

## II. SOVIET AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY ATTITUDES:

# Content analysis of elite articulations

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### Introduction

#### RATIONALE OF THE STUDY<sup>1</sup>

It is widely assumed today that the USSR and the United States are destined to experience a rather prolonged relationship of what has come to be called "peaceful coexistence" but which might better be characterized as "*competitive coexistence*." This assumption carries with it an image of intensive competition in the diplomatic, economic, and propaganda fields, combined with a rather different sort of competition in the military field. Whereas the *nonmilitary* competition is likely to be perceived on both sides as essentially a series of zero-sum games in which the win-or-lose payoffs are important but not particularly crucial or final, the competition in weaponry and strategy—because of the extreme disutilities of certain possible payoffs—is likely to be regarded as more of a non-zero-sum affair. The implication is that the seriousness and finality of the perceived payoffs in the military competition will lead to the mutual adoption of certain forms of "cooperation" within the competitive framework, and that the adversaries will find it

possible to envisage intermediate outcomes of a basically win-win nature. In the economic and diplomatic realms, each side can still afford to pursue victories, because such victories are still meaningful and because defeat is far from final.

Thus, when we speak of deterrence in the military field, we have reference to the adoption of strategies dominated not by *win-the-war* objectives but by *prevent-the-war* objectives. Or to be more realistic, we may at least speak of strategies that represent some form of compromise between win-the-war and prevent-the-war doctrines. In many ways this is the essence of a relationship that we characterize as one of mutual deterrence.

If the above assumptions are generally correct, it follows that both major powers must take great care to "cooperate" in establishing and maintaining a high degree of stability in their relationship. This effort must include (1) steps to minimize the likelihood of either side being led to believe that the other has adopted, or is about to adopt, a win-the-war move; and (2) steps to assure that if one side *does* so opt, the other is not too seriously disadvantaged.

Such a relationship, based as it is on the need for a sophisticated and continuing exchange of signals, on the reliability of expectations, and on approximate qualitative and quantitative parity in military technol-

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<sup>1</sup> This brief statement is spelled out at greater length in chapters 2-5 of Singer (1962). An essentially similar position is found in much of the contemporary literature on stable deterrence.

ogy, is extremely delicate and highly prone to instability.<sup>2</sup> This instability need not, however, prove fatal; delicate as it may be, its preservation seems to be clearly within the bounds of probability. Moreover, there are certain things that each side can do to enhance and maximize whatever inherent stability the relationship of mutual deterrence may hold.

Perhaps one of the most promising of these is to develop as accurate an image as possible of the other's foreign policy operational code. The more clearly each sees the other's assumptions, expectations, and preferences, the less likely one is to make the move that leads the other to upset the tenuous balance. If each is committed to the avoidance of strategic war (more particularly, general nuclear war), such "complete" information should be highly valued by its decision-makers as bases for the development of rational strategies. The more accurately each perceives the other, the less likely either is to develop the "wrong" type of weapon system, to stockpile an inappropriate quantity of hardware, or to deploy men or material in a manner that is provocative rather than deterrent.

Likewise, similar benefits may be expected to flow from a conscious awareness of one's own assumptions, expectations, and preferences. Not the least of the latter benefits is an awareness of the presence or absence of symmetry in these variables. For example, one of the factors that tends to push decision-makers into increasingly belligerent (and destabilizing) behavior is a high

level of perceived dissimilarity between oneself and the adversary. The more convinced one is of the divergencies and incongruences between the two sides, the greater the inclination to believe in inevitable clash, and the less the inclination to engage in stability-conserving behavior. Considerations such as those noted here provide, then, the rationale for seeking the information described below.

#### INFORMATION SOUGHT IN THE STUDY

In this study we are trying to produce certain information that will help to generate as accurate a picture as is possible of both the Soviet and the American foreign policy operational codes during the period 1957-1960. We have established 35 dimensions on the attitudes of the foreign policy elites, and have divided these dimensions into four basic issues:

A. How does each side's foreign policy elite perceive and evaluate the international political system—the environment in which the deterrent relationship must be maintained?

B. What is each foreign policy elite's evaluation of the contemporary and predictable distribution of power?

C. How does each elite evaluate the foreign policy operational code of its adversary?

D. What are the main characteristics of each elite's articulation of its *own* operational code?

We are interested not only in where the two sets of elites "come out" on these four issues, but the degree of salience each dimension has for these elites. Conceivably, the frequency with which particular items are discussed reflects the relative importance of these items to the people who formulate and articulate a nation's foreign policy. Thus, both in the text and in the

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<sup>2</sup> Not all observers would concur on the importance of military parity and, indeed, many American strategists would consider any loss of our preponderance to be a destabilizing factor. Implicit in that view, moreover, is a rejection of the mutuality of the deterrent relationship.

supplemental Tabulated Coding Results the reader will find a simple measure of salience for each dimension; i.e., the number of times an elite articulation on the matter at hand appeared in each periodical.<sup>3</sup>

Before going into the specific dimensions of these four basic issues, it should be stressed that we are seeking exactly the same sort of data for each side, and that the attitudinal framework of the study itself is not a "we-they" sort of focus. Rather it is a focus in which the researcher proceeds from the assumption that here are two major powers (A and B, X and Y, or United States and USSR) engaged in a very risky set of relationships, and that the more objective and accurate a picture each has of the other's operational code, the less risky the relationships become. Our purpose is to help provide that information, and not to pass judgment on the code or conduct of the states involved. (This does not preclude, however, a "shifting of hats" in the conclusion, where certain policy implications for the United States are discussed.)

It should also be pointed out that we are focusing on what might be called "elite articulations," and that such a focus implies certain limitations. First of all, it raises the question of properly identifying those who compose the foreign policy decision-making elite in each of the two nations under study. Second, it raises the question of whether articulations, expressions of opinion, and

statements of policy are particularly reliable indices of actual policy behavior. Both of these problems will be dealt with in greater detail later, but it seems worthwhile to at least forewarn the reader at the outset.

Let us now return to the four basic issues on which information is being sought and attempt to spell out in greater detail the nature of the information desired and the reasons behind the search.

#### *A. Image of the International Environment*

Here we are operating from the well-founded propositions: (1) that individuals (alone or in groups) always have some image of their environment and that this image is an attempt to impose some acceptable (and, to *them*, rational) structure and order upon the world in which they must operate; and (2) that this image or attributed structure is a key determinant in their behavior. Thus we feel justified in attempting to identify such general and persistent dimensions in each elite's image of the international environment as:

A-1. Whether harmony or conflict is the dominant attribute of the contemporary international system as they see it.

A-2. Whether their mutual relationship is viewed as a struggle between ideologies, social systems, or power centers.

A-3. Whether war is perceived as most likely to arise—if at all—out of one state's aggressiveness, the normal clash of national interests, or accident and miscalculation.

A-4. Whether they believe that nations with differing sociopolitical characteristics must clash, may compete, or can cooperate.

A-5. Whether they think of prediction about international events as highly possible or almost impossible.

A-6. Whether they think that nations have much, or little, control over their own destinies.

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<sup>3</sup> It might be argued that a more "sophisticated" measure of salience is in order, but given the wide range of *Ns* among the dimensions (from 2 to 156 for the USSR and from 5 to 471 for the US), any other measure would be artificial and misleading. There are 1,618 references in the Soviet sample and 3,105 in the American one; dividing by 35, we get means of 46 and 89 respectively. In the final section of this study some further comparisons of salience are offered.

A-7. Whether the broad trends in the distribution of power are favorable or unfavorable to them.

A-8. Whether any limited war is susceptible to restraint and limitation or whether it is more likely to escalate into general war.

When we study the results of these particular inquiries we will find that, while such information could be highly useful and relevant to each side, neither elite seems to give much expression to such theoretical and philosophical generalizations; this is particularly true of the first six, more abstract, items.

### B. Evaluation of the Power Balance

Here we leave the more abstract and general characteristics that each side's elite tends to attribute to the international political environment, and turn to some of its more concrete present-day characteristics. The focus here is on the way in which each appraises its power and capabilities vis-à-vis the other, and the premise is that perceived superiority or inferiority is bound to affect the behavior of the elites involved. We are not saying, however, that the more powerful an elite thinks it is—or is becoming—the more aggressive or bellicose its behavior will be; we are most skeptical of postulating any one-to-one relationship between perceived power and propensity for conflict.

In this group of dimensions we seek to discover each side's evaluation of the current and foreseeable power balance in terms of the following:

B-1. Vulnerability of own strategic strike-back capability.

B-2. Limitations and effectiveness of own deterrent posture.

B-3. Relative progress in military technology and production.

B-4. Overall military capability vis-à-vis the other.

B-5. Strengths of own alliances.

B-6. Effectiveness of other's decision-making process.

B-7. Dominant forces in other's decision-making process.

B-8. Impact of arms expenditure on other's economy.

B-9. Vulnerabilities of other's sociopolitical structure.

B-10. Outcome of general nuclear war.

### C. Evaluation of Other's Operational Code

In this realm we are interested in discovering how each elite perceives and evaluates the operational code of its adversary. Again the assumption is, to paraphrase the game theorists, that "each player's strategy is a function of the other's strategy," or, more accurately, the *perception* of the other's strategy. Here we seek to identify the way in which each sees the goals, motivations, capabilities, and strategies of *the other* in terms of the following dimensions:

C-1. Their ultimate and dominant political goals.

C-2. Their relative preference for physical security and ideological consistency.

C-3. Their relative preference for various foreign policy techniques and instruments.

C-4. The basis for attributing aggressive designs to the adversary.

C-5. Their dominant military doctrine.

C-6. The purposes of their outer space programs.

C-7. The purposes of their foreign aid programs.

### D. Own Operational Code

In this fourth and final group of dimensions, we hope to identify the major characteristics of each elite's foreign policy

operational code. And it is here that we run into our most important epistemological problems. It is relatively easy to say that this is how a group *sees* the environment, *evaluates* the power balance, or *appraises* the other side, but it quite another thing to say that this *is* the mode of behavior of a group. In other words, such relatively observable phenomena as perceptions are not too difficult to identify and measure; but goals, motivations, and preferences pose a more formidable problem. One may infer them from actual *behavior*, or one may infer them from what the actors *say* about them, but in each case we are compelled to reply upon the intelligent inference.<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, it is generally true that an individual or a group is never fully aware of the forces that make for its *own* behavior, even though it may be quite aware of these forces in the behavior of others. Finally, there is the problem of dissimulation in any of its myriad aspects. An elite may articulate in order to generate an image, persuade an audience, demonstrate solidarity, plead a case, or merely blow off steam. Despite these pitfalls, however, we felt the study would be seriously incomplete were it to omit any effort to infer the operational code of each elite from its own articulations. We examine these in terms of the following dimensions:

D-1. The general criteria used in making foreign policy decisions.

D-2. The prerequisites for successful negotiation.

D-3. The way in which peace can best be maintained.

D-4. The applicability of limited war in pursuit of strategic interests.

D-5. The political settlement–disarmament sequence.

D-6. The arms reduction–inspection control sequence.

D-7. Decision-making procedures in international organization.

D-8. The various disengagement proposals.

D-9. The motivation for foreign aid programs.

D-10. Free international trade.

### *Procedures*

#### METHOD AND SOURCES EMPLOYED IN THE STUDY

Having discussed the reasoning behind the study and the sorts of information that it was designed to produce, let us turn to the question of what materials were employed in this search for information. As suggested earlier, one can seek to identify the major characteristics of a state's foreign policy operational code in several ways. One may examine the overt behavior itself and then reconstruct by inference the assumptions, expectations, aspirations, and calculations that entered into and influenced that behavior. Or one might refine and limit this technique by selecting a single variable or cluster of variables and then attempting to interpret and explain past and current behavior in terms of that variable. In this vein, one might choose such "objective" factors as geography, location, resources, the diplomatic or military history of a nation, its productive and distributive system, or its level of technology, to mention but a few. Or one may opt for the less tangible factors such as religion,

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<sup>4</sup> Perhaps the best discussion of the problem of inference in content analysis is in George (1959), especially chapter 4. The present study has been strongly influenced, and to a great extent made possible, by the work of George and his colleagues in the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service of the Federal Communications Commission.

literature, formal ideology,<sup>5</sup> or national character. Interestingly enough, in this age of motivation research, psychoanalysis, and attitude manipulation, there has been an increasing tendency toward these latter bases of explanation. The approach seems legitimate enough, but some very serious difficulties arise and it is our suspicion that many of these have been ignored or evaded by those who utilize the more attitudinal types of interpretation.

Thus, without contradicting the notion that beliefs and attitudes are clearly influential in the foreign policy behavior of states, we might nevertheless ask such questions as *whose* beliefs are influential; how do we know that they *believe* what they say they believe; and if there are contradictions in statements of belief, which statements are to be used? In other words, there is a genuine problem of validity in any research design that seeks to identify beliefs, and this problem has been the subject of considerable reflection and difference of opinion among users of the content-analysis technique.<sup>6</sup> Keeping these caveats in mind, let us proceed to a description and explanation of the type of attitudinal data utilized in this study and to the nature of the sample that has been drawn from the data.

First, our concern is with those whom

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<sup>5</sup> See especially Leites (1951 and 1953). Though Leites asserts that he is not inferring actual behavior from articulations of formal ideology, the frequent use of "operational code" and the general tone of both studies suggest that the prefatory caveats are partially ignored throughout.

<sup>6</sup> An excellent volume dealing with these and other implications in content analysis is Pool (1959). See also the classic study by Berelson (1952) and the valuable effort by George (1959), already cited, to combine technique and substance.

we believe to be most influential in the formulation of Soviet and American political and military strategy—the elites who most accurately make and/or express the operational code.<sup>7</sup> Second, we wanted to identify those written materials that would most faithfully reflect the assumptions, expectations, and aspirations of those elites. Third, because of the complexity of our method (to be described momentarily), we had to draw a relatively small sample of the elite articulations with which we are concerned.

Given these requirements, we decided that an adequately faithful mirroring of our two elites could be had by focusing upon three periodicals on each side. After considerable discussion, consultation, and pre-testing, we selected for the USSR: *Pravda*, a daily newspaper published in Moscow, organ of the Central Committee of the Communist party of the Soviet Union (CPSU); *Kommunist*, a monthly journal published in Moscow, the theoretical spokesman for the Central Committee; and *International Affairs*, a monthly journal published in Moscow in several languages.

And for the United States, we selected: *The New York Times*, a privately published daily newspaper, most widely confided in and read by the governmental and quasi-governmental decision-making elite; *The Department of State Bulletin*, the weekly official organ of the executive agency most deeply involved in foreign policy; and *Foreign Affairs*, a quarterly journal privately published by the Council on Foreign Relations in New York.

Some defense of our selections is in order. First of all, there was a considerable temptation to use at least one military periodical

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<sup>7</sup> It could be argued that these may not necessarily be the same people, but we assume that they are.

on each side, but it was soon established that no journal on the Soviet side would have frequent enough reference to the broad range of dimensions with which we were concerned; the material is so restricted in scope that it might be useful for a study in strategic doctrine alone,<sup>8</sup> but not for a study in which military strategy is only one segment of the broader spectrum with which the study is concerned. Moreover, the only Soviet military journal whose scope and level of generalization might have been adequate for our purposes is *Military Thought*, and because the USSR has classified it, it was nearly impossible to get access to more than a few scattered issues. Such media as *Red Star*, *Soviet Fleet*, *Military Knowledge*, *Naval Journal*, and *Soviet Union* were all too restricted in their materials, as were their American counterparts.

Another problem was whether or not to restrict our sample to that of official governmental publications. On the Soviet side this presented no real difficulty, as almost nothing in the foreign affairs field is published there that does not reflect governmental policy, and this in turn is a function of Party policy.<sup>9</sup> Thus we chose *Pravda* for its breadth of coverage and for its faithfulness in reflecting the Party line. *Kommunist*, likewise a Party journal, was selected because of its greater concern for the theoretical, the doctrinal, and the abstract. And because neither *Pravda* nor *Kommunist* is primarily devoted to foreign affairs, and hence might often fail to produce data on some of our more specialized dimensions, we decided to use *International*

*Affairs* to fill that gap. The latter also has the virtue of appearing in English as well as in Russian, thus reducing our translation and coding burden.<sup>10</sup>

On the American side, we did decide to go outside of government for two of our three journals because the foreign policy elite is not restricted to government or party elites. No student of American politics could deny the significance of the *New York Times* as a reflector of elite opinion on foreign policy; not only do some of its employees occasionally participate (informally, for the most part) in foreign policy making, but its editorials are viewed by most policy-makers as singularly reflective of nongovernmental elite opinion. *Foreign Affairs* is likewise the outlet for many foreign policy influentials both in and out of government; its parent organization, the Council on Foreign Relations, enjoys a remarkable intimacy with official policy-makers. And this latter journal supplements the more detailed day-to-day commentary of the *Times* by producing a number of theoretically-oriented but policy-focused articles in each issue. The *Department of State Bulletin* is, of course, indispensable as the primary source of policy articulations from the middle as well as the upper levels of the diplomatic bureaucracy.

It might be said that *Pravda* and the *Times* editorials provide the more immediate day-to-day coverage we required, *Kommunist* and *Foreign Affairs* provide the theoretical and more long-range articula-

<sup>8</sup> Even this is problematical, as most of the military journals still tended (in the late 1950s) to concentrate on the more restricted questions of tactics, training, and equipment.

<sup>9</sup> Very suggestive in this regard is Inkeles (1951).

<sup>10</sup> It is occasionally suggested that certain intentional omissions and modifications are made when such periodicals are translated for foreign consumption. Though this seems plausible, only two of the specialists we consulted seemed to think this happens with any frequency, and in a rough comparison made by one of our bilingual coders, no such evidence was found.

tions demanded by our code dimensions, and *International Affairs* and the *Bulletin* give us the exclusive preoccupation with foreign policy and thus the subject matter breadth so necessary to this type of study. But these pairings ought not to be taken too literally as indications of extreme similarity; the many differences should be evident.<sup>11</sup>

Finally, the implied symmetry between the two societies should not be interpreted as overlooking the disparate roles of the media in each. We readily recognize the sharp difference between the objectives of *informing* the reader and *persuading* the reader, but nevertheless conclude that the net results are not profoundly different. Moreover, none of the American samples used here can be thought of as having a primarily *informative* role; all three are, to put it mildly, interpretive in their mission.<sup>12</sup>

#### DRAWING THE SAMPLE

Once the basic decision is made as to what materials will be employed in a study, the question arises as to how to sample from among these materials in an appropriate fashion. As in all sampling problems, we were confronted with the not always compatible demands of selectivity and randomness. Let us describe how we dealt with the need for selectivity first.

In each of the six periodicals used, we wanted to code only those articles or editorials that would produce the information described in the sections on the findings of the study, and were therefore interested in excluding a great many items from each. Such inclusions and exclusions are listed below.

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<sup>11</sup> On the general problem of cross-national comparability in the media, see Pool *et al.* (1952), especially chapter 1, justifying their selection of journals to be studied.

<sup>12</sup> This issue is discussed in Singer (1963b).

*Pravda*: Because no effort is made to distinguish in content between editorial and reportorial material in this newspaper, we coded all articles that (1) were "primarily concerned" with Soviet foreign relations and (2) contained any "interpretive material." This excludes mere factual reports, and because interpretive articles were both lengthier and more prominent, decision to code or not code an article was relatively simple. There was high agreement between two independent coders on the number of codable items in this newspaper.

*Kommunist*: All articles in this journal were coded that (1) were primarily concerned with Soviet foreign relations (thus excluding such items as relations between satellite nations, literature in China, etc.) and (2) were written by Soviet nationals. Authors were generally easily identifiable.

*International Affairs*: Because almost all of the articles in this journal deal with the subject at hand, we coded only the single editorial and the lead article; if there were two editorials, the first was coded. Occasionally, in place of the editorial there might be the text of an important speech or an exchange of letters; these were coded as if they were editorials.

*New York Times*: Editorials primarily concerned with American foreign relations were the only items coded. If there were two or more of these on a given day, only the first was coded.

*Department of State Bulletin*: We coded only those articles that were significant enough to be listed in the index of the issue, under the name of the official to whom the statement was attributed; statements or articles by foreigners were excluded. By limiting ourselves to indexed items, we excluded all straight factual items.

