

## I. SOCIAL VALUES OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN ELITES:

# Comparing the sources

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The two studies that have just been presented afford an opportunity to compare the results obtained from two methods of research. The first study proceeded by setting up a large number of value dimensions with discriminated value positions within each, by systematically sampling the content of selected Soviet periodicals, and by recording the value positions being taken by the members of several elites. Dr. Dunham pursued the method of the sensitive literary critic reading between the lines for intimations of the value positions of the authors. Both studies were part of the same project and were planned to complement each other.

Two frames of reference in Dr. Dunham's material help to identify the point where comparison can be made. She speaks of three generations: the first, or revolutionary, generation, now almost gone, with its philosophical conviction and its idealism; the middle, or Stalinist, generation now filling most of the high posts in Party and government, with its habituation to a tight, authoritarian system; and finally, the third, or youthful, generation, with its discontents and probing questions, now rising to challenge the second. The other frame of reference consists of the three time periods that Dr. Dunham suggests: the "thaw" just before the period when the content analysis began on May 1, 1957; the period of tightening up from May, 1957 until December, 1958; and the period of moderate relaxation from then to the end of our study on April 30, 1960. Dr. Dunham's analysis is concerned mostly with the

relationship of the third to the middle generation, especially in the third period. In terms of the elites distinguished in my study, her analysis is particularly concerned with the relation of the cultural elite of that third generation to the government-Party elite of the middle generation.

Before we go into matters of substance, it may be worth asking whether there is any validation of the significance of the time periods outlined. For only 11 of the 40 categories were there enough data on the Soviet side to make the separation of the second and third periods meaningful. Tables were in fact prepared making this division but they have not been presented because December 1, 1958 did not seem to be an important turning point. There did turn out to be more coded items per issue of a periodical after that date, indicating that elite members felt freer to talk about value preferences than they had before. Furthermore, there was slightly more criticism by the government-Party elite of other elites before than after that date, and some tendency for more positive injunctions after than before. These trends might indicate a substitution of the carrot for the stick.

Only Dr. Dunham's analysis of the two Khrushchev statements gives us direct evidence of the change in attitude of the government-Party elite itself from our first to our second period. She feels that whereas in 1957 he had insisted on tight control, the 1959 statement indicates that he is settling for a division of labor that would delegate to the cultural elite the job of handling

its own problems. This is accompanied by greater emphasis on his part on justice in the measures adopted to reach societal goals (evidence Kazakhstan), by greater respect for privacy, and by more willingness to allow criticism of the regime. Unfortunately, there were not enough coded materials on the Soviet side in any of these three dimensions to make the break into time periods worthwhile. We have, therefore, no means of validating Dr. Dunham's belief that the government-Party elite became more permissive on these dimensions after December 1, 1958, than it had been the year and a half preceding.

Although Dr. Dunham makes no claim that the restiveness with things as they are, which she detects in the younger poets and novelists, is stronger after December 1, 1958, one might expect such restiveness to achieve more expression than if that was indeed a period of greater permissiveness. The data from the content analysis give very little support to this hypothesis. For only one of six dimensions relevant to possible restiveness for which we had data enough to make a time split was there any indication of change from one period to the other.

This generally negative result is, however, not at all conclusive. It may be that this restiveness cannot be expected to show in public discussion but only in private discussion and in the sort of veiled or oblique manner in which one detects it in creative literature. There is another way to get at the matter, and that is to compare the preferences of the cultural elite with those of the government-Party elite throughout our whole three-year period.

One of the strongest urges that Dr. Dunham finds among young writers is for more untrammelled expression. This corresponds to our dimension Degree of Freedom of

Thought in Political and Social Affairs. In Table 21 there is support for her finding. Eighteen of the 20 departures from the Party line are on the part of the cultural elite. A related dimension is Degree of Criticism of Means, but perhaps one not so dear to the heart of the creative artist. Here again there is confirmation. Eight of the nine really dissident preferences in Table 23 were expressed by the cultural elite. Again, Indoctrination of Youth would seem to be a relevant dimension. Table 25 gives us no confirmation, however. Similar small proportions of the cultural and government-Party elites hold that nonpolitical agencies should have chief responsibility for indoctrination.

Another aspect of the criticism by the younger members of the cultural elite found by Dr. Dunham was directed at the materialism of Soviet society. We have two dimensions that are relevant: Criteria for Social Status, and Ends of the Society. Table 24 shows only a slightly greater preference by the cultural elite than by the government-Party elite for more respect for intellectual, artistic, and spiritual achievement, but on Ends of the Society the evidence is overwhelming. In Table 27, 70 percent of all preferences expressed by the cultural elite are for more emphasis on intellectual, aesthetic, and spiritual achievement, whereas the corresponding figure for the government-Party elite is only nine percent. The cultural elite is evidently much more concerned about the direction its society is taking than about its own prestige.

