

tionality, and what kinds of responses can be deterred with what kinds of threats appear to belong, at least in part, to the domain of psychological science. Such analysis has relevance to a future world populated by many nuclearly armed countries because it indicates rather clearly that a balance of power, if nuclear, is unlikely to be maintained in such a world. This may be one of the most important conclusions that politicians must accept as a working principle in dealing with world problems. In other words, analysis of the concept of deterrence indicates a wide range of situations under which nuclear deterrence can fail, that this range increases, perhaps geometrically as the number of nations which possess nuclear weapons increase, and that the probability is that nuclear war will occur unless other conditions can be brought about.

Conclusion

There is no genuine question of the relevancy of the science of psychol-

ogy to international affairs. The real question is the definition of the points at which psychology is relevant to such large issues. It is our belief that there is a need for systems building such as those undertaken by Talcott Parsons and Kenneth Boulding. A social science theory must be constructed that will relate the variables of sociology, economics, psychology, and political science in a logical, coherent, and empirically accessible manner. Skinner⁴ has presented some of the basic elements of an approach in this direction. Although such a theory can often be checked by correlational data and naturalistic observation, it may be the case that the only point of genuine practical experimentation will be at the psychological level. Given a nomological network, however, such data should lend truth value to the entire theory. It is at this perhaps seemingly remote and abstract level that the social sciences, including psychology, will finally make the significant contributions to

the study of international behavior that we all seek. This may be in the long run the most relevant route to solving many of our theoretical and empirical difficulties.

In the final analysis such an approach may indeed justify the optimism expressed by C. P. Snow⁵ in the evolution of a "third culture" of social scientists that will shift the focus of attention in a direction which will be more profitable to us all.

REFERENCES

- ¹ Singer, J. David, "The Relevance of the Behavioral Sciences to the study of International Relations." *Behavioral Science*, 1961, Vol. 6, No. 4.
- ² Lyons, Eugene, "The Military Mind," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Nov., 1963. Vol. 19, No. 9.
- ³ Jordan, Nehemiah "International Relations and the Psychologist," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Nov., 1963. Vol. 19, No. 9 and "Letters to the Editor," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March 1964. Vol. 20, No. 3.
- ⁴ Skinner, B. F. *Science and Human Behavior*, New York: MacMillan, 1953.
- ⁵ Snow, C. P. *The Two Cultures: And A Second Look*, New York: Mentor, 1963.

Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis

by SAMUEL J. ELDERSVELD · University of Michigan

Here is an intensive empirical study of American party elites and major party structures. It combines a fresh set of theoretical orientations and new behavioral data to answer such questions as:

- Who actually makes the final decisions within the organization?
- How well do the party members perform within the organization?
- How does the party go about contacting the public?
- What factors influence voting behavior and political attitudes?

Utilizing both sociological and psychological factors, this study concentrates on the environmental conditions of the society in which the parties must live and adapt, and the importance of the motivational basis of political leadership. It will be of considerable significance in the study of comparative party leadership, party structures, and public opinion.

1964 618 pages \$8.00



For information, write: College Department, Room 150
RAND MCNALLY & COMPANY, P.O. Box 7600, Chicago, Ill. 60680