated even moderate Tamils from the Sri Lankan government. For

example, the TULF platform advocating secession cited the torture and imprisonment without trial of Tamil youths as a central factor motivating its stance (Sivarajah 1996).

The 1983 riots were the final straw for Tamils.[217] In July, the LTTE killed 13 Sinhalese soldiers in the north; troops then rampaged through Jaffna, killing about 50 civilians. The next day, massive riots spread through Colombo and the rest of the island. Although Tamils' property and livelihood were targeted in the first days[218], the latter stages of the riot clearly targeted individuals. Atrocities were widespread:

> cars were stopped … and [Tamils] were burned inside them, petrol was poured over people and they were set alight, people were also burned in their houses, and were hacked to death (Hyndman 1988: 26).

Moreover, evidence indicated official involvement in the riots. Many of the Sinhalese mobs held lists of Tamils drawn from census and voting records and moved between neighborhoods in government vans. Witnesses also reported that members of the governing party's trade union led several of the mobs (Roberts 1994; Senaratne 1997; Tambiah 1997).

Conservative sources estimate that between 400 and 600 people died in the clashes, but most independent estimates indicate that at least 2,000 people – and possibly as many as 6,000 – died. Between 100,000 and 275,000 people were internally displaced, and thousands more fled the country for India, Europe, and North America (Bush 2003; de Silva 1998; Hyndman 1988; Mukarji 2000; Somasundaram 1998).

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[217] In the dataset, I define past conflicts as those occurring at least a year before the civil war. The 1983 riots often are considered the beginning of the war, and would be included in the war in the quantitative data, and so I include the riots in the atrocities discussion. They also are part of the larger pattern of violence discussed in the previous section, and produced similar reactions to other riots in the past. The atrocities discussed above would not be coded as such in the quantitative data. One of the benefits of case studies is their role in 'checking' the validity of coding decisions. Since combatants in this conflict were clearly influenced by the Prevention of Terrorism Act before the war, I include this in the discussion.
[218] The riots damaged around 150 billion Rs worth of property (Mukarji 2000).

The 1983 riots produced a flood of recruits to the LTTE and other Tamil militant organizations. One year after the riots, the number of trained Tamil guerrillas had risen from 200 to 5,000 (Senaratne 1997). The violence – and the indications that it was backed by elements of the state – signaled to Tamils that they were no longer considered Sri Lankan citizens and that non-violent struggle simply was not a viable option. The riots also were the first time that ethnicity trumped all class and caste barriers.[219] Thus, the violence also benefitted the nascent guerrilla movement by helping to unify Tamils (Bush 2003; Mukarji 2000; Somasundaram 1998).

Most of the atrocities in the first year of the war were directed against Tamils and included the targeting of civilians, torture, arbitrary arrests, detention without trial, and killing of detainees (Bush 2003; Hyndman 1988; Somasundaram 1998). Throughout the war, civilians have been massacred regularly by both sides, religious sites are targeted, and torture remains widespread. Both sides also carry out demonstration killings, designed to send a very public message to civilians on both sides. The intended message is somewhat more nuanced than in Guatemala and El Salvador. On one hand, government troops do seek to signal to Tamils that the LTTE cannot protect them. The LTTE kills its critics to signal it will brook no opposition.[220] And both sides seek to raise their opponents' costs of prosecuting the war and to deter civilians from supporting their adversary (Mukarji 2000; Naidoo and Schaus 1998).

The atrocities – both those early in the conflict and more recent abuses – directly produced thousands of militants, launching the civil war and continuing to fuel it for years to come. They have also substantially exacerbated mistrust between the

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[219] Some scholars believe that middle-class Tamils were especially likely to be targeted (Tambiah 1997).
[220] The LTTE effectively wiped out the other guerrilla groups by the late 1990s, and has continued to assassinate individuals who oppose its platform or tactics.

communities, diminishing any hope of reconciliation. LTTE suicide attacks against

civilians have played a major role in the hardening of Sinhalese opposition to any

devolution of power. Moreover, Tamils both at home and in the diaspora frequently cite

abuses during the war as a central reason they continue to support the LTTE's campaign

for independence (Asia Foundation 2004; Human Rights Watch 2006; Orjuela 2008).

This support from Tamils abroad, as I detail below, has further enhanced the LTTE's

capabilities and allowed it to prosecute the war long past the point it might otherwise

have been defeated. In the long run, atrocities have fueled war-weariness on all sides, but

the hardening of positions and fears generally have overcome desires for peace.

During the JVP insurrection, both sides committed some atrocities, although there

is little evidence as to the scope of these tactics. The JVP forces killed civilians

suspected of supplying information to the security forces; in conjunction with looting,

these abuses shortened the war by turning the population against the insurgents (Alles

1977; Arasaratnam 1972; Dubey 1988). My theoretical argument focuses on the effect of

atrocities committed against one's opponents, and I make no predictions about this type

of situation. However, it is consistent with the mechanisms I detail, insofar as it sapped

support from the atrocities' perpetrators.

The security forces also abused and killed JVP members, often under murky

circumstances. News articles cite reports of headless bodies floating down rivers

("Bodies of Rebels" 1971), reports of torture and disappearances are widespread, and the

government publicly acknowledged that police may have taken revenge on some

prisoners (Alles 1977; Criminal Justice Commission 1976).

There is little evidence that these policies lengthened the conflict or made JVP members reluctant to surrender to government forces. Indeed, the thousands who did surrender indirectly indicates that such fears cannot have been especially strong. Unfortunately, there are no interviews or direct testimony available from most JVP members (as opposed to the leaders, who were presumably driven by different motivations).[221] Possibly, individuals were not aware these incidents were occurring – or the killings and torture were not widespread – so did not create a serious commitment problem. Or perhaps the fears they engendered were not strong enough to overcome the JVP's military weaknesses.[222] Although outside the scope of this case study, some evidence also indicates that the second JVP insurrection may have been influenced by these events.[223]

Identifiability

Throughout the conflict, Tamils have been targeted based on identifiable ethnic characteristics. In riots, names often served as a marker of ethnicity, as did place of origin. Tamils are believed to be darker skinned, and thus race also identified some (Roberts 1994). Tamils also were singled out based on ear piercing and inability to recite Buddhist verses (Claiborne 1983; Vittachi 1959). And mobs stopped individuals and made them recite Sinhalese words that are very difficult for non-native speakers to pronounce correctly (Hyndman 1988).

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[221] The information on this conflict is very limited; most sources draw on the same few primary or secondary reports.

[222] This seems the most plausible interpretation to me. By the time of the first amnesty, these reports had tapered off; this is limited although inconclusive evidence that most of the atrocities occurred in the first days of fighting. Thus, JVP members may not have feared surrender enough to continue fighting a losing battle.

[223] For a discussion of the history of the JVP, see Alles (1990).

These tactics were supplemented by many others during riots, including identity cards, electoral lists, census data, and neighbors' testimony (Hyndman 1988). Throughout much of the civil war, the security forces also have treated all Tamils in the north as suspected LTTE supporters (de Silva 1986). Thus, being a Tamil can be dangerous both when the conflict is mass-based and when it is a more conventional civil war between the government forces and secessionist groups.

Even Tamils who can 'pass' as Sinhalese express deep fear of being identified during violent episodes. This fear of being singled out as Tamil and killed or tortured has had three main effects. First, it led many individuals to emigrate, especially in the wake of the 1983 riots. Because they believed there was no way to keep themselves and their families secure in Sri Lanka, they simply left. As I show below, these individuals have helped to sustain the LTTE financially and militarily. Second, it contributed to segregation, as Tamils moved from Colombo and the southern areas of the island to the Tamil-dominated regions. Many of these individuals either could not or did not want to emigrate, but believed they would be safer out of Sinhalese-majority regions. Below, I discuss how regional segregation has helped to fuel conflict. Finally, this fear has led Tamils to support militant actors. They do so believing that independence is the only truly secure means to provide for their own and their families' safety. Thus, Tamils' identifiability by multiple ethnic markers has helped prolong the civil war both by exacerbating fears of being personally targeted, as I predict, and through a number of other mechanisms.

JVP supporters are not distinct from other members of the population. Since the movement was clandestine before the insurrection, its members had little fear even of

210

being identified by friends and neighbors. Although thousands of JVP supporters were detained, the discrepancy between those arrested or killed and the estimated strength of the movement indicates that many simply slipped back into the population.[224] JVP supporters did not continue fighting because they could be targeted for their political leanings.

