Education Acting as a Moderator for Racial Priming

A Thesis Presented By
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Abstract

Does education moderate racial priming? The current literature on racial priming has conflicting answers. Some authors assert that racial priming happens only for the less educated, while another author asserts it may occur only for the more educated. I hypothesize that there will not be a difference in susceptibility based on the level of education of the respondent. I believe this partially because numerous other studies have not found an educational component. Additionally, people may hold latent racial views regardless of their formal education level. To resolve this debate, I conducted my own experiment; I distributed questionnaires to over 150 White participants with various educational backgrounds. Ultimately, I found all respondents, regardless of educational attainment, are susceptible to priming. However, several situations allowed for only certain subsets—males or females, or the more or less educated—to be primed. This lends support to the ideas of differential susceptibility, although the previous authors' initial ideas appear not to be entirely correct. I also found that, on some issues, respondents were susceptible to explicit racial priming regardless of education level. This is an important finding given that the dominant racial priming theory suggests that explicit appeals are rejected as breaking the norm of racial equality. Overall, my research contributes to understanding the ever-present issue of race in the United States today; specifically, that racial appeals used by political elites and racial stereotypes exacerbated by the media can have a serious influence the mass public.

Preface

I learned about racial priming for the first time during my introduction to public opinion course. This was my favorite course at the University of Michigan and racial priming quickly became the most captivating topic for me. Given my burgeoning interest, I wanted to learn more about the facets of priming—Did women respond differently than men? Was there any research on how minorities respond to priming? More generally, I wondered what factors influenced susceptibility to priming. These questions ultimately developed into this thesis research project.

To many people I owe incredibly huge thanks for their help and support during this process. I must thank my parents for their incredible support. Not only did they provide moral and spiritual support, they were actively involved throughout the entire research process. Similarly, much thanks to my friends and family that helped me along the way. Their contribution to my research was immense. Additionally, I owe them for listening to my endless discussion of thesis struggles and accomplishments. I would like to give a special thanks to Nicholas Waltz, Emalee Maus, Linda Zhong, Wesley McLaughlin, Sarah Queen, and Patrick Cherry.

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Introduction

Race in America

"I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin, but by the content of their character."
—Martin Luther King, Jr.

A Colorblind Society

During the civil rights movement, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. urged the American people to dismantle segregation and live up to the American credo. He suggested we accomplish these goals by beginning a new era of colorblindness, where Blacks were not discriminated against based on the color of their skin. King envisioned a day Black and White children could be seen holding hands and playing together. Initially this idea of colorblindness was used as a reformist ideology by civil rights activists, but the idea has transformed over time. Unfortunately, in the post-civil rights era, the idea of a colorblind society has come to be a "powerful tool for racial retrenchment" (Gotanda 1991). King's idea of colorblindness has been twisted; it has morphed from an attempt at gaining equality for minorities to simply ignoring issues of race and declaring ourselves a "colorblind" nation.

In the mid-1960s, the United States government began to incorporate the idea of colorblindness into law. When the United States government moved toward this *prima facie* neutrality in law and rhetoric, it was partially responding to pressure generated by the civil rights movement, but also in an effort to undercut emerging radical movements (Kim 2000). It did so by undermining the message of groups like the Congress of Racial Equality, the Black Panther Party, and the Student Nonviolent (later National) Coordinating Committee because their

messages were blatantly racialized. Thus, colorblind talk ultimately proved to be an effective means of delegitimizing these Black Nationalist groups. Once a colorblind rhetoric was assumed by the state, it was used to hold back more radical racial change. Even today, Kim (2000, 19) argues that this colorblind talk is still used to impede the progress of Black Americans; she cites that it is used as the "preferred weapon of conservatives seeking to roll back reforms in affirmative action, redistricting, and other areas."

The riots of the 1960s also created a large racial rift. The Watts riots, for example, provided televised images of violent mobs, as well as people looting stores and torching neighborhoods. This stood in stark contrast to previous riots highlighted on the news, showing well-dressed Blacks peacefully petitioning for their rights while being struck with nightsticks or attacked by police dogs. Although both Whites and Blacks feared the violence, Whites were much more likely to condemn participants in the riots, as well as being more eager for the police and National Guard to retaliate against them; Kinder and Sanders (1996, 321) cite that in national surveys from 1968, "62% of Whites declared looters should be *shot*, 72% said that civil rights leaders were trying to push too fast, and 79% agreed that blacks shouldn't push themselves where they're not wanted." Kinder and Sanders argue that these images of violence made Blacks appear that they were not appreciative of the advances given to them.

Politicians soon began appealing to the apprehensions of Whites. The emphasis on equality was replaced by discussions of law and order. Simultaneously, George Wallace appeared on the national stage, soon followed by Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan. Each gave public expression to racial resentment; they interpreted inner-city violence and poverty as examples of how Blacks failed to live up to American values. These discussions helped legitimize what some scholars have described as a new type of prejudice; one not based on

charges of biological inferiority, White supremacy, segregation, or representing Blacks as second-class citizens. The subtle message was that Blacks should take quiet advantage of the ample opportunities now available to them. Ultimately, Blacks should work their way up without any special favors in a society that was now colorblind. Since this shift occurred, the idea of "pulling yourself up by your own bootstraps" has become a popular political refrain.

By the mid-1970s, Whites were less concerned with issues of civil rights. Kinder and Sanders (1996) assert that by this time, Whites seemed to feel the United States government had successfully swept away all the obstacles standing in the way of African American participation in society. All the previous impediments were now removed; segregation was being dismantled, discrimination was illegal, and voting rights were being enforced. Consequently, "in the view of many white Americans, the problem of race was solved" (Kinder and Sanders 1996).

Over a decade later, the trope of the "urban underclass" was popularized by William Julius Wilson's *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy* (1987). Wilson argues that Black urban poverty is due to a combination of economic forces (such as deindustrialization and disinvestment in the inner city) and social deviance (such as crime, drug use, and teen pregnancies). Essentially, Wilson argued that the significance of race was declining, but he simultaneously holds poor urban Blacks responsible for certain cultural deficiencies (e.g. drug use or poor work habits) without making claims that this behavior was somehow due to their racial background.

This coincides with the mainstream view that America affords opportunities for everyone who works hard enough. As Bobo and Hutchings (1996, 954) explain it, "The dominant stratification ideology in the United States holds that opportunities are plentiful and that individuals succeed or fail largely on the basis of their own efforts and talents." Ultimately, the

language used in the underclass myth continues to stigmatize Blacks by reconstructing them as a distinct racial group with specific negative characteristics. As Kim (2000) writes, the use of this language serves to perpetuate and justify Blacks low status in American society.

A New Form of Prejudice

Scholars of this new form of racial prejudice argue that this resentment formed based on the American commitment to hard work. The question became not whether Blacks possessed the ability to succeed, but whether they would *try* to succeed. One could now argue that African Americans could be judged as Martin Luther King, Jr. had hoped they would be—based on the content of their character. Thus, the riots and inner-city life style were interpreted by many Whites as "repudiations of individualism, sacred American commitments to hard work, discipline, and self-sacrifice" (Kinder and Sanders 1996, 105). At the same time, negative stereotypes of Blacks began to swell. These included allegations of abuse in the welfare system, increased crime, dissolution of the traditional family, increased drug use, and a dependence on government hand-outs. More recently, issues of affirmative action have been at the forefront; allowing promotions and jobs for unqualified Blacks, as well as schools full of unprepared and undeserving Black students.

Each of these issues created a public venue for the spread of racial animosity. This new form of prejudice is preoccupied with issues of one's moral character, informed by the virtues associated with the American tradition of individualism. The core of this prejudice states that African Americans simply don't try hard enough and they take what they have not earned. Therefore, prejudice today is expressed in the language of American individualism.

The colorblind discourse obscures America's racial problems. Within this discourse, the most egregious efforts at racial classification are permissible as long as they are racially coded. Thus, discourses on race likely will not reference race at all. For example, claims that Blacks have certain cultural or behavioral deficiencies—such as using drugs, depending on welfare, or having high rates of teenage pregnancy—are acceptable because they do not blame society. These comments characterize Blacks as a distinct racial group with negative attributes, allowing for the justification of their low status in society. Although White opinion makers no longer talk about the racial natures of the "Negro," Kim (2000) argues that the contemporary discourse upholds a system of racial ordering that keeps Blacks located at the bottom and Whites located at the top.

Overall, behind the façade of colorblindness, groups are continuously re-racialized in a way that reproduces the American racial order. Some of the racial ordering processes involve White intentionality, while some do not (Kim 2000). Regardless, they reinforce a structural relationship between Blacks, Whites, and other groups such that the misfortunes of Blacks become opportunity for other groups.

Political elites have taken advantage of the idea that White Americans are more accepting of racial equality but also hold negative racial stereotypes about African Americans. These elites have appealed to racially conservative views in an attempt to activate Whites' latent negative racial views. In keeping with the concept of a colorblind society, this happens mostly indirectly; mainly via discussions of issues stereotypically associated with racial minority groups—such as crime or welfare—rather than direct references to the minority group. These appeals activate the latent racial attitudes of Whites and this can influence their vote choice and policy preferences. Even though these racial attitudes are activated, politicians have found a way to make them

salient without violating the contemporary norms of racial equality. This process is known as racial priming.

Most studies used to assess the impact of negative racial cues use an experimental design. This design randomly assigns viewers to either a stereotypical racial cue (such as a Black criminal) or a counter-stereotypical or non-related issue (such as something about the environment). Exposing respondents to these messages is the first step towards understanding the impact of such cues. After viewing the messages, investigators measure viewers' preferences for relevant candidates or policies. These responses are then examined to see if the racial cue caused a racialized reaction. This racialized reaction manifests itself in several possible forms. One common version is assessing respondents' level of longstanding negative racial predispositions (such as stereotypes or resentments) and test for evidence that the racial cue caused racial priming—defined as "the increased impact of negative racial predispositions on relevant candidates or policy opinions" (Mendelberg 2008, 110). Based on these methods, the overarching conclusion is made that exposure to media cues containing subtle, and not-so-subtle, racial messages can significantly influence political preferences.

Overview of Chapters

Now that we have a more solid understanding of race relations and issues of race in the United States, we can more easily grasp the issues involved with racial priming. In chapter 1, we will examine the impact of race cues. There is an extensive, although far from exhaustive, literature review of the current understanding of racial cues, leading into racial priming. In chapter 2, we will examine the facets of racial priming. Specifically, we move toward

understanding the effects and limitations of the two types of racial primes—implicit and explicit. In chapter 3, there will be a larger discussion of the role of my research on education in the racial priming literature via my hypotheses and methodology. In chapter 4, we will examine my data beginning with an examination of the impact of exposure to racialized cues, without considering the possible moderating effects of education. This is important to examine first because it helps lay the groundwork for understanding racial priming and the primary dispute between Mendelberg, on the one hand, and Huber and Lapinski, on the other. Then, in chapter 5, we will move on to the education-related priming results. This chapter gets at the heart of my research question and provides direct evidence for the importance of education for the priming hypothesis. In chapter 6, there will be a general discussion of all the findings and the broader implications of research on education effects. Finally, in chapter 7, I will conclude my thesis with a discussion of why this research is important and what it means in a broader context.

Chapter 1

The Impact of Race Cues

Historical Use of Racialized Messages and Priming

Prior to the Civil Rights movement, explicitly racialized messages were used in general discourse, as well as by political elites. Politicians, especially but not exclusively in the South, regularly engaged in race baiting to generate political support (Mendelberg 2001; Williams 2003; Hutchings, Walton, and Benjamin 2010). These appeals were generally directed at White men. In the 1860s, for example, President Andrew Johnson proclaimed that "this country is for White men and by God, as long as I am President, it shall be a government for White men" (Williams 2003, 25). Similarly, in 1946, Mississippi Senator Theodore Bilbo was on the campaign trail when he was quoted giving the following instructions: "You and I know what's the best way to keep the nigger from voting. You do it at night before the election. I don't have to tell you any more than that. Red-blooded men know what I mean" (Mendelberg 2001, 71). Given that most Blacks were disenfranchised and Whites generally endorsed negative racial stereotypes throughout the 19th and into the 20th centuries, there was little reason to avoid such blatantly racialized appeals.

However, as the political influence of African Americans began to grow, these appeals diminished. Given the growing power of African Americans, these blatantly racist appeals were difficult to justify (Mendelberg 2001). Although these overt appeals began to disappear, they did not fade away completely. Although many Whites became more racially tolerant in the second half of the 20th century, many continued to embrace negative views of African Americans.

The messages given by political candidates have also evolved to meet these increasingly tolerant attitudes. Their appeals now had to adhere to the norm of racial equality. This norm developed during and after the civil rights movement as racial attitudes grew more tolerant. Explicitly racial messages, common during the first half of the 20th century, were replaced by implicitly racial messages. These explicit messages portrayed African Americans as threats and used racial nouns like "Black" or "race." For example, the former Governor of Alabama, George Wallace, openly called for continued segregation, "Segregation today, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever." The contemporary implicit appeals convey a similar message to their explicit counterparts, but replace racial terms with more vague references to race. Most often, they rely on pictures (of Blacks) rather than racialized words. Mendelberg (2001) argues that these implicit messages are the only ones that can be employed successfully; she believes that explicit appeals are seen as racist and violate the norm of racial equality.

In the 1988 presidential contest featuring George H. W. Bush versus Michael Dukakis, the implicitly racialized Willie Horton ad was created by political groups associated with the Bush campaign (see Image 1). The ad portrayed Dukakis as being "soft on crime," allowing a Black man convicted of murder to be given weekend passes where he was able to leave the prison. During one of these weekend passes, Horton assaulted a White couple. The advertisement flashed a grainy picture of Horton as it described the awful events. Though Bush had initially trailed Dukakis in several polls in the summer of 1988, within one month after airing the Horton ads, Bush's support skyrocketed. Within four months, Bush held a decisive lead (Mendelberg 2001). Some commentators attribute this, at least in part, to the Horton ad campaign.

