City Versus Suburb? The role of Social Identity and Economic Well Being in Determining Support for Urban Policy

by

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I. Introduction

"We don't want them here:" A common refrain in the past for suburbanites trying to protect the racial and class homogeneity of their suburban community. "We don't need them anyway:" A common response from urbanites that hold their neighbors as morally superior to the racist, conservative, suburbanites. Although political leaders of suburbs and cities have often had mutually antagonistic relationships, the hostile relationship is not confined to them: average people have also felt real animosity towards the other side of the metropolitan area. Almost no metropolitan area in America has had poorer city-suburban relations than Detroit. For a long time, African Americans were excluded from living and even working in the suburbs, and those in the suburbs would only come in to work. Due to suburban fear of the urban residents that public transportation would bring from the city, plans for those routes were stopped. People in the city would feel hostility towards the people who moved out into the suburbs and abandoned the city. To a certain extent, this occurs still today. This is despite the existence of similar problems affecting both Detroit and its suburbs. Both community types have been negatively affected by the continued outward growth of the metropolitan region, leaving behind the central city first and then the inner ring suburbs. Additionally, economic growth and equal opportunity have been hindered due to the lack of a coherent metropolitan policy, and the cuts to state revenue sharing that Detroit has faced in recent years. However, this issue goes beyond just Detroit; many metropolitan areas in Michigan do not work as well as they should, and all have faced tight budgets while state revenue sharing simultaneously decreases.

Looking at how race, party identification, the income of one's community, and the income of the individual affect support for aid to central cities and metropolitan cooperation can

help policymakers understand the sources of opposition and support to support for aid to central cities and metropolitan cooperation. Also, since metropolitan policy is set at the statewide level, it is important to analyze not just urban and suburban opinion, but rural opinions as well. This question is important to answer for both theoretical and substantive reasons. It is not only intellectually interesting to find out what type of people and areas hold positive and negative attitudes towards central cities, but it also has practical applications. Utilizing this knowledge could lead to more effective coalition-building techniques in metropolitan areas.

Research Question:

What is the effect of race, political party identity, and the economic well being of a zip code and an individual on levels of support for aid to central cities and metropolitan cooperation in the United States?

Independent Variables:

-Economic well being of municipality.

-Economic well being of individual.

-Political party identification.

-Race

Dependent Variables:

-Support for state transfers to central cities.

-Support for metropolitan cooperation.

II. Conceptualization

The conceptualization of the components of the research question is important to elaborate upon because although some are relatively self-explanatory, it is important to be as precise as possible in what is meant when these terms are used to avoid possible confusion. In order to facilitate the ability to refer back to this section, this will be presented in list format.

Suburbs-

The conceptualization used for a suburb is a community that is separate from the central city boundaries, yet is still economically connected and geographically related to the central city and is not large enough in comparison to the central city to be equal with it. The most common components of defining and measuring suburbs include physical definitions, such as location and built environment characteristics, functional or operational definitions, such as transportation use and activity segregation, social definitions, such as political separation or sociocultural features, and other factors including: building style, community design, and relative age of the community (Forsyth 273). The United States Census Bureau's definition of urbanized areas will be used to delineate the line between urbanized and not urbanized. The Census Bureau defines an Urbanized Area as an area with 50,000 people or more that contains "a densely settled core of census tracts and/or census blocks that meet minimum population density requirements, along with adjacent territory containing non-residential land uses as well as territory with low population density included to link outlying densely settled territory with the densely settled core" (United States Census Bureau -2010 Definition). The Census Bureau considers suburbs to be part of the 'urbanized areas' and does not distinguish between the central city and the suburbs. However, the Census Bureau does have a list of all Zip Code Tabulation Areas that fall within

the urbanized area (United States Census Bureau- 2010 Relationship File). Once the central city zip codes are excluded, all that will remains will be the suburban zip codes to be used in the data analysis.

Central Cities-

Using the same Census Bureau definition listed above, the Zip Code Tabulation Areas will be used to define what constitutes a central city. For these purposes, the central city of the metropolitan area is considered to be a central city. In metropolitan politics it is the municipality boundaries that matter the most because it is these distinctions that come into play when distributing tax dollars or when coordinating metropolitan policies across communities. For example, despite the fact that many Detroit suburbs have fairly high population densities and contain an older housing stock, only the city of Detroit counts as a central city.

Metropolitan Area-

A metropolitan area's delineation comes from merely using the entirety of the Zip Code Tabulation Area, as described above. Although the Census Bureau describes these areas as urban areas, for these purposes they will be called metropolitan areas to avoid confusion and arguably be more accurate.

Rural Areas-

Lastly, rural areas are defined as being all the zip codes that fall outside of the urban area listed in the Zip Code Tabulation Area. Although surely some small cities would object to be considered rural, for the purposes of this analysis, it is important to distinguish the areas that lie within the metropolitan area from those that lie within. The zip codes outside of the metropolitan

areas would on average have far less contact with the central city and be much less likely to be affected by metropolitan policies.

Economic well being of a zip code-

The conceptualization used for the economic well being of a community is the median income of the zip code that a person resides in. Not only is this more precise than measuring on a municipality level, but the zip codes are also coded into the State of the State survey files that I use in my analysis (Michigan State University). Zip codes will be divided into high income or low income based on whether the median income of the zip code is above or below the median income of Michigan. The theory of "relative deprivation" (Walsh 2012, 517) explains that when people feel that they are not getting their fair share and feel that others are getting more, it activates in group solidarity to social groups including race and community type (urban, suburban, rural). Any zip code below the median income will be classified as low income because the community will feel deprived when it compares itself to the benchmark of the average community and finds its income lower, even if only slightly lower.

Economic well being of an individual-

The conceptualization used for economic well being of an individual follows the same method as the economic well being of a municipality. The median income of the household of an individual is classified as low income when below and high income when above the median household income of Michigan.

Political party identification-

The conceptualization used for political party identification is focused on whether an

individual thinks of his or herself as a Democrat, Republican, or Independent. It does not depend on actual registration with a political party. This conceptualization is frequently measured in public opinion surveys.

Race-

The conceptualization used for race is similar to that of political party identification in that it is dependent on racial self-identification. Non-Hispanic Whites will be put in one category with all others put in the other category. Racial self-identification is also frequently measured in public opinion surveys.

Support for state transfers to central cities/urban aid and support for metropolitan cooperation-

Support for urban aid is defined by public support for state transfers to central cities. State transfers to central cities is defined by Michigan State University's State of the State survey as: "money given to local governments to support police and fire protection, street and fire protection" (Michigan State University). This has the strength of asking people directly what they think about an issue. The survey questions include instances in which the definition of state revenue sharing was not provided and times in which it was. The purpose of this policy is to have Michigan taxpayers in effect partially subsidize the budgets of central city governments. Although arguments can be made in support of this policy, one being that city governments need to provide much more services than other governments while also having a poorer taxpayer base than the average municipality, the argument can also be made that these state transfers are unfair redistribution.

Additionally, support for metropolitan cooperation through public opinion data will be analyzed. Although metropolitan cooperation will be conceptualized as governmental action that has the intent of increasing intergovernmental ties among metropolitan municipalities, the surveys used only ask respondents about policies and concepts more specific than the vague 'metropolitan cooperation'. Questions on specific metropolitan policies can reveal the sources of support and opposition for specific policies, even if they do not explain public opinion for metropolitan cooperation in general. There are a variety of policies associated with this issue with stated goals that vary both between different types of metropolitan policies and within the policies themselves. This can make it hard to elucidate what the exact goals of people who promote these policies are.

These two variables are important to analyze for intellectual and normative reasons. Intellectually, the two issues are related, and it is important to find out the ways in which the types of people who support and oppose the issues differ to further academic discourse on the relationship between the two. Additionally, this research is a contribution to academic discourse on the importance of race, individual income, community income, and party identification on public opinion towards these issues and their relative importance more broadly. It is possible that people who support state transfers to central cities are identical to people who support metropolitan cooperation, or they could be quite different. An important distinction between the two issues is that I believe that it is easier to frame transfers as redistribution than metropolitan cooperation. Therefore, I believe that it is likely that the issue will be affected by race and income considerations. I will further elaborate on how race and income may affect support for state transfers and metropolitan cooperation in the section titled "Metropolitan Politics and Public Opinion Explanations."

