Dispute Resolution in the Provincial Courts of the Third Dynasty of Ur

by

Laura E Culbertson

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Doctoral Committee:

Professor Piotr Michalowksi, Chair
Professor Gary Beckman
Professor Norman Yoffee
Professor Henry T. Wright

For my mother

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A	Tablets in the collection of the Oriental Institute Museum, University of Chicago
AHDO	Archives d'Histoire du droit oriental, Wetteren
AnOr	Analecta Orientalia (Rome 1931 ff.)
AO	Museum siglum Louvre (Antiquités orientales)
AoF	Altorientalische Forschungen, Schriften zur Geschichte und Kultur des Alten Orients (Berlin 1974 ff.)
AOr	Archiv Orientáliní (Prague 1931*ff*)
AuOr	Aula Orientalis (Barcelona 1983 ff.)
Bab	Babyloniaca (Paris 1906-1946)
BBVO	Berliner Beiträge zum Vorderer Orient (Berlin 1982 ff.)
BM	Tablet siglum of texts in the British Museum, London
BPOA	Biblioteca del Próximo Oriente Antiguo (2006); Ur III Adminstrative Tablets from the British Museum Part I
FAOS	Freiburger Altorientalische Studien (Freiburg 1975 ff.)
HS	sigla of Hilprecht-Sammlung, University of Jena, Germany
ITT	Inventaire des tablettes de Tello
L	Tablet siglum of texts in the Archeological Museum in Istanbul (Lagaš/Girsu)
MCS	Manchester Cuneiform Studies (Manchester 1951 ff.)
MLC	Morgan Library Collection, siglum of the Yale Babylonian Collection, New Haven
MM	tablets in the collections of the Abbey of Montserrat (Barcelona)
MVN	Materiali per il vocabulario neosumerico (Rom 1974 ff.)
NSGU/NG	Falkenstein, A. 1956-7. *Die neusumerischen Gerichtsurkunden*.
Rev.Sem.	Revue Sémitique (Paris 1893-1914)
RTC	F. Thureau-Dangin, Recueil des tablettes chaldéennes (Paris 1903)
SNAT	*Selected Neo-Sumerian Administrative Texts from the British Museum* (Japan 1990)
TCL	*Textes cunéiformes*, Musées du Louvre (Paris 1910 ff.)
TCTI	Bertrand Lafont and Fatma Yildiz, Tablettes cunéiformes de Tello au Musée d´Istanbul: datant de l´époque de la IIIe Dynastie d´Ur. Tome I. ITT II/1, 617-1038. PIHANS 65. (Leiden, Nederlands Instituut voor het Nabije Oosten, 1989)
TUAT	Texte aus der Umwelt des Alten Testaments (Gütersloh 1982 ff.)
UIOM	Tablets in the collections of the Univ. of Illinois Oriental Museum
UM	Tablet siglum of the University Museum, Philadelphia

ABSTRACT

This dissertation is an investigation of dispute resolution as it was practiced in the two best-documented provinces of the strongly centralized state of the Third Dynasty of Ur (Ur III, ca. 2100-2000 BCE), Umma and Lagaš. This southern-Mesopotamian state left tens of thousands of administrative documents reporting on a variety of economic and administrative activities, and this project focuses on approximately 370 of them, in particular those identified by the Sumerian term ditila ("case closed") that record the outcome of dispute proceedings. The corpus utilized for this undertaking consists both of ditila-documents analyzed by Adam Falkenstein in his 1956 treatment of the topic, as well as many that have been identified or published since then.

Previous studies of these documents have viewed them as evidence of "law" and as sources for the study of Sumerian linguistics. The approach adopted in this dissertation, however, views the texts as limited administrative summaries of procedures, and, inspired by studies in the anthropology of law, mines them for evidence of social groupings, mobility, and competition among provincial elites and their associates within the 38-year window covered by the texts.

The study shows that, in spite of long-standing images of the Ur III state as a static, despotic entity, there were differences between the two provinces and changes in the nature of courts over time. The findings of other recent studies that have noted variations in administrative organization among the provinces are corroborated, while it is also demonstrated that there were regional differences in the organization and execution of disputing practices. The latter point indicates that there was not a centrally legislated,

uniformly applied body of laws overarching the state, and thus challenges the idea of an Ur III "legal system."

Moreover, it is argued that the resolution system at work in these provinces was in constant flux, subject to both local political changes as well as currents of competition among urban, provincial elites. Disputing was engaged by a number of elite families, who participated both as disputants and court officials, in order to secure and transform status and negotiate their political standing within the community.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

Conflict and disputation are inevitable and consequential parts of life in all societies, even if such practices were differently constructed across time and space and inconsistently deposited into the written record. Among the prodigious body of administrative documents transmitted to us from the powerful Mesopotamian state of the Third Dynasty of Ur (hereafter Ur III; *ca*. 2111-2004 B.C.E.), is a relatively small corpus of texts known to scholars as ditilas, a term that literally means "closed case." These roughly 370 records, primarily emanating from the largest core provinces of the Ur III state, Umma and Lagaš,[1] document the results of legal procedures such as trials and litigations, though this dissertation will argue that their contents are more accurately described as the abbreviated reports of mediated dispute resolutions and public procedures aimed at clarifying ambiguous or contentious economic and social transactions. By either definition, the ditila documents constitute the first substantial corpus of procedural records in world history,[2] and are among the earliest known written evidence for ancient law.

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[1] Recent studies on the city, province, and history of Umma (modern Tell Jokha) can be found in van Driel (1999/2000), Dahl (2003 and 2007), Studevent-Hickman 2005, Adams 2008, Steinkeller 2007, and Ouyang 2009:13ff. Oh'e 2003 and Molina *forthcoming* deal specifically with the court records of the province. For an overview of the province of Lagaš, its Ur III capital of Girsu (modern Telloh), and the recovered documents, see Falkenstein and Opificius 1957, Jones 1975, Sallaberger 1999:285, Sharlach 2004, and Allred 2006:106f. Such documents also exist from the core provinces of Ur and Nippur, but in smaller number. Falkenstein 1956-7 is the authoritative treatment on the court records of this province.

[2] Legal documents were produced before the Ur III period, but evidence for legal procedure, litigation, or dispute processing, is comparably limited. See Wilcke 2007:42ff. for a recent overview of these texts.

The appearance of these ditila records in history coincides, according to some scholars, with the administrative transformations implemented by king Šulgi in the latter half of his reign (see Steinkeller 1987), which saw a precipitous and rapid expansion of administrative recordkeeping in the core provinces of the state. Even though the precise archaeological context of the ditilas is unknown, it is certain that they were filed, like most Ur III administrative documents, in central archives of the provincial institutions, the governors' palaces at both Lagaš[3] and Umma.[4] The royal year names provided in individual ditilas allow for the reconstruction of a relative chronology of the texts, and indicate that they can be assigned to a period of roughly 38-39 years. After first appearing in Šulgi's year 32, the corpus spanned the reigns of his successors, Amar-Sin, Šu-Sin, and Ibbi-Sin, before disappearing by Ibbi-Sin's year 5, not long before all administrative documentation ceases and the Ur III state disintegrates altogether.

These texts preserve a limited imprint of disputing and negotiation among elite members of southern Mesopotamian society during this 38 years, documenting interactions of relatively finite and centralized communities of the wealthy provincial nobility and their close affiliates and subordinates. An array of social, economic, and civil matters are addressed by the ditilas, ranging from topics that we now place under the heading of family law (including marriages, divorces, adoptions, probate and inheritance issues, and the sale and status of household slaves); to contract law (including disputes over property claims and transfers, loans, hiring of labor, and disputes over negligence or mismanagement); to

[3] Filing tags (pisan dub-ba) that have been recovered from Lagaš (discussed 2.X.X) indicate that the Lagaš dispute records were centrally organized according to year date, and usually also according to court official (e.g., a judge, a group of judges, or the governor).

[4] Umma has never been systematically excavated apart from a short period before the Second World War, but Molina (2008: 125-127) has explained that the majority of Umma ditilas comprise part of a large, single acquisition of Ur III texts from Umma obtained by the British Museum in 1912 (almost all texts in the BM 106000 series). This "suggests that we are dealing with a homogeneous group of tablets from the central archives of the governor of Umma, possibly coming from a single findspot" (127). It is indeed impossible that these ditilas, the majority of which date to Amar-Sin's year 2, would coincidentally have been recovered from myriad dispersed locations and compiled into a single collection by an antiquities dealer.

debt law (including loans, leases, creditor complaints, and debt-slavery); to general matters of entitlement and social status, care of property, and family welfare.

However, even after a full century of indispensable scholarship on these documents, the corpus deserves new examination. Much of the research on early Mesopotamian legal documents, including the ditilas, has yielded a picture of a complex system, legal or otherwise, that operated according to logic that is familiar, accessible, and predicable to the modern scholar. The ease of the applicability of the very notion of "law" to this corpus – one that significantly antedates the Code of Hammurapi, the Codes of the Hebrew Bible, and the pivotal legal philosophies produced by the Classical and Roman civilizations – should immediately warrant our skepticism, unless we posit that innumerable social, political, and ideological upheavals over the millennia have little affected societies since the beginning of Mesopotamian civilization. Indeed, several scholars have already expressed doubts about the applicability of "law" to the early Mesopotamian context after critical analyses of royal "Law Codes" (e.g., Michalowski and Walker 1989, with discussion of Sjöberg 1976; and see now Rubio 2009:31ff.), but the matter requires further investigation paying specific attention to non-royal documents.

With identification and publication of new ditilas in recent years, and taking inspiration from works of legal anthropologists, the purpose of this dissertation is to reexamine the ditilas in order to understand the social dynamics and local distributions of power that they partially reflect and record. That is, this project is not an investigation of the ditilas *per se*, but rather utilizes them as a source for disputing procedures and social transformations underway in Ur III society. This project owes an incalculable debt to the philological and Mesopotamian legal studies that precede it, but the approach adopted herein is anthropological and views ditilas as byproducts of disputing practices which may be mined for evidence of social groupings, mobility, and competition among the elites and

their associates of this period. In order to see such most clearly, the project adopts a comparative approach, simultaneously examining the Umma and Lagaš ditilas but as separate archives. The small handful of ditilas thus far known from other provinces also assisted this endeavor.

Several factors justify the need for such an approach, including the reshaping of the corpus in recent years since the seminal work of Adam Falkenstein (1956-7), the development of new directions in the study of Mesopotamian and ancient law from which the ditilas have escaped consideration, and the fact that recent treatments of Ur III society and economy have emphasized regional variations in administration and local political structures, a picture against which the Ur III ditilas must be compared.

1.2 The Study of the Corpus and the Archival Approach

When scholars first identified ditila texts, they regarded them as comprising a corpus of Ur III legal-administrative documents that self-identify with the Sumerian signature di til-la, meaning "Case Closed" (after Edzard 1967:151) or "Completed Proceedings" (after Fortner 1997:19), which appears as a heading (*Überschrift*) in texts from Lagaš, and as a subscript (*Unterschrift*) in many of the Umma texts. Thureau-Dangin (1903), Virolleaud (1903), Pélagaud (1910), Mercer (1913, 1915), de Genouillac (1910-21, 1911), and Fish (1935) identified and published small groups of such texts, provoking substantial interest in the Ur III legal system and in the development of early Mesopotamian law in general. Building on their investigations, Adam Falkenstein (1956-7) systematically assembled, translated, and collated all known examples of such texts in his venerable study *Die neusumerischen Gerichtsurkunden* (NG). This three-volume work provides first-rate grammatical and philological analyses of the texts, as well as critical and philological commentaries, and thus deservedly remains an authoritative study

of Ur III legal documents. Falkenstein also developed parameters for the corpus, expanding the total number of texts to 220, by including documents that did not contain the sub- or superscript di til-la but which nonetheless recorded legal cases in the same form and style as the texts that did bear the designation. Since then, many scholars have used the term "ditilla," as it is most often rendered, to refer to Ur III litigation records whether or not they self-identify with the term di til-la.

Falkenstein's NG reflects two difficult limitations, however. Firstly, Falkenstein excluded litigation records from his corpus if they did not contain explicit mention of a court official (e.g., a judge, governor, or maškim), regarding such texts as "private" legal documents and publishing them separately (Çig, Kızılyay, and Falkenstein 1959). Because of the lack of secure archaeological context for the ditilas, including the so-called "private" ones, it remains impossible to know if these documents were indeed stored outside of the governors' archives, and thus if the separate categorization of these texts is justified by their context.[5] Similarly, Falkenstein was reluctant to include texts that did not explicitly include evidentiary oaths (nam-erim$_2$, see Chapter 3), owing to his assumption that this oath was the crucial indicator of a completed litigation and proper legal procedure. The shape and dimensions of his corpus were therefore predicated on the assumption that litigation was a firmly established procedure during the Ur III period, assuming the same form of execution from place to place.

Secondly, because only few Umma ditilas were known at the time of Falkenstein's work – merely 29 compared to 193 texts from Lagaš – his corpus faced the unavoidable limitation of being grossly one-sided, and the data would not allow for a comparison of Umma and Lagaš ditilas that could expose regional idiosyncrasies beyond the level of

[5] Regrettably few "private" dispute records (i.e., records kept outside of an institutional archive), let alone records with a secure provenience, are known from the Ur III period, save for small samplings such as a handful of documents of the Ur-Nusku archive from Nippur (see Garfinkle 2000:208-9).

philology or local scribal practices. His discussion of the Ur III "legal system" (vol. 1, 1956) is thus largely applicable only to the Lagaš corpus, reflecting little about Umma's organization and disputing procedures. Because of the foundational nature of Falkenstein's work, many studies have inherited a bias towards Lagaš when approaching the Ur III legal system, and some still view the ditilas as a distinctly Lagašite type of document (e.g., Pomponio 2008:121).

Falkenstein's indispensable contribution was swiftly reviewed by Kraus (1958) and Sollberger (1958), the latter of whom included a new ditila in his review. More ditilas were subsequently identified and published in small assortments by Kienast (1969), Sollberger (1976), van Dijk (1963), Sigrist (1995), Molina (2004, 2008, *forthcoming*), and Johnson and Veenker (*forthcoming*). Resulting from these discoveries, the Umma corpus has expanded and warranted its own treatment (e.g., Oh'e 2003 or Molina *forthcoming*). Important new editions, collations, translations, and analyses of selective groups of Lagaš and Umma ditilas have also been published by Krecher (1974), B. Lafont (2000), Molina (2000, *forthcoming)*, Lafont and Westbrook (2003), Sallaberger (2008), and Pomponio (2008). Consequently, the parameters of the ditila corpus have shifted again, and many of the above-cited scholars now grant membership to any Ur III document that records a legal process of any kind and in any stage of its execution (e.g., Molina 2004, 2008).

As it is currently conceived, the corpus thus contains a variety of legal-administrative texts that exhibit clear evidence of court entities or litigious procedures. Of course, the distinction between Ur III legal and administrative texts is often difficult to determine (Sallaberger 1999), and the notion of an expansive genre of Ur III "legal documents" is largely a scholarly invention rather than a native textual categorization. However, it is likely that the Ur III archivists did themselves conceive of ditilas as a

specific type of document based on their label, hence filing them together in the archives, but whether they considered this label a legal or administrative one is questionable and anachronistic.

The Ur III ditilas should be regarded as documents unassociated with the Sumerian "model court cases" of Old Babylonian Nippur, so-termed by Roth (1988), even if there are superficial similarities between both types of texts.[6] The Ur III documents are strictly administrative in character, with the inclusion of year names, names of identifiable people, and technical terminology (Hallo 2002), and cannot be considered literary or school texts.[7] While the context and purpose of the "model cases" is unclear to me, their literary character, Old Babylonian origins, and focus on Isin-era kings suggest that they are products of a context dissimilar to that of the Ur III administrative archives.

The present study, aiming to compare disputing at Lagaš and Umma, utilizes all texts (see Appendix 1) that bear the designation ditila, but given our specific inquiries, I also utilized texts that exhibit evidence of disputing, resolution procedures, or negotiations, and accordingly include the so-called "private" documents; court entities (judges, maškims, witnesses) need not be present for negotiations to occur between two parties. I treat the ditilas as comprising at least two separate archives that span a roughly 38-year period, with the exception of texts that are unprovenienced or show evidence of belonging outside the Umma and Lagaš provincial archives; such texts are not equivalent to "private"

[6] For example, the second "model case" of CBS 11324 (Klein and Sharlach 2007:9) identifies itself as di til-la and names a maškim, but the document is Old Babylonian and reports that its case was adjudicated by the Isin king, Išme-Dagan, thus having no obvious relation to Ur III administrative documents.

[7] To my knowledge, there is only one pair of perfectly duplicate texts from the corpus, the tablet of Text 60, and the first of two cases entered on the collective tablet BM 110379 (Molina 2008: no. 4), both from Umma. Text 120a and 120b are typically considered quasi-duplicates, but in the case of the latter texts, the spanning of the case in question from Umma to the subsidiary city of Nagsu may explain the need for two copies of the document. An explanation for the former pair of duplicates is harder to produce, but the existence of these two duplicates is not evidence for their inclusion in a school curriculum.

documents (e.g., the Adab ditila [Widell 2002] or *MVN* 11 185, probably from Susa). I also consider the handful of ditilas from Ur and Nippur where possible.

Limited by his data, Falkenstein considered the ditilas to belong to a single genre of legal texts, and paid limited attention to regional and temporal trends. Subsequent studies of ditilas have analyzed small corpora or single texts, not contextualizing the documents in any archival context. Consequently, the full body of ditilas has yet to be analyzed by way of an archival approach, but the advantages of such have been outlined by Gelb (1967), Civil (1980), and Steinkeller (1982) and the present state of the data permits us to consider most of the documents as belonging to at least two institutional, archival context in Umma and Lagaš, respectively. This strategy differs from the atomistic investigations of legal texts in that it allows for the identification of larger trends among the texts and organizes them according to provenience, thereby exposing local and regional variations in how disputing was done. At the same time, the present study differs from the comprehensive analyses of Old Babylonian legal texts (Dombradi 1996, Fortner 1997) or Pre-Ur III legal documents (Edzard 1968, Wilcke 2007), because it does not organize the texts according to legal categories[8] but rather considers them according to the nature of the underlying dispute and persons and families involved in them, as well as according to the chronological context as much as is possible.

In addition to the diachronic and regional trends that may be exposed by this method, there are further advantages. Importantly, it allows for the political contextualization of trends and changes in Ur III disputing practices, making it possible to observe how performances of disputing were both shaped by and integral to political developments on the local and state level. Meanwhile, by understanding the ditilas as sources for the study of disputes instead of analyzing them as single texts, we are able to

[8] See, however, Holtz's (2009:5ff.) recent discussion of the advantages of a typological approach to litigation records, with discussion of Falkenstein, Fortner, and Dombradi.

gain greater access to the variety of events and procedures surrounding disputing. The number of resolution procedures and transactions reflected in the data far outnumber the total of texts, not only because some texts contain reports of multiple cases that occurred on the same day (collective tablets, henceforth), but also because many ditilas make reference to past events, cases, or stages of disputing upon which the presently-reported case has built; the total number of actual cases for which we have some reference may well be thrice the total number of documents in the corpus. Such issues of reading the text for procedure and case history are taken up in Chapter 2, while the lives of these procedures and history of disputes are reconstructed in Chapter 3.

1.3 The Study of Early Mesopotamian Law

Another advantage of posing new approaches to the study of dispute records of the Ur III period involves their ability to assist in addressing old and new questions about early Mesopotamian law in general, and on its relation to the state and its members. Since the discovery of the Code of Hammurapi (CH) and subsequent piecing together of other early "Law Codes" – compositions replete with hegemonic and centralist claims – questions have circulated in a venerable chain of scholarship (overviewed in Chapter 5) about the relationship between these monumental texts (and by extension, the king) and the practice of law and order within these early states. The latter field of activity is partially preserved by legal documents, or better, "practice documents" (after Wells 2005), a category of tablets including records of contracts, sales or other types of transactions, and litigious or resolution processes, such as the ditilas. While numerous analyses have evaluated the nature of the Law Codes and magisterial claims of centralized law they are thought to embody, legal documents have "rarely been the object of comparable reflection" (Roth 2001:243), especially those of the Ur III period.

Special attention has been paid to the relationship between CH and the contemporary documents of the Old Babylonian period, and numerous lines of inquiry now conclude that the CH, though monumental, was not the metaphorical backbone of a centralized Old Babylonian legal system as once thought, but rather a work whose impact was felt by restricted groups of scribal aristocracy.[9] Similar inquiries must be extended to the data of the Ur III state. The Laws of Ur-Namma (LU), in which the Ur III dynastic founder Ur-Namma[10] describes the creation of the state and imposition of justice upon it, may be compared with non-royally commissioned practice documents, such as the ditilas. In light of the centralization of administration and taxation implemented by Ur-Namma and Šulgi (Sharlach 2004), it seems unnecessary to challenge the idea that the Ur III kings had an exclusive control over decision-making.

Yet, a problematic underpinning of Mesopotamian legal studies is the ever-pervasive assumption of legal centralism, the notion that a central power, the king, creates and implements a formal, autonomous body of laws and legal procedures that were to be applied and enforced equitably in each corner of the state.[11] Once embraced as the definitive model for Mesopotamian law (Jacobsen 1946, Mendenhall 1954, Speiser 1954), it is now complicated by the repositioning of the Law Codes and the fact that they were not enforced, universally applied treatises. In spite of this rejection of one of the central pillars of legal centralism, various strands of the paradigm nonetheless prevail in Mesopotamian studies.

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[9] A variety of approaches and lines of argumentation have led to different angles of this position, see representatives of different methods in Eilers 1932, Landsberger 1939, Kraus 1960, Finkenstein 1961, Bottéro 1982, Levinson (ed.) 1994, Levy (ed.) 2000, Renger 2008, Rubio 2009; but see also Chapter 5.

[10] For an overview of Ur-Namma and the foundation of the Ur III state, see Kuhrt 1995:58, Flückiger-Hawker 1999:1ff.

[11] Or, "the false ideology that 'law is and should be the law of the state, uniform in all persons, exclusive of all other law, and administered by a single set of state institutions'" (Tamanaha 2000:299, citing J. Griffiths 1986). See also A. Griffiths 1998a and 2001; but see also Chapter 5.

For example, one symptom of the dependence of Mesopotamian legal studies on such conceptualizations of law has been an emphasis on the structure of legal systems and analysis of specific laws. Indeed, in spite of a long history of singling out procedural records from other forms of legal documents (transactional records, contracts, etc.), few studies have sought to investigate the socio-political dynamics they indirectly report.[12] Most studies of Ur III legal or practice texts have likewise concentrated on philological analyses of particular stages of procedure (e.g., Edzard 1975, Sallaberger 2008), the structure of courts and function of court entities (e.g., Ishikida 1998, Oh'e 2003, Lafont and Westbrook 2003), or meaning and execution of specific laws (e.g., Finkelstein 1966). Less focus has been exerted on the social context of conflicts, the combination of forces that brought about their resolution, or the social and political consequences of disputing for the participants. As a result, changes and fluctuations in the system are overlooked or disguised in Ur III scholarship, which unintentionally favors the idea of a static and monolithic legal system even in light of observable historical changes on both the local and state level throughout this period.

Falkenstein's NG, though not a disquisition on legal centralism, nonetheless incorporated many aspects of the paradigm, concluding that, "Die neusumerische Gerichtsurkunde ist durch die überragende Bedeutung der Gerichtsbarkeit des König bestimmt" (1956:147). Not only did Falkenstein conduct many of his textual analyses with reference to literature and royally commissioned works attributed to the Ur III kings – a valid methodology for philological analysis – but he also predicated his interpretations of many ditilas on the assumption that a coherent state structure arched over the provinces.[13] Moreover, Falkenstein expected to find a uniformity of procedure among the documents,

[12] For useful exceptions from the Old Babylonian period, see Dombradi 1996, Leemans 1968, Yoffee 2000:47, and Roth 2001.
[13] See especially 1956:139ff. and his commentaries on Text 213, 101, 112.

even in spite of noting variations in textual composition from province to province. Where he found difficulties interpreting a text, he typically appealed to structural presentation of other documents rather than factors of chronological context, regional context, or the social make-up of the participants. Even though the purpose of NG was not to advance new theories and philosophies of ancient law, the study nonetheless exemplifies how the centralist paradigm affects scholarly readings of ancient documents; the present endeavor continues to struggle with this legacy.

The eminent genealogy of scholarship on early Mesopotamian law has thus far produced many important works that continue to teach much about royal ideology, narratives of state formation, and ideals of social order, but it is the contention of this project that theory and fact have been confused: the focus on Law Codes and, thus, the centralist perspective they embody, has placed incommensurate emphasis on the *ideas* and *ideals* of law from the perspective of kings, while the *practice* of law and lived reality of disputing and its resolution in the Ur III period have remained largely untreated. With the advantage of databases now available to the Ur III scholar,[14] the current state of the corpus of ditilas, and assistance from other fields, it is possible to access at least a small but illuminating sliver of this realm of activity.

1.4 The Study of Disputes

Of course, we are faced at the outset with the problem of what is meant by "law"; one paradigm cannot simply replace another, yet some framework for investigation is

[14] In particular, the Cuneiform Digital Library Initiative (CDLI; http://cdli.ucla.edu/index.html) and the Database of Neo-Sumerian Texts (BDTNS; http://bdts.filol.csic.es).

needed.[15] Cross-cultural studies produced in the field of legal anthropology have much to offer this problem, but the relationship between the study of law and its applicability to the Ur III state is in a somewhat awkward position. Over the course of the last century, two major currents have dominated the anthropological study of law: the state-oriented studies of legal formalism, and, emanating from Malinowski's seminal *Crime and Custom* (1926), a substantivist school that focused on non-institutional normative orders among "primitive" societies.[16] The former emphasized law as rules, while the latter developed the idea of law as culture.

The Ur III state is not an appropriate candidate for either school. On the one hand, the complexity of the state, with its airs of centralization and complex, interprovincial administrative structure seems superficially more comparable to Classical and modern legal systems than to "primitive" societies. However, even if the *idea* of a centralized body of rules existed in Codes, the absence of any proof for legislation (Landsberger 1939, Roth 2000) and the difficulties of demonstrating judicial centralization or the existence of specialized legal professionals (see Westbrook 2005)[17] disqualifies the Ur III state for comparison with these other contexts. On the other hand, the other approach in legal anthropology, à la Malinowski (1926), involves treating law as sets of cultural norms that communities can enforce, and this mode of understanding seems equally inapplicable to the Ur III society given the complexity of hierarchy, degree of state formation, and so forth, not to mention the involvement of institutions, writing, and bureaucracy. Moreover, in the absence of any non-administrative sources, we have no access to the kinds of sources that

[15] As Engel (1990:335) has asked in connection with his study, "What might our research look like if it rejected the definitions and assumptions of legal centralism and emphasized that systems of meaning are inseparable from behavior? Chaotic, perhaps."
[16] See Fuller 1994, Roberts 1981 for a description of these trajectories, with full citations. See also Hertel 2007 for an overview of the Law-as-Rules and Law-as-Process dichotomy and its connection with the study of Old Assyrian law.
[17] But compare to Westbrook's earlier works, e.g., 1985 and 1995.

would be necessary for such a study. Neither legal formalism nor the law-as-culture approach can usefully serve the Ur III context, even if both schools have provided many important studies for us to engage.

Facing a similar conundrum, many legal anthropologists abandoned the impossible pursuit of building the edifice of law and turned instead to matters of process, focusing on the study of disputes as a more fruitful method for understanding the practiced dynamics of authority and power (Gluckman 1955, Bohannan 1968, Pospisil [Date]). As Roberts (1983:11) put it, "Once we are freed from the *necessity* of the King and the Judge, though in the West still expecting to find them somewhere in the picture, it becomes possible to examine the range of dispute institutions in a far less restricted way." Indeed, studies of dispute systems proved to be a useful entryway into the study of power dynamics and the manner in which rules and process are created and transformed. Many studies, by way of dissecting single disputes, have uncovered complex cross-sections of social relationships, seeing things not obvious if one merely studies legal terminology and ontology. Studies of resolution procedures have allowed scholars to see how social and political changes occur by focusing on the dynamics of negotiation and how it happens. To summarize some of the findings of dispute studies:

1) Disputing is never an apolitical or neutral process, but is an arena in which the proportions of power among community members are determined and standing can be redistributed as negotiations occur or as third-party entities affirm and deny claims of entitlement (see Griffiths 1998).

2) Disputing involves particular, culturally determined configurations of people that reflect social standing (see Abel 1973, Felstiner 1974, Benda-Beckmann 1983, Chase 2005). That is, even though there may be numerous types of organizations that may be

assumed in the resolving of a dispute (Greenhouse 1985), these organizations are determined by context and can be subject to change as society itself changes.

3) In fact, multiple resolution agents can exist in a single society, and these need not be hierarchically organized (Galanter 1981, J. Griffiths 1986, Merry 1988, Fuller 1994).

4) Culturally specific logic is employed to perform and resolve disputes, and such is not necessarily fixed by "law," but can rather be determined by individuals or assembled committees (Damaska 1997, Comaroff and Roberts 1981, Cotterrell 2004, Bohannan 2005, Chase 2005:2). That is, disputing is not an institution so much as a social agency.

5) Even when a dispute is reducible to a matter between two individuals, it may easily escalate to the level of community factions; the community in which disputants reside is never remote or irrelevant to the pursuit of resolution, but deeply invested (Harrington and Merry 1988, Parnell 1988, Cover 1983).

6) Not all disputes are predicated on conflict or crime (Bennett 1998:651 after Griffiths 1998a). Some disputes, as we shall see, are based on mutual interests in determining recompense, compensation, or the ironing out of fiscal irregularities resulting from unavoidable situations which no particular individual is deemed to be at fault, while other disputes are merely responses to routine life situations, such as family deaths, divorces, or various unforeseen disasters. In these cases, disputing may be performed so that order may be recovered or perpetuated and ambiguities clarified.

7) Finally, it follows that disputes are not therefore not anomalous, but socially pathological, "routine parts of social discourse" (A. Griffiths 1998a:136).

It is not a given that all of these aspects of disputing will be visible in the Ur III data, but these observations and arguments, based on decades of field work, alert us to characteristics of our documents that could otherwise be overlooked and provide a provisional set of lenses with which to conduct a study. Most importantly, we are relieved

of the necessity of resorting to a definition of "law," and can rather seek understanding of how any such notion was built among the communities attested in the ditilas. Perhaps, after all,

> Law is whatever people identify and treat through their social practices as 'law' (or recht, or droit, and so on)… what law is, is determined by the people in the social arena through their own common usages, not in advance by the social scientist or theorist" (Tamanaha 2000:313-314).

1.5 Disputes and the Ur III State

Scholarly conceptualizations of the Ur III state have transformed significantly over the last century, and the last decade has yielded new models that emphasize the local, specific, and diachronic aspects of the half-century for which the Ur III period yielded documentation. Comprehensive works now consider provinces independently (e.g., Dahl 2007, Ouyang 2009) or in comparison (e.g., Sharlach 2004, Allred 2006), and are increasingly focusing on social and political dimensions of the state after decades of almost exclusive concentration on the highly centralized Ur III economy. There has thus been a de-emphasis on the issue of centralization. As Garfinkle (2008:60-61) has recently argued,

> The Ur III state was centralized only in the sense that the crown was the locus for the direction of resources from throughout the state. In order to manage and direct these resources the kings of Ur relied extensively on local networks of power and authority that lay beyond their immediate control… competition frequently expressed itself in the pursuit of status and wealth through the control of offices that were often accompanied by the usufruct of the land and other resources of the state.

The findings of this project accord well with these new perspectives on the Ur III state. The dispute resolution system of the Ur III period was not a living, breathing instantiation of state power, but rather involved local, competitive forces among urban, provincial families of elites who sought to maintain and create power by way of local disputing traditions, many of which were likely to have predated the establishment of the Ur III state. Disputing in the time of the Ur III state was integral to their competition, and can be understood as a social act that had consequences for all parties involved, including disputants, court officials, and community.

After proposing a method for extracting such dynamics from the ditila documents (Chapter 2), I traced the origin of disputes from the bottom up in order to understand how they progressed through provincial society and found resolution (Chapter 3). In order to understand the nature of the authority by which resolution occurred, I next approach disputes from the opposite direction by tracing the dynamics of court composition from the top down (Chapter 4), before returning to the question of the role of the king and state (Chapter 5).

CHAPTER 2

FROM TEXT TO PROCESS: DITILAS AS SOURCES FOR DISPUTES AND THE SUMERIAN DI

2.1. Introduction[1]

The inherent ability of legal procedures to manipulate discourse and render misshapen portraits of conflicts has long been perceived. Textual reports about such proceedings, even more predisposed to trivialize and distort events, are the only link between ancient proceedings and later inquiring parties. In order to engage the logic of dispute resolution and the dynamics of courts in the Ur III period, it is necessary to reflect upon the textual sources – the ditila-tablets that record the results of cases (Sumerian di) – considering what kinds of information these texts are or are not capable of transmitting to us. More specifically, this endeavor requires consideration of how conflicts and disputes entered into the textual record in the first place, and how scholars can, given the immense distances between ancient and modern societies and the abbreviated nature of the texts, extract the ancient events without imposing distortions or assuming that the texts are untarnished mirrors of real-life events. A routine plight for many legal historians ever since Sir Henry Maine's *Ancient Law*, such an approach has yet to be applied to the ditilas of the Ur III period. In many analytical studies of ditilas, for example, text or textual structure is conflated with actual case procedures, a nearly unavoidable methodological trap given that

[1] The term "process" is used throughout to refer to a related series of transformations associated with completing a certain goal, and is not intended to be equivalent to "legal procedure" as are German *Prozeß* or French *procès*.

the texts are the only vestige of the Ur III system available to us. Certainly, this approach is accompanied by a number of perils and the texts cannot be expected to present us with first-hand testimonies of Ur III disputes. Here I consider the issue of how written accounts of cases are constructed, organized, and presented in texts with the aim of developing an approach for accessing the "reality" behind them, that is, the procedures and practices experienced by the participants mentioned in the texts.

This endeavor can be aided by other studies of dispute resolution systems, which, at the very least, may assist in establishing our expectations. A number of studies have noted, for example, the impossibility of finding a dispute – in any phase of its life – that has not been adulterated by charged conversation, rounds of procedures aimed at fixing or examining the problem, or the expression of the dispute in written language. As Conley and O'Barr noted in their study of modern legal transcripts,

> As a practical matter, it is virtually impossible for a researcher to come upon a dispute in any sort of pristine form. In most cases, by the time the first account is given to a third party, the dispute is likely to have undergone significant changes since the occurrence of the events that gave rise to it (Conley and O'Barr 1990:x).

Rosen (1989), in his study of Islamic law courts in Morocco, similarly argues that,

> Whatever else a legal proceeding may be – an encounter between contending parties seeking confirmation of the respective claims, a carefully staged ritual aimed at the exorcism of potential chaos, a life-threatening confrontation with the manifest power of the state – it is not a simple recapitulation of a past occurrence… It is never really possible to reconstruct exactly the actions or utterances that gave rise to the case at hand: no witness can precisely recreate what was once said or heard, and even the videotape of an undisputed crime cannot delineate the inner state of the accused (1989:20).

It follows that disputes are not only undecipherable outside of the cultural and political contexts in which they develop, but also that disputes are things constantly in flux. Shifts in the parameters of disputes are well documented cross-culturally. Parnell's engaging study of a rural Mexican community in *Escalating Disputes* (1988), for example, provides a detailed dissection of what began as a simple conflict between two men over a missing key, but shows how the dispute spiraled into a community-wide polarization, eventually

requiring state involvement, and how its meaning and stakes faced constant renegotiation as people communicated and debated about the matter both in- and outside of official proceedings. Indeed, as new parties and authorities are introduced to a conflict, a dispute will necessarily transform, and even the language used to articulate the problem may shift into different levels of discourse – e.g., from colloquial vernacular to legal court language in the case of Conley and O'Barr's study (1990) – such that, in some cases, the initial participants may lose their voice. Moreover, as disputes travel and expand through different dimensions of a population, formidable, state-level currents may be set against a community's customs and values (Parnell 1988:5), further complicating the matter for the historian or scholar and, for our purposes here, requiring an attentive approach to the texts that report on the disputes in question and the context in which they were produced.[2]

Given this sampling of reflections and observations, to what extent can the Ur III textual records inform us about disputes and legal proceedings in early Mesopotamia? This chapter seeks to address this question by first delimiting what the texts cannot tell us, and then by attempting to precisely triangulate the role of the textual records within the real-life processes that took place. At stake is the question of whether the textual records at our disposal had a significant role in resolution procedures, present and future, a proposition that often comes with the suggestion that the state, or some central institution, was involved and preeminently authoritative in the proceedings. I here attempt to reposition dispute records within the Ur III administration and institutional filing systems in a manner that accurately reflects their role in real-life procedures. Finally, with all these considerations, this chapter seeks a preliminary definition of what, in fact, a procedure or "case" (di/*dīnum*) was in the Ur III period, utilizing the texts as a full corpus. Scholars have so far defined the term either by equating it with the structure of information in the texts –

[2] Related studies of particular disputes of interest to these points can be found in Comaroff and Roberts (1981), Nader and Todd (1978), A. Griffiths (1998); see cases in Gagos and van Minnen (1995).

assuming that the texts are reliable, first-hand sources for cases – or by looking across vast periods and different languages, using lexical lists, literary texts, and legal texts. As a result, we have a broad and superficial understanding of what a di-procedure is, but particulars of the Ur III usage still need to identified. Moreover, as textual structure does not equate to an outline of procedure, our current understanding of di as a "litigation" involving a standardized process may be erroneous.

2.2 "Procedural Records" in Mesopotamia

Studies of legal corpora from ancient Mesopotamia typically seek to impose some kind of typological scheme onto the texts, based either on specific clauses or headings employed in the texts or on legal themes (e.g., contract, marriage, divorce, probate, criminal cases, etc.). This approach, though inherently anachronistic given the vast disparities between ancient and modern generic categories, has nevertheless provided fruitful analysis and indispensable organization to immense sets of texts (e.g., Schorr 1913, Falkenstein 1956, Edzard 1968, Dombradi 1996, Fortner 1999:19ff., Wilcke 2007, Holtz 2009; see discussions in Yoffee 2000:47, Hertel 2007:4ff., 106, and Renger 2008:184). In such taxonomies, records of legal procedures, litigations, or trials (i.e., *Prozeßurkunden*) are usually regarded as a unique class of legal texts,[3] and the ditilas of the Ur III period are usually considered to be a distinctive category of legal documents, different from transactional records, contracts, or witnessed oaths, because they presumably reflect legal protocols or direct accounts of trial procedures (e.g., Lafont and Westbrook 2003:184).[4]

[3] See, for example, Fortner's (1997) distinction between litigation records and "associated documents" or Holtz's (2009:3) discussion of the "tablet trail."

[4] See Krecher 1974 for the application of this distinction to Sargonic and pre-Sargonic legal documents, further, Dombradi 1997:Intro and Fortner 1999:19ff. for the complications with this distinction in Old Babylonian legal texts, and Hertel 2007:93ff. for the Old Assyrian period. Hertel explains in his discussion of Old Assyrian legal records that, "The dissonance between the general character of Old Assyrian terminology and the drive for analytical precision and abstraction in scholarly practice demands contemplation on how can we justify our

Falkenstein (1956:13) even proposed different types of ditilas, identifying a class he called *Prozeßprotokollen* ("trial protocols"), those texts which record specific parts of the court proceedings as opposed to other legal or economic events that related to the litigation. The explicit enumeration of the various parties who attended the proceedings (e.g., disputants, judges, or witnesses) gives weight to this perspective as the presence of such persons implies the performance of an official procedure, as opposed to simply the drafting of transactional records. Additionally, such texts often present information in a sort of narrative form, as if the ancient scribe rendered a transcript of completed proceedings, outlining point-by-point the series of events leading to a resolution or transformation of circumstances. In practice, scholars assume, more often than not, that the information provided in ditilas and other procedural records provides a more-or-less first-hand account of the procedures that transpired and that, with a certain degree of care, the scholar can reconstruct the ancient proceedings, allowing the tablets to play a directive role in understanding the real-life contexts and events that led to the resolution of cases (e.g., see below 2.3). Given that the tablets are the only vestiges of the Ur III system that have been transmitted to us, these perspectives are difficult to dismiss.

This view of dispute records is more analytically limiting than useful, however, and the idea that Ur III procedural records are ontologically different from other legal forms and documents is unsustainable. Indeed, the procedural records do "relate a story," as Roth (2001:255) put it, but the same could be said of any legal text from Mesopotamia, even if the story is merely about a deal struck and written in a contract, an oath taken and recorded, or a sale completed and its finalization symbolized with the drafting of a sale report. Even though Ur III procedural records appear to be different thanks to their ostensible narrative structure, they cannot be read as first-hand transcripts of cases in the sense of a

subdivisions of the varied repertoire of legal documents, and what these sub-divisions refer to in terms of legal ontology" (2007:106).

stenographer's notes produced in a modern courtroom. Consequently, the issue of the relationship between legal texts and the reality vaguely reflected in them is not a straightforward one. An overview of how scholars have conceptualized the structure of ditila-records demonstrates some problems.

2.3 The Structure of the Records

Ditila-records are notoriously tricky to interpret, and scholars have faced difficulties in developing composite reconstructions of their structure for several reasons. For one, there is the consequential matter of how to translate the dispute records into modern legal vernacular and of finding the appropriate terminology to describe specific Sumerian formulae and terminology. Second, the total quantity of these texts was not always substantial enough for a thorough reconstruction of procedures, and many studies of ditilas have been atomistic analyses of single texts or of small arbitrarily selected groups, aside from Falkenstein's work (1956) and Molina's analysis of the British Museum Umma records (*forthcoming*); many reconstructions of textual structure exclusively reflect the Lagash corpus.[5] As few studies have referenced each other, the following overview is provided.

Mercer (1913:38) was among the first[6] to offer a composite reconstruction of the ditila-records, but, given the limited number of texts at his disposal and the contemporary state of the field, he understood these dispute records within the context of early contract law. To him, the structure of dispute records was a direct outgrowth of the structure of Old Akkadian contract formulae, and he suggested that the inclusion of an oath in the Ur III

[5] I will not offer a composite of the Umma textual corpus here, but see the following chapter on procedure for description of the cases and their method of presentation in the texts.
[6] For other early works, see Virolleaud 1903, Thureau-Dangin 1903, and Pélegaud 1910.

texts signified a new stage in the development of law from the Old Akkadian to the Ur III period (1913:36). His outline of these texts is as follows:

1. Introduction of parties involved in the "contract" (listed names)
2. The object and nature of the transaction
3. Mention of any "extra incidents connected with the transactions"
4. Oath
5. Witness and judges
6. Date (Mercer 1913:38, my numbers)

Mercer's composite was intended to be a summary of the basic "formula" (1913:38) for recording transactional events, rather than a case transcript or narrative; his outline reads like a list of entries on a form. This interpretation of the texts conforms to the way that scholars understand other types of legal texts from Mesopotamia, such as contracts and sale reports, in which basic information is recorded in predetermined formulae as if the scribe is simply filling out an (imaginary) template as he drafts the document.

Many of Mercer's assumptions about the place of ditila-records in Ur III legal taxonomies were either obviated or refined by Falkenstein's more comprehensive work, which firmly established the ditila-records as a unique class of legal documents, as described in the previous section, rather than an oath-inclusive subtype of contracts. In his detailed analysis, Falkenstein (1956:59ff.) advanced a hypothesized court procedure by paying attention to the organization and structure of dispute records, proposing that litigation occurred in roughly four phases: the formal initiation of proceedings (59), the taking of evidence (or "discovery" as it is presently called, 62), the final decision or judgment (74), and any closing procedures dealing with disclaimers, payments, or other actions to tie up the proceedings (79). Sallaberger (1999:224)[7] elaborated upon and reproduced these phases as follows:

[7] See also Kraus 1958.

1. The background of the case (*Vorgeschichte des Prozesses*)
2. The complaint (that is, a formal action to initiate a lawsuit; *die Klage*)
3. Argumentation and discovery of evidence (*Beweisführung*)
4. Renunciation of claims, obligations, or penalties (*Verzichterklärung und Verpflichtung, die Strafe zu übernehmen*)
5. Enumeration of entities (officiators, witnesses, disputants)

In contrast to Mercer's outline, Falkenstein/Sallaberger's reconstruction purports to be an overview of the stages of conducting a case and the overt use of German legal terminology emphasizes this reading. Given Falkenstein's unquestionable premise that the texts were recorded after the completion of cases, his composite reconstruction of ditilas can be understood as a summary transcript of a series of case phases punctuated with a list of the relevant entities.

More recently, B. Lafont (2000:40ff.) has offered another, more elaborate outline of ditila structure, subsuming the phases of litigation (*procès*) under seven numbers:

1. Initiation of legal action ("intenter un procès") signified by one of three expressions (inim—gar, di—dug_4, or inim—dug_4)
2. Record of the entities overseeing the resolution (including any entities cited as having been involved before the legal proceedings began)
3. Comparison of testimonies
4. Deposition
5. Rebuttals
6. Expressions/Oaths (nam-$erim_2$-am_3/mu-lugal)
7. Where relevant, the issue of return (gi_4)

With the inclusion of modern legal terminology (deposition, rebuttal),[8] Lafont's reconstruction conforms more accurately to the phases of a modern legal procedure, in a general sense, and focuses on the actions and operations involved in settling the case – that is, a deposition or an execution of an oath are things *practiced* – rather than a description of information on the tablet.

[8] Consulting *The Council of Europe French-English Legal Dictionary*, Strasbourg (1994).

Molina's ten-stage outline similarly equates textual structure with real-life phases of litigation, and he asserts that the tablets provide information about judicial procedure with "certain precision" (2000:29):

1. The heading: ditila
2. Brief introduction about the object of litigation
3. Should the case proceed, relevant information to the prehistory of the case
4. The nature of the claim
5. Pertinent evidence
6. Respective testimonies and evidence for each party's case
7. Yielding of one of the parties
8. Resolution of the case
9. A promissory oath or explicit acceptance of the judgment by the party who did not win the case
10. Name of the maškim ("comisario")
11. Names of governor and judges
12. Names of witnesses
13. Date

Each of these useful reconstructions[9] is accompanied by the disclaimer that not every element of the outline may be present on each tablet, and that some tablets may spend more or less space elaborating on a single number. This point in part explains the variations in these scholarly reconstructions and the different numbers of phases, as each phase must derive from different interpretations about which elements should appear in the composite and which should be omitted. Lafont includes a phase called "rebuttals," for example, while the others omit this phase or presumably subsume it under another category. There is no clear Sumerian term for "rebuttal" in its formal meaning, but since the texts frequently report that a disputant delivered some kind of statement following the exposition of his adversary's claim, it is difficult to establish which perspective is more accurate.

This issue aside, many of the variations in these reconstructions result from very different perceptions of early Mesopotamian law operating underneath the analyses, a question which in turn results in the use of modern legal terminology. For example, while Molina posits the existence of preliminary stages of litigation that occur before the start of

[9] See also Pomponio 2008 for another composite outline of Lagash ditila structure.

the case proper (stage 3), Falkenstein and Lafont suggest an immediate, formal initiation of litigation (stage 2 and 1, respectively). Or, while Lafont uses Sumerian terminology (inim—gar, etc. of stage 1) to signify the onset of litigation, Falkenstein and Sallaberger subsume postulated phases of lawsuits under German terminology, even though there is no appropriate Sumerian word for such phases; there is no Sumerian expression for *Beweisführung*, for example.

In short, ever since Mercer's work, the increasing use of modern legal concepts has coincided with an assumption that the texts are mirrors or protocols of real-life procedures, which in turn are intelligible in the texts owing to the order of information and narrative structure. In other words, while Mercer understood the texts essentially as stylized forms, the latter three scholars, by utilizing modern legal terminology or modern conceptualizations of litigation, viewed the texts as preserved capsules of whole disputes. There has been a blurring of the difference between textual structure and the real-life practices used to resolve cases.

The composites of Falkenstein, Sallaberger, Lafont, and Molina – the latter three of which were admittedly meant to be expository rather than analytical – may have different advantages and disadvantages for the study of ditila-records. In any case, the idea of the texts as narratives that can be equated with a real-time transpiring of events is not supportable when considering any single text. For example, in a reconstruction of three texts that record contestations over the ownership and status of slaves, the structure and wording of the texts defy any real-time interpretation, and the outcome of the case is presented as a given from the very first lines of the document:

Ditila.
PN_1 bought SLAVE from PN_2 for x shekels (or mina) of silver.
[SLAVE and/or PN_2 claimed the sale did not occur, that SLAVE was illegitimately enslaved due to non-payment].
$WITNESS_1$ and $WITNESS_2$ swore that PN_1 paid for SLAVE in full.
SLAVE was confirmed to PN_1.
PN_3 was the maškim.
Names of judges.
Date.

(from Lagaš Texts 35, 38, 45)

Figure 2.1. Structure of Texts Reporting Slave Sale Disputes: Lagaš.

