

Based on data taken from 412 adult education students in Montreal, Quebec, Canada, this research attempts to show that attitudes toward French Canadian Separatism by the sample members can be accounted for by differential communication processes. Results show that attitudes held by sample members are well explained ($R^2 = .64$) by a weighted average of the information they received from interpersonal and media sources. The resultant attitude shows substantial effects on behaviors related to separatism for the same respondents.

POLITICAL RADICALIZATION AS A COMMUNICATION PROCESS

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While the role of communication processes in the formation of radical political movements has been considered fundamental even by scholars predating Aristotle, contemporary communication researchers have generally left the investigation of these processes to other disciplines. One of the most widely propounded explanations of these movements contends that they are populated essentially by the alienated lower classes who are seeking to modify the conditions of their alienation. Marx is undoubtedly the most well known exponent of this view. One of the more recent sociological theories in this genre, which has become to be known as the mass society theory of extremism, was

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proposed by Lipset (1963). According to Lipset, certain psychological and interpersonal features inherent in the structural situation of the lower classes make them prone to left-wing extremism. These conditions include low education, isolation from secondary groups in society, and socialization practices which lead toward the development of authoritarian personalities. Lipset (1963: 114) maintains that

the lower-class individual is likely to have been exposed to punishment, lack of love, and a general atmosphere of tension and aggression since early childhood—all experiences which tend to produce deep-rooted hostilities expressed by ethnic prejudice, political authoritarianism, and chiliastic transvaluational religion.

Gradually, evidence has mounted indicting the mass society position. A good part of this evidence derives from examinations of the two major types of left-wing movements in the United States during the 1960s: student activism and Black protest. The student protest provides a particular anomaly in the notion that left-wing violence is a function of membership in the poorly educated lower classes. Not only did the students not represent the lower classes of the U.S. population in general, but even when compared just with the student population, "the student movement represents the disaffection not of an underprivileged stratum of the student population but of the most advantaged sector of the students" (Flacks, 1967: 55). Flacks' data also belie the notion that explains disaffection among socially advantaged youth by suggesting that their academic performance leads them to expect failure or downward mobility. Flacks' findings show that the protestors have slightly better grades than nonprotestors.

The Black protests of the 1960s also dispute the proposals of lower-class extremism. C. McPhail (1971) examined the results of ten different reports concerning individual participation in five different riots. He found such socioeconomic indicators as level of education, income level, employment,

underemployment, and occupational status to be unrelated to, or only slightly related to, riot participation in these studies.

Even when restricting attention to the lower-class extremists, the evidence indicates that they espouse their extremism for reasons other than those cited by mass society theory. Portes (1971) tested three key hypotheses of mass society theory on a sample of lower-class Chileans. He found that extremism among these lower-class individuals was unrelated to levels of education, participation in secondary groups, or exposure to the mass media, evidence clearly discrepant with mass society predictions.

Possibly the crucial failure in mass society theory has been the notion that left-wing radicalism is a deviant process of attitude formation. Portes (1971) points out that implicit in Lipset's schema is the view that left-wing extremism is somewhat simplistic, irrational, and abnormal behavior. According to Portes (1971: 829), Lipset contends that embracing of left-wing ideology "far from following the normal processes of attitude formation, is depicted as an exceptional deviant case."

The recent investigations into political socialization have indicated, however, that individuals' political partisanship (Knoke, 1972; Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 1960), attachment to the political system (Hess and Torney, 1967), sentiments toward democracy (Lipset, 1963), vote in specific elections (Rose, 1957), attitudes toward specific political issues (Jennings and Neimi, 1968), and other political attitudes can be traced to normal socialization processes. Essentially, these studies have shown, albeit tentatively, that an individual's political attitude position is a function of information he or she receives about these attitude objects, particularly information from parents, peers, and teachers. It appears reasonable to assume that the processes which have generated these attitudes should be the same ones which give rise to political extremism.

There is currently evidence available to support this assumption. Flacks (1967) and Keniston (1967), among others (Solomon and Fishman, 1963), have demonstrated that student activists have parents who are more liberal in their political views than are the parents of nonactivists. According to Flacks (1967: 68), "the great majority of these students [the activists] are attempting to fulfill and renew the political traditions of their families." In addition, Keniston argues that peer group support is a prime factor in a student's decision either to become an activist or to remain one. Portes (1971) found that the two best predictors of left-wing radicalism in his study were the political ideology of the parents, and the political orientation of the neighborhood in which the individual lived.

