

# THE LOUD AND THE UNHAPPY

## AN EMPIRICAL CHARACTERIZATION AND INTERPRETATION OF PARTICIPATION IN COLLECTIVE ACTION

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## **AUTHOR'S NOTE**

I spent last year living in a neighborhood of Paris, France that experienced peaceful (but noisy) protests that shut down the area as often as twice a month. After a while, I began to wonder, “Who goes to these things?” This work attempts to answer that question.

## I. INTRODUCTION

People participate in politics in democratic societies. Though this is a tautology, it has, nevertheless, an important meaning. “Democracy” means “government by the people...fit[ting] the etymology of the term: demos, the people, and kraton, to rule” (Cohen 1971, 3). Public participation is what makes democracies democratic. Yet, not all members of the public participate in the same way.

The question of who participates and how is important both on scientific grounds and because of normative concerns about the quality, quantity, and equality of political participation (Campbell 2013). When discussing equality of participation, it is worthwhile to think about the three modes of political participation that draw distinctly different slices of the population: voting, civic activism, and collective action (Norris 2002, 195). Voting is a highly institutionalized activity, and, generally, civic activism is, too. Since these take place within an organized structure, it is possible to address equality concerns through laws and regulations. Collective action, on the other hand, is a non-institutionalized form of political participation. It is a form of participation that is only available to some people, those with motivation and time (Marien, Hooghe, and Quintelier 2010).

**Participation in collective action is only available to some people, those with the motivation and time to do so.**

Along with other forms of collective action, such as boycotts and petition-signing, the use of protest has been on the rise in the twentieth century (Norris 2002, 197). This has been especially true in Western societies (Marien, Hooghe, and Quintelier 2010), but it has recently risen to the fore in countries all over the world, from Taiwan to Venezuela. While the movements of recent decades are tiny in comparison to the enormous mass-movements of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century (Koopmans 1996), they have had an undeniable influence on the policy and structure of government, from the Anti-Apartheid movement and the fall of the Berlin Wall to Occupy Wall Street and the Arab Spring to the recent uprising in Ukraine.

**Collective action unveils the relation between social structure and political authority.**

Such events as these reveal the relationship between social structure and political authority better than any other event, policy, or outcome (Lichbach 1998). Protestors share a collective identity and aspire to collective goals. This affinity is what gives the term, “protest,” meaning. But what is beguilingly easy to forget about protests is that they are made up of individuals, each carrying their own unique identity, with their own reasons for participating. Thus, collective action is a meeting of two closely intertwined identities, the individual and the collective. The key to understanding this process is built upon a social psychological framework (Klandermans 1997, 2–4).

While macro-level of explanations of protest and other forms of collective action can be illuminating, the key is the individual’s decision-making process after encountering a problem. It has long been observed that actors, economic or otherwise, experience changing levels of performance (Hirschman 1970, 2). While this concept is not particularly interesting from a market perspective, since the loss of one actor in a competitive market only results in its replacement by others, it assumes importance when considering the performance of the state, a unique and irreplaceable actor.

**Faced with deteriorated performance, the individual can use exit or voice.**

When the performance of an organization, such as the state, is believed to have significantly deteriorated, the individual has two options: voice or exit (Hirschman 1970, 4). Voice serves to alert an organization of its failings and urge it to reform (Hirschman 1970, 33). Exit, in the political realm, is synonymous with revolution, a reaction outlawed by the state as criminally treasonous (Hirschman 1970, 17). Exit is rooted in the feeling that individuals currently in power are illegitimate. When neither exit nor voice are exercised, the individual remains silent and accepts the state’s deterioration, at least for some period of time. The degree to which this deterioration can be tolerated is determined by the individual’s loyalty to the organization. If the deterioration of performance reaches an intolerable degree, however, citizens will be confronted with the need to choose between advocating for reform (voice) or revolution (exit).

The question is, therefore, which of these two reactions does collective action represent? In this paper, I describe and test a model of participation

that addresses that question. This model proposes an individual's response, exit or voice, is conditioned by a combination of individual attitudes, motive sources and mobilizing structures, and contextual factors. After briefly defining the term, "collective action" and summarizing three competing interpretations of the function of collective action, I will explore each of the three model components in turn. Then, using data pooled from 44 countries observed in the 5<sup>th</sup> (2005-2008) and 6<sup>th</sup> waves (2009-2013) of the World Values Survey, I will analyze this model with a series of logistic regressions to characterize the participants in peaceful demonstration and determine whether collective action is more likely to be used in voice or exit. The current literature on collective action would suggest that collective action is a tool of voice rather than exit. If this is supported by the data, I will conclude with some larger observations on the implications of such a finding.

## **II. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION**

### **A. DEFINITION OF COLLECTIVE ACTION**

The term for any action that aims to improve the status, power, or influence of a group by challenging social inequality and injustice is "collective action" (Van Zomeren and Iyer 2009) Why "collective action" and not "protest" or "demonstration?" If the meaning of the latter terms is considered in context, they prejudice the intentions and political positions of the participants, generally from the unflattering perspective of the target of these actions: authority (Tilly and Tilly, 1981). In contrast, "collective action" is a value-neutral term and applies equally to actors of all motivations across a wide range of behavior (ibid.).

Collective action is also a term of specificity. It is a specific response to specific conditions of social existence (Gurr 1970, 312). What these conditions are has been the subject of considerable debate over the past three centuries at a minimum. John Stuart Mill understood collective action

to be the product of strict calculation of the pursuit of individual interest (C. Tilly 1978, 16). Karl Marx traced collective action back to group interest and, unsurprisingly, conflict in the organization of production (ibid., 15). Émile Durkheim viewed collective action through the lens of identity, a direct response to the integration and disintegration of groups in society (ibid., 15-16). Max Weber presented collective action as the product of commitment to certain belief systems (ibid., 17). Rather than being irreconcilable, these four interpretations lend themselves to a syncretic theory of mobilization, as will be described below.

While “collective action” may be the best available term, it is not without its shortcomings. “Protest” is more explicitly political in its objectives (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997, 128). “Social movement” is more clearly oriented around the opinions and beliefs of its participants and targeted toward change in the structure of society (McCarthy and Zald 1977, 1217). Therefore, in an attempt to address these shortcomings, I will use “collective action” to describe the action of assembling individuals that share opinions and beliefs to attempt to change the political structure of society.

**Collective action is an assembly of like-minded individuals trying to change the political structure of society**

The “action” in collective action is not so broad in practice as it might first appear. Most people pursue collective action through a limited number of forms, though these can change over time (C. Tilly 1983). These forms are determined by political opportunity, mobilizing structures, and cultural frames (Lichbach 1998). The changing interests, grievances, and aspirations across generations are reflected in the changing forms and goals of collective action over time (C. Tilly 1983). Earlier repertoires of action gave ordinary people the opportunity to make their opinions known in the absence of elections, surveys, and sustained, generalist social movements (ibid.). These may have been in the form of more or less spontaneous reform movements, such as riots or violent revolutions. As institutionalized democratic processes strengthened and subjects increasingly became citizens, at least in Europe, in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century, these early forms lost favor and were used more rarely (ibid.). By the 20<sup>th</sup> century, some forms of collective action took on an increasingly institutionalized aspect (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001). For

example, many of the seminal moments of the U.S. civil rights movement, such as the 1963 March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, were the product of planned actions by permanent activist organizations. Today, collective action is generally seen as a legitimate method of political participation and, in the eyes of some, complementary to elections and surveys for understanding public opinion (ibid., C. Tilly 1983).

## **B. THREE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF COLLECTIVE ACTION**

As described by Norris et al, there are three common interpretations of the meaning of collective action (Norris, Walgrave, and Aelst 2005). After an overview of these interpretations, each will be explored in greater detail. The first interpretation holds that instances of collective action are dependent on entirely contextual conditions (ibid.). It discourages hasty generalizations, cautioning that the differences between collective actions may be greater than their similarities. Different contexts are liable to act as confounding variables to the point that a unitary concept of collective action becomes incoherent (Diani 2009). It claims that there are few qualities inherent to collective action that are predictive of the background of participants, so it would be a mistake to lump all demonstrators together (Norris, Walgrave, and Aelst 2005).

The second, more ambitious view is that collective action is essentially an expression of anti-state sentiment, a rejection of the status quo and a call for revolution. This sees collective action as a mechanism for releasing built-up tension between the desires of individuals and the structures of society (L. Tilly and Tilly 1981, 14). Alienation and dissatisfaction are the principal predictors of participation (Dalton 2002, 67). In this mindset, a “they” must be targeted and an “us” must be formed in order to create a set of collective

beliefs, including the belief that collective action can address current inadequacies (Klandermans 1997, 17–18).

The third and final viewpoint interprets collective action as voice, as one option among many in the toolkit of political engagement. This perspective relies less on tension and emphasizes the rational basis of social movements (L. Tilly and Tilly 1981, 14). It suggests participation is driven by politically sophisticated individuals motivated by shared convictions about politics and identity (Dalton 2002, 67). McGarty et al. (2009) summarizes this view by writing, “If this logical thread can be expressed in a single sentence then it is that collective action must be connected to ideas, and the political action must be connected to ideology, and all of these things, action, ideas, and ideology must be tied to collective identity.” Thus, collective action would be a means of advocating for rational proposals for societal reform.

## 1. THE CONTEXTUAL INTERPRETATION

The first interpretation of collective action is more a message of caution. It claims that there is little inherent to demonstrations to predict participation, meaning it would be a mistake to place all demonstrators together under the banner of a sprawling theory (Norris, Walgrave, and Aelst 2005). This thesis suggests that the mobilization of social groups and the underlying attitudes of these groups depend principally upon the specifics of the event (*ibid.*). These details include the issues, actors, processes, and cultural frames of the participants and they act as confounding variables in attempts to create models of participation (Diani 2009).

A specific example is the predictive strength of education, occupation, and gender for levels of political participation. These predictors are stronger in countries with a communist heritage than countries that never experienced communist rule, a contextual historical fact that might be mistakenly omitted from a predictive model (Smith 2009). Some of these confounding effects can be taken into account, especially if they are easily measured (*ibid.*). Other



contextual variables, such as the practical constraints of transport and time and the physical danger of participation, may change so much from event to event that it becomes difficult to accurately consider their influence (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001). Finally, the degree to which collective action may represent major social upheaval depends on citizen group access to the political regime (Diani 2009). When access is restricted, civil associations may radicalize, draw closer to protest groups, and increase support for collective action.

Nevertheless, it is possible to account for some contextual variables. It is also possible that a few variables of collective action have such a strong predictive effect that changing context does not significantly diminish their power. Therefore, it is worthwhile to consider two competing, grander explanations of collective action.

## **2. THE ANTI-STATE INTERPRETATION**

The roots of the anti-state interpretation of collective action run deep, having exerted dominance over political thought for centuries. In a celebrated quotation, the French theorist Gustave Le Bon links collective action with the destruction of the status quo, writing in 1895, “The rise of crowds marks one of the last steps...towards those periods of confused anarchy that always seem to need to proceed the creation of each new society” (6). The anti-state thesis also implies protestors hold irrational, immature political attitudes. Writing in 1951, Eric Hoffer explains:

“For men to plunge headlong into an undertaking of vast change, they must be intensely discontented...they must have an extravagant conception of the prospects and potentialities of the future. Finally, they must be wholly ignorant of the difficulties involved in their vast undertaking. Experience is a handicap” (quoted in Gamson 1975, 131).

For Hoffer, the participants in mass movements are dissatisfied, idealistic, and come from portions of the population that have had little prior exposure to politics.

**According to the antistate view, participants are dissatisfied, idealistic, and inexperienced.**

This view continues to be echoed in the public sphere today. For example, many media commentators used this lens to interpret the coordinated, 8-million person, 8-country demonstration against the Iraq war on 15 February 2003 as an attempt to undermine the American government rather than a protest against an American policy (Diani 2009). Therefore, the pervasiveness of its use and lasting attractiveness of this interpretation makes it worth exploring.

The most influential political scientist to elaborate the antistate thesis is Ted Robert Gurr. In Gurr's book on instability and political conflict, *Why Men Rebel* (1970), he outlines the main causal sequence of collective action. First, discontent develops out of a state of relative deprivation. This is a situation in which there is a perceived discrepancy between the expectations of citizens and the capabilities of their government to fulfill those expectations (13). This gap results in a lack of confidence in government, alienation toward elected representatives, and frustration with the current political and social system (ibid., 11). The discontent is then politicized and then actualized through a public demonstration of dissatisfaction (ibid., 12).

These "civil troubles" take on three forms: turmoil, conspiracy, and internal war (ibid., 11). Turmoil is relatively spontaneous, unorganized collective action with widespread popular participation. Conspiracy is highly organized action with limited participation, often a military-led coup d'état. Internal war features both high degrees of organization and widespread participation. What unites these three forms of "civil troubles" are their foci: the structure of authority and resistance through action (Lichbach 1998).

A good deal of political thought has gone into attempting to explain why individuals would be willing to participate in such action beyond the existence of general discontent. An explanation that has found traction, at least in the media, is that the willingness to participate in such episodes of "nonconforming" behavior comes from a deficit on the part of the

individual. The participant in these demonstrations would have acquired an insufficient social investment in conformist institutions and behavior, making it impossible to resist the nonconforming impulse to exit the system in the face of deterioration (Becker 1963, 27-28).

This is perceived to be a development that is particularly prevalent on the left side of the political spectrum. This “hero of the New Left” is alienated from mainstream society and attempts to escape it through social deviance (Horowitz 1972, 356). This antihero “wins” by refusing to become involved in the traditional political process in order to preserve the freedom to experiment and experience without constraint. Thus, victory is not seizing over political power, but an anarchistic rejection of political power (ibid.).

Unfortunately, at least for those who back the anti-state interpretation, this theory has not gained empirical support (Norris, Walgrave, and Aelst 2005). On the contrary, political collective action often does not even have an anti-state character (Kaase and Marsh 1979, 27). For example, one study demonstrates that demonstrations on environmental or civil rights prove no more confrontational than conventional forms of participation (Koopmans 1996). In addition, the alienated and dissatisfied are not disproportionately drawn to collective action (Dalton 2002, 68). Of course, this is not to say that collective action cannot be anti-state. Such events do occur, but, on their own, collective action can be used to infer little to nothing about threats to system stability (Kaase and Marsh 1979, 35).