*Foreign Affairs*: In this quarterly journal, all articles were coded that were (1)



primarily concerned with American foreign policy (thus excluding articles that focused on another given nation or region) and (2) written by American nationals or foreigners whose occupation and residence indicate a basically American viewpoint. All authors are clearly identified in each issue.

To reduce the size of our coding universe, once selection for appropriateness had occurred, we decided on a random sample as follows: *Pravda*, every eighth day; *Kommunist*, every issue (more or less monthly); *International Affairs*, every issue (monthly); *New York Times*, every eighth day; *Department of State Bulletin*, every issue (weekly); *Foreign Affairs*, every issue (quarterly).

#### TIME SPAN COVERED

The time span covered in our coding was the three-year period beginning May 1, 1957 and ending April 30, 1960—which was, coincidentally, just prior to the U-2 incident, the summit breakup at Paris, and the subsequent alterations in the nature of Soviet-American relations. It is important to bear in mind that this was essentially a period of relatively stable and “normal” relations; and, while the “peaceful coexistence” doctrine was not abandoned after the closing of our three-year sample period, it became a less strong and dominant element in Soviet foreign policy articulations. There may also be some significance in these facts: (1) by the beginning of our period, May 1957, Khrushchev had rather successfully consolidated his power and authority in the Soviet government and in the Party, and (2) John Foster Dulles was United States Secretary of State during nearly two of these three years. The reader should bear in mind how rapidly change is occurring in world politics and that, even though the present tense is used in the analysis, the midpoint of the sampled period was six years ago.

#### CODING PROCEDURES

Here we turn to the most important of our preliminary explanations, prior to an examination of the data themselves. As was indicated in the section on information sought in the study, the purpose of the study was to generate an accurate picture of Soviet and American foreign policy goals and strategies as far as they might be reflected in elite articulations regarding (A) the international environment, (B) the distribution of power, (C) the other's operational code, and (D) their own operational code.

The procedure followed two main phases: designing and refining our coding procedure, and then applying it. The first phase followed six more or less distinct steps:

(1) The questions that seemed most germane to the study at hand were compiled. These were, of course, based on a multiplicity of sources: the author's general knowledge of the subject, the parameters of his own conceptual schemes, and those dimensions of foreign policy suggested by the writings and research of others in the field.<sup>13</sup>

(2) Once a tentative set of essentially *a priori* dimensions was set up and arranged, these dimensions were discussed, criticized, and modified by the author, his assistants, some consultants, and several professional colleagues.

(3) This set of dimensions was then applied by the coders to a sample of the material to be coded, resulting in the deletion of some dimensions, the rephrasing of others, and the addition of a few new dimensions.

(4) The author then reappraised the di-

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<sup>13</sup> Particularly suggestive on the Soviet side were Leites (1953), Moore (1950), and Meyer (1957).

mensions and further tightened up the three positions within each dimension, in order to maximize mutual exclusiveness as well as exhaustiveness of these positions.

(5) The dimensions and their positions were then pretested by the coders themselves to insure that: (a) the literature to be coded made frequent enough reference to the dimensions to be worth coding;<sup>14</sup> (b) the dimensions themselves did not overlap one another (except in a few cases where some subtle shadings of attitude were being sought); (c) the dimensions themselves were clear and unambiguous enough to assure that independent coders would have a high agreement that a specific article should or should not be coded along that dimension (each article was to be coded only once, if at all, per dimension); and (d) the three positions within each dimension were as mutually exclusive as possible, yet exhaustive of the possible ranges of relevant response.

(6) When the pretests had demonstrated, by agreement between two or more independent coders, that the dimensions and positions were adequately refined and clarified, they were settled upon as final.

In the second phase, applying the code to the materials, we proceeded as follows:

(1) Each of our six periodicals was assigned to two separate and independent coders (Russian-reading coders for *Pravda* and *Kommunist*) in the following pattern:

<i>New York Times</i>	<i>Pravda</i>
1. McLeod	1. Slobin
2. Samuels	2. Proffer
<i>Department of State Bulletin</i>	<i>Kommunist</i>
1. Jellison	1. Slobin
2. Samuels	2. Proffer
<i>Foreign Affairs</i>	<i>International Affairs</i>
1. Samuels	1. McLeod
2. Cohl	2. Samuels

(2) The coders—three of whom had already been engaged in pretesting the preliminary dimensions and positions—received their final revised instructions, the pertinent parts of which are given in Appendices A and B (p. 477).

Though the standard content-analysis techniques were used and they worked relatively well in all but a few cases,<sup>15</sup> it must be emphasized that the method does require an inferential reasoning process and that no two coders will in all cases infer, from the same statement, the same conclusion. The degree of intercoder agreement was, however, as high as might be expected, as the following section indicates.

STATISTICAL RELIABILITY  
AND INTERCODER AGREEMENT<sup>16</sup>

In any social science research that employs quantitative measures and indices, one is obligated to indicate how reliable the measures and indices turned out to be. Our concern in this particular study is with the reliability of our dimensions and the posi-

<sup>14</sup>In some instances, dimensions that produced relatively sparse pretest results were retained because of their seeming importance, and on the hope that the full population would produce a larger *N*. Furthermore, to have excluded low *N* items would have deprived us of the range and contrast necessary to a useful measure of salience. Finally we were confronted by the fact that certain dimensions might be of high salience for one nation but not for the other.

<sup>15</sup>The only real difficulties were in coding the *Department of State Bulletin*; these occurred on items A-1, A-2, C-1, C-3, and D-9. In these five cases, the wide discrepancies between the two coders were resolved by a conference in which the principal investigator was able to discover the sources of "error" and have them recoded.

<sup>16</sup>For the application of the technique used here and for the calculations themselves, the project is indebted to Jack McLeod and Ellen Samuels.

TABLE 1  
 EXPECTED PERCENT AGREEMENT (P<sub>e</sub>), OBSERVED PERCENT AGREEMENT (P<sub>o</sub>),  
 INTERCODER AGREEMENT (IA), AND SIGNIFICANCE OF DIMENSIONS FOR USSR

Dim.	<i>Pravda</i>				<i>Kommunist</i>				<i>International Affairs</i>			
	P <sub>e</sub>	P <sub>o</sub>	IA	Sig.	P <sub>e</sub>	P <sub>o</sub>	IA	Sig.	P <sub>e</sub>	P <sub>o</sub>	IA	Sig.
A. Soviet Image of International Environment												
1	0.733	0.506	0.459	***	0.414	0.394	0.033	NS	0.43	0.32	0.17	0.09
2	0.507	0.351	0.240	***	0.552	1.000	Neg.	-	0.76	0.32	0.65	***
3	0.760	0.413	0.591	***	0.655	1.000	Neg.	-	0.81	0.63	0.50	**
4	0.787	0.348	0.673	***	0.828	1.000	Neg.	-	0.61	0.28	0.48	***
5	0.960	0.922	0.487	0.15	0.759	0.600	0.398	***	0.83	0.79	0.18	0.29
6	0.920	0.807	0.585	***	0.724	0.529	0.414	***	0.51	0.35	0.25	*
7	0.880	0.644	0.663	***	0.655	1.000	Neg.	-	0.94	0.62	0.85	***
8	0.947	0.897	0.485	0.10	0.828	0.705	0.417	***	0.94	0.82	0.68	**
B. Soviet Evaluation of Power Balance												
1	0.973	0.922	0.654	***	0.897	1.000	Neg.	-	0.94	0.97	Neg.	-
2	1.000	1.000	0.000	-	1.000	1.000	0.000	-	0.94	0.68	0.82	***
3	0.907	0.578	0.780	***	0.414	0.505	Neg.	-	0.90	0.51	0.80	***
4	0.947	0.696	0.826	***	0.655	0.672	Neg.	-	0.91	0.48	0.84	***
5	0.960	0.680	0.875	***	0.724	1.000	Neg.	-	0.71	0.47	0.47	***
6	1.000	0.780	1.000	***	0.759	0.610	0.382	***	0.79	0.57	0.50	***
7	0.853	0.489	0.712	***	0.621	0.619	0.005	NS	0.69	0.39	0.48	***
8	0.893	0.500	0.786	***	0.655	0.510	0.296	***	0.80	0.52	0.58	**
9	0.947	0.560	0.879	***	0.655	0.382	0.442	***	0.69	0.44	0.44	**
10	0.947	0.677	0.836	***	0.724	0.479	0.470	***	0.67	0.42	0.44	**
C. Soviet Image of American Operational Code												
1	0.973	0.769	0.883	***	0.655	0.353	0.467	0.15	0.67	0.41	0.45	***
2	1.000	0.974	1.000	***	1.000	1.000	0.000	-	0.99	1.00	Neg.	-
3	0.853	0.339	0.778	***	0.621	0.208	0.521	***	0.64	0.29	0.49	***
4	0.800	0.268	0.727	***	0.793	0.303	0.702	***	0.57	0.23	0.45	***
5	1.000	0.974	1.000	***	1.000	1.000	0.000	***	0.83	0.84	Neg.	-
6	0.960	0.974	Neg.	-	0.966	0.933	0.492	0.01	0.97	0.94	0.48	0.22
7	0.947	0.731	0.803	***	0.828	0.600	0.570	***	0.96	0.78	0.81	***
D. Soviet Expressions of Own Operational Code												
1	0.987	0.974	0.500	0.35	0.966	0.933	0.492	0.01	0.69	0.63	0.15	0.25
2	0.787	0.645	0.400	0.15	0.586	0.453	0.243	0.01	0.84	0.47	0.71	***
3	0.787	0.438	0.621	***	0.655	0.332	0.484	0.15	0.53	0.29	0.33	**
4	1.000	1.000	0.000	-	1.000	1.000	0.000	-	0.97	1.000	Neg.	-
5	0.813	0.522	0.601	***	0.655	0.515	0.289	***	0.51	0.46	0.10	0.26
6	0.867	0.825	0.240	0.15	0.310	0.391	Neg.	-	0.83	0.46	0.69	***
7	0.973	0.853	0.816	***	0.931	0.933	Neg.	-	0.87	0.81	0.31	0.18
8	0.880	0.649	0.658	***	0.897	0.600	0.742	***	0.90	0.56	0.77	***
9	0.893	0.681	0.665	***	0.828	0.489	0.663	***	0.96	0.89	0.61	0.07
10	0.867	0.707	0.546	0.05	0.759	0.446	0.565	***	0.94	0.72	0.80	***

tions within each of the dimensions, in terms of the agreement between the two independent coders who worked on each of our six periodicals.

The technique employed here is one that has been especially devised for precisely this type of study and is described fully in Scott (1955). It differs from the more

conventional methods, not only in that it takes partial account of the frequency of agreement to "no code" an article in a given dimension, but that it avoids the bias that favors those dimensions in which most or all of the coding is in only one or two of the positions. If we were to count, in the reliability of a certain dimension, only those

articles that *have* been coded by at least one of the coders, we would be biasing the index in favor of the *frequently* coded dimensions. On the other hand, if we counted all articles (including those not coded) in the reliability index of a dimension without allowing for the distribution of codes among the positions, we would be biasing the index in favor of the *least frequently* coded dimensions. Another implication is that the conventional indices destroy the comparability between and among publications when there is a sharp disparity in the frequency with which each may be coded.

The Index of Intercoder Agreement (IA) used here represents the ratio of the *actual* difference between the obtained agreement and chance agreement to the *maximum* difference between obtained and chance agreement, and is comparable to the conventional "percentage agreement" indices in that it varies from 0.0 to 1.0.

1. Expected percent agreement ( $P_e$ ) is calculated as follows:

$$(1) \quad P_e = \frac{n_a^2 + n_b^2 + n_c^2 + n_{ab}^2 + n_{ac}^2 + n_{bc}^2 + n_x^2}{(n_a + n_b + \dots + n_x)^2}$$

2. Observed percent agreement ( $P_o$ ) is calculated as follows:

$$(2) \quad P_o = \frac{\text{total no. of agreements}}{(n_a + n_b + \dots + n_x)}$$

3. Having calculated  $P_e$  and  $P_o$ , the IA is computed by this formula:

$$(3) \quad IA = \frac{P_o - P_e}{1 - P_e}$$

4. Then, in order to get the statistical significance of our IA for each periodical, or the critical ratio (CR), we use the following formula:

$$(4) \quad CR = \frac{IA}{\sqrt{\left(\frac{1}{1 - P_e}\right)^2 \frac{P_o(1 - P_o)}{n - 1} + \left(\frac{1}{1 - P_e}\right)^2 \frac{P_e(1 - P_e)}{n - 1}}}$$

5. The CR is checked for its probability by comparing it to the normal curve tables of any statistics text; we assume a one-tailed test inasmuch as the direction is predicted.

Having noted the special advantages of this technique, however, we recognize that it still has its shortcomings, and might conceivably be replaced by some of the newer techniques in any subsequent study of this sort. Among those that have been suggested are Cohen (1960) and Garner and Hade (1951).

Tables 1 and 2 show  $P_o$ ,  $P_e$ , IA, and significance (*Sig.* column) for the three periodicals on each side, for all 35 dimensions (*Dim.* column). In the *Sig.* column, three asterisks (\*\*\*) represent a probability (of chance agreement) of less than 0.001, two (\*\*) represent a probability between 0.01 and 0.001, and one (\*) represents a probability between 0.05 and 0.01. Probabilities higher than 0.05 are shown at the significance level indicated (0.09, etc.). In certain cases, the observed agreement was lower than the expected agreement. These dimensions are designated by "Neg." in the IA column and by a dash (—) in the *Sig.* column.

### *Findings of the Study: USSR*

Turning from the problems of method and procedure to the substantive findings, let us first describe and discuss the data that emerge from the Soviet and American sides of the study, in this and the following section. In the last section we attempt some comparisons and conclusions. It will be recalled that the foreign policy attitude dimensions were divided into four main sets

TABLE 2  
 EXPECTED PERCENT AGREEMENT (P<sub>e</sub>), OBSERVED PERCENT AGREEMENT (P<sub>o</sub>),  
 INTERCODER AGREEMENT (IA), AND SIGNIFICANCE OF DIMENSIONS  
 FOR UNITED STATES

Dim.	<i>N. Y. Times</i>				<i>Bulletin</i>				<i>Foreign Affairs</i>			
	P <sub>e</sub>	P <sub>o</sub>	IA	Sig.	P <sub>e</sub>	P <sub>o</sub>	IA	Sig.	P <sub>e</sub>	P <sub>o</sub>	IA	Sig.
A. American Image of International Environment												
1	0.85	0.80	0.25	0.15	0.724	0.577	0.347	0.025	0.961	0.715	0.863	***
2	0.82	0.44	0.68	***	0.622	0.506	0.235	0.15	0.936	0.436	0.753	***
3	0.96	0.99	Neg.	-	0.969	0.945	0.436	***	0.987	0.901	0.869	***
4	0.93	0.86	0.53	*	0.927	0.857	0.489	***	0.974	0.787	0.878	***
5	0.88	0.72	0.59	***	0.993	0.986	0.500	***	1.000	0.901	1.000	***
6	0.77	0.46	0.57	***	0.950	0.905	0.474	***	0.961	0.499	0.922	***
7	1.00	1.00	0.00	-	0.974	0.949	0.490	***	1.000	0.901	1.000	***
8	0.97	0.96	0.34	0.26	0.988	0.972	0.571	***	1.000	0.724	1.000	***
B. American Evaluation of the Power Balance												
1	0.99	1.00	Neg.	-	0.960	0.922	0.487	***	0.987	0.832	0.923	***
2	0.99	0.94	0.73	*	0.924	0.851	0.490	***	0.949	0.788	0.759	***
3	0.97	0.94	0.49	0.14	0.958	0.917	0.774	***	0.936	0.856	0.556	***
4	0.99	0.92	0.82	**	0.915	0.830	0.500	***	0.961	0.789	0.815	***
5	0.83	0.60	0.57	***	0.554	0.351	0.313	***	0.923	0.669	0.519	***
6	0.88	0.86	0.13	0.33	0.653	0.476	0.338	0.10	0.961	0.789	0.815	***
7	0.93	0.85	0.51	*	0.967	0.931	0.522	***	1.000	0.926	1.000	***
8	0.99	0.99	0.50	0.28	0.981	0.963	0.486	***	1.000	1.000	0.000	-
9	0.99	0.99	0.50	0.28	0.965	0.913	0.598	***	0.987	0.975	0.480	***
10	0.96	0.85	0.71	**	0.939	0.839	0.621	***	0.987	0.833	0.323	0.05
C. American Evaluation of Soviet Operational Code												
1	0.84	0.72	0.44	**	0.634	0.339	0.446	***	0.961	0.611	0.899	***
2	0.98	0.97	0.44	0.37	0.981	0.963	0.486	***	0.949	0.879	0.578	***
3	0.82	0.65	0.48	***	0.571	0.308	0.380	***	0.974	0.507	0.947	***
4	0.91	0.82	0.46	*	0.894	0.808	0.448	***	0.987	0.835	0.927	***
5	0.99	0.99	0.50	0.29	0.974	0.949	0.490	***	1.000	0.949	1.000	***
6	0.99	0.94	0.88	**	0.960	0.909	0.560	***	1.000	0.925	1.000	***
7	0.99	0.97	0.76	0.09	0.830	0.598	0.577	***	0.987	0.812	0.931	***
D. American Expressions of Own Operational Code												
1	0.78	0.68	0.32	*	0.821	0.656	0.480	***	0.949	0.543	0.888	***
2	0.96	0.87	0.71	**	0.948	0.892	0.518	***	0.949	0.879	0.578	***
3	0.77	0.47	0.58	***	0.616	0.367	0.340	***	0.961	0.648	0.889	***
4	0.98	0.94	0.61	*	0.945	0.873	0.567	***	0.974	0.728	0.904	***
5	0.93	0.88	0.42	0.08	0.950	0.878	0.590	***	0.974	0.875	0.792	***
6	0.89	0.77	0.52	**	0.801	0.586	0.519	***	0.961	0.854	0.733	***
7	0.96	0.93	0.37	0.33	0.976	0.939	0.607	***	1.000	0.901	1.000	***
8	0.98	0.96	0.50	0.16	0.995	0.972	0.852	***	0.987	0.832	0.923	***
9	0.89	0.77	0.53	**	0.611	0.351	0.401	***	0.949	0.520	0.894	***
10	0.99	0.99	0.50	0.29	0.900	0.750	0.600	***	1.000	0.950	1.000	***

of issues, and we will examine our results in that particular sequence.

In the tables for the 35 dimensions on the Soviet side, the first three columns are journal columns; P stands for *Pravda*, K

for *Kommunist*, I for *International Affairs*. The figures shown under these three heads and in the three position rows (*a*, *b*, *c*) are *percentage* distributions for each journal. The fourth column, headed C (*combined*),

shows the mean percentage distribution of the three journals for each position. The figures in the *Salience* row are the number (not, as in Angell's study, the percentage) of times that the total dimension itself was mentioned in each of the three journals, with total *N* shown under the C column. All figures represent the mean between the two independent coders. At the end of the study are eight summary tables, showing each coder's—as well as combined—results for all four sets of foreign policy issues on both sides.

A. SOVIET ELITE IMAGE OF THEIR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

A-1. This first dimension is intended to produce the articulated image of the natural and normal character of the international political system. The three possible positions and percentage distributions were:

	P	K	I	C
a. Recurrent conflict between nations with differing ideologies and social systems ....	0	25	45	25
b. Harmony, but periodically upset by deviant aggressor .....	100	75	55	75
c. Continuing conflict, regardless of ideology and other national differences .....	0	0	0	0
<i>Salience</i> .....	(23)	(16)	(32)	(71)

These figures illustrate, at the very outset, a sharp disagreement between traditional Bolshevik doctrine and the contemporary Party line as articulated in the Soviet media. Whereas the dominant theme in Marx, Lenin, and Stalin is one of continuing and unremitting conflict until the victory of Communism has been achieved, our analysis reveals that a much more immediate interpretation appears in the current era. Thus, instead of adhering to the

doctrine of the three struggles (capitalists vs. colonies, capitalists vs. capitalists in their struggle for colonies, and finally capitalists vs. "socialists"), we find the elites of 1957-60 arguing that the international system is not one of continuing conflict, but rather one whose natural harmony is upset by the temporary aggressors of the moment—i.e., the Western camp led by the United States. In not one of the three periodicals did our coders find any reference to pervasive conflict inherent in the system; they did find, however, that 75 percent of the references to the international system implied that were it not for the American-led aggressors, the system would be peaceful. This line was particularly evident in *Pravda*, whose readership is, of course, the broadest of the three and which is the only mass-circulation journal studied; here 100 percent of the codes were on position *b*. In *Kommunist*, the Party's theoretical journal, position *b* dropped somewhat to 75 percent, and position *a* scored 25 percent, suggesting that at least the belief in the normal conflict between nations of differing ideologies and social systems remains. And in the more specialized journal, *International Affairs*, the distribution moves further still from the line of the moment toward the more traditional one, by dropping to 55 percent for the deviant aggressor theme and going up to 45 percent for the ideological and social system explanation.