Presumably, the disputes between PN_1 and PN_2 summarized here revolved around questions of whether the sale of the slave had occurred, whether the sale was legitimate, or whether the sale had been completed by way of payment in full. At some time, then, the status of the slave and the nature of the sale were questionable, and ambiguity prevailed until witnesses were produced who could confirm one side of the story and convince the judge(s) to confirm the slave to the buyer. The same is apparent in texts from Umma, as, for example, in my reconstruction of Text 48:

PN_1 bought SLAVE from PN_2 for 2/3 shekels of silver.
In the presence of $WITNESS_1$,
In the presence of $WITNESS_2$.
In the year Šulgi 43, he bought SLAVE.
Later, his father said he was not sold.[10]
Before the governor it was confirmed (that the sale took place).
PN_1 will return with the slave in his hand.
Ditila of the sons of A'ebara.
Date.

(Text 48 [Collated])

Figure 2.2. Structure of Texts Reporting Slave Sale Disputes: Umma.

[10] This line in Text 48 (Umma) could also read: "Later, his father said he did not sell (him)," (egir-ra ab-ba-ne_2 nu-sa_{10} bi_2-du_{11})

The textual reports about these disputes insist unambiguously at the outset that the sales were both legitimate and complete, even though the subsequent lines reveal that these matters were once complicated and underwent at least one procedure (witness testimonies) to un-complicate them. In reality, a procedure does not begin with a confirmation of status but remains open to interpretation until various procedures ensue that clarify the matter and establish the appropriate status of the slave. These records thus cannot be considered point-by-point reports about the procedures taken to clear up the ambiguity of the matters concerning the slave.

2.3.1. A Counter-Narrative Example: a_2—dar

Moreover, ditila-records often employ loaded vocabulary at the outset of the text in a manner that confuses the nature of the dispute. An example can be taken from texts with attestations of the Sumerian verb a_2—dar, recently translated as "to cheat, confiscate" (Michalowski, *forthcoming,* Letter UdŠ 1), "to sequester" (Steinkeller 2004b:101 note 29) or "to seize illegally."[11] In ditilas, the objects of an a_2—dar can be slaves (Text 67:5, Lagaš), free women (Text 369, Umma), grain (Text 145:7′, Lagaš), or immovable property (Text 214:10-13, case 2, Umma). When a party is found to be responsible for having committed the act – that is, if the act committed by a party is determined to be illegitimate – he or she will be required to pay recompense to repair the ensuing damage, even if the offending party involves the Grand Vizier's office (sukkal-mah, text 67).

When the texts report on such events, they present information in a manner that presupposes the "guilt" of the offending party instead of narrating a story about a contentious acquisition; the texts immediately declare the acquisition to be a_2—dar, before

[11] See also de Maaijer and Jagersma *AfO* 44/45:285. Falkenstein (1957:90) translates a_2—dar as "zu Unrecht zurückhalten, beschlagnahmen."

explaining how the matter came to be characterized as such. For example, the Umma ditila *SNAT* 372 reports the dissolution of a marriage:

^{I}nin-za$_3$-ge-si dumu gu-du-ka	Nur-Eštar son of Akab-šen abducted (a$_2$—dar) Nin-
nu-ur$_2$-eš$_4$-tar$_2$ dumu a-kab-še$_3$-en$_6$-ke$_4$	zagesi daughter of Gudu and married her (by force).
a$_2$ in-ni-dar	
dam-še$_3$ ba-an-tuku	Nur-Eštar said: "I never abducted her; I know nothing
nu-ur$_2$-eš$_4$-tar$_2$-e a$_2$ nu-ni-dar	(about this)."
nu-zu bi$_2$-in-dug$_4$	Esagila, AN.DU-bi, and Lu-duga were the witnesses.
^{I}e$_2$-sag-il$_2$-la	
$^{[I]}$AN.DU-bi	
$^{[I]}$lu$_2$-du$_{10}$-ga	
lu$_2$ ki-inim-ma-me	Gudu the father of Nin-zagesi swore that she was
[gu]-du ab-ba nin-za$_3$-ge-si-ke$_4$	taken for marriage.
nam-dam$^{!}$-še$_3$-am$_3$ ba-an-[tuku]	
nam-erim$_2$-bi [in-ku$_5$]	
[x] ra nu-[x]	
	[1-3 lines missing].
[1-3 line missing]	
rev.	
mu-[lugal x x x]	[Akab-šen?] [said]: I swear [by the king]: my son did
dumu-mu nu-un-[ ] ma-an-[dug$_4$]	not [take her?].
bi$_2$-in-dug$_4$[x]	Ur-mes the ⌜farmer⌝ and Ur-Dumuzi the [x] (were) the
^{I}ur-mes ⌜engar⌝	witnesses of Nur-Eštar.
^{I}ur-^{d}dumu-zi [x]	They came up with false words.[12]
lu$_2$-inim-ma nu-ur$_2$-[eš$_4$-tar$_2$]	They swore by the king.
du$_{11}$-ga lul-la$_2$ ba-an-[x]-ku$_4$	
mu-lugal pad$_3$-da-aš	Gudu did not confirm (this). ...
gu-du nu-un-da-gi-[in]	
mu-lugal inim ba-a-gi$_4$-a-x-eš	Nureštar left (his) wife. He will pay her 1 *mina* of
nu-ur$_2$-eš$_4$-tar$_2$-e dam in-taka$_4$	silver.
1 ma-na ku$_3$-babbar in-la$_2$-e	
igi ensi$_2$-ka-še$_3$	Before the governor. Lu-Šara son of Inim-Šara, Ur-
^{I}lu$_2$-^{d}šara$_2$ dumu inim-^{d}šara$_2$	Baba son of Gududu, and Ni$^{?}$damu were the men who
$^{[I]}$ur-^{d}ba-u$_2$ dumu gu-du-du	served at the place. 6th month of Amar-Sin 6.
[^{I}ni]-da-mu	
[lu$_2$] ki-ba gub-ba-me	
[iti] ⌜šu⌝-numun mu ^{d}amar-^{d}suen/ lugal-e ša-aš-ru-u^{ki}/	
mu-ḫul	

In the first line of the text, we are informed that Nur-Eštar "illegally took" (a$_2$—dar) the woman Nin-zagesi and married her. The text explicitly states at the opening that Nur-Eštar's actions were unequivocally befitting the term a$_2$—dar. At the same time, the

[12] Or, perhaps this line extends from the mu in broken line 10: "because the witnesses of Nur-Estar came up and swore a false statement…"

majority of the text's body is spent outlining a number of rituals and proceedings that were executed in order to determine the veracity of Nur-Eštar's claim of innocence and/or ignorance. Even though much of this portion of the text is damaged and illegible, it is clear that a series of such events ensued to determine the nature of Nur-Eštar's actions and to untangle the conflicting testimonies of the relevant parties. The composer of the text never otherwise expresses ambiguity about Nur-Eštar's actions and marriage, revealing the final, fixed interpretation of reality in the first lines and then adding the subsequent information merely to support this foregone conclusion. In short, even though much of the text reads like a narrative of the case from its start to completion, it is not such. The other attestations of a_2—dar present information in a similar fashion.

The consequences of overlooking the formulaic structure of the texts and subsequent distance they create between events and documentation are two-fold. First, the fixity and uniformity among the ditila texts of Umma and Lagaš can lead to the assumption that there was a fixity and uniformity of litigation practices across and within the provinces of the state, implying that there existed a centrally mandated method for resolving cases, a legal model which requires substantiation. Second, this perspective also requires the assumption that cases arrived in court in clear-cut condition, with an obvious legal matter in mind and well-defined stakes, or with obvious plaintiffs and defendants whose plights fell under specific legal headings. Indeed, the texts always report from the perspective of the victorious disputant, either by implicating fault of the loser of the case at the outset of the text (as in the case of a_2-dar), or by opening the document with a statement that the victorious party was the one who opened proceedings, as in for example:

> PN_1 had such-and-such legitimate claim of entitlement, but PN_2 failed to meet his obligations vis-à-vis this claim. The court determined that a) the claim was legitimate and b) that PN_2 had failed to meet the claim. The court determined that PN_1 wins the case.[13]

[13] E.g., Text 308 (Appendix 3, no.5).

These characteristics may be taken to imply that PN_1 is a plaintiff and PN_2 a defendant, but it would amount to a remarkable coincidence if all cases happened to be initiated by the party who ultimately won; the texts therefore structure their account according to the outcome of proceedings.[14] The distinction between plaintiff and defendant, and with it the notion that cases could arrive before a court with an obvious and tidy configuration and, consequently, an obvious course of action, are fictions of the textual structure that are elsewhere contradicted by the texts if different approaches are utilized.

2.3.2 Reading for Procedure

Most ditilas do not provide elaborate detail about the cases they report, btu some studies of Old Babylonian texts provide examples for extrapolating information about procedure. Roth's (2001) study of the uncharacteristically detailed Old Babylonian dispute record *PBS* 5 100 offers a more successful and realistic approach for reading dispute records and negotiating with their narrative structure in order to learn what procedures were executed. Arguing that legal texts intend to relate an account of events, and do so in a manner that is not arbitrary (2001:255), Roth proposes that an extraction and analysis of procedures and events can be accomplished if the text is read with attention to not only 1) "the external form and structure of the narrative," but also, and perhaps more importantly, 2) "the internal presentation of events – why are certain facts and others presented, and in which ways, to make the situation come out the way it does, to tell the story that it tells" (2001:256). The analysis of *PBS* 5 100 that results from this approach demonstrates that this record, and probably most records, were not neutral descriptions of cases but rather a scribe's particular rendition, perhaps informed by other authorities at court. This does not

[14] A similar situation, in which the distinction between "plaintiff" and "defendant" is one only of record-keeping and grammatical constructions, may be found among the Tiv (see Bohannan 2005:87, 94 note 1), who otherwise call the other party involved in a case a "partner." "The distinction between plaintiff and defendant is the distinction between the subject and the object of the verb 'call'" (ibid. note 1).

mean that scribes inserted editorial commentary into their reports, but rather that they were forced to select appropriate events to include at the necessary omission of others. By identifying and breaking down the different entries of information that the scribe reports, Roth was able to follow the logic of the proceedings and describe what phases or stages of the process occurred, or perhaps could not have occurred, and in what logical order. Yoffee's (2000) analysis of the Old Babylonian document *CT* 47 63 offers a similar analysis of events and judicial procedure.

The usefulness of these studies for ditilas is somewhat limited, however; there is no text from the Ur III period that is as thorough as these two documents and both *PBS* 5 100 and *CT* 47 63 are unusually detailed and enumerate more phases of the resolution procedures. Also, ditila-records have a different structure than their Old Babylonian successors, and were produced in different contexts, as the following section will explore. Nevertheless, if large sets of ditilas are examined together, patterns within the internal structure and the presentation of events may become obvious, placing idiosyncrasies and deviations in sharp relief and thereby allowing the kind of study that Roth and Yoffee were able to accomplish with the longer Old Babylonian records. Such idiosyncrasies may include instances when a scribe explicitly states that a procedure was not performed, for example in Text 99 when it is reported that all parties declined to perform an oath, or when a procedure has failed, as in the above-provided Text 369, in which witness testimonies were shown to have been invalid. In spite of their misleading premise, the ditila composites produced by Ur III scholars may, if taken together, be useful for comparing texts and determining what is or is not in the tablet and whether these internal features reflect something about procedures.

In sum, scholars have approached the Ur III dispute records with the wrong expectations. Even if the texts do display a quasi-narrative structure, it should still be noted

that narratives are never unbiased in the first place, as Roth suggests, and should not be expected to serve as accurate or impartial accounts of disputes and proceedings. Rather than read the texts as first-hand accounts of disputes and real-time narratives of the proceedings regarding them as the composite studies have done, we should regard the ditilas as forms or templates that were filled out by scribes sometime after disputes and resolution procedures were brought to a close.

2.4 The Administrative Context of the Records

In other words, ditilas are products of centralized bureaucracy rather than individualized synopses of events that were dispersed to the various involved parties. By repositioning the dispute records in their institutional context, we may be able to gain a better understanding of the mechanics of their construction and internal structures. In general, early Mesopotamian administrative documents were limited in the range and depth of information they provided, reflecting not only the developed conventions of record drafting and demands of economic and administrative efficiency, but also the choices, preferences, or even purposes of the scribe and personnel involved in the recorded affair. As Adams (2004:3) put it, our records "come to us through a screen of narrowly focused observation, selective retention, and reinterpretation at levels entirely removed from the conduct [of the activity at hand] itself." Discussing economic and administrative texts of Puzriš-Dagan, Steinkeller (2004) argued that the two most important characteristics of Ur III administrative texts are that they 1) almost always are written *post factum* to the events they describe, and 2) that they describe a "special type of reality," that is, they state facts that "are not what happened in real life." He explains,

> More often than not, there is no one-to-one correspondence between the event as it really occurred and as it is described in the tablet. One could say, therefore, that the administrative records operate within a kind of 'accounting reality' or even 'accounting fiction,' in that the events and their temporal sequence are re-interpreted and regrouped to suit best the purposes of the administrative procedure.

> If I am correct that the overwhelming majority of administrative documents were written *post-factum* (and that the extant evidence leaves no doubt that this was the case), it becomes apparent … that the operation of the whole system at least on the level of the individual/primary economic units did not depend on the presence of written records (2004:74, 77, quoted also in Adams 2004:2).

Steinkeller further argued that such administrative and accounting fictions reflected a deliberate interest in conducting economic prognostication, but a simpler and less controversial explanation is that such conventions were simply efficient, well-suited for the consolidation of information in a single space, and well-suited to the medium of writing (see Englund 1988, Widell 2009). Indeed, all written documents, ancient or modern, are inherently fictive and biased in some manner, and can implicate a variety of unrelated people by way of signatures or stamps, even if such persons have never met. In the Ur III context, the scribe had the task of composing a short document once all relevant events had fully transpired, and consequently he was afforded the opportunity to summarize, opting for succinct expressions and limiting formulae, condensing information and fitting it into a pre-established formula to the point of distorting reality. For example, as Steinkeller describes, when drafting economic transactions, a scribe may write the names of people who were never present at the events in question (e.g., an absent supervisor or manager), sometimes misleading the modern reader into concluding that there was a greater degree of centralization of activity when chains of command may have disseminated tasks in order to complete larger projects. Multiple transactions (deliveries, exchanges, sales) can be recorded on a single document under a single date, even if the events occurred in physically disparate locations or at different times. Steinkeller refers to these distortions as "accounting fictions" and concludes that such fictions, combined with the *post factum*

nature of the texts, indicate that the cuneiform tablets were not integral to the execution of transactions.[15]

Of course, the very existence of written documents demonstrates their importance in some way, but the question is worth posing of the ditila records: what was the relationship of these texts to, as Steinkeller put it, "real life?" As discussed in Chapter 1, these records, like the administrative documents Steinkeller describes, were kept in central, institutional filing systems, never used or retained by the disputants involved in the case and thus having no "private" function (Lafont and Westbrook 2003:193), as opposed to, for example, a *ṭuppi lā ragāmim* of the Old Babylonian period (see Veenker 1974).[16] However, the institutional use of the tablets was limited and should not be taken as indicative of a centralized, institutionalized legal system.

It is here argued that while dispute records in the Ur III period may have had an important administrative role for which they were composed, they only had an indirect role in the processing of disputes and the functioning of the dispute resolution systems of Ur III society (contra Wilcke 2007). Texts and dispute practices did not have a reflexive relationship, the former serving merely as passive repositories of information – much of which was never accessed after the filing of the tablet. The purpose of dispute records was,

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[15] While this may be an overstatement, a number of Ur III scholars have now in fact, questioned whether writing indeed had an indispensable role in the day-to-day mechanics of administration and economy at all, especially given that administrative and economic documents are so laconic, formulaic, fictive, and generally removed from reality. Adams (2004:1-2), for example, posed the question of the relationship between agricultural records and the carrying out of agricultural activities, wrestling with the fact that, "The density of the written record… might seem a self-evident indication that a literate, effectively functioning, in fact almost smothering, bureaucracy was so indispensable that it was necessarily held in place." Wilcke (2007:12) has similarly dismissed the idea that writing played a significant role in the development of early Mesopotamian law, finding, for example, that it "was in no way a necessary or important factor in the formation of contracts and not for the law of obligations." Indeed, it is anachronistic, and perhaps unnecessary to assume that the written word was preeminently endowed with authority and authenticity, prevailing in operations of institutions and courts over other forms of communication, in all or most pre-modern contexts (see MacNeil 2000). However, the very existence and abundant use of writing attests to its importance.

[16] Of course, there have been practically no excavations of Ur III deposits outside of the public quarters and major urban centers, and thus we do not know what kinds of texts were filed in domestic quarters. Consequently, it is possible that "private" ditilas exist; see Chapter 1 note 5. By contrast, domestic areas of Old Babylonian cities have been excavated, yielding the legal documents in question.

as Lafont and Westbrook have already suggested (2003:193), preserving the name of the maškim, a person who acted as the preferred repository of institutional memory and personal representative of various high-ranking court officials such as governors and judges and other relevant attending parties where relevant, such as a "guarantor" (lu_2 gi-na-ab tum),[17] who oversaw past transactions, and various types court functionaries (e.g., the lu_2 ki inim-ma, see Chapter 4), who supervised or attended previous attempts at dispute resolution. That is, the point of drafting court records was *potential accountability*, even if this was only ever potential, and the records thus preserve the chains of responsibly and command of the various officials involved in cases. Thus the texts were only of use in the immediate posterity of the specific case documented within.

When a case returned before a court, persons who performed situational court functions provided accounts of past events instead of written documents. If a written record was cited in the course of the proceedings, the purpose was to assert that such witnesses existed and could testify, and thus texts did not serve as evidence *per se* (see Postgate 1992:286); as will be demonstrated in the Chapter 3, oral testimony was unfailingly victorious over written documentation in the settlement of Ur III disputes.

If such functionaries were entrusted with preserving memory and the vehicles through which past proceedings could be transmitted to the future, and if the purpose of written records was most immediately to preserve their names and the associated cases, it follows that the information on the texts was never intended to be a reliable, unadulterated rendition of the proceedings. The need for discursive accuracy and detail was obviated by the fact that a human entity could and did fulfill this function. This does not mean that the information presented in dispute records was written haphazardly or selected arbitrarily

[17] See Texts 51, 62, 70, and 163 (Lagash) or Text 281, 288, and 344 (Umma) for examples in which a "guarantor" is cited in association with a transaction, or directly referenced as having attended proceedings to verify the existence or nature of a past transaction.

(see Roth 2001), but that it was not selected according to an anachronistic standard of matching reality or providing a vivid, narrativistic account of proceedings for any reader to follow.

The consolidation of documents in provincial institutions secured this information and perhaps reflects an attempt to stabilize and manage dispute processing given the propensity of conflicts to return before courts over the course of decades (see Chapter 3), and in this limited manner, the texts assisted in dispute processing. However, the texts did not have a determinative role in dispute resolutions and, given their limited nature, would be poor substitutes for personal accounts.

2.5 The Administrative Characteristics of Dispute Records

A closer examination of the specific types of distortions employed in dispute records further emphasizes their limited ability to communicate dispute narratives. Hertel (2007:101) identifies two types of "interpretive complications" exhibited by Old Assyrian legal documents, which also can be found in the Ur III records: abbreviation and telescoping. Abbreviations refers to the omission of information, such as when an event, the names of parties involved, the precise amount of silver or area of an urban plot, or other key details that would seem essential in modern legal documents, are left out of the document. The result is a complicated presentation of chronology "that can be interpreted in various ways" (ibid.). Ditilas accomplish abbreviation with grammatical simplifications and uncommonly basic sentences, sometimes providing so little information that one could postulate that the text served merely as a mnemonic trigger for the maškim or witnesses.

Telescoping "refers to a jump from one procedural situation to another, where several procedures in between are left unmentioned" (Hertel 2007:101), and may also be

considered a characteristic of the Ur III records. In ditilas, events are often contorted into simple formulae, which presumably could signal to the native reader what events have taken place, as when, for example, the text reports that, "PN appeared before the judges" (PN igi di-ku_5 bi_2-in-ĝar). Masked by this short formula is the tremendous amount of time and preparation required to undertake a resolution procedure. It is often clear that phases of a procedure may have been omitted from the text, even if it is nonetheless likely or possible that they occurred; the absence of an oath may not mean that one never took place, since it is possible that it remained unrecorded at the discretion of the scribe (or the authoritative entities instructing him) if it was not deemed a pivotal moment of the case.[18] In addition to abbreviation (punctuation of details) and telescoping (collapsing of time), the ditila records also condense space.

In addition to these characteristics, ditilas also centralize disparate time and places into a single report even if disputes traveled through a variety of context and courts before taking shape in writing (see Chapter 3), and misrepresent "fact." That is, ditilas often state information as fact even though the factual basis of this information may be complicated or contradicted by content presented elsewhere in the same document, as in, for example, in divorce reports. Appendix 2 lists all (legible) cases known to me (eleven from Lagash and one from Umma) that report the dissolution of marriages. Even though the reasons for a couple to dissolve a marital contract are certainly complicated and often resist a simple explanation, these records nonetheless report the story in a manner whereby one party alone is implicated as having violated the terms of the marriage. In other words, one spouse is found to have failed, in some capacity, to uphold the conditions and obligations upon which the marriage was predicated, thus providing the other spouse with an entitlement to leave or

[18] As discussed in Chapter 1, such problems in part account for the omission of a number of "private texts" from Falkenstein's corpus in *Die neusumerischen Gerichtsurkunden*. Because mention of certain procedural oaths or mention of certain entities was lacking, he assumed the texts had nothing to do with procedure, and relegated them in status as "private" documents unrelated to ditilas.

possibly to demand recompense. In all but three of these cases, the texts report that it is the husband who was somehow responsible for compromising the contract and whose actions have compelled the wife and/or her father to seek dissolution and/or advance a demand for restitution. As Appendix 2 shows, these texts use the phrase "he left her" in all cases except where the passive PN ba-tuku ("she was left") is used. The creation of a marriage is expressed in the phrase (nam-dam-$še_3$) tuku "to take (as a wife)," and, while usually the man is the agent of this construction, there are cases in which it is the woman (Texts 14:17, and 206:17′; see Lafont and Westbrook 2003:201). A comparison with the terminology of marriage formation and dissolution, then, highlights the unusualness of the construction that expresses marriage dissolution and the ability of the administrative language to hide or distort events.

These administrative fictions described above must not be confused with current conceptualization of "legal fictions," which refers to the ability of legal language to conceal social discourses and social events in order to expedite procedure. Maine (1861) pioneered the concept of legal fictions in order to explain how the language of Codes and Edicts disguises social and political developments. More recently, Conley and O'Barr (1990:11) have developed the concept to show how legal language eliminates access to the courses and vagaries of conflict narratives in order to facilitate legal procedure. In the U.S. legal system, for example, legal language or documentation utilizes terms (e.g., "alleged" and "claim") that flatten personal narratives and aim to render simplified, depersonalized accounts of pertinent events that can be quickly evaluated in a courtroom setting (ibid.). Some information must necessarily be relegated to the category of "hearsay," belonging outside the boundaries of the constructed account. According to this analysis, legal language and its creation actively affects the course of procedure as legal professionals appropriate and modify dispute narratives in order to engage the law and settle cases. Even

though all dispute processes involve the evaluation and construction of narratives in order to resolve disputes, it is not legal language that possesses this power in the system attested by the ditilas, but rather the oral testimonies of people who attended the proceedings. That is, the "fictions" found in ditila records are administrative in character, and there is no evidence that they encouraged the swift execution of resolution procedures. Consequently, the application of the term of "legal fiction" to these texts must be done with caution.

In any case, we must regard our sources for Ur III disputes as secondary, tertiary, or greatly removed sources for the events described within them. Given their context, content, and the structure of the content, they cannot be trusted as immediate accounts of disputes, but may still be used for analysis if these characteristics are regarded and noted. In what follows this chapter intends to seek a better understanding of what, given the proceeding sections, a procedure (di), was in the Ur III period.

2.6 Ditila as Record of di

If the text cannot be equated with process, then it is necessary to reinvestigate what the process – the di – is. The Sumerian term di(d) (Akkadian *dīnum*) has been translated a number of ways: lawsuit, case, trial, legal decision, litigation, or legal process (akin to German *Prozeß* or French *procès*),[19] and is thought to enjoy "a wider latitude of connotation than the denotative 'judgment;' 'verdict;' or 'lawsuit' which is generally associated with it" (Fortner 1999:18). Derivatives are also translated in accordance with the concept of formal law, for example with di—ĝar as "to sue, bring a legal complaint" or di-ku$_5$ as "judge," or as a verb, "decide a legal case" (see Edzard 1975:73). Linguistic and philological investigations of these terms have already explored the semantic boundaries

[19] *dinum* can be translated "decision, verdict, judgment, punishment; legal practice, law, article of law; case, lawsuit; claim; court" (*CAD* D 150ff.). Molina (2008) opts for the less loaded "process." See Attinger (1993:459) for a full bibliography; see Falkenstein (1956:59 n. 2 and 1957:97).

and linguistic and grammatical contexts,[20] and Michalowski (1978:117) and Edzard (2005:22ff.) have discussed the problematic relationship between the Akkadian and Sumerian versions of the term,[21] so here I primarily seek to define the parameters of activity associated with performing a di in the context of disputing.

While it is difficult to identify a single term that encapsulates the Sumerian di, and, in fact, many of the above renditions need not be challenged, it is still important to discuss some problems with the wholesale importation of their connotations and contexts into the Ur III data. Firstly, the dangers of applying essentialist definitions of law and legal systems have been summarized (Tamanaha 2000), and, because "law" is not constant across time and space, and it may often be misleading to transport terminology from context to context, across historical and socio-political boundaries. I argue, in fact, that the term di/ *dīnum* has been defined so broadly in Mesopotamian sources that the particulars of its usage during the Ur III period have been overlooked.

Second and more importantly, the term di is commonly understood to refer to a trial or litigation (e.g., Sigrist 1995, Lafont and Westbrook 2003:184), i.e., to some type of antagonistic relationship, but this meaning is complicated by the fact that many texts self-identify as a di or ditila while containing no hint of litigious activity, as with, for example, marriage contracts and declarations of a change of status. Genouillac (1911:13) noticed this problem, and stated that not all ditilas contain legal procedures, and Greengus (1969) and Fortner (1997) later considered the problematic nature of di as litigation as well. Falkenstein (1956:12-13, after Koschaker 1917:154 note 11) addressed the issue by suggesting that such texts should be considered *die gerichtliche Beurkundung eines Rechtsgeschäftes* ("the judicial registration of a legal transaction"), but the distinction is

[20] op cit. as well as Falkenstein 1956:9ff., Hallo and van Dijk 1968:72 (citing *BIN* 8 154 and 155); Wilcke (1978), Edzard 1975:73f., Michalowski (1978), Edzard 2005:22f.
[21] The case for the word being di(d) rather than di or di(n) is best summarized in Michalowski 1978:117, with full citations.

unsupported by the native classifications and this solution still fails to explain why a word for "litigation" would apply to judicial registrations.

An overview of the terminology of procedure can assist in resolving these problems. The first attestations of the Sumerian word di occur as early as the Fara period or at least just before the Akkad Dynasty (e.g., see *BIN* 8 154 from Nippur). However, the term does not routinely appear in Sumerian-language dispute records during the Old Akkadian period, in contrast to the prominence it is afforded in texts from Ur III times. Rather, Old Akkadian legal texts in Sumerian usually employ the expression inim (al-til) when they refer to legal processes and their settlements,[22] less frequently opting for di.[23] On the occasions when di is used, it is almost always in connection with the name of a maškim,[24] and is almost always in construction with the verb si—sa_2, "to settle,"[25] even in letters.[26] Occasionally, the maškim is cited as having settled the di himself, but more often there are other figures who assume this role. The idiom di… ……si—sa_2 is not used in the Ur III dispute records; in fact, I am not aware of any attestations from administrative records of this time.[27] Rather, the Ur III method of expressing that a di has been completed is to use til, "complete; finished," hence the expression di til-la.

The earliest and only pre-Ur III attestation of the construction di til-la ("finished case")[28] appears in the regrettably unhelpful Old Akkadian text *MCS* 9 150, in connection with a tersely reported series of transactions involving sheep. The text does not assume the

[22] E.g., for inim al-til: *WdO* 1982, 13:20 1 4ĭ, Krecher 1974:241 no. 18 lines 9ĭ-11ĭ, no. 21 line 21 (=*MAD* 4 15), *BIN* 8 167; see also the pre-Akkad Nippur texts *BIN* 8 170 and 175.
[23] E.g., *BIN* 8 157.
[24] E.g., *MAD* 4 80, maškim di-si-sa_2-a-bi; here no other authorities are cited, perhaps suggesting that the maškim had a greater or more direct role in the resolution of cases in the Old Akkadian period.
[25] si... sa2: E.g., Krecher 1974:257 no. 26 col. 3 line2; *MAD* 4 80 3; *SR* 88:16 (=*BIN* 8 170); *SR* 82 10 (=*BIN* 8 167), *SR* 85:8 (= *BIN* 8 164), *SR* 82:10 (= *BIN* 8 173); see Wilcke 2007:45.
[26] Letters: E.g., *SR* 92 14 (= *BIN* 8 157); see also *SR* 93 (= *BIN* 8 155) and *SR* 94 (= *BIN* 8 153).
[27] This does appear in Ur III literary compositions, however. See, for example, Šulgi Hymn B 219.
[28] Translated by Sigrist as "sentence du tribunal" (1992:46) and Edzard as "Rechtssache" (1968:*passim*).

form of a dispute record, if one compares it with the other Old Akkadian texts, reads more like an economic receipt:

MCS 9 150, Old Akkadian

1 udu da-da dam-gar$_3$	1 sheep, Dada the merchant
1 udu inim-^{d}šara$_2$ engar	1 sheep, Inim-Šara the farmer
NIĜIN$_3$ maškim	Niĝin (was) maškim
1 udu nin-gu$_2$	1 sheep, Ningu
1 udu nin-[x x]	1 sheep, Nin-x-x
niĝir ki-añ$_2$ maškim	Niĝir Kiağ (was) maškim
1 udu NIGIN$_3$ dam-gar$_3$	1 sheep, Nigin the merchant
lu$_2$-^{d}šara$_2$ maškim	Lu-Šara (was) maškim
1 udu ur-lu$_2$	1 sheep, Urlu
NIĜIN$_3$ maškim	Niĝin (was) maškim
di til-la	Case closed.

This text has inspired a small debate (i.e., one restricted to footnotes) about its interpretation, since it is unclear if the cited maškims are the recipients of sheep or if they supervised the disbursement of sheep to the winners of a case, as suggested by the inclusion of the final declaration "closed case."[29] The latter position is perhaps bolstered by the fact that di was associated early on with the concept of "settling" something over which two parties have disagreed, signified by its common association with si—sa$_2$, thus seemingly referring to a resolution process instead of a transaction.[30] The Akkadian term *dīnum* is used in Akkadian documents of the Old Akkadian period, and is understood as inim/*awātum* "word, matter" as it is used in the Sumerian texts.

After the Ur III period, the Sumerian terms di and di til-la are occasionally used in Old Babylonian literary compositions and lexical lists,[31] but it is certain that there has been an evolution of the meaning and context of the terms since the end of the Ur III period

[29] Compare to Ur III animal disbursement texts discussed in Oh'e 1983. On the various interpretations of this text, see also Gelb (1952 no. 208, 228, and 242), Edzard (1968 no. 79), Sommerfeld (1999 no. 55-57), and Wilcke (2007:40 note 80). On the issue of whether maškims were paid for services in the Ur III period, see Chapter 4.
[30] On the general structure of Old Akkadian litigation texts and associated Sumerian and Akkadian terminology, see Wilcke 2007:42ff.
[31] E.g., OB Izi I and II, OB Kagal.

and since the decline of Sumerian as the predominant language for recording legal cases. Sumerian literary works from the Old Babylonian period, for example, refer to di in connection with the "assembly" (Akkadian puḫrum), but neither this term nor the body of authorities to which it refers is concerned with the management of disputes in Lagash or Umma during the Ur III period.[32] For example, from *Flood Story* 24 and *LSUr* 364:

di-til-la inim pu-uḫ-ru-[um-ma-ka šu gi_4-gi_4 nu-gal_2]	The judgment of the assembly cannot be turned back (after Michalowski 1989:59)

After the Ur III period, the term di til-la is attested in Middle Assyrian lexical lists[33] and in first millennium lexical lists, most notably *ana ittišu*, where an Akkadian equivalent (*dīnum gamrum*) is provided.[34] In fact, the strongest retention of Old Akkadian and Ur III terminology is found in lexical lists of the late second and first millennia.[35] Lexical equivalents of Sumerian and Akkadian legal terminology are problematic, however, and are known to break down upon investigation of the practical contexts of terms.[36]

The topic of the meanings and nuances of Akkadian terms referring to dispute cases in the Old Babylonian period, *dīnum* and *awātum*, is an immense subject that deserves its own treatment and cannot be covered here to any satisfactory degree. Suffice it to say for our present purposes that there is a development of the meaning of *dīnum* (and therefore di) after the Ur III period. For one thing, there is a tangible redefinition of the Sumerian

[32] Two possible examples of pu-uḫ$_2$-ru-um from the Ur III period are probably from Nippur: IM 28051 (see van Dijk 1963 ZA 55:71) is unprovenienced and undated, while the other text refers to a pu-uḫ$_2$-ru-um nibru^{ki} -ka (*RAI* Prague Handout text from W.W. Hallo; Nippur, Ur III = P200661). The dating of these texts to the Ur III period, however, needs reevaluation.
[33] AOTU 2/1 70-72 o i 23, 24, 25.
[34] Neo Assyrian *R*5 24 1 o i 29, 30, 32; *ana ittišu* , see MSL1, 7, col. 1 28a, 29, 30, 32. See also Finkelstein's (1967) publication of a tablet copy from the Code of Hammurapi.
[35] E.g., *ana ittišu* VII i 46 provides the Akkadian equivalent of the phrase di si—sa$_2$ = *dinum šutešuru*, but I am not aware of any uses of this idiom between the Old Akkadian period and this lexical entry.
[36] See, for example, Ellis (1972) on DI.DAB$_5$.BA = *ṣimdatu* or Westbrook (1996) on ZIZ$_2$.DA = *kiššatum*; but see also Steinkeller 1980 and Wilcke 2007:59 note 180.

terminology, as when, for example, Old Babylonian legal texts use the logograms DI.TIL.LA or DI.DAB$_5$.BA as idiograms for *dīnum*, (Kraus 1939:157, Finkelstein 1967, Ellis 1972), even though di til-la is not synonymous with di in the Ur III period (see below) and di is seemingly the equivalent of *dīnum*. Moreover, it has been suggested that the very use of the Sumerian terminology varies by city in the Old Babylonian period,[37] implying that the terms are possibly in flux, whether or not the reality of solving cases has changed or remained the same.

Second, in most of the Ur III dispute records, the term di cannot take on the same semantic fields as the Old Babylonian *dīnum* and seems to refer primarily to disputes rather than to verdicts, laws, or the act of suing. That is, in the Old Babylonian period, the meaning of the term *dīnum* takes on a much broader range of meanings than di assumes during the Ur III period, referring not only to the process by which lawsuits are settled, but also to the final verdict or judicial decision of the suit itself. It is not equally possible, however, for a di during the Ur III period to refer to a judicial verdict. Not only is this usage unattested, but also, if the term di is defined as such, then the distinction between di as "verdict" and di til-la, "finished verdict," is unclear to me. There is similarly no clear instance of the term di referring to "law" or "rule" as *dīnum* may in the Old Babylonian period.

Given these many shifts in terminology, language, and, of course, social and political contexts over the course of early Mesopotamian history, how do we understand the meaning of di for the Ur III period? By utilizing the full corpus of Ur III dispute records and observing exactly what can and cannot occur in the context of a di, as well as by paying attention to what is meant when the texts refer to this term, it may be possible to propose a precise definition. To start, we must assume that di and di til-la are not

[37] On legal terminology after the Ur III period see de J. Ellis 1974:77, Landsberger 1939, Kraus 1951.

interchangeable terms and that it is not necessary or justifiable to import the various meanings of *dīnum* to the Ur III context. Moreover, it is not possible that di carried the meaning of "verdict" or "legal decision" in the Ur III dispute records as this obfuscates the meaning of the more ubiquitous term di til-la. The latter term refers, obviously, to the completion of the di, which in turn must refer to the *process* or possibly "case."

As mentioned above, the construction di…si—sa_2, characteristic of Old Akkadian dispute records, is abandoned in the administrative language of the Ur III period (see Shulgi Hymn B 219), and cases are completed in this period with til, "complete; finished." A di becomes til, presumably, when appropriate entities have confirmed one party's claim, sometimes reported with the verb gi "to establish, confirm." The term di til-la thus seemingly refers to the conclusion of a di, or the moment at which the matter for which the arbitration was sought has been resolved and the process is theoretically closed. The case can resurface, however, as seen above in case Text 276 and also in Text 112:5 and 15, indicating that, in practice, cases did not truly stay til forever in all instances.

a-kal-la dumu ab-ba-mu di-da ba-a-gi_4	Akala the son of Abamu returned the case.
ur-^{d}lama dumu ab-ba-mu-ke_4	Ur-Lama son of Abamu, Akala's brother, abandoned
a-kal-la šeš-a-ni	the case.
di-ta in-tak_4	

Still, Molina (2008:no. 8) suggests that the goal of all parties was to make the case til and eliminate ambiguity once and for all:

Text 287: o. 6-r. 3)

$ša_3$-ge-bu_3-lu_5	Šagebulu
mu lugal in-pad_3	swore by the king and said:
tukum-bi u_4 3-kam-ka	"If I cannot bring a witness
lu_2-inim-ma nu-mu-tum_2	in three days,
di til-la he_2-a bi_2-in-du_{11}	let the case be closed."

A similar example can be found in Text 122.

There are also reasons to propose that di til-la was not only a term for a complete di but also a reference to the physical tablet that recorded the conclusion of the di, as is evident in the Bowden tablet (Text 377, Johnson and Veenker, *forthcoming*, line 8), which, in the context of discussing a past case that has resurfaced, uses the phrase di til-la as an indicator that there is a tablet documenting the case:

Text 377, line 8, Umma

lu_2-du_{10}-ga maškim di til-la-bi i_3-me-am_3	Lu-duga (was) the maškim of this ditila.

The same is also clear for basket tags (pisan dub-ba) that label the files where dispute records were kept and that refer to the basket's contents as ditilas.[38] For example:

Text 223, Lagaš

pisan dub-ba	Tablet box:
di til-la i_3-ĝal_2	(Here) are the concluded cases of
$arad_2$-^{d}nanna	Arad-Nanna
sukkal-mah $ensi_2$	Grand Vizier, governor,
gir_3 šu-i_3-li_2	Under Šu-ili
lu_2-diĝir-ra	Lu-Diĝira
lu_2-^{d}nin-gir_2-su	Lu-Ningirsu
di-ku_5-bi-me	were the judges.
mu ma_2-gur_8-mah ba-dim_2	The year ŠS 8.

The dispute record Text 277 also demonstrates this point:

Text 277, left edge, Lagaš

gaba-ri di til-la […x]	A copy of this closed case [...] was put in a basket of
pisan e2-gal-ka i_3-ib_2-g[ar]	the palace (archives).

Thus modern scholars are not unjustified when calling the corpus of di records, the actual texts, ditilas. Most likely, the Ur III term functions as a cover term that refers to the complete process and the fact that there is a record of the official (maškim) who can

[38] See Lagash Texts 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, and BM 14440 (Sollberger 1976: no. 3). No tags pertaining to dispute records are presently known from Umma. On pisan dub-ba texts, see also Sallaberger 1999:214-215 and Nelson 1979.

testify about the proceedings. In other words, a di is not equivalent to the verdict, while the term di til-la refers to the fact that a di has been completed, and to its deposit into the written record.

Only an exploration of the native uses of di in the context of dispute records will clarify its meaning. Using this approach, we find that the majority of such texts signify the beginning of undertaking a di with one of several expressions. In many instances, the text reports that one of the involved parties has simply "appeared before the judges," using the construction PN igi di-ku$_5$ bi$_2$-in-ĝar.[39] Almost all uses of this expression are followed by a first-person declaration of the matter at hand, accompanied by the verb (bi$_2$-in)-du$_{11}$, "he/she declared." For example:

BM 23678, rev. 5, Lagaš

dam-qa$_2$-at u$_3$ KA-la-a ašgub	Damqat and her brother KA-la'a, the leather worker,
šeš-a-ni di-bi be$_2$-eš$_2$	started a di.
dam-qa$_2$-at …. bi$_2$-in-du$_{11}$	Damqat declared that...

When a first-person declaration is omitted, one will find instead a report that a promissory oath was taken, an affair that would similarly involve a public address before witnesses.

Where this expression – "PN appeared before the judges and declared" – is not used, another expressions will likely be found: inim—ĝar , di—du$_{11}$, or inim—du$_{11}$, as Lafont pointed out (2000:40 see above). These terms are also frequently accompanied by a succinct first-person declaration about the matter at hand.[40]

[39] Instead of judges, sometimes a governor is cited. See Falkenstein 1956:18*ff* for a breakdown of the entities present at cases in the Lagash corpus.
[40] Garfinkle (2000:208, see also 2004:8 note 20) has pointed out that the use of dug4 in court records is their "distinguishing characteristic."

Compound Verb:	Common Translations:	Literal Translation:
igi di-ku$_5$-ne-še$_3$ in-ĝar … bi-in-dug$_4$	to make a statement before judges; appear before a tribunal (Sigrist 1995: no. 1, 7)	to appear before judges and say
inim—ĝar	to sue (Falkenstein 1957:124, Lafont and Westbrook 1993:194); make a legal claim; to bring legal action against someone (Thompsen 1984:306); to claim, sue (Hallo 2002:152)	to place a statement, speak (that is, to present one's point of view[41]
di—dug$_4$	to start legal proceedings; (Falkenstein 1957:97); to lodge a lawsuit (Finkelstein 1969:80 n. 18); carry on a lawsuit (against someone) (Thompsen 1984:301); to adjudicate (Hallo 2002:152); to litigate with someone for something (Wilcke 2007:43)	to say a di
inim—dug$_4$	to sue; make a legal complaint	to utter a word, statement, complaint

Table 2.1. Expressions of Initiating a di.

The attested lexicon of beginning a di involves references to speech and declarations before the authoritative party who will be entrusted to settle the matter.[42] Edzard (2005:22f), in fact, has speculated that di may derive from the non-finite *marû*-form of the verb dug$_4$, "to speak." Even though each of these compound verbs has a connection with the act of speaking or delivering a statement, they are typically translated by extension as having to do with registering a complaint, suing, or formally initiating the litigation process. Regardless of the potential anachronisms imposed by such conceptualizations, the importance of uttering some kind of statement ties the different terms together.[43] It follows then that a di is not only an occasion of public declarations about a matter, but more specifically involves the process of making such statements before

[41] See Letter 23 line 5 in Michalowski (*forthcoming*), from Puzur-Namushda to Ibbi-Sin: igi-ni ma-an-ĝar-ma, "He presented the matter as follows."
[42] An exception is the verb di—gar, attested only once in a dispute record from Adab, CMAA 015-C0019 line 5, see Widell 2002. Widell translates as "to bring a legal complaint."
[43] The association between oral declarations and launching a procedure predates the Ur III period, when inim was used in favor of di (see above) and compound verbs such as gu$_3$—gar expressed the onset of proceedings (see Wilcke 2007:36, citing Utu-hegal).

an authoritative third party, as opposed to simply before an adversary or partner in the case. The third party has been approached to disambiguate a confused situation, to sort through conflicting stories and confirm the correct one, or to establish that a claim is justified and legitimate.

The association between speaking a statement before an authoritative party and starting a case is clear in the promissory oath recorded in Text 225:

Text 225 6-rev. 12, Lagaš[44]

di nu-ub-be$_2$ inim nu-ub-be$_2$-a sukkal-mah-ra nu-u$_3$-na-be$_2$-a tukum-bi di bi-in-du$_{11}$ NIR-da i$_3$-me-a mu-lugal be$_2$-in-pa$_3$	He swore by the king that he will not utter a di, that he will not speak a complaint, that he will not complain before the Grand Vizier, (and) that if he does utter a di, it will be a serious offense.

Thus far, it seems reasonable to describe a di as a quarrel, grievance, or dispute, but the direct or exclusive equation of di with these concepts is not satisfactory. The term di cannot be equivalent to a quarrel or grievance, since such matters do not necessarily or specifically involve public declarations explicitly directed at third-party adjudicators. More interesting, however, is the issue of whether di can be directly synonymous with a dispute, since textual references to dis differentiate them from disputes. For example, a ditila from Umma differentiates di from a dispute between two men, Ur-Ninsun and Lugal-itida, over a slave named Nin-kala. According to the text, the resolution of their case is forestalled because a key witness is unavailable. Here di cannot be simply equated with "dispute," since it makes little sense to say that Ur-Ninsun and Lugal-itida were not involved in a dispute until their key witness returned from his journey:

[44] Most likely from Lagash. Sollberger (1958:106) argues that the text probably comes from Lagash based on the inclusion of the personal name aga-šag-keš-‹da›-e, which appears at Lagash only.

Text 286: rev. 3-6 (Molina 2008, no. 7)[45]

Lu_2-ša-lim kaskal-ta du-é	Ur-Ninsun swore by the king that when *Awil-šalim*
di di-da	returns from the trip, the di will be undertaken.
Ur-^{d}Nin-‹sun_2›-ka-ke4	
mu lugal in-pad_3	If he does not do the di, Lugal-itida will take Nin-kala
tukum-bi di li_2-bi_2-in-du_{11}	[the slave over whose ownership the dispute revolves]
Nin_9-kal-la Lugal-iti-da ba-an-tum_2-mu	with him.

Rather, the di here seems to be the process undertaken to address the dispute.

However, the term di cannot be linked with litigation or lawsuit, as evidenced by a number of texts that present cases in which the parties are not acting against each other, and instead seem to be reaching agreements that are recorded without any apparent references to the signals of litigation (evidentiary witnesses, evidentiary oaths, settlements and confirmations).[46] This is clearest when considering marriage agreements (Falkenstein's *Ehevertrag*),[47] such as those that assume following structure:

di til-la
PN_1 son of PN
has taken
PN_2 daughter of PN
(for wife-ship).
Before WITNESSES he (var. they) swore by the king.
PN was the maškim
PN were the judges.
Date.

Structure of texts 1, 2, 3 (Lagaš); see Greengus 1969:525

Figure 2.3. Structure of Marriage ditilas.

As Greengus already pointed out (1969:524), such documents are structured identically to records of promissory oaths (compare, e.g., *BCT* 2 156), save for the inclusion of the heading di til-la in the case of the marriage agreements. Because of this heading, these

[45] Molina translates: "Ur-Ninsun swore by the name of the king that when *Awil-šalim* comes from his trip, the process will be undertaken" (2008:155).
[46] See Falkenstein 1956:13 for a discussion and list of such texts.
[47] See also texts 191 case 2; 210 col. ii 14′-19′ and col. iii 18-col. iv 2; 211 cases 1 and 6, for other, more abbreviated examples of marriage agreements.

texts immediately pose a problem: if one conceptualizes di as a dispute or litigation it is unclear what the stakes of the suit were or what it was about, which parties were engaging an adversarial relationship, or which party was either "plaintiff" or "defendant." In fact, all we can gather is that at least four people, organized into two parties (two fathers and their respective children), agreed that a marriage would be formed and declared their intentions orally before judges – actions that at least seem far from inimical to the interests of any involved party. Falkenstein (see 1956:13) addressed this problem by classifying such texts as legal memoranda or notarizations (*gerichtliche Beurkundungen*) that resulted from or were intended to assist in a lawsuit, and included them in his corpus of litigation records because of the heading di til-la. That is, Falkenstein believed that these texts were non-litigious, but argued that they belong in the corpus because they may have become significant if the couple in question wanted to divorce.

Greengus (1969:529ff.), setting some of Falkenstein's assumptions against what can be known about early Mesopotamian marriage practices, argued that the idea of a non-litigious ditila is oxymoronic (ibid., 531 note 137). Finding it unclear why marriage agreements would be relevant in judicial contexts in the first place, he suggested that either the agreements themselves must have been verdicts of litigations that are not known to us, or else these texts must be records of non-litigious procedures that were conducted, and written, to help if litigation should be threatened in the future (530-1). As argued above, however, we know little about the stages of court procedure during the Ur III period, and the written records do not necessarily outline phases of litigation, making it problematic to propose, based only on textual structures, that there were litigious and non-litigious phases of court proceedings. In addition, it is anachronistic to translate di as "verdict" or "decision" in this era, since there is no other use of the term in the dispute records of this period. And, most importantly, because tablets played virtually no role in conducting a di

and/or winning cases, it is uncertain whether these documents were drafted for use in potential future cases.