Notably, most studies attempting to undermine the anti-state hypothesis have only looked at those who express interest in attending protests, or protest potential (Norris, Walgrave, and Aelst 2005). It is worthwhile to see whether this interpretation might hold among individuals who, so to say, walked the walk, not just talked the talk.

### **3. THE POLITICAL RESOURCE INTERPRETATION**

The third and most widely accepted approach interprets collective action as a political resource for reform. This view places collective action in the wider context of political engagement, as one choice among the many tools of political action (Kaase and Marsh 1979, 27). In this sense, the informal association of individuals through collective action is integral to the successful formulation of an active, vocal, and democratic civil society (Zompetti 2006).

**The political resource perspective interprets collective action as just one tool among many.**

The political resources theory places collective action in the context of political strategy and claims that those who participate in these movements hold mainstream attitudes and social characteristics (Norris, Walgrave, and Aelst 2005). Over the past few decades, at least, the population willing to take part in collective action has normalized (Norris 2002, 200–202). In fact, participation in conventional political behavior is now positively correlated with higher protest potential, suggesting that protest behavior is an unexceptional part of today’s political life (Marsh and Kaase 1979a, 94).

The “normalization” of protest means, in this sense, means that the profile of protestors is shifting to resemble that of the population most likely to engage in conventional political participation. In concrete terms, protest potential has long been highest among younger people (Norris 2002, 200–202). With normalization, the middle-aged are increasingly the most strongly involved age group, reflecting their engagement in civic activism (ibid.).

Collective action also enjoys the legitimacy of conventional political action (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001). It is not just the domain of socially or economically marginalized minorities, but also of typical political participants (ibid.). One example this fact is that the participants in the Occupy Wall Street protests of 2011 tended to be socially-embedded individuals, not marginalized “hippies” (Van Stekelenburg 2012).

Of course, the participants in collective action are still dissatisfied with the current state of affairs, but their unhappiness is of a more limited, directed form. It does not damage the individual’s relationship with societal structures on the whole, but focuses on a problem through the use of a specific set of actions. For example, the regulatory nature of institutions is

legitimized by unemployment. When mass unemployment hits, individuals undertake collective action to signal the failure of market forces. Society must then respond through the creation an alternate, non-market, pathway for socialization (Piven and Cloward 1972, 7). An early case of the logical relationship between need, protest, and response took place in the French city of Lyon in the Middle Ages. Starving, impoverished rioters periodically overran the city until the city leaders created a standardized, centralized administration for welfare support (ibid., 11). In this situation, riots served as a means of expressing dissatisfaction with the situation, not the authorities.


The political resource interpretation replaces Le Bon and Hoffer's notion of the immature protester lost in the crowd of raw emotion with a middle-aged, politically active participant with demands rooted in basic need and reasoned desire. It claims that participants in collective action are as equally rational as other political actors. They have essentially instrumental goals and pursue them with methods suited to the task (Gamson 1975, 138). William Gamson, author of *The Strategy of Social Protest*, one of the first books to endorse the political resource interpretation, writes, "In the place of the old duality of extremist politics and pluralist politics, there is simply politics" (138). This view places collective action under the same heading as more conventional measures of public opinion, such as voting or surveys.

If this is so, collective action should be seen as the expression of public opinion through the lens of resource management (ibid.). These resources include the structure of local organizations, the involvement of outside individuals and organizations represented by the collective action, the supply and demand of resources from specific movements, and the costs and rewards of participation (McCarthy and Zald 1977). Political scientists espousing the political resource interpretation claim that the influence of these incentivizing structures on the costs and benefits of participation is the key to understanding collective action as an expression of public opinion (ibid.).

### III. THEORETICAL MODEL

The most compelling explanations of the decision to participate in collective action meld individual and social factors together with reference to contextual normative questions (Campbell 2013). Sophisticated models are needed to follow the interaction between the motives of individuals and the characteristics of the groups in which they move (Van Stekelenburg, Klandermans, and van Dijk 2011). One comprehensive framework for moving from macro-level to micro-level characteristics claims that social modernization influences state structure; state structure influences mobilizing agencies; and mobilizing agencies influence political activism as moderated by resources and motivation (Norris 2002, 20). Thus, it is necessary to include macro-level indicators of human development, aggregate levels of political rights, civil liberties, and state institutions, and the measures of the mobilizing organizations, individual resources, and motivation to model political activism (Kaase 1990, 42; Norris 2002, 31).

Taking this into account, I propose a model of participation in collective action. I contend that the individual's reaction to a perceived degradation in the performance of the state is conditioned by the combination of pre-existing political, social, and attitudinal characteristics of the individual, motive sources and mobilizing structures through which participation could take place, and macro-level contextual factors of civic culture and socioeconomic conditions. Figure 1 is a visual representation of this model. Through the use of this model, it will be possible to see which of the three interpretations of collective action is the most plausible. The following three sections will describe the theoretical foundation for each part of the model.




**Figure 1** – Model overview. Social characteristics, motive and mobilization, and contextual factors combine to moderate the individual's reaction to an intolerable deterioration of state performance. This can take the form of voice (reform) or exit (revolution).

## **A. INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS**

There are three categories of individual characteristics. The first, “Socioeconomic Characteristics”, focuses on signs that an individual has the time and resources to participate in collective action. The second, “Political Characteristics,” deals with an individual’s interest in politics and political convictions. Finally, “Attitudinal Characteristics” examines an individual’s expectations and judgment of state performance. The relation between the components and groups of components are represented in Figure 2.





**Figure 2** – Schematic of Individual Characteristics. Social characteristics comprise religiosity, education, sex, employment status, age, and class. Political characteristics include interest in politics and political ideology. Attitudinal characteristics are composed of discontent and values. These three groups influence with one another.

## 1. SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS

The “Socioeconomic Characteristics” category is composed of five elements: gender, education, religiosity, social class (subjective and objective), and age. The main points are the following:

- Due to gendered cultural expectations, men should be more likely to participate than women.
- Educational attainment should correlate with greater participation because higher education raises individual awareness of degradation and is linked with access to greater resources.
- Religion is a source of norms ordering and justifying power relations in society. Acceptance of religious ideology results in higher tolerance of the status quo, especially among individuals in high social positions. Therefore, religious belief and participation in religious activities should correlate with less participation.
- Subjective identification with the elite and objective elite status (income) should correlate with greater participation, since the elite has more time and resources to devote to collective action. However, this relationship may be weak because the unemployed, objectively lower classes should also correlate with greater participation, for the same reasons.
- Age should weakly correlate with less participation because, despite the mainstreaming of collective action, youth tend to have the greatest time available to spend joining in collective action.

In summary, participants in collective action are likely to be drawn from portions of the population that are disproportionately male, younger, more educated, less religious, and elite.

### a. Gender

The first, most salient element of individual characteristics is gender (Dalton 2002, 68). When men join collective action, their behavior is

**Participation in collective action by women has been perceived as a violation of gender-related legal codes.**

generally within masculine cultural boundaries (*Women and Social Protest* 1990, 4). This is not the case for women. Protest politics has long been associated with men, and participation by women has generally been perceived as a violation of gendered legal codes, religious ideologies, and social doctrines (ibid.).

With the ongoing social diffusion of collective action as an acceptable political resource, the gender gap has been closing in recent years (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001). This may be the result of the success of the feminist movement, which oriented the political potential of young women towards the use of collective action (Marsh and Kaase 1979b, 134). Economic development is also associated with the closing gender gap, suggesting economic growth may further reduce the disparity (Inglehart and Norris 2000).

Nevertheless, a significant gender gap remains and there is some doubt over whether and how this disparity may continue to close (Norris 2002, 200–202). For example, women today are less likely to participate in collective action specifically against sexism than in the past (Ellemers and Barreto 2009). This is because “modern” sexist views are less likely to be perceived as a form of discrimination, eliciting less anger and, as a result, less support for collective action, the intention to protest, and collective action behavior (ibid.). Gender is expected to be a consistently influential predictor of participation in collective action.

## **b. Educational Attainment**

Another strong predictor of participation in collective action is educational attainment (Campbell 2013). Differences in education exacerbate inequality of unconventional political activism to a greater extent than institutionalized forms of participation, such as voting (Marien, Hooghe, and Quintelier 2010). Voting has a relatively low threshold of required knowledge and an extremely low time commitment. Attending a protest requires both

**Differences in education are particularly exacerbated through collective action relative to institutionalized forms of participation.**

more effort and time, restricting the potential population of protesters to those with enough available resources. It is possible that the common explanatory basis of class and education would result in interaction effects (although this will be beyond the scope of this analysis).

The explanatory power of educational attainment comes from the relative nature of social status, since only high-status citizens are generally able to spend the time and effort to participate. In addition, increased education leads to more participation in civic associations, which form the mobilizing structures of collective action (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001). Therefore, greater educational attainment is predicted to correlate strongly and positively with participation.

### **c. Religiousness**

Religious belief is the third predictor of participation. Religion is an intermediary between authority and individual citizens, a means of impressing society's structures of power upon the mental structures of individuals (Bourdarias 2009). It works as a sort of language, one that is both structured by and structuring of society (Bourdieu 1971). The content of this language contains the symbols, beliefs and collective practices of the entire social body (André and Hilgers 2009). When exposed to this religious language, individual dispositions are conditioned to internalize this system and transform a society's ethos, or implicit aspirations, into a personally meaningful ethic, or systematized ensemble of explicit norms (Bourdieu 1971).

**Religion impresses social structures of power on individual predispositions.**

The norms diffused by religious ideology are intended to order the temporal world and relations between individuals (Bourdarias 2009). Religion is subordinate to the power relations, both real and imaginary, within society (Bernault and Tonda 2000). As such, religion is predisposed to assume a political ideological function, work to erase relativism, and legitimize authority in the minds of believers (Bourdieu 1971).

The political impact of religion does not, however, have a uniform influence on every member of society. The social position of the audience is linked to the production of specific kinds of religious messages (André and Hilgers 2009). Given that religion is oriented towards the confirmation and legitimation of propositions linked to the existential and social concerns of its audience, the social function of religion differs according to the audience's position in the class relation structure and the division of religious labor (Bourdieu 1971).

When religious institutions are confronted with the liberalization of the social and political sphere, they tend to splinter (André and Hilgers 2009). The better-off are more apt to follow religious messages that confirm the moral righteousness of the status quo, while poorer individuals are likely to support a more activist ideology. Nevertheless, religion acts as a brake on participation on the whole, since the poor are unlikely to have the time or resources to devote to collective action, as described below.

Therefore, since religious ideology often places social perturbations and conflict in a negative light, it is reasonable to predict that religious individuals would avoid taking part in the chaos of collective action (Bourdarias 2009). The results of the seminal five-nation survey by Alan Marsh and Max Kaase support this view, finding a negative correlation between strong religious feelings, of any form, and participation in collective action (1979b, 118).

On the other hand, some thinkers argue that, on the contrary, the religious should be more likely than most to participate in collective action, either because they are habitual joiners, have internalized religious beliefs encouraging participation, or because religious social groups encourage attendance at such events (Campbell 2013). This, too, has received some empirical support. A recent study by David E. Campbell suggests frequent religious attendance is positively correlated with an individual's civic and political participation. Though the former explanation appears to be more convincing from a theoretical perspective, but this analysis provides an excellent opportunity to test the latter.

#### **d. Class**

The fourth element, class, intuitively appears to be a good predictor of participation. This is because recourse to the use of voice comes far more readily to the elite than other members of society, leading to their overrepresentation in the political sphere and a positive-feedback loop (Hirschman 1970, 53). High-status groups use disproportionate access to the political sphere in order to pursue reforms that increasingly widen the gap in political participation between social classes (ibid.). As Elmer E. Schnattschneider remarked, “The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly choir sings with a strong upper-class accent” (quoted in Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, 177).

Income is an objective measure of class. As described above, voice comes more readily at the upper end of the income range. This results in an increasingly defined separation of the richest and the rest of society (Hirschman 1970, 53). While the traditional class conflict model argues that the poorest should be the most supportive of social change, they must have the time and resources available to participate (Inglehart 1990, 93). Therefore, higher income should correlate with greater participation, though it may be curvilinear if the poorest, having the greatest reason to participate, are able to do so.

Subjective class should also be a strong predictor, since it includes individuals who identify with the elite without objectively being so. Individuals who anticipate joining the elite, but are not yet elite, often behave like objectively elite individuals. For example, the aspirational elite are equally likely as the objectively elite to support oppressive behavior when presented with negative norms about out-groups (Postmes and Smith 2009). The effect of subjective belonging on willingness to oppress has been noted in other domains, as well, such as religious affiliation (Bourdarias 2009).

Empirical research has drawn conflicting conclusions about the power of subjective class to predict participation in collective action. Marsh and Kaase claim that class, both objective and subjective, has no consistent relationship

to collective action (Marsh and Kaase 1979b, 127). A more recent study found that, though perhaps less influential than in the past, objective class continues to be source of differentiation of political behavior (Caínzos and Voces 2010). That study did not consider the role of subjective class, which this analysis will also attempt to clarify.

### **e. Age**

Finally, age has been long been believed to condition participation in collective action (Norris 2002, 200–202). Age is traditionally understood to stand in a negative relationship with protest potential, with the youngest respondents holding the highest protest potential (Marsh and Kaase 1979b, 104).

Over recent years, the participation profile of collective action has evolved and the overrepresentation of youth at protests has diminished. This may be due to the social diffusion of protest as a legitimate tool of dissent (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001). The mainstreaming of protest is due to the combination of civic associations' increasingly frequent use of collective action and the fact that the middle-aged are generally the most strongly involved age group in civic associations (Norris 2002, 200-202). In addition, value change may have contributed positively to this evolution. However, there should still be an overrepresentation of youth at collective action because they are most likely to have the time to participate. It is reasonable, therefore, to predict that age has a weakly negative correlation with protest participation.

## **2. POLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS**

In addition to the socioeconomic characteristics of individuals, political characteristics are key components of individual attitudes towards collective

action. In this analysis, this category is broken up into the individual's interest in politics and his or her political ideology. Individuals with a greater interest in politics, supportive of democracy, and aligned with issues central to the political left should correlate positively with participation.

### **a. Political Interest**

Individuals with political interest are strongly likely to participate in politics (Campbell 2013). There is a two-way relationship between political interest and political knowledge (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, 8). The more one knows about politics, the more one is interested. However, interest in politics is not sufficient to have political knowledge. In addition to motivation to learn, political knowledge is the product of the ability and opportunity to learn, as moderated by socioeconomic and systemic factors (Campbell 2013).