A-2. The second dimension seeks to ascertain the Soviet foreign policy elite's interpretation of the present international struggle. The three possible interpretations and responses were that it is between:

	P	K	I	C
a. Two belief systems	8	5	13	10
b. Two social systems	50	54	60	55
c. Two centers of power .....	42	41	27	35
<i>Salience</i> .....	(24)	(22)	(47)	(93)

These figures indicate that the Soviet elite perceives its struggle with the United States and its allies as spilling over into all three positions. While the emphasis on competition between social systems might be expected, it is interesting that there is a considerably heavier emphasis on position *c* (centers of power) than on position *a* (belief systems). This not only deviates from our stereotyped notion of Soviet attitudes, but may hold some small promise of peaceful resolution of the current conflict, as it is considerably easier for a protagonist to compromise in a power struggle than in an ideological struggle.

A-3. Dimension 3 asks where this particular elite tends to find the causes of war. The possible responses and results are shown below.

	P	K	I	C
a. One state's aggressiveness .....	86	100	80	88
b. Normal conflict of goals or clash of interest .....	0	0	5	2
c. Accident or miscalculation .....	14	0	15	10
Salience .....	(28)	(20)	(20)	(68)

These figures are less surprising in the light of the dimension 1 results than they might otherwise have been. Again, the doctrinaire image of a world in continuing and regular struggle is replaced by the more typical *national* view of any state engaged in this sort of conflict; it is not the system and its normal clashes but the aggressiveness of "the enemy" that threatens war. Also somewhat encouraging in our results is the partial awareness of accident and miscalculation as the cause of war. Though there were no references to this variable in the theoretical journal (*Kommunist*), 15 percent of the references in *International Af-*

*fairs* and 14 percent of those in *Pravda* were to accident or miscalculation.

A-4. Once recognizing that the present protagonists do have rather different social and political systems, what does the Soviet foreign policy elite see as the possible results of such a relationship? The possible alternatives and responses are shown.

	P	K	I	C
a. Must inevitably clash militarily .....	0	4	0	1
b. Can compete economically and politically .....	49	81	41	53
c. Can coexist cooperatively .....	51	15	59	46
Salience .....	(33)	(27)	(51)	(111)

Here, of course, is the nub of the "co-existence" dilemma for both the US and the USSR. During the 1957-60 period under study, the coexistence line was dominant, and as a result we found almost no references to inevitable military clash (and then only in *Kommunist*, written by and for the theoreticians). *Kommunist* was also the most conflict-oriented of the three periodicals. It was the only one producing a higher number of references to the economic and political competition theme (81 percent) than to the cooperation theme (15 percent). *Pravda* and *International Affairs*, on the other hand, were closer to the line of the moment, showing a more or less equal concern with both aspects of the relationship, indicating that they believe that cooperation and competition are not necessarily incompatible in a given bilateral relationship.

A-5. In dimensions 5 and 6 we seek some clues as to the more general philosophical attitudes that the Soviets have regarding international relations: the problem of prediction and the problem of inevitability. Dimension 5, dealing with

their views on the predictability of international events, offered the alternative positions and percentage responses shown below.

	P	K	I	C
a. Highly possible	100	100	47	69
b. Occasionally possible	0	0	53	31
c. Almost impossible	0	0	0	0
Saliency	(1)	(10)	(15)	(26)

At first glance it would seem that the Soviet elite believes that the course of events in international relations is rather predictable, but the results can be given little credence because of the very low number of references or allusions to this question. As indicated in the *Saliency* row, our sample produced a total of only 26 such references over the three-year period, suggesting that such abstract and theoretical concerns receive little attention in their media.

A-6. In dimension 6, we move from the predictability question to that of inevitability, posing three alternative responses to the statement "In international relations we are . . .":

	P	K	I	C
a. Masters of our own destiny	17	17	34	28
b. Limited by realities	83	75	66	70
c. Pawns of great forces	0	8	0	2
Saliency	(6)	(12)	(29)	(47)

This time we find a higher number of references, especially in *International Affairs*, and the results suggest that the elite take a fairly pragmatic view, emphasizing that they could, within certain acknowledged (but usually undefined) limits, influence the course of events. Again, the saliency is low enough to suggest that the traditional and formal ideological assertions

play a diminishingly intrusive role in Soviet images of the world.

A-7. Dimension 7 offers a general and preliminary clue as to where they stand on the more specific aspects of the contemporary power balance. In regard to this distribution of power, the possible categories and the responses are shown below.

	P	K	I	C
a. Shifting against USSR	8	0	0	1
b. Remaining static	0	0	0	0
c. Shifting in USSR favor	92	100	100	99
Saliency	(12)	(21)	(51)	(84)

These results are, of course, highly predictable and highlight a key point not only in Soviet external propaganda, but in that aimed at the domestic audience as well. But it ought not be assumed that this is solely a position designed for public consumption; the tone of confidence exuded coincides with the oft-quoted Khrushchev dictum that "we will bury you."<sup>17</sup> Note that reference is not to the military or any other specific variable in the power equation but to an across-the-board evaluation. As to the implications, one may only guess, since very little is known about the impact of perceived power on state behavior. One may just as readily hypothesize that such confidence will lead to more aggressive and belligerent behavior as that it will produce a more tolerant and less fearful posture because the earlier (articulated) insecurity has diminished so dramatically.

<sup>17</sup> Since this phrase is generally misunderstood in the West to imply the active notion of destruction, it should be noted that it can have a more passive connotation in the Russian idiom, merely indicating a belief that they will outlast the West and hence be present in all their vigor at the funeral. It should also be noted that it was not until 1961 that the West's nuclear-missile superiority became evident.



A-8. In this dimension, we seek another clue as to the Soviet foreign policy elite's view of the contemporary international scene. Here we look for their attitude on the implications of limited war and what its outcome might be.

	P	K	I	C
a. Remain limited by nature of weapons, etc. ....	0	0	0	0
b. Remain limited with considerable restraint .....	50	67	0	25
c. Probably escalate into general war .....	50	33	100	75
Saliency .....	(2)	(3)	(7)	(12)

These percentages tend to support those in the United States who favor emphasis on retaining a powerful retaliatory force; the Soviet fear of escalation (most sharply reflected in the specialists' journal, *International Affairs*) reveals both the perceived capability and credibility of the nuclear threat. The lack of a single reference to the probability of a limited war remaining limited may, however, suggest that it is part of their effort to push the peaceful coexistence line and to demonstrate that those "Western imperialists" who are giving serious consideration to limited war are really advocating general nuclear war, but in stages. It would be most useful to check this dimension out in *Military Thought*, *Military Herald*, and other of the more professional journals, since its saliency for the nonmilitary elites is clearly small.

**B. SOVIET ELITE EVALUATION OF THE POWER BALANCE**

In this issue we turn from the more general images or attitudes about the international political system of the current era to some of the more specific variables reflecting Soviet appraisals of the relative power

of themselves and the Western coalition. As suggested above (dimension A-7) the implications of their views on relative power are not at all clear and obvious.

B-1. In the first four dimensions in this set, reference is to power variables of an essentially military nature. The first dimension deals with the crucial question of how vulnerable they believe their retaliatory capability to be.

	P	K	I	C
a. Highly vulnerable to a surprise strike-first blow .....	0	0	0	0
b. Partially vulnerable .....	0	50	25	25
c. Nearly invulnerable .....	100	50	75	75
Saliency .....	(2)	(2)	(4)	(8)

Thus the few allusions we did find emphasize the relative invulnerability of their retaliatory capability; we found not a single reference in position *a* (highly vulnerable). As in many of the other dimensions, this is probably a function of both a propaganda effort and a well-founded belief.<sup>18</sup> Even before their ICBM became operational, they seemed to evince such confidence, and in materials other than those coded in this study such confidence is reiterated. If they believe in this relative invulnerability (based on concealment and hardening as well as numbers) they should be a more

<sup>18</sup> An indication of the rapidity with which technological relations—and hence political relations—change in this era is the essential obsolescence of the comments on dimensions 1 through 4. In the years between the period analyzed and the present writing, the missile advantage has clearly shifted and the vulnerability of the American missile forces has been dramatically reduced. However, the Soviet elite still seems to believe that their "minimum deterrent" can ride out a counter-force strike and retaliate with a counter-city blow of proportions unacceptable to North America.

predictable and conservative partner in this delicate game of mutual deterrence. The more convinced they are that they can ride out and absorb a first strike, the less likely they are to fear surprise attack or to consider a preemptive strike necessary. And if they believe that the Western capability is essentially a counter-city or counter-economy one (as opposed to a counter-force capability), they should be even less inclined to expect us to opt for surprise; this self-limited capability reduces our ability to eliminate the chance of reprisal, and thus reduces our incentive to strike first. The trouble in this equation is that until we have diminished our own vulnerability, their capability is as much counter-force as it is counter-city.

B-2. The second dimension is designed to indicate the elite's perception of their own deterrent capability and offers three views.

	P	K	I	C
a. Can deter limited war only .....	0	0	0	0
b. Can deter strategic nuclear war only ..	0	0	0	0
c. Can deter both ....	0	0	100	100
Salience .....	(0)	(0)	(14)	(14)

In coding, we found no references to any of these capabilities in *Pravda* and *Kommunist*, but in *International Affairs* 100 percent of the references fell into position c, evincing belief in their overall deterrent capability. They certainly want everyone at home and abroad to believe that this capability exists, but if the elite does in fact believe it too, then we can view it as a rather hopeful sign. That is, such a belief suggests that they (1) are pursuing a strategy of deterrence and (2) feel no need to strike first.

B-3. Turning to the hardware component of their articulated capability, we seek to

ascertain the Soviet elite's evaluation of their progress in weapon production and technology vis-à-vis the West. The responses are shown below.

	P	K	I	C
a. Slower than West	0	8	0	2
b. Faster than West	100	92	100	98
c. The same				
as West .....	0	0	0	0
Salience .....	(5)	(12)	(39)	(56)

This easily anticipated result reflects (or did reflect), again, a dual situation of reasonably well-founded confidence and an effort to convey that confidence to several audiences. As in dimension A-7, it reveals not only an assurance regarding the present power balance but, more significantly, an assurance regarding trends into the near future. If they believe that in military technology and production, as well as in the more general indices of power, they are forging ahead, they may become less interested in any sort of military engagement, seeing eventual political victory as theirs without armed conflict. On the other hand, such confidence could just as easily lead them toward increasingly bellicose or overbearing behavior that would provoke us into a similar posture. It is also possible that, if both sides perceive a power trend as going in the same direction, the potentially disadvantaged one may be impelled to strike before the anticipated edge becomes decisive.

B-4. Much the same results appear in dimension 4, dealing with the Soviet elite's appraisal of the current military balance. During the period studied, our periodicals revealed this percentage distribution:

	P	K	I	C
a. In West's favor ..	0	0	0	0
b. In Soviet's favor ..	100	100	94	95
c. One of stalemate ..	0	0	6	5
Salience .....	(3)	(8)	(31)	(42)

The interpretations of dimensions B-1, B-2, B-3, and A-7 are equally applicable here.

B-5. Turning to a somewhat different index of the Soviet foreign policy elite's evaluation of their relative power, we seek statements regarding the basis and motivation of their alliances.

	P	K	I	C
a. An enduring similarity of social systems and beliefs ..	100	100	74	84
b. The common need for protection against aggression .....	0	0	26	16
c. Our need to unite with others for our protection .....	0	0	0	0
Salience .....	(7)	(8)	(23)	(38)

These results, too, suggest an effort to convey a sense of strength and confidence; this is particularly evidenced by the absence of any allusion to their *own* national need for the alliance. Rather they emphasized the social, political, and ideological solidarity of the Communist coalition, with only a minor emphasis on the negative and defensive characteristics of the alliances (see Brzezinski, 1960, and Modelski, 1960).

B-6. Shifting from dimensions that focus either on their own strength or on relative power, we turn to four items that indicate the Soviet elite's appraisal of American strengths and weaknesses. The first deals with their evaluation of American foreign policy planning and strategic decision-making.

	P	K	I	C
a. A combination of plan and improvisation .....	0	20	14	16
b. Masterful and thorough .....	0	20	7	10
c. Haphazard, merely responding to events .....	0	60	79	74
Salience .....	(0)	(5)	(14)	(19)

While the mass circulation paper's articles on foreign affairs were found to have not a single reference to the qualities of the American decision process, the item appeared with some frequency in *Kommunist*, and with greater frequency in *International Affairs*. Whereas there is a strong tendency in the West to exaggerate the efficacy and thoroughness of Soviet planning, and to look upon Kremlin policy as the adroit pursuit of prearranged and subjectively inevitable goals, the Soviet elite give American and Western planning no such credit. To the contrary, they make only infrequent references to its being a combination of plan and improvisation (which is what all national policies must be), and most often describe it as haphazard, responding primarily to events over which we have no control. This narrow empirical base does not provide justification for any broader generalizations, but if the attitudes reflected here are any clue to their general image of our strategic decision processes, it may make them more wary of any alleged stability in the balance of terror, when such stability is a function not only of weapon systems but of the command and decision processes that restrain or unleash such systems. Whether their low estimate of the rationality of American planning is advantageous or not is, however, another matter, as a reputation for recklessness may produce not only concessions, but perhaps reciprocal recklessness as well.

B-7. In addition to the Soviet image of the quality of American planning, we were interested in their notion of which groups dominate the policy-making process.

Here is a classic case of the relevance of orthodox Marxism to the Soviet image of "capitalist" societies; 78 percent of the time they assigned dominance to the economic and technological elites (primarily the

former, but we used the combination because of its applicability to the American image of Soviet policy). In *Pravda*, neither coder found a single article assigning this dominance to the political leadership, and only one such was found in *Kommunist*. Again, *International Affairs* demonstrates the least adherence to official dogma and a greater sophistication than the other two, but it, too, seems to misunderstand the American political system. The assignments of dominance were as follows:

	P	K	I	C
a. Military leaders ...	22	5	11	12
b. Economic and technological elites ..	78	90	72	78
c. Political (party and government) leaders ..	0	5	17	10
Saliency .....	(18)	(20)	(36)	(74)

B-8. Regarding the relationship of the American armament program to the economy as a whole, we offered these three alternatives:

	P	K	I	C
a. Necessary to the economic system .....	67	94	75	80
b. Not related to it ..	0	0	4	2
c. Damaging to it ..	33	6	21	18
Saliency .....	(6)	(16)	(24)	(46)

Again, the influence of the formal and official ideology is very evident, with 80 percent of the references alleging that, in one way or another, the American economy is highly dependent upon preparedness expenditures. This result jibes, of course, with the results on dimension 7, where economic elites are seen as dominating American policy. The connection is clear: they are the ones who profit from preparedness expenditures. Another interesting point raised by this dimension is that during early 1959 Khrushchev began to articulate with some frequency a rather deviant position in order

to make his disarmament proposals more attractive: the arms race is not only *not* advantageous to the American economy, but represents a considerable drain upon it. Throughout this new phase, however, the Soviet press continued to argue that "Wall Street," etc., would stand in the way of arms elimination, tension reduction, or political settlement because of the *belief* that profits would disappear or the economy would collapse without the arms race.

B-9. As to the various vulnerabilities of the United States, this dimension seeks a description of the way in which the American sociopolitical system would meet its allegedly inevitable demise. Responses on the three possible factors leading to this collapse are shown below.

	P	K	I	C
a. Soviet's forcible measures .....	0	0	3	2
b. Soviet sociopolitical successes elsewhere ..	67	50	41	45
c. America's own weaknesses and contradictions .....	33	50	56	53
Saliency .....	(3)	(16)	(39)	(58)

The expressed faith in the inevitability of American collapse is best indicated by the nearly total absence of references to their own forcible measures, and most of those references were in the context of an American-initiated war. There was a fairly equal emphasis on their own ideological and political successes elsewhere and the inherent weaknesses and contradictions within the United States itself. Here, of course, is a dominant strain in the coexistence theme and a crucial one for meeting neo-Stalinist criticism within the Communist world: war or other overtly aggressive action is not even necessary.

B-10. The final dimension utilized in trying to identify the Soviet elite's appraisal

of the relative power balance concerns the implications of a general nuclear war. The possible outcomes that they could have predicted are shown below.

	P	K	I	C
a. Soviet victory .....	20	50	37	37
b. Greater destruction to US than to selves ..	0	13	11	10
c. Tremendous mutual devastation ..	80	37	52	53
Salience .....	(5)	(8)	(38)	(51)

Such results indicate the inevitable ambivalence that any national elite must face in coping with the nuclear war problem. On the one hand, there is the objective awareness of the irrelevance of "victory" in such a war; in the same vein, they need to stress the tremendous propaganda for peaceful coexistence and disarmament. On the other hand, they cannot afford to go all the way in this direction for fear of giving the impression of a nation so paralyzed with the apprehensions of war that they might not even fight in a showdown. Thus, the 37 percent score on the "victory for us" and the 10 percent score on "greater destruction to the US" are an index of their reliance on deterrence (requiring credible threats of retaliation), while the somewhat higher 53 percent score on the mutual devastation position may reflect a combination of genuine concern and political propaganda.

C. SOVIET ELITE IMAGE OF AMERICAN OPERATIONAL CODE

Turning from the Soviet foreign policy elite's image of American and Western power vis-à-vis themselves, we look at their image of our goals and general international strategy. If it is true that a major variable in the behavior of a nation is its expectations regarding the behavior of others, the results of this part should be particularly useful.

C-1. In the first dimension we pose a question to our unseen and unsuspecting respondents concerning their belief as to what constitutes the major and dominant goal of American foreign policy. The positions and responses were:

	P	K	I	C
a. World domination	6	25	33	24
b. Retaining and expanding their sphere of influence ..	94	69	63	73
c. Self-preservation ..	0	6	4	3
Salience .....	(16)	(16)	(27)	(59)

This particular dimension was inserted in the hope that we might find some sophisticated differentiations, on the part of each side's elite, between policies of domination or expansion and mere self-preservation, but the hopes were unjustified. First of all, no nation involved in a struggle such as that between the Soviets and ourselves can be expected to give official credence to the other's protestations of self-preservation; to accept the legitimacy of such a claim would be to suggest one's own aggressiveness. Nor can official spokesmen be expected to realize (or articulate) that much of the adversary's bellicosity is a function of the anarchic international system rather than their dreams of conquest. Moreover, our coders experienced considerable difficulty in differentiating between statements attributing position *a* (world domination) to the United States and those attributing position *b* (retaining and expanding sphere of influence) to us. The only conclusion emerging from this dimension is that the Soviet elite say that they think the United States is particularly aggressive and belligerent.

C-2. In this dimension we sought to identify the relative influence that the Soviet elite attributes to the roles of physical security and formal ideology in American policy-making when (and if) the two con-

siderations came into conflict. The alternative responses are shown.

	P	K	I	C
a. Ignore security and act according to ideology .....	0	0	0	0
b. Choose security but make it appear to fit ideology .....	100	0	0	50
c. Choose security and ignore ideology .....	0	0	100	50
Salience .....	(1)	(0)	(1)	(2)

The results, however, are completely insignificant within the response context. We found only one reference to this conflict between security and ideology in *Pravda*, none in *Kommunist*, and one in *International Affairs* over our three-year sample. Had there been more responses one might have concluded that, as far as the Soviet elite is concerned, there is no clash or discontinuity between ideology and security for the American elite. However, this would not tell us whether they believe that American imperialistic ideology is in such a position of mastery that there is no question of conflict between the two sets of demands, or whether they believe that the two sets of demands are just thoroughly compatible. Results on other dimensions suggest that the latter interpretation is more reasonable.

C-3. Here we attempt to ferret out what the Soviet elite considers to be the major instrument of American foreign policy. According to the Soviet articulations, the United States comes out on this continuum as shown in the table below.

