

# I. SOCIAL VALUES OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN ELITES: Content analysis of elite media

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## *Introduction*

### PURPOSE

Sociologists concerned with normative order believe that the values men cherish are important to study because they are influential in the making of choices and the determination of policies. If there are common values among the members of groups, and if these groups are powerful in a society, then these common values constitute significant data for an understanding of how that society acts and will act.

For our purpose here, a value is an element of the good life as seen by the person who cherishes it. It is a preference that serves as a standard for making choices. The good life is of course a broad term covering many segments of experience. In this study the values that are chiefly important are those that define the good society and the good world. Preferences of these kinds particularly affect the relations between two great powers like the United States and the Soviet Union. Differing concepts of the good world obviously will bring societies into conflict, but it is also true that

even differences of value with respect to domestic concerns tend to cause strain. No nation altogether trusts another that runs its affairs in accordance with values and norms that are strange and alien.

In stressing the importance of values, there is no intention of belittling the concept of national interest as traditionally used by political scientists. It is certainly true that nations strive to acquire power. But it is also true that it makes a difference how that power is likely to be used—for what ends and by what means. Given equal power, a Nazi Germany is far more to be feared than the United States.

This study was undertaken in the hope that greater knowledge of the values held by the principal elites on both sides of the Cold War would contribute to our understanding of the present situation and to our appreciation of future possibilities. It is important to know where the value compatibilities and the value incompatibilities are between the two sets of elites, because the goals and strategies of the foreign policies of the two nations are bound to be influenced by them.

### THE ELITES

In speaking of elites we are not limiting ourselves to the makers of governmental policy. Rather, we are proceeding on the

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<sup>1</sup> Research assistants in this study were Gabor Horvath and Dan I. Slobin, of The University of Michigan.

assumption that the decision-makers on both sides need stable support for their policies and that they can get it only by satisfying a much broader stratum of the population. This is obviously true in the United States, and we believe it to be true even in the Soviet Union. This broader group can be broken up into several elites, as is done in this study, but the members of all of them are well-informed persons who, because of their prestige or power, can exert influence on the decision-makers. In the Soviet Union these persons, though of many occupations, will usually be members of the Communist Party, and at relatively high levels. In the United States these persons are not in the same degree formally connected with one another, but they have many informal contacts with one another and have access to channels to the national decision-makers. In both cases the discussion of governmental policies goes on among the members of these elites, and their influence is felt at the top.

The six elite groups chosen for investigation are very similar in the two societies. Four of them are identical: (1) the military elite comprises the general officers in the armed services and the high officials in the defense departments; (2) the scientific elite consists of leading figures in the natural sciences and in the professions of medicine and engineering, including professors in universities and technical institutes and research scientists employed by governmental bureaus and industry; (3) the cultural elite includes leading writers and artists, journalists, professors in the humanities and social sciences, and prominent religious figures; (4) the labor elite is made up of the high officers in the labor union structure.

The other two elites of each society are not defined identically. They include people employed in government, business,

and the legal professions. Because of the different structures of the Soviet and American societies, these persons have been divided differently. In the Soviet Union we differentiate between (5) the government-Party elite and (6) the economic elite. The former includes those of great political power whether in the Communist Party or in the governmental system or both; the economic elite consists of those charged with economic planning in the Union government or the republics and those managing large industrial enterprises. For the United States we differentiate on another basis. Several studies have shown that the most important split in our government-legal-business group is between the "cosmopolitans" and the "locals."<sup>2</sup> The former are likely to be those with broad horizons, who realize the importance of foreign relations and who live in the extended world made possible by modern communication. The locals, on the other hand, find the focus of their interest in the community and are leaders there. An illustration of the difference is the contrast in a small city between the president of a corporation doing a nationwide or worldwide business and the owner of a drygoods store who has become mayor. For brevity, we labeled these (5) the cosmopolitan elite and (6) the provincial elite. The only nonfederal officials to be part of the cosmopolitan elite are state governors.

Because of the widespread belief that, since the "thaw" in the Soviet Union, creative writers were expressing ideas formerly inhibited, Dr. Vera Sandomirsky Dunham

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<sup>2</sup> See especially Robert K. Merton, "Patterns of Influence," in *Communications Research, 1948-1949*, edited by Paul Lazarsfeld and Frank Stanton (Columbia University, Bureau of Applied Social Research Publications), New York: Harper, 1949, pp. 180-219.

was commissioned to analyze novels, plays, and poetry. Her work, included as the second part of this study (p. 386 below), is conceived as a supplement to the data presented here on the Soviet cultural elite.

#### THE VALUE CATEGORIES

Since values defined as elements of the good life or as preferences in terms of which choices are made may be legion, we confronted a formidable problem in conceptualizing a manageable number for this study. The criterion adopted for selecting the value dimensions was their relevance to the interrelationship of one society to another. Since relevance is a matter of judgment, this was a difficult criterion to apply. The 40 value dimensions listed below are the fruit of study of the sociological literature, discussion with other scholars, much thought, and considerable trial and error with our materials, especially on the Soviet side. The grouping under three heads is purely for convenience in the later exposition; it was not part of the research design.

#### *Value Dimensions Concerning the Economy*

Mode of ownership of property  
 Planning and control  
 State's responsibility for employment  
 System of allocation to jobs and training  
 Distribution of pecuniary and other rewards  
 Structure of economic incentives  
 Degree of obligation to work  
 Amount and kind of leisure  
 Role of labor unions

#### *Value Dimensions Concerning Social and Internal Political Affairs*

Unitary or pluralistic society  
 Political and economic centralization or decentralization  
 Integration or separation of political functions

Nature of political party system  
 Locus of public decision-making  
 Control of primary and secondary education  
 Criteria for scholarships and other aid to students in higher education  
 Responsibility for health services  
 Church and state  
 Relation of mass media to government and people  
 Surveillance of citizens  
 Degree of freedom of thought in political and social affairs  
 Degree of freedom of thought in natural sciences and technological matters  
 Degree of criticism of means  
 Race relations  
 Role of national and other cultural minorities  
 Criteria for social status  
 Young and old in the society  
 Indoctrination of youth  
 Risk-taking  
 Relations of means to ends in the achievement of the good society  
 Ends of the society

#### *Value Dimensions Concerning External Relations*

Civil-military relations  
 Political and military relations to other nations in the bloc  
 Aid to others  
 Relations to uncommitted peoples  
 Trade with members of the other bloc  
 Degree of trust toward members of the other bloc  
 War as a means of national policy  
 The way to world order  
 Relation to international agencies

Inspection of this list will reveal that there are four types of values that are not included in any of the dimensions. (1) One type of value was thought to be too dis-

tantly related to foreign policy for inclusion in this study, though differences were thought to exist between American and Soviet societies. Some of the values of this type are those concerning family relations, friendships and cliques, school curricula and standards, and methods for the control of delinquency and crime. (2) Another type of preference was not dealt with because it was thought there would be no significant differences between Soviet and American societies. We believe elites on both sides favor intelligent leadership, education, aid to the needy aged, the application of science to man's problems, communication between classes and regions in their own societies, and patriotism. (3) Another type of value was excluded because of the impossibility of fashioning truly common dimensions for the two societies. Because the state is the only significant entrepreneur in the Soviet Union, many questions that arise in American society do not arise there at all: "To what degree should scientific development be a responsibility of government?" "To what degree should private business be regulated by the government?" "What should the rules be for the settlement of labor-management disputes?" On the other hand, the Soviet Union has problems that have no counterpart in the United States; for instance, "How much control over factory managers should be exerted by the local Party?" Other topics for which meaningful dimensions seemed impossible were: tax systems, especially when one considers the past Soviet practice of exacting forced loans; and freedom of movement abroad, because for the Soviet Union this is not just a matter of whether they want their citizens exposed to foreign cultures, but whether they want to use their limited foreign exchange for this purpose. (4) One value dimension, at least, was omitted be-

cause it would yield only predictable results—philosophical position. The Soviet materials would overwhelmingly reflect materialism, whereas the American materials would rarely express a philosophical preference.

This study aims to make possible two sorts of value comparisons: (1) comparison of the values of each elite with those of the other elites in the same society; and (2) comparison of the values of each elite with the corresponding elites and with the other elites in the other society. The first comparison will show to what degree, normatively, there is a single elite rather than separate elites in each society. The second comparison will test the hypothesis that elites of the same type in the two societies will tend to be similar.

### *Research Method*

#### CONTENT ANALYSIS

Content analysis is the term given to any systematic attempt to codify the matter contained in a defined set of communications. One could perform content analysis on letters, on periodicals, on books, on moving pictures, or even on radio and television programs. The method has been most widely used on published materials, usually with a view to obtaining measures of the substantive material contained therein. This has been its use in this study.

Content analysis was chosen in this case because it has high scientific objectivity and because materials were available on the Soviet side as well as on the American side to carry it out. The study of the Soviet Union at arm's length is very difficult, but one source of material we do have is their publications.

Few would question the validity of using American newspapers and periodicals to get at the values of members of elites who write

TABLE 1  
UNITED STATES PERIODICALS ANALYZED

Elite represented	Periodicals	Material read	Sampling design	Recorded value positions	
				Number	Percent
Cosmopolitan	New York Times	Editorials	Every 13th issue	390	18
	Fortune	Editorials	Every monthly issue	63	3
Provincial	Nation's Business	All <sup>a</sup>	Every monthly issue	322	15
	American Bar Association Journal	Editorials	Every monthly issue	49	2
Labor	American Federationist	All <sup>a</sup>	Every monthly issue	505	23
Military	Army	All <sup>a</sup>	Issues of 12/57 12/58 and 9/59 <sup>b</sup>	66	3
	Navy	All <sup>a</sup>	Every monthly issue <sup>c</sup>	114	5
	Air Force	All <sup>a</sup>	Every monthly issue	140	6
Scientific	Science	Editorials	Every weekly issue	57	3
	American Scientist	News and Views sect.	Every quarterly issue	19	1
	GeoTimes	All <sup>a</sup>	Every monthly issue	4	0.5 <sup>d</sup>
	American Institute of Biological Sciences Bulletin	All <sup>a</sup>	Every issue (5 times a year)	12	1
	Chemical & Engineer- ing News	All <sup>a</sup>	Every 3rd weekly issue	23	1
	Physics Today	All <sup>a</sup>	Every monthly issue	17	1
Cultural	Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists	Articles <sup>a</sup>	Every 5th week (10 times a year)	44	2
	Saturday Review	Ideas Section	Every 4th weekly issue	268	12
	Harpers	Articles <sup>a</sup>	Every 3rd monthly issue	61	3
Total				2,154	100

<sup>a</sup> Except general and categoric exceptions; general exceptions are listed in text and categoric exceptions are listed in Appendix A (p. 417).

<sup>b</sup> Only these three issues of *Army* were read because they contained the addresses at the annual convention of the Association of the U. S. Army that were most suitable for our purposes. The other issues of this journal are more purely technical than are the issues of *Navy* and *Air Force*.

<sup>c</sup> *Navy* did not begin publication until May 1958.

<sup>d</sup> Less than 0.5 of 1%.

signed articles for them or whose views as expressed in speeches or interviews are quoted. There might be more doubt about using editorial material as representative of the group or of the individual controlling the periodical, but this will probably seem legitimate to most people. Freedom of speech is enough of a reality in the United States for us to assume that editorials really do represent the people for whom they pur-

port to speak. When we come to the Soviet Union, however, the matter is quite different. Everyone knows that the Communist Party exercises a close surveillance over Soviet periodicals. Is there any point, then, in analyzing the contents of Soviet newspapers and journals in the hope of finding any differences among elites? Is it not a case of one voice speaking through a hundred mouths?

TABLE 2  
SOVIET UNION PERIODICALS ANALYZED

The entire contents of each periodical were read with general exceptions as listed in the text and categoric exceptions as listed in Appendix A (p. 417).

Elite represented	Periodicals	Sampling Design	Recorded value positions	
			Number	Percent
Government-Party	Pravda	Every 22nd daily issue	1,369	34
	Kommunist	Every 5th issue (8 times a year)	307	8
	Voprosy Filosofii	Every 5th monthly issue	79	2
Economic	Voprosy Ekonomiki	Every 5th monthly issue	295	7
	Sovetskaia Torgovlia	Every 5th monthly issue	133	3
	Planovoe Khozaistvo	Every 5th monthly issue	206	5
Labor	Sotsialisticheskii Trud	Every 5th monthly issue	311	8
Military	Krasnaia Zvezda	Every 43rd daily issue	528	14
Scientific	Vestnik Akademii Nauk	Every 5th monthly issue	37	1
	Vestnik Vysshiei Shkoly	Every 5th monthly issue	240	6
Cultural	Novyi Mir	Every 5th monthly issue	130	3
	Literaturnaia Gazeta	Every 27th bidaily issue	272	7
	Teatr	Every 5th monthly issue	82	2
Total			3,989	100

This is indeed a fair question, and a very difficult one to answer. We want to make it perfectly clear that we tried to do no reading between the lines. In this study, only explicit statements are analyzed. We felt at the beginning of this study, and we now believe that our feeling was justified, that enough free play has developed near the top of Soviet society since the death of Stalin for elite differences of value to come to light in Soviet periodicals. It is true that the explicit differences on the Soviet side are not striking, but in a good many of our value dimensions they are real.

We emphasize that we are not assuming that periodical content represents the views of the readers. We are assuming only that it represents the views of the editors, the authors, and the persons quoted. These persons can be identified as belonging to one

or another elite, and their value preferences credited thereto.

#### PERIODICALS CHOSEN

The task of choosing the periodicals to represent the various elites was not an easy one. Advice was sought and obtained from a number of scholars whom we do not name because we do not wish to implicate them in our choices, some of which they would not approve. Tables 1 and 2 show the periodicals analyzed for the United States and the Soviet Union, respectively, the elites they represent, the material in each that was read, the sampling design for the issues for each periodical, the number of items in which value positions were expressed from each periodical, and the percentage of the total number of preferences that each periodical represents.

It is obvious that if the periodicals chosen to represent the different elites do not in fact do so, our results will be seriously misleading. On the American side, the only categorization about which we have serious misgivings is that of the *American Bar Association Journal* in the provincial elite. At the time this assignment was made, we knew it was of doubtful validity, but we were so anxious to have data from the influential metropolitan lawyers that we decided to use it. Since hindsight makes it appear probable that the editorials in that journal do not represent the provincial elite, it is perhaps fortunate that relevant data in editorials of the journal were so sparse that only 13 percent of all data for the provincial elite are drawn from them.

On the Soviet side there is, of course, the general problem that the government-Party elite tends to dominate all the others. But insofar as the others do have an opportunity for independent expression, we feel that the periodicals were accurately chosen to represent the several elites.

The reason there are almost twice as many recorded value positions in Table 2 as in Table 1 is that we felt we already knew much more about American than about Soviet society, and therefore should put more of our effort into the analysis of the latter. As it turned out, there are few surprises in the American analysis, so that we may regard it as serving three purposes:

(1) It validates our method, since the results show close correspondence with independent, more qualitative analyses by American scholars.

(2) It gives a solid quantitative basis for comparison of Soviet and American elites.

(3) It can serve as a base line for the future study of social changes in the United States. The same method can be used at

any later time to assess the shift in value preferences.

In planning the content analysis, roughly equal reading time was allotted to the periodicals for each of the six elites. The results shown in Table 1 reveal that some American sources were much richer per hour of reading time in information about value preferences than were others. The scientific periodicals were particularly unrewarding. It was not intended originally to use so many of them, but when it became apparent that *Science* and *The American Scientist* were going to yield so little, it was necessary to find more specialized scientific periodicals that had some editorial or editorial-like material. *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* is much the richest in the kind of material desired, but only a small sample was taken here because the scientists who support the journal are regarded by other scientists as not wholly representative of the profession. If the scientists are reticent to reveal their preferences for the good society, the labor elite is not. *The American Federationist* proved to be an unexpectedly plenteous source.

