How States Respond to Terrorist Attacks:
An Analysis of the Variance in Responses

A Thesis

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Abbreviations/Acronyms

Aum Shinrikyo	Aum
CCTV	Closed circuit television
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DOP	Defence and Overseas Policy
ETA	*Euskadi Ta Askatasuna*
EU	European Union
FTO	Foreign Terrorist Organization
GCIM	Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group
GEO	*Grupo Especial Operaciones* (Special Operations Group)
GTD	Global Terrorism Database
IRA	Irish Republican Army
KSM	Khalid Sheikh Mohammed
MIPT	Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism
PP	*Partido Popular*
PSOE	*Partido Socialista Obrero Español*
START	National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
TOPs	Terrorist Organization Profiles
TSA	Transportation Security Administration
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States
WTC	World Trade Center

Preface

Universities now offer classes and entire majors relating to the issues of national and international security. That is how I ended up in Professor Marwil's History of 9/11 class during the Fall 2012 semester at the University of Michigan. On the first day of class, Professor Marwil told us that we would be studying a single day in history for the entire semester. For some people, this was enough to turn away from the topic. But, the semester allowed me to immerse myself into a topic that would shape the rest of my college career. When reading the first chapter of *The 9/11 Commission Report* (2004), I felt overwhelmed by all of the details that I was learning about the event and its aftermath. The class continually bombarded me with more details day after day. At the end of the semester, I wanted to continue working with the topic because I knew that fifteen weeks I devoted to the course only scratched the surface of my understanding.

Then the research of other large "n" terrorist attacks began. Initially, I was fascinated with the emergence and reform of national security institutions as a a result of terrorist attacks. But I was operating under the misconception that every large attack results in some kind of response. Since then, I have broadened my research interest to analyze how nations respond or do not to large terrorist attacks. And I have come to realize that there are other responses to account for when analyzing the aftermath of large attacks.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Two bombs. Two trains. Two countries. Two terrorist organizations. Less than two years apart. The similarities could not be more striking. In spite of these similarities, the results were two completely different reactions. When Spain was attacked, it led to a change in the political party holding power in the government. Then the United Kingdom was attacked, which elicited no response, beyond judicial measures, from the nation. What causes the divergence between these two cases that share so many similarities? This thesis seeks to examine the two events described in this paragraph along with five additional case studies in order to understand the divergence in the responses to large "n" terrorist attacks.

It may be surprising that some of the cases presented in this thesis showcase examples of countries that do not react to large "n" terrorist attack. This could be attributed to the way that terrorism is presented in popular culture. Television shows portray terrorism as a problem that can have a solution in twenty-four hours or elicits an immediate reaction. Yet this form of media rarely, if ever, shows a situation where a country does not react to a terrorist attack.[1] But it is not just television that has captivated audiences with stories of terrorism, movies and literature provide additional mediums as well. Figure 1 and Figure 2 both show that there has been an increase in the literature written in English regarding the topic of terrorism.[2] Using Google Ngrams Viewer, Figure 1 depicts the increase in fiction

[1] For examples see *24, The West Wing, NCIS, Sleeper Cell, Homeland*.
[2] See Appendix B.

books that mention the words "terrorist," "terrorism," or the "War on Terror." Figure 2 uses the same search terms, but it illustrates a similar trend among all types of literature (both fiction and nonfiction). The increasing trends indicate that these three subjects have received more attention in recent years. A proliferation in these terms has broadened the subject area and indicates that these issues are of growing importance. As the analysis that follows will prove, understanding terrorism— what it is, how it works, and its implications— has become the central focus for many scholars. Despite the proliferation in the subject, many questions remain unanswered.

This thesis seeks to answer two questions. First, after a terrorist attack, why do some nation-states react and other nation-states do not? Second, if a nation-state does react, why is there variance in the reactions? By variance in reactions, there will be three coded responses: "Institutional Change," "Policy Shift," and "Government Change." It is also possible to have one event coded with multiple types of responses. Each of these will be explained in more detail in Chapter 2.

Foley (2013) asks a very similar question to the second one that I pose in his literature review: "Why do states respond to terrorism in the particular ways they do?"[3] Then he answers this question by stating, "…this question has received relatively little attention in the counterterrorism literature, which has tended to focus more on descriptive case studies and assessments of effectiveness."[4] While

[3] Foley, Frank. 2013. *Countering Terrorism in Britain and France: Institutions, Norms, and the Shadow of the Past.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 7.
[4] (Foley 2013, 7)

this thesis will employ descriptive case studies, the goal is not to assess the effectiveness of counterterrorism policies. Instead, the focus of the work will be in understanding the variance in responses to acts of terrorism. Based on the literature that I reviewed, there have been no other authors that have employed the use of "Non-React" cases to distinguish the variances in responses of "React" cases. The parameters of the analysis for this thesis will be further defined in Chapter 2.

Conceptualizations

National Security

National security is also referred to as homeland security, so many of the sources that I have reviewed use the term interchangeably. Conceptualizing national security is particularly challenging because it covers a wide range of topics, and because it is a constantly changing term. Thus, I will conceptualize national security in an overarching manner, which will show that I have an understanding of the complexity of the issue. Then I will provide a narrower conceptualization of national security.

There tends to be two separate camps that form when conceptualizing national security: The first offers "traditionally narrow boundaries and specialized training, [and] argue[s] that national security must restrict itself to military defense against foreign attack,"[5] while the second expands on that first conceptualization by "includ[ing] particularly every destabilizing or undesirable tendency internal or

[5] Mandel, Robert. 1994. *The Changing Face of National Security.* Westport: Greenwood, xiv.

external to a nation."[6] While Mandel writes about these opposing conceptualizations in 1994, these two camps still exist in Neack's book, which was published in 2007. Specifically in Chapter 2, titled "National Security," the author struggles with how to conceptualize the term.[7] It is critical to have a thorough understanding of both conceptualizations.

To begin, I will focus on the broader conceptualization of national security because the narrower conceptualization is a more focused version of the broad concept. Shearman explains that "To be secure, simply, is to be out of harm's way. If something threatens harm then, depending on what it is, individuals or communities can develop strategic policies to deter, counter, or in the final analysis fight off threats."[8] I conceptualize national security through a two-fold manner.

First, it is a process of identifying, and in some cases the inability to properly identify, potential threats. Second, it is the manner in which a nation-state works to combat those threats. National security includes securing citizens from threats that include, but are not limited to: internal security, external security, international security, border control security, economic security, human security, cultural/ethnic/racial security, health/biological security, natural disasters, violent state actors, violent non-state actors.[9] The ways in which nation states can secure

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[6] (Mandel 1994, xv)
[7] Neack, Laura. 2007. *Elusive Security: States First, People Last.* Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 13-45.
[8] Shearman, Peter. 2004. "Reconceptualizing Security After 9/11." In *European Security After 9/11*, edited by Shearman, Peter and Sussex, Matthew, 11-27. Aldershot: Ashgate, 12.
[9] See for examples: Busby, Joshua W. 2008. "Who Cares about the Weather? Climate Change and U.S. National Security." *Security Studies* 17 (3): 468-504. doi: 10.1080/09634108023195529; Mandel

their citizens also vary. Those can include, but are not limited to: border/customs controls, limiting immigration into the country, economic sanctions, budgeting for intelligence collection/analysis, preparation of military forces, setting federal regulations regarding movement of people/goods/services, diplomatic venues.[10] Next, I will turn to a review of the relevant literature in order to garner a better understanding of the research questions.

Terrorism

Understanding terrorism as a concept can be difficult to grasp. Many authors point to the challenges of conceptualizing terrorism based on its varying nature.[11] On this point, Martha Crenshaw articulates that:

> It is thus necessary to recognize that an important aspect of terrorism is its social construction, which is relative to time and place, thus to historical context. It is not a neutral descriptive term. Even scholarly definitions of terrorism are subjective because they must take into account ordinary language uses of the term, which contain value judgments. […] Since "terrorism" is a political label, it is an organizing concept that both describes the phenomenon as it exists and offers moral judgment.

(1994); Neack (2007); Peterson, Susan. 2002. "Epidemic Disease and National Security." *Security Studies* 12 (2): 48-81. doi: 10.1080/09636410212120009; Richard, Anne C. 2005. *Fighting Terrorist Financing: Transatlantic Cooperation and International Institutions.* Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations; Shearman, Peter and Matthew Sussex. 2004. *European Security After 9/11.* Aldershot: Ashgate.

[10] See for examples: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks. 2004. T*he 9/11 Commission Report.* 1st ed. Washington DC: W.W. Norton; Richard (2005); Shearman and Sussex (2004); Seidenstat, Paul. 2004. "Terrorism, Airport Security, and the Private Sector." *Review of Policy Research* 21 (3): 275-91. Wiley. doi: 10.1111/j.1541-1338.2004.00075.x; von Hippel, Karin. 2005. *Europe Confronts Terrorism*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan; Wise, Charles R. and Nader, Rania. 2002. "Organizing the Federal System for Homeland Security: Problems, Issues, and Dilemmas." *Public Administration Review* 62 (Special Issue: Democratic Governance in the Aftermath of September 11, 2001): 44-57. JSTOR.

[11] See for example: Alexander, Yonah, ed. 2002. *Combating Terrorism: Strategies of Ten Countries.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press; Anderson, Sean and Stephen Sloan. 1995. *Historical Dictionary of Terrorism*. Historical Dictionaries of Religions, Philosophies, and Movements: no. 4. Metuchen: Scarecrow Press; Crenshaw, Martha. 1995. *Terrorism in Context.* University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press; Wilcox Jr, Philip C. 2002. "United States." In *Combating Terrorism: Strategies of Ten Countries*, edited by Alexander, Yonah, 23-61. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

> A label is useful shorthand, combining descriptive, evocative, and symbolic elements, but its meanings are inherently flexible and ambiguous. They may even be contradictory.[12]

Crenshaw's assertion that conceptualizing terrorism is subjective can be seen through the various ways that other authors explain how they conceptualize the term. Anderson and Sloan (1995) provide a variety of conceptualizations, including the differences between international and domestic terrorism.

The best illustration of how variant and flexible the conceptualization of terrorism can be is from the changes that have been made by researchers that the University of Maryland's START Global Terrorism Database. The use of this database in relation to this thesis will be further explained in Chapter 2: Methodology. This database has information that was collected in two parts according to dates. Information collected from 1970 to 1997 is part of GTD1. Incidents that were collected for GTD1 used the following conceptualization of terrorism: "the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation."[13] The researchers changed the conceptualization of terrorism when collecting the data for GTD2, which accounts for incidents that took place between 1998 and 2007. An adjusted conceptualization for each event in this data was that the incident

> …had to be an intentional act of violence or threat of violence by a non-state actor. In addition, two of the following three criteria had to met for inclusion in GTD2:

[12] (1995, 8-9)
[13] National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2012). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd

1. The violent act was aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal;
2. The violent act included evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) other than the immediate victims; and
3. The violent act was outside the precepts of International Humanitarian Law.[14]

While there are various ways to interpret both of the conceptualizations provided by START GTD, this was the intent of the researchers. That way any future researcher would be able to use the data in a way that fit their own conceptualization of terrorism.[15] Given that I have selected to use the START GTD Database, I have decided to keep my conceptualization of terrorism consistent with the GTD2 criterion.[16] Additionally, using a broad-based approach to the concept of terrorism will match the broad-based concept of national security that has been selected for this analysis.

Literature Review

Institutions

Before examining how institutions relate to national security, it is critical to define the term institution. Stone Sweet et al explain that "an institution is a complex of rules of procedures that governs a given set of human interactions."[17] The authors point to the work of Douglass North as the basis for their definition.

[14] (START GTD 2012)
[15] (START GTD 2012)
[16] For a complete literature review regarding the conceptualization of terrorism, please see Sinkkonen, Teemu. 2009. "Political Responses to Terrorism: Case Study on Mardid Terrorist Attack on March 11, 2004, and Its Aftermath." Dissertation. http://tampub.uta.fi/handle/10024/66534, 39-58.
[17] Stone Sweet, Alec, Sandholtz, Wayne, and Fligstein, Neil. 2001. "The Institutionalization of European Space." In *The Institutionalization of Europe,* edited by Stone Sweet, Alec, Sandholtz, Wayne, and Fligstein, Neil, 1-28. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 6.

North states that "Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction. They consist both of informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights)."[18] Although North (1991) focuses his argument around the creation of economic and financial institutions, his definition still applies to political institutions, such as those for national security. These definitions for institution are broad in that each definition points to how people have created structures to oversee their encounters with one another, but those structures can be either informal or formal as North (1991) defined. A broad definition for institution will allow for a wider range of national security data to review.

Now that I have a definition for institutions, it is important to understand why institutions emerge and change. Thelen and Steinmo (1992) and Knight (1998) provide explanations to the questions of why institutions emerge and change. One of the main points of Thelen and Steinmo's work is "historical institutionalism," which they explain "represents an attempt to illuminate how political struggles are mediated by the institutional setting in which they take place."[19] In order to help readers understand historical institutionalism Thelen and Steinmo compare and

[18] North, Douglass C. 1991. "Institutions." *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 5 (1): 97-112. JSTOR, 97.
[19] Thelen, Kathleen and Steinmo, Sven. 1992. "Historical Institutionalism In Comparative Politics." In *Structuring Politics: Histoical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis*, edited by Thelen, Kathleen, Steinmo, Sven, and Longstreth, Frank, 1-32. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2.

contrast "old institutionalism" to "new institutionalism".[20] They outline that:

> The "old" institutionalism consisted […] of detailed configurative studies of different administrative, legal, and political structures. This work was often deeply normative, and the little comparative "analysis" then existing largely entailed juxtaposing descriptions of different institutional configurations in different countries, comparing and contrasting. This approach did not encourage the development of intermediate-level categories and concepts that would facilitate truly comparative research and advance explanatory theory.[21]

Yet, "new institutionalism" is based on rational choice institutionalists and historical institutionalists.[22] Knight (1998) also uses rational choice theorists as the basis for his arguments. His main argument is that "social actors are motivated by a preference for social institutions that best serves their individual interests."[23]

Knight (1998) outlines three ways that institutions emerge or change: first is through social convention, second is through exchange and competitive selection, and finally, through bargaining and distribution.[24] Knight's theory of social conventions asserts that institutions arise as a result of repeated, coordinated social interactions between actors.[25] The theory of exchange and competitive selection is about how institutions form through interactions that are much like economic market contracts.[26] Finally, the theory of bargaining and distribution is a way "to explain the emergence of social institutions primarily in terms of the characteristics that distinguish different institutional forms," so "this approach places primary

[20] (1992, 3 and 7)
[21] (Thelen and Steinmo 1992, 3)
[22] (Thelen and Steinmo 1992, 7)
[23] Knight, Jack. 1988. "Models, Interpretations, and Theories: Constructing Explanations of Institutional Emergence and Change." In *Explaining Social Institutions,* edited by Knight, Jack and Sened, Itai. 95-119. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 108.
[24] (1998, 101-4;104-7;107-10)
[25] (1998, 102)
[26] (Knight 1998, 104)

emphasis on a comparison of the different outcomes induced by the possible institutional alternatives."[27] When Knight (1998) provides economic arguments, his work is very similar to North (1991). While Thelen and Steinmo (1992) also provide a rational choice theory to the emergence and change of institutions, Knight focuses his work on the use of game theoretical models to explain why institutions emerge and change.[28]

National Security as a Collective Action Problem

National security can be described as a collective action problem. Argomaniz (2011) and Bossong(2013) describe national security in terms of collective action. While both fail to cite Ostrom (1990), she is one of the most influential theorists on the subject of collective action. Collective action problems are centered on the use of common pool resources.[29] Her argument is that in situations of common interests over shared resources, people will act selfishly to promote their own self-interest. As a result, people have implemented institutions to regulate their use of common pool resources.[30]

While Argomaniz (2011) and Bossong (2013) never directly apply her argument, I apply it to their arguments on national security in the following way. National security is a collective action problem because the security of all (common pool resource) would benefit everyone, but no one government wants to bear the

[27] (Knight 1998, 107)
[28] (1998, 96)
[29] Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[30] (Ostrom 1990)

total responsibility for providing security. Therefore, no one government (and in some cases no one institution within the government) provides security. It is important, when analyzing the data for my research questions, to examine national security through the lens of a collective action problem because it provides context for why the question holds merit for research.

