

Africa: The Political Culture of Nationhood and the Political Economy of the State

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Special Foreword by Professor F.S. Northedge,

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The Millennium—Chase annual lectures are the offspring of a happy marriage between Millennium, the LSE journal of international studies, and the Chase Manhattan Bank of New York, a union which we all hope will long prosper. The series is now in its fifth year, previous lecturers having been Professor Raymond Aron, Professor Ernest Gellner of this School, Professor Johan Galtung and, most recently, Professor J.K. Galbraith. This year we are privileged to have as our speaker an African political scientist of world-wide reputation, Professor Ali Mazrui. Professor Mazrui was born in Kenya and took his BA at Manchester University, an MA at Columbia University and a doctorate at Oxford. He taught for ten years at Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda, where he was Head of the Department of Political Science and Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences. He is now Research Professor at the University of Jos, Nigeria, and Professor of Political Science and of Afroamerican and African Studies at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

Professor Mazrui has written voluminously on African politics and political culture and African relations with the rest of the world, his two most recent writings being Africa's International Relations, published in 1977, and Political Values and the Educated Class in Africa, which came out a year later. In 1979, he contributed to the series of Reith Lectures of the BBC under the title 'The African Condition' and the lectures were published as a book.

Professor Mazrui's subject in this article is 'Africa: the Political Culture of Nationhood and the Political Economy of the State', on which there is surely no-one better qualified to speak. There are Europeans, I know, who sometimes question whether the concept of nation, at least as Europeans understand the term, properly describes the political condition of Africa today. Professor Mazrui offers here a vigorous and an ingenious examination of what nationhood means in the African context.

F.S. Northedge

As is evident from the title, the theme of this essay is fairly basic to Africa. But let me begin by mentioning things which at first sight would appear to be

not directly connected. First, Lenin was an influential political theoretician. Second, Lord Lugard was an influential imperial theoretician within Africa's British colonies. Third, a hundred years ago Karl Marx died. Fourth, ninety years ago Lugard checked the French advance Eastwards, and prevented at least Northern Nigeria from falling into the hands of the French, for better or for worse. Fifth, eighty years ago Lugard conquered the Sultanate of Sokoto. Sixth, sixty-five years ago Lenin led the October Revolution. Finally, about sixty years ago, Lenin died. Why are all these relevant to the theme of Political Economy of the State and the Political Culture of Nationhood in Africa?

In order to answer this question, it is necessary that I put forward a series of propositions. The first is that the Anglo-Saxons, that is the white, English-speaking nations, have on the whole presided over the destiny of capitalism for two hundred years, and I mean the English-speaking sector of the capitalist world. Secondly, the Marxists have presided over the destiny of socialism for much of the twentieth century. Recent African history (the last hundred years or so) has been influenced both by the Anglo-led world of capitalism and the Marxist-led world of socialism. The connecting link for Africa is of course the imperial influence. Western imperialism opened up Africa to capitalism, but the same imperialism has made Africa increasingly receptive to radical critiques of the world system. Involved in all this is a crisis of identity in Africa, a crisis whose main theatre is the nation. But there is also a crisis of authority and control, a crisis whose main theatre is the state. The Anglo-led world of capitalism and the Marxist-led world of socialism have exerted their pressure on both political leaders and on leaders of thought in Africa, as they have grappled with issues of the state and nationhood.

There are a lot of African scholars around. It is interesting to note that thinkers and scholars in Africa are very often divided between those focusing on the political culture of their new nations on one side, and those focusing on the political economy of their new states on the other; remembering that states are the central theatre of problems of authority and control and that nations are the central theatre of problems of identity.

Now, scholars interested in nationhood scrutinise issues which range from ethnicity to nationalism, from issues of modernisation to regional integration. Those are the nationhood-orientated scholars. Scholars interested in the state increasingly worry about issues which range from central authority to economic class relations, from bourgeois legitimacy to radical social reproduction. In my discipline, political science, this division certainly manifests itself very often, but it has relevance to all the social sciences. Is nationhood everywhere a matter of political culture? Is the state a matter of political economy? And how do we learn from the information and inherited thinking that is already available to us?

In the African context, two foreign legacies captured the basic dilemma. One, the legacy of Lenin, of the world of socialism, a theoretician of the state in the perspective of political economy. The other is a British administrator, Fredrick Lugard, of the world of Anglo-led capitalism, a theoretician of nationhood in the perspective of political culture.