A word should be said about the exceptions noted in the column headed "Material read" in Tables 1 and 2. The general exceptions were the following:

(1) Articles written neither by the editors of the periodical nor by a member of an elite.

(2) Articles by foreigners or exclusively about a foreign country.

(3) Articles exclusively factual or technical in character, where no reference is made to the role of the activities discussed in promoting or detracting from the good life.

(4) Articles of an exclusively historical character not giving value preferences in the period studied.

(5) Biographies and obituaries.

(6) In American periodicals, all book reviews; in Soviet periodicals, reviews of books that would be excepted by points (1) through (5).

The categoric exceptions were made up after inspection of each periodical. Appendix A (p. 417) gives them in full, so that another research team could follow our procedure exactly.

#### PERIOD STUDIED

The period chosen for study was May 1, 1957 to April 30, 1960. Three years seemed a sufficient period, and April 30 was chosen as the last feasible date for ending this project. The fact that our project closed the day before the descent of the American U-2 plane in Soviet territory was completely fortuitous. It was undoubtedly fortunate, however, since our period was one of considerable stability in Soviet and American affairs. We started after the beginning of President Eisenhower's second term and more than a year after the famous speech by Khrushchev denouncing Stalin. Marshal Bulganin was still premier on May 1, 1957, but Khrushchev was already the dominant figure in the Soviet leadership.

#### THE VALUE POSITIONS

The most difficult methodological step of all was the working out of a set of positions within each of the 40 selected dimensions in terms of which the material in the periodicals could be coded. The essential dilemma was to make each position specific enough to be meaningful, yet general enough to be conceivably taken by persons in either the American or the Soviet society. The difficulty is illustrated by the political dimensions. The Communist Party plays a tremendous role in the Soviet Union; there is no counterpart in the United States. We got around the

problem in several cases by speaking of "the central political structure" or "the dominant political power." This enabled us to treat the American federal government and the combined Communist Party-Soviet government complex as equivalent. Similar circumlocutions were necessary in other dimensions to make the value positions possible ones for the members of both societies.

The actual process of formulating the value positions was a long one. We formulated two to five positions for the various categories from theory and general knowledge, tried them out (especially on Soviet materials), revised them, and tried them out a second time. The final set of positions as set forth in the tables for each dimension was a product of three months of work. Even after we had "frozen" our scheme, situations came up that indicated the scheme could have profited from further revision.

We recorded the position of a given elite within a particular dimension as evidenced by an article or editorial in a newspaper or magazine no matter how long or how short. The same elite might take positions within several dimensions in the same article; indeed, the positions of several elites might be reported. Thus, one article could yield a great many coded positions or it might yield only one. What we did not do was to code the same position twice just because it was reiterated in the same article. If for a dimension like Ends of the Society a particular elite seemed to be emphasizing two positions, the coder had to decide which was given the greater emphasis.

The assumption was *not* made that all items in a periodical represented the elite for which it had been chosen as representative. The only case in which this was true was editorial matter. Editorials in the American magazine *Science* were assumed to be speaking for the scientific elite; editorials in



*Pravda* for the Soviet government-Party elite. News stories were read for the statement of positions by various elites. Thus, an article in *Nation's Business* might be devoted to the position of labor leaders. Signed articles or published addresses were recorded as representing the elite of the author. Articles and addresses by foreigners and news stories about foreign comment were not coded at all, nor were articles about the preferences of nonelite persons.

It is important to note that we were not interested in the present state of either society but only in what the members of certain elites thought it should be. Thus articles with no preferences expressed or strongly implied were omitted altogether. Also, the preference had to be a contemporary one. An historical account of what Americans wanted in the thirties was not relevant.

One feature of our system of analysis that deserves mention is that criticisms of value preferences were recorded. Thus, if *Pravda* criticized the cultural elite for taking some stand on freedom of speech, the cultural elite was recorded as actually taking the stand. There is of course danger of misrepresentation here; perhaps the charge has no substance, perhaps no such stand has been taken. We realized this danger but thought it more likely that there is some fire where there is much smoke. At any rate, since in the Soviet Union this is one of the few chances to detect departures from the Party line, we decided we should not forgo the opportunity. In subsequent tables for the dimensions, the number of value preferences derived from criticisms rather than from affirmative statements is in parentheses below the principal figures. The reader can therefore judge the degree to which bias may have been introduced by the practice of including the criticisms in

the principal figures. For those interested in details, the instructions to coders are given in Appendix B (p. 418).

A further point worth mention has to do with positions intermediate to those we had settled upon for each dimension. For those dimensions where this was a frequent problem, we discuss it in detail when we present the specific tables. Our general solution was to allow the coder to record an *ab* when it seemed to him that what was being said could be accurately coded neither under *a* nor *b*. When the tables were made up to show the frequency of various preferences, half of the recorded number at these intermediate positions was distributed to the positions on either side of them. This accounts for the fact that many of our tables give fractional figures at various positions.

#### RELATIVE PROMINENCE OF ELITES

The distribution of recorded preferences according to the elite periodicals from which they came did not of course correspond to the distribution of the same items according to the elites expressing them. Thus, the *American Federationist* frequently stated the position of employers, and the *Saturday Review* commented critically on the Eisenhower administration. Table 3 shows the total number of items in the United States and the Soviet Union samples. A comparison of the left side of Table 3 with Table 1 shows interesting things about the American elites and their periodicals. Obviously the journals of the other elites talk much more about the cosmopolitan government-legal-business elite than do the journals of this elite talk about the other five elites. The *New York Times* and *Fortune* yielded only 453 value preferences, whereas altogether there were 715 value preferences recorded for the elite for which they speak. The two sets of figures approximately

TABLE 3  
RECORDED VALUE PREFERENCES

Elite	United States		Soviet Union	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Cosmopolitan .....	715	33	—	—
Provincial .....	269	12	—	—
Government-Party .....	—	—	1,584	40
Economic .....	—	—	1,020	26
Labor .....	439	20	46	1
Military .....	239	11	482	12
Scientific .....	184	9	187	5
Cultural .....	308	14	670	17
Total .....	2,154	100	3,989	100

balanced for both the scientific and cultural elites: for the former, 176 and 184; for the latter, 329 and 308. The periodicals of the other three elites were generous in talking about other elites, but the tendency was not reciprocated. One could interpret this evidence as showing that, in the discussion of value preferences, the cosmopolitan elite is thought to be most important; the cultural and scientific elites the next most important; and the provincial elite, the labor elite, and the military elite the least important.

On the Soviet side, the comparison of the right side of Table 3 with Table 2 shows that the disparities are not great for the government-Party, the military, and the scientific elites. However, they are great for the economic elite and the labor elite, and in opposite directions from that shown for the United States. Evidently the other elites are concerned to report the value preferences of the planners and managers in the Soviet Union, no doubt as a spur to economic effort. Even the labor newspaper *Trud* rarely reports the value preferences of anyone who can be identified as a member of the labor elite. The great contrast between the two societies on the relative importance of the labor elite (an unfavorable balance in the Soviet Union of 7 to 1 and in

the United States of 7 to 6) probably reflects the greater attention our labor elite gets because of its ability to bargain collectively with employers and to strike. It is difficult to account for the fact that the value preferences of the Soviet cultural elite are discussed by others more than the value preferences of others are discussed by the cultural press. Possibly this reflects a tendency for the cultural elite to be the "bad boy" of Soviet society. It is, in fact, the most frequently criticized Soviet elite.

#### RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY

In this research we found that it was much harder to get agreement among coders on whether or not a dimension was involved in a story or editorial than on what position was being taken within a dimension. On the latter, we obtained agreement between coders more than 90 percent of the time right from the start of our practice coding. On the former, the results were most discouraging for a long time. It turned out that one trouble was the passing reference. One coder would record a passing reference to the one-party state as a preference for it, whereas another would not. A rule adopted on this subject (see Appendix B) helped a great deal. Discussion and analysis of the

differences between coders on their practice runs also increased reliability. We believe our statistical tables represent 80 percent reliability.

Reliability is one of the greatest problems in content analysis. How can we be sure that the results shown in statistical tables are not due to the idiosyncrasies of particular coders? How do we know that approximately the same results would be obtained by other qualified researchers?

In this part of the study, we adopted a statistical test of reliability rather than a one-for-one test. We thought that what the reader wanted to be assured of was that the total result was reliable, not the coding of a particular article. We believed that the reader would be satisfied if it could be shown that two coders, working over 100 issues of *Pravda*, let us say, would come out with results on our 40 dimensions that looked much alike and would give rise to the same interpretations.

In our practice coding we computed percentages of agreement between coders as follows: Each coder read the same material and recorded value preferences at various positions within the several dimensions. Let us assume that one coder recorded 300 preferences and the other only 275. Suppose that for 200 of the preferences recorded by Coder A there was a matching preference by Coder B, but that the remaining 100 preferences recorded by A and the 75 remaining for B were unmatched. This would yield us 400 matched preferences and 175 unmatched ones, or an agreement level of approximately 70 percent.

In our practice coding we had great difficulty in getting these levels above 70 percent when we covered relatively small amounts of material. However, we made the interesting discovery that the more materials coded, the higher the percentage of

agreement became. We found, for instance, that if positions in which two or fewer recordings had been made by each coder were omitted, the reliability rose by at least 10 percent—a practice run that had yielded 65 percent agreement now showed 78 percent agreement. This becomes understandable if it is assumed that whether or not a particular statement deserves to be coded at all is often such a close question that there is an element of chance in the assignments. Then, the more entries in the various positions, the more likely that there will be matches.

This is demonstrable statistically as follows: if the normal approximation is applicable, then the sum of the matches would be

$$\sqrt{n} \left( \sqrt{n} - \frac{\sqrt{r-1}}{\sqrt{\pi}} \right)$$

where  $n$  is the average number of recordings of the two coders and  $r$  is the number of positions in terms of which the material is coded. If there are 100 assignments by each coder of a chance nature into 50 positions, this formula says that the average sum of the matches in the several positions would be 60.4, which is 60 percent agreement. If, now, the number of chance assignments by each coder is 200, the agreement rises to 72 percent. Even if the normal approximation is not applicable, the same increase of the average sum with the increase of  $n$  occurs, though the formula to prove it is much more complicated.

We are not asserting that the assignments of our coders were generally a matter of chance; not at all. When they both believed that the item should be coded within a certain dimension, the position chosen showed very high agreement. But there were numerous instances where one decided that an item should be coded within a par-

ticular dimension and the other decided it should not be coded. This is where chance enters, and although more decisions of this sort arise as the volume of material increases, still the formula proves that the greater the total volume of material coded, the higher the percentage of agreement in the end.

As shown, then, even if there are chance fluctuations in the coding process, the more material coded, the greater will be the reliability. This is true of the work of two coders or of the work of the same coder repeated after an interval. Since there are 2,154 items of information coded from the American periodicals and 3,989 from the Soviet periodicals, we are confident that we have reached more than 80 percent reliability.

The question of validity—of whether the explicit statements in periodicals represent the true positions of the several elites—is of course moot. We can have much more confidence on this score in the American materials than in the Soviet materials. In the latter case there is doubt both that the government-Party elite allows the other elites in the Soviet Union to voice their preferences and that the government-Party elite always expresses its own value preferences frankly. We do not wish to pass over the seriousness of this problem. We can only point to the fact that different positions are taken by elite members in the Soviet Union and hope that these differences give some indication, however inadequate, of the true situation.

STATISTICAL TABLES FOR VALUE DIMENSIONS

In the tables giving the result of content analysis for the 40 value dimensions, the various elites are represented by letters as follows:

Co—Cosmopolitan	}	United States
P —Provincial		
G —Government-Party	}	Soviet Union
E —Economic		
L —Labor		
M —Military		
S —Scientific		
Cu—Cultural		
T —represents total		

In these tables, salience percentages are shown for each elite and for the combined elites in each country. These percentages are obtained by dividing the total number of items recorded within a dimension for a particular elite by the total number recorded for all dimensions for that elite in Table 3. They show the degree to which a particular value dimension is emphasized by particular elites. A comparison of the percentages horizontally across any table shows whether or not a particular elite is more or less concerned than other elites. This percentage corrects for any possible over- or undersampling of the value preferences of particular elites.

The figures in parentheses represent the number of criticisms rather than affirmative statements contained in the figures just above them.

All figures opposite value positions are absolute numbers, not percentages. A word of caution about reading these figures: to determine whether one elite is more favorable than another elite to a particular position, it is necessary to compare the figures down the columns as well as across the rows. Thus, as shown in Table 4, the American cultural elite (with 4 recorded preferences) may be more inclined to position *b* than is the cosmopolitan elite (with 13 recorded preferences) since the proportion for the former is higher.

TABLE 4  
MODE OF OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY

Value position	United States								Soviet Union							
	Co	P	L	M	S	Cu	T	G	E	L	M	S	Cu	T		
a. Socialization of property should be the norm. Exceptions should be very few.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	81	55	1	16	12	32	197		
b. Our society has been too dogmatic in its property principles. We should accept some modifications that will bring us nearer a mixed system of private and public ownership.	13 (7)	0.5	2.5 (2)	-	1	4 (2)	21 (11)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
c. Private property should be the norm with only rare exceptions, e.g., the postal service.	24 (1)	33.5	0.5	2	-	3	63 (1)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Total .....	37 (8)	34	3 (2)	2	1	7 (2)	84 (12)	81	55	1	16	12	32	197		
Saliency of this dimension, %	5	13	1	1	1	2	4	6	5	2	3	7	5	5		

LEVEL OF SIGNIFICANCE IN  
STATISTICAL TABLES

The number of possible comparisons in any of the tables on particular value dimensions is so great that it is not feasible to compute the levels of significance of difference of them all. However, in a critique of the first draft of this study done by Dr. Rolfe LaForge of the Oregon Research Institute, levels of significance were computed by means of a chi-square test for all the relationships about which assertions of difference or of no difference were made. The standard of significance used by Dr. LaForge was  $p = 0.05$ . He found that a number of the statements originally made were unjustified at that level, and these statements have accordingly been deleted. He also found a few cases where there were

differences in saliency that had not been indicated. Statements about these have been added.

*Results for Value Dimensions  
Concerning the Economy*

For the sake of more organized discussion, the data and interpretations of the nine dimensions that are principally economic in character are grouped in this section. Each dimension is discussed in turn, and then comments are made on them as a group.

MODE OF OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY

Ideologically, this is the most focal of all our dimensions. One expects that Soviet elites will always express a collective property preference, whereas American elites will always express a private property pref-

erence. In wording the value positions there was no difficulty with the extremes, but it was hard to find a meaningful middle position that might occasionally be taken by elite members on either side. Position *b* in Table 4 represents less a definite point on a continuum than a tendency to forsake the extremes. Any tendency on the part of the elites on either side to indicate disillusion with the dogma of their own society on property principles would, however, be extremely significant.

On the Soviet side there was some doubt whether position *b* should be used for an article approving the transfer of equipment from machine tractor stations to collective farms. On the surface, this looks like a denationalizing of property, but in fact it is only putting the ownership in an agency which is itself dominated by the Party and which may in fact soon be brought into the state farm system. Such items were therefore not coded here but rather in position *c*, under political and economic centralization and decentralization.

On the American side, position *c* in this first dimension was used, even in the absence of a flat statement of private property preference, if there was strong criticism of large federal budgets which support activities competing with private business.

Table 4 shows that the elites on the two sides, taken together, comment about equally often on the mode of property ownership. The difference is that this commentary is concentrated heavily in one of the American elites—the provincial—whereas the commentary is more evenly spread through the Soviet elites.