Segregation

Segregation between Tamils and Sinhalese steadily increased in the decades before the civil war. Regional segregation resulted partly from the sporadic communal conflict and partly from the groups' historical concentration in different regions of the island (Tamils live primarily in the north and east; Sinhalese in the south and west). Within urban areas, however, the communities lived intermixed (Bush 2003; Sivarajah 1996). Although inter-marriage occurred, endogamy within each community increased throughout the 20th century (Obeyesekere 1974). And although Tamils and Sinhalese interacted in their workplaces, they rarely did so at home (Tambiah 1997; Wickramasinghe 2006). Most inter-ethnic interactions were restricted to the older generations of elites, who shared English as a common medium of communication (Hyndman 1988; Sabaratnam 2001).[225]

Segregation appears to be more pronounced in some regions: at least in recent years, inter-ethnic interactions are relatively common in parts of eastern Sri Lanka.

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[224] About 10,000 individuals were arrested, and 5,000-10,000 were killed. The movement had between 50,000 and 100,000 active supporters (Wickramasinghe 2006).
[225] At the same time, many Sinhalese sheltered Tamil friends, neighbors, and co-workers during riots. Often, they incurred considerable personal danger in doing so (Hyndman 1988; Tambiah 1997).

Moreover, Tamils and Sinhalese in the region assert that inter-marriages are one reason some communities have had more peaceful relations (Asia Foundation 2004).

Segregation did not create signaling problems or make individuals especially uncertain what their adversaries were likely to do. It did facilitate stereotypes, however, and may have made people more receptive to the hostile narratives propagated by politicians and in the media.

The most common stereotypes among Sri Lankans primarily influenced their beliefs about the other community's economic prospects: Tamils are seen as thrifty, hard-working, and good subordinates; Sinhalese as friendly, sociable, and lazy (Somasundaram 1998). Insofar as these perceptions may have affected inflammatory rhetoric and university admissions policies, they exacerbated the conflict. However, there is no evidence that these stereotypes directly influenced fears of adversaries' intentions, nor that segregation significantly exacerbated them.

Other stereotypes are more pernicious, however, and are closely tied to the perpetuation of conflict. In particular, many Tamils believe an essential part of Sinhalese nature is to oppress Tamils. For their part, many Sinhalese believe that all Tamils support the LTTE, want only to divide Sri Lanka, and advocate terrorism as a means to this end (Sabaratnam 2001). This leads Tamils to conclude that the only possible resolution to the conflict is a separate state, and Sinhalese to judge that Tamils will always harbor separatist intentions. Thus, both communities believe it is virtually impossible for Sinhalese and Tamils to cooperatively build a unitary, multi-ethnic state. This has become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The JVP supporters also rarely interacted with those they perceived to be the enemy. Sri Lanka's elite were educated in English and spoke the language in social interactions and at home. Moreover, marriage was endogamous within caste and class lines. This meant that peasants and lower-class Sinhalese virtually never interacted with elites (Obeyesekere 1974). There is little evidence that this promoted stereotypes, or that it increased signaling problems. However, it may have helped JVP leaders play on the fears of their supporters, especially to inculcate fears of an imminent move toward dictatorship.

There was little other incitement to violence or propagation of negative stereotypes in the media or by politicians in the JVP conflict.[226] This has not been true in the Tamil-Sinhalese civil war. Both Tamil and Sinhalese media have deliberately promoted parochial views of the conflict. Terminology emphasizing an us-them dichotomy is common, and media outlets play down civilian casualties in the other community (Hyndman 1988; Kandiah 2001). The state media tend to portray the LTTE as simultaneously barbaric and rational, heightening fears among Sinhalese. Both sides disproportionately report on their opponent's offensives and focus primarily on their own side's casualties. This has helped to entrench stereotypes and to foster beliefs that opponents will only accept a maximal solution (DeVotta 2004; Senaratne 1997).

At times, the media has even more directly affected the conflict. For example, following the 1983 LTTE attack on Sinhalese soldiers in the north, the southern media failed to report the retaliatory rampage by Sinhalese troops. Some observers believe that

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[226] This probably is because the uprising surprised most Sri Lankans so much, and because it concluded so quickly.

if people knew there had been retaliation, the anti-Tamil riots might not have occurred, or might not have been as severe as they were (Hyndman 1988).

Politicians also have exacerbated fears between the communities. Inflammatory rhetoric has been most common as an electioneering tactic or around seminal events and increased as Sri Lankan politics became more ethnicized (Sebaratne 1997; Somasundaram 1998). This rhetoric has influenced both events on the ground and perceptions of the 'other'. In the 1950s, politicians on both sides contributed to adoption of Sinhala Only by advocating violence and playing on peoples' fears. Prime Minister Jayawardene's hard-line rhetoric and public declarations threatening Tamils also may have directly contributed to the 1977 riots (DeVotta 2004).

In July 1983, Jayawardene did not impose a curfew for 24 hours after the rioting began, and he made no public statement for four days. When he did, he focused almost exclusively on Sinhalese suffering and appeared to justify why the security forces had stood aside and sanctioned the rioting, saying,

> At first, the [Tamil] movement for separation was non-violent… But since 1976 it became violent… Because of this violence by the terrorists, the Sinhalese people themselves have reacted.… The Government has now decided that the time has come to accede to the clamor and the national request of the Sinhala people that we do not allow the movement for division to grow any more (in Hyndman 1988: 35).

A few days later, he commented in an interview: "I think there was a big anti-Tamil feeling among the [government] forces. They also felt that shooting the Sinhalese, who were rioting, would have been anti-Sinhalese…" (in Hyndman 1988: 37). The UNP Minister Cyril Mathew was an especially vocal instigator of violence, and other politicians and political activists were identified by witnesses as leaders in the gangs attacking Tamils (Hyndman 1988; Wickramasinghe 2006).

214

These factors all influenced Tamils' belief that the violence was state-sanctioned, if not state-orchestrated, and therefore, that separation was the only way they could prevent future riots. Politicians on both sides also have kept fears and grievances alive throughout the conflict. On the Tamil side, rhetoric is especially common in regards to language and university admissions policies (de Silva 1999). For instance, despite the fact that language policy has undergone tremendous changes in the last four decades, a recent editorial on a prominent pro-Tamil website argued that, "Everybody knows that without the de-construction of the Sri Lankan state and its concept of 'Sinhala Only' sovereignty, no viable alternative can emerge" ("Setting the Hands" 2009). Among Sinhalese, rhetoric focuses on violence and the threat of separatism. For instance, a randomly selected group of articles from the *Colombo Times* in the autumn of 2008 reported primarily on LTTE attacks or weapons caches hidden throughout the country in 26% of its political reporting. Clashes or battles between the military and the LTTE comprised another 19% of the coverage.[227]

Thus, although there is little direct evidence that this rhetoric resonated more because of segregation, it seems quite plausible. Regardless, these messages have fueled both sides' fears of each other's intentions.

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[227] I chose this period because it was before the 'final offensive', when coverage of the ongoing violence might have been higher. This count represented a very conservative estimate of the articles that might be considered to invoke a 'threat'. Another 10-15% of the articles focused on support for Tamils from India. Given the history and perceptions of Indian involvement (discussed below), these could be construed as magnifying the threat from the LTTE, as well. A substantial proportion of the articles used language referring to terrorists; reported only on army victories; and did not present any details on Tamil civilian casualties.

3.2.3 Third Party Support

Aid from Unrelated Third Parties

Third parties not directly related to the combatants intervened in both conflicts. Since 1983, the Sri Lankan government has bought weapons or received training from China, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Pakistan and received diplomatic support and foreign aid from the United States and Britain. In the 1990s, India helped to patrol the Palk Straits to prevent smuggling (Mukarji 2000; Sivarajah 1996).

Tamil guerrilla groups also drew on support from multiple actors not driven by ethnic ties. Some EROS[228] members trained in Lebanon with the PLO in the 1970s. Although the extent of material support is unclear, Tamil groups also have had ties to SWAPO, the Polisario, the ULFA in Assam, Sikhs in the Punjab, the Andhara People's War Group, Kashmiri guerrillas, the FARC, Khmer Rouge, Eritrean separatists, the PFLP, the Muslim Brotherhood, the JVP, and a variety of separatist groups in Tamil Nadu.[229] Their state supporters include Libya, Syria, Iran, and Zimbabwe, although there are no data on the level or amount of aid from these countries (DeVotta 2004; Gunaratna 1999; Sivarajah 1996).

The support from these third parties has helped to prolong the conflict by altering the balance of capabilities. In particular, at stages when an LTTE victory seemed close, Sri Lanka's allies helped to boost the government's capabilities. It is difficult to say whether the same is true for the LTTE, since most of its ties to foreign actors are murkier. As I detail below, however, support from Tamils abroad has deeply influenced the course and duration of the conflict.