Recapping briefly, the view posited here sees the process of becoming a radical as essentially a function of being exposed more frequently to a radical political ideology than to a more conservative one.

While at first all this may seem of only peripheral interest to the communication researcher, the failure of the mass society view along with the relatively recent success of the simpler differential socialization model suggests that political radicalization is basically a communication process. This paper investigates the hypothesis that political radicalization is wholly a consequence of communication processes which lie within the domain of communication research.

A COMMUNICATION THEORY OF POLITICAL RADICALIZATION

The differential socialization model suggested by the pattern of available data may be characterized as a set of information sources 1, 2, 3, . . . , n, each of which provides information favoring (on the average) some level of radicalism, $x_1, x_2, x_3, \dots, x_n$. Each source is furthermore

assumed to provide a differential *quantity* of information. The quantity of information about the topic in question may be represented as the product of the amount of exposure the individual has from each source a_i ; and the proportion of that exposure which is relevant to that topic b_i . Thus, the product $a_i b_i$ represents the amount of exposure an individual has had to the i th information source. Following this notation, differential socialization theory takes the form:

$$p = a_1 b_1 x_1 + a_2 b_2 x_2 + \dots + a_n b_n x_n = \sum_{i=1}^n a_i b_i x_i \quad [1]$$

where p represents the value of an individual's attitude position on a continuum of political radicalism.

Expressed as in equation 1, differential socialization theory does not anticipate that information from any source is more or less effective than other primary sources, but differential effectiveness has long been hypothesized by communication researchers, particularly in the context of research on source credibility (Insko, 1967). More general, therefore, is model 2:

$$p = \mu_1 a_1 b_1 x_1 + \mu_2 a_2 b_2 x_2 + \dots + \mu_n a_n b_n x_n = \sum_{i=1}^n \mu_i a_i b_i x_i \quad [2]$$

where μ_i represents a weighting factor describing the net effectiveness of a single "bit" of information from the i th source.

By contrast, a central hypothesis of mass society theory argues that political isolation (i.e., separation from communication sources *itself*) predisposes individuals to radical political ideologies, which, in the notation given above may be represented as

$$p = a_1 + a_2 + a_3 + \dots + a_n = \sum_{i=1}^n a_i \quad [3]$$

or, assuming the sources 1, 2, . . . n are differentially effective,

$$p = \mu_1 a_1 + \mu_2 a_2 + \dots + \mu_n a_n = \sum_{i=1}^n \mu_i a_i \quad [4]$$

Since the structures of equations 2 and 4 are identical (i.e., both are first-degree polynomials in n terms), a direct, quantitative comparison of the two hypotheses is given readily by a comparison of the multiple correlations each produces with p, the individual's political position. Furthermore, the overall predictive ability of each theory is given by its multiple correlation, and the relative net effectiveness of each of the information sources 1, 2, . . . , n is given by the partial slopes (which correspond to the weighting factors μ_i) yielded by the regression procedure.

DATA

The theory detailed above argues that the extent to which any individual holds radical political views is a simple linear function of the extent to which he or she has been exposed to a preponderance of information favoring such a view.

Accordingly, a sample of 412 was drawn from the adult students enrolled in undergraduate courses during the summer session (1970) at Loyola of Montreal and the Universite de Montreal, both located in Montreal, Quebec. The respondents at Loyola of Montreal were enrolled in social science courses and at the Universite de Montreal in the Faculte des Lettres et Sciences Humaines. Both groups of

respondents were engaged for the most part in full-time occupations and were students only on a part-time basis.

The respondents (N = 412) were subdivided on the basis of linguistic orientation into three categories—unilingual French, unilingual English, or bilingual. The French respondents numbered 104; the English, 115; and the bilingual, 193.