The Soviet materials show no break in the Party line—all the preferences are in position *a*. There is much more flexibility on the American side, with 25 percent of the items indicating a tolerance for a mixed

system of private and public ownership. It should be noted, however, that a good half of the items recorded in position *b* were criticisms rather than affirmative statements. More than half of all criticisms were directed at the cosmopolitan elite for taking position *b*. In most instances it was the provincial elite that was disgruntled, as can well be imagined from their heavy concentration at position *c*. It will surprise many that the American labor elite so rarely expresses a property preference at all. It is striking that, in the *American Federationist*, the general principles that underlie the American economy are rarely questioned. The labor elite is inclined to a mixed system, but it does not focus its attention on the matter.

#### PLANNING AND CONTROL

This is a difficult category to deal with, particularly on the Soviet side, because so much periodical material deals with the fulfillment or lack of fulfillment of plans. Such material was not coded since it does not express a value preference. In order to be recorded, an item had to speak of the value (or lack of it) of planning, or of the importance (or unimportance) of human dedication in the implementation. On the American side, position *b* (Table 5) was used for those who favored national housing schemes.

As would be expected, Soviet periodicals emphasize planning more than do American periodicals. As compared with their opposite numbers in the Soviet Union the military and scientific elites in the United States seem not to express preferences within this dimension, which perhaps reflects the non-involvement of these two groups in politics.

More than two-thirds of the American items were recorded at position *b*, which shows that American society has gone far toward acceptance of the planning of impor-

TABLE 5  
PLANNING AND CONTROL

Value position	United States							Soviet Union						
	Co	P	L	M	S	Cu	T	G	E	L	M	S	Cu	T
a. There should be continuous planning in all sectors of the economy and continuous active implementation by all the people.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	128 (2)	107 (2)	3	19	14	21	292 (4)
b. There should be effective planning of important features of the economy where necessary, with government regulation of business where needed, in addition.	28 (11)	5	26 (2)	1	2	7 (1)	69 (14)	2 (2)	1	-	-	-	-	3 (2)
c. Trial and error processes (not planning) should be relied upon to produce a vigorous and integrated economy.	13 (5)	14	-	-	-	-	27 (5)	-	1 (1)	-	-	-	-	1 (1)
Total	41 (16)	19	26 (2)	1	2	7 (1)	96 (19)	130 (4)	109 (3)	3	19	14	21	296 (7)
Salience of this dimension, %	6	7	6	0	1	2	5	8	10	7	4	7	3	7

tant features of the economy. The labor and cultural elites are unanimously in favor of this, and the cosmopolitan elite markedly so. The provincial elite shows a strong tendency in the other direction—toward a minimum of planning. The split in viewpoint between the elites is very sharp.

Among the Soviet elites, this dimension is understandably most salient for the economic elite. The data again show well-nigh complete acceptance of the Party line. Three of the four exceptions recorded at positions *b* and *c* are criticisms rather than affirmative statements. In other words, elite members are accused of having these preferences, though we have found this out only indirectly by the criticisms voiced by other elite members. The lone member of

the economic elite who made an affirmative statement of this kind is indeed an isolated figure.

#### STATE'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR EMPLOYMENT

This dimension is not frequently discussed by Soviet elites. They probably take the state's responsibility for granted. Most mentions of it in Soviet periodicals occur in connection with criticisms of capitalist countries for unemployment. They simply say approvingly that in their society the state sees to it that no one is unemployed. Soviet economic and labor papers sometimes indicate that employment is not in fact full—that when new machines are introduced that throw men out of work, there are often long delays in getting reassignments. However,

TABLE 6  
STATE'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR EMPLOYMENT

Value position	United States							Soviet Union						
	Co	P	L	M	S	Cu	T	G	E	L	M	S	Cu	T
a. A primary responsibility of the state is to provide full employment at the person's level of ability.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	3	-	-	-	1	5
b. A primary responsibility of the state is to provide full employment, but not necessarily at the person's level of ability.	0.5	-	1.5	-	-	-	2	8	14 (1)	-	-	1	3	26 (1)
c. Though the state has no responsibility to provide full employment, it should cushion the shock of unemployment by a scheme of unemployment insurance and by holding in readiness plans for public works to be implemented in periods of unemployment.	4.5 (1)	-	15.5	1 (1)	1	2	24 (2)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
d. The state's responsibility in the field of unemployment does not extend, at most, beyond unemployment compensation.	8 (6)	5	-	-	-	-	13 (6)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total .....	13 (7)	5	17	1 (1)	1	2	39 (8)	9	17 (1)	-	-	1	4	31 (1)
Saliency of this dimension, %	2	2	4	0	1	1	2	1	2	0	0	1	1	1

there is no indication that any of the elites condone this.

Table 6 shows little overlap in the value preferences of the two sets of elites. Soviet elites take positions *a* and *b*; American elites tend to take *c* and *d*. Perhaps the only contrast worth comment is that the labor elite in the United States most frequently

discusses the state's responsibility for employment, whereas in the Soviet Union it is the economic elite. This possibly reflects a greater authoritativeness in Soviet industry. Although the provincial elite in the United States seldom raises the issue, when it does, it consistently takes the most conservative position.



TABLE 7  
DISTRIBUTION OF PECUNIARY AND OTHER REWARDS

Value position	United States							Soviet Union						
	Co	P	L	M	S	Cu	T	G	E	L	M	S	Cu	T
a. Everyone contributes what he can to the working of the economic system, therefore all positions should be rewarded substantially equally.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 (1)	1 (1)	-	-	-	-	2 (2)
b. Some degree of inequality of reward to various occupations or to various degrees of productivity is necessary for the satisfactory functioning of the economic system, but this inequality should be kept to a minimum.	7	-	22 (3)	5	-	2	36 (3)	8	8	-	-	2	2	20
c. High productivity is so important to the economic system that persons of highest productivity should be rewarded much more than those of low productivity.	-	1	1	-	-	2	4	31	49	11	-	4	6	101
d. The different occupations* are of very unequal importance to the economy and should therefore be rewarded very unequally.	3 (2)	6 (2)	-	-	-	-	9 (4)	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
Total .....	10 (2)	7 (2)	23 (3)	5	-	4	49 (7)	41 (1)	58 (1)	11	-	6	8	124 (2)
Saliency of this dimension, %	1	2	5	2	0	1	2	3	6	24	0	3	1	3

\* Independent party workers constitute an occupation in the Soviet Union.

SYSTEM OF ALLOCATION TO JOBS AND TRAINING

Since only five items occurred in the American materials that were relevant to this dimension, no significant comparison can be made with the Soviet results. Table 39 in Appendix C (p. 420) shows that on the Soviet side there is strong consensus on the proposition that the government and the

Party have the right to allocate people to jobs in the interest of social efficiency.

Though no table is presented at this point, all the data that were coded on this dimension, both Soviet and American, are included in summary presentations, like Table 11. This will be true for the materials of all dimensions omitted from the body of the text.

TABLE 8  
STRUCTURE OF ECONOMIC INCENTIVES

Value position	United States						Soviet Union							
	Co	P	L	M	S	Cu	T	G	E	L	M	S	Cu	T
a. In work, the interest of the person and of the society are fused. He works best either individually or in groups who is motivated by a burning loyalty to his society.	-	-	-	2.5	-	1	3.5	66	40.5	1	11	3	14	135.5
b. The best incentive to hard work is the spirit of a team of workers striving for a group reward.	-	5	-	0.5	-	2	7.5	3	10.5	-	-	1	-	14.5
c. The self-interest of the person and his interest in his family are the best incentives to hard work.	-	5	-	-	-	-	5.0	7	8.0	-	-	2	1	18.0
Total .....	-	10	-	3.0	-	3	16.0	76	59.0	1	11	6	15	168.0
Saliency for this dimension, %	0	4	0	1	0	1	1	5	6	2	6	1	2	4

DISTRIBUTION OF PECUNIARY AND OTHER REWARDS

Positions *c* and *d* in Table 7 are two different ways in which inequality of rewards may be justified. Position *c* expresses the view of the Stakhanovite movement in the Soviet Union or of the piecework system in the United States. Position *d* represents more of a status conception—that doctors, let us say, are more important than farmers.

Table 7 indicates that the matter of rewards had much the same saliency in the Soviet periodicals as in the American. The labor elite in each society is the most concerned, with the Soviet labor elite more concerned than the American. In fact, a quarter of all the recorded information about labor elite preferences in the Soviet Union is on this dimension. As would be expected, the Soviet economic elite also fre-

quently expresses concern with this dimension.

There is a wide range of value positions on both sides within this dimension, and hence considerable overlap. American elites (especially the labor one) favor position *b*—that, though there should be some inequality of reward, it should be kept to a minimum. This is much less often expressed in Soviet periodicals, but it represents about 16 percent of their total recorded value preferences. The overwhelming weight of Soviet preference seems to be position *c*—high productivity should be rewarded much more than low. Obviously this is consonant with the drive of the Soviet Union to catch up with the United States in industrial production; but, perhaps even more, it reveals the regime's desire to make its most productive workers contented and loyal.

TABLE 9  
AMOUNT AND KIND OF LEISURE

Value position	United States							Soviet Union						
	Co	P	L	M	S	Cu	T	G	E	L	M	S	Cu	T
a. Workers may occasionally be required to do overtime work.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	4	-	1	7
b. Overtime work should not be required.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	2
c. The work week should be reduced.	-	-	6 (2)	-	-	-	6 (2)	18	29.5	1	1	2	6	57.5
d. The quality, not the quantity, of leisure is the main problem to be dealt with.	1	-	1	-	-	5	7	-	0.5	-	1	-	-	1.5
Total .....	1	-	7 (2)	-	-	5	13 (2)	18	32	2	6	2	8	68
Saliency of this dimension, %	0	0	2	0	0	2	1	1	3	4	1	1	1	2

#### STRUCTURE OF ECONOMIC INCENTIVES

This dimension proves much more fruitful in the Soviet materials than in the American. Only the provincial elite discussed this much on the American side, and they showed an interesting tendency to split their preferences equally between the self-interest and the teamwork motives (Table 8). Evidently industrial administrators and social psychologists are in touch with one another. It is interesting that the military elite tended to take the position that emphasizes loyalty to the society.

On the Soviet side it was expected that for the government-Party and the economic elites this would be a dimension of some saliency, but it is perhaps surprising that it is more salient for the military than for the labor elite. Indeed, the minimal comment by the latter indicates how little they attempt to influence the practical philosophy of the regime.

The dominant Soviet position is that which emphasizes loyalty to the society. The Soviet military elite are unanimous in this position and the cultural elite almost so. It is interesting that the ones who are nearest to the problem—the government-

Party and the economic elites—take the other positions more often. That 11 per cent of their preferences should be for the self-interest motive is revealing. As an illustration, in the September 1957 issue of *Teatr*, Khrushchev criticized Stalin for not paying sufficient attention to material self-interest in economic motivation. He told the story about a cousin of his who chopped down an orchard because the taxes on it were too high, and another story about peasants who did not gather potatoes because the pay was too low.

#### DEGREE OF OBLIGATION TO WORK

This dimension proved to be completely worthless on the American side, since there are no recorded items on the subject. Since no comparison can be made with the Soviet results, the latter are relegated to Table 40 in Appendix C (p. 420).

#### AMOUNT AND KIND OF LEISURE

The value positions within this dimension (Table 9) do not constitute a continuum. The first three steps in a sense do, but the fourth step is off in a different direction. Positions *a* and *b* were considered necessary

in dealing with the Soviet Union, and position *d* was necessary for the United States.

The American results show (1) that this topic is not much discussed, even in the labor press; (2) that only two elites are interested in it—the labor and cultural elites; (3) that the labor elite prefers that the work week be shortened; and (4) that the cultural elite believes that the low quality of American leisure pursuits is a matter of concern.

The Soviet materials show an unexpected concentration on the preference for more leisure by reducing the work week. Only the military elite dissents from this view, probably because of their concern for increased production of weapons. The general result, however, is one that shows real concern for “butter” as well as “guns.” The upshot is that the Soviet society in general tends to take the position of the American labor elite.

#### ROLE OF LABOR UNIONS

In this dimension the American materials are much richer than the Soviet materials. This no doubt reflects the independent status of unions in the United States as contrasted with their close tie-in with the state in the Soviet Union. Because of their independence in the United States, their role is much more controversial.

It is interesting that in the United States this category has the largest proportion of criticisms in the information about value positions—22 percent of the total. This means that the subject is highly controversial, since the partisans are frequently defining the positions of their opponents and criticizing them.

On both sides, this dimension is most salient for the labor elites. Since the Soviet value preferences are so concentrated at position *a* in Table 10, one can only be sur-

prised that any members of the government-Party elite dared to take, even by implication, position *b*, which includes the right to strike. This boldness is perhaps correlated with the fact that unions have recently been given more power in the field of recreation and have a comparatively free hand in making so-called collective agreements with management.

There was grave difficulty in coding the American materials because value preferences were often not clearly position *b* or *c*. In nonunion journals a favorable attitude toward unions was coded position *c* unless the union shop was specifically approved. In *The American Federationist*, position *b* was used where the union shop was either explicitly or implicitly approved. When it was not clear whether it was being approved or not, a *bc* was recorded. Where the preference was being expressed for organizing white collar workers, position *c* was chosen because at this time even ardent unionists do not hope to achieve union shop provisions with white collar workers.

Table 10 has no surprises for those familiar with American society. The labor union issue is most salient for the labor elite, and next most salient for the provincial elite. The labor elite takes the union shop position more frequently than any other elite, although the cultural elite is also somewhat sympathetic to this position. The correspondence of the positions coded in this table to material from other sources about the value preferences of American elites tends to validate our method of analysis.

#### SUMMARY OF DIMENSIONS CONCERNING THE ECONOMY

If the first nine dimensions we have considered are representative of economic matters in the two societies, then their elites are approximately equally concerned with

TABLE 10  
ROLE OF LABOR UNIONS

Value position	United States							Soviet Union						
	Co	P	L	M	S	Cu	T	G	E	L	M	S	Cu	T
a. Membership in labor unions should be required of workers* and, since planners in the central political system will see to it that they receive their just reward, strikes are unnecessary. However, the role of labor unions should include jurisdiction over many aspects of the worker's life.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14.5	13	5	1	2	2	37.5
b. Membership in labor unions should be required of workers, and the unions should have the right to advocate their views and to strike against employers.	7 (1)	2	74 (9)	-	-	4.5	87.5 (10)	1.5	-	-	-	-	-	1.5
c. Membership in labor unions should be freely open to workers, and unions should have the right to advocate their views and to strike against employers.	35.5 (11.5)	25.5 (9.5)	24	-	-	4.5	89.5 (21)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
d. Labor unions are undesirable and, if they are permitted to exist, should not have the right to strike.	5.5 (5.5)	4.5 (4.5)	-	-	-	-	10 (10)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	48 (18)	32 (14)	98 (9)	-	-	9	187 (41)	16	13	5	1	2	2	39
Saliency of this dimension, %	7	12	22	0	0	3	9	1	1	11	1	1	0	1

\* In Soviet Union refers to *trudyacheysya*.

such matters. Table 11 shows that some 25 percent of all recorded items fall within these dimensions for the Soviet Union, and 23 percent for the United States, with concern more evenly spread among the elites in the Soviet Union. The infrequency of expression of value preference in this area by the American military and scientific elites is noteworthy. The contrast with the Soviet Union is explained by the fact that there the scientific and military journals are strongly influenced by the Party. Higher production

is emphasized across the whole gamut of Soviet periodicals.