Issues of race have also been injected into the current political race for the 2012 Republican Presidential nomination. While campaigning in New Hampshire, for example, Newt

Gingrich made several race-related remarks. Gingrich discussed Black's dependence on food stamps at a campaign stop. According to Lucy Madison of CBS News, Gingrich told an audience on January 5, 2012 that if he were invited to speak at the NAACP convention he would talk about why "the African American community should demand paychecks and not be satisfied with food stamps." This racialized remark received a severe backlash from the NAACP President and many news outlets reporting on the story. NAACP President and CEO Benjamin Jealous released a statement hours after Gingrich's remarks saying, "The majority of people using food stamps are not African American, and most people using food stamps have a job." Gingrich's spokesman later told CBS News that the candidate wants Americans of "all backgrounds" to "have the opportunity to earn a paycheck."

These remarks help perpetuate the stereotype that African Americans are heavily reliant on food stamps and are too lazy to work. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, 28 percent of households receiving food stamps are African American, whereas 59 percent are White. The fact that Blacks are more likely to receive food stamps is reflective of the fact that they are in disproportionately lower socioeconomic groups. Given that Gingrich suffered little backlash after this explicitly racialized comment, this calls into question Mendelberg's insistence that the mass public strictly adheres to the norm of racial equality.

Similarly, while campaigning in Iowa in early January, Republican presidential nominee Rick Santorum referred to Blacks as being welfare-dependent. This speech was delivered to a mostly White audience. At the campaign stop is Sioux City, Santorum told an audience while discussing entitlement reform, "I don't want to make Black people's lives better by giving them somebody else's money; I want to give them the opportunity to go out and earn the money."

Santorum later backtracked from his remarks, telling CBS News on January 2, 2012, "Let me just say that no matter what, I want to make every lives [sic] better…. I've been pretty clear about my concern for dependency in this country and concern for people not being more dependent on our government, whatever their race or ethnicity is." Santorum tried to dismiss the racial nature of his comment by claiming that he did not say "Blacks," but actually mumbled and misspoke so it simply sounded like he said "Blacks."

In the same month, when discussing the economy on Fox News, Gingrich made a racialized attack on President Obama. Gingrich told Sean Hannity in May 2011 that, "President Obama knows how to get the whole country to resemble Detroit." While this may be an attack on President Obama's ideology or the struggling economy, it also implicitly racializes the issue. Detroit is often stereotypically associated with crime and poor African Americans. As a result, Gingrich's comment connects these stereotypic depictions of Blacks with our nation's first Black president.

Although some of these messages may be more blatantly racialized than others, they all help illustrate that race is still an issue in the United States. There are serious stereotypes and misconceptions that are being perpetuated via these candidates' campaigns, as well as the media's display of these candidates' messages. Given the repetitive use of these messages over time, it begs the question of their effectiveness. Presumably, if these appeals were not effective, political candidates would no longer use them. Thus, we must turn to the literature to examine if and how racialized messages affect viewers' perceptions of African Americans.

The Contribution of Social Psychology

The largest literature indicating that race cues are primed by racial stereotypes can be found in social psychology. All these studies point to the fact that racial cues often work without a respondent's awareness (i.e., in an unconscious fashion). The impact of these racialized messages is important to note given the numerous studies showing a significant decline in explicit measures of racial stereotypes and prejudice, which appears to be heavily influenced by social desirability (see especially Devine and Elliot 1995; Devine et al. 1991; Dovidio and Gaertner 1986; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Schuman et al. 1998; Sears et al. 2000).

It is important to note that there has been some genuine change in racial attitudes over time. For example, we have seen the elimination of overt bigotry, strict segregation, adherence to the idea that Blacks are intellectually inferior to Whites, and advocacy of governmentally enforced discrimination (Bobo and Smith 1998). Although some considerable negative racial attitudes remain, we should not make the mistake of characterizing all changes as insincere or merely as a result of social desirability. Still, some studies have shown that less overt measures of prejudice reveal high levels of racial stereotyping and bias. Thus, these problems have not disappeared, but they continue to operate in a more subtle manner.

For research involving implicit priming, subliminal cues are often used. These studies expose subjects to subliminal racial cues, such as the words "Black" or "White," but the exposure is so quick that subjects don't consciously register it. Thus, when asked, subjects say that they never saw these words. However, subjects who are exposed to the word "Black" and then asked to indicate whether subsequent letter strings represent real or fake words are quicker and more accurate in classifying negative than positive stereotypical words. For respondents unconsciously exposed to the term "White," they are more able to quickly identity positive

stereotypical words (Wittenbrink, Judd, and Park 1997). The negative stereotypic words include poor, lazy, and dangerous while positive stereotypic words included wealthy, responsible, and independent. Examples of fake words include random letter strings such as "niiise" or "lwhie." In a similar design, subjects cued with images of African Americans are more likely to mistakenly identify innocuous objects as weapons. Conversely, images of Whites led respondents to mistakenly identifying weapons for innocuous objects (Payne 2001; Payne, Lambert, and Jacoby 2002).

Another famous subliminal design is the Implicit Association Test (IAT). By pressing computer keys, subjects are asked to distinguish between Black and White faces, as well as positive and negative words. Then, they are asked to press a single key for a face paired with a word. Investigators determine bias by measuring the difference in speeds of responses to the Black-positive versus White-positive pairings, and to Black-negative versus White-negative pairings. According to Greenwald and Krieger (2006), all demographic groups show considerably *more* racial bias on this measure, via faster reactions to White-positive and Black-negative cues, than are revealed in explicit measures. More than sixty other studies have also shown an association between the IAT and relevant behaviors. Implicit stereotyping has been replicated over various time periods, situations, and with various stimuli. Judgments by police officers, juries, and judges have replicated and validated these findings, specifically with some studies examining real-world decisions (Blair, Judd, and Chapleau 2004; Eberhardt, Goff, Purdie, and Davies 2004; Eberhardt, Davies, Purdie-Vaughs, and Johnson 2006; Graham and Lowery 2004; Plant and Perchue 2005).

Some research has helped to clarify the real-world impacts of race cues associated with stereotypes of African Americans. For example, Eberhardt et al. (2004) found that subliminally

cuing concepts or objects associated with Black stereotypes lead to more attention to Black faces, with the strongest relationship for more stereotypical Black faces. The authors also found that judges sentenced Blacks with more stereotypically Black facial features to an average of eight additional months of sentencing compared to Blacks with lighter skin and less Afrocentric features (Eberhardt et al. 2004). Thus, declines in blatant stereotyping have occurred and Americans' consistently endorse equal treatment under the law, but exposure to Black faces can lead to discrimination in murder cases when the particulars of the crime—i.e., a White victim and a Black perpetrator—make race salient. Eberhardt et al. (2006) find that in actual cases where this race cue is present, defendants with more stereotypically Black faces are sentenced to the death penalty at more than twice the rate of defendants with less stereotypically Black faces (58 percent versus 24 percent, respectively). These effects control for mitigating and aggravating circumstances, as well as murder severity. This illustrates how much of an impact these cues can have on real people, including jurors and defendants.

The culmination of all this research suggests that racial cues can influence people's responses in ways that solidify racial inequities. This is true even when people are unaware that they have been exposed to racial cues and their decisions are shaped by racial stereotypes or attitudes. These claims lend support to the idea that racial messages are likely to work, especially implicitly. However, because these studies deal with cues and responses that are removed from political decisions, their evidence is insufficient for our purposes. We must examine studies of public opinion to illuminate a connection between racial cues altering political decisions.

The Contribution of Public Opinion and the Media

Realistic news messages also produce results similar to those described in the previous section. For example, Terkildsen (1993) found that racial predispositions can be activated beneath the level of conscious awareness through an implicit process. She created a fabricated newspaper story describing a fictional gubernatorial candidate to show to subjects. In the story there is a photo of the candidate and the male was "morphed" to appear dark-skinned Black, light-skinned Black, or White depending on which story the respondent viewed. Everything else about the candidate besides race or skin color was identical. Terkildsen (1993) found that the Black candidates received less support than the identical White candidate. The effect of negative racial predispositions on candidate support was also strongest on the implicit cue (i.e., the light-skinned Black candidate). Thus, light skin serves as an implicit racial cue that avoids detection and circumvents Whites' self-censorship. Respondents who were less concerned about social norms, however, experienced stronger effects of negative racial predispositions on candidates for the dark-skinned candidate. This study also provides evidence that the effect of race cues is regulated by sensitivity to norms, which represses racial predispositions.

Nelson and Kinder (1996) examined whether racial cues can prime attitudes on affirmative action. The authors found that for affirmative action, implicit racial cues do prompt racial priming attitudes. The authors exposed subjects to negative images (i.e., consistent with stereotypes) or positive images (i.e., counter-stereotypical) of Blacks, or irrelevant images of Whites. For the White images, racial resentment had virtually no effect. However, a moderate effect (although statistically insignificant) was found for positive images of Blacks while a considerable impact was found with the negative images of Blacks (Nelson and Kinder 1996).

Other research has also shown the important influence of the media on public opinion. For example, Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley (1997) found that the way in which a story is covered results in extremely different portrayals of the same event. They also found that words and images are equally important. Alternative portrayals or frames can greatly influence perceptions of issues and result in differing opinion formation (Nelson et al. 1997). The emphasis on the importance of pictures lends support to the effectiveness of implicit racial priming. Slocum (2001) examined the use of racial code words in political campaigns. Similar to Mendelberg, Slocum finds that blatant racial appeals are socially unacceptable in contemporary America. However, given the recently racialized interviews and messages by presidential candidates, it is unclear if this is always true. Perhaps, as Hutchings, Walton, and Benjamin (2010) suggest, only certain segments of the population accept the norm of racial equality; specifically, they believe White men and Southerners may be less likely to adhere to it. Given that racial priming often occurs via the media's airing of political candidates and their messages, it is unclear if messages differentially impact less and more educated viewers.

Valentino (1999) conducted an experimental study pertaining to support for political candidates. He examined the impact of racial cues embedded in actual crime news stories on support for Bill Clinton. Valentino used a five-second mug shot of two suspects, both of the same race, as the racial cue. In addition to a control group that viewed no crime story, one treatment group viewed a crime story with no images, while four other treatment groups viewed White, Black, Asian, or Hispanic male suspects of the crime (Valentino 1999). Valentino found that only the minority suspects had an effect; ultimately reducing Clinton's lead over Dole by 22 percentage points relative to the control condition. Additionally, Valentino asserts that implicitly racial cues are "connected in memory and can be simultaneously activated by common news

coverage" (1999, 293). Thus, if people are continuously subjected to this racialized crime news, they may automatically associate certain races with certain stereotypical actions. These experiments further the belief that implicit crime-based cues result in racial priming.

Valentino, Hutchings, and White (2002) found that code words are a sufficient trigger for racial priming and found the strongest results emerge when the racial cues are implicit – that is, paired with images of African Americans. Valentino et al. (2002) also concluded that pairing stereotype consistent visuals with a narrative triggers the effect of racial priming more so than simply the presence of Black images (i.e. non-stereotypic portrayals of African Americans). Forty-two percent of Valentino et al.'s sample had a college education and they were still susceptible to being primed by code words. This lends support to Mendelberg's view that education likely does not moderate racial priming.

Hurwitz and Peffley (2005) conducted an experiment to examine the effects of racial priming on a national scale. The authors performed an experiment with a nationwide random telephone sample where they asked non-Hispanic Whites to answer the following question: "some people want to increase spending for new prisons to lock up violent [inner-city] criminals. Other people would rather spend this money for antipoverty programs to prevent crime. What about you?" (Hurwitz and Peffley 2005, 223). Half of the sample was randomly assigned a version of the question omitting the phrase "inner-city." The authors found that racial attitudes (defined as anti-Black stereotypes and perceptions of racial fairness) influence punitive preferences on crime policy, but only when violent criminals are identified as "inner-city." Racial predispositions became more powerful than variables measuring attitudes toward the general fairness of the justice system, equality, fear of crime, ideology, party identification, education, gender, age, or region based on the implicit ("inner-city") racial cue (Hurwitz and

Peffley 2005). Hurwitz and Peffley's national sample lends support to the idea that racial priming occurs on a large-scale and many Americans are susceptible.

The largest experiment using racial cues was conducted by Gilliam and Iyengar (2000). They examined the connection between violent crime and racial imagery that is commonly found on the news. Subjects were shown an actual, typical television news crime story featuring either a mug shot of the Black perpetrator, White perpetrator, or no picture. They found that the connection between crime and imagery creates a crime narrative "that includes two core elements: crime is violent and perpetrators of crime are non-white males" (Gilliam and Iyengar 2000, 560). Nearly half the subjects exposed to the crime story *without* an image claimed they remembered seeing a Black suspect when there was none. The Black image and no image conditions had similar results, in contrast to the White image.

The authors believe exposure to the racial element of the crime narrative heightens negative attitudes about African Americans among White, but not Black, viewers. According to Gilliam and Iyengar's (2000) experiments, only a five-second exposure in the news to a Black perpetrator is sufficient to stimulate an increase in White viewers who believe crime is caused by individual failings and express negative beliefs about African Americans. Thus, regardless of a viewer's level of education, exposure to these messages could potentially create or reinforce (latent) negative racial attitudes. Additionally, Gilliam, Iyengar, and Wright's (1996) work found that African Americans are "disproportionately featured in the coverage of violent crimes," whereas Whites are underrepresented. Thus, Blacks are disproportionately featured as criminals in the news, and only a brief exposure to this creates more negative views of Blacks as a whole. This likely helps contribute to the ever-present stereotype of Blacks as criminals.

Domke (2001) extended the work on the impact of implicit race cues. He gave an experimental group a news article with racially coded words (i.e., gangs, inner city, and crack cocaine) and the other group a version without those words. Domke then asked for open-ended responses to crime. Thirty-four percent of respondents cued with racial code words mentioned those words and related terms. This was more than double the percentage in the group that lacked racial code words (Domke 2001).

White (2007) also found implicit priming results via similar experiments. One experiment exposed subjects to a newspaper article about a politician who opposes the war in Iraq because it discriminates against African Americans (explicit), or because it prevents spending on programs to assist the poor (implicit), or for nonracial reasons (non-racial), or an off-issue control story. For White respondents, only the implicit story increased the effect of anti-Black feelings on opposition to the war relative to the control condition. For Blacks, however, the response was a strongest effect of pro-Black feelings on opposition to the war. It was strongest in the explicit condition, given that more explicit pro-Black messages would better mobilize in-group solidarity (White 2007).