This relationship functions within the context of social networks, with the content of political knowledge and the strength of political interest working within an individual's larger social environment (ibid.). Therefore, membership in a political party should be indicative of a relatively high level of interest in traditional politics.

Assuming participants support the goals of collective action, the “inherent tension between promoting a society with enthusiastically participative citizens and promoting one imbued with tolerance and respect for differences of opinion” makes it appear likely that individuals who are interested and involved in traditional politics, and thus knowledgeable and opinionated, participate in collective action (Mutz 2006, 3).



## **b. Political Ideology**

**Political ideology justifies emotional responses to relative deprivation.**

The second aspect of the individual's political character is political ideology, both in terms of support for the democratic system and along the left-right ideological axis. Ideology works to rationalize emotional responses to relative deprivation (Van Stekelenburg, Klandermans, and Van Dijk 2009). Justifications that bypass the cost/benefit mindset are often powerful enough to overcome the problem posed by collective action, making it a strong motive source (ibid.).

Since political parties are the main source of ideology, there is often an associational component to ideology, further increasing the likelihood of participation (Van Stekelenburg 2012). Parties on the left side of the ideological spectrum have long been linked with collective action due to their traditional alliance with labor organizations and with progressive political orientations (Horowitz 1972, 355). Therefore, support for issues that have long been associated with the left, such as welfare and income equality, should positively correlate with participation.

Individuals may also identify with anti-democratic political parties. If an individual does not support democracy as a political system, they would be more likely to use exit, rejecting the legitimacy of those in power, rather than use voice to achieve reform within the current system.

## **3. ATTITUDINAL CHARACTERISTICS**

Dissatisfaction, both political and social, and values compose the third and final component: attitudinal characteristics. Perhaps intuitively, discontented individuals desirous of reform should be more likely to participate in collective action. In addition, individuals who prize self-expression, rational, and postmaterialist values should be more likely to exercise voice.

### a. Discontent

The causal chain of dissatisfaction is theorized to work as follows: the greater the relative deprivation perceived, the greater the frustration; the greater the frustration, the greater the aggression (Gurr 1970, 9). Anger, the product of emotional coping mechanisms following the observation of unfair treatment, is hypothesized to energize the individual to act (Stürmer and Simon 2009). In this sense, collective action is the politicized product of discontent (Gurr 1970, 320). Accordingly, dissatisfaction is predicted to correlate positively with participation.

While the capacity for self-expression through protest is inherent in the individual, the willingness to use it depends upon the degree to which social expectations are violated (Gurr 1970, 317). Their violation is an essentially subjective judgment on the part of the individual (Hirschman 1970, 34). Modern democratic governments are burdened with high public expectations for the provision of services. These governments sometimes fail to deliver, leading to the public's inevitable disappointment and resulting in a decline of public confidence in government (Thomassen 1990, 104).

This route to protest is fragile, however, since the desire to express discontent may result in the selection of less costly means than collective action (Stürmer and Simon 2009). It appears that discontent affects the individual's desire to participate only to the extent that it represents an opportunity to experience a cathartic reduction of aggression (*ibid.*). When an alternative means of relief is provided, there is no connection between discontent and protest potential (*ibid.*). Furthermore, elite-challenging behavior is most popular among individuals with an optimistic view of their own future (Thomassen 1990, 133).

Empirical analyses have shown that there is no evidence of a relation between protest potential and support for either the governing authorities or the political regime as a whole (*ibid.*, 132-133). The degree of support for the political regime is similarly not linked to the actual rate of participation in demonstrations (Koopmans 1996). In addition, dissatisfaction is not

**Anger is a fragile route to collective action, since less costly means of catharsis may be preferred.**

correlated with traditional political participation, such as voting, engaging in campaigns, or being involved in local politics (Dalton 2002, 51–54). Therefore, given the costliness of participating in collective action, the relationship between discontent and collective action may be weak.

## b. Values

**Without the desire for self-expression, dissatisfaction does not become actualized.**

The studies cited in the section above generally deal only with protest potential and ignore the question of realizing this potential. When exit is not an option, as is often the case in the political sphere, discontented individuals will be maximally motivated to use voice to bring their dissatisfaction to the attention of those in power (Hirschman 1970, 70). However, without the accompanying desire to express one's self, dissatisfaction remains latent. In addition, holding secular and rational values may help individuals causally link discontent with worldly social structures, favoring participation in collective action.

These values do not come into being in a vacuum. Often secure in satisfying their immediate needs, postmaterialist individuals tend to have been economically secure during their youth, when values are developed and solidified (Inglehart 1990, 98). Today, postmaterialists are an emerging minority whose priorities are often left unaddressed by the traditional political establishment (ibid., 92). Since they value material things less than materialists, they may view the economic disruptions caused by collective action less negatively (ibid.). Therefore, one would expect that individuals holding values emphasizing self-expression and rationality would be particularly apt to participate in collective action (Welzel and Inglehart 2008).

Postmaterialists use collective action as a strategic resource for civic expression (Norris, Walgrave, and Aelst 2005). Economic development increases people's resources and results in a greater desire for self-expression and freedom of choice (Welzel and Inglehart 2008). This desire leads to citizen empowerment, and, since the institutions most permissive of citizen

involvement are democratic ones, people tend to seek democracy (ibid.). The rise of self-expression values is a process that moves a society from electoral democracy, which is simply based on suffrage, to “effective” democracy, where citizens are able to effectively apply pressure upon the political elite.

While a great deal of empirical research supports the predictive power of postmaterialism values, at least one analysis has found no association between postmaterialism and participation in unconventional forms of political participation (Koopmans 1996). While postmaterialist values are expected to correlate positively with participation, it is of interest to see whether this relationship is supported in light of Koopman’s conclusions.


## 4. COMBINATIONS

The three types of individual characteristics share several common linkages, since it is impossible to draw hard divisions between them. Most notably, religious ideology can influence both social characteristics and attitudes. Expectations of political responsibility may also represent both political and attitudinal characteristics. Similar distinctions could be made for many of the other factors.

## B. MOTIVE AND MOBILIZATION

Simply being willing to participate in collective action does not cause an individual to do so. Mobilization is “the process by which a group acquires collective control of the resources needed for action” (C. Tilly 1978, 7). It describes the creation and activation of commitment, which requires an effort of some kind (Gamson 1975, 15). Therefore, a motive is required to justify this effort and start the process of turning protest potential into participation. Then a mobilizing structure is required to extend this willingness into sustained participation. This process is described in Figure 3.

**A motive is required to justify the effort of participating in collective action.**



**Figure 3** – Schematic of the motive vocalization process. The motive sources of cost/benefit, identity and anger influence the transition from the understanding to mobilization phase. Identity and anger may function on their own or in concert with one another. The societal mobilizing structures of social networks and formal organizations influence the transition between initial mobilization and continued engagement. There is often overlap between social networks and organizations, but each can successfully sustain mobilization on their own.

When a deterioration of performance is observed, individuals internally vocalize motives to provide new reasons to participate in collective action (Mills 1940). The vocalization of motive takes place in three stages. The individual first must reach the understanding that his or her personal problem is the result of a public problem (Klandermans 1997, 5–7). Next, the individual must choose to act upon such an understanding, and finally, he or she will sustain or abandon this newfound commitment (ibid.). New motives can be created by the instrumentalization of cost-benefit calculations, the politicization of social identification, and/or the perception and emotion of group-based injustice (Van Zomeren and Iyer 2009). These motive sources are often used simultaneously, but each may suffice on their own. Once a justification for mobilization is found, it becomes a stable motive, unquestioningly accepted by the individual. The individual then looks to participate through a mobilizing structure, such as those provided by civic associations. The success or failure of this process is manifested by the participation or non-participation of the individual (Klandermans 1984).

### **1. MOTIVE SOURCES**

Motives are strategies that provide common grounds for collective action (Mills 1940). These can appear as a pair of alternatives, such as love or money, pleasure or pain. C. Wright Mills, writing on motive in 1940, described it as “one which is to the actor and to the other members of a situation an unquestioned answer to questions concerning social...conduct.” For Mills, motive the key influence on decision-making, being “that in man which leads him to do good or evil” (ibid.).

There are three sources of motive. Cost/benefit analysis is the basis of rational participation. In this case, individuals will choose to participate in collective if he or she perceives the potential benefit of joining to be greater than the cost. Identity is a normative appeal to the individual, bypassing the question of cost. Instead, participation is put forward in terms of

identification and group interest. Finally, anger is a motive source that can work either solely on the basis of principle, meaning the violation of normative expectations, or in tandem with a threat also appealing to the identity motive source.

### **a. COST/BENEFIT**

The first motive source is the rational use of cost/benefit calculations, in which the decision to participate in collective action is the logical result of an internal process of weighing the costs and benefits of participation (Klandermans 1984). In this approach, the benefits of collective mobilization is the expectation of reward for effort (Van Zomeren and Iyer 2009), while the costs are the barriers to accessing collective action events, as well as the potentially negative consequences of participation for the individual (Marien, Hooghe, and Quintelier 2010). Thus, while the consideration of the costs and benefits has expectations rooted in the imagination, it has consequences in real-world mobilization (Klandermans 1984).

This motive source is limited, however, by the fact that participation is, as a rule, objectively unfavorable at the individual level. This means the costs of mobilization are almost always higher than the benefits (Klandermans 1997, 6). If mobilized, the individual must pay costs and take on risk without knowing whether his or her effort will make the attainment of the collective goal any more likely or whether he or she will enjoy the benefits of any change stemming from the event (ibid.). Consequently, participation in collective action is, an example of the public good “free rider” and Prisoner’s Dilemma collective action problems (Lichbach 1998).

Market approaches to solving the problem of mobilizing according to cost/benefit calculations with social order and contract solutions result in the so-called “Five Percent Rule.” This rule of thumb states that less than 5% of the supporters of a cause become actively involved in the cause. The fact that

**Instrumental motives are limited by the logic of collective action problems.**

even 5% of individuals are willing to choose the less-optimal solution is indicative of the insufficiency of the rational motive source.

## **b. IDENTITY**

A second source of motive is identity-based. Over the past few decades, the demands of protestors have become increasingly focused on values (Van Stekelenburg 2012). This suggests that the politicization of social identity and values is a rich source of motive today (McGarty et al. 2009). When the individual believes in the existence of a set of shared socio-structural characteristics, he or she is led to identify with a particular group, see the boundaries between groups as impermeable and, therefore, become more likely to participate in an identity-based action on behalf of group interests (Van Zomeren and Iyer 2009). Individual attitudes and cultural themes influence the relationship between information and interpersonal interactions, resulting in the politicization of this identity (Klandermans 1997, 21).

**Individuals choose to take on an identity by believing he or she shares the group's values and opinions.**

The social identity source does not equate simple membership in a social category with membership in a social identity, or psychological group. While the goals of collective action are generally on the behalf of social categories, the categories themselves do not motivate collective action (McGarty et al. 2009). Unlike social categories, psychological identities are context-dependent and variable, not just the raw product of the social and economic rapports of force (ibid.). Individuals must subjectively choose to identify with a psychological group, generally by believing he or she shares the opinions of the group (ibid.).

The most successful of these psychological groups present themselves as being aligned with dominant, positively valued social categories (ibid.). Once such an identity establishes itself, it begins to expand, placing pressure on smaller, less powerful identities, often leading to internal divisions arising from attempts to assure its survival (Hilgers 2009, 272). These divisions



create new opinion-based groups that individuals can use to gain a sense of agency and participate in collective action (Klandermans 1997, 63).

### **c. ANGER**

The third and final motive source is group-based anger about a perceived injustice (Stürmer and Simon 2009). This source uses the influence of individual attitudes and cultural values to mediate the relation between information and social interaction (Klandermans 1997, 21). Group anger requires a negative contrast with other groups to motivate the desire to improve (Van Zomeren and Iyer 2009). This places the decision to mobilize in the context of relative deprivation, where the individual identifies with a dominated group (Walker and Smith 2002). The emotional response to such a situation gives the individual a feeling of agency and increases his or her willingness to participate in collective action (Klandermans 1997, 63). Though anger is closely aligned with the identity, the two sources are not identical. Anger is often a subset of identity, but the identity motive source can effectively mobilize individuals without a perception of relative deprivation and anger can be effective across inter-group boundaries.

### **d. COMBINATIONS**

These three sources coexist easily since different motive sources are used for different actions and issues. Instrumental considerations appeal more to power-oriented collective action, while value-oriented protests draw more from the identity and anger motives (Van Stekelenburg, Klandermans, and Van Dijk 2009). The growing frequency of value-based demands, combined with the ongoing shift towards post materialist values occurring worldwide, suggest that the identity and anger motive sources will continue to increase in their efficacy (Van Stekelenburg 2012).

**Motive sources vary in effectiveness according to the objective of the collective action.**

The preference of some motive sources over others can also depend on the individual's decision-making framework. Individuals who do not feel strongly about their social identity can be characterized as “intuitive economists” looking to maximize subjective utility as moderated by beliefs of efficacy (Van Zomeren and Iyer 2009). In contrast, strong identification might lead to a greater predisposition towards thinking as an “intuitive politician” attempting to maintain positive identities or as “theologians” defending sacred norms (*ibid.*).

It is possible to use these three motive sources to predict participatory decision-making. For example, the politicization of social identity as conditioned by the combination of relative deprivation and frustration may have a strong influence on individual mobilization (Klandermans 1984). Such a model would account for variance in motivation among actual participants in collective action (Van Stekelenburg, Klandermans, and van Dijk 2011). This analysis will provide a basis for evaluating the efficacy of these three motive sources in mobilizing individuals to participate in collective action.

## **2. MOBILIZING STRUCTURES**

In addition to having the motivation to participate in collective action, a mobilizing structure is needed for participation. The two mobilizing structures in society are traditional mobilizing organizations and the individual's own social network. These may be related and lead to even more effective facilitation of mobilization.

### **a. ORGANIZATIONS**

Once an individual who is predisposed to participate in collective action successfully vocalizes a motive for participating, he or she usually looks to join a collective action led by a formal organization to which he or she has sentiments of loyalty (Gamson 1975, 14–15). These organizations aim to

achieve influence over policy, a public show of forceful membership, and an increase in benefits for their members (ibid., 14). The question of material reward is often a powerful issue for these groups, as demonstrated by the fact that the frequency of protest events have historically peaked during economically challenging times, such as the decades of the 1880s and the 1930s (ibid., 21).