Questionnaires (in the appropriate languages) were administered to the sample on which respondents were asked to estimate: (a) the average amount of time spent reading newspapers, (b) the approximate frequency with which respondents saw reference made to French Canadian Separatism in those newspapers that they read, and (c) the general bias of that coverage. The first item was scaled: 0 = not at all; 1 = a few hours a month; 2 = a few hours a week; 3 = a few hours a day; 4 = nearly all the time. The second item was scaled: 0 = not at all; 1 = very seldom; 2 = seldom; 3 = frequently; 4 = very frequently. The last item (bias) was scored -2 = highly opposed to separatism; -1 = opposed; 0 = neither for nor against separatism; +1 = in favor of separatism; +2 = strongly in favor of separatism. This three-item index was repeated for second-most frequently read newspapers, first and second television, records and tapes, movies, family and first and second most frequently seen friends. Thus, the first item of each three-item index is an approximate measure of contact with that particular source of information. The weighted sum of those (i.e.,

$$\sum_{i=1}^n \mu_i a_i$$

where n = the number of media 13, represent the exposure μ_i , = a weighting factor, and a_i the amount of exposure the individual reports with the i th medium items) serves as a reasonable approximate combined measure of total media

exposure and its inverse of social isolation. Since the weights are those resulting from regressing attitudes toward separatism upon these exposure variables, the chance is optimized of supporting the mass society schools' hypothesis regarding the importance of exposure to media and interpersonal influence.

On the other hand, for each source, the product of exposure multiplied by bias forms an index which varies between ± 32 . It may be seen as representing the amount of favorable or unfavorable information (on the average) the individual has received about separatism from that source. The regression-weighted sum of these items, i.e.,

$$\sum_{i=1}^n \mu_i a_i b_i x_i$$

serves as a reasonable approximate combined measure of the information that the individual has received.

In spite of differences among separatists concerning tactics, French Canadian Separatism may be seen as an essentially radical political ideology, since the realization of separatist goals—primarily the political separation of the Province of Quebec from the Dominion of Canada—requires a radical revision of the political structure of Canada. Accordingly, ascription to the goals of separatism is considered *prima facie* a radical political belief in this study, and the dependent variable is measured straightforwardly as a single Likert item: "What position do *you* take concerning the issue of SEPARATISM?" Responses are the standard, "strongly favorable, favorable, neither favorable nor unfavorable, unfavorable, and strongly unfavorable." Several other important variables were also measured and will be discussed as they become germane.

Portes' (1971) findings indicate no substantial relationship between measures of social isolation—either alone or in combination—and political radicalism. Table 1 represents the equivalent data from our research. Contrary to Portes' findings, measurable (although not absolutely large) relationships do exist, at least in the aggregate, between isolation as measured by media contact and separatism, and apparently in the direction predicted by "mass society" theory. (That is, media contact is negatively related to separatism.) To be sure, these relationships are vanishingly small, particularly after

TABLE 1
Zero-Order Correlations and Twelfth-Order Standardized Partial Regression Coefficients of Attitude Toward Separatism Regressed on Exposure Indices

Sample	French		English		Bilingual	
	r	β	r	β	r	β
First newspaper	.04	.02	.02	-.07	-.02	-.01
Second newspaper	.17	.16	.12	.24 ^a	.04	.08
First radio	-.06	-.28 ^a	-.14	-.18	-.17	-.07
Second radio	.11	.14	-.09	-.10	-.15	-.08
First magazine	.01	.18	.13	.13	.04	.15
Second magazine	.15	-.03	.05	-.14	-.06	-.13
First television	.15	.18	.04	.06	-.08	-.04
Second television	.03	-.03	.08	.08	-.12	-.06
Records and tapes	.21	.18	.12	.11	.00	-.00
Movies	.22	.23	.18	.25 ^a	.05	.06
Family	-.16	-.16	-.08	-.10	-.26	-.20 ^a
First friends	-.05	-.14	-.11	-.06	-.06	-.08
Second friends	.10	.14	-.04	-.13	.09	.16 ^a
R	.49		.40		.35	
R²	.24		.16		.13	
n	104		115		193	
Corrected for shrinkage R²	.14		.05		.07	

a. $p > .05$.

correcting for shrinkage ($\hat{R}^2 = .14, .05$ and $.07$, respectively, for French, English, and bilingual subsamples). In an important sense, however, this is not a test of the theory at all, since the theory does not predict that the alienated will be more radical politically—rather, more precisely, it predicts that the alienated will be “more susceptible” to a radical appeal *given that they are exposed to it*. Isolation, however, should lessen the likelihood of exposure to radical ideologies, and it is precisely those with little or no media contact who should be expected to have the least contact with any political ideology (recalling that media include interpersonal contacts in this operationalization). Moreover, it should be strongly suspected that establishment media generally present unfavorable views of radical political ideologies, and, consequently, greater media exposure should subject individuals to greater anti-leftist information. Failure to control for media bias should yield zero-order correlations between simple exposure and leftist radicalism which are negative. Such results would in fact support the second theory—the differential socialization theory.