In summary, it is critical to find out sources of support and opposition to state transfers to central cities and metropolitan cooperation in the hopes that this information can be used as a resource to better craft appeals to aid cities and better encourage metropolitan cooperation. Whether it involves changing the wording and framing of the appeals, or altering the policies themselves so they have more public support is outside the scope of this article. However, if this analysis can contribute in some way to future articles and research on crafting support for aiding cities and cooperation among municipalities in metropolitan regions, I would consider this piece a success.

III. Literature Review

Suburban History

Suburbs today contain both affluence and poverty despite the popular perception of suburbia as uniformly prosperous. Depictions and conceptions of suburbia still see it inhabited exclusively by the white middle class and upper class (Hanlon 2010, 12, 14). This image, which still resonates to a lesser extent today, was reinforced in the past not only by popular culture but also academic studies that focused on the homogeneity of American suburbs (Hanlon 2010, 14). The suburbs on the whole also contain more racial diversity than ever before, although racial minorities in the suburbs are still segregated (Hanlon 2010, 15). Additionally, suburbia contains growing, declining, and stable communities (Phelps 2011, 2597). The location of growing, declining, and stable suburbs is linked to their historical beginnings.

Many of the most affluent and stable suburban communities in the United States are also some of the oldest (Hanlon 2010, 115). Many of these suburbs are classified as inner ring

because of their close geographic location to the central city and old housing stock (Hanlon 2010, 114-115). The very first suburban communities, due to the limited transportation options of the time, were frequently limited to the wealthiest of society who desired a more private and natural community, along with a class of servants (Jackson 1985, 99). These elite suburbs, many of them relatively close to the main city, started out elite and have managed to maintain their status (Hanlon 2010, 118-119). Examples in Michigan include Grosse Pointe, Birmingham, and East Grand Rapids.

The growing suburbs are new, on the periphery of the metropolitan area, following the general pattern of outward growth (Jackson 1985, 302). Some of these outer suburbs have exhibited so much growth that they have begun to become major employment centers, and have started to exhibit urban characteristics (Phelps 2011). These areas have been called "edge cities," "technoburbs," "ex-urbs," and "edgeless cities" (Phelps 2011, 2591). Examples in Michigan of these new types of communities include Auburn Hills, Troy, and Canton Charter Township.

Between the older inner-ring affluent suburbs and the newer outer ring suburbs are the medium aged inner ring suburbs. The majority of these suburbs are either declining or are very vulnerable to decline (Hanlon 2010). Many of these inner ring suburbs were built in the post-World War II suburban expansion, a time period when the middle class and suburbia became linked (Hanlon 2010, Jackson 1985). These relatively small and modest homes built after World War II until 1970 were often cheaply constructed and have become less favored in comparison to the newer and larger housing in the outer suburbs (Hanlon 2010, 47).

Hit even harder have been the blue-collar inner ring industrial suburbs, built frequently before World War II for expanding industries that wanted more room or lower tax rates for their

factories (Hanlon 2010, 47). These suburbs have been hit hard by deindustrialization, often losing the vast majority of employment in the suburb (Hanlon 2010). Many of these suburbs have also witnessed a large increase in minority population and in some cases have poverty levels as high as any city (Hanlon 2010, 107-108). Examples in Michigan include Ecorse and River Rogue (Hanlon 2010, 123). The existence of declining and low-income suburbs in these inner ring suburbs is critical to understanding suburban politics, and why different types of suburbs vary greatly in their support of urban aid and metropolitan cooperation.

Metropolitan Racial Segregation

The extent of racial discrimination in the pre-Civil Rights Era is well documented in the creation of American suburbia as a place for the *white* middle and upper class. "Red lining" (Jackson 1985, 197), in which racial minorities could not receive loans to buy a house in a white area and also could not obtain a loan in a minority area, is also well known. However, less well known is the extent of racial segregation today despite a lack of governmental enforcement and improving racial attitudes (Sethi 2004). The expansion of the black middle class, for instance, has not resulted in lower residential segregation (Sethi 2004). In fact, among the Northern cities, residential segregation is about at the same level as it was in the 1940s (Sugrue, 1996, 8). Racial segregation is the same for black households of all income groups (Sethi 2004, 1297). Among metropolitan areas with a large minority population, segregation is high when income inequality between races is high and low, with variation in the middle range (Sethi 2004, 1298). This suggests that racial segregation is not based simply on class, and that improving income levels among minorities will not necessarily improve racial segregation (Sethi 2004). The continued segregation of minorities is reflected by the lower proportion of blacks and Hispanics in the suburbs compared to their overall population (Phelan 1996, 660). This segregation has real

consequences for metropolitan regions.

Despite the decline of overt racism, racial segregation still affects not only racial minorities and the central city but also regions as a whole. Black and Hispanic suburban populations are also concentrated in certain suburbs that have significantly higher minority populations (Phelan 1996, 661). An example in the Detroit area is the suburb of Southfield, which saw its white population exit as African Americans entered (Sugrue, 1996, 269). It may be easy to think that the creation of a black suburb is just a reflection of preferences and is neutral to justice. However, suburbs with a high black population and suburbs with a high Hispanic population are generally poorer than majority white suburbs (Phelan 1996, 675). It is likely that as Southfield becomes more homogenously African American and whites continue to leave, it will go from a fairly prosperous suburb to one with significant pockets of poverty, even though it will not become as poor as Detroit. As racial segregation expands among suburbs, it could lead to even more fragmented regions. The evidence demonstrates that racial segregation has persisted long past the days of overt racial discrimination, and has real consequences.

There are several reasons why racial segregation has persisted despite overt racial discrimination in housing is outlawed. A possible factor contributing to racial disparities in suburban communities is the creation of "suburban ethnic enclaves" (Alba 1999, 447). According to "spatial assimilation theory" (Alba 1999, 446), suburbanization is the last stage of assimilation for ethnic minorities. Under this theory, minorities become part of the mainstream by moving out of urban ethnic enclaves, such as Chinatowns, and becoming part of the mainstream white American society, giving up their customs, language, and culture along the way (Alba 1999, 447). The practice of many current immigrants of settling together in suburban communities and forming enclaves is seen as a threat to this model of assimilation (Alba 1999). Another

phenomenon that contributes to racial segregation in the suburbs is the creation of suburbs where racial minorities are the majority in population (Card 2008). The transition of a suburb or any community or neighborhood from majority white to minority white is facilitated by the "tipping point" (Card 2008, 177). The tipping point is the demographic moment in time when the minority population is high enough in a neighborhood that whites begin to leave (Card 2008, 177). The persistence of a tipping point has serious consequences for metropolitan areas if it indeed exists.

David Card, Alexandre Mas, and Jesse Rothstein analyze neighborhood level data from the 1970 to 2000 United States Census and concluded that the tipping point in neighborhood demographics does exist. They found that the tipping point ranges from five to twenty percent, in some cases over twenty percent if the community is especially racially tolerant (Card 2008, 212). This is despite a lack of evidence found for drops in rental prices or home values when the whites begin to leave (Card 2008, 212). A weakness of this approach is that because the data starts in 1970, when racial attitudes among whites were significantly worse, the tipping point today is probably higher (in terms of minority population percentage) than the results they found. However, the tipping point is still a valid explanation of why racial segregation still exists to the extent that it does in contemporary America. The research on racial segregation in suburbia and the tipping point proves that race is still a very salient component of residential choice and suburban politics in general, which is critical to understand the conclusions of the racial explanations for suburban public opinion.