**Formal organizations are the “motors” of collective action.**

Very few participants come alone to a demonstration (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001). Rather, the “motors” of collective action are associations (ibid.). These might be religious organizations, environmental organizations, or even self-help groups. In empirical analyses, individuals with higher participation in civic associations are more likely to protest (ibid.).

While collective action often takes place under the supervision of ongoing organizations, this is not always the case. The rise of “New Social Movements,” focusing on the postmaterialist themes of ecology, LGBT and women’s rights, the Third World, and anti-nuclear issues, among others, signal an addition to conventional forms of mobilization (Koopmans 1996).

These movements often offer an individualized form of collective action but do not easily accept the participation of traditional organizations (Van Stekelenburg 2012). For example, traditional institutional organizations were seen as “greedy” for demanding large investments of time and effort during the Occupy Wall Street protests (ibid.). Protestors favored “light” groups, which were more informal, being easy to join and easy to leave (ibid.). What remained true, however, was the continued need to for some form of organizational framework to marshal group demands and co-ordinate plans of action.

## **b. SOCIAL NETWORKS**

The second aspect of mobilizing structures, social networks, drive the “New Social Movements.” While social scientists increasingly recognize the importance of social networks in predicting participation in collective action,

**The influence of social ties is increased when embedded in organizations.**

they are difficult to measure (McAdam and Paulsen 1993). This is because the influence of social networks is determined by their content, not just their structure (ibid.). Individuals who reinforce salient identities, such as friends in mobilizing organizations, are crucial mediators of participation (Campbell 2013). Participation is “contagious,” meaning the decision to participate can influence up to four other members of an individual’s social network.

Social network-based explanations of participation in collective action focus on the recruitment of the individual, the linkage of that person’s identity with the movement, and the confirmation of that movement by identity-sustaining individuals in the absence of strong opposition by other individuals (McAdam and Paulsen 1993). These high requirements explain the “Five Percent Rule” of support and participation, in contrast with explanations focusing on the logical dilemma of participation (Lichbach 1998).


### **3. COMBINATIONS**

These two components are often combined since social ties are particularly powerful mediators of recruitment when friends are embedded in a broader mobilizing organization (McAdam and Paulsen 1993). In addition, individuals who feel that they can influence the direction of a larger organization through their social ties are more likely to participate in collective action (Hirschman 1970, 40). Organizations, in turn, use social networks to support their communication efforts and their access to similar organizations and state institutions (McCarthy and Zald 1977). This analysis will consider both the type of civic organization and the strength of involvement, as this is indicative of both the content and number of embedded social ties.

## C. CONTEXTUAL FACTORS

The third and final portion of the model is the contextual factors of the situation in which the collective action is taking place. The practices, representations, and forms of individuation are determined by the “imaginative spaces” of society (Hilgers 2009, 208). There are three such spaces in society: the government, the market, and civil society (Zompetti 2006). Collective action can only take place when the imaginative space allows for the critique of authority (Hilgers 2009, 208). When this space exists, citizens can gain the skills of civic activism and participate in the construction of a shared set of political orientations, or civic culture (Zompetti 2006).

Societal context is linked to individual participation because individuals within a nation are likely to hold similar values and, since holding different values would presumably lead different individuals to participate in collective action, it is reasonable to hypothesize that national-level measures would be significant predictors of participation (Inglehart and Baker 2000). As described in Figure 3, the two central contextual factors are the degree to which the political orientations encouraged by a country’s civic culture and a country’s socioeconomic conditions. Participative institutions are closely linked with socioeconomic development, since economic development is associated with a growing desire to participate in political action (Welzel and Inglehart 2008).



**Figure 4** – Schematic of contextual factors. Cognitive and affective understandings of the world are placed within one of many evolutionary decision-making frameworks to produce political orientations that are either participatory or non-participatory. Civic culture is composed of the combination of political orientations and political systems and institutions. Civic culture and socioeconomic conditions are contextual factors in which collective action takes place.

## 1. CIVIC CULTURE

As conceived by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, civic culture is “a pluralistic culture based on communication and persuasion, a culture of consensus and diversity, a culture that permit[s] change, but moderate[s] it” (1989, 8). The character of a society’s civic culture is mediated by interpersonal relationships, and trust and confidence in others (Almond and Verba 1989, 493). A particularly important influence on a society’s civic culture is religion. Religious ideology provides the framework for the construction of a particular interpretation of social relations, which then affects political perceptions, the exercise of voice, and the power of loyalty (André and Hilgers 2009).

### a. POLITICAL CULTURE

Almond and Verba explain that one subset of civic culture is political culture, which is made up of the set of specifically political attitudes, or psychological orientations, regarding the political system and the role of the self in the system (13). Political attitudes are composed of three levels of increasingly complex orientations. The first is cognitive, containing an individual’s knowledge of the political system’s inputs and outputs (*ibid.*, 15). The second level is affective, which covers the individual’s feelings about the information at the cognitive level (*ibid.*). On a societal scale, these levels might be informed by national measures of religiosity or postmaterialist values or a history of communism. The third orientation is evolutionary, where judgments are made combining values, information, and feelings (*ibid.*).

**Social-function labels are useful for summarizing decision-making frameworks**

Social-function labels can efficiently characterize these evolutionary decision-making frameworks and the priorities inherent to them. These include goal-oriented scientists, utilitarian economists, accountability-oriented pragmatic politicians, principled theologians trying to protect the sacred, or

prudent prosecutors enforcing social norms (Tetlock 2002). While people use different blends of these functions over time as individual frameworks rise and fall in relative salience, the political cultures of successful democracies usually feature a preponderance of participatory political orientations that use a balanced mix of instrumental and emotional information (Almond and Verba 1989, 489).

In participatory political cultures, citizens have an “activist” self-conception, meaning they focus on both the political system’s inputs and outputs (ibid., 19). The presence of activist citizens enhances democratic sustainability because they are available and willing to work to maintain the performance of the political system (ibid., 31, 496). Similarly, non-participatory attitudes, which limit the individual’s willingness to commit to politics, are correlated with non-democratic political systems (ibid., 32). Activist political orientations can be measured by examining participation in collective actions, such as petitions, lawful demonstrations, and boycotts (Kaase 1990, 47).

The extent to which participatory political orientations are present is the product of a combination of psychological factors, shaped by personal experience, sociological factors, and social structure (Becker 1963, 26–27). Long-term predispositions conditioned by religion in particular are highly predictive of political behavior, including mobilization for collective action (Inglehart 1990, 98). The presence of a participatory political culture is not sufficient, however, to explain the willingness of an individual to demonstrate; the means of collective action need to be perceived as effective, too. The relationship between the expectation of efficacy and political orientation goes both ways. In non-participatory political cultures, exit, rather than voice, might be the preferred response to deterioration in state performance. This would occur when the change through the current political and social system is perceived to be impossible, leading to the loss of legitimacy by authority and an increased potential for social upheaval (Horowitz 1972, 294).

**Individual expectations of performance, not objective accomplishments, determine political action.**



Citizens in participatory cultures, on the other hand, may postpone the use of exit or regard it as an option of last resort (Hirschman 1970, 37). Voice is then seen as a useful option, since there is a precedent of individuals contributing to the reformation of the political system. It is therefore unsurprising that people in societies where activist political attitudes are relatively widespread also tend to believe that collective action has high efficacy (Marsh and Kaase 1979a, 92). Since they have invested in the construction of the political and social system as active citizens, rather than passive subjects, they are reticent to call the system dysfunctional. To exit such a society would be to admit defeat, while reform allows for the possibility of eventual success.

### **b. POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS**

**Competitive political systems divert discontent into traditional forms of political participation.**

The presence of competitive political systems and participative institutions are also thought to result in greater participation in collective action (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997). Competitive and participative structures have the capacity to divert what might be otherwise revolutionary desires into tame discontent with the governing authorities (Hirschman 1970, 28). Citizens identify with political parties through the investment of effort on their behalf, diverting discontent towards elections and other conventional forms of participation. In addition, the fewer the political parties, the more lively the intra-party struggle, since the limited number of parties raises exit costs and leads to the preferential use of voice by discontented party members (*ibid.*, 84). If these costs become too high, such as the case in one-party states however, authoritarian organizations can repress both voice and exit and take advantage of the captive state of their members (*ibid.*, 97). In such situations, discontent with the party becomes discontent with the regime, nullifying the benefit of participative systems.

Participation in government is more than the simple extension of suffrage. Effective democracy requires giving citizens the right to choose

their governors and to participate in decisions about substantive issues (Welzel and Inglehart 2008). Inequalities in political participation result in inequalities in political life, since those in less politically active portions of the population feel they do not have a mechanism to have their voice heard (Smith 2009). Therefore, merely having a democratic political system does not equate with having participative political institutions.

The extent to which a democracy is participative can be measured by considering measures of formal democracy and elite integrity (Welzel and Inglehart 2008). In this analysis, Freedom House's "Freedom in the World" score is used for the former and the World Economic Forum's Global Competitive Index's "Public Institution Score" measures the latter. While institutionalized competition is normally linked to greater participation in collective action (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997, 149-151), others propose that the effect of opening the opportunity structure to social movements may result in the decline of the prominence of unconventional collective action (Koopmans 1996). This analysis will attempt to shed further light on the influence of participative institutions.

## 2. SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS

While cultural and political heritage leaves a clear and enduring imprint on civic and political culture, economic development can stimulate the spread of activist political orientations (Inglehart and Baker 2000). A.O. Hirschman's classic work, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*, rests on the implicit assumption that collective action results from the overgrowth of expectations relative to government performance (Thomassen 1990, 107). This means that individual attitudes and expectations of state performance, not objective accomplishments, are determinants of political action (Barnes and Kaase 1979, 16).

Examining the linkage between individual attitudes and behavior can test this claim (Kaase 1990, 49). For example, rapid economic development in

semi-authoritarian African states in the first half of the 1990s coincided a growth of participatory attitudes in these states (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997, 3). These activist citizens organized demonstrations against underperforming governments and helped lead the transition away from single-party and military rule by pushing for liberalizing reforms, culminating with competitive elections and the installation of new regimes approximately five years later (ibid.).

**Socioeconomic development is associated with the creation of effective democracy and greater use of voice.**

One widely respected measure of socioeconomic development, the second factor, is the United Nations Development Program's Human Development Index. The Human Development Index is a measure of quality of life combining life expectancy, educational attainment, and income. Fully 60% of the variation in the development of effective democracy can be explained by changes in the Human Development Index, twice as much explanatory power than the relationship has for electoral democracies (Welzel and Inglehart 2008). Citizens of societies that produce surpluses may initially give the state greater latitude for deterioration of performance because such inefficiency leads only to discomfort, not disaster (Hirschman 1970, 7-9). If deteriorated conditions persist, however, discontented citizens are forced to choose between exit and voice. In effective democracies, citizens prefer to use voice (Norris 2002, 198-199). Therefore, greater socioeconomic development is predicted to have a positive correlation with participation in collective action.

### **3. COMBINATIONS**

Rising Human Development Index scores are correlated with the spread of effective democracy, as determined by measures of formal democracy and elite integrity. The development of effective democracy is correlated with the greater exercise of voice (ibid.). This effect also can be observed at the individual level, with changes economic circumstances, whatever the direction, resulting in higher rates of participation (Thomassen 1990, 122).

## IV. METHODS

### A. OPERATIONALIZATION OF PREDICTORS

In order to test the model described above, it is necessary to measure actual participation in a collective action and correlate participation with a battery of predictive factors. Many of studies of collective action have limited themselves to the willingness of individuals to participate (Topf 1995, 58). The results of these studies would suggest there is a considerable difference between being willing to participate and actually participating (Marsh and Kaase 1979a, 92). Measures of protest potential may be confounded by social values or general political orientations, rendering it an unreliable, context-dependent measure (Norris 2002, 194). In order to avoid this problem, the study of collective action requires evaluating models using data from those actually engaged in it, not just those positively disposed towards it.

In addition, while Marx and Engels identified two important aspects of collective action, social structure and its current state of performance, the motivation to join in collective action is produced by individual desire (Van Zomeren and Iyer 2009). The way to examine this is by placing the focus on similar individual-level relationships within in a given society (Norris, Walgrave, and Aelst 2005). By identifying similar slopes without much concern for different regression intercepts, it may be possible to control for cultural factors and draw large-scale conclusions about the desire to participate in collective action (Barnes and Kaase 1979, 21).

Scientific surveys allow researchers to learn about the values, beliefs, and behaviors of the average citizen (Dalton 2002, xiii). While some have expressed concerns about encountering reporting bias when asking about participation in collective action, these have generally been unfounded. Using surveys to evaluate participation in peaceful protest has not been shown to have a significant impact on under-reporting (Meyerhoff and Liebe 2010). In

addition, non-response bias has been found to be independent of political interest or orientation (Rüdig 2010). While some mail questionnaires have encountered difficulties with over-response from some populations, the World Values Survey, the source for all individual-level data in this analysis, avoids such problems as it is conducted through face-to-face interviews.

The predictors of the model described above are operationalized through the use of questions in 5<sup>th</sup> (2005-2008) and 6<sup>th</sup> (2009-2013) waves of the World Values Survey. The countries and years surveyed are listed on Table 1.