The results indicate that they see primary reliance on military force in American policy, with a nevertheless substantial emphasis on subversion and penetration. This suggests that the Soviets may not think that the United States is willing to engage them in the less violent areas of competitive co-

existence, but insists on pursuing the struggle primarily in military terms. If this is true, it may lead to increased Soviet confidence and aggressiveness in the nonmilitary realms, and require us in turn to pick up that challenge or to be left behind.

	P	K	I	C
a. Direct military force .....	63	44	62	59
b. Political and military subversion ..	25	25	24	24
c. Economic and social penetration ..	12	31	14	17
Salience .....	(24)	(16)	(50)	(90)

One point should be made concerning dimensions C-1 through C-3: they were designed primarily for the American part of the study and are to a great extent a function of American hypotheses about Soviet foreign policy peculiarities. They therefore may be less relevant for this part of the study.

C-4. In this dimension, our concern is to identify that aspect of Western behavior which most convinced the Soviets of hostile intent on the part of the United States and its allies. The various positions complete the statement "Their aggressive intentions are revealed by. . ."

	P	K	I	C
a. Their home-based military capability ..	0	0	18	8
b. Their military alliances .....	52	62	53	54
c. Their overseas bases .....	48	38	29	38
Salience .....	(58)	(26)	(72)	(156)

The hope here was that we might get at least a gross clue as to what was particularly provocative from the Soviet point of view, and the results do show very little concern (8 percent) over American preparedness *per se*. They profess much more alarm over our alliances (54 percent) and

overseas bases (38 percent); in all three periodicals the emphasis is on alliances (52, 62, 53 percent) more than on overseas bases (48, 38, 29 percent). Though the gap is not dramatic, it poses an interesting question: alliances by themselves cannot pose a direct and tangible threat to them, but bases surely can. Is it possible that they are more worried over the fact that other nations are involved in anti-Soviet preparations than over the overt presence of weapons on their periphery? It is also noteworthy that our coders found a higher total of references to this item than to any other in group C. Finally, it should be noted that the bulk of the study covers the period prior to the installation of the soft and vulnerable IRBM sites in Britain, Italy, and Turkey; our hypothesis would be that in a continuing analysis, the bases would take on greater salience than the alliances that paved the way for them.

C-5. In this dimension (retained primarily because of its value in the American side of the study) we search for some indications as to the Soviet elite's image of American strategic doctrine. As in the pre-test, there were very few references to this trichotomization, but the distribution is shown below.

	P	K	I	C
a. Preventive strike ..	100	0	55	58
b. Preemptive strike	0	0	45	42
c. Retaliatory strike ..	0	0	0	0
Salience .....	(1)	(0)	(11)	(12)

Most of the pertinent references were in *International Affairs*, and if they indicate anything, it is that neither protagonist can afford to admit publicly that the other's strategy is purely or primarily a retaliatory one. It also suggests that the "subtle" distinctions are not considered relevant for public discussion and that the adversary's

strategy tends to be described in gross, negative, and hostile terms.

C-6. As to the Soviet elite's image of American motivation for space research and production, there were somewhat overlapping possibilities, as shown.

	P	K	I	C
a. Military strength ..	100	100	100	100
b. Popular prestige ..	0	0	0	0
c. Scientific knowledge .....	0	0	0	0
Salience .....	(1)	(1)	(2)	(4)

But the number of references were so few as to make these results not particularly significant. Again, whether the periodical is of a mass- or an elite-audience nature, it is seldom likely to inquire into the subtleties of the adversary's motivations.

C-7. The final dimension in the Soviet evaluation of the American operational code concerns our motivation in giving economic assistance to the underdeveloped nations. The positions shown are the possible explanations.

	P	K	I	C
a. Strengthen Western side and weaken Soviet bloc .....	100	100	100	100
b. Improve recipient's ability to remain nonaligned .....	0	0	0	0
c. Help the recipient nation and people ..	0	0	0	0
Salience .....	(11)	(6)	(8)	(25)

The results could hardly be more conclusive; the Soviet elite seems to believe that there is no altruism in American aid and that it is not even designed to preserve the neutrality of the recipient peoples. Our motivation is seen as being solely within the Cold War context, with heavy emphasis on alliance-building.

D. SOVIET EXPRESSIONS OF OWN OPERATIONAL CODE

Having examined, by analysis of a sample of their press, Soviet images of the international system, the power balance, and the American operational code, we now turn to the fourth and last issue on the Soviet side of the study—expressions of their own operational code.

D-1. The first dimension in this issue deals with certain of the criteria by which policy decisions ought to be made. The positions consist of three completions of the phrase "Foreign policy should be based on. . . ."

	P	K	I	C
a. Gain-loss calculus; any means all right in pursuing national interest .....	0	100	23	27
b. How nonaligned people will view act .....	0	0	0	0
c. Certain moral principles; means are important in themselves .....	100	0	77	73
Salience .....	(1)	(1)	(13)	(15)

First of all, there is no public recognition of the need to consider neutral evaluation of their policy; no coder found a single reference to position *b*. On the other hand, considerable emphasis (73 percent) was placed upon the need to adhere to moral principles, and the combined score on a pure self-interest approach was a low 27 percent. However, a genuine problem of interpretation arises here; when the Soviets refer to moral principles, the evidence is that they have in mind the official and formal ideology as derived from Marx, Lenin, and Stalin. Thus one must be careful to distinguish between the Soviet and Western notions of morality; they differ considerably

in content, though probably not in their normative applicability as articulated by the respective elites.

D-2. A key to their bargaining strategy is sought by posing the statement "Successful negotiations are most likely to occur when. . . ."

	P	K	I	C
a. We (USSR) are stronger .....	33	33	86	66
b. They are stronger .....	0	0	0	0
c. Both are equal in power .....	67	67	14	34
Salience .....	(9)	(9)	(29)	(47)

In line with the normal attitude of one protagonist in any competition, the Soviets indicate (with a combined score of 66 percent) that they believe that any superiority they enjoy in a bargaining situation would *not* be exploited by themselves, but that if they were on the short end, the other side would try to exploit it, making successful negotiation impossible. (Note the zero score in position *b*.) Here is the crux of the "posture of strength" dilemma; neither side wants to negotiate if weaker, and since an accurate appraisal is hard to make, a situation of parity would seldom appear as such, but rather as one of disadvantageous imbalance to each. Thus, each will try to achieve a preponderance *prior* to serious negotiation, but is unlikely to be successful in any broad-scale, long-run sense of the word. If one side *is* successful, they will—despite the oft-articulated belief to the contrary—seek to exploit the edge; and if they do not do so, fear that they will makes the weaker side most unwilling to negotiate. Relevant here is the old diplomatic dictum that if you're stronger, you don't have to negotiate, and if you're weaker, you don't dare to. The one encouraging sign in these results, however, is the 34 percent fre-



quency of position *c* (negotiation based on approximate parity). As a matter of fact, the coders of *Pravda* and *Kommunist* found that 67 percent of their responses fell into this position, but subsequent investigation suggests that they inferred *this* position from mere *rejections* of position *b*. Such an inference is plausible, but hardly inevitable.<sup>19</sup>

D-3. In the same vein, we asked our unknowing respondents to indicate "Peace can best be maintained by. . . ."

	P	K	I	C
a. Our (USSR) superior military capability .....	7	23	22	18
b. Soviet-Western cooperation .....	80	72	59	67
c. Effective international organization	13	5	19	15
Salience .....	(30)	(22)	(63)	(115)

If these articulations are reliable indices of elite conviction, they offer some mixed encouragement. Though 18 percent of the responses reflected the traditional national belief in "peace through strength," the bulk (67 percent) were in the major power cooperation position. This is, in all probability, partly a function of sincere belief. However naive the proposition that major powers in a conflict relationship can cooperate for peace, its support by the Soviet foreign policy elite *may* be an augury of serious intent. The disappointing score in the effective international organization position (15 percent) does not, however, look particularly promising to the student of international politics whose faith in peace through strength and peace through cooperation has been shattered by their numerous failures throughout the history of the nation-state system.

<sup>19</sup> Suggestive here are Dennett and Johnson (1951) and Jensen (1962).

D-4. Here we had hoped to get some clues as to Soviet and American thinking on limited war, and despite the low salience of this dimension in our pretests in the Soviet literature, we included it for its value on the American side. The frequency of its appearance in the Soviet sector of the study was so low as not to warrant reporting. For the record, the possible responses to "Resort to limited war is . . ." are given below.

	P	K	I	C
a. A reasonable instrument of policy .....	0	0	0	0
b. Useful as a threat to back up diplomacy .....	0	0	50	50
c. Only to be used in retaliation .....	0	0	50	50
Salience .....	(0)	(0)	(2)	(2)

Here again is one of those cases where the coding of more specialized military journals might be productive.

D-5. In the next two dimensions we search for, and find, some indications of Soviet strategy vis-à-vis arms reduction and elimination. The first dimension concerns the political settlement-disarmament sequence.

	P	K	I	C
a. Political settlement (and/or tension reduction) must precede disarmament	0	0	7	3
b. Political settlement need not precede disarmament .....	90	100	86	90
c. Political settlement must accompany disarmament .....	10	0	7	7
Salience .....	(20)	(12)	(28)	(60)

Thus there is little (3 percent) acceptance of the conventional Western doctrine that, because political disputes preceded the arms race, they must therefore be re-

solved before the arms can be eliminated. And only 7 percent of the time did they even call for *simultaneous* handling of arms and political disputes. In the bulk of the cases (90 percent) the "need not precede" position was taken, suggesting a belief that immediate efforts in the disarmament field might be fruitfully undertaken, despite the existence of outstanding political disputes or high levels of bilateral tension. If this does represent their beliefs accurately, and is not merely part of the propaganda barrage, it helps at least *one* of the problems in the arms control-reduction-elimination field: the feeling that a multitude of other problems need not (and perhaps cannot) be dealt with first (see Singer, 1958).

D-6. Another, and perhaps more critical, aspect of Soviet elite thinking on the armament problem concerns the matter of inspection and controls. Again, the possible positions involve chronological priorities.

	P	K	I	C
a. Arms reduction should precede controls .....	17	50	29	29
b. Controls should precede arms reduction .....	0	0	0	0
c. Arms reduction may accompany controls .....	83	50	71	71
Salience .....	(18)	(10)	(24)	(52)

The Soviet foreign policy elite articulates a conviction that there must be no controls without arms reduction, scoring zero for controls *preceding* reductions, and that controls must either follow (29 percent) or *accompany* (71 percent) arms reductions. This latter distinction and the respective scores are significant; despite Western contentions that the Soviets propose that we begin (or even conclude) a disarmament process prior to the installation of a control, inspection, or enforcement scheme, there is

little evidence of that position here. However, there is still the unresolved question of what the Soviets regard as adequate or effective controls, and this has been one (but only one) of the major obstacles in the negotiations to date (see Noguee, 1961).

D-7. Next we turn to their position on political decision-making in the United Nations or any other present or future international organization. Designed before their 1960 General Assembly attacks on the United Nations structure, the dimension asked what the decisions of international organizations should be based on.

	P	K	I	C
a. Great-power unanimity .....	100	100	24	54
b. Majority, regardless of its composition ...	0	0	38	23
c. Great power unanimity plus general approval of other members .....	0	0	38	23
Salience .....	(4)	(1)	(8)	(13)

Though *Pravda* and *Kommunist* tended to insist on the traditional doctrine of great-power unanimity and its corollary, the veto, the more sophisticated *International Affairs* (which, it must be remembered, is published and distributed in several languages) accepted (38 percent) the need for "general approval of other members." This journal, again in contrast to the two home-consumption ones, also partially accepted (38 percent) the doctrine of majority rule. (Germane here are Dallin, 1962; Goodman, 1960; Jacobson, 1964; and Rubinstein, 1960.)

D-8. Our next dimension concerns the Soviet elite's position on "the various disengagement proposals" for central Europe, and though this item was inserted primarily for the American side of the study, it is not

irrelevant here. The reactions to such proposals are shown below.

	P	K	I	C
a. Essentially a form of appeasement or retreat .....	0	0	0	0
b. Risky, but valuable if carefully negotiated .....	0	0	4	2
c. A promising way of avoiding war .....	100	100	96	98
Salience .....	(13)	(8)	(24)	(45)

Having played an instrumental role—or at least an encouraging one—in the initiation of these various plans, beginning with that of Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki, the Soviets could hardly have taken a position other than that outlined in position *c*.

D-9. The last two dimensions are in the realm of international economic relations, with this one articulating Soviet motives for engaging in foreign aid programs.

	P	K	I	C
a. Strengthen our (USSR) side and weaken theirs .....	11	0	0	5
b. Improve recipient's ability to remain neutral .....	22	50	60	40
c. Help the recipient nation .....	67	50	40	55
Salience .....	(9)	(6)	(5)	(20)

If we recall that these are the same positions as utilized in group C (*Other's Operational Code*), some interesting results emerge. While all three of their periodicals attributed only the "Cold War" motivation to American foreign aid programs, they see their own motivations in a drastically different light. In *Pravda* and *Kommunist*, their motives were seen as solely altruistic in 67 percent and 50 percent of the cases, respectively, and in *International Affairs* it was 40 percent, for a combined self-congrat-

ulatory score of 55 percent. In addition, the "help them remain independent" (of Western imperialism) theme was expressed 40 percent of the time. Only 5 percent of the references were to self-interest and these were all in *Pravda*; apparently the policymakers have no Congressional appropriations committees to contend with in the USSR.

D-10. In this dimension we seek some indication as to their position on the free international trade question. The available responses were of the open-ended type.

	P	K	I	C
a. Must wait upon political settlement and/or tension reduction .....	0	0	8	3
b. Is undesirable .....	0	0	0	0
c. Can help pave way for political settlement and/or tension reduction .....	100	100	92	97
Salience .....	(12)	(10)	(12)	(34)

Undoubtedly, the Soviets would like to see an international trade picture in which they had easier access to certain now-proscribed raw materials and manufactured goods, and they might even be willing to permit greater import and export freedom across their boundaries. But as proponents *par excellence* of the political use of economic instruments and believers in the mobilization of all resources for the enhancement of national power, they could hardly be expected to accept a trade arrangement with all other nations in which they would be required to accept many imports and in which their exports would have to compete on an open world market. Any modification of trade barriers would have to be politically, rather than just economically, advantageous for the USSR to accept it. It should be pointed out, though, that this is

another of the dimensions whose relevance was seen primarily in the American rather than in the Soviet context, and it will be examined further in the next section of the study.

*Findings of the Study: United States*

One of the major assumptions underlying this study is that a truer perspective on the object under scrutiny can be obtained by comparing that object with another of approximately similar attributes. Thus we feel that, in examining Soviet foreign policy articulations, our understanding of them will be improved if they can be set alongside American articulations regarding the same policy dimensions. But there is another and perhaps even more compelling reason for examining these characteristics on the American as well as the Soviet side—the fact that both powers are engaged, one with the other, in a conflict relationship that is often just a short distance from the precipice of strategic nuclear war. And central to our approach is the assumption that an unintended war (as distinguished from a carefully predetermined aggressive strike) can be made less likely as each side becomes more accurate in predicting the behavior of the other.<sup>20</sup> The purpose of this study is to enhance, to the extent permitted by our method and data, the ability of each to make such predictions, despite the admitted disadvantages. Let us turn, there-

<sup>20</sup> This is not to suggest that there are no disadvantages in such predictability. For example, a successful bluff can often produce substantial political concessions, but such success diminishes in probability as mutually accurate predictions increase. Some might contend that the ideal situation is one in which “we” can anticipate all of their behavior with a high degree of certainty, while “they” are good at predicting only certain limited aspects of ours.

fore, in this section to the results of our coding of the *New York Times* (T in the tables), *Department of State Bulletin* (B), and *Foreign Affairs* (F). The same sequence as employed in the preceding section will be followed.

A. AMERICAN ELITE IMAGE OF THEIR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

A-1. The first dimension in group A is intended to tell us something regarding the way in which the American foreign policy elite perceives the natural, normal, enduring character of international politics. The alternatives and results were as follows:

	T	B	F	C
a. Recurrent conflict between nations with differing ideologies and social systems ....	55	55	66	58
b. Harmony, but periodically upset by deviant aggressor	45	35	17	35
c. Continuing conflict, regardless of ideology or other national differences .....	0	10	17	7
Salience .....	(20)	(11)	(12)	(43)

Just as on the Soviet side, we find markedly little evidence that the system is viewed as basically conflictful; each elite tends to imply that harmony *could* be the natural order. But whereas the Soviets tended to see conflict more as a function of the periodic aggressor or “imperialist,” the Americans tended to see it in terms of differing ideologies or social systems. This in itself is a reversal of what might have been expected, since in the United States we tend to emphasize the degree to which the Soviets themselves are ideological in their outlook. Several qualifications are, however, in order. First, in neither sample did we find much reference to the general and enduring international system; consequently

the coders were often extrapolating from an articulated view of the contemporary system to the more general one. Second, the percentage differences, while pronounced, are not profound; the Soviets emphasized the deviant aggressor theme vis-à-vis the continuing ideological conflict theme by 75 to 25, while the American ratio in the opposite direction was 58 to 35 (with 7 as opposed to the Soviet zero for a conflict-inherent-in-the-system view). And as might be expected, the strongest expression of this latter, more sophisticated, perception was found in *Foreign Affairs*. Among other things, the results in this dimension partially bear out the contention made by George Kennan that Americans fail to appreciate the degree to which the environment is habitually a hostile and conflictful one (Kennan, 1952 and 1954).

A-2. Turning from international politics in general to the American elite's perception of the contemporary system, we seek their view on the nature of the immediate struggle between the superpowers. Again we find an emphasis that would have been more expected in the USSR.

	T	B	F	C
a. Between two belief systems .....	8	66	7	50
b. Between two social systems .....	14	20	20	19
c. Between two centers of power .....	78	14	73	31
Salience .....	(65)	(252)	(30)	(347)

But this time we discover a dramatic difference among our sources. Whereas both the *Times* and *Foreign Affairs* tended to view the struggle in terms of *Realpolitik*, the official *Department of State Bulletin* radically reversed this interpretation, placing its emphasis on the clashes in ideology 66 percent of the time. There are several possible explanations for this sharp diver-

gence within the American elite. The obvious one is that of Secretary Dulles' own personal image of the Cold War (he held the post until mid-April 1959, or nearly two-thirds of the time span under study) and the powerful emphasis he gave its moral and ideological aspects. Obviously, his subordinates would tend to reflect this image in their statements, as would Mr. Herter in the months immediately following Dulles' resignation and death. Another is that much of the content of the *Bulletin* consists of speeches, press conferences, and other efforts to arouse the public and to "make the record"; in this case an emphasis on moral righteousness against the infidel is preferable to cold-blooded "power politics." As suggested in the preceding section, the greater the emphasis on ideological conflict, the more difficult is successful diplomatic negotiation, and it might be hoped that the State Department itself has since begun to move toward the position articulated by the *Times* and *Foreign Affairs*.

A-3. Still in search of generalizable perceptions, this dimension asks where the elites tend to find the causes of war.

	T	B	F	C
a. One state's aggressiveness .....	50	88	44	63
b. Normal conflict of goals or clash of interests .....	25	12	28	21
c. Accident or miscalculation .....	25	0	28	16
Salience .....	(4)	(8)	(7)	(19)

Here we see a logical extension of the images articulated on dimensions 1 and 2, with the specifics of the Cold War extrapolated to the system in general. And again we find a noticeable difference between the *Bulletin* and our two nonofficial sources, with the former placing heaviest (88 per-

cent) emphasis on one state's aggressiveness. What is also interesting in these figures is the degree of importance attached to accidental war. As did *Kommunist*, the *Bulletin* seems to discount completely the notion that wars might begin unintentionally. On the other hand, both the *Times* and *Foreign Affairs* authors give this possibility almost twice as much emphasis (25 and 28 percent) as did *Pravda* or *International Affairs* (14 and 15 percent).

A-4. Becoming somewhat more specific, we next want to know how the American foreign policy elite perceives the outcome of a relationship between states whose beliefs and sociopolitical structure seem to differ so sharply.