Metropolitan Politics and Public Opinion Explanations

-Racial Explanations

The first theoretical argument to explain differences in political support for aid to and cooperation with central cities focuses on racial prejudice. This argument stresses that racial prejudice still exists in the United States, although not in the form of overt prejudice. Instead, racial prejudice is expressed through "racial resentment" (Feldman 2005, 169). Racial resentment expresses itself in the idea that racial minorities do not try hard enough, receive more governmental attention and assistance than they deserve, and could become better off if they were less lazy (Feldman 2005). Under the concept of racial resentment, public policies that are race-conscious would receive less support than race-neutral ones. For example, affirmative action programs specifically targeted at African Americans are expected to do worse than universal scholarship programs (Feldman 2005, 168). However, mixed results have occurred when regarding the concept of race conscious programs, because the opposition to policies like affirmative action could be argued from an ideological standpoint (Feldman and Huddy 2005, 168). Stanley Feldman and Leonie Huddy found that opposition to racial scholarship programs among liberals was based on resentment rather than ideology, but conservative opposition was based on ideology to such an extent that it was not possible to determine the effect of resentment (Feldman 2005, 1980). A major weakness of measuring support for race-conscious public policies is that it is hard, if not impossible to separate the policy from the race of the people it would help, making it difficult to measure what support for the policy would be in the absence of race.

More success has been found in measuring the effect of race on "racially coded" (Gilens 1996, 593) public policies than measuring race conscious policies. Racial coding is the effect of the association with race on public policies that are officially race neutral (Gilens 1996, 593). Public policies can be associated with certain races due to individual prejudice, and also by how

politicians refer to them and how the mass media reports on them (Gilens 1996). Crime, welfare, and drug use are all racially coded issues (Gilens 1996, 593). It could easily be argued that aid to central cities could generally be considered a racially coded issue as well, given that for most of American history, central cities have been where a disproportionate amount of racial and ethnic minorities, along with recent immigrants, have resided. Thus, the effects of racial coding on public policy support can have implications for urban policy.

There have been several studies that have demonstrated the power of racial coding on public policies. Martin Gilens analyzed the effects of racial coding on support for welfare, defined as the programs of Aid to Families with Dependent Children, General Assistance, and Food Stamps (Gilens 1996, 593-594). He first analyzed data from the 1991 National Race and Politics Study and found that the largest indicator of support or opposition to welfare was the respondent's views towards blacks (Gilens 1996, 598). Additionally, in a survey experiment respondents were asked about welfare mothers, with half asked about a white welfare mother and the other half asked about a black welfare mother. Gilens calculated that being asked about a black welfare mother had about twice the impact on views towards welfare. This demonstrates the significant impact of race on support for public policies. Additionally, it has been shown that after the passage of the welfare reform bill in the United States Congress, which gave states more control over welfare policy, states were more likely to pass limits on the length that a recipient could receive welfare, "family-cap policies," and other punitive measures in states where blacks and Hispanics were a larger percentage of welfare recipients, even after controlling for other variables (Soss 2001, 390). It appears that if either transfers to central cities or metropolitan cooperation were to be racialized there would be a significant amount of increased opposition.

If aid to central cities were to be racialized it would have serious consequences. Among

white suburbanites, support for aid to a central city would be inversely linked with increasing minority population in the central city of the metropolitan region in which they live, especially for Hispanic and black populations if urban aid is a racialized issue. If public policies that are categorized as assistance, aid, and other similar frames were unpopular when associated with racial minorities, whites would likely be the ones driving this trend. Therefore, if aid to central cities and metropolitan cooperation were racialized, whites would have a greater drop in support than non-whites. This could mean that there is a strong correlation between racial identification and support for urban aid or metropolitan cooperation if either of these two types of policies were racialized.

-Definitional and Semantic Explanations

Another reason that Americans often oppose urban aid and metropolitan cooperation, besides the effects of race, social identities, and spatial traits, is the way they define the two concepts. Given Americans' propensity to view politics as a zero-sum game, in which the gains of one group must cause the losses of another group, along with already discussed racial animosity, causes many suburban Americans to oppose urban aid as an automatic reaction (Weir 2005, 749). Less than fifty percent of Americans support fiscal aid to urban areas when phrased in general terms (Lawrence 2010, 423). When varying the question wording, Eric Lawrence, Robert Stoker, and Harold Wolman found that support increases when a specific program, such as fiscal aid for police or housing is mentioned rather than fiscal aid in general (Lawrence 2010, 421). Support increases for urban aid when it is specified for the elderly or children and decreases from the universal condition when targeting government workers and low-income single mothers (Lawrence 2010, 422).

Many Americans oppose metropolitan and regional cooperation because they value the concept of "home rule" (Barron 2003, 2259), in which local control is maximized by making communities in metropolitan areas as independent as possible. In this way, metropolitan reforms can be seen as infringing on the freedom of metropolitan residents (Barron 2003). Local control is also known as the "Public Choice School" (Tomas 2012, 555), which stresses the ability to vote with their feet by leaving communities they do not like. This model is seen as promoting "efficiency, democracy, and economic competitiveness" (Tomas 2012, 555). Mariona Tomas believes that citizens who favor this model are unlikely to be won over by arguments to cooperate with central cities on the basis of making the metropolitan area more equal, because that is not an important goal for people of this disposition (Tomas 2012). Additionally, when politics is seen as zero-sum, equality implies making some people better off by making other people worse off. However, arguments that metropolitan cooperation will increase economic competitiveness or other goals held by people who favor local control will be more effective (Tomas 2012). Therefore, people who support home rule form a portion of the opposition to metropolitan cooperation, but they are not an impenetrable form of opposition.

These results suggests that greater specificity in questions about aid will achieve greater support when the programs are popular and the recipients are held in a positive light by society, and questions about metropolitan cooperation will be more effective when framed in a way that supports suburbanites' conceptions of self-interest, rather than appealing to concepts of aiding or assisting other areas. If the community or individual believes that they will receive more than they give, support may increase even if the community or individual is otherwise hostile to central cities.

-Spatial Explanations

Although the differences in political beliefs between suburbs and cities is well known, differences between the two have often been more likely explained by the individuals within those communities, and the emphasis individuals give on political issues (Gainsborough 2005). For example, a community with more people in poverty will have a greater focus on social welfare policies when evaluating candidates. However, it is also theorized that it is the communities themselves that have an influence on the residents' political beliefs, rather than just being merely places where people live. Thad Williamson analyzed political attitudes and ideology using the 2000 Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey along with the presidential vote for 2000 and 2004 at the county level and compared this data to the spatial qualities of the counties (Williamson 2008, 904). Williamson analyzed the effect of population density, transportation mode, neighborhood age, and commuting patterns on political beliefs (Williamson 2008, 904). Williamson found that after controlling for other variables, higher population density, a lower percentage of people who commute to work by driving alone, an older housing age, and a higher percent of people living and working in the same community all were correlated with a higher vote for the Democratic presidential candidate and a higher percentage of respondents self-identifying as liberal (Williamson 2008, 914, 917). There are four main explanations for this effect.

The four main reasons provided for Thad Williamson's observations of politics and the spatial qualities of communities are self-selection theory, reinforcement effect, shifting self-interest, and shifting social perception. Self-selection theory states that liberals are attracted to certain communities and conservatives are attracted to others. A corollary of this idea is the "reinforcement effect" (Williamson 2008, 922), in which after self-selection occurs, a resident of a liberal or conservative community is more likely to associate with people of their own political

beliefs and be contacted by activists of their own ideology. The theory of "shifting self-interest" (Williamson 2008, 913) states that regardless of demographics, residents of cities and older, denser suburbs are more likely to desire to alleviate poverty than those in lower-poverty outer suburbs because they are more likely affected by the negative effects of poverty. This extends to other political attitudes. Lastly, the theory of "shifting social perception," states the amount and quality of "public space" an individual experiences affects their political ideologies (Williamson 2008, 913, 913). The sprawling suburb is characterized by private space: the single family home, the private car, and the playground in the backyard instead of the public park. The suggestion is that this leads to a more individualistic and conservative political outlook than denser suburbs and central cities, which have a larger amount of public space and interaction. These theories are all plausible, but there are some but also hard to prove.