**TABLE 1 - Country List, Missing Data, and Cultural Zones**

<b>Nation</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>Retained Observations</b>	<b>Original Observations</b>	<b>% Retained</b>	<b>% Total</b>	<b>Cum. %</b>	<b>Cultural Zone</b>
Andorra	2005	775	1003	77.27%	1.98%	1.98%	Catholic Europe
Armenia	2011	515	1100	46.82%	1.32%	3.30%	Orthodox
Australia	2005	1024	1421	72.06%	2.62%	5.92%	English-Speaking
Azerbaijan	2011	915	1002	91.32%	2.34%	8.26%	Islamic
Brazil	2006	1117	1500	74.47%	2.86%	11.12%	S. America
Bulgaria	2006	340	1001	33.97%	0.87%	11.99%	Orthodox
Burkina Faso	2007	538	1534	35.07%	1.38%	13.37%	Africa
Canada	2006	1068	2164	49.35%	2.73%	16.10%	English-Speaking
Chile	2006	559	1000	55.90%	1.43%	17.53%	S. America
Cyprus	2011	808	1000	80.80%	2.07%	19.60%	Catholic Europe
Estonia	2011	900	1533	58.71%	2.30%	21.90%	Orthodox
Ethiopia	2007	644	1500	42.93%	1.65%	23.55%	Africa
Finland	2005	715	1014	70.51%	1.83%	25.38%	Protestant Europe
Georgia	2009	620	1500	41.33%	1.59%	26.97%	Orthodox
Germany	2006	1229	2064	59.54%	3.14%	30.11%	Protestant Europe
Ghana	2012	1545	1552	99.55%	3.95%	34.07%	Africa
India	2006	500	2001	24.99%	1.28%	35.34%	S. Asia
Italy	2005	425	1012	42.00%	1.09%	36.43%	Catholic Europe
Japan	2010	698	2443	28.57%	1.79%	38.22%	Confucian
Kazakhstan	2011	1500	1500	100.00%	3.84%	42.06%	Islamic
Kyrgyzstan	2011	1262	1500	84.13%	3.23%	45.29%	Islamic
Mali	2007	309	1534	20.14%	0.79%	46.08%	Africa
Moldova	2006	665	1046	63.58%	1.70%	47.78%	Orthodox
New Zealand	2011	258	841	30.68%	0.66%	48.44%	English-Speaking
Nigeria	2011	1759	1759	100.00%	4.50%	52.94%	Africa
Norway	2007	821	1025	80.10%	2.10%	55.04%	Protestant Europe
Poland	2005	436	1000	43.60%	1.12%	56.16%	Catholic Europe
Romania	2005	643	1776	36.20%	1.65%	57.80%	Orthodox
Russia	2011	878	2500	35.12%	2.25%	60.05%	Orthodox
Slovenia	2005	443	1037	42.72%	1.13%	61.18%	Catholic Europe
South Africa	2006	1998	2988	66.87%	5.11%	66.30%	Africa
South Korea	2010	975	1200	81.25%	2.50%	68.79%	Confucian
Spain	2011	702	1189	59.04%	1.80%	70.59%	Catholic Europe
Sweden	2011	835	1206	69.24%	2.14%	72.72%	Protestant Europe
Taiwan	2006	1175	1227	95.76%	3.01%	75.73%	Confucian
Thailand	2007	1377	1534	89.77%	3.52%	79.25%	S. Asia
Trinidad	2011	440	999	44.04%	1.13%	80.38%	English-Speaking
Turkey	2007	859	1346	63.82%	2.20%	82.58%	Islamic
Ukraine	2011	1349	1500	89.93%	3.45%	86.03%	Orthodox
United States	2011	1897	2232	84.99%	4.85%	90.88%	English-Speaking
Uruguay	2011	485	1000	48.50%	1.24%	92.13%	S. America
Viet Nam	2006	1055	1495	70.57%	2.70%	94.83%	S. Asia
Zambia	2007	527	1500	35.13%	1.35%	96.17%	Africa
Zimbabwe	2012	1495	1500	99.67%	3.83%	100.00%	Africa
44 Countries		39078	63778	61.3%	2.27%		

Participation in collective action, the dependent variable in the model, is measured as a binary response to the question, “Have you participated in a peaceful/lawful demonstration in the past 5 years?” The response, “yes,” is counted as a positive outcome and “no” or “don’t know” are considered negative outcomes.

The independent variables are approached in the following ways and original survey questions can be found in Appendix A. Religiousness is measured through a question of practice, membership in a church (or other religious organization), and a question of belief, the importance of God in one’s life. Class is measured through subjective placement in social class and by income and employment status. Educational attainment is measured on four levels: none, primary, secondary, and tertiary. Sex and age are measured through direct questions. Interest in traditional politics is measured directly and in terms of membership in a political party. Political ideology is measured through placement on a left/right spectrum and support of democracy as a political system.

General discontent is measured through a question about the individual’s level of happiness in life and political discontent is measured in terms of confidence in the national government. Values are measured through the World Values Survey’s composite measures of postmaterialism: self-expression-survival values and traditional-rational values.

Participation in civic organizations is measured through a composite measure of membership. These organizations include sport clubs, art, music, and educational organizations, labor organizations, environmental organizations, professional organizations, and humanitarian organizations. The question allows for the distinction between nonmembers, inactive members, and active members. The composite “civic activism score” considers an individual’s level of involvement in each type of civic organization, with non-membership counting for 0 points, inactive membership counting for 1 point, and active membership counting for 2 points. This composite measure does not include membership in a political

party or a religious organization in order to avoid double-counting in the analysis.

Finally, the contextual factors of civic culture and socioeconomic conditions are considered. The political systems and institutions component of civic culture is measured through the Freedom House Freedom in the World Index and the World Economic Forum's Global Competitive Index's Public Institutions score. Political culture is evaluated in terms of national mean postmaterialism score, the presence or absence of a legacy of communist rule, and cultural zone. This measure is modeled on the World Value Survey's "Cultural Map" and contains nine world cultures: Africa, Catholic Europe, Confucian, English-speaking, Islamic, Orthodox, Protestant Europe, South Asia, and South America (Inglehart and Welzel 2010, 554). Socioeconomic conditions are measured through the Human Development Index and GDP growth at time-of-survey.

## **B. MODEL CREATION AND ANALYSIS**

Of the countries surveyed in the 5<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> waves of the World Value Survey, only countries that had responses for all the variables included in this analysis were considered. When a country fulfilled this requirement in both waves, the oldest observations were discarded. The pattern of missing country-level data is believed to be random and estimated through multiple imputation, a technique to replace missing data with plausible values in order to allow for inference about population parameters.<sup>1</sup> While there is no consensus way to use hot deck imputation and obtain inferences about the completed data set, it is used by highly respected organizations, such as the U.S. Census Bureau and the National Center for Education Statistics to perform population-level analyses. The main advantages of hot deck imputation lie in its independence from model fitting, possible gains in

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<sup>1</sup> All information pertaining to imputation in this section relies on Andridge and Little 2010.



efficiency, and a reduction in non-response bias. This technique was performed in the statistical analysis program STATA, repeated five times, and its results averaged to reduce the variability introduced by data non-response. Multiple imputation was not used to estimate missing individual-level data because the pattern of missingness appeared to be a mix of random and non-random patterns. “Don’t Know” responses were assumed to be randomly missing and treated as non-responses.

Following the imputation of country-level data, a series of logistic regressions were performed with the dependent variable, “Attended a Peaceful Demonstration” (No/Yes) and clustered by country. First, a “main model” was analyzed. The variables included in this model were suggested by the literature to be strong, consistent predictors of participation. These are: sex, political interest, self-placement on the left/right ideological scale, support of democracy, and the scores on the survival-self-expression and traditional-rational value scales.

Three other sets of variables were created and regressed with the main model in different combinations. The first set of variables contains other measures of individual characteristics. These included education, subjective class, income, age, employment status, membership in a political party, membership in a church (or other religious organization), and the importance of God in one’s life.

The second set of variables contains measures of happiness, confidence in the national government, and civic activism. Finally, the third variable set contains national-level measures. These are GDP growth at the time of survey, presence or absence of communist heritage, and the cultural zone, national mean postmaterialism, the Freedom House, World Economic Forum, and Human Development Index scores.

As described in Table 2, these three variable sets were regressed in seven different combinations: the main model with each of the individual variable sets, the main model with the three possible combinations of two variable sets, and the main model with all three variable sets. When large variation in significance was observed, select variables were re-analyzed omitting

regressors in a process of elimination in the attempt to isolate the variable combination responsible for the variation. The results of this analysis are discussed in the following section.

**TABLE 2 - Combinations of Regressions**

	#1	#2	#3	#4	#5	#6	#7	#8
Main Model	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Variable Set 1 – Individual Characteristics		X			X	X		X
Variable Set 2 – Motive and Mobilization			X		X		X	X
Variable Set 3 – Contextual Factors				X		X	X	X

## V. RESULTS

The condensed results of the logistic regression are grouped by variable set and shown in Table 3. I will first discuss the results of the main model before moving on to discuss each of the three variable sets in terms of direction of correlation and significance across different combinations of regressors. A full tabulation of results from all eight regression is located in Appendix B. Significance is set at the 95% confidence and strong significance is set at the 99% confidence level

**Table 3 - Regression Results - Odds Ratios**

	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5	R6	R7	R8
<i>Main Model</i>								
<b>Sex (Male)</b>								
Female	0.858***	0.884**	0.883***	0.852***	0.908*	0.897***	0.872***	0.916**
<b>Interest in Politics (Very)</b>								
Somewhat	0.568***	0.632***	0.59***	0.555***	0.62***	0.624***	0.571***	0.614***
Not Very	0.407***	0.472***	0.443***	0.372***	0.47***	0.45***	0.396***	0.444***
Not At All	0.31***	0.368***	0.331***	0.27***	0.354***	0.341***	0.29***	0.332***
<b>Political Scale (Left)</b>								
2	0.995	1.062	1.067	0.98	1.095	1.029	1.016	1.041
3	0.917	0.988	0.987	0.94	1.019	1.008	0.985	1.023
4	0.740**	0.816	0.82	0.765*	0.863	0.833	0.821*	0.866
5	0.509***	0.569***	0.564***	0.565***	0.592***	0.624***	0.61***	0.647***
6	0.478***	0.531***	0.531***	0.534***	0.562***	0.581***	0.563***	0.601***
7	0.389***	0.432***	0.43***	0.445***	0.461***	0.481***	0.47***	0.503***
8	0.398***	0.443***	0.456***	0.457***	0.487***	0.494***	0.489***	0.525***
9	0.465***	0.499***	0.517***	0.561***	0.541***	0.578***	0.569***	0.597***
Right	0.414**	0.472***	0.511***	0.618***	0.532**	0.627***	0.65**	0.662**
<b>Democratic System (Very Good)</b>								
Fairly Good	0.737***	0.771***	0.771***	0.779***	0.783***	0.811***	0.789***	0.813***
Fairly Bad	0.734*	0.773	0.756	0.828	0.776	0.891	0.824	0.874
Very Bad	0.742**	0.75*	0.697***	0.786*	0.715***	0.834	0.744**	0.8*
<b>Traditional -&gt; Rational</b>	1.212**	1.472***	1.014	1.362***	1.127	1.489***	1.122**	1.172***
<b>Survival -&gt; Self-Expression</b>	1.568***	1.6***	1.819***	1.705***	1.822***	1.716***	2.037***	2.027***
<i>Variable Set 1</i>								
<b>Education (No Formal)</b>								
Primary		0.992			0.936	1.271		1.205
Secondary		1.281			1.159	1.766***		1.555*
Tertiary		1.54			1.324	2.386***		1.97***
<b>Subjective Class (Upper Class)</b>								
Upper Middle		1.141			1.129	1.226		1.235
Lower Middle		1.199			1.198	1.241		1.277
Working		1.157			1.172	1.287		1.345
Lower		1.219			1.217	1.094		1.136
<b>Income Scale (1)</b>								
2		1.167			1.215	1.163		1.208*
3		1.096			1.154	1.044		1.087
4		0.962			1.045	0.891		0.952
5		0.992			1.094	0.93		1.001
6		0.911			0.996	0.848		0.909
7		0.948			1.024	0.873		0.939
8		0.948			0.995	0.865		0.91
9		1.034			1.044	0.921		0.972
Highest		0.991			0.948	0.906		0.888
<b>Employment (Full-Time)</b>								
Part-Time		0.933			0.939	1.035		1.036
Self-Employed		0.863			0.88	0.858*		0.885
Retired		0.953			1.017	0.877		0.941
Housewife		0.594***			0.665***	0.612***		0.674***
Student		0.929			0.942	0.927		0.945
Unemployed		1.079			1.133	1.106		1.172
Other		0.64			0.699	1.222		1.302*
<b>Age</b>		1.002			1.001	1.009***		1.008***
<b>Political Party (Not A Member)</b>								
Inactive		1.448**			1.106	1.498***		1.157
Active		1.847***			1.364*	1.948***		1.436***
<b>Religious Org (Not A Member)</b>								
Inactive		1.023			0.835*	1.031		0.896
Active		1.173			0.904	1.171		0.965
<b>Importance of God (Not At All)</b>								
2		0.831			0.82	0.855		0.817
3		0.799			0.757*	0.793*		0.731***
4		0.884			0.848	0.87		0.812*
5		0.945			0.853	0.869		0.783*
6		1.027			0.93	0.944		0.832
7		1.024			0.909	0.959		0.836
8		1.168			0.983	0.985		0.825
9		1.397*			1.131	1.113		0.905
Very Important		1.75**			1.388	1.317*		1.053

**Table 3 (cont.) - Regression Results - exp( $\beta$ )**

	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5	R6	R7	R8
<i>Variable Set 2</i>								
<b>Happiness</b> (Very)								
Rather			1.526***		1.526***		1.526***	1.526***
Not Very			3.158***		3.158***		3.158***	3.158***
Not At All			5.424***		5.424***		5.424***	5.424***
<b>Gov't Confidence</b> (A Great Deal)								
Quite A Lot			1.352		1.352		1.352	1.352
Not Very Much			1.692*		1.692*		1.692*	1.692*
None At All			2.36***		2.36***		2.36***	2.36***
<b>Comp.Civic Activism Score</b> (0)								
1			1.439***		1.439***		1.439***	1.439***
2			1.566***		1.566***		1.566***	1.566***
3			1.795***		1.795***		1.795***	1.795***
4			2.062***		2.062***		2.062***	2.062***
5			2.412***		2.412***		2.412***	2.412***
6			2.414***		2.414***		2.414***	2.414***
7			3.181***		3.181***		3.181***	3.181***
8			3.61***		3.61***		3.61***	3.61***
9			3.982***		3.982***		3.982***	3.982***
10			4.067***		4.067***		4.067***	4.067***
11			4.51***		4.51***		4.51***	4.51***
12			4.51***		4.51***		4.51***	4.51***
<i>Variable Set 3</i>								
<b>Cultural Zone</b> (Africa)								
Catholic Europe				4.199***		4.199***	4.199***	4.199***
Confucian				2.002		2.002	2.002	2.002
English-Speaking				1.419		1.419	1.419	1.419
Islamic				4.381**		4.381**	4.381**	4.381**
Orthodox				9.255***		9.255***	9.255***	9.255***
Protestant Europe				1.444		1.444	1.444	1.444
S. America				1.62		1.62	1.620	1.620
S. Asia				0.318*		0.318*	0.318*	0.318*
<b>Nat'l Postmaterialism Score</b>				1.587		1.587	1.587	1.587
<b>(Ex-)Communist Heritage</b> (No)						0	0.000	0.000
Yes				0.231***		0.231***	0.231***	0.231***
<b>Freedom House Score</b> (2)						0	0	0
3				0.411*		0.411	0.411	0.411
4				1.051		1.051	1.051	1.051
5				2.005		2.005	2.005	2.005
6				0.119***		0.119***	0.119***	0.119***
7				1.019		1.019	1.019	1.019
8				1.932		1.932	1.932	1.932
10				0.763		0.763	0.763	0.763
11				0.615		0.615	0.615	0.615
12				0.734		0.734	0.734	0.734
<b>Public Institutions</b> (1 -> 7)				0.980		0.98	0.980	0.980
<b>Human Development Index</b>				0.122*		0.122*	0.122	0.122
<b>GDP Growth</b>				1.079***		1.079***	1.079***	1.079***
<b>Constant</b>	0.754	-1.359*	0.180***	0.481	0.111***	0.265	0.316	0.167
<b>Number of obs</b>	39078	39078	39078	39078	39078	39078	39078	39078
<b>Prob &gt; chi<sup>2</sup></b>	0.000	.	0.000	.	.	.	0.000	.
<b>Wald chi<sup>2</sup> (18)</b>	678.2	.	16735	.	.	.	49162	.
<b>Pseudo R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.098	0.118	0.137	0.150	0.146	0.168	0.181	0.190

**Table 3** – Condensed Regression Results – Values reported are odds ratios. R1 = Main Model (MM), R2 = MM + Variable Set (VS) 1, R3 = MM + VS2, R4 = MM + VS3, R5 = MM + VS1 + VS2, R6 = MM + VS1 + VS3, R7 = MM + VS2 + VS3, R8 = MM + VS1 + VS2 + VS3. \* – p-value ≤ 0.05, \*\* - p-value ≤ 0.01, \*\*\* - p-value ≤ 0.001.