In White's second experiment, he used funding for food stamps as the topic of the newspaper article. White respondents racialized their opinion only in the implicit "inner city families" condition, not in the explicit "black and Hispanic," implicit "poor," or non-racial "working American" conditions (White 2007). Black respondents were again found to be more responsive to the explicit condition. Similarly, the article elicited a negative response from Blacks with the use of "inner city" in the implicit condition. Thus, White replicates the finding that White subjects only respond to implicit, and not explicit, cues to negative racial stereotypes. Given that Blacks respond to explicit messages and Whites respond to implicit messages, White

(2007) concludes that racial responses are tailored to racial norms. That is, Whites perceiving an anti-Black reaction to an explicit cue is a violation of the norm, whereas Blacks perceiving a pro-Black reaction is no such a violation.

Brader, Valentino, and Suhay (2008) examined what triggers public opposition to immigration and found that the emotional impact of a message was crucial. Brader et al. (2008) find that the news about immigration triggers emotions, specifically anxiety. They suggest that the power of anxiety also causes the public to be more susceptible to error or manipulation when group cues trigger anxiety independently of an actual threat being posed by the group. Brader et al. also argues that anxiety arousal may "hinge on stereotypic depiction of the group. When stereotypes are undermined, the emotional impact wanes" (2008, 975). Thus, the authors argue that when cues about minority out-groups are available, political elites can fill information about the issue with emotional significance. Ultimately, "to understand the impact of elites on mass opinion, one must attend to the power of feeling, not just seeing, threats" (Brader et al. 2008, 976).

While their research focuses solely on Latino immigrants, the broader implications of Brader et al.'s findings are relevant to other minority groups. The overrepresentation of African Americans in crime news, for example, could explain the ongoing negative feelings, especially fear, of the group more generally. Given the stereotypic presentation of African Americans as criminals, this may be enough to trigger anxiety and concern about the group. Similarly, because political elites can easily inject emotion into their messages presented to the public, the fear of African Americans or Latinos could easily be heightened.

The consistent emphasis that the media puts on crimes, especially violent ones, as being perpetrated by Black males could perpetuate the negative stereotypes and views of Blacks by

Whites. At the very least, these messages serve to scare White Americans into believing Blacks are threatening. As a result, regardless of ideology, White viewers may be more likely to oppose government help for Blacks. Though White viewers may not admit or even consciously realize these negative feelings towards Blacks, their latent feelings are illustrated via racial priming research.

The Theory of Racial Priming

Mendelberg helped pioneer the concept of racial priming. She first examined how campaigns can prime the racial predispositions of Whites' views on government policies "designed to ameliorate racial inequality" in the United States (Mendelberg 1997). Mendelberg concluded that the racial appeals in the 1988 Presidential campaign by George H. W. Bush, namely the Willie Horton ad, "mobilized whites' racial prejudice, not their worries about crime" (1997, 151).

According to Mendelberg, "issues of welfare and crime have a long history of entanglement with race and a continuing salience in American politics" (2001, 5). Mendelberg developed a theory of racial priming which contrasts messages that are implicitly and explicitly racialized. An explicitly racial message represents stereotypes against African Americans; it portrays African Americans as a threat and uses racial nouns such as "Black," "race," or "racial." On the other hand, an implicitly racial message conveys the same message, but replaces the racial nouns and adjective with "more oblique references to race" (Mendelberg 2001). Thus, implicit messages mainly rely on the use of pictures and not words. She argues that in

contemporary politics, implicit racial messages are the only ones that can be employed successfully.

Mendelberg argues that the racial aspect of implicit messages appears to be coincidental and tangential and, as a result, many viewers are not aware of its racial nature. The goal of these racialized messages, whether implicit or explicit, is to result in racial priming. The effects of racial priming can be measured by an increase in racial stereotypes, fears, and resentments, leading to increased opposition to racial policies. She adds, "[political candidates] or their campaign aides sometimes consciously convey implicit racial meaning, and, regardless of the campaigners' intent and awareness, implicit racial meaning is often communicated by the media and received by voters" (Mendelberg 2001, 5).

With this in mind, Mendelberg created a theory of racial priming that continues to receive wide support. Her theory states that racial priming occurs without a spoken narrative, actually relying solely on visual cues, and has four basic assumptions (Mendelberg 2001). The first assumption is that Whites sincerely endorse racial equality and simultaneously resent minorities. Though Whites are genuinely committed to the norm of racial equality, many Whites also view Black demands for racial justice as illegitimate. Thus, they simultaneously support the norm of racial equality and harbor anti-Black stereotypes. Second, subtle racial appeals are effective because they are ambiguous. Since the messages are ambiguous they could arguably be about something other than race. Third, subtle appeals make latent racial attitudes more accessible. Implicit racial appeals make it easier for Whites to recall and apply their racial views to political decisions. Finally, racial appeals are only effective if they are *not* recognized as such by the audience. Persuasive racial appeals must be implicit, characterized by oblique references to race. She recognizes that code words can trigger racial priming, but relies solely on visuals because

the exact definition of what constitutes a code word is debated. Mendelberg argues that implicit (i.e., visual but not verbal) cues are more likely than explicit (i.e., visual *plus* verbal) cues to meet this requirement (Mendelberg 2001).

Summary of the Racial Priming Literature

Overall, there are several large literatures—based on a variety of different methods and samples—leading to two important conclusions. First, public opinion can be more or less racialized depending on the messages in the political environment. Second, "in all but the aggregate studies (in which the nature of the cue is unclear), these messages appear to work implicitly" (Mendelberg 2008, 115). Given that all of these studies are sufficiently different—in demographics, methods, time frame, and nature of the racialized cues—their consistent conclusion is difficult to refute by reference to one specific dimension. Thus, a study claiming to find no evidence of racialized responses stands out as peculiar. Much further research is needed to fully understand the nuances of racial priming, such as the potential effects of education or gender.

Chapter 2

Examining the Facets of Racial Priming: Implicit vs. Explicit

Recognition of Racial Priming's Effectiveness

Though considerable scholarship is dedicated to racial priming, there are still many aspects yet to be explored. My research question examines one aspect of racial priming that has received minimal attention: does education moderate racial priming?

In order to answer my research question I need to approach the racial priming literature from multiple levels. The first level seeks to replicate previous findings by determining whether racial priming really exists. The majority of authors agree that it does exist. However, some (see especially Huber and Lapinski [2006, 2008]) are more cautious about findings that assert racial priming. A second level examines if there are differences between implicit and explicit racial priming, namely examining if explicit racial appeals are effective. The third dimension examines if there are differences between types of priming; specifically, are certain groups differentially susceptible to racial priming? Debate at this third level requires general agreement on the first two. The review of the following literature aims to outline the interaction between the different levels.

Mendelberg's theory of racial priming argues that voters will reject explicit racial appeals in contemporary politics because they violate the norm of equality. As a result, candidates must create ambiguous messages that indirectly evoke racial stereotypes. This is generally done through the use of images rather than racial nouns or adjectives (for example, "Black" or "inner city"). She argues these subtle appeals are effective because they make voters' latent racial

attitudes more accessible in memory (Mendelberg 2001). Mendelberg's theory has been supported by several other scholars with relatively minimal controversy.

The methodology used to study racial priming is generally very similar throughout the literature. Participants are first randomized into either control or treatment groups. The treatment group views fabricated news articles or campaign ads with racial cues, whereas the control group is exposed to non-political articles or ads without racial undertones. Both groups fill out a questionnaire before and after they have been exposed to the treatment; they are asked questions about their political views and their opinions pertaining to race, such as support for welfare or affirmative action. The participants are told this information is necessary for background purposes in the data. A key component of the racial priming research is that participants should remain unaware that the researchers are examining race.

One skeptic of the existing priming literature is Lenz. Although Lenz (2009) does not deny the findings of the massive priming literature, he believes the results are actually showing something besides priming effects; he argues that *learning* causes a significant effect that can change views on policies. Lenz examines four cases of apparent priming and finds that effects occur only on individuals who learn the parties' positions during the treatment. His work examined how people's attitudes shifted—either based on party or the specific issue. The author writes, "exposing individuals to campaign and media messages on an issue informs some of them about the parties' or candidates' positions on that issue… these newly informed individuals often adopt their party's or candidate's position as their own. Combined, these effects give rise to the appearance of priming in the absence of actual priming" (Lenz 2009, 822).

Lenz's work states that education and learning may in fact be mistaken for priming. Thus, a more educated person may appear to have been primed when in fact they were not. Although

Lenz's findings are noteworthy, they are not directly applicable to *racial* priming. Given that he examines priming effects on candidate preference or incumbent evaluations, his conclusions aren't germane to the discussion of priming on policy issues (as racial priming examines).

The majority of the literature supports the idea that racial priming exists. However, the distinction between the effectiveness of two subtypes of racial priming—implicit and explicit—continues to be disputed in the public opinion literature. Mendelberg argues that explicit racial priming is not effective because it breaks the norm of racial equality—the idea that if someone sees or hears a blatantly racial appeal they will reject the message (Mendelberg 2001). Several other authors agree with Mendelberg's argument that explicitly racial appeals are rejected and have found evidence of priming based only on implicitly racial cues.

Are Implicit Appeals Effective? Does Education Moderate Susceptibility?

The most prominent opposition to implicit racial priming is from the work of Huber and Lapinski. They argue several reasons why education moderates racial priming. First, for experimental subjects in the control group (those that did not view any racial appeal), racial predispositions were found to be more powerful predictors of opinions for more educated respondents. Thus, racial cues in political advertisements are unnecessary. They also argue that for less educated respondents, implicitly racial appeals increase the effect of racial predispositions on opinion for all four policy areas examined in the survey; the increase was statistically significant for three of the four policy areas (Huber and Lapinski 2008). They argue that candidates can use explicit or implicit racial appeals and witness some effect on segments of the population—i.e., the less educated—because they do not reject explicit appeals as

illegitimate (Huber and Lapinski 2008). The authors argue that more educated individuals are more likely to have egalitarian views, thus rejecting messages identified as running counter to their views (Huber and Lapinski 2006). However, the rest of the racial priming literature has not found a similar education effect (see especially Mendelberg [1997, 2001]; Valentino et al. [2002]). In Huber and Lapinski's defense, this may be because no other racial priming research has explicitly looked for an education effect.

Additionally, Huber and Lapinski argue that Mendelberg's theory assumes that respondents recognize and reject explicit racial appeals because they violate norms of racial equality. However, this requires an attachment to the egalitarian norm, recognition the norm is being violated, and the ability to actually reject the message if the norm is violated. Huber and Lapinski argue that all three of these processes are less likely to be found among lesser educated individuals (Huber and Lapinski 2006). It seems conceivable that this cognitive sequence may not occur in the mass public's mind while watching or reading advertisements. However, the majority of the racial priming literature has found that explicit racial appeals are generally rejected regardless of the respondent's level of education (see especially Mendelberg [2001]; White [2007]; Slocum [2001]). This may mean Huber and Lapinski's three processes are incorrect, or that these processes are not actually as difficult as the authors assert.

Another important note is that Huber and Lapinski's (2006) supporting evidence for education acting as a moderator for racial priming is often insignificant. Mendelberg (2008, 117) shows that despite Huber and Lapinski's education distribution, "the less educated subsample does not behave differently at conventional levels of statistical significance." Another counterpoint to Huber and Lapinski's argument are the various other studies that have found racial priming effects among the more educated, such as Mendelberg (2001) and Valentino et al.

(2002). Overall, Huber and Lapinski's analysis of education-related influences is questionable given that they found few statistically significant effects.

Huber and Lapinski's research conclusions are also questionable based on their methodology. For example, they likely have skewed data because they "pre-primed" respondents. This pre-priming resulted from their survey module; the authors asked respondents pointed race-related questions immediately prior to exposing them to their priming treatment. This could also help to explain why much of their data is insignificant. Similarly, Mendelberg (2008) also notes that the website used to expose respondents to the treatment, Knowledge Networks' Web-TV survey panel, was known to have issues downloading videos. Huber and Lapinski's post-test questionnaire also lacked any questions to ensure that participants actually watched the treatment. As a result, it is unclear if their survey panel suffered the same limitations as Clinton and Lapinski (2004) experienced when over half of their respondents were unable to view the video treatment.

Furthermore, there are other questionable aspects of Huber and Lapinski's research. For example, they find that highly educated respondents are more likely to rate explicit racial appeals as "bad for democracy" than less educated respondents. They argue that this supports their argument that implicit and explicit racial appeals work equally well for the less educated. However, this vague question about democracy may have been confusing for less educated respondents, and as a result, they may have just answered no. In my research, well-worded questions about race-related policies and issues replace the vague phrasing used by Huber and Lapinski. Similarly, because much of Huber and Lapinski's data is insignificant their conclusions surrounding education are problematic.

Federico (2004) examined the effects of education on welfare attitudes. To draw his conclusions, he examined survey data from the 2000 and 2002 National Election Study, as well as the 1991 Race and Politics Study rather than using racial priming techniques. Unlike Huber and Lapinski, his studies find a "paradox of education." This paradox suggests that education actually *strengthens* the relationship between perceptions of people on welfare and global welfare attitudes, but only when welfare recipients are Black (Federico 2004). Federico's work directly contradicts Huber and Lapinski's by suggesting that more education may lead to a greater likelihood of priming. However, Federico is not researching racial priming. Perhaps this difference in conclusions illustrates that racial priming techniques somehow systematically induce respondents to answer differently than they would in observational studies. Or, perhaps this difference in results suggests that people respond differently to various issues. Considering Federico only examined welfare attitudes, one of the most commonly racialized and stereotyped issues, effects could vary when examining other issues.

Federico's examination of welfare presents an interesting counterpoint to Huber and Lapinski. Federico argued that education is associated with a "greater ability to connect general predispositions with specific policy attitudes" (Federico 2004, 374). He finds a "paradox of education" because race cues prompt stronger racial associations in the better educated. The alternative conclusion drawn from his research using different techniques is interesting. Does this mean there is a difference in the way people respond to surveys versus racial priming appeals? The priming appeals are expected to make people's latent racial views more accessible, thus they could be more readily associated with another set of attitudes (such as policy or candidate preferences). However, this does not explain why people are differentially susceptible

to priming based on the methods which their attitudes are asked (by either racial priming or survey techniques).