There are some issues that make it hard to trust Williamson's research completely. The use of countywide data reduces the precision in Williamson's research. Many people in low-income inner ring suburbs may support Democratic candidates and also oppose urban aid due to the influence of social identities and feelings of relative deprivation. Unfortunately, due to data limitations this level of precision in the analysis is not possible. Therefore, inner-ring versus outer ring suburbs will not be able to be compared. Additionally, to increase the number of data collected and therefore increase statistical validity, the scope of the opinions collected was expanded from merely collecting suburban opinions to include urban and rural opinions as well. This will make it harder for a precise measure of spatial effects on public opinion to be enacted. However, an analysis of community types broadly will be included, with the effect of living in an urban, suburban, and rural zip codes analyzed.

-Social Identity Explanations

The influence of "social identity" (Ashforth 1989, 20) on political beliefs and public opinion is critical. Social Identity Theory (Ashforth 1989, 20) states that people categorize themselves and others into numerous societal groups, and it is the combination of their perceived individual characteristics with their membership in identities that determine their "social classification" (Ashforth 1989, 21). Studies have found that this thought process leads to "in-group favoritism" (Ashforth 1989, 24), which has political implications. Obviously, this theory has applications to race, increasing solidarity among people of the same race, while decreasing support for people of different races (Miller 1981). However, the real effect of social identity on political behavior comes from "group consciousness" (Miller 1981, 495), which is the concept of identification with a social group combined with a political awareness that recognizes the position of the group in society, along with working to maintain or change the group's position.

The concept of group consciousness can be applied to identities beyond race, to include class, age, gender, and a whole host of other identities (Miller 1981). Katherine Cramer Walsh also studied the effect of group consciousness on rural citizens in Wisconsin, and found that it is very important to how they understood the world and politics (Walsh 2012). Many people in rural areas identified themselves as rural Americans, and expressed hostility towards urban areas (Walsh 2012, 524). This expressed itself not only in racial overtones in the form of "racial resentment" (Walsh 2012, 524), but also hostility was felt for urban white collar Americans, government workers, and college professors (Walsh 2012, 524). Walsh emphasizes the role of feelings of "relative deprivation" (Walsh 2012, 517) in rural group consciousness, and argues that this can be applied to other groups as well. What makes relative deprivation potent is the fact that if a social group believes that they are not getting their fair share, they are likely to become more united and hostile to other groups, whether the dichotomy is racial or community type

(Walsh 2012). People living in low-income zip codes are likely to feel increased solidarity and group consciousness because of their shared relative deprivation. This can cause low-income zip codes to feel hostile to urban aid because they feel deprived themselves. This effect may be particularly pronounced in low-income suburbs and rural areas towards central cities, but will be difficult to prove in light of the inclusion of low-income central city zip codes in the survey data, which will likely be quite supportive of aid to transfers to the central city.

IV. Hypotheses

The theories elaborated on in the previous section are the foundation for several hypotheses that will be tested using public survey data. The influence of racial attitudes on a wide variety of policies as explained by Martin Gilens and the idea of racially coded and racialized policies is something that I believe negatively affects support for state transfers to central cities and metropolitan cooperation. Therefore, I will test the effect of race on support for the aforementioned issues. It was hoped that the effect of racial attitudes would be able to be used as a variable to test, but due to data limitations it needed to be discarded. Therefore, race will be used as an imperfect proxy to racial attitudes. Additionally, the effect of relative deprivation will be tested, with the predicted effect that it will cause low-income zip codes to reduce support for transfers to central cities but not metropolitan cooperation. This will be contrasted with the theoretically simple test of individual income, with the predicted effect of reduced support for policies that are considered redistributive. Lastly, party identification will also be tested, with the predicted result that Democrats will support both state transfers to central cities and metropolitan cooperation to a greater degree because they support redistribution to a greater degree and support home-rule to a lesser degree.

a) White respondents are less likely to support state transfers to central cities than non-white respondents.

b) White respondents are less likely to support metropolitan cooperation than non-white respondents.

c) Residents of low-income zip codes are less likely to support state transfers to central cities than residents of high-income zip codes.

d) Low-income respondents will be more likely to support state transfers to central cities than high-income respondents.

e) Residents of low-income zip codes will have more support for metropolitan cooperation than residents of high-income zip codes.

f) Low-income respondents will be more likely to support metropolitan cooperation than high-income respondents.

g) Democrats are more likely to support state transfers to central cities than Republicans.

h) Democrats are more likely to support metropolitan cooperation than Republicans.

V. Methodology

The influence of race, political party affiliation, household income, and the income of one's community on support for state transfers to central cities and metropolitan cooperation on residents of the state of Michigan was analyzed. Public opinion data used was provided by Michigan State University's State of the State Surveys, which have been asking residents

questions relating to public affairs since 1994. These surveys provide information on the zip codes, income, race, and political party affiliation of respondents, all of which was used in the statistical analysis. The geographic information provided by the State of the State survey was used to code the respondent's location as rural, suburban, or central city using the Zip Code Tabulation Areas. The center city of any given metropolitan area was coded as the center city, the remaining zip codes listed as part of the Urban Area being suburban. Lastly, all the zip codes that fall outside of the urban area are coded as rural. The coding was done by using Stata's Do-File function. Each zip code in the state of Michigan that was utilized in the State of the State survey was individually assigned a value on whether it was rural, suburban, or central city. If it was central city, it was assigned a two, suburban, a one, and rural, a zero. This was using Stata's 'recode' command after cloning the variable. The variable was cloned so that a viewer of the data would be able to see both the zip code's community type and the zip code that this value represents.

Following the sorting of zip codes by community type, these zip codes were coded by whether the zip code had a median income above or below the median income of the state of Michigan. This involved more utilization of United States Census Bureau data. The median household income of the state of Michigan was referenced, and then the median income of each Michigan zip code was recorded. The median income for the Michigan zip codes was referenced by the American Fact Finder looking up whether the respondent's zip code's median income is above or below the median income of Michigan. Specifically, the census bureau's 2008-2012 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates were used to determine the zip code median incomes. After that, the zip code variable was once again cloned to recode the zip code values while keeping the original zip codes. The recode command in Stata's do-file was used to

individually recode the zip codes as either above or below the median income of the state. This process is important in order to facilitate analysis of the effect of the economic well being of the municipalities on levels of support for urban aid and metropolitan cooperation. I also used the recode command to turn almost all the variables into binary. For example, I collapsed the variables "very conservative," "somewhat conservative," and "lean conservative" into the new value "conservative," which I assigned the value zero. The variables coded are as follows:

Name	Meaning	Old Values	New Values
cd1	Gender	1=Male 5=Female	0=Male 1=Female
cd2	Age	Continuous (value=age reported)	Continuous (value=age reported)
cd3	Education	0=Did not go to school 1-11=1st-11th grade 12=High school graduate or GED 13-15=Some college 16=College Graduate 17= Some post-graduate 18=Graduate degree 20=Technical/Junior College Grad 98=Do not know 99=Refused	0=Less than a Bachelor's degree 1=Bachelor's degree or more
cd4a_a	Race	1=White	0=White

		5=Not white 8=Do not know 9=Refused	1=Non-white
cd6	Religion	0=None 1=Catholic 2=Islamic/Muslim 3=Jewish 4=Protestant 5=Other non Christian 7=Other Christian 8=Unable to classify 98=Do now know 99=Refused	0=Christian 1=Non-Christian (includes both non-Christian religions and nonreligious)
cd8	Marital Status	1=Married 2=Divorced 3=Separated 4=Widowed 5=Member unmarried couple 6=Single never been married	0=Married 1=Not married
newinc	Individual Income	1=$10,000 or less 2=$10,000-19,999 3=$20,000-29,999 4=$30,000-39,999 5=$40,000049,999 6=$50,000-59,999	0=Below the median income of Michigan. 1=Above the median income of Michigan.

