

PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH ON SOCIAL CHANGE SOME SCIENTIFIC AND ETHICAL ISSUES ¹

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L'étude psychologique des changements sociaux. Problèmes scientifiques et éthiques. — Les recherches psycho-sociologiques peuvent aider à comprendre comment faciliter des changements sociaux constructifs. Pour des raisons à la fois scientifiques et sociales, l'étude du changement social présente un intérêt commun pour les psychologues des pays avancés et de ceux qui le sont moins. De plus, elle requiert, pour être efficace, un haut degré de coopération internationale. S'engager dans de telles études soulève des problèmes fondamentaux tant du point de vue scientifique que du point de vue moral. Les problèmes scientifiques sont relatifs aux implications de telles recherches pour le développement de la discipline et le maintien de l'objectivité scientifique : les études du changement social dans les pays en voie de développement peuvent réellement contribuer, et d'une manière irremplaçable, aux progrès de la psychologie sociale; l'objectivité scientifique dépend, non de l'absence de valeurs préférentielles, mais de la manière dont le chercheur tient compte de ces valeurs. Les problèmes éthiques concernent essentiellement les relations du chercheur qui vient d'une société industrielle pour faire des études dans un pays en voie de développement, avec les membres de la société d'accueil, et particulièrement, avec ses collègues locaux. Quels sont les problèmes moraux qui risquent de se poser ? Imposer des valeurs étrangères, envahir des domaines privés, utiliser la recherche à des fins d'espionnage et d'intervention, exploiter le pays d'accueil, détourner à son profit les chercheurs locaux de valeur. Il est essentiel que s'établissent des relations fondées sur la participation et la réciprocité, pour que les recherches interculturelles soient conduites de façon morale et pour que se développe une mutuelle confiance.

The world community is faced with the necessity of finding creative responses to the powerful forces of social change that are nudging the old order everywhere. These forces are most pronounced and most obvious in the so-called developing parts of the world, where demands for political independence, economic development, and social reform are producing a pattern of change that is too rapid at some points, too slow at others. The forces toward social change, however, are by no means restricted to the developing countries. They manifest themselves wherever there are populations that have been excluded from effective participation in the political process, from a share in the benefits

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of the national economy, and from meaningful roles within the social structure. Thus, for example, the civil rights struggle and the renewed awareness of the problem of poverty in the United States are part of this worldwide revolution of human rights. What can be done to meet the challenge posed by this revolution, to facilitate social change and to increase the likelihood that it will move in constructive directions? What kinds of institutional arrangements can be fashioned that would improve the conditions of the masses of the population, that would be consistent with their fundamental human needs for security and dignity, and that would bring ever wider segments of the population into full participation in their societies, politics, and economies? What institutions and values might increase, within the population of a developing country, the sense of the legitimacy of its political regime, the feeling of national identity, the readiness for involvement in citizenship responsibilities, in economic enterprises, in population control programs, in other forms of social planning? What techniques of change can be developed that would minimize the use of violence, the brutalization of the active and passive participants in the change process, and the predisposition to govern by coercion and repression? How can change be introduced without destroying the existing culture patterns and values that provide meaning and stability to a people, while at the same time helping to build the new patterns and values that an urbanizing, industrializing, and ever-changing society requires if it is to remain human?

Any attempt to answer these questions requires the input of new ideas and new data, often, in fact, of entirely new perspectives and ways of thinking. Social psychology is clearly a relevant source of such new inputs, for all of the questions I posed have distinctly psychological components. Thus, the challenge presented by the forces toward social change is also a challenge to us. Can social-psychological research meet this challenge? Can it contribute to the systematic analysis, to the understanding, and to the rational solution of the problems of social change? That it cannot do so alone and that it cannot produce a grand and all-inclusive design for answering the questions goes without saying. But we do have concepts and methods that ought to be applicable and, in my view, we should be able to play a significant role in a many-sided effort to deal with these problems. Obviously relevant contributions can come from many kinds of social-psychological research, such as research on the short- and long-term consequences of different techniques of inducing attitude and behavior change, on the sources of resistance to change in individuals and communities, or on the psychological effects of rapid social change. The type of research I am speaking of here is basic research, although there are, of course, valuable and legitimate contributions that can come from applied research as well. It is basic in the sense that it is concerned with long-range issues rather than specific programs, and that it is designed to answer general questions rather than questions posed by specific operating agencies relevant to their particular missions. At the same time, I do not pretend that I am speaking of research that is neutral and independent of value preferences. The research is based on the assumption that social change is desirable. It is designed to contribute to the understanding (1) of ways to facilitate constructive change in the direction of meeting human needs and of expanding the participation of people all over the world in the political, economic, and social processes of their respective societies, and (2) of ways to

minimize the coercive, destructive, and psychologically disabling consequences of rapid social change.