Well, of course, both Lenin and Lugard were practical men rather than social scientists. In a sense, Lugard was the voice of a cultural approach to

society, and Lenin was the voice of an economic approach to society. Lugard was wedded to a kind of cultural relativism, studying each African community in its own dimensions. Lenin was wedded to the principle of economic universalism. In terms of the impact on African social science, Lenin has been more potent than Lugard. Scholarship in Africa has been moving leftward; more and more social scientists on African campuses are moving leftward. So, in terms of impact on African scholarship, there is no doubt that Lenin has been more relevant than Lugard. Lenin has affected the study of African society. But, in many ways, Lugard has affected the substance of African life (at least, in those sections that were ruled by Britain). In the same way that Lenin is regarded as the architect of the Soviet state, so Lugard is widely regarded as the architect of modern Nigeria; he virtually invented it in some ways. He didn't invent the people, but he invented the territorial appendices.

At first sight, these two individuals seem to have nothing to do with each other, but there is a sense in which political experience in those parts of Africa ruled by Britain have been moulded less by the legacy of Lenin than by the legacy of Lugard. Of course, Lenin is a much bigger figure than Lugard, but on the other hand Lugard is, so far, a much bigger figure in countries like Nigeria and Uganda in the repercussions of his ideas. But behind Lenin is the heritage of Marx himself, and as we grapple with these two legacies, we have to bear that in mind.

Since Lugard is the least known of the three figures we mentioned – Lenin, Marx and Lugard – just a quick work about Lugard. In African history, he must be seen as conquerer, administrator and practical philosopher. As conquerer, as I indicated, he helped to check the French advance on behalf of the Royal Niger Company, barely two weeks before the French arrived in Hausland. Lugard therefore managed to consolidate British control of the area, but consolidation was not really confirmed until 1903 with the dethronement and defeat of Sultan Attahiru I of Sokoto. And before Nigeria, Lugard had also helped to conquer Uganda; arriving there in 1890 representing the Imperial British East African Company, he helped to subdue Uganda and helped to establish a British protectorate. Lugard the administrator, as governor of Northern Nigeria, took charge of the protectorate of Northern Nigeria from about 1900, served as colonial governor of Nigeria, helped to amalgamate Northern and Southern Nigeria in 1914 and established, as it were, what is today Africa's largest nation-state, or nation-state in the making. Finally, Lugard, as practical philosopher, helped to popularise the idea of indirect rule: why don't we rule the natives through the institutions they have already evolved, why don't we rule them through the chiefs they understand? In some ways, it was a philosophy which appealed to British gradualists. After all, Britain is basically gradualist. As Burke advised, 'neither entirely nor at once depart from antiquity'; if you have to depart from antiquity, do it slowly, and certainly don't do it all at once. And British possessiveness, with some slow change in political institutions domestically, helped to create a responsive constituency for gradualist change in the colonies as well.

As Lugard was in the process of unifying Nigeria from 1914 onwards, destiny was preparing Lenin for the October Revolution in Russia. In his later years, Lenin took up the issue of creating a kind of vanguard of the proletariat, a kind of leadership of the working class. In Leninist doctrine, this became the Communist

Party. Upon capture of power in a socialist revolution, the dictatorship of the proletariat was to become the dictatorship of the vanguard. What was not confronted by Leninist theoreticians at the time was the issue of a possible vanguard of the bourgeoisie, who led the other side. If imperialism was the highest stage of capitalism, is it not conceivable that the vanguard of the bourgeoisie was the advanced imperialist power of the day?