Four of our dimensions touch upon aspects of the governmental and societal structures that Dr. Dunham believes to be unacceptable to the young literati: Integration or Separation of Political Functions, Locus of Public Decision-Making, Unitary or Pluralistic Society, and Relation of Means

to Ends in the Achievement of the Good Society. On the first of these, no member of the cultural elite took a deviant position (Table 14). But on the second, the members of the cultural elite differentiate themselves sharply from the government-Party elite (Table 16). Since this bears quite directly on the split between the "we" and the "they" that Dr. Dunham mentions, there is real confirmation here. Oddly enough, the cultural elite seems not to favor a pluralistic society any more than does the government-Party elite (Table 12). With respect to concern for the justice of means (Table 46, Appendix C, p. 423) there is so little evidence from the cultural elite that no conclusions can be drawn.

There are other aspects to the imputed dissatisfaction with the collective. One of them is the resentment of lack of privacy, and another is the notion that long-term, large-scale planning dwarfs the individual and neglects his dignity. Table 42 (Appendix C) gives us no help on the first aspect for lack of data, and Table 5 fails to show any resentment in the cultural elite at inclusive planning.

Two other dimensions with which Dr. Dunham's findings need to be compared are Young and Old in the Society and Risk-Taking. She believes (1) that the young writers wish to see more accent on youth (the third generation wishes to get out from the straitjacket fitted by the second generation) and (2) that they are willing to take risks to achieve the good society. There is no evidence for the first proposition in Table 45 (Appendix C), but the second is confirmed in Table 26, though the data are few.

Finally, Dr. Dunham found a great dread of war reflected in Soviet literature, though it is not certain that the writers were expressing their own view or merely mirroring

that of the people. Anyway, Table 34 does not show that this fear is more marked in the cultural elite than elsewhere. There is no deviation from the Party line in any elite.

Of the 14 dimensions that seemed to us relevant to the preferences of the younger members of the cultural elite as found by Dr. Dunham in their writings, the results in five are clearly confirmed and in six are not. In three there is not enough evidence or it is only slightly positive. The five confirmations come from quite different areas: freedom of thought and criticism; emphasis on intellectual, aesthetic, and spiritual ends; participation in decision-making; and willingness to take risks. This—together with the fact that the government-Party elite never took a more permissive position than the cultural elite—lends a good deal of general support to the notion that there is indeed some ferment at work. There are two other considerations that make it likely that our tables understate rather than overstate the matter. The most powerful members of the cultural elite are the older men of the middle generation. They would be the ones whose preferences would be more likely expressed in the nonliterary periodicals than would those of the writers of the third generation. And, more generally, it takes courage for anyone to deviate from the Party line, so that one would not expect the full extent of any cleavage between the government-Party and the cultural elite to show.

Besides the points on which we could make direct comparisons through our dimensions, Dr. Dunham made other observations of interest. One was that the third generation is full both of idealism and of cynicism. Some are turning back to the enthusiasm of the first generation and asking for the realization of the dream that

somehow got lost. Others are disenchanted with their society and are not sure that life has any meaning. They have decided simply to look out for number one. It is the former who are willing to take the risks to achieve a better life. They, too, are the ones who are saying that trust must replace distrust and that control by fear is no longer good enough.

A related theme that may be even more significant is that young writers are feeling shame and guilt at some of the things that have been done. The thought that all the people created Stalin, the shame at the plight of the peasants, and the feelings of guilt at their own perquisites are indications that the government-Party elite would find it hard indeed to reimpose a Stalinist system.

The great contribution of Dr. Dunham's analysis is not in telling us what the cultural elite is willing to say explicitly in its own name—we know that from our 40 tables. Rather, it is in pointing out what the younger members of this elite are probably feeling that they hesitate to express openly. Their characters speak for them. Thus we get at a deeper level of preference.

In trying to fit these results into the larger context of Soviet-American relations, the question of how powerful the cultural elite is becomes crucial. Granted that its positions are to some degree in opposition to some of the elements of Soviet society, is their point of view likely to be influential in the future and to put pressures on the government-Party elite that have to be heeded? Certainly the answer to this question partly depends on how much the cultural elite is expressing merely its own longings and how much it is representative of a much broader segment of the Soviet population. Our materials do not make possible a judgment on this point.