An alternate solution to the problem is needed, and I suggest that it is simpler to view a di not as a litigation between adversarial parties that required a verdict, but rather, more generically, as a designation that is applicable to any occasion when parties delivered oral statements to authoritative entities in public, in order to establish an unambiguous situation and fix people and property into place. A marriage pact, or any of the other pacts recorded in ditilas with no clear verdict or reference to litigation, could thus be considered di-procedures and were concluded in order to ensure that property, entitlements, and statuses were straightened out, fixed, unambiguously and publicly acknowledged. Thus, as Greengus seems to suggest, the purpose of taking an agreement before the judges may have been to avoid a dispute. By my definition, a di could be undertaken to address either a dispute or any situation in which property and statuses were in a transition or an unclear or ambiguous state.

This argument is supportable considering the so-called "unfinished cases" from the Umma and Lagaš provinces. Falkenstein (1956:16-17) suggested that there were some cases for which there was no final decision and supported the idea that these cases should be termed di nu-til-la, "incomplete case" because they lacked conclusive oaths or expressions of confirmation (e.g., gi). The term dinutila appears in lexical lists of the late second millennium and first millennium with the Akkadian equivalent *dīnu lā gamru*,[48] but, as Sollberger (1958:105) noted in his review of Falkenstein, it is never actually used in the Ur III period administrative documents.[49] By my calculation, upwards of 20% of texts from the Umma corpus can be called "unfinished cases" because they have no final

[48] di nu-til-la / *di-nu la-a gam-ru* (*AOTU* 2/1 70-72 o i 25); di nu-til-la / *di-i-nu la ga*-[*am-ru*] (R5 24 1 o i 30); di nu-til-la / *di-i-nu la gam-ru* (ana ittiCu 7 Seg. 1 30). The problems with lexical equivalents Ur III legal terms and later Akkadian/Assyrian terminology were discussed above.
[49] In fact, I was unable to find many examples of *dinu la gamru* in Akkadian documents of later periods.

settlement, decision, or confirmation of status. To characterize these cases as incomplete, however, ignores the fact that many of these cases are wrapped up with common expressions of finality: agreements to take oaths at a future date, agreements to reconvene with new evidence after a fixed amount of time, and agreements about how to resolve the dispute elsewhere, suggesting that it is possible that these cases are, in fact, complete and that the court has served in the full capacity for which it was recruited.[50]

The purpose of conducting a di was not always to settle a dispute, then, and the reason for assembling a court and performing a di could be to develop agreed upon courses of action that could lead to the settlement of the dispute elsewhere or at another time. In other words, even if the so-called dinutilas do not contain a resolution, the di itself is concluded.

In sum, by looking at the particulars of the term di in the Ur III period, we can identify some salient characteristics of this term that are not visible if we equate textual structure with process or if we assume that the term bears the same meaning for all three thousand years of Mesopotamian history. Below I offer two charts to summarize the differences between di and disputes or lawsuits. The purpose of these superficial comparisons is not to imply that there exists some essential definition of "lawsuit" or "dispute" – indeed, the extant number of differing scholarly definitions available to me is far too high to cite – but rather to emphasize the advantages of unmooring the Ur III concept of di from the other ancient and modern usages of the terms. Very likely di procedures themselves would not allow for a universal definition even in the native context.

[50] For examples, see see BM 106527, M. Molina 2008 no.1, BM 106540 *ibid.* no. 7; *NSGU* 62 = BM 105347; possibly *TCL* 5 6167.

Lawsuit	di
Initiated with the filing of a complaint or pleadings (generally), by one party against another	Initiated when mediation is introduced to either a dispute or ambiguous situation
Action directed from a plaintiff to a defendant	Do not necessarily involve adversarial relationships (e.g., marriage agreements)
Arbitration and authority determined by jurisdiction	Involved parties may choose an arbitrator at their discretion
Procedure (litigation) defined by statutory laws Procedure dictated by precedent	Procedure determined (often *ad hoc*) by third-party mediators and/or arbitrators, and may vary widely
Concerned with finding law	Concerned with "finding fact" (Roth 2001:255)

Table 2.2. Comparison of "Lawsuit" and di.

Dispute[51]	di
Starts when mutual grievances are exchanged between two or more parties	Starts when a party seeks mediation and publicly delivers their statement
Can be "privately" managed and resolved (e.g., within a household or small-scale community)	Definitively a public matter known to authority figures and third-party arbitrators as well as, most likely, to the general public
Resolution may be achieved in a variety of manners (e.g., between the two parties alone), bi-lateral negotiation, etc.	Resolution, if it is the purpose of a di, is accomplished by an authoritative third party
May culminate in an equitable remedy to harmonize the needs of both sides	Settlements, where applicable, are unambiguously one-sided

Table 2.3. Comparison of "Dispute" and di.

[51] Composite definition of key aspects from Aubert 1963, Abel 1973, Felstiner *et al*. 1980-1, Lempert 1980-1, Snyder 1981, Toivari 1997:154, Parnell 1988, Yoffee 1988, Chase 2005, Hertel 2007:39*ff*. The issue of whether the dispute must be public is either unmentioned or assumed.

2.7 Conclusions

The observable, intimate relationship between the written word and modern legal systems is not universal. This problem, paired with the impossibility of ever finding a dispute that has not been redefined, reworked, and reworded by both written and oral discourse, makes it imperative for scholars to consider ancient legal documents in their immediate contexts, and poses a challenge for scholars of the Ur III dispute records in disarticulating text and process. As the foregoing discussion aims to show, disputing and the conducting of case procedures in the Ur III period was primarily an oral world, where texts were merely cumulative caches of witness names, and were hardly successful at transmitting accurate transcripts of real cases and processes due their nature as "fictive" administrative forms. Because these texts cannot be equated with process, it was necessary to develop a better definition of process in the Ur III period that more accurately reflects the realities of the corpus. With such considerations in mind, I offer a new outline of the characteristics of processes evident in texts of the Ur III period. A di is a process that involves:

a) a situation in which property or personal entitlements are in a contested, ambiguous, or transitional status, resulting in
b) a nucleation of people and a party's public declaration of a complaint, promise, or statement about the matter at hand,
c) which is delivered before a maškim and third-party judges or other provincial authorities,
d) whose job it is to either disambiguate the complicated situation, confirm or change the status of things, or settle a contested matter in favor of one side, hopefully ensuring that it will not be raised again by conducting the matter in public, taking oaths, and committing the events to the memory of the maškim for future use and preservation of the newly established *status quo*.

Upon the completion of these events, a text is drafted and deposited into the archives, where it could be consulted in the future for the name of the maškim or any relevant witnesses or temporary functionaries. Just enough details were committed to the tablet to help in locating the document and associated maškim if the situation demanded.

"Case" may be the best translation of di, according to this outline, though cross-cultural comparisons may produce other ideas. For example, it is probably no accident that the concept of straightening out (si—sa$_2$), often anachronistically mis-conceptualized as "justice," is associated with carrying out a di in the Old Akkadian period.[52] The term is akin to the concept of "disentangling," developed by White and Watson-Gregeo in their discussion the dispute rhetoric of small communities of the Pacific Islands (1990:2, 35 note 1).

> We prefer the label "disentangling" over "conflict resolution" or "dispute management" because disentangling points to elements of local meaning that organize and guide the activities we examine. To begin with, the notion of disentangling signals a process rather than an end product, indicating that engagement in moral negotiation itself may be more significant than specific decisions or outcomes (White and Watson-Gegeo 1990:35 note 1).

A di is certainly a process during which two parties sought public arbitration or mediation of a third party in order to clarify ambiguities, "straighten out" the place of property, statuses, entitlements, and disentangle a situation that is, or has the potential to become, disorganized.

In any case, with the above outline in mind, it is possible to explore more specifically the mechanics of executing the di-procedure, determining how, and by what authority and political configurations of people, different cases were accomplished.

[52] And beyond, appearing in Old Babylonian literary texts as well (e.g., *LSUr* 439).

CHAPTER 3

THE LIFE, CHARACTER, AND RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES

3.1 Introduction

Elites of the Ur III core provinces conducted a procedure called a di to settle disputes, uncertain transitions, or situations when routine transitional phases of life offered no clear, normative method for handling changes and thus had the potential to devolve into conflict. This chapter seeks to trace the life of a dispute from inception to completion, attempting to understand 1) where disputes came from in Ur III society and how they escalated to the point of requiring arbitration and the performance of a di, and 2) how the Ur III provincial courts handled them, and by what specific performances. Even though it is common for studies of Mesopotamian law to focus on the structure of "legal institutions" and identification of "laws," it is argued here that an emphasis on the process, where allowed by the sources, is more analytically useful for understanding the social and political dynamics of Ur III society.[1] Indeed, socio-political structures were in constant flux and displayed new configurations after the execution of processes, including the di. Thus, this chapter attempts to explore how and where our attested disputes formed and what relationships they challenged, how they, in full or nascent form, were addressed by a di, how winners and losers of a dispute were established, and by what logic these procedures helped disputes and transitions come to a legitimate and socially valid conclusion, at least

[1] For a summary of the advantages and disadvantages of the idea of "Law as Process" and the processual approach, see Comaroff and Roberts 1981:11ff., Hertel 2007:22ff.

temporarily. In order to consider these questions, it is necessary to understand what a dispute looked like in the Ur III period, where it comes from, and how it ended up in a record or in central filing systems of the Ur III provincial capitals.

Central to this discussion is my proposal that the Sumerian term di, which has a close relationship with dispute processing and resolution, is not synonymous with "dispute" or "trial," but rather refers to a public civil procedure used in the Ur III period to resolve disputes and attempt to contribute to their management and conclusion. Disputes themselves must be considered in their specific socio-cultural context, since the nature and gravity of disputes can be different across cultures (Chase 2005).

3.2 The Origins and Catalysts of Disputes

As in all societies, social discord in the Ur III period could arise from a number of forces, driven, according to the ditilas, by events either routine and endemic or unforeseen and disruptive. On the one hand, disputes could be triggered by the inevitable events of life, such as family deaths, which could be problematic for families with non-traditional family structures that defied normative patterns of inheritance or marriage; financial crises, in particular where a party was unable to fulfill a routine contractual obligation; or unpreventable or unanticipated disasters, which could result in costly damage to property and long-term injury to relationships if handled improperly. Of course, the full nuances and backgrounds of the situations are not explicitly articulated in the texts due to the latter's focus on the pertinent details of resolution rather than the story of how the dispute originated. In fact, many cases here cited have been differently characterized by scholars with different research agendas. A case in which a slave argues for his or her freedom, for example, may accurately be classified as a dispute over slave status, but very likely the

initial catalyst for this type of conflict was in fact the death of the slave's owner and a problematic estate settlement; that is, such a case originated when a family death resulted in an unclear inheritance pattern. These factors were likely inseparable from debates over the slave's status, even if they were somewhat neglected by a ditila's report.[2] In spite of these complexities and the fact that the texts only tell the end of the story rather than the full series of events, it is possible to postulate that such transitions and crises were responsible for sparking a large number of cases or at least causing parties to consider seeking the court to prevent a dispute from ensuing:

Crisis or Transition:	Presumed Normative Response:	Aberrancy:	Attested Resolution Strategies:	Examples:
Family Death (Father)	Transfer of property and slaves to eldest son	- Non-traditional family structure - Alternative arrangements were expressed before the death	Highly variable, depending on family structure, property, and context	Lagaš: 29, 32, 33, 83, 99, 205 case 1 Umma: 347
Sale	Seller delivers purchase to buyer	- Conditions of the sale later misunderstood or denied - Payment was complicated	- Oaths taken or witness statements delivered to clarify the conditions or transpiring of the sale	Lagaš: 100, 146, 176, 262 Umma: 132 See also 337 (Nippur)
Sudden Poverty, Financial Emergency	Poverty not anticipated; family members assist, loans taken	- Family incapable of assisting or non-existent - Party cannot find a loan	Highly variable. Includes debt-slavery, self-sale	Lagaš: 35?, 36, 38, 68, 71 Umma: 48
Precarious Status Transition (e.g., Manumission)	The freed slave faces no future claims by the former owner	- New status could or has been contested - Manumission declared void or temporary by former owner	- Existence of manumission determined - New status declared in public and conditions expressed	Lagaš: 75, 76, 77, 78; see 205 case 3; see also 74 Umma: 304 (Appendix 3 no. 2), 317 (Appendix 3 no. 4)
Loan of Funds or Property	Debtor pays off the debt according to pre-determined	- Debtor cannot pay and has no expendable	Variable. Includes debt-slavery, self-sale, sale of	Lagaš: 118, 142, L 11056

[2] The most common occasion for slaves to appear in court and attempt a claim of emancipation was upon the death of their owner, usually the male head of the family; such cases are presented as disputes between the slave and the heirs of his or her deceased owner. See, for example, Lagaš texts 7, 33. 34.

	schedule and conditions	property or assets - Debtor has died	children, marriages	Umma: 308 (Appendix 3)
Unforeseen or Unpreventable Disaster to Rented or Supervised Property	Appropriate party assumes damages in a clear-cut situation	- Parties disagree about who bears the responsibility - The responsible party cannot pay - Pre-established contractual arrangements cannot accommodate the new situation	Highly variable, cases often settled in favor of higher-ranking party	Lagaš: 72 (slaves fled), 127 (missing sheep), 132 (missing ox) Umma: 143[?], 144, 355 (missing sheep)
Imminent Family Transition (e.g., Impending Death of an Ill Person or Spouse)	No process needed; transfer of property and slaves to eldest son/child	- Alternative family structure precludes (straightforward) transfer of property or care for the dying party	New family structure established via adoption or conditional marriage arrangement	Lagaš: Text 6, 7, 8 See also MRAH O. 120 (Limet 2000) (unprov.)
Marriages with Anomalous Needs	Payments of bride price and dowry and appropriate oaths	Unclear, but di conducted to make status fixed and normative	Promissory oaths, public declarations of the arrangement	Lagaš: 270

Table 3.1. Examples of Cases Resulting from Crises or Transitions.

On the other hand, disputes could also erupt because of an overt violation of normative behavior or an established contract, breaches of social or economic agreements, or even from what, in other cultural or legal contexts, would be considered criminal offenses. Failure to meet pre-determined obligations or refusal to entertain recompense for the resulting expenses falls under this category. Remarkably, even though some of these examples would be regarded as "criminal" cases in modern courts, they are presented and resolved as civil disputes between two parties in the Ur III provincial context and not as cases between the offender and the state or community (i.e., they are not "public" offenses).

Object of the di:	How Offending or Liable Party is Determined:	Attested Resolution Strategies:	Examples:
Failure to Fulfill Conditions Established by a Promissory Oath	- Establishment of the existence and legitimacy of the promissory oath - Evaluation the present validity of the oath if circumstances have changed	Settlement in favor of appropriate party (enforcement of oath, forging of new obligations)	Lagaš: 27, 116, 117, 119
Denial of Existence of a Contract or Demonstrable Sale	- Evaluation of whether the transaction occurred by way of witnesses	Completion of the transaction carried out	Lagaš: 45, 46, 47?, 50, 53? Umma: 287
Double-Booking (Making the same contract with two parties)	- Testimony or proof from both parties claiming entitlement to the same contract - Determination of which party entered the contract first	Object of the contract awarded to the first party; damages paid to appropriate party	Lagaš: 15, 68, 70 Umma: 60
Failure to Deliver Property or Slaves after Receiving Payment or vice versa	- Inquiry into whether the payment was made or into whether the indebted party can pay	Court confirms property to buyer; seller may pay rent to seller; interest may be paid for time delay	Lagaš: 63, 65, 66?, 131, 207 case 1 Umma: 48, 49, 51, 289
Misappropriation of Property or Land	Recompense awarded to the landowner or violated party	Profit, rent, or recompense paid to appropriate party	Lagaš 67, 109, 205 case 4 Umma: 120b, 201, 284
Mismanagement of Slaves/Goods or Abuse of Privilege	- Determination of the nature of the mismanagement and evaluation of the value of the resulting damage - Evaluation of what recompenses can repair the situation	Demonstration of mismanagement, recompense paid but no penalties; payment of rent for appropriated property or slave	Lagaš: 12?, 67, 88, 106, 212 case 1 Umma: 62
Negligence, Loss of Property in an Employee's care	- Determination of the value of lost/damaged property - Determination of against whom the damages were committed	Payment or transfer of property commensurate with lost/damaged property to victim	Lagaš: 88, 123, 143 Umma: 307 (see Appendix 3)
Theft	Guilt is determined or assumed; evaluation of property loss	Enslavement (Lagaš), imposition of compensation paid to the victim, or transfer of property to victim	Lagaš: 42, 126, 128, 129 Umma: 69, 121, 127, 138, 312 (Appendix 3) See also Text 125 (unprov.)
Homicide	Determination of alleged murderer financial set-back to survivor	Imposition of fine, enslavement, or transfer of property to victimized party	Lagaš: 41, 202
Flight of Slaves	Slave is captured and returned to his or her owner	Ownership of slave and legitimacy of enslavement determined before the	Lagaš: 41, 72 Umma: 281, 282

		slave is returned	
Violation of Marriage Practices	- Determination of the nature of the violation - Evaluation of the losses to the violated party	Dissolution of the marriage (invariably), payment in silver to violated partner	Lagaš: 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19[?] Umma: 369

Table 3.2. Examples of Cases Involving Offenses, Breaches of Behavior, or Break of Contract.

Even though these (not exhaustive) tables only represent attested situations and do no reflect a native typology of cases, they still inform us of several important things. First, it is clear that dispute cases that arrived in the provincial courts involved situations that merely threatened to become contentious in addition to substantial, fully-fledged crises. That is, a di could address both a dispute as well as audit an ominous situation if it had the potential to become a dispute. Thus, while it is likely that most cases involved an opposing relationship between mutually aggravated parties, some cases, largely from the former category of Table 3.1, could arguably be in an early phases of escalation, in which a situation was simply complicated and confusing and thus required treatment in court by a di. Text 75 (see Falkenstein 1956-7: plate 6), for example, in which a slave is declared free, identifies itself as a completed di even though no conflict or adversary to the slave is evident. Presumably, the purpose of the public performance of this case was to ensure that a conflict would not arise from the slave's change of status.

di-til-la
$^{\text{I}}$ur-saĝ-ub$_3^{\text{ki}}$ arad u$_2$-uḫ i$_3$-me-am$_3$
lu$_2$-$^{\text{d}}$ba-ba$_6$ u$_3$ lu$_2$-$^{\text{d}}$nin-gir$_2$-su dumu u$_2$-uḫ-ke$_4$-ne
igi-bi ib$_2$-$^{\text{ĝa}_2}$ĝar$^{\text{ar}}$
mu lugal
ur-saĝ-ub$_3^{\text{ki}}$ arad-ra
ama-gi$_4^{\text{gi}_8}$-ni he$_2$-$^{\text{ĝa}_2}$ĝar$^{\text{ar}}$
dumu lu$_2$ aš-gin$_7$-na-am$_3$ he$_2$-dim$_2$ bi$_2$-du$_{11}$-ga
u$_3$ arad-da ama-gi$_4^{\text{gi}_8}$-ni ba-$^{\text{ĝa}_2}$ĝar$^{\text{ar}}$-kam

Case closed. Concerning Ur-saĝub, the slave of U'uh: Lu-Baba, Lu-Ningirsu, the sons of U'uh appeared and declared, "By the king: freedom is given to Ur-saĝub, which makes him like the son of a free man."[3]

(Thus) freedom was given to the slave.

Ur-saĝub swore before Lu-gišbar, Lu-gu'aba, Lu-

˹lu$_2$-^{d}giš-bar-e	Inana, KAnizi, Lu-balašaga, Simtur, and Ni-x-zi.
˹lu$_2$-gu$_2$-ab-ba^{ki}	
˹lu$_2$-^{d}inana	
˹inim-ni-zi	
˹lu$_2$-bala-sa$_6$-ga	
˹sim^{mušen}-tur	
˹nin-ˀxˀ-[x]-zi	
ur-saĝ-ub$_3^{ki}$-ke$_4$ ˀinˀ-pad$_3$-da	
lugal-dug$_4$-ga-na	Lugal-dugana, Nin-šugigi, and Kala, the sons of Bazi
nin-šu-gi$_4$-gi$_4$	swore.
kal-la dumu ba-zi	
nam-erim$_2$-am$_3$	
ur-saĝ-ub$_3^{ki}$ u$_3$ dumu-ne-ne	Ur-sagub and his children have entered into 'freeborn-
dumu-gir$_{15}$-ra ba-an-ku$_4$	status'.
lu$_2$-gi-na maškim	Lu-gina was the maškim.
lu$_2$-šara$_2$	
lu$_2$-ib-gal	Lu-Šara, Lu-Ibgal, Lu-diĝira, and Ur-Ištaran were its
lu$_2$-diĝir-ra	judges.
ur-^{d}ištaran	
di-ku$_5$-bi-me	
mu si-ma-num$_2^{ki}$ ba-ḫul	

In another example, the relatively long Lagaš Text 99 presents what appears to be a dispute over an estate division between the widow of man named Dudu and his offspring by way of a previous marriage. The text reports at several turns in the procedure that the parties declined to take recommended actions against each other to the full extent offered by the officiators.[4] For example, Dudu's sons were asked if they would require their stepmother's witness to swear to his statement, and they decline on the grounds that his statement, and therefore her claim, is agreeable to them. Either Dudu's heirs were strategically tricked by the court's officials into betraying their interests and supporting their opponent's claim, or in this case the parties simply were not antagonistic towards one another. Perhaps, rather, Dudu's widow and heirs were tentatively united in mutual concern for the proper fate of the estate, and, possibly, their decision to address the matter with a di prevented the estate's slaves from raising future claims of freedom and protected their respective interests for years to come.

Second, the inclusion of both "civil" and "criminal" matters, a "distinction which did not exist" in Mesopotamian legal texts (Renger 2008:184, Neumann 2004:72),

deserves comment. As deviant acts are culturally determined, it is perhaps not unusual that these types of cases can be undifferentiated. However, it should be noted that both types of cases share concerns for damages, costs to either party, or recompense – essentially pecuniary matters. In the examples of offenses that might be considered "criminal" (homicide, theft), the cases typically center on the matter of what losses were incurred to the victimized party and in what form the offender should pay these, suggesting that there were other, probably local arenas in which acts of retribution and revenge were carried out (see Westbrook 2008a), fully separate from the provincial courts. In other words, the purpose of the di was merely to determine damages owed rather than to punish or impose penalties on a criminal offender, and thus to address the aftermath of the crime rather than the crime itself (see Texts 41 and 42, for example). In short, the ditilas provide only slivers of the full disputes, and, as both cases such as Dudu's estate and the homicide cases make clear, there were clearly other layers to the matters at hand, and other phases and angles of the dispute's life that remain undocumented with which the court was unconcerned.

Third, and perhaps most important, it follows that, according to the ditilas, a di is not conceived as a case between a defendant and the law, the state, or the community, but rather takes the form of a personal conflict between two parties. As such, cases center squarely on a claim of entitlement and breaches to someone's interests, not on breaches of law or aggressive acts towards state authority. The di specifically allows for the determination of two things: the legitimacy of the claim of entitlement – i.e., the promises made, what contracts were struck, what statements were uttered in the past by relevant players, etc. – and/or, if the claim is found to be well-founded, the question of whether or not the other party had indeed failed to meet his or her obligations.

Accordingly, it is analytically useless to characterize the disputes as matters between "plaintiffs" and "defendants," as was suggested in the previous chapter, since this distinction often requires that one party (the plaintiff) is allied in cooperation with state officials and the interests of the state (e.g., as in the relationship between a prosecuting attorney and a victim), and that these state officials, by adherence to an abstract body of principles, protect the interests of the offended party.[5] Even though a di entails a triangular configuration of parties – two disputants and the court or arbitrating entity who addresses their dispute – the court does not have any alliance with either party. It follows that there are no prosecutors in the Ur III dispute resolution system.

With these preliminary observations about the nature and character of disputes in Ur III society, it is possible to trace their trajectory from catalyst to di.

3.3 The Prehistory of Cases

Before a dispute, or any problems associated with it, is addressed by a di, where had it already been addressed? More interesting, assuming that our textual sources represent only a small fraction of the total number of conflicts and disputes experienced by members of Ur III society, why did some disputes end up in the provincial courts, and how were they selected to be there? Chapter 2 already discussed the impossibility of ever finding a dispute in pristine form because discourse and procedures always reshape the stakes and redefine the parameters of the matter at hand. Indeed, the ditilas present disputes as tidy, firmly resolved cases, and report the cases as tersely worded success stories, offering an unambiguous, if illusionary, idea that the court and its constituents swiftly and successfully ended disputes. This perspective is not likely, as suggested by the following

table showing the extreme lengths of time that could pass between the catalyst of the dispute, and the di (and date of the ditila) itself.

Text/ditila	Date of ditila	Years Cited before Composition of the ditila	Reference to Another, Previous di?
5:3f.	Broken; ŠS date based on judges	Broken: ⌜PN$_1$⌝ dumu PN$_2$ [mu-da-x-ta] ⌜PN$_3$⌝ dumu PN$_4$ [in]-tak$_4$	✓ (possibly, line 8)
10:4	Broken; must be ŠS	20 years between acquisition of property and ditila	
31:4'	Broken	20 years between bequeathal of property and ditila	
34:5	ŠS date based on judges	3 years between start of case and ditila	✓
34:6	ŠS date based on judges	15 years since slave given and ditila	✓
41:10-15	ŠS date based on judges	5 years between enslavement and ditila	✓
46:8	ŠS 3	15 years between sale and ditila	
47	Must be ŠS date, based on judge	At least 2 years between sale and ditila	
48	AS 2	8 years between sale and ditila	
63:6 and 14	broken	unclear	
65:6	ŠS 6	10 years of prehistory	
67:3	IS 1	6 years duration of offense before ditila	
70	Broken	X years, presumably more than a few: u$_3$ a$_2$ geme$_2$ [mu-x-kam] 12 gin$_2$ ku$_3$-[babbar-am$_3$], "and the slave wage of 12 shekels for x years (PN will refund)"	
71:9	AS 5	13-14 years between sale and ditila	✓
88	ŠS 4	10 years between sale and ditila	
102:6	Late ŠS date based on presence of Šu-ili judge	20 years between bequeathal and ditila	
105:8	ŠS 5	20 years between transaction and ditila	
113 case 3: 11-16	Broken	40 years between first di and ditila	✓
116	Broken[6]	2 years for a transaction to be fulfilled	
131	ŠS 6	2 years	
144	AS 3	3 years of interest cited	
192:4'	Broken	20 years	
205 case 1	ŠS 4	36 years between transaction and ditila	✓
271	ŠS date based on judges	10 years	

Table 3.3. References to Time Elapsed and Case Prehistory.

It is interesting to note that some ditilas mention or allude to a previous occasion on which a di was already performed for the matter in question, suggesting either that there was difficulty enforcing a rendered decision and the case had to be redressed, or that one or

more of the disputants was unsatisfied with the outcome of a previous procedure. On the other hand, however, most of the cases listed above do not specifically a previous di in the overview of case prehistory. Because it is unlikely that disputants would idly allow highly charged conflicts or situations of ambiguous consequence to go unaddressed for up to several decades, it must be inferred that other forms of resolution and arbitration were sought before the matter was treated in the provincial capitals and subsequently recorded in a ditila. That is, it is not likely that such prolonged disputing is attributable to cumbersome court machinery or a saturation of provincial court dockets.

More likely, there were many other venues through which disputes could be addressed. Cross-cultural comparisons and theoretical studies of dispute systems indeed show that 1) there are typically a variety of "remedy agents," to use Nader's term (e.g., 1991, see also Metzger and Nader 1963), in a society that address disputes and conflicts as resolution is sought, and that, accordingly, 2) disputes can assume different forms as they escalate and travel through these different venues. Parnell (1988) argued that disputes can spiral upwardly through different political contexts before resolution is achieved, involving an ever increasing number of participants along the way. Davis' (2005) study shows that lawsuits could travel through different, unrelated tiers of legal levels before finding a conclusion, and ample other studies of dispute resolution demonstrate the variety of contexts within single communities and societies, both official or unofficial, in which resolution may be attempted (e.g., Nader and Metzger 1963, Galanter 1981, Comaroff and Roberts 1981:107, Fuller 1994, Barnash 2004, Chase 2005).

As a dispute changes resolution venues, it changes structure and, according to some scholars, it also changes in kind. Roberts' (1983:11-12) oft-cited summary of dispute

studies suggests that, cross-culturally, they generally assume one of three methods for resolution:

1. Bilateral negotiation, a resolution between two disputing parties
2. Mediation, a resolution achieved by way of a third-party's help or advice
3. Formal arbitration or adjudication, in which a binding decision is imposed upon the disputants by an "umpire" (Roberts 1983:11-12)

One and the same dispute may take all three shapes in the course of its life, and the choice of remedy agent and degree of authority exercised by this officiator varies in turn according to social context (Greenhouse 1985). In many contexts, the disputants themselves can choose the context and type of remedy agent that is preferred, save for the case of adjudication, in which the authority of the adjudicator is predicated on a state or legal power that transcends individual preferences.

Because it is difficult to construct a similar, more specific scheme of the native conceptualizations of dispute resolution context for the Ur III society due to lack of documentation, we can provisionally rely on Robert's scheme.[7] The cases documented in the ditilas conform to the arbitration-style type described by Robert's third class of cases. A useful comparison may come from McRee (1994), who argues in his study of records from medieval Norwich England, that disputants could select one of several modes of dispute settlement, choosing either "informal attempts at accommodation between contending groups" or "more formal appeals for the intervention of external authorities" (1994:834). The former approach, essentially private negotiation, automatically introduces problems for the historian because it simply "obviated the need for written records" (ibid.). Nonetheless, McRee demonstrates how the existence of such negotiations can be deduced or extracted from the texts relating to the latter category, because the use of other forms of dispute resolution (e.g., negotiation) "can often be inferred… from a close examination of

the circumstances surrounding a dispute, and it can occasionally be confirmed by direct testimony" (1994:835).

A similar approach is possible with ditilas and there are two reasons to propose that, much like McRee's data, there were multiple contexts in which disputes could be settled and multiple authorities who could address them. It is possible, for example, to identify a trajectory of entities who handled cases before their resolution, and, in most of these instances, it is possible to identify progressive levels as they move toward their final adjudication.

Text(s):	Officials Cited in Case Prehistory:[8]	Final Officials cited in the ditila:
Texts 8, 42	Gudea, aba uru[9] (local official)	Governor
Text 34	Royal Courier (lu_2-kin-gi_4-a)	Judges
Lagaš 205 (case 4)	lu_2 nig_2-dab_5-ba-officials	Judges and governor
Lagaš 120b (two different hazanum), 120a	hazanum of Nagsu (local official)	Judges
Texts 62, 64, 69, 268, 370, 371	Other local officials (e.g., hazanum)	Judges or a governor
Text 71, 257; see 4.3.1.2; Text 205 case 1; 276; see also 278	Former governors of Lagaš	Judges or a new governor
See 4.3.1.3	Former governors of Umma	New governor or other city administrators
Text 113	Royal judges (di-ku_5 lugal)	Ur-Lamma, governor of Lagaš
Text 88	(transaction under the auspices of) Grand Vizier	Judges

Table 3.4. Examples of Officials Cited in Case Prehistory.

Cases could face a variety of urban officials and local headmen before finding resolution. For example, cases originating the Umma subsidiary city of Nagsu were at sometime handled by the local hazanum,[10] "mayor," of Nagsu,[11] especially in a number of texts dating to the reign of Amar-Sin.[12] The fact that he was involved in prior stages of dispute resolution is evidenced by his swearing oaths about pertinent information. In Lagaš text 64, a hazanum swears with the governor ($ensi_2$) and the two are identified as evidentiary witnesses (lu_2 inim-ma-bi-me, line 13′). However, in the ditilas that cite

this hazanum, we find a different final authority in the ditila who subsequently addressed the case.

Because we know little about local dispute resolution mechanisms, such as that of those of local mayors, it is likely useless to conceive of Ur III resolution contexts, or courts, as "formal" or "informal." Moreover, according to our data, many of the disputes or cases that arrived in the "formal," provincial courts were not fully formed disputes, many dealing rather with what appear more as contracts (e.g., marriage agreements) that presumably hope to avoid conflict, or audits of situations that appear to have already been settled. In the previous chapter, it was suggested that each of these types of texts, in spite of the differences in structure and content, nonetheless represents the execution of a di. The question remains to be explored, however, as to whether these tablets represent different phases in the litigation process, for example, 1) preliminary hearing, 2) dispute resolution, 3) audit and enforcement of verdicts. This supposition requires the assumption that all phases of disputing occurred in the same courts, and also is not entirely sensitive to the reality that most disputes did not make it into the written record.[13] It remains clear that dis were apparently performed to address any phase of the dispute.

Of course, for the Ur III period, it is difficult to relocate the trail of disputes because we have only the final textual report, but it is still possible to identify attempts at resolution before the case arrived in the context in which the ditila was composed. Attestations of locally managed cases are difficult to come by in the Ur III period, save for a handful of tablets from the archives of the entrepreneurial shepherd SI.A-a (Garfinkle 2003), the merchant Ur-Dumuzida (see Neumann 2000), and a few ditilas that regard the household and subordinates of a wealthy landholder, Ur-meme (e.g., Lagaš Text 209, see van Driel 2000:18 and Steinkeller 2002:122).[14] However, following the suggesting of McRee to

mine the text for allusions to past attempts at resolution and regard the context of conflict, the following reconstructions of dispute life can be proposed.

3.3.1 From Family to Community

While many disputes were presumably resolved without any third-party involvement or within small groups, others were not successfully resolved in the context at which resolution was first attempted. In part, some of the Ur III disputes documented in ditilas – that is, those that were ultimately presented in the provincial capitals – probably had to travel outside the context of their origin for arbitration because most were ultimately between people of unequal statuses (e.g., slaves and freemen, rich and poor, high-ranking and common) and thus negotiation or mediation of a mutually known associate would be problematic. At the same time, other disputes were between people who, at least by title, were of relatively even status, but of the same family, kin group, or community and this mutual affiliation precluded any member of the local community from neutral intervention. In either case, the structure of social relations of people involved in disputes has direct bearing on the way the dispute will take shape, travel, and be addressed (see Felstiner 1974). Because most of the Ur III disputes either "cross[ed] lines of stratification" (after Roberts 1983:8) or became matters of status definition as they progressed, they reflect this problem by necessarily transcending social arenas, moving from a dyadic to triadic configuration.

For the most part, there were two basic social units in which disputes could originate: the household or the guild, the extended household or community united by profession, two basic units of Ur III society (Steinkeller 2004b, Steinkeller 1987, Westbrook 1995:149) in addition to the palace, temple, or neighborhood. Hypothetically, and as suggested by the records at our disposal, many disputes in Umma and Lagaš began

on the household level between members of the same family. When the disputes were sparked by a transition in the family such as a death as noted above in Table 3.1, disagreements over property, inheritance and divisions of estates, marriages, and ownership and status of family slaves ensued, and, by extension, issues over the right to assume the role as the head and manager of the family became tense. When these cases could not be settled within the family, an outside entity was needed to advise or conclude the matter. When households were large, included a number of slaves, held a variety of socially important associations with people, and valuable immovable property, it would be imperative for a separate, trustworthy authority to handle or oversee the division of the estate. See for example the lengthy estate audits of wealthy households documented in Texts 99, 211, and 213.

Marriage agreements and dissolutions, similarly, started as matters restricted to small groups of family members and, arguably, the first attempt at managing these situations began in the household rather than proceeding immediately to state officials for a sanctioned decision, contra the workings of modern societies. Indeed, most marriage agreements and dissolutions are framed as matters between household heads (see Greengus 1969:525ff. and, for example, Texts 1, 2, 3 and Appendix 2). Many of the marriage dissolutions listed in Appendix 2 were explicitly framed as conflicts between the fathers of the husband and wife. When agreements could be struck and dissolutions were complicated, the families could voluntarily seek outside assistance on the matter.

In short, when the households were unable to resolve the dispute, it could be brought before leaders of the local community or trustworthy figures of relevance. In most instances, a di is resolved by judges, a governor, or the Grand Vizier, but ditilas often mention other officials or groups that handled the case before it arrived in the context

recorded by the ditila. The ditilas do not make clear statements about the efficacy of these groups or why the new court has superceded them, but often it is implied that the previous arbitrators were either unable to make a decision, or one or both of the disputants was unsatisfied the rendered decision and dismissed it, seeking instead another, usually higher-ranking, entity to provide another approach.

In addition to families, various semi-independent groups are attested in the ditilas, including merchants (on which see Steinkeller 2004b:102), coppersmiths (see Neumann 2000 and Text 207), guda-priests (e.g., Text 115, see Lafont and Westbrook 2003:194), and guild- and family-bound groups of high-ranking musicians (e.g., Text 205 cases 4 and 5). When an outside party attempted to complain against a member of one of these groups, members would serve each other's interests and act as witness for their relatives and colleagues. However, when members of these groups were involved in disputes among themselves, the involvement of entities outside their community was needed. In a few cases, communities of people are involved in disputes as collectives. The poorly understood rural community called im-ri-a[15] is cited in one case, Text 201, for example.

3.3.2 From Community to City

If a dispute was unsuccessfully arbitrated in the context of villages or by a community leader, it could then be taken to the provincial capital; presumably, no dispute, upon inception, preceded directly to provincial authorities. In these instances, the disputants either found new arbitrators to hear their statements and make decisions, or, often in the Umma province, they attempted a resolution before the provincial officials along with the local leaders who were previously involved. Consequently, a number of places throughout the core provinces are cited in ditilas as the hometowns of disputants

(Falkenstein 1957:83ff.) and probably the site at which the dispute began (see also Molina *forthcoming*).

Subsidiaries of Umma in Umma ditilas:	A'ebara, Garšana, Idula, Nagsu, NIGzida, Zabalam
Subsidiaries of Girsu in Lagaš ditilas:[16]	Adab (only Text 250), Nina/Niğin[17], Gu'aba, (Du)-Gišaba
Other cited places outside Umma and Lagaš:	ša Nibru^{ki} (e.g., Text 117, Lagaš), ša Uri^{ki} (e.g., Text 355, Umma)

Table 3.5. Towns and Cities Mentioned in the Umma and Lagaš Ditilas.

The construction di til-la dumu GN (literally, "ditila son of GN") is used a handful of times for cities, towns, or peoples not in the provincial capital:

Text(s):	Cited Town:	Year:	Cited Court Officials:
144	Zabalam$_3^{ki}$	AS 3	No officials mentioned
48	A'ebara	AS 2	No officials mentioned at end; governor cited
363	A'ebara	AS 2	Governor and one other official
372	Garšana^{ki}	AS 2	No officials mentioned
360, 373	Garšana-ka	AS 2	1 royal courier
268	Nagsu^{ki}	AS 2	1 maškim, no other officials
331	NIGzida (NIG$_2$-zid$_2$-da^{ki})	AS 2	The judge Lu-amana
362, 286	Idula^{ki}	AS 2	2 officials cited as final witnesses

Table 3.6. Uses of di til-la dumu GN in Umma Dispute Records.[18]

Note that in some of the Umma cases, the governor is cited as having arbitrated the case and rendered a conclusive decision, while in others, no Umma city administrator or elite official is cited, suggesting that the local community's decision to perform a di in the provincial capital could be for reasons other than to make use of the authority of urban administrators.

Additionally, still other texts suggest that a case occurred or originated in a different community with the phrase ša GN, "(this was/concerning) in GN." In these cases, most of which are from Lagaš, the final arbitrators or judges are urban elites of the provincial capital.

Text:	Attested GN:	Year:	Lu-marza present?:	Final Adjudicators:
42 (Lagaš)	$ša_3$ Nina^{ki}	ŠS 4	No	2 judges
50 (Lagaš)	$ša_3$ Nina^{ki}	ŠS 4	No	2 judges
83 (Lagaš)	$ša_3$ G[u_2-ab-ba^{ki}]	Undated	Yes, 2	Governor
93 (Lagaš)	$ša_3$ Nina^{ki}	Missing	No	3 judges
117 (Lagaš)	$ša_3$ Nibru^{ki}	ŠS 1	No	7 judges of the king (see 5.3.2)
374 (Lagaš)	$ša_3$ E-Gibile^{ki}	IS 5	No	1 official; seal of scribe
355 (Umma)	$ša_3$ Uri_5^{ki}-ma-ka	Missing	No	12 listed men, including Umma governor Ur-Lisi

Table 3.7. References to "(This was) in GN."

Interestingly, ten cases from Umma explicitly mention that the case occurred in, or primarily concerned people of, Umma itself. In these cases, a range of officials are cited as having attended the cases, from local leaders to the Umma governor himself.

Text(s):	Year:	Cited Officials:
375:6′	AS 2	Officials listed as lu_2 ki-ba-gub-ba (man who served at the place), Gudea
267	AS 2	A hazanum and other officials listed as lu_2 ki-ba gub-ba (men who served at the place)
281	AS 2	5 listed officials
323	AS 2	3 men, listed as lu_2 ki inim-ma-me
376	AS 2	A governor
349	AS 2	None mentioned
324	AS 2	Dadu, cited as maškim; no other entities
323	AS 2	3 listed officials
289	AS 2	An aba uru and listed lu_2-ki-ba-gub-ba-me
345	AS 2	Officials listed as lu_2-ki-ba-gub-ba-me
343	AS 2	Ur-ku, cited as maškim; no other entities

Table 3.8. References to di til-la dumu Umma^{ki}

3.3.3. Summary: The Landscape of Dispute Resolution in the Ur III State

There are a number of ways that we can interpret the citation of multiple locations and local and provincial officials in the ditilas, but the most commonly expressed understanding of the Ur III "legal system" assumes that the provincial capitals blanketed their respective territories with a common "legal system," and such has been the prevailing position of scholars (e.g., Falkenstein 1956, Maeda 1985, Sigrist 1995, Lafont and

Westbrook 2003). Given that, as some Ur III scholars argue, the core provinces were organized into a hierarchical political configuration (Steinkeller 1987), it arguably follows that local and provincial courts were structurally interrelated in a systematically organized judicial machine, which possibly positioned local courts under the direct jurisdiction of the provincial government. According to this perspective, any and all matters of social discord and breaches of normative practices throughout the province were of interest to and directly addressed by the objectives of the central crown.

The above data, however, seems to defy the idea of a coherent system by indicating that disputants could seek various contexts in which to settle their dispute; in spite of the cumulative character of the texts, the disputes documented in the ditlas are partial, anomalous, and were selected for arbitration by provincial officials only after other contexts were explored. Often, disputes that were handled in the provincial capitals were resolved with local structures intact (as exemplified by the cases in Table 3.7).

With a preliminary sense of the origin and character of disputes in mind, we can proceed to an investigation of the final stages of the life of a dispute, its resolution. An overview of the di procedure itself further clarifies the above points and the character of Ur III disputes.

3.4 The Resolution Procedure

While we lack sources for the conclusion of most Ur III disputes, we can observe the final resolution of some disputes due to the fact that they were subject to the performance of a completed di in the provincial capitals and subsequently recorded in a ditila tablet. The topic of such resolution procedures[19] is a difficult one for early Mesopotamia, given the rigidly standardized nature of the texts, which washes over the

idiosyncrasies and dynamics of unique cases, and given the fact that legal procedures obey a culturally-specific logic that can often appear "permeated with unreason" to an outsider (see Damaska 1997:25). Unsurprisingly, the topic of legal procedures is generally neglected in studies of ancient Mesopotamian law, which instead favor structural reconstructions of systems or their organization (e.g., Bottéro 1982 and 1992, Lafont and Westbrook 2003) or the identification of textual traditions and "laws" (e.g, Finkelstein 1966, Westbrook 1988). Yet, studies of procedures of other ancient societies have shown the usefulness of focusing on how law is actually executed (e.g., Garagin 1986, Watson 1998), and, even if the di performed in the Ur III period hardly involved law, an examination of these studies can yield some insights. As I discussed in Chapter 2, procedure cannot be reconstructed by taking individual tablets at face value and assuming a one-to-one correspondence between the textual narratives and phases of activity.

To summarize, resolution procedures have been understood as occasions when official or unofficial rules and statutes can be enforced (see Watson 1998:91ff.), when social and cultural boundaries can be identified, (re)claimed, or shifted (Garagin 1986:2-6), when authorities can "forestall losers' revenge, or their alienation" (Chase 2005:ix), as well as when conflict can be effectively regulated and managed so as not to expand into social chaos (Watson 1998:91). Procedures may be about the political more than about the execution of "justice," and the logic that dictates their courses may be very context-specific rather than rigidly mandated by a centrally governed design.

It should be emphasized that ancient resolution procedures cannot be described in all cases as trials, since the latter is commonly understood as not only a locale for the above-listed characteristics, but also "a distinctive domain for the production of legal meaning" (Umphrey 1999:394). As the following sections aim to show, the Ur III di was

not a procedure aimed at the production of rules, law, or legal precedent. Rather, in this dispute resolution system, the purpose of finding resolutions and performing the di-process was to establish *facts*, as defined by the social and cultural contexts, and, more often than not, to simply confirm the veracity of one disputant's claim(s) rather than to introduce innovative solutions, sanctions, or penalties.

In spite of the straightforwardness of these goals, the process was not so simply executed. As the next sections aim to show, when a di was conducted in order to resolve a dispute, its preparation and performance was a lengthy endeavor that involved balancing factors of timing, finances, and the assembling of complicated and sometimes elusive forms of proof. Moreover, while it may be an overstatement to characterize these procedures as purely random or *ad hoc*, there was variation (across time and space) in the way the procedure could be executed and resolved. It is only because of the size of the corpus as a whole that we are able to detect any patterns or common characteristics of the resolution procedure in the Ur III ditilas.

3.4.1 Assembling the Parties and Starting the di

I previously proposed that the most central, definitive reason for performing a di was the fact of its public nature, which contributed to the effectiveness and legitimacy of the outcome of the process and established accountability. Persons involved in a dispute deliberately sought out this procedure to settle their problems, and were not usually summoned or coerced into attending court by official warrants. The disputants also seem to have been able to choose their arbitrators and were probably not assigned them. This is perhaps indicated by the phrase, especially common at Lagaš, "PN came before the judges" (PN igi di-ku$_5$ bi-in-ĝar), governor, or Grand Vizier (or their representatives).

Even though it is likely that not all persons cited on a ditila were physically present for the duration of the affair, it is clear that many people were necessarily present for the proceedings, and that a di could stop in its tracks if a central figure was absent; tablets were not considered a sufficient replacement for oral testimonies (see below, 3.4). The emphasis of the procedure on oral declarations and witness statements suggests that the physical presence of most parties was requisite for a successful resolution. See, for two examples, Umma Text 287 (see Chapter 2) and Text 122, which indicate that disputants' cases would not proceed to successful conclusion if the necessary parties were absent. In the first text a disputant swears that he will bring a witness in three days or forfeit the case (and the privilege of partaking in the proceedings), which indeed occurs, and, in the second, a disputant is told that he must appear at an allotted place at the appropriate time.[20]

šeš-kal-la e_2-u_6-e e_2-^{d}šara$_2$-ka mu-lugal gu_2-zi-ga tukum-bi nu-gub-be_2-en_3 mu-lugal-la di til-la he_2-a bi_2-dug_4 (9 names) lu_2 ki-ba gub-ba-me nam-ḫa-ni maškim	Šeškalla *swore* by the king to E'u in the Šara temple: "if you do not stand (at the proceedings) at dawn, the case will be closed," he said. (9 names) were the men who stood at the place. Namhani was the maškim.

This text has been cited as an example of a "summons" to court, but probably this characterization is an overstatement and the text, like Text 287, merely intends to address the fact a procedure requires both parties (and thus their critical oral statements). See also the compilation Text 209, which documents three cases in which parties have returned to court with witnesses after a fixed hiatus of three days to retrieve them.

It must be asked, then, how all the necessary parties (disputants, witnesses, guarantors of past transactions, maškims, scribes, arbitrators, other attending parties such

as “bystanders,” etc.) were assembled, especially given the disparate hometowns of many disputants who appear in the ditilas. The passing of lengthy amounts of time between the spark of a dispute and the execution of its resolution (Table 3.3) could be partially attributable to the difficulties of gathering the necessary parties.

Presumably, the first and foremost task of the disputants was to assemble their witnesses (on whom see 4.2.4), without whom a case could not take place or even be lost (e.g., Lagaš text 62). In most cases from Lagaš and a few from Umma, a maškim was also present for the proceedings. Molina (*forthcoming*) has speculated that the purpose of the maškim was actually to draw up the case for the trial, but, even though it would be reasonable to assume that someone was responsible for arranging cases, there is no direct evidence for this. In some cases, the maškim was appointed for the case by a judge or governor (e.g., see Text 280, left edge, “Urniĝar (was the) maškim of (the man) Aba-Enlilgin”), and the question of how to interpret this is discussed elsewhere (see 2.4.1 and 4.2.1) but it is probable that the person who assumed this function served an observer for judges and governors, viewing the cases in their stead.