	T	B	F	C
a. Must inevitably clash militarily .....	0	4	22	7
b. Can compete economically and politically .....	36	64	45	53
c. Can coexist cooperatively .....	64	32	33	40
Salience .....	(11)	(25)	(9)	(45)

The similarity between Soviet and American articulations on this score is impressive. On combined averages, each side scored 53 percent for position *b*, while there was a slightly higher American score on inevitable military clash (7 percent as opposed to 1 percent) and a slightly lower one regarding cooperative coexistence (40 percent as opposed to 46 percent). These differences may well be explained in terms of the degree to which Soviet media tend to stay closer to the official position or line of the moment, and in any event they are remarkably slight. A more interesting difference is the degree to which the *Times* reverses the *Bulletin* and, to a lesser extent, *Foreign Affairs*. The latter two expressed belief in the cooperative coexistence theme about

one-third of the time (32 and 33 percent) whereas the former did so nearly two-thirds of the time (64 percent), which is more than that of the highest Soviet organ (*International Affairs*—59 percent).

A-5. These next two dimensions are designed to shed some light on the more philosophical attitudes of the American elite regarding international political relations. Dimension 5, dealing with their views on predictability, offered these alternatives and results:

	T	B	F	C
a. Highly possible ....	5	25	0	7
b. Occasionally possible .....	33	25	60	36
c. Almost impossible .....	62	50	40	57
Salience .....	(21)	(4)	(5)	(30)

The rather pragmatic view seems to dominate here, with all three sources tending to discount the predictability of international events. The *Times*, perhaps because its editorial writers are less aware of the emerging possibilities in the research world than are the others, takes a particularly dim view of prediction. It may also be significant that *Foreign Affairs* authors, coming as they often do from the academic setting, are both less pessimistic and less optimistic than the others, placing a strong emphasis (60 percent) on the "occasionally possible" position.

A-6. Moving from the question of predictability to that of voluntarism and determinism, we posed three possible responses to the statement "In international relations, we are . . ." (see next page).

These scores are, with the exception of the *Bulletin*, very similar to those of their opposite numbers. Occasionally the *Times* and *Foreign Affairs* make the "free-will" claim, but for the most part there is a marked preference for the "limited by realities" view. Whereas only the official organ

expresses strong confidence in the self-determination approach,<sup>21</sup> all three give only the most occasional emphasis to a deterministic view. Oddly enough, the Soviet media likewise tended to downgrade this position, but for them such scores represent a greater deviation from the historical determinism which allegedly dominates their political thinking.

	T	B	F	C
a. Masters of our own destiny .....	14	44	20	20
b. Limited by realities .....	84	50	75	77
c. Pawns of great forces .....	2	6	5	3
Salience .....	(69)	(16)	(20)	(105)

A-7. Moving now toward some of the more specific characteristics of the contemporary international system, we seek a preliminary and general indication as to how the American elite would regard (or say they regard) the power distribution and balance of the era bounded generally by the 1957 Sputnik launching and the 1960 U-2 incident.

	T	B	F	C
a. Shifting against US .....	0	0	57	33
b. Remaining static ..	0	60	29	42
c. Shifting in US favor .....	0	40	14	25
Salience .....	(0)	(5)	(7)	(12)

If our *N* were larger, we might consider these results rather dramatic, especially when contrasted to those on the Soviet side. But neither coder found any statement in

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<sup>21</sup> It is ironic that the official *Bulletin* should take so much more a voluntaristic view than the others, when three of its more articulate policy-planning "graduates" should have argued rather cogently for the opposing view. See Marshall (1954); Halle (1958); and Kennan, *op. cit.*

this dimension in the *Times* editorials that were sampled, and only a few were found by the *Bulletin* and *Foreign Affairs* coders. This was, however, a period of disenchantment for many foreign policy formulators and observers, with the Kremlin demonstrating an unexpected (for many) technological capability as well as notable good fortune in the struggle within the non-aligned nations. It may also be worthy of note that, of our three sources, only *Foreign Affairs* reflected this pessimistic view, thus highlighting the fact that it is the least concerned of the three regarding its impact on mass public opinion. Finally, our general observations regarding the impact of perceived relative power upon policy obtain here as well as on the Soviet side of the analysis. To date there has been insufficient collection and interpretation of empirical data to shed much light on the dispute as to whether self-confidence correlates with more bellicose or more conservative behavior in nations.

A-8. As a final dimension in the general issue "Image of the International Environment," we asked our unknowing respondents how they viewed the possibility of limited war remaining limited in the contemporary system. They tended to be more sanguine than their Soviet counterparts.

	T	B	F	C
a. Remain limited by nature of weapons, etc. ....	20	0	47	31
b. Remain limited with considerable restraint .....	40	83	40	50
c. Probably escalate into general war ..	40	17	13	19
Salience .....	(5)	(6)	(15)	(26)

Thus, the general feeling was that with restraint and cool judgment, we and the Soviets could engage in military conflicts

limited as to space, objectives, weapons, and commitments, without such conflict necessarily escalating. Most uncertain was the *Times* editorial staff, which predicted escalation on 40 percent of the occasions in which the problem was discussed. The *Bulletin* seems to reflect the professionals' confidence in their own skills, by denying that keeping such wars limited will be an easy or natural concomitant of the situation, while also downgrading the danger of escalation. Certain *Foreign Affairs* authors, however, when dealing with the matter at all, tended to echo the position of those who believed in the restraining effect of strategic weapons. One might say that the American elite's position on this vital dimension is a hopeful one: aware of the possibility of escalation, yet not so fearful of it that an unwillingness to engage in limited war is conveyed.

B. AMERICAN ELITE EVALUATION OF THE POWER BALANCE

In the previous paragraphs, we summarized the results of our inquiry into the American elite's image of the general international system, and in dimension A-7 we sought our first clue as to broad power trends. In this part, we want to examine this issue of power balance and distribution in more specific terms. As suggested above, we believe perceived relative power to be one of the more central variables in the behavior of nations, but are not at all sure in which direction such perceptions tend to move nations.

B-1. Perhaps one of the most crucial elements in today's strategic stand-off, and one that sharply affects its stability, is the degree to which either side can "ride out" an opening attack, preserving enough retaliatory force to mount a punitive blow in retribution. More important still is the degree

to which each side's elite perceives such retaliatory capabilities. The positions were responses completing the statement "Our strike-back (retaliatory) capability is. . ."

	T	B	F	C
a. Highly vulnerable to a first strike .....	0	27	28	26
b. Partially vulnerable .....	100	9	57	32
c. Nearly invulnerable .....	0	64	15	42
Salience .....	(1)	(11)	(7)	(19)

The deterrent effect of these statements is not particularly reassuring. Despite the wide range of statements on this subject, there is still a strong admission of high vulnerability (26 percent when all media are combined). As might be anticipated, the official articulations cluster around the two extreme positions, often in order to justify a given policy or budget request, while those in *Foreign Affairs* cluster around the middle (partially vulnerable) position, with rather infrequent (15 percent) claims of near-invulnerability. Our sampling of *Times* editorials failed to produce a large enough *N* to take seriously.

B-2. In a similar vein, our respondents were asked to complete this statement: "We have a military posture capable of deterring. . ."

	T	B	F	C
a. Limited war only	0	0	24	7
b. Strategic nuclear war only .....	0	0	38	9
c. Both .....	100	100	38	84
Salience .....	(4)	(20)	(8)	(32)

These responses are not exactly consonant with those under dimension 1, but do seem to be explicable. Thus, even though our elites expressed a higher degree of combined confidence in their overall deterrent capabilities (84 percent) than their views



on invulnerability might justify, the distribution is quite plausible. Whereas the *Times* and the *Bulletin* are highly concerned with generating such a confident image, the *Foreign Affairs* analyst is more concerned with advocating certain changes; moreover, this latter journal was a major vehicle for the limited war-massive retaliation debate during this period. It must also be borne in mind that one can admit to a relatively "high" degree of vulnerability and still believe that enough retaliatory force will remain to deter effectively.

Though we found fewer references to both these items in the Soviet media, those that did appear displayed a much narrower range of opinion. Thus, 75 percent of their responses indicated a belief in their own near-invulnerability, with 25 percent suggesting a more limited confidence (partially vulnerable). And on dimension 2 there was an unanimous 100 percent articulation under the "both" position, though all such references were found only in *International Affairs*.

B-3. Moving to the hardware component of articulated and perceived capability, we seek an indication of the American elite's evaluation of comparative progress in the production and technological development of weapon systems. The possible evaluations and results are shown below.

	T	B	F	C
a. Slower than USSR .....	67	12	62	45
b. Faster than USSR .....	33	63	13	37
c. Same as USSR ....	0	25	25	18
Salience .....	(6)	(8)	(8)	(22)

In this dimension we find, again, a lower level of articulated confidence than that displayed in the Soviet press, which rated itself as faster than the United States 98 percent of the time. On the American side,

the *Bulletin* again reflected the more optimistic view, with both the *Times* and *Foreign Affairs* revealing serious concern in 67 percent and 62 percent of the cases, respectively. Consequently, we get an overall picture that suggests serious American concern, generated to a large extent by Soviet successes in rocketry and an overreaction on the part of those who had tended earlier to belittle their military technology.

B-4. In viewing the contemporary military balance (rather than its trend) the American elite responded as shown below.

	T	B	F	C
a. In Soviet's favor ..	28	4	42	19
b. In West's favor ....	28	74	25	52
c. One of stalemate ..	44	22	33	29
Salience .....	(7)	(23)	(12)	(42)

Again, a combined picture of restrained confidence emerges, with the *Bulletin* once more reflecting the most optimistic views. The results of these first four dimensions in group B illustrate rather nicely the running controversy over missile gaps, deterrent gaps, and the like. In each case, we found the State Department expressing the most sanguine view, with the academic experts (nongovernmental for the most part) articulating the greatest concern.

B-5. Shifting now to some of the broader aspects of the power balance, we look first at the images of each side's alliance system. The sources were asked to indicate what seemed to be the basis of our alliances.

	T	B	F	C
a. Enduring similarity of social systems and beliefs .....	38	14	7	17
b. The common need for protection against aggression ....	57	54	64	55
c. Our need to unite with others for our protection .....	5	32	29	28
Salience .....	(40)	(223)	(14)	(277)

Though our coders found some difficulty in distinguishing between positions *b* and *c*, they did uncover a fairly consistent pattern, with frequent recognition not only of the common need (57, 54, and 64 percent, respectively) but of the particular self-interest involved in these alliances. In this case, the *Times* assumed the normal role of the *Bulletin* by emphasizing the ideological and social solidarity of the alliance members, and by downgrading the importance of these coalitions to our own national interest. None of the American sources, however, even approached their Soviet counterparts, where 84 percent of the references were to this solidarity, 16 percent to the common need, and none to their own self-interest.

B-6. The next four dimensions attempt to appraise some of the specific elements in the power of the adversary. Beginning with a reference to the other's decisional capabilities, the American elite characterized Soviet foreign policy planning in the terms shown below.

	T	B	F	C
a. A combination of plan and improvisation .....	54	14	44	36
b. Masterful and thorough .....	31	79	56	56
c. Haphazard, merely responding to events ..	15	7	0	8
Salience .....	(13)	(14)	(9)	(36)

One thing that is certain is that none of our elite samples belittled the Soviet decision-making process. As might be expected, the *Bulletin* tended to exhort via the "master-plan" image, which has often confused the American public, but oddly enough so did the *Foreign Affairs* writers, though to a lesser extent. The latter's figure of 56 percent for the "masterful and thorough" position may, however, be explained by the

propensity of advocates to exaggerate the cunning of the adversary in order to justify the adoption of some highly touted "plan" for our side. The combined result reflects the normal tendency to impute thoroughness and orderly planning to a process when only the final result is visible, whereas the observer is able to discern the pluralistic and contradictory forces at work in the process at home. Finally, the comparison with Soviet views of the American policy process is rather disturbing, since the Soviet elite classified the United States 74 percent of the time on the "haphazard" line, with 16 and 10 percent for the first two positions.<sup>22</sup>

B-7. As to whom the dominant groups are thought to be in Soviet policy-making, the American elite responded as follows:

	T	B	F	C
a. Military leaders ....	0	0	0	0
b. Economic and technological elites ..	9	14	0	10
c. Political (party and government) leaders .....	91	86	100	90
Salience .....	(11)	(7)	(3)	(21)

The only surprising result here is the lack of a single reference to the military leaders, since many of those responsible for *Times* editorials and *Foreign Affairs* articles were later explaining Zhukov's ouster as due to the undue (if not preponderant) influence that Khrushchev allegedly thought the army was exercising. The difference between the Soviet and American images of each other on this dimension is quite striking—and, it would seem, indicative of profound misunderstanding on the part of the

<sup>22</sup> On the other hand, there may be an occasional bargaining advantage for the side perceived as somewhat reckless or unpredictable—provided that the perceiver is not himself addicted to such a style.

former. Thus, they assigned the dominant American role to economic and technological elites (primarily the former) 78 percent of the time, with *Kommunist* showing the ideological way with a 90 percent score.

B-8. As to the relationship between the Soviet armaments program and their economic system, the American sources took the three positions as shown.

	T	B	F	C
a. Necessary to their economic system ----	0	67	0	40
b. Not related to it ..	50	33	0	40
c. Damaging to it ---	50	0	0	20
Salience -----	(2)	(3)	(0)	(5)

This dimension was designed primarily for the Soviet side of the study and clearly reveals one area (at least) of huge asymmetry between the two. Whereas our coders found an average total of 46 references to this dimension in the Soviet media, they found it to be of much lower salience in the American media.

B-9. Another dimension designed primarily for the other half of our study concerned the fashion in which each expected the other to meet its demise. Our American sources were coded to ascertain articulations as to how the Soviets would be defeated.

	T	B	F	C
a. America's forcible measures -----	0	0	0	0
b. America's socio-political successes elsewhere -----	0	8	50	13
c. Soviet's own weaknesses and contradictions -----	100	92	50	87
Salience -----	(1)	(13)	(2)	(16)

This sort of statement was certainly not a strong preoccupation of the American elite. Whereas it appeared 58 times in the Soviet media, our coders only found 16 such ref-

erences in the American materials; and of these, 13 were in the *Bulletin*. It is also noteworthy that only once on the Soviet side and never on the American side was reference made to one's own "forcible measures"; clearly the explicit threat to use force was, during this period, being increasingly reserved for specific and critical confrontations.<sup>23</sup>

B-10. Finally, we used a dimension that tends to combine a number of the variables in perceived relative power—the predicted outcome of a general nuclear war.

	T	B	F	C
a. US victory -----	10	0	10	4
b. Greater destruction to USSR than to selves -----	10	0	20	7
c. Tremendous mutual devastation -----	80	100	70	89
Salience -----	(10)	(26)	(10)	(46)

The frequency of references to United States victory (4 percent) was considerably lower than the 37 percent frequency found on the Soviet side, suggesting that *their* elite were either more naive regarding the nature of contemporary weapons or more concerned with raising the credibility of their retaliatory threat. It is somewhat surprising that, while pushing the coexistence "war-is-hell" line, they would have referred to military victory so much more frequently, particularly since an equally heavy dose (37 percent) of "victory for our side" statements appeared in their export journal, *International Affairs*—or at least in the English language edition. This dimension nicely illustrates the dilemma of both major powers, in that statements of confidence are essential to the credibility of threatened

<sup>23</sup> It would be useful, for instance, to ascertain the increase, if any, of such references during the Berlin crisis of 1961 and the Cuba crisis of 1962.

strategic retaliation while recognition of "tremendous mutual devastation" plays a significant role in the peace propaganda battle.

C. AMERICAN ELITE IMAGE OF SOVIET OPERATIONAL CODE

Having examined the articulations of the American elite regarding the international environment and the distribution of power therein, let us turn now to their image of the adversary's goals and strategies.

C-1. The first dimension concerns the matter of the Soviet's primary long-range goals in world politics, and these were appraised with the percentage distributions shown below.

	T	B	F	C
a. World domination	44	31	14	31
b. Retaining and expanding their sphere influence	52	69	82	68
c. Self-preservation	4	0	4	1
Saliency	(27)	(248)	(22)	(297)

Our coders encountered some difficulty in distinguishing between positions *a* and *b*, but after some extra pretests they settled on adequate criteria. The distribution of responses along this continuum were quite similar to those expressed by the Soviet elite. Neither side gave much public credence to the "self-preservation" claims of the other (United States, 1 percent; USSR, 3 percent) or acknowledged with much frequency the existence of legitimate security interests for the opponent. On the other hand, each tended to put more emphasis on the other's typical drive for power and influence than on the ominous "world domination" position—68 percent as opposed to 31 percent for the United States, and 73 percent as opposed to 24 percent for the USSR. Though these attributions of unlimited ambition to one another are im-

pressive, they are low enough to offer some prospects of eventual negotiated *détente*. Had the figures for positions *a* and *b* been reversed, one might have to conclude that little room for bargaining remained.

C-2. The next dimension deals with the degree to which the American elite think (or say they think) that Marxist-Leninist ideology influences Soviet national security policy. In completing the statement "Choosing between security and ideological demands, they would . . .", the American sources speculated as shown below.

	T	B	F	C
a. Ignore security and act according to ideology	25	0	17	14
b. Choose security but make it appear to fit ideology	50	75	50	57
c. Choose security and ignore ideology	25	25	33	29
Saliency	(4)	(4)	(6)	(14)

Positions *a* and *c* are admittedly rather extreme, and we might have replaced "ignore" with "downgrade" or "subordinate," but we did want a sharpening of the distinctions. The results were in a sense rather encouraging, especially in regard to the *Bulletin* with its tendency to "ideologize" on so many of the dimensions. If it is true that collaboration with an enemy is made more difficult when he is perceived to be fanatical, then the 14 percent frequency of position *a* is promisingly low. Moreover, on the Soviet side there was not a single reference found suggesting that they might view the United States as ideology-bound; this, paradoxically enough, fits their own ideological views as to the factors that impel nations to certain forms of behavior. At the other end of the continuum we also find relatively low average scores, with only 29 percent of our items suggesting that the

USSR is perceived as playing a pure "power and security" game. The bulk of our respondents (57 percent) tended to assign more or less complementary roles to security and ideological considerations in Soviet strategy.

C-3. As to the major instrument in the Soviet's pursuit of their foreign policy goals, the American sources reflected a range of emphases.

	T	B	F	C
a. Direct military force .....	33	28	20	28
b. Political and military subversion ..	53	32	52	35
c. Economic and social penetration ....	14	40	28	37
Saliency .....	(36)	(410)	(25)	(471)

Though *Foreign Affairs* and the *Times* tended to see political and military subversion as the primary tool of Soviet expansionism, the State Department spokesmen were inclined to put greater emphasis on the even less direct techniques of penetration and the manipulation of social movements. The combined results suggest that little remains of the tendency to view the Soviet threat as primarily a military one, except the stereotype that much of the critical and articulate American public still holds regarding the adversary. And although the American elite is now inclined to see the manifold aspects of Soviet aggressiveness, the Soviet elite still has a strong tendency (59 percent) to view American policy as being primarily reliant on physical force, with only occasional concern over our economic and social penetration techniques (17 percent).

C-4. American positions in this dimension rated those characteristics of Soviet behavior that are most indicative of aggressive intentions.

	T	B	F	C
a. Home-based military capabilities .....	63	98	72	87
b. Military alliances .....	37	2	14	12
c. Overseas bases .....	0	0	14	1
Saliency .....	(17)	(45)	(7)	(69)

Here we see one of the more striking examples of asymmetry in Soviet-American mutual perceptions. Whereas the former expressed almost no concern (8 percent) over American preparedness *per se*, our elite mentioned Soviet preparedness as most indicative of Soviet aggressiveness 87 percent of the time. Conversely, sharp Soviet concern over American alliances (54 percent) and American bases (38 percent) contrasts with American figures of 12 and 1 percent, respectively. This difference indicates not only that the USSR has few overseas bases in the literal sense of the word, but that we view their alliances as something less than the effective, voluntary association of sovereign states, allied, as they claim, in a common strategic cause.

C-5. As to the general nature of the Soviet strategic doctrine, the American elite characterized it as shown below.

	T	B	F	C
a. Preventive strike ..	100	0	50	30
b. Preemptive strike ..	0	83	50	60
c. Retaliatory strike ..	0	17	0	10
Saliency .....	(2)	(6)	(2)	(10)

As crucial as this dimension is, it might better have been omitted. On the Soviet side, only *International Affairs* discussed it with any frequency (coding 55, 45, and 0 percent, respectively); on the American side, the most frequent reference (6) was in the *Bulletin*. The distinction between positions *a* and *b*, it might be noted, was difficult to communicate to our coders, suggesting that

our lexicon may need some improvement in this case.<sup>24</sup>

C-6. Regarding the primary purpose of the Soviet outer space programs, American sources scored it as shown below.