The variables in for the main model are consistently, strongly significant across models. Males are approximately much more likely to participate than females. Holding a strong interest in politics is also a strong predictor of participation, with less interest correlating with less participation. When asked to place themselves on a left/right ideological scale, individuals who place themselves in the center and right portions of the scale are the least likely to participate. Holding a very positive opinion of democracy as political system is also strongly correlated with participation. So far as values are concerned, individuals prizing rational and self-expression values are most likely to participate. The only variable in the main model that appears to have a strong interaction effect is the traditional-rational scale, which becomes insignificant when combined with happiness (Appendix C). The results of the main model follow the predictions found in the literature.

The first variable set contains measures of individual characteristics. Age is highly significant in the eighth regression, but its effect is negligible. Social class, both subjectively and objectively measured, is consistently insignificant. Employment status is also generally insignificant, with the exception of housewives, who are strongly less likely than others to participate in collective action. Membership in a political party is predictive of participation, but there is a difference between active and inactive members. Inactive membership appears to have a strong interaction with civic activism, becoming insignificant only when civic activism is included in the regression (Appendix C). Active membership in a political party is positively correlated with participation, remaining significant throughout. A similar effect is observed between membership in a religious organization and civic activism, with inactive membership only becoming significant (marginally so) when regressed in combination with civic activism while active membership remains insignificant throughout (Appendix C). Finally, there is no clear relationship between the importance of God in one's life and participation, as there is strong variation across different regressions. However, it is possible that individuals holding strong convictions about God's importance, at either end of the spectrum, are more likely to participate than those in the middle.

The second variable set considers measures of discontent, civic engagement, and individual values. The unhappier an individual feels about life in general, the more likely he or she is to participate in demonstration. This strong effect is consistently observed throughout the different regressions. Similarly, when individuals feel less confidence in the national government, they are strongly more likely to participate in collective action. Civic activism is consistently, strongly correlated with participation. For every civic engagement an individual takes part in, the likelihood of their participation in collective action rises. Individuals with the highest civic activism score are over four times more likely to participate than individuals with the lowest score.

The third and final variable set contains national-level measures. National average materialist/postmaterialist scores and the World Economic Forum's Public Institutions Index are consistently insignificant and there is no clear relationship between participation and a country's Freedom House score. Holding a communist heritage was consistently and strongly correlated with less participation in collective action. Positive GDP growth is strongly correlated with greater participation and a higher Human Development Index score is strongly correlated with less participation.

Before discussing the final variable, cultural zone, it is worthwhile to mention these results do not account for exogenous events, such as the 2011 Arab Spring wave of uprisings. Their limited explanatory value should be considered when drawing conclusions about the nature of collective action in these cultural zones. At the time these surveys were performed, individuals in Islamic, Orthodox, Catholic European, and South American countries were most likely to participate in collective action, individuals in African, Confucian, Protestant European, and English-Speaking countries were somewhere in the middle, and individuals in South Asian countries were the least likely to participate.

## VI. LIMITATIONS

There are several limitations to this analysis. The data are self-reported, leaving room for misinterpretation. For example, respondents might understand the question as asking about attendance at a wholly peaceful demonstration or about peacefully attending any demonstration, whether or not others at the demonstration were engaged in violence.

A second consideration is the granular nature of the data. It would be interesting to survey the participants at different types of peaceful protests, so as to differentiate participants in protests according to the explicit aims of the action. It would also be useful to learn whether the characterization described above also applies to violent collective action.

In the motive source section of this analysis, it was difficult to identify measures of cost/benefit calculations and identity-based mobilization. As a result, the only motive source examined is discontent.

In addition, there are high levels of missing data from country to country (an average of 39%). It is possible some bias was introduced into the analysis through the listwise deletion of missing data, an approach required by logistic regression. A promising route for future research is to separate the random missing from the non-random missing data and create estimates of missing values for the individual-level variables to ease concerns of bias and improve the power of this analysis.

A further extension of this analysis would consider mixed model effects to better examine and quantify multiple correlated measurements for each individual respondent. For example, it would be important to understand the interaction between religiousness and political ideology. These techniques were not used in this analysis due to time constraints.

Finally, the most variation explained by this model is 19% ( $r^2$  of regression #8 = .19). There is clearly much more to collective action than the variables measured in this analysis.

## VII. DISCUSSION

The proposed model appears to be adequate for a characterization of participants in collective action. Civic culture and socioeconomic, political, and attitudinal characteristics influence an individual's predispositions. These attitudes moderate the efficacy of different motive sources in inciting an individual to participate in collective action through mobilizing structures, which are rooted in a larger context of economic development and political structure.

If stability of this predictive model is assumed, meaning the contextual explanation is set aside, which of the two remaining explanations of collective action is more reasonable: the anti-state (revolution) interpretation or the political resource (reform) interpretation?

The answer lies somewhere in between those two extremes. Some of results support the perspective of collective action as a political resource. Participants in collective action are of all ages, of all incomes, and all levels of religiosity. As is typical of politically active citizens, they are disproportionately male and interested and interested in traditional politics. They hold secular/rational values and believe it is important to express one's self. From this, it is possible to imply that they use collective action as a means of self-expression. They believe democracy is generally a good political system. Taken together, these results suggest collective action is generally calls for reform, not revolution.

Despite the normalized appearance of collective action, participants differ from the typical citizen in important ways. They tend to be disproportionately drawn from the extreme left of the ideological spectrum and they are strongly dissatisfied with both their life and their government. Despite holding postmaterialist values, usually associated with happiness, unhappy people are far more likely to participate in collective action than happy people. While the difficulty of measuring other potential motive

**Participants in collective action are of all ages, incomes, and levels of religiosity.**

**Participants in collective action are strongly dissatisfied with their life and their government.**



sources precludes comparison between motive sources, discontent appears to be an effective motive source.

Traditional mobilizing organizations, such as labor unions and political parties, work in concert with nonpolitical civic associations to provide the structure for the actualization of participation. The reticence of housewives to participate in collective action may be yet another interesting path for future research.

It is clear that culture and history influence participation in collective action. While it is difficult to draw any strong conclusions from the cultural zone measure, it is clear that the willingness to participate differs among cultures. Considering the negative effect of higher Human Development Index scores and the positive effect of economic growth in tandem, it appears as though inhabitants of developing countries are more likely to participate in collective action than well-developed or slow-growing nations. There are also strong differences between individuals living in countries that have experienced communist rule and those who have not. The reticence of the former may be the lasting product of non-participative political cultures under communist rule. The Freedom House scores' lack of significance is particularly surprising, since it might appear intuitive that countries that have strong protections for civil and political liberties would have higher rates of participation in collective action. Continued exploration of the relationship between collective action and civil and political liberties may be a fruitful area for further research.

**Culture and history influence participation in collective action.**

~\*~

**The absence of anti-state sentiment among participants should not be confused with political representativeness.**

These results largely support the proposed conceptual model, although more fine-grained data is necessary to explore how this process works in practice. Individuals generally use collective action as a political resource, but any attempt to equate collective action with voting, surveys, and other measures of public opinion appears misguided. The mere absence of anti-state sentiment should not be confused with political representativeness.

Participants are far more dissatisfied, ideologically extreme, and likely to hold postmaterialist values than the typical citizen.

Political leaders would be wrong to dismiss demands supported through collective action out of hand. The results of this analysis leave little doubt that collective action is not simply the domain of minorities and the marginalized. Nevertheless, despite that superficial appearance of representativeness, the opinions of participants must also represent those of the general population if political leaders are to treat collective action as analogous to elections or surveys. This does not appear to be so.

Therefore, collective action should be understood as a tool of reform, used by discontented individuals who have not yet given up on the current political system. Their dissatisfaction and postmaterialist values mean their demands may not align with the desires of the population as a whole. Collective action is not a political tool just like all the others. It lies firmly in the hands of the loud and the unhappy.

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## IX. APPENDIX

### A. Original Survey Questions – World Values Survey

<b>Sex</b>										
V238	<i>(Code respondent's sex by observation):</i>									
	1	Male								
	2	Female								
<b>Interest in Politics</b>										
V84	How interested would you say you are in politics? Are you <i>(read out and code one answer)</i> :									
	1	Very interested								
	2	Somewhat interested								
	3	Not very interested								
	4	Not at all interested								
<b>Political Scale</b>										
V95	In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking? <i>(Code one number)</i> :									
	Left								Right	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
<b>Having a Democratic System</b>										
I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?										
					Very good	Fairly good	Fairly bad	Very bad		
V130	Having a democratic political system				1	2	3	4		
<b>Education</b>										
V246	What is the highest educational level that you have attained? [NOTE: if respondent indicates to be a student, code highest level s/he expects to complete]:									
	1	No formal education								
	2	Incomplete primary school								
	3	Complete primary school								
	4	Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type								
	5	Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type								
	6	Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type								
	7	Complete secondary: university-preparatory type								
	8	Some university-level education, without degree								
	9	University-level education, with degree								
<b>Note</b> – the responses to this question were translated onto a four-point scale (0 = none, 1 = primary, 2 = secondary, 3 = tertiary).										

<b>Subjective Class</b>									
V236	People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the <i>(read out and code one answer)</i> :								
1	Upper class								
2	Upper middle class								
3	Lower middle class								
4	Working class								
5	Lower class								
<b>Income Scale</b>									
V237	On this card is an income scale on which 1 indicates the lowest income group and 10 the highest income group in your country. We would like to know in what group your household is. Please, specify the appropriate number, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in. <i>(Code one number)</i> :								
Lowest Group									Highest Group
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
<b>Employment Status</b>									
V249	Are you employed now or not? If yes, about how many hours a week? If more than one job: only for the main job <i>(code one answer)</i> :								
Yes, has paid employment:									
1	Full time employee (30 hours a week or more)								
2	Part time employee (less than 30 hours a week)								
3	Self employed								
No, no paid employment:									
4	Retired/pensioned								
5	Housewife not otherwise employed								
6	Student								
7	Unemployed								
8	Other <i>(write in)</i> : _____								
<b>Age</b>									
V239	Can you tell me your year of birth, please? 19____ <i>(write in last two digits)</i>								
V240	This means you are ____ years old <i>(write in age in two digits)</i> .								
<b>Civic Associations</b>									
Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary organizations. For each organization, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization? <i>(Read out and code one answer for each organization)</i> :									
		Active member	Inactive member	Don't belong					
V25	Church or religious organization	2	1	0					
V26	Sport or recreational organization	2	1	0					
V27	Art, music or educational organization	2	1	0					
V28	Labor Union	2	1	0					



## The Loud and the Unhappy

V29	Political party	2	1	0
V30	Environmental organization	2	1	0
V31	Professional association	2	1	0
V32	Humanitarian or charitable organization	2	1	0

**Note** – The composite civic activism score was calculated without V25 and V29, as these were analyzed separately. The composite score was calculated by summing up a respondent’s answers to V26, V27, V28, V30, V31, and V32 where non-membership = 0, inactive membership = 1, and active membership = 2.

### Importance of God

V152 How important is God in your life? Please use this scale to indicate. 10 means “very important” and 1 means “not at all important.” (*Code one number*):

Not at all important									Very Important
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

### Happiness

V10 Taking all things together, would you say you are (*read out and code one answer*):

1	Very happy
2	Rather happy
3	Not very happy
4	Not at all happy

### Confidence in Government

I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? (*Read out and code one answer for each*):

		A great deal	Quite a lot	Not very much	None at all
V115	The government (in your nation’s capital)	1	2	3	4

**B. Regression Results Tables #1 - #8****Regression #1 - Main Model**

		<u>Main Model</u>		
		$\beta$	p-value	exp( $\beta$ )
<b>Sex (Base = Male)</b>				
	Female	-0.154	0.001***	0.858
<b>Interest in Politics (Base = Very)</b>				
	Somewhat	-0.566	0.000***	0.568
	Not Very	-0.900	0.000***	0.407
	Not At All	-1.171	0.000***	0.310
<b>Political Scale (Base = Left)</b>				
	2	-0.005	0.967	0.995
	3	-0.087	0.411	0.917
	4	-0.300	0.003**	0.740
	5	-0.675	0.000***	0.509
	6	-0.739	0.000***	0.478
	7	-0.944	0.000***	0.389
	8	-0.921	0.000***	0.398
	9	-0.765	0.000***	0.465
	Right	-0.881	0.008**	0.414
<b>Having a Democratic System (Base = Very Good)</b>				
	Fairly Good	-0.305	0.000***	0.737
	Fairly Bad	-0.309	0.04*	0.734
	Very Bad	-0.298	0.008**	0.742
<b>Traditional -&gt; Rational</b>		0.192	0.006**	1.212
<b>Survival -&gt; Self-Expression</b>		0.450	0.000***	1.568
<b>Constant</b>		-0.282	0.098	0.754

Number of obs = 39078      Prob > chi<sup>2</sup> = 0.0000Wald chi<sup>2</sup>(18) = 678.18      Pseudo R<sup>2</sup> = 0.0979

\* - p-value ≤ 0.05, \*\* - p-value ≤ 0.01, \*\*\* - p-value ≤ 0.001.