My central thesis is that our discipline ought to invest a major effort in research along these lines. On another occasion, I spoke of this type of research as a contribution to radical thinking about societal processes. It is radical because, in analyzing social arrangements and alternative policies, "it searches for causes and attempts to specify the conditions that define a given state of affairs... [and] it asks what [these arrangements and policies] mean to concrete human beings" (Kelman, 1965b, pp. 33-34). In short, it goes to the roots and recognizes that "the root is man." My reasons for urging that we invest a major effort in research on social change are partly scientific. The investigation of these problems offers very special opportunities for theoretically significant research about social behavior, to which I shall return shortly. Aside from these scientific reasons, however, I also urge this line of research as a contribution to work on vital social issues. For social scientists in developing countries these issues are obviously at the heart of the problems faced by their societies. They are equally vital, however, for social scientists in the more fully industrialized nations. I have already mentioned the continuity between the problems of social change in developing and industrialized societies. Most highly industrialized societies, for example, contain within them pockets of poverty — regions that are economically less developed —, ethnic or cultural minorities that are not fully integrated into the opportunity systems and the political life of the country, and internal conflicts that inhibit growth and integration. Moreover, these issues are vital for social scientists in industrialized nations for the simple reason that the problems of social change and development, wherever they may occur, are world problems. We all share in the responsibility and we are all confronted by the necessity to deal with these problems for both moral and prudential reasons. The welfare of all is everyone's concern, and in this increasingly interdependent world the fate of one nation is inextricably linked with the fate of all others. Thus, we all have a responsibility to contribute to the development of broader perspectives for viewing the process of social change, and this is precisely what social science research can accomplish.

For both scientific and social reasons, then, the study of social change is of mutual interest to psychologists in both more and less developed countries. This convergence of interest should provide the necessary motivation for cooperative endeavors in this area. Furthermore, a high degree of cooperation between these two groups is essential if research is to proceed effectively, because of our mutual interdependence. On the one hand, problems that we wish to investigate and the detailed knowledge of the nature of these problems and their social and cultural context reside in the developing countries. On the other hand, the human and material resources for investigating these problems are more fully developed in the industrialized nations, where trained research personnel, accumulated research experience, research facilities, and research funds are far more readily available. There is thus clearly both a basis for international cooperation in research on social change and a strong necessity for organizing such cooperative efforts. In urging, then, that we place psychological research on social change high on our professional agenda, I would urge as a corollary that this research be built, as indeed it must be built, on international cooperation.

As we begin to think about mounting such an effort, there are some basic scientific and ethical questions that we must consider. What are the implications of this kind of effort for the development of psychology, particularly social psychology, as a discipline, and what special problems of scientific objectivity does it raise? What are the ethical implications of research on social change in developing countries and what barriers do these create to cooperation among psychologists from the less and more developed countries? The rest of my remarks will be devoted to a discussion of these scientific and ethical issues and of their further implications for the way in which cooperation in research on social change must be organized.

SCIENTIFIC IMPLICATIONS

Development of the discipline. Is there a danger that attention to the study of social change might distract psychologists from their primary task and might impede the advancement of psychology as a science? It is my contention that the study of social change is by no means incompatible with the development of our discipline. As a matter of fact, I would guess that just the opposite holds true for the growth of psychology within developing countries themselves. Research that is relevant to pressing social problems is most likely to gain support within these societies, given their limited resources. Moreover, problems of social change can probably provide the most exciting opportunities for significant research in this setting and capture the imagination of the most promising students. Thus, this kind of emphasis is most likely to contribute to the growth of psychology in developing countries, by promoting acceptance for it, by demonstrating its relevance, and by stimulating significant psychological research. With time it would then become possible for psychological research on a variety of other problems to gain increasing support.