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[228] A Tamil militant group that is now defunct.
[229] The most common assertion is that these groups trade technology. They may also share weapons. This applies primarily to the current ties, rather than those in the 1970s and 1980s (Gunaratna 1999).

During the JVP insurrection, third parties provided extensive aid to the government, which benefitted from its non-aligned position. Caught unprepared by the JVP attacks, the government's resources were rapidly depleted. However, it was able to resupply quickly with planes, arms, and equipment sold or loaned by India, Britain, the US, the USSR, the UAR, Egypt, Pakistan, and Yugoslavia; India's navy also helped to blockade the coastline so that the JVP could not bring in supplies (Bush 2003; Dubey 1988; Jeyasingham 1974). The situation was extremely dire for the government, and a JVP victory was plausible before this aid arrived. The armed forces quickly regrouped with the influx of supplies and equipment, however, and were able to defeat the insurrection shortly thereafter.

The government's victory was facilitated by the JVP's dearth of weapons and external supporters. The leaders crafted elaborate plans to smuggle marijuana and gems in exchange for weapons, and even bought coastal land to facilitate this (Criminal Justice Commission 1976).[230] The JVP approached a number of foreign powers for support, including Cuba and China, but received little beyond promises. North Korea let the JVP leaders give lectures at the embassy.[231] Although South Yemen promised funding to attend conferences and to transport any weapons the JVP could procure, it offered little else (Criminal Justice Commission 1976; Jeyasingham 1974).

In the end, the JVP had virtually no financial support except that provided by donations from its members and collections at meetings. It supplemented these funds with bank robberies and thefts (Criminal Justice Commission 1976; Dubey 1988). Most

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[230] Most of these plans were never implemented. It does appear that the group was able to send some gemstones to Europe and purchased weapons with the proceeds (Criminal Justice Commission 1976).
[231] Which was closed down in retaliation

of its weapons were handmade; judging by the number of accidental explosions, the weapons also appeared to be poor quality, and the cadres untrained.[232]

Thus, the JVP began the insurrection as a relatively weak organization militarily: its main assets were the number of its supporters and the element of surprise. Without foreign backers, the group was unable to sustain protracted conflict and thus was quickly defeated once the government began receiving aid from outside parties.

Aid from Co-Ethnics

Co-ethnics have been deeply involved in the Tamil-Sinhalese conflict. In Chapter Two, I argue that ethnic kin can influence conflict duration through several different mechanisms. These include shaping the balance of capabilities, changing combatants' bargaining positions, and complicating bargaining by increasing uncertainty. In this case, Tamil co-ethnics primarily have influenced the balance of capabilities. However, Tamils in India may also have affected the bargaining relationship between the parties, although their effect on duration through this mechanism has been limited. I will focus first on the role of cross-border kin in India, and then on the diaspora in Europe and North America.

Tamils in India have helped to sustain the LTTE and other Tamil militant groups since the 1970s. Sri Lankan Tamils have linguistic, cultural and religious ties with Tamils in Tamil Nadu state. India thus perceived the conflict as a regional one and actively aided Tamil groups. Both strategic and ethnic motives underlay this support; Indian opposition to Sri Lanka's pro-Western stance influenced its policies, along with genuine sympathy for and a desire to aid the Tamils. This latter motive strengthened

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[232] One contemporary source does claim that some of the members trained in Algeria and North Korea (Arasaratnam 1972). I have not been able to substantiate this with any other evidence.

after the 1983 riots, in particular, when public pressure to intervene and "halt genocide" became quite vociferous (de Silva 1998; Fuglerud 1999).

Indian intelligence supplied and trained at least five Tamil separatist groups, including the LTTE. These groups established training camps in Tamil Nadu in the mid- to late-1970s; by 1984, there were 32 of these camps (Gunaratna 1999). The Indian government both actively and tacitly supported the camps, along with the groups' headquarters and offices, until the LTTE assassinated Rajiv Gandhi in 1991. By the early 1980s, tens of thousands of members of the LTTE and other groups operated within and from India. Since Sri Lanka is only 22 miles from India, it was easy for individuals to move back and forth and to escape Sri Lankan government pursuit by fleeing across the Palk Straits. With Indian government sanction, the camps thus became a haven for Tamil militants, a launching point for raids into Sri Lanka, and a base for storing weapons and smuggling into and out of Sri Lanka. The government allowed groups to recruit and to solicit support in the refugee camps in Tamil Nadu, as well (de Silva 1998; DeVotta 2004; Gunaratna 1999; Naidoo and Schaus 1998; Sivarajah 1996).[233]

This assistance from India substantially prolonged the civil war. It allowed Tamil guerrillas to escape capture, resupply, rest, train, and recruit. Indian government training was especially valuable since it could be passed down to new recruits. India is the dominant regional power, and the overt intervention led some Sri Lankan policy-makers to fear an Indian takeover, making the government more intransigent in the face of Tamil demands. The Indian peacekeeping force, launched for mixed motives, had complex effects on the duration of the war. Indian diplomatic efforts before the intervention, however, prolonged the conflict. Given the two countries' sometimes-adversarial

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[233] By 1991, about 200,000 Tamil refugees were in India.

relationship, Indian pressure to grant Tamils more rights probably made Sri Lanka even more intransigent (Mukarji 2000). It also further increased the government's threat perception, since Sinhalese have long seen themselves as an endangered minority, compared to the Tamils in Sri Lanka *and* India (Bush 2003).

The Tamil diaspora has lent even more valuable support to the LTTE. Between 200,000 and 250,000 Tamils live in Canada; 110,000 are in the UK; over 20,000 in the US; 50,000 in Germany; and 30,000 each in Switzerland, France, and Australia (Human Rights Watch 2006; Naidoo and Schaus 1998). In total, about 700,000 to 800,000 Tamils – over one-third of the pre-war Sri Lankan population – live in the diaspora (Fuglerud 1999; Human Rights Watch 2006).

The Tamil community abroad was well-organized by the late 1980s, and by 2000-2001 operated in at least 40 countries. Many of its members routinely donate to the LTTE, in part as a result of LTTE efforts to 'socialize' Tamils to regularly give small amounts of money. Diaspora Tamils voluntarily support the LTTE in many cases, driven by memories of discrimination and atrocities in Sri Lanka. Many believe that the government will never devolve enough power to protect Tamils and that the LTTE's secessionist campaign thus is the only viable alternative for their families and co-ethnics who remain in Sri Lanka (DeVotta 2004; Fuglerud 1999; Gunaratna 1999).

Voluntary donations are driven by other motives, as well. For instance, Wickramasinghe (2006) suggests that financial support for the LTTE is an important source of Tamil identity and sense of community for those in the diaspora. Not all donations that sustain the LTTE are altruistic. The organization also has an elaborate

system of taxation and of intimidation and coercion for those who refuse to donate or balk at "donating" the requested amount (Fuglerud 1999; Human Rights Watch 2006).

The LTTE also benefits indirectly from the diaspora. A network of co-ethnic allies shelter its illegal activities and help to launder money. The group also trades gold, traffics drugs and people, and supplies forged passports and other documents.[234] And the LTTE has more mundane fundraisers: it sponsors film festivals, has investments, and owns restaurants, shops, and farms (Gunaratna 1999). Many of these activities are facilitated by group members' ability to blend in to the larger Tamil refugee population.

The sums collected from these sources are substantial. Donations alone provide millions of dollars in revenue. For instance, Canadian Tamils typically are asked to contribute Cdn $2,500-5,000.[235] By the mid 1990s, 80-90% of the LTTE military budget came from the diaspora and other investments and businesses[236] (Human Rights Watch 2006). In total, the organization collects $200-300 million per year from these sources (Orjuela 2008).

Tamils in the diaspora also mobilize concerted public relations and propaganda campaigns. They disseminate news on the conflict and have lobbied to stop arms shipments and aid to the government of Sri Lanka and to support the separatist cause in the UK, US, Germany, France, and Canada (Gunaratna 1999; Sivarajah 1996). After concerted pressure by the Sri Lankan government, some of these states began to restrict LTTE fundraising. It has further declined since the group was added to lists of terrorist

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[234] For instance, heroin has been transported from Burma/Myanmar to Europe on LTTE-owned ships. The proceeds are substantial: one analyst cites a shipment of SAM missiles that the LTTE bought for $1 million apiece, paid for entirely with money from drug trafficking (Gunaratna 1999).
'Loot' as a concept in the model does *not* cover this type of criminal activity. Rather, it encompasses when groups exploit a local source of drugs (or gems or other valuable material) to fund their rebellion.
[235] In 2005-2006, when this figure was collected, this was approximately $2,900-$5,750 USD.
[236] Gunaratna (1999) cites a figure of 60% after Jaffna fell to the army in 1996; the Human Rights Watch figure cited here appears to be from a few years later.

organizations; in some countries, the group may have lost half to two-thirds of its income (Orjuela 2008; Wickramasinghe 2006).[237] Diplomatic support by diaspora Tamils has influenced international policies and perceptions. There is little evidence that the diaspora has introduced uncertainty into the conflict or complicated bargaining, however, except insofar as it has heightened the government's perception of the LTTE's threat. The effects of diplomatic aid and lobbying on duration have been dwarfed by that of financial support.