		7=$60,000-69,999 8=$70,000 or more 98=Do not know 99=Refused	
partyid	Party Identification	0=Other 1=Strong republican 2=Not strong republican 3=Lean republican 4=Neither 5=Lean Democrat 6=Not strong Democrat 7=Strong Democrat 8=Do not know 9=Refused	0=Republican 1=Democrat
ideology	Ideology	0=Other 1=Very conservative 2=Somewhat conservative 3=Lean conservative 4=Middle 5=Lean liberal 6=Somewhat liberal 7=Very liberal 8=Do not know 9=Refused	0=Conservative 1=Liberal
zipcode2	Community	Five digit zip codes in the	0=Rural area

	type of zip code	state of Michigan	1=Suburban area 2=Central city
zipcode3	Income of zip code	Five digit zip codes in the state of Michigan	0=Below median income of Michigan 1=Above median income of Michigan
StateRev	Level of support for state transfers to central cities	Variables collapsed into StateRev= ur5a, ur5b, b1, b1b, land1, land2, and fund2e.	0=Opposition to state transfers to central cities. 1=Support for state transfers to central cities.
CityCoop	Level of support for metropolitan cooperation	Variable collapsed into CityCoop= uscm2a, uscm2b, uscm2c, uscm2d, uscm2e, uscm2f, uscm2g, cp1, lg2, lu4a, lu4b, lu4c, newecon1f, land5a, land5b	0=Opposition to metropolitan cooperation. 1=Support for metropolitan cooperation.

Beyond recoding variables to make them simpler, I also combined a variety of variables to create the 'master variables' StateRev and CityCoop. To do this I needed to combine data sets from several different surveys. The state transfer questions and metropolitan cooperation questions were contained in the following State of the State surveys: State of the State 28, 30, 32, 33, 54, and 61. To do this, the append command needed to be executed to create a new large data set. There were identical questions asked on different surveys with different variable names. For example, on some surveys gender had the variable name cd1 and on others the variable name CD1. The variable names had to be standardized prior to appending in order to allow them to be continuously represented across surveys. Otherwise, a regression might have missing data if only one version of the variable was written in the command. Once the data sets were combined and

all the independent variables were standardized, the dependent variables still needed to be combined into new master variables. However, unlike the independent variables, which were asked on every survey, many of the state transfer and metropolitan cooperation questions were only asked on a few surveys. Therefore, data had to be imputed in order to have the capability to combine the variables. Due to Stata's programming, if a variable that is being combined with any other variables has missing values, the variable will simply be excluded. Therefore, in order to fill in the gaps that were created by combining data sets, the mean of the variable's results was created and imputed to replace the missing values.

A statistical analysis was conducted in which regressions were created for each one of the independent variables on the two dependent variables of StateRev and CityCoop in Stata. First, linear regressions were made to look at the relationship between each one of the independent variables without controlling for any other variables. Following that, the same linear regression was run while controlling for gender, age, education level, religion, marital status, ideology, race, individual income, residence type of zip code, and income of zip code. This facilitated the ability to draw conclusions about the effect of each variable on the opinions of the respondents by isolating it from the others. Otherwise, partisan differences among respondents might cloud some of the results. For example, one of the variables looked at closely was the race of the respondent. Minorities are much more likely to be Democrats than non-Hispanic whites. To say that minorities are more supportive of urban aid and metropolitan cooperation without controlling for political party would be misleading because the difference in levels of support might be partisan rather than determined by race. In addition to running linear regressions while controlling for party identification, logistic regressions using odds ratios were also created. This was done in order to provide an alternative measure, and therefore another level of reliability. If the results

are consistent between linear and logistic regressions, there is more reason to be confident in the statistical validity. Additionally, changing almost all of my values to zero or one made logistic regressions a good fit.

VI. Results

The results of the statistical analysis have confirmed some of the hypotheses and have disconfirmed others. First the results will be summarized individually and then how these relate to the hypotheses will be discussed. For more complete statistical data, please consult the appendix.

From all points hence, these symbols will have these meanings:

Symbol or Abbreviation	Meaning
(1)	Linear regression between the dependent and independent variable, with no controls
(2)	Linear regression between the dependent and independent variable, with all other relevant variables controlled.
(3)	Logistic regression between the dependent and independent variable with odds ratios, all other relevant variables controlled.

***	P-value is less than 0.01, very high level of statistical significance.
**	P-value is less than 0.05, high level of statistical significance.
*	P-value is less than 0.10, moderate level of statistical significance.
No star.	P-value is more than 0.10, low level of statistical significance.

The same general format was followed in the testing of the eight hypotheses, which will be reflected in the identical format of the eight following tables. In each case, the same three types of regressions are run, but with different variables. The first regression will be a simple linear regression between the dependent and independent variables without any controls. The second regression will also be a linear regression between the dependent and independent variable while controlling for all other relevant independent variables. The relevant independent variables are gender, age education level, race, religion, marital status, party identification, ideology, individual income, community type of zip code, and income of zip code. The third regression will be a logistic regression with odds ratios that controls for all of the included variables. The second and third regressions in a given table will be identical in the variables that they test, with the only difference being the type of regression test. Additionally, p-value ranges will be provided. The first table tests the effect of race on support for state transfers to central

cities, and the second tests the effect of race on support for metropolitan cooperation. The third and fourth tables test the effect of zip code income and then individual income on support for state transfers to central cities. The fifth and sixth tables test the effect of zip code income and individual income on support for metropolitan cooperation. Lastly, the seventh and eighth tables test the effect of party identification on support for state transfers to central cities and metropolitan cooperation.

Summary of Results

Table 1. Racial Effects on Support for State Transfers to Central Cities

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Race	.0486774**	.0635781	1.096448

*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

There is a positive relationship between race and support for state transfers to central cities, with non-whites showing more support than whites. Although there is a strong relationship between race and support for state transfers to central cities when not controlling for variables, after controlling for relevant variables there is a weak relationship under both the linear and logistic model.

Table 2. Racial Effects on Support for Metropolitan Cooperation

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Race	-.0962976	-.3679958***	.7521499**

*p<0.10, **<0.05, ***p<0.01

There is a negative relationship between race and support for metropolitan cooperation, with non-whites showing less support than whites. Although there is a weak relationship between race and support for metropolitan cooperation when not controlling for variables, after controlling for relevant variables there is a very strong relationship under the linear regression and a strong relationship under logistic regression.

Table 3 Zip Code Income Effects on Support for State Transfers to Central Cities.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Zip Code Income	-.0348794**	-.0213322	.9534277

*p<0.10, **<0.05, ***p<0.01

There is a negative relationship between zip code income and support for state transfers to central cities, with high-income zip codes showing less support than low-income zip codes. Although there is a strong relationship between zip code income and support for state transfers to central cities when not controlling for variables, after controlling for relevant variables there is a weak relationship under both the linear and logistic model.

Table 4 Individual Income Effects on Support for State Transfers to Central Cities.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Individual Income	-.0678928***	-.0770405***	.8081283***

*p<0.10, **<0.05, ***p<0.01

There is a negative relationship between individual income and support for state transfers to central cities, with high-income respondents showing less support than low-income respondents. There is a very strong relationship between individual income and support for state transfers to central cities under all three regressions.

Table 5 Zip Code Income Effects on Support for Metropolitan Cooperation.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Zip Code Income	.0104005	.1233156	1.018592

*p<0.10, **<0.05, ***p<0.01

There is a positive relationship between zip code income and support for metropolitan cooperation, with high-income zip codes showing more support than low-income zip codes. However, there is a weak relationship among all three models.

Table 6 Individual Income Effects on Support for Metropolitan Cooperation.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Individual Income	-.169283**	.3068582***	1.231002**

*p<0.10, **<0.05, ***p<0.01

There is a negative relationship between individual income and support for metropolitan cooperation, with high-income respondents showing less support than low-income respondents under the linear regression without controls. Conversely, there is a positive relationship between individual income and support for metropolitan cooperation under the two other regressions.

There is a strong relationship between individual income effects and support for metropolitan cooperation when not controlling for variables, a very strong relationship under the linear regression with controls, and a strong relationship under the logistic regression with odds ratios.

Table 7 Party Identification Effects on Support for State Transfers to Central Cities.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Party Identification	.0538816***	.0559969**	1.161815*

*p<0.10, **<0.05, ***p<0.01

There is a positive relationship between party identification and support for state transfers to central cities, with Democrats showing more support than Republicans. There is a very strong relationship between party identification and support for state transfers to central cities when not controlling for variables, a strong relationship under a linear regression while controlling for variables, and a moderate relationship under a logistic regression with controls.