One broad generalization about the differences between the two societies in the economic sphere can be drawn from the seven dimensions for which comparisons can be made: differences within these dimensions increase the more salient is the opposition between individual autonomy and collective control. The three dimensions within which there is the greatest overlap of preferences between the two societies are

Distribution of Pecuniary and Other Rewards, Structure of Economic Incentives, and Amount and Kind of Leisure. This is an interesting result because all three have to do with motivation to work, and not with the control of workers. To the degree that there is some convergence on these subjects, it may show that the Soviet Union and the United States have discovered that industrialized societies pose similar problems of human engineering.

Two other dimensions, Mode of Ownership of Property and Planning and Control, show rigidity on the Soviet side, but some flexibility on the American. Within the property dimension there were many American expressions of approval for a mixed economy, and within the other dimension a very wide acceptance of the notion of planning important features of the economic system. The Soviet elites expressed almost unanimous approval of state ownership of property and inclusive planning. Evidently many Americans find no fundamental conflict between collective effort and individual autonomy.

Finally, within the dimensions State's Responsibility for Employment and Role of Labor Unions, there is complete divergence between the two societies. In the Soviet Union collective responsibility and control are unanimously approved; in the United States economic voluntarism is equally favored.

### *Results for Value Dimensions Concerning Social and Internal Political Affairs*

Twenty-two dimensions are grouped under this heading. Since they are interdependent in many ways, they will be discussed in a summary at the end of their exposition. One can differentiate two rough subgroups, however. The first ten dimen-

TABLE 11  
SALIENCE OF ECONOMIC MATTERS TO THE ELITES

Elite	United States, percent	Soviet Union, percent
Cosmopolitan .....	22	—
Provincial .....	40	—
Government-Party .....	—	25
Economic .....	—	35
Labor .....	40	52
Military .....	5	12
Scientific .....	2	24
Cultural .....	12	16
Total .....	23	25

sions deal primarily with the broad structure of the society and its institutions; the last twelve deal somewhat more with the place of persons and classes of persons in the society and with collective orientations. Brief reviews of the findings for each subgroup will therefore be introduced.

#### UNITARY OR PLURALISTIC SOCIETY

As Table 12 shows, this dimension is much more salient in the discussions of Soviet elites than American, which may be because the Soviet Union feels that its unitary society is under attack. American elites probably have this feeling much less. The American pluralistic society is almost two centuries old, and has established itself not only in the eyes of its own people but in the eyes of the world. Since the government-Party system that gives Soviet society its unitary character is less than fifty years old, that society may feel less secure.

This dimension deserves a word of explanation. The concern here is not with political unity—that is taken care of by the dimension Nature of the Political Party System—but with whether or not the political system shares power with other types of organizations and groups. The various value positions show clearly what is meant.

TABLE 12  
UNITARY OR PLURALISTIC SOCIETY

Value position	United States							Soviet Union						
	Co	P	L	M	S	Cu	T	G	E	L	M	S	Cu	T
a. There should be a single system of power, political in character, which controls all other types of organizations in the society.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	86	73	3	40	7	43	252
b. The political power must be dominant, but it should allow some latitude for self-direction to other types of organizations, such as trade unions and voluntary associations.	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	7 (1)	2 (2)	1	1	1	4 (1)	16 (4)
c. There should be many centers of power based on occupation and voluntary associations, all helping to form public opinion.	10	11	13	-	3	13	50	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total .....	10	11	13	1	3	13	51	93 (1)	75 (2)	4	41	8	47 (1)	268 (4)
Salience of this dimension, %	1	4	3	0	2	4	2	6	7	9	9	4	7	7

We have not coded material on the desirability or undesirability of independent power exercised by labor unions here since we had a separate dimension for the role of labor unions.

The Soviet unitary society is so well established that rarely does one find a flat statement that there should be a single system of power. Rather, two kinds of statements occur with great frequency, which we thought justified the use of position *a*: one, where it is emphasized that all the people are strongly behind the Party; the other, where separate organizations, including the armed forces, stress their unanimity with the Party directives. After the fall of Zhukov in 1958, the newspaper *Krasnaia Zvezda* (*Red Star*) was particularly emphatic on this point.

The elites of the two societies have diametrically opposed positions on this subject; each believes in its own system. For once, the American elites show a more unanimous position than the Soviet elites.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC  
CENTRALIZATION OR DECENTRALIZATION

This dimension is not really a continuum. Originally we had only positions *a* and *c* in Table 13. These proved adequate for dealing with the Soviet materials but inadequate for the American materials, and hence we introduced the present position *b*, which takes care of the views of those, for instance, who favor federal aid on a broad front. They oppose a strong states' rights position but do not favor anything so monolithic as position *a*. (Questions of federal aid to schools were handled under the dimension Control of Primary and Secondary Education and were not coded here.) It is a fair question whether the preference among members of Soviet elites for decentralization of economic functions to the autonomous republics and regions should come under position *c*, as now, or under *b*. We left such preferences under *c* because the Soviet Union does not have the system of grants-

TABLE 13  
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CENTRALIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION

Value position	United States							Soviet Union						
	Co	P	L	M	S	Cu	T	G	E	L	M	S	Cu	T
a. The political and/or economic system should be strongly integrated, with power centralized and lower administrative units exercising limited functions subject to central control.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	13.5	-	2	6.5	3.5	34.5
												(1)	(1)	
b. There should be active supplementation by the central government of the resources of the subordinate regional units for carrying out their reserved functions.	3	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	(2)						(2)							
c. There should be a sufficiently strong central power in the political-economic systems for the effective operation of the society, but with many functions reserved to subordinate regional units.	7	24	-	-	-	-	31	33	15.5	-	-	4.5	9.5	62.5
Total .....	10	24	-	-	-	-	34	42	29	-	2	11	13	97
	(2)						(2)						(1)	(1)
Salience of this dimension, %	1	9	0	0	0	0	2	3	3	0	0	6	2	2

in-aid that the United States has adopted on occasion. As mentioned earlier, approving references to the transfer of machine tractor stations to collective farms were recorded in position *c* also.

In the United States the provincial elite is mainly concerned with this category, and with a view to keeping the system as decentralized as possible. Perhaps it is significant that on the Soviet side the government-Party elite is strongest for decentralization, though supported by the cultural elite. The economic and scientific elites appear to be dragging their feet somewhat in adopting the new Party line.

It is not a dimension of sharp contrast between the two societies. Both are wrestling with the same problem, and the value preferences concerning it are not perhaps as different as is generally supposed.

INTEGRATION OR SEPARATION OF  
POLITICAL FUNCTIONS

Like the two dimensions just discussed and the two that follow, this one deals with an aspect of the very complicated problem of the relation between the political system and the more inclusive social system. Although this dimension seems to be concerned only with the internal structure of the political system, either the integration or the separation of political functions is preferred because of an assumed contribution to the welfare of the society.

The results in Table 14 are clear-cut. The elites of the two societies express their traditional positions without deviation. On the American side, it is interesting that this question is more salient for the provincial elite than for the others, which perhaps



TABLE 14  
INTEGRATION OR SEPARATION OF POLITICAL FUNCTIONS

Value position	United States							Soviet Union						
	Co	P	L	M	S	Cu	T	G	E	L	M	S	Cu	T
a. There should be a single-person executive dominant over the whole political structure of the society.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1.5	-	1.5	2	0.5	6.5
b. The executive function should be dominant, but the members of a high political body should share in the executive power.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	19	10.5	-	5.5	4	4.5	43.5
c. The legislative function should be the dominant one in the central political structure.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
d. There should be no function that is dominant in the central political structure. (The judiciary should have sufficient power to keep a balance between the executive and legislative functions.)	10	14	1	-	1	4	30	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total .....	10	14	1	-	1	4	30	20	12	-	7	6	5	50
Salience of this dimension, %	1	5	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	3	1	1

stems from the great anxiety of this elite over "big government." Its members hope that the system of checks and balances will slow the absorption of functions by the federal government.

On the Soviet side, the great concentration on position *b* rather than *a* is significant. Most of the material within this dimension was gathered in the early part of our period when the remains of the Stalinist "cult of personality" were still being dealt with. The preference for a system in which "the members of a high political body should share in the executive power" clearly indicates the reaction to the single-person dominance of the Stalin era.

NATURE OF POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM

There is remarkable contrast within this dimension between the paucity of materials on the American side and the richness of materials on the Soviet side. And this

despite the fact that, for the Soviet periodicals, we followed carefully the injunction to coders to "code here [in position *a*] only when at least a full sentence clearly indicates the virtue of a single party." If we had coded value preferences expressed less fully, we would have had many more of them. Coded here were all references to the monolithic character of the Party. In the continuing criticism of the "anti-Party group" of Malenkov *et al.* there were many statements like the one in *Pravda* of July 6, 1957, in which the Party declared itself "against the scoundrels and fractionists who tried to strike a blow at the unity of our Party." The value preference of the anti-Party group was coded at position *b*.

The results of Table 15 show complete unanimity among the members of American elites on the multiparty system. It is perhaps interesting, in view of the frequent charge that American labor tends to support

TABLE 15  
NATURE OF POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM

Value position	United States							Soviet Union						
	Co	P	L	M	S	Cu	T	G	E	L	M	S	Cu	T
a. A single-party system is better than a multiparty one because all constructive wishes and goals of the people are represented in it. (Therefore, other parties are unnecessary.)	-	-	-	0.5	-	-	0.5	124	67	1	38	10	38	278
b. Though the single-party system is superior, crucial changes in the situation may require sharp dialectical changes in party policy.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10 (5)	-	-	-	-	-	10 (5)
c. The multiparty system is better because the party in power can be displaced with another party if it is not adequately serving the freedom and interests of the people.	12	3	11	1.5	-	4	31.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total .....	12	3	11	2	-	4	32	134 (5)	67	1	38	10	38	288 (5)
Saliency of this dimension, %	2	1	3	1	0	1	1	8	7	2	8	5	6	7

only the Democratic party, to find high saliency of the multiparty preference in the labor elite.

The saliency is high for most elites on the Soviet side. The small number of items at position *b*, even though many of them were criticisms rather than positive statements, shows the overwhelming consensus on the present party system at least as far as explicit statements in periodicals are concerned.

LOCUS OF PUBLIC DECISION-MAKING

This dimension brings clearly into view the contrast between the two societies on the political side. The epithet of "totalitarian" hurled at the Soviet Union by the West can here be tested.

It is first of interest that this is a more salient category in the United States than

in the Soviet Union (Table 16). This may be because elites in open societies like to compare their value positions on so important a matter as the process of decision-making, whereas in closed societies the system of decision-making is taken as given, so that only occasional reinforcements of the accepted positions seem called for.

Though the two societies are sharply contrasted in this dimension, there is approximately a 13 percent overlap. Some 11 percent of the items on American elites take position *c*, which is much like that espoused by Walter Lippmann in his political writing. It is significant that 15 percent of the Soviet items reflect the same position, stressing the desirability of interaction between the masses and the leaders before the latter formulate basic policies. This is an important bit of convergence between the two

TABLE 16  
LOCUS OF PUBLIC DECISION-MAKING

Value position	United States							Soviet Union						
	Co	P	L	M	S	Cu	T	G	E	L	M	S	Cu	T
a. Entire responsibility for policy decisions should rest with leaders.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3 (3)	-	-	-	-	-	3 (3)
b. Policy decisions should be made by leaders who are in close contact with the masses.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	51 (1)	9.5	1	12.5	3	6.5	83.5 (3)
c. Leaders should be the active governing force, making most of the policy decisions; but there should be interaction between the masses and the leaders in the formulation of the most basic policies.	9 (5)	0.5	2.5 (1)	-	-	1	13 (6)	3	3.5 (1)	-	1.5	-	7.5 (1)	15.5 (2)
d. There should be constant and general interaction between the masses and the leaders in the formulation of policy, based upon a strong sense of responsibility in the masses.	24	17.5	31.5	4	13	16	106	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total .....	33 (5)	18	34 (1)	4	13	17	119 (6)	57 (4)	13 (1)	1	14 (2)	3	14 (1)	102 (8)
Saliency of this dimension, %	5	7	8	2	7	6	6	4	1	2	3	2	2	3

NOTE: Freedom of information questions are coded here as relevant to the ability of the masses to contribute to the formulation of policy.

societies. The cosmopolitan elite in the United States and the cultural elite in the Soviet Union take this position proportionately most frequently. The American cultural elite takes a more populist or radically democratic position, whereas the government-Party elite in the Soviet Union takes a more authoritarian one. Thus the high government elite is always more leader-oriented than is the cultural elite, but the general difference between the two societies is such as to cause parts of the American cosmopolitan and the Soviet cultural elites to take the same position.

As in the previous four dimensions, the American military elite rarely expresses value preferences. This is consonant with the tradition of the military not mingling in politics. In three of the five preceding dimensions, the Soviet military shows sharp contrast. This is no doubt because it is

closely tied into the Party and therefore expresses itself on governmental matters.

It should be noted that all the items coded in position *a* on the Soviet side were criticisms of the government-Party elite. These were, in fact, items attacking the so-called anti-Party group that had already been removed from power.

CONTROL OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION

This is a very difficult dimension within which to construct meaningful positions. Really two different facets of the problem are put together in our wording of the preferences: one is the degree of ideological control and the other is the degree of local versus nonlocal administrative control. These flow into each other in confusing ways.

TABLE 17  
CONTROL OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION

Value position	United States							Soviet Union						
	Co	P	L	M	S	Cu	T	G	E	L	M	S	Cu	T
a. The best system of education is one that accepts ideological guidance <sup>a</sup> from the central political system, no matter how the schools are supported.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13	9	1	-	-	13	36
b. The best system of education is one that takes its basic ideological position from the central political system but in which latitude is given regional and local authorities in implementation of objectives.	0.5	-	-	-	-	-	0.5	4	2	-	-	3	7	16
c. The best system of education is one that maintains regional or local control but receives aid in considerable amounts from the central political system.	10.5 (3)	1	18	-	8	3.5	41 (3)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
d. The best system of education is one that grows out of local needs, is controlled either locally or regionally, and depends hardly at all for support from the central political system.	4 (1)	12	-	-	-	0.5	16.5 (1)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total .....	15 (4)	13	18	-	8	4	58 (4)	17	11	1	-	3	20	52
Salience of this dimension, %	2	5	4	0	4	1	3	1	1	2	0	2	3	1

<sup>a</sup> This refers specifically to content of instruction.

The great weight of American preference in Table 17 is for a system that maintains local control but in which the local school districts receive a good deal of aid from the federal government. Evidently the members of elites who express themselves in periodicals are more in favor of this position than Congress has been. The labor and scientific elites were unanimous in their expression on this point. The cosmopolitan elite was strongly of the same mind, in sharp contrast to the provincial elite, which was almost unanimously for the traditional system of local control and support. The military did not comment one way or another.

This is not a salient dimension on the Soviet side. The positions taken are as ex-

pected, positions *a* and *b*. The cultural elite is most concerned. The scientific elite is the only one strongly for the giving of some latitude to regional and local authorities, perhaps because they feel that a better chance for freedom of thought exists under these conditions. Although this dimension does not appear salient for the economic elite, one coder reports that this elite more than any other was writing about curriculum content in *Vestnik Vysshei Shkoly* (*Journal of Higher Education*), urging that more weight be given to industrial and commercial subjects. However, they were not particularly oriented toward the restricting of ideological guidance from the Party.