Fundraising in the diaspora helped the LTTE grow into one of the best-trained and equipped non-state military groups in the world. It is especially formidable compared to the poorly trained, low-morale Sri Lankan army. This military advantage facilitated the group's armed struggle for the last 25 years. But by significantly altering the balance of capabilities, military and financial assistance has made the war years – if not decades – longer than it would otherwise have been.

One reason the JVP insurrection was so short was that after the initial attack, the group had no external supporters to help it re-supply. Although the JVP aspired to establish cells in the Maldives and Kerala and bases in India, it was unsuccessful. The group did establish a branch in London, but received no material assistance from the UK (Criminal Justice Commission 1976).

3.3 Summary

The JVP insurrection indicates that my theory can explain the duration of non-ethnic civil wars, in addition to ethnic wars. When inter-group interactions do not significantly increase fears of adversaries' future intentions, and third parties do not

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[237] The US added the LTTE to its list in 2002; Canada and the EU banned the organization in 2006.

support combatants, civil wars end quickly. The conflict also highlights that the target of third party support sometimes matters. I do not measure whether external aid benefits the stronger party in the quantitative data. Precise data on the balance of capabilities are very difficult to gather, as I discuss in Chapter Three. Moreover, the judgment of which party is stronger or weaker can be ambiguous due to the relative importance of quantitative and qualitative advantages. But the JVP insurrection suggests that it may be fruitful to attempt this distinction. I argue that aid promotes a stalemate. When only the stronger party benefits, however, conflicts may end sooner, as this war illustrates.

The Tamil-Sinhalese conflict also supports the theory I elaborated in Chapter Two, both alone and in comparison with the JVP insurrection. Support for separatism rose sharply in the Tamil community between about 1972 and 1976. By the mid-1980s, surveys gauged that most Tamils in Sri Lanka saw no alternative to an independent state, leading to widespread support for the LTTE and other secessionist movements (Sivarajah 1996). Why was this?

Commitment problems – that is, fears about adversaries' future behavior – have been nearly crippling throughout the conflict, especially for Tamils. These stem from the history of anti-Tamil discrimination and from the repeated ethnic violence and the state's role in that violence. Frequent atrocities during the civil war, Tamil identifiability, and the inflammatory rhetoric and stereotypes in both communities exacerbated these fears of the future. Both sides' concerns over each other's intentions have repeatedly stymied compromise efforts, motivated new recruits, and pushed both politicians and individuals toward maximalist positions. The conflict also has been sustained by aid from Tamils in India and in the broader diaspora. The Indian government, community organizations, and

individuals have together helped to supply the LTTE and other secessionist groups, to provide them a safe haven for shelter and training, and to lobby on behalf of a Tamil state.

These two cases also indicate that my theory may help to explain why ethnic civil wars often last so long, compared to other types of civil wars. First, the JVP's supporters slipped back into the population in ways that Tamils never could. This alleviated many of the commitment problems that might have complicated the conflict. In particular, the relative fixedness of ethnic identity can create especially severe commitment problems if individuals face little hope of escaping from discrimination, past conflicts, or atrocities. If one cannot change allegiances but is consistently forced into the same group in a repeated conflict, the stakes become much higher.

Second, the JVP did not have highly motivated supporters abroad to provide it with weapons or money, perhaps in part because it lacked the strong bond of sympathetic co-ethnics. This inability to re-supply was the single most important determinant of the group's failure to sustain the rebellion for more than a few weeks.

4.0 Conclusions

This chapter has illustrated several ways that third party support and inter-group interactions vary between ethnic and non-ethnic civil wars. Discrimination, or more broadly, a lack of political and economic opportunities, played a central role in both the Salvadoran civil war and the JVP insurrection. In the long term, it could be easier for members of a socio-economic (or other non-ethnic) group to escape discrimination than for members of an ethnic group (Horowitz 2000). But in the short term, restricted

prospects play a very similar role in motivating potential rebels. Security discrimination also may be salient in both types of conflicts, although there is little evidence of its role in these two non-ethnic wars. Cultural discrimination has no analogue in these types of conflicts. Therefore, the fears of group extinction or forced assimilation it can engender probably play little role in non-ethnic wars such as those launched by the JVP or the FMLN.

In some conflicts, multiple forms of discrimination reinforce each other (e.g. Jonas 2000). Insofar as some types of discrimination may be more likely to occur in ethnically divided societies, such policies may play an even more pernicious role in ethnic wars. Determining whether this significantly influences variation in conflict duration must wait for more data on non-ethnic wars.

Past conflicts have complex effects on beliefs about one's opponents. In Sri Lanka, the history of Tamil-Sinhalese violence engendered deep fears among Tamils and led them to support secession by the thousands. Repeated targeting in riots simply erased any confidence they had in a secure future as Sri Lankan citizens. In the Central American wars, however, past conflicts played a more complex role. Depending on the actor, they reduced the desire to rebel, increased hopes of escaping violence, or increased fears of opponents. In a statistical sense, these dynamics could cancel each other out. Thus, these cases may help to illuminate the indeterminate model results in Chapter Four.

There are no clear differences between the roles of past conflicts in ethnic and non-ethnic wars. It seems quite plausible that ethnic groups may be more likely to repeatedly clash along the same cleavage than, for instance, socioeconomic groups. If this is the case, past conflicts may be more likely to influence commitment problems in

ethnic wars. The evidence here does not clearly support or refute this hypothesis, which must be tested against far more cases than these four.[238]

Atrocities played very similar roles in the Central American wars and the Tamil-Sinhalese conflict. They increased fears of adversaries' future behavior and prolonged the conflicts by facilitating recruiting. Even when killings were deliberately intended as a deterrent, it often took years before they had this effect – if at all.

Interestingly, abuses had much less effect during the JVP insurrection. This may be because torture and killing of detainees decreased after the first days, alleviating the JVP members' fears of surrender. This could have been reinforced by the government's willingness to offer an amnesty, signaling it did not intend to kill all the militants. The Guatemalan experience also would support this interpretation. Signals that torture or death was not inevitable allayed fears there, too. It also seems quite plausible that fears were alleviated by individuals' ability to melt back into the population, thus escaping the risk of falling victim to these abuses. This suggests that atrocities may have a substantially lower effect on perceptions and duration in non-ethnic wars and in ethnic wars where identifiability is low.

Identifiability also played a significant role in Central American wars and the Tamil-Sinhalese conflict. Yet identifiability can be much broader than the traits I measure in the quantitative data. These wars illustrate that residence can be just as damning as physical traits in many conflicts.[239] Thus, the cases – especially the war in El Salvador – indicate that when it is hard to escape one's town or immediate region, commitment problems may be just as high as when one can be dragged out of a car,

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[238] Indeed, each of these wars was part of a repeated conflict along roughly similar cleavages.
[239] This is consistent with the case evidence in Chapter Four, as well.

fingered as a member of the opposing group, and set on fire. As the JVP experience indicates, however, low identifiability may mitigate fears, particularly in non-ethnic wars.

Segregation did not engender significant signaling problems in any of these conflicts, although it was present in several. Groups – whether ethnic or socioeconomic – seem to have a wealth of information about each other. This information may be fairly accurate or it may stem from stereotypes, but it still influences predictions about adversaries' future behavior. The cases do not provide clear evidence that incitement or inflammatory rhetoric resonates more deeply when segregation is high. All the conflicts characterized by significant rhetoric of this type also occurred in segregated societies.[240] The interaction I hypothesize remains theoretically plausible, but I cannot either confirm or refute that it plays a role in either ethnic or non-ethnic civil wars.

Aid from third parties clearly shapes the length of both ethnic and non-ethnic civil wars. In all four conflicts, it influenced the military balance. When the parties are relatively evenly matched – as in Guatemala and El Salvador – external aid seems to promote a stalemate, regardless of its target.[241] When the stronger party is the only aid recipient – as in the JVP insurrection – intervention facilitates a swift victory. And when the weaker party is the beneficiary of overwhelming support – as in the Tamil-Sinhalese war – the military stalemate can drag on for decades.