	T	B	F	C
a. Military strength ..	43	64	20	50
b. Popular prestige ..	57	21	40	35
c. Scientific knowledge ..	0	15	40	15
Salience ..	(7)	(14)	(5)	(26)

Though the tendency is certainly one of discounting the search for scientific knowledge *per se*, the American elite took a considerably less cynical position than did their opposite numbers, who scored the United States 100 percent in position *a*. Perhaps the most important point to emerge from this dimension is that, by scoring the Soviets 35 percent on the prestige motivation, the Americans reveal the degree of importance that they themselves attach to space exploration achievements as a means to national prestige.

C-7. The final dimension in this issue pertains to the motivation behind the other side's foreign aid programs. Asked which of the following best characterized the Soviet purpose in rendering economic and technical assistance to the underdeveloped and nonaligned nations, the American elite responded as follows:

	T	B	F	C
a. Strengthen Soviet side and weaken Western bloc ..	100	99	70	96
b. Improve recipient's ability to remain nonaligned ..	0	0	20	2
c. Help the recipient nation and people ..	0	1	10	2
Salience ..	(3)	(88)	(10)	(101)

<sup>24</sup> Two studies that are highly relevant to the period under review are Dinerstein (1959) and Garthoff (1958).

Again, the American elite—like their opposite numbers—are hardly prone to attribute altruism to the other side. Though they did not match the latter's score of 100, 0, and 0 percent, they came rather close, with only the *Foreign Affairs* contributors showing an occasional tendency to look at other than the obvious, short-run, power-maximization considerations.

D. AMERICAN EXPRESSIONS OF OWN OPERATIONAL CODE

The purely American side of this study concludes with an attempt to ascertain some of the more directly relevant dimensions in American foreign policy views. Having discussed the American elite's articulations regarding their image of the international system, the distribution of power, and the adversary's operational code, we now examine those articulations regarding their own operational code.

D-1. The first dimension is designed to shed light on the general criteria used in making foreign policy decisions, especially in terms of ongoing debate between the realists and the idealists.<sup>25</sup> The next table shows how American sources rated these three criteria.

	T	B	F	C
a. Gain-loss calculus; any means all right in pursuing national interest ..	12	6	29	11
b. How nonaligned people will view act ..	16	1	38	10
c. Certain moral principles; means are important in themselves ..	72	93	33	79
Salience ..	(25)	(80)	(21)	(126)

<sup>25</sup> The issue was nicely drawn some years ago in an article by Cook and Moos (1952) and another by Morgenthau (1952).

These results show not only that the elite as a whole tend to put heavy emphasis on ethical considerations, but that those in government (during this 1957-60 period, at least) differed sharply with those writing for *Foreign Affairs*. The *Times* scored somewhere between the other two media on all three lines. On the other hand, it cannot be overemphasized that this is a study of articulated rather than applied criteria, and in the realm of political morals there tends to be a wide disparity. Note, too, the similarity with the Soviet scores of 27, 0, and 73 percent.

D-2. One of the more crucial elements in competitive coexistence concerns the prerequisites for successful negotiation: how does relative power correlate with such success? The American elite said that successful negotiations are most likely to occur when:

	T	B	F	C
a. We (US) are stronger .....	50	90	50	69
b. They are stronger .....	0	0	10	2
c. Both are equal in power .....	50	10	40	29
Salience .....	(12)	(20)	(10)	(42)

When these figures are compared with the very similar ones for the USSR we see a classical case of the central dilemma in diplomacy. Each side speaks—and often acts—as if it would employ any power advantage it enjoyed in only the most benign fashion, while expressing the conviction that the other would exploit a similar advantage with considerable ruthlessness. Thus each tends to strive for relative superiority before entering serious negotiation, and with each so striving—and almost invariably with only a transitory success—genuine bargaining and mutual compromise are seldom achieved.

D-3. Much in the same vein, American elite articulations were coded to indicate the way in which they thought peace can best be maintained.

	T	B	F	C
a. Our (US) superior military capability ....	15	54	58	47
b. Soviet-Western cooperation .....	54	28	21	32
c. Effective international organization	31	18	21	21
Salience .....	(52)	(221)	(14)	(287)

One conclusion that emerges is that neither side places much confidence in international organization, with the slight American edge (21 percent as opposed to 15 percent) a function of the *Times'* forceful pro-United Nations editorial position. As to the more contemporaneously important issue, we find a sharp but expected difference. Whereas the Soviets rate cooperation (or peaceful coexistence) 67 to 18 percent over a peace-through-strength line, the American emphasis is in the opposite direction by 47 to 32 percent. While the international politics specialist may be permitted a skeptical attitude toward both positions, one might infer that—if mere articulations on this type of question are worth considering—the USSR expresses a stronger propensity toward *détente* than does the United States. Having said this, however, it must be emphasized that the former is using a controlled press to urge a party line, whereas the latter is expressing the result of disenchantment by way of relatively free media.

D-4. Our next dimension concerns the perceived applicability of limited war in pursuit of American strategic interests.

Here is another case in which the difference between the functions of periodicals markedly affects the results. As an articulator of official policy and hence a guide to

American behavior for others, the *Bulletin* must not only emphasize the peaceableness of our policy (retaliation only, 70 percent) but also play the conflicting role of deterrence via subtle threat (a reasonable instrument of policy, 25 percent). Though the *Times* assumes a similar, but unofficial, role during specific crises and diplomatic impasses, in its day-to-day editorializing it can afford to express a perpetually more peaceful line. On the other hand, the average<sup>26</sup> *Foreign Affairs* contributor generally plays a more detached and critical role, with less concern for the impact upon opinion among our adversaries, allies, or neutrals. Hence the reversal in emphasis between this journal and the others regarding the role of limited war. It should also be noted that this was the period during which the assault on the massive retaliation doctrine appeared, with a corresponding emphasis on the importance of limited war doctrines and capabilities.

	T	B	F	C
a. A reasonable instrument of policy	0	25	55	31
b. Useful as a threat to back up diplomacy	25	5	9	9
c. Only to be used in retaliation	75	70	36	60
Saliency	(4)	(20)	(11)	(35)

D-5. The next two dimensions continue our concern with military policy, but focus rather on two of the more crucial chronological variables in the relationship between weapons control and the larger political setting. The first raises the question of whether arms reduction or elimination must precede, accompany, or follow the settle-

<sup>26</sup> It should be emphasized that although a considerable proportion of articles are written by policy-makers and their close associates, most are not.

ment of outstanding political and territorial conflicts or the reduction of international tensions.

	T	B	F	C
a. Political settlement (and/or tension reduction) must precede disarmament	22	30	25	28
b. Political settlement need not precede disarmament	67	40	50	47
c. Political settlement must accompany disarmament	11	30	25	25
Saliency	(9)	(23)	(4)	(36)

There seems to be wide agreement among our three sets of elites, but the scores themselves suggest considerable indecision and disagreement. Though the dominant position is that disarmament need not necessarily wait upon the settlement of political issues or the reduction of East-West tensions (47 percent), there was frequent adherence to the opposing view that it must precede (28 percent) or that they must accompany each other (25 percent). Apparently the Soviet elite (scoring in position *b* 90 percent of the time) have either resolved the arms-tension dilemma more satisfactorily than their American counterparts, or have ignored it in their eagerness to push a particular disarmament line.

D-6. In the same vein, we seek an indication of the American views on inspection and control in multilateral disarmament.

	T	B	F	C
a. Arms reduction should precede controls	0	1	0	1
b. Controls should precede arms reduction	56	91	50	83
c. Arms reduction may accompany controls	44	8	50	16
Saliency	(23)	(104)	(8)	(135)



As confused as the American elite appeared to be on the timing of arms reduction vis-à-vis political settlement, they were extremely decisive on the question of controls and inspection. Only one reference to position *a* was found in all three periodicals, while the preponderance were in favor of the “controls first” approach. Especially was this true of the *Bulletin* (91 percent), which has emphasized this view for years. The *Times* could, on the other hand, be somewhat more flexible and agree 44 percent of the time that disarmament and controls might develop concurrently.

Also striking is the contrast to the Soviet results, where 71 percent of the responses were for simultaneous measures, and 29 percent for reduction preceding controls. On the verbal level at least, there is little doubt that there exists a wide gap on the disarmament-inspection question. However, if we look not so much at the relative strengths of positions *a* and *b* and their mutual exclusiveness, but at the fact that the Soviets scored 71 percent on simultaneity and the *Times* and *Foreign Affairs* scored 44 and 50 percent, respectively, on this position, there may be a remote possibility of bipolar compromise on this crucial issue. It might even be suggested that if we and the USSR are to ever break out of the armament-tension dilemma, it will be largely as a result of concurrence on position *c*.

D-7. Closely linked with the disarmament problem is that of international political organization (see Singer, 1963a). Central in the future of such organization is the type of decision-making procedure established. The three suggested alternatives and American responses are shown below.

The contrast between the US and Soviet positions is striking. Whereas the latter came close to unanimity (100 percent in

*Pravda and Kommunist*) on the “great-power unanimity” position, the American average was only 13 percent for this position. On the other hand, the American sources did tend to shy away somewhat from the straight majority concept, with 56 percent calling instead for a combination of great-power unanimity plus general approval of other members. The relevance of both sets of scores for the various *troika* proposals needs further investigation.

	T	B	F	C
a. Great-power unanimity .....	17	14	0	13
b. Majority, regardless of its composition .....	0	43	67	31
c. Great-power unanimity plus general approval of other members .....	83	43	33	56
Salience .....	(6)	(7)	(3)	(16)

D-8. Turning to an issue that combines a number of strategic and political considerations, we seek an indication of the American elite’s views on the various disengagement proposals current during the 1957-60 period.

	T	B	F	C
a. Essentially a form of appeasement or retreat .....	25	34	50	40
b. Risky, but valuable if carefully negotiated .....	25	33	25	27
c. A promising way of avoiding war .....	50	33	25	33
Salience .....	(4)	(3)	(8)	(15)

The only conclusion that emerges is that the dominant view was a skeptical one (40 percent), but that considerable difference of opinion existed. *Foreign Affairs* reflected the most skeptical point of view, but none of the three found the issue as salient as

one might have anticipated, considering the stir caused by Kennan's Reith Lectures (summarized in Kennan, 1959).

D-9. The next dimension deals with the American articulation of their own motivation for giving economic and technical assistance to neutrals.

	T	B	F	C
a. Strengthen our (US) side and weaken theirs .....	22	43	40	42
b. Improve recipient's ability to remain neutral .....	50	35	30	35
c. Help recipient nation .....	28	22	30	23
Saliency .....	(18)	(273)	(23)	(314)

These results illustrate the profound difference between each side's self-image and that held of it by the other. When this question was put in terms of the *other's* motivation, the USSR assigned position *a* to the United States 100 percent of the time, and the United States scored its adversary in the same fashion 97 percent of the time. Also noteworthy is the fact that the Soviets recognized this motivation for themselves on only 5 percent of the occasions compared with a rather frank 42 percent admission score for the United States.

D-10. The final dimension seeks some clues as to the elite views on free international trade. The American results are shown below.

	T	B	F	C
a. Must wait upon political settlement and/or tension reduction .....	0	3	0	2
b. Is undesirable .....	0	0	0	0
c. Can help pave way for political settlement and/or tension reduction .....	100	97	100	98
Saliency .....	(1)	(42)	(2)	(45)

Like other abstract virtues, everyone is in favor of free international trade; thus, the USSR and the United States scored 97 and 98 percent, respectively, on position *c*, though each has consistently acted somewhat differently. Though expressing a belief in the utility of free trade as a tension reducer, or as an aid in the solution of political differences, each side has nevertheless been compelled by these very political differences to obstruct any serious effort to achieve such mutual interdependence. For both protagonists in the Cold War, economic policy is a weapon whose function is to strengthen oneself and weaken one's adversary (Liska, 1960).

*Findings: Comparative*

Though frequent asides of a comparative nature have already appeared, it might be useful to recapitulate here in a more systematic fashion. On the matter of saliency, first, it appears that the Soviet and American foreign policy elites reveal only a partial similarity in their preoccupations. Thus, bearing in mind the sample of possible media and of possible foreign policy dimensions, we find a positive correlation of 0.32 between the attention which the two elites devote to the various dimensions. This Pearson R correlation, given an *N* of 35 dimensions, is significant at the 0.03 level. To put it another way, knowing the saliency distributions of one side, we could predict those of the other side with some modest confidence.

Beginning with the image of the international environment, we find that neither side expresses a particularly objective or even realistic view. The Soviets never saw the system as one characterized by and contributing to incessant conflict, and the Americans only did so in 7 percent of the cases. Thus each tended to assume that

conflict was not inherent in the system, but flowed from periodic peculiarities thereof. For the Americans, conflict tended to be seen as a function of differing ideologies or social systems (58 percent), while for the Soviets, it was more often (75 percent) the result of aggression on the part of the "imperialist camp" led by the United States. And in describing the contemporary bipolar conflict, the Americans again took a more ideologized position, asserting that it was between two competing "belief systems," while the Soviets saw it more in terms of competing "social systems." As to its being essentially a power struggle, neither would (or could) give this interpretation much emphasis; the Americans scored this position only 31 percent of the time and the Soviets did so with a 35 percent frequency.

As to the origins or causes of *military* conflict, both sides converged sharply. For the United States, war was seen as the result of "one state's aggressiveness" 63 percent of the time, and for the Soviets it was 88 percent. Thus, even though the two elites differed on both the character of the system and the present struggle, each had no difficulty in translating general views into rather specific allegations.<sup>27</sup> The convergence is even more sharply revealed when each expressed its views as to the emerging nature of the current confrontation. The Americans scored 53 percent on economic and political competition and 40 percent on cooperative coexistence, with their opposite numbers coming out with figures of 53 and 46 percent, respectively.

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<sup>27</sup> An excellent analysis of this "causes of war" question is in Waltz (1959). Though Waltz and the author sharply disagree on certain questions of research strategy, both concur that the most accurate and useful positing of the "cause" of war is in the total international system. See the review article, Singer (1960).

Neither side gave frequent expression to the "must inevitably clash" position, with scores of 7 and 1 percent, respectively.

Shifting the emphasis slightly, we discover that our two elites first disagree and then agree on their views of prediction and inevitability in international politics. The Americans tended to feel that the prediction of international events was "almost impossible" (57 percent) or only "occasionally possible" (36 percent), and, consistently enough, refused to accept the proposition that the nations are "pawns of great forces" (3 percent). They tended, rather, to take a more pragmatic view and embrace the intermediate position that nations are "limited by realities" (77 percent). The Soviets, on the other hand, came out very close to the Americans on all three determinism dimensions, but nevertheless expressed a strong degree (69 percent) of confidence in the predictability of international events. In the classical terms of Marxism and Leninism, this apparent inconsistency is easily explained: the vanguard of the proletariat, though armed with a "scientific" view of history, replete with all its inherent "inevitabilities," must also act in the appropriate revolutionary manner to hasten the inevitable. Here, as elsewhere, our results strongly confirm what we would expect the ideology to produce, but it does not necessarily follow that the Kremlin will actually *conduct* its foreign policy in accordance with such articulations.

Turning from the general images of the international system, let us now compare the ways in which Soviet and American foreign policy elites seem to perceive the present and projected distribution of power. To begin with the specific dimensions of military power, each tends to stress the near-invulnerability of its retaliatory forces, but the Soviets express a more uniform con-

confidence (75 percent as opposed to 42 percent). The United States, on the other hand, has experienced sharp internal debate over this issue, and thus we find the *Bulletin* describing these forces as "nearly invulnerable" 64 percent of the time, while the specialists in *Foreign Affairs* classified them as "highly vulnerable" 28 percent of the time and as "partially vulnerable" 57 percent of the time. As to progress in the development and production of advanced weapons systems, this contrast is even sharper. Almost every reference to this dimension in the Soviet press termed their own technological progress as "faster" than that of the United States (98 percent), whereas the American press—reflecting the impact of Sputnik I and II, etc.—scored their own weapon technology as developing more slowly than that of the opponent 45 percent of the time. In terms of overall military posture, however, this difference disappears. In other words, Americans may express inferiority in specific power positions, but still say 84 percent of the time that they are capable of deterring both limited and nuclear attacks; their opposite numbers expressed such confidence 100 percent of the time. If, however, deterrence requires high credibility on the part of the deterree, the acknowledgment of specific weaknesses may well tend to vitiate the effects of articulated overall confidence. Such a possibility is dramatically illustrated in comparing the respective evaluations of the "present military balance." The Soviets rate it as in their own favor 95 percent of the time, as contrasted to the remarkably low figure of 52 percent for the Americans' self-confidence articulation; even the *Bulletin* appraised the balance in favor of the US only 74 percent of the time.

When predictions about war are made, the same general pattern emerges. Whereas

the American elite predict "tremendous mutual devastation" with an 89 percent frequency, their opposite numbers do so only 53 percent of the time. Conversely, the Soviets anticipate "victory for us" 37 percent of the time with only 4 percent for the Americans. Only when it comes to the limitation of limited war is the "tough-timid" classification reversed. That is, the American elite expressed high confidence in the possibility of keeping limited war limited (only 19 percent for "probably escalate into general war"), while those in the USSR made this fearful prediction 75 percent of the time. It should be noted, however, that the USSR finds this position essential to its propaganda line, whereas a large segment of the American elite has a strong vested interest in a belief in the limitability of limited war, especially the limitability of wars in which tactical nuclear weapons are used.<sup>28</sup>

The next three dimensions bear on the mutual appraisals of some key elements in one another's power base, with the first two dealing with relative decisional capabilities. Thoroughly anticipated would be the Soviet allegation that the dominant influence in American foreign policy is the economic-technological elite (78 percent) and the American belief that the political Party leaders dominate Soviet policy (90 percent). But the specific appraisals of effectiveness did not seem to fit the pattern. The Soviets, despite alleging the existence of an economic elite conspiracy in American foreign policy, nevertheless suggest that the policy itself is one of a "haphazard responding to events" 74 percent of the time, and only allude to a "masterful and thorough" policy planning with a 16 percent fre-

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<sup>28</sup> For an analysis of this problem and an indication of the declining popularity of tactical nuclear weapons, see Halperin (1962).

quency. On the other hand, the American elite take the apocalyptic view that Soviet policy is masterful and thorough 56 percent of the time, and recognize its erratic nature only 36 percent of the time. As to the solidarity of their alliances as indicators of strength and decisional capability, the Soviets claim that theirs are based on a "similarity of social systems and beliefs" with an 84 percent frequency contrasted to a 17 percent claim by the Americans; the latter tend rather to emphasize the "common need for protection against aggression" (55 percent).

Looking at another dimension, we found that the Soviet elite had not yet begun to give full adherence to the then-emerging Khrushchev dictum that the American armaments program is detrimental to the American economy, with only an 18 percent reference to this position. Rather the standard line that the program is essential to economic prosperity appeared with an 80 percent frequency. There was almost no concern with this relationship on the other side.

Concluding the general appraisal of relative power and power bases, our results suggest a marked asymmetry in views. In line with the above-mentioned elements in the power relationships, the USSR claimed to perceive the shift in their favor almost every time (99 percent) and predicted an American collapse resulting from Communist "successes elsewhere" (45 percent) and the "weaknesses and contradictions" of the American system (53 percent). The American elite also tended to adhere to their emerging pattern: a more limited degree of self-confidence. Thus, they scored the balance as "remaining static" 42 percent of the time, with only a 25 percent score on "shifting in our favor." Thus, when asked how the adversary's system will collapse, they

put much more emphasis on "its own weaknesses and contradictions" (87 percent) than did the Soviets, and less on "success of our system elsewhere" (13 percent) than did their opposite numbers.

As suggested throughout, the implications of these contrasting appraisals of the contemporary and projected power balance in the military, economic, and political realms are far from clear. The state of empirically-based international relations theory is not such that one can safely make correlative, no less causal, statements regarding the impact of perceived relative power on behavior (even assuming that these coded statements are in fact reflections of perceived power rather than self-congratulations, propaganda, or semiautomatic reiterations of the inherited dogmas). Thus, it would seem to be equally plausible to assume that these Soviet indications of extreme self-confidence might precede aggressive behavior as well as conservative behavior. The more crucial variables have to do with the way in which present and predicted power differences are combined. In other words, if an essentially "revisionist" power perceives itself as currently abreast of the conservative or status-quo power, and anticipates either holding its own or drawing ahead, there is probably less tendency to resort to force than if it expects to fall behind again. If it perceives itself as behind, but drawing abreast or ahead of the opponent, there might also be a low predicted propensity to violence. However, the international system is such that the revisionist must anticipate that the overtaken power may well resort to force while ahead in order to remain so. Thus, we are again brought face to face with the dilemma of the *application and use* of power in order to *acquire* power or *modify* a power ratio.