The choice of arbitrator likely depended on the case prehistory and the timing of the case according to the availability of the official in question. It is otherwise unclear how a di was scheduled and whether authoritative parties selected and enforced the date or the disputants approached the provincial authorities and started the process in an *ad hoc* manner. There are some references to judges setting deadlines for disputants to produce witnesses and tablets, but these are always after the process has been initiated and court is underway (see below).

In part, a solution to this question hinges upon whether or not most high-ranking adjudicating officials were physically present at the di, or whether their office was merely

invoked in their absence. The collection tablets such as Text 205, which reports that all five cases on the tablet were overseen by the Lagaš governor and Grand Vizier Arad-Nanna, seems to indicate that there were on occasion single allotted days during which the official would hear cases (see Table 4.3). However, it is difficult to establish that Arad-Nanna was physically present and available in Lagaš on many of the occasions of his service to disputants.

Moreover, there are references to "places" (ki) where a di took place, as in the designation lu_2 ki di-da-ka gub-ba-me "(these) were the men who stood at the place of the di" (Text 35, and *MVN* 18 185), suggesting a nucleation of men for the execution of the procedure. This is also clear in Text 34: rev. 6-7 (and see also Text 126:14-16):

ur-saĝ-ub_3^{ki} šeš a-ḫu-ma ki di-da-ka i_3-gub-am_3	Ur-saĝub the brother of Ahuma was present at (or served at) the place of the di.

In addition to gathering various parities at the place where the di was to occur, disputants also had to assemble appropriate evidence, which consisted primarily of witnesses who could give statements, take oaths about past events, and attest to the execution of pertinent oaths taken by a disputant in preparation for trial.

3.4.2 Evidence and Proof

To reiterate, the ultimate goal of a di was to disambiguate competing narratives, to untangle confusing statuses, and to clarify the appropriate status of property and people. Arbitrators and judges required trusted rituals or demonstrations of evidence to make these determinations; as Chase (2005:3) puts it, such rituals "employ in the service of legitimacy" and make both the disputants' statements, and the process as a whole, legitimate.

The idea of an "evidentiary procedure," a series of steps by which facts (as culturally defined) are determined and confirmations of claims established, is not straightforward across time and space. What is meant by "factual evidence" can vary widely even within one society depending on the specific court. Damaska (1997:25), discussing the role of the oath in Medieval European lawsuits, has shown how the rationality of proof is culturally determined and obeys a specific form of logic of its own context. Before discussing the logic of Mesopotamian methods of establishing proof, it is necessary to address two problematic assumptions about Ur III evidentiary procedure that impede analysis.

First, the tendency of scholars to separate Mesopotamian evidentiary forms into a dichotomy of "rational" versus "religious" undermines the equal, real effectiveness of either approach. Recently, Wells (2008) proposed that there are two types of procedures employed in the Near East. "Cultic procedures," on the one hand, is a category including judicial oaths, oracles, and ordeals, closely akin to the "supra-rational procedures" discussed by Frymer-Kensky (1981) and Westbrook (2003) that rely on powers beyond "human logic" to determine fact. "Forensic procedures," on the other hand, are defined as those that involve "ordinary judicial and investigative procedures such as the hearing of witness statements and the examination of physical evidence" (Wells 2008:206), and are similar to the "rational" procedures described by Frymer-Kensky and Westbrook. Wells' (2008:206) terminological shift, he argues, is aimed at disassociating the discussion from the anachronistic notion of rationality, since rituals (such as oaths) could be considered "rational" to their practitioners and were indeed highly effective means of supporting claims for much of Mesopotamian history. Indeed, examination of the uses and methods of executing oaths in Mesopotamia, for example, arguably shows that there is a rational,

logical design to the execution of the procedure and its outcome, even if the logic defies the expectations of the modern, rational thinker.

The problem remains, however, that either dichotomy assumes that cultic or supra-rational evidentiary rituals cannot engage empirical reality, and are thus not "real" or capable of establishing facts on the same legitimate, presumably infallible, basis as forensic or non-religious methods of fact-finding. Yet as Roth (2001) has noted, early Mesopotamian procedures were aimed at findings of "facts," and thus the procedures used in court must have been appropriate for meeting this goal. Indeed, even if the oaths used in Ur III dispute resolution could result in different degrees of success for the oath-taker, they commonly did establish empirically observable facts in many cases – not because of divine intervention or a practitioner's dread of divine retribution,[21] but due, as will be argued below, to the public nature of the oath-taking ritual and the possibility that the one who swore could be held accountable for a false oath and face a ruined reputation.[22] Moreover, on the other hand, forensic methods of establishing evidence could be just as liable to inaccuracy as cultic ones, as is evident in the false witness statements exposed in the cases reported in Text 369 (Umma) and Texts 69, 76, or 84 (Lagaš), while written documents, considered the most infallible type of proof in modern courts, were not trusted in the Ur III courts (see below). Because, as Wells (2008) points out, Mesopotamian legal sources make little ontological distinction between these types of evidence, it is better to approach the data, where possible, with attention to native typologies or hierarchies of evidence that are attested in the sources.

A second foundational assumption about Mesopotamian evidentiary procedure is that procedures were fixed in a manner that could transcend the individual needs of a specific case, or that demands for specific types of evidence were issued consistently from case to case (see a discussion of procedure in Johnson and Veenker *forthcoming*). In other

words, it is assumed that if there are two identical parties engaging in two identical disputes, and if two identical sets of evidence are assembled in each case, then one may expect two identical verdicts. Not only does this idea not apply to the legal texts from either Umma or Lagaš, it is arguably not a reality of any legal system, given that power, politics, context, and other emotional or topical factors can direct the settlement of disputes. While every case has at its disposal oaths, witnesses, and texts, these are not applied in the same way and for the same reasons in every case, and, arguably, they certainly do not produce the same outcomes.

In the evidence from the Ur III ditilas, there is a clear hierarchy of the forms used in the proceedings, or at least a clear pattern of which type of evidence was preferable in most attested situations and according to most of the presiding officials. Most commonly, verbal statements, with or without accompaniment by an oath, were preferred over written documentation. Tablets were mentioned in order to assert the existence of possible witnesses who could testify or swear to the validity of a claim or existence of a transaction. Attested types of evidence used in Ur III dispute resolution were hierarchically organized; the higher forms of forms of evidence had the ability to trump the lower. These included, in order of efficacy:

1. Sworn oral statements by a witness
2. Sworn statements by a disputant or unsworn statements by a witness
3. Unsworn statements by a disputant
4. Written documentation

Not all cases conform precisely to this scheme, and the factor of who officiated the case may have dictated the choice of appropriate evidence and the weight it carried (see 4.4). In some instances at Umma, the purpose of conducting the di was simply to determine which of these performances would suffice for the case to be concluded, and after presenting their

suggestion, the arbitrators sent the disputants away to finish the procedure themselves in another context (e.g., Text 51, 62, 280 , and 286).[23]

The following presents overviews of how these forms were used, noting variations between Umma and Lagaš cases.

3.4.3 Oral Statements

The commencement and execution of a di revolved around public statements whereby participants and disputants issued their respective claims (or sides of the story) and presented supporting evidence. As Table 2.1 indicates, the very initiation of a di hinged on the delivery of public declarations. If witnesses were present, their word would trump the statement of the disputant who had no supporting testimonies. It is likely that debate ensued at the proceedings, given that arbitrators could recommend an oath to parties whose stories conflicted in order to call forth more witnesses (e.g., Text 169). In Umma, a presiding official could evaluate the validity of a claim on the spot; the Umma governors especially held this prerogative.[24] However, in most instances, a contested statement would require the support of an evidentiary oath.

Statements could be rejected on the spot and this is expressed with the Sumerian term gur "to reject" or "to challenge." In the event that a statement was challenged, the rejected disputant often took an oath (nam-erim$_2$) to secure his statement (e.g., Texts 36, 37, 42, 54, 55, 79, 86, 107). Often, this rebuttal oath would help the disputant win his case, but not in every example. In Lagaš, around 20% of all attested witness statements were subject to challenge, but the act was less frequent in Umma sources. See 4.3.2.1.

3.4.4 Oaths

Even though the central and effective role of the oath in early Mesopotamian civil proceedings cannot be questioned, the basis of its power and logic of its use remain difficult matters for the modern scholar to contend with.[25] It must be noted that the use of oaths was not restricted to ditilas and resolution procedure, but was also found in a variety of contexts where it was used as a civil act that could secure social relationships and ease the flow of transactions. Appearing in contracts, sale arrangements, and other kinds of promissory notes, oaths were used for social negotiation in general. It thus became central to dispute procedures even before the Ur III period, attested amply in Old Akkadian texts (see *MAD* 1 135, *OAIC* 7 and 51, and *SR* 85:2, for example).

While diachronic developments of the oath have been studied, along with philological and etymological aspects of oath terminology, the function of oaths in dispute resolution and the social context of their use have been somewhat less considered. Typically, Ur III oath-taking is described as having two types: the promissory oath and the evidentiary oath. Yet, an examination of the contexts of these types of oaths will show that, in spite of the limited terminology for oaths in the Ur III period, their uses and contexts were multiple and they were applicable to various kinds of social interaction in general, not just restricted to court contexts.

3.4.4.1 The Promissory Oath

The Sumerian term mu lugal (pàd) is commonly understood to refer to a promissory oath and its performance involves a single person swearing to fulfill a promise before two or more witnesses. Numerous texts exist from the Ur III period that record a promissory oath and the attending witnesses,[26] but few of these tablets are ever referenced

during the course of a di, in which the testimony of witnesses was preferred.[27] In general, there are two contexts in which the promissory oath was used during the life of a dispute: the inception of a dispute and the conclusion of a di. Because promissory oaths were sworn to establish marriage agreements (Texts 1, 2, 3, or 19), to promise the delivery of slaves (e.g., Texts 48, 49, 51) or property (e.g., Text 131) after a sale or transaction, to agree on prices (e.g., Text 9), or to the conditions of loans (e.g., Text 146), these oaths could be cited in ditilas involving disputes that have erupted over the non-fulfillment of sworn promises. That is, these oaths were apparently not always reliable, and for reasons unknown, were frequently broken. Of the texts of the Lagaš corpus, for example, approximately 70 cases of disputation were sparked because of a person's failure to fulfill the conditions of a promissory oath, resulting in the pursuit of a di.

At the same time, the promissory oath could also be sworn to promise not to commit an offensive act or to renounce future claims (e.g., Text 26). The most frequent use of the promissory oath for this purpose was the oath of "not returning" to court, which was sworn at the end of a di (e.g., Texts 147, 156, 157, 164) and thus played a role in the execution of resolution procedure.

3.4.4.2 The Evidentiary Oath

More frequent are the types of oaths expressed by the construction nam-erim$_2$-(am$_3$) (Lagaš) or nam-erim$_2$ tar (Umma). This type of oath, commonly understood as the evidentiary or assertative oath, was primarily performed by witnesses, though disputants could swear to the veracity of their own statements as well if necessary. Even though this oath was not always decisive in winning cases, as we shall see, scholars have considered the execution of this oath to be the most decisive and expedient act in the

resolution of cases, one that cemented uncontestable victories.[28] Falkenstein (1956:66) considered the "*prozeßentscheidende Eid*" to be the ultimate determiner of the fate of the proceedings, while Wells (2008:207), for example, calls this oath "dispositive," since it "automatically disposed of the case in favor of the oath-taker," and Lafont and Westbrook (2003:194) characterize it as "absolutely decisive."

These perspectives are attributable to the fact that the multiple uses of the nam-erim$_2$ oath in ditilas have not been fully disarticulated apart from Falkenstein's provisional taxonomy (1956:63-72, and see Sallaberger's recent study [2008]); the oath could be used in several contexts for a variety of purposes during the execution of a di. On the one hand, the oath was taken to attest to the transpiring of past events or existence of transactions (e.g., Texts 56, 58, 102, 104, 105), such as a sale, promissory oath, declaration, or other pertinent incident, and in this case someone who "witnessed" an event swore the oath. However, a witness could also take this oath in order to buttress a disputant's statement if the opposing party contested it (e.g., Texts 36, 37, 42, 52, 72, 79, 86, or 107). In the latter case, I suspect that the oath-taking witness was not necessarily swearing to "evidence," but vouching for the reliability of the disputant's contested declaration. In Umma, the oath could be also sworn in the Šara temple after the case was settled, as a sort of separate and final phase of the proceedings (see Sallaberger 2008), in which case the purpose of the oath was not to assert or prove anything, and perhaps solidified and acknowledged the transpiring of the di as a whole. Similarly, a few ditilas, especially from Lagaš, conclude with a report that one or both parties took the nam-erim$_2$ oath at the end of the case (e.g., Texts 126, 127, and possibly 152, 153), but in these examples it is unclear what purpose this oath served or where it fit into the procedure. In short, the nam-erim$_2$ oath could be used in the unfolding of the di to establish claims, but it could also be used as a sort of final ritual to seal the outcome of the case once a decision had been produced.

In the former uses of the oath, it often served as the fulcrum upon which the final decision hinged, yet an examination of the use of this oath as well its consequences demonstrates that taking the oath was not a guaranteed method of winning a case. Numerous factors, including the disposition of the disputants, the nature of the dispute, the approach of the specific officiators of the dispute, and local traditions could determine the weight and necessity of the nam-erim$_2$ oath. These factors and conditions are lost to us as the texts do not report them, but they can be extrapolated from a few ditilas.

For example, a disputant was entitled to decline the court's recommendation to take the oath and refuse it (recall the above-cited Text 99), but this could lead to loss of the case (e.g., Text 70:15′, possibly also Text 113). Yet, just because refusing to swear the oath upon the court's suggestion could lead to a loss, it does not follow that swearing the oath invariably led to a victory. The difficult Lagaš Text 18 poses complications to many assumptions about the dynamics between statements and oaths. The case, a dispute between two widows over the "son-in-law-ship" (nam-mi$_2$-us$_2$-sa)[29] of a young man whom they wish to marry their daughters, involves a series of evidentiary oaths that contradict each other.



Figure 3.1. Organization of Disputants in Text 18.

I outline the stages of the procedure as follows:

Disputant$_2$ claimed L. should be her son-in-law
Witnesses swore that L.'s father (when alive) swore that L. would marry the daughter of Disputant$_1$, and that L.'s mother was present at the swearing
L.'s mother renounced this oath
Disputant$_1$ took an oath (renouncing L.'s mother's renunciation)
Witnesses stated that Disputant$_2$ renounced her claim to L.
Disputant$_2$ rejected this statement
Disputant$_1$ took another oath to the veracity of the statement
Disputant$_1$'s daughter won marriage to L.

Figure 3.2. Outline of Oaths and Procedures of Text 18.

The text does not report the full reasons for the victory of DISPUTANT$_1$, but one may infer that the performance of oaths complicated, rather than facilitated, the resolution of this dispute.

The fact that the decision to use oaths may have been at the behest of the specific judges or arbitrators who saw the cases is clear from cases with similar disputes that do not use identical methods of resolution. For example, Text 289 and Text 48, both presumably from an Umma archival context and both dating to Amar-Sin 2, involve similar disputes in which a person sold a slave, received payment from the buyer, but then failed to deliver the slave to the buyer. Later, the seller presumably denied that the sale occurred and a dispute ensued. In Text 289, the buyer is awarded the slave after swearing the nam-erim$_2$ oath, but in Text 48 the buyer receives the slave solely on the basis of the court's determination. The case in Text 289, which explicitly states that proceedings occurred in Umma, was arbitrated by several attending witnesses including one with the title aba uru, while that of Text 48 does not specify who oversaw it, stating only that it concerned the people of A'ebara.[30]

While it may seem requisite for a dispute resolution to rely on a consistent, predetermined execution of evidentiary procedures such as the nam-erim$_2$ oath if it is to have any degree of success, the procedures used in Ur III Umma and Lagaš varied according to the officiator of the case. In fact, just as with the above two texts, the specific officiators in fact correlate to the frequency of the use of the oath in general. For example, Arad-Nanna, the Grand Vizier and governor of Lagaš after Šu-Sin 1, only used oaths in approximately 10% of his cases,[31] while other entities, such as the Lagaš judges, use the oath more regularly.

3.4.5 Written Documentation

Scholars of various ancient legal systems have shown that complex legal systems do not demand written forms of evidence or widespread legal literacy (Thomas 1992, Whitley 1997). The role of texts in Ur III evidentiary procedure was negligible, as has been previously noted (e.g., Lafont and Westbrook 2003). The relative dearth of references to tablets, including to past ditilas, in the resolution of cases perhaps suggests their relative inefficacy in confirming claims, and certainly suggests that arbitrators in the Ur III period did not regard them as first-hand accounts that carried the same weight as oral statements. As Liebesny (1941:130) once suggested of written documentation in Nuzi court procedure, "proof by document was but a simpler form of proof by witnesses." It is possible to suspect that many disputants simply did not have access to writing and possessed no tablets, but this seems unlikely given the social and economic affiliations of most disputants. Regardless, in the few cases in which tablets are cited, they are usually not the determining, conclusive factors in the outcome of the case.

In general, references to documents in the ditilas may occur for one of two reasons. In the first instance, a disputant could require a tablet in the proceedings if the case involved a dispute over a past contract or transaction, and if the tablet was a product of these events. References to contracts, receipts, or witnessed transactions may thus appear, but the purpose of yielding the document in court was solely to demonstrate the existence and/or availability of witnesses who could testify about the events. For example, in Lagaš Text 45:1-16 (ŠS 4), a receipt that records the sale of the slave Ninmenbaba is mentioned, but it is clear that citation of this tablet is relevant because it bears the names of the witnesses to the sale, who may be summoned for testimony.

di til-[la]	
^{ld}nin-men-^{d}ba-ba$_6$ geme$_2$	Closed case:
nam-egi$_2$-ni-du$_{10}$ [ama]-na	
sam$_2^{am_3}$ til-la-ni 5 giğ$_4$ ku$_3$-babbar-še$_3$	Nin-menbaba, the slave:
AN-sa$_6$-ga dumu ^{d}utu-ki-du$_{10}$-ke$_4$	ANsaga, the son of Utukidu,
in-ši-sa-a	bought from her mother Nameginidu for her full price
ur-^{d}ba-ba$_6$	of 5 shekels of silver.
lugal-amar-ku$_3$	
lu$_2$-inim-ma ša$_3$ dub-ba-ka	Ur-^{d}Baba and Lugal-Amarku are the witnesses in the
dub-bi ki di-ku$_5$-ne-še$_3$	tablet (that documents this sale).
AN-sa$_6$-ga-a mu-de$_6$	
u$_3$ nam-egi$_2$-ni-du$_{10}$-e	ANsaga brought this tablet to the place of the judges
geme$_2$ nu-u$_3$-gi$_4$-gi$_4$-da	and Nameginidu swore by the king that she will not
mu lugal-bi in-pa$_3$	take back the slave.
geme$_2$ AN-sa-ga	
ba-na-ge-en$_6$	The slave was confirmed to ANsaga.

Here the tablet helped ANsaga undermine the attempts of his slave and her mother to nullify their sale, but it is clear that the tablet's relevance was limited to the fact that it could implicate Ur-Baba and Lugal-Amarku, the witnesses to the sale. The same is presumably the reason for the citation of documents in other cases (e.g., Texts 116, 131, 146, case 3 of Text 208, and on Text 99 see Fish 1935 or Wilcke 1998:50-51). Text 137 (Umma) treats a situation in which the absence of a corroborative tablet affects the outcome of the case, but the case is left somewhat ambiguously and Falkenstein declared it potentially "unsolved" (1957:231).

The only aberrance to this pattern appears in the third case of the collection tablet 205: col. ii 11ff. from Lagaš, in which a slave's assertion of freedom is confirmed on the basis of a tablet presented by the slave to the Grand Vizier.

dumu mumus e_2-ur_2-bi $arad_2$ lu_2-gu-la-ka-ra	
i_3-bi_2-la lu_2-gu-la-ke_4-ne	The heirs of Lu-Gula have raised a claim about the
inim in-ni-$^{\tilde{g}a_2}$ĝar^{ar}-eš	daughter of E'urbi, the slave of Lu-Gula.
lu_2-gu-la ti-la-a	
igi-ni in-$^{\tilde{g}a_2}$ĝar^{ar}	When Lu-Gula was alive, he appeared and swore by
mu-lugal	the king that, 'the daughter of E'urbi, my slave, I set
dumu-munus e_2-ur_2-bi $arad_2$-[ga_2-ka]	free.' Nin-duga, the sister of E'urbi, brought the tablet
ama-ar-gi_4-[bi i_3-ĝar]	of Lu-Gula to the Grand Vizier.
[bi_2-in-du_{11}-ga]	
dub lu_2-[gu-la-bi]	The heirs of Lu-Gula abandoned their claim against
nin-du_{11}-ga ⌜dumu⌝ [e_2-ur_2]-bi $arad_2$-da-[ke_4]	the child(ren) of E'urbi [literally, the child(ren) of
igi sukkal-maḫ-$še_3$ mu-de_6	E'urbi are dropped by the heirs of Lu-Gula?].
dumu e_2-ur_2-bi-ke_4-ne	
ki i_3-bi_2-la lu_2-gu-la-ke_4-ne-ta	Ur-Lamma, the son of Lumu, was the maškim."
tug_2 ib_2-ur_3	
ur-^{d}lamma dumu lu_2-mu maškim	

This text is often cited as example of the prevalence of tablets in Ur III evidentiary procedure (e.g., Wilcke 2007), but the victory resulting from the reference to a tablet is idiosyncratic rather than typical. Presumably, the tablet was permitted as testimony because the promissory oath it documented – declaring the slaves free – was issued by a person who was deceased.

The second reason for tablets to appear in the ditilas occurred when a disputant claimed the existence of a relevant document once the di was underway, but did not possesses it in hand. In such situations, the opposing party and officiators invariably made the party swear a promissory oath to return with the tablet in a fixed number of days (usually three but not always), lest he or she permanently forfeit the case. For example, in Lagaš Text 109 a party is given seven days to arrive with the tablet documenting the sale of an orchard.

While there are other cases where a similar extension is granted (e.g., Text 116 and Sigrist 1995: no. 1), there is no extant record of a disputant successfully returning with the tablet and consequently winning the case – at least as far as the details in these cases allow us to know. This begs the question of whether the extension of proceedings, and the oath promising to forfeit the claim upon failure to produce the tablet, may in fact have been the arbitrators' tactical maneuver aimed at calling a disputant's bluff. Indeed, in all cases in which a stock extension is granted to allow a disputant to provide substantiation for his or her claim, this party fails to accomplish the goal and loses the case.

Taking this small sample of cases into account, the sole purpose of citing tablets in Ur III resolution procedures seems to implicate witnesses. It is not clear why the officiators determined that witnesses need only to mentioned rather than summoned, but the possibility of their testimony could suffice.

3.4.6 Tactics and Resolution Strategies

In addition to calling bluffs over alleged tablets, judges or adjudicators had a full kit of tactics to which they could subject the disputants if it helped expedite resolution by making swift determinations about their claims. Most commonly used was the offer of an extension of time, not only for tablets, but also for any item that a disputant failed to produce when it was directly implicated in the procedure. See, for example, Text 131, in which disputant is requested to produce a chair over which a dispute has erupted. Typically, or at least according to the available texts, this method could effectively expose fraudulent or supportable claims, bringing the proceedings to a swift conclusion (see also Text 169, 259, and 287).

3.4.7 The Resolution

As argued above, not every di was performed to resolve a dispute, and, in Umma, many disputes are addressed only in part by determining what courses of action disputants should take on their own; when considering the resolution of cases in the Ur III period, it is important to differentiate between the conclusion of a di and the settling of a dispute. The two events may overlap on many occasions, but in other cases they may not. The examples in which the above-described methods allowed officiating judges or arbitrators to make a decision that settled a dispute, thus completing the di as well, and several factors characterize the achieved resolution. Firstly, it was unambiguously one-sided, not a mutually agreeable harmonization of both disputants' demands. Secondly, as mentioned above, penalties and punishments were absent; where one party has caused a financial setback to the other by way of a breach of interest, the officiators recommended payments to equal the resulting damages but nothing more. Thirdly, it follows that, in the cases where the explicit intent of the di was to settle a dispute, officiators merely made confirmations of claims (expressed by the verb gi(n), "to confirm") exactly as they were presented by the disputants and did not impose new ideas, solutions, sanctions, or social reconfigurations upon the involved parties. That is, the officiating entities may have determined the resolution procedure and dictated what should be demonstrated and how, but they did not invent the outcome that they would come to confirm. Often, the texts make this clear with the expression "it was confirmed before PN (the official)."

When any di was concluded, whether or not a dispute resolution was the goal, both Umma and Girsu texts signal the conclusion with the term di-til-la ("completed di"), which appears as a heading in the Lagaš tablets and a subscript in Umma tablets, the latter type of which may also culminate with the phrase di-bi ba-til "this di is closed" (e.g.,

Text 281) or di-bi til-am$_3$ (e.g., Text 345). In spite of the superficial similarity, however, the final appearance of a di in each province is different.

Most Lagaš cases were decisively concluded with a confirmation of status (signaled by gin) and these cases involved the full settlement of disputes. At Umma, on the other hand, not every di ended with a confirmation of status and a settlement, and, in the few cases that do, it was only the governor who officiated. Otherwise, the term gin itself is rarely used to *conclude* cases at Umma; indeed, many Umma cases have no fixed conclusion at all, and some cases are expressly suspended or terminated before any settlement is rendered. During the reign of Amar-Suen (to which most Umma ditilas date), 20% of cases do not involve a dispute settlement. In these instances, the officiators simply advise the disputants about an appropriate procedure for resolving the case, either sending them away to perform these rituals elsewhere or providing stipulations for a possible resumption of proceedings.[32]

Scholars have called these kinds of cases "unsolved" and classified them under the Sumerian di nu-til-la ("unfinished di") (Falkenstein 1956:16, Sigrist 1995). But this term is inappropriately applied to the Ur III context (see 2.6). To reiterate, the expression is nowhere used in the corpus of Sumerian ditilas or the larger body of legal documents; moreover, many of the cases that have been dubbed "unsolved" do in fact end with lines reading, for example, di-bi til-am$_3$, "this case is closed" (see Umma Text 144, for example), even if they do not wrap up with a final oath, or the term gin, as do most cases at Girsu. The question of the nature of authority in Umma versus that in Lagaš is the subject of the subsequent chapter, but suffice it to say here that Umma and Lagaš officials clearly had different objectives and obligations when presiding over cases, and while Lagaš

officiators concerned themselves with the full settling of cases, Umma arbitrators advised on how to settle disputes, but kept local structures and local arenas of settlement intact.

Even though it was primarily the job of the disputants to resolve a case and confirm their own claims, the outcome of a dispute, upon completion, became the order of the officiator, and could later be referred to as his "command" (inim).

3.4.8 Compensation and Damages

A number of records from Umma and Lagaš concluded that the dispute would be resolved if the property in question was simply replaced, and this is expressed in the texts with a declaration that one party will repay the other for damages or costs accrued. This is indicated by the construction su-su-dam, "to repay" (after Ouyang 2009:39) or "replace," which Falkenstein rendered rug_7-rug_7-dam. Items replaced include grain (e.g., Texts 208 case 5), animals (e.g., Text 128, 324), silver (e.g., Texts 67 or 205 case 4), or slaves (Text 190). It is often impossible to know if the replacement indeed took place and how it was enforced. In one text, (Text 143), it appears that party felt entitled to a repayment after damage was inflicted to his house, but his opponent refuses to make the replacement and argues against this claim of obligation.

3.4.9 Returning to Court

Just because a di was performed to help settle a dispute does not mean a dispute would stay fixed forever. Both Lagaš and Umma have yielded examples of cases that resurface repeatedly in court. According to some ditilas (see Table 3.3 above), the dispute could continue to fester and perhaps reappear before arbitrators for another procedure. So concerned was the court with the possibility of facing a return of disputants that a number

of methods existed which could be undertaken to avoid new rounds of procedures, and this is the one aspect in which the courts attempted to impose requests upon the disputants.

Expression:	Examples:
mu-lugal oath + gi_4 (public promise not to return)	147:2′, 156:2′. 157:6′, 164:3′
mu-lugal oath + kur_2 (public promise not to alter a statement or agreement)	99:45-46 (see also Texts 41, 76, 351 and see *ZA* 53 56 5).
tug_2-ur_3 + mu lugal oath (public forfeit of any future claims)	73, 78, 169, 258

Table 3.9. Expressions of Not Returning to Court.

3.5 Conclusions.

The preceding discussion aimed to show how disputes and dis started and finished in the Ur III period, even if the evidence resists producing a map for settling a dispute or executing a di, and though it still remains difficult to propose the existence of a single, coherent set of patterns that encapsulates all cases from the whole period and from all provinces. It is nonetheless clear that the ditila-records provide us with a very limited window into the workings of Ur III dispute resolution, the bulk of which was conducted in venues outside the scope of textual records and without the need for provincial officials or the conducting of a di.

In part, the reason for the great differentiation among cases, disputes, and decisions must be related to the composition, structure, and power of the court – and shifts thereof over time and across the Ur III state – a topic that may now be taken up.

CHAPTER 4

THE COURT AND ITS ENTITIES: THE DYNAMICS AND COMPOSITION OF AUTHORITY IN THE UR III COURTS

4.1 Introduction

Now that we have a provisional understanding of how disputes were handled in the Umma and Lagaš provinces, it is possible to investigate the nature of the entities that presided over resolution processes, investigating the extent and limitations of the authority upon which this power was predicated. That is, given that disputes involve the casting of property, entitlements, or people into intermediate, contested statuses, we may ask who in provincial societies determined their trajectories and on what authority such determinations were made. Central to this inquiry is the question of whether court entities acted as coercive agents of state and provincial institutions, or whether they were ephemerally assembled groups of mediators who were consulted to observe and assist the resolution of disputes for their colleagues and subordinates by virtue of their professional titles, social standing, and, perhaps, respectability.

After briefly discussing the uses and limitations of the idea of an Ur III "court," this chapter aims to show that at least a few common factors characterize the provincial courts of the Ur III period. On the one hand, the size, nature, and composition of courts varied according to province and the Umma and Lagaš courts were different in size and make-up throughout the period. On the other hand, within each province, the nature of court entities

changed during the latter half of the Ur III period.[1] While the earliest known ditilas (Š 32 – AS 3) report disputes that were overseen by a single office, that of the governor, cases gradually became the business of larger groups of officials, and it is now possible to substantiate the supposition that authority in the provincial courts was transformed from being vested in a single person or office to being shared among collegia of high-ranking men from throughout the provincial and state administration (see Westbrook 2005 and Molina *forthcoming*).[2] As Molina (ibid.) has already pointed out, noticeable changes in court composition do not demonstrably correspond to the reigns of the Ur III kings, yet may loosely correlate with turnover in the office of provincial governor (ensi$_2$) in each province, though most observable in the Umma corpus. Shifts and transformations in the court composition are indeed attributable to forces on the local level, rather than a result of centrally mandated regulations by the Ur III crown, but it will be suggested here that currents emanating from political developments in the royal capital did ripple through the provinces and directly affect dispute resolution.

Finally, it can be shown that, regardless of the degree of power held by governors or collegia, the concluding decisions of provincial cases were not unbreakable and could be challenged upon a later occasion. There is no extant ditila that reports a punishment or penalty was imposed upon a losing disputant as a result of his or her ignoring, challenging,

[1] Or possibly throughout the entire period; the lack of documentation before Šulgi 32 makes this impossible to know.

[2] The cooperation of a mixture of local and state officials in arbitrating cases can be noted for other periods of Mesopotamian history, see Westbrook 2003:367ff. on the Old Babylonian period or Oelsner 2003:918 on Neo-Babylonian records. Yet, it should be noted that the concept of the urban "assembly" is absent in the Ur III sources of Umma and Lagaš, and, while an assemblage of officials did see cases in the provincial capitals, these groups were inconsistently structured from case to case, as the following discussion argues, suggesting that there was not a fixed entity that warrants the designation "assembly" as the term may be used for other periods (e.g., for the Old Assyrian socio-legal framework, see Hertel 2008:144f. or for the Old Babylonian period, see Seri 2003, 2005). The *puhrum* assembly is attested at Nippur in model court cases, but these are "qualified as literary on a number of grounds" (Hallo 2002:141).

or breaking the decision of the court, and a disputant who refused to play by the rules of the court would simply forfeit the claim of entitlement rather than face correctional measures.

In other words, the power of Ur III court officials was not absolute and was not based on the impartation of a sovereign endowment. Rather, the authority of Ur III court entities was predicated on and inextricable from each official's location in the provincial political and social networks, his relationships vis-à-vis other high-ranking members of various communities, his capacity as an official, elite member of provincial society, and often his membership in one of the large ruling families of the provinces. It was a combination of these undifferentiated personal and public factors that granted officials the privilege of hearing cases, a situation that accords well with the position of an ever-growing number of scholars that Ur III officials had multiple, often fluctuating affiliations and a plurality of offices, spanning both urban and rural society, and that it was their capacity as officials that entitled them to seek profit and maximize their standing (e.g., van Driel 2000, Steinkeller 2004b:103).

4.2 Mesopotamian Courts: Context and Terminology

Defining the role and organization of courts in complex literate societies is a complicated endeavor, most immediately made difficult by the simultaneously generic and loaded quality of the term "court." On the one hand, this term may refer simply to the setting in which dispute resolution is accomplished, but it may on the other hand refer to the body of authoritative persons who, by way of some entitlement, settle disputes and thereby engage issues of law, societal order, and social control (see Dombradi 1996). While the first characterization ignores the specifics of individual contexts, the second is perhaps inapplicable to the dispute resolutions systems of many ancient societies, which did not have a reified notion of law organized into a coherent, comprehensive system that consisted

of legal professionals whose job it was to engage this law. Accordingly, one must ask whether the term has any applicability to the Ur III context, given that no native word for "court" is known, and, as Westbrook (1995:28) has noted, "parties speak of going before a particular official or administrative body, or simply before 'the judges,'" but not before a fixed, institutionally-affiliated body (see also S. Lafont 2008:76). Moreover, even within Mesopotamian civilization, differences in what may be called "courts" are noticeable across time and space[3] even if central factors (judges, the rendering of decisions, the use of oaths) remain constant.[4]

Equally problematic is accurately pinpointing the nature of a court's authority. Often, ancient courts are reductively defined as sturdy, if cumbersome, institutional machines that, by way of a statutory endowment from the gods or crown, could enforce rules, prescribe courses of behavior, and punish deviations (e.g., Henry Maine and his scholarly descendents). Early Mesopotamian courts have been frequently described in such terms, and scholars have attributed "full coercive power" to them (e.g., Westbrook 1994:20). The Ur III courts, as has been argued throughout, did not assume a correctional or disciplinary role, however, and it is not demonstrable that they were well-demarcated institutions in their own right. These courts also had no legislative capacity and cases did not establish precedent for future cases of similar nature (on which issue see Roth 2000 and Landsberger 1939); the courts were therefore not involved in the reification of principles and production of laws. Thus, if these courts had coercive abilities and the power to prescribe courses of social behavior, such was possibly due to the public setting and open nature of the di, which hypothetically could impose pressures to resolve disputes and accept settlements rather than perpetuate discord within the community.

[3] Compare the courts and court entities discussed in Wilcke 2007:35f. (Old Akkadian Period), Liebnesny 1941 (Nuzi), Fortner 1997 (Old Babylonian Period), or Westbrook 2003b and Hertel 2008 (Old Assyrian Period).
[4] At least, superficially. See, for example, Wells' (2008) discussion of the changing uses and executions of oaths, ordeals, and oracles, or see Westbrook 2003.

Courts may also be defined, by contrast, as neutral but authoritative mediators that exist to help conflict resolution (see Greenhouse 1985 or Hertel 2007:45 for a summary of "mediation"). This may seem a better description of the cases reported in ditilas, since it describes the particular configuration of disputants and officiator found in many cases whereby two disputants engaged in a di under the auspices of a powerful, high-ranking authority whose job it was to oversee that one side of the story was established as correct (symbolized by this entity's declaration of a confirmation with the verb gin). But the idea of the court as a mediator is only superficially applicable, since this configuration could also be characterized as *supervised negotiation* rather than mediation, and since it is the disputants who establish the final outcome and render it satisfactory for the court, rather than the officiators. The courts-as-mediators characterization also falls short of the Ur III data since other cases seem rather to have involved an arbitrator, who "derive[d] his authority to decide the dispute from the invitation of the disputants themselves, who have voluntarily submitted to his decision" (Roberts 1983:12).[5] In addition to these idiosyncrasies, it is also demonstrable that the courts were not entirely "neutral" in their decision-making, a consequence of the tightly knit nature of groups who were involved in the cases from either province.

Engel (1990) has described other dangers with employing the term and concept of "court" in studies of conflict resolution systems, first noting the propensity of the concept to ignore changes in time and place. The emphasis on court structure and the terminology of its participants, rather than its dynamics, can "simplify the conceived relationship between individuals and court by exaggerating the predominance of official law in what is actually a complex tangle of overlapping and competing systems…" (Engel 1990:335),

[5] Different definitions for mediation and arbitration exist, further complicating the matter. See Felstiner 1974. Dombradi (2007) has posed similar questions on the differences of types of cases to the Old Babylonian legal data ("mediation oder res judicata?"). See also Dombradi 1996.

which can change according to time and space. Moreover, the use of such terminology can overshadow concepts and terms meaningful to the disputants and court participants themselves, consequently placing an undue and misleading emphasis on the end of the court:

> "Thus we know what the court considers a 'case' to be, but what definitions might the disputants themselves apply to this term? And how would such definitions compare to the official definitions? Similarly, how might local people define their "community" and its boundaries? And how might such definitions compare to the official jural community within which the court exercises its authority?" (Engel 1990:335).

These matters are difficult to address because of both the limitations of the Ur III ditilas and their cursory, abbreviated reporting style and the context of their production by the hands of elite scribes who were presumably members of the urban administration. However, Engel reminds of the danger in importing a hegemonic concept of "court" without attention to the native context and actual dynamics of power acting within this context.

In spite of these problems, dispensing with the term "court" leaves us with no means to refer to the specific phenomena of settling cases reported in the ditilas, or to the specific groups of people who stood on hand to undertake a di and render resolutions. It is thus essential to utilize the term with attention to the details of the context and with acknowledgement of each of the various layers of participants and their respective backgrounds. Fortunately, studies in the structure and organization of power in the Ur III provinces offer much to the topic,[6] even if many of the offices and persons attested in ditilas remain difficult or impossible to contextualize. Prosopographical study allows nonetheless the identification of some court entities and disputants, and can allow the identification of affiliations and relationships, at least on the professional level, of certain court entities. There are two ways in which officials may be identified. First, their names may be listed at the end of the ditila document as part of a roster of attending court entities

[6] For an overview and recent citations, see Chapter 1.

(the *Unterschrift*). Second, given that many cases were not resolved after the first appearance in court and that ditilas often cite the person(s) who previously officiated a case, we may also find references to court entities embedded in the text's report about the case's prehistory.

With the above discussion in mind, I provisionally use "court" as a short-hand to refer to the array of constituents involved with conducting a di-procedure, that is, the ever-changing body of local and elite provincial persons or officials – both affiliated with the government or not and including the disputants themselves – assembled for a di, the resolving of a dispute, or the overseeing and attending of proceedings designed to address potentially and particularly contentious social transitions or precarious economic transactions. The functions performed by these persons included judge, maškim, witness, or the functions of lu_2 mar-za or lu_2 ki-ba gub-ba. It is likely that the highest-ranking persons to fill these roles, for example the Vizier or governors, did not physically attend cases but provided one or more representatives from their office to attend in their stead; this explains the prevalence of the maškim in Lagaš cases, where such entities were linked to specific governors and judges. During the reign of Šulgi and early years of Amar-Sin, the persons who comprised these courts were almost exclusively from the office of the provincial governor, representing the governor and his authority as provincial ruler. However, over the course of Amar-Sin's reign and up to the end of our documentation, the courts transformed somewhat and increasingly included high-ranking officials from a variety of local and urban professions. These officials assumed a variety of ephemeral, context-specific functions for the proceedings, ranging from "judge" to various kinds of attending witnesses, and an official could circulate through these various functions rather than permanently entrench himself in one position. Thus, according to the ditilas, not all of the officials who comprised this court were mediators or arbitrators, and some assumed

other, functions whose purpose remains unclear. Finally, as in many pre-modern and ancient societies, the participants of the court derived their power and authority from the offices and occupations they already held, which had nothing to do with professional legal or court structure, and from their outstanding relationships in the community.

Finally, according to the ditilas, disputants and court officials came from the same limited pool and were members of the same provincial aristocratic communities. The same elites appear in ditilas as disputants and court entities.

4.3 The Composition of Ur III Provincial "Courts"

It follows, then, that the Ur III courts were not affixed to any one institution or "judicial" body. Nonetheless, it is possible to detect patterns in resolution practices or methods for solving cases, possibly implying that the dynamics of these groups were complicated and, potentially, unwieldy. The following overview addresses the different types of entities according to title and social location with attention to diachronic trends.

4.3.1 The Office of the Governor (ensi$_2$)

Even though regional differences in administrative structure are perceptible within the Ur III state (see now Sharlach 2004, Allred 2006, Dahl 2007) and the political histories of Umma and Lagaš may have been very different, these core provinces of the Ur III state shared some administrative offices in common, including that of the governor, the ruler of the province.[7] With the exception of the complicated Umma ruling family (Dahl 2007), Ur III provincial governors often originated from the local provincial population and were "directly subordinate" (Steinkeller 1987:24) to the Grand Vizier (sukkal-mah) and the

[7] On the Ur III governors in general, see Hallo 1953, Frayne 1997:195, 275, 345, 379 and Sallaberger 1999:191ff. "Offices" here refers specifically to the governor's office itself and its staff, as opposed to the economic "offices" or bureaus outlined by Steinkeller (2003, Sharlach 2004:24), which make up the economic units of the provincial center, overseen and directed by the governor.

king. Parallel to and independent from the governor was the office of šagina, a military title often translated as "general" (Steinkeller 1987, Sallaberger 1999:194). The occupier of this office typically came from outside the provincial community, and many scholars suggest a connection to the royal family (Steinkeller 1987, Dahl 2007). The precise difference between the two positions is still debated, but it is clear that they were paired as some sort of check-and-balance approach to provincial management, the general overseeing the military and royal dependents, and the governors controlling "all the temple households and their employees, both in the capital and in the provincial towns and villages" (Steinkeller 1987:25). It is thus not surprising that governors appear frequently in ditila records while generals do not,[8] as the former would naturally be more involved in the civil affairs of provincial citizens while the latter attended to affairs of the military. In one text from Umma (Text 212) the two offices appear together as equals, but it is probable that this case involves a public negotiation between the two offices about their authority over a group of laborers.

The governor has been described as the "highest judicial authority for his city" (e.g., Edzard 1967:147), and the relatively high volume of cases overseen by a governor's office superficially validate this claim. At Umma, roughly half of all cases mention the presence of the governor's office at proceedings, while nearly a fourth of Lagaš cases reference the same. These figures are, of course, determined by the state of the data set currently available. In the context of court proceedings, this office included sons and relatives of the governor and a subordinate who functioned as maškim, though the latter was not necessarily required in all instances. Occasionally, the governor's son could serve on his own (e.g., Text 265, IS 1, Lagaš). Because of the preponderance of seals dedicated

[8] With a handful of exceptions. "Gudea son of the šagina" appears as a member of the court (lu_2 mar-za) in Lagaš Texts 89 and 199, and as a maškim in Lagaš Text 112, and this is presumably the same Gudea who is elsewhere called abba-iri. See also Lagaš Text 156. The šagina himself appears among court entities in Text 288.

to a single governor and their simultaneous use, we may assume that a variety of people used the seals; the governor himself was not necessarily present at the case even if his name is singularly invoked on the ditila.[9]

The frequency of such citations and the preeminence that governors exerted over cases, coupled with the fact that most of their cases were reported as concretely concluded disputes in the ditilas, may lead to the supposition that the governor's entourage was not only the highest-ranking component of this dispute resolution system, but also the most effective, expedient, and systematic. An overview of specific governors and comparison of their function in either province, however, shows that their power had restrictions in the context of dispute resolution, the office having relinquished its monopoly as the provincial authority on settling cases and gradually becoming one of many offices to comprise the court. Further, other elite entities may have been more effective agents of dispute resolution than the office of the governors.

4.3.1.1 The Governors' Office at Lagaš

Due to the current state of the data and degree to which the Lagaš provincial archives have been recovered, the governors of Lagaš[10] are not as well known as those of the Umma province, but can be provisionally outlined as follows with rough dates of their textual attestations provided:

[9] For example, Dahl (2003:158, and see note 402) counts at least 40 seals dedicated to the Umma governor Ur-Lisi. See also citations in Maekawa 1996:127. No doubt the high number is the result of the well-recovered state of the Umma archives.

[10] In actuality, the title of this position was usually rendered "governor of Girsu" outside of the local context (see Sallaberger 1999:192, Michalowski *forthcoming*), but I henceforth anachronistically employ Lagaš according to scholarly convention (e.g., see explanations in Sharlach 2004:62 or Allred 2006:106 note 173).

Governor:	Attested Years of Reign:	Attestation in ditilas:
Lu-kirizal	Šulgi 28-32[11] (5 years)	Šu-Sin 4
Ur-Lamma	Šulgi 33[12] – Amar-Sin 3 (19 years)	Šulgi – Amar-Sin 1
Alla/Alalu[13]	Šulgi 38-40 (~2 years)	Amar-Sin 1, 5
Nanna-zišagal	Amar-Sin 4 (~ 1 year)	Šu-Sin 1?
Šarakam	Amar-Sin 4 – Amar-Sin 7 (3-4 years)	Amar-Sin 5, 6[14], Šu-Sin references
Arad-Nanna, sukkal mah	Amar-Sin 7[15] -- Ibbi-Sin 4[16] (6-7 years or more)	Šu-Sin 1 – Ibbi-Sin 2

Table 4.1. Governors of Lagaš.

By far, the governors Ur-Lamma and Arad-Nanna received the highest volume of citation in the ditilas, both as overseers of cases and in citations of past cases, in the event that a past case they oversaw later went before another entity. References to Lu-kirizal are very few,[17] and little is known about his tenure as governor of Lagaš, but it is clear that he oversaw court cases because of references to him in ditilas dating to later governorships. Texts 13:6, 193:23ĭ and 205:6, all of which certainly date to the time of Šu-Sin over 30 years after Lu-kirizal's governorship,[18] mention him (with his maškim) as having overseen previous matters associated with the disputes presently addressed by new authorities in the Šu-Sin ditila at hand.

[11] According to Sharlach 2004:62.
[12] Or 38, according to Maekawa (1996:121).
[13] Between Šulgi 38-40, the man Alla/Alalu is ited as governor of Girsu in texts, but it is unclear to me if he was a replacement to Ur-Lamma. See Texts 43, 71:44, or 113 for citations in ditilas.
[14] According to the file tag (pisan dub-ba) Text 256.
[15] According to Michalowski (*forthcoming*).
[16] The decline and eventual lack of documentation from Ibbi-Sin's reign makes it difficult to determine the precise date of termination for Arad-Nanna's tenure as governor of Lagaš.
[17] To my knowledge, only the badly broken Text 261 contains a ditila of Lu-kirizal, see rev. 8′-9′: di-til-la lu_2-$kiri_3$-zal he_2-sa_6 maškim (no other officials are cited).
[18] Text 205 dates to Šu-Sin 4; Text 193 is broken, but the references to the judges Lu-Šara, Lu-Ibgal, and possibly Ur-Ištaran, as well as a short list of lu_2-mar-za men, securely date the text to the time of Šu-Sin and preclude previous dates. Text 13 may also be securely dated to Šu-Sin based on the same judges. See also Text 77, which is more difficult to date.