**Regression #2 - Main Model + Individual Characteristics (VS1)**

	<u>Main Model</u>			<u>Variable Set 1 - Individual Characteristics</u>		
	$\beta$	p-value	exp( $\beta$ )	$\beta$	p-value	exp( $\beta$ )
<b>Sex (Base = Male)</b>				<b>Education (Base = No Formal Education)</b>		
Female	-0.123	0.004**	0.884	Primary	-0.008	0.980
<b>Interest in Politics (Base = Very)</b>				Secondary	0.247	0.462
Somewhat	-0.458	0.000***	0.632	Tertiary	0.432	0.227
Not Very	-0.751	0.000***	0.472	<b>Subjective Class (Base = Upper Class)</b>		
Not At All	-0.999	0.000***	0.368	Upper Middle	0.132	0.413
<b>Political Scale (Base = Left)</b>				Lower Middle	0.181	0.298
2	0.060	0.626	1.062	Working	0.145	0.404
3	-0.012	0.915	0.988	Lower	0.198	0.411
4	-0.203	0.057	0.816	<b>Income Scale (Base = 1)</b>		
5	-0.564	0.000***	0.569	2	0.155	0.146
6	-0.634	0.000***	0.531	3	0.092	0.394
7	-0.840	0.000***	0.432	4	-0.039	0.762
8	-0.815	0.000***	0.443	5	-0.008	0.957
9	-0.695	0.000***	0.499	6	-0.093	0.581
Right	-0.751	0.001***	0.472	7	-0.054	0.757
<b>Having a Democratic System (Base = Very Good)</b>				8	-0.054	0.768
Fairly Good	-0.261	0.000***	0.771	9	0.034	0.811
Fairly Bad	-0.257	0.098	0.773	Highest	-0.009	0.957
Very Bad	-0.287	0.018*	0.750	<b>Employment Status (Base = Full-Time)</b>		
<b>Traditional -&gt; Rational</b>	0.386	0.000***	1.472	Part-Time	-0.069	0.447
<b>Survival -&gt; Self-Expression</b>	0.470	0.000***	1.600	Self-Employed	-0.148	0.265
				Retired	-0.048	0.683
<b>Constant</b>	0.257	0.028*	-1.359	Housewife	-0.522	0.000***
				Student	-0.073	0.480
Number of obs = 39078	Prob > chi <sup>2</sup> = .			Unemployed	0.076	0.441
Wald chi <sup>2</sup> (18) = .	Pseudo R <sup>2</sup> = 0.1181			Other	-0.447	0.197
				<b>Age</b>	0.002	0.570
				<b>Political Party (Base = Not A Member)</b>		
				Inactive	0.370	0.002**
				Active	0.614	0.000***
				<b>Religious Org (Base = Not A Member)</b>		
				Inactive	0.023	0.838
				Active	0.160	0.329
				<b>Importance of God (Base = Not At All)</b>		
				2	-0.185	0.122
				3	-0.225	0.057
				4	-0.123	0.326
				5	-0.057	0.715
				6	0.026	0.861
				7	0.024	0.896
				8	0.156	0.332
				9	0.335	0.049*
				Very Important	0.559	0.004**

\* - p-value ≤ 0.05, \*\* - p-value ≤ 0.01, \*\*\* - p-value ≤ 0.001.

**Regression #3 - Main Model + Motive and Mobilization (VS2)**

	<u>Main Model</u>			<u>Variable Set 2 - Motive and Mobilization</u>			
	$\beta$	p-value	exp( $\beta$ )		$\beta$	p-value	exp( $\beta$ )
<b>Sex (Base = Male)</b>				<b>Happiness (Base = Very)</b>			
Female	-0.124	0.001***	0.883	Rather	0.422	0.000***	1.526
<b>Interest in Politics (Base = Very)</b>				Not Very	1.150	0.000***	3.158
Somewhat	-0.527	0.000***	0.590	Not At All	1.691	0.000***	5.424
Not Very	-0.813	0.000***	0.443	<b>Confidence in Government (Base = A Great Deal)</b>			
Not At All	-1.107	0.000***	0.331	Quite A Lot	0.302	0.087	1.352
<b>Political Scale (Base = Left)</b>				Not Very Much	0.526	0.014*	1.692
2	0.065	0.607	1.067	None At All	0.858	0.000***	2.360
3	-0.013	0.900	0.987	<b>Composite Civic Activism Score</b>			
4	-0.198	0.072	0.820	1	0.364	0.000***	1.439
5	-0.572	0.000***	0.564	2	0.448	0.000***	1.566
6	-0.634	0.000***	0.531	3	0.585	0.000***	1.795
7	-0.845	0.000***	0.430	4	0.724	0.000***	2.062
8	-0.785	0.000***	0.456	5	0.880	0.000***	2.412
9	-0.659	0.000***	0.517	6	0.881	0.000***	2.414
Right	-0.671	0.000***	0.511	7	1.157	0.000***	3.181
<b>Having a Democratic System (Base = Very Good)</b>				8	1.284	0.000***	3.610
Fairly Good	-0.260	0.000***	0.771	9	1.382	0.000***	3.982
Fairly Bad	-0.280	0.081	0.756	10	1.403	0.000***	4.067
Very Bad	-0.361	0.001***	0.697	11	1.506	0.000***	4.510
<b>Traditional -&gt; Rational</b>	0.014	0.848	1.014	12	1.506	0.000***	4.510
<b>Survival -&gt; Self-Expression</b>	0.598	0.000***	1.819				
				<b>Constant</b>	-1.717	0.000***	0.180

Number of obs = 39078 Prob > chi<sup>2</sup> = 0.0000  
Wald chi<sup>2</sup>(18) = 16735.54 Pseudo R<sup>2</sup> = 0.1370

\* - p-value ≤ 0.05, \*\* - p-value ≤ 0.01, \*\*\* - p-value ≤ 0.001.

## Regression #4 - Main Model + Contextual Factors (VS3)

	Main Model			Variable Set 3 - Contextual Factors			
	$\beta$	p-value	exp( $\beta$ )	$\beta$	p-value	exp( $\beta$ )	
<b>Sex (Base = Male)</b>				<b>Cultural Zone (Base = Africa)</b>			
Female	-0.160	0.000***	0.852	Catholic Europe	1.435	0.000***	4.199
<b>Interest in Politics (Base = Very)</b>				Confucian	0.694	0.165	2.002
Somewhat	-0.588	0.000***	0.555	English-Speaking	0.350	0.262	1.419
Not Very	-0.989	0.000***	0.372	Islamic	1.477	0.007**	4.381
Not At All	-1.310	0.000***	0.270	Orthodox	2.225	0.000***	9.255
<b>Political Scale (Base = Left)</b>				Protestant Europe	0.367	0.361	1.444
2	-0.020	0.887	0.980	S. America	0.483	0.072	1.620
3	-0.062	0.610	0.940	S. Asia	-1.147	0.023*	0.318
4	-0.268	0.013*	0.765	<b>Nat'l Postmaterialism Score</b>	0.462	0.407	1.587
5	-0.571	0.000***	0.565	<b>(Ex-)Communist Heritage (Base=No)</b>			
6	-0.627	0.000***	0.534	Yes	-1.464	0.000***	0.231
7	-0.810	0.000***	0.445	<b>Freedom House Score (2 = Free, 14 = Not Free)</b>			
8	-0.783	0.000***	0.457	3	-0.890	0.036*	0.411
9	-0.579	0.000***	0.561	4	0.050	0.885	1.051
Right	-0.481	0.001***	0.618	5	0.696	0.322	2.005
<b>Having a Democratic System (Base = Very Good)</b>				6	-2.132	0.001***	0.119
Fairly Good	-0.250	0.000***	0.779	7	0.019	0.969	1.019
Fairly Bad	-0.189	0.199	0.828	8	0.659	0.184	1.932
Very Bad	-0.240	0.018*	0.786	10	-0.270	0.623	0.763
<b>Traditional -&gt; Rational</b>	0.309	0.000***	1.362	11	-0.487	0.318	0.615
<b>Survival -&gt; Self-Expression</b>	0.534	0.000***	1.705	12	-0.309	0.560	0.734
				<b>Public Institutions = (1 -&gt; 7)</b>	-0.020	0.910	0.980
				<b>Human Development Index</b>	-2.102	0.023*	0.122
				<b>GDP Growth</b>	0.076	0.000***	1.079
				<b>Constant</b>	-0.732	0.618	0.481

Number of obs = 39078

Prob > chi<sup>2</sup> = .Wald chi<sup>2</sup>(18) = .Pseudo R<sup>2</sup> = 0.1495

\* - p-value ≤ 0.05, \*\* - p-value ≤ 0.01, \*\*\* - p-value ≤ 0.001.

Regression #5 - Main Model + VS1 + VS2

<u>Main Model</u>				<u>Variable Set 1 - Individual Characteristics</u>			<u>Variable Set 2 - Motive and Mobilization</u>				
	$\beta$	p-value	exp( $\beta$ )		$\beta$	p-value	exp( $\beta$ )		$\beta$	p-value	exp( $\beta$ )
<b>Sex (Base = Male)</b>				<b>Education (Base = No Formal Education)</b>				<b>Happiness (Base = Very)</b>			
Female	-0.096	0.015*	0.908	Primary	-0.067	0.824	0.936	Rather	0.422	0.000***	1.526
<b>Interest in Politics (Base = Very)</b>				Secondary	0.147	0.631	1.159	Not Very	1.150	0.000***	3.158
Somewhat	-0.478	0.000***	0.620	Tertiary	0.280	0.393	1.324	Not At All	1.691	0.000***	5.424
Not Very	-0.755	0.000***	0.470	<b>Subjective Class (Base = Upper Class)</b>				<b>Confidence in Government (Base = A Great Deal)</b>			
Not At All	-1.038	0.000***	0.354	Upper Middle	0.121	0.491	1.129	Quite A Lot	0.302	0.087	1.352
<b>Political Scale (Base = Left)</b>				Lower Middle	0.180	0.334	1.198	Not Very Much	0.526	0.014*	1.692
2	0.090	0.475	1.095	Working	0.159	0.386	1.172	None At All	0.858	0.000***	2.360
3	0.019	0.868	1.019	Lower	0.197	0.428	1.217	<b>Composite Civic Activism Score</b>			
4	-0.148	0.165	0.863	<b>Income Scale (Base = 1)</b>				1	0.364	0.000***	1.439
5	-0.524	0.000***	0.592	2	0.194	0.063	1.215	2	0.448	0.000***	1.566
6	-0.576	0.000***	0.562	3	0.143	0.173	1.154	3	0.585	0.000***	1.795
7	-0.775	0.000***	0.461	4	0.044	0.720	1.045	4	0.724	0.000***	2.062
8	-0.721	0.000***	0.487	5	0.090	0.527	1.094	5	0.880	0.000***	2.412
9	-0.614	0.000***	0.541	6	-0.004	0.979	0.996	6	0.881	0.000***	2.414
Right	-0.631	0.002**	0.532	7	0.023	0.885	1.024	7	1.157	0.000***	3.181
<b>Having a Democratic System (Base = Very Good)</b>				8	-0.005	0.975	0.995	8	1.284	0.000***	3.610
Fairly Good	-0.244	0.000***	0.783	9	0.043	0.750	1.044	9	1.382	0.000***	3.982
Fairly Bad	-0.253	0.108	0.776	Highest	-0.054	0.756	0.948	10	1.403	0.000***	4.067
Very Bad	-0.335	0.005**	0.715	<b>Employment Status (Base = Full-Time)</b>				11	1.506	0.000***	4.510
<b>Traditional -&gt; Rational</b>	0.119	0.086	1.127	Part-Time	-0.063	0.496	0.939	12	1.506	0.000***	4.510
<b>Survival -&gt; Self-Expression</b>	0.600	0.000***	1.822	Self-Employed	-0.128	0.336	0.880	<b>Constant</b>	-2.202	0.000	0.111
				Retired	0.017	0.878	1.017	Number of obs = 39078	Prob > chi <sup>2</sup> = .		
				Housewife	-0.408	0.000***	0.665	Wald chi <sup>2</sup> (18) = .	Pseudo R <sup>2</sup> = 0.1458		
				Student	-0.059	0.559	0.942				
				Unemployed	0.125	0.143	1.133				
				Other	-0.359	0.251	0.699				
				<b>Age</b>	0.001	0.716	1.001				
				<b>Political Party (Base = Not A Member)</b>							
				Inactive	0.101	0.461	1.106				
				Active	0.310	0.034*	1.364				
				<b>Religious Org (Base = Not A Member)</b>							
				Inactive	-0.181	0.049*	0.835				
				Active	-0.101	0.527	0.904				
				<b>Importance of God (Base = Not At All)</b>							
				2	-0.198	0.095	0.820				
				3	-0.278	0.013*	0.757				
				4	-0.165	0.174	0.848				
				5	-0.159	0.286	0.853				
				6	-0.072	0.602	0.930				
				7	-0.096	0.603	0.909				
				8	-0.018	0.910	0.983				
				9	0.123	0.443	1.131				
				Very Important	0.328	0.063	1.388				

\* - p-value ≤ 0.05, \*\* - p-value ≤ 0.01, \*\*\* - p-value ≤ 0.001.