Two important qualifications are in order here. The favorable development that I am predicting would be far less likely to materialize if we make exaggerated claims about the immediate and direct relevance of psychological research to problems of social change. These claims cannot be sustained and would only discredit us. A large part of the value of psychological research in this area rests on its cumulative effect and on its contribution, along with other sources of knowledge, to basic thinking about the processes of social change. By the same token, psychology as a discipline would be far less likely to advance if its potential contributions to problems of social change became narrowly defined, in terms of answering specific operational questions of various agencies involved in one or another aspect of social change. I do not question the value and importance of such applied research, but this is not at the heart of the effort that I am advocating. If psychological research on social change is to gain support within developing countries and at the same time contribute to the development of the discipline, we will have to stress that basic research, even though it may not answer certain immediate operational questions, may be more fruitful in the final analysis than applied research that narrowly focuses on problems of the moment. Such research may build the framework for fundamental answers to long-range problems, and may be highly relevant to problems that are likely

to arise in the future but have not yet been recognized by policy-makers. In short, we will have to demonstrate what I believe to be true : that theoretical research, and the development of the discipline in which it is embedded, can have important practical implications, although these may not always be readily apparent, particularly if one takes a short-range view. Going beyond the question of the advancement of psychology in developing countries, what is the probable impact of concerted efforts in the study of social change on the further advancement of psychological, and particularly social-psychological, theory and research in general? It should be evident from my emphasis on theoretical problems that what I am proposing is not a distraction of the social psychologist from his role in basic research, but one way of carrying out this role. Not only is a concern with facilitation of social change and with the social problems surrounding it compatible with basic research, but indeed there are some interesting and significant theoretical problems for which such a starting-point may actually represent the most productive way of carrying out basic research (*cf.* Tajfel, 1966). Research that addresses itself to such broad questions as, for example, "How can economic development be facilitated in highly traditional, agricultural societies?" or "How can the psychological and social dislocations resulting from rapid social change be minimized and counteracted?" can certainly be a source of important theoretical advances that would not derive from studies formulated in more neutral terms and carried out in more antiseptic settings.

From a methodological point of view, there is a special type of opportunity that research in developing countries can offer to the theoretically oriented social psychologist. This opportunity is linked to the very occurrence of major and rapid changes within these societies. It becomes possible to observe social change and related phenomena in extreme form and in the process of emergence. Because of the discontinuity and the rapidity with which these changes occur, it is sometimes possible to approximate a before- and after-design, that is, to obtain measurements before the introduction of some major innovation and after it has taken its course. The effects of certain variables, whose history is known almost in its entirety, can thus be observed in detail and in relative isolation from contaminating factors. Even if it is difficult to pin down specific causal connections, it is possible to observe the development of certain new values, beliefs, or social institutions. For example, my own research on national role conceptions and nationalist ideology can benefit greatly from observations carried out in new nations where the sense of national identity is often just in the process of emergence. Another special type of opportunity that research in developing countries can offer to the theoretically oriented social psychologist is that it can extend the range of cultures in which theoretical propositions can be put to the test. For example, it ought to be possible to test hypotheses about the determinants of different reactions to social change, of different processes of acceptance and diffusion of change, or of differences in capacity to adjust to rapid societal transformations, by comparing societies that vary along certain relevant cultural dimensions. Cross-cultural comparisons enable us to check the generality of propositions that have been tested in a single culture and to develop theoretical models that can encompass contradictory findings in different cultural contexts (*cf.* Tajfel, 1966). Developing countries offer unique opportunities for comparative research, not only because they provide cultural contexts different from

those in which social-psychological research has generally been carried out, but also because they often contain a wide diversity of cultures within relatively small geographical units. In sub-Saharan Africa, for example, societies differing greatly with respect to some aspects of culture are, at the same time, characterized by many uniformities, both in culture and in conditions of life. It thus becomes possible to conduct natural experiments, to observe the effects of certain cultural differences on the process of social change and reactions to it with some degree of quasi-experimental control.

Cross-cultural comparisons of this sort are significant, of course, not only for the study of social change, but also for the study of many other social and psychological processes. A useful dividend of participation in research on social change in developing countries may be that it gives the researcher access to comparative data on a wide variety of other phenomena, not directly related to social change as such. In some cases, these data may be obtained as part of the research design in a study of social change, but also analyzed for different purposes. For example, in studying the sources of differing reactions to social change, one might examine different patterns of child rearing, which in turn would provide a pool of data applicable to various other problems as well. In other cases, it may be possible to add to the design of a study on social change some procedures relevant to a different problem. For example, at the end of an interview, respondents may be asked to give a few more minutes to a perceptual experiment. In yet other cases, an investigator's colleagues in the host country may be more willing to help him carry out a completely unrelated study because he has been collaborating with them on research on social change which is of mutual interest. These are some possible indirect benefits that this kind of research may yield, above and beyond its inherent theoretical significance.