Turning now to the way in which each elite perceives the operational code of the other, we find a mixture of symmetry and asymmetry as well as consistency and inconsistency in the reciprocal images. As an example of the latter, neither side admits (or believes?) that the other's dominant goal is self-preservation (1 and 3 percent were the scores), yet each says with a very high frequency (United States, 86 percent; USSR, 100 percent) that the other would choose "security" over ideological considerations in making policy decisions. In the same vein, there is almost no willingness to grant that the other's military doctrine is a retaliatory one. On the few occasions on which this item appeared in either set of media, the tendency was to see it as either preventative or preemptive. The symmetrical tendency to impute aggressive designs to the adversary is also borne out in the low degree to which each attributes scientific progress as the motive behind the other's space program. Likewise, almost all references to the other's foreign aid motivations are in terms of "strengthen their side and weaken ours" (96 and 100 percent), while each articulated more altruistic motives when discussing its own aid programs.

As to the lack of symmetry in the mutual perceptions, these are best revealed in the dimensions dealing with one another's foreign policy instruments. The Soviets allege that the major instrument of American policy is "military force" (59 percent), with political subversion and socioeconomic penetration scored at the 24 and 17 percent levels; whereas the American elite score only 28 percent for Soviet military force, with 35 and 37 percent for the less violent techniques. And while the Soviets say they are primarily threatened by American bases (38 percent) and alliances (54 percent),

the Americans see home-based Soviet capabilities as the best indicator of aggressive intent, with an 87 percent score.

Turning from these various classes of images to the more specific articulations of their own operational codes, we again find a mixture of symmetry and asymmetry. Verbal agreement between the adversaries is high on the two opening dimensions. Each puts heavy emphasis on the importance of moral principles and means in foreign policy (79 percent for the United States and 73 percent for the USSR), neither is willing to express serious concern for the neutralist bloc reactions (10 and 0 percent, respectively), and only a low endorsement (11 and 27 percent) of the "national interest" dictum is manifested. But the greatest display of reciprocal self-righteousness and mutual distrust occurs on the "conditions for successful negotiation" dimension. By a ratio of approximately 2 to 1, each claims that negotiations are more likely to be successful when its own side is *stronger* than when there is approximate *parity*. (The Soviet scores were 66 and 34 percent, while American scores were 69 and 29 percent.) Almost never does either see any hope for success in negotiations when the adversary is (or is perceived to be) stronger; the phrase is "negotiating from weakness." The results on these two dimensions seem to suggest a rather dim prospect for the negotiated settlement of major Soviet-American conflicts.

This pessimistic view is further reinforced by the results on the "peace can best be maintained by" dimension. The Soviets voted for "major power cooperation" with a 67 percent frequency, and the Americans did so 32 percent of the time. Despite the disparity, it is clear that each expresses some confidence in a process whose preconditions neither side seems willing to ac-

cept. Hence we should be somewhat surprised by the tendency—particularly on the Soviet side—to downgrade “peace through military superiority” and to upgrade the major power cooperation line. The most discouraging element, however, is the extremely low frequency with which each looks to “effective international organization” (15 percent for the USSR and 21 percent for the United States). This relative indifference toward international organization is also borne out by the findings along the voting power dimension. Each side prefers some form of the great power veto to a large extent, the USSR scoring a combined 77 percent on the two pro-veto positions and the United States scoring 69 percent.

Closely related to this set of concerns is that concern regarding multilateral reduction and elimination of armaments. On both of these, the two sides revealed strongly differing views. As to the question of whether political settlement must be reached before or along with disarmament, the American elite scored a combined 53 percent on the “precede” and “accompany” positions, compared with only 10 percent for the Soviet elite. Conversely, the latter expressed a belief in disarmament without political settlement with a 90 percent frequency, compared with 47 percent for the Americans. And on the related question of inspection and controls, the asymmetry of views was equally pronounced. Thus, the Soviets scored 100 percent on the combined positions of reductions preceding (29 percent) or accompanying (71 percent) controls and inspection, while the United States scored only 17 percent on these two. Conversely, the United States called for the establishment of controls before any arms reduction 83 percent of the time. As suggested earlier, the only promising note is

that the Soviets accepted the principle of simultaneity 71 percent of the time even during that period, while the *Times* and *Foreign Affairs* scored 44 and 50 percent, respectively. If there are to be successful negotiations for the multilateral reduction of either conventional or nuclear weapons, it seems rather certain that the simultaneity principle will have to be adhered to.

Next we looked at a pair of policy alternatives that fall short of nuclear war at one end and total disarmament at the other. The first is that of limited war and the other is disengagement, and each of these further serves to illustrate dissimilarities in the Soviet and American operational codes. As to the appropriate role of limited war, there were few Soviet references to it, but these always rejected the notion that it might be a “reasonable instrument of policy,” arguing that it should be used only for retaliatory purposes or as a threat to back up diplomatic demands. The Americans, on the other hand, not only talked about it more often, but expressed approval of it as a reasonable instrument of policy on 31 percent of the occasions (never, however, in the *Times*, and only 25 percent in the *Bulletin*). However, both sides did tend to emphasize the retaliatory function. As to the various disengagement plans, the asymmetry is more striking. Whereas the Soviets view them as “a promising way to avoid war” with a 98 percent frequency, with only 2 percent of the references to the notion that they might be “risky, but valuable if carefully negotiated,” the American elite take an exceptionally dim view of such plans. On nearly half (40 percent) of the occasions, they were classified as “essentially a form of appeasement or retreat,” with 27 and 33 percent distribution in the “risky but valuable” and “promising” positions.

On the final dimensions of foreign aid

TABLE 3  
 SYMMETRY OF ATTITUDES AS INDICATED BY HIGHEST SCORING  
 POSITION ON EACH DIMENSION

<i>Dim.</i>	USSR	US	<i>Dim.</i>	USSR	US	<i>Dim.</i>	USSR	US	<i>Dim.</i>	USSR	US
A-1	b	a	B-1	c	c	C-1	b	b	D-1	c	a
A-2	b	a	B-2	c	c	C-2	b/c	b	D-2	a	a
A-3	a	a	B-3	b	a	C-3	a	c	D-3	b	a
A-4	b	b	B-4	b	b	C-4	b	a	D-4	b/c	a
A-5	a	c	B-5	a	b	C-5	a	b	D-5	b	b
A-6	b	b	B-6	c	b	C-6	a	a	D-6	c	b
A-7	c	b	B-7	b	c	C-7	a	a	D-7	a	c
A-8	c	c	B-8	a	a/b				D-8	c	a
			B-9	c	c				D-9	c	a
			B-10	c	c				D-10	c	c

and free international trade, each pays lip service to certain ideals, but departs markedly from them in practice. Both claim to view trade as a tension-reducing device and a precursor to political settlement (97 and 98 percent), but these articulations clash sharply with the actual trade policies of each. Both protagonists, given the perceived probability of war, must and do follow a policy that aims, among other things, to prevent the other's stockpiling of strategic materials, developing certain industries, or gaining access to key resources and markets. And in the foreign aid struggle, we also see that economic policies are the handmaidens of political considerations. On the American side, there is at least the admission (42 percent) that aid is used to "strengthen our side and weaken theirs," but this varies considerably depending upon whether the audience is an appropriations subcommittee or a visiting African.

Given these results, it might be useful to indicate the extent to which the two foreign policy elites compare and contrast. Certainly the confusing notion of "mirror images," which has so preoccupied some behavioral scientists of late, turns out to be less than fully substantiated—though

by no means contradicted. Assuming for the moment that by mirror image we imply a symmetry in outlook, let us examine Tables 3 and 4. In the former, we see the frequency with which both sides came out highest on the same position, and in Table 4 are the chi-square correlations between their scores. As the first of them indicates, the degree to which each elite sees itself, the other, and the world in identical terms is not very impressive; on only 14 (17, if we include ties for first position) of the 35 dimensions do they give most frequent expression to the same position. And the similarities and differences are evenly distributed among the four basic groups of issues. Likewise, if we turn to Table 4, which is intended to reveal the significance of the Soviet-American differences, we find that in 20 of the 35 dimensions the differences are great enough to have had only a 1 percent probability of occurring by chance. Conversely, in only 13 are the distributions similar enough to exceed the 10 percent level. Thus, by the criteria of either table, we find an appreciable lack of symmetry in articulated outlooks. Even if the "mirror image" metaphor suggests that A looks into the mirror and then attributes to



TABLE 4  
CORRELATION BETWEEN SOVIET AND AMERICAN DISTRIBUTIONS (CHI-SQUARE)\*

<i>Dim., pos.</i>	USSR	US	Chi <sup>2</sup>	<i>Dim., pos.</i>	USSR	US	Chi <sup>2</sup>	<i>Dim., pos.</i>	USSR	US	Chi <sup>2</sup>	<i>Dim., pos.</i>	USSR	US	Chi <sup>2</sup>
A-1	18	25	19.7 (0.01)	B-1	0	5	3.4 (> 0.10)	C-1	14	91	2.9 (> 0.10)	D-1	4	14	4.1 (> 0.10)
A-2	53	15	3**	B-2	2	6	2.5 (> 0.10)	C-2	43	203	0.6 (> 0.10)	D-2	0	13	1.4 (> 0.10)
A-3	0	3	66.1 (0.01)	B-3	6	2	11.4 (0.01)	C-3	2	3	33.7 (0.01)	D-3	11	99	42.3 (0.01)
A-4	9	173	32	B-4	0	2	4.4 (> 0.10)	C-4	0	2	135.8 (0.01)	D-4	31	29	3.7 (> 0.10)
A-5	52	66	11.4 (0.01)	B-5	14	27	30.1 (0.01)	C-5	1	8	2.5 (> 0.10)	D-5	0	1	21.9 (0.01)
A-6	32	108	11.4 (0.01)	B-6	32	48	1.1 (> 0.10)	C-6	53	132	3.5 (> 0.10)	D-6	16	12	113.6 (0.01)
A-7	60	12	4.4 (> 0.10)	B-7	55	8	62.2 (0.01)	C-7	22	163	1.5 (> 0.10)	D-7	21	136	6.0 (0.05)
A-8	1	4	30.1 (0.01)	B-8	0	4	11.8 (0.01)		15	176		D-8	77	93	31.8 (0.01)
	7	3	1.1 (> 0.10)	B-9	0	8			4	60		D-9	17	58	457.1 (0.01)
	1	3	30.1 (0.01)	B-10	40	22			8	8		D-10	0	11	0.04 (> 0.10)
	59	24	1.1 (> 0.10)		2	12			13	20			1	3	3.7 (> 0.10)
	51	18	30.1 (0.01)		32	48			7	3			1	21	21.9 (0.01)
	8	11	1.1 (> 0.10)		6	152			5	6			2	10	21.9 (0.01)
	0	17	30.1 (0.01)		0	77			0	1			4	9	113.6 (0.01)
	13	21	1.1 (> 0.10)		3	13			4	13			15	1	113.6 (0.01)
	33	81	30.1 (0.01)		14	3			0	4			37	22	113.6 (0.01)
	1	3	30.1 (0.01)		9	0			25	97			7	2	6.0 (0.05)
	1	4	62.2 (0.01)		58	2			0	2			3	5	6.0 (0.05)
	0	5	11.8 (0.01)		7	19			0	2			3	9	31.8 (0.01)
	83	3	11.8 (0.01)		37	2			0	2			0	6	31.8 (0.01)
	0	8	11.8 (0.01)		1	2			12.0	2			1	4	31.8 (0.01)
	3	13	11.8 (0.01)		8	1			6.1	0			1	4	31.8 (0.01)
	9	5	11.8 (0.01)		1	0			6.1	2			1	130	457.1 (0.01)
					26	2			6.1	14			8	111	457.1 (0.01)
					31	14			16.9	2			11	73	457.1 (0.01)
					19	2			16.9	2			1	1	0.04 (> 0.10)
					5	3			16.9	3			0	0	0.04 (> 0.10)
					27	41			16.9	41			33	4	0.04 (> 0.10)

\* Certain assumptions, such as that of independent observation, are not fully met by these data, but no more fully appropriate measure is available.  
 \*\* Parenthetic numbers in chi-square column are significance levels.

B the characteristics it discerns in itself, little such tendency emerges. On the other hand, if it merely implies that each side tends to view the other in similarly negative terms, then, of course, there is something to the metaphor. That is, in issue group C (image of the other's operational code) we see that in only 2 of the 7 dimensions are there any statistically significant differences. In any event, we need feel no surprise that a study such as this should reveal a strong tendency toward ethnocentrism, condemnation, and stereotypy within the foreign policy elites of two societies engaged in so intense and profound a rivalry.

### *Summary and Policy Implications*

In this study we have attempted to utilize content analysis in order to shed some light on certain aspects of Soviet and American foreign policy. More specifically, our concern was with the way in which selected elites on each side viewed—during the three-year period 1957–60—some of the recurrent variables in international relations generally, and Soviet–American relations particularly. Despite the previously acknowledged risks implicit in reliance upon articulations as indicators of actual and potential behavior, we believe this method has helped turn up here some of the key elements in the foreign policy operational code on each side. While much of this information was already generally accepted in the scholarly and governmental community, and nothing particularly unexpected has emerged, we believe that the data and interpretations that emanate are useful.

First of all, there are many conflicting models that allegedly describe and explain the behavior of these (or any) two powers, and any new empirically-based evidence can always contribute to the confirmation, disconfirmation, or modification of such

models as do exist. Second, there is the widely perceived virtue of examining the behavior and relationships of systems, organizations, and groups from as many points of view as possible. Thus, one might want to combine the results of studies based on such initially disparate phenomena as formal ideology, past military strategy, physical resources, technological capabilities, demographic characteristics, economic institutions, political systems, elite structures, past performance in international organizations, and so forth. Each might reasonably be expected to help illuminate a nation's operational code vis-à-vis others in the international system. So it is with elite articulations, which constitute one set of phenomena that should help to describe, explain, and predict the behavior of nations. Third, we believe that the more empirically observable the phenomena are, the more likely they are to generate accurate results. And while a heavy measure of inference is required in this particular case, it seems to be less than that required by the analysis of many other types of phenomena.

Bearing these assets and liabilities in mind, let us now go somewhat beyond the strict limits of our data and summarize some possible implications for the near future. One of the striking things to emerge is the presence of two particular sets of variables which tend to interact in a reinforcing and dangerous fashion. First, our results confirm that the United States and the USSR not only have an impressive range of incompatible goals and clashes of interest, but that each nation's foreign policy elite is aware of this. Second, each society reveals a powerful tendency to act and to speak in such a way as to exacerbate these differences. Each is prone to underestimate the degree to which its own behavior and articulations help to confirm and reinforce the

negative and fearful view that the other holds toward it; we uncovered very little awareness during the three-year period under scrutiny that either side could (by perhaps paying slightly less attention to its domestic drum beaters) help alleviate the other's equally compelling need to do likewise. In addition, each tends to misallocate the "blame" for the contemporary state of affairs. Rather than recognize the extent to which the faulty organization of the international system, combined with the speed and destructiveness of nuclear-missile technology, is responsible for the intensity of the conflict and its propensity to violence, each succumbs to the convenient and satisfying view that the other is the sole or primary villain. Without neglecting the profound differences in goals, we must assume that the environment largely induces the behavior that is manifested; moreover, each has within its power the ability to begin the slow and painful modification of that environment toward a condition in which such self-defeating and mutually disadvantageous policies might become far less necessary.

To summarize, it may be said that our inquiry into the Soviet and American operational codes confirms the impression that both major powers have been appallingly slow in discovering the strategies that may enable them to survive the present while shaping the future. The international system has changed appreciably since the 1957-1960 period, and while Washington and Moscow seem to recognize such change, they have been reluctant to pay the price of adaptation. Just as the coalitions began to loosen, and diplomacy once again became possible, the United States shifted (or drifted) to a new military doctrine based on the implied threats of a "credible [or full] first-strike capability." If the interest was

to strengthen our diplomatic hand, the results were, at best, mixed. Such a strategic preponderance may, for example, have been crucial in inducing the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba, but we cannot blink the possibility that it may well have provoked such adventurism in the first place. Though the "full first-strike" superiority is no longer official doctrine, our move toward a more conservative and stabilizing posture has been only partial at best. Moreover we have continued to follow a double standard, via military intervention in areas well within the adversary's sphere of influence. The Soviet Union has likewise found it most difficult to move away from the traditional doctrines of "self-help." Perhaps as serious as the Cuban adventure and the constant appeal to violence in the nonaligned areas has been their obsessive obstructionism in the disarmament negotiations. Though neither superpower has been enthusiastic about this rather promising approach toward modification of the international system, the United States seems to have moved much closer to a responsible position than has the USSR.

Similarly, if competent diplomacy is to serve as a span between the remnants of anarchy and the rudimentary phases of order in the mid-twentieth century, neither elite has shown sufficient awareness of its requirements. On the domestic scene, as our study clearly reveals, they go to excessive lengths to exaggerate the virtues of self and the viciousness of the other. The consequent strengthening of the home-front jingoists makes honest compromise a most awkward, costly, and unlikely mode of conflict management. And on the global scene, this same effort to dichotomize has created a Manichean world in which all who are not with us must be classed as against us. Thus Mao's China and De Gaulle's France, by

resorting to standard diplomatic ploys, have been castigated as disloyal to their alliances and treated as pariahs by their respective bloc leaders. As inefficient as nineteenth-century diplomacy may have been as a means of peaceful adjustment, most of the evidence suggests that bipolar confrontation and rigid Cold War strategies hold even less promise.

Are these maladaptive practices a function of legitimate national interests, incompatible value systems, or some mixture of these *plus* short-sighted and inept foreign policy articulation? On the basis of this study, we are inclined to the latter view. The results suggest the serious degree to which the respective foreign policy elites continue to *create the conditions* which make diplomatic innovation almost impossible. One or both of them not only insist on persuading their domestic audiences that the other is an implacable enemy (dimensions A-1, 2, and 3), but go right on suggesting that war is a reasonable instrument of policy (B-1, 2, 3, 4, and 10). They not only attribute the most aggressive motives to the other (dimensions C-1, 3, and 4 are among the most frequently used by both sets of media) and proclaim their own unsullied virtue (D-1 and 2), but reject out of hand most of the other's negotiating positions (D-6 and 7). As long as each elite expresses such attitudes—and generates them within the domestic population—it will find internal resistance to serious bargaining almost impossible to overcome. Our impression is that a similar analysis of the years since 1960 would reveal some encouraging changes in this regard, but insufficient ones.

That the value systems of the two societies make further or more rapid improvement of this sort impossible seems most unlikely. Though there are a great many

value dimensions on which the USSR and the United States elites clearly disagree, it must be emphasized that there is a profound difference between dissimilarity and incompatibility. Moreover, the extent of symmetry in value preferences is considerably greater than the media-reading (or hearing or seeing) public would have expected.

The problem seems, therefore, to be less one of profound incompatibility in either the images of the good life or the national interests, than of a relative absence of both knowledge and courage on the part of the elites. Admittedly, the century of total war and of the industrialized welfare society makes the public education task of the elites a most difficult, awkward, and even risky one; but as our value analysis makes clear, both nations tend to accept (the US more reluctantly) the principles of executive leadership and the need for modest risk-taking. Surely, there must be a way in which they can disarm their bellicose domestic factions and prepare their publics for some modest *détente*. If nothing else, this study should help to identify some of the areas in which such preparation might begin.

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## APPENDICES

## A. General Instructions to Coders

We are seeking, by use of quantitative content analysis, to develop a profile of the Soviet and American foreign policy operational codes during the three-year period 1 May 1957 to 30 April 1960.