The statistical results presented in Chapter Five indicate that support from co-ethnics is more likely to prolong ethnic civil wars than support from other parties. However, these cases do not provide clear evidence whether co-ethnics play different roles than do non-ethnic supporters. That is, do ethnic kin provide more reliable aid?

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[240] One testable implication of this might be whether such rhetoric occurs more often in segregated societies.
[241] Not surprisingly, 'evenly matched' parties may vary in the quantity and quality of their edge.

Are ethnic conflicts more likely to experience intervention by co-ethnics than by unrelated parties? Are they more likely to experience intervention than are non-ethnic civil wars? Although the Tamil diaspora has provided extensive and sustained support, and support that has dwarfed that of Sri Lanka's allies, this is evidence from only one conflict. Thus, whether the two sources provide qualitatively different aid remains a question for future research.

Finally, an important question that other scholars may want to pursue is whether the prevalence of these factors varies between ethnic and non-ethnic civil wars. That is, it is important that we know not only how interactions and interventions influence the length of conflicts, but simply whether they are more likely to occur in certain types of wars. In the concluding chapter, I discuss this question in more detail, in addition to reviewing the findings of the preceding chapters and laying out the complete picture of how interactions and interventions influence the length of ethnic civil wars.

Chapter 7. Conclusions

1.0 Introduction

In the spring of 2009, Sri Lanka's government declared victory over the Tamil Tiger secessionist rebellion. The war had lasted for 26 years. Nearly 100,000 lives may have been claimed during the war, over 7,000 of them in the last four months of fighting (Mallawarachi 2009). Why was the Sri Lankan government unable to defeat this group for a quarter-century? At the same time, Sudan's Islamist government waged a seemingly endless series of conflicts against non-Muslim southerners and then against Darfuris. Why is Khartoum also unable to declare victory?

The conventional wisdom in the media and among many policy-makers holds that civil wars are long, and ethnic civil wars are especially long – because they are ethnic. A recent *New York Times* article summarized this view of wars fought between "implacable foes, brothers even, divided over ideology or religion or the thirst for justice or ethnic representation, [who] fight to the bitter end" (Bowley 2009). But some ethnic wars are very short, and scholars are sharply divided as to the effect ethnicity has on civil wars – or if it has an effect at all. So what can explain this pattern? Is the conventional wisdom in the press and public right: can ethnicity explain why some civil wars are longer than others? If so, when and why do some ethnic civil wars last especially long?

Political scientists should know how a factor as central as ethnicity influences when civil wars end. We should be able to explain why ethnic civil wars in Burundi sometimes have lasted a few months and sometimes have not ended for more than a

decade. We should be able to explain why the Sri Lankan government could not defeat the Tamil Tigers, even though it was able to win a war against JVP insurgents in a few months. Civil wars such as these are the dominant form of conflict in the international system, and they are deadly, claiming thousands of lives a year. Certainly a great deal of ink has been spilled attempting to explain these patterns, and the lack of consensus on seemingly simple factors such as ethnicity is startling.

This dissertation answers these questions, and in doing so, it reconciles the contradictory research on the role of ethnicity in civil wars. I have argued that scholars' very different approaches to these questions account for the very different conclusions they reach. Studies that argue that ethnicity cannot explain when civil wars become especially long typically have used very rough measures and aggregated all civil wars into one analysis, regardless of their type. But we know that many other factors operate differently in different types of civil wars – why should ethnicity not be the same? Moreover, why should we expect ethnicity to influence the length of non-ethnic wars? On the other hand, studies that argue ethnicity is central to any explanation of when civil wars become especially long typically reach that conclusion based on detailed but narrow evidence. How do we know, therefore, that the insights drawn from one or a few wars are applicable to other conflicts?

I have argued here that ethnicity influences the length of ethnic civil wars through two processes. First, when inter-ethnic interactions exacerbate commitment or signaling problems, ethnic civil wars become more difficult to resolve. Second, when ethnic wars draw in third parties, the combatants are more likely to reach a military stalemate, and resolution becomes more difficult. Below, I review each of these in turn.

2.0 Goals of Study and Findings

Ethnic civil wars are not *about* ethnicity. That is, the combatants rarely are fighting over whose religion is more true, whose skin color is more beautiful, or whose cultural practice is the correct one. But ethnicity does deeply affect these wars. It influences how combatants and their potential supporters see themselves, their relationships with other groups, and the stakes of the conflict. In this dissertation, I have focused on the mechanisms through which civil wars become protracted when the combatants are organized along ethnic lines. In doing so, I have sought to closely detail a set of independent variables and processes that result from how ethnic groups interact with each other and with external parties. I have focused on how these factors affect the duration of only this type of civil war. Yet since these conflicts comprise approximately two-thirds of the civil wars that have occurred since 1945, my theory explains variation in the duration of a substantial proportion of intrastate conflicts. And, I have advanced a set of tentative hypotheses about how this theory may apply to the other one-third of civil wars, in which the combatants are not organized along ethnic lines.

These analyses revealed several things, in addition to the central findings. First, they confirmed several established patterns in civil wars. When lootable resources such as diamonds, timber, or drugs are prevalent, wars last longer (Buhaug and Lujala 2004; Ross 2004, 2006). This is one of the strongest findings in the existing literature on civil war duration, and it was confirmed in all of the analyses here. Multiple mechanisms could drive this relationship. The most common explanation is that rebels can buy weapons, pay soldiers, and otherwise fund their campaign with these resources. Yet as

the civil wars in Aceh and West Papua, Indonesia show, lootable resources also can create incentives for actors or interest groups to retain control of a territory.[242]

Second, rebel groups are not monolithic. Nearly every one of these conflicts saw significant divisions among the state's challengers. Usually, one group ended up dominant, as the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka did, but not always. In both Guatemala and El Salvador, the rebel movements eventually united into coalitions of organizations that had some common goals, but also had different visions of how best to achieve those goals. In any war, this heterogeneity is important to assess and to be sensitive to in our analysis. Rarely are rebel movements unitary actors. Of course, this does not mean we can never draw generalizations about their strategies or motivations, but we should do so with caution. Although I do not explicitly focus on the effects of inter-group schisms in this project, the interactions between groups certainly influence the length of civil wars.[243]

Finally, people also join rebellions for many reasons. Recent research has delved more deeply into the micro-foundations of recruitment, and this study supports many of the findings of these studies.[244] Salvadorans joined the FMLN for food, and both Guatemalans and Salvadorans made decisions based on which faction controlled territory at a given time. Many Sri Lankan Tamils were forced to participate in a war and to support factions they eschewed. Individuals in many of the wars examined here used ongoing conflicts to pursue local grievances, take their neighbors' land, or make a profit. But they participated for other reasons, too.

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[242] This is put forward as a potential mechanism in some studies (Ross 2004, 2006), and these cases highlight its role.
[243] See Cunningham (2006).
[244] E.g., Gates (2002), Kalyvas (2006).

What this analysis has shown is that studies focusing on these motives capture part of the picture of individuals' participation in civil wars, but only part. Individuals also are driven by fears of their neighbors and of a future that leaves them unable to protect themselves or provide for their families. And sometimes, they simply find themselves unable to end a war, no matter how much they may want to. I focused on five specific types of ethnic interactions that can provoke concerns about the future: discrimination, past conflicts, atrocities, identifiability, and segregation. I distinguished the effects of support from three different sets of actors: unrelated third parties, cross-border kin, and diasporas. Below, I review the findings related to each of these sets of factors.

2.1 Interethnic Interactions

In Chapter Four, I tested a theory of when interethnic interactions prolong civil wars. This theory rests on the critical role of information for combatants' predictions about their adversaries in civil wars. I argued that five types of information should influence calculations about whether it is safe to disarm.

The statistical analysis found that each of these sources of information, with one exception, significantly affected the duration of ethnic civil wars. Case studies of the civil wars in Moldova and Azerbaijan in the early 1990s provided further support for the theory and confirmed that the key mechanism is, in fact, commitment problems. That is, when information makes combatants fear their adversaries' intentions, they resist disarming and thus fight longer wars.

Discrimination in the years before a war breaks out powerfully affects reputations. It leads combatants to believe that if they cannot gain independence or autonomy, their prospects will be severely restricted. In some cases, it also produces fears that adversaries cannot be trusted at all, regardless of the costs. The case studies showed that even when discrimination is low, if individuals perceive themselves to be relatively disadvantaged, as was the case in Karabakh, they will not trust their opponents. This is especially important for policy-makers to recognize, since it means that the chance of alleviating conflict by redressing historical disparities between groups rests on who a groups' point of reference is.