Scientific objectivity. In describing the type of research I have in mind, I indicated not only that it was basic research, but also that it was rooted in certain value commitments. Implicit in the way research questions are formulated is the assumption that "constructive social change" — an admittedly vague phrase whose meaning, I hope, is clear from my earlier remarks — is desirable. The existence of such a value preference brings up another scientific issue: Is it possible, under these conditions, to maintain the scientific objectivity of one's research? That value preferences affect the scientific process and are likely to introduce some distortions into it goes without saying. This is true of every line of research, certainly within social psychology, and even more certainly in an area marked by social significance. However, if we are going to do research on social change and other social problems, then we will have to live with this ambiguity and thoroughly re-examine our assumptions about scientific objectivity. The alternative would be to restrict ourselves arbitrarily to the study of phenomena less likely to engage basic values, to the extent that such phenomena exist at all in human psychology.

Some social scientists might argue, perhaps, that one can enhance the scientific objectivity of research on social change if one deliberately excludes value considerations from the formulation of the research problem. According to this view, the researcher merely sets up the conditions for observing the relevant phenomena, and, by the use of objective methods, is able to do so in disinterested fashion. I submit that this view, if indeed anyone takes it, is based on self-delusion.

It is impossible to work in the area of social change, or in other areas pregnant with value considerations, such as the area of mental health, as a purely disinterested observer, merely looking at whatever presents itself. Value preferences are inevitably built into the assumptions of the research design, which determine the questions that are to be asked, the events that are to be observed, the variables that are to be assessed, the categories in terms of which the data are to be organized. I suspect that it is easiest to delude ourselves about the disinterested nature of our research when our assumptions reflect the dominant value preferences within our society. These value assumptions are so thoroughly built into the structure of reality, as we perceive it, that it does not occur to us to question them and to entertain the possibility of alternative assumptions. Thus, we have the anomalous situation that research rooted in the dominant values of the society is less likely to be questioned about its scientific objectivity and yet more likely to suffer from the lack of it. It is not only impossible to conduct basic research on socially significant problems in a value vacuum, but it is also not necessary to do so. To be maximally objective, research need not be value-free. There is no reason why the choice of problem cannot be based, as it generally is, on certain value preferences, and why the study cannot be designed to answer questions that have definite value implications. Thus, for example, questions about the conditions favorable to the development of mental health in an individual or about the procedures conducive to improvement in mentally ill patients are deeply immersed in value suppositions, yet they can be approached through objective research. In large part, of course, it is a matter of using methods that are objective, in the sense of being explicit, reliable, and replicable. As I have already pointed out, though, this does not prevent the intrusion of value preferences into the assumptions on which the design is built, for the intrusion of values cannot be prevented. The issue is not whether the investigator has value preferences, but how he takes account of them.

There are several essential steps that can help us take account of our values in the interest of maximizing the genuine objectivity of value-laden research : — 1. We must recognize and make explicit the value preferences underlying our research, in order to protect ourselves from unwittingly letting these slip into our assumptions and in order to allow others to reconstruct the basis of our design and conclusions. — 2. We must distinguish clearly between commitments to certain valued end-states and commitments to certain specific paths for achieving these states, particularly if these paths represent vested interests concerned with maintaining or achieving power within the society. Thus, for example, there is an important difference between research based on the assumption that social change is desirable and research based on the assumption that the program for social change developed by Party X is desirable. Similarly, there is an important difference between research based on the assumption that political stability is desirable and research based on the assumption that a powerful military establishment as the protector of political stability is desirable. I would not argue that research based on commitment to specific paths is illegitimate, but it has a totally different scientific status in that it tends to limit the investigator's ability to question basic value assumptions. It is thus essential to make such commitments explicit. The question of the auspices under which the research is done, to which I shall return later, becomes central here. — 3. We must be prepared to review our value