American Institutional Reform

The literature that encompasses the formation of national security institutions in the United States is quite vast. Upon review of the literature, it is clear that the keystone document is *The 9/11 Commission Report* (2004). This government report has two main focuses: to (1) provide a detailed timeline of the events leading up to and surrounding 9/11 and (2) give recommendation about improvements that could prevent future attacks.[31] It is apparent that the 9/11 Commission is highly critical of the formation of the Department of Homeland Security. In chapter 12 of the report ("What to Do? A Global Strategy"), the Commission makes several recommendations about what the DHS should be doing to improve its overall effectiveness.[32] Chapter 13 of the report ("How to Do It? A Different Way of Organizing the Government") focuses on how the United States government should reform its national security institutions in order to become more effective as a group of institutions.[33] While *The 9/11 Commission Report* thoroughly addresses the changes that should be made to the national security

[31] (*The 9/11 Commission Report* 2004)
[32] (2004, 361-398)
[33] (2004, 399-428)

institutions, the Commission never addresses how these changes should be measured. It is important to know that the proposed changes were non-binding recommendations. It is the duty of the United States government to decide whether or not these recommendations would be implemented.[34]

Wise and Nader (2002) and Caudle (2005) both provide ways to measure national security institutions although their measurements are different. Wise and Nader propose that "the United States will likely be utilizing a dual-track intergovernmental approach" to national security institutional reform.[35] That means that on one hand, the national security policy will constantly be debated and changed accordingly. The second track is the institutional networks (local, state, federal) are forming and re-evaluating how they function together. If one were to measure national security institutional reform according to this model, then it could be done in two parts. First, it is important to examine the national security policy that has been changed regarding the recommendations. Next, it is critical to examine how those policies influenced change at the local, state, and federal levels.

Caudle, on the other hand, argues that "Results management relies in large part on the defining of the mission, key actors who must deliver it, and principles guiding those choices about results that should be achieved."[36] So instead of separating the analysis into two parts, as Wise and Nader (2002) propose, Caudle (2005) approaches the national security institutional reform as one process. She

[34] *(The 9/11 Commission Report* 2004, xv-xviii)
[35] (2002, 54)
[36] Caudle, Sharon. 2005. "Homeland Security: Approaches to Results Management." *Public*

utilizes the "capabilities-based planning and assessment approach" as a method of measuring and managing homeland security.[37] She explains that "Capabilities-based planning and assessment stresses the capabilities to accomplish clearly-defined missions, such as preventing terrorists from hijacking airplanes."[38]

While Wise and Nader (2002) and Caudle (2005) propose different models, the two models work in tandem. Caudle's capabilities-based planning approach could be used to analyze the policy changes that Wise and Nader expect to track in the first part of their dual-track approach. Then Caudle's model can also be used to assess if the local, state, and federal institutions are able to implement the policy changes from the first part of the model. Her model is able to evaluate an institution's ability for "identification of capabilities to approach missions."[39] I have found no research to date that reconciles these models. Additionally, while the literature has only used these models to explain institutional changes pertaining to national security after 9/11 in the United States, these models are applicable to many other cases as well.

Analysis provided by Seidenstat adds a third dimension to the Wise and Nader model and the Caudle model. Seidenstat compares the pre-9/11 formation of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA).[40] In this specific case, there was already an institution in place, the FAA, so it did not need to be formed, but rather

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Performance & Management Review 28 (3): 352-75. JSTOR, 353.
[37] (Caudle 2005, 356)
[38] (Caudle 2005, 369)
[39] (Caudle 2005, 357)
[40] (2004)

reformed.

European Institutional Reform

Most of the research on European national security institutions focuses on empirical data with examples of case studies of national security institutional reform.[41] Sussex re-evaluates Samuel Huntington's 'Clash of the Civilizations.'[42] Argomaniz (2011) and Bossong (2013) both provide an empirical and a theoretical framework in order to understand the European Union's counterterrorism institutional changes. Additionally, both authors criticize other authors for not providing a theoretical approach to the national security reforms post-9/11. In particular, Argomaniz writes "Most studies have been empirically based, some elegantly analytical, others more descriptive; but EU counter-terrorism research remains under theorised."[43]

Despite similarities, Argomaniz and Bossong's analyses diverge as well. Institutional, horizontal, and vertical consistencies are the core of Argomaniz's theoretical analysis.[44] He devotes a chapter to each of the theories (Chapter 4, 6, 7 respectively). Institutional consistency is achieved when institutions have the same policies within and across countries.[45] Horizontal consistency is critical to the European Union's national security policy because the EU has a composite policy,

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[41] See for example: Bossong, Raphael. 2013. *The Evolution of EU Counter-Terrorism: European Security Policy after 9/11.* New York: Routledge; Shearman and Sussex (2004); von Hippel (2005).
[42] Sussex, Matthew. 2004. "Cultures in Conflict? Re-Evaluating the 'Clash of the Civilizations' Thesis After 9/11." In *European Security After 9/11,* edited by Shearman, Peter and Sussex, Matthew, 28-50. Aldershot: Ashgate.
[43] Argomaniz, Javier. 2011. *The EU and Counter-Terrorism: Politics, Polity and Policies after 9/11*. New York: Routledge, 8.

meaning that all the countries in the EU must adhere to some similar policies regarding national security.[46] Argomaniz describes that "vertical consistency applies to the process of coordination, cooperation, and communication to actors at the national and European levels of governance."[47]

Yet Bossong's theoretical framework of "multiple streams" argues that there have been "windows of opportunity" for the European Union national security institutional reform.[48] By this Bossong asserts throughout his book that there have been certain periods in history that have allowed for the necessary national security institutional reforms.[49] That is because in times of crisis, the "window of opportunity," governments have made changes to institutions to reflect a need for different institutional measures. Bossong's theoretical framework of "windows of opportunity" is the set-up for his empirical analysis, which is devoted to unpacking the European Union's counter-terrorism history from the late 1970s to early 2012. While there is some historical information in Argomaniz's work, he argues that "coherence" or "consistency" is the most critical aspect of the institutional reform because "regardless of the practical adequacy of the [European] Union as an actor in a number of counter-terror aspects, consistency [or coherence] weaknesses undermine the added value that the Union could more broadly provide."[50]

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[44] (2011)
[45] (Argomaniz 2011, 12)
[46] (Argomaniz 2011, 14)
[47] (2011, 14)
[48] (2013, 142)
[49] (2013)
[50] (2011, 150)

Even though Sussex does not directly connect with Argomaniz or Bossong it is still imperative to consider Sussex's argument about re-evaluating Samuel Huntington's 'Clash of the Civilizations.'[51] As Sussex explains, Huntington's thesis "claimed to have identified the emergence of a new world order that would pit the 'West against the rest' and particularly against Islam, was roundly dismissed for a variety of sins."[52] While Huntington's thesis does not directly address national security institutions, the importance of this chapter for the literature review is that sometimes it is necessary to re-evaluate previously dismissed theories. Sussex makes two arguments regarding Huntington's thesis. First, "that analysis of the evolving post-September 11 security environment lends greater weight to classical realist explanations than does a true clash of civilizations."[53] He also argues, on the other hand, that Huntington's thesis "is correct in identifying culture as a motivating force for conflict on the intra-sate level of analysis."[54]

Beyond the theoretical analysis, there is ample empirical data and analysis about case studies of European national security reform. Von Hippel provides a volume in which several different authors thoroughly explain how France, Germany, Italy, Nordic countries, Spain, and the United Kingdom have had institutional reforms.[55] Shearman and Sussex also provide country-specific case studies.[56] The case studies provided by both literatures are particularly enhanced through the

[51] (Sussex 2004, 28-50)
[52] (2004, 28)
[53] (Sussex 2004, 30)
[54] (Sussex 2004, 30)
[55] (2005)

work of Bossong, specifically the case studies that focus on the terrorist attack on Madrid and the bombings in London.[57] Each of these case studies examines how Spain and the United Kingdom responded to their respective attacks.

The terrorist attack in Madrid and the bombings in London took place after September 11, 2001, so some institutional changes had already been made.[58] It is interesting to compare the responses of the United States after September 11 (provided by *The 9/11 Commission Report* 2004) and the responses of Spain and the United Kingdom to each of the attacks (Chapters 6 and 7 in von Hippel 2005). For example, "International support for Spain resembled that witnessed after 11 September 2001. Within Spain […] there were more volunteers than emergency services could accommodate."[59] Yet Bossong explains that "the EU's reaction to the Madrid bombings was not a targeted response to the new terrorist threat, but could best be accounted for by the multiple streams framework that highlights more contingent agenda-setting and policy making dynamics."[60] The contrast between state level and regional level reactions might provide insight as to why different developed democracies have taken different approaches to national security reform.

Applying the Balance of Threat Theory

The balance of threat theory was first introduced by Stephen A. Walt. It is a

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[56] (2004)
[57] (2013)
[58] See Chapters 6 and 7 in von Hippel (2005)
[59] Ramos, Ana. 2005. "Spain: Part I: Counter-Terrorism in Spain--An Overview." In *Europe Confronts Terrorism*, edited von Hippel, Karin, 123-32. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 124.
[60] (2013, 73)

modified version of the balance of power theory.[61] Walt's theory was explained in the context of why countries choose to balance or bandwagon when forming alliances. His argument is that the choices that states make when choosing to balance or bandwagon with other states is not based solely on the power of the other state. But rather, and as Walt argues, more accurately, states are making the choice to "…ally with or against the most *threatening* power."[62] The addition of assessing the threat of another state provided further criteria to be considered when making alliances. Katzenstein (2002) offers an interpretation on the balance of threat theory that places it in the context of terrorism.[63] We will return to Katzenstein's specific argument in Chapter 3.[64]

To explain why Katzenstein applies Walt's theory to the context of terrorism, it is critical to examine how Walt explains his argument. Walt outlines four different factors that countries will consider when assessing how threatening a state is and whether or not it should create an alliance. The four factors considered are: 1) the other state's available resources; 2) the geographic distance between the states; 3) the relative offensive power; 4) the potential offensive intentions.[65] Katzenstein does not directly explain his application of the balance of threat theory to terrorism. However, it could be described in the following manner. When deciding whether or

[61] Walt, Stephen M. 1985. "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power." *International Security* 9 (4): 3-43. doi: 10.2307/2538540.
[62] (Walt 1985, 8-9)
[63] Katzenstein, Peter J. 2003. "Same War Different Views: Germany, Japan, and Counterterrorism." *International Organization* 57 (4): 731-60. doi: 10.1017/S0020818303574033, 735.
[64] More specifically, Katzenstein's contributions will be assessed in the discussion section for the Japan 1994 and Japan 1995 cases.

not a terrorist organization is a threat, a country will consider four factors: 1) terrorist organization's available resources; 2) the geographic location of the terrorist organization to the country that it has attacked; 3) the terrorist organization's offensive power; and 4) the terrorist organization's offensive intentions from its attack. These four criteria provide a way to analyze the threat that is posed to a state. While Walt applies these criteria to a state, it is possible to use the theory for assessing the threat that a terrorist organization poses. So for my analysis, instead of assessing a threatening state, a nation-state is assessing the threat of a non-state actor.

There are some potential problems with applying Walt's theory to terrorism. When considering a nation-state there is more available information about the four criteria that are outlined by Walt. While it is possible to obtain information about a nation-state regarding its organization and power, this information may prove more challenging to gather for non-state actors. As a result, I offer the following interpretations on each of the four criteria in my case studies. I use the relative size of the terrorist organization's membership as a proxy for the organization's available resources. My rationale behind this choice is that the members can be seen as an available resource and in many cases the members contribute financially to the organization. For the geographic location, my first consideration is whether the organization is based within or outside of the country in which the attack occurs. Walt states that "…states that are nearby pose a greater threat than those that are

[65] (Walt 1985, 9-12)

far away."[66] Based on this logic, a nation should be more likely to respond when it is attacked from within than when it is attacked from a non-state actor that is based in another state. In my analysis, offensive power is tied very closely to information about the available resources. The fact that an attack occurs indicates that the organization is willing to use its offensive power and that it possesses the resources and skills to do so. I use the combined magnitude as a proxy for the offensive intentions of a specific attack because the goal of these attacks is to kill or injure as many people as possible in order to create more fear.

What the Literature is Missing

My primary observation, after reviewing the literature, is that there is a lack of in-depth theoretical analysis of the institutional changes of national security in the United States. The majority of that type of analysis that appears in the literature is focused on Europe. While I do not intend to focus solely on the United States, I hope to fill this gap through the course of my thesis because it is important to provide a theoretical framework to analyses. A theoretical and empirical approach will allow me to fully immerse myself in the subject matter. It likely will also produce more data, which will either help confirm or nullify my hypotheses.

My secondary observation is that there is no literature, that I have reviewed, that directly addresses my research questions. While many authors examine the reform of national security institutions following September 11, 2001, none seek to

[66] (1985, 10)

understand why there is variance in the responses.[67] Through my research, I would like to bridge the gap to understand why this variance exists.

Hypotheses

Given that this thesis seeks to answer two questions, there will also be two sets of hypotheses. The first question is: after a terrorist attack, why do some nation-states react and other nation-states do not? For this portion of analysis, I will apply Walt's balance of threat theory. While I believe that this theory can be used as an initial assessment to explain why some countries react and others do not, it will not fully explain the first question. In addition to the assessment provided by the balance of threat theory, I expect that a country's history and culture will also need to be considered. The data provided from the theoretical framework along with the historical and cultural background of the nation-states that has been attacked will provide a complete answer to the first question.

The second question then focuses upon the nation-states that do react to terrorist attacks. As a reminder, that question probes: if a nation-state does react, why is there variance in the reactions? I have offered a hypothesis for each of the responses that I have coded for in the analysis.

(a) Institutional Change: If a targeted country finds that a terrorist attack occurred as a result of a lapse in its national security institutions, then its national security institutions will undergo an organizational change in the aftermath of the

[67] See for example: von Hippel 2005; *The 9/11 Commission Report* 2004; Shearman and Sussex 2004.

attack.