TABLE 18  
CRITERIA FOR SCHOLARSHIPS AND OTHER AID TO STUDENTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION

Value position	United States							Soviet Union						
	Co	P	L	M	S	Cu	T	G	E	L	M	S	Cu	T
a. Primary emphasis in awarding aid should be on loyalty and past activities contributory to the system.	-	-	-	-	0.5	-	0.5	7	2	1	1	4	7	22
b. Primary emphasis should be on scholarly ability.	2	-	2	-	1.5	-	5.5	3	1	-	-	-	-	4
c. Emphasis should be on both scholarly ability and economic need.	2	-	3	-	4	-	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
d. Primary emphasis should be on economic need.	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
e. Primary emphasis should be on membership in religious, ethnic, or other groups.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total .....	4	1	5	-	6	-	16	10	3	1	1	4	7	26
Salience of this dimension, %	1	0	1	0	3	0	1	1	0	2	0	2	1	1

CRITERIA FOR SCHOLARSHIPS AND OTHER  
AID TO STUDENTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION

This is perhaps the most limited in scope of all our dimensions, and one may well ask why it was included. Our reasoning was that the priority of values in a society will be manifested by the criteria applied to the selection of those who are to be helped through higher education. The preferences that are dominant will influence the character of the society's leadership in the next generation.

Originally we had only four positions in this dimension—the present position *c* in Table 18 was lacking. Tests with American materials quickly made it apparent that we needed position *c* since so many items gave equal emphasis to scholarly ability and economic need; in fact, this is the most frequently expressed value preference on the American side.

The materials in this dimension are very sparse, but they do perhaps show one thing clearly—that there is a marked difference between the two societies. The Soviet elites

believe that loyalty to the system and work for the Party are the prime qualifications in obtaining aid for higher education. This is a very large group of potential scholarship holders. No doubt if our categorization had been finer, the several Soviet elites would have shown differences on the criteria for selection within this large category. Some would no doubt have favored war heroes, others heroes of industry, and still others leaders in Komsomol (Party youth) groups. American elites, on the other hand, see scholarly ability and economic need as prime requisites.

(Note: one coder reports that American periodicals during the period were emphasizing the general importance of scholarships for matching Soviet progress in science and other fields, whereas Soviet periodicals were urging that a larger proportion of bright students have more work experience and less exclusively academic experience. This latter possibly shows a fear in the Soviet Union that the young intellectuals will acquire dangerous ideas if they are not kept sufficiently close to the masses.)

TABLE 19  
RESPONSIBILITY FOR HEALTH SERVICES

Value position	United States							Soviet Union						
	Co	P	L	M	S	Cu	T	G	E	L	M	S	Cu	T
a. There should be a complete system of public medical care throughout life without cost to the patients.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.5	3	1	0.5	-	0.5	7.5
b. Basic health services should be furnished without cost by the State. Special care and expensive medicines should be paid by the patient.	0.5	-	2.5	-	-	-	3	7.5	7	1	0.5	2	1.5	19.5
c. The costs of medical care should be made bearable by the use of public insurance schemes, and by government care of those who cannot meet the costs. Governmental regulation of the medical supply industry may be adopted to prevent exploitation.	2.5 (1)	-	13.5	-	-	1	17 (1)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
d. The general norm should be that families look after their health expenses as they look after other expenses. Only if dire need develops should the state relieve it.	1 (1)	3	-	-	2 (2)	1	7 (3)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total .....	4 (2)	3	16	-	2 (2)	2	27 (4)	10	10	2	1	2	2	27
Saliency of this dimension, %	1	1	4	0	1	1	1	1	1	4	0	1	0	1

RESPONSIBILITY FOR HEALTH SERVICES

This dimension is a continuum from completely socialized medicine to as nearly a private service-for-fee system as current standards of humanitarianism will allow. Table 19 shows that this was not a salient value dimension in either society; however, the pattern of saliency among the elites on the two sides was almost identical. In both cases it was the labor elite that showed the greatest proportionate concern. This is certainly natural since the lower socioeconomic groups in both societies are the most fearful that their health needs will not be met.

The American value positions cover a wider range than do those of the Soviet. Position *c* is preferred, but there is a scattering of items on both sides in *b* and *d*. All items on the Soviet side are recorded in positions *a* and *b*, both of which represent socialized medicine, the only difference being one of degree. (One coder, from his own knowledge of the Soviet Union, hazards the opinion that positions *c* and *d* would not appeal to members of the Soviet elites because of the close tie-in with the dimension Surveillance of Citizens. He believes that the doctors are used to check up on economic malingers and that, for this

TABLE 20  
RELATION OF MASS MEDIA TO GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE

Value position	United States							Soviet Union						
	Co	P	L	M	S	Cu	T	G	E	L	M	S	Cu	T
a. All newspapers and radio and TV stations should be responsible to and represent the views of the dominant political power in the society.	-	1.5 (1)	-	-	-	-	1.5 (1)	17 (1)	3	-	8	3	6 (1)	37 (2)
b. The means of communication should be so administered, either publicly or privately, that no political or social view is excluded from expression.	5 (1)	2.5	0.5	1	-	0.5	9.5 (1)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
c. The means of communication should be so administered, either publicly or privately, that various political and social views obtain substantially equal coverage.	-	-	1.5	-	-	5.5	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total .....	5 (1)	4 (1)	2	1	-	6	18 (2)	17 (1)	3	-	8	3	6 (1)	37 (2)
Saliency of this dimension, %	1	1	0	0	0	2	1	1	0	0	2	2	1	1

reason alone, anything like a private system of medicine would be looked upon with disfavor.)

CHURCH AND STATE

Data on this dimension were so sparse that significant conclusions cannot be drawn from them. For whatever interest they may have, they are given in Table 41 in Appendix C (p. 421).

RELATION OF MASS MEDIA TO GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE

This dimension is closely connected with the two dimensions on freedom of thought that come later. The difference is that all institutional preferences are coded here, whereas more general preferences concerning freedom of thought on different sorts of matters are coded there. The saliency of this dimension is low, and it is consistently so across the elites in both societies.

More difference between the societies

exists perhaps than appears from a casual inspection of Table 20. The difference between position *a*, which members of the Soviet elites take unanimously, and position *b*, which most of the members of the American elites take, is great. It is the step from a Party-controlled press to a press open to all shades of opinion. There seemed to be no way of constructing an intervening step that would show finer shadings. Either one believes in control or one does not. Moreover, some of the Americans preferred to go further and see to it that various social and political views obtain substantially equal coverage.

REVIEW OF FINDINGS ON POLITICAL AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE

The nine of the first ten dimensions of this section for which we could show significant tables break into five in which there is virtually no overlap in position between the two societies, and four in

TABLE 21  
DEGREE OF FREEDOM OF THOUGHT IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS

Value position	United States							Soviet Union						
	Co	P	L	M	S	Cu	T	G	E	L	M	S	Cu	T
a. There is only one political truth. Its relations to the rest of the culture are so intimate that not only should no other political doctrines be allowed expression, but there should be general cultural conformity throughout the society.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	57	35	1	34	3	43	173
b. There is only one political truth, but other aspects of culture are sufficiently differentiated from the political to make variety possible and desirable in aesthetic, recreational, and other peripheral fields.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1 (1)	1 (1)	-	-	-	18 (17)	20 (19)
c. Though freedom of speech, assembly, and teaching are of value in preventing over-rigidity in a society, they need to be curbed in the interest of preserving the moral order favored by the majority.	5 (4)	3 (1)	2 (2)	3	-	1 (1)	14 (8)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
d. Since truth is discovered only through the clash of viewpoints, we should allow freedom of thought, speech, and teaching.	19 (1)	9	8	5	9	20	70 (1)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>24 (5)</b>	<b>12 (1)</b>	<b>10 (2)</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>21 (1)</b>	<b>84 (9)</b>	<b>58 (1)</b>	<b>36 (1)</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>61 (17)</b>	<b>193 (19)</b>
<b>Salience of this dimension, %</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>5</b>

which there is considerable overlap. In the first group seem to be those that are most closely related to the maintenance of the political system in its essentials—Unitary or Pluralistic Society, Integration or Separation of Political Functions, Nature of Political Party System, Relation of Mass Media to Government and People, and Control of Primary and Secondary Education. For these five dimensions one can make a simple generalization: members of American elites are just as unanimous in support of a pluralistic system as members of Soviet elites

are in support of a monolithic one. This speaks well for the success of American political principles, since the permissive context would allow the taking of dissident positions if the elite members should wish to do so.

Two of the other four dimensions might seem at first glance also to be essential to the maintenance of the political system—Political and Economic Centralization or Decentralization, and Locus of Decision-Making. Actually for both societies it is evident that these are taken as instrumental



TABLE 22

DEGREE OF FREEDOM OF THOUGHT IN NATURAL SCIENCES AND TECHNOLOGICAL MATTERS

Value position	United States							Soviet Union						
	Co	P	L	M	S	Cu	T	G	E	L	M	S	Cu	T
a. Periodically, scientific and technical doctrine must be evaluated and criticized by responsible experts. But when the new consensus has been reached all should fall in line and support the revised doctrine.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	32	-	5	4	6	54
b. Science and technology advance only through the clash of competing viewpoints. There must be freedom of thought and speech and teaching at all times.	3	-	-	-	13	3	19	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total .....	3	-	-	-	13	3	19	7	32	-	5	4	6	54
Saliency of this dimension, %	0	0	0	0	7	1	1	0	3	0	1	2	1	1

questions on which men may differ without leaving the ideological fold. In the Soviet Union there is no evidence that Party control is being questioned by those taking minority positions; it is just a matter at what point that control should be asserted. In the American case, similarly, all positions are compatible with democratic values.

The final two dimensions—Responsibility for Health Services and Criteria for Scholarships—deal with matters that are clearly not crucial to the maintenance of the political system. Americans naturally take variant positions on them and this is evidently acceptable in the Soviet Union too.

SURVEILLANCE OF CITIZENS

Since there has been great interest in how much surveillance has been lessened in the Soviet Union since the advent of Khrushchev, we included this dimension. Actually it is so little discussed in the Soviet periodicals (only nine coded items in our sample) that no significant comparison can be made with the American data. The results are given in Table 42 in Appendix C (p. 421).

DEGREE OF FREEDOM OF THOUGHT IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS

This is a crucial dimension in the comparison of the American and the Soviet societies. It is the one on which the most emphasis is laid in intellectual circles. Fortunately, value preferences with respect to this dimension were frequent in the periodicals on both sides. Position *b* in Table 21 was very carefully worked out in the hope that by means of it we could detect signs of restlessness in the Soviet Union.

There is no overlap in the positions taken by the elites in the two societies—all Americans take positions *c* and *d*, all Soviet writers positions *a* or *b*. In both societies this dimension is most salient for the cultural elite, and in both societies they take a position for more unfettered expression than do the other elites, with the exception of the scientific elite in the United States, which is unanimously in favor of complete freedom. It is interesting that this category is much less salient for the Soviet than for the American scientific elite. Does this show a proneness to tend to their knitting without

TABLE 23  
DEGREE OF CRITICISM OF MEANS

Value position	United States							Soviet Union						
	Co	P	L	M	S	Cu	T	G	E	L	M	S	Cu	T
a. We need to have from party workers continuous criticism of the way things are being done.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14	2.5	-	10	3	4	33.5
b. We welcome from anyone self-criticism and constructive criticism of the way things are being done.	1	-	-	1	-	-	2	11	3.5	-	4	-	11	29.5
c. We welcome both constructive and destructive criticism of the way things are being done, but only from the members of the public who are well informed.	1 (1)	-	-	-	-	1 (1)	2 (2)	-	-	-	-	1 (1)	2 (1)	3 (1)
d. We welcome both constructive and destructive criticism of the way things are being done, except on matters vital to the national security.	2 (2)	-	-	-	1 (1)	-	3 (3)	-	-	-	-	-	2 (2)	2 (2)
e. We welcome from anyone criticism of any sort of the way things are being done.	8	3	1	1	2	12	27	-	-	-	-	-	4 (4)	4 (4)
Total	12 (3)	3	1	2	3 (1)	13 (1)	34 (5)	25	6	-	14	4	23 (7)	72 (7)
Salience of this dimension, %	2	1	0	1	2	4	2	2	1	0	3	2	3	2

bothering about larger societal questions? The materials in the next dimension will throw further light on this matter. The high salience of this dimension for the Soviet military elite results chiefly from much discussion of the importance of political instruction in the armed forces.

DEGREE OF FREEDOM OF THOUGHT IN  
NATURAL SCIENCES AND  
TECHNOLOGICAL MATTERS

We separated this dimension from the preceding one on the ground that in the Soviet Union there might be much more freedom in this case than in the former. Natural science and technology are realms in which truth or falsity can be objectively ascertained so that ideological controls are harder to impose. Table 22 shows, how-

ever, that there is still a great gap between the two societies on these matters. Whereas there is unanimous preference for the position that scientific truth is arrived at through the clash of competing viewpoints on the American side, there is no explicit recognition of this viewpoint among the Soviet elites. This is hard to credit, since there is no doubt that Soviet scientists have great prestige. Can it be that the prestige does not confer the right to theoretical dissent?

Another contrast is that this dimension is particularly salient for the American scientific elite. This is not true on the Soviet side, where the economic elite feels the most concern. Possibly this is because they are constantly worried about meeting production quotas and feel that quarrels about the

most effective technological methods would only slow things up. The materials show that they tend to be wedded to the traditional methods of manufacture and are not eager to embark upon automation with the headaches of transition.

The reticence of the Soviet scientific elite on this subject can be variously interpreted. It seems to us most likely that, not daring to take position *b*, they remain silent rather than to stultify themselves by taking position *a*.

#### DEGREE OF CRITICISM OF MEANS

The two preceding dimensions were meant to get at freedom of thought with respect to ends and values of life. This dimension was specifically designed to catch the preferences at the level of means (Table 23).

There is more overlap of the value preferences of the elites of the two societies in this dimension than in the two preceding ones. It is interesting, however, that this overlap comes about very largely in terms of criticisms. All but one of the affirmative statements of the American elites are in position *e*. Positions *c* and *d*, which favor both constructive and destructive criticism with certain exceptions, are regarded by the main body of the elite in both societies as deviant—too permissive by the Soviets and too restrictive by the Americans. In such a case it is doubtful that one can speak of much convergence in values.

Though their modal positions are far apart, the cultural elites on both sides seem to perform a sort of needling function here as they did on degree of freedom of thought in political and social affairs. They are both inclined to be more concerned and to be more permissive than are most of the other elites in their own societies.

The fact that this dimension is no more

salient on the Soviet side than on the American side is perhaps itself significant. In the period just before our study, when Stalin was being downgraded, the government-Party elite emphasized the necessity of self-criticism and constructive criticism. It is interesting that the military elite continues that emphasis into our period—not so much in urging criticism of purely military affairs but in urging criticism of the relations between the Party and the military.

#### RACE RELATIONS

Although this dimension proved to be a very live one in American society, it did not prove so in Soviet society. There were no recorded deviations from the principle of full integration in the Soviet materials, but the number of coded items was so small that no significant comparison can be made. The results are to be found in Table 43 in Appendix C (p. 422).

#### ROLE OF NATIONAL AND OTHER CULTURAL MINORITIES

The paucity of material on the American side in this dimension bespeaks the great change since the days of heavy immigration before World War I. Though there was adequate material on the Soviet side because of their many national minorities, no significant comparisons can be made between the two societies. The data are given in Table 44 in Appendix C (p. 422).

#### CRITERIA FOR SOCIAL STATUS

The criteria for according status or prestige in a society are significant value preferences because they show the kind of personal goals that seem important to the persons holding the preferences. Table 24 shows that preferences in relation to social status are more frequently expressed in Soviet than in American periodicals; hence

TABLE 24  
CRITERIA FOR SOCIAL STATUS

Value position	United States							Soviet Union						
	Co	P	L	M	S	Cu	T	G	E	L	M	S	Cu	T
a. Respect* on the basis of political achievement is emphasized.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10.5	10.5	-	6.5	-	5	32.5
b. Respect on the basis of military distinction is emphasized.	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	7.0	-	-	7.0
c. Respect on the basis of productive work is emphasized.	-	3	-	-	-	1	4	33.0	42.0	2	21.5	8	41	147.5
d. Respect on the basis of possession is emphasized.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.5	0.5	-	-	-	-	1.0
e. Respect on the basis of intellectual, artistic, or spiritual achievement is emphasized.	1	2	1	1	12	2	19	6.0	1.0	-	2.0	1	9	19.0
Total .....	1	5	1	2	12	3	24	50.0	54.0	2	37.0	9	55	207.0
Saliency of this dimension, %	0	2	0	1	7	1	1	3	5	4	8	5	8	5

\* In the Soviet Union the Russian word *chest* is meant.

this is one of the salient dimensions for the Soviet elites but not for the American (with the exception of the scientists).