assumptions, to test the limits of these assumptions, and to explore the possibility and reasonableness of alternative assumptions. For example, if we assume that social change is desirable, we must question whether this is necessarily so, whether it is always so, and what further assumptions lie behind this preference. — 4. In this process of questioning our assumptions, we must be particularly alert to the possibility that our preferences are based on certain further assumptions about facts, which may in themselves be questionable or at least unquestioned. — 5. We must constantly re-examine our definition of the desired end-state, whether it be mental health or constructive social change. If we fail to do so, we can easily slide into the assumption that our way of defining the concept is *the* way of defining it, for example, that adjustment or freedom from symptoms *is* mental health, and thus allow our value preferences to slip out of our awareness and into the very definition of the criterion.

The steps I have outlined are a mere hint of the kind of re-examination of the relationship between scientific objectivity and value commitments that I consider necessary. There is no easy solution to the problem of objectivity in research on socially significant problems. Certainly the avoidance of such research is an unsatisfactory answer, nor ought we to pretend that it is possible to conduct such research in *disinterested* fashion. One of the coming tasks for social psychology is to learn how to work in areas in which important values are engaged, how to combine social commitment with scientific integrity.

ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS

So far, much of the research on social change in developing countries has been done by social scientists from industrialized nations, who have come into the country of concern, set up their project, collected their data, and then taken them home for analysis. This has been accomplished with varying degrees and kinds of cooperation on the part of social scientists in the host society. These activities of foreign scholars have often and understandably created suspicion and resentment among local social scientists and other elements in the society. If we are going to continue to do research in developing countries, and particularly if we hope to establish long-term collaborative relationships, we will have to become more sensitive to the concerns of members of the host societies and above all, to those of our colleagues and potential colleagues there. Dealing with the suspicion and resentment of the intruding scholar is not merely a public relations problem. There are, of course, many reasons for these reactions, and no doubt some of them can be ascribed to the sensitivities of intellectuals in developing countries. But to the largest extent, I submit, these problems are rooted in the ethical ambiguities inherent in the situation of the North American or European scholar coming into a developing country to carry out his research. I would like to describe five issues around which resentment and suspicion may focus, point to the ethical concern that each brings into play, and then say something about possible ways of arranging the relationship between the visitor and his hosts that might reduce ethically questionable behavior and the resentments that follow upon it.

Imposition of foreign values. The problem of imposing foreign values is endemic to research on change, wherever it is conducted, particularly if the research is linked to an action program designed to induce change, or if it attempts to develop specific recommendations for facilitating change (*cf.* Kelman, 1965a). Planned change is typically based on certain values of the change agent, which are not fully shared by the target population. The ethical implications of this state of affairs are more or less acute, depending on the nature of the influence process used. In any event, however, such change does involve at least some threat to the existing values of the target population and a certain amount of tampering with these values. Even when the change agent is a member of the same society, the values governing his influence attempt are likely to be somewhat foreign to those of the target population because usually the two represent different social classes. When the change agent is a member of a foreign society, the problem clearly takes on more serious proportions. The investigator must keep himself constantly aware of the danger of such imposition. He must develop an informed respect for the people who are being investigated or influenced, for their values and their way of life, understood insofar as possible within their own terms. He must repeatedly question his assumptions about the desirability of the changes he is promoting : perhaps these changes do not justify the extent to which they disrupt existing values. He must review the methods for inducing change that are employed from the point of view of the degree of manipulation and imposition that they represent. When the foreign scholar works closely with local counterparts, which is generally true in those situations in which the research is tied to an action program, then the problem is lessened, since the local colleague would be more sensitive to the general values of the society that are being threatened and to potentially disruptive consequences. Even in this case, however, the foreign investigator cannot escape the responsibility of confronting the problem of imposition of foreign values. Because of the class differences that I have already mentioned, the local scholar may himself not be fully aware and appreciative of the values of the target population. In fact, it is conceivable that an outsider, because of his distance and lack of indoctrination in class-based assumptions, may at times have a sharper appreciation of the special character of the target population than his local colleague. I can well imagine, for example, that a foreign social scientist might learn things about the values of lower-class Negroes in the United States of which most white middle-class North American scholars simply have no conception.