But one statement can be made. The Soviet society has become highly literate and its people do read fiction and poetry voraciously. Thus, whether or not the people now share value preferences of the cultural elite, they are and will continue to be exposed to them. This in itself constitutes some pressure on the government-Party elite. At least they will have to explain why they do not follow the lines suggested in creative literature. In the absence of equally strong counterpressures from some other elite—say the economic or the military—we may assume that the government-Party elite will be influenced somewhat by the sorts of preferences that Dr. Dunham's analysis uncovers.

The upshot of the whole matter is that we have a present position, exposed to us in our statistical tables, and a possible, perhaps probable, direction of future modifications, as revealed by the characters created by the younger writers. Does this direction of possible future modification suggest any annotations to our summaries of the three sets of dimensions?

Reexamination of the summary of the economic dimensions shows little need for change. The cultural elite comments little on property matters or even level of rewards and does not seem to be pushing for any great changes here, though Dr. Dunham thought she detected some mistrust of inclusive planning. If this does develop, it would only increase the overlap on this dimension already present because of American willingness to adopt widespread planning.

Of the dimensions relating to social and internal political affairs, there were 11 that showed overlap or convergence. Dr. Dunham's analysis has nothing to say about four of these, but it tends to reinforce the convergence on seven of them. The analysis

of literature strongly suggests that the slight present overlap in the dimension Locus of Public Decision-Making is likely to increase. The responsibility for policy-making may have to be diffused somewhat. In connection with Table 42 (Appendix C) it was noted that some of the cosmopolitan elite were being criticized for taking a Soviet-like attitude on surveillance; Dr. Dunham's material suggests that some members of the Soviet cultural elite would like to take an American-like attitude. The convergence already found on Degree of Criticism of Means is now clearly reinforced. Our periodical analysis showed some willingness on the part of American elites to have the government indoctrinate youth, and thus they overlap the Soviet elites. The material from creative literature suggests that there will be a tendency for more of the members of Soviet elites to break from this position. The greater willingness of the Soviet elites to take risks is again confirmed. On Criteria for Social Status, and Ends of the Society, the convergence already found is reinforced, particularly on the latter.

There were nine dimensions in the social and internal political affairs group upon which no convergence of value preference was found. Does the analysis of creative literature suggest any probable change in these situations? On five of them there is no evidence for comparison. The nature of the political party system, the control of education, the criteria for scholarships, the relation of church and state, and the relation of the mass media to the people and the government are not explicitly treated in Dr. Dunham's analysis. On four others, however, there is evidence. All of these are closely related to the functions of writers and to their desire for freedom of expression. The young literati are thought to be impatient of the unitary nature of Soviet

society and to long for a more pluralistic one; and to be unhappy with the complete integration of political functions in their society and to feel that more freedom of thought both on social and political matters and on natural science and technological matters would be beneficial. Thus, there may be pressure toward a more open system in these respects that our statistical analysis of periodicals did not uncover.

We have no material that would allow us to make the same kind of future speculations on the American side. Most observers of the American scene believe that American value preferences will shift very slowly since there seems not to be the same level of discontent that is found in the Soviet Union. Or perhaps better, the discontents are due to a failure to live up to American common values rather than to a disbelief in the values themselves.

Since Dr. Dunham's analysis did not deal with the external relations of Soviet society, we can make no comparisons on these topics.

A final word may be said about the kinds of information obtained by the two methods. Each method has its peculiar dangers. In the case of formal content analysis of periodicals, there is the danger that in a country like the Soviet Union what is explicit and therefore recorded for analysis is not in fact the real value position of the elite in question. It may be simply what elite members think it is politic to say. The problem here is the validity of the material being coded. In the case of the interpretation of creative literature there is the same problem. The authors may be writing what they think the Party elite wants. There is, however, a further danger—and Dr. Dunham would be the first to agree—that mistaken inferences may be made in the interpretation of what is written.

On the other hand, both methods have their strengths. The systematic content analysis does not require reading between the lines to obtain the results sought. Once coder reliability has been established, there is little problem of inference. The strength of the interpretation of creative literature is not in its systematic quality but rather in its ability to bypass the controls of a totalitarian society. Creative writers can hint at their value preferences subtly through their characters. If the interpreter is sufficiently knowledgeable about the society being studied and sufficiently sensitive to the

nuances of the material interpreted, value positions that cannot be baldly expressed may be successfully inferred.

There is much to be said for the employment of the two methods in the same general project, as here. They reinforce each other to the degree that the same value preferences may be expressed in two different forms, and they complement each other in the sense that formal content analysis of periodicals may catch better the established value preferences, whereas the interpretation of creative literature may catch the incipient tendencies.