We started out with only the present positions *a*, *c*, *d*, and *e*, but it quickly became apparent that we needed the position *b*—respect for the military heroes—especially in the Soviet Union.

The high proportion of members of American elites who prefer that respect be given to intellectual, artistic, or spiritual achievement is in part a function of the launching of the Soviet Sputniks in the fall of 1957. Most of the emphasis in the American materials thereafter was on the need for giving scientists and other intellectuals more status in the society—much of it expressed by the scientists themselves. The provincial elite was at the same time emphasizing the need for higher rates of production.

More than 70 percent of the Soviet preferences recorded are in the position *c*—status for productive work. This is certainly consonant with the great drive for produc-

tion to catch up with the United States. The emphasis on intellectual, artistic, or spiritual achievement is much less than it is for the American elites. But perhaps the greatest contrast is the emphasis on political achievement in the Soviet Union compared with the complete lack of any mention of this by American elites. The same general contrast holds for military achievement. Neither side thinks that possessions should confer status.

YOUNG AND OLD IN THE SOCIETY

By introducing this dimension we hoped to get some impression of whether the several elites saw their societies as needing more or less young blood in the leadership, or, to put it conversely, less or more wisdom from the older generation. Unfortunately, this proved to be a very nonsalient dimension for the American elites, and only a little more salient for the Soviet elites. We show these nonsignificant results in Table 45 in Appendix C (p. 423).

TABLE 25  
INDOCTRINATION OF YOUTH

Value position	United States							Soviet Union						
	Co	P	L	M	S	Cu	T	G	E	L	M	S	Cu	T
a. There is a need for the indoctrination of young people in our country's ideals, and chief responsibility for it should be taken by the representatives of the political system.	-	-	-	5	-	-	5	31.5	4	1	21.5	7.5	26	91.5
b. There is need for the indoctrination of young people in our country's ideals, but chief responsibility for it should be taken by nonpolitical institutions and associations.	-	-	-	7	-	1	8	2.5	-	-	0.5	0.5	2	5.5
						(1)	(1)							
c. There is danger that indoctrination of young people in our country's ideals will be overdone, leading to stereotyped thinking.	1	-	-	-	-	2	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total .....	1	-	-	12	-	3	16	34	4	1	22	8	28	97
						(1)	(1)							
Salience of this dimension, %	0	0	0	5	0	1	1	2	0	2	5	4	4	2

INDOCTRINATION OF YOUTH

This dimension was introduced on the theory that the attitudes toward the development of the younger generation are crucial for determining the type of society. If the older generation believes that the younger should be indoctrinated with the nation's ideals, a very conforming society may result; if it believes that the young should be allowed to fashion their own ideals to some extent, a more experimental society is possible.

Table 25 shows that this is a subject of greater salience for the Soviet than for the American elites. Had it not been that the Advisory Council on Naval Affairs was conducting a moral leadership program during the period—a program that was supported in the magazine *Navy*—we would have found almost no references to this subject in the American periodicals. Most of these *Navy* articles were coded *ab* because they

seemed to favor both the military and civilian leadership in the program. They therefore contribute to both position *a* and position *b*. The American cultural elite seems to have misgivings about the indoctrination of youth, which fits with their strong emphasis on freedom of thought.

The great predominance of preference among the Soviet elites is for position *a*—which of course accords with the Party line. None of the elites shows much inclination toward deviation. It was not always easy to decide between positions *a* and *b* because agencies other than the government or Party—the family in particular—were frequently urged to help in the indoctrination process, but in most cases the writers seemed to want the main responsibility to lie with the instrumentalities of the political system. The three main institutions that carry out the official indoctrination are the schools (where some of the teachers

TABLE 26  
RISK-TAKING

Value position	United States							Soviet Union						
	Co	P	L	M	S	Cu	T	G	E	L	M	S	Cu	T
a. There is always uncertainty in human affairs. Nothing is achieved without taking risks. The society that gets ahead will be the society that takes large and frequent risks, even on vital matters.	-	-	-	1.5 (1)	0.5	4.5	6.5 (1)	5.5	15.5	-	14	2	6	43
b. It is quite proper to take small and occasional risks on matters not vital to a society's welfare, but on vital matters there should be much caution.*	6.5 (0.5)	3	-	1.5	2.5	5	18.5 (0.5)	17.5	23.5	-	1	2	3	47
c. A society should play it safe and not take any risks that are avoidable even if it means a slower rate of progress.	1.5 (0.5)	-	1	1 (1)	-	1.5	5 (1.5)	6 (6)	3 (3)	-	-	-	-	9 (9)
Total .....	8 (1)	3	1	4 (2)	3	11	30 (3)	29 (6)	42 (3)	-	15	4	9	99 (9)
Salience in this dimension, %	1	1	0	2	2	4	1	2	4	0	3	2	1	2

\* Willingness to accept untried innovations can be included.

seem to think other important topics are being neglected), the armed forces, and the Komsomols. The slogan that is used to justify this indoctrination is: In the light of the decisions of the plenum of the Central Committee, we should increase the ideological work among youth.

RISK-TAKING

This dimension is somewhat different from the others. The willingness or unwillingness to take risks is usually regarded as a characteristic of the person rather than of the society. However, because it seemed an important background variable in relation to foreign policy strategy and goals, we introduced it into the study. Actually we looked for comment in the periodicals on the desirability or undesirability, for the welfare of the society, of taking risks.

The dimension proved a little more salient for the Soviet elites than for the American (Table 26). On both sides the most frequent value preference was for the middle position—a belief in taking risks but not on matters vital to the society's welfare. But the Soviets were much bolder than the Americans in taking position *a*, which authorizes taking risks even on vital matters. This may be one of our most important findings. It is interesting that it is not the government-Party elite that shows this boldness but the military and, to a lesser degree, the cultural elites. The contrast between the government-Party and the military elites is one of the most striking things discovered on the Soviet side.

Noteworthy is the salience of this category for the Soviet economic elite. Discussion of innovations in technological processes and economic organizations accounts for

TABLE 27  
ENDS OF THE SOCIETY

Value position	United States							Soviet Union						
	Co	P	L	M	S	Cu	T	G	E	L	M	S	Cu	T
a. Increase in mastery over nature and technological power is emphasized.	22	5	1	22	17 (1)	6	73 (1)	77	42	-	10	9	11	149
b. Increase in mastery over nature and technological power, and increase in the immediate standard of living are emphasized.	-	-	-	-	-	1 (1)	1 (1)	73	91	2	10	9	21	206
c. Increase in the immediate standard of living is emphasized.	-	1	6	-	1	2	10	9	14	-	2	1	4	30
d. Increase in intellectual, artistic, or spiritual achievement is emphasized.*	20	2	2	1	26	37	88	15	-	-	14	2	84	115
Total .....	42	8	9	23	44 (1)	46 (1)	172 (2)	174	147	2	36	21	120	500
Salience of this dimension, %	6	3	2	10	24	15	8	11	14	4	7	11	18	13

\* An explicit statement is not necessary for this position if the whole tenor of the item is in this direction.

this and may also be a subtle way for the managers to express a desire for greater freedom of action in running their plants.

It is interesting that not a single Soviet preference for position *c* is affirmatively stated, all being criticism of other elites for having shown this play-it-safe preference. This is evidently not a posture that accords with the dominant climate of opinion in the Soviet elites. There is some reluctance in the American elites also, but not nearly so striking, to affirm a policy of caution openly. Much more light will be thrown on the matter of Soviet risk-taking by a research study presently in process for Project Michelson. This is being carried on by Professor Jan F. Triska of Stanford University. It covers twenty-nine crises faced by the Soviet Union since World War II.

#### RELATION OF MEANS TO ENDS IN THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE GOOD SOCIETY

This dimension proved to be much more discussed by the Soviet elites than by the

American. Since only six items were coded from the American materials, the data have been relegated to Table 46 in Appendix C (p. 423).

#### ENDS OF THE SOCIETY

Table 27 has the largest number of entries of all the tables. This was the dimension most frequently coded in the Soviet materials and the third most frequently coded in the American. The positions here contain one that is mixed (position *b*), because Soviet writers have a tendency to state that both an increase in technological power and an improvement in the standard of living are desirable, and to say it in the same sentence and without any greater weight on one side than on the other. The chief difficulty in assigning value statements to the positions, as given, was in the field of science. We adopted the rule that statements emphasizing the need for more applications of science should be coded position *a*, but statements emphasizing more theo-

retical work or basic research should be coded position *d*. It was perhaps unfortunate that these two positions were not placed next to each other so that we could have assigned a combined position, afterward to be divided between the two, as we did for a few other dimensions. In what may seem a strange decision to Americans, we decided to code in position *d* a few statements that Soviet society needed more thorough indoctrination in Marxism.

The most striking difference in the proportions in the value positions taken by the elites of the two societies is revealed by the fact that more than half of the American items emphasized an increase in intellectual, artistic, or spiritual achievement, whereas less than one-fourth of the Soviet items did. This is perhaps natural since the United States is more mature as an industrial society, while the Soviet Union still tends to stress the importance of material progress. Materially, Americans tend to feel they have arrived.

The percentages of salience reveal two striking facts. The Soviet economic elite is much more likely to express itself on the ends of the society than is the American provincial elite, and the American scientific elite is more likely to do so than is the Soviet scientific elite. Since neither the Soviet economic nor the American provincial elite emphasizes intellectual, artistic, or spiritual achievement, the former difference is mainly a matter of a greater sense of urgency in the Soviet case about matters of production and distribution. The extraordinary salience of this dimension for the American scientific elite is almost certainly due to the concern aroused by the early Soviet successes in satellites. The low degree of comment on ends of the society by both labor elites is striking.

#### REVIEW OF FINDINGS ON SOCIETY-INDIVIDUAL RELATIONS

Although we recorded value preferences on twelve dimensions of this kind, only seven of them produced data that could be significantly compared between the two societies. Four of these seven can well be discussed together.

The extreme divergence between the two societies in the two freedom of thought dimensions conforms to expectation. Nor is the limited overlap on Degree of Criticism of Means surprising, given the fact that this is seen by Soviet leaders as a technical matter, not as a question of ideological orthodoxy. The Soviet system, like the American, needs criticism if it is to work well. But the Soviet leaders are much more opposed to destructive criticism than are the American. Their accusations of those who practice it, however, may show that it is a growing phenomenon in the Soviet Union. The most surprising result in this general area is on Indoctrination of Youth. Here one might expect full-scale opposition between the two systems on the same ground that there is opposition on the control of education. This is not the case because some members of American elites do not look upon indoctrination in the democratic set of values as limiting freedom of thought. On the other hand, a few Soviet leaders seem willing to have the indoctrination carried out chiefly by nonpolitical institutions and associations.

The fact that there is considerable overlap on Risk-Taking is not indicative of any basic consensus on substantive matters. Perhaps important is the finding that Soviet elites are more willing to take risks than American ones.

On Criteria for Social Status and on Ends of the Society, there are some points of convergence and some points of interesting difference. The points of convergence may be



TABLE 28  
SALIENCE OF SOCIAL AND INTERNAL  
POLITICAL MATTERS TO THE ELITES

Elite	United States, percent	Soviet Union, percent
Cosmopolitan .....	36	—
Provincial .....	48	—
Government-Party .....	—	53
Economic .....	—	57
Labor .....	38	35
Military .....	25	62
Scientific .....	69	63
Cultural .....	59	75
Total .....	43	59

explained by the fact that both are large, complex, industrial societies that need high levels of productive efficiency and many kinds of professional skill. Hence technological progress and intellectual achievement are taken as ends, and the qualities that contribute to them are admired. The differences in these dimensions may be correlated with the stages in development of the respective societies. The United States has already achieved a high level of per capita wealth and need not be so concerned with a high level of consumption as is the Soviet Union. It can therefore direct more of its energies toward a high level of intellectual, artistic, or spiritual achievement. Another difference in situations is important: the Soviet Union feels that it is making its own way against great odds; the United States has arrived. Hence the Soviet elites admire those who have made great political and military contributions, whereas American elites show little of this orientation. With the passing of time, the maturing of Soviet society, and the realization of some of its economic and political goals, one may expect that the already considerable convergence in these dimensions will increase.

SUMMARY OF DIMENSIONS CONCERNING  
SOCIAL AND INTERNAL  
POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Table 28 shows that internal politics and social affairs are more salient to the Soviet elites than the American. This is perhaps the result of the complementary fact that external political affairs are less salient. In a society in which foreign policy is conducted with little reference to public opinion, it is not surprising that internal affairs bulk larger in the value preferences of the elites than they do in the United States.

It is interesting that there is fairly consistent parallelism in the salience of these 22 dimensions taken as a group among the elites on the two sides, with a single exception. The American military elite is much less concerned with these matters than is the Soviet military elite. This is almost certainly because of the close tie-in between the government-Party and the military elites in the Soviet Union. The high officers are expected to become political as well as military leaders.

We have been able to contrast the two societies on sixteen dimensions relating to social and internal political affairs. On seven of these there is practically no convergence between the two sets of elites. These involve the degree of "unitariness" of the society, its party system, the governmental structure, control of the mass media and of education, and freedom of thought, both on political and social affairs and in the natural sciences and technological matters. Why these seven dimensions hang together may be somewhat different for the two societies. In the Soviet case the leadership in a single party may be the dominant value, and the unitary society, the governmental structure, the control of mass media and education, and the doctrine of a single

truth all spring from it. In the United States, on the other hand, the pioneer situation made for a pluralistic society, from which have sprung a governmental system with checks and balances, a multiparty system, local control of education, mass media almost exempted from control, and freedom of thought.

There is some value convergence between the elites of the two societies in the other nine dimensions. It is perhaps significant that of the four included structural dimensions, two are seen as means-values (Centralization or Decentralization, and Locus of Decision-Making), and two are only loosely linked to the political system (Health Services, and Criteria for Scholarships). All but one of the other dimensions deal with rather vague relationships between the person and his society—criticism of means, risk-taking, status, ends of the society. It is understandable that there should be dispersion of value preferences on these dimensions in each society, and hence some overlap. Only the mild convergence on Indoctrination of Youth was quite unexpected.

There is confirmation in the tables of this section for the widespread belief that the cultural elite in the Soviet Union is the most dissident one. They are being mentioned by other elites as believers in destructive criticism, they believe in more freedom of thought on political and social issues, they are more willing to involve the masses in decision-making, and they emphasize more than others intellectual, artistic, or spiritual achievement as ends of the society.

#### *Results for Value Dimensions Concerning External Relations*

The nine dimensions analyzed in this section are, in general, arranged in an order

that proceeds outward from the society to the organization of nations in the world. Thus civil-military relations within the nation, because they affect defense, are taken as the first step, followed by relations to members of the society's own bloc, to uncommitted nations, to members of the opposing bloc, and to the United Nations. One dimension, Aid to Others, could just as well have been put in the preceding section, since "others" may be anyone from one's neighbor to the peoples on the other side of the globe, but we placed it here because the most interesting data on it are those that relate to other nations.

#### CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

The value positions in this dimension form a sort of circle. Position *a* and position *d* in Table 29, for instance, are both preferences in which the civil side is dominant over the military, but they are different in the degree of separation between the two.

Our periodicals yielded relatively little information on this subject. The military was the only elite in either society for which it had any degree of salience. The spokesman in *Krasnaia Zvezda* took the Party line more strongly than did the government-Party elite itself—in favor of control of the military by the civil side through Party representatives in the armed forces. One can of course speculate that this is the Party using *Krasnaia Zvezda* to control the military, rather than the military speaking for itself. The military elite in the United States tended to favor a situation in which they had a strong advisory role but not one equal to the civil authorities in policy-making. The Soviet preference makes for a more monolithic system, the American for a more independent military that is yet subordinate to the civil authorities.

TABLE 29  
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Value position	United States							Soviet Union						
	Co	P	L	M	S	Cu	T	G	E	L	M	S	Cu	T
a. The central political organization should ensure its control of the military by having its representatives within the armed forces.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.5	-	-	31.5	-	-	33
b. Since survival of the society is the ultimate value, the military should be strongly represented on the bodies making governmental policy.	-	-	-	2 (1)	-	-	2 (1)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
c. Because of the importance of defense in the modern world, the military should be involved in the making of governmental policy and given an advisory role.	3 (1)	-	-	5.5	1	0.5	10 (1)	2.5	-	-	0.5	-	-	3
d. The civil side of the government should be absolutely dominant, and the military should be excluded from all policy-making.	-	-	-	0.5	-	0.5	1	2	-	-	2	-	-	4
Total .....	3 (1)	-	-	8	1	1	13 (2)	6	-	-	34	-	-	40
Saliency of this dimension, %	0	0	0	3	1	0	1	0	0	0	7	0	0	1

POLITICAL AND MILITARY RELATIONS TO  
OTHER NATIONS IN THE BLOC<sup>3</sup>

This dimension was introduced in an attempt to get at the value preference that the various elites have for ties with other nations on their own side of the Cold War. Such preferences are slightly more salient in the United States than in the Soviet Union. This tends to be true of the whole group of dimensions dealing with external relations,

<sup>3</sup> The two blocs were defined as follows: (a) Soviet Union—Communist China, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, North Vietnam, North Korea, Outer Mongolia; (b) United States—Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Netherlands, Belgium, West Germany, France, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Thailand, Philippines, Nationalist China, Japan, South Korea.

probably for two reasons: (1) American elites are better informed than Soviet elites on most topics, especially those dealing with external matters; and (2) other Soviet elites are not encouraged by the government-Party elite to comment on foreign relations.

The high government and military elites are the ones for whom relations to others in the bloc are more salient (Table 30), as would certainly be expected. But the positions of the two societies are in sharp contrast. On the Soviet side there is absolute unanimity on the preference for a monolithic front "under our leadership." (Note that we coded items here even when Communist China was included in the "us.")

There is a little wider range of preference among the members of the American elites, but still the predominance of position *b* is well established. (Coders were allowed to

TABLE 30  
POLITICAL AND MILITARY RELATIONS TO OTHER NATIONS IN THE BLOC

Value position	United States							Soviet Union						
	Co	P	L	M	S	Cu	T	G	E	L	M	S	Cu	T
a. Our bloc should present a monolithic front to the world (under our leadership).	-	-	1	1	-	0.5	2.5	53	6	-	14	2	8	83
b. A strong bloc is one in which the autonomy of each member is limited only by its commitments to the bloc.	41	1	4.5	18	-	4.5	69	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
c. The good bloc is one whose members have chosen to belong to it; hence each has the right to leave at any time.	1 (1)	-	0.5	1	-	1	3.5 (1)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	42 (1)	1	6	20	-	6	75 (1)	53	6	-	14	2	8	83
Salience of this dimension, %	6	0	1	8	0	2	3	3	1	0	3	1	1	2

infer position *b* when there was strong emphasis on the need for working together closely in the bloc.) It is interesting that there was about as much deviation from this position one way as the other, toward the monolithic position and the loose bloc position.

The divergence in this dimension between the elites of the two societies does not augur well for their future relations. The value positions buttress present realities, and present realities are two blocs quite differently constructed. The opponents in the Cold War will therefore probably continue to be dissimilar, and this may make rules of a peaceful game all the more difficult to work out.

AID TO OTHERS

This dimension needs more explanation than most. The value positions in Table 31 are gradually enlarging circles. Each step signifies that the humanitarian impulse runs at least as far as described, although one does not know whether it runs further. Hence comparisons have to be very carefully made. The sort of statement that constitutes a

value preference within this dimension is also a problem. We adopted the rule that simple statements of fact—that so many tons of wheat had gone to India from the United States or from the Soviet Union—would not be coded unless they were accompanied by statements indicating approval or emotional involvement.

The high total salience of this dimension on the American side results in part, but by no means entirely, from the fact that *New York Times* editorials were the principal source of data on the cosmopolitan elite. The *Times* supports almost all the charitable drives in New York through editorials, and these account for many of the 29 entries in position *a* by the cosmopolitan elite. But even without these, the total American salience figure would be six percent.

With the exception noted, the various elites on each side are strikingly uniform in the salience percentages. This would seem to show that aid to others is a broadly human problem on which all feel competent to express themselves. American humanitarianism tends to run much further out into the world than does that of the

TABLE 31  
AID TO OTHERS

Value position	United States							Soviet Union						
	Co	P	L	M	S	Cu	T	G	E	L	M	S	Cu	T
a. Content indicates willingness to grant aid <sup>a</sup> to all in need in the same society.	29 (3)	5	12	-	-	1	47.0 (3)	11	10	-	8	1	3	33.0
b. Content indicates willingness to aid all in need in the bloc.	4 (1)	-	1.5	1	1	-	7.5 (1)	18	7	1	2	2	4	34.0
c. Content indicates willingness to aid all in need except those who are in the opposite bloc.	35 (2.5)	3	10.5 (1)	6	4	4	62.5 (3.5)	18.5	2	-	6	-	3	29.5
d. Content indicates willingness to aid all specified in position c plus those in the opposite bloc who we hope may be persuaded to leave that bloc.	4 (0.5)	-	2	-	-	-	6.0 (0.5)	5.5	-	-	2	1	3	11.5
e. Content indicates willingness to aid all in need throughout the world.	9	2	1	1	2	15	30.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total .....	81 (7)	10	27 (1)	8	7	20	153.0 (8)	53	19	1	18	4	13	108.0
Saliency of this dimension, %	11	4	6	3	4	6	7	3	2	2	4	2	2	3

<sup>a</sup> Aid is interpreted broadly to include more than economic aid.

Soviets. There are no expressions of willingness to give aid on a worldwide basis in the Soviet periodicals, but 20 percent of the American items take this position, with the cultural elite taking it most frequently. For the other American elites the modal position is *c*.

The Soviet data do not show sharp differences in the scope of humanitarianism of the several elites, though this impulse seems less broad in the economic elite than in the others. This may reflect their awareness of the needs at home.

#### RELATIONS TO UNCOMMITTED PEOPLES

We tried with this dimension to discover whether uncommitted peoples (those neither in one's own bloc nor in the enemy bloc) are seen as societies to be forcefully brought

to one's own side, or let alone, or something in between. The value positions in Table 32 speak for themselves except for the notation that anticolonial statements were regarded as evidence of position *c*.

There is more convergence here between the elites of the two societies than in most categories. Though the Soviet items tend toward position *a* and the American toward position *c*, there is an overlap of roughly 38 percent at position *b*. Many on both sides want to persuade uncommitted countries and peoples to their value positions. They do not want to subvert them on the one hand or leave them alone on the other. This convergence is, however, obviously not one that will necessarily make for friendly relations. The competition in persuasion may become bitter.

TABLE 32  
RELATIONS TO UNCOMMITTED PEOPLES

Value position	United States							Soviet Union						
	Co	P	L	M	S	Cu	T	G	E	L	M	S	Cu	T
a. Uncommitted countries and peoples constitute a potential for revolutionary movements that will bring them to our side.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	29.0	4	-	4	3	5	45.0
b. Uncommitted countries and peoples should be persuaded to our value position by active efforts on our part or should be warned against adopting the positions of the other bloc.	12.5 (1)	1	3.5	2	1	4.5	24.5 (1)	10.5	3	-	5	1	4	23.5
c. Uncommitted countries and peoples are ends in themselves and should be left to work out their own position.	12.5	-	12.5	1	3	3.5	32.5	1.5	-	-	-	-	-	1.5
Total .....	25.0 (1)	1	16.0	3	4	8.0	57.0 (1)	41.0	7	-	9	4	9	70.0
Salience of this dimension, %	3	0	4	1	2	3	3	3	1	0	2	2	1	2

TRADE WITH MEMBERS OF THE OTHER BLOC

We did not have a dimension for foreign trade in general because we thought the Soviet side was so complicated by relations with members of their bloc that the meaning of the data when gathered would not be clear. However, we felt that value preferences regarding trade with the other, or enemy, bloc were meaningful and could be interpreted intelligibly. Unfortunately, we found little material on the subject in the periodicals on either side. The few data are given in Table 47 in Appendix C (p. 423).

DEGREE OF TRUST TOWARD MEMBERS OF THE OTHER BLOC

This was one of the most difficult dimensions in which to code the materials, both American and Soviet, because positions *a* and *c* are so hard to separate. Many articles took the view that, though the other side

should be approached with great caution because of probable untrustworthiness, they should still be approached in a friendly manner. The decision for coding rested on whether the writer saw any realistic hope for the development of mutual trust or whether he did not. Since whole articles, not single statements, were being coded, the decision had to be based on the weight of emphasis.

Table 33 shows that this dimension is more salient for American than for Soviet elites, which is true even of the political elites on each side (government-Party versus cosmopolitan). And the greater salience for the American side is entirely in the expression of lack of trust. Since during the period under study Soviet policy was to express friendship for the West, and since the Soviet press is closely controlled, few expressions of strong distrust appeared. Not so in the American press. One would expect the United States military elite to be espe-

TABLE 33  
DEGREE OF TRUST TOWARD MEMBERS OF THE OTHER BLOC

Value position	United States							Soviet Union						
	Co	P	L	M	S	Cu	T	G	E	L	M	S	Cu	T
a. The members of the other bloc* should not be trusted and we should make no concessions.	22	2	19	26	1	-	70	9	-	1	6	-	2	18
					(1)		(1)							
b. Even though we mistrust the members of the other bloc,* we should make concessions to avoid the possibility of a nuclear holocaust.	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	13	-	4	1	-	-	18
c. We should approach the members of the other bloc in a friendly spirit in the hope that feelings of mistrust can be overcome and some degree of mutual trust achieved.	24	1	-	2	9	5	41	24	-	-	2	3	8	37
	(3)						(3)							
d. We should be willing to make concessions and to trust the other side to do likewise.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	-	1	6	-	2	18
Total .....	46	3	19	28	11	5	112	55	-	6	15	3	12	91
	(3)						(4)							
Salience of this dimension, %	6	1	4	11	6	2	5	3	0	7	4	2	2	2

\* In "a" and "b", "bloc" means rulers, not people.

cially preoccupied with this dimension, and it is no surprise that its value position was one of heavy distrust. It may come as a surprise to those who did not read of Walter Reuther's meeting with Khrushchev to find the labor elite so solidly mistrustful of the Soviet Union. The cosmopolitan, the scientific, and the cultural elites in the United States were all more inclined to the friendly approach.

The paucity of comment on this dimension by the provincial and the cultural elites on the American side and by the economic, scientific, and cultural elites on the Soviet side is worthy of mention. The high political and the military elites on both sides naturally expressed value positions on this subject.

The general relations between the two societies show much convergence on position *c*—that the two societies should approach each other in a friendly spirit. Approximately a 38 percent overlap occurred

on this position. If words can be trusted to represent real value preferences, this is hopeful.

#### WAR AS A MEANS OF NATIONAL POLICY

We are here at the heart of the most important question in Soviet-American relations. Do the elites believe their country should resort to war on slight provocation, on great provocation, or not at all? This was a very difficult dimension on which to construct value positions. Position *a* in Table 34—preventive war—was no problem. But positions *b* and *c* proved not wholly satisfactory. Position *b*—be ready to retaliate but do not start a war—tends of course to be the commonest one. We wanted to discriminate it from a more pacifistic position that yet would not be so far in that direction that it would not be found expressed in the materials. Actually the coders were often puzzled over whether an item was an expression of *b* or *c*. The last phrase in position *c*

TABLE 34  
WAR AS A MEANS OF NATIONAL POLICY

Value position	United States							Soviet Union						
	Co	P	L	M	S	Cu	T	G	E	L	M	S	Cu	T
a. We should be willing to go to war to attain important national objectives including the prevention of attack on us.	-	-	-	1	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
					(1)		(1)							
b. We should not start a war but should stand ready at all times to retaliate with all our force against any attack on us or on countries with which we are bound by ties of value and ideology.	48	6	9.5	87	7.5	14	172	33	3	-	15	3	2	56
	(3)						(3)							
c. We should not resort to war under any circumstances given modern methods of destruction (even if this brings the danger of being conquered).	1	-	0.5	-	4.5	10	16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total .....	49	6	10	88	13	24	190	33	3	-	15	3	2	56
	(3)				(1)		(4)							
Salience of this dimension, %	7	2	2	37	7	8	9	2	0	0	3	2	0	1

was almost never expressed. Hence we have put it in parentheses. Usually the more pacifistic items simply stated that nuclear war is too horrible to contemplate and that we should not engage in it. The issue of the alternative was not raised.

Perhaps the most striking thing in this dimension is the tremendous difference in salience between the two societies. Some of this, but by no means all, can be laid to the preoccupation of the American military elite with this subject. The figure would be higher still if we had not scrupulously avoided coding articles that simply took the military establishment for granted as a tool for making war; there had to be explicit emphasis on the need for defense. Two facts probably explain the military's 37 per cent salience: (1) because of the American tradition of the nonparticipation of the military in politics, they do not express value preferences in *other* dimensions as freely as do the Soviet military; and (2) because of the integration of the civil and military in

the Soviet Union, discussion of war is played down in military periodicals at a time when the Party line emphasizes coexistence. The second reason would also account for the lower salience of this dimension for the other elites on the Soviet side.

The unanimity with which members of the Soviet elites take position *b* shows the power of the Party line. The same result, except for the scientific and cultural elites, is achieved on the American side, but from a more open process of discussion. The American scientific and cultural elites are the ones that have the greatest horror of nuclear war. This is probably because the former understands best the devastation that would be wrought (and some have feelings of guilt), whereas the latter is the most sensitive to the human values that would be sacrificed.

THE WAY TO WORLD ORDER

The several positions within this dimension were thought to represent the logical



TABLE 35  
THE WAY TO WORLD ORDER

Value position	United States							Soviet Union						
	Co	P	L	M	S	Cu	T	G	E	L	M	S	Cu	T
a. The only way to world order is through the military conquest of one bloc by the other.	-	-	-	-	-	1.0	1.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
b. The best way to world order is through revolutions in countries not belonging to our bloc that will bring our social system to power throughout the world.	0.5	-	-	-	1 (1)	0.5	2.0 (1)	1	3	-	-	-	-	4
c. The best way to world order is through coexistence (until our system prevails through its inherent virtues).	8.5	-	4	5	1.5	3.5	22.5	59	31	1	18	4	19	132
d. The best way to world order is through dynamic peace movements in many countries that will force governments to settle their differences.	-	0.5	-	-	0.5	-	1.0	7	1	-	-	2	1	11
e. The best way to world order is through a gradual convergence of value systems until a system of effective law is possible.	5.0	9.5	-	1	3	10.0	28.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total .....	14.0	10.0	4	6	6.0 (1)	15.0 (1)	55.0	67	35	1	18	6	20	147
Saliency of this dimension, %	2	4	1	3	3	5	3	4	3	2	4	3	3	4

alternatives for reaching a stable international system. Two difficulties were encountered in coding. Position *c* in Table 35 was often expressed without any explicit statement of the part in the parentheses. We adopted the rule that if the coder thought this part was implied, he could code it; if he thought that the writer did not see coexistence as a solution to the problem of world order, he should not code it on this dimension at all. The other difficulty was that "the gradual convergence of value systems" was frequently not expressed as a condition of the world rule of law. *The American Bar Association Journal* was notable in this respect. However, we coded here all items where world order through world law was the preference.