Invasion of privacy. The problem of invasion of privacy, which confronts social research in general, takes on a special character when the investigator is a representative of a more developed society. Members of the host society may resent the implication that their country is being looked upon as a specimen and studied because of the " quaintness " of its primitive culture and the " backwardness " of its social life. It ought to be possible to persuade our colleagues, and through them other members of their society, that we do not regard them with this kind of patronizing superiority if, indeed, we bring to our research a deep respect for the integrity of the culture that we have come to observe. Such resentments can also be overcome to the extent to which the research is clearly placed in a comparative context, so that it becomes quite apparent that our interest is not in the oddities of a particular culture but in the way in which

different cultures handle problems common to all of them. It is particularly important to the development of a cooperative relationship that we not only communicate our awareness of the continuity between more and less developed societies with respect to problems of social change, but that we also build opportunities for mutual exposure into our research plans. Thus, if we are interested in studying tribal conflicts in Africa, we should try to provide an opportunity for our African colleagues to study race relations in the United States. Similarly, if we are interested in studying the social consequences of rapid urbanization in Asia, we should try to provide an opportunity for our Asian colleagues to make direct observations in the slum areas of US cities. Such reciprocal arrangements would help to overcome the potential resentment that one-sided exposure might arouse. At the same time, they would provide excellent opportunities for training young investigators and enhance the contributions of colleagues from developing countries to the larger research enterprise.

Use of research for purposes of intelligence or intervention. Suspicion about the use of social research as a cover for espionage or intervention in foreign countries arose dramatically in the now famous case of Project Camelot (*cf.* Horowitz, 1965; Silvert, 1965). While there are no indications whatsoever that either espionage or intervention was involved in this case, it helps to bring into focus some of the ethical problems arising out of the political relationship between the foreign scholar's country and the host country. I do not need to dwell on the obvious point that no social scientist ought to participate, directly or indirectly, in any operation that uses social science research as a front for intelligence work or intervention in another country. If he engages in such activities, he is not working as a social scientist and he certainly must not pretend to be doing so. I would also regard it as clearly inconsistent with scientific ethics for a social scientist to work for an academic or research organization that serves as a cover for intelligence operations, even if he himself does not participate in them, since he is allowing his scientific standing to be used to legitimize these activities.

The problem, however, goes beyond the obvious and ethically straightforward question of whether a piece of social science research is an act of intervention in disguise. Given the nature of the relationship between the United States and Latin America, for example, a perfectly legitimate study, carried out by honest investigators, may in subtle ways reflect an interventionist policy and contribute to it. This may happen, as it seemed to happen in the case of Project Camelot, when a study, though free and independent in its operations, is carried out for a military client and uses military policy objectives as its frame of reference and source of assumptions (Horowitz, 1965). The important question that the social scientist must ask himself when he enters into a foreign country to do research on politically sensitive matters is whether he is truly an autonomous agent, not only in the sense of being free to choose his own methods, but also in the sense of being free to question certain basic assumptions and to entertain a totally new set of assumptions, in other words, in the sense of being free to function as a scientist. He must ask himself whether the auspices under which he is doing the research are such that he is really bound, even in the absence of an explicit contract to that effect, to take a particular perspective as his point of departure and to continue within its terms. To the extent that he is, he is not really operating as an autonomous investigator and should not present himself

as such. As Silvert (1965) points out, "the peculiar attribute and unique scientific virtue of the university-affiliated social scientist is his freedom. Once abridged, for whatever reason, then the people relying on his objectivity are in serious danger of accepting a misrepresented product..." (p. 224). The crucial issue, it should be noted, is not the sponsorship of the research or the source of funds, but the nature of the explicit or implicit contract under which the funds are obtained.

It is a good general rule to be very clear about both the source of funds and the nature of the contract, in order to allow colleagues in the host society to make their own estimates about the political implications of the research and in order to allay their understandable suspicions. It would be valuable if, beyond sharing this kind of information as well as information about the purposes and premises of the research, the foreign investigator engaged in close, frank consultation with colleagues in the host country. This would enable him not only to allay their suspicions and answer their questions, and to learn through them about the suspicions and questions that others have, but also to discover certain implicit assumptions that he might have been making unwittingly. Even more desirable would be full participation of colleagues in the host country in the formulation, conduct, and analysis of the research, not as consultants or specialists, but as collaborators, sharing in basic decisions. Under these circumstances, it is less likely that subtle reflections of an interventionist policy would slip into the research design.