Far more cases are available from the tenure of Ur-Lamma, whose cases typically concluded with a concrete, unambiguous confirmation of a disputant's claim, often represented by the verb gin ("to confirm"), and usually after the performance of nam-erim$_2$ oaths, the most commonly attested method of concluding a di by Ur-Lamma's office. In other words, Ur-Lamma's office did not limit its involvement in disputes to mere suggestions about evidentiary procedure as other court officials did, preferring rather to resolve disputes by allowing disputants to demonstrate their cases before him. In one instance (Text 113), the office entertains a case that was hitherto overseen by men called the king's judges (di-ku$_5$ lugal), evidently exercising the authority to overturn their orders (inim).[19]

Text:	Date:	Involved in Case Prehistory?:	Oaths:	Case closed:[20]	Other Court Entities:	Maškim:
12	Š 32	No	No	Yes	Ḫabazizi wrote the tablet	Lu-igimaše dumu Lu-Ningirsu
208	Š 37	No	5/7 cases have an oath	Yes	None	Ka, [missing], Lugal-irida, Ka, Urgu, Lugal-irida
4	Š 39	Unclear	Broken	Broken	Broken	Broken
200	Š 44	No	nam-érim	Yes	None	Ur-Baba šeš Urmes, Lu-Nanše dumu Egu, missing
142	Š 45	No	No	Yes	Broken	Broken
254	S 45.8	No	nam-érim	Yes	None	Baaga dumu Lu-Nanše, Atu dumu Malahgal, Ur-nigar
255	Š 47	No	nam-érim	Yes	None	[x]-ba-uru, Nigmu, [x x], Ur-Lamma himself
22	Š 47	No	nam-érim	Yes	None	Ur-Baba
184	Š 47	No	1 of 2 cases	Yes	None	Ur-nigar, Ur-Baba
20	Š 48	No	nam-érim	Yes	None	Ur-nigar
135	AS 1	No	No	Yes	None	Lu-igimaše, gala
166	AS 1	No	1 of 2 cases	Yes	None	Atu dumu Lugal-du'ure, Unila
177a,b	AS 1	No	A, not b	Yes	None	Lu-Ningirsu, Nimu
43	AS 1.4	No	nam-érim	Yes	None	Atu dumu Ur-dumuzi

[19] 113:30-1 mu inim di-ku$_5$ lugal-ka ur-^{d}lama-ke$_4$ i$_3$-kur$_2$-ra-Ce$_3$ "Because Ur-Lamma changed the command of the king's judges…"
[20] Indicated by the use of the verb gi(n) or tug$_2$--ur$_3$.

207	AS 1	No	1 of 5 cases	Yes	None	Ur-tur, Ur-nigar, Ur-nigar, Ur-[X], Ur-Baba
182	AS 2	No	1 of 2 cases	Yes	None	Ur-Baba, Ur-guza
278	AS 3	Yes	N/a	Yes	None	Ur-Enki guzala
205 case 1	ŠS 5	Yes	N/a	Unclear	Arad-Nanna	Ur-Baba dumu Lu-Lala
83	no date	Yes	N/a	Yes	Arad-Nanna	Unclear
104	broken		mu-lugal	gin?		missing
112	no date	Yes	N/a	gin	Arad-Nanna	Gudea aba uru dumu šagina
128	broken	No	No	Yes	None	Kala
139	broken	No	No	Yes	None	Ur-[missing]
150	broken	Yes	n/a	Yes	4 judges	missing
152	broken	Broken	nam-érim	Yes	None	Ur-turtur
159	broken	No	No	Yes	None	missing
187	broken	No?	nam-érim	Yes	None	Atu dumu Lugal-du'urre, Ur-nigar
196	missing	No	nam-érim	Yes	None	Ur-mama, Ur-mama, Atu dumu Ur-Dumuzi
210	Missing	No	1 of 10 cases	Yes	None	Ka (3 times), Ur-Ensignuna, Niurum ra-gaba (two times), missing, Ka, Habazizi

Table 4.2. Cases of Ur-Lamma, Governor of Lagaš.

By the year Amar-Sin 3, Ur-Lamma's office did not independently officiate new cases, serving rather with other entities, and Ur-Lamma's name disappears from the ditilas shortly after this time, except for references to several of his cases that resurfaced before a new officiator at a later date.

During the almost two decades of Ur-Lamma's governorship, his was the only office to oversee cases in the provincial capital. That is, in cases overseen by Ur-Lamma and his predecessors, no other court entities or offices are cited in the same case with that of the governor, allowing us to infer that the governor's office held a monopoly over such activity in Lagaš.[21] Of course, we may alternatively infer that other entities, such as judges, did address cases and that these were merely unrecorded during the governorships of Ur-

[21] With one exception of case 113, in which Ur-Lamma's office was joined by Lu-Nina, the Chief Musician; see below.

Lamma and his predecessors, but either way, after Ur-Lamma's office was dismantled, the office of governor assumed a different position in provincial dispute settlement at Lagaš.

While the circumstances of the transition of power from Lu-kirizal to Ur-Lamma are somewhat obscure, it has become increasingly likely that Ur-Lamma's long career ended in some state of turbulence,[22] and he was replaced, most likely before his death, by a short series of governors (Nanna-zišagal and Šarakam) who had previously served in the royal administration. Nanna-zišagal held the title zabar-dab$_5$ while Šarakam was probably a royal land surveyor (sag du$_5$ lugal) (Maekawa 1996:122).

It is certain that these two governors were involved in the conducting of court procedures, even if references are few and sometimes indirect. Nanna-zišagal is cited in Text 276 and Text 101 (dating to Šu-Sin's reign); in the latter he is cited as working with two judges, Alamu and Ur-Ištaran. Šarakam oversaw a case independently in Text 133 (AS 5), but his office is also cited as having shared responsibility over a case with Adaga the hazanum ("mayor") in Text 64 (ŠS 6).[23] The file tag Text 256 (Sollberger 1976:437) indicates that a file existed to store Šarakam's cases during the year Amar-Sin 6. Interestingly, other ditilas dating between the years Amar-Sin 3-5 reference neither governor (e.g., Texts 140, 275, 278), suggesting an expansion or proliferation of authority over cases during this time.

In other words, regardless of the circumstances surrounding Ur-Lamma's exit from office, the office of governor of Lagaš never recovered its monopoly over hearing cases in the provincial capital after his exit from office. Over the course of Amar-Sin's reign, the courts became increasingly more flexible, with openings for more participants in their composition, while decisions of past and present governors were fair game for contestation

[22] Possibly associated with the awkward transition of power between Šulgi and Amar-Sin.
[23] See also Text 71 (AS 5), *ZA* 53 63 07 (L 11089, date missing), and Text 276 for other ditilas that cite a past involvement of governor Šarakam's office.

or revisitation by other entities or new governors. Possibly, Ur-Lamma's exit from office resulted in a challenge to the office of governor from which it did not recover, opening a door for more competition and increased presence of other elite families at court proceedings.

This trend continues throughout the reign of Šu-Sin, after the Grand Vizier Arad-Nanna[24] assumed the title of Governor of Lagaš (probably in AS 8, see Sallaberger 1999:192) and his office was installed in Girsu – possibly because it was "expected to settle the political instability in Girsu which had begun in Amar-Suen 2" (Maekawa 1996:122). Arad-Nanna's office thus attended cases dated from Šu-Sin 1 to Ibbi-Sin 2, though it is arguable that it was involved in cases prior to Šu-Sin's reign because at least a few texts mention him as having overseen disputes in the distant prehistory of the ditila's case (e.g., Texts 87, 88, 99, all ŠS 4). As Table 4.3 shows, cases of Arad-Nanna's office typically concluded with a concrete confirmation of status rather than an evidentiary directive or open-ended suggestion, similar to the cases of his predecessor Ur-Lamma, and thus most of his cases resulted in the closing of disputes, in theory at least. However, Arad-Nanna's ditilas almost never closed with an oath, unlike those of Ur-Lamma's office, suggesting that the former's office preferred other methods of concluding the proceedings.

[24] On whom see Michalowski (CKU *forthcoming*). Arad-Nanna was made sukkal-mah sometime between Šulgi 36 and 41, and thus had already been involved in state administration long before setting up office in Lagaš, which is also very likely his town of origin. I translate sukkal-mah as "Grand Vizier" according to convention, but Sharlach (2005:18 note 5) has commented on the problems with this translation, suggesting instead "Chief Secretary."

Text:	Citation:	Date:	Officiating Present ditila?	In Case Pre-history?	Case closed ?	Maškim:	Other Entities:
11	di til-la Arad-^{d}⌈Nanna⌉ ensi$_2$-[ka][25]	ŠS 1	✓		n/a	Ur-Baba dumu Ur-Lala (w/ the judge)	Ur-Ištaran
38	Arad-^{d}Nanna sukkal-mah ensi$_2$-ka	ŠS 2	✓		Yes	Kala	none
174	sukkal-mah	ŠS 2	First case only	✓		Lu-Duga	Lu-Šara, Lu-Ibgal, Ur-Ištaran
87	Arad-^{d}Nanna sukkal-mah ensi$_2$	ŠS 4	✓	✓	Yes	Lugal-giškimzi dumu Lu-galnamgu	
88	šu Arad-^{d}Nanna sukkal-mah ensi$_2$-ka	ŠS 4		✓	Yes	Erenda	Lu-Šara and Ur-Ištaran
99	šu Arad-^{d}Nanna sukkal-mah ensi$_2$-ka	ŠS 4		✓	Yes	Ur-Bagara dumu Ur-x	Lu-Šara, Lu-diĝira, and Ur-Ištaran
205	Arad-^{d}Nanna sukkal-mah ensi$_2$	ŠS 4	✓	✓	Yes	Ur-[missing], Gudea aba uru, Ur-Lama dumu Lumu, Lugal-igihuš guzala, and Tiemahta	Ur-Ištaran, Lu-diĝira dumu Lugal-barae, Ur-Nuna dumu Dada, and Nani gadubba, cited as lumarza
143	Arad-^{d}Nanna sukkal-mah ensi$_2$	ŠS 5	✓	✓	Yes	[missing] dumu Eurbi and Gudea abba-iri	Lu-Šara, Ur-Ištaran, and Lu-diĝira
169	Arad-^{d}Nanna sukkal-mah ensi$_2$	ŠS 5	✓	✓	Yes	Ur-Nungala dumu Ur-šaga and Lu-Gudea dumu Ur-šaga	
204	Arad-^{d}Nanna sukkal-mah ensi$_2$ di-bi bi$_2$-dab$_5$	ŠS 5	✓	✓	Yes	[missing], Lu-Gudea, Urbagara, and Lugalgiški mzi	

[25] Falkenstein (1956) and Molina (2000:116) have Arad-^{d}Nan[na sukkal-mah] ensi$_2$-[ka], but according to the drawing, there simply isn't room for sukkal-mah. The date, ŠS 1 is probable, though the text is broken.

27	di-til-la sukkal-mah (Arad-^{d}Nanna)	ŠS 9	✓	✓	Yes	Lugalgiški mzi	None
67	Arad-^{d}Nanna sukkal-mah ensi$_2$-ke$_4$ a$_2$ in-[ni-dar]	IS 1		✓	Yes	Atu dumu Ur-Dumuzi	Lu-Šara, Lu-Ningirsu?, and Lu-diğiraa, plus at least to lumarza
333	Arad$_2$-mu sukkal-mah maškim	IS 2	Dada, governor of Nippur cited		Yes	Arad-mu sukkal-mah	Nippur governor
57	Arad$_2$-^{d}Nanna ⌜sukkal⌝-[mah] ensi$_2$ Lagaš[^{ki}-ke$_4$]	broke n	✓		Yes	Abakala dumu Ur-tur	none
83	šu Arad-^{d}Nanna sukkal-⌜mah⌝ ensi$_2$-ka	Not dated	✓	✓?	Yes	Ur-Lamma dumu Ur-[missing]	Ur-igalim šitim and Lugal-sigbu dumu AN-[missing] are lu$_2$-mar-za
112	di [til-la Arad-^{d}Nanna sukkal-mah ensi$_2$-ka]	broke n	✓	Ur-Lamma cited	Yes	Gudea abba-iri dumu šagina	None?
168	[x x] sukkal-mah	ŠS X[1?]	✓		Yes		
186x	igi sukkal-mah	broke n	Unclear	✓	n/a		
ZA 53 56 5 (L 11050)	⌜šu⌝ Arad-^{d}Nanna⌝ [sukkal-mah] ensi$_2$-[ka]	Broke n	Unclear	✓	unclea r	Missing	Missing

Table 4.3. Cases Overseen by Arad-Nanna, Governor of Lagaš, Grand Vizier.

Moreover, unlike previous Lagaš governorships, Arad-Nanna's office rarely officiated cases alone but was more regularly accompanied by one or more judges and other kinds of entities. During the reign of Šu-Sin, Arad-Nanna's office served with a highly-attested group of judges who handled the majority of cases from Lagaš at that time (see below), and by the reign of Ibbi-Sin, this office also served in connection with groups of elite men called lu$_2$-mar-za (see below), even though many of the judges were still active and present at many cases. The installation of Arad-Nanna's Vizierate office at Lagaš did

result in a take-over of dispute resolution; local elites were nonetheless able to rival his presence in the courts and retain the preeminence they established after the demise or death of Ur-Lamma.



Figure 4.1. Number of Cases Officiated by Ur-Lamma and Arad-Namma at Lagaš.

In spite of the possible instability of the involvement of the governor's office in Lagaš cases, it should be noted that certain aspects of the office remained constant. All of the Lagaš governors worked with a limited range of officials who filled the function of maškim. Lu-kirizal is probably linked with the same maškim in all his citations, Ur-numun-du_{10}-ga (Texts 193, 205). The offices of both Šarakam and Nanna-zišagal are linked with a maškim called Sada (sa_6-da, see Text 276). Although the offices of Ur-Lamma and Arad-Nanna had different methods for approaching cases, they shared the habit of working with a limited range of persons who filled the function of maškim. Ur-Lamma

repeatedly served with Ka (ka$_5$-a), the sukkal (Texts 208, 210), Ur-nigar (Texts 20, 184, 207, 254), and Ur-Baba (22, 182, 184, 207), among others, while Arad-Nanna worked in the company of one Lugal-gizkimzi several times (Texts 27, 87, 204). It is further interesting to note that, according to several examples, Ur-Lamma and Arad-Nanna encountered some of the same persons in their role as maškim. Atu son of Ur-Dumuzi acted as maškim under both Ur-Lamma and Arad-Nanna (Text 196, date missing and Text 67, IS 1, respectively), as did Gudea aba uru (Text 112, date missing, and Text 205, ŠS 4) and possibly a man named Kala (Text 128, date missing, and Text 38, ŠS 2, respectively). Ur-Lamma's last officiated case dates to the year Amar-Sin 3, indicating that the involvement of these men with the courts spanned a time as long as, if not more, than a decade.

4.3.1.2 The Governors' Office at Umma

Umma's governors in the latter half of the Ur III period (the brothers Ur-Lisi, A(a)kala,[26] and Dadaga) are better documented and more prevalently represented in the ditilas. Their reigns spanned this period as follows:[27]

[26] Before he assumed the governorship, the name was Akala, but it was changed to the spelling a-a-kal-la during AS 8, rendered in "a more formalized style" (Maekawa 1996:128).
[27] See Dahl 2003:153ff. or 2007 for the most recent overviews of the Umma governors. I exclude the governor Abamu and other earlier governors from this table, since Abamu and the others are not attested in the ditilas and remain poorly known. The end date of Dadaga's reign is postulated to be Ibbi-Sin 2 or 3, but of course the significant decline of documentation early in Ibbi-Sin's reign makes it difficult or impossible to propose a date with any certainty. The scant texts from Ibbi-Sin 4 do not mention any governors and shed no light on the matter.

Governor:	Attested Years of Reign:	Attestation in ditilas:
Ur-Lisi	Šulgi 33[28] – Amar-Sin 8 (20+ years)	Amar-Sin 2-6
Ayakala	Amar-Sin 8 – Šu-Sin 7 (8 years)	Amar-sin 8, Šu-Sin 2, 4
Dadaga	Šu-Sin 7 – Ibbi-Sin 2 or after (5+ years)	References undated

Table 4.4. Governors of Umma.

After the year Amar-Sin 2, the ditila sources decline to cite the specific name, preferring igi ensi$_2$-(ka)-še$_3$, "before the governor," instead (see Molina 2008:136). Thus, only Ur-Lisi is routinely cited by name, before Amar-Sin 2. As such, texts that cite a governor's involvement in a *previous* procedure or transaction relevant to the proceedings at hand leave it impossible to know which governor is meant. Ayakala is otherwise mentioned in only one ditila record (Text 356), which bears his seal, and Dadaga is explicitly mentioned only once as well in the badly broken Text 354.

Hence most of the explicit attestations of an Umma governor mention Ur-Lisi, but this is undoubtedly a function of this shift in practice and his lengthy tenure.[29] The total number of cases attended by a governor at Lagaš account for less than 22% of the total attested cases, while Umma governors appear in roughly half of the cases from this province, possibly suggesting that the Umma governors had a more regular role in dispute resolution, but of course this may also be due to the current state of documentation. In any case, Umma's governors did not attend cases in discernable patterns, and could serve either alone or in the company of a large entourage composed of local or royal officials. Consequently, it is more difficult to identify their role in the courts.

Nonetheless, Molina's (*forthcoming*, and see also Dahl 2007) comprehensive analysis of court officials at Umma outlines several important characteristics of the

[28] Based on Dahl's (2003:154f.) overview of the evidence suggesting that Ur-Lisi retained the title of "chief of the granary" before Shulgi 33 and was therefore not governor prior to this date. The precise ascension of Ayakala to governorship remains otherwise obscure due to lack of documentation.
[29] Perhaps unusually, see Michalowski 1985:296.

appearance of Umma's governors in the texts. For one, while Lagaš governors stood with, but in distinction to, judges as a separate type of entity, the Umma governor Ur-Lisi explicitly took the title of "judge" on several occasions,[30] and in these cases no other person at the court took this title. According to the Umma texts Text 285 and Text 110 (both Amar-Sin 5), for example, Ur-Lisi took the title of judge in some cases, in which instances the texts did not mention his status as Governor of Umma even though they date to squarely within Ur-Lisi's tenure as such. Secondly, like the offices of the Lagaš governors, those of the Umma governors served with people drawn from a relatively limited pool of the provincial administration and repeat appearances were not uncommon. Ur-Lisi was even joined by his own family members in several cases (e.g., his brother Akala nu-banda$_3$). Finally, most of the cases overseen by the Umma governors concluded with a definitive confirmation of status, expressed by both language of closing (til) of a di, and the verb gin "to confirm." It thus appears that both the Umma and Lagaš gubernatorial offices preferred to settle disputes conclusively rather than offer preliminary procedural courses of action for the disputants (as in the so-called dinutilas).

Umma's political history and relation to the royal household also shed some light on the role of the governors in provincial dispute resolution. Like Ur-Lamma of Lagaš, Ur-Lisi may have been the subject of a political occurrence that resulted in the termination of his office as governor and subsequent dismantling of his household property (Maekawa 1996:126f., Dahl 2003:165f.); these events seem to correlate to the downfall of Amar-Sin and the complications apparent in the transfer of power between him and Šu-Sin (on which see Lafont 1994, Michalowski 1977). Coinciding with the onset of Ur-Lisi's probable demise and starting around Amar-Sin 5, the evidence exhibits a sudden and substantial increase in the average number of officials who served on cases at Umma. This trend

[30] Ur-Lisi di-ku$_5$: Text 110, Text 312, and Text 285, all AS 5.

continues until the end of the documentation and Ur-Lisi's brothers and successors rarely served on cases alone.

It thus appears that a rupture in the governor's office at Umma resulted in a proliferation of power over dispute cases, much like at Lagaš, and that the break served as an opportunity for a variety of local and provincial elites to compete for relevance and authority at court. In contrast to the data from Lagaš, however, there are few intelligible patterns of preferences for procedure in the Umma cases, perhaps owing to the unpredictable and shared nature of authority overseeing these cases.

4.3.1.3 The Governor's Office in Summary

The following chart summarizes the changes in court size in relation to the governors of Umma and Lagaš during the latter half of the Ur III period:



Figure 4.2. Average Number of Officials Per Year at Umma and Lagaš.[31]

[31] The average was calculated by compiling all cases from a single year and totaling the number of present entities including: governor, judges, lu_2-mar-za and lu_2 ki-ba gub-ba men, and men listed as having witnessed the proceedings "before" them (igi-PN-e_3). At Lagaš, the total number of officiators (and therefore the average) before AS 4 is 1; at Umma, some years had anomalously had more than one officiator listed (e.g., Text 328, Š39, has a governor and two high-ranking officials from the state government).

In both provinces, albeit in very different political contexts relating to the specific circumstances surrounding the fates of Ur-Lamma and Ur-Lisi, the governorships of Umma and Lagaš lost their monopolies over decision-making and their exclusive entitlement to supervise di-procedures. This weakening or transformation of authority coincided with the creation of opportunities for various members of the provincial elite to participate, at least in the context of resolving disputes of the provincial citizens. These changes may have been the indirect results of ripples emanating from political developments in the capital, but this does not preclude the possibility that provincial or state officials may also have "authorized" the proliferation of power once it was underway in order to allow local elites a sense of participation in, and therefore loyalty to, the state and provincial rulers.

Whatever the case, it is not demonstrable that the governors' decisions were binding or enforceable, and cases exist from both provinces in which disputants returned to court to challenge the governor's decision or even successfully overturn it. There are presumably many contexts in which these possibilities could occur, but two are especially noticeable in the corpuses. On the one hand, it appears that on the occasion of a change of governor, disputants could bring cases anew before the new governor to seek a different outcome (e.g., Text 205 case 1). The possibility that governors' offices and estates were audited or inventoried upon the change of hand proposed by Maekawa (1996, see also Dahl 2003:177), coupled with the likelihood that social affiliations would experience renegotiations during a period of political turnover indicates that such a context could also be appropriate for revisiting decisions or cases of the old governor.

On the other hand, after the tenures of Ur-Lamma and Ur-Lisi, disgruntled disputants could ignore the governor's office altogether and take their cases before the offices of relatively lower-ranking officials (e.g., Lagaš Text 11). Hence there are several

cases that, having once been addressed before a governor, returned to be delivered before judges, important but lower-ranking members of the provincial administration (e.g., from Lagaš Texts 13, 64, 67, 71, 88, 99), while many judges abided by the decision of the governor in place (sometimes in the company of a maškim from the previous di as in Text 41), there are cases in which they entertained challenges to the previous governor's decision (e.g., Texts 83, 150, 205 case 1). Cases could also be leveled against the governor himself, as in the Lagaš case of Text 67 (IS 1) in which Arad-Nanna was accused of having misappropriated a slave. Interestingly, this case was officiated by three judges who, in previous years, had served as Arad-Nanna's colleagues in the hearing of cases.

In sum, while it may seem reasonable to assume that the provincial governors, positioned atop the provincial socio-political ladder, were ideally the ultimate and most powerful judges of dispute cases, their presence at cases was limited in frequency and in the amount of power they were able to effectively wield over the course of the period, and Arad-Nanna, even as Vizier, was no exception. Their presence was presumably formidable, but checked and challenged by the other kinds of officials from the local aristocratic community, who served with them and within the same system.

4.3.2 Judges (di-ku$_5$)

Because of the preeminence of judges in *dīnu* (legal cases, decisions) of the latter two millennia of Mesopotamian history, it is easy to assume that early Mesopotamian courts similarly revolved around prestigious persons identified as judges,[32] but in fact the role and importance of judges during the Ur III period needs reconsideration because judges were not prevalent in the cases of Umma ditilas, nor in the economic, administrative,

[32] For an overview of the topic of judges in Mesopotamia, see Fortner 1997:173ff., the contributions in Skaist and Levinson (2006), Wilcke 2007:35ff., Hertel 2007:374f.

and legal records of the Ur III period as a whole, having not even been attested before the reign of Amar-Sin (see Molina *forthcoming* and Falkenstein 1956:32).[33] Even though judges are frequently cited in Lagaš cases, especially during the reign of Šu-Sin, the fact that there are cases from both provincial capitals that were settled without reference to any judges further limits their significance. Because others have already discussed the philological matters surrounding the term di-ku$_5$ "judge" (e.g., Edzard 2005:20ff.), this discussion will focus on the role of Ur III judges in the context of dispute settlement.

Central to any understanding of the judges of the Ur III period is the matter of what the term or title designates (on which see Westbrook 2005:29f.). With a greater volume of textual material to consult, scholars of the Old Babylonian period (e.g., Walther 1917:7ff.; Driver and Miles 1956:491) developed the supposition that judges were members of a professional office, but it is now more frequently assumed that the position of judge in many periods of Mesopotamian society was a function rather than a permanent office, usually undertaken by elite members of society, after no evidence for a judicial course of study has been identified (e.g., Kraus 1982, Fortner 1997, Westbrook 2005:38).[34] Indeed, "judging was regarded as an inseparable part of an official's duties, even in offices that would seem purely administrative in character" (Westbrook 2005:38), and thus it need not be considered the primary professional role of an official that required specific training. Unfortunately, the ditilas rarely provide patronymics when rendering the names of persons

[33] Molina (*forthcoming*) counts 65 judges in the entire Ur III corpus, only 41 of whom appear in what we may call "procedural records." I note that most of these judges are mentioned only once in the documentation, and those who are cited on multiple occasions are from the same restricted groups.

[34] Even if there were common protocols or "codes" for how persons acting as judges would operate effectively (S. Lafont 2000:33), there is simply no evidence for "legal" training in the Ur III period. While forerunners to the lexical series *ana ittišu* may exist, the series dates to the Middle Babylonian period and known exemplars date to the first millennium BCE. Tablets 1 and 2 of UR$_5$.RA = *hubullu* indeed contain legal phraseology and terminology of credits and loans, but it is only the subsequent tablets of the series that date to Old Babylonian Nippur schools (contra Renger 2008:193); Hallo thus stated that the first two tablets are a "separate composition" (Hallo 1982:85f.). No Nippur forerunners to the series exist, again complicating the idea of an early Mesopotamian tradition in legal training (Michalowski, "The study of 'Law' and 'Legal' Phraseology in Old Babylonian Schooling," paper presented at the 53rd Rencontre Assyriologique Internationale, July 19th, 2006, Münster.).

identified as judges, impeding specific identification of most of these persons or of their regular official professions. Further complicating the idea that di-ku$_5$ "judge," was a designation used in the context of court procedure, there are at least three texts known to me in which the name of an Umma judge is accompanied by the title outside the context of court procedure. A royal delivery text from Drehem mentions a lamb delivery of "Luamana, judge," listed along with other high-ranking figures such as the governor Dada, and several merchants and šabras (Sigrist, *Ontario* 128 rev. 15; ŠS 5.7.13),[35] and this judge is also cited with the title in *OIP* 121 83 (Drehem, AS 5.3.26; see also *MVN* 10 217, AS 3). The Umma judge Kiağ is similarly cited in the Drehem economic text *PDT* 1 433 (Š 44.1.26), in which his donation of animals to the Akitu festival is documented. However, the use of the title outside of litigious contexts is attested in texts from other Mesopotamian periods,[36] and Westbrook (1995:30) has suggested that the term "might therefore cover a variety of situations," not limited to what we consider "litigious" contexts.[37]

Indeed, it is essential to note that judges in the provincial courts of the Ur III period typically did not make "judgments"; in absence of the rule of law, the task of a judge was not to ascertain a general theory of law and deductively apply it to the particular setting present before him.[38] As the previous chapter has explained, the judge's purpose was generally restricted to hearing testimonies or prescribing methods for settling disputes, assessing damages and recompense, and observing the disputants as they attempted to demonstrate the validity of their statements. While these activities may have involved

[35] Almost certainly the same Lu-amana who acted as judge at Umma. See *MVN* 18 635 and 4.3.2.2 below.
[36] E.g., see Wiseman (1953/1983) 6:31 and 56:48 for two examples from Alalakh. See also Westbrook 2005:29 note 5.
[37] See also Text 3, which cites a member of a lu$_2$ mar-za list named "Ur-Baba, son of Ur-šaga, judge.," with four other judges listed separately. Lu-diğira, an oft-cited judge at Lagaš, is accompanied by the title in Drehem text ICP 376 (*TRU* 376).
[38] The matter of the nature and role of judges is complicated for any context; see Benditt 1978:1-3, 15ff.

tactical savvy, wisdom, and an acute sense of the community's opinions and values, the ultimate goal of Ur III judges was merely to confirm claims rather than to establish the theoretical parameters around which a case would revolve or to justly represent a legislated body of rules for the sake of society as a whole. Given these factors, it is unclear how a judge was any different from any elite official who presided over the execution of a di, and why some persons retained the designation in courts while others did not. A comparison of judges at Umma and Lagaš may shed some light on these matters.

4.3.2.1 The Judges at Lagaš

There are around 17 attested judges from Lagaš dispute records, the largest number of known judges from any Ur III province.[39] Falkenstein's (1956:32ff.) comprehensive and systematic discussion of these judges still stands as the authoritative consideration. There are no cited judges before Amar-Sin 3, before which time all cases of the provincial capital were the exclusive concern of the governor's office. After the shift of power from Ur-Lamma to his successors, however, officials assuming the title of judge proliferate. Of these judges, by far the most frequently attested are Lu-diĝira, Lu-Šara, Lu-Ibgal, and Ur-Ištaran. These four men (or their offices) attended cases in various configurations with each other and various other entities during the latter half of Amar-Sin's reign, but during the early reign of Šu-Sin they attended cases as an exclusive college. Lu-Ibgal disappeared some time around Šu-Sin 4, possibly having died, and was gradually replaced by Šu-ili within three or four years; however often Lu-Ibgal's surviving colleagues served as a triad without replacing him.

[39] Compared to four from Umma, three from Nippur, and three from Ur, and 10 judges are listed on the problematic Text 355 from Umma that seemingly documents a dispute from Ur. The imbalance in these numbers is certainly skewed by the differential documentation available to scholars, but is nonetheless striking. See Molina (*forthcoming*).

As Appendix 2 indicates, there were several other officials who worked in close connection with these judges. Gudea aba uru is cited with them as judge, maškim, or in other types of functions (see Falkenstein 1956:36). The officials Tiemahta, Ur-Lamma dumu Kala, and Abamu repeatedly acted as the maškim for these judges over a period of almost two decades. Similarly, sometimes the judges themselves could assume a variety of functions, as when, for example, Ur-Ištaran acted as both judge and maškim in a single case (Text 279). Groups of men identified as lu_2-mar-za appeared alongside judges in some instances, and, of course, Lagaš judges would attend cases in the company of the governor Arad-Nanna, as discussed above.

The relationship between judges and governor at Lagaš may suggest that the two shared interests in each other's offices and could act interchangeably in the conducting of a di. While many of the above-cited examples support this interpretation, there are some examples that do not fully accord and where judges overturned the governor's decisions (see Text 101?) or vice versa. The decision of the Šu-Sin judges to settle a case against Arad-Nanna's office in the Ibbi-Sin 1 Text 67, for example, suggests an unstable relationship between judges and governor, but perhaps this occurrence is not representative of all interactions among these offices.

It is clear that Lagaš judges served alone only rarely, but rather cooperated in groups of up to seven members at a time. A variety of factors is likely to have dictated the presence or absence of any one judge from one case to the next, assuming that their service as judges was tangential to the other professional and administrative responsibilities of these men.

Owing to such variations in their attendance in court, there are some identifiable differences in certain judges' approaches to solving cases. For example, the judge Lu-Šara, one member of the Šu-Sin-era foursome, appears to have been the only judge among all

Lagaš judges or officiating entities whose presence corresponds with the use of the procedural act gur, "to reject." It is not clear what specific procedures were involved with this act, but it usually refers to either a witness statement or an oath and was often followed by a nam-erim$_2$ oath or new statement from the disputant whose position was rejected. With two exceptions (Umma Text 51 [AS 5] and Text 377 [undated]), all occasions of a gur occurred in the reign of Šu-Sin and all of these cases were addressed by Lu-Šara in his capacity of judge. That is, if the college of judges served without Lu-Šara, the gur would not occur, but if he was present, the act could appear in the procedure. The reason for this correspondence is difficult to determine, but it is possible that the judges' offices at Lagaš had different respective interests or at least varying styles of approaching cases even when they served as colleges.

4.3.2.2 The Judges at Umma

At Umma, in contrast to Lagaš, only a few judges are known in spite of the present extent of the corpus. Judges who are attested as being physically present at Umma cases, other than the governor Ur-Lisi, are Kiağ,[40] Lu-amana,[41] Ur-sagamu[42]. Aba-Enlilgin is attested in a couple of cases from Nippur (*NRVN* 1 1, AS 1) and Ur (Text 355), the latter of which also includes Lu-amana, but one Umma case mentions that Aba-Enlilgin's maškim attended a case in Umma (Text 280), suggesting that more documentation would confirm Aba-Enlilgin's presence in this province. The most significant difference between

[40] Kiağ: Studies Sigrist 1 16, 17. Kiağ is cited as having overseen disputes or witnessed relevant transactions in the case prehistory in *SNAT* 374 (Text 269, AS 6), undated Text 308 (unpublished) with the maškim Lu-Sin, Text 312 (AS 5, unpublished), Text 377 (Johnson and Veenker *forthcoming*), and Text 316 (AS 5, unpublished); in these instances he does not take the title "judge."
[41] Lu-amana: Text 49 (AS 2), Text 203 (AS 7.4.0), and *MM* 928(+)943 (see Molina 1996). Possibly also BM 111032 (unpublished), igi lu$_2$-ama-na-še$_3$, even though he is here not qualified as "judge." Cited in non-litigious Drehem texts *Ontario* 128, *OIP* 21 83, and *MVN* 10 217, cited as "judge" in each instance. See also Text 355 (Umma dispute resolved in Ur).
[42] Ur-sagamu: Christie's tablet cited as BDTNS no. 59331, probably from Umma: igi ur-sa$_6$-ga-mu di-ku$_5$-še$_3$ (line 3).

the Umma and Lagaš judges is that the former did not serve in colleges, and only one judge may be cited per case, sometimes as one of many "bystanders" (lu_2 ki-ba gub-ba, see below). A single exception is found in the collective tablet Text 203, in which Lu-amana serves with two other judges, Ur-mu and Nigarkidu, who are otherwise unattested. It is likely that this text documents cases handled outside the provincial context, since it reports that all proceedings were supervised under an entity who was affiliated with the crown (gir_3 Šeš-kal-la u_3 ur-^{d}nin-giz-zi-da gu-za-la_2). Interestingly, the Umma judges rarely took the title "judge" in the context of Umma's ditila records, assuming the title in non-litigious contexts instead, particularly in economic documents from Drehem that are cited above.

Even if the activities of judges were limited in Umma, however, it can be suggested that many of Umma's judges were preoccupied with cases from other provinces or other political business of the provincial administration. Kiağ oversaw at least one promissory oath "in his house" according to the Umma Text 342 (*BCT* 2 156) left edge:

ur-sa_6-ga-mu dam-gar_3	Ur-sagamu the merchant swears by the king that:
kišib ba-sa_6-ga na-me	any seal(ed document) of Bašaga is not at his place,
ki-na nu-gal_2-la	and that no one will take/have it.
$niğ_2$-na-me nu-u_3-da-an-tuku-a	
mu-lugal-bi in-pad_3	
igi a-tu dumu ni_9-ğar-ki-du_{10}-ka-$še_3$	Before Atu son of Niğarkidu,
rev.	
igi lu_2-diğira-ra dumu lu_5-lu_5-mu-ka-$še_3$	Before Lu-diğiraa son of Lulumu,
igi ur-^{d}geštin-an-ka dumu šeš-kal-la-ka-$še_3$	Before Ur-gestin-anka son of Šeškala,
igi ur-lugal lu_2 inim-^{d}šara$_2$-ka-$še_3$	Before Ur-lugal the witness of Šara,
igi a_2-nin-ga_2-ta $guda_2$ ^{d}nin-us_2-KA LUM ka-$še_3$	Before Aningata, the guda-priest of NinusKALAM.
mu ^{d}amar-^{d}sin lugal	Amar-Sin 1.
left edge:	
$ša_3$ e_2 ki-$ağ_2$ di-ku_5-ka	In the house of Kiağ the judge.

Because the text is from Umma, it may be implied that Kiağ's household, or at least his administrative office, was located there. However, the Umma receipt *BPOA* 2 2183 (Š34, see Johnson and Veenker, *forthcoming*) records a transfer of property belonging to

Kiağ's wife (igi-kar$_2$ dam ki-ag$_2$ di-ku$_5$-ra$_2$-a, line 4) from Umma to Ur. This, combined with the above-cited document from Drehem (*PDT* 1 433), suggests that Kiağ's affiliations and official activities were not restricted to Umma. Lu-amana similarly participated in transactions that extended beyond Umma's borders, while Aba-Enlilgin, as mentioned above, served cases in Ur and Nippur even if he is otherwise associated with Umma.

In short, Umma judges had statuses that transcended the local arena, unlike the Lagaš judges, who seem to have been more intimately connected with their local community and its aristocracy, appearing more frequently in cases and in closer company with other people.

4.3.2.3 Umma and Lagaš Judges in Summary

The title of judge was used in different ways in Lagaš and Umma, but appears outside of scope of the governors' office only after the exits of governors Ur-Lamma and Ur-Lisi. While it seems that a small variety of Lagaš judges shared the title within a restricted circle, the Umma governor secured the title for himself; the only other officials called "judge" primarily used the title outside of this province. Possibly, officials who were afforded the privilege of serving as judge were hesitant to share the title in the increasingly competitive environment that was developing during the reigns of Amar-Sin and Šu-Sin. It is indeed noteworthy that, when the office of governor and Grand Vizier Arad-Nanna began to attend cases, he did not or could not take the title "judge" but was more or less restricted to serving in their company as a separate type of court entity.

Procedural idiosyncrasies show that there were personal preferences at odds in the proceedings, where, for example, Arad-Nanna rarely entertained conclusive oaths at the end of di, while Lu-Šara was willing to allow – or willing to suggest – rejections (gur) to

statements. Meanwhile at Umma, the governors attempted a monopoly on the title of "judge," even sometimes at the expense of their title of ensi, and no colleges of judges are known save for that documented in Text 203, which probably reports a case that was handled outside the auspices of the provincial administration.

4.3.3 The maškim

4.3.3.1 The Administrative Function of the maškim

Seemingly the most ubiquitous function in the Ur III courts, the purpose of the maškim is notoriously difficult to understand and the term resists a precise translation. Sigrist (1995) suggested "bailiff" while Falkenstein (1956:47ff. [esp. 54], 1957:139) adopted the term "commissar" (rendered Kommisär) with its connotations of institutional leadership and ministerial charge. This term is also favored by Pomponio ("commessario," 2008:121), B. Lafont (1996:43), and Edzard and Wiggerman (1989:449ff.), who added that the term can also be understood as "Anwalt" (lawyer) or "Sachwalter" (trustee). B. Lafont goes somewhat further, suggesting that the maškim was an "auxiliare de justice" (1996:43). Any of these renderings import problematic anachronisms, however, and afford the occupant of this position more administrative power in the Ur III cases than can be supported by the textual sources. It cannot be shown that the maškim of a case introduced new information, argued sides, or performed any directive role in cases, which were conducted rather by disputants before the offices of governors, judges, and other figures. It is thus better understood that a maškim was a function rather than a permanent occupation attached to the high-ranking tiers of the bureaucracy. In fact, scholars now opt to leave the term half-translated, rendering it, for example, "maškim-official" (e.g., Allred 2006:*passim*), but it may be more appropriate to leave the term in Sumerian as there is no equivalent title in the modern world and since, while the occupant of the position of the

maškim may have been an official, it was not the temporary function of maškim that rendered him so.

In any case, the same title is ubiquitous in economic texts of the Ur III period, where the term clearly refers to a person who witnessed transactions, deliveries, withdrawals, exchanges, or sales, and preserved a memory of such dealings for future reference (see Oh'e 1983, van de Mieroop 1987:97ff.). In spite of the frequency of the term in such texts, however, few studies have explicitly entertained the idea that perhaps the maškim of the ditilas serves precisely the same job – that of observing, remembering, and, by extension, extending legitimacy to the transpired events.

That the maškim held this role in the ditila-records, however, is especially evident in instances when a case, already once presented to judges and settled, resurfaced for a second or third time either because a party failed to uphold the obligations established in the first round of proceedings, or because one or both parties found the previous decisions illegitimate, disagreeable, or possible to change under a new authority figure. On such occasions, the entities charged with addressing the petitioners' claims did not consult the archives for the written record of foregoing proceedings, but rather summoned persons who were previously involved. Text 276 (1′-rev. 3) from Lagaš, reporting a series of cases concerning the sale of some property, illustrates the point:[43]

[di-til-la]	
[few lines broken]	[Closed case:]
GIŠGAL-[di-še3][44]	Ur-šaga said: "I bought [a storehouse for x price] from Gišgaldi.
in-ši-s[a_{10}-a bi-du_{11}-ga]	Ur-šaga did not bring the tablet of this storehouse sale.
ur-$ša_6$-ga-[a]	It was given to the heirs of Gišgaldi.
dub ga_2-nun sa_{10}-a-bi nu-mu-da-DU-a	
i_3-bi_2-la GIŠGAL-di-da-ke_4-ne	
ba-ne-a-sum-ma	
$ša_6$-da maškim	Šada was the maškim.
di-til-la ^{d}Nanna-zi-$ša_3$-gal_2 $ensi_2$-ka	It was the ditila of Nanna-zišagal, governor.
ur-$ša_6$-ga	

[43] See also Lafont and Westbrook (2003:196), who cite Text 160 (Lagaš). More examples may be found in Lagaš texts 41, 121, 138, and, from Umma, see Text 308, Text 312, and Text 316.
[44] On GIŠGAL-di, see Falkenstein 1957:36 n. 2 and Molina 2004: text 3.

di-da ba-a-gi$_4$-a di ga$_2$-nun-ka ba-an-tak$_4$-a i$_3$-bi$_2$-la GIŠGAL-di-da-ke$_4$-ne ba-ne-a-gi-na ša$_6$-da maškim di-til-la ^{d}šara$_2$-kam ensi$_2$-ka	Ur-šaga returned *with* the case, and the case of the storehouse remained (as it was). The heirs of Gišgaldi confirmed it. Šada was the maškim. Closed case of Šarakam, governor.

This text reports a dispute between the heirs of (the undoubtedly deceased) Gišgaldi and a man named Ur-šaga. Evidently, Ur-šaga claims to have purchased a storehouse (ga$_2$-nun) from Gišgaldi, but cannot support his claim to the satisfaction of the other parties. The text reports that, in the past, Ur-šaga twice attempted to bring the matter to court, and the maškim for these previous proceedings, Šada, is cited in both cases. However, between the occurrences of these two cases, a local regime change had transpired: the governor Nanna-zišagal's office oversaw the first case but Šarakam's office, rather, attended the second. Perhaps the regime change accounts for Ur-šaga's second attempt in court. In any case, because Šarakam was not involved in the initial case, Šada again assumed the role of maškim and handled the transition to the second round of proceedings. According to this text, it was the maškim who, present or not, was cited as the keeper of information about the previous proceedings. See also Text 286 (Umma).

A full discussion of the negligible role of contracts and receipts in winning and losing cases was provided in the previous chapter, but it is worth reemphasizing here that it is possible that the citation of a sale tablet in this case was relevant only because the alleged document contained the names of witnesses who could attest to existence of the contended sale, thereby supporting Ur-Šaga's case. See Text 45 (translated in Chapter 3).

4.3.3.2 The Socio-Political Context of the maškim

The administrative, functional, or pragmatic role of the maškim provides only one aspect of this function, and an overview of the socio-political context of the officials who

assumed this function in Ur III dispute cases is required as well. Given the high-ranking status and powerful affiliations of many of the maškim found in dispute records (see Falkenstein 1956:48f), a variety of factors intersected to support their selection and qualifications for this duty.[45] In fact, it is likely, if only circumstantially demonstrable, that the selection of the maškim was linked to the specific officiator of a case and political affiliations were a significant determining factor in the appointment of this functionary. That is, the offices of judges and governors included a colleague or subordinate to function as maškim. In several cases (e.g., 87, 143, 169, 205) one finds that Arad-Nanna revisited cases attended by his office in past proceedings, yet a maškim was cited as having delivered an account of the prior events. This suggests that Arad-Nanna was detached from the affairs of the court and required eyes and ears to attend the proceedings for him.

The role of maškim was also linked to the judges' offices, as is apparent in Text 316 (unpublished) and Text 308 lines 4-7, which reports that a disputant claimed:

di-mu ki-aĝ$_2$ in-[til]	"Kiaĝ finished my case,
bi$_2$-dug$_4$	she said,
lu$_2$-^{d}suen maškim di-ti-la-mu bi$_2$-du$_{11}$	"Lu-Sin was the maškim of my ditila;
lu$_2$-^{d}suen en$_8$ ba-na-tar^{ar}	"Lu-Sin was asked, 'Is this false?'"
lu$_5$-am$_3$ bi$_2$-dug$_4$	she explained.[46]

The judge Kiaĝ had a handful of associates who acted as maškim for him and would handle future proceedings if a dispute was not settled the first time (see Text 377, Johnson and Veenker *forthcoming*).

[45] There is evidence that maškims were paid for their services in Sargonic times (Wilcke2007:39); however no comparable evidence exists for payment of maškims in the Ur III period itself.

[46] See Sallaberger 2008:173f. for another translation.

Text:	Date:	Judge:	Maškim:	Prehistory or Present case?	Other Entities:
280	AS 5.12	Aba-Enlil-gin (not present)	Ur-niĝar	Present case	None
316	AS 5.9	Kiaĝ (not present)	Ur-ĝeštin-anka maškim ditila Kiaĝ	Both	3 lu_2 ki-ba gub-ba
308	Not dated	Kiaĝ (not present)	Lu-Sin	Prehistory	5 attending officials
377	AS[47]	Kiaĝ (not present)	Lu-Duga	Both	Unnamed governor

Table 4.5. Maškims of Specific Judges.

The fact that judges were far more predominant at Lagaš than at Umma may account for the disparity of references to maškims between the two provinces, 19 from Umma versus over 100 from the Lagaš urban elite, approximately one-third of whom assume the role two times or more. In either case, the people who acted as maškim came from a limited pool, and officials who otherwise served as officiators or judges could sometimes assume the function themselves.[48] Arad-Nanna once appears as maškim in a case from Nippur (*RA* 71 126, appearing with the title sukkal-mah). Ur-Ištaran, as mentioned above, acted as both the judge and maškim of a single case (Text 194). A man named Habazizi is cited in a case as having inscribed the ditila at the end of a di (Text 12, Habazizi… mu-sar[ar]), but in case Text 210 (col. iv line 12, date missing), he appears as a maškim instead, even though he otherwise served as a scribe.

As mentioned above, governors in Ur III cases seem to have had a finite reservoir of colleagues who served with them as maškim. That this phenomenon likely reflects collegial relationships rather than a sort of check-and-balance type of configuration is evidenced by the fact that maškim are charged with reporting the governors' decisions at future dates if a case returns to court. They must presumably have been trusted associates of the governors rather than neutrally selected adversaries. See the persistent appearances

[47] Probably year 5, according to the prosopographical analysis of Johnson and Veenker *forthcoming*.
[48] Similar to the array of people who served as maškim in Sargonic-era texts (Wilcke 2007:40).

of the maškim Lu-Girsu in asserting the governor's position in Text 41, for example. The governor Ur-Lamma seems to have been frequently linked with a loyal maškim called Ur-Baba son of Ur-Lala, who appears as his maškim in Text 11, and, during the tenure of Arad-Nanna as governor attends court to present a former decision of Ur-Lamma (Text 205, case 1). Judges could also have specific, recurring colleagues serve as maškim over a period of time, as is apparent from the examples Appendix 4.

To summarize, even if the theoretical purpose of a maškim was to preserve an institutional memory of the case, they seem also to have played the role of legitimating the authority and trustworthiness of presiding officials, and were thus more reliable sources for future problems than officiating entities themselves. However, the occupiers of this function were not gleaned from different segments of society as the officiators were members of the same circles.

4.3.4 The So-Called Attending Witnesses

The highest volume of persons at cases from Umma and Lagaš are found in lists of high-ranking men called lu_2 (ki-ba) gub-ba "men serving (at the place)" and lu_2 mar-za (ki-ba) gub-ba, for which a translation is less straightforward.[49] The former term is prevalent at Umma, while the latter is restricted to Lagaš. Neither term is attested before the Ur III period (see Oh'e 1980:128) or in other provinces according to the available documentation (e.g., Ur and Nippur), suggesting that these groups are local phenomena. Falkenstein (1956:54f.) suggested that this term and lu_2-mar-za referred to "Publizitätszeugen," public witnesses, but if the purpose of these positions was limited to

[49] Much has been made of the inclusion of mar-za in this term, since it was once assumed to correspond to the Akkadian *parṣu* = Sumerian $garza_2$ (PA.AN/LUGAL) "rites" (Emesal mar-za), and therefore thought to refer to a ritual function (e.g., Lafont 2000:39f.). However, as Oh'e remarks, this understanding does "not aid our understanding of the function [of the term]" (1980:126), and it is moreover impossible that the term has any relation to Emesal. Recently, D'Agostino and Santagati (2008) have shown that mar-sa refers rather to a naval facility and its professionals; see below.

this function, it is unclear why other entities were entrusted with a similar role (e.g., the maškim), although there are only a few examples in which both such a group and a maškim appear in the same text (Text 110, 138, and see *RA* 27 1). At both Umma and Lagaš, these designations appear at the end of the tablet and consist of a list of between 2 and 14 names followed by the title. If there were any other kinds of entities at the same case (e.g., a governor or judges), these persons are identified before or directly after the list of names.

In spite of the ubiquity and frequency of these groups of people, their purpose and definition remains elusive even after a particularly rigorous series of scholarly inquiries.[50] A confusing mixture of persons filled both categories from local, provincial, and royal administrations. The fact that these groups were composed of a diverse assortment of officials and titles precludes the suggestion that their membership was based on family affiliations. It has been argued that these two designations refer to qualitatively different court functions (e.g., Oh'e 1980), but recently Molina (*forthcoming*), has suggested that they are essentially the same, arguing that some of the same individuals may serve in either type of group at either province, such as the aforementioned Gudea aba uru.