Table 35 shows slightly more Soviet than American saliency for this dimension. Qualitatively the great difference is that, whereas the emphasis in the United States material is about equal on positions *c* and *e*, in the Soviet materials it is heavily on position *c*. This undoubtedly reflects the power of the Party line in the Soviet Union. Coexistence is the official doctrine. The failure of any item to be recorded in position *d* on the American side is puzzling. This would certainly be the Quaker position, and it is surprising that belief in the efficacy of peace movements did not find expression.

Another surprising datum is the reticence of the American cosmopolitan elite. There is proportionately more interest in the subject in both the cultural and the provincial

TABLE 36  
RELATION TO INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES

Value position	United States							Soviet Union						
	Co	P	L	M	S	Cu	T	G	E	L	M	S	Cu	T
a. We should participate (fully) in the work of the United Nations and other international agencies.	38	3	16	5	9	10	81	5	2	-	1	1	-	9
b. Some international agencies are unfair to our side, but we should participate actively in all of them, trying whenever necessary to change their character.	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	9	-	-	-	-	-	9
c. It is good to participate in international agencies that carry on technical services, but we should not rely upon such agencies to solve political problems.	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
d. It is good to participate in those international agencies that are in conformity with our goals.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	3	1	-	-	-	11
e. The United Nations is ineffectual, and we should participate in it only to a minimum degree.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
f. The United Nations system is a threat to our welfare, and we should not participate in it.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total .....	39	3	16	5	9	11	83	21	5	1	1	1	-	29
Salience of this dimension, %	5	1	4	2	5	4	4	1	0	2	0	1	0	1

elites. The provincial elite score is somewhat of a freak because of a campaign in *The American Bar Association Journal* sparked by one of its presidents. (This makes it clear that this journal was not a good choice to represent the provincial elite.) Perhaps the American cultural elite is more inclined to think about long-term issues than is the cosmopolitan elite.

On the whole, the fact that 41 percent of the American and 90 percent of the Soviet items express the coexistence value preference, even though one may suspect that the latter reflects Party control, is a sign of considerable convergence.

RELATION TO INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES

In this dimension our anticipations were wrong. We expected that we would need

positions *e* and *f*, but Table 36 shows that we did not. We had supposed that there were elite members in both the Soviet Union and the United States who looked askance at the whole United Nations effort, but, if there are, their value preferences were not expressed in our sample of materials. It is perhaps significant that the American elites are proportionately much more concerned with the relation to international agencies than are the Soviet elites. The difference in salience here is because only the government-Party elite seems willing to speak up on this subject, whereas on the American side more than half the recorded value positions are the expressions of elites other than the cosmopolitan. This no doubt reflects the Communist Party's closer control over foreign policy statements than over domes-

TABLE 37  
SALIENCE OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS TO THE  
ELITES

Elite	United States, percent	Soviet Union, percent
Cosmopolitan .....	43	-
Provincial .....	13	-
Government-Party .....	-	22
Economic .....	-	8
Labor .....	22	13
Military .....	70	26
Scientific .....	29	14
Cultural .....	29	16
Total .....	35	16

tic statements. The unanimity on the American side is also impressive. All American elites seem to be "sold" on active participation in international agencies. It should be noted that the items coded in position *a* were not always concerned with the United Nations. When, for instance, an article was enthusiastic about participation in the International Geophysical Year, and there was an undertone of approval of international cooperation generally, the item was coded in position *a*. If there was any indication of reservations on other types of cooperation, the item was coded in position *c*.

Though few items were recorded on the Soviet side, their distribution among the positions is interesting. Approximately equal weight is given to participation in agencies as they are, to participation with hopes of changing the character of one or more agencies, and to participation only in those that "are in conformity with our goals." This represents much less satisfaction with international agencies than is apparent on the American side. The distinction between positions *c* and *d* is that two kinds of difference are represented among agencies—one the technical versus political, the other the favoring-our-system versus the not-favoring-our-system. The chief agency

in point on the latter for the Soviet elites is the International Labor Organization, whose system of representation by employers and government does not suit the Communist economic pattern.

SUMMARY OF DIMENSIONS CONCERNING  
EXTERNAL RELATIONS

Table 37 shows clearly that the nine dimensions just discussed are far more salient in the published comment of American elites than they are in the published comment of Soviet elites. The 35 percent and 16 percent totals are of course the converse of the combined percentages of Tables 13 and 36. That is, if the Soviet elites are more interested in internal affairs, the American elites must be more interested in external affairs. Our general explanation for this is that, in a tightly controlled society, more of the necessary information for the maturing of value preferences even among elites will be available on internal than on external matters, and there will be greater opportunity for their expression.

The value positions taken in these dimensions show that the two sets of elites have different conceptions of the way their own society and their own bloc should be organized for external relations. The Americans prefer a military establishment separated from politics but subordinate to the civil government; the Soviets like one that is infiltrated by political representatives. The Americans like a bloc in which there is cooperation among autonomous nations; the Soviets prefer a bloc that is monolithic. The societies also differ in their attitudes toward the world beyond their own blocs. American elites evidence a wider-ranging humanitarianism than do Soviet elites, and they see the United Nations and other international agencies as much more worthy of their full participation. One can speculate that the

Soviet elites feel their country and their doctrine are more alien to the rest of the world than do the American elites. This would cause them to organize their own society and bloc more tightly, to be less humanitarian toward other peoples, and to be suspicious of the United Nations.

Despite the differences enumerated, there is considerable convergence of value positions in some of the dimensions. One cannot assume, however, that such convergence conduces to peace. The data in each case have to be carefully interpreted.

The fact that both sides tend to believe that "uncommitted countries and peoples should be persuaded to our value position by active efforts on our part" does not mean that there may not be bitter struggles. But surely this is more hopeful than had both sides expressed a preference for revolutionary movements in uncommitted countries.

For the dimensions dealing with trust, with war, and with the way to world order, interpretation depends wholly upon the degree of sincerity in the explicit statements. In all three cases there is a good deal of convergence toward the positions (1) that the members of the other bloc should be approached in a friendly spirit to overcome mistrust, (2) that the nation should go to war only if attacked, and (3) that "the best way to world order is through coexistence until our system prevails through its inherent virtues." If these preferences could be taken at their face value, there would be much hope. Americans believe that their own elites are expressing themselves frankly. They doubt that the Soviet elites are similarly genuine in their expressions. Even if these doubts are well-founded, there is still a consideration worth pondering. Can expressions of value positions that are given such wide dissemination as are those of the Soviet elites be flouted without danger of

loss of support in the masses? Do the elites in any sense become prisoners of their own value statements?

### *The Relation of the Elites to One Another*

We have, in the course of our discussion, pointed out the relation of the elites to one another within and between societies for particular dimensions. We have also showed the percentages of all their value preferences that fall within each of the three broad groups of dimensions that we have used. In this section we shall see which of the elites hang together, so to speak, and which are far apart in their interests and thinking.

It would be most desirable to know which elites most frequently take the same positions in each of the 40 dimensions and which do so least frequently. Then one would have a good measure of their affinity or lack of it. To carry out this analysis is, however, a large undertaking and very time-consuming. It would require that every figure opposite a position in each of the 40 tables be reduced to a percentage of the total value preferences recorded for each elite in that table. Once this had been done, a complicated calculation would have to be made to discover the degree of overlap of each elite with each of the other five in the society. The magnitude of the task seemed beyond our capabilities at the time, and it is doubtful in any event whether the information obtained would be worth the cost in time and effort.

A second best and a much easier analysis is to discover to what degree the several elites see the same dimensions as salient. This analysis shows us whether the labor elite and the cultural elite, for example, are paying attention to the same aspects of their society. We will not know whether they

have the same value preferences within the several dimensions, but we will know whether they distribute their attention and interest similarly across them.

The differences in salience shown in Table 38 were calculated from the salience percentages of the elites for each of the 40 dimensions. Each figure in the table is the mean of the differences in salience percentages between the elite represented by the column and the elite represented by the row. On the right side of the table, for instance, one sees that the mean salience difference for the American labor and cultural elites is 1.25 percent. This means that on the average throughout the 40 tables these two elites differed by only 1.25 percent in salience. The United States data are given in the upper right half of the table, the Soviet Union data in the lower left half. The italic figures on the diagonal between are the mean salience differences between the corresponding elites in the two societies.

The table shows that the cosmopolitan and the cultural elites are the focal ones on the American side. Their mean differences in salience from other elites have lower averages than the other four—0.93 percent and 0.91 percent. Put the other way around, this means that the provincial, labor, military, and scientific elites are less typical of the general run of interest and attention of the society. It must be recalled that we are speaking only of salience, not of value position.

The table shows that the links are close between the cosmopolitan and the cultural, the cultural and the scientific, the cultural and the military, and the military and scientific elites. Of these four, the only surprising pair is the cultural–military. Examination of the data shows that it was their high common salience on ends of the society more than anything else that produced the

result. Their preferences were somewhat different—more inclination toward technological mastery by the military and more toward intellectual, scientific, and artistic achievement by the cultural elite—but they are alike in expressing frequent concern about societal ends.

The two elites least related to the others are the provincial and the labor elites, and they are not closely related to each other. The truth of the matter is that these elites appear to be more self-centered than the other four. They show high salience on the dimensions that particularly concern their own positions in society. The cosmopolitan, military, scientific, and cultural elites show more detachment.

The Soviet results are in some ways similar to the American, in some ways different. The government–Party elite, surprisingly enough, is no more focal than the cultural elite. They have the same mean salience difference. In this case, however, the economic elite (which roughly corresponds to the American provincial) is very close to the government–Party rather than being distant from it. On the Soviet side the only elite that is quite different in its run of interest and attention is the labor elite. The cause seems to be much the same as with the American labor elite. The dimension called distribution of pecuniary and other rewards was far more salient for the Soviet labor elite, for instance, than for the others.

Finally, there is the interesting fact that the mean of all the salience differences among the Soviet elites is 1.55 percent and for the American elites 1.65 percent. This says nothing about the controls exercised by the Party (though these are undoubtedly strong) on the value positions taken by the various Soviet elites. It simply shows that the Soviet elites are more similar to each

TABLE 38  
MEAN DIFFERENCES IN SALIENCE BETWEEN ELITES

		United States						
		Co	P	L	M	S	Cu	
Soviet Union	G	1.98	1.15	1.15	0.93	0.78	0.65	Co
	E	0.48	2.58	1.45	1.68	1.53	1.35	P
	L	1.78	1.65	2.30	1.48	1.28	1.25	L
	M	0.65	0.90	1.65	2.85	0.60	0.68	M
	S	0.65	0.98	1.63	1.03	2.53	0.60	S
	Cu	0.60	0.75	1.58	0.63	0.60	2.00	Cu
		G	E	L	M	S	Cu	

other in what they attend to and react to than are the American elites.

Table 38 also indicates that different elites are more similar in the same society with respect to saliences than are the corresponding elites in the two societies. Every figure on the diagonal is larger than any figure in the rest of the table. Thus, one's society is more powerful in influencing one's attention and interest than is membership in a particular elite. We should add, however, what has been repeatedly noticed in discussing the various tables: that there is a tendency for the corresponding elites on the two sides to have a similar position with reference to the other elites in the same society, even though the percentages of the corresponding elites may be quite different. For instance, in Table 7 (distribution of pecuniary and other rewards) the salience is highest for both labor elites, but the American figure is only 5 percent whereas the Soviet is 24 percent. Thus the salience difference between the American labor elite and the Soviet labor elite is much greater than the differences between the American labor elite and other American elites, but the patterning among the elites in each society is somewhat similar.

This same point is brought out by putting the percentages in Tables 11, 28, and 37 into graph form as shown in Fig. 1. We are thus able to see to what degree the pattern of salience among the elites in one society parallels the pattern of salience in the other society. It is striking that there is great similarity for the economic categories and the categories dealing with external relations, but only mild similarity for the categories concerning social and internal political matters. This would suggest that for great modern societies there is much convergence on who needs to be interested in economic matters and foreign affairs, but that there is diversity on who needs to be interested in social and internal matters. The greatest contrast shown by Fig. 1 is between the two military elites. Whereas the Soviet military elite expresses itself frequently on social and internal political affairs, the American military elite does not. This difference is reversed on matters concerning external relations, where the American military elite shows predominant interest.

*Conclusion*

It is impossible to summarize the results of a study such as this. Any attempt to do so would merely amount to a repetition of the summaries of each of the three groups of value dimensions. What can be done and what is perhaps worth doing is to evaluate our research procedures.

This exploratory study has shown that it is possible to extract explicit value positions from periodical content by setting up dimensions and coding the positions of authors or quoted speakers within those dimensions. The evidence seems to be that where the analysts already know the society well, as in the American case here, they will not learn a great deal that they did not know already. They can, however, estab-




FIG. 1. SALIENCE TO THE ELITES OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF DIMENSIONS

(a) Dimensions concerning the economy; (b) dimensions concerning social and internal political affairs; (c) dimensions concerning external relations.

lish a quantitative basis for comparison with later time periods, which may be valuable in making accurate statements about social change.

When the society is not already intimately known to the analysts, as in the Soviet case here, the method is much more rewarding. Even though explicit statements in periodicals may not always represent the free expression of those involved, not even the

Communist Party in the Soviet Union succeeds in seeing to it that the same value emphasis is reflected in all periodicals. We have found that the various elites do in fact express different preferences in many categories, and we have no reason to suppose that these differences are not genuine. It is probable that they simply do not appear as frequently as they would under less controlled conditions. Even though the value differences are muted, the small differences that do appear undoubtedly hint at strains that lie below the surface. These strains become particularly obvious if, in addition to positive value statements, criticisms of one group by another are recorded.

Even if it be admitted that the explicit statements do not yield an accurate map of the value positions in a totalitarian society, the recording of them does give rise to a useful body of evidence. The analysis by salience, for instance, tells a good deal about the several elites, and it is completely independent of the genuineness of the explicit value positions. The relative prominence of the various elites, calculated from data showing which elites are most talked about in the journals of other elites, can also be revealing.

Beside evidence of modest accomplishment, the study has real weaknesses. The greatest difficulty we encountered was undoubtedly the achievement of intercoder reliability. Our experience would indicate that it would take months of training to obtain 90 percent reliability on material such as that coded in this study. As stated earlier, the problem is not in securing reliability on the value position within a dimension once the coders agree that that dimension is being discussed. However, since all degrees of allusiveness are found in written material, it is almost impossible to find a rule that will discriminate cases where a

value position is being taken from cases where there is a veiled and uncertain reference to it.

Though not so irritating to the investigators, an equally important shortcoming lies in the value dimensions themselves. Life is so complex and yet so seamless a web that the task of breaking it down into value dimensions that are meaningful and, for the purpose in hand, exhaustive is an almost hopeless one. No matter how carefully a

team of investigators canvasses the field in advance and thinks through the scheme of analysis, awkward dimensions and omissions seem bound to occur. At some point the investigators will wish they could again revise the dimensions. One is therefore torn between the desire for extensive pretesting to perfect the analytical scheme, and the exigencies of time and cost. One is never sure that the inevitable compromise represents an optimum return.