Exploitation of the host country. The researcher from an industrialized country often engages in activities that his colleagues in the host country regard as exploitative and that thus arouse their resentment. The foreign scholar may come into the country, arrange to get help from local social scientists in the collection of his data, give them fair compensation for their help, and then go home with his data to analyze them and write them up. He is too busy and task-oriented and thus not sufficiently thoughtful to view these activities as exploitation. The local scholar, however, resents the fact that he is working on problems of others, without advancing his own career and without being left more capable to initiate research on his own. He sees the foreign scholar as "an exporter of data" (Silvert, 1965, p. 227), who takes all that is valuable out of the country to use it for his own ends. Such feelings of exploitation are less likely to develop if research collaborators in the host country are not merely assigned a specific task in the project and trained to perform it. To the extent to which participation in the project contributes to their general training and provides them with broad experience, they will come away from it feeling more capable to initiate their own research on problems of their own choosing. Such an outcome is most likely to occur if colleagues from the developing countries have maximum opportunity to participate in all phases of the research, including the definition of the problem and the initial planning.

Aside from the ethical problem and the feeling of resentment engendered by the more exploitative relationship, the growth of social psychology as a discipline within the developing countries is at issue here. The growth of the discipline can be advanced only if the capabilities of personnel in developing countries for initiating and carrying out their own research relevant to their own interests are enhanced. Research projects organized by North American

and European investigators are particularly likely to contribute to this end if they are carried out within the context of a training program. That is, if investigators from other countries come not merely to carry out a specific project, but to help set up or to contribute to an ongoing training program — along the lines of the program being developed by Syracuse University and Makerere College (Kampala) under the direction of Marshall Segall — they are more likely to make a long-range contribution, while at the same time pursuing their research interests. It is important to stress, in this connection, that an arrangement that is one-sided in the other direction, that is, one whereby the North American or European psychologist comes to a developing country entirely for the purpose of serving that country, without viewing this experience as relevant to his own research interests, is also untenable in the long run. A cooperative relationship in which one side is always the benefactor and the other the beneficiary will not be acceptable for long to either side. The most promising relationship is a reciprocal one, in which participation by colleagues from the developing countries enhances their own capabilities, while at the same time advancing in concrete ways the research goals of the visiting scholar.

Diversification of local research talent. The foreign scholar is usually in a better position to offer financial and other inducements and may thus divert local research talent to work on his problems. Members of the host society may resent the use of their limited human resources for research on the theoretical problems of the outside scholar rather than on the pressing immediate problems faced by the society. To the extent to which this resentment is based on a perceived conflict between theoretical research and research that has social utility, I would argue, as I have already done earlier, that social-psychological research certainly can have and typically does have practical implications, even if they are not immediately apparent. We can respond to the concern about the social relevance of psychological research by integrating our theoretical interests with research that takes the problems of developing societies as its starting point, and by demonstrating convincingly that some theoretical studies that have no obvious immediate utility do have long-range relevance to these problems. Beyond that, the remedy that I have already mentioned several times is equally applicable here: If colleagues from the host society participate fully in the formulation of the research, then there is a greater likelihood that it will in fact be relevant to the special problems of their societies as they see them.

CONCLUSION

Most of the ethical problems that arise in the relationship between social scientists from more and less developed societies can be linked to the pseudo-imperialist character that these relationships sometimes take on. While I doubt that most North American social scientists have imperialistic values or character structures, the realities of their own situations and of the situations into which they come tend to cast them into imperialistic roles. Many of us have assumed, implicitly and without questioning, that the other society is simply there for us to research upon it, and that we can take what we wish from it, as long as we pay the fair market price. In the process, we have too often displayed a lack of

respect for the values of the society, the sensitivities of its members, the dignity of our respondents, and to personal and professional aspirations of our colleagues. Such an attitude simply will not do. The *sine qua non*, it seems to me, for coming to grips with these ethical problems, and by the same token for extending psychological research on social change, is the development of patterns of truly participatory and reciprocal cooperation. We need to experiment more actively with exchanges that involve mutual exposure, with collaborative research projects built on full participation and reciprocal benefit, with international institutes for research and training, with closer integration between research and training efforts, with international boards to review projects that may be politically sensitive. Needless to say, the degree and type of international cooperation will have to differ from project to project, but the participatory and reciprocal relationship must become our norm, the background against which ethical conduct can be defined and mutual trust can develop.

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