

## Dolev's Anti-Metaphysical Realism: A Critique

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In Time and Realism: Metaphysical and Antimetaphysical Perspectives, Yuval Dolev (2007) argues that the metaphysical debate between tensed and tenseless theorists (presentists and eternalists; A-theorists and B-theorists) in the philosophy of time is ultimately incoherent.<sup>1</sup> His perspective is unlike those who argue that these views are indistinguishable because the apparent debate is either based on semantic confusions centering on the equivocal uses of the word 'exist', or on the indistinguishability of tensed-transition and tenseless-transition.<sup>2</sup> Although Dolev believes that working through the metaphysics of the tensed and tenseless views is indispensable if we are to arrive at a proper understanding of time, he argues that the debate must ultimately be transcended by recognizing that both views rest on a common thread—an ontological assumption—that cannot be sustained. The ontological assumption is that 'tense concerns the ontological status of things' (p. ix); which implies that the central question in the philosophy of time is whether past, present and future objects are ontologically on a par, being equally real, or are there real ontological differences between these tense determinations? For example, does the present have a reality that the past and future do not have? Dolev argues that these queries depend on the metaphysical theories that give rise to them and since those theories make use of terms, such as, 'tenseless relations' and 'the moving now' that are themselves unintelligible and empty notions, the theories and questions they give rise to and sought to answer are also unintelligible and empty. He believes that by coming to this realization, 'a systematic dissolution of the traditional philosophical questions concerning time is brought about' (p. 60).

The aim of this paper is to defend the metaphysics of time against Dolev's attack. My response to Dolev is to demonstrate that his understanding of the debate, as centering on the

reality of past, present and future events and things, while typical, is not sufficiently sensitive to the more fundamental ontological differences between the disputants in the metaphysics of time. For that reason he fails to consider a third ontological alternative to his characterization of the tensed and tenseless views. With the emergence of this third metaphysical theory of time we shall see that Dolev's main arguments against the coherence of traditional metaphysical questions concerning time can be refuted. First a few words about ontology.

Ontology has as its subject matter everything that exists or all the entities there are, and its aim with regard to that subject matter is to determine what categories or most general principles of classification there are, and then to say something about the relations between those categories. Of course ontology does not consider each existent one by one, but is concerned primarily with the most general categories (for example, things, relations, qualities, identity), founded on the most ubiquitous phenomena. Its aim is to specify to what category or categories certain general classes of phenomena belong, and then to say something about that category.<sup>3</sup> Thus, to answer the ontological question: What is the nature of time? is to give an inventory of all temporal entities, or rather, of the category or categories of entities they belong to. Certainly, time is a basic and ubiquitous phenomenon and thus is within the purview of ontological explanation. What then are the temporal phenomena? and what category or categories are temporal phenomena based? Before addressing those questions I want to briefly consider aspects of C. D. Broad's conception of philosophy and relate it to the ontology of time. This background will set the stage for a consideration of Dolev's critique of the metaphysics of time, and my critique of Dolev.

According to Broad, one aspect of the subject matter of Philosophy—Critical Philosophy—consists in 'the analysis and definition of our fundamental concepts, and the clear

statement and resolute criticism of our fundamental beliefs' (Broad 1923: 18). In our everyday dealings with the world we make use of general concepts and apply them without having a clear idea of their meaning or their relations. Common sense constantly uses concepts in terms of which it interprets experience, for example, when 'it talks of things of various kinds; it says that they have places and dates, that they change, and that changes in one cause changes in others, and so on. Thus it makes constant use of such concepts or categories as thinghood, space, time, change, cause, etc' (1923: 15). For ordinary purposes it does not matter that we are not clear about the precise meaning and relations between and among the concepts we employ, but for the purposes of determining what entities fall under these concepts their meaning must be clear and unambiguous.

The second task of Critical Philosophy is take those uncritically accepted, deeply rooted beliefs that we employ in ordinary life and in the sciences, to state them clearly and then to subject them to criticism. Of course, in order to state clearly our deeply held beliefs such as that 'events pass or flow through time from the future to the present and into the past', or that 'every change has a cause', we must first know exactly what is meant by time's flow or passage, the notions of past, present and future, and the concept of change and cause. Thus, the critical examination of beliefs presupposes an analysis of the notions employed, and they too must be subject to critical examination. Only in that way can we have some degree of certainty that we have arrived at the truth.