Moreover, some of these very people are found in lists of names that appear at the end of ditilas in untitled lists of names "before" whom the proceedings occurred (igi… še$_3$). The precise qualitative differences between these igi-še$_3$ lists and the other two types is not immediately clear, and there are at least a few ditilas in which igi-še$_3$ lists appear in the same text as one of the other types of groups (e.g., Text 49). The repeated presence of the same people in all types of lists indicates that the boundaries between these groups were not rigid. Generally, two men of the same occupation or family did not appear in the same list – at least as far as the limits of prosopography allow us to know.

[50] Falkenstein 1956:54ff., Krecher 1963, Oh'e 1980, Steinkeller 1989, and Molina (*forthcoming*). See these sources for comprehensive lists of the different variations of each term.

As for the nature of their involvement in di-procedures, the use of igi-$še_3$ and references to a group's presence at a "place" (ki), suggests that all such groups were involved in some part of the proceedings and were not merely invoked as the governors were. Moreover, the fact that some texts exist in which lu_2 (ki-ba) gub-ba, lu_2-mar-za, or igi-$še_3$ lists are the only entities present at proceedings also complicates the idea that they were neutral bystanders whose purpose was merely to observe and keep a memory. Oh'e (1980) has suggested that they were present to impart authority to final verdicts, but this suggestion is vitiated by the fact that some cases attended by such entities were not conclusively settled, unlike the cases overseen by governors, and, at Umma, such cases were often focused on developing an evidentiary process rather than settling a dispute. An overview of these terms and their use across time may yield further insights.

4.3.4.1 lu_2 (ki-ba) gub-ba

The Umma-attested term lu_2(ki-ba) gub-ba, which appears only after Amar-Sin 2 and throughout his reign, is difficult to assess. Molina (*forthcoming*) has recently evaluated the question of their purpose by conducting a prosopographical study of the 244 individual names of such entities at Umma, 166 of which were identifiable, and determined that groups of lu_2 gub-ba could consist of the following types of people: representatives of the provincial administration (roughly half of attested members), what he calls representatives of the royal administration (e.g., relatives of the sukkal-mah, military figures, and dependents of the sukkal-mah), and "professionals" (e.g., merchants), and local administrators (e.g., a hazanum or aba uru). Members of the Lagaš aristocracy could appear as lu_2 gub-ba at Umma as well. Molina concluded that these groups were

involved in the development of the case, though were not its final arbitrators, and therefore shared "coresponsibility" for the situation and its final outcome.

Indeed, groups of these men could attend cases in a variety of configurations with other types of entities. They appear alone (e.g., Text 49), and, among such cases are texts that also happen to explicitly state the matter was "in Umma" (e.g., Text 345 and 321, see Table 3.8), indicating their corporate affiliation and service to this city. Such groups can also appear with the governor (e.g., Texts 62, 369, or 346), who in some cases is qualified as "judge" rather than "governor" (e.g., Text 285), or with both the governor and a judge (Texts 110 and 138), but never with a judge alone. If a judge is mentioned, it is either because his maškim has attended the case to attest to a past decision of the judge (e.g., Text 316) or because he is a member of the list of lu_2 ki-ba gub-ba. While most cases that mention a group of lu_2 ki-ba gub-ba do not also mention a maškim, there is one attestation in which they appear together, as mentioned above (Text 49). Finally, according to the available data, the term was used only in cases that involved residents of the city of Umma; if another locale is cited in the ditila (e.g., Garšana or Nagsu, see Table 3.7), a lu_2 (ki-ba) gub-ba list is not provided (see Oh'e 2003:39).

4.3.4.2 lu_2-mar-za

Similarly, the changing body of Lagaš officials called lu_2 mar-za or lu_2 mar-za ki-ba gub-ba appears midway through the reign of Amar-Sin at year 5, replacing references to governors, and reaches preeminence by the reign of Ibbi-Sin. The rare designation lu_2 ki di-da-ka gub-ba ("men who served at the di") also appears around this time in two exemplars (Text 35 and 351), suggesting that various kinds of groups existed for engaging in di-procedures as collectives.



Figure 4.3. Frequency of the Presence of lu_2 mar-za at Lagaš.

Like the groups at Umma, then, a group of lu_2 mar-za men could serve alone and without the presence of judges or other officiating entities (e.g., Text 63), in the company of one or more judges (e.g., Text 67), or in the company of the governor (e.g., 205). In addition, there was often a maškim at the cases attended by a lu_2 mar-za group. Unlike the lu_2 gub-ba at Umma, these groups were present at cases involving members of the urban aristocracy as well as a number of cases that originated in other locales of the province (e.g., Text 83, from Guabba). It is also noticeable that most cases in which a list of lu_2-mar-za is provided make explicit mention either of a previous di, or of past occasions upon which a previous governor was involved in a dispute.

4.3.4.3 The lu_2 mar-za and lu_2 ki-ba gub-ba as "Courts"

Even if it is impossible to know, according to the current state of the corpus, what the precise role of these groups was or what contribution such men made in the course of

performing a di, several important observations are possible. Firstly, it is clear that persons from a relatively restricted circle of families filled these types of lists (Oh'e 1980:133), and that, like the members of the lu_2 gub-ba groups at Umma, such people enjoyed a number of different affiliations, coming from both formal institutions and semi-independent backgrounds.

The recent suggestion that Sumerian mar-sa refers to naval facilities (D'Agostino and Santagati 2008)[51] raises important questions about the designation lu_2-mar-za. Since it is impossible for the mar-za of this term to be related to cultic rites, the term is perhaps rather to be associated with mar-sa "dockyard," indicating that these groups were possibly a kind of "court" in their own right, and reminds of the *kārum,* "port authority," of the Old Babylonian period. However, the *kārum* is an institution in its own right, unlike the *ad hoc* groups called lu_2 mar-za, and the philological basis of their association limits its merit. However, tentative comparative arguments may be offered. It is well established that the Old Babylonian litigation system involved numerous forms of authorities ranging from specific offices and institutions, to judges, to various councils (e.g., the *puhrum* or *ālum*) (Dombradi 1996, Westbrook 2003:55-122, S. Lafont 2008, Renger 2008:201f.). Even though changes in social, economic, and political conditions between the Ur III and Old Babylonian periods are palpable, the above outlines show that the Ur III system of dispute resolution was similarly multi-faceted, involving groups and entities from different offices, professional entities, and local and provincial offices. If the groups of "bystanders" mentioned in Ur III texts from Umma and Lagaš were some precursor to the different courts of the Old Babylonian period, even though the in latter context courts were institutions rather than an *ad hoc* assemblages of officials. Just as Old Babylonian legal cases could travel from one court to another or combine two or more assemblies for the

[51] See also *UAVA* 8 185 (876), 271, T 82 98: guruš lu_2-mar-sa-me $munu_3$-gaz-a.

resolution of litigation (Yoffee 2005:119), so traveled cases in the Ur III period, as the previous chapter has already claimed.

All of the Ur III groups of men who attended or were somehow involved in cases had approximately the same denotation, acting as heading for an assortment of elite men from various families in the local, provincial, and state administrations, who were, at some point, associated with a case and contributed to or observed its conclusion with shared responsibility. The proposals of Falkenstein, Oh'e, and Molina need not be mutually exclusive; it is also certain that the presence of these men added to the legitimacy of the proceedings because of their presence as witnesses, ability to contribute to resolution, and, by way of their implication in cases and, presumably, the public's knowledge of this, their shared responsibility and accountability for outcomes.

The sudden appearance of such groups or *ad hoc* "courts" over the course of Amar-Sin's reign and the possibility that they worked independently of the governor's office as a separate *ad hoc* or official type of court assemblage deserves note. Once the provincial governors' offices lost or relinquished their monopoly over officiating disputes in the provincial capitals, aggressive competition for this role may have ensued, resulting in the sudden and increasing participation of multiple families and representatives of many different social units.

Thus, in both provinces, these groups could attend cases with or without other court entities. At Lagaš, these assemblies had a greater presence at cases but were conceived of as separate entities from judges, after whom they were listed. When a ditila states specifically that a case was settled/closed, it is either the governor or the judges to whom this achievement is attributed and not to the lu_2-mar-za. Meanwhile, at Umma, such boards were not separate from judges but could occasionally include one judge as a member of the group, with the exception of the cases at which the governor was identified

as judge. In this situation, the governor was conceived as the possessor of the di and credited with the resolution of a dispute, often indicated by the phrase di/di-til-la PN $ensi_2$-ka-ka, "di/ditila of the governor PN." The same construction is never used for groups of attending entities. However, while it consequently may appear that these groups were less eminent than governors or less effective at handling disputes, it should be noted that no text documents the return of a case after being handled by these groups; cases returned to court only if overseen by a governor or judge as well.

4.3.5 Case Witnesses (lu_2 inim-ma and lu_2 ki inim-ma)

The above categories of court attendees must be differentiated from the witnesses who participated in the proceedings because of their relationship to the dispute in question. Two terms designate these evidentiary witnesses: lu_2 inim-ma and lu_2 ki inim-ma, and, as Oh'e (1979, contra Falkenstein 1956) has pointed out, these terms must refer to two different kinds of witnesses since both could be used in the same record (e.g., Umma Text 51).

Differences between the two terms are indeed apparent, and it may be suggested that lu_2-inim-ma was simply the term denoting witnesses to evidentiary matters, including "facts," past events, transactions (e.g., Texts 46 or 47), or other types of support for the veracity of a disputant's claim. Thus the occupants of this role could range from family members to high-ranking affiliates of the disputant, to slaves (e.g., Text 49). The persons who served this role often took nam-$erim_2$ oaths or delivered statements in order to establish or refute a claim. These types of witnesses were never neutral participants in the proceedings, having been brought to court at the behest of the disputant who required their help; there is no record of court officiators summoning witnesses to the proceedings, though they could on a few occasions encourage the disputants to seek witnesses to more

effectively resolve their case (e.g., Text 287). Given that the goal of a di was often to publicly determine damages or recompense for an injured party, the purpose of the lu_2-inim-ma was also to establish the amount of these damages; hence the majority of their citations refer to a specific transaction or contract they were entitled to address, even if the witness was arguably not present at these events (see Texts 107, 108, 110).[52] In other words, lu_2-inim-ma is not synonymous with "eye witness," because there were a number of things to which such a witness could attest that were not necessarily observed.

Oh'e (ibid.) noted that the lu_2 ki inim-ma, by contrast, does not deliver statements or take oaths in the context of an Ur III di,[53] and thus his function remains obscure. The term is attested only at Umma in the Ur III period,[54] where, according to Oh'e (1979:73), such a figure was

> present only to verify the fact that legal proceedings took place and were concluded. He maintains neutrality. If the occurrence of the trial becomes an issue in the future, his knowledge of the affair would be helpful, and he might answer a summons to testify to the occurrence and conclusion of the legal proceedings as a lu_2-inim-ma, in this case an "eye-witness."

Accordingly, lists of lu_2 ki inim-ma were provided at the end the document before the names of the officiating entities. The composition of these groups could vary widely, and they do not represent a "stable juridical body" (contra Diakonoff 1985:54).

Molina (*forthcoming*), however, with access to hitherto unpublished ditilas, has been able to show that the lu_2 ki inim-ma a) witnessed transactions such as sales, loans and "other events involving promissory oaths, and thus were a type of transactional guarantor,"[55] b) witnessed contested transactions presented in the procedures, or c)

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[52] The idea of an "eye witness" is not specifically attested in the ditilas, though Heimpel (1981) finds such a concept in the Nanše Hymn, accompanied by the idea of an "ear witness." The literary context and poetic use of these distinctions, however, prevent us from applying such a distinction to the ditilas.
[53] For a list of other attestations of the term beyond the Ur III period, see Goetze 1966:127.
[54] Not at Lagaš, Nippur, or Ur.
[55] See Text 51, in which two of such witnesses are cited as having witnessed a purchase alongside a third person who is mentioned as the "guarantor" (lu_2 gi-na-ab-tum).

sometimes also appeared in the lu$_2$ ki-ba gub-ba rosters in ditilas (e.g., see *AnOr* 12 103 4 and *BPOA* 1 365), even if these two designations could coexist in one text. Thus, if Molina's observations are correct, these entities were witnesses who had a different investment in the proceedings than the lu$_2$-inim-ma. The former type of witnesses could be invested in the development of the procedure and serve as part of the court, while the lu$_2$-inim-ma was uninvolved in this aspect of the di and functioned only to substantiate the claims of disputants and perform any associated oaths or testimonies.

It is clear that witnesses were central to the evidentiary procedure regardless of province, but there could appear groups of witnesses at Umma that were personally uninvolved in the dispute in question, attending court to observe the resolution. The purpose of the lu$_2$ ki inim was probably to create public accountability.

4.3.6 The Disputants

The majority of the disputants of the ditilas came from the same limited array of socio-political circles as the men who served as case officiators and attendees of the court proceedings; most were not social underlings but high-ranking, wealthy elites who had positions as officials or were the close relatives and family members of officials. Disputants could be involved in the military (e.g., Text 201), religious institutions (e.g., Text 210), or come from various occupations within the provincial and royal courts.

There are two possible exceptions to this. Slaves, in spite of their unfree status, could attend court and plead their disputes before judge and governors just as easily as freemen; however, given that most of the slaves attested in the ditilas were in the service of elite families – members of their households, in fact – it is unlikely that the slaves in the Ur III courts were impoverished, lowly members of society forging their way through an unfamiliar, intimidating system in order to seek their freedom. Several texts report that the

slaves in question had free children or spouses, further emphasizing this point (e.g., Text 99). The fact that some slaves were debt-slaves, having sold themselves into this status after a financial crisis, indicates that some forms of slavery were temporary (ITT 3 6564).

Secondly, some texts report disputes that involved small-scale communities or collectives of people, such as $eren_2$ "laborers" (Text 213) or im-ri-a (Text 201), who were not as high-ranking as the majority of individuals mentioned in ditilas. However, these cases were explicitly regarded as disputes among the officials who were responsible for these groups and did not directly involve any member of the community itself.

These exceptions aside, a number of persons attested in the ditilas can be found not only as disputants in some cases, but they or their family members can elsewhere be found as witnesses, judges, as lu_2 ki-ba gub-ba or lu_2-mar-za, depending on province, or as the maškim.

4.4 Summary and Conclusions

The people who comprised the Ur III "courts" were not fixed bodies of entities, who, as a result of specialized training in legal matters, were entitled to be involved in the institutionalized manufacture of rules, even if they were concerned with matters of defining and perpetuating a normative order. Furthermore, these bodies were not connected to any one institution, as the foregoing has shown, and the locus of authority resided in court entities because of their daily occupations and political statuses rather than because of an explicit ordinance based on ability to practice law. In the limited span of time documented by the ditilas, we see the same individuals serve in a multiplicity of roles in the court system, participating in dispute resolution as a sort of social obligation that was deeply related to status and political relevance in the provincial community.

At the same time, the courts were not institutions in and of themselves. There was, to be accurate, no quintessential court and the dynamics and purposes shifted constantly not only according to who was present and what specific interests they held, but also in response to political currents emanating from both the state and local levels. Consequently, the size and shape of the Ur III court shifted significantly over the course of the period from one that was roughly synonymous with the governor's office to a multi-faceted body of officials that could best be described as a cohort of representatives from various elite families and professional guilds. Moreover, the court did not assume the same dimensions or configuration from one day to another, since these factors were determined by the participation of specific offices and families. It is my suggestion that this reflects a necessity of dispute resolution in an urban context; while disputes among members of rural communities, generally under the auspices of large household estates, could be overseen by an individual from the presiding household (see Chapter 3), the urban setting of these courts and the presence of multiple, competing families – many of whom were intermarried or professionally intertwined – required that more than one family be represented in the court, lest one gain precedence and authority over the others. The manifestations of this composition differed between the provinces of Umma and Lagaš.

It has long been assumed that "judicial authority was a royal prerogative" (e.g., Lafont and Westbrook 2003:193) in Mesopotamia and especially in the Ur III state, manifested in provincial institutions that enforced the king's statutes. While many participants in the Ur III dispute resolution system had important royal affiliations, this was not the basis of the authority they wielded in court settings and, according to the foregoing discussion, it was more likely the immediate provincial community that determined the degree to which elites could legitimately exercise power rather than a mandate from an

apparently removed crown. The issue of the state's control over provincial affairs thus needs revision, and is the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER 5

DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE TIME OF THE UR III STATE

5.1 Introduction

As discussed at the outset of this study, a problem of approaching the ditilas has been identifying an appropriate model for organizing, understanding, and analyzing this data. While studies of "primitive" or customary law provide examples of disputing and resolution processes in comparable smaller communities and emphasize lived processes and social dynamics, they often do not deal with complex states like that of the Ur III period. On the other hand, studies of dispute resolution in the context of states cannot be applied to the third millennium BCE without the impending danger of importing anachronisms, and are better suited for modern or colonial contexts far removed from early Mesopotamia. One product of the second example of legal inquiry, often called the formalist model of law or legal centralism (e.g., by Galanter 1981, J. Griffiths 1986; see below), in fact has a long history of application to Mesopotamian legal studies, even if Assyriologists have not used this precise terminology, and in spite of the fact that it has been thoroughly discredited by legal specialists.

Under the far-reaching shadows cast by the monumental Code of Hammurapi (CH) and Laws of Ur-Namma (LU), it has long been argued that the king was the central source of authority in the Ur III period, the "fount of justice and final arbiter" (Kuhrt 1995:66), the "supreme judge" (Edzard 1967:140) of an absolute regime, and the dispenser of justice

(Wilcke 2007), who, *de facto* and *de jure*, righteously established, institutionalized, and governed a legal system of his own creation (Westbrook and Lafont 2003:193). His laws were monumentally manifested in Codes that were to be copied throughout later centuries, enabling the transplantation of these laws across time and societies, reaching even to the modern world (Finkelstein 1981). The early Mesopotamian kings themselves endorsed this perspective, claiming legislative and judicial omnipresence, the ability to smite corruption and crime, shepherd their subjects through disputes and injustices, and render decisions and edicts within an equitable, statewide program of systematized justice (nig$_2$-si-sa$_2$) that no man could overturn.

But the hegemonic claims of the Ur III kings are amply contradicted by the stories told by the Umma and Lagash ditilas. Indeed, it is beyond question that the Ur III kings could, and occasionally did, oversee dispute cases, and in theory their decisions could overrule those of subordinate officials, as the king was the highest-ranking entity in the state. However, there are several reasons to entertain suspicion about their claims of supremacy, and the actual nature and degree of their investment in dispute resolution deserves investigation. If the descriptions and analyses of dispute resolution presented in the previous two chapters are accurate, then the king's involvement in disputing practices must be weighed against the reality of multiple, competing resolution authorities, the ability of officiating entities to overturn decisions of both subordinates and superiors, and the enormous variations in resolution methods between and within the provinces of Umma and Lagash, as well as across time. These factors, added to the reality that the Ur III "court" was not a coercive agent of a central institution, but rather an *ad hoc* assemblage of people who gathered for the performance of a di, undermine the notion of a centralized legal system under a single authority in the Ur III period.

This chapter aims to determine the role of the crown and state in the context of the ever-transforming dispute resolution system described in the previous pages, ultimately proposing a new descriptive model for dispute resolution in the Umma and Lagash provinces during this period that utilizes our findings from the previous chapters.

5.2 The Centralist Model of Ur III Law

According to studies in legal anthropology, the prevailing understanding of Ur III law – one in which the king presides as the active culmination of authority, the sole agent of legislation and jurisprudence – can be characterized as legal centralism, a formalist, positivistic model for law and state under which all legal studies and conceptualizations of law "stand in the shadow" (A. Griffiths 1998). Legal centralism, both an ideology and analytical model, was so termed by the early proponents of legal pluralism who self-consciously articulated its characteristics in pursuit of better approaches (J. Griffiths 1979 and Galanter 1981).[1] It can be summarized as follows:

> Baldly stated, the characteristics of this model, which derive from a modern Western legal paradigm, are that it promotes a uniform view of law and its relationship with the state, one which places law at the center of the social universe and which endorses normative prescriptions for interpreting society. In this model legal norms are set apart from, but privileged over, social norms and used to determine outcomes where conflict arises. All these attributes combine to create an autonomous legal field, one which presides over the hierarchy of social relations…"
>
> "In this context, authority became centralized in the form of the state, represented through government, the most visible symbol of which was the legislature. Law formed part of this process of government but was set apart from other government agencies, having its own specific institutions, such as courts and legal personnel who required specialist training. Law was conceived as gaining its authority from the state, and, as part of a process of government, it became authoritative. This authority, at its most basic level, was upheld through the power to impose and enforce sanctions " (A. Griffiths 1998a:29 and 30, citing J. Griffiths 1986, Roberts, 1979, Galanter 1981, Comaroff and Roberts 1981).

Numerous works in the field of legal anthropology have systematically dismantled legal centralism, to the extent that its vitality "has been so sapped by repeated attacks that the

[1] Even though this definition was articulated and demolished in the context of the creation of legal pluralism, the latter model faces a number of critiques of its own, including accusations of essentialism and rigid reifications of "common" versus "state" law (see Tamanaha 2000). Thus, while I adopt the critique of Legal Centralism advanced by the Legal Pluralists, I do not adopt general models of legal pluralism, which are better suited for some contexts over others.

paradigm is now virtually defunct" (Bennett 1998:655). Yet, it still prevails in the field of Mesopotamian Studies.

The original champions of the idea of a centralized, autonomous body of laws were the Ur III kings themselves. In LU, commissioned either by Ur-Namma (but see Kramer 1983, Michalowski and Walker 1983), the king claims to have established an equitable system of justice throughout the state:

niĝ$_2$-si-sa$_2$ kalam-ma ḫu-mu-ni-ĝar	I set up justice in the land.[2]

The text bolsters these assertions by listing the specific laws,[3] which deal with matters of the same nature as those found in the ditilas, such as marriage and family life, as well as matters unattested or only indirectly referenced in the ditilas, such as homicide. It is asserted that the relevance and application of these laws extends to all conquered territories incorporated into the state, but only in the case of one law can this claim be tentatively substantiated. A law pertaining to marriage dissolution states that:[4]

tukum-bi lu$_2$-u$_3$ dam-nitadam-a-ni in-tak$_4$-tak$_4$ 1 ma-na ku$_3$-babbar i$_3$-la$_2$-e	If a man leaves his primary spouse, he will pay her 1 mina of silver.

As Appendix 2 shows, most of the 13 attested marriage dissolutions from the Ur III period indeed concluded with a payment of 1 mina of silver from husband to wife. Explanation for the correspondence is difficult to produce, and the fact that most copies of LU date to several centuries later (Gurney and Kramer 1965:13) adds distance to the rift between

[2] Frayne (1997) E3.2.1.1.20 lines 180-1
[3] For authoritative editions and commentaries of LU, see Finkelstein (1969), Yildiz (1981), Roth (1995), Wilcke (2002).
[4] See law 6 of Finkelstein's (1969:22) publication of Si 277; law 9 of Yildiz's (1981) composite reconstruction of Si 277, *ISET* 2 128 (Ni 3191), and U 7739, see also Roth 1995 and Wilcke 2002.

actual Ur III divorce practices and the law as it appears in copies of LU. Importantly, the ditilas cited in Appendix 2 do not cite the LU as a resource on the situation, listing rather the names of court entities. Text 20 offers an exception, citing a payment of ten shekels to the wife in exchange for her forfeiture of future claims against her husband; this certainly suggests that the rule, if it was truly extant and practiced, was not applied to all primary wives. Of course, as Chapter 2 already argued, the circumstances behind these dissolutions are inaccessible.

Other laws deal with situations that resemble the disputes documented in ditilas, as with a law stating:[5]

tukum-bi $^{a\text{-}ša_3}$aša$_5$ lu$_2$ niĝ$_2$-a$_2$-ĝar-še$_3$ lu$_2$ i$_3$-ak ba-an-uru$_4$ di bi$_2$-dug$_4$ gu$_2$ in-ni-⌈šub⌉ lu$_2$-bi a$_2$-ni ib$_2$-ta-an-e$_{11}$-de$_3$	If someone forcibly cultivated the field of another, and he (the owner of the field) started a di against him, but he neglects him, this man will forfeit his expenses (i.e., labor and profit taken from the cultivation).

The situation addressed by this law is reminiscent of the obscurely reported event of the collective tablet Text 213:1-7 (Lagash, undated):

2/3 aša$_5$ sag aša$_5$ gu$_4$-ka engar ur-e$_2$-ninnu-ke$_4$ in-uru$_4$-a ur-e$_2$-ninnu saĝĝa ba-an-zu-a ⌈aša$_5$⌉-ba NIR-da in-ni-ĝar-ra [še$_3$]-bi e$_2$-gal ba-an-ku$_4$-ra [ur]-e$_2$-ninnu šabra dumu lugal-ša$_3$-la$_2$ [nam]-erim$_2$-am$_3$	Ur-Eninnu, the šabra, son of Lugal-šala swore that: the farmer of Ur-Eninnu, plowed 12 units of field; that Ur-Eninnu, the chief temple administrator, knew about this; that in this field an offense was committed; and that he (Ur-Eninnu the šabra) brought grain to the palace/temple (to compensate for the plowing).

According to this short account, the šabra (temple administrator) Ur-Eninnu sent a farmer to plow a field over which he had no charge. It is unclear if the nature of the offense was strictly that he plowed a field he was not authorized to manage, or if the field was

[5] Finkelstein's (1969:70) law 27; Wilcke 2002:320.

specifically designated for another use and its usufruct was compromised by the cultivation. The significance of the clause, "he knew about it," possibly indicates a "forcible" plowing of the field. Both the LU clause and the case of Text 213 deal with illicit plowing of fields over which the offender has no legitimate charge, but the event reported in Text 213 did not develop into an offense about delaying the procedures required to address the matter. At the same time, no version of LU addresses the consequences of forcible plowing as an isolated offense, so its relevance remains questionable even if LU retains an awareness of the common types of situations likely to expand into disputes.

Aside from the fact that the content of LU can only selectively be made relevant to the events recorded in ditilas, the fact is that there is no reason to assume that LU, or any law codes, had any bearing on the actual resolution of disputes. Several lines of inquiry pertaining to Old Babylonian law have discredited the idea that the codes were invoked in the context of court procedure, and these need only be summarized here (see Jackson 2008:9ff. and Rubio 2009:32f.). First, a number of studies have noted that Old Babylonian and Ur III court records do not mention the codes as a basis for the conclusion of cases nor do they display an obvious, working knowledge of their contents (Eilers 1932, Landsberger 1939). On the other hand, other investigations, focusing on the internal structures of the codes, have noted the inability of the compositions to be applied to any real, functioning society, owing to various loopholes and inconsistencies (Yoffee 1988, Roth 1995:4). Finally, studies that have sought to identify the socio-political and educational context of the codes, both as compositions and as physical monuments, have arrived at the conclusion that the codes are best considered part of literary (Finkelstein 1961, Roth 1995 and 1997) or scientific traditions (Kraus 1960, Bottéro 1992, Westbrook 2000, 2003:12ff.), though others have noted that the monumental context of these texts sets them apart from the other "legal" compositions of the scribal curriculum, commenting also

on the relative dearth of copies of codes (Michalowski and Walker 1989, Lafont 1994; see also Leemans 1991). In either case, no evidence of a legislative or judicial environment in which to situate the codes has been proven to exist.[6]

In short, after almost a century of research on the matter of early Mesopotamian law codes, no sufficient evidence has been offered to suggest that the composition of codes in any way resulted in the consummate dispensation of "law" across the land, centralizing the system under one legislative and judicial body. An alternative to these problems have been proposed by S. Lafont (2000b), who hypothesized the existence of an autonomously operating "common law" sub-stratum beneath the state level. However, the anachronistic association of this proposal with recent European Union approaches to law have been noted (Roth 2002:39, Jackson 2008:13). I add that the very notion of a "common law" requires a "state law" from which it is different; in the absence of legislation and centralized adjudication, there is no "state law" *per se*, and there is therefore no reason to postulate the existence of another realm of law that stood in contradistinction.

The superb scholarship on early Mesopotamian law codes has taught much about the scribal academy, early ideologies of kingship and state formation, and ideals of social order. In order to evaluate the extent and nature of the king's true role in dispute resolution during the Ur III period, however, it is perhaps more fruitful to return to the administrative documents.

5.3 The King and Disputes

Legal-administrative texts offer some piecemeal information about the king's role in dispute processes in the provinces of Umma and Lagash. Unfortunately, the Ur III data is

[6] Rubio (2009:34) has most recently addressed the issue, concluding that the codes were academic tractates on law used for the training of scribes who would practice as judges and legal experts." This explanation still struggles to address the observations initially noted by Eilers and Landsberger.

skewed in favor of these provinces, and fewer ditilas are known from the capital, Ur, or from Nippur, where decisions of the king or of royally-affiliated offices are found in a higher percentage of the court records.

However, in the Umma and Lagaš court records, direct references to the king, his household, or his envoys are scant, and the most common invocation of the king occurs in the promissory mu-lugal oath. In contrast to the mu-lugal oaths of the preceding Old Akkadian period, however, the Ur III exemplars do not cite the king by name.[7] While the Old Akkadian mu-lugal oaths could be sworn for specific promises, the Ur III oaths are far more generic, paired with any expression of intent or promise,[8] and thus suggesting that the invocation of the king was a general expression that accompanied, and possibly required, a promissory act.

5.3.1 Cases of the King

Few references to a di of the king can be securely dated to the Ur III period. The phrase di dab_5-ba lugal is often rendered as "judgment of the king" (see Attinger 1993:462)[9] but this understanding reflects the Old Babylonian usage of *dīnum*, which can refer to a final verdict or decision that ends a case; di is not necessarily used in this sense in legal documents of the Ur III period, as Chapter 2 already argued. A better translation might be "di accepted (by the) king" or "di taken up/over by the king."[10]

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[7] See, for example, *SR* 85:2 in which Naram-Sin is cited, or Krecher (1974:248 no. 21 line 21 [*MAD* 4 15]), which invokes Šarkališarri.
[8] E.g., see Krecher (1974:243 no. 19 line 19) for an oath of "not returning" after a sale, or Krecher (1974:259) no. 27 (*MAD* 4 14).
[9] The construction di.dab_5 in fact seems to refer to "laws" or "rules" in the Old Babylonian period, see Finkelstein 1967:43.
[10] Or something in the same sense as Finkelstein's understanding 1966:359: [pu]-uḫ-ru-um-e di-d[ab_5], "the assembly instituted for them the judicial process." =

Even though it is found in numerous compositions of later periods, the phrase di dab_5-ba lugal appears only twice[11] in Ur III court records, both times in texts from Ur. Text 114 dates to Ibbi-Sin 14, about a decade after documentation ceases in Umma and Lagaš and contains two seals of Ibbi-Sin. It concludes with the phrase and implicates the presence of the king's office as having overseen crucial parts of the case. *UET* 9 1156, also Ibbi-Sin 14, uses this expression but is badly damaged. In both cases, the king is not cited alone but among a list of men who bear the designation "judge."

In short, there are too few references to cases overseen by the king's office to make any overarching remarks, but the lack of references is certainly a function of the data. Perhaps more dispute records from Ur would clarify whether the king attended most or all cases in the province, and whether the disputants of such cases originated in provinces outside Ur.

5.3.2 Judges of the King (di-ku_5 lugal)

The role or title di-ku_5 lugal, "judge(s) of the king," is attested on and off during three millennia of Mesopotamian history. There are no uses of the term before the Ur III period, with the possible exceptions of a Girsu Sargonic text (L 4699, Foster 1980:40), a list of provisions for members of the royal family, officials, and four persons described as "judges" (Wilcke 2007:37), but this association is tentative.

There are only four attestations of "judges of the king" in the Ur III dispute records and in all examples the cases somehow involve Nippur.[12] In Lagaš Text 113, the office of Lagaš governor Ur-Lamma overturns a decision of the king's judges, but without

[11] IM 28051, published by van Dijk (1963) contains the phrase, but the lack of a date for the tablet and implication of a puḫrum ("assembly") allow the suggestion that this document is not from the Ur III period.
[12] The increased prominence of the king and his affiliates in Nippur cases of the Ur III period raises the question of whether this is reflected in the so-called "model court cases" of the Old Babylonian period, in which the king relegates decision-making to a puḫrum.

repercussion and on his own authority. Lagaš Text 117:rev. 3′-5′ reports that its case was overseen by "7 judges of the king" (di til-la di-ku$_5$ lugal imin-ba ša$_3$ Nibru^{ki}), but the text explicitly adds that the di occurred in Nippur. The case involves a delinquent payment owed by one disputant to the children of the other. That the document comes from Lagaš is indicated not only by the textual structure, but also by the fact that the disputants, Nammaḫ son of Ur-gigir and Ur-šağa, are amply attested in Lagaš with no Nippur attestations. Nammah is cited as performing the function of maškim at Lagaš in Text 13, while the other disputant, Ur-saga, identified as a nu-banda$_3$, is amply attested at Lagaš, and is also cited in the dispute reported by Text 94 where he also takes the title gu-za-la$_2$. The latter appears also in Text 39, from Ur, where he is listed among the case attendees in an igi-še$_3$ list.

Other references to "judges of the king" also come from Nippur texts. *BE* 3/1 14 (Šulgi 36.12.-) records a witnessed sale attended by Ur-Dumuzida "judge of the king" (line 7). The document contains a seal impression, of the seal of "Ur-Dumuzida, judge, your (Šulgi's) servant" (see Steinkeller 1989: no. 1). The fragmentary *NRVN* 1 249, also dating to Šulgi's reign, records a case with which Lu-diğira was involved, and the tablet contains impressions of a seal of Ur-Nisaba of Nippur. The restriction of "judges of the king" to Nippur suggests that this position was localized to the city, but only more documentation could substantiate this phenomenon.

More important for our purposes is the question of whether these judges held a higher position than other judges by virtue of their association with the king, that is, if the organization of court entities throughout the state was hierarchical. Given the dearth of sources for this matter, we may appeal to Fortner's (1999:417ff.) discussion of the king's judges in the Old Babylonian period. After the Ur III period, persons bearing this designation (DI$_5$.KU LUGAL/*šarrim*) are unattested until the reign of Hammurapi, save for

one example dating to the reign of Sabium (Harris 1961:119, Fortner 1999:418). Upon its reappearance, the designation is applied both to individual persons as well as collegia. Fortner considers whether this term, as well as that of "judges of Babylon," referred to a specific rung of judicial authority that indicates top-tier precedence over other judges or institutions, or whether the terms denote a specific institution in Babylon. Finding that such collegia were listed as subordinate to other kinds of court officials, and that "a bevy of other officials was required" (ibid. 483) to settle cases also attended by these judges, Fortner concluded that the idea of a "royal jurisdiction" was inapplicable to the Old Babylonian context and that such types of judges were not hierarchically superior to others (contra Harris 1961), but comprised yet another dimension in a complex variety of court entities characteristic of the Old Babylonian litigious system.

Because the legal system of Old Babylonian society has served as a paradigm of early Mesopotamian law, owing to the history of scholarship, its greater volume of litigious records, and important legacy of scholarship concerning CH, Fortner's conclusions are significant. If it cannot be demonstrated that the Old Babylonian king (or his judges) reserved a supreme role in adjudication in the Old Babylonian period (see also Leemans 1968), the role of the Ur III king and his judges is open for questioning as well.

The previous chapters have shown that a variety of officials, in a variety of different configurations, were available to attend resolution proceedings, that disputes could move vertically and horizontally between different groups of officials in pursuit of resolution, and that regional traditions and political developments dictated the manner in which these configurations formed and how they approached disputes. The Ur III "judges of the king" were not participants in these dynamics in Umma and Lagaš and their "jurisdiction," for lack of a better term, is localized to Nippur and Ur, where they served alone or with other

high-ranking officials.[13] When their paths crossed with residents of Umma and Lagaš, their authority over them was shared with other entities and thus limited.

5.3.3 Royal Messengers

However, identifying "judges of the king" is not the only method for detecting the participation of members of the royal household in Umma and Lagaš; persons from the royal household without the title appear in dispute records of these provinces. Royal messengers (lu_2 kin-gi_4-a lugal), for example, are also cited in ditilas.

An unprovenienced messenger text from Amar-Sin's reign (Allred 2006: text 3) reports provisions allotted for royal messengers on their visits to unknown locations. Among the listed provisions and messengers we find (rev. 1-3):

1 $sila_3$ tu_7 1 ku_6	1 quantity of soup, 1 fish
ur-^{d}šul-pa-e_3 lu_2 kin-gi_4-a lugal	(for) Ur-šulpa'e, messenger of the king,
u_4 maškim lu_2 di-da-ka-$še_3$ im-ĝen-na-a	when he went to the maškim, man of the di.

The entry suggests that royal messengers attended resolution procedures during their travels; however, the degree to which this service was performed on the behalf of the king is not clear. The ditilas confirm that royal messengers attended local cases, in which they are attested as serving as maškim (Text 106) and witnesses (Text 33, 67) at Girsu, and as attendees along with local officials (Text 69, 130, 287), maškim (Text 60, 365, 283), or

[13] Compare to the role of "judges of the king" in the Neo-Babylonian and Persian periods, whose purpose was explicitly to insert the king's power into cases and promote his law, see Wunsch (AOAT 252, pp. 557-595).

outside authorities who could investigate estates (Text 214[14]) at Umma. The messenger Awilatum is listed as an attendee in Text 351, which possibly comes from Susa.[15]

5.3.4 Royal Family Members and Associates

One ditila from Umma reports that its case was concluded before the governor, probably Ur-Lisi given the date of Amar-Sin 6, and before Lu-duga, son of the king (Text 286). It is difficult to identify other members of the royal household due to the lack of secure patronymics and sparse use of seals, so it remains impossible to accurately measure the degree to which royal princes were present in provincial cases.

Because of a few seal impressions, we can determine that persons with close associations with the royal household were involved in provincial cases, however. Seal impressions do not routinely appear on ditilas and from the entire corpus of ditilas there are less than 10 impressions. Text 356 (Umma, see Molina 1996) retains the impression of governor Ayakala, citing his subordination to the king Šu-Sin. The end of the document is partially broken, but it is clear that Ayakala's office attended the case in the company of other officials who were listed as "men who served." A ditila of the Lagaš governor Šarakam (Text 133) bears the governor's seal; the association of this man with the royal administration has already been discussed (see Chapter 4.3.1.2). The seals were undoubtedly in the possession of the governors' offices and do not indicate the physical presence of the king at these cases. The rest of seal impressions from the corpus belong to scribes. Umma court records with seals of scribes can be found in Text 265 309, 322, MM 701, MM 711a (MVN 18 516), BM 13944+A, BM 106239; and see Text 374 from Lagaš.

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[14] See Falkenstein's (1956:184) discussion of this text.

[15] Text 305 rev. col. 3 line 7 (unpublished) also contains a reference to a royal messenger: ^{d}šul-gi-si-lu-ul lu_2 kin-gi_4-a lugal maškim (AS 6).

5.3.5 Summary

The king had no greater role in dispute resolution in the core provinces than the provincial officials themselves, except potentially in Ur, where he is specifically cited in known cases, and Nippur, where judges bearing his seal implicated their affiliation with the king while overseeing cases. In Umma and Lagaš, the impact of the king's office is less palpable. While it is clear that various affiliates and members of the royal household participated in provincial dispute resolution when they were present in the cities, regular patterns of involvement cannot be detected and they typically served among other provincial elites. Thus, as S. Lafont (2000:18) has already suggested, the idea that the king intervened in issues throughout his kingdom is a gross exaggeration and, as we find here, unsupportable even in light of an incomplete data set.

This does not mean that the king was uninterested in disputing in provinces outside his own, and it is possible to suggest that he entertained cases from a variety of provinces throughout the kingdom while expecting his close "servants" – sons, colleagues, messengers – to serve at cases as well regardless of location. This service may be interpreted as a method of imposing the king's eyes and ears in local contexts, but more likely reflects the fact that all high-ranking officials were obligated to attend cases and, over the course of the period, such responsibility became increasingly shared among groups of officials. The royal household was only one of many households involved in these processes, and had a less visible or regular role in the performance of di-procedures at Umma and Lagaš that did other officials.

5.4 Summary and Conclusions

By removing the edifice of law from our study, we were able to see beyond matters of rules and regulations, engaging the ditilas from new directions. Whether or not we have arrived at a new, insightful definition or understanding of Ur III "law" remains open for debate, but several important aspects of dispute resolution have emerged.

First, we find that the participants of this system included a variety of urban households, including that of the king, who competed for the authority to oversee cases and were not organized as a pyramid, atop which the crown charted courses of procedure and bestowed power to subordinates. At Umma and Lagaš, the governors Ur-Lamma and Ur-Lisi, respectively, attempted to monopolize decision-making during their reigns, but upon their exit from office the turn of power served as an opportunity for representatives of other urban households to enter and participate as groups in dispute processing.

Second, we see that the di was a public civil procedure through which statuses of people and property were articulated and negotiated. Not all performances of this procedure were the result of conflict, many being routine functions of life events. However, the setting in which a di took place was never a neutral haven for the impartial application of equitable rules. Rather, these contexts were sites of intense competition among urban households, in which elites vied for professional titles, wealth, status, and affiliations. The di could thus be a cultural legitimation of status for some, taking place before the community, but it could also be a transformer of status, both positive and negative, for others. The di was thus also a site where upward and downward social mobility was possible.

Third, we have found that the decisions and confirmations accomplished by di-procedures were difficult to enforce in many cases. It was not the king's law, nor a community-wide ethos of preserving order (à la Cover 1983 or Parnell 1988), that resulted

in the successful conclusion of disputes, but rather a system of public accountability in which the risk of status damage was, very likely, a formidable incentive to abide by oaths and keep promises. Moreover, the binding forces of obligation and professional service experienced by high-ranking officials created a network of accountability, whereby officials could and did implicate one another in disputes in order to check contested behaviors.

Fourth, how the di was performed varied by province and was often subject to the particular configuration of officials who were invested in the dispute, even if they were not always physically present at the final stages of the proceedings.

These conclusions raise more questions than they answer. For one, questions are raised about how other segments of Ur III society processed disputes and by what system. In particular, it is worth asking whether the system described herein was practiced by only the top tiers of provincial society or was common, in some manifestation, throughout southern Mesopotamia. Moreover, the specific reasons for and why this system transformed into that of the Old Babylonian period are unknown, and a comparison of dispute processing between the two periods would be enlightening. Finally, did this system work?

Indeed, it is ultimately impossible to evaluate the degree of success or failure of this dispute resolution system. The decline of documentation early in Ibbi-Sin's reign and the subsequent demise of the Ur III state abruptly cut off our sources before we have a chance to evaluate the degree of efficacy or unwieldiness of the system, and thus its relation to the collapse of the Ur III state remains unknown.

APPENDIX 1

List of Ditilas:

1. NSGU 1 = UM 26 = KM 89026 = JCS 7 46
Lagaš, ŠS 6
Publications: V. Crawford (1954) JCS 8:46; Molina (2000) La Ley más Antigua 139 no. 28

2. NSGU 2 = L 05263= ITT 3/2 5263
Lagaš, ŠS 8
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 5263

3. NSGU 3 = L 3523 = ITT 2/1 3523
Lagaš, ŠS 7
Publications: Genouillac (1910-11) ITT 2/1 3523; Ch. Virolleaud (1903) RS 11 Di-tilla 185 no. 11; F. Pélagaud (1910) Babyloniaca 3 115 no. 22; Lafont and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 2 3523

4. NSGU 4 = L 06579 = ITT 3/2 6579
Lagaš, Š 39
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6579

5. NSGU 5 = L 06603 = ITT 3/2 6603
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6603

6. NSGU 6 = L 06550 = ITT 3/2 6550
Lagaš, ŠS 5
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6550; Lafont (2000) in Joannes (ed.), Rendre la justice en Mesopotamie no. 5

7. NSGU 7 = L 02781 = ITT 2/1 2781
Lagaš, Š 45?
Publications: H. de Genouillac (1910-11) ITT 2/1; Lafont and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 2 2781; Lafont (2000) in Joannes (ed.) Rendre la justice en Mesopotamie no. 11

8. NSGU 8 = L 06836 = ITT 5 06836
Lagaš, not dated
Publications: H. de Genouillac (1921) ITT 5 15

9. NSGU 9 = L 06582 = ITT 3/2 6582
Lagaš, not dated
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6582

10. NSGU 10 = L 06533 = ITT 3/2 6533
Lagaš, date illegible
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6533

11. NSGU 11 = L 06447 = ITT 3/2 6447
Lagaš, ŠS 1
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6447

12. NSGU 12 = RTC 288 = DAS 330
Lagaš, Š 32
Publications: F. Thureau-Dangin (1903) RTC 288; C. Virolleaud (1903) Di-tilla 36ff no. 20; F. Pelagaud (1910) Babyloniaca 3 101 no. 3

13. NSGU 13 = L 04191 = ITT 2/1 4191
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1910-11) ITT 2/1 4191; Lafont and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 2 4191

14. NSGU 14 = RT 22 153-4/1
Lagaš, ŠS 4
Publications: V. Scheil (1900) RT 22 153-4; C. Virolleaud (1903) Di-tilla 28f no. 15; F. Pelagaud (DATE) Babloniaca 3 114 no. 21; Molina (2000) La Ley más Antigua 139 no. 29

15. NSGU 15 = L 06444 = ITT 3/2 6444
Lagaš, date broken (ŠS-era)
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6444; Siegel (1947) Slavery during the Third Dynasty of Ur 22/47; Lafont (2000) in Joannes (ed.) Rendre la justice en Mesopotamie no. 4; Molina (2000) La Ley más Antigua 141 no. 31

16. NSGU 16 = L 06432 = ITT 3/2 6432
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6432

17. NSGU 17 = L 00958 = ITT 2/1 958
Lagaš, ŠS 2
Publications: Genouillac (1910-11) ITT 2 958; Lafont and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 1 958; Lafont (2000) in Joannes (ed.) Rendre la justice en Mesopotamie no. 7; see ITT 2/1 pl. 51; Molina (2000) La Ley más Antigua 140 no. 30 (listed erroneously as NSGU 15).