Past conflicts did not appear to affect the length of conflict in the statistical analysis. There are good reasons to believe this is an artifact of the data, something that bears further testing. The case studies illuminated this relationship in three ways. First, they supported the hypothesized mechanism: past conflicts exacerbate mistrust between groups. In doing so, they prolong conflicts. The cases also demonstrated that the sources of these fears may date back quite far. To be clear, the cases do not suggest that groups are destined to clash forever once they are involved in an ethnic war. Rather, they show that when conflicts break out, people turn to the experiences of their grandparents or great-grandparents for lessons and to generate predictions about the future. Finally, the evidence indicates that reputations can matter in a number of ways other than those I tested here. For instance, Transnistrians feared Romanian influence in Moldova not because of past conflict, but because Romanians had a reputation as fascists.

Atrocities profoundly affect the duration of civil wars, and when they begin early in a conflict, they engender greater fears of the future. Even a few beatings, arrests,

disappearances, or instances of torture can create profound mistrust between groups. Atrocities were central to perceptions of adversaries' intentions in nearly every war I examined; even very high levels of atrocities designed to signal the danger of supporting one side (usually the rebels) failed to have their intended effect in most cases. In Moldova, atrocities were quite limited, but have become an enduring reference for why the two sides cannot reconcile or live in a unified state. In Azerbaijan, too, atrocities helped to radicalize displaced persons and fueled deep-seated fears of ethnic cleansing and genocide. In Guatemala and El Salvador, both targeted atrocities and indiscriminate massacres of whole communities were the single most important motivation for many recruits to the rebel movements. When indiscriminate atrocities waned, so did support for the guerrillas.[245] Similarly, in Sri Lanka, JVP members were willing to surrender once the government signaled that they would not be killed on the spot. And in Aceh and West Papua, as well as between Sinhalese and Tamils in Sri Lanka, public displays of bodies, the disappearances of hundreds or even thousands of individuals, torture, and indiscriminate massacres all have fueled deep-seated, long-lasting fears of adversaries' intentions.

Ethnic identifiability – that is, one's ability to 'pass' as a member of another group – also influenced the length of civil wars, although the effect was less uniform. In almost all of the wars I examined, traditional ethnic markers like dress, race, or language were supplemented by other information. This suggests that identifiability may create a deeper commitment problem in ethnic wars, but that there are many ways to single out members of a group in non-ethnic wars. Location is one important indicator. In

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[245] This is consistent with Kalyvas (2006) who argues that discriminate atrocities can have a very different effect from indiscriminate attacks.

Guatemala, El Salvador, the Tamil-majority regions of Sri Lanka, Karabakh, Aceh, and West Papua, residing in a rebel-controlled or sympathetic zone, or in a secessionist region, was often deadly. This suggests that regional segregation may interact with ethnic identifiability. When markers of allegiance or support are *not* clear, however, individuals are wracked by far fewer fears. The JVP members provide an illustrative example. Literally thousands of supporters and participants in the insurrection simply returned to their communities, with no one the wiser as to their role.

Ethnic civil wars in segregated societies last longer. I hypothesized that signaling problems – that is, uncertainty whether one's adversary has any intention of implementing a peace accord – are one mechanism driving this relationship. The case studies showed little evidence of this logic. Individuals draw on a wealth of information about their adversaries – accurate or otherwise – to make predictions about the future. The case studies identified some of these sources of alternative information. In particular, while past conflicts may not affect perceptions in segregated societies more, discrimination does deeply influence predictions about the future. Incitement, or the narratives that extremist media and politicians provide, also resonates deeply in segregated societies, even when segregation is fairly low. The statistical analysis found that incitement *does not* influence the length of conflicts in integrated societies. However, the case studies all suggest that incitement can be relevant for individuals, regardless of how much they interact with other groups. In Sri Lanka, Moldova, and Azerbaijan, these types of narratives fueled fears of adversaries' intentions and made individuals reluctant to lay down their weapons and trust their erstwhile adversaries.

Incitement also prolonged conflict by locking politicians into outbidding; in Armenia, for instance, politicians who advocated a negotiated solution were treated as traitors.

This set of findings suggests that policy-makers interested in limiting civil wars might pursue several strategies. Ethnicity itself is not easily influenced. But this research shows that ethnicity influences the length of civil wars through factors that *can* be shaped. First, fostering interactions between individuals (preferably, positive ones) can offer alternate sources of information and narratives to counter those provided by extremist media and politicians.[246] Second, education can provide alternate historical narratives or interpretations that are less threatening; rather than highlighting past conflicts and tensions, materials could focus on the broader scope of interactions. Media laws also can be crafted to reduce the reach of extremists' messages, and the legal system should punish those who incite others to violence. Moreover, attacks on civilians, torture, disappearances, and other atrocities should be minimized. Of course, in many conflicts, the perpetrators of these actions are not concerned with the moral dimension of their policies. However, it may be more convincing to know that these strategies often are counterproductive. Finally, alleviating discrimination is not always a perfect means to reducing concerns about the future. However, this research suggests that institutions that provide all groups with a political voice and with economic opportunities, coupled with representative security forces and tolerance for cultural practices, can significantly ameliorate tensions and increase confidence that war is not the only means to a safe or secure future.

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[246] This is consistent with Varshney (2002).

2.2 Third Parties

Third parties may intervene in a civil war with altruistic motives. But they usually end up prolonging the conflict. This may be because they even the military balance between the combatants, promoting a stalemate. Third parties also can complicate bargaining, as they did in Karabakh, or make combatants more bellicose, as the Russian Third Army did in Transnistria. Or, they may simply introduce uncertainty that makes it hard for the combatants to know what they must concede to reach a settlement.

Regardless of how third parties prolong the war, and independent of how long it lasts or the combatants' relative capabilities during the war, the government rarely loses. At best, the combatants fight to a permanent 'no war, no peace' stalemate, as they did in Moldova and Azerbaijan. Sometimes, they survive to fight another day, as the JVP in Sri Lanka and GAM in Aceh did. Sometimes, they agree to share power with the government, as Guatemalan and Salvadoran groups did. And sometimes, even with an overwhelmingly powerful force, they are defeated, as it appears the LTTE has been.

Some external supporters affect the length of conflicts more than do others. Third parties who are not related to a group of combatants often intervene, yet they rarely affect the length of the civil wars in which they do so. The only way unrelated third parties do influence the length of civil wars is through lobbying or other forms of diplomatic aid. Perhaps this is an artifact of the Cold War, or perhaps it reflects a compound effect of diplomatic pressure from many different actors, as I hypothesized in Chapter 5. Several of the cases also suggested that some third parties may exacerbate commitment problems and thus fuel longer wars by shaping perceptions and mistrust. A deeper understanding

of these relationships will require more case studies, since it likely will be difficult to untangle in a statistical analysis.

Ethnic kin, on the other hand, prolong the wars in which they intervene. Cross-border and diaspora supporters have approximately equal effects on the length of civil wars when they intervene. The forms of support they might provide, on the other hand, yield substantially different effects. Bases and safe havens in neighboring countries are particularly important for combatants. Indeed, the evidence suggests that this type of aid may produce an effect far out of proportion to the magnitude of the support itself. In West Papua, guerrillas' ability to escape across the border – and the collaboration of those who merely refuse to turn them over to security forces – has sustained the OPM for decades against its much more numerous and better armed opponent. It seems counter-intuitive, but transfers of money, weapons, or expertise have a smaller – albeit still substantial – effect on the length of ethnic civil wars. Perhaps this is because small rebel movements find themselves most in need of escape routes to facilitate guerrilla warfare, which can be waged with relatively few concrete resources. Certainly this has been the case in West Papua. Or perhaps this result reflects the need for a greater commitment of this type of aid to produce an effect. In Aceh, for instance, it was not enough that Libya trained several hundred GAM members; without supplies or an external base, they could not sustain the rebellion.

Both bases abroad and financial or weapons transfers also may have a contingent effect. That is, if they influence the length of civil wars by affecting the balance of capabilities, this relationship may depend on the terrain or the type of warfare being waged. Indeed, it seems quite plausible that in guerrilla warfare, large weapons

shipments might matter far less than in a conventionally-waged civil war. In a mountainous, sparsely populated region, weapons also might matter less than the ability to launch a quick strike and then escape.

For policy-makers, these findings might suggest that curtailing transfers of weapons or other material resources to the combatants in civil wars can shorten the length of these conflicts. Moreover, cutting off contact with neighboring states, particularly those from which combatants draw support, can also shorten civil wars. However, policy-makers must bear in mind that these recommendations should be applied only with extreme caution. Both can have profound humanitarian implications. In at least some cases where these strategies have been applied, horrific human rights abuses have resulted.[247] For instance, cutting off weapons can necessitate a complete embargo that has devastating effects on civilians already trapped in a war zone. Or it can leave a weak group defenseless against ethnic cleansing or genocide. And closing a country's border can leave non-combatants also unable to escape the fighting. Thus, these approaches should be adopted only with hesitation and in concert with other strategies designed to facilitate a negotiated peaceful settlement.