This brings us to the historic role of the Anglo-Saxon powers, meaning the English-speaking, white nations. In the nineteenth century, the most advanced imperialist power from the capitalist ranks was Great Britain. By the end of the middle years of the inter-war period, the most advanced power of capitalist imperialism had become the United States. The torch was passed from one English-speaking, capitalist country to another English-speaking, capitalist country to preside over the destiny of capitalism. Britain in the nineteenth century and the United States in the twentieth century have presided over precisely such a world. Indeed, the Anglo-factor, the English-speaking factor, in the destiny of capitalism, has taken a variety of forms. But what are the credentials of this chairmanship thrust upon the English-speaking universe? Why especially English-speaking nations, why not the Germans, the French? The first credential is technological leadership; Britain in the nineteenth century, and the United States in the twentieth century, have been the technological leaders of the world economy. The second credential is their share of the world economy. The British empire until the First World War, and some may say until the Second World War, and the United States since then, have had the greatest impact on the world economy. The third credential is the Anglo-factor in rationalising capitalism, and rationalising private property. It is amazing how large the Anglo-factor is in the theoretical justification of capitalism, from John Locke and the doctrine of private property, to Lord Keynes, and from Adam Smith to Milton Friedman in Chicago today. The influence is further evident in some of the advisors of Margaret Thatcher and President Reagan as well. But certainly with regard to the capitalist revolution, the Adam Smith thrust, the Lockean private property stimulus, as well as the notions of the mating between liberalism, and capitalism, there is a pronounced Anglo-factor in the rationalisation of this particular mode of production. In our time, this rationalisation has fallen more to the United States than to Britain. At the same time, the Anglo-countries have generated not just the rationale for the capitalist mode of production but also the most brilliant critiques of capitalism itself. The classic laboratory case of capitalism was, according to Marx, Britain. The classic case of imperialism was, according to Lenin, again Britain in the early part of this century. And we mustn't forget Hobson's influence on Lenin's theory of imperialism.

Now, if the Anglo-Saxons have presided over the destiny of world capitalism for two centuries, do they constitute the *de facto* vanguard of the world's bourgeoisie? Their impact on Africa has so far been more through British imperialism than through American, and, in the history of British imperialism in Africa, as I indicated, the name of Fredrick Lugard is definitely part of the vanguard. But what would Marx have said about this idea of a vanguard of the bourgeoisie and the role of the Anglo-led European imperialism? Well, he had ideas about the role of Britain, as you know, in the colonies. What did those have in common with Lugard's ideas in subsequent years, and where did their

perspectives diverge? The first factor, possibly underestimated, is that both Marx and Lugard agreed that Anglo-led European imperialism was, on the whole, a progressive force in the world. Also, the grand critic of capitalism in Marx and the grand policy maker of British imperialism in Africa in Lugard agreed that European imperialism on the whole was a progressive force in history. How could they agree? Because they both agreed that North America and Europe were at a more advanced stage of civilisation than were the countries that Europe colonised. But Lugard believed in cultural continuity in the colonies, hence don't disturb the natives too much, use the chiefs they are accustomed to; Marx believed in cultural revolution. For Marx, imperialism in non-Western countries was not a reactionary formation but was in fact a revolutionary force potential. So, if Lugard believed in economic exploitation without cultural destruction, Marx condemned the economic exploitation of imperialism while applauding the cultural disruption which came with it. Indeed, imperialism was a progressive force to Marx precisely because it helped to liberate colonial societies from the chains of their own making. Of course, Marx wrote when much of Africa hadn't as yet been colonised, so much of his theorising is based on experience in India. As Marx wrote:

English interference in India produced the greatest, and so to speak, only social revolution ever heard of in Asia. Now, as sickening as it must be to human feelings to witness millions of industrious, patriarchal and inoffensive social organisations disorganised and dissolved into their units, thrown into a sea of woes and their individual members at the same time losing their ancient forms of civilisation and their hereditary means of subsistence, sickening as all this must be as we witness the impact of the English on Indian society, we must not forget that these idyllic village communities, inoffensive though they may appear, have always been a solid foundation of oriental despotism; that they constrained the human mind within the smallest possible campus, making it the unresisted tool of superstition, enslaving it in its traditional rules, depriving it of all grandeur and historical penitence . . . England, it is true, in causing a social revolution in India, was activated only by the vilest of interests . . . and England was stupid in her manner of enforcing it.

But, Marx says, that is not the question. The question is, can mankind fulfill its destiny without a fundamental revolution in the social state of Asia? If not, whatever were the crimes of England, she was the unconscious tool of history in bringing about the revolution. But then, whatever bitterness the spectacle of the crumbling of an ancient world caused in our personal feelings, we have the right to exclaim with Goethe 'should this torture then torment us since it brings us great pleasure . . .'