18. NGSU 18 = L 00960 + L06519 = ITT 2/1 960 + 3/2 6519
Lagaš, ŠS 3
Publications: Genouillac (1911) RA 8 26-28; H. Gennouillac (1910-11) ITT 2/1 960; Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6519; P. Koschaker (DATE) Rechtsvergleichende Studien

zur Gesetzebung Hammurapis 155ff; AOr 18/2 281/88; Lafont and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 1 960; Lafont (2000) in Joannes (ed.) Rendre la justice en Mesopotamie no. 2; see ITT 2/1 pl. 24

19. NSGU 19 = L 06610 = ITT 3/2 6610
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6610

20. NSGU 20 = L 00759 = RTC 289
Lagaš, Š 48
Publications: Ch. Virolleaud (1903) Di-tilla 34ff no. 18; F. Pélagaud (1910) Babyloniaca 3 105 no. 9; Genouillac (1911) RA 8 8f no. 7; Genouillac (1910-11) ITT 2 Š. 23 no. 759; F. Thureau-Dangin (DATE) Florilegium Melchior de Vogüé 596f; R. Jestin (DATE) Abrégé de Grammaire Sumérienne 108f; Š.A.B. Mercer (1913) 42; Lafont and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 1 759; RTC 289; Molina (2000) La Ley más Antigua 142 no. 32

21. NSGU 21 = L 06832 = ITT 5 6832
Lagaš, ŠS 2
Publications: Genouillac (1921) ITT 5 15; 6832

22. NSGU 22 = L 00948 = ITT 2/1 948
Lagaš, Š 47
Publications: Genouillac (1911) RA 8 25f; Genouillac (1910-11) ITT 1/2 50; Š.A.B. Mercer (1913) 38; Lafont and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 1 948; Lafont (2000) in Joannes (ed.) Rendre la justice Mesopotamie no. 3; see ITT 2/1 pl. 23

23. NSGU 23 = L 06555 = ITT 3/2 6555
Lagaš, ŠS 2
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6555; Ch. Virolleaud (1903) RS 11 Di-tilla 185f no. 12; Ch. Virolleaud (1903) Di-tilla 32ff no. 17; F. Pélagaud (1910) Babyloniaca 3 106 no. 10

24. NSGU 24 = L 06948 = ITT 5 6948
Lagaš, date unclear
Publications: H. de Genouillac (1921) ITT 5 6948; Lafont in Joannes (2000) Rendre la justice en Mesopotamie no. 6

25. NSGU 25 = L 06843 = ITT 5 6843
Lagaš, IS 1
Publications: H. de Genouillac (1921) ITT 5 6483

26. NSGU 26 = L 00931 = ITT 2/1 931
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: H. de Genouillac (1911) RA 8 22f; Genouillac (1910-11) ITT 2/1 931; Lafont and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 1 931; see ITT 2/1 pl. 21

27. NSGU 27 = L 06556 = ITT 3/2 6556
Lagaš, ŠS 9
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6556

28. NSGU 28 = L 06534 = ITT 3/2 6534
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6534

29. NSGU 29 = L 06528 = ITT 3/2 6528
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6528

30. NSGU 30 = BM 105382
Umma, not dated
Publications: T. Fish (1935) AnOr. 12 103 no. 4; Š. Oh'e (1979) ASJ 1: 69f

31. NSGU 31 = L 06573 = ITT 3/2 6573
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6573

32. NSGU 32 = L 00744 = ITT 2/1 744
Lagaš, ŠS 6
Publications: Genouillac (1910-11) ITT 2 744; Š.A.B. Mercer (1913) 40; A. Falkenstein ZA NF XI 181f ; Siegel (1947) Slavery during the Third Dynasty Ur 30ff; Lafont and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 1 744; ITT 2/1 pl. 4

33. NSGU 33 = L 11003
Lagaš, AS 5; related to 34

34. NSGU = L 03810 = ITT 2/1 3810
Lagaš, ŠS 5; related to 33
Publications: Genouillac (1910-11) ITT 2/1 3810; Lafont and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 2 3810; Lafont (2000) in Joannes (ed.) Rendre la justice en Mesopotamie no. 15

35. NSGU 35 = L 000925 = ITT 2/1 925
Lagaš, AS 5
Publications: Genouillac (1911) RA 8 19f; Genouillac ITT 2/1 46; Lafont and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 1 925; see ITT 2/1 pl. 18-19

36. NSGU 36 = L 06830 = ITT 5 6830
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1921) ITT 5 6830

37. NSGU 37 = L 06516 = ITT 3/2 6516
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6516; Sollberger (1976) AOAT 25 439ff no. 4; Sigrist (1995) FS Greenfield 612f no. 2; Lafont (2000) in Joannes (ed.) Rendre la justice en Mesopotamie no. 17

38. NSGU 38 = L 05657 = ITT 3/2 5657
Lagaš, ŠS 2

Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 5657; Siegel (1947) Slavery during the Third Dynasty of Ur 19/38, 23/21, 23/53

39. NSGU 39 = UET 3 0043
Ur, date broken
Publications: L. Legrain (1937) UET 3: 43

40. NSGU 40 = MM (Montserrate Musuem, Madrid) 0344 = N. Schneider AnOr 7 326
Umma, date broken
Publications: Molina MVN 18, 326; transliteration AuOr. Suppl. 11 (1996)

41. NSGU 41 = L 02789 = ITT 2/1 2789
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1910-11) ITT 2/1; Siegel (1947) Slavery during the Third Dynasty of Ur 24f; Lafont and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 2 2789; Lafont (2000) in Joannes (ed.) Rendre la justice en Mesopotamie no. 26; Neumann (2004) TUAT NF 1 12 1.14

42. NSGU 42 = L 05664 = ITT 3/2 5664
Lagaš, ŠS 4
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 5664; Siegel (1947) Slavery during the Third Dynasty of Ur 25ff

43. NSGU 43 = L 00751 = RTC 291
Lagaš, AS1.4
Publications: Ch. Virolleaud (1903) Di-tilla 10f no. 5; Pélegaud (1910) Babyloniaca 3 103f no. 6; Genouillac (1909) RA 7 6f no. 5; Genouillac (1910-11) ITT 2/1 Š. 22 751; Š.A.B. Mercer (1913) 38; Lafont and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 1 751; RTC 291

44. NSGU 44 = L 00748 = RTC 290
Lagaš, not dated
Publications: Ch. Virolleaud (1903) Di-tilla 4f no. 2; Pélegaud(1910) Babyloniaca 3 108 no. 13; Genouillac (1911) RA 8 5f no. 4; Genouillac (1910-11) ITT 2/1 748; Siegel (1947) Slavery during the Third Dynasty of Ur 38; Lafont and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 1 748; RTC 290; Molina (2000) La Ley más Antigua 125 no. 15

45. NSGU 45 = L 3532 = ITT 2/1 3532
Lagaš, ŠS 4
Publications: Genouillac (1910-11) ITT 2/1 3532; Š. Oh'e (1979) ASJ 1:73; Lafont and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 2 3532

46. NSGU 46 = L 06416
Lagaš, ŠS 3
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2

47. NSGU 47 = L 06536 = ITT 3/2 6536
Lagaš, date broken or illegible
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6536

48. NSGU 48 = BM 113035

Umma, AS 2
Publication: Fish (1935) AnOr. 12 104 8; Molina (2000) La Ley más Antigua 124 no. 14

49. NSGU 49 = MM 0495 (Montserrat Museum, Madrid) = Schneider AnOr 7 321
Umma, AS 2
Publications: Schneider (1932) AnOr 7:321; Cagni (1983) OrAnt 22:111; Molina (1993) MVN 18:321; Molina (1996) AnOr. Suppl. 11 (1996); Molina (2000) La Ley más Antigua 124 no. 13

50. NSGU 50 = L 06522 = ITT 3/2 6522
Lagaš, ŠS 4
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6522

51. NSGU 51 = AO 06167 = TCL 5 6167
Umma, AS 5.8
Publications: Genouillac (1922) TCL 5: 6167; Falkenstein (1939) ZA NF XI 184f; Oh'e (1979) ASJ 1: 69f

52. NSGU 52 = L 06538 = ITT 3/2 6538
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6537

53. NSGU 53 = L 06564 = ITT 3/2 6564
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6564; Ch. Virolleaud (1903) RS 11 Di-tilla 180 no.2; Ch. Virolleaud (1903) Di-tilla 8f no. 4; F. Pélagaud (1910) Babyloniaca 3 101 no. 2; Siegel (1947) Slavery during the Third Dynasty of Ur 13, 23/52; I Mendelsohn (DATE) Slavery 8;

54. NSGU 54 = L 000830 = ITT 2/1 830
Lagaš, AS 4.8
Publications: Genouillac (1911) RA 8 12f; Genouillac (1910-11) ITT 2/1 s. 30; Š. A. B. Mercer (1913) 39; Lafont and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 1 830; see ITT 2/1 pl. 10

55. NSGU 55 = L 05269 = ITT 3/2 5269
Lagaš, ŠS 3
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 5269

56. NSGU 56 = L 06526 = ITT 3/2 6526
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6526

57. NSGU 57 = L 01034 = ITT 2/1 1034
Lagaš, ŠS ?
Publications: Genouillac (1910-11) ITT 2/1 s. 55 (Appendix); Lafont and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 1 1034; see ITT 2/1 pl. 87

58. NSGU 58 = L 06529 = ITT 3/2 6529
Lagaš, date broken

Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6529

59. NSGU 59 = L 06517 = ITT 3/2 6517
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6517

60. NSGU 60 = BM 105379
Umma, date broken
Publications: Fish (1935) AnOr 12 102 2;

61. NSGU 61 = L 06514 = ITT 3/2 6514
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6514

62. NSGU 62 = BM 105347
Umma, ŠS 4.9
Publications: Fish (1935) AnOr 12, 101 no. 1; Steinkeller FAOS 17 (1989) 87; Lafont (2000) in Joannes (ed.) Rendre la justice en Mesopotamie (Paris) no. 24; Molina Ley mas anitgua (2000) 156 no. 46

63. NSGU 63 = L 06560 + L 06731 = ITT 3/2 6560 + 5 6731
Lagaš, date illegible
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6560;

64. NSGU 64 = L 06548 = ITT 3/2 6548
Lagaš, ŠS 6
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6548

65. NSGU 65 = L 06561 = ITT 3/2 6561
Lagaš, ŠS 6
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6561; Lafont (2000) in Joannes (ed.) Rendre la justice en Mesopotamie no. 20

66. NSGU 66 = L 06509 = ITT 3/2 6509
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6509

67. NSGU 67 = L 06541 = ITT 3/2 6541 + V 6829
Lagaš, IS 1
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6541; R. Englund (1990) BBVO 10 41 n.143

68. NSGU 68 = L00832 = ITT 2/1 832
Lagaš, ŠS 1
Publications: Genouillac (1911) RA 8 13f; Genouillac (1910-11) ITT 2/1 s. 30; M. David (DATE) Huwelijkssluiting 31/84; P. Koschaker (DATE) AOr 18/3 282/88; B.J. Seigel (1947) Slavery during the Third Dynasty of Ur 17ff; Lafont and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 1 832; see ITT 2/1 pl. 10

69. NSGU 69 = BM 105381

Umma, date broken
Publications: Fish (1935) AnOr 12 102 3; Lafont (2000) in Joannes (ed.) Rendre la justice en Mesopotamie no. ?

70. NSGU 70 = L 06727 = ITT 5 6727
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1921) ITT 5 6727; Siegel (1947) Slavery during the Third Dynasty or Ur 42ff

71. NSGU 71 = L 03519 = ITT 2/1 3519
Lagaš, AS 5
Publications: Genouillac (1910-11) ITT 2/1 3519; Siegel (1947) Slavery during the Third Dynasty of Ur 35f; Lafont and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 2 3519

72. NSGU 72 = L 06559 = ITT 3/2 6559
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6559; Siegel (1947) Slavery during the Third Dynasty of Ur 41f

73. NSGU 73 = L 06952 = ITT 5 6952
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1921) ITT 5 16; 6952

74. NSGU 74 = L 06609 = ITT 3/2 6609
Lagaš, ŠS 7
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6609; Siegel (1947) Slavery during the Third Dynasty of Ur 42

75. NSGU 75 = L 00235
Lagaš, ŠS 3
Publications: Molina (2000) La Ley más Antigua 131 no. 19

76. NSGU 76 = L06842 = ITT 5 6842
Lagaš, ŠS 9
Publications: Genouillac (1921) ITT 5 6842

77. NSGU 77 = L 06520 = ITT 3/2 6520
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6520

78. NSGU 78 = L 06527 = ITT 3/2 6527
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6527

79. NSGU 79 = L 00746 = ITT 2/1 746
Lagaš, ŠS 4
Publications: Genouillac (1911) RA 8: 4f; Genouillac (1910-11) ITT 2/1 21; Š.A.B. Mercer (1913) 40; Lafont and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 1 746; ITT 2/1 pl. 5; Molina (2000) La Ley más Antigua 127 no. 17

80. NSGU 80 = L 06439 = ITT 3/2 6439
Lagaš, ŠS 3
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6439; F. Thureau-Dangin (1913) RA 10 95ff; Siegel (1947) Slavery during the Third Dynasty of Ur 26, 31; J. Klíma (DATE) Untersuchungen zum altbabylonischen Erbrecht 7f

81. NSGU 81 = L6515 = ITT 3/2 6515
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6515

82. NSGU 82 = L 05246 = ITT 3/2 5246 + 6513
Lagaš, ŠS 7
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 5246 (+6513?); J. Klíma (DATE) Untersuchungen zum altbabylonishen Erbrecht 8/2-3

83. NSGU 83 = L 03541 = ITT 2/1 3541
Lagaš, not dated
Publications: Genouillac (1910-11) ITT 2/1 3541; Ch. Virolleaud (1903) RS 11 Di-tilla 183f no. 8; Ch. Virolleaud (1903) Di-tilla 24f no. 11; F. Pélagaud (1910) Babyloniaca 3 114 no. 20; Lafont and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 2 3514

84. NSGU 84 = L 06539 = ITT 3/2 6539
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6539; see also Falkenstein (1939) ZA NF 45: 169-194

85. NSGU 85 = L 06584 = ITT 3/2 6584
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6584

86. NSGU 86 = L 06593 + L 06615 = ITT 3/2 6593 + 6615
Lagaš, date broken or not dated
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6593 + 6615; Ch. Virolleaud (1903) RS 11 184 no. 9; Ch. Virolleaud (1903) Di-tilla 12f no. 4; F. Pélagaud (1910) Babyloniaca 1 110

87. NSGU 87 = L 00928 = ITT 2/1 928
Lagaš, ŠS 4
Publications: Genouillac (1911) RA 8 20f; Genouillac (1910-11) ITT 2/1 47; Siegel (1947) Slavery during the Third Dynasty of Ur 33f; Lafont and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 1 928; see ITT 2/1 pl. 20

88. NSGU 88= L00932 = ITT 2/1 932
Lagaš, ŠS 4
Publications: Genouillac (1911) RA 8 23f; Genouillac (1910-11) ITT 2/1 47; Š.A.B. Mercer (1913) 45; Lafont and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 1 932; Lafont (2000) in Joannes (ed.) Rendre la justice en Mesopotamie no. 18; see ITT 2/1 pl. 21

89. NSGU 89 = TÉL 111g.

Lagaš, ŠS 4
Publications: Virolleaud and Lambert (1968); Virolleaud (1903) Rev.Sem. 11 184 10; Pelagaud (1910) Babyloniaca 3 pl. 8, 17

90. NSGU 90 = L 06581 = ITT 3/2 6581
Lagaš, date undeterminable
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6581

91. NSGU 91 = L 06828 = ITT 5 6828
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1921) ITT 5 6828

92. NSGU 92 = L 06722 = ITT 5 6722
Lagaš, IS 1
Publications: Genouillac (1921) 5 6722

93. NSGU 93 = L 06841 = ITT 5 6841
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: H. de Genouillac (1921) ITT 5 15, 6841

94. NSGU 94 = L 06835 = ITT 5 6825
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: H. de Genouillac (1921) ITT 5 6835

95. NSGU 95 = L 06577 = ITT 3/2 6577
Lagaš, AS 4.11
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6577

96. NSGU 96 = L 06601 = ITT 3/2 6601
Lagaš, ŠS 4
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6601

97. NSGU 97 = L 06845 = ITT 5 6845
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1921) ITT 5 16, 6845

98. NSGU 98 = L 06571 = ITT 3/2 6571
Lagaš, ŠS 4
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6571; Ch. Virolleaud (1903) RS 11 181 no. 4; Ch. Virolleaud (1903) Di-tilla 14f no. 7; F. Pélaguad (1910) Babyloniaca 3 104f

99. NSGU 99 = L 05279 = ITT 3/2 5279
Lagaš, ŠS 4
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 5279; F. Thureau-Dangin (1913) RA 10 93ff; Siegel (1947) Slavery during the Third Dynasty of Ur 16/31, 20, 26, 33; Lafont (2000) in Joannes (ed.) Rendre la justice en Mesopotamie no. 12; C. Wilcke (1998) in M. Stol and Š. Vleeming (eds.) The Care of the Elderly in the Ancient Near East 50-51

100. NSGU 100 = L 06837 = ITT 5 6837

Lagaš, date broken
Publications: H. de Genouillac (1921) ITT 5 15, 6837

101. NSGU 101 = L 06724 + 06730 = ITT 5 6724 + 6730
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1921) ITT 5 6724 + 6730; TEL? 111 e; M. Lambert (DATE) RA 57, 95 3

102. NSGU 102 = L 06566 = ITT 3/2 6566
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6566

103. NSGU 103 = L 3529 = ITT 2/1 3529
Lagaš, IS 1
Publications: Genouillac (1910-11) ITT 2/1 3529; Lafont and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 2 3529; M. Malul (1988) Legal Symbolism 340

104. NSGU 104 = L 06844 = ITT 5 6844
Lagaš, date partially broken
Publications: H. de Genouillac (1921) ITT 5 15 6844

105. NSGU 105 = L 06567 = ITT 3/2 6567
Lagaš, ŠS 5?
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6567; Lafont (2000) in Joannes (ed.) Rendre la justice en Mesopotamie no. 21

106. NSGU 106 = L 00920 = ITT 2/1 920/1
Lagaš, ŠS 7?
Publications: Genouillac (1911) RA 8 14f; Genouillac (1910-11) 2/1 s. 44f; Š.A.B. Mercer (1913) 41; Lafont and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 1 920; see ITT 2/1 pl. 17

107. NSGU 107 = L 00929 = ITT 2/1 929
Lagaš, ŠS 4
Publications: Genouillac (1911) RA 8 21f; Genouillac (1910-11) ITT 2/1 47; Š.A.B. Mercer (1913) 41; Lafont and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 1 929; see ITT 2/1 pl. 20

108. NSGU 108 = L 05262 + L 06729 = ITT 3/2 5262 + 5 6729
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2

109. NSGU 109 = L 09009? = Bab III no. 19
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Ch. Virolleaud (1903) RS 11 182 no. 6; C. Virolleaud (1903) Di-tilla 20f no. 9; F. Pélaguad (1910) Babyloniaca 3 113f; C. Virolleaud and M. Lambert (1968) TEL 3/1

110. NSGU 110 = AO 06058 = TCL 5 6058
Umma, AS 5.4
Publications: H. de Genouillac (1922) TCL 5 6058; Š. Oh'e (1980) ASJ 2: 126

111. NSGU 111 = MM 0522 (Montserrat Museum, Madrid) = N. Schneider AnOr. 7 322
Umma, not dated
Publications: N. Schneider (1932) AnOr 7:322; L. Cagni (1983) OrAnt 22:111; Molina (1993) MVN 18, 322; P. Attinger (1993) ELS 462; Molina (1996) AuOr. Suppl. 11

112. NSGU 112 = L 06575 = ITT 3/2 6575 = CDLI P111382
Lagaš, not dated
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6575; Lafont (2000) in Joannes (ed.) Rendre la justice en Mesopotamie no. 13

113. NSGU 113 = L 01010 = ITT 2/1 1010 + ITT 5 6848
Lagaš, Š 40
Publications: Genouillac (1911) RA 8 31f; Genouillac (1910-11) ITT 2/1 s. 56f (only ITT 2/1 1010); Š.A.B. Mercer (1913) 42; Falkenstein (1939) ZA NF 45: 169-194; Lafont and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 1 1010; see ITT 2/1 pl. 28

114. NSGU 114 = IM ? (Baghdad) = UET 3 45
Ur, IS 14?.8?
Publications: L. Legrain (1937) UET 3 195, 45

115. NSGU 115 = L 6849 = ITT 5 6849
Lagaš, ŠS 6
Publications: H. de Genouillac (1921) ITT 5 16, 6849

116. NSGU 116 = L 06607 = ITT 3/2 6607
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6607

117. NSGU 117 = L 06532 = ITT 3/2 6532
Lagaš, ŠS 1
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6532

118. NSGU 118 = L 06547 = ITT 3/2 6547
Lagaš, IS 2
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6547

119. NSGU 119 = L 06586 = ITT 3/2 6585
Lagaš, ŠS 3
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6585

120a. NGSU 120a = BM 105393
Umma, AS 6.6
Publications: Fish (1938) Iraq 5: 159, 168

120b. NSGU 120b = AO 6163 = TCL 5 6163
Umma, AS 6.6
Publications: H. de Genouillac (1922) TCL 6 6163

121. NSGU 121 = AO 6165 = TCL 6 6165
Umma, AS 8.5
Publications: H. de Genouillac (1922) TCL 5 6165

122. NSGU 122 = BM 112949 (Rs. s. Tf. 13)
Umma, Not dated
Publications: Fish (1935) AnOr 12 104 no. 7

123. NSGU 123 = L 06707 = ITT 5 6707
Lagaš, AS 9.10.25
Publications: Genouillac (1921) ITT 5 6707; Molina (2000) La Ley más Antigua 135 no. 23

124. NSGU 124 = HS 1259 = TMH NF 1-2 259
Nippur, SS3.5.17
Publications: A. Pohl TMH NF (1937) 1-2 259

125. NSGU 125 = MLC 109 Le Problème des Habiru Š. 7
Unknown, not dated
Publications: A Goetze, l. c. Š. 5; J. Bottéro CSA 12 7 (1954)

126. NGSU 126 = L 00734 = ITT 2 734
Lagaš, ŠS 6
Publications: Genouillac (1910-11) ITT 2 734; C. Virolleaud (1903) Di-tilla 6 no. 3; F. Pelagaud (1910) Babyloniaca 3 111 no. 16; H. de Genouillac (1911) RA 8: 2; Siegel (1947) Slavery During the Third Dynasty of Ur 35; Lafont and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 1 734; RTC 307

127. NSGU 127 = AO 06164 = TCL 5 6164
Umma, AS 7.12
Publications: Genouillac (1922) TCL 5 6164; Falkenstein (1939) ZA NF 11 183f; Molina (2000) La Ley más Antigua 137 no. 26

128. NSGU 128 = L 06524 = ITT 3/2 6524
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6524

129. NSGU 129 = L 06558 = ITT 3/2 6558
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6558; see also Falkenstein (1939) ZA NF 45: 169-194

130. NSGU 130 = YBC 00277 = YOS 4 31
Umma, AS 3
Publications: C.E. Keiser (1919) YOS 4 31

131. NSGU 131 = L 03538 = ITT 2/1 3538
Lagaš, ŠS 6

Publications: Genouillac (1910-11) ITT 2/1 3538; Š. Oh'e (1980) ASJ 2: 126; Lafont and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 2 3538; Neumann (1996) AoF 23 257-9; Lafont (2000) in Joannes (ed.) Rendre la justice en Mesopotamie no. 14; Neumann (DATE) Verkvertrag p. nn.

132. NSGU 132 = BM 105384
Umma, AS 2
Publications: Fish (1935) AnOr. 12 103 no. 5

133. NSGU 133 = L 00805 = ITT 2/1 805
Lagaš, AS 5
Publications: Genouillac (1911) RA 8 10f; Genouillac (1910-11) ITT 2/1 s. 28; A. Deimel (DATE) C(shin)L 457, 39a; Lafont and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 1 805; ITT 2/1 pl. 9

134. NSGU 134 = L 06512 = ITT 3/2 6512
Lagaš, ŠS 7
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6512

135. NSGU 135 = AO 2512 = RTC 292 = DAS 332
Lagaš, AS 1
Publications: F. Thureau-Dangin (1903) RTC 292; DAS 332; Ch. Virolleaud (1903) Di-tilla 24 no. 12; F. Pelagaud (1910) Babyloniaca 3 103 no. 5

136. NSGU 136 = L 06840 = ITT 5 6840
Lagaš, AS 4.4
Publications: Genouillac (1921) ITT 5 6840

137. NSGU 137 = AO 06169 = TCL 5 6169
Umma, AS 5
Publications: Genouillac (1922) TCL 5 6169; see also G. Farber (DATE) Fs. Kraus 35

138. NSGU 138 = UIOM 938
Umma, ŠS 6.10
Publications: only NSGU, Falkenstein (1956-7) text 138

139. NSGU 139 = L 05626 = ITT 3/2 5626 (uncollated)
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 5626

140. NSGU 140 = L 06531 = ITT 3/2 6531
Lagaš, AS 4.5
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6531

141. NSGU 141 = L 06592 = ITT 3/2 6592
Lagaš, ŠS 4
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6592

142. NSGU 142 = L 06834 = ITT 5 6834
Lagaš, Š 45

Publications: Genouillac ( ) ITT 5 6834

143. NSGU 143 = L 06463 = ITT 3/2 6463
Lagaš, ŠS 5
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6463

144. NSGU 144 = AO 06170 = TCL 5:6170
Umma, AS 3.4
Publications: H. de Genouillac (1922) TCL 5 6170

145. NSGU 145 = L 06572 = ITT 3/2 6572
Lagaš, AS 7
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6572; Ch. Virolleaud (1903) RS 11 183 no. 7; Ch. Virolleaud (1903) Di-tilla 28 no. 14; F. Pélagaud (1910) Babyloniaca 3 112f

146. NSGU 146 = L 01008 = ITT 2/1 1008
Lagaš, ŠS 2
Publications: Genouillac (1911) RA 8 30; Genouillac (1910-11) ITT 2/1 s. 56; Š.A.B. Mercer (1913) 46; Lafont and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 1 1008; see ITT 2/1 pl. 27

147. NSGU 147 = L 06831 = ITT 5 6831
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1921) ITT 5 6831

148. NSGU 148 = L 06726 = ITT 5 6726
Lagaš, IS 3
Publications: Genouillac (1921) ITT 4 6726

149. NSGU 149 = L 06599 = ITT 3/2 6599
Lagaš, AS 7
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6599

150. NSGU 150 = L 06951 = ITT 5 6951
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1921) ITT 5 6951

151. NSGU 151 = L 06596 = ITT 3/2 6596
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: H. Genoullac (1912) ITT 3/2 6596

152. NSGU 152 = L 11002 Tf. 15
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: only NSGU, Falkenstein (1956-7) text 152

153. NSGU 153 = L 06608 = ITT 3/2 6608 (Vs. s. Tf. 15)
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6608

154. NSGU 154 = L 06521 = ITT 3/2 6521

Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6521

155. NSGU 155 = L 06507 = ITT 3/2 6597
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6597

156. NSGU 156 = L 06595 = ITT 3/2 6595
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6595

157. NSGU 157 = L 06600 = ITT 3/2 6600
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6600

158. NSGU 158 = L 06833 = ITT 5 6833
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1921) ITT 5 6833

159. NSGU 159 = L 06947 = ITT 5 6947
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1921) ITT 5 16 (under no. 6950)

160. NSGU 160 = L 06602 = ITT 3/2 6602
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6602

161. NSGU 161 = L 06540 = ITT 3/2 6540
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6540

162. NSGU 162 = L 06735 = ITT 5 6735
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1921) ITT 5 6735

163. NSGU 163 = L 06551 = ITT 3/2 6551
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6551

164. NSGU 164 = L 06734 = ITT 5 6734
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1921) ITT 5 6734

165. NSGU 165 = L 06562 = ITT 3/2 6562
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6562

166. NGSU 166 = L03516 = ITT 2/1 3516
Lagaš, AS 1

Publications: Genouillac (1910-11) ITT 2/1 3516; Š.A.B. Mercer (1913) 40; Lafont and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 2 3516

167. NSGU 167 = L 06578 = ITT 3/2 6578
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6578

168. NSGU 168 = L 06542 = ITT 3/2 6542
Lagaš, ŠS ?
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6542

169. NSGU 169 = L 03547 = ITT 2/1 3547
Lagaš, ŠS 5
Publications: Genouillac (1910-11) ITT 2/1 3547; P. Koschaker (DATE) ZA 35:210; E. Szlechter (DATE) L'affranchissement 179ff; San-Nicolò (DATE) Schussklauseln 186f; G. Dossin (1948) AHDO 3 146f; G. Dossin (DATE) RA XLII 119; M. Malul (1988) 340f; Lafont and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 2 3547; Molina (2000) La Ley más Antigua 133 no. 21; Š. Greengus ( ) JAOS 89: 532 note 142; Jacobsen

170. NSGU 170 = L 03542 = ITT 2/1 3542
Lagaš, ŠS 1
Publications: Genouillac (1910-11) ITT 2/1 3542; Ch. Virolleaud (1903) RS 11 181f no. 5; Ch. Virolleaud (1903) Di-tilla 26f no. 13; F. Pélagaud (1910) Babyloniaca 3 106f no. 11; M. San Nicolò (1992) Schlußklauseln 97/30; Š.A.B. Mercer (1913) 41; Siegel (1947) Slavery during the Third Dynasty of Ur 18; I. Mendelsohn (DATE) Slavery 7; Lafont and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 2 3542

171. NSGU 171 = L 03514 = ITT 2/1 3514
Lagaš, ŠS 7
Publications: Genouillac (1910-11) ITT 2/1 3514; Ch. Virolleaud (1903) RS 11 180 no. 1; Virolleaud (1903) Di-tilla 36f no. 19; F. Pélagaud (1910) Babyloniaca 3 104 no. 7; Lafont and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 2 3514

172. NSGU 172 = L 06535 = ITT 3/2 6535
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6535

173. NSGU 173 = L 06594 = ITT 3/2 6594
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6594

174. NSGU 174 = L 04159 = ITT 2/1 4159
Lagaš, ŠS 2
Publications: Genouillac (1910-11) ITT 2/1 4159; Lafont and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 2 4159

175. NSGU 175 = L 02802 = ITT 2/1 2802
Lagaš, ŠS 2

Publications: Genouillac (1910-11) ITT 1/2; Š.A.B. Mercer (1913) 41; Lafont and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 1 2802

176. NSGU 176 = AO 2449 = RTC 294
Lagaš, not dated
Publications: F. Thureau-Dangin (1903) RTC 294; DAS 331; C. Virolleaud (1903) Ditilla 2f no. 1; F. Pelagaud (1910) Babyloniaca 3 100 no. 1; Š.A.B. Mercer (1913) 41; Molina (2000) La Ley más Antigua 126 no. 16

177. NSGU 177 = L 00752 = ITT 2 752
Lagaš, AS 1
Publications: Genouillac (1911) RA 8 7f; Genouillac (1910-11) ITT 2/1 (752) Š. 22; Š.A.B. Mercer (1913) 39; Siegel (1947) Slavery during the Third Dynasty of Ur 43/47; E. Szlechter (1952) L'affranchissement 180; Lafong and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 1 752; ITT 2/1 pl. 5

178. NSGU 178 = L 06544 = ITT 3/2 6544
Lagaš, ŠS 2
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6544

179. NSGU 179 = L 06580 = ITT 3/2 6580
Lagaš, ŠS 1
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6580; F. Pélagaud (1910) Babyloniaca 3 107

180. NSGU 180 = L 05656 = ITT 3/2 5656
Lagaš, ŠS 1?
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 5656

181. NSGU 181 = L 06523 = ITT 3/2 6523
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6523

182. NSGU 182 = L 06437 = ITT 3/2 6437
Lagaš, AS 2
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6437

183. NSGU 183 = L 06754 = ITT 5 6754
Lagaš, ŠS 2
Publications: Genouillac (1921) ITT 5 6754

184. NSGU 184 = L 00936 = ITT 2/1 936
Lagaš, Š 47
Publications: Genouillac (1911) RA 8 24f; Genouillac (1910-11) ITT 2/1 936; Š.A.B. Mercer (1913) 38 no. 2; Siegel (1947) Slavery during the Third Dynasty of Ur 43ff; Lafont and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 1 936; Lafont (2000) in Joannes (ed.) Rendre la justice en Mesopotamie no. 29; see ITT 2/1 pl. 22

185. NSGU 185 = L 6847 = ITT 5 6847
Lagaš, date broken

Publications: Genouillac (1921) ITT 5 6847

186. NSGU 186 = L 06569 = ITT 3/2 6569
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6569

187. NSGU 187 = L 06598 = ITT 3/2 6598
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6598; F. Pelagaud (1910) Babyloniaca 3 102

188. NSGU 188 = L 06565 = ITT 3/2 6565
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6565

189. NSGU 189 = BM 105346
Umma, ŠS 5.11
Publications: Fish (1938) Iraq 6: 185f ; R. Englund (1990) BBVO 10: 160-162

190. NSGU 190 = L 06545 = ITT 3/2 6545
Lagaš, ŠS 6
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6545; Siegel (1947) Slavery during the Third Dynasty of Ur 9f

191. NSGU 191 = L 06838 + L 06839 = ITT 5 6838 + 6839
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1921) ITT 5 6838 and 6839

192. NSGU 192 = L 06568 = ITT 3/2 6568
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6568

193. NSGU 193 = L 06613 = ITT 3/2 6613
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6613

194. NSGU 194 = L 00963 = ITT 2/1 963
Lagaš, AS 7
Publications: Genouillac (1911) RA 8 28f; Genouillac (1910-11) ITT 2/1 s.52; Š.A.B. Mercer (1913) 39; Lafont and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 1 963; see ITT 2/1 pl. 26

195. NSGU 195 = L 06563 = ITT 3/2 6563
Lagaš, AS 3.12
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6563; Siegel (1947) Slavery during the Third Dynasty of Ur 12

196. NSGU 196 = L 02775 = ITT 2/1 2775
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1910-11) ITT 2/1 2775; Lafont and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 2 2775

197. NSGU 197 = AO 3738 = RTC 293
Lagaš, ŠS 1
Publications: F. Thureau-Dangin (1903) RCT 293; C. Virolleaud (1903) Di-tilla 16ff, no. 8; F. Pelagaud (1910) Babyloniaca 3 108 no. 14; Š.A.B. Mercer (1913) 44; H. Sauren (1970) ZA 60 71 3

198. NSGU 198 = L 06846 = ITT 5 6846
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1921) ITT 5 6846

199. NSGU 199 = L 06537 = ITT 3/2 6537
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6537

200. NSGU 200 = A 31810 = HLC 3 143 (HLb 381)
Lagaš, Š 44.9
Publications: G. Barton (1905-14) HLC 143 pl. 18; T. Maeda (1980) ASJ 2:223

201. NSGU 201 = AO 6059 = TCL 5 6059
Umma, not dated
Publications: Genouillac (1922) TCL 5 6059

202. NSGU 202 = AO 06168 = TCL 5 6168
Umma, not dated
Publications: Genouillac (1922) TCL 5 6168; B. Lafont (2000) in Joannes, Rendre la justices en Mesopotamie no. 31

203. NSGU 203 = VAT 07046 = OrSP 47-49
Ur, AS 7.3
Publications: N. Sneider (1930) OrSP 47-9 145

204. NSGU 204 = L05276 + L06570 = ITT 3/2 5276 + 6570
Lagaš, ŠS 5
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 5276 and 6570; F. Thureau-Dangin (1913) RA 10 94/4; M. David (1927) Adoption 22f; J. Klíma Untersuchungen zum altbabylonischen Erbrecht 8/3-4; Siegel (1947) Slavery during the Third Dynasty of Ur 13ff; J. Klíma (DATE) JCS 5: 37/14; G. Dossin (1948) AHDO 3 146f; G. Dossin (1948) RA XLII 119;

205. NSGU 205 = L 05286 = ITT 3/2 5286
Lagaš, ŠS 4
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 5286; Falkenstein (1939) ZA NF 45: 169-194; W. Sallaberger (1999) OBO 160/3 225-227 (lines 1-42); C. Wilcke (1998) in M. Stol and Š. Vleeming (eds.) The Care of the Elderly in the Ancient Near East 51; Molina (2000) La Ley más Antigua 128 no. 18

206. NSGU 206 = L 06557 = ITT 3/2 6557
Lagaš, date broken

Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6557

207. NSGU 207 = L 00923 = ITT 2/1 923
Lagaš, AS 1
Publications: Genouillac (1910) RA VIII 15ff; Genouillac (1910-11) ITT 2/1 45; Š.A.B. Mercer (1913) 37 no. 1; Lafont and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 1 923; Lafont (2000) in Joannes (ed.) Rendre la justice en Mesopotamie no. 30; Neumann (2000) in Bongenaar (ed.) Interdependence of Institutions and Private Entrepreneurs 129ff.

208. NSGU 208 = VAT 02512 = TU(T) 164/14
Lagaš, Š 37
Publications: G. Reisner (1901) TUT 164/14; G. Pettinato (1985) SVS 1/1, 164/14; P. Steinkeller (2002) Money-Lending Practices 126 no. 2-3

209. NSGU 209 = HS 1271 = TMH NF 1-2 271
Lagaš, ŠS 5.11
Publications: A. Pohl (1937) TMHC NF 1-2 47; Çig and Kızılyay (1959) ZA 53 57; Krecher (1995) AOAT 240 154 11

210. NSGU 210 = VAT 02366 = TUT 125
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: G. Reisner (1901) TUT 125; G. Pettinato (1985) SVS 1/1 125

211. NSGU 211 = L 06518 + L 06543 = ITT 3/2 6518+6543
Lagaš, AS 7
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6518 and 6543; P. Steinkeller (1989) Sale Documents 86

212. NSGU 212
Umma, Š 42
Publications: Falkenstein (1957) NSGU 212

213. NSGU 213 = L00924 = ITT 2/1 924
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Genouillac (1911) RA 8 17ff; Genouillac (1910-11) ITT 2/1 45f; Š.A.B. Mercer (1913) 41); Lafont and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 1 924; see ITT 2/1 pl. 18-19; K. Maekawa (1988) ASJ 65, 69

214. NSGU 214 = AO06047 = TCL 5 6047
Umma, not dated
Publications: Genouillac (1922) TCL 5 6047

215. NSGU 215 = AO 06048 = TCL 5 6048
Umma, not dated
Publications: H. de Genouillac (1922) TCL 5 6048; M. Civil (1993) Studies in Honor of William W. Hallo 76

216. NSGU 216 = L 09530 = ITT 5 9530
Lagaš, Š 40

Publications: H. de Genouillac (1921) ITT 5 9530

217. NSGU 217 = L 03272 = ITT 2/1 3272
Lagaš, Š 46
Publications: Genouillac (1910-11) ITT 2/1 3272; N. Schneider (1940) Or NS 9 6; Lafont and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 2 3272

218. NSGU 218 = L 03354 = ITT 2/1 3354
Lagaš, AS 3
Publications: Genouillac (1910-11) ITT 2/1 3354; N. Schneider (1940) Or NS 9 6; Lafont and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 2 3354

219. NSGU 219 = L 06588 = ITT 3/2 6588
Lagaš, AS 7
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6588; N. Schneider (1940) Or NS 9 6

220. NSGU 220 = L 03401 = ITT 2/1 3401
Lagaš, AS 8
Publications: Genouillac (1910-11) ITT 2/1 3401; Lafont and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 2 3401

221. NSGU 221 = L 00810 = ITT 2/1 810
Lagaš, ŠS 1
Publications: Genouillac (1911) RA 8 11f ; Genouillac (1910-11) ITT 2/1 s. 28f; N. Schneider (1940) Or NS 9 6f; Lafont and Yildiz (1989) TCTI 1 810; Sallaberger (1999) OBO 160/3 215; see ITT 2/1 pl. 9

222. NSGU 222 = L 05629 = ITT 3/2 5629
Lagaš, ŠS 8
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2; N Schneider (1940) Or NS 9:7

223. NSGU 223 = L 06046 = ITT 3/2 6046
Lagaš, ŠS 8
Publications: Genouillac (1912) ITT 3/2 6046; N. Schneider (1940) Or NS 9 7

224. NSGU 224 = L 06032 = ITT 3/2 6032
Lagaš, IS 1-2
Publications: H. Genouilllac (1912) ITT 3/2 6032; N Schneider (1940) Or NS 9 7

225. MAH 16455
Lagash, IS 3
Publications: E. Sollberger (1958) JCS 12/3:105-107; H. Sauren (1969) WMAH 1; H. Sauren (1974) MVN 2 1; M. Civil (1993) FS Hallo 76

226. L 11063
Lagash, IS 1
Publications: Çig, M., H. Kızılyay, and Falkenstein (1959) ZA 19:52, no. 1

227. L 11070

Lagash, date broken
Publications: Çig, M., H. Kızılyay, and Falkenstein (1959) ZA 19:54, no. 2

228. L 11074
Lagash, date broken
Publications: Çig, M., H. Kızılyay, and Falkenstein (1959) ZA 19:54, no. 3

229. L 11079
Lagash, date broken
Publications: Çig, M., H. Kızılyay, and Falkenstein (1959) ZA 19:55, no. 4

230. L 11050
Lagash, date broken
Publications: Çig, M., H. Kızılyay, and Falkenstein (1959) ZA 19:56, no. 5

231. L 11061
Lagaš, ŠS 5
Publications: Çig, M., H. Kızılyay, and Falkenstein (1959) ZA 19:61, no. 6; quasi-duplicate of 209, (NSGU 209; orig. A. Pohl, TMHC NF I-II 271)

232. L 11089
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: Çig, M., H. Kızılyay, and Falkenstein (1959) ZA 19:63, no. 7

233. L 11090
Lagaš, AS 8
Publications: Çig, M., H. Kızılyay, and Falkenstein (1959) ZA 19:66, no. 8

234. L 11066
Lagash, date broken
Publications: Çig, M., H. Kızılyay, and Falkenstein (1959) ZA 19:68, no. 9

235. L 11069
Lagash, date broken
Publications: Çig, M., H. Kızılyay, and Falkenstein (1959) ZA 19:69, no. 10

236. L 11071
Lagash, IS 1
Publications: Çig, M., H. Kızılyay, and Falkenstein (1959) ZA 19:70, no. 11

237. L 11072
Lagash, date broken
Publications: Çig, M., H. Kızılyay, and Falkenstein (1959) ZA 19:72, no. 12

238. L 11073
Lagash, not dated
Publications: Çig, M., H. Kızılyay, and Falkenstein (1959) ZA 19:72, no. 13

239. L 11077

Lagash, not dated
Publications: Çig, M., H. Kızılyay, and Falkenstein (1959) ZA 19:73, no. 14

240. L 11075
Lagash, not dated
Publications: Çig, M., H. Kızılyay, and Falkenstein (1959) ZA 19:74, no. 15

241. L 11076
Lagash, not dated
Publications: Çig, M., H. Kızılyay, and Falkenstein (1959) ZA 19:74, no. 16

242. L 11004
Lagaš, IS 4
Publications: Çig, M., H. Kızılyay, and Falkenstein (1959) ZA 19:76, no. 17; Š. Oh'e (1979) ASJ 1: 73

243. L 11060
Lagash, AS 3
Publications: Çig, M., H. Kızılyay, and Falkenstein (1959) ZA 19:78, no. 18

244. L 11059
Lagash, date broken; pre-Ur III?
Publications: Çig, M., H. Kızılyay, and Falkenstein (1959) ZA 19:79, no. 19

245. L 11051
Lagash, ŠS 9
Publications: Çig, M., H. Kızılyay, and Falkenstein (1959) ZA 19:80, no. 20

246. L 11078
Lagash, AS 8
Publications: Çig, M., H. Kızılyay, and Falkenstein (1959) ZA 19:81, no. 21

247. L 11053
Lagash, Š 47
Publications: Çig, M., H. Kızılyay, and Falkenstein (1959) ZA 19:83, no. 22

248. L 11056
Lagash, ŠS 2
Publications: Çig, M., H. Kızılyay, and Falkenstein (1959) ZA 19:85, no. 23

249. L 11065
Lagash, ŠS 1
Publications: Çig, M., H. Kızılyay, and Falkenstein (1959) ZA 19:86, no. 24

250. L 11068
Lagash, ŠS 4
Publications: Çig, M., H. Kızılyay, and Falkenstein (1959) ZA 19:89, no. 25

251. L 11062

Lagash, ŠS 1
Publications: Çig, M., H. Kızılyay, and Falkenstein (1959) ZA 19:90, no. 26

252. VAT 12823
Lagaš, date broken
Publications: B. Kienast (1959) ZA 19:93-96

253. BM 105398
Lagash, ŠS 5
Publications: Fish (1935) AnOr 12 104 no. 6

254. Sollberger 1 = BM 014821
Lagaš, Š 45.8
Publications: Sollberger (1976) AOAT 25 (FS Kramer) 435 text 1

255. Sollberger 2 = BM 015350
Lagaš, Š 46
Publications: Sollberger (1976) AOAT 25 (FS Kramer) 437 text 2

256. Sollberger 3 = BM 014440
Lagaš, AS 6
Publications: Sollberger (1976) AOAT 25 (FS Kramer) 439 text 3

257. Sollberger 4 = Sigrist 2 = BM 019359
Lagaš, ŠS 3
Publications: Sollberger (1976) AOAT 25 (FS Kramer) 439 text 4; Sigrist (1995) FS Greenfield 612 text 2; C. Wilcke (1998) in M. Stol and Š. Vleeming Care of the Elderly in the Ancient Near East 48

258. Sollberger 5 = Sigrist 3 = BM 019360
Lagaš, ŠS 3
Publications: Sollberger (1976) AOAT 25 (FS Kramer) 440 text 5; Sigrist (1995) FS Greenfield 613 text 3

259. Sollberger 6 = Sigrist 1 = BM 019356
Lagaš, ŠS 6
Publications: Sollberger (1976) AOAT 25 (FS Kramer) 441 text 6; Sigrist (1995) FS Greenfield 610f text 1; B. Lafont (2000) Rendre la Justice 57 no. 16; Molina (2000) La Ley mas Antigua 130 no. 20

260. Sollberger 7 = BM 015839
Lagaš, not dated; ŠS era
Publications: Sollberger (1976) AOAT 25 FS Kramer: 442f text 7

261. Sollberger 8 = BM 015798
Lagaš, not dated
Publications: Sollberger (1976) AOAT 25 FS Kramer: 443f text 8

262. AOAT 25, 445 = Sollberger 9 = R. Scottish M, Edinburgh

Lagaš, not dated
Publications: Sollberger (1976) AOAT 25 (FS Kramer) 444f text 9

263. Sollberger 10 = BM 013994 + 013994a (envelope)
Lagaš, envelope IS 2.4.14; tablet IS4.4
Publications: Sollberger (1976) AOAT 25 (FS Kramer) 447 text 10; Gomi, Tohru and Sato (1990) SNAT 210; B. Lafont in Joannes (ed.) Rendre la justice en Mesopotamie no. 28

264. Sollberger 11 = BM 014977
Lagaš, IS 2.5
Publications: Sollberger (1976) AOAT 25 (FS Kramer) 448 text 11

265. Sollberger 12 = BM 014985
Lagaš, IS 1.6
Publications: Sollberger (1976) AOAT 25 (FS Kramer) 448 text 12

266. Sollberger 13 = BM 014909
Lagaš, not dated
Publications: Sollberger (1976) AOAT 25 (FS Kramer) 449 text 13

267. SNAT 321 = BM 106218
Umma, AS2
Publications: Gomi and Sato (1990) SNAT 117 no. 321

268. SNAT 334 = BM 106427
Umma, AS2.12
Publications: Gomi and Sato (1990) SNAT 122 no. 334; Lafont in Š. Lafont (1997) Jurer et maudire 10-11, 42-47; B. Lafont (2000) Rendre la justice en Mesopotamie no. 23

269. SNAT 374 = BM 106404
Umma, AS6
Publications: Gomi and Sato (1990) SNAT 138 no. 374; C. Wilcke (1998) in M. Stol and Š. Vleeming (eds.) The Care of the Elderly in the Ancient Near East 52-53

270. Sigrist 4 = BM 022867
Unknown, ŠS 1
Case: Sigrist (1995) FS Greenfield 614f text 4

271. Sigrist 5 = BM 025077
Lagaš, not dated
Publications: Sigrist (1995) FS Greenfield 616 text 5

272. Sigrist 6 = BM 029980
Unknown, not dated
Publications: Sigrist (1995) FS Greenfield 617 text 6

273. Sigrist 7 = BM 019102
Unknown, date broken

Publications: Sigrist (1995) FS Greenfield 618 text 7

274. Molina FS Pettinato 1 = BM 022858
Lagaš, AS3
Publications: Molina (2004) FS Pettinato text 1

275. Molina FS Pettinato 2 = BM 022861
Lagaš, AS3?
Publications: Molina (2004) FS Pettinato text 2

276. Molina FS Pettinato 3 = BM 022871
Lagaš, ŠS?
Publications: Molina (2004) FS Pettinato text 3

277. Molina FS Pettinato 4 = BM 023678
Lagaš, AS8.4
Publications: Molina (2004) FS Pettinato text 4

278. Molina FS Pettinato 5 = BM 023747
Lagaš, AS 3?
Publications: Molina (2004) FS Pettinato text 5

279. Molina FS Pettinato 6 = BM 025739
Lagaš, AS8.4
Publications: Molina (2004) FS Pettinato text 6

280. Molina FS Sigrist 1 = BM 106527
Umma, AS 5.12

281. Molina FS Sigrist 2 = BM 106550
Umma, AS2

282. Molina FS Sigrist 3 = BM 085441
Umma, Š 48.4

283. Molina FS Sigrist 4 = BM 110379
Unknown, undated

284. Molina FS Sigrist 5 = BM 105369
Umma, AS2

285. Molina FS Sigrist 6 = BM 106439
Umma, AS 5.7

286. Molina FS Sigrist 7 = 106540
Umma, AS 6.7

287. Molina FS Sigrist 8 = BM 106551
Umma, AS 6.1

288. Molina FS Sigrist 9 = BM 106614
Umma, AS 2

289. Molina FS Sigrist 10 = BM 111148
Umma?, AS 2

290. BM 015855 = unpublished
Lagaš, date broken

291. BM 018173 = unpublished
Lagaš, not dated

292. BM 018844 = unpublished
Lagaš, Š 42.4

293. BM 021024 = unpublished
Lagaš, ŠS 5

294. BM 021411 = unpublished
Lagaš, Š 47

295. BM 022859 = unpublished
Lagaš, not dated

296. BM 022973 = unpublished
Lagaš, Š 44.5

297. BM 024554 = unpublished
Lagaš, ŠS 1

298. BM 024557 = unpublished
Lagaš, not dated

299. BM 025455 = unpublished
Lagaš, not dated

300. BM 025456 = unpublished
Lagaš, not dated

301. BM 029156 = unpublished
Unknown, not dated

302. BM 082688 = unpublished
Lagaš, AS 9.4

303. BM 095539 = unpublished
Lagaš, ŠS 8

304. BM 095843 = unpublished

Lagaš, ŠS 1

305. M 105339 = unpublished
Umma, AS 6

306. BM 106219 = unpublished
Umma, not dated

307. BM 106442 = unpublished
Umma, AS 8.5

308. BM 106451 = unpublished
Umma, not dated

309. BM 106457 = unpublished
Umma, ŠS 2

310. BM 106466 = unpublished
Umma, Š 37.12

311. BM 106468 = unpublished
Umma, not dated

312. BM 106470 = unpublished
Umma, AS 5

313. BM 106476 = unpublished
Umma, ŠS 3.4

314. BM 106479 = unpublished
Umma, AS 4

315. BM 106482 = unpublished
Umma, AS 5.9

316. BM 106495 = unpublished
Umma, AS 5.9

317. BM 106498 = unpublished
Umma, AS 5.12

318. BM 106509 = unpublished
Umma, not dated

319. BM 106525 = unpublished
Umma, not dated

320. BM 106536 = unpublished
Umma, AS 5

321. BM 106537 = unpublished
Umma, Š 41

322. BM 106612 = unpublished
Umma, ŠS 3

323. BM 106641 = unpublished
Umma, AS 2

324. BM 107277
Umma, AS 2
Publications: Ozaki and Sigrist (2006) BPOA 1 972

325. BM 108178 = unpublished
Umma, not dated

326. BM 110171 = unpublished
Umma, AS 8

327. BM 110490 = unpublished
Umma, not dated

328. BM 110603 = unpublished
Umma, Š 39

329. BM 110614 = unpublished
Umma, AS 8

330. BM 110793 = unpublished
Umma, AS 3

331. BM 111032 = unpublished
Umma, AS 2

332. BM 111052 = unpublished
Umma, ?

333. RA 71, Durand 1977
Private archive?, IS 2
Publications: B. Lafont (2000) in Joannes (ed.), Rendre la justice en Mesopotamie no. 9

334. CBS 11572 = Myhr. BE 3-1 007
Nippur, IS 3
Publications: D.W. Myhrman (1910) Sumerian Administrative Documents from the Second Dyn. Of Ur Pl. 4 no. 7; Š.A.B. Mercer (1913) 42); A Hattori (2001) CRRAI 45-2 75

335. CBS XXXXX = Myhr. BE 3-1 004 = BDTNS 001674

Nippur, AS 7.1.25
Publications: D. Myhrman (1910) Sumerian Administrative Documents from the Second Dyn. Of Ur. Pl. 3 no. 4; Š.A.B. Mercer (1913) 43

336. CBS XXXXX = Myhr. BE 3-1 011 = BDTNS 001681
Nippur, AS 5.11.11
Publications: D. Myhrman (1910) Sumerian Administrative Documents from the Second Dynstasty of Ur Pl. 5 no. 11; Š.A.B. Mercer (1913) 43

337. CBS 5136 = Myhr. BE 3-1 14
Nippur, Š 36.12.-
Publications: D. Myhrman (1910) Sumerian Administrative Documents from the Second Dynasty of Ur Pl. 10 no. 14; Š.A.B. Mercer (1913) 43; P. Steinkeller (1989) Sale Documents 1; A. Hattori (2001) CRRAI 45-2 89 1

338. Myhr. BE 3-1 018 = BDTNS 001667
Nippur, IS 4.1
Publications: D. Myhrman (1910) Sumerian Administrative Documents from the Second Dynasty of Ur Pl. 10 no. 18; Š.A.B. Mercer (1913) 43

339. CBS 08291 = NATN 098 = BDTNS 024975
Nippur, IS 2.6
Publications: Fish (1936) JAOS 56/4: 494; D. Owen (1982) NATN 98; Neumann (2004) TUAT NF 1 13 1.15 (with translation)

340. H. de. Genouillac (1914) RA 11: 27
Umma, ŠS 3
Publications: H. de. Genouillac (1914) RA 11: 27; Š. Oh'e (1980) ASJ 2: 135

341. CMAA 015-C0019 (California Museum of Ancient Arts)
Adab, Š 48 (Widell 2002: §13)
Publications: M. Widell (2002) "A Previously Unpublished Lawsuit from Ur III Adab" CDLJ 2002:2.