Table 2 shows the mean value of the media indices. As suspected, 31 of the 39 biases are negative—that is, anti-separatist. Clearly, exposure to media is closely associated with exposure to anti-separatist information. Only among the French-speaking sample are any favorable sources to be found, and it should be recalled that this subsample speaks only French. Still, the zero-order correlations afford no control for other variables suspected to play a role in this process.

If the theory underlying this research is correct, then the indices of exposure, coverage, and bias should produce substantially improved predictive power. Table 3, which lists the correlations (both zero-order and multiple) of the media indices and separatism strongly substantiates the differential

TABLE 2
Mean Bias of Media Toward Separatism

Sample	French	English	Bilingual
Media	\bar{X}	\bar{X}	\bar{X}
First newspaper	-.16	-.82	-.63
Second newspaper	-.02	-.63	-.52
First radio	.01	-.76	-.50
Second radio	.23	-.54	-.51
First magazine	.07	-.32	-.11
Second magazine	-.01	-.16	-.14
First television	.13	-.52	-.41
Second television	-.12	-.39	-.37
Records and tapes	.09	-.06	-.06
Movies	.14	-.12	.00
Family	-.28	-1.40	-1.10
First friends	.23	-1.13	-.52
Second friends	-.09	-.85	-.41
n=	104	115	193

socialization theory. First of all, the multiple correlations are substantially higher, and explained variances using the indices of coverage, exposure, and bias are doubled for the French sample, tripled for the English sample, and increased sixfold for the bilingual sample.

Although these data favor the communication-based theory of political socialization quite clearly, several additional considerations might be made. First, as the coefficients of determination (R^2) reveal, the political positions of the sample members are not completely accounted for by these indices. This is as it should be, since no theory would predict that any individual's political position on a long-term issue like separatism could be wholly explained by a measure of information received only recently (as these are), no matter how complete such a measure may be. Measurement of the

Table 3
Zero-Order Correlations and Twelfth-Order Standardized Partial
Regression Coefficients of Attitude Toward Separatism Regressed on
Exposure Coverage/Bias Indices

Sample	French		English		Bilingual	
	r	β	r	β	r	β
First newspaper	-.15	-.10	-.13	-.21	.23	.03
Second newspaper	-.04	.03	-.11	-.02	.02	-.10
First radio	.13	-.01	.22	.23 ^a	.25	.14 ^a
Second radio	.11	-.03	.05	-.05	.22	.00
First magazine	.09	.03	.10	.11	.11	-.10
Second magazine	.11	.09	-.13	-.11	.02	-.05
First television	.23	.15	-.01	-.01	.30	.06
Second television	-.22	-.18	-.08	-.05	-.01	-.02
Records and tapes	.19	.09	.17	.15	-.01	-.02
Movies	.24	.09	-.11	-.12	.26	.06
Family	.35	.16	.28	.18	.53	.25 ^a
First friend	.41	.21 ^a	.28	.19	.57	.38 ^a
Second friend	.35	.24 ^a	.09	-.02	.35	.02
R	.60		.50		.66	
R ²	.36		.25		.44	
n=	104		115		193	
Corrected for shrinkage R ²	.27		.16		.41	

a. $p > .05$.

complete communication histories of the respondents in this topic is of course not feasible for such a large sample ($n = 412$), but we can estimate the effects of these earlier processes by the attitudes each respondent reports toward other topics related to separatism. Table 4 adds such additional information sources as are available in these data, along with several sociostructural variables, as well as plausible operationalizations for other elements of the political attitude complex of which separatism is very likely a part. This last is particularly important even though not an

TABLE 4
Twenty-Ninth and Thirtieth-Order Standardized Partial
Regression Coefficients