Marx formulated his own dual-mindedness — 'England has to fulfill a double mission in India, one destructive the other regenerative.' The destructive one, the annihilation of ancient Asiatic societies, and the regenerative one, the laying of the material foundations of Western society in Asia. So since imperialism in North-Western societies helped to create both a bourgeoisie and a proletariat and since socialism was impossible without the two, imperialism, according to

the Marxist school, helped to prepare the Third World for socialism. There is a quote here, too, from Engels with regard to French occupation of Algeria:

... and the Congress of Algeria has already forced Tunis and Tripoli and even the Emperor of Morocco to enter upon the path of civilization. All of these nations of free barbarians look very proud, noble, glorious at a distance, but only come near them and you find that they, as well as the more civilized nations, are ruled by lust... and only employing ruder and more cruel means. And after all the modern bourgeois, with civilization, industry and order, and at least relative enlightenment, is preferable to the feudal lord or marauding robber with the barbarian society to which they belong.

Now, the important question is, is this just an example that inevitably Marx and Engels were children of their own age, that they were products of nineteenth century cultural arrogance, and that they didn't expect to be totally independent of the prejudices of their era? Or, was the theory built into historical materialism; does historical materialism, in fact, imply that any force which generates the emergence of a bourgeoisie where none existed before is progressive, and that the emergence of a proletariat and industrial working class, because it is producing two historically decisive classes, is by its very nature revolutionising? If that is the case, then the theory of Marxism itself has built within it a partial acceptance of the imperial role in creating conditions preparatory to a socialist revolution. Now, the position of Marx and Engels, therefore, could be said to follow logically from their prediction about the impact of an advanced capitalist civilisation upon pre-capitalist formations.

Therefore, if Marx and Engels had their way in Nigeria, for example, they would have opposed Lugard's strategy of indirect rule. Why? Because by maintaining and conserving pre-capitalist and feudal structures in Nigeria, indirect rule blunted the force of capitalism and slowed down its conquest of Nigeria. To Marx and Engels, that was bad news. So Lugard became a bulwark against rapid capitalist penetration of, say, Northern Nigeria; he was not against the exploitation of Nigeria by capitalism, but he did seem to be against the conversion of Nigeria to capitalism. Lugard felt that international capital and trade should indeed exploit Africa, both for its own benefit and the interests of the wider world, but need not turn African society into a major capitalist actor on the world scene. Was he unrealistic? Could capitalism exploit feudal societies without turning them into capitalist societies? Lugard said yes, but is it really true?

Well, in reality there have been consequences in Africa. The capitalism which has emerged is what I would describe as Africa's crippled capitalism. That is to say, the borrowing of only certain sections of the Western ideology; the missing out of important balancing elements, which then reduce the efficacy of the borrowed mode. For example, Africans have been better at learning Europe's consumption patterns, than at learning its production techniques; better at learning European tastes, than European capacities; better at inheriting the profit motive from the peoples of capitalism, than the entrepreneurial skills; better at learning to be acquisitive without being disciplined. All these

are factors, which I can testify to with regard to my own country and which I, as a resident of Nigeria, can testify to in Nigeria. Crippled capitalism, therefore, sometimes exaggerates the ills of capitalism in Africa. It is an inheritance which is lopsided. It may have been accidentally lopsided, or it may have been purposely lopsided. What is clear is that it is not working in a balanced form.

But the other influence is still there, and some Africans respond to the challenge of imperialism by going socialist. Here, we have Africa's problem, not so much as crippled capitalism, but as retarded socialism. The normative climate for socialism in Africa is good, but the structures and sociological soil is barren. In what sense is the climate of values good, and the structure bad? Let us take each in turn. Why can't socialist experiments work? What is wrong? On the positive side, the normative situation seems ready and receptive to a socialist transplantation. First, there is a mood of disenchantment and therefore a mood of readiness to start new things, to accept new models of transformation and development. What has been tried so far has not satisfactorily worked. Second, the fact that the imperialist powers themselves came with capitalism, has made capitalism suspicious to large sectors of opinion. If it is linked to imperialism it must be evil, there must be something bad for Africa in that precise mode of production and ideology. Therefore, we must link our nationalism to socialism. Third, there is a belief that the corruption which is hitting our society is the logical extremity of the profit motive and the essential greed embedded in the capitalist ideology. Since capitalism does involve the acquisitive ethos and since some of us have attained levels of acquisitiveness that are now outright corrupt, there is a conclusion that this is because of the very mode of production and its capitalist ideology. We are corrupt because we are capitalistic. And fourth, there is a belief, sometimes romantic, but sometimes with some semblance of validity, that the collective principle involved in socialism is a natural development from the collective principle involved in traditional black community, that so-called tribal collectivism is a natural, fertile, ground for the emergence of socialist collectivism. So much for the normative climate favourable to socialism.