Table 8 Party Identification Effects on Support for Metropolitan Cooperation.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Party Identification	.017893	-.0040339	.9422927

*p<0.10, **<0.05, ***p<0.01

There is a positive relationship between party identification and support for metropolitan cooperation, with Democrats showing more support than Republicans under the linear regression without controls, a negative relationship under the linear regression with controls, and a positive

relationship under the logistic regression with controls. However, there is a weak relationship under all three regressions.

Evaluation of Hypotheses:

a.) White respondents are less likely to support state transfers to central cities than non-white respondents.

This hypothesis is not proven because when controlling for relevant variables there is a weak relationship between race and support for state transfers to central cities under both a linear and logistic regression with odds ratios. The results that have been found lead to the conclusion that perhaps race does not play as central a role in determining levels of support for state transfers to central cities as was initially thought. It is possible that a large portion of the difference between whites and non-whites in levels of support for these policies is due to differing partisan affiliations, incomes, and ideologies. The argument could be made that a large reason for why people choose to be a Republican or Democrat, or describe themselves as a liberal or conservative, is due to differences among the parties on racialized issues, but the causal influence of that effect cannot be proven in the context of this analysis.

b) White respondents are less likely to support metropolitan cooperation than non-white respondents.

Surprisingly, this hypothesis has been validated after being invalidated in regards to state transfers to central cities. When controlling for relevant variables, it appears that race is quite important for supporting or opposing metropolitan cooperation policies. Even more surprisingly, the relationship is the opposite of what was predicted: whites were actually more supportive of

metropolitan cooperation policies than non-whites.

c) Residents of low-income zip codes are less likely to support state transfers to central cities than residents of high-income zip codes.

This hypothesis has been invalidated because it appears that the income of a zip code is not very important in determining levels of support for state transfers to central cities. When controlling for relevant variables, the effect of zip code income falls from a strong to a weak relationship.

d) Low-income respondents will be more likely to support state transfers to central cities than high-income respondents.

This hypothesis has been proven because there is a very strong relationship between individual income and support for state transfers to central cities under all three regressions. Low-income respondents are much more likely to support state transfers to central cities than high income respondents. Therefore, income remains an important component in determining support for state transfers to central cities.

e) Residents of low-income zip codes will have more support for metropolitan cooperation than residents of high-income zip codes.

This hypothesis has not been proven because there is a weak relationship between support for metropolitan cooperation and the income of a zip code among all three regressions. It appears that the case for zip code income being an important component in support for either state transfers to central cities or metropolitan cooperation is weak.

f) Low-income respondents will be more likely to support metropolitan cooperation than high-income respondents.

This hypothesis has been invalidated, and the converse has been proven: high income respondents are actually significantly more likely to support metropolitan cooperation when controlling for relevant variables than low income respondents. This is surprising because it is the opposite of the relationship between income and state transfers to central cities. Therefore, although income is very important to both support for state transfers to central cities and metropolitan cooperation, they play very different roles. Therefore, it is very likely that people conceptualize these two issues in very different ways, and they should not be treated as the same type of issue. It is clear from these results that just because someone supports metropolitan cooperation, it does not mean that they support state transfers to central cities.

g) Democrats are more likely to support state transfers to central cities than Republicans.

This hypothesis is proven, given that the relationships were in the correct direction and statistically significant under all three regressions. It appears that there is a strong partisan component in support for state transfers to central cities. The does not seem to be the most powerful reason for supporting or opposing this type of policies, but it is important.

h) Democrats are more likely to support metropolitan cooperation than Republicans.

This hypothesis was not confirmed, because there was a weak relationship under all three regressions. Given that there was a weak relationship, the opposite (republicans supporting metropolitan cooperation at a greater level) cannot be proved. Although there is a strong partisan effect in levels of support for state transfers to central cities, there does not appear to be the same

effect for metropolitan cooperation. Therefore, it appears that metropolitan cooperation policies do not have strong partisan signals. However, there could be a confounding factor to consider. It is possible that metropolitan cooperation does actually have partisan signals but did not come through due to the way the questions were collected into the metropolitan cooperation variable. Far more metropolitan cooperation questions were collected than state transfer questions due to their greater availability and variety in survey data, and this may have made the data somewhat jumbled in comparison to the state transfer questions. However, there were other variables, such as individual income, that did have strong relationships with support for metropolitan cooperation.

VII. Conclusion

One benefit of having a quantitative analysis in this type of question is that although there are theoretical concepts that influence the hypothesis, the data is out of the researcher's control as long as they remain honest. By letting the data for the most part speak for itself, the hypothesis is falsifiable. For better or for worse, several of the hypotheses were either falsified outright or were not fully supported by the data. The hypothesis on the centrality of race in determining people's opinions towards state transfers to central cities was not supported. This suggests that perhaps the issue is not as racialized as it was thought to be, and that the differences in levels of support on this specific issue may have to do more with differing ideologies. Although many studies have proven that opposition to welfare is partially due to negative racial attitudes among whites, the same cannot be said for state transfers to central cities.

Conversely, race appeared to be important in determining support or opposition to metropolitan cooperation. Surprisingly, when controlling for relevant variables, non-whites are

actually less likely to support metropolitan cooperation than whites. This is likely not because of negative racial attitudes that non-whites hold towards urban areas, as was hypothesized for whites when it came determining support. It would be interesting to further investigate why whites support metropolitan cooperation at greater levels. One can only speculate, due to the lack of data that could prove causal inference. However, it is possible that non-whites who live in central cities could hold suspicion towards metropolitan plans, which could be seen as taking away from power that the city holds. Additionally, given that this effect occurs after controlling for party identification and ideology, maybe metropolitan cooperation is much more in vogue among white liberals and Democrats in comparison to non-white liberals and Democrats.

Additionally, the hypothesis that low-income zip codes would have less support for state transfers to urban areas was not supported. It must be noted that this result came from data collected from a wider scope than was imagined originally. It was initially thought that only suburban opinions would be collected, but to increase the 'n' and therefore statistical significance of the results, the range was expanded to rural and urban zip codes as well. Therefore, the inclusion of low-income urban zip codes might have skewed the results for the hypothesis that low-income zip codes would be less supportive of urban aid than high-income zip codes when controlling for party identification. Urban zip codes are a disproportionate percentage of the low-income zip codes in Michigan and also would likely be more supportive of state transfers to central cities than the general population. Also, the hypothesis that low-income zip codes would be more likely to support metropolitan cooperation than low-income zip codes was not proven. It appears that the income of a zip code is not very important for support or opposition to state transfers to central cities or metropolitan cooperation.

Individual income was found to be very important for determining levels of support for

aid to central cities and metropolitan cooperation. Interestingly, although high-income respondents had less support for state transfers to central cities as expected, high-income respondents had more support for metropolitan cooperation. Although causal inference is unfortunately beyond the data capabilities at disposal, there are some possible explanations for this effect. It is possible that state transfers to central cities are seen as highly redistributive, which would increase the effect of income on the formation of people's opinions. Additionally, there is the possible confounding factor of the location people who have incomes below the Michigan median income. Many of those people are located in central cities, which could support state transfers to central cities more than those in the suburbs. However, many rural zip codes are low income as well and the analysis of residence type on support for state transfers shows that there is not a strong relationship. The causal mechanism is further complicated given that high-income respondents support metropolitan cooperation more than low-income respondents. Although it is likely that metropolitan cooperation is not viewed as highly redistributive as state transfers, it would be expected that high income respondents would realize that they would be paying for more of the costs than low income respondents. However, it is important to note that before controlling for relevant variables, high-income respondents were less likely to support metropolitan cooperation. Therefore, one of or a combination of the controlled variables would explain the switch. However, unlike the race question, the difference cannot be caused because of party identification being controlled, because Democrats are no more likely to support metropolitan cooperation than Republicans.