3.0 New Insights

This dissertation offers a number of new insights for scholars of ethnicity in civil wars. First, it reconciles the opposing views of ethnicity and its effect on the length of civil wars. By showing how ethnicity exacerbates dynamics inherent to many civil wars, I bridge the gap between research finding that ethnicity has a central effect on duration

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[247] Two recent examples of these types of effects are the weapons embargo imposed on Bosnia throughout most of the war there and the embargo of East Timor by Indonesia. Civilians bore the brunt of both these strategies.

and research finding that ethnicity has no effect on duration. In other words, ethnicity matters, but *only under certain conditions.* In order to show this, I develop new quantitative measures of variables that include both ethnic interactions and support from third parties.

More broadly, I show that simply testing whether combatants are organized along ethnic lines will not tell us whether ethnicity matters. Nor will a measure of how many ethnic groups live in a country. We have nuanced, insightful theories about *how* ethnicity should matter, and they should not be dismissed too quickly. By using the insights of these theories, I have shown that ethnicity only prolongs wars under certain sets of conditions.

Another insight of this research is that ethnic interactions influence information, mistrust, and combatants' beliefs about the safety of disarming. Perceptions matter in civil wars. We know that commitment problems influence the probability of a negotiated settlement in civil wars (Walter 2002), but we do not know when combatants face especially strong commitment problems. In this dissertation, I have shown how several specific types of interactions influence the intensity of these commitment problems. In doing so, these interactions affect the length of civil wars.

Third, I have shown that different types of third parties intervene in ethnic civil wars, and those actors have different effects on the length of wars. I also have demonstrated several ways that third parties influence the length of civil wars. Again, the fact that third parties affect conflict duration is not novel. Nor is it a new insight that co-ethnics intervene to support their kin. But what we did not know was how different types of intervention affect conflict duration. I have focused on one type of intervention – that

designed to bolster one side's chance of victory – and have shown that *who* intervenes

matters. Moreover, the tools they employ on behalf of the combatants critically shape the

length of the war.

4.0 Next Steps

This dissertation offers a number of important contributions to the study of ethnic

civil wars. One of these is its suggestions for future research. I focus on four such

opportunities below.

First, while the case studies lend support to the mechanisms I hypothesize, this

link has not been definitively proven. A number of researchers recently have emphasized

the importance of understanding the micro-foundations of civil wars (Gates 2002; Green

and Seher 2003; Kalyvas 2007), a task which I agree is vital.   The hypotheses here were

crafted in part based on my informal conversations with many individuals over the years

about their experiences living in conflict areas. One important task is to systematize

these types of individual-level insights. Surveys in post-conflict societies may provide an

especially important appreciation of these relationships.

Second, the analysis revealed that third parties may play a complicated role in

some civil wars. The effect of third party support may rest especially on factors such as

terrain, relative capabilities, or the type of war being prosecuted. Although data are

relatively easy to gather on some of these measures – notably the type of war and the

terrain – testing other factors will require a considerably larger outlay of time and effort,

and it is a task I leave for future studies.

Third, the case studies could not distinguish the relative role of different potential mechanisms tying third party intervention to conflict duration. Again, informal conversations suggest that all of the proposed mechanism play some role. Close analysis of a number of other civil wars may help to illuminate this further. Interviews with politicians, rebel leaders, and mediators also could help to show whether third parties exacerbate moral hazard problems, complicate bargaining, or introduce uncertainty into a conflict.

Finally, I began the important task of extending this research to non-ethnic civil wars in the final empirical chapter. The preliminary findings of the case studies in Central America and Sri Lanka suggested two important sets of hypotheses that bear further testing. First, many – but not all – of the concepts I focused on here apply to non-ethnic wars. Thus, this theory may explain differences in the lengths of these conflicts, as well as in ethnic wars. Yet several of these factors play notably different roles in non-ethnic roles. They may have lower effects, or they may drive different mechanisms. Thus, these same factors also may explain differences between the lengths of non-ethnic and ethnic civil wars. The first step in this research agenda is answering questions such as whether ethnic kin provide more reliable aid; whether discrimination is more likely in some types of civil wars; whether ethnic civil wars are more or less likely to experience interventions; and whether atrocities are more likely to occur in some types of civil wars. Exploring these ideas further is my next task.

Appendices

Appendix A. Ethnic Civil Wars, 1945-2004

Country	War Identification	Start and End Dates
Afghanistan	vs. Taliban	April 1992-
Angola	UNITA	January 1975-August 2002
Angola	FLEC / Cabinda	October 1992-
Azerbaijan	Nagorno-Karabakh	January 1992-May 1994
Bangladesh	Chittagong Hill Tracts	August 1976-June 1997
Bosnia	Rep. Srpska / Croats	March 1992-November 1995
Burma	Karens, etc.	April 1948-
Burundi	Hutu uprising	April 1972-July 1972
Burundi	Organized massacres	August 1988-September 1988
Burundi	Hutu groups vs. government	October 1993-
Chad	FROLINAT, various	October 1965-
Chad	Rebels in South	June 1994-June 1998
China	Tibet I	October 1950-November 1950
China	Tibet II	February 1956-June 1959
China	Xinjiang / Uighurs	June 1991-
Croatia	Krajina	June 1991-October 1995
Cyprus	Cypriots, Turkey	July 1974-August 1974
DRC	Katanga, Kasai	June 1960-November 1965
DRC	FLNC	March 1977-May 1978
DRC	Kabila / AFDL	October 1996-May 1997
Ethiopia	Eritrea, Tigray, etc.	September 1974-May 1991
Ethiopia	Oromo Liberation Front	June 1992-
Georgia	Abkhazia	January 1992-June 1994
Guatemala	URNG, etc	July 1966-December 1996
India	Northeast rebels	May 1952-
India	Sikhs	April 1983-October 1993
India	Kashmir	January 1990-
Indonesia	South Moluccas	April 1950-November 1950
Indonesia	Darul Islam	September 1953-November 1953
Indonesia	OPM / West Papua	August 1965-
Indonesia	East Timor	November 1975-September 1999
Indonesia	Aceh / GAM I	June 1989-June 1991
Indonesia	Aceh / GAM II	January 1999-
Iran	KDPI (Kurds)	April 1979-December 1992
Iraq	KDP, PUK (Kurds)	March 1961-April 1975

Country	War Identification	Start and End Dates
Iraq	Shiites, SCIRI, Kurds	January 1982-November 1996
Lebanon	Nasserites vs. Chamoun	May 1958-September 1958
Lebanon	Militias	April 1975-July 1991
Mali	Tuaregs	June 1990-January 1995
Moldova	Transnistria	March 1992-October 1992
Morocco	Polisario / Western Sahara	December 1975-August 1988
Nigeria	Biafra	July 1967-January 1970
Pakistan	Bangladesh	March 1971-December 1971
Pakistan	Baluchistan	February 1973-July 1977
Pakistan	MQM / Sindhis vs. Mohajirs	August 1983-November 1998
Papua New Guinea	Bougainville	May 1989-May 1997
Philippines	MNLF, MILF / Moros	September 1972-
Russia	Estonia	June 1946-June 1948
Russia	Latvia	June 1946-June 1947
Russia	Lithuania	June 1946-June 1948
Russia	Ukraine	June 1946-June 1950
Russia	Chechnya I	June 1994-December 1996
Russia	Chechnya II	August 1999-
Rwanda	Post-revolution strife	November 1963-December 1966
Rwanda	RPF, genocide	September 1990-July 2001
Senegal	Casamance / MFDC	June 1989-
Somalia	SSDF, SNM, Isaaqs	June 1981-Juny 1994
South Africa	ANC, etc.	June 1983-June 1996
Sri Lanka	LTTE, etc.	July 1983-
Sudan	Anya Nya	September 1963-December 1971
Sudan	SPLA, etc	July 1983-
Turkey	PKK / Kurds	August 1984-
Uganda	NRA, etc.	February 1981-January 1986
Uganda	LRA, West Nile, etc.	August 1986-
United Kingdom	IRA	June 1969-June 1999
Yugoslavia	Croatia/Krajina	June 1991-January 1992
Zimbabwe	ZANU, ZAPU	December 1972-December 1979
Zimbabwe	Ndebele	January 1983-December 1987

Appendix B. Variables in the Dataset

CONTROL VARIABLES

StartDate   Date (to beginning of month) war started, based on Fearon and Laitin, PRIO/Uppsala data, and news accounts

EndDate   Date (to beginning of month) war ended, based on Fearon and Laitin, PRIO/Uppsala data, and news accounts

ended   Dummy 0-1 if war has ended or is ongoing

country   Country in which the war occurred

casename   Specific conflict identification

duration   Calculated based on difference between start and end dates (represents number of months of war) If war ongoing, represents number of months to end of dataset

loot   From Fearon and Laitin 'evidence of significant contraband financing'; modifications and additions from Ross and case studies necessary

lpop   From Fearon and Laitin. ln(population)

ef   From Fearon and Laitin. Ethnic fractionalization.

lintensity   Deaths from Fearon and Laitin Approximate number killed during the war. Updates from Keesings. Divided by number of months of the war and size of the population.

lgdpen   From Fearon and Laitin. Log GDP per capita

Cold War   Dummy 0-1 if war occurred during the Cold War

ETHNIC INTERACTIONS
Discrimination

pdiscrim	PolDis from MAR discrimination data. I code average for 10 years before (or as many years as MAR data available). If there is more than one group fighting, code the average. The role of public policy and social practice in maintaining or redressing political inequalities.