(b) Policy Shift: If a terrorist attack happens when a country is in negotiations with the terrorist network that causes the attack, then the government in the targeted country will change its policies for handling the situation from diplomatic to military. Thus there will be an escalation in the situation.

(c) Governmental Change: If the citizens of a targeted country feel unsatisfied by the governmental response to a large terrorist attack and there is exogenous election timing, then an incumbent government or party will be unseated or voted out of office.

Chapter Previews

The purpose of Chapter 1 is to provide a statement of the problem and set the framework for the analysis that will be provided in this thesis. Now that the reader is familiar with the concepts that will addressed, more specific details about certain events can be analyzed. In Chapter 2, a detailed explanation of the methodology employed in this project will be provided. This section will provide the reader with a thorough understanding of the project layout and how the specific cases were selected for this thesis. The main analysis will be provided in Chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 3 will unpack the case studies that have been coded as "Non-React" to terrorist attacks. This will be the first chapter that uses Stephen A. Walt's balance of threat theory as it is applied to assessing the threat level of a terrorist organization. While the theoretical framework provides a foundation for analyzing these cases, additional factors such as a country's history and culture will also be

taken into account. Chapter 4 provides the counter-cases to the "Non-React" cases analyzed in Chapter 3. All of the cases in Chapter 4 will be analyzed in light of being coded as "React" cases; and further analysis will be provided regarding the types of reactions that each case illustrates. A total of three cases will be examined in Chapter 3 and there will be four cases provided for Chapter 4. Finally, in Chapter 5, I will provide my arguments about improvements for the balance of threat theory. Additionally, I will re-assess the hypotheses outlined in this chapter and will articulate the implications of my findings. This chapter will also provide ideas for future research on the topic and question at hand.

CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY

Use of Global Terrorism Database

Reason for Database Selection

I selected the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which is housed at the University of Maryland to help create my dataset. The GTD is part of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, also known at START. This open-source database tracks national, transnational, and international terrorist attacks from 1970 to 2012. There are over 113,000 events that are included in the dataset.

This database appears to be the most comprehensive open-source information available regarding terrorist attacks. Also, the database is available for download as an Excel spreadsheet. The dataset also includes its resources on most of the events that are documented, so it is possible to check the information for accuracy. For these reasons, I selected to use this database when compiling my own dataset. Additionally, other authors have endorsed the database in the following manner:

> Established in 2001, the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terror's Global Terrorism Database is the most comprehensive terrorism dataset, containing information on both domestic and international terrorist attacks around the world from 1970 to 2005. Such improved datasets will promote the use of regression analysis in terrorism research, which will perpetuate the debate over the merits of large-*n* versus case studies.[68]

Information Missing in the Database

Each event is coded to include anywhere from 45 to 120 variables. More

recent events tend to have more variables coded. Because there is variance in the coded variables, some of the events have missing information. For example, for some events the number of people injured is not reported. This is the case for each of the events coded on 11 September 2001 in the United States. There is no estimate or exact number of people injured at each of the event sites. Correspondence with the GTD revealed that "when media reports fail to disaggregate casualty counts…" the database opts to "use the average" for the casualty counts.[69] So for some of the events the casualties and injuries reported are averages. It would be more ideal to have exact casualty and injury counts; however, sometimes the averages are the only open-source data available.

There is one entire year missing from the GTD: 1993. All of the data from 1970-1997 was originally stored as a hard-copy database. During the process of converting the files to an electronic database, the cards from 1993 went missing. While some of the information is available in the GTD Codebook, a majority of the information was lost.[70] Because all of the data from 1993 is missing, it is possible that there are cases missing for the project dataset. If more time was available and there was enough open-source data, I would have attempted to recreate the data from 1993. Having a completed dataset would have made my results more comprehensive.

Additionally, the missing data from 1993 is directly related to my case from

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[68] Foley, Frank and Abrahms, Max. 2010. "Terrorism and Counterterrorism." In *The International Studies Encyclopedia*, edited by Denemark, Robert A. doi: 10.1111/.9781444336597.2010.x
[69] Miller, Erin. 2013. "Re: Global Terrorism Database Comment," November 13.

11 September 2001. Prior to the 2001 attacks, the World Trade Center has bombed when a truck bomb was detonated in the underground parking garage of the North Tower by al-Qaeda operatives.[71] This will be explained in greater detail in Chapter 4. Thus, it was necessary to obtain information regarding the number of casualties and injuries from alternative sources.

Creation of My Dataset

Using GTD

First, the database was downloaded so that it could be further manipulated to suit the needs of the project. The database includes information about the number of people killed and the number of people injured by each event; it does not provide a column that adds that information together. This thesis is studying the how governments respond to large "n" terrorist attacks, so information about the magnitude of the events is critical. To measure magnitude in this study, an aggregate of the number of people killed and the number of people injured at each event was taken. Then the events were rank ordered so that the largest aggregate was moved to the top and the data appeared in descending order.

The original database had over 113,000 terrorist attacks, so it was necessary to create a magnitude cutoff for the dataset that was created for this project. In order to be included in the project dataset, a minimum magnitude of 200 was required. Using a minimum magnitude of 200, there are a total of 150 terrorist

[70] (Miller 2013; START GTD 2012)
[71] (*The 9/11 Commission Report* 2004, 71)

attacks in the project dataset. The magnitude range is from 200-10,000. Because all of the events are stored as separate attacks, such as the 11 September 2001 attacks being recorded as four separate events, the next step was to combine all events that were recorded separately, but part of the same terrorist attacks together. This was accomplished by searching the GTD using the identification codes for each event. If a terrorist attack was coded as separate events, then each part of the attack will be shown as a search result if one identification code is used.

After all of the necessary events were combined, the list was once again rank ordered based on magnitude with the data appearing in descending order. Then it was necessary to code each of the large "n" attacks as either a "Large," "Medium," or "Small" event. This means that the magnitude range had to be divided into approximate thirds. So a "Large" event is any magnitude greater than 900; a "Medium" event is any magnitude greater than 550; a "Small" event is any magnitude less than or equal to 550 to 200. The Table below shows the number of cases that were available after the initial coding process had been completed.

Event Coding	Number of Cases
Large	10
Medium	11
Small	129

Coding System

Once all of the events had been coded as "Large," "Medium," or "Small" events, the next step was to determine if the government in a country had responded to the terrorist attack. So the events in each of the three categories were

then coded as "React" or "Non-React." A case is classified as "React" if there are any actions beyond judicial measures that happen as a result of the terrorist attack. Conversely, a case is coded as "Non-React" if the only actions following a terrorist attack are within the bounds of a judicial process. This could mean investigative work, arrests, and trials of people involved in the attacks. Then the "React" events had to be coded for "Institutional Change," "Government Change" and/or "Policy Shift." Each of the final codes will be explained in greater detail in Chapter 4: Escalation in Reactions. Some events were coded in multiple ways, which could indicate a more dynamic response to a terrorist attack. A copy of the project dataset is available upon request to the author.

Case Selection

A total of seven case studies have been selected for further review from the project dataset. There are four case studies for the "React" responses and three case studies for the "Non-React" responses. The two tables below will indicate the cases that will be reviewed in Chapters 3 and 4. There are both a "React" and "Non-React" case available for each of the magnitude ranges. This will aid in the comparative methodology that has been selected for this project. Creating the magnitude ranges helped in the case matching procedure.

React	
Large	United States (2001) Spain (2004)
Medium	Russia (1999)
Small	Russia (2002)

Non-React	
Large	Japan (1995)
Medium	Great Britain (2005)
Small	Japan (1995)

The selection of the Russia (2002) case must be explained because based on the minimum magnitude range of 200, this case is not part of the project dataset. This event only has a total magnitude of 129. Yet there were a total of 850 hostages. A counterfactual history will be used in order to include this case into the project. Bunzl explains that "Counterfactuals are contrary to fact, so ipso facto they are not true (in the actual world), and, ipso fact, they leave no evidence."[72] Essentially, this means that a counterfactual history will seek to understand how the past might be different if a certain event had not occurred.[73] The case in question is the attacks on the Moscow Theater. The event was initiated by the Chechen rebels, but was stopped by the Russian government. If the all of the hostages had been killed by the Chechen rebels, then the event would have been included in the project dataset. It would have been coded in the magnitude range of a "Medium" event. Since the attack was initiated and then foiled, it will be included on the basis of the above-mentioned counterfactual history. Because the actual magnitude was only 129, it will be coded in the "Small" event magnitude range.

[72] Bunzl, Martin. 2004. "Counterfactual History: A User's Guide." *The American Historical Review* 109 (3): 845-58. JSTOR, 847.

[73] (Bunzl 2004). Throughout the article, Bunzl offers several examples from other authors who employ this technique. It appears as though this techique is most commonly used to understand how the present would be different if certain events in wars had not occured (See for example Bunzel 2004, 846).

A Note on Style

Before providing the next chapters of analysis, I wanted to make some general notes about style. When directly quoting authors, I decided to leave the quotes with the grammar, spelling, and phrasing as each would appear in the original texts. This is particularly relevant because I cite several sources that were produced outside of the United States. Additionally, there are several different spellings for the al Qaeda, but I have selected to use this form for my analysis.[74] Given that the spelling matters much less than its meaning, I just wanted to ensure that I was consistent within my work. Finally, I used some videos as background information in some of the case studies. The majority of this information has been paraphrased. If a specific quote is elicited, then it was provided from a transcript of the video, which can be found through the direct sources (with the exception of one video).

[74] Other spellings include: Al Qaeda, Al Qa'ida, al Qaida.

CHAPTER 3: "NON-REACT" CASE STUDIES

Japan (1994)

Given the nature of the events, the Japan 1994 and Japan 1995 events will be explained together. The strength of studying these cases together allows for a greater understanding to the choices that the Japanese government made during the mid-1990s when it was faced with terrorist attacks. Both attacks were conducted by the same religious organization and in many ways, as will be explained below; the events are directly tied to one another. An analysis of the response to the Japan 1994 attack will be provided after the explanation of both the 1994 and 1995 attacks. Although, as explained in Chapter 2, it is still possible to study the Japan 1994 case as a small event and the Japan 1995 case as a large event.

On the evening of June 27, 1994, a group of religious cult members drove a truck into a quiet Japanese neighborhood in Matsumoto City.[75] Once they parked, the group used a sprayer attached to the back of the truck to spray thirty kilograms of sarin into the air. The targets of this attack were three judges who had recently ruled against the religious cult in a land dispute.[76] While none of the judges were killed, seven other people died and approximately five hundred were injured as a result of the sarin.[77]

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[75] Tu, Anthony T. 2002. *Chemical Terrorism: Horrors in Tokyo Subway and Matsumoto City*. Fort Collins: Alaken, Inc., 91. "Cult members involved were Nakagawa, Murai, Niime, Endo, Tomita, Nakamura, and Hashimoto..." (Tu 2002, 91).

[76] (Tu 2002, 90-93)

[77] (START GTD 2012; START TOPs 2014; Tu 2002, 100). There has been some variance in the reported number of people injured as a result of this attack. For example, Itabashi, Ogawara, and Leheny reported only 150 injuries (2002, 327). But as explained in Chapter 2, all information about

The religious cult responsible for this attack was Aum Shinrikyo (hereafter, Aum), which means "Supreme Truth." Shoko Asahara, the man who founded the cult, had ordered the attack not only to attempt to kill the judges, but also to test the effectiveness of sarin. Asahara harbored a deep hatred from the Japanese government that extended beyond the judicial branch. After an attempt to run two dozen candidates in an election, in which none of the candidates won, Asahara was humiliated. He wanted to take revenge not only on the government, but also on the voters who had denied his political party a possibility at holding public office.[78] Additionally, Asahara wanted to bring more followers to his cult because he claimed Armaggeddon was coming and "The only way to survive the catastrophe would be to join Aum Shinrikyo."[79] So he needed a plan that would create a disaster, in this case the use of sarin, to convince other people to join Aum.[80]

While emergency services were aware that people had been poisoned, the poisoning agent was not identified until July 4, 1994. It took seven days to identify the poisoning agent because sarin is not frequently made or used. This was the first use of sarin for chemical terrorism. Sarin was first developed by Nazi Germany in the 1930s. But it was never used by Hitler.[81] The first known use of sarin against

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the number of deaths and injuries will be drawn from START GTD.

[78] Wright, Nicolas. 2008b. "Japanese Sarin Cult." *International Terrorism Since 1945.* London: British Broadcasting Corporation. http://search.alexanderstreet.com/proxy.lib.umich.edu/view/work/1598947.

[79] (Tu 2002, 45)

[80] (Tu 2002, 45)

[81] (Wright 2008b)

other people was by Saddam Hussein.[82] Despite its limited use, its effectiveness is well-known: a drop on the skin is enough to kill a healthy adult.[83] Brian Balmar, a researcher at the University College London, describes sarin as "…the poor man's atomic bomb."[84] Because the Japanese authorities were initially unaware that sarin was the poisoning agent, no nerve gas antidote was used to treat the patients that suffered from the poison.[85]

Initially, the police focused their investigation on the man who had been the first person to contact the fire department about the poisonous gas. They based their investigation upon the fact that he had many chemicals, including organophosphates, in his home. After an extensive questioning process, the man was released.[86] In November 1994, the police received complaints of a noxious gas in Kamikuishiki, where the Seventh Satyan Aum facility was located. The Seventh Satyan was the location where Aum was manufacturing sarin. The police took a soil sample from the Aum site and found sarin byproducts in the sample.[87]

Despite the evidence, the police were hesitant. A local newspaper broke the news about the police findings before any arrests could be made for the attacks. Asahara was shocked to hear that the police had found evidence from the sample

[82] (Wright 2008b)
[83] (Wright 2008b)
[84] World Wide Entertainment. 2011. "Tokyo Sarin Gas Attack." Documentary. *Where Were You*.Geelong. http://search.alexanderstreet.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/view/work/1792926?play=1.
[85] (Tu 2002, 101-102)
[86] (Tu 2002, 109-110 and World Wide Entertainment 2011)
[87] (Tu 2002, 119)

soil and immediately began to fear a police raid.[88] But the police raid never occurred. Tu argues that the raid never happened because of the Kobe earthquake in early 1995.[89] And thus the close of the Japan 1994 case is with no police reaction to the use of sarin in Matsumoto City. A full analysis of this non-reaction will be provided after the events of the Japan 1995 case are outlined.