Similarly, the discrepancy in the findings of Federico and Huber and Lapinski are unclear given that the authors have a somewhat similar argument. Both sets of authors believe that the more educated are likely to bring racial attitudes to bear on political judgments. Thus, it could be argued that exposure to racial appeals does not lead the more educated to rely more heavily on their racial attitudes since they are already inclined to use these attitudes when making political decisions. As Huber and Lapinski suggest, this may mean that less educated individuals are more susceptible to priming—which is also what their research finds. Conversely, Federico finds that the more educated are likely more susceptible to racial priming. This contradiction shows that this hypothesis may be inaccurate or current research was insufficient. Huber and Lapinski may have skewed data because they "pre-primed" respondents by asking pointed race-related questions immediately prior to showing their treatment. This mistake could also explain why much of their data is insignificant.

Are Explicit Racial Appeals Effective?

Mendelberg acknowledges that in certain situations, explicit appeals may not be rejected outright. She draws this conclusion based on results found by Hutchings and Valentino (2003) that suggested "explicit messages may work when certain frames are used" (Mendelberg 2008, 118). Hutchings and Valentino found that messages about policy conflicts between racial groups can be explicit and still result in priming, but messages containing racial stereotypes are more likely to work implicitly. Mendelberg argues this is in keeping with her theory given that people

are more likely to reject the message if it conveys statements easily recognized as racist (i.e., stereotypes). She believes they are less likely to reject messages if explicit statements appear to be "legitimate policy disagreements with black leaders or activists" (Mendelberg 2008, 118).

However, the current understanding of explicit racial priming follows the suggestions of Mendelberg and, therefore, explicit racial appeals are generally rejected. Not everyone agrees with her conclusion though. For example, there are some prominent skeptics of this, including Hutchings, Walton, and Benjamin (2010). They argue that explicit racial appeals have not disappeared in contemporary politics and are not necessarily rejected by viewers (Hutchings et al. 2010). The authors' research focuses on a potential gender gap in support for Confederate symbols, as well as the partisan transformation of the South. Hutchings et al. conducted their racial priming research in Georgia to test if explicit racial appeals were rejected. They found that after viewing an explicit racial appeal, White Democratic women were most likely to abandon support for the battle flag, whereas White men were unmoved (Hutchings et al. 2010). The authors also found that those who are more likely to oppose interracial marriage are also more likely to support the confederate battle flag.

While this work may not be representative on the United States as a whole, the findings in the South are very interesting and also bring education effects into question. For example, even when viewers are exposed to racial appeals explaining how Confederate symbols are oppressive, White males still do not reject their racial views; in fact, they actually embrace the Republican Party even more (Hutchings et al. 2010). Thus, the effects of southern culture—particularly the lack of egalitarian norms—may outweigh the effects of education. This brings Mendelberg's idea that everyone adheres to the norm of racial equality into question.

The arguments behind Hutchings, Walton, and Benjamin's assertion that explicit appeals may still be acceptable are convincing. First, they argue that explicit political messages about race have been confused with openly racist appeals. However, they believe that it is possible for political elites to openly discuss race without violating the norm of racial equality. They cite an example possibility is through "the mention of racial group differences in public policy views" (Hutchings, Walton, and Benjamin 2010, 2). An emphasis on social group differences on public policy is quite common given the structure of the mainstream media. For example, Entman and Rojecki (2000) found that the media, through implicit and explicit depictions, commonly inflate interracial differences. Thus, the news media generates a compelling story and emphasizes race, while they simultaneously avoid legitimating racial inequality. Similarly, Hutchings and Valentino (2003) argue that explicit appeals can effectively prime attitudes as long as they are stereotype neutral. Explicit messages also work successfully if they highlight candidate distinctiveness (Hutchings and Valentino 2003).

Hutchings, Walton, and Benjamin (2010) also argue that gender can potentially cause a differential response to the norm of racial equality. Mendelberg asserts that the norm has been internalized throughout the population and, as a result, explicit messages are rejected. However, Hutchings, Valentino, and White (2004) report that women are more receptive than men to racially egalitarian political appeals. Other research supports these differences may be a result of the different socialization given to boys and girls, resulting in women becoming more apt to internalize a sense of responsibility for the most vulnerable in society while men are encouraged to focus on self-fulfillment (Choderow 1978; Gillian 1982). This differential socialization has implications in policy preferences as well. A variety of cross-national studies have found that

women are significantly more likely than men to endorse social group equality, express concern

for the disadvantaged, and identify as liberals (Beutel and Marini 1995; Furnham 1985).

Additionally, the majority of racial priming research has taken place in the Northeast or

Midwest. This makes it difficult to draw sweeping conclusions, especially when it comes to the

racial views of people in the South. Thus, it is unclear of the norm of racial equality would be

adhered to in the South. These results may not be seen if explicit racial appeals were shown

nationwide because the South is distinct in its conservative views on racial policies and stronger

support for the Republican Party. As a result, the South may not accept the same egalitarian

views that many other states have, thus being less likely to reject explicit racial appeals. Perhaps

southerners do not appeal to the norm of racial equality as much as the theory of racial priming

would suggest. No other research has aimed to test if these explicit racial appeals were merely

coincidentally found in Georgia and cannot be replicated elsewhere.

Education-Related Literature

The link between educational attainment and liberalism has been a question of interest for

decades. Weil (1985, 458) notes that "The positive relationship between higher levels of

educational attainment and social and political liberalism (especially tolerance) has been one of

the most stable and consistent findings in empirical social research of contemporary American

society." However, Weil challenged this notion and found that the effects of education on liberal

values varied cross-nationally. He conducted his public opinion research in the United States,

West Germany, Austria, and France aiming to measure anti-Semitism. Weil found that the sense

of liberalism among the more educated varied in certain countries, across certain historical

periods, and on certain values. Thus, he concludes that "the effect of education on values, when it occurs, must be interpreted as a form of socialization" (Weil 1985, 471).

There are also several researchers examining policy preferences and links to education and race. For example, Sears, Van Laar, Carrillo, and Kosterman (1997) examined policy preferences and what contributed to Whites' racial policy attitudes on equal opportunity, federal assistance, and affirmative action. In each case, the authors found that racial attitudes were the strongest single predictor of these policy preferences, even among college students (Sears et al. 1997). They conclude that race is "the dominant cue governing whites' responses to explicitly race-targeted policies" (Sears et al. 1997, 45).

Sniderman, Piazza, Tetlock, and Kendrick (1991) compare the effects of education versus importance of traditional values on racism. The authors conclude that the least educated are more prone to racism, regardless of their values (Sniderman et al. 1991). This argument supports Huber and Lapinski's theory that the less educated will not reject explicit racial appeals. However, more educated respondents may adhere more strongly to the norm of racial equality, thus masking their negative racial attitudes to avoid violating the norm. When Hutchings, Walton, and Benjamin (2010) found framing results based on explicit racial appeals, educating was not specifically examined. However, given that a significant effect was found, this suggests that respondents from various educational backgrounds were primed by the explicit appeal (rather than rejecting it, as Mendelberg would expect). Sniderman et al.'s work also has limitations. Specifically, the conclusions drawn may not be representative of the United States as a whole because it was conducted solely in Northern California.

Though there has been previous research on education in terms of policy preferences, it is unable to answer my question of potential education effects on racial priming. I believe my

research question adds great value to the current literature on racial priming, as well as public opinion more generally. As previously shown, there is some controversy surrounding how education affects policy preferences (Sears et al. 1997). Overall, I believe the current state of the literature on racial priming is fairly straightforward—explicit racial appeals are mostly ineffective, whereas implicit racial appeals are effective. As a result, examining the role education plays is the next logical step to enhancing this field of study.

Chapter 3

Examining Racial Priming Based on Education

Hypothesis

Given the majority of the literature on racial priming, I anticipate that levels of education will not affect susceptibility to priming. I believe my hypothesis is correct for several reasons. First, it makes sense that the more educated would be equally as likely to be primed by racial cues given that they may have latent racial attitudes. Hence, simply receiving an education wouldn't automatically make someone forget negative racial perceptions they may have of minorities. Other factors such as socialization and upbringing likely play an important role. Although the more educated may be more likely to gain information countering stereotypes, they may not significantly change their racial views. As Zaller (1992) argued, people who receive information running counter to their values are more likely to reject that information, if they recognize the partisan implications. In addition, just because a person has less formal education does not mean they have no understanding of politics or race-related issues. Similarly, a formal education does not automatically provide someone with a strong understanding of politics.

The formation of my hypothesis was also created based on the components of the theory of racial priming. The current state of racial priming literature lacks any evidence, except that from Huber and Lapinski, that education moderates susceptibility to racial priming. Given the concerns around Huber and Lapinski's research (namely, pre-priming respondents and/or respondents not actually being able to view the treatment which they were expected to watch), their results and conclusions seem questionable. Given that Federico's research about education effects are related only to people's views of welfare, his research may not be applicable more

broadly. Similarly, given that his conclusions are drawn from survey data alone, racial priming techniques may yield different results.

My second hypothesis is that explicit racial appeals will not be consistently rejected. Based on the work done in the South by Hutchings, Walton and Benjamin (2010), as well as the racialized comments made by Republican Presidential candidate Newt Gingrich that received minimal criticism, I believe there is a likelihood that people do not appeal to the norm of racial equality as often or as strongly as suggested by Mendelberg. Although the South is distinct from the North in its conservatism, I believe that there is a chance that Northerners will also not reject explicitly racial messages.

If my theory that education does not act as a moderator for racial priming is correct, I would expect to find that the more and less educated are equally susceptible to racial priming. I also expect that explicit racial appeals will be rejected by the majority of respondents regardless of their levels of formal education. This hypothesis is supported by the components of Mendelberg's (2001) theory of racial priming, but is also contested by Huber and Lapinski's (2006) argument that less educated individuals are unlikely to reject explicit racial appeals. Further, the contemporary egalitarian views that many people hold today, whether they are simply a front or not, would likely prompt the rejection of explicit racial appeals.

In the early 20th century, explicitly racial campaign ads were not uncommon, especially in the South. In contemporary politics, the observation that political news and campaign advertisements lack explicitly racial appeals, on the whole, adds greater support for my theory. This is evidence that those appeals are now ineffective given that political campaigns use whatever appeals they find most effective. Thus, the use of implicit ads in contemporary American politics points to a generally accepted norm of racial equality. Furthermore, it is

possible that implicit racial appeals activate cognitions or prejudices in our head that operate beneath the level of conscious awareness and are therefore not changeable by education. If this were true, levels of education would not change responses to racial appeals, thus showing education does not moderate racial priming. This cognitive aspect could also help explain why education effects have not previously been found in racial priming research.

If, however, education does act as a moderator for racial priming, I would expect to find the opposite results. If this were the case, explicit racial appeals would be rejected by only higher educated individuals because less educated individuals would either not recognize them or not care that they violate the norms of racial equality. An alternative hypothesis is that more formally educated people are better able to discern partisan or ideological implications of a cue. Thus, a more educated person would reject certain cues because they realize they run counter to their personal values or beliefs. Yet another alternative hypothesis is that more educated people are able to defend their position more enthusiastically, hence being more resistant to elite cues. Similar to Federico's work, a third alternative hypothesis is that negative racial attitudes will be heightened in respondents with a college education who held negative attitudes prior to attending college.

Given the plausible arguments from Huber and Lapinski, Federico, and Mendelberg, further research needs to be done to assess whether education truly acts as a moderator for racial priming. Although Mendelberg disputes Huber and Lapinski's arguments, she acknowledges the discrepancy in their findings compared with those of Federico (2004) and writes, "Nevertheless, education deserves more attention" (Mendelberg 2008, 118). My research question aims to answer the questions surrounding potential education affects that were not well answered by Huber and Lapinski.

Methodology

To execute my research I followed the general format of current racial priming research. The first step was creating a news article about a political campaign or advertisement that contained race-related issues. I created my treatment to be a crime news story. I styled the story in the same format as online news articles so it appears to be an authentic article from a well-known media source. Additionally, I used the masthead of the Detroit Free Press newspaper to increase the legitimacy of my article. The formatting and appearance were crucial to making the story seem real and produce an authentic response by the reader. Respondents were informed after finishing the questionnaire that the story they read was fake and not an actual Detroit Free Press article. I used a printed survey format instead of an online video format to lessen potential problems with distributing the article to people with different socioeconomic statuses. Similarly, I wanted to avoid problems like Huber and Lapinski encountered with their online video player. However, if people requested an electronic copy instead of a paper-and-pencil version, I would email them the appropriate documents. (See Appendix 1-5 for the pre-test questionnaire, control and treatment stories, and post-test questionnaire, respectively.) I had only 34 out of 157 surveys completed electronically and, like the paper-and-pencil version, the electronic versions were distributed randomly across conditions.

I avoided the use of online survey websites (such as MTurk) for several reasons. First, I did not have the necessary funds to compensate participants for taking part in my research. Additionally, the survey takers signed up for MTurk are mostly college-educated Whites. While I needed all White respondents, the lack of variety in education served as a serious barrier. An additional issue was that the majority of survey takers are also self-identified liberals. Given the criticisms of Mendelberg's research for having a liberal bias, I wanted to obtain data from as

many moderate or conservative respondents as possible. Given these complications, MTurk did not serve as an appropriate outlet for me to obtain data.


Image 2: *Perpetrator depicted in implicit and explicit racial appeals*

Choosing a picture for my treatments was also crucial. This picture serves to help emphasize the race-related appeals in the news article. The picture needed to be clearly an African American, but not appear to be an intimidating person. Ultimately, I found a photo of an unambiguous African American male—i.e., stereotypical African American facial features, such as a wide nose and dark skin color. The photo also presents the criminal like any other "normal" person (see Image 2). That is, all pictures of menacing and threatening men, including those with facial hair or tattoos, were eliminated immediately. This image will test the respondent's reactions to explicit racial appeals (racial language and a picture of an African American) and implicit appeals where race is not explicitly stated. There is also no mention of the perpetrators' age. However, it can be inferred from the photograph that this is a younger man.

When composing the articles, I also followed the guidance of Slocum's (2001) research on effective code words used in racial priming. Slocum finds that people more quickly associate terms such as "people on welfare" or "poor people" with African Americans than a term like "civil rights protestors." Among Whites, other code words like "crime," and especially "violent crime," have also become racial code words (Slocum 2001). Gilliam and Iyengar (2000) found the connection between African Americans and violent crime may be a result of the way the media presents news using racial imagery. In my treatments, I use the term "violent crime" to get the desired response.