Regression #6 - Main Model + VS1 + VS3

<u>Main Model</u>				<u>Variable Set 1 - Individual Characteristics</u>			<u>Variable Set 3 - Contextual Factors</u>				
	$\beta$	p-value	exp( $\beta$ )		$\beta$	p-value	exp( $\beta$ )		$\beta$	p-value	exp( $\beta$ )
<b>Sex (Base = Male)</b>				<b>Education (Base = No Formal Education)</b>				<b>Cultural Zone (Base = Africa)</b>			
Female	-0.109	0.001***	0.897	Primary	0.239	0.234	1.271	Catholic Europe	1.435	0.000***	4.199
<b>Interest in Politics (Base = Very)</b>				Secondary	0.569	0.001***	1.766	Confucian	0.694	0.165	2.002
Somewhat	-0.471	0.000***	0.624	Tertiary	0.869	0.000***	2.386	English-Speaking	0.350	0.262	1.419
Not Very	-0.798	0.000***	0.450	<b>Subjective Class (Base = Upper Class)</b>				Islamic	1.477	0.007**	4.381
Not At All	-1.075	0.000***	0.341	Upper Middle	0.204	0.205	1.226	Orthodox	2.225	0.000***	9.255
<b>Political Scale (Base = Left)</b>				Lower Middle	0.216	0.173	1.241	Protestant Europe	0.367	0.361	1.444
2	0.029	0.834	1.029	Working	0.252	0.097	1.287	S. America	0.483	0.072	1.620
3	0.008	0.950	1.008	Lower	0.089	0.717	1.094	S. Asia	-1.147	0.023*	0.318
4	-0.182	0.085	0.833	<b>Income Scale (Base = 1)</b>				<b>Nat'l Postmaterialism Score</b>	0.462	0.407	1.587
5	-0.472	0.000***	0.624	2	0.151	0.132	1.163	<b>(Ex-)Communist Heritage (Base=No)</b>			
6	-0.544	0.000***	0.581	3	0.043	0.624	1.044	Yes	-1.464	0.000***	0.231
7	-0.732	0.000***	0.481	4	-0.115	0.230	0.891	<b>Freedom House Score (2 = Free, 14 = Not Free)</b>			
8	-0.706	0.000***	0.494	5	-0.073	0.497	0.930	3	-0.890	0.036*	0.411
9	-0.549	0.000***	0.578	6	-0.164	0.143	0.848	4	0.050	0.885	1.051
Right	-0.467	0.001***	0.627	7	-0.135	0.227	0.873	5	0.696	0.322	2.005
<b>Having a Democratic System (Base = Very Good)</b>				8	-0.145	0.282	0.865	6	-2.132	0.001***	0.119
Fairly Good	-0.210	0.000***	0.811	9	-0.082	0.415	0.921	7	0.019	0.969	1.019
Fairly Bad	-0.115	0.418	0.891	Highest	-0.099	0.426	0.906	8	0.659	0.184	1.932
Very Bad	-0.181	0.080	0.834	<b>Employment Status (Base = Full-Time)</b>				10	-0.270	0.623	0.763
<b>Traditional -&gt; Rational</b>	0.398	0.000***	1.489	Part-Time	0.034	0.629	1.035	11	-0.487	0.318	0.615
<b>Survival -&gt; Self-Expression</b>	0.540	0.000***	1.716	Self-Employed	-0.153	0.027*	0.858	12	-0.309	0.560	0.734
				Retired	-0.131	0.101	0.877	<b>Public Institutions = (1 -&gt; 7)</b>	-0.020	0.910	0.980
				Housewife	-0.490	0.000***	0.612	<b>Human Development Index</b>	-2.102	0.023*	0.122
				Student	-0.076	0.417	0.927	<b>GDP Growth</b>	0.076	0.000***	1.079
				Unemployed	0.101	0.177	1.106				
				Other	0.201	0.284	1.222	<b>Constant</b>	-1.330	0.379	0.265
				<b>Age</b>	0.009	0.000***	1.009				
				<b>Political Party (Base = Not A Member)</b>				Number of obs = 39078	Prob > chi <sup>2</sup> = .		
				Inactive	0.404	0.000***	1.498	Wald chi <sup>2</sup> (18) = .	Pseudo R <sup>2</sup> = 0.1677		
				Active	0.667	0.000***	1.948				
				<b>Religious Org (Base = Not A Member)</b>							
				Inactive	0.030	0.689	1.031				
				Active	0.158	0.062	1.171				
				<b>Importance of God (Base = Not At All)</b>							
				2	-0.157	0.158	0.855				
				3	-0.231	0.012*	0.793				
				4	-0.140	0.167	0.870				
				5	-0.140	0.228	0.869				
				6	-0.058	0.584	0.944				
				7	-0.042	0.758	0.959				
				8	-0.015	0.877	0.985				
				9	0.107	0.301	1.113				
				Very Important	0.275	0.014*	1.317				

\* - p-value ≤ 0.05, \*\* - p-value ≤ 0.01, \*\*\* - p-value ≤ 0.001.

**Regression #7 - Main Model + VS2 + VS3**

<u>Main Model</u>				<u>Variable Set 2 - Motive and Mobilization</u>				<u>Variable Set 3 - Contextual Factors</u>			
	$\beta$	p-value	exp( $\beta$ )		$\beta$	p-value	exp( $\beta$ )		$\beta$	p-value	exp( $\beta$ )
<b>Sex (Base = Male)</b>				<b>Happiness (Base = Very)</b>				<b>Cultural Zone (Base = Africa)</b>			
Female	-0.137	0.000***	0.872	Rather	0.422	0.000***	1.526	Catholic Europe	1.435	0.000***	4.199
<b>Interest in Politics (Base = Very)</b>				Not Very	1.150	0.000***	3.158	Confucian	0.694	0.165	2.002
Somewhat	-0.561	0.000***	0.571	Not At All	1.691	0.000***	5.424	English-Speaking	0.350	0.262	1.419
Not Very	-0.925	0.000***	0.396	<b>Confidence in Government (Base = A Great Deal)</b>				Islamic	1.477	0.007**	4.381
Not At All	-1.238	0.000***	0.290	Quite A Lot	0.302	0.087	1.352	Orthodox	2.225	0.000***	9.255
<b>Political Scale (Base = Left)</b>				Not Very Much	0.526	0.014*	1.692	Protestant Europe	0.367	0.361	1.444
2	0.015	0.910	1.016	None At All	0.858	0.000***	2.360	S. America	0.483	0.072	1.620
3	-0.015	0.895	0.985	<b>Composite Civic Activism Score</b>				S. Asia	-1.147	0.023*	0.318
4	-0.198	0.05*	0.821	1	0.364	0.000***	1.439	<b>Nat'l Postmaterialism Score</b>	0.462	0.407	1.587
5	-0.495	0.000***	0.610	2	0.448	0.000***	1.566	<b>(Ex-)Communist Heritage (Base=No)</b>			
6	-0.574	0.000***	0.563	3	0.585	0.000***	1.795	Yes	-1.464	0.000***	0.231
7	-0.755	0.000***	0.470	4	0.724	0.000***	2.062	<b>Freedom House Score (2 = Free, 14 = Not Free)</b>			
8	-0.715	0.000***	0.489	5	0.880	0.000***	2.412	3	-0.890	0.036*	0.411
9	-0.563	0.000***	0.569	6	0.881	0.000***	2.414	4	0.050	0.885	1.051
Right	-0.431	0.002**	0.650	7	1.157	0.000***	3.181	5	0.696	0.322	2.005
<b>Having a Democratic System (Base = Very Good)</b>				8	1.284	0.000***	3.610	6	-2.132	0.001***	0.119
Fairly Good	-0.237	0.000***	0.789	9	1.382	0.000***	3.982	7	0.019	0.969	1.019
Fairly Bad	-0.193	0.191	0.824	10	1.403	0.000***	4.067	8	0.659	0.184	1.932
Very Bad	-0.295	0.003**	0.744	11	1.506	0.000***	4.510	10	-0.270	0.623	0.763
<b>Traditional -&gt; Rational</b>	0.115	0.004**	1.122	12	1.506	0.000***	4.510	11	-0.487	0.318	0.615
<b>Survival -&gt; Self-Expression</b>	0.712	0.000***	2.037					12	-0.309	0.560	0.734
								<b>Public Institutions = (1 -&gt; 7)</b>	-0.020	0.910	0.980
								<b>Human Development Index</b>	-2.102	0.230	0.122
								<b>GDP Growth</b>	0.076	0.000***	1.079

Constant -1.153 0.421 0.316

Number of obs = 39078 Prob > chi<sup>2</sup> = 0.0000

Wald chi<sup>2</sup>(18) = 49162.75 Pseudo R<sup>2</sup> = 0.1809

\* - p-value ≤ 0.05, \*\* - p-value ≤ 0.01, \*\*\* - p-value ≤ 0.001.



Regression #8 - Main Model + VS1 + VS2 + VS3

<b>Main Model</b>				<b>Variable Set 1 - Individual Characteristics</b>			<b>Variable Set 2 - Motive and Mobilization</b>			<b>Variable Set 3 - Contextual Factors</b>					
	$\beta$	p-value	exp( $\beta$ )	$\beta$	p-value	exp( $\beta$ )	$\beta$	p-value	exp( $\beta$ )	$\beta$	p-value	exp( $\beta$ )			
<b>Sex (Base = Male)</b>				<b>Education (Base = No Formal Education)</b>			<b>Happiness (Base = Very)</b>			<b>Cultural Zone (Base = Africa)</b>					
Female	-0.088	0.004**	0.916	Primary	0.186	0.323	Rather	0.422	0.000***	1.526	Catholic Europe	1.435	0.000***	4.199	
<b>Interest in Politics (Base = Vcry)</b>				Secondary	0.441	0.011*	1.555	Not Very	1.150	0.000***	3.158	Confucian	0.694	0.165	2.002
Somewhat	-0.488	0.000***	0.614	Tertiary	0.678	0.000***	1.970	Not At All	1.691	0.000***	5.424	English-Speaking	0.350	0.262	1.419
Not Very	-0.811	0.000***	0.444	<b>Subjective Class (Base = Upper Class)</b>				<b>Confidence in Government (Base = A Great Deal)</b>				Islamic	1.477	0.007**	4.381
Not At All	-1.104	0.000***	0.332	Upper Middle	0.211	0.237	1.235	Quite A Lot	0.302	0.087	1.352	Orthodox	2.225	0.000***	9.255
<b>Political Scale (Base = Left)</b>				Lower Middle	0.245	0.165	1.277	Not Very Much	0.526	0.014*	1.692	Protestant Europe	0.367	0.361	1.444
2	0.040	0.766	1.041	Working	0.296	0.081	1.345	None At All	0.858	0.000***	2.360	S. America	0.483	0.072	1.620
3	0.023	0.836	1.023	Lower	0.128	0.622	1.136	<b>Composite Civic Activism Score</b>				S. Asia	-1.147	0.023*	0.318
4	-0.144	0.141	0.866	<b>Income Scale (Base = 1)</b>				1	0.364	0.000***	1.439	<b>Nat'l Postmaterialism Score</b>	0.462	0.407	1.587
5	-0.436	0.000***	0.647	2	0.189	0.049*	1.208	2	0.448	0.000***	1.566	<b>(Ex-)Communist Heritage (Base=No)</b>			
6	-0.508	0.000***	0.601	3	0.084	0.343	1.087	3	0.585	0.000***	1.795	Yes	-1.464	0.000***	0.231
7	-0.688	0.000***	0.503	4	-0.049	0.619	0.952	4	0.724	0.000***	2.062	<b>Freedom House Score (2 = Free, 14 = Not Free)</b>			
8	-0.644	0.000***	0.525	5	0.001	0.995	1.001	5	0.880	0.000***	2.412	3	-0.890	0.036*	0.411
9	-0.516	0.000***	0.597	6	-0.096	0.391	0.909	6	0.881	0.000***	2.414	4	0.050	0.885	1.051
Right	-0.413	0.003**	0.662	7	-0.063	0.553	0.939	7	1.157	0.000***	3.181	5	0.696	0.322	2.005
<b>Having a Democratic System (Base = Very Good)</b>				8	-0.094	0.458	0.910	8	1.284	0.000***	3.610	6	-2.132	0.001***	0.119
Fairly Good	-0.208	0.000***	0.813	9	-0.029	0.770	0.972	9	1.382	0.000***	3.982	7	0.019	0.969	1.019
Fairly Bad	-0.134	0.346	0.874	Highest	-0.119	0.334	0.888	10	1.403	0.000***	4.067	8	0.659	0.184	1.932
Very Bad	-0.223	0.03*	0.800	<b>Employment Status (Base = Full-Time)</b>				11	1.506	0.000***	4.510	10	-0.270	0.623	0.763
<b>Traditional -&gt; Rational</b>	0.158	0.001***	1.172	Part-Time	0.035	0.637	1.036	12	1.506	0.000***	4.510	11	-0.487	0.318	0.615
<b>Survival -&gt; Self-Expression</b>	0.706	0.000***	2.027	Self-Employed	-0.122	0.073	0.885					12	-0.309	0.560	0.734
				Retired	-0.061	0.429	0.941					<b>Public Institutions = (1 -&gt; 7)</b>	-0.020	0.910	0.980
				Housewife	-0.395	0.000***	0.674					<b>Human Development Index</b>	-2.102	0.023*	0.122
				Student	-0.057	0.566	0.945					<b>GDP Growth</b>	0.076	0.000***	1.079
				Unemployed	0.159	0.023*	1.172					<b>Constant</b>	-1.791	0.228	0.167
				Other	0.264	0.143	1.302					Number of obs = 39078	Prob > chi <sup>2</sup> = .		
				<b>Age</b>	0.008	0.000***	1.008					Wald chi <sup>2</sup> (18) = .	Pseudo R <sup>2</sup> = 0.1900		
				<b>Political Party (Base = Not A Member)</b>											
				Inactive	0.146	0.102	1.157								
				Active	0.362	0.000***	1.436								
				<b>Religious Org (Base = Not A Member)</b>											
				Inactive	-0.110	0.130	0.896								
				Active	-0.035	0.655	0.965								
				<b>Importance of God (Base = Not At All)</b>											
				2	-0.203	0.071	0.817								
				3	-0.313	0.000***	0.731								
				4	-0.208	0.05*	0.812								
				5	-0.244	0.036*	0.783								
				6	-0.184	0.068	0.832								
				7	-0.179	0.213	0.836								
				8	-0.193	0.074	0.825								
				9	-0.100	0.392	0.905								
				Very Important	0.051	0.658	1.053								

**C. Table of Variables With Potential Interaction Effects****TABLE 3 - Select Variables With Potential Interaction Effects**

	Regression #	Interacting Variable	Original Regression			Regression Without Interacting Variable		
			$\beta$	p-value	$\exp(\beta)$	$\beta$	p-value	$\exp(\beta)$
Traditional -> Rational	#3	Happiness	0.01	0.848	1.014	0.172	0.009	1.188
Inactive Political Party	#5	Civic Activism	0.1	0.461	1.106	0.374	0.004	1.454
Inactive Religious Organization	#5	Civic Activism	-0.18	0.049	0.835	-0.005	0.961	0.995

It is probable that there are other interaction effects present in these data, but a comprehensive exploration of this topic is outside of the scope of this analysis.