Japan (1995)

Having seen the effectiveness of sarin and needing a distraction about the disappearance of Mr. Kariya, Asahara ordered the use of sarin once again.[90] This time his target was the Tokyo subway system during morning rush hour. On March 18, 1995, he made the orders and on March 20, 1995, the plan was executed. The morning of the attack, five cult members carrying a total of eleven bags filled with sarin each boarded their targeted trains. The cult members, dressed as ordinary citizens, placed the bags of sarin on the ground in each train and punctured the bags with the sharpened umbrella tips.[91] All of the selected trains had stops at the police headquarters, which Asahara chose in order to target the citizens and the police. Five subway lines were targeted by Aum Shinrikyo. Those lines were: (1) Hibiya Line from Kitasenjyu to Megro, (2)Hibiya Line from Naka Megro to East Zoo Park, (3) Marunouchi Line from Ikebukuro to Ogikubo, (4) Chiyoda Line from Abiko to

[88] (Tu 2002, 121)
[89] (2002, 122)
[90] (Tu 2002, 141) Mr. Kariya was the father of a former cult member who had fled the cult. In order to learn about her whereabouts, Asahara had Mr. Kariya kidnapped and interrogated. But after giving him too many drugs, he died and Asahara demanded that the body be hidden (Tu 2002, 139-140).
[91] (Tu 2002, 145-146)

Yoyogi, and (5)Marunouchi Line from Ogikubo to Ikeukuro.[92] The effect of the attack makes it a large case within the dataset with twelve deaths and approximately five thousand injuries reported.[93]

After this attack, it only took Japanese police two hours to identify the poisoning agent as sarin because there was leftover sarin in the subway cars and they had anticipated an attack after the 1994 attacks.[94] This is likely because following the 1994 sarin attacks, American experts told Japan that the Matsumoto attack was simply a test for a larger attack that was yet to come.[95] Authorities had reason to believe in advance of the subway attacks that the Tokyo subway system would be Aum's second target.[96]

Following the Tokyo attack, it took two days for the police to raid Aum facilities. The delay was caused from a lack of protective equipment for the police to use. This equipment was necessary because the police feared that Aum would strike using additional poisonous gas upon arrival at Kamkuishiki.[97] During the raids, the police found a variety of chemicals that were available to Aum in large quantities.[98] In addition to the chemical stockpiles, "…police investigators found that the cult had developed other chemical agents, such as VX gas, tabun, and soman, and had also

[92] (Tu 2002, 147-150) For a detailed account of the events on each of these trains, see (Tu 2002, 147-150).
[93] (START GTD 2012)
[94] (Tu 2002, 157)
[95] (Wright 2008b and Tu 2002, 87)
[96] (Wright 2008b)
[97] (Tu 2002, 172)
[98] (Tu 2002, 172-176). For a complete list of the chemicals that the police seized and what each chemical was likely being used for see (Tu 2002, 172-176).

grown biological agents like the anthrax bacillus and *Clostridium botulinum."*[99] The police arrested about 450 Aum members in relation to the sarin gas attacks.[100] Many of the arrested members were arrested on minor offenses, since "…the police could not link the Tokyo sarin incident directly to Aum…."[101]

Immediately following the attack on the subway, Asahara demanded that all of the evidence of sarin production be buried and destroyed.[102] This, however, did not stop the police from arresting him. After which, he was put on trial and sentenced to death.[103] During his trial, Asahara plead not guilty to all charges; claiming instead that the cult had acted without his knowledge or approval.[104] Since then, Asahara is no longer the leader of Aum and he refuses to speak to anyone.[105] In Japan, there is a sentiment that the truth about the events was not realized during the trials of Asahara and other leaders of Aum.[106]

According to START TOPs, "At its peak, Aum had 10,000 members in Japan, with 35,000 in Russia. Aum also had offices in the U.S., Germany and Taiwan."[107] Today, Aum is operating under the name of Aleph and has renounced its past violent practices.[108] The current membership of Aleph is about 1,500 people.[109] Despite

[99] (Itabashi, Ogawara, and Leheny 2002, 337-388)
[100] (Tu 2002, 197)
[101] (Tu 2002, 197). Tu notes at several moments throughout his book that this is a common practice for the Japanese police. A detailed example of this practice can be seen in (Tu 2002, 78-79).
[102] (Tu 2002, 171)
[103] (START TOPs 2014)
[104] (Wright 2008b and Tu 2002, 215-216)
[105] (World Wide Entertainment 2011)
[106] (World Wide Entertainment 2011)
[107] (2014)
[108] (World Wide Entertainment 2011)
[109] (START TOPs 2014)

Japan's decision to not disband Aum, the United States includes this group under its Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) classification.[110]

Discussion

As I mentioned in Chapter 1, Katzenstein provides his interpretation of Walt's balance of threat theory as it is related to Japan. So to begin, I want to assess Katzenstein's argument. Katzenstein offers the following application and interpretation of the balance of threat theory stating:

> Balance of threat theory offers a plausible situational analysis that focuses on the different magnitude and sources of threat. On September 11, the United States suffered massive casualties in one day as the result of an act of international terrorism. Germany and Japan experienced significantly smaller casualties over a period of two decades. Because it was attacked from outside, the United States responded with war; because Germany and Japan were attacked from inside, they did not.[111]

Essentially, Katzenstein argues on the basis of the balance of threat theory that Japan did not respond to the Aum attacks in 1994 and 1995 because it was attacked from inside and because there were few casualties.[112] Yet this application does not closely follow the four factors that Walt outlined. The Japanese government was aware of Aum's available resources based on the evidence that they collected during the investigations following the 1995 attack. According to Walt, a country is less likely to respond to a threat the further the threat is from the country.[113] Given that Aum was located within Japan, it should have been more likely to respond. The 1994 attack signaled Aum's offensive power. Additionally, the police had both the evidence that Aum was producing sarin and the forewarnings of their American

[110] (START TOPs 2014)
[111] (Katzenstein 2003, 735)
[112] (2003, 735)

counterparts that Aum was planning a second attack. Thus Japan has responded, according to the use of the balance of threat theory, to the 1994 attack because Aum had signaled that its resolve to attack was high. If we use the combined magnitude as a proxy for the offensive intentions from a terrorist attack, then Japan should have seen the first attack as a small intention and the second attack as a large threat. This means that it should have been more likely to respond. Despite these interpretations of Walt's four factors, Japan has still been identified as a non-react state for both its 1994 and 1995 attacks in my analysis.

Even if we accept Katzenstein's interpretations of the four considerations that a state makes when deciding how to perceive a threat, first we must classify the event as a threat. At the root of Walt's balance of threat theory is that a country must perceive another country as a threat. To translate that to a terrorist organization, a country must perceive a non-state actor's actions a threat. So both Katzenstein and Walt fail to analyze how a state will react if it does not perceive an attack as a threat, but rather as a different kind of problem. Japan did not classify either one of the attacks by Aum to be threats. Additionally, neither author include any information about how a country's history and culture play a role in country's decision on whether or not it will react to an attack by a non-state actor.

In order to have a complete understanding of why Japan 1994 and Japan 1995 have been coded as non-react events for the purposes of my analysis, it is important to begin with a historical perspective. Japan has an "allergy" to a strong

[113] (1985, 10)

police and military force as a result of its post-war experiences. Thus the Japanese government is hesitant to make changes to the pre-existing policies and structures.[114] This was illustrated in the cases above when the police arrest cult members on minor offenses and then question them about their involvement in the sarin attacks. Another way to think about the "allergy" analogy that is presented is to consider the subdued nature of Japanese culture. Additionally, in Japan, "…terrorism is not treated as a discrete political issue requiring a response but rather a subset of other types of crises, which include natural disasters and accidents."[115] Japanese counterterrorism built on the foundation that terrorism should be handled through "crisis management."[116] As a result, during both the 1994 and 1995 attacks, terrorism in Japan lacked a focused strategy. This is a part of the possible explanation for Japan's non-reaction to both events.

It is important to note that there was an institutional reform in Japan following the 1995 attacks. However, the changes that were made were not a result of the 1995 attacks alone. The demand for institutional reform came as a result of the failing economy in the early 1990s in Japan, the political problems within the coalition government, the 1994 sarin attack in Matsumoto City, the earthquake in early 1995, and the 1995 sarin gas attack in Tokyo.[117] These events together intensified the idea among Japanese citizens that "…the Japanese government was ill

[114] Itabashi, Isao, Ogawara, Masamichi, and Leheny, David. 2002. "Japan." In *Combating Terrorism: Strategies of Ten Countries*, edited by Alexander, Yonah, 337-74. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 339, 352, and 357.
[115] (Itabashi, Ogawara, and Leheny 2002, 339)
[116] (Itabashi, Ogawara, and Leheny 2002, 352)

equipped to handle crises or deal with rapid, cataclysmic events in a way that might minimize the loss of life."[118] Yet there is a lack of literature that addresses the effectiveness of these changes. Given that the institutional changes occurred as the result of multiple exogenous factors, the 1994 and 1995 Aum attacks will continue to be coded as a non-react situation. If the other factors were excluded, there is no evidence to indicate the the Japanese government would have reacted beyond the judicial actions taken against Asahara and Aum's other top leaders.

United Kingdom (2005)

On the morning of July 7, 2005, three bombs exploded, nearly simultaneously, in the London Underground during the peak of rush hour.[119] The three affected locations were: (1) "A train just outside the Liverpool Street station…"; (2) "A train just outside the Edgware Road station…"; and (3) "A train traveling between King's Cross and Russell Square stations…."[120] About one hour later, at 9:47 A.M., a fourth explosion occurred atop a double-decker bus in Tavistock Square.[121] A total of fifty-six people, including the four terrorists responsible for the attacks, were killed and 786 people were injured as a result of the explosions.[122] For this reason, this case has been coded as a medium size attack

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[117] (Itabashi, Ogawara, and Leheny 2002, 352, 355-356, and 360)
[118] (Itabashi, Ogawara, and Leheny 2002, 353)
[119] "Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005." 2006. Government Report HC 1087. London: House of Commons. http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/hc0506/hc10/1087/1087.asp, 2.
[120] "July 7 2005 London Bombings Fast Facts." 2013. *CNN*. November 6. http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/06/world/july-7-2005-london-bombings-fast-facts-index.html.
[121] ("Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005" 2006, 2)
[122] (START GTD 2012; "Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005" 2006, 2)

in the dataset used for this analysis.

There were four individuals that were responsible for the attacks in London. The group was comprised of Mohammed Sadique Khan (Edgeware Road bomber), Shahzad Tanweer (Aldgate bomber), Hasib Hussain (Tavistock Square bomber), and Germain Morris Lindsay (King's Cross/Russell Square bomber).[123] Khan, Tanweer, and Hussain met through various social groups.[124] Lindsay later met Khan and joined the group and he is often referred to as the outsider in the group.[125] Three of the four were second generation British citizens, while Lindsay was born in Jamaica.[126] While all four of the men where open about their religion, they showed no outward signs of being interested in violent extremism.[127] It is unclear whether or not the group had any direct ties with another organization. The method of attack followed the *modus operandi* of al Qaeda and al Qaeda later claimed responsibility for launching the attack; however there is no direct evidence that ties the two groups together.[128] Khan's last Will and Testament explained that the group's motivation was to avenge the United Kingdom's involvement in the Middle East.[129]

The morning of the attacks, each of the men had a backpack in which he was carrying the bomb that would be used at his location. Based on CCTV, eye witness, and forensic evidence, it was estimated that each individual was carrying two and

[123] ("July 7 2005 London Bombings Fast Facts" 2013)
[124] ("Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005" 2006, 15-16)
[125] ("Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005" 2006, 18)
[126] ("Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005" 2006, 13 and 17)
[127] ("Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005" 2006, 23)
[128] ("Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005" 2006, 21 and 23)
[129] ("Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005" 2006, 19).This was

five kilograms of high explosives. All of the materials used in explosives were readily available in stores and relatively inexpensive. Additionally, the bombs that were built did not require much skill and instructions on how to make these explosives could have been easily obtained from open-source information.[130] The location where the bombs were made for the attack was located on July 12th. It was an apartment that the group had sublet from an Egyptian PhD student.[131] On July 13th, the police identified Khan, Tanweer, and Hussain as the bombers responsible for the Underground attack. The following day, Lindsay was identified as the perpetrator of the double-decker bus bombing.[132]

In the weeks following the July 7th attacks, the police were able to use DNA evidence to directly tie three of the bombers to the apartment where the bombs were made[133]. Yet no arrests were made in connection with this attack until March 22, 2007. Mohammed Shakil, Sadeer Saleem, and Waheed Ali "…[were] charged with unlawfully and maliciously conspiring with the four suicide bombers and of conspiring to cause explosions at tourist locations in London."[134] During trial, the three arrested men were all found not guilty of helping plan the attacks.[135] Beyond the creation of the Official Report that has been cited throughout the previous four paragraphs and the arrests that took place two years later; this case is coded as a

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expressed in a video that was released by Al Jazeera on September 1, 2005 ("Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005" 2006, 4 and 23).
[130] ("Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005" 2006, 4 and 23)
[131] ("Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005" 2006, 22)
[132] ("July 7 2005 London Bombing Fast Facts" 2013)
[133] ("Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005" 2006, 11-12)
[134] ("July 7 2005 London Bombing Fast Facts" 2013)

non-react state.

Discussion

Once again, this discussion section will begin by analyzing the case in terms of Walt's balance of threat theory. As a reminder, Walt's balance of threat theory as applied to terrorism hinges on four factors: 1) available resources; 2) geographic distance; 3) offensive power; and 4) offensive intention. One of the facts that make this case difficult to fit into the framework of the balance of threat theory is that it is still unclear if the four bombers were directly linked to al Qaeda. Since no formal evidence can tie the two groups together, this case will be analyzed under the assumption that the four bombers were operating as a separate group. The available resources were all either used in the attacks or located in the apartment by the British police. So on this point, the government was less likely to have viewed the available resources to be a threat. Yet, the country was attacked by a group from within its own borders and arrests were made of additional men that could have been involved in the attacks. This should have made it more likely for a post-attack response to occur, beyond the judicial actions that were taken. In terms of offensive power, there were only four men directly involved in the attacks and all four died as they were suicide bombers. Again, using the combined magnitude to understand the offensive intention, this event was classified as a medium size attack because it has magnitude of 842 people.

But the balance of threat theory framework does not provide a satisfactory

[135] ("July 7 2005 London Bombing Fast Facts" 2013)

picture for why the United Kingdom did not respond to the London suicide bombings. The historical perspective for this case will be unpacked using two different historical events. First, it is important to consider the how the government handled the longstanding acts of terror in North Ireland. Next, the focus will shift to examine the role that September 11, 2001 played in changing structures within the government. From the historical background of 9/11 a British culture of how to handle terrorism will become clearer.

The attack against the UK on July 7, 2005, was not the first encounter that the country had with terrorism. As a matter of fact, the country had faced nearly thirty years of terrorist attacks from the Irish Republican Army. Many of the attacks launched by the IRA took place in Northern Ireland, but some of the attacks targeted to the British mainland as well. This sustained period of attacks resulted in 3,075 deaths.[136] Foley reports that "2,950 of these were killed in Northern Ireland and 125 in mainland Great Britain."[137] One of the first steps in understanding why the UK was a non-react state following the terrorist attack in 2005 is looking at how the country handled the encounters with the IRA. The response by the British government to the IRA "…was based mainly on coercive action by the military, police and intelligence services."[138] Various tactics were used in the coercive action including: internment, coercive interrogations, and detainment without trial.[139] Yet Malcolm Gladwell in his most recent book, *David and Goliath*, explains that

[136] (Foley 2013, 18)
[137] (2013, 18-19)
[138] (Foley 2013, 19)

> In Northern Ireland, the British made a simple mistake. They fell into the trap of believing that because they had resources, weapons, soldiers, and experience that dwarfed those of the insurgent elements that they were trying to contain, it did not matter what the people of Northern Ireland thought of them. General Freeland believed Leites and Wolf when they said that 'influencing popular behavior requires neither sympathy nor mysticism.' And Leites and Wolf were wrong.[140]

Essentially, Gladwell is explaining, through this quote and the rest of this chapter, why the fighting between the British police and the IRA was prolonged. His main argument is that although the IRA could be viewed as the underdog, which in this situation the British power was limited against the willpower of the people of Northern Ireland.[141] The lessons learned from nearly thirty years of terrorist actions by the IRA were not lost on British officials. Instead, the British officials retroactively "…affirmed that responses to terrorism had to be 'proportionate', in order to not exacerbate the problem."[142] What we can draw from the British experiences with the IRA is that British officials realized that the use of force, against terrorist organizations, is not always effective.[143] The influence of these realizations continues to manifest as we now consider how the UK handled the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001.