Additionally, I had to create two versions of the news article—an article with implicit racial cues and another article with explicit racial cues—as well as an unrelated, non-racial control story (see Table 1). The control story lacks a picture to coincide with the narrative (see Appendix 2 for full control story). I chose an article from CNN Health entitled "Unhealthy Living May Age Your Brain," that is neither racial nor political in nature. This serves as an ideal control story given that it greatly differs from the crime news story treatments. Thus, it serves as an effective baseline measure. For the treatments, the same crime story is used. The only difference in implicit versus explicit racial appeals, as following Mendelberg's theory, is the insertion of the word "Black" into the explicit story (see Appendix 3 and 4 for full treatment stories). However, both treatments use the same picture of the perpetrator. The treatments cite that the robbery and murder takes place in Mason County, Michigan. According to the 2005-2009 American Community Survey's five-year estimates, Mason County has a population of 28,676 people, of which 95.8 percent are White and 0.6 percent is Black. While this city was chosen at random, people may be familiar with these demographics and assume that the crime is taking place against White storeowners. However, given that the majority of my surveys were completed in Monroe and Wayne counties, and Mason County is on the north-west side of Michigan, many respondents are likely not familiar with Mason County's demographics.

Table 1			
Narrative	**Control Story**	**Implicit Story**	**Explicit Story**
Title	Unhealthy Living May Age Your Brain	Four Teenagers Murder Store Clerk	Four **Black** Teenagers Murder Store Clerk
Picture	None	Mug shot of African American male	Mug shot of African American male
First paragraph	Vascular risk factors such as high blood pressure, smoking, diabetes, and obesity may cause the brain to age faster	Four teenagers were apprehended on June 10 robbing a local Rite Aid and murdering one of the store's clerks.	Four **black** teenagers were apprehended on June 10 robbing a local Rite Aid and murdering one of the store's clerks.
Middle Paragraph	Researchers looked at 1,352 people from the Framingham Offspring Study. Participants received body mass index measurements, blood pressure, cholesterol and diabetes tests, as well as brain MRI scans. If patients had previously experienced a stroke or dementia they were excluded.	A police officer near the Rite-Aid saw the getaway car fleeing west-bound down US-24. Police began a pursuit that lasted nearly an hour before the getaway car hit another car at the intersection of Dean Road and Douglas Road.	A police officer near the Rite-Aid saw the getaway car fleeing west-bound down US-24. Police began a pursuit that lasted nearly an hour before the getaway car hit another car at the intersection of Dean Road and Douglas Road.
Final Paragraph	DeCarli hopes this study brings attention to the importance of treating these vascular risk factors early.	This is the third time in two months that a violent crime has occurred in Mason.	This is the third time in two months that a violent crime has occurred in Mason.

After creating these various stories, I printed numerous copies of each to distribute to respondents. I avoided using Ann Arbor as an area to collect data given Huber and Lapinski's criticism of Mendelberg's research for having a liberal bias. Similarly, the Ann Arbor area would likely be insufficient to get the necessary spread of education levels that my research question requires. Thus, I collected data from other cities in Michigan, including Monroe, Canton, and Southgate.

I also collected data from other states—Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Virginia—in an attempt to gain more representative data from a variety of people. In these other states, I used a confederate to distribute the surveys. These confederates did *not* take the surveys themselves; they were given the appropriate instructions to distribute to people. I mailed numerous copies to the confederates and they then distributed surveys to their neighbors, co-workers, and friends. The questionnaires and stories were stapled together in the appropriate order, so the room for error or misunderstanding when the confederates distributed the surveys was minimized. I also informed confederates to be aware of the amount of time respondents required to finish the survey. Based on surveys I had distributed, the average time to complete a survey was approximately ten minutes. If a respondent took significantly less than that, I asked the confederate to set their survey aside after it had been completed given that they likely did not read the treatments. However, the number of surveys returned from these out of state respondents was less than originally anticipated—14 surveys were completed in Indiana, 13 in Ohio, 10 in Virginia, 1 in Illinois, leaving a total of 119 completed in Michigan. These 38 surveys were equally distributed across control and treatment cells. Unfortunately, these surveys do not make up as significant a portion of my collected data as originally hoped.

The most important part of my data collection was receiving data from a vast array of educational backgrounds to avoid criticisms like Mendelberg received by Huber and Lapinski. Fortunately, I was able to collect data from a wide variety of educational backgrounds from all of the locations which I received completed surveys.

Preparing the pre-test questionnaire was also very important. There has been criticism in the racial priming literature surrounding pre-tests that may trigger racial attitudes in both control and treatment groups. This was an important critique of Huber and Lapinski's (2006) research. Because they administered the pre-test (with race-related questions at the end) immediately prior to giving the treatment they may have nullified any potential priming effects. For example, Mendelberg (2008) has argued that this was likely a prime within itself. Thus, it is possible that the results may be diminished because both the control and experimental groups have been primed.

To avoid this potential contamination, I carefully crafted my pre-test to avoid pre-priming respondents. Originally, I planned to have respondents fill out the pre-test weeks before being exposed to the treatment and filling out the post-test questionnaire. However, this posed a problem of needing personal information about respondents to be able to get in touch with them. Given that my research offered no monetary incentive, I could only offer respondents complete anonymity as an incentive to be honest in their answers. Thus, to avoid reducing the anonymity available to respondents, I decided to distribute the pre-test questionnaire and treatments together. Although this was not ideal, precautions were taken to avoid potential pre-priming like Huber and Lapinski likely experienced. Namely, I put the race-related questions near the beginning of the pre-test questionnaire while the rest of the questionnaire was full of distracter questions. These additional questions served the purpose of keeping people unaware that my

research was about race. These distracter questions included questions about women, homosexuals, views on abortion, and even respondents' favorite sports.

Based on previous research by Mendelberg and Hutchings, I anticipated needing approximately 50 respondents per cell to take part in my research. Thus, 150 total respondents were needed to complete the survey. To keep the surveys distributed as randomly as possible, I used a free online number randomizer intended for research purposes. Coding the control, implicit, and explicit treatments as 1, 2, and 3, respectively, I was able to randomize the order in which they were to be distributed. This method successfully resulted in having approximately even numbers of each type of survey completed—54 control, 56 implicit, and 47 explicit. When using confederates I would mail them the surveys to have completed in the appropriate randomized order. Confederates were also given instructions of distributing them in the order in which they were received.

After collecting all of the necessary data, I performed statistical analyses using linear regressions. These regressions help illustrate what significant results were found in terms of general racial priming and education-related priming. I assessed racial attitudes with measures in my pre- and post-tests. The pre-test questionnaire contains a multitude of questions regarding different groups in society. This serves to show feelings towards these groups, as well as general political attitudes. One of the most important measures in the pre-test is the racial resentment scale. This scale, based on responses to three questions, measures levels of racial resentment ranging from 0 (low resentment) to 1 (high resentment). I also examine respondents' sympathy measures towards various groups in society. In the post-test questionnaire, I included some additional measures of racial attitudes and some policy issues. Thus, with this design I can determine if racial predispositions (e.g. racial resentment) measured in the pre-test are more

strongly associated with various policy preferences, as measured in the post-test, when subjects are exposed to either implicit or explicit racial cues..

This type of analysis is referred to as an "across subjects" research design. This compares people in a baseline condition with a treatment group. Thus, this is not an examination of attitudes changing over time, but actually comparing individuals who receive a treatment with individuals who do not. That is, based on these independent variables from the pre-test questionnaire—i.e., racial resentment, party identification, or sympathy measures—I will examine how respondents' attitudes in the treatment groups differ from respondents' attitudes in the control group.

The analyses would support my hypotheses if I found a significant relationship between racial predispositions in the treatment group, relative to the control, and policy preferences (i.e. racial priming). This is especially important for the implicit racial appeal, given that is where the main disagreement lies between Mendelberg's theory and Huber and Lapinski. However, I also believe that Hutchings, Walton, and Benjamin's assertion that not everyone accepts the norm of racial equality is compelling. Thus, although it disagrees with Mendelberg's theory, I anticipate finding significant results based on the explicitly racialized appeals.

Although I expect my hypotheses to be supported, there is a risk that either Federico's or Huber and Lapinski's arguments will be supported. This would happen if significant priming effects were found differentially based on education. However, the general research examining potential education effects is the most important point. Given the lack of research on this facet of priming, the concerns with Huber and Lapinski's research, and Federico's sole use of survey data, it is difficult to anticipate what results may be found. Thus, this research is crucial to enhancing the current state of the literature on racial priming.

Chapter 4

Non-Education Related Priming Data & Results

My data has uncovered numerous significant findings that, in some way, support and oppose all the aforementioned theories. Support for Huber and Lapinski, Federico, and my own hypotheses varied based on the issues, the scale used to measure results, and the type of message (implicit or explicit) presented to respondents. It is important to first present the priming results on the entire sample in order to evaluate the competing claims of Mendelberg and Huber and Lapinski. That is, it is first necessary to determine whether priming occurs at all before examining whether a specific subset of the population more or less susceptible to priming. Thus, examining general priming results sets the stage of examining education effects.

Although not a representative sample, the respondents who participated in my study come from various backgrounds. Out of 156 total respondents, 82 were female and 74 were male. The mean age was 38 years old; nearly 27 percent of respondents were over the age of 50, while 50 percent of respondents were age 30 or younger. In all, 44 percent of respondents had a high school diploma or less, 29 percent had gone to college but not graduated, and 28 percent had graduated from college or gone on to receive a post-graduate degree. When asked about household income, 35 respondents declined to answer. But, of those who did, 8 percent lived in a household that made less than $25,000 per year, 46 percent made between $25,000-$74,999 per year, 15 percent made between $75,000-$99,999, and 31 percent made more than $100,000 per year. A majority of respondents identified their political views (ideology) as moderate, 37 percent. Twenty-three percent said they were slightly liberal, liberal, or extremely liberal and 40 percent said they identified as slightly conservative, conservative, or extremely conservative. In

terms of party identification, 22 percent identified as Democrats, 54 percent identified as independents, and 23 percent identified as Republicans.

The randomization across the various cells of the experimental design appeared to work as intended, with the exception of age. As a result, the only variable that needed to be controlled for in my analyses was age. Although the mean age was 38, the average age of a respondent receiving the control story was nearly 9 years younger than a respondent exposed to an implicit racial appeal. The surveys were distributed in a pre-sorted, randomized order to ensure the most random distribution possible, but age was still non-random. Fortunately, no other demographic variables—gender, education, or income—were found to be non-random.

To examine the issue of education, I created a dichotomy out of the range of options for analysis purposes. Based on much previous research, the completion of a college degree appears to be significantly associated with heightened racial tolerance and positive attitudes toward African Americans (Lipset 1960; McClosky and Zaller 1984; Sniderman et al. 1991). Federico (2004) also argues that negative racial perceptions are less evident among the college-educated relative to those without a college degree. Thus, respondents who had not received a degree were grouped into one category (college=0) and respondents who had received a degree were grouped into another (college=1). This dichotomy was created based on the importance of splitting people based on degree attainment to compare the liberalizing effects of their college education. Huber and Lapinski (2006) argue that the educated are sophisticated enough to resist racial appeals, whether implicit or explicit. Thus, this should be even truer for individuals who have graduated from college, not just attended.

Examining my data requires looking at independent variables, measured in the pre-test questionnaire, alongside dependent variables measured in the post-test. Some of the independent

variables include measures of racial resentment, sympathy for Blacks, and party identification. The racial resentment scale is based on the contention that "blacks do not try hard enough to overcome the difficulties they face and that they take what they have not earned" (Kinder and Sanders 1996). The scale is calculated based on participants' responses to three items in the pre-test questionnaire. These three items measure respondents' attitudes towards Blacks based on a four-point scale (see Table 2 for actual resentment items). As with the rest of the pre- and post-test questionnaire questions, there are distracter questions mixed in so it is not apparent to participants that the aim of the research surrounds racial attitudes. Distracter questions use the exact same wording as the comments about Blacks, but substitute in another group—such as, women or the poor. The data presented by Mendelberg, Huber and Lapinski, and most other authors in the racial priming literature relies heavily, if not solely, on the racial resentment scale.

Table 2: Racial resentment scale as it appears in the pre-test questionnaire				
	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
a. Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.				
b. It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as Whites.				
c. Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve.				

There has been some debate around what the racial resentment scale actually measures. Some critics claim that the scale is actually only capturing views related to ideology. There is also concern that what the concept of racial resentment is supposed to capture is not actually

what the specific survey items measure. Bobo and Tuan (2006) don't express concerns about the specific survey items, but argue that conceptually racial resentment can be folded into the broader concept of group position. On the other hand, Sniderman and Carmines (1997) argue about both the concept of racial resentment and the specific measures used to capture it. They believe that racial resentment is not a driving force in determining attitudes towards racial policies. The authors say that although racial prejudice influences political thinking, but is far from a dominating factor (Sniderman and Carmines 1997). Kinder and Sanders (1996) agree that racial resentment is not the *only* thing that matters for race policy. But, because it acts as an excellent predictor of attitudes on racial policies—much better than self-interest or group interest, for example—they argue it is the most important.

Another item captured in my pre-test questionnaire was a measure of racial sympathy. These items were included as a secondary measure behind the racial resentment scale. However, this measure was included with a battery of similar measures and only one item dealt with African Americans. The other three items are about other groups—women, homosexuals, and the handicapped. These groups are selected to get an idea about how people feel towards these typically disadvantaged groups. Appendix 6 displays the exact wording of questions, in addition to the summary of answers provided by respondents.

After completing the survey, one respondent said that the questions made him feel like he was "two-faced." When asked to elaborate, the respondent said that the repetitive nature of the questions made him think about his answers and feel bad about responding differently based on the group in question. This respondent's opinion seemed to reflect the larger pool of participants' answers to the survey; many appeared to treat some groups differently than others. Similarly, many respondents questioned the purpose of the research after completing the post-test

questionnaire. After explaining and distributing a debriefing paper that explained the purpose of my research, many people were surprised. These responses were a good indicator that the distracter questions were successful and race was not the apparent purpose of my research. Although not all respondents were questioned about their views, those that did offer their opinions were unanimously surprised. This suggests that concerns about pre-priming effects should be diminished, unlike what Huber and Lapinski (2006) experienced.