What about the barren soil, structurally and sociologically? Here, too, there are several factors at work. Sociologically there are two factors: low class consciousness and high ethnic consciousness. The level of class consciousness is a bit too low for a successful socialist transformation. It is related to the problem of high ethnic consciousness, which Lugard helped to perpetuate, at least, in Nigeria. It is very interesting to see how Chief Awolowo fared in the 1983 elections in Nigeria as a result of high ethnic consciousness. In the past, he has used the rhetoric of the left, he has used the rhetoric of trying to help the disadvantaged in Nigeria, of preparing the ground for social justice in Nigeria, of rallying all the underprivileged behind the banner of his party. But, in the past, every time he has looked to see who was following him it was almost exclusively his fellow Yoruba, regardless of social class, rather than all the underprivileged of Nigeria, regardless of ethnic groups. In the past, also in my own home of Kenya, Odinga has at times experimented with the clarion call of the disadvantaged to rally them all behind him. But, every time he has done that, and looked to see who was following him, he saw it was mainly his ethnic compatriots, fellow Luo. Now, that is a situation which sociologically and

structurally is probably inhospitable to a socialist experiment; the high ethnic consciousness and the low class consciousness are uncongenial for socialism.

Structurally, there is also the outer wall of the prison house of capitalism, which is still with us. One morning you may wake up and as you are enjoying breakfast there is an announcement on the radio saying they have gone socialist in such and such a country and such and such industries are nationalised and the revolutionaries will be out soon for all those that exploit the masses and take advantage of the peasants. A blow for social justice has been struck, at least, a proclamation of intent. But then, we take a closer look. Ah! Yes, it is true. The revolution has managed to knock down the first wall of the prison house of capitalism, but alas, there is another wall just behind it. What is that wall? It is the wall of all the other things you are still landed with. First, where do you sell your goods, given the nature of economic development which took place while your country was under colonial rule, and when your markets are still excessively in the capitalist world? In the setting, what are the rules to follow? What are the rules of the game? They are pre-eminently rules which evolved out of the history of Western capitalism. What is the ultimate principle acclaimed in international trade? It is, sometimes even more so than domestically, supply and demand; the clarion organising principle of capitalism itself, but something operating at the global level even more so than in some capitalist domestic economies. What are the financial institutions that might rescue you if you are in trouble? They are overwhelmingly institutions in the capitalist world, both the straight commercial banks and the development institutions, ranging from regional developmental banks to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. What is the currency of exchange we are going to use? Foreign exchange reserves really mean dollars and pounds sterling and other freely convertible currencies on the world market. You look for currencies of the capitalist world, and even if you are doing business with the Soviet Union, they are not interested in getting roubles from you; they'd much prefer to have dollars. Even if you are a close friend, the hard-headed bargaining Soviet negotiators are still keen to see what capitalist money might flow into Soviet coffers, not what roubles might return home. That is the outer wall of capitalism. The Anglo-factor is still there; the mighty Anglo-banks, the mighty Anglo-dollar and the less mighty Anglo-pound, but nevertheless playing a part in this outer wall of capitalist imprisonment. So, in a way, many of our efforts to change fundamentally our conditions are frustrated because they are outer walls which we often underestimate. There is a simplistic tendency to think you can just make a proclamation and transform your society. We know the sad case of Tanzania's efforts to build socialism and self-reliance. In the case of self-reliance, Tanzania is now the greatest recipient per capita of foreign aid in black Africa. In the case of socialism, Tanzania really is heart-broken over the issue of corruption, which is now more severe than it was in 1967. So, the prison house continues. There is an area of achievement in Tanzania which is grossly underestimated; that is where cultural policy and language policy in Tanzania have helped to create a sense of nationhood and helped to diffuse ethnic affiliations. But Tanzania is judged on its experiment with socialism and self-reliance, and it is seldom judged on the cultural experiment in language policy and nation building. The latter is more of a success story than people

realise, but the economic experiment is certainly in disarray.

However, the real problem elsewhere in Africa results not from socialism or capitalism, that is to say retarded socialism and crippled capitalism, but from the fractured nation-state in Africa. The state is weak, perhaps, when class consciousness is weak. Conversely, the nation is weak when ethnic consciousness is strong. So, weak class consciousness weakens the state, and strong ethnic consciousness weakens the nation. The colonial state, for some reason, did not create classes for themselves (as Marx would have put it) but did help to create so-called tribes for themselves. So, the post-colonial scramble for scarce resources is not an inter-class struggle but an inter-ethnic struggle.