Independent Variable	Dependent Variable		
	Attitude Toward Separatism	Assisting Separatist Candidate	Attending Separatist Rally
Age	-.02	-.01	.02
Sex	-.01	-.07	-.05
University status	-.01	.02	-.01
French-speaking	.10 ^a	.02	-.04
English-speaking	-.12 ^a	-.07	-.05
Catholic	-.08 ^a	-.00	.07
Protestant	-.05	.04	.02
Jewish	-.09 ^a	.00	.06
Atheist/agnostic	.01	-.00	-.00
First newspaper index	-.05	.02	.01
Second newspaper index	.02	.01	.09
First radio index	.08 ^a	-.04	-.08
Second radio index	.00	.03	.06
First magazine index	-.04	.02	.04
Second magazine index	.02	-.05	-.03
First television index	.04	.03	.03
Second television index	-.04	-.05	.00
Radio and tape index	.03	-.01	-.01
Movie index	-.00	.05	.03
Family index	.17 ^a	.13 ^a	-.07
First friends index	.11 ^a	.01	.01
Second friends index	.02	-.05	.00
Attitude toward U.S.	.03	-.05	.10 ^a
Attitude toward France	.02	.00	.03
Attitude toward Great Britain	-.00	-.04	.03
Attitude toward English Canada	.08 ^a	-.09 ^a	.07
Attitude toward English Canada	.10 ^a	-.05	-.03
Attitude toward Canada	.28 ^a	.20 ^a	+.08
Friends assisting sep. candidate	.12	.35 ^a	-.01
Friends attending sep. rallies	.12 ^a	.06	.37 ^a
Attitude toward separatism	-	.21 ^a	.22
R	.80 ^a	.74 ^a	.61 ^a
R ²	.64	.55	.37
n	412	412	412
R ^{2b} (corrected for shrinkage)	.62	.51	.32

a. $p > .05$.

b. See Lord and Novick (1968: 286, equation 13.2.1).

information source in the strict sense, because the research reported here (as does almost all survey research) intervenes in a process which has gone on long before the data were gathered. Consequently, the researcher must recognize and deal with the effects of other attitudes previously formed and related to the attitudes in question (Woelfel and Haller, 1971).

The addition of these variables into the analysis serves another purpose as well. Since these data represent single-point-in-time survey observations, they can at best represent covariation in the sample; thus, the hypothesis that persons deliberately seek out media coverage favoring their own view cannot be *prima facie* ruled out. Should such be the case, however, inclusion of the related attitudes complex, along with sociostructural factors, should not result in substantial increased explained variance, and furthermore would reduce or eliminate the net effects of the message variables. A sizable increase in the variance explained, however, would indicate that (a) the communication model of political radicalization shows substantial predictive utility, and (b) differential exposure to messages, insofar as it is independent (additive) of prior attitudes, is more likely viewed as exerting causal effects over attitudes than as an effect of selective exposure.¹

Table 4 includes, then, along with those variables previously reported in Table 3, the sociostructural variables sex, age, university status (i.e., year in school), and religion (measured as dummy variables); the model-type interpersonal influence variables (1) number of friends who have assisted separatist political candidates and (2) number of friends who have attended separatist rallies and demonstrations, and the set of attitudes (measured on standard 5-point Likert scales) toward the United States, France, Great Britain, French Canada, English Canada, and Canada as a whole, all of which ought reasonably to be related to separatism. Table 4 also presents

the measured net relationship between this set of variables, along with the measured separatist attitude, and two behavioral measures of separatism: frequency of assisting separatist political candidates and frequency of attendance at separatist rallies and demonstrations (both self-reported).

Of first interest are the sizes of the coefficients of determination, which are very large, particularly in the case of attitude toward separatism. Given the very large sample size ($n = 412$), these sizable coefficients cannot be interpreted as a simple result of the relatively large number (29 and 30, respectively) of independent variables, and the negligible change of these coefficients when corrected for shrinkage shows this clearly. These coefficients alone provide strong support for a communication-based theory of political socialization.

An even stronger pattern of support is revealed by an analysis of the individual regression coefficients. When the dependent variable is the attitude toward separatism, interpersonal communication processes are particularly strong, with family and friends' communication indices and friends' behavior variables large and significant. The sizable and significant coefficients for the linguistic orientation variables, the related attitudes toward French Canada, English Canada, and Canada in general, and the religious orientation variables support as well the notion that considerable prior information flow processes have not been tapped by this design. The small and nonsignificant coefficients for the various media indices indicate clear support for the notion that different sources are differentially effective in controlling for exposure and bias, and further show media sources to be consistently less effective than interpersonal sources. While no speculation about the reasons for this discrepancy will be presented here, this is clearly an issue of major concern to the communication researcher.