There are numerous dependent variables included on my post-test questionnaire. However, for the purposes of this paper, we are focusing on the crime-related and race-related variables. Given that the treatment exposed respondents to a violent crime narrative, it seems most appropriate to examine issues related to crime—such as, views on the death penalty, gun control, and treating juvenile offenders as adults. These issues have also been argued as implicitly racialized in previous research. Hurwitz and Peffley (2003) address the issue of racialization in the death penalty. Similarly, Thomas and Mary Edsall's (1991) book *Chain Reaction* argues that political language—like death penalty, crime, and welfare—all have a racial subtext. Thus, my experiment will examine these claims of implicit racialization.

The key dependent variables from the post-test primarily included issues related to crime or domestic policy including, for example, such issues as support for the death penalty, treating juvenile criminal defendants as adults, support for President Obama, views on the amount of services that should be offered by the government, and views on gun control. To determine statistical significance in my data, I examined whether attitudes in the relevant treatment groups were distinct from attitudes in the control condition. My results are presented in the next section.

Crime-Related Issues

Treating Juvenile Defendants as Adults

> *"Do you strongly favor, favor, oppose, or strongly oppose treating juvenile defendants as adults if they have been accused of committing a violent crime?"*

As illustrated in Table 3, views on treating juvenile offenders who are charged with committing serious crimes as an adult became significantly shifted. For respondents scoring low on the racial resentment scale (i.e. racial liberals) after viewing the implicit message, they became 30 points more supportive of treating juvenile offenders as adults. However, respondents scoring high on the racial resentment scale (i.e. racial conservatives) became *less* supportive of treating juvenile offenders as adults. It is worth noting that even in the implicit condition racial conservatives are much more supportive of this crime policy than their more liberal counterparts (see Figure 1). When examining the effects of the implicit cue relative to the explicit cue, there is a significant difference; using a one-tailed T-test, the implicit is 25 percentage points different $(t=1.53; p>|t|=0.07)$.

Figure 1:
Support for Treating
Juvenile Offenders as Adults

It is also interesting to note that the significant effects are being driven by female respondents (see Figure 2). Women, specifically racially liberal women, are moving in a more conservative direction after exposure to the treatment—that is, more likely to support treating juveniles as adults. This goes against the expectations of the theory of racial priming—given that it would expect racial liberals to become *increasingly* more liberal (that is, more strongly opposed to treating juveniles as adults) after exposure to the treatment. However, it is important to note that while these women did become more conservative, they shifted from strongly opposed to treating juveniles as adults to more moderate, not necessarily supporting or opposing. Because a murder and robbery occur in the crime story, these racially liberally females may have become more supportive of treating juvenile offenders as adults because of the fear associated with violent crime rather than the racial component. One way to determine this would have been to include an additional treatment where the suspect was White, but unfortunately this was not included in my experimental design.

Figure 2:
Support Among Female Respondents for Treating Juvenile Offenders as Adults

	Control	Implicit
Racially Liberal Females	0.128	0.503
Racially Conservative Females	1.05	0.81

Probability of Support (y-axis)

Support for Gun Control

> *"Do you think the federal government should make it more difficult for people to buy a gun than it is now, make it easier for people to buy a gun, or keep these rules about the same as they are now?"*

Relative to support for gun control, no significant racial priming results were found. However, there was a slight shift in opinion relative to exposure to the treatments. Racially liberal respondents who saw the implicit racial appeal became more opposed to gun control, whereas respondents who read the explicit racial appeal became more supportive of gun control.

Support for the Death Penalty

> *"Do you strongly favor, favor, oppose, or strongly oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?"*

Support for the death penalty was also not significantly influenced by exposure to the racial appeals. Neither the implicit nor explicit appeals were successful in priming respondents on this topic.

| Table 3								
Crime-Related Dependent Variables	**Treating Juvenile Offenders as Adults**			**Support for Gun Control**			**Support for the Death Penalty**		
Gendered Results	**All**	**Only females**	**Only males**	**All**	**Only females**	**Only males**	**All**	**Only females**	**Only males**
Constant	0.275 ** (0.12)	0.143 (0.17)	0.460** (0.19)	0.913*** (0.14)	1.069*** (0.163)	0.65*** (0.22)	0.348*** (0.13)	0.315* (0.184)	0.393** (0.18)
Implicit	0.304 * (0.16)	0.375 † (0.23)	0.223 (0.24)	0.023 (0.18)	0.086 (0.23)	0.077 (0.28)	0.021 (0.17)	- 0.013 (0.26)	0.044 (0.24)
Explicit	0.052 (0.16)	0.095 (0.24)	- 0.095 (0.26)	0.024 (0.18)	- 0.213 (0.24)	0.075 (0.30)	- 0.048 (0.17)	0.098 (0.27)	- 0.136 (0.25)
Racial Resentment	0.692 *** (0.18)	0.918*** (0.26)	0.414 (0.27)	- 0.510** (0.21)	- 0.414 (0.25)	-0.355 (0.31)	0.500*** (0.19)	0.632 (0.29)	0.373 (0.26)
Implicit * Racial Resentment	- 0.453 * (0.26)	- 0.611 † (0.38)	- 0.286 (0.37)	- 0.029 (0.29)	- 0.293 (0.38)	-0.026 (0.43)	0.033 (0.27)	0.094 (0.42)	- 0.042 (0.36)
Explicit * Racial Resentment	- 0.068 (0.26)	- 0.085 (0.43)	0.124 (0.38)	- 0.169 (0.30)	0.154 (0.42)	-0.205 (0.44)	0.151 (0.28)	- 0.220 (0.47)	0.330 (0.37)
Age	-0.00009 (0.001)	- 0.0004 (0.002)	0.00009 (0.002)	0.002 * (0.001)	0.0006 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.00003 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)
Number of Cases	147	78	69	147	78	69	147	78	69
Adjusted R-squared	0.128	0.154	0.017	0.128	0.083	0.085	0.127	0.084	0.12
Significance tests are two-tailed; † p<.15 * p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01									

Non Race-Related Issues

Support for Health Care

"As you may or may not know, a new law passed in March 2010 will change the way we pay for health insurance in two ways: it will require all Americans to buy health insurance, with government helping pay for those who cannot afford it, and it will require health insurance companies to cover anyone who applies for insurance, no matter what pre-existing medical conditions they have.

Taken together, do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose these changes?"

Recent research has suggested that the health care bill signed into law has been racialized because it is related back to President Obama and is often referred to as "ObamaCare." To analyze if this recent finding might be true, a related question was included on my post-test questionnaire. The question regarding the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) primed respondents regardless of education (see Table 4). Racial liberals became 45 percentage points more supportive of PPACA while racial conservatives became 5 percentage points more opposed after exposure to the implicit racial appeal (see Figure 3).

Figure 3:
Support for 2010 Health Care Bill

It is also interesting to note that the priming results are being driven by racially liberal female respondents (see Figure 4). Overall, after exposure to the implicit appeal, these respondents dramatically increased their support for the health care bill introduced by Obama. These women became 66 percentage points more supportive of PPACA while their racially conservative female counterparts became less supportive of the bill. This supports the idea that PPACA has become racialized given the significant shift in opinions based simply on viewing an implicitly racialized crime news story. Similarly, this supports the idea that women respond differently to racial cues than men, as suggested by Hutchings, Walton, and Benjamin (2010).

Figure 4:
Support Among Females for
2010 Health Care Bill

This is an interesting finding given the suggested racialization of PPACA. Tesler (forthcoming) finds that racial attitudes had a significantly larger impact on health care opinions in late 2009 than they had in other surveys from the past two decades, including panel data collected before Obama became strongly associated with the policy. Health care policies were "significantly more racialized when attributed to President Obama than they were when these same proposals were framed as President Clinton's 1993 reform efforts" (Tesler forthcoming, 1).

Similarly, Tesler finds that the racial divide on health care opinions is 20 percentage points greater in 2009-2010 than it was over President Clinton's plan in 1993-1994. The results showing that President Obama racialized public opinion about the health care bill supports the idea that the strong resistance generated from the bill stems from a race-based opposition to a Black president's legislative agenda. Thus, my findings support the idea that PPACA has been racialized; racially liberal respondents becoming 45 percentage points more supportive after viewing the implicit appeal suggests a racial undertone is present.

Influence of the Working Class

> *"Do you think that **WORKING-CLASS PEOPLE** have too much influence in American politics, too little influence, or just about the right amount of influence?"*

Significant priming results were also found relative to views of the influence of the working class on government (see Table 4). Again, significant results were found only for respondents who viewed the implicit treatment. This priming effect was driven almost entirely by racially liberal respondents (see Figure 5). These respondents became approximately 34 percentage points more likely to think that the working class lacks influence after exposure to the implicit racial appeal. Racial conservatives, on the other hand, were essentially unmoved by the treatments; they shifted less than 1 percentage point.

Similar to support for the 2010 health care bill, these results were also driven entirely by female respondents, particularly racially liberal women (see Figure 6). These racially liberal women became nearly 45 percentage points more likely to think that the working class lacked

influence after exposure to the treatments. However, racially conservative women became just one percentage point more likely to feel that the working class lacked influence.

Figure 5:
Views on Influence of the Working Class

Responses are coded so that 1 is too much influence and 0 is too little influence.

Figure 6:
**Views of Female Respondents on Influence of the Working Class**

Views on Government Services Offered

"Some people think the government should provide fewer services, even in areas such as health and education, in order to reduce spending. Other people feel that it is important for the government to provide many more services even if it means an increase in spending.

Where would you place yourself on this scale?"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Fewer Services			**Same Amount**			**More Services**

General support for government services was not statistically significant. However, when examining priming effects by gender, statistically significant results are found for male respondents only (see Table 4). This result was found only for men who viewed the implicit racial treatment. Racially liberal men actually moved 55 percentage points in a more liberal direction; feeling that more government services should be offered. However, racially conservative males moved in the opposite direction with nearly 30 percentage points increased opposition to increasing government services. Conservative women are opposed to services in both the control and implicit condition. Although not significant, it is noteworthy that they choose not to embrace more conservative policies here even though their male counterparts do.

Figure 7:
Opposition of Male Respondents to Increasing Government Services

| Table 4								
Non Race-Related Dependent Variables	**Support for 2010 Health Care Bill**			**Influence of the Working Class**			**Opposition to More Government Services**		
Gendered Results	**All**	**Only females**	**Only males**	**All**	**Only females**	**Only males**	**All**	**Only females**	**Only males**
Constant	0.353 * (0.20)	0.286 (0.26)	0.423 (0.30)	0.309 ** (0.13)	0.466 ** (0.18)	0.068 (0.18)	0.367*** (0.13)	0.211 (0.18)	0.629*** (0.20)
Implicit	0.452 * (0.26)	0.660 * (0.38)	0.228 (0.38)	-0.340** (0.17)	-0.453* (0.25)	-0.141 (0.23)	- 0.244 (0.17)	0.032 (0.25)	-0.550** (0.25)
Explicit	0.314 (0.26)	0.144 (0.38)	0.316 (0.42)	-0.160 (0.17)	-0.337 (0.26)	-0.061 (0.25)	- 0.154 (0.18)	0.063 (0.26)	-0.238 (0.28)
Racial Resentment	- 0.003 (0.29)	0.341 (0.41)	-0.242 (0.43)	-0.172 (0.19)	-0.291 (0.28)	0.082 (0.26)	0.240 (0.20)	0.454 (0.28)	-0.076 (0.29)
Implicit * Racial Resentment	- 0.506 (0.41)	- 0.908 (0.60)	-0.146 (0.59)	0.346 (0.27)	0.446 (0.42)	0.104 (0.36)	0.363 (0.28)	-0.079 (0.42)	0.841** (0.39)
Explicit * Racial Resentment	- 0.596 (0.42)	- 0.316 (0.67)	-0.542 (0.61)	0.143 (0.28)	0.426 (0.46)	-0.008 (.36)	0.163 (0.28)	-0.286 (0.45)	0.370 (0.40)
Age	0.003 * (0.001)	0.002 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.0004 (0.001)	-0.0006 (0.001)	0.0009 (0.002)	0.0004 (0.001)	0.0003 (0.002)	- 0.0004 (0.001)
Number of Cases	147	78	69	146	78	68	143	75	68
Adjusted R-squared	0.066	.0069	0.051	0.012	0.025	-0.064	0.065	0.008	0.055
Significance tests are two-tailed; * p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01									

Chapter 5

Education Related Priming Data & Results

The following results are organized via the treatment viewed and educational level of respondents. Based on the previously presented theories, there are numerous potential findings expected from my data. First, Mendelberg would argue that no education related effects will be found. She argues that everyone is equally susceptible to being primed and education is not a moderating factor. Huber and Lapinski, on the other hand, believe that only the lesser educated (for my purposes, those without a college degree) would be racially primed. This subset of respondents would likely be primed regardless of the treatment they were exposed to. Additionally, Federico's argument suggests that only the higher educated are likely to be primed. The author's "paradox of education" suggests that although the more educated are also more likely to be tolerant, that tolerance is not applicable to the issue of welfare. Although Federico finds supporting evidence for this assertion, it's unclear if the "paradox of education" will hold true for issues apart from welfare.

Crime-Related Issues

<u>Treating Juvenile Defendants as Adults</u>

Relative to racial resentment, the highly educated were the only respondents primed on the issue of treating juvenile offenders as adults (see Table 5). For highly educated racial liberals, the implicit appeal prompted them to become over 40 percentage points more supportive of treating juveniles as adults. This dramatic shift also helps to explain the general priming results found (as presented in the previous chapter). However, this shift runs in the opposite direction to what is expected by Mendelberg. Still, racial liberals shift from being very opposed to treating juvenile offenders as adults to being at least slightly supportive. This may suggest that their racial liberalism is a façade, perhaps enhanced due to exposure to elite norms in college, but it dissolves when exposed to the implicit condition. It is also important to note that the effect of the implicit versus explicit tests were significantly different. Using a one-tailed T-test, the implicit appeal is 41 percentage points different from the explicit appeal (t=2.32; p>|t|=0.013).