September 11, 2001 can be described as event that shaped not the United States, but various other parts of the world as well. The history of what happened following 9/11 in the UK is important to the study of why it did not react in 2005 to

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[139] (Foley 2013, 19)
[140] Gladwell, Malcolm. 2013. *David and Goliath: Underdogs, Misfits, and the Art of Battling Giants*. New York: Little Brown and Company, 203-204. Gladwell is referring to the work of "...two economists--Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf Jr--[who] wrote a repot about how to deal with insurgencies. [...] Their report was called *Rebellion and Authority*" (Gladwell 2013, 201).
[141] (Gladwell 2013, 197-231)
[142] (Foley 2013, 60)
[143] The UK considers the IRA to be a terrorist organization (START TOPs 2014).

its own attack because the decisions made in 2001 indicate a subdued approach to responding to terrorist attacks. In light of the history of the IRA, this subdued approach seems to have infiltrated the counterterrorism culture in the UK. Immediately following the attacks in the United States, "…a central Sub-Committee on International Terrorism was established under the Defence and Overseas Policy (DOP) Committee of the Cabinet Office" in order to "…review government policy on international terrorism, with a particular focus on the UK's ability to locate, capture and convict suspected terrorists."[144] Ultimately, no large-scale organizational changes, such as the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in the United States, were made because the British government did not feel that "…the US model would be either appropriate nor necessary."[145] Following the attacks in 2005, the idea of creating a department modeled after the DHS in the U.S. was reassessed. Those in favor of this option were the Conservative Party and many security analysts. However, the government ultimately opted to strengthen existing institutions and procedures.[146]

The decision to not make any organizational changes in the UK following 9/11 could be explained in a two-fold manner. As I explained above, the British government wanted to make sure, as a result of its history with the IRA, that it was making proportional responses to terrorist actions. Additionally, if we apply Walt's argument that geographic distance is an important factor in determining the threat

[144] (Foley 2013, 78)
[145] Cornish, Paul. 2005. "The United Kingdom." In *Europe Confronts Terrorism*, edited by von Hippel, Karin, 146-67. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 146-147.

level of a terrorist action, then the distance between the attacks in the U.S. and security of the UK may have played a role in the decision not to make any changes following 9/11. Additionally, although the UK government was aware that there were Islamic extremists residing within the country, it did not believe that these extremists would pose a direct threat against the nation.[147] So from a perspective of offensive intention, the British government also did not believe that it would be the target of any attack.

Now that we have a clear understanding of how the historical context of terrorism in the UK has led to a culture that values a proportionate response or no response at all to attacks, we can examine how the UK perceives terrorism conceptually. Unlike "…the US government, which has tended to perceive terrorism as an act of war, …European policymakers …perceive it as a crime."[148] The UK falls into step with most European policymakers in the fact that it too perceives terrorism as a crime.[149] Von Hippel (2005) would describe the choice to perceive terrorism as a crime as a more "tolerant" approach to the situation. She explains her argument by stating that

> European governments have historically adopted a more tolerant approach to dealing with terrorist-sponsoring states than the US government for three reasons. First, in general, Europeans consider it better to maintain a dialogue than not. Second, certain European countries have wanted to protect foreign investment opportunities, in particular in the oil and gas industries. Third, and relevant to Islamic extremist terrorism, many of these same European countries are home to large Muslim populations—approximately 20 million people in the EU refer to

[146] (Foley 2013, 79)
[147] (von Hippel 2005, 9 and Foley 2013, 48)
[148] (Foley 2013, 44)
[149] (Foley 2013, 49)

> themselves as Muslims—and therefore have been fearful of a domestic backlash if harsh action were taken.[150]

Of these three reasons, the third seems most relevant to this case because of the large Muslim population that lives in the UK.[151] The combination of treating terrorism as a crime and with a "tolerant approach" creates parallels to the reasons why both Japanese cases were also coded as non-react. In all three cases, we also see that there is a historical explanation for the way that terrorism is perceived.

[150] (von Hippel 2005, 7)
[151] (von Hippel 2005, 9)

CHAPTER 4: "REACT" CASE STUDIES

Spain (2004)

On the morning of March 11, 2004, just three days before the parliamentary elections, a series of bombs exploded disrupting morning rush hour in Madrid, Spain.[152] Ten bombs, hidden backpacks, exploded on four commuter trains.[153] Crawford and Levitt explain that "The first explosions were at 7:34am, as two trains approached Madrid's busy Atocha terminal. The other trains were running late, and the bombs exploded at Santa Eugenia and El Pozo, stations further down the line."[154] If the other trains had been running on time, then all of the explosions would have taken place at the Atocha terminal, which according to a high-ranking Spanish diplomat would have left Spain with a situation similar to September 11, 2001 in the United States.[155] The explosions killed 191 people and injured about 1,800 people.[156] This event is classified as a large event in the project dataset.

Immediately following the attacks there was confusion about which group was responsible for the attacks. Prime Minister José María Aznar prematurely claimed that the group responsible was the *Euskadi Ta Askatasuna* (ETA), a

[152] In Spain this event is known as 11-M (Sinkkonen 2009, 11).
[153] Woehrel, Steven. 2004. "March 11 Terrorist Attacks in Madrid and Spain's Elections: Implications for U.S. Policy." CRS Report for Congress RS21812. Washington, DC: Library of Congress. https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=450390, 1.
[154] Crawford, Leslie and Levitt, Joshua. 2004. "'A Place in the History of Infamy'--How the Government's Assumption and Misjudgment Shook Spain." *The Financial Times,* March 26. 35,412 edition, 15.
[155] (Crawford and Levitt 2004, 15)
[156] Sunderland, Judith and Human Rights Watch (Organization). 2005. "Spain, Setting an Example?: Counter-Terrorism Measures in Spain", 7. (START GTD 2012).

terrorist organization within the Basque region of Spain.[157] The ETA was founded in 1959 with the aims of creating a separate nation-state for the Basque region of Spain. These claims had a chance of sticking because the ETA had a reputation for similar attacks against the Spanish government in the four and a half decades prior to the March 11th attacks.[158] Additionally, in the months leading up to the Madrid train bombings, there had been several attempts made by the ETA to execute attacks that involved using explosives to disrupt the train system.[159] The day of the attack, Spain turned to the United Nations Security Council and asked for support through the passage of Resolution 1530. The U.N. Security Council was persuaded by Spain's pleas and the resolution was passage to condemn the ETA for the attacks.[160] Yet uncharacteristically, the ETA vehemently denied that it had executed the attacks and instead pointed to Arab resistance groups as the culprit.[161]

While Prime Minister Aznar was claiming that the ETA was responsible for the attacks, the police were finding evidence in concordance with the ETA. Based on the evidence, police initially believed that the attacks were executed by Islamic extremists that were tied to al Qaeda.[162] Even Spanish Interior Minister Angel Acebes stated on March 11, 2004 that Spain could not eliminate al Qaeda as the

[157] (Sunderland 2005, 7; Woehrel 2004, 1-2; Crawford and Levitt 2004, 15)
[158] (START TOPs 2014)
[159] (Crawford and Levitt 2004, 15 and Woehrel 2004, 1-2). For complete details about the foiled attacks, see Crawford and Levitt 2004, 15.
[160] (Woehrel 2004, 1; Crawford and Levitt 2004, 15)
[161] (Crawford and Levitt 2004, 15)
[162] (Crawford and Levitt 2004, 15; Woehrel 2004, 1-2; and Sunderland 2005, 7)

group responsible.[163] On March 13, 2004, al Qaeda released a video claiming responsibility for the attack. The video featured "…a man speaking in Arabic with a Moroccan accent."[164] Two days after the attacks, the Spanish authorities made their first arrests. A total of five men, three Moroccans and two Indians, were arrested after evidence from the scene linked them directly to the investigation.[165] With continued progress in the investigation, the police were eventually able to tie the attacks to the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GCIM), which has ties with al Qaeda.[166] Formed in the 1990s, the GCIM is sympathetic to the international jihadi movement and was added to the United States Foreign Terrorist Organization list in October 2005.[167]

The police investigation was aided by the fact that there was one bomb that did not detonate. Additionally, the police were able to locate three other bombs that they then detonated in a controlled explosion environment.[168] With the unexploded bomb and evidence from the scene, the police, who had been handling ETA bombings for approximately 30 years, noted right away that the explosives used in this attack were different from those used in past ETA attacks.[169] The explosives found inside the bag were attached to a detonator that consisted of a cell phone and

[163] "Spain Train Bombings Fast Facts." 2013. *CNN*. November 4. http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/04/world/europe/spain-train-bombings-fast-facts/index.html.
[164] ("Spain Train Bombings Fast Facts" 2013)
[165] ("Spain Train Bombings Fast Facts" 2013; Crawford and Levitt 2004, 15; Sunderland 2005, 7)
[166] (Woehrel 2004, 2)
[167] (START TOPs 2014)
[168] ("Spain Train Bombing Fast Facts" 2013)
[169] (Crawford and Levitt 2004, 15)

a timer.[170] Specifically, the explosives used were dynamite.[171] With the cell phone, the police were able to "…trace it to a business owned by a Moroccan immigrant named Jamal Zougam, who was suspected of having links to Al Qaeda."[172] Woehrel also reports that "Less than four hours after the attacks, police found several detonators and an audiotape of verses from the Koran in an abandoned van in the town of Alcala de Henares, through which the bombed trains had passed."[173] All of this evidence is what eventually lead to the arrests of the five men on March 13, 2004.

The arrests of the five men and an additional nineteen others before the end of March 2004 led to information suggesting that the specific group of individuals responsible for the March 11th were located in an apartment in Leganés[174]. A brigade of *Grupo Especial Operaciones* (GEO) was sent to the apartment to arrest the seven men located there. When the brigade arrived, the seven men resisted arrest in what became a shootout lasting several hours. The standoff only ended when "…the seven men inside committed suicide by detonating explosives strapped to their bodies. The explosion also killed special operations agent Javier Torrontera and wounded fifteen other agents."[175] One of the seven men was "…the alleged leader of the terrorists, Serhane ben Abdelmajid Farkhet, known

[170] ("Spain Train Bombing Fast Facts" 2013)
[171] Jordán, Javier and Horsbugh, Nicola. 2005. "Spain: Part II: Islamic Extremism." In *Europe Confronts Terrorism*, edited by von Hippel, Karin, 132-45. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 137.
[172] (Woehrel 2004, 2)
[173] (2004, 2)
[174] This is a neighborhood located in Madrid, Spain.
[175] (Sunderland 2005, 20)

as 'the Tunisian.'"[176] Once the apartment was raided, the police found plans and explosives for additional terrorist attacks to be executed by the group.[177]

Discussion

Before examining how this case functions within Walt's theoretical framework, a resolution to the case will be provided. This case has been coded as a "React" case because there was a response following the attack beyond the judicial measures that were explained above. One of the most critical facts in this case is that the attacks happened three days before the parliamentary elections. Prime Minister Aznar was running for re-election for the Partido Popular (PP). Prior to the attack, election polls were reporting that the PP would defeat political opposition, the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE). Yet as Sinkkonen succinctly articulates "…none of the polls was right: PSOE won the elections with a significant majority over the PP. This was an electoral overturn."[178] Therefore, this case is also coded as a case that displays a "Government Change" as the result of a terrorist attack. This case provides a counter-example to what might be anticipated as a political leader following a terrorist attack: the rally around the flag effect. Instead of experiencing overwhelming support from the public, the incumbent political party is replaced.

In order to understand why the attack on March 11 led to a "Government Change," it is necessary to unpack some of Prime Minister Aznar's political decisions regarding terrorism. This has been best laid out in the following two-fold manner:

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[176] (Woehrel 2004, 2)
[177] (Jordán and Horsbugh 2005 137; Woehrel 2004, 2)
[178] (2009, 13-14)

> 1) ETA had been enemy number one for Prime Minister…Aznar's Government, and framing ETA for the March 11 attack would confirm that the enemy was rightly fought. 2) Aznar's Government had taken a very unpopular and unilateral decision to participate in the U.S. led coalition in the Iraq war, and if the assailant in Madrid proved to be some Islamic group, it would easily lead to causal analysis that such participation had caused the attack. This would especially benefit the political opposition. The leader of the socialist party (PSOE) José Luís Rodríguez Zapatero had already promised in this electoral campaign that if PSOE were to win the elections, he would take Spanish troops out of Iraq.[179]

Blaming the ETA for the attack would benefit Prime Minister politically. If Prime Minister Aznar's government had been able to prove that the ETA was responsible for the attack on March 11, then it would have provided legitimacy to his battle against the terrorist organization. Ramos explains that "Aznar's government could also lay claim to eight years of good economic results, a tough stance against ETA, including a number of high-profile arrests and the banning of its political wing, as well as a close relationship with the United States."[180] Additionally, by proving that the attack was not the result of an Islamic extremist group, Prime Minister Aznar would not have to continually defend his government's decision to fight with the United States in the war in Iraq. Woehrel provides a similar analysis on the political advantages and disadvantages to making and proving claims that the ETA was responsible for the attack.[181]

Before considering the actions of the new Prime Minister, the balance of threat theoretical framework must be applied to the case. The first consideration in this theory is the resources available to the group, which must be evaluated in light of the ties between the GCIM and al Qaeda. Given the ties between the two groups,

[179] (Sinkkonen 2009, 12)
[180] (2005, 124)

the available resources, while unknown, can be expected to be quite high quality and quantity. Spain and Morocco are situated very close together geographically. As a matter of fact, the states are nearly connected but for a water passage between the two. Much like the available resources, the offensive power of these two terrorist organizations is not entirely measurable; but given that this event took place three years after September 11, Spain would have knowledge about al Qaeda's offensive power. And unlike United Kingdom 2005 case, the seven terrorists that died after committing suicide can be traced to larger terrorist networks. This leads to the consideration of offensive intention of the group. With a combined magnitude of 1,991 people injured or killed as a result of this attack, the impact was enough to consider this case to be a large event in my dataset. All of these considerations paired with campaign promises are what likely lead Prime Minister Zapatero to withdraw the 1,300 Spanish troops from Iraq.

Here again, it is also important to examine the impact of Spain's history and culture on the question of why it chose to respond to this attack. The fact that Spain had been actively engaged against the ETA for nearly four decades prior to the 2004 attack could indicate that it is more likely to respond to terrorist actions. On the other hand, the most prominent tactic used against the ETA is the judicial system.[182] Remember that for the purposes of my study a case is only considered to be a "React" case if there are measures taken beyond the judicial system. Spain's history

[181] (2004, 2)
[182] (Sunderland 2005, 14; Ramos 2005, 132)

with the ETA is unlike the UK's history with the IRA because the UK had settled the concerns with the IRA prior to its attack in 2005. On the other hand, the ETA was an ongoing issue for Spain, so it is more challenging to use this story as an indication for why Spain did react.