For each of these two nations, we want to ascertain the articulated opinion of the foreign policy elite in terms of its

- A. Image of the international environment
- B. Evaluation of the power balance
- C. Evaluation of the other's operational code
- D. Evaluation of own operational code

These articulated images and evaluations will be directly inferred by coding of a certain class of statements appearing in certain periodicals which have been selected as most representative of foreign policy elite opinion in each nation. These periodicals, and the frequency with which they will be coded, are for the United States: *New York Times*, every eighth day; *Department of State Bulletin*, every weekly issue; *Foreign Affairs*, every quarterly issue; and for the Soviet Union: *Pravda*, every eighth day; *Kommunist*, every issue; *International Affairs*, every monthly issue.

## B. Detailed Instructions to Coders

[Items 1 and 2 described which articles were to be coded and which were to be excluded, in the Soviet and American samples, respectively; see text on "Drawing the Sample."]

3. Use orange sheets for Soviet and green for American periodicals, pasting the four master codes (A, B, C, and D) along the left-hand edge of each of the four separate sheets used for each periodical.

4. At the top of each code sheet, write name of periodical, name of coder, and time period covered on that sheet. Above *each column* identify the article being coded by title, author, page number on which article begins, date it appeared, or in any way to insure that the principal investigator will be able to compare

the results you achieved with those of the other coder working on the same periodical.

5. Remember that we are coding in order to discover the position which the article takes *in its entirety*; an article will be coded *only once* (if at all) *per dimension*. Therefore, the entire article must be read or scanned first.

6. Then note which set of issues (A, B, C, or D) and dimensions (1, 2, 3, . . .) are dealt with in the article.

7. Then go back over the article in order to ascertain where the writer (or speaker) comes out on *each of the dimensions covered*; i.e., is his position *a, b, or c?*

8. Normally you will find little difficulty in ascertaining whether the article takes position *a, b, or c*. If, however, after careful and judicious appraisal, you find an article which should be coded along a certain *dimension*, but cannot ascertain whether its *position* is *a, b, or c*, refer to item 9.

9. If the article is so ambiguously worded that it could be coded in more than one position, or takes two different positions, then and only then, mark *both* position spaces.

10. Be absolutely certain that, as you mark your code sheets, the mark is not only *alongside* the appropriate dimension and position, but *under* the article identified at the top of the sheet.

11. Before doing any coding, be sure to read through, at least twice, the illustrative materials that follow. These will give you realistic sentences and phrases taken from the very materials we are using and show where such statements would fall on the code sheets.

12. As you do the actual coding, if there is any doubt as to the exact meaning of the abbreviated position description which is on the left-hand master codes, refer back to the illustrative materials in the instruction manual for the fuller description.

[Then follows a sheaf of 35 pages, one for each dimension, and on each are illustrative statements for each of the three possible positions within that dimension.]

C. Tabulated Coding Results

The following supplemental tables (5 through 12) give the individual scorings of the two coders for the three positions in each dimension for each periodical; the average of the scorings; the percentage distribution of this average; and the salience (N) counts. In these

tables, columns 1 and 2 represent the scorings of Coders 1 and 2; the *Average* columns show the arithmetic mean of 1 and 2; the *Percentage* columns show the percentage distribution of the average among the three positions; the *Combined* column is the sum of the three averages and the percentage distribution of these.

TABLE 5  
(A) SOVIET ELITE IMAGE OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Dim.	Pravda				Kommunist				International Affairs				Combined	
	1	2	Av.	%	1	2	Av.	%	1	2	Av.	%	No.	%
1 a	0	0	0	0	0	8	4	25	24	4	14	45	18	25
b	26	19	23	100	16	7	12	75	28	7	18	55	53	75
c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
N			23				16				32		71	
2 a	1	3	2	8	0	2	1	5	9	2	6	13	9	10
b	1	22	12	50	9	15	12	54	30	26	28	60	52	55
c	0	19	10	42	0	18	9	41	13	12	13	27	32	35
N			24				22				47		93	
3 a	18	30	24	86	21	18	20	100	22	10	16	80	60	88
b	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	5	1	2
c	6	2	4	14	0	0	0	0	3	2	3	15	7	10
N			28				20				20		68	
4 a	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	4	0	0	0	0	1	1
b	14	17	16	49	22	22	22	81	28	14	21	41	59	53
c	16	18	17	51	1	6	4	15	22	38	30	59	51	46
N			33				27				51		111	
5 a	2	0	1	100	13	6	10	100	9	4	7	47	18	69
b	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	13	2	8	53	8	31
c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
N			1				10				15		26	
6 a	0	1	1	17	4	0	2	17	16	3	10	34	13	28
b	3	6	5	83	7	11	9	75	32	6	19	66	33	70
c	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	8	0	0	0	0	1	2
N			6				12				29		47	
7 a	1	0	1	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
b	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
c	12	10	11	92	21	20	21	100	51	50	51	100	83	99
N			12				21				51		84	
8 a	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
b	0	2	1	50	0	4	2	67	0	0	0	0	3	25
c	2	0	1	50	1	0	1	33	6	8	7	100	9	75
N			2				3				7		12	

TABLE 6  
(B) SOVIET ELITE EVALUATION OF POWER BALANCE

Dim.	<i>Pravda</i>				<i>Kommunist</i>				<i>International Affairs</i>				Combined	
	1	2	Av.	%	1	2	Av.	%	1	2	Av.	%	No.	%
1 a	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
b	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	50	1	0	1	25	2	25
c	2	2	2	100	2	0	1	50	5	1	3	75	6	75
N			2				2				4		8	
2 a	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
b	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	16	14	100	14	100
N			0				0				14		14	
3 a	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	8	0	0	0	0	1	2
b	2	8	5	100	2	19	11	92	41	37	39	100	55	98
c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
N			5				12				39		56	
4 a	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
b	6	0	3	100	9	6	8	100	29	29	29	94	40	95
c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	2	6	2	5
N			3				8				31		42	
5 a	2	12	7	100	5	11	8	100	27	7	17	74	32	84
b	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	4	6	26	6	16
c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
N			7				8				23		38	
6 a	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	20	2	1	2	14	3	16
b	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	20	0	1	1	7	2	10
c	0	0	0	0	0	5	3	60	13	9	11	79	14	74
N			0				5				14		19	
7 a	7	1	4	22	1	0	1	5	3	4	4	11	9	12
b	15	12	14	78	23	12	18	90	33	19	26	72	58	78
c	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	5	5	6	6	17	7	10
N			18				20				36		74	
8 a	1	6	4	67	11	19	15	94	20	15	18	75	37	80
b	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	4	1	2
c	4	0	2	33	2	0	1	6	7	2	5	21	8	18
N			6				16				24		46	
9 a	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	3	1	2
b	0	4	2	67	5	11	8	50	16	16	16	41	26	45
c	0	2	1	33	7	8	8	50	26	17	22	56	31	53
N			3				16				39		58	
10 a	0	2	1	20	2	5	4	50	23	5	14	37	19	37
b	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	13	5	3	4	11	5	10
c	2	6	4	80	1	4	3	37	22	18	20	52	27	53
N			5				8				38		51	



TABLE 7  
(C) SOVIET ELITE IMAGE OF AMERICAN OPERATIONAL CODE

Dim.	<i>Pravda</i>				<i>Kommunist</i>				<i>International Affairs</i>				Combined	
	1	2	Av.	%	1	2	Av.	%	1	2	Av.	%	No.	%
1 a	0	1	1	6	5	2	4	25	8	9	9	33	14	24
b	10	20	15	94	8	14	11	69	28	5	17	63	43	73
c	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	6	2	0	1	4	2	3
N			16				16				27		59	
2 a	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
b	1	0	1	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	50
c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	100	1	50
N			1				0				1		2	
3 a	12	17	15	63	3	10	7	44	38	24	31	62	53	59
b	6	5	6	25	5	3	4	25	14	9	12	24	22	24
c	1	5	3	12	4	6	5	31	12	2	7	14	15	17
N			24				16				50		90	
4 a	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	20	6	13	18	13	8
b	27	32	30	52	13	18	16	62	40	35	38	53	84	54
c	28	28	28	48	12	8	10	38	24	17	21	29	59	38
N			58				26				72		156	
5 a	1	1	1	100	0	0	0	0	10	1	6	55	7	58
b	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	5	5	45	5	42
c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
N			1				0				11		12	
6 a	0	1	1	100	0	1	1	100	3	1	2	100	4	100
b	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
N			1				1				2		4	
7 a	10	11	11	100	6	5	6	100	11	5	8	100	25	100
b	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
N			11				6				8		25	

TABLE 8

(D) SOVIET EXPRESSIONS OF OWN OPERATIONAL CODE

Dim.	<i>Pravda</i>				<i>Kommunist</i>				<i>International Affairs</i>				Combined	
	1	2	Av.	%	1	2	Av.	%	1	2	Av.	%	No.	%
1 a	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	100	5	0	3	23	4	27
b	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
c	1	0	1	100	0	0	0	0	18	2	10	77	11	73
N			<u>1</u>				<u>1</u>				<u>13</u>		<u>15</u>	
2 a	0	5	3	33	4	1	3	33	29	20	25	86	31	66
b	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
c	0	11	6	67	0	11	6	67	4	4	4	14	16	34
N			<u>9</u>				<u>9</u>				<u>29</u>		<u>47</u>	
3 a	2	2	2	7	7	3	5	23	15	12	14	22	21	18
b	28	19	24	80	17	14	16	72	42	32	37	59	77	67
c	3	5	4	13	1	1	1	5	20	4	12	19	17	15
N			<u>30</u>				<u>22</u>				<u>63</u>		<u>115</u>	
4 a	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
b	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	50	1	50
c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	50	1	50
N			<u>0</u>				<u>0</u>				<u>2</u>		<u>2</u>	
5 a	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	2	7	2	3
b	13	22	18	90	6	17	12	100	38	9	24	86	54	90
c	3	0	2	10	0	0	0	0	0	3	2	7	4	7
N			<u>20</u>				<u>12</u>				<u>28</u>		<u>60</u>	
6 a	1	4	3	17	2	7	5	50	6	7	7	29	15	29
b	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
c	13	17	15	83	6	4	5	50	15	19	17	71	37	71
N			<u>18</u>				<u>10</u>				<u>24</u>		<u>52</u>	
7 a	5	2	4	100	1	0	1	100	3	1	2	24	7	54
b	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	3	38	3	23
c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	3	38	3	23
N			<u>4</u>				<u>1</u>				<u>8</u>		<u>13</u>	
8 a	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
b	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	4	1	2
c	14	11	13	100	8	7	8	100	23	22	23	96	44	98
N			<u>13</u>				<u>8</u>				<u>24</u>		<u>45</u>	
9 a	0	1	1	11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	5
b	3	0	2	22	5	1	3	50	3	2	3	60	8	40
c	4	8	6	67	1	5	3	50	1	2	2	40	11	55
N			<u>9</u>				<u>6</u>				<u>5</u>		<u>20</u>	
10 a	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	8	1	3
b	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
c	14	9	12	100	13	6	10	100	11	11	11	92	33	97
N			<u>12</u>				<u>10</u>				<u>12</u>		<u>34</u>	

TABLE 9  
(A) AMERICAN ELITE IMAGE OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Dim.	<i>N. Y. Times</i>				<i>Bulletin</i>				<i>Foreign Affairs</i>				Combined	
	1	2	Av.	%	1	2	Av.	%	1	2	Av.	%	No.	%
1 a	9	13	11	55	0	11	6	55	11	4	8	66	25	58
b	6	12	9	45	0	7	4	35	2	2	2	17	15	35
c	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	10	0	4	2	17	3	7
N			<u>20</u>				<u>11</u>				<u>12</u>		<u>43</u>	
2 a	6	4	5	8	177	154	166	66	0	3	2	7	173	50
b	8	9	9	14	28	73	51	20	9	2	6	20	66	19
c	46	56	51	78	21	49	35	14	27	16	22	73	108	31
N			<u>65</u>				<u>252</u>				<u>30</u>		<u>347</u>	
3 a	3	0	2	50	12	1	7	88	1	4	3	44	12	63
b	1	0	1	25	0	1	1	12	1	3	2	28	4	21
c	1	1	1	25	0	0	0	0	2	1	2	28	3	16
N			<u>4</u>				<u>8</u>				<u>7</u>		<u>19</u>	
4 a	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	4	1	2	2	22	3	7
b	4	4	4	36	12	19	16	64	4	4	4	45	24	53
c	6	8	7	64	10	5	8	32	3	2	3	33	18	40
N			<u>11</u>				<u>25</u>				<u>9</u>		<u>45</u>	
5 a	0	1	1	5	1	0	1	25	0	0	0	0	2	7
b	11	2	7	33	1	0	1	25	5	1	3	60	11	36
c	17	9	13	62	3	0	2	50	3	0	2	40	17	57
N			<u>21</u>				<u>4</u>				<u>5</u>		<u>30</u>	
6 a	15	4	10	14	11	3	7	44	4	3	4	20	21	20
b	58	58	58	84	7	8	8	50	20	9	15	75	81	77
c	0	1	1	2	1	0	1	6	1	1	1	5	3	3
N			<u>69</u>				<u>16</u>				<u>20</u>		<u>105</u>	
7 a	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	5	4	57	4	33
b	0	0	0	0	6	0	3	60	2	1	2	29	5	42
c	0	0	0	0	4	0	2	40	0	1	1	14	3	25
N			<u>0</u>				<u>5</u>				<u>7</u>		<u>12</u>	
8 a	1	1	1	20	0	0	0	0	8	5	7	47	8	31
b	2	1	2	40	5	4	5	83	9	2	6	40	13	50
c	2	1	2	40	1	0	1	17	1	3	2	13	5	19
N			<u>5</u>				<u>6</u>				<u>15</u>		<u>26</u>	

TABLE 10  
(B) AMERICAN ELITE EVALUATION OF POWER BALANCE

Dim.	<i>N. Y. Times</i>				<i>Bulletin</i>				<i>Foreign Affairs</i>				Combined	
	1	2	Av.	%	1	2	Av.	%	1	2	Av.	%	No.	%
1 a	0	0	0	0	6	0	3	27	2	1	2	28	5	26
b	1	0	1	100	1	0	1	9	4	3	4	57	6	32
c	0	0	0	0	10	3	7	64	1	0	1	15	8	42
N			1				11				7		19	
2 a	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	2	24	2	7
b	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	2	3	38	3	9
c	3	5	4	100	32	7	20	100	6	0	3	38	27	84
N			4				20				8		32	
3 a	2	5	4	67	0	1	1	12	4	6	5	62	10	45
b	2	2	2	33	7	3	5	63	0	2	1	13	8	37
c	0	0	0	0	1	2	2	25	1	2	2	25	4	18
N			6				8				8		22	
4 a	1	2	2	28	0	1	1	4	5	5	5	42	8	19
b	2	1	2	28	28	6	17	74	2	3	3	25	22	52
c	3	3	3	44	3	6	5	22	3	4	4	33	12	29
N			7				23				12		42	
5 a	11	19	15	38	43	20	32	14	1	1	1	7	48	17
b	20	26	23	57	162	77	120	54	13	4	9	64	152	55
c	0	4	2	5	87	54	71	32	5	3	4	29	77	28
N			40				223				14		277	
6 a	7	6	7	54	3	1	2	14	3	4	4	44	13	36
b	2	6	4	31	13	9	11	79	5	4	5	56	20	56
c	2	1	2	15	1	0	1	7	0	0	0	0	3	8
N			13				14				9		36	
7 a	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
b	0	1	1	9	1	0	1	14	0	0	0	0	2	10
c	6	14	10	91	10	2	6	86	3	3	3	100	19	90
N			11				7				3		21	
8 a	0	0	0	0	3	0	2	67	0	0	0	0	2	40
b	1	0	1	50	1	0	1	33	0	0	0	0	2	40
c	1	0	1	50	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	20
N			2				3				0		5	
9 a	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
b	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	8	0	1	1	50	2	13
c	1	0	1	100	15	9	12	92	1	1	1	50	14	87
N			1				13				2		16	
10 a	1	0	1	10	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	10	2	4
b	1	0	1	10	0	0	0	0	2	1	2	20	3	7
c	9	6	8	80	40	12	26	100	6	8	7	70	41	89
N			10				26				10		46	

TABLE 11  
(C) AMERICAN ELITE IMAGE OF SOVIET OPERATIONAL CODE

Dim.	<i>N. Y. Times</i>				<i>Bulletin</i>				<i>Foreign Affairs</i>				<i>Combined</i>	
	1	2	Av.	%	1	2	Av.	%	1	2	Av.	%	No.	%
1 a	15	8	12	44	83	69	76	31	4	2	3	14	91	31
b	10	18	14	52	186	156	171	69	16	20	18	82	203	68
c	1	0	1	4	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	4	3	1
N			27				248				22		297	
2 a	1	0	1	25	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	17	2	14
b	3	0	2	50	6	0	3	75	2	3	3	50	8	57
c	1	1	1	25	1	0	1	25	1	3	2	33	4	29
N			4				4				6		14	
3 a	11	12	12	33	127	103	115	28	5	5	5	20	132	28
b	15	22	19	53	149	112	131	32	16	10	13	52	163	35
c	3	6	5	14	186	141	164	40	8	5	7	28	176	37
N			36				410				25		471	
4 a	15	6	11	63	46	41	44	98	6	3	5	72	60	87
b	7	4	6	37	2	0	1	2	0	1	1	14	8	12
c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	14	1	1
N			17				45				7		69	
5 a	2	1	2	100	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	50	3	30
b	0	0	0	0	10	0	5	83	1	0	1	50	6	60
c	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	17	0	0	0	0	1	10
N			2				6				2		10	
6 a	3	2	3	43	12	6	9	64	1	0	1	20	13	50
b	4	4	4	57	4	2	3	21	2	2	2	40	9	35
c	0	0	0	0	3	0	2	15	1	2	2	40	4	15
N			7				14				5		26	
7 a	3	3	3	100	100	74	87	99	6	7	7	70	97	96
b	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	2	20	2	2
c	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	10	2	2
N			3				88				10		101	

TABLE 12  
(D) AMERICAN EXPRESSIONS OF OWN OPERATIONAL CODE

Dim.	<i>N. Y. Times</i>				<i>Bulletin</i>				<i>Foreign Affairs</i>				Combined	
	1	2	Av.	%	1	2	Av.	%	1	2	Av.	%	No.	%
1 a	0	5	3	12	6	4	5	6	5	7	6	29	14	11
b	6	2	4	16	2	0	1	1	10	5	8	38	13	10
c	16	19	18	72	84	64	74	93	10	3	7	33	99	79
N			25				80				21		126	
2 a	7	4	6	50	23	12	18	90	6	4	5	50	29	69
b	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	10	1	2
c	6	5	6	50	2	1	2	10	4	4	4	40	12	29
N			12				20				10		42	
3 a	10	5	8	15	145	95	120	54	8	7	8	58	136	47
b	26	29	28	54	74	49	62	28	3	3	3	21	93	32
c	20	12	16	31	42	36	39	18	5	1	3	21	58	21
N			52				221				14		287	
4 a	0	0	0	0	9	1	5	25	8	3	6	55	11	31
b	0	1	1	25	1	0	1	5	1	0	1	9	3	9
c	2	3	3	75	24	3	14	70	4	4	4	36	21	60
N			4				20				11		35	
5 a	2	2	2	22	12	2	7	30	0	1	1	25	10	28
b	7	5	6	67	15	3	9	40	1	2	2	50	17	47
c	1	1	1	11	8	6	7	30	1	1	1	25	9	25
N			9				23				4		36	
6 a	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1
b	11	15	13	56	104	85	95	91	5	3	4	50	112	83
c	15	4	10	44	2	14	8	8	5	3	4	50	22	16
N			23				104				8		135	
7 a	0	1	1	17	0	1	1	14	0	0	0	0	2	13
b	0	0	0	0	5	1	3	43	3	0	2	67	5	31
c	3	6	5	83	2	4	3	43	1	0	1	33	9	56
N			6				7				3		16	
8 a	0	2	1	25	1	1	1	34	4	3	4	50	6	40
b	1	0	1	25	1	0	1	33	1	2	2	25	4	27
c	1	2	2	50	0	2	1	33	2	2	2	25	5	33
N			4				3				8		15	
9 a	2	5	4	22	122	112	117	43	11	6	9	40	130	42
b	6	11	9	50	100	89	95	35	9	4	7	30	111	35
c	4	6	5	28	57	64	61	22	8	6	7	30	73	23
N			18				273				23		314	
10 a	0	0	0	0	2	1	1	3	0	0	0	0	1	2
b	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
c	0	2	1	100	58	24	41	97	2	2	2	100	44	98
N			1				42				2		45	