Figure 8:
Support for Treating Juvenile Offenders as Adults
(High Education)

Support for the Death Penalty

On the issue of support for the death penalty, two findings were unearthed: one from low education respondents and the other from high education respondents (see Table 5). Both findings were based on the implicitly racial appeal. The highly educated results were nearly significant—with t=1.49 and p>|t|= 0.140. Interestingly, the results for the high and low educated respondents move in opposite directions.

After exposure to the implicit treatment, less educated respondents split based on their racial resentment score. Thus, racial liberals became 50 percentage points more opposed to the death penalty while racial conservatives became nearly 40 percentage points more supportive (see Figure 9). Given that racial liberals in the control group are more supportive of the death penalty than their racially conservative counterparts, the shift after viewing the implicit respondents supports the arguments made by Huber and Lapinski, as well as Federico. Essentially, the implicit appeal could be causing these less educated respondents to connect the policy implications with their ideological views that were otherwise unclear. The authors would argue that this is not necessary for highly educated respondents because they already have a better understanding of the policy implications of their ideology.

Figure 9:
Support for the Death Penalty
(Low Education)

For highly educated respondents, however, the opposite shift occurred. Those who scored high on racial resentment and were highly educated were approximately 24 percentage points *less* supportive of the death penalty after exposure to the implicit appeal (see Figure 10). Alternatively, the well-educated racially liberal respondents became 33 percentage points *more* supportive of the death penalty after exposure to the implicit appeal. This result is a stark contrast to that observed by the low education respondents. As a result, this shift would not be expected by Federico, Mendelberg, or Huber and Lapinski.

Figure 10:
Support for the Death Penalty
(High Education)

Support for Gun Control

Relative to racial resentment, priming results were found based on exposure to both the implicit and explicit appeals (see Table 5). This priming effect was found for both low and high education respondents. For the first time, the less educated respondents were primed based on both the implicit and explicit treatments (see Figure 11). Corresponding to Huber and Lapinski and Federico's suggestions, racial liberals and conservatives split along ideological lines. After

exposure to the implicit appeal, and even more so to the explicit, racial liberals became increasingly supportive of gun control—by 44 and 72 percentage points respectively. Racial conservatives, however, became less supportive of gun control after viewing the treatments; shifting 25 points after exposure to the implicit and 53 points after viewing the explicit appeal.

Figure 11:
Support for Gun Control
(Low Education)

Similar to the shift on the death penalty, highly educated respondents moved in an unexpected direction on gun control. These results were not quite significant, but were close after exposure to the explicit appeal (t=-1.45; p>|t|= 0.15). Racial liberals became 30 percentage points less supportive of gun control after exposure to the explicit appeal, while racial conservatives became 10 percentage points more supportive. Similar to the previous finding for the highly educated, this is inconsistent with Huber and Lapinski, Mendelberg, and Federico.


Figure 12:
Support for Gun Control
(High Education)

Crime-Related Dependent Variables	Treating Juvenile Offenders as Adults		Support for the Death Penalty		Support for Gun Control	
Education Level	Low Edu	High Edu	Low Edu	High Edu	Low Edu	High Edu
Constant	0.488 ** (0.23)	0.198 (0.14)	0.756 *** (0.21)	0.124 (0.17)	0.485 ** (0.24)	1.10 *** (0.17)
Implicit	- 0.091 (0.30)	0.420 ** (0.19)	- 0.497 * (0.28)	0.333 † (0.22)	0.490 † (0.31)	- 0.176 (0.23)
Explicit	0.167 (0.34)	0.013 (0.18)	- 0.296 (0.32)	0.104 (0.21)	0.722** (0.36)	- 0.315 † (0.22)
Racial Resentment	0.389 (0.33)	0.766 *** (0.22)	- 0.155 (0.32)	0.898 *** (0.25)	0.226 (0.35)	- 0.998 (0.26)
Implicit * Racial Resentment	- 0.062 (0.43)	- 0.480 † (0.32)	0.880 ** (0.41)	- 0.571 † (0.38)	- 0.740 † (0.46)	0.331 (0.39)
Explicit * Racial Resentment	- 0.319 (0.53)	0.014 (0.30)	0.556 (0.50)	- 0.162 (0.35)	- 1.25 ** (0.56)	0.418 (0.36)
Age	0.0009 (0.002)	- 0.0003 (0.002)	0.0009 (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.001)	0.003 (0.002)
Number of Cases	67	80	67	80	67	80
Adjusted R-squared	-0.0098	0.27	0.065	0.19	0.063	0.24
Significance tests are two-tailed; † p<.15 * p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01						

Table 5

Non Race-Related Issues

<u>Influence of the Working Class</u>

Relative to racial resentment, highly educated respondents were primed based on the implicit and nearly the explicit racial appeals (see Table 6). Both racial liberals and conservatives felt that the working class has too little influence on government (see Figure 13). Racial liberals shifted 42 percentage points towards saying the working class lacks influence after viewing the implicit appeal, whereas racial conservatives shifted only 4 percentage points in the same direction.

Although not quite significant, the explicit racial appeal caused a similar result (t=-1.55; p>|t| = 0.124). Racial liberals felt that the working class had too little influence after viewing the explicit appeal. They shifted 31 percentage points towards this conclusion, although it was less dramatic than the shift from racial liberals who viewed the *implicit* appeal.

Responses are coded so that 1 is too much influence and 0 is too little influence.

Views on Government Services Offered

Views on government services primed less educated respondents. This result was found only after respondents viewed the implicit appeal. For the less educated respondents scoring low on the racial resentment scale, they moved 54 percentage points towards supporting an increase in services offered by the government. Those that scored high on the racial resentment scale moved in the opposite direction; opposing an increase in government services by 18 percentage points.

Figure 14:
Opposition to
Increasing Government Services
(Low Education)

Table 6						
Non Race-Related Dependent Variables	**Support for Universal Health Care**		**Influence of the Working Class**		**Opposition to Government Services**	
Education Level	Low Edu	High Edu	Low Edu	High Edu	Low Edu	High Edu
Constant	0.196 (0.33)	0.535 ** (0.26)	0.062 (0.24)	0.386 ** (0.16)	0.519 ** (0.21)	0.296 * (0.17)
Implicit	0.469 (0.43)	0.435 (0.35)	- 0.034 (0.35)	- 0.429 ** (0.21)	- 0.586 ** (0.28)	- 0.120 (0.23)
Explicit	0.164 (0.49)	0.310 (0.33)	0.229 (0.35)	- 0.306 † (0.20)	- 0.228 (0.31)	- 0.097 (0.22)
Racial Resentment	0.207 (0.49)	- 0.189 (0.39)	0.161 (0.35)	- 0.264 (0.23)	- 0.062 (0.31)	0.456 * (0.26)
Implicit * Racial Resentment	- 0.605 (0.64)	- 0.424 (0.58)	0.010 (0.45)	0.387 (0.35)	0.764 ** (0.41)	0.233 (0.39)
Explicit * Racial Resentment	- 0.335 (0.78)	- 0.613 (0.54)	- 0.358 (0.55)	-.296 (0.32)	0.345 (0.50)	- 0.021 (0.36)
Age	0.005 ** (0.002)	0.0003 (0.003)	- 0.0001 (0.002)	0.0009 (0.002)	0.0007 (0.002)	- 0.00006 (0.002)
Number of Cases	67	80	66	80	63	80
Adjusted R-squared	0.029	0.067	- 0.083	0.063	0.047	0.092
Significance tests are two-tailed; * p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01						

Chapter 6

Discussion of Findings

In sum, there has been much evidence to support four important points. First, implicit primes are effective for people, regardless of their education levels. Unlike Huber and Lapinski's findings, the data I collected found numerous priming effects for the well educated after being exposed to implicitly racialized appeals. Contrary to Federico, other issues primed the less educated respondents as well.

Second, explicit appeals are not rejected outright in at least some situations. There were three instances that significant (or nearly significant) results were found. Given that this is a convenience sample, these results could potentially be increased and expanded across more issues if a more representative sample were taken. Huber and Lapinski assert that implicit appeals are only effective, whether administered implicitly or explicitly, to the lesser educated. However, we find that that is also not true; of the three significant instances of explicit priming, one is the result of highly educated respondents. Although only three significant results were found using these measures, they suggest that Huber and Lapinski's idea that only the less educated don't hold themselves to the norm of racial equality was wrong. However, my research is unable to draw this as a concrete conclusion; more research is necessary to examine why people may not adhere to the norm of racial equality in certain situations.

This point also has important implications for Mendelberg's theory of racial priming. Given that she conducted research to create her theory from Ann Arbor and New Jersey, perhaps respondents in these locations were too liberal to accurately represent the population at large. Although the data I collected was a convenience sample, with approximately the same number of

respondents that Mendelberg surveyed, it was drawn from more conservative areas in Michigan. Thus, the criticism that Huber and Lapinski leveled against Mendelberg for having a liberal bias in her research appears to be legitimate. A majority of people participating in my survey were from Monroe, Michigan or the metro-Detroit area. These respondents may be more representative of the general population than a college town like Ann Arbor. For example, According to CQ Press Voting and Elections Collection from February 2012, Monroe maintains a close 50-50 partisan split in terms of voting records for Presidential elections over the past decade. Thus, if the data collected from these areas seems to ignore the norm of racial equality, at least in certain situations, we might find even larger effects if this exercise was repeated nationwide, especially in the South. This creates a serious concern with Mendelberg's theory.

Additionally, the minimal examination of gendered priming effects here suggest that gender may be another moderating factor. The racial resentment scale picked up two scenarios in which women were primed (on support for health care and influence of the working class) and one instance where only men were primed (on views of government services). It is interesting to note that in each of these cases, the primed group actually took a more liberal stance—that is, responding with increased support for the health care bill, feeling that the working class lacked influenced, and that the government should provide more services. For women, their shift in attitudes on both issues was so significant that it caused all respondents to appear to have been primed; however, the priming of only men on government services did not lead to the entire group appearing to be primed. Little research has been conducted to examine such gender effects, so this may be an important stepping stone for further research given the indications here that gender effects do exist.

Finally, it appears that education can play an important role in moderating priming. Examining the whole data set, people with less than a college degree were the only ones primed on certain issues (e.g. views on the amount of services the government should offer), whereas those with a college degree were primed on separate issues (e.g. views on the influence of the working class on government); and, sometimes both groups were primed (e.g. opinions on the death penalty, gun control, treating juveniles as adults, government help for Blacks, and universal healthcare). It is important to recognize that for some issues only one education subset experienced racial priming after exposure to either appeal and they pushed the entire group to appear to have been primed on the issue. For example, the highly educated were the only educational subset to be primed on the issue of treating juveniles as adults and their significant reaction was large enough to cause the general priming effects to be significant. This may be connected with the gendered results, but my data set is too small to accurately examine this.

It also interesting to note that even the education effects observed here were inconsistent. Sometimes they followed the expectations of Federico and Huber and Lapinski, while other times they ran counter to those expectations. While the authors' expectation that the less educated respondents need the implicit prime to connect their ideology with policy preferences, this was not always the case. For example, some of the highly educated respondents moved in the opposite direction of what their ideology would suggest. Given that Federico expects highly educated respondents to be primed—based on their familiarity with the appropriate policy preferences prior to the racialized appeals—these results run counter to his findings on welfare. This suggests that highly educated respondents react differently to welfare than other policies, or that highly educated respondents may not be as familiar with policy preferences as Federico (and Huber and Lapinski) suggest. In any case, education appears to moderate priming.

Overall, though my research suggests that people are differentially susceptible to priming, it is important to keep this separate from the idea of people being racist. My results cannot and should not be generalized to mean that, on some level, *all* White people are racist. First, it is important to note that because my data is drawn from a convenience sample it would be a mistake to draw sweeping conclusions from it. Secondly, my research did not intend to address the question of racism. Instead, I set out to settle a discrepancy between existing pieces of literature, as well as contribute more research to the important, yet under-examined, facet of education. On a similar note, the racial priming literature examines how people respond to different elite messages. Thus, my research aims to examine what *can* happen based on the types of messages viewers are exposed to. As seen from my data, as well as the literature at large, these messages do not always move viewers in one direction; that is, messages do not only make racial liberals become more racially conservative, but as we have seen, sometimes exactly the opposite occurs. In short, my data does not support the notion that all White people are racist, nor does the existing literature.

Though my research has contributed to the existing literature, there is much left to be examined. I have found a flaw in Mendelberg's theory that explicit racial appeals are ineffective, evidence against Huber and Lapinski's argument that only the lesser educated can be primed, and evidence against Federico's paradox of education. Ultimately, I have found that segments of the population can be differentially primed, but it is not entirely clear what causes these differential results, as sometimes they are inconsistent. Thus, more research is needed to examine these interesting discrepancies that my research is unable to explain.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

As Martin Luther King, Jr. accepted his Nobel Peace Prize in December 1964 he recognized there was still much work to be done to battle racial injustice. In his acceptance speech he said, "I refuse to accept the view that mankind is so tragically bound to the starless midnight of racism and war that the bright daybreak of peace and brotherhood can never become a reality." Dr. King's words are still relevant today; although progress has been made, there is much more work to do.

The existing literature illustrates that messages from political candidates and elites can significantly influence public opinion. My research supports this idea and also adds a new facet: certain populations are differentially susceptible to these messages. However, it is unclear what causes these differential responses. Similarly, it is clear that messages aimed at racial priming are incredibly effective. The media's reproduction of these messages and portrayal of crime news continue to perpetuate the stereotypes present in our society.

In short, the communications crafted by political elites can play on our society's racial stereotypes and misconceptions to shape public opinion for at least some segments of the population. This unfortunate reality should raise questions about what can be done to reduce or eliminate these stereotypes, thereby diminishing the effectiveness of racialized messages. Increasing education about diversity could be an important step. While McCauley, Wright, and Harris (2000) report that 81% of colleges and universities in the United States have offered diversity workshops, none of these institutions have evaluated the effectiveness of such workshops. Thus it remains unclear what effect these workshops have. At the least, they provide

an outlet for people to meet others of diverse backgrounds. This interaction alone may increase tolerance and understanding, while decreasing negative views of out-group members.

Regardless of how effective diversity workshops may be, segments of the population will remain excluded from such options because they do not attend college. Or, even if they do, they may not be interested in attending such workshops. Students who may be uninterested in attending might feel increased resistance towards out-groups if they are required to be present. According to Brehm (1966), people suffer a backlash because they perceive a threat to their freedom of expression or are offended by the implication that they are prejudiced.