I believe that a paradigm shift occurred within the Spanish community following the attack on March 11. Prior to being attacked, Spain, much like many other European countries, did not believe that it would be the target for a terrorist attack.[183] Yet this perception changed as a result of the attack especially because many Spaniards made the causal connection that the attack was the result of Spain supporting the U.S. in Iraq.[184] This shift is important because it could be seen as the catalyst for the PSOE to win the elections three days after the attack. A sense of safety particularly from the measures taken against the ETA had arisen in the years leading up to the attack in 2004.[185] The Spanish citizens no longer felt safe in their country and perceived their lack of safety to be a result of the war in Iraq.

Counterfactual Analysis

While it is impossible to know the actual outcome, it is interesting to consider what would have happened in Spain had the elections not taken place three days after the attacks. Therefore, in this portion of the analysis, the focus will shift to consider a counterfactual history of the Spain 2004 case. The analysis provided in the Discussion section explains the extensive role that the election cycle

[183] (von Hippel 2005, 11)
[184] (von Hippel 2005, 11)
[185] (Ramos 2005, 132)

played in the aftermath of the attacks. From this analysis, a question arises: What would the outcome of the Spain 2004 case if the timing of the attack had not occurred three days before the parliamentary elections? If we take a step back and study the details, this case actually demonstrates more similarities to a "Non-React" case than a "React" case. In this counterfactual analysis, I will operate under the assumption that Prime Minister Aznar is holding office.

One of the big points of contention in the original case surrounds the fact that the government was quick to blame the ETA for the attacks and then continued to assert that the ETA was responsible despite evidence otherwise. The evidence indicates that this might have been a protective measure in light of the upcoming election. While I still believe that the Spanish government would have initially insisted that the ETA was responsible for the attacks, based on the past encounters with the ETA attempting similar attacks, without election pressure, the government might have been more responsive to evidence indicating that another group was responsible. Prime Minister Aznar would have been able to garner more votes by proving that the ETA was responsible, which can explain his insistence that the ETA was the responsible group. But without the electoral pressures, he might have also considered how if the group responsible was an Islamic terrorist organization that it could also strengthen his government's decision to enter a coalition with the United States in Iraq.

Given that the PP and Prime Minister Aznar supported the U.S. efforts in Iraq, it seems unlikely that even with the knowledge that the group responsible was

affiliated with Islamic extremism that it would have withdraw its troops and support from the U.S. efforts in Iraq. If anything, it is plausible to believe, based on the original instance that the ETA was responsible, that Prime Minister Aznar would have found a way to make the situation proof that the war in Iraq was necessary. That is because the attack could be viewed as proof of the growing threat of Islamic terrorism and thus could be used as a counterexample for the opposition to the country's involvement in the U.S. coalition in Iraq. Additionally, the Spanish troops with a force of 1,300 people constituted approximately only one percent of their American counterparts' troop quantity.[186] Given the relative size of Spanish troops to American troops the claim that the attack was a result of Spanish presence in Iraq might not have carried as much weight as it did with an election happening within hours of identifying the responsible group as Islamic extremists. So without the election pressures, Aznar's government might have viewed the attack as an opportunity to increase support in Iraq.

Following the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, Spain made changes to its own institutional structures that were related to national security. Ramos summarizes those changes below

> Nine months after 11 September, the new National Intelligence Centre (CNI) was established, responsible for domestic and international intelligence, as a substitute for the former Defence Information Centre (CEID). The new organisation has been complemented by very powerful information services, such as those that belong to the Policia Nacional and Guardia Civil, and works closely with international intelligence agencies. The same law that created the CNI also established a coordination commission, presided over by one of the government's vice presidents. The commission includes the Ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Interior and

[186] (Ramos 2005, 124)

> Economy, with the same purpose of coordinating all information and intelligence organisations in Spain.[187]

These changes are important to consider when thinking about the counterfactual history because given that institutional changes had already occurred in Spain, it is less likely that additional changes would have occurred later. If we return to the "windows of opportunity" argument from the literature review, then we know that a window of opportunity for institutional change had already occurred internationally following September 11, but the Spain 2004 case, while also a "Large" event did not have as many deaths as September 11.[188] Therefore, this case created a smaller "window of opportunity" than September 11 and it would have been less likely for an institutional change to have occurred as a result of this attack.

United States (2001)

While the events on September 11, 2001, took place at three different locations and are counted as four separate events in the GTD, this section will consider all the attacks together as one. As millions Americans made their way to work on September 11, 2001, four fully fueled air planes were hijacked between 8:14 A.M. and 9:28 A.M.[189] American Airlines Flight 11, from Boston to Los Angeles, was the first plane to be hijacked. At 8:46 A.M. the plane crashed into 1 World Trade

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[187] (2005, 127)
[188] (Bossong 2013, 142)
[189] (*The 9/11 Commission Report* 2004, 32-33). The main source used in this case study will be *The 9/11 Commission Report* (2004) because of its reliability. President George W. Bush called for the creation of this commission as a result of the attacks on September 11, 2001. Over the course of three years, the ten commissioners "reviewed more than 2.5 million pages of documents and interviewed more than 1,200 individuals in ten countries" (*The 9/11 Commission Report* 2004, xv). Given the breadth of information reviewed, this document will suffice as the single document to provide the majority of the information for this case study.

Center (North Tower). United Airlines Flight 175, also from Boston to Los Angeles, was the second hijacked plane that made its way to New York City. This plane crashed into 2 World Trade Center (South Tower) at 9:03 A.M. The next flight to be hijacked was American Airlines Flight 77, headed from Washington D.C. to Los Angeles. Once hijacked, the plane was re-directed to the Pentagon, where it crashed at 9:37 A.M.

Finally, United Airlines Flight 93, from Newark to San Francisco, was hijacked, but failed to reach the intended target when the passengers on the plane fought back against the terrorists. This did not stop Ziad Jarrah, the terrorist pilot, from crashing the plane into an empty field just outside of Shanksville, Pennsylvania at 10:03 A.M.[190] Evidence indicates that United 93 had a potential target of either the Capitol or the White House.[191] According to the START GTD, all four combined events lead to 2,997 casualties, including the nineteen terrorists. The database was unable to provide an estimate for the number of people that were injured as a result of these attacks. This qualifies September 11, 2001, to be analyzed as a large case in this project's dataset.

The attack on September 11 was not the first time that the World Trade Center had been the target of a terrorist attack. At 12:18 P.M. on February 26, 1993, a bomb was exploded from within a truck that was located in the parking garage beneath the two towers. There were six deaths and over one thousand reported

[190] (*The 9/11 Commission Report* 2004, 29 and 32-33)
[191] (*The 9/11 Commission Report* 2004, 14). For a complete explanation of the September 11th attacks, see *The 9/11 Commission Report* 2004, 1-46.

injuries as a result of this attack.[192] It has been reported that "Ramzi Yousef, the Sunni extremist who planted the bomb, said later he had hoped to kill 250,000 people."[193] This attack is critical for the discussion of the 2001 attacks for two main reasons. First, beyond judicial measures, the 1993 attack can be classified as a non-react event. I will return to this point in the Discussion section. Second, the involvement of Yousef's uncle, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (hereafter KSM), is a common thread between the 1993 and 2001 attacks. The 9/11 Commission described KSM in the following manner: "No one exemplifies the model of the terrorist entrepreneur more clearly than Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the principal architect of the 9/11 attacks."[194]

KSM, as the principal architect for 9/11, was operating under the direction of Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda[195]. Reports indicate that KSM first met with bin Laden in 1996 and during this meeting he proposed what would later become the plans for the attack on 9/11.[196] Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 6 of *The 9/11 Commission Report* (2004) all provide background information about past encounters between al Qaeda, particularly with bin Laden, and the United States prior to the attacks on September 11. Foley summarizes many of the detailed events in the following paragraph:

> While Al-Qaeda was networking with other groups during the 1990s, it was also developing its core organization, as well as recruiting and training its own operatives and building a structure of operational and support cells in a number of countries. Having spent most of the previous eight years in Sudan, Bin Laden

[192] (*The 9/11 Commission Report* 2004, 71)
[193] (*The 9/11 Commission Report* 2004, 72)
[194] (*The 9/11 Commission Report* 2004, 145)
[195] (*The 9/11 Commission Report* 2004)
[196] (*The 9/11 Commission Report* 2004, 148-149)

> returned to Afghanistan in 1996 and established his base and a number of terrorist training camps there. Thousands flowed through these camps, but no more than a few hundred seem to have become Al-Qaeda members. Some of those recruited joined the operational cells that were to become increasingly active from the mid- to late-1990s. The 1998 bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the attack on the US battleship *Cole* off the coast of Yemen in 2000 were carried out by Al-Qaeda cells under the supervision of Bin Laden and his chief aides. The September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington were similarly directed by Bin Laden and his principal associates.[197]

The main idea behind Foley's analysis is that bin Laden's al Qaeda network was growing rapidly not only in terms of membership, but also in terms of training those members. Al Qaeda was able to signal its growing strength through the attacks against the World Trade Center in 1993, the U.S. embassies in 1998, and the *U.S.S. Cole* in 2000. With each attack, al Qaeda moved one step closer to its ultimate attack in 2001.

Each of the four hijacked planes was intended to make cross-country flights on the morning of September 11. While there is no definitive evidence, it is likely that these flights were chosen because the planes would then have lots of jet fuel in the tanks to create larger explosions at the target locations. Three of the four flights had five hijackers aboard, but United 93 only had four hijackers.[198] While there was confusion on some of the flights about the weapons that the terrorists had armed themselves with, evidence indicates that the terrorists primarily used mace, pocket knives, and the threat of bombs to subdue the passengers. Some passengers, in cell phone calls, stated that the terrorists had firearms, but no evidence can support

[197] (2013, 22-23)
[198] (*The 9/11 Commission Report* 2004, 231-240)

these claims.[199]

Discussion

This discussion section will feature several different areas of analysis. To begin the discussion, I will explain the differences between the 1993 attack and the 2001 attack in the United States. Then I will unpack the two different reactions that the U.S. had a result of the 2001 attacks: "Institutional Change" and "Policy Shift." Next, I will apply Walt's balance of threat theory to the 2001 case. Finally, an analysis of the way that the U.S. perceives terrorist attacks will be provided to fully explain why the U.S. was a react case instead of a non-react case in 2001.

If the United States 1993 attack had been included as a case in this analysis, I would have coded it as a "Non-React" case because there were no measures taken beyond the judicial actions following the attack. The United States 1993 case would also have been coded as a "Large" event with a total magnitude of 1,006 deaths and/or injuries. When the U.S. is attacked in 2001, I coded it as a "React" case. This bears a striking difference to the Japanese cases that were studied in Chapter 3. Both of the Japanese cases were executed by the same organization, much like both of the U.S. attacks. In the 1994 Japan case, there was evidence that a second attack would occur. To relate this to the U.S. case, the 1993 attack indicated that the World Trade Center could be a potential target of attacks by al Qaeda. Yet there is a divergence in comparing these cases when examining the number of deaths that result from each attack. In the Japan 1994 attack, there were seven deaths. There were twelve deaths

[199] (*The 9/11 Commission Report* 2004, 4-14)

as a result of the Japan 1995 attack. In 1993, at the World Trade Center six people died. The U.S. 2001 case caused 2,997 deaths. Both Japanese cases caused a similar number of deaths. But with the U.S. case and its 1993 attack, there is an exponential increase in the number of people who are killed as a result of the terrorist actions. This difference may explain why there is divergence between how I coded the Japanese cases as "Non-React" and the U.S. 2001 case as "React," particularly when the U.S. 1993 attack would have qualified as a "Non-React" case in my study.

There are two different ways that the United States reacted following its attacks in 2001. The first reaction is an "Institutional Change." In November 2002, Congress passed the Homeland Security Act, which called for the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (hereafter, DHS). President George W. Bush offered the proposal entitled *"*The Department of Homeland Security" in June 2002.[200] The proposal explains that "The mission of the Department of Homeland Security would be to: prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism; and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur."[201] Prior to the creation of the DHS, more than one hundred different government organizations dealt with homeland security.[202] Under the DHS, twenty-two separate departments are combined with the strength of one.[203] Ironically, an "Institutional Change" quite similarly structured to the DHS was

[200] "Creation of the Department of Homeland Security." 2014. Accessed February 9. http://www.dhs.gov/creation-department-homeland-security.
[201] Bush, George W. 2002. "The Department of Homeland Security." Washington, DC. http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/book.pdf, 8.
[202] (Bush 2002, 1)

proposed in a publication from March 2001. *Terrorism Threat and U.S. Government Response: Operational and Organizational Factors* (2001) includes a final chapter, by Douglas Menarchik, which outlines the historical path of homeland security and his recommendations for improvements to the system.[204] Most notably, Menarchik calls for unification of the various departments responsible for homeland security under one guidance.[205] Less than two years later, this idea would become a reality as a result of the events on September 11.

The second reaction is a "Policy Shift." In this case, the shift in policy was a declaration of war both metaphoric and literal. Immediately following the attacks, President George W. Bush declared a war against terrorism, more colloquially known as the "War on Terror."[206] Wilcox Jr succinctly describes that "On the basis of compelling information that the Osama bin Laden group was responsible for September 11, the United States launched military attacks against the militant Islamist Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which had given refuge to bin Laden and his senior Al Qaeda henchmen."[207] This case is different from the other cases that have been previously analyzed because the group responsible was an international terrorist organization. Therefore, any actions taken against those responsible will

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[203] ("Creation of the Department of Homeland Security" 2014)
[204] Smith, James M. and William C. Thomas, ed. 2011. *The Terrorism Threat and U.S. Government Response: Operational and Organizational Factors*. US Air Force Academy: USAF Institute for National Security Studies.
[205] Menarchik, Douglas. 2001. "Organizing to Combat 21st Century Terrorism." In *The Terrorism Threat and U.S. Government Response: Operational and Organizational Factors*, edited by Smith, James M. and Thomas, William, C, 219-68. US Airforce Academy: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 227.
[206] (Wilcox Jr 2002, 57)
[207] (2002, 57)

need to take place in a manner other than through domestic judicial measures. Put differently, any actions taken against the terrorists would have to happen at the international level because the domestic judicial system does not have jurisdiction against the group.

The United States opted to take measures beyond the domestic judicial system by tracking down top al Qaeda officials. Following the attacks on September 11, many top officials in the organization were forced into hiding. Among those in hiding were Osama bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri.[208] In 2011, a group of U.S. Navy SEALs located and killed Osama bin Laden. Yet a "second-tier leadership for al Qaeda had already emerged in place of top leadership.[209] So while Americans may have viewed the killing of bin Laden as a success in the campaign against terrorism, his death did not have much impact on the fluid network of al Qaeda and its international presence.

