

agrarian sovietization as well as the unique value of this study in an admirable manner.

CARL G. ANTHON

Executive Secretary
Fulbright Commission for the
German Federal Republic
Bad Godesberg, Germany

KONSTANTYN KONONENKO. *Ukraine and Russia: A History of the Economic Relations Between Ukraine and Russia (1654-1917)*. (Marquette Slavic Studies, IV.) Pp. xvi, 257. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1958. \$6.50 paperbound; \$7.50 clothbound.

The problem posed in this study is this: with respect to soil, climate, precipitation, and mineral resources, the Ukraine is one of the richest and most diversified regions in Europe; it is strategically located with respect to Central Europe, the Middle East, and the Caucasus, and has access to the ice-free waters of the Black and Oziv Seas; yet neither agricultural nor industrial development of the region has matched that attained by less favored areas. Why?

Kononenko asserts that the Ukraine was already at a relatively high stage of commercial development when it came under Russian sovereignty, but that it was never unified economically with Russia; instead, ". . . Russian economic policy always aimed at differentiating Ukraine from Russia, and of keeping Ukraine in the status of a colony" (p. 32).

Although the analysis is limited to the period from the abolition of serfdom, which took place in 1861, to 1917, one chapter of thirty-two pages is devoted to developments from 1648 to 1861. Major attention is given to agrarian developments from 1861 to 1917 (67 pp.), to industrial developments, with detailed examination of the sugar, coal and metallurgical industries (56 pp.); and to conditions in banking and "finance capital" (37 pp.).

In his analysis, Kononenko uses official government statistics, state papers, letters of government officials, and numerous studies made by Russian scholars. His conclusion is clear cut: from the beginning, "The aim of Russian policy was not merely to shield their industry and commerce from dangerous Ukrainian competition but also

the transformation of Ukraine into a source of raw material and a market absorbing their production" (p. 108).

A variety of tools was used to accomplish these goals. Railroads were located to serve industries in Moscow and Petersburg, and the freight rates imposed were discriminatory both as to commodities and direction of traffic; a tax system was constructed which not only channeled revenues into Russia without corresponding expenditures in the Ukraine but which also raised prices of Ukrainian products to the point of discouraging domestic consumption, thus forcing the goods into export trade which helped provide a favorable balance of trade. In other cases, export of Ukrainian raw materials was prohibited in order to channel them, at low prices, into Russian factories. At one time, we are told, erection of certain factories was prohibited by law, and some Ukrainian plants were dismantled and rebuilt in Russia. Extensive use was made of customs duties, both internal and foreign, always to the disadvantage, we are told, of Ukrainian interests.

Developments in the field of banking and foreign investments were both more complex and more subtle; but the end result was the same: the earnings and capital accumulation arising from such Ukrainian industry as was permitted were channeled out of the Ukraine into the hands of Russian capitalists or the imperial treasury.

At times the economic reasoning is difficult to follow. It is especially difficult to believe that all phases of economic relationships between the two regions were so carefully planned and so successfully administered as to work always to the disadvantage of this particular territory.

The numerous tables throughout the study usually carry no headings; actual contents must be discovered from the text itself. A Bibliography of six pages is appended, and a four-page Index.

CHARLES P. WHITE

Professor of Finance
University of Tennessee

RICHARD MANSFIELD HAYWOOD. *The Myth of Rome's Fall*. Pp. 178. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1958. \$3.50.

The "myth" which this book seeks to explode is that the Roman Empire in the West fell because of internal weaknesses which made its fall "inevitable," rather than because of external attacks. As an introduction to his argument, the author has given a masterly survey of the rise of the Roman Empire, its salient characteristics at the time of its height in the second Christian century, and the various calamities which befell it in the third century. He then devotes several chapters to the fourth century, discussing the recovery initiated by Diocletian, the economic and social problems and how they were met, cultural conditions, and the significance of the transition from paganism to Christianity. He concludes with an account of the "fall" in the fifth century and a short chapter on the changing culture of the epoch.

This is a very scholarly work that is a pleasure to read. With most of it the reviewer is in full agreement. Where he differs is in the emphasis to be placed on certain phenomena of the fourth century. For the author, the Empire at this time was politically stable, administratively reasonably efficient, economically reasonably sound, culturally creative, and militarily competent. For the reviewer, this is too favorable an appraisal. Granted that the attacks of the barbarians in the fifth century were needed to topple the imperial structure in the West, we must still ask, with Aymard, why a state of its size, population, and resources could not ward off peoples vastly inferior in numbers, wealth, and culture, and possessed of no superior weapons or military skill.

The only answer can be internal weakness—the inability to muster resources effectively for defense. Symptomatic of this weakness were the Empire's military dependence upon barbarians, the lack of the will to resist among its civilian population, civil war and rebellion, treachery in high places, and above all the inability to assimilate the barbarians recruited for its service or settled within its borders. Aymard seems to be right in holding that the recovery begun in 284 lost its momentum by the mid-fourth century after which stagnation and some deterioration set in.

As E. Stein pointed out, the disaster at Adrianople marks "the beginning of the end" of the Roman Empire as the Mediterranean world empire. Christianity contributed little to the fall in the West, but there it failed to provide the basis of loyalty which it later gave to the Byzantine Empire. Nor can we ignore the fateful division of the Empire in 395, and the hostility of the East to the West. As for the East, it barely escaped a like fate. The break-up of the Hun Empire, a sounder economy, a stronger population, more astute military policy, and more effective diplomacy were the main factors in its survival.

A. E. R. BOAK

Professor of History, Emeritus
University of Michigan

RICHARD HERR. *The Eighteenth-Century Revolution in Spain*. Pp. xii, 484. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958. \$7.50.

In this significant study Professor Herr establishes the validity of his central thesis—that "on the fundamental questions of the form of government and religion there was no cleavage of any depth in Spain before the outbreak of the French Revolution," and that "the French Revolution . . . provided the irritants that transformed into cancerous growths the hitherto innocuous discords brought on by the Enlightenment and economic expansion."

The pursuit of the complex events behind his analysis led the author into thorough examination of secondary works and wide use of primary sources. The narrative is divided into two parts, entitled *The Enlightenment* and *The Revolution*, and ranges through such chapters as "Land Boom and Land Hunger," "French Propaganda Campaigns," "Godoy and the Revival of Enlightenment," and the—renewed—"Jansenist Offensive."

The most useful and original part of the book deals with the impact on Spain of the events which occurred between 1792 and 1802—the execution of the French monarch, war and peace with France, and war with England. Here the author contributes to the knowledge of many aspects of Spanish history; yet it is precisely here