When the dependent variables are the behaviors *attendance at separatist rallies* and *assisting separatist candidates*, attitude effects partial out the effects of all communication variables except for family in the case of assistance of separatist candidates, as should be expected. (Why family effects should persist in this instance is not clear, although this deviation is probably minor.) Similarly, the substantial net direct effects of friends assisting separatist candidates on the individual's own assistance of separatist candidates, and of friends' attendance at separatist rallies on the individual's own attendance might indicate compliance to group pressures independent of attitude or, perhaps more likely, may represent the simple fact that attendance at such events necessarily creates exposure to others already engaged in such activities who later become friends.

DISCUSSION

Several objections might be levelled against this design and should be considered. Principal among these is the suggestion that the information received from various media (including friends) is, in fact, not an antecedent condition of the individual's attitude, but rather a *consequence* of the attitude by means of a process of selective exposure. Briefly, the notion of selective exposure assumes that information sources and media are sought out by the individual on the basis of their similarity to his or her own views. Selective exposure in the present case assumes that the individual chooses friends and other sources of information insofar as the information they convey is consistent with his or her own political position. While such a theory might initially appear to be equally supported by these data, the balance of

evidence appears to oppose the selective exposure hypothesis in general and the political homophily hypothesis in particular.

First, even under laboratory conditions where structural restrictions over the selective exposure process can be eliminated, the bulk of studies fail to show such an effect. Sears and Freedman (1971) examine eighteen experimental studies of the phenomena, and find only five which support the selective exposure hypothesis, eight which show no relationship, and five which show subjects actually prefer to expose themselves to communications inconsistent with their own attitudes. The authors suggest:

Therefore, we cannot conclude that a preference for supportive information is a strong or prevalent phenomenon. In these relatively well-controlled situations, in which a person can expose himself easily to either supportive or non-supportive information, the mechanism of selective exposure is not an important explanation of how people resist persuasion [Sears and Freedman, 1971: 289].

If selective exposure is a minor phenomenon under laboratory conditions, it should be expected to be even less salient in real-life settings, where structural factors mitigate the individual's ability to choose freely among information sources. Here the evidence is convincing. Duncan, Haller, and Portes (1968) show in a study of high school boys in Lenawee County, Michigan, that the high correlation between the levels of aspirations of best friends cannot be accounted for by status homophily. Similarly, Segal has shown in a study of friendship preferences in the Maryland State Police force that structural factors like rank, assignment, headquarters, and physical propinquity are the most important variables governing friendship choices in the

department. These relationships are even demonstrated in a strong tendency for trainees to choose friends whose last name is close to their own in alphabetical order, presumably since locker assignments are alphabetical. In studies of interpersonal influence over educational and occupational plans, Woelfel (1972) has shown that well over fifty percent of all persons designated by high school students as major information sources about education and occupation can be accounted for by structurally determined physical propinquity.

In the present sample, the effects of self-selection of sources along lines of congruence should be even further attenuated by the fact that (a) the sample members are adults whose associates are likely to be governed rather strongly by occupational and family constraints, and (b) nearly two-thirds of the sample is monolingual, and media biases break strongly along linguistic division (see Table 2). Even if we were to conclude, in the face of this evidence, that self-selection along lines of homophily does occur in this sample, our best guess would be that the *amount of variance* in the bias of the sources explained uniquely by political homophily or self-selection would be inconsequentially small.

Clearly, caution should be used in the interpretation of these single-stage survey data. Nonetheless, the overall size of the coefficients of determination, along with the very systematic pattern of regression coefficients can be viewed as supporting a communication-based theory of political radicalization, even though the theory presented here is very rudimentary. Moreover, these data do show unambiguously that different information sources have differential effectiveness over political attitudes, even controlling for amount of exposure and bias of coverage, with mass media consistently less effective than interpersonal sources.

NOTE

1. In Table 3, regression equations were calculated separately within each linguistic category in the sample. In Table 4, equations are calculated on the whole sample (n = 412), and linguistic orientation is controlled by inclusion as dummy independent variables. Thus, while the number of independent variables is increased from 13 to 29 and 30, the sample size is roughly tripled and very large, leaving respectively 382 and 381 degrees of freedom for each equation. Consequently, artifactual increase in the multiple correlation coefficient due to the increased number of independent variables is not a problem here.

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