Now, we don't know whether there will be class consciousness as a result of the severe chronic troubles in post-colonial Africa. Declining African economies, industrial inactivity, are these going to increase class consciousness? Will there be less ethnic antagonism now that we are in economic trouble or more. Will the state get stronger as the African economies weaken, or will it do the reverse? Will there be an interruption in the tendency for urbanisation without industrialisation, which hit Africa before? Is there evidence in a decaying economy, like Ghana's or Uganda's, that people move back to the countryside, or at least establish new links with their villages? Is there such evidence in any former colonial possession that people are re-establishing links with their villages, partly in an effort to maintain joint survival? These are all questions which will remain with us as we look at the African state in its present condition.

On the whole, African countries previously ruled by France are probably closer to nationhood, that is in solving their ethnic problems, than those previously ruled by Britain. Conversely, countries previously ruled by Britain may be closer to solvent statehood, that is to having a sense of independent statehood, than those previously ruled by France. The French have maintained their control of at least part of the lives of their colonies; to that extent, they have diluted the sovereign state. On the other hand, it may well be that the absence of a French Lugard may be partly responsible for the fact that outside Chad French colonies have experienced fewer large-scale eruptions of violence and civil wars than former British colonies.

What can be said by way of an expansive conclusion? Africa is caught between, as I indicated, an Anglo-led world capitalism and a Marxist-led world socialism. As I indicated, Britain in the nineteenth century, and the United States in the twentieth century, had presided over the destiny of this world capitalism. Socialism in the world has had a Marxist vanguard; imperialism has opened Africa up to a post-capitalist stimulus of socialist opposition and Anglo-Saxon imperialism has been at the forefront of that penetration.

Let's put the Marxist and the Lugard versions of penetration together again. Marx, in favour of cultural destabilisation in the non-Western countries; Lugard in favour of cultural conservation. Marx, dedicated to a kind of economic determinist school; Lugard, dedicated to a school of the primacy of culture. Marx, believing in the positive role of imperialism in places like India; Lugard, believing in the positive role of imperialism in places like Nigeria and Uganda. Marx, seeing imperialism as having a dual mandate to develop the colonies for the world proletariat and the rest of the people; Lugard, seeing imperialism as having a dual mandate to cultivate the colony for the Western World and for the

locality. Marx, believing that religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the sentiment of a heartless world and the soul of souless conditions, 'it is the opium of the people'. Is it conceivable, without using the same terms, that Lugard believed culture and ethnicity were the sigh of the oppressed creature? Culture and ethnicity are in fact the heart of a difficult world in Africa, the soul of souless conditions. Marx, much less sensitive perhaps to religion than Lugard, was nevertheless aware of the dimensions of its hold on pre-capitalist societies. Finally, there is Lenin's greatly influential theories of neo-colonialism, which are almost a latterday theory of indirect rule. For what is neo-colonialism but looking for rulers who are there and using them from a distance, which is precisely what they did in the pre-independence era with regard to the utilisation of native authorities.

The result is the clash between the nature of the political economy of the state and the political culture of the nation. Socialism, in search of a Utopia which is classless; nationalism in Africa, in search of a Utopia which is tribeless. Higher socialism, according to Lenin: from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs. Lower form of capitalism, I'm afraid, in Kenya: from each according to his agility, to each according to his greed. The higher level of socialism: Utopia is the death of the state, so you sit around dreaming about the death of the state. Lower level of nationalism: Utopia is the birth of the nation, so you sit around dreaming about the birth of the nation. The world of socialist allegiance and class allegiance is predicated on a solidarity which emerges from the forces of economic collapse. The world of ethnic allegiance is an allegiance stimulated from the solidarity of the forces of biological reproduction and its symbolism; the kith and kin phenomenon, the symbolism of being related biologically on one side, as against the economic phenomenon, the kindred in economic interests rather than anything biological.

The destiny of my continent, therefore, falls between the dreams of its thinkers and the sighs of its suffering masses, between the legacies of its past and the fallacies of its present, between the ghosts of Marx, Lenin and Lugard and the shadows of Africa's own ancestors. Anglo-led capitalism and Marxist-led socialism have sought to capture the African state; an alien culture and indigenous tradition have sought to forge the African nation. The dilemmas persist and, as they say, the struggle continues.

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