342. A. 1255_1982 = BCT 2 156
Umma, AS 1
Publications: P. Watson and W.B. Horowitz (1993) BCT 2 156; W. Sallaberger (1994) OLZ 89 544

342. BM 111173 = unpublished
Umma, not dated

343. BM 111186 = unpublished
Umma, AS 2

344. BM 106170 = SNAT 360
Umma, AS 5.9.-
Publications: Gomi and Sato (1990) SNAT 360

345. BM 106209 = SNAT 320
Umma, AS 2
Publications: Gomi and Sato (1990) SNAT 320; Sallaberger (2008) 173

346. BM 106161= SNAT 373
Umma, AS 5.7.-
Publications: Gomi and Sato (1990) SNAT 373; Wilcke (1991:16); Westbrook (1996)

347. BM 106157 = SNAT 535
Umma, Date missing
Publications: Gomi and Sato (1990) SNAT 535; Neumann (1996)

348. BM 105377 = MCS 2 75
Umma, AS 4.12.-
Publications: Fish (1952) MCS 2 75; Wilcke (1998:49)

349. BM 106773 = BPOA 1 495
Umma, AS 2.11.-
Publications: Ozaki and Sigrist (2006) 495; Sallaberger (2008:172)

350. Aynard 1
Lagaš, AS 7.5.7
Publications: Durand (1979) RA 73:26 no. 2

351. HSM 7749
Susa, not dated
Publications: Owen (1982) MVN 11 185

352. HSM 7172
Umma, ŠS 5.12.-
Publications: Owen (1982) MVN 11 162

353. Nik. 2 447
Umma, AS 3.11.-
Publications: Steinkeller (2004:100), Neumann (2005:19)

354. CFC 12
Umma, date broken
Publications: Grégoire (1970) AAS 79

355. BM 106428
Umma, not dated (month 11)
Publications: Gomi and Sato (1990) SNAT 541; Molina (2000:136) Ley más Antigua no. 27; Sallaberger (2008:170) no. 32

356. MM 426
Umma, date missing
Publications: Schneider (1932:342); Molina (1993) MVN 18 342; Molina (1996)

357. MM. 928+943
Umma, Date missing
Publications: Molina (1993) MVN 18 635; Molina (1996)

358. BM 106658
Umma, AS 2
Publications: Ozaki and Sigrist (2006) BPOA 1 382; Sallaberger (2008:168)

359. BM 12867
Lagaš, date missing
Publication: Ozaki and Sigrist (2006) BPOA 1 7

360. BM 106880
Umma, AS 2
Publications: Ozaki and Sigrist (2006) BPOA 1 602

361. BM 106878
Umma, AS 5.1.-
Publications: Ozaki and Sigrist (2006) BPOA 1 600

362. BM 106944
Umma, AS 2
Publications: Ozaki and Sigrist (2006) BPOA 1 664

363. BM 106945
Umma, AS 2
Publications: Ozaki and Sigrist (2006) BPOA 1 665

364. BM 107073
Umma, not dated
Publications: Ozaki and Sigrist (2006) BPOA 1 786

365. BM 107141
Umma, AS 3
Publications: Ozaki and Sigrist (2006) BPOA 1 852

366. BM 107173
Umma, AS 2
Publications: Ozaki and Sigrist (2006) BPOA 1 878

367. BM 107413
Umma, not dated
Publications: Ozaki and Sigrist (2006) BPOA 1 1086

368. BM 107626
Umma, AS 2
Publications: Ozaki and SIgrist (2006) BPOA 1 1285

369. BM 106172

Umma, AS 6.6.-
Publications: Gomi and Sato (1990) SNAT 372

370. L 2643
Lagaš, AS 5
Publications: Genouillac (1910) ITT 2 2643; Lafont and Yildiz (1996) TCTI 2 2643

371. BM 106218
Umma, AS 2
Publications: Gomi and Sato (1990) SNAT 321

372. IES 134
Umma, AS 2
Publications: Steinkeller (1989) 100; Owen and Mayr (2008) CUSAS 3 1420

373. BM 106880
Umma, AS 2
Publications: Ozaki and Sigrist (2006) BPOA 1 602; Owen and Mayr (2006) 1419

374. BM 27844
Lagaš, IS 5.6.-
Publications: de Maaijer (2001) Studies Veenhof 7; Molina (2001:143-144) JAOS 121

375. IM 54370
Umma, AS 2
Publications: van Dijk (1963) ZA 55 54370

376. BM 106751
Umma, AS 2
Publications: Ozaki and Sigrist (2006) BPOA

377. Bowden Tablet
Umma, AS
Publications: Johnson and Veenker (*forthcoming*)

APPENDIX 2

References to Ur III Marriage Dissolutions:[1]
* Indicates the name of the husband

Text	Year/ Prov.	Sumerian	Translation	Case Initiator	Fault?	Payment to Wife
4	Š39, Lagaš	ur-^{d}ig-alim dumu ur-^{d}šul-pa-e$_3$-ke$_4$ / a-ša$_6$ dumu ur-meš$_3$ in-tak$_4$	*Ur-Igalim son of Šulpa'e left Aša, daughter of Urmeš	Unclear; missing	Unclear	1 mina
22	Š47, Lagaš	^{I}nin-munus-zi dumu PN$_1$ lu-^{d}ba-ba$_6$-ke$_4$ dumu PN$_2$ in-tak$_4$	*Lu-Baba son of PN$_2$ left Nin-munuszi daughter of PN$_1$	Husband (Lu-Baba)	Wife's; for not performing "proper spousal duties"	None
20:2-4	Š48, Lagaš	^{I}geme$_2$-^{d}en-lil$_2$-la$_2$ lu$_2$-^{d}utu dumu nig$_2$-^{d}ba-ba$_6$-ke$_4$ in-tak$_4$	*Lu-Utu, son of Nig-Baba, left Geme-Enlila	Probably the wife (Geme-Enlila)	Husband's; the wife has entitlement to demand 1 shekel	10 shekel for not suing
207, case 3	AS 1, Lagaš	^{I}ba-ba$_6$-nin-am$_3$ dumu AN.PU$_3$ nar / amar šuba$_3$ dumu ur-kisal-ke$_4$ in-tak$_4$	*Amar-šuba son of Ur-kisal left Baba-ninam daughter of AN.PU the musician	Unclear; too abbreviated	Unmentioned	Wife is of musician clique; AN.PU mentioned in following case (207:25)
SNAT 372	AS 6, Umma	nu-ur$_2$-^{d}eš$_4$-tar-e dam in-tak$_4$	*Nur-Eštar left (his) wife	Father of wife	Husband's; for abduction	1 mina
Sigrist Text 4	ŠS 1, Lagaš	ur-^{d}ba-ba$_6$-ke$_4$ ninKAgina in-tak$_4$	*Ur-Baba left NinKAginia	Wife	Husband's; for breach of expectations regarding living arrangements	None mentioned
5	ŠS,[2] Lagaš	[a-kal]-la dumu ba-a-ke$_4$ / [mu-da-x-ta] im-ti-dam du[mu-x-x] / [a]-ba-ilum / [in]-tak$_4$	*Akala son of Ba left, in year x, Imtidam daughter of Aba-ilum	Unclear; missing	Presumably the husband's (Falkenstein 1956:7)	Probable, but broken (Falkenstein 1956:6-7).

[1]See also Text 169 case 2, in which a woman's status of "wifeship" (nam dam) is overturned, and see Text 210, case 3, which appears to deal with the payment of a divorce settlement of 2/3 mina. Text 192 also references the dissolution of a marriage, but is far too fragmentary to discuss.

15: rev. 4	ŠS,[3] Lagaš	ḫa-la-^{d}ba-ba$_6$ ba-tak$_4$	Ḫalababa was left; He left Ḫalababa	Parents of another woman	Husband's; promised to another woman	None
23	ŠS 2 Lagaš	$^{\lceil}$šul-gi-u$_3$-nam-ti dumu ku$_5$-da nar-ke$_5$ geme$_2$-^{d}nanna dumu lu$_2$-bala sa$_6$-ga nar in-tuku-am$_3$ in-tak$_4$	*Šulgi-namti son of Kuda the musician married Geme-Nanna daughter of Lu-balasga the musician and left her.	Husband, who later retracts	Unclear	Likely but missing
205, case 2	ŠS 4, Lagaš	ka-ta ba-tak$_4$	Kata was left; He left Kata	Presumably the husband	Wife's; for involvement with another man	None
25	IS 1	[geme$_2$]-^{d}nin-gir$_2$-su-$^{\lceil}$ka$^{\rceil}$ ba-tak$_4$	Geme-Ningirsu was left; He left Geme-Ningirsu	Unclear	Unclear (see Falkenstein 1956:40-41)	None

[2] Probably dates to the reign of Šu-Sin based on the presence of judges Lu-Šara and Lu-diĝira.
[3] Undoubtedly dates to the reign of Šu-Sin based on the presence of the judges Lu-Šara, Lu-Ibgal, Lu-dingira, and Ur-Ištaran.

APPENDIX 3

Selected Text Editions

1. Text 270. BM 22867, Sigrist 1995: no. 4. Lagaš, ŠS 1. Concerning the Dissolution of a Marriage.

1 di til-la
2 nin-KA-gi-na dumu/ lu_2-^{d}nanna-ka
3 ur-^{d}ba-ba_6 dumu di-gi_4-di-gi_4-ke_4
4 in-tuku- am_3
5 nin-KA-gi-na-ke_4
6 e_2 lu_2-^{d}nanna ab-ba/-na-ka
7 ur-^{d}ba-ba_6-ra
8 zag in-na-us_2-sa-am_3
9 ur-^{d}ba-ba_6 $\tilde{g}ir_2$-su_2^{ki}-⌜a⌝/ ti-la-a-ni
10 dam-ni-ir[1] iti-3-am_3
11 e_2-a-nu-ši ku_4-⌜ra⌝
12 mu ur-^{d}ba-ba_6-ke_4

rev.
13 du_{11}-ga-na ba-ni/-gi-na-a-$še_3$
14 ur-^{d}ba-ba_6-ke_4
15 nin-KA-gi-na
16 in-tak_4
17 kal-la dumu ur-^{d}en-lil_2-la_2/ maškim
18 lu_2-ib-gal
19 ur-^{d}ištaran
20 di-ku_5-bi-me
(space)
21 mu šu-^{d}suen lugal

[1] Collation confirms that the signs are dam-ni-ir and not dam-ni-«NI» as Sigrist (1995: no. 4) read.

Translation:
[1]Case Closed: [2-4]Ur-Baba son of Digidigi married (literally, took) Nin-KAgina daughter of Lu-Nanna. [5-8]Nin-KAgina, had set aside[2] the house of her father. [9-11](But), while Ur-Baba was dwelling in Girsu, she did not enter the house for her husband in 3 months. [12-16]Because Ur-Baba confirmed her statement, Ur-Baba left Nin-KAgina. [17]Kala son of Ur-Enlila was maškim. [18-21]Lu-Ibgal, Ur-Ištaran were its judges. Šu-Sin 1.

2. Text 304. BM 95843. Lagaš, ŠS 1. Contestation Over a Disinheriting.[3]

1 di til-la
2 igi-zu-bar-ra ti-la-a
3 ur-^{d}ba-ba$_6$ dumu-ni-ir
4 igi-ni in-na-^{ĝa2}ĝar^{ar}
5 mu lugal i$_3$-bi$_2$-la-ĝu$_{10}$/ ba-ra-me-de$_3$-en$_6$
6 ⌜in⌝-na-du$_{11}$-ga ⌜x⌝
7 ⌜igi⌝-zu-bar-ra-a ur-^{d}ba-ba$_6$/ i$_3$-bi$_3$-la-še$_3$ la-ba-[ra-x]
8 ⌜lu$_2$⌝ inim-ma-[bi-me]
(4-5 lines of obverse broken)

Rev:
(at least 5 lines broken)
1′ [lu$_2$-^{d}šara$_2$?]
2′ lu$_2$-diĝir-⌜ra⌝
3′ ur-^{d}⌜ištaran⌝
4′ di-ku$_5$-bi-me

Top:
mu šu-^{d}suen lugal

Translation:
[1]Case Closed. [8]Witnesses [swore that], [2-4]Igizubara, when alive, appeared and declared to Ur-Baba, his son, [5-6]‘by the king, you will indeed not be my heir.”[4] [7]Igizubara [removed?] Ur-Baba as heir. [section missing]. [1′-4′] [PN was the maškim. Lu-diĝira and Ur-Ištaran were its judges. [top]Šu-Suen 1.

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[2] The compound verb zag—us means “to border on,” but I take it here in the sense of “to set by” after Sollberger (1966) *TCS* 1, and assume that the point is that the bride was staying aside in her father’s house, not moving in with her husband.
[3] For another probable reference to disowning from Lagaš, see Text 204, col. ii 4 - rev. col. ii. 5, and see Siegel’s (1947:15) interpretation.
[4] Compare this construction (lines 2-6) to Text 18 lines 5-10: ur-^{d}nin-giš-zi-da ti-la/ lu$_2$-gu$_3$-de$_2$-a dumu ur-sa$_6$-ga-ka-ra/ igi-ni in-na-^{ĝa2}ĝar^{ar}/ mu lugal/ lu$_2$-^{d}nin-gir$_2$-su ibila$_2$-mu/ mi$_2$-us$_2$-sa$_2$-zu ḫe$_2$-a in-na-du$_{11}$-ga, “Ur-Ningizidu, when alive, appeared and declared to Lu-Gudea son of Ur-šaga, “by the king, Lu-Ningirsu, my heir, will be your son-in-law.”

3. Text 307. BM 106442. AS 8.5.00. Dispute over the Whereabouts and Compensation for Missing Goats.

1 3 maš$_2$ e$_2$-a-šar sipa/ da-da gala-ka
2 u$_2$-gu ba-an-de$_2$-⌜a⌝
3 e$_2$-a-šar lugal-^{giš}gigir [x]/ ba-an-la-aḫ bi$_2$-dug$_4$
4 e$_2$-a-sar egir-ba im-[ma]-an-[x]
5 ^{I}lu$_2$-diĝir-ra
6 u$_3$ ur-^{d}utu-ke$_4$ [x$^{?}$]
7 3 maš$_2$ igi lugal-^{giš}gigir-re-⌜ka⌝/ gub-be$_2$ igi bi$_2$-in-du$_8$-am$_3$
8 arad$_2$ maš$_2$-e me-ta mu-la-aḫ/ in-na-an-eš
9 igi e$_2$-gal-e-si-še$_3$
10 igi nin-dub-sar-še$_3$
11 maš$_2$ e$_2$ a-kal-la dumu
^{d}utu-sig$_5$-ka ba-an-su-un[5]

rev.
12 igi lu$_2$-^{d}inana-ka-še$_3$
13 e$_2$ a-kal-la-ke$_4$ 1 GAR/-am$_3$ nu-ti-a gaba-ri-na mu-DU
14 ^{I}a-ni maškim
15 ^{I}ur-^{d}suen nar
16 ^{I}tir$^{?}$-gu maškim
17 igi-ne-ne-še$_3$
18 nin$_9$-ku-li dumu ur-^{d}[nin$^{?}$]-lil$_2$-[la$_2$]
19 da-da dumu lu$_2$-⌜^{d}⌝[šara$_2$]
20 10 la$_2$ u maš$_2$ ziz$_2$-da-[aš x]
21 ga-ra-ak ⌜in⌝-[na-du$_{11}$]
22 lugal-šu-nir-ri a x [x x]/ sizkur$_2$-bi bi$_2$-[x]
23 du$_{11}$-ga ba-an-ge-[en$_6$]
24 igi lu$_2$-diĝir-ra dumu lugal-[x]-ab-e$_2$-še$_3$
25 igi a-tu dumu arad ḫul$_2$-la-še$_3$
26 igi inim-ma-AN-še$_3$

left edge.
igi ur-^{d}lamma-še$_3$
igi ḫe$_2$-na-sa$_6$-še$_3$
igi da-da-mu-še$_3$
iti RI mu en eridu^{ki} ba-ḫun

[5] I understand su-un as sun$_5$, plural of ku$_4$ "to enter," and translate the sentence as transitive.

Translation:

[1-11]Three goats (in the care) of E'asar,[6] the shepherd of Dada[7] the musician, got lost.[8] He (E'asar) said that E'asar and Lugal-gigir had brought them back. After this, E'asar [x]. Lu-diğira and Ur-Utu the [x] saw the 3 goats standing in the presence of Lugal-gigir. They said, "from where did the servant bring the goats?" Before Egalesi and Nin-dubsar, (who can corroborate this). They brought the goats to the house of Akala the son of Utusig. [12-13]Before Lu-Inana (who can corroborate this). *X? that is not nearby*[9] brought into the house of Akala as his replacement. [14-23]Ani, maškim, Ur-Sin, musician, Tirgu[10] maškim: before all of them. Nin-Kuli[11] daughter of Ur-^{d}[Nin]lila, [says to] Dada son of Lu-Šara, "I will make a repayment[12] of 9 goats." Lugal-šunir [x x] this offering. The statement was confirmed. [24-l.e.]Before Lu-diğira dumu Lugal-[x]-abe. Before Atu the servant of Hula. Before InimAN. Before Ur-Lamma. Before Ḫenasa. Before Dadamu. Month 5, Amar-Suen 8.

4. Text 317. BM 106498. Umma, Amar-Sin 5.12.- Marriage Agreement.

1	ur-^{d}šul-gi-ra/-ke$_4$
2	nin-a-zu nam-mussa /-še$_3$
3	mu lugal in-na-pad$_3$
4	amar-gi-na dam-g̃u$_{10}$/ ḫe$_2$-a bi$_2$-dug$_4$
5	igi a-ni-ni-še$_3$
6	igi lugal-ḫe$_2$-g̃al$_2$/ ku$_3$-dim$_2$-še$_3$
7	a-gi$_4$
8	u$_3$ u$_2$-da-a
9	nam-erim$_2$-bi/ ku$_5$-dam
10	lu$_2$ inim-ma mu / lugal-pa$_3$-da-me
	(space)
11	iti ^{d}dumu-zi
12	mu en unu$_6$-gal ^{d}inin ba-ḫun

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[6] The name is also found in *UET* 3 1590, 1468, and 1738, and *MVN* 2 239, and must be Semitic (see Hilgert 2002:214).

[7] On Dada, a well-known lamentation singer of the Ur III period, see Michalowski (2006).

[8] On the verb u$_2$-gu…du$_2$, see Michalowski (forthcoming) the Letter 2 (Šulgi to Aradmu) commentary on line 13.

[9] The term ti here can be taken as from teg̃ "to be near; to approach," but the meaning of this sentence is no clearer to me.

[10] The name Tirgu is attested 4 times in Umma administrative documents, supporting the reading tir in this document.

[11] Problematic name. Nin-kuli, written with nin$_9$, is not attested as a personal name in this period, while nin-ku-li is found in only one attestation. Because the sign is nin$_9$, then, we could understand the name as "the sister of Kuli." The patronymic provided also does not help, since it is broken and may be either Ur-Enlila or Ur-Ninlila. Neither Nin$_9$-kuli nor Kuli dumu Ur-En/Nin-lil$_2$-la$_2$ are attested elsewhere in the corpus.

[12] On the term ziz$_2$-da, see Steinkeller 1980, Westbrook 1996, and Wilcke 2007:59 note 180.

Translation:
[1-2]Ur-Šulgi swore by the king (granting) Ninazu son-in-law-ship.[13] [4]He (Ninazu) thus declared, "Amagina is my wife." [7-10]Agi and Uda swore (attesting to this) before Anini and before Lugal-heĝal the goldsmith. They are the witnesses of the oath of the king. [11-12]The 12th month of Amar-Sin 5.

5. Text 308. BM 106451. Umma, not dated. Concerning Clarification about a Debt.

1 geme$_2$-^{d}suen-ke$_4$
2 dam ur-lugal santana-ka
3 2 ma-na ku$_3$-babbar in-da/-tuku in-na-dug$_4$
4 di-ĝu$_{10}$ ki-aĝ$_2$ in-⌜til⌝ / bi$_2$-dug$_4$
5 lu$_2$-^{d}suen maškim di-til/-la-ĝu$_{10}$ bi$_2$-dug$_4$
6 lu$_2$-^{d}suen-ra en$_8$[14] ba/-na-tar^{ar}
7 lul-am$_3$ bi$_2$-dug$_4$
8 egir-ra dam ur-lugal-ke$_4$
9 10 giĝ$_4$ ku$_3$-babbar in-da-an-tuku-⌜aš⌝
10 in-ge-en$_8$

rev.
11 a-lu$_5$-lu$_5$ dumu ur-lugal-⌜ke$_4$⌝
12 5 giĝ$_4$ ku$_3$-babbar in-da-an-tuku-aš
13 in-ge-en$_8$ [x]
14 dumu ur-lugal-ka 5-⌜bi⌝
15 nam-erim$_2$-ma ba-ni-dab$_5$
16 in-dur$_2$-ru-uš
17 igi a-kal-la nu-banda$_3$-še$_3$
18 igi lu$_2$-diĝir-ra dumu lugal-ba/-ta-e$_3$-še$_3$
19 igi NI-da-mu-še$_3$
20 igi inim-ma-AN dam-gar$_3$-še$_3$
21 igi ba-sig$_5$ dumu gala-maḫ-še$_3$

Translation:
[1-3]Geme-Sin declared that the wife of Ur-lugal the gardener owes[15] her 2 minas of silver. [4-7]"Kiaĝa closed my case," she said. "Lu-Suen was the maškim of my ditila," she said, "Lu-Sin was asked about this; he said, 'these are lies.'" [8-10]Later the wife of Ur-lugal confirmed that she (still) owes her 10 shekels of silver. [11-13]Alulu, Ur-lugal's son,

[13] For other uses of the term nam-mussa (mi$_2$-us$_2$-sa$_2$), see Text 18 (Lagaš) and the broken Text 167 (Lagaš).
[14] The scribed thrice used ša for en$_8$, here, and in lines 10 and 13.
[15] The term da+tuku in this case refers to having someone else's money, i.e., owing something to someone, and does not have anything to do with taking a spouse. See Snell 1990:763.

confirmed that he has 5 shekels of (her) silver. [14-16]The five children of Ur-lugal swore by the king (that they will repay the debt). They made them sit.[16] [17-21]Before Akala, the captain. Before Lu-diĝira the son of Lubata'e. Before NIdamu. Before InimAN the merchant. Before Basig, son of the chief lamentation singer.

6. Text 314. BM 106479. Umma, AS 4. Case over Disowning as a Result of Theft.

1 [I]a-kal-la dumu ḫu-ru/-mu-ka
2 [I]a-lu$_5$ dumu lugal-inim-ke$_4$
3 ⌜gu$_4$⌝-a-ni ba-an-zuḫ
4 mu gu$_4$ ba-an-zuḫ-a-še$_3$
5 ⌜lugal⌝-inim-e
6 [a]-lu$_5$
7 ⌜nam-i$_3$-bi$_2$⌝-la in/-ni-gul
8 [igi ur-^{d}ma]-⌜mi⌝-še$_3$
(2-3 lines missing)

Rev.
1′ ⌜ur⌝-^{d}ma-an-iš-du$_{10}$-[su] / dumu-ni
2′ ⌜igi⌝ ensi$_2$-ka-še$_3$ di / bi-in-⌜du$_{11}$⌝
3′ nam i$_3$-bi$_2$-la ba-an-gul
4′ ša$_3$-ba ur-^{d}ma-mi-ke$_4$/ nam-erim$_2$-bi ku$_5$-dam
5′ [I]lu$_2$-diĝir-ra dumu lugal ba/-ta-ab-e$_3$
6′ [I]da-ad-da-g̃u$_{10}$-še$_3$
7′ [I]ur-ni$_9$-g̃ar dumu ha-ba/-lu$_5$-ke$_4$
8′ lu$_2$ ki-ba gub-ba-me
9′ iti diri mu en maḫ-gal-an-na/ en ^{d}nanna ba-ḫun

Translation:

[1-3]Alu son of Lugal-inim stole sheep belonging to Akala son of Hurunu. [4-8]Because he stole the sheep, Lugal-inim has cut-off Alu as his heir (literally, heir-ship). Before Ur-Mami. [section missing] [1′-4′]Ur-Manišdu, his (?) son, started a di before the governor. He cut-off the status of heir. Ur-Mami took an oath. [5′-8′] Lu-dingira, Dadamuše, (and) Ur-nigar son of Habalu: these were the men who served at this place. [9′]13th month of Amar-Sin 4.

[16] The sign must be dur$_2$ and not ku, since the latter verb should be written ku$_4$-r.

7. Text 311. BM 106468. Umma, not dated.

1 nin-dub-sar
2 dumu šu-^{d}er$_3$-ra arad$_2$/ inim-^{d}šara$_2$-ke$_4$
3 inim lugal nu-u$_3$/-um-da-an-šub-ba-aš
4 in-tuku-am$_3$/ bi$_2$-dug$_4$
5 na-ba-a-ge-en$_6$
6 ^{I}ma-ba
7 ^{I}lugal-ku$_3$-zu
8 nam-erim$_2$-bi/ ba-šum$_2$

Rev.
9 nin-dub-sar-re
10 inim$^{?}$ x x ba-a-gi$_4$
11 (erased PN)
12 ^{I}lu$_2$-diğir-ra
13 ^{I}šu-^{d}nin-šubur/ nu-banda$_3$-«še$_3$»
14 ^{I}a-kal-la nu-banda$_3$-«še$_3$»
15 ^{I}gu$_3$-de$_2$-a/ nu-banda$_3$-«še$_3$»
16 ^{I}a-za-a ḫa-za-num
17 igi sig$_2$-bu-«še$_3$»
18 igi a-ab-ba
19 igi na-ba-ša$_6$

Bottom:
lu$_2$ ki-ba gub-ba/-me

Note:

The reverse of this tablet contains numerous erasure marks, not only over the entirety of line 11, but also, beneath all the personal name markers (^{I}) of lines 12-19, which appear to have been written over erased igi-signs. The corresponding marker še$_3$, however, was not erased in lines 13-15 and 17, and there are no indications of erasures of this sign on the other lines. In my opinion, the scribe first wrote a series of igi-signs down the left-hand side of the reverse, accompanied by some corresponding še$_3$-signs on the other side in what are now lines 13-15 and 17, intending to fill in the personal names after this. However, due to the limitations of space or some other factor, he had to erase the igi signs and replaced them with the personal name marker diš, forgetting to remove four uses of še$_3$. In lines 17-19, igi was not fully erased.

Typically, lists of men identified as lu$_2$ ki-ba gub-ba are not written with igi…še$_3$, with rare exceptions (e.g., Text 122).

8. Text 60. BM 105379, Falkenstein 1956: no. 60. Umma, date broken.

1 Ⅰnigar$^{\tilde{g}ar}$-ku-du$_{10}$ dumu/ ur-^{d}lisi$_{9}^{!}$-si$_{4}$-na-ke$_{4}$
2 Ⅰdigir-ga$_{2}$-bi$_{2}$-du$_{11}$/ arad$_{2}$ ur-^{d}- li$_{9}$-si$_{4}$-na/ i$_{3}$-me-a-aš
3 in-ge-en
4 Ⅰha-ha-ša
5 Ⅰur-^{d}ištaran
6 Ⅰni-da
7 lu$_{2}$-inim-ma-me

rev.
8 ha-ha-ša nam-erim$_{2}$/ bi$_{2}$-⌜in⌝-ku$_{5}$
9 ^{d}ir$_{3}$-[ra-nu-ib$^{?}$]
10 lu$_{2}$-⌜kin-gi$_{4}$⌝-a lugal/ ⌜maškim⌝-bi-im

Translation:

[1-3]Nigarkidu son of Ur-Lisi confirmed that Digir-gabidu is the slave of Ur-Lisi. Hahaša, Ur-Ištaran, and Nida were the witnesses. [8]Hahaša took an oath. [9-10]Erra-nu'ib[17], messenger of the king, was its maškim.

[17] The name, omitted in Falkenstein's edition, can be reconstructed with the help of BM 110379 line 9, which contains the name ^{d}ir$_{3}$-ra nu-ib lu$_{2}$ kin-gi$_{4}$-a lugal (see Molina 2008:131). However, the name is still confusing as there is another known messenger called ^{d}ir$_{3}$-ra-nu-ID (see Michalowski 2005), but neither this text nor BM 110379 can have this reading.

APPENDIX 4

Cases of the Lagaš Judges[1]

Text	Date	Present Judges	Other Officiators	Reference to previous proceedings?	Lu_2-marza present?	Case closed?[2]	Maškim
95	AS 4	Alamu, Lu-Ibgal, Lu-diĝira				[missing]	[missing]
33	AS 5	Alamu, Lu-Ibgal, Lu-diĝira				✓	[missing] dumu Ala
35	AS 5	Alamu, Lu-Ibgal		✓	Ur-Lamma dumu Tulta, Ala dumu Erenda	✓	[missing]
71	AS 5	Alamu, Lu-Ibgal, Lu-diĝira				✓	Abamu
145	AS 7	ditila of Ur-Ištaran and Gudea				✓	Erenda
148	AS 7	Lu-Šara			Nani, Ur-Lamma, Lu-Girsu	✓	Tiemaḫta
149	AS 7	Lu-Šara		✓	Nani, Ur-Lamma, Lu-Girsu	✓	Tiemaḫta
194	AS 7	ditila Ur-Ištaran (judge) and Gudea aba uru	Gudea aba uru	Broken but unlikely		✓	[x], Ur-Ištaran, Ur-nigar
211	AS 7	Ahua, Lu-ibgal, Ur-Ištaran, Lu-diĝira		✓		✓	Lu-Ningirsu, Babamu and Ur-Baba (alternate cases)
277	AS 8	Lu-Šara, Ur-Ištaran				✓	Lu-$URU \times KAR_2^{ki}$ dumu Ur-

[1] This Appendix excludes Texts 105, 106 (both probably ŠS 5), 161, 168, *HSM* 3662 (Edzard 1962), and *ZA* 53 52 because they are too fragmentary to identify the names of the judges, even though the inclusion of judge names is evident.

[2] Indicated by the verbs tug_2--ur_3 or gi(n), by a final $nam\text{-}erim_2$ oath, or by any other indicator that the case is fully completed and not awaiting another procedure.

							Baba
279	AS 8	Lu-Šara, Lu-Ibgal, Lu-diĝira, Ur-Ištaran	Ur-Nanše judge of the Nanna Temple[3]			✓	Ur-Ištaran
123	AS 9	Ur-^{d}AB (judge of Nanna Temple)	Ur-Sin dumu Ur-Šul, Amu			✓	None
11	ŠS 1	Ur-Ištaran	Arad-Nanna (governor)		Ni'urum, Ur-meš, Ur-šaga, Ur-Baba, Ur-Igalim,	✓	Ur-Baba dumu Lu-Lala
68	ŠS 1	Lu-Šara, Lu-Ibgal, Lu-diĝira[4], Ur-Ištaran				✓	Abamu
170	ŠS 1	Lu-Šara, Lu-Ibgal, Ur-Ištaran				✓	[missing]
179	ŠS 1	Lu-Šara, Lu-Ibgal, Ur-Ištaran				✓	Atu dumu Ur-Dumuzida
180	ŠS 1	[missing]				✓	[missing]
197	ŠS 1	Lu-Šara, Lu-Ibgal, Lu-diĝira, Ur-Ištaran				✓	Ur-kisal, Ur-[x], Ur-Lama dumu Kala
304	ŠS 1	[3 broken names] Ur-Ištaran		Broken		[missing]	[missing]
270	ŠS 1	Lu-Ibgal, Ur-Ištaran				✓	Kala dumu Ur-Enlila
17	ŠS 2	Lu-Šara, Lu-Ibgal, Ur-Ištaran				✓	Ur-Ištaran dumu Nimu
21	ŠS 2	Lu-Šara, Lu-Ibgal, Lu-diĝira, Ur-Ištaran				[missing]	[missing]
23	ŠS 2	Lu-Šara, Lu-Ibgal, Lu-diĝira, Ur-Ištaran		✓		[missing]	Tiemaḫta
146	ŠS 2	Lu-Šara, Lu-Ibgal, Lu-diĝira, Ur-Istaran				✓	[missing]
168	ŠS 2?	Lu-Šara, Dada, Akala	Grand Vizier	Unclear		✓	Ur-Lamma dumu Lu-mu
171	ŠS 2	Lu-Šara	None		Ra dumu	✓	[2, missing]

[3] After listing the judges, the text adds that ur-^{d}nanše di-ku$_5$ ^{d}nanna di-ba in-gub-am$_3$ "Ur-Nanše, judge of the Nanna temple served at this case" (line 11′).

[4] The case involves a Lu-dingira, mentioned without patronymic. It is unclear why such would not be provided to avoid confusion, unless this is the same Lu-dingira as the judge

					Lu-igisasa and [missing]		
174	ŠS 2	Lu-Šara, Lu-Ibgal, Ur-Ištaran				✓	Lugal-duga
175	ŠS 2	[Lu]-[Šara], Lu-dingi[ra], Ur-Ista[ran]				✓ 2 cases	Iri-indazal, Urigalim dumu Abamu
178	ŠS 2	Lu-Šara, Lu-Ibgal, Lu-diĝira, Ur-Ištaran		[missing]		✓	Ur-Iš[taran], Ur-[x]
18	ŠS 3	Lu-Šara, Lu-Ibgal, Lu-diĝira, Ur-Ištaran		✓		✓	Kala
46	ŠS 3	Lu-Šara, Lu-Ibgal, Ur-Ištaran, Lu-diĝira				✓	Tiemaḫta
55	ŠS 3	Lu-[Šara], Lu-ibgal, Lu-diĝira, Ur-Ištaran		✓ [Alamu and Šu-ili are referenced]		✓	Ur-[x]
75	ŠS 3	Lu-Šara, Lu-Ibgal, Lu-diĝira, Ur-Ištaran				✓	Lu-gina
80	ŠS 3	Lu-Šara, Ur-Ištaran				✓	Ur-Igalim dumu Abamu
119	ŠS 3	Lu-Šara, Lu-Ibgal, Ur-Ištaran, Lu-diĝira				[missing]	[missing]
14	ŠS 4	Lu-Šara, Ur-Ištaran		✓?		✓	Tiemaḫta
42	ŠS 4	Lu-Šara, Ur-Ištaran		✓		✓	Šeškala dumu Dudubi
45	ŠS 4	Lu-Šara, Lu-Ibgal, Lu-diĝira, Ur-Ištaran				✓	I_3-na-a
50	ŠS 4	Lu-Šara, Ur-Ištaran		✓		✓	Ur-Lammu dumu Kala
79	ŠS 4	Lu-Šara, Ur-Ištaran				✓	Uraba
88	ŠS 4	Lu-Šara, Ur-Ištaran		✓		✓	Erenda
89	ŠS 4	Lu-Šara, Lu-Ibgal, Ur-Ištaran		✓		✓	Erenda
96	ŠS 4	Lu-Šara, Lu-Ibgal, Ur-Ištaran,				✓	[Ra] dumu [lu_2-igi]-$ša_6$-ga?

99	ŠS 4	Lu-Šara, Lu-diĝira, Ur-Ištaran		✓ Arad-Nanna (governor)		✓	Ur-bagara dumu Ur-x.x
107	ŠS 4	Lu-Šara, Ur-Ištaran				✓	Tiemaḫta
205	ŠS 4		Arad-Nanna (governor)	✓ Ur-Lamma, (governor)	Ur-Ištaran, Lu-diĝira dumu Lugal-barae, Ur-nun dumu dada, Nani Gaduba	✓	Lugal-irida (Grand Vizier), Ur-[x], Gudea aba uru, Ur-Lamma dumu Lumu, Tiemaḫta
257	ŠS 4	Lu-Šara, Ur-Ištaran		✓ Ur-Lamma (governor)		✓	Tiemaḫta
282	ŠS 4	Lu-Šara, Lu-Ibgal, Ur-Ištaran				✓	Uru-idani[?]
	ŠS 5						
6	ŠS 5					✓	Ur-Lamma dumu Kala
34	ŠS 5	Lu-Šara, Lu-Ibgal, Ur-Ištaran				✓	Ur-Lamma dumu Lu-mu
143	ŠS 5	Lu-Šara, Ur-Ištaran, Lu-diĝira	Arad-Nanna, governor	Possibly, Arad-Nanna		✓	[x] dumu E'urbi u_3 Gudea aba uru
1	ŠS 6	Lu-Šara, Ur-Ištaran, Lu-diĝira				✓	Ur-Igalim dumu Lu-mu
32	ŠS 6	Lu-Šara				✓	Tiemaḫta
65	ŠS 6	Lu-Šara, Ur-Ištaran, Lu-diĝira		Possibly		✓	Ur-Lamma dumu Kala
115	ŠS 6	Lu-Šara, Ur-Ištaran, Lu-diĝira		✓		[missing]	[missing]
126	ŠS 6	Lu-Šara, Ur-Ištaran, Lu-diĝira				Unclear	Gudea aba uru
131	ŠS 6	Lu-Šara, Lu-diĝira		✓ Babamu maškim	Ur-Nanše dumu Lu-Igimaše, Ra dumu Lu-igišaša, Lugal-sigbu	✓	Tiemaḫta
190	ŠS 6	Lu-Šara, Ur-Ištaran, Lu-diĝira				✓	Ur-Bagara, Tiemaḫta
259	ŠS 6	Lu-Diĝira[!], Ur-Ištaran, Lu-Diĝira[5]				✓	Lu-irika

[5] According to my collation, Lu-dingira is written twice, the first Lu-dingira must be a mistake for Lu-Sara.

3	ŠS 7	Su-ili, Ur-Ištaran, Lu-Ningirsu, Ludiĝira			Ur-Nanse dumu Lu-Igimaše, Urbaba dumu Ur-šaga di-ku$_5$	✓	[missing]
74	ŠS 7	Šu-ili, Arad-ḫula, Ur-Ištaran, Lu-diĝira		✓ (Ur-tur dumu Ur-diĝira maškim)		[missing]	[missing]
82	ŠS 7	Su-ili, Lu-Šara, Ur-Ištaran, Lu-diĝira				✓	Ur-Lamma dumu Kala
106	ŠS 7	Lu-Šara, Lu-Ningirsu, Lu-diĝira		✓ Ur-Lamma (governor)	Lu-Girsu, Ur-Nanše, Imtidam	✓	E'aqatata (royal courier) and Ur-Lamma dumu Kala
134	ŠS 7	Šu-ili, Ur-Ištaran				[missing]	[missing]
2	ŠS 8	Šu-ili, Ur-Ištaran,			Ka-[x] dumu Lu-duga, Lu-Ša-[x dumu x],[missing]	✓	Ur-Ištaran dumu Nimu
303	ŠS 8	Su-ili, Ur-Ištaran, Lugal-Ningirsu		Unclear	Lu-Girsu, Ur-Ab, Lu-kirizal	✓	Ur-Gatumkidu
76	ŠS 9	Šu-ili, Ur-Ištaran, Lu-Ningirsu, Lu-diĝira			At least 4 [missing]	[missing]	Ur-[x]
ITT 2 944	ŠS 9	Šu-ili, Lu-Ningirsu, Lu-Šara	Umaniše, Ḫuḫni, Ur-Šulpa'e			✓	None
25	IS 1	Lu-Šara, Lu-Ningirsu, Gudea, Danu'e				✓	Lugal-gizkimzi
67	IS 1	Lu-Šara, Lu-Ningirsu, Lu-diĝira			2 or more [missing]	✓	Atu dumu Ur-Dumuzi
103	IS 1	Lu-Šara, Lu-Ningirsu, Lu-diĝira		✓ (before judges)		✓	Tiemaḫta
118	IS 2	[missing]			2 or more [missing]	[missing]	[missing]
5	Date Broken	Lu-Šara, Lu-diĝira				[missing]	[missing]
8	Date broken	Šu-ili, Lu-diĝira, Lu-Ningirsu			Ur-Ištaran, Ur-Nanše, Gudea aba uru, Bazi dumu Šeša	[missing]	[missing]
10	Date broke	Šu-ili, Lu-Šara, Ur-Ištaran, Lu-		Unclear, broken	Unclear, broken	✓?	[missing]

	n	diĝira					
13	Date broke n	Lu-Šara, Lu-Ibgal, Lu-diĝira, Ur-Ištaran		✓ Lu_2-kirizal (governor)		✓	Nam-maḫ dumu Ur-Ninbara
15	Note dated	Lu-Šara, Lu-ibgal, Lu-diĝira, Ur-Ištaran				✓	Ur-kigula
37	Date broke n	Lu-Šara, Ur-Ištaran				✓	Tiemaḫta
41	Date broke n	Lu-[Šara, Lu-Ibgal, Lu-diĝira, Ur-Ištaran]		✓ Grand Vizier with Lu-Girsu as maškim	None, but broken	✓	Final maškim [missing]; Lu-Girsu present for previous cases
44	Not dated	Lu-Šara, Lu-Ibgal, Lu-diĝira, Ur-Ištaran				✓	Ur-Lamma dumu Kala
76	Date broke n	Šu-ili, Ur-Ištaran, Lu-diĝira			3-4 [missing]	[missing]	Ur-[x]
78	Date broke n	Su-ili, Arad-ḫula, Ur-Ištaran, Ludiĝira		Broken	None, but broken	✓	Ur-Šulpae
84	Date broke n	Alamu, Lu-ibgal, Lu-diĝira		Not likely	None, but broken	✓	[missing]
86	Note dated	Lu-Šara, Lu-diĝira		Unclear	Possibly, broken	✓	Lu-gina
90	Date broke n	Lu-Šara, Ur-Ištaran, Alamu				✓	Uru'idazal
93	Date broke n	Lu-Šara, Ur-Ištaran, Aḫu'a dumu Lu-duga				✓	Lugal-melam
94	Date broke n	Lu-Šara, Lu-Ibgal, Ur-Ištaran				[missing]	[missing]
100	Date broke n	Lu-Šara, Lu-Ibgal (rest broken)			Possibly, broken	✓	Ur-[missing]
101	Date broke n	Lu-Šara, Ur-Ištaran		✓ (before judges)		✓	[missing]
102	Date broke n	Šu-ili			Lu-Girsu, Gudea dumu Lani, Lu-šaga, governor	✓	Aba-ilum
106	Date broke	Lu-Šara, Lu-Ningirsu, Lu-		✓ Ur-Lama governor, Iri-in-	Lu-Girsu, Ur-Nanse,	✓	E'aqatata (royal

	n	diĝira		da-zal maškim	Imtidam		courier), and Ur-Lamma dumu Kala
117	Date broke n	ditila 7 judges of the king				✓	[Ur-Baba$^{?}$] dumu Lu-Lala
147	Date broke n	Šu-ili, Ur-Ištaran, Lu-Ningirsu		Broken	Ur-Nanše, Lu-kazala dumu Atu	✓	None
150	Date broke n	Lu-Šara, Lu-Ibgal, Lu-diĝira, Ur-Ištaran		Broken	Possibly; broken	[missing]	Ur-[x]
152	Date broke n	Šu-ili, Ur-Ištaran		Broken	Ra dumu Lu-igisasa	✓	Arad dumu Erenda
154	Date broke n	Alamu, Lu-Ibgal, Lu-diĝira		Broken	Arad-mu ABaba, Nigurum ra_2-gab	[missing]	Lu-diĝira
155	Date broke n	Lu-Šara, Lu-Ibgal, Lu-diĝira, Ur-Ištaran			Ra dumu Lu-igišaša, Lu-kazala dumu Atu, Lu-Utu dumu Bazi	[missing]	[missing]
156	Date broke n	Lu-Šara[6], Lu-Ibgal, Lu-diĝira, Ur-Ištaran				✓	Ur-Lamma dumu Kala
157	Date broke n	Šu-ili, Alamu dumu Ur-šaga, Ur-Ištaran [7]					
163	Date broke n	Lu-Šara, Lu-ibgal, Lu-diĝira, Ur-Ištaran		No, but broken	None, but broken		[x]-maḫ-kam u_3 [Ur]-Utu
193	Date broke n	Lu-Šara, Lu-ibgal, Ur-Ištaran		✓ reference to tablet	[x]-⌈sig_7⌉ and [x $di^{?}$]-ku_5	✓	Tiemaḫta
199	Date broke n	[Ur]-Ištaran	Unclear		Broken	[missing]	[missing]
ZA 53 93	Date Broke n	Šu-ili, Ur-Ištaran, Lu-Ningirsu			2 (partially broken)	✓	Lu-Gudea
TEL 110	Date broke n	Šu-ili, Ur-Ištaran			Ra dumu Lu-igišaša, Lu-kirizal dumu Atu, Lu-Utu dumu Bazi	[missing]	[missing] dumu Dada

[6] Here Lu-Šara is qualified as dumu šagina.
[7] Here the name Ur-^{d}Ištaran is provided a title, which Falkenstein (1956:254) renders ^{lu_2}[maš-šu]-⌈gid_2⌉-[gid_2]. The tablet is too fragmentary to evaluate this reading.

260	No date given	Su-ili, Ur-Ištaran			Lu-Girsu, Ur-Nanše dumu Lu-igimaše, Lu-kirizal dumu Atu (possibly 1 more)	✓	Tiemaḫta
271	Not dated	Su-ili, Ur-Ištaran, Arad-ḫula			Lu-Girsu, Lu-Nina nu-banda$_3$, Lu-sigbu dumu ensi$_2$	✓	Abakala dumu Ur-mes

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