Wilcox Jr (2002) also offers another way to analyze why the United States may have opted for the "Policy Shift" rather than a judicial option. He writes that:

> On the few occasions when the United States has used force to punish or preempt terrorism, the public response has been very positive. A swift, strong, military reaction has an immense cathartic effect in satisfying the anger and outrage Americans feel about terrorist killings of innocent citizens. Force is regarded as an effective message that the United States will not be intimidated by terrorism and a warning to others that such attacks will be avenged. Compared to the tedious and uncertain alternative of using criminal law in response to terrorist crimes, the military option offers the appearance of swift justice.[210]

This quote will begin the discussion about how history, culture, and perception play

[208] (Foley 2013, 23)
[209] (Foley 2013, 23)
[210] (Wilcox Jr 2002, 43)

a role in determining whether or not a country will respond to a terrorist attack. The fact that previous uses of force over judicial measures have had successful results in the past could explain why the government made a similar decision to act with force given the events of September 11. With its historical roots, the use of force has become a cultural norm when responding to terrorist attacks in the United States. Also the positive response that the use of force has received from the public supports the government's decision to use force in a similar manner given the events of this case. One of the key parts of this quote is the last sentence which explains that the use of force over criminal proceedings "offers the appearance of swift justice." Following the attacks on September 11, the public was outraged and calling for swift justice against the attackers.[211]

Before continuing the discussion about how history, culture, and perception of terrorism each play a role in this case, I want to apply the same theoretical framework that I have been using in each case. Walt's balance of threat theory hinges on four main factors: (1) the other actor's available resources; (2) geographic location; (3) offensive power; and (4) offensive intentions. In this case, the U.S. was aware that al Qaeda was responsible for the attacks. And while the government will never a complete picture of al Qaeda's available resources, the fact that it was able to fund nineteen terrorists to fly fully loaded passenger planes into targets indicated that its resources were quite substantial. The two described

[211] Kean, Thomas H and Lee Hamilton. 2006. *Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 4.

reactions came even before the 9/11 Commission was able to uncover some information regarding the actual resources available to the group. The second factor, geographic location, is more challenging to analyze in this case given that al Qaeda is an international organization. However, given that many of the involved actors were from countries in the Middle East, the United States focused its policy reaction on this location. According to Walt's theory, however, the geographic distance between the U.S. and the countries with which it declared war should have been a deterrent for a response. As I noted earlier, the attacks leading up to September 11 can be seen as signals of al Qaeda's offensive power. The fact that this case reported 2,997 deaths and an undocumented amount of injuries are evidence of al Qaeda's offensive intentions.

This case provides a unique opportunity to examine the offensive intentions of the attackers beyond the proxy of combined magnitude. Chapter 11 of *Without Precedent* seeks to explain the 9/11 Commission's mission to answer the question: What were al Qaeda's motives? Two answers are offered to this question: religion or a hatred for the American public/what the United States stands for.[212] To further explain these answers it is critical to also examine the locations of the attacks in terms of symbolic value. Evidence presented by the 9/11 Commission suggests that each of the targets was selected based on its symbolic importance. For example, Mohamed Atta, one of the key leaders of the attacks, wanted one of the targets to be a nuclear facility, but top leadership in al Qaeda vetoed this idea because there was

not enough symbolic value attached to a nuclear facility.[213] The World Trade Center was chosen for its cultural connection to the "arts."[214] The WTC could also have been viewed as a symbol of the economic strength of the United States. The Pentagon was chosen because of its symbolic value to the American "law" and the Capitol or White House target was supposed to be representative of American "politics."[215] While the 9/11 Commission never directly stated why it is important to view the targets as symbols of American culture, examining the targets in this light can help answer questions relating to the offensive intentions of al Qaeda.

The ways that history and culture overlap is manifested in the manner through which a country perceives terrorism. As with all of the other cases, the United States does have a history with terrorist organizations, particularly with al Qaeda. What makes the U.S. different from the other cases that when the U.S. is subjected to a terrorist act it perceives the attack as not only a threat to the nation, but also to the international community as a whole. That is because an attack disrupts international peace and could indirectly impact U.S, interests abroad.[216] Given that the U.S. government perceives an attack in the U.S. as an attack against a larger community, this could explain the "Policy Shift" that occurred following the attacks on September 11. The "Policy Shift" was aimed at not only protecting the United States, but other countries against similar attacks from al Qaeda in the future.

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[212] (Kean and Hamilton 2006, 233)
[213] (*The 9/11 Commission Report* 2004, 245)
[214] (*The 9/11 Commission Report* 2004, 248)
[215] (*The 9/11 Commission Report* 2004, 248)
[216] (Wilcox Jr 2002, 27)

Russia (1999)

Given the nature of the events, the Russia 1999 and Russia 2002 cases will be explained together. The cases are closely related because the Russia 1999 case can be seen as a catalyst for the Russia 2002 case. This will be explained once background for the Russia 1999 case has been outlined. An analysis of the response to the Russia 1999 attack will be provided after the explanation of both the 1999 and 2002 attacks. Although, as explained in Chapter 2, it is still possible to examine the Russia 1999 case as a medium event and the Russia 2002 case as a small event. As an additional note, the Russia 1999 case background will not be as robust as the background for the other cases because many of the details surrounding this attack are still shrouded.

The Russia 1999 case is a series of attacks at various locations in Russia over the course of several days. Two of the attacks occurred in Moscow and the third attack took place in Volgodonsk.[217] On September 9, an explosion occurred at an apartment building on Guryanova Street. Next came an attack, on September 13, on Kashirskoye Highway. Finally, on September 16, a third explosion was set off in Volgodonsk.[218] In terms of overall impact, Dunlop refers to this series of explosions

[217] Myers, Steven Lee. 2003. "Russia Closes File on Three 1999 Bombings." *The New York Times*. May 1, sec. World. http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/01/world/russia-closes-file-on-three-1999-bombings.html.
[218] Carr, Jeff. 2013. "Re-Examining the 1999 Apartment Bombings in Russia." February 20. http://postsovietpost.stanford.edu/discussion/re-examing-1999-apartment-bombings-russia; Dunlop, John. 2013. "The Moscow Bombings of September 1999." February 20. http://postsovietpost.stanford.edu/moscow-bombings-september-1999-full-text.

as the Russian version of 9/11.[219] Dunlop has called for the formation of a commission, similar to the 9/11 Commission, to finally uncover the entire story of the attacks.[220] Across all three explosions there were 289 deaths and an additional 464 people were injured.[221] Based on this magnitude, this case is coded as a medium size attack.

One of the challenging parts of analyzing this case is that the responsible group is still unclear based on the literature. According to Carr, "The state moved quickly to place the blame on Chechen extremists."[222] Wright offers a similar note by stating "Although, there was no direct proof the Chechen terrorists were behind the attacks, most Russians assumed that they were and demanded vengeance."[223] The use of the word *assumed* casts doubt on whether or not the Chechen extremists were actually responsible for this series of bombings. Dunlop's recent book on the topic has caught the media's attention. Carr writes that "According to the *New York Review of Books*, the volume 'makes an overwhelming case' that Russian authorities were complicit in the attacks that not only killed hundreds of their own civilians, but set off a chain of events catapulting Vladmirovich Putin to the presidency."[224] With the implication that the Russian government may have set off the bombs as part of a plan to get President Putin elected, many questions relating to this attack remain.

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[219] (2013)
[220] (2013; Carr 2013)
[221] (START GTD 2012)
[222] (2013)
[223] Wright, Nicolas. 2008a. "Chechen Extremism." *International Terrorism Since 1945.* London: British Broadcasting Corporation.
http://search.alexanderstreet.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/view/work/1792121?play=1.

However, I will examine this case in light of the fact that the Russian prosecutor general's office closed the case in 2003 by stating that the responsible party was a group of Islamic extremists. It is critical to note that "…none of those accused appeared to be Chechens themselves. Rather, they were Muslim fighters from other regions, which raise questions about Russia's stated reason for starting the second war in Chechnya only weeks after the bombings."[225]

Russia (2002)

As I explained in Chapter 2, the Russia 2002 case is different from the other cases for a variety of reasons. It is included as a case study based on a counterfactual history. Additionally, this is the only case that examines a hostage situation. Yet it can be read as an extension and response to the Russia 1999 case because Chechen extremists were aiming at stopping the war in Chechen, which will be further explained below.[226]

Nord Ost was Russia's first musical and it drew crowds that filled theaters. The evening of October 23, 2002 was no exception: Russia's premier musical was playing for a sold out audience.[227] At 9:05pm, Chechen extremists stormed onto the stage and forced the actors to sit in the audience. Then they made their demands: Russia must stop the war in Chechnya within three days or all 800 people in the

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[224] (2013)
[225] (Myers 2003)
[226] As will be explained later in the background information, there are no questions regarding who the specific perpetrators of this hostage situation were.
[227] Makahra, Deborah Schlaff, Peter Hankwitz, Mikko. Alanne, Georgy. Vasiley, Viktoria. Zaspavskia, Marat. Abdrakhimoy, Mark. Frachetti. et al. 2003. *Terror Strikes Moscow*. United States: A&E Television Networks.

theater would die. Additionally, if there was an attempt by Russian forces to seize the theater back from the terrorists, everyone would die immediately.[228] If their demands were not met, and Russia refused to withdraw its troops the extremists were willing to "…start shooting the hostages one by one before blowing up the theater…."[229]

A total of forty two Chechen extremists, led by Movsar Barayev, watched over their hostages and waited for a response from the Russian government. Calling themselves Chechen freedom fighters, all of the extremists are willing to die for their demands.[230] To make their threat credible, the extremists placed two large explosives in theater seats: one in the center of the theater and another on the balcony. Each of these explosives was guarded by a female suicide bomber. Twenty-five additional female suicide bombers sat among the audience members ready to die for their cause. In addition to hand guns, the terrorists also had over one hundred hand grenades.[231]

One striking fact about these Chechen extremists is that when they posted their flag at the front of the theater, it bore Arabic script. The female suicide bombers were also dressed in black robes and wore headdresses to cover their faces with Arabic expressions stitched into the tops. Front these symbols, it appeared as though an "Islamicization" had struck the Chechen movement.[232] Hahn (2007)

[228] (Makahra et al. 2003)
[229] (Wright 2008a)
[230] (Wright 2008a)
[231] (Makahra et al. 2003)
[232] (Makahra et al. 2003)

further explains this "Islamicization" as a direct tie to al Qaeda operatives. He writes that

> The Chechen terrorists who seized Moscow's Dubrovka theatre in October 2002 used al Qaeda's communication strategy to the letter, sending a video to the al-Jazeera television station showing a hostage scene replete with Islamist propaganda. The footage showed female suicide bombers wearing Islamic veils in front of a green banner inscribed with the Arabic words "Allahu akhbar" (God is great). Throughout the video the captors used bin Laden's slogan: "We desire death even more than you desire life." International jihadists, like al Qaeda, are now the model for Chechen-led jihadists' terrorist attacks and guerrilla warfare throughout the North Causcasus.[233]

The connection between Chechen extremists and al Qaeda indicates the growing strength of the al Qaeda network. So Russia was not just facing the threat of Chechnya, but of its allies in the al Qaeda network.

Initially the only communication about the situation was through the use of cell phones that the terrorists distributed among the audience members. The hostages were required to call anyone they knew and explain what was happening and the terrorists' demands. For the first day and a half of the situation, the Russian government officials were nervous because they had no communication from the inside beyond the initial phone calls. The Chechen extremists did not want to talk.[234] Despite the lack of communication, the Russian government did not sit idly. Instead it was working hard to create a plan to successfully raid the theater without causing the terrorists to follow through with their threat to blow up the building if it was breached by police and military forces.[235] Yet the decision to take the theater by force signals that Russia is unwilling to consider withdrawing its troops from

[233] Hahn, Gordon M. 2007. *Russia's Islamic Threat*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 39.
[234] (Makahra et al. 2003)
[235] (Makahra et al. 2003)

Chechnya. Wright notes that only "…one thing is certain, Putin will never agree to pull out of Chechnya."[236]

As the plans for raiding the theater begin to emerge, one plan is considered to be more viable than the rest, but it does not come without risk. The Russian government was aware that the resolve of the Chechen extremists was incredibly high and that a forced entry would likely lead to a bloody battle. Chechen resolve was signaled when a young civilian woman entered the theater to demand that the siege be given up. She was shot dead immediately.[237] Based on this event, the Russian government had little hope that a forced entry would end the situation. Instead, it needed a plan to subdue the terrorists before entering the complex. At this point, a highly controversial plan was created to fill the theater with a knockout gas. Using knockout gas would not only affect the terrorists, but also the hostages. And given the unpredictability of how knockout gas can affect an individual; the government was running a risk of using it on nearly 850 people.[238] Dr. Mark Wheelis explained that knockout gas affects an individual's central nervous system; therefore the authorities needed to use just enough to knockout everyone, but not enough to cause lethality.[239] Despite the potential risks, the plan garnered approval from Putin. Just hours before the deadline, Russian authorities began to leak the gas into the theater using the air conditioning system.[240]

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[236] (2008a)
[237] (Wright 2008a; Makahra et al. 2003)
[238] (Wright 2008a; Makahra et al. 2003)
[239] (Quoted in Wright 2008a)
[240] (Wright 2008a; Makahra et al. 2003)

As the gas began to leak into the theater, the Chechen extremists realized what was happening and immediately prepared to follow through with their plan. The women were ready to detonate their bombs and the men rushed to the front doors to thwart any chances of taking the building before the explosion occurred. Right as the Russia Special Forces entered the building, some of the hostages who had not been impacted by the gas walked out of the building.[241] Within a half hour, the Russian Special Forces had killed all of the Chechen extremists without losing a single solider. Then they began to remove the hostages from the theater as quickly as possible because the Special Forces were afraid that the building was still going to explode.[242]

As the Special Forces began to move the hostages out of the building, the impact of the risk of using a knockout gas became apparent. A total of 129 people died as a result of this incident.[243] Whether or not the knockout gas was the cause of death of the hostages is still in question today. Each death certificate leaves the cause of death blank. Instead, forensic evidence has tried to establish that the lack of food, water, and movement were the cause of death. Alternatively, some victims' families were told that their loved one suffered from pre-existing medical conditions that were the leading causes in their deaths.[244]

In memory of the victims and to prove that the attacks did not have the desired impact, *Nord Ost* was re-staged in February 2004. Its nationalistic themes

[241] (Makahra et al. 2003; Wright 2008a)
[242] (Makahra et al. 2003)
[243] (START GTD 2012; Makahra et al. 2003)

were a sign of defiance against the terrorists. The actors wanted to prove that they were strong and could move beyond the event. Unfortunately, three months later, the show was forced to close because people feared that a copy-cat attack would occur. When the theater was renovated following the attack, the families of the victims fought to make sure that the memory of their loved ones would not be forgotten. To this day, a placard is hung outside of the building bearing the names of all of those lost in the event.[245]

Discussion

Both the Russia 1999 case and the Russia 2002 case lead to a "Policy Shift" with how Russian government handled the Chechnya territory. Following the attacks in 1999, the Russian government declared war on Chechnya, which would become known as the Second Chechen War.[246] The decision to invade Chechnya received a 64 percent public approval rating in Russia.[247] President Putin's decision to invade Chechnya led to an increase in his approval rating as well. Carr (2013) reports that "His approval rating rose from 53 percent in September to 66 in October, and 78 in November." So not only did the administration make changes in how it was handling Chechnya, but it was widely supported by the Russian people at the time that the decision was made to invade. Then the Russia 2002 case is also classified as a "Policy Shift" because the Russian government took a no concessions approach when the extremists made their demands that troops be removed from

[244] (Makahra et al. 2003)
[245] (Makahra et al. 2003)
[246] (Hahn 2007, 33; Carr 2013)

Chechnya. Instead, the Russian government moved forward with its own rescue mission despite the threat that the building would be exploded if the Russian military tried to take the theater by force. Hahn explains that this "Policy Shift" became a more permanent change in the Russian government. He writes that "Since the beginning of the guerrilla war Putin's policy has consisted of… refusing to negotiate with any Chechens…."[248]

In order to garner a full understanding of why both Russian cases are coded as "React" cases, it is necessary to start with the history of the relations between Russia and the Chechnya territory. Chechnya and Russia have had a strained relationship since the mid-19th century when the Russian Empire first conquered the territory.[249] Since that time, Chechnya has attempted to take several grasps of freedom. Most notably, Chechnya claimed independence from the Soviet Union during World War II and even declared war to assert their independence. But Joseph Stalin took action against this claim of independence and forced deported the Chechens to Siberia.[250] Following these events, there have been both times of peace and times of conflict regarding the status of Chechnya within Russia.[251] As I will explain later in this discussion section, the history of the region plays a role in how terrorism is perceived in Russia and thus provides a potential explanation about why the Russian government reacted with a "Policy Shift" for both cases being

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[247] (Carr 2013)
[248] (Hahn 2007, 33)
[249] (Wright 2008a; Makahra et al. 2003)
[250] (Wright 2008a)
[251] (Wright 2008a)

examined.