An alternative action could be a shift in the media. The media could adopt a more active stance on the issue of race and, for example, stop over-representing African Americans in crime news. By presenting Blacks in a more positive light—and also illustrating that White people commit crimes too—anti-Black stereotypes could diminish. Similarly, the misconception of African American's as welfare dependent might be remedied if news organizations actively reduced the perpetuation of this stereotype. Consequently, political elites' discussion of welfare issues would not be as effective at priming attitudes. In turn, this would reduce the incentive to prime racial attitudes. Given the impact the media can have on public opinion is large, as illustrated by the aforementioned literature, even this seemingly small step could potentially have a big impact on race relations in our society.

Removing the façade of colorblindness would also be another step in the right direction. While this may be controversial, it would allow for an honest discussion of how race affects the formation of policies, campaigns, and elections, as well as the everyday lives of Americans. For this to be effective, we have to consciously recognize that racial cues are important and agree that issues of race are still relevant in society today.

Appendix 1: **Pre Test Questionnaire**

1. What is your gender?
   a. Male
   b. Female

2. What is your age?   _____ years

3. What race or ethnicity do you most identify with?
   a. White, non-Hispanic
   b. Black
   c. Hispanic

We would like to ask you several questions about different groups in society.

4. Below are several statements. Please tell us whether you agree or disagree with each statement.

	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
d. Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.				
e. It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if women would only try harder they could be just as well off as men.				
f. It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as Whites.				
g. It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if the poor would only try harder they could be just as well off as the rich.				
h. Over the past few years, women have gotten less than they deserve.				
i. Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve.				
j. Over the past few years, the poor have gotten less than they deserve.				

5. Below is a 7-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged. Where would you place yourself on this scale?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Extremely Liberal	Liberal	Slightly Liberal	Moderate	Slightly Conservative	Conservative	**Extremely Conservative**

6. Do you consider religion to be an important part of your life, or not?
    a. Yes
    b. No

7. We are interested in how people are getting along financially these days. Would you say that you and your family living with you are better off, neither better off nor worse off, or worse off financially than you were a year ago?
    a. Better off
    b. Neither better off nor worse off
    c. Worse off

8. Do you think there are any important differences in what the Republicans and Democrats stand for?
    a. Yes, differences
    b. No, no differences

9. Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic Party?
    a. Strong Democrat
    b. Weak Democrat
    c. Independent Democrat
    d. Independent Independent
    e. Independent Republican
    f. Weak Republican
    g. Strong Republican

10. Would you say that either one of the parties is more conservative than the other at the national level? If yes, which party is more conservative?
    a. Yes, Democrats
    b. Yes, Republicans
    c. No, both same

11. We would like to ask you if you have ever felt sympathy for Blacks. Please tell us whether you have felt sympathy for Blacks often, fairly often, not too often, or never.
    a. Often
    b. Fairly Often
    c. Not too often
    d. Never

12. How about sympathy for the handicapped? Please tell us whether you have felt sympathy for the handicapped often, fairly often, not too often, or never.
    a. Often
    b. Fairly Often
    c. Not too often
    d. Never

13. How about sympathy for women? Please tell us whether you have felt sympathy for women often, fairly often, not too often, or never.
    a. Often
    b. Fairly Often
    c. Not too often
    d. Never

14. How about sympathy for homosexuals? Please tell us whether you have felt sympathy for homosexuals often, fairly often, not too often, or never.
    a. Often
    b. Fairly Often
    c. Not too often
    d. Never

15. This country would be better off if we did not concern ourselves with problems in other parts of the world.
    a. Agree
    b. Disagree

16. People like me don't have any say about what the government does.
    a. Agree
    b. Disagree

17. Some people feel that women should have an equal role with men in running business, industry and government. Others feel that women's place is in the home. Where would you place yourself on this scale?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Equal Role						**Women's place is in the Home**

18. Which one of the opinions on this page best agrees with your view?
    a. Abortion should never be permitted.
    b. Abortion should be permitted only if the life and health of the woman is in danger.
    c. Abortion should be permitted if, due to personal reasons, the woman would have difficulty in caring for the child.
    d. Abortion should never be forbidden, since one should not require a woman to have a child she doesn't want.

19. What is your favorite professional sport?
    a. National Basketball Association (NBA)
    b. National Football League (NFL)
    c. NASCAR
    d. Major League Baseball (MLB)
    e. None of the Above

20. Do you watch any of the following TV shows?
    a. American Idol
    b. Dancing with the Stars
    c. The Mentalist
    d. Oprah
    e. None of the Above

Appendix 2: Control Story[1]

CNN Health

Unhealthy Living May Age Your Brain

Vascular risk factors such as high blood pressure, smoking, diabetes, and obesity may cause the brain to age faster, possibly 10 years faster, according to a study published Monday in the journal Neurology. Researchers found people with these risks factors had smaller brains and had diminished brain function later in life.

"Vascular risk factors affect our brains and our ability to think even in middle life and we need to focus on treating these things if we are going to have a healthy mind and body," says study author Dr. Charles DeCarli. Eating healthy and exercising are important but if you develop hypertension and if you develop diabetes, the most important thing is to treat them, he adds.

Researchers looked at 1,352 people from the Framingham Offspring Study. Participants received body mass index measurements, blood pressure, cholesterol and diabetes tests, as well as brain MRI scans. If patients had previously experienced a stroke or dementia they were excluded.

Identifying and understanding these how these risk factors play a role in accelerating the aging process might make someone with hypertension, for example, more likely to seek treatment earlier, says DeCarli.

"People need to understand what they are setting themselves up for later in life," says Dr. Maria Carrillo, a senior director at the Alzheimer's Association. "Anything that actually compromises cardiovascular health has the potential for comprising their brain health."

"We (the Alzheimer's Association) do tell people they need to watch their weight and be physically active as early as one can and it's important to control these factors because they may impact their risk for Alzheimer's later in life."

DeCarli hopes this study brings attention to the importance of treating these vascular risk factors early. "You talk to 70-year-olds and their biggest complaint is their brain's not working well," he says.

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[1] Trisha Henry, "Unhealthy Living May Age Your Brain," CNN Health, http://thechart.blogs.cnn.com/2011/08/01/unhealthy-living-may-age-your-brain/?iref=allsearch (accessed August 5, 2011).

Appendix 3: Implicit Racial Appeal

Detroit Free Press

Four Teenagers Murder Store Clerk

The gunman, Jacob Smith, after being captured by police

Four teenagers were apprehended on June 10 robbing a local Rite Aid and murdering one of the store's clerks. The teenagers allegedly shot the clerk and stole over $500 of prescription medicine and other merchandise. Three of the teenagers entered the store in hooded outfits, each holding a firearm. The gunman, Jacob Smith, proceeded to the pharmacy and after the clerk refused to give him any medication, the clerk was shot twice in the chest. After grabbing medications and other items, the three perpetrators fled to a getaway car waiting across the street.

A customer in the store called 911 at 9:40 p.m. saying that the four suspects had shot a clerk and that the clerk appeared non-responsive. The clerk was taken to the hospital where he was pronounced dead.

A police officer near the Rite-Aid saw the getaway car fleeing west-bound down US-24. Police began a pursuit that lasted nearly an hour before the getaway car hit another car at the intersection of Dean Road and Douglas Road. The getaway car hit three more parked cars before ending up at a dead-end street. The suspects then fled from the vehicle, running through nearby back yards.

All four suspects were apprehended by the police officers on foot. Jacob Smith is being charged with first degree murder and armed robbery, while the other three teenagers are being charged as accomplices. One of the accomplices is also being charged with aggravated assault for striking police officers and resisting arrest. All four teenagers are also charged with robbery and possession of stolen property after a police search found items stolen from other local stores in the trunk of their car.

This is the third time in two months that a violent crime has occurred in Mason.

Appendix 4: Explicit Racial Appeal

Four Black Teenagers Murder Store Clerk

The gunman, Jacob Smith, after being captured by police

Four black teenagers were apprehended on June 10 robbing a local Rite Aid and murdering one of the store's clerks. The teenagers allegedly shot the clerk and stole over $500 of prescription medicine and other merchandise. Three of the teenagers entered the store in hooded outfits, each holding a firearm. The gunman, Jacob Smith, proceeded to the pharmacy and after the clerk refused to give him any medication, the clerk was shot twice in the chest. After grabbing medications and other items, the three perpetrators fled to a getaway car waiting across the street.

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<u>Appendix 5</u>: Post-Test Questionnaire

21. Do you strongly favor, favor, oppose, or strongly oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?
    a. Strongly Favor
    b. Favor
    c. Oppose
    d. Strongly Oppose

22. Do you strongly favor, favor, oppose, or strongly oppose treating juvenile defendants as adults if they have been accused of committing a violent crime?
    a. Strongly Favor
    b. Favor
    c. Oppose
    d. Strongly Oppose

23. Do you think the federal government should make it more difficult for people to buy a gun than it is now, make it easier for people to buy a gun, or keep these rules about the same as they are now?
    a. More difficult
    b. Make it easier
    c. Keep these rules about the same

24. Do you strongly approve, approve, disapprove or strongly disapprove of the way Barack Obama is handling his job as president?
    a. Strongly Approve
    b. Approve
    c. Disapprove
    d. Strongly Disapprove

25. Do you strongly approve, approve, disapprove or strongly disapprove of the way Barack Obama is handling the economy?
    a. Strongly Approve
    b. Approve
    c. Disapprove
    d. Strongly Disapprove

26. As you may or may not know, a new law passed in March 2010 will change the way we pay for health insurance in two ways: it will require all Americans to buy health insurance, with government helping pay for those who cannot afford it, and it will require health insurance companies to cover anyone who applies for insurance, no matter what pre-existing medical conditions they have.

Taken together, do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose these changes?
- a. Favor
- b. Neither favor nor oppose
- c. Oppose

Please let us know if the story you read made you feel any of the following emotions.

27. Did the story make you feel <u>happy</u>?
- a. Yes
- b. No

28. Did the story make you feel <u>sad</u>?
- a. Yes
- b. No

29. Did the story make you feel <u>angry</u>?
- a. Yes
- b. No

30. Did the story make you feel <u>scared</u>?
- a. Yes
- b. No

31. Did the story make you feel <u>depressed</u>?
- a. Yes
- b. No

32. Did the story make you feel <u>disgusted</u>?
- a. Yes
- b. No

33. Did the story make you feel <u>proud</u>?
- a. Yes
- b. No
- c.

34. Did the story make you feel <u>uneasy</u>?
- a. Yes
- b. No

Next, we would like you to answer some questions about different groups in America. Some people think that certain groups have too much influence in American life and politics, while others feel that they don't have enough influence. You will be presented with a list of groups and for each one please tell us whether that group has too much influence, just about the right amount of influence, or too little influence.

35. How about **WHITES**? Do you think that **WHITES** have too much influence in American politics, too little influence, or just about the right amount of influence?
    a. Too much influence
    b. Just about the right amount of influence
    c. Too little influence

36. How about **BLACKS**? Do you think that **BLACKS** have too much influence in American politics, too little influence, or just about the right amount of influence?
    a. Too much influence
    b. Just about the right amount of influence
    c. Too little influence

37. How about **RICH PEOPLE**? Do you think that **RICH PEOPLE** have too much influence in American politics, too little influence, or just about the right amount of influence?
    a. Too much influence
    b. Just about the right amount of influence
    c. Too little influence

38. How about **MIDDLE-CLASS PEOPLE**? Do you think that **MIDDLE-CLASS PEOPLE** have too much influence in American politics, too little influence, or just about the right amount of influence?
    a. Too much influence
    b. Just about the right amount of influence
    c. Too little influence

39. How about **WORKING-CLASS PEOPLE**? Do you think that **WORKING-CLASS PEOPLE** have too much influence in American politics, too little influence, or just about the right amount of influence?
    a. Too much influence
    b. Just about the right amount of influence
    c. Too little influence

40. How about **POOR PEOPLE**? Do you think that **POOR PEOPLE** have too much influence in American politics, too little influence, or just about the right amount of influence?
    a. Too much influence
    b. Just about the right amount of influence
    c. Too little influence

Please tell us how much you agree with the following statements.

41. Some people think the government should provide fewer services, even in areas such as health and education, in order to reduce spending. Other people feel that it is important for the government to provide many more services even if it means an increase in spending.

    Where would you place yourself on this scale?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Fewer Services			**Same Amount**			**More Services**

42. Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed.
    a. Strongly Agree
    b. Agree
    c. Disagree
    d. Strongly Disagree

43. This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are?
    a. Strongly Agree
    b. Agree
    c. Disagree
    d. Strongly Disagree

44. It is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others.
    a. Strongly Agree
    b. Agree
    c. Disagree
    d. Strongly Disagree

45. If people were treated more equally in this country we would have many fewer problems.
    a. Strongly Agree
    b. Agree
    c. Disagree
    d. Strongly Disagree

46. Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every effort to improve the social and economic position of Blacks. Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help Blacks because they should help themselves. Where would you place yourself on this scale?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Government Help						**Help Themselves**

47. Now we have some more questions about different groups in society. How close do you feel to each of the following groups of people in your ideas, interests, and feelings about things?

	Very close	Fairly close	Not too close	Not at all close
a. Northerners				
b. Southerners				
c. Middle-class people				
d. Working-class people				
e. Men				
f. Women				
g. Whites				
h. Blacks				
i. Hispanics				

48. What is the highest level of formal education you have received? Please check the appropriate box.

Some high school	
High school graduate	
Some college	
College degree	
Post-graduate degree	

49. What is your total household income?

    a. Less than $12,500
    b. $12,500 - $24,999
    c. $25,000 - $49,999
    d. $50,000 - $74,999
    e. $75,000 - $99,999
    f. More than $100,000
    g. Prefer not to answer

Appendix 6: Measures of Sympathy

Sympathy Measures	Percentages			
	Often	**Fairly Often**	**Not Too Often**	**Never**
Have you ever felt sympathy for **Blacks**?	7	22	51	20
Have you ever felt sympathy for the **handicapped**?	49	41	10	0
Have you ever felt sympathy for **women**?	6	30	50	14
Have you ever felt sympathy for **homosexuals**?	16	17	34	33

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