    0   No discrimination
    1   Neglect/Remedial policies
    2   Neglect/No remedial policies
    3   Social exclusion/Neutral policy
    4   Exclusion/Repressive policy

ediscrim	EcDis from MAR discrimination data. I code average for 10 years before (or as many years as MAR data available). If there is more than one group fighting, code the average. The role of public policy and social practice in maintaining or redressing economic inequalities.

    0   No discrimination
    1   Historical neglect/Remedial policies
    2   Historical neglect/No remedial policies
    3   Social exclusion/Neutral policies
    4   Restrictive policies

sdiscrim	From case studies. The role of public policy and social practice in maintaining or redressing security forces/recruitment inequalities.

    0   No discrimination
    1   Neglect/Remedial policies
    2   Neglect/No remedial policies
    3   Social exclusion/Neutral policy
    4   Exclusion/Repressive policy

cdiscrim	From case studies. The role of public policy and social practice in maintaining or redressing cultural inequalities.

    0   No discrimination
    1   Neglect/Remedial policies
    2   Neglect/No remedial policies
    3   Social exclusion/Neutral policy
    4   Exclusion/Repressive policy

AvgDiscrim	Mean of political, economic, cultural, security
HighDiscrim	Square of average discrimination

Past Conflict

History Highest level of past conflict. Data from Fearon and Laitin, PRIO, case studies

0 No conflicts in the last 50 years
1 Conflict less than 50 and more than 20 years ago that killed less than 100
2 Conflict less than 50 and more than 20 years ago that killed 100 – 1000
3 Conflict less than 50 and more than 20 years ago that killed more than 1000
4 Conflict less than 20 years ago that killed less than 100
5 Conflict less than 20 years ago that killed 100 – 1000
6 Conflict less than 20 years ago that killed more than 1000

PastDummy 0 No conflict in past 50 yrs
1 Conflict in past 50 yrs

HighHist Square of history

Atrocities

Atrocities Based on case studies. Prevalence and timing of arbitrary arrests, disappearances, torture, extrajudicial executions, massacres of either civilians or prisoners of war, and the use of chemical or biological weapons.

0 None or very limited
1 Occasional (1-2 / year), not in first year of conflict
2 Occasional (1-2 / year), in first year of conflict
3 Frequent (6-8 / year), not in first year of conflict
4 Frequent (6-8 / year), in first year of conflict
5 Very extensive (at least monthly), not in first year of conflict
6 Very extensive (at least monthly), in first year of conflict

HighAtroc Square of atrocities

Identifiability

lang Original data based on MAR. Degree to which groups speak the same language.

0 Groups speak same language
1 Groups speak multiple languages but likely to speak the same language as at least a second language
2 Groups speak different languages although may also speak the same language

248

custom	From MAR data. Measures whether groups practice the same customs 0 Same social customs 1 Different social customs
belief	Original data based on MAR. Measures whether groups practice the same religion. 0 Groups are the same religion 1 Groups are different sect within same religion 2 Groups belong to multiple sects, some of which are different from other groups 3 Groups belong to different religions
race	Original data based on MAR. Degree to which groups are of different races. 0 No significant racial differences between group 1 Groups have some minor racial differences, may be substantial intermixture 2 Groups are significantly different racially, substantial intermixture 3 Groups are of different races
Identifiable	Twice the value of language + custom + belief + three times race

Segregation

Segregation	Based on case studies. Extent to which members of different groups live, work, eat, play, and worship together. 0 Extensive interaction 1 Some limited interactions 2 Little to no interaction
MediaIncite	Based on case studies. Do media which reach a significant proportion of the population propagate negative messages about members of other ethnic groups? 0 No 1 Sometimes 2 Fairly often
PolitIncite	Based on case studies. Do popular politicians propagate negative messages about members of other ethnic groups? 0 No 1 Sometimes 2 Fairly often

THIRD PARTY SUPPORT
Aid from Cross-Border Kin

XborderAid

Is there explicit evidence that groups across border provide smuggling routes, training sites, safe havens, or other unique forms of assistance? Data from Byman et al., Proquest and Keesings, case studies

0   No support
1   Some evidence of support
2   Fairly extensive support
3   Very extensive support

XbAidONE

Does only one group of combatants receive aid from cross-border kin?

0   Multiple groups receive aid
1   Only one group receives aid from cross-border kin

XBMoneyGuns

Do cross-border kin provide money or weapons to the combatants?

0   Combatants do not receive money or weapons from cross-border kin
1   Combatants receive money or weapons from cross-border kin

XBShelter

Do cross-border kin provide shelter, bases, training sites, or smuggling routes to the combatants?

0   Combatants do not have help establishing bases, shelters, or routes from cross-border kin
1   Combatants have help establishing bases, shelters or routes from cross-border kin

XBDiplom

Do cross-border kin lobby, negotiate, or provide other diplomatic or non-military aid to combatants?

0   Cross-border kin do not lobby, negotiate, or provide other diplomatic or non-military aid to combatants
1   Cross-border kin lobby, negotiate, or provide other diplomatic or non-military aid to combatants

Aid from Diaspora

DiasporaAid

Do diasporas abroad provide arms, money, fighters or other material support? Data from Byman et al., Proquest and Keesings, case studies

0   No support
1   Some evidence of support
2   Fairly extensive support
3   Very extensive support

DiaspONE	Does only one group of combatants receive aid from a diaspora?
	0 Multiple groups receive aid
	1 Only one group receives aid from a diaspora

DiaspMoneyGuns   Does the diaspora provide money or weapons to the combatants?
                        0   Combatants do not receive money or weapons from a diaspora
                        1   Combatants receive money or weapons from a diaspora

DiaspDiplom   Does the diaspora lobby, negotiate, or provide other diplomatic or non-military aid to combatants?
    0   The diaspora does not lobby, negotiate, or provide other diplomatic or non-military aid to combatants
    1   The diaspora lobbies, negotiates, or provides other diplomatic or non-military aid to combatants

Aid from Unrelated Supporters

NotEthAid   Do non-related parties abroad provide arms, money, fighters or other material support? Data from Byman et al., Proquest and Keesings, case studies
    0   No support
    1   Some evidence of support
    2   Fairly extensive support
    3   Very extensive support

NotEthONE   Does only one group of combatants receive aid from unrelated supporters?
    0   Multiple groups receive aid
    1   Only one group receives aid from cross-border kin

NotEthMoneyGuns   Do unrelated supporters provide money or weapons to the combatants?
    0   Combatants do not receive money or weapons from unrelated supporters
    1   Combatants receive money or weapons from unrelated supporters

NotEthShelter   Do unrelated supporters provide shelter, bases, training sites, or smuggling routes to the combatants?
    0   Combatants do not have help establishing bases, shelters, or routes from unrelated supporters
    1   Combatants have help establishing bases, shelters or routes from unrelated supporters

NotEthDiplom   Do unrelated supporters lobby, negotiate, or provide other
diplomatic or non-military aid to combatants?

    0   Unrelated supporters do not lobby, negotiate, or provide
other diplomatic or non-military aid to
combatants

    1   Unrelated supporters lobby, negotiate, or provide other
diplomatic or non-military aid to combatants

Appendix C. Maps

Map 1. Moldova and Transnistria


Map 2. Azerbaijan and Karabakh

Map 3. Indonesia

Map 4. Aceh

Map 5. West Papua

Map 6. El Salvador

Map 7. Guatemala

Map 8. Sri Lanka

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