Another invalidated hypothesis was that Democrats would be much more likely to support metropolitan cooperation than Republicans. This was proven false, although the converse was not proven true. This is another important result from the results, because in

general party identity is very important for determining support for public policies. However, it appears that this is not the case for support for metropolitan cooperation. There are two possible explanations for this result, neither of which can be proven from the data collected: either metropolitan cooperation is a non-partisan issue or metropolitan cooperation policies are not well known to the general public, so only the extremely well informed have polarized opinions about the policies. Either possibility is different than the conceptualization that was used, in which metropolitan cooperation, although less polarizing than state transfers, was still an issue that had a strong partisan component. This appears to not be the case for the general public. Conversely, Democrats were significantly more likely to support state transfers to central cities than Republicans. The difference between state transfers and metropolitan cooperation in this regard could be that state transfers to central cities are a much more partisan issue, are more well known by the general public, or that they are seen as more redistributive, something that Republicans tend to oppose.

Although this research thesis prompted about as many questions as it answered, it has some important results. In particular, the strong role of household income, the comparatively weak role of zip code income and race, and the weak role of party identity on support for metropolitan cooperation are results that are significant to figuring out the puzzle that is urban and metropolitan politics. Additionally, the ability to replicate the research design adds to the value of the research, so people can test the results using the same data and different methodologies. Although many of the hypotheses were proved wrong, what was found is just as important as if the hypotheses had all been proven correct. These results raise interesting questions for further research; it is time to get started.

Appendix

Appendix A- State Transfer and Metropolitan Cooperation Questions

State Transfer Questions

ur5a, ur5b, b1, b1b, land1, land2, fund2e

ur5a

Michigan State of the State 28 January 13, 2003

Addressing Problems- Cities

Who do you think is mainly responsible for addressing the problems of Michigan's cities? Would you say the state government or the cities themselves?

PCT	N	VALUE	LABEL
28.1	147	1	STATE GOVERNMENT
52.9	277	3	CITIES THEMSELVES
18.9	99	5	BOTH/BOTH ABOUT THE SAME (R VOLUNTEERS)
	5	8	DON'T KNOW
	1	9	REFUSED
	460	.	NOT APPLICABLE

ur5b

Michigan State of the State 28 January 13, 2003

Addressing Problems- Detroit

Who do you think is mainly responsible for addressing the problems of the city of Detroit? The state government or the city of Detroit?

PCT	N	Value	Label
13.9	60	1	STATE GOVERNMENT
66.0	285	3	CITIES THEMSELVES

20.1	87	5	BOTH/BOTH ABOUT THE SAME (R VOLUNTEERS)
	25	8	DON'T KNOW
	2	9	REFUSED
	529	.	NOT APPLICABLE

Michigan State of the State 30 Page 8

B1

Budget Version I

As you may know the state budget in Michigan is in deficit.

Of all the things that the state could do to address the budget deficit, which one of the following should the state government do first?

Reduce medicaid spending, reduce revenue sharing to local governments, reduce aid to local schools, reduce aid to colleges, or reduce prison spending by releasing prisoners early?

USE THESE DEFINITIONS: Revenue sharing to local governments is giving state tax dollars to local governments to support police and fire protection, street and road maintenance, and other services such as parks, recreation and administration. Medicaid is health care for low income and needy people

PCT	N	VALUE	LABEL
9.0	34	1	REDUCE MEDICAID
45.3	173	2	REDUCE STATE REVENUE SHARING
4.7	18	3	REDUCE AID TO SCHOOLS
18.1	69	4	REDUCE AID TO COLLEGES
22.9	88	5	CUT PRISON SPENDING
	52	8	DO NOT KNOW
	67	9	REFUSED
	473	.	NOT APPLICABLE

---

975 cases

Type: numeric
Decimals: 0

B1b

Budget Version II

As you may know the state budget in Michigan is in deficit.

Of all the things that the state could do to address the budget deficit, which one of the following

should the state government do first?

Reduce medicaid spending, which is health care for low income or needy people, reduce revenue sharing to local governments, which is money given to local governments to support police and fire protection, street and road maintenance, and other administration, reduce aid to local schools, reduce aid to colleges, or reduce prison spending by releasing prisoners early?

PCT	N	VALUE	LABEL
4.4	21	1	REDUCE MEDICAID
28.3	134	2	REDUCE STATE REVENUE SHARING
3.0	14	3	REDUCE AID TO SCHOOLS
23.3	110	4	REDUCE AID TO COLLEGES
18.7	88	5	CUT PRISON SPENDING
11.8	56	8	DO NOT KNOW
10.6	50	9	REFUSED
	502	.	Not APPLICABLE

---
975 cases

Type: numeric
Decimals: 0
Input location: 3/24
Min: 1 Max: 9

MD Codes: none
land1

Redirect State Resources
Next, I have a few questions about land use in Michigan. Land use refers to the use of land for residential, commercial, industrial, agricultural, and recreational purposes. I would like to read you some policy proposals concerning land use and have you tell me to what extent you would support or oppose each.

The first is, state resources should be directed for redevelopment of existing commerce centers rather than for the development of undeveloped areas.

Commerce Centers are communities with larger populations that already have the infrastructure (roads, transportation systems) to support development.

Would you say you would strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose or strongly oppose this proposal?

PCT	N	VALUE	LABEL
23.7	205	1	STRONGLY SUPPORT
36.3	314	2	SOMEWHAT SUPPORT
20.9	181	3	SOMEWHAT OPPOSE
19.2	167	4	STRONGLY OPPOSE

	53	8	DO NOT KNOW
	20	9	REFUSED
	940 cases		

Min: 1 Max: 4

MD Codes: 9,8

land2

Housing Financial Incentives

The state government should create financial and other incentives so that affordable housing is less concentrated in central cities and more available throughout all communities in a region.

Would you say you would strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose or strongly oppose this proposal?

PCT	N	VALUE	LABEL
43.7	395	1	STRONGLY SUPPORT
35.0	316	2	SOMEWHAT SUPPORT
13.7	123	3	SOMEWHAT OPPOSE
7.6	69	4	STRONGLY OPPOSE
	29	8	DO NOT KNOW
	8	9	REFUSED
---			
940 cases			

Metropolitan Cooperation Questions

lu4a, lu4b, lu4c, uscm2a, uscm2b, uscm2c, uscm2d, uscm2e, uscm2f, uscm2f, uscm2g, cp1, lg2, lu4a, lu4b, lu4c, lu5a, lu5b, newecon1f, land5a, land5b

lu4a

Encourage Local Government Cooperation

There have been several suggestions on how best to approach land use issues between state and local government. I'd like to read you a couple of suggestions and have you tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each.

State government should encourage local governments to work together to develop coordinated land use plans to manage growth.

Would you say you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree?

PCT	N	VALUE	LABEL
49.1	461	1	STRONGLY SUPPORT

42.7	401	3	SOMEWHAT SUPPORT
4.8	45	5	SOMEWHAT OPPOSE
3.4	32	7	STRONGLY OPPOSE
	27	8	DO NOT KNOW
	8	9	REFUSED
	---		

975 cases

Min: 1 Max: 4

MD Codes: 9,8

lu4b

Financial Incentives

State government should use financial incentives to encourage cooperation between local units of government on land use decisions.

Would you say you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree?

PCT	N	VALUE	LABEL
24.0	223	1	STRONGLY SUPPORT
47.7	444	2	SOMEWHAT SUPPORT
17.3	161	3	SOMEWHAT OPPOSE
11.0	102	4	STRONGLY OPPOSE
	34	8	DO NOT KNOW
	11 ---	9	REFUSED

975 cases

Min: 1 Max: 4

lu4c

Regional Planning

Local units of government should coordinate their land use planning on a regional scale.

Would you say you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree?

IWER: USE THIS DEFINITION: "By region we mean within your county and neighboring counties".

PCT	N	VALUE	LABEL
38.9	355	1	STRONGLY SUPPORT
51.9	473	2	SOMEWHAT SUPPORT
6.8	62	3	SUPPORT OPPOSE
2.4	22	4	STRONGLY OPPOSE

47	8	DO NOT KNOW
16	9	REFUSED

---
975 cases

Type: numeric
Decimals: 0
Min: 1 Max: 4

Input location: 2/19
USCM2a

Transportation
Some people feel that individual local governments should address issues or problems concerning services or programs by themselves, while others feel that these issues are best addressed by local governments working together.