This case will benefit from the use of Walt's balance of threat theoretical framework. When considering Chechnya's available resources, there are two factors to consider. First is that the established tied between Chechnya and al Qaeda, which is stressed by *The 9/11 Commission Report* (2004) and Hahn (2007), can be interpreted as an increase in the number of resources available to Chechen extremists. In this case, the available resources from al Qaeda could be both monetary and knowledge of how to improve warfare tactics. The second factor to consider when thinking about available resources is the evidence that suggests that Chechen extremists were receiving funding from Russian government officials. Quite a bit of evidence has emerged in the years since the 1999 attacks that top Kremlin officials were funding Chechen extremists with the hopes of leading the country into war.[252] If this evidence holds any weight, then the Russian government would have been aware of some of the resources available to Chechnya, which would have made the government more likely to react to the threat. Chechnya is located in the North Caucasus approximately one thousand miles south of Moscow and is completely landlocked.[253] Given the location of Chechnya within Russia, the threat caused by attacks originating within the region would likely make the Russian government more responsive to any attacks. Additionally, considering the history of the region, Russia's desire to keep Chechnya as part of Russia would make

[252] (Dunlop 2013)
[253] (Wright 2008a)

it more likely to that the Russian government would respond to any attacks because the government would want to keep the region as non-reactive as possible. Offensive power in these cases can also be considered from the same angles as the available resources with the additional consideration taken about Chechnya's display of power. The Chechen display of offensive power is most clear from their resolution to take eight hundred hostages and refuse any negotiations with the Russian government. With this display of power alone, Russia would be more likely to react to any attacks because the government could have been concerned about escalating the risk for its citizens. Finally, we will consider this case in terms of offensive intentions. Both the Russia 1999 case and the Russia 2002 case were actions taken by the Chechen extremists to harm as many people as possible in order to bring attention to their fight for independence.

Mathematician Andrei Piontkovsky provides the best analysis about how Chechen terrorism was received in Russia during the times of both attacks. He explains that "…in the public consciousness, the word 'Chechen' has already become a synonym for 'terrorist,' and it is also linked to the word 'destroy.'"[254] So the general notion about Chechen terrorism was the Russian government had to put a stop to the actions. If we unpack this quote, then there is also a sense that the problem with Chechnya has moved from a dispute over regional autonomy to an issue of national security concern. This view is also expressed in the public support that the government received for its decision to invade Chechnya in 1999. Much like

the United States 2001 case, the Russian government receives swift public support for its strong use of force against the threat of a terrorist organization. The shift in focus of Chechnya being viewed as a location that is associated with terrorism instead of a location that desires political autonomy can also serve as an explanation for why there is a "Policy Shift" in both cases.

[254] (Quoted in Carr 2013)

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

Assessment of Hypotheses

My analysis has focused on an assessment of Walt's balance of threat theory as it is related to assessing the threat of terrorism. The argument that has emerged throughout this analysis is that Walt's theory can provide the basis for understanding why some countries will react to terrorist attacks and others will not; however, this theory fails to provide a complete explanation of this question. In order to fill in the holes that this theory leaves, we must consider three additional factors: a country's history, culture, and perception of terrorism. Each of these factors can provide insight about why a country will choose to react and which reaction will be manifested. When considering this "full picture," what we find is that no two cases are exactly the same, but that there can be some patterns that emerge.

Perception of terrorism appears to be the key element to deciding whether or not a nation-state will react to a terrorist attack. While, the perception portion of the analysis relates most closely to history and cultural elements of my hypotheses, I did not directly account for this in my hypotheses. I have found that the discussion on history and culture of each nation-state informs the perceptions that nation-state has about terrorism. Japan perceives terrorism as a crisis management situation because of a cultural norm that formed following the historical period of a militaristic state. As a result, Japan does not want a strong police force or to take any actions to strengthen its national security forces. The United Kingdom is slightly

different because it treats terrorism as a crime, which calls for only judicial measures to take place following an attack. Even when faced with the choice of strengthening national security measures the United Kingdom is hesitant because of its history with the IRA. Yet when the United States was attacked in 2001 it viewed the terrorist actions as a threat to both national and international security. This is likely because of the escalation of attacks from al Qaeda against the United States. Additionally, historically the United States government received strong support from its citizens when force was used against threatening powers.

The fact that both Japan and Russia both had two case studies strengthens the arguments about whether or not those nation-states will react to a terrorist attack. Yet the United States could be used as a counter-point given that there was a shift over time in how terrorism was perceived within the nation-state. To explain this, however, we need to consider the time lapse between all of the cases. The U.S. was attacked in 1993 and then again in 2001. During this time lapse there is a paradigm shift. Japan is attacked in 1994 and then again in 1995, but there is no change in the coding it as "Non-React" because during both events Japan viewed the attacks as a "crisis situation." Russia is attacked in 1999 and 2002, but the fact that the reaction from the first attack caused the war that the second attack was protesting, it is unsurprising that the second attack would also result in reaction.

In my analysis, there were three cases that were coded "Non-React" and four cases that were coded "React." The Spain 2004 case, while coded "React," bears differences from the other three cases with which it is grouped. This is highlighted

by the counterfactual analysis that I provide at the end of the case study. What makes this case different is that the reaction that occurred within the nation-state following the terrorist attack was driven by the citizens, through their right to vote, rather than by the government. Both of the Russian cases and the United States 2001 case illustrate reactions from the nation-state that are driven by the government. While the governments of these nation-states may have been persuaded by the citizens, the ultimate responsibility for the changes is attributed to the governments of Russia and the United States. If we consider these case studies to be a sample of the all the cases available for consideration, then this indicates that when reaction occurs as the result of a terrorist attack that it will most frequently be a reaction from the government of the nation-state that is attacked.

This leads to a discussion about the three sub-hypotheses regarding the three types of reactions: "Government Change," "Policy Shift," and "Institutional Change." For a "Government Change" to occur, I hypothesized that "If the citizens of a targeted country feel unsatisfied by the governmental response to a large terrorist attack and there is exogenous election timing, then an incumbent government or party will be unseated or voted out of office."[255] This hypothesis appears to be reflected in the Discussion section of the Spain 2004. Next, the "Policy Shift" hypothesis was "If a terrorist attack happens when a country is in negotiations with the terrorist network that causes the attack, then the government in the targeted

[255] This wording is quoted directly from my Hypotheses section. The same will be true of the direct quotes for the "Policy Shift" and "Institutional Change."

country will change its policies for handling the situation from diplomatic to military. Thus there will be an escalation in the situation." Both Russian cases and the United States case were coded as "Policy Shift" cases. I believe that the evidence I uncovered tells a more powerful story about how history and culture dictate the types of responses, specifically policy responses that a nation-state is going to display. Therefore, I would say that this hypothesis was incorrect in light of the analysis that I provided. Finally, the "Institutional Change" hypothesis stated that "If a targeted country finds that a terrorist attack occurred as a result of a lapse in its national security institutions, then its national security institutions will undergo an organizational change in the aftermath of the attack." The only case coded with an "Institutional Change" was the United States 2001 case. Once again, evidence appears to support this hypothesis.

Future research could be done to test if this analysis could be used as a predictability model for future attacks. The idea would be use a nation-states history and culture to determine whether or not it would react to a terrorist attack. Then if it would be coded as a "React" situation, an author could then assess the type of reaction that the nation-state would have. This would be difficult to test, however, because it would be based on events that have not occurred yet or someone would have to wait until an event occurred that would elicit this type of analysis.

Future Research

To strengthen the argument that I have presented, I would want to apply my analysis to more case studies. Expanding the number of case studies would provide

a greater opportunity to hone in the specificities of the argument. The addition of a case that would not fit into the assessment that I have proposed would also be useful for understanding the weaknesses in my analysis. Conversely, taking the time to focus on each of the case studies individually could also yield more insight into the intricacies of the events, which might provide greater clarity on the analysis that I have already done.

One of the problems that I encountered from using Walt's balance of threat theory is that he never addresses how much weight should be given to each of the four factors that are outlined for determining the threat that another country poses. When translating this theory to my analysis on terrorism, I encountered a similar problem. I was uncertain about which factors should be weighed more heavily than others. This made some of the analysis challenging because it does not always offer a complete picture of why a country was reacted or did not react to a specific terrorist event. Further research could be done to try and see if there is a pattern that is associated with each of these factors and how each is weighted in various situations. This could either be done in Walt's original intentions by examining when countries chose to create alliances with or against threatening state powers; another option would be to analyze this from the perspective of how countries weigh the threats of terrorist actions and terrorist organizations.

In the literature review, I explained that the words "national security" and "homeland security" are often used interchangeably. Figure 3 in Appendix B shows that following 9/11 that "homeland security" is being used more frequently in

literature. It would be interesting to study the driving factors of this increased usage. Additionally, trying to find if there is divergence between the two phrases and if there are differences in connotation could be another question for future research. In a similar line of analysis, a researcher could conduct interviews with authors to find out if there is a reason why one phrase is used over the other phrase in their publication. A study of that nature would unveil whether or not authors make conscious word choices in terrorism research. This type of research might be better suited for Linguistics or English; however, the overlap between the areas of study would be case for an interdisciplinary publication.

Nature of the Cases Studied

To complete this analysis, I want to explain the nature of the cases that I have selected to study. If an average magnitude is calculated from the project dataset, it is 500 deaths and/or injuries per event. If an average magnitude is calculated from the entire GTD database, it is approximately 5 deaths and/or injuries per event. I use these averages to illustrate the fact that the cases that I have selected to study are those with a much greater magnitude than the average case in the GTD database. The cases that I have selected for my dataset are not the "typical" scale terrorist attack. Figures 5 and 6 show the project dataset illustrated as a histogram.[256] The take away point from Figures 5 and 6 is that many of the case studies that I selected to analyze in this thesis are outliers in the dataset. Yet these are the cases that most

[256] See Appendix B for Figures 5 and 6.

frequently elicit a reaction. Figure 6 shows the number of cases in the project dataset with a magnitude of less than 1,000. This helps highlight that most of the cases tend to be smaller in scale. Research into this phenomenon might be able to provide more insight about whether or not magnitude impacts whether or not a nation-state will respond to a terrorist attack.

This thesis is meant to start the discussion on the variance in responses to terrorist attacks. As an area that has received little attention within terrorism research, the analysis that I have provided only scratches the surface of what could possibly be found. These cases may be outliers on the scale; however, the importance of each cannot be emphasized enough. I hope that my research will ignite others to ask similar questions and seek new answers. What I have learned through this process is that research is not simply about being right; it is about finding the right answers. Even if another researcher proves my analysis incorrect, there will be growth within the field of study. I encourage others to set upon the task of finding answers to these questions and many others that arise as a result of these questions.

Appendix A

How to Use the GTD

I drew upon several specific web pages from the GTD. Rather than citing each page individually, I will provide an explanation of how to navigate the database. Each event has a specific numerical identification code that can be used to locate it in the database. All of the codes follow the same format which consists of the date and a specific event code. The date is listed as "yyyymmdd." So September 11, 2001 would be coded as 20010911. Then the event code would be added to the end; for example, "0004" would then make the code 200109110004. Because the GTD will list each location as an isolated event, for example 9/11 is listed as four separate events in the database, I found that it is best to drop the last digit off the code when searching the database. When you do this, it will open all of the events that occurred on the specific date that you are researching. Any one of the cases that I analyzed in this thesis can be found through this method. For further information about the coding system and how the database can be used, please see the GTD Codebook, which is available online.[257]

How to Use TOPs

START TOPs is a qualitative database that was compiled by the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT). It is a subsection of the START GTD. Much like the GTD, I use several web pages from START TOPs, so I want to provide an explanation of how to navigate this qualitative database. There is a

search box on the main page where you can enter the specific terrorist organization that you are looking for or there is an option to view an alphabetized list to find a group. So this database is quite simple to use. The only potential problem that you may encounter is making sure that you have the group name correct. This can be particularly tricky if the group name has been translated to English from another language.

How to Use Google Books Ngram Viewer

Google Books Ngram Viewer uses the corpus of Google books to graph the frequency of words and/or phrases used over time. Using the tool is very straight forward. You just type in the word or phrase that you want to see into the search box. If you have multiple words or phrases, those will need to be separated by commas. It is possible to change the time range, language, and smoothing effect on each of the graphs that you produce. IN order to provide the readers with the specific graphs that I created, I took a screenshot of the output. It is also possible to embed a link directly into a specific text.

[257] (START GTD 2012)

Appendix B

Figure 1



Figure 2



Figure 3


Google books Ngram Viewer
Graph these comma-separated phrases: national security,homeland security
case-insensitive
between 1800 and 2008 from the corpus English (2009) with smoothing of 3 .
Search lots of books
0.000550%
0.000500%
0.000450%
0.000400%
0.000350%
0.000300%
0.000250%
0.000200%
0.000150%
0.000100%
0.000050%
0.000000%
1800
1820
1840
1860
1880
1900
1920
1940
1960
1980
2000
national security
homeland security
(click on line/label for focus)

Figure 5[258]



[258] Figures 5 and 6 were produced using the dataset that I compiled for this analysis. The actual histograms were produced by Professor Mika LaVaque-Manty. I want to thank him for creating these histograms twice (once as a rough draft and the final product that you see here).

Figure 6


Terrorist incidents with fewer than 1000 casualties
Number of incidents
60
40
20
0
0
300
600
900
Magnitude

Databases Referenced

Google Books. 2004. "Ngram Viewer." https://books.google.com/ngrams/.

Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT). 2014. "Terrorist Organization Profiles." http://www.start.umd.edu/tops/.
Note: Within the text, the citations for this source always read (START TOPs 2014).

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2012). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd
Note: Within the text, the citations for this source always read (START GTD 2012).

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Note: In the text, this source is simply referred to as (*The 9/11 Commission Report* 2004).

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