Thinking about the area in which you live, is providing public transportation something that is a best addressed by local governments themselves or is this something that is best addressed by local governments working together?

PCT	N	VALUE	LABEL
18.6	177	1	INDIVIDUALS LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
81.4	777	5	GOVERNMENTS WORKING TOGETHER
	31	8	DO NOT KNOW
	4	9	REFUSED

---
989 cases

USCM2b

Land Use Issues
Land use issues such as planning and zoning?
(Is this something that is a best addressed by local governments by themselves or is this something that is best addressed by local units of government working together?)

PCT	N	VALUE	LABEL
43.1	412	1	INDIVIDUAL LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
56.9	544	5	GOVERNMENTS WORKING TOGETHER
	26	8	DO NOT KNOW
	7	9	REFUSED

---
989 cases

Type: numeric
Decimals: 0
Min: 1 Max: 5

USCM2c

Utilities
Providing utilities such as water and sewers?
(Is this something that is a best addressed by local governments by themselves or is this something that is best addressed by local units of government working together?)

PCT	N	VALUE	LABEL
34.2	330	1	INDIVIDUAL LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
65.8	635	5	GOVERNMENTS WORKING TOGETHER
	18	8	DO NOT KNOW
	6	9	REFUSED

---
989 cases

USCM2d

Police, Fire, EMT Services
Providing police, fire, and EMT service?
(Is this something that is a best addressed by local governments by themselves or is this something that is best addressed by local units of government working together?)

PCT	N	VALUE	LABEL
42.3	415	1	INDIVIDUAL LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
57.7	565	5	GOVERNEMENTS WORKING TOGETHER
	9	8	DO NOT KNOW
	1	9	REFUSED

---
989 cases

MD Codes: 9,8

Type: numeric
Decimals: 0
Min: 1 Max: 5

USCM2e

School Funding
School funding?
(Is this something that is a best addressed by local governments by themselves or is this something that is best addressed by local units of government working together?)

PCT	N	VALUE	LABEL
41.0	396	1	INDIVIDUAL LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
59.0	568	5	GOVERNMENTS WORKING TOGETHER

20	8	DO NOT KNOW
6	9	REFUSED

---

989 cases

USCM2f

Art and Other Museums
Funding for art and other museums?
(Is this something that is a best addressed by local governments by themselves or is this something that is best addressed by local units of government working together?)

PCT	N	VALUE	LABEL
39.8	376	1	INDIVIDUAL LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
60.2	568	5	GOVERNMENTS WORKING TOGETHER
	42	8	DO NOT KNOW
	2	9	REFUSED

989 Cases
Type: numeric
Decimals: 0
Min: 1 Max: 5

Input location: 2/6
Type: numeric
Decimals: 0
Min: 1 Max: 5

MD Codes: 9,8

USCM2g

Affordable Housing
Providing affordable housing?
(Is this something that is a best addressed by local governments by themselves or is this something that is best addressed by local units of government working together?)

PCT	N	VALUE	LABEL
34.7	331	1	INDIVIDUAL LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
65.3	622	5	GOVERNMENTS WORKING TOGETHER
	25	8	DO NOT KNOW
	12	9	REFUSED

---

989 cases

CP1

Land Use Collaboration

Thinking about land use issues (such as zoning and planning) should the state of Michigan require local governments to cooperate, should it encourage local governments to cooperate, or should local governments resolve these issues themselves?

PCT	N	VALUE	LABEL
19.4	184	1	REQUIRE COOPERATION
40.9	388	3	ENCOURAGE COOPERATION
39.7	377	5	RESOLVE ISSUES LOCALLY
	29	8	DO NOT KNOW
	11	9	REFUSED

989 cases

Type: numeric
Decimals: 0
Min: 1 Max: 5

Input location: 2/8
Type: numeric
Decimals: 0
Input location: 2/9
Min: 1 Max: 5

MD Codes: 9,8

LG2

Incentives

Should state government provide financial incentives to local units of government (cities, villages, and townships) for working together to reduce costs and improve the delivery or services?

PCT	N	VALUE	LABEL
82.6	776	1	YES
17.4	163	5	NO
	43	8	DON'T KNOW
	7	9	REFUSED

---

989 cases

MD Codes: 9,8

—

Type: numeric

Decimals: 0
Min: 1 Max: 5

Input location: 2/10
lu4a

Encourage Local Government Cooperation
There have been several suggestions on how best to approach land use issues between state and local government. I'd like to read you a couple of suggestions and have you tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each.

State government should encourage local governments to work together to develop coordinated land use plans to manage growth.

Would you say you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree?

PCT	N	VALUE	LABEL
49.1	461	1	STRONGLY SUPPORT
42.7	401	2	SOMEWHAT SUPPORT
4.8	45	3	SOMEWHAT OPPOSE
3.4	32	4	STRONGLY OPPOSE
	27	8	DO NOT KNOW
	8	9	REFUSED
---			
	975 cases		

Type: numeric
Decimals: 0
Min: 1 Max: 4

MD Codes: 9,8

lu4b

Financial Incentives
State government should use financial incentives to encourage cooperation between local units of government on land use decisions.

Would you say you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree?

PCT	N	VALUE	LABEL
24.0	223	1	STRONGLY SUPPORT
47.7	444	2	SOMEWHAT SUPPORT
17.3	161	3	SOMEWHAT OPPOSE
11.0	102	4	STRONGLY OPPOSE
	34	8	DO NOT KNOW
	11 ---	9	REFUSED

975 cases

Type: numeric
Decimals: 0
Min: 1 Max: 4

MD Codes: 9,8

lu4c

Regional Planning
Local units of government should coordinate their land use planning on a regional scale.

Would you say you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree?

IWER: USE THIS DEFINITION: "By region we mean within your county and neighboring counties".

PCT	N	VALUE	LABEL
38.9	355	1	STRONGLY SUPPORT
51.9	473	2	SOMEWHAT SUPPORT
6.8	62	3	SOMEWHAT OPPOSE
2.4	22	4	STRONGLY OPPOSE
	47	8	DO NOT KNOW
	16	9	REFUSED

---

975 cases

land5a

Consolidate Local Governments
Next, I have a couple of questions about local government which includes cities, villages, and townships.

Do you think neighboring local governments should be consolidated as a way to save money or to improve efficiency?

PCT	N	VALUE	LABEL
48.7	437	1	YES
3.2	29	3	DEPENDS: R VOLUNTEERS
48.0	430	5	NO
	35	8	DO NOT KNOW
	8	9	REFUSED

---

940 cases

Type: numeric
Decimals: 0

Min: 1 Max: 5

Input location: 1/55
land5b

Incentives for Consolidation
Should the state government provide financial incentives to local governments to consolidate?

PCT	N	VALUE	LABEL
71.7	325	1	YES
4.5	21	3	DEPENDS: R VOLUNTEERS
23.8	108	5	NO
	11	8	DO NOT KNOW
	1	9	REFUSED
	474		Not Applicable
---			
	940 cases		

Type: numeric

Decimals: 0

Min: 1 Max: 5

MD Codes: 9,8

March 16, 2004
Input location: 1/56

newecon1f

New Economy: Local Governments

It is important that local governments in Michigan work together across jurisdiction (city, township, village and county) borders to implement regional economic development strategies.

%	N	VALUE	LABEL
58.5	559	1	STRONGLY AGREE
36.6	349	2	SOMEWHAT AGREE
3.2	30	3	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
1.8	17	4	STRONGLY DISAGREE
	5	8	DO NOT KNOW
	4	9	REFUSED/NO ANSWER

100.0 963

cases

numeric

Appendix B- Notes on Data

Michigan State University's State of the State survey data is available to the public online. This includes both PDF files of the questions asked and data files. Data files are in both .por and .dta format. Please visit <http://ippsr.msu.edu/soss/sossdata.htm> to access this data if you wish. I encourage others to replicate my research to test its validity.

Data analysis was conducted using Stata 13.1. The final combined master file in which the regressions were run is available by request. This includes all the combined surveys, with recoding values, collapsed of variables, and deletion of irrelevant variables already completed.

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