Russell once expressed the sentiments involved in Broad's notion of 'Critical Philosophy' in the following passage:

The process of sound philosophizing, . . . consists mainly in passing from those obvious, vague, ambiguous things, that we feel quite sure of, to something

precise, clear, definite, which by reflection and analysis we find is involved in the vague thing that we start from, and is, so to speak, the real truth of which that vague thing is a sort of shadow. (1918, 1964: 179-80)

For Broad, the process of arriving at ‘the real truth of which that vague thing is a sort of a shadow’ that is, the proper analysis or description of a concept, and the phenomena on which that concept is based, is facilitated by making use of what Broad calls The Principle of Pickwickian Senses. According to this principle, the proper analysis of a phenomenon or a concept may not be what common sense implicitly and unknowingly takes it to be, since the implicit analysis, if in fact there is one, may be subject to dialectical difficulties and not hold up to critical examination. The Pickwickian sense of a concept, although perhaps not intuitive, has the advantage that it is quite certain that there is something that answers to it, ‘whereas with the other definitions of the same entities this cannot be shown to be so’ (1924: 93).

Broad gives as an example, Whitehead’s Pickwickian definitions of points, and moments in which it is certain:

( $\alpha$ ) that they exist; ( $\beta$ ) that they have to each other the sort of relations which we expect points and moments to have; and ( $\gamma$ ) that there is an intelligible and useful, though Pickwickian, sense in which we can say that volumes are “composed of” points, and durations of moments. (Broad 1924: 95)

Similarly, the existence of certain phenomenological facts that need an ontological ground may be accounted for by a set of facts that might not be what common sense implicitly take them to be, but they may be the best we can get and entirely suitable to account for the phenomenology of the situation. In other words, the principle allows that even if an analysis is not the one that is implicitly assumed by common sense (assuming with Broad, for the moment, that there is an

implicit ontology in common sense), we can still accept that there exist entities that fall under the concept or ground the phenomenology, and justify the application of the concept.

Broad uses the concepts of the ‘self’ and ‘matter’ to explain an error that can come about from failing to see the distinction implied by The Principle of Pickwickian Senses between our ordinary concepts, beliefs and phenomenological data on the one hand, and the analysis or proper description of those concepts, beliefs and data on the other. One such error occurs in the following passage where Broad notes that questions like: Does matter exist? or Is the self real? cannot be answered with a simple yes or no. He continues,

Unquestionably there are facts in the world to which the names “matter” and “self” apply; and in that sense they are names of something real. But it is vitally important to distinguish between facts and the proper analysis or description of facts. The words “matter” and “self,” as commonly used, do suggest certain theories about the facts to which they are applied. These theories are never clearly recognized or explicitly stated by common-sense; and, on critical analysis, they are often found to consist of a number of propositions of very different degrees of importance and certainly. E.g., I think there is very little doubt that the word “self,” as commonly used, implies something like the Pure Ego theory of the structure of those entities which we call “selves.” Hence anyone who rejects the Pure Ego theory is, in one sense, “denying the reality of the self.” But, if he offers an alternative analysis, which does equal justice to the peculiar unity which we find in the things called “selves,” he is, in another sense, “accepting the reality of the self.” Whenever one particular way of analyzing a certain concept has been almost universally, though tacitly, assumed, a man who rejects this analysis

will seem to others (and often to himself) to be rejecting the concept itself. (1924: 94-95).

According to Broad, however, that would be a mistake. We must distinguish, Broad says, between facts, what I shall call ‘common sense facts’ and the proper analysis or description of those facts, what I shall call ‘ontological facts’. There are, undoubtedly, common sense facts to which the term ‘self’ applies, that is, there are selves commonsensically speaking, and it may be, as Broad suggests, that a particular ontological analysis of the self is tacitly accepted (though never clearly recognized or explicitly stated) by common sense. However, if upon critical examination it is seen that there are reasons to reject that analysis and if an alternative analysis of the self can be given that accounts for all of the common sense and phenomenological facts that need to be accounted for, such as “the unity of the self,” then one can accept that the concept of the self has an application and thus that the self exists. Thus, it is a mistake to assume that if one rejects what is tacitly assumed by common sense (or a specific ontological analysis); one is thereby rejecting the concept and denying that there exist entities that fall under that concept.

Broad gives an example of this mistake in the following passage:

Thus, James raises the question: “Does Consciousness Exist?”, and suggests a negative answer. But really neither James nor anyone else in his senses doubts the existence of certain facts to which we apply the name “consciousness.” The whole question is: What is the right analysis of these facts?” Do they involve an unique kind of stuff, which does not occur in non-conscious facts; or is their peculiarity only one of structure? To deny the first alternative is not really to deny the existence of consciousness; it is merely to deny an almost universally held theory about consciousness. (1924: 95)

In this passage Broad is drawing a distinction between the common sense facts or pre-analytic data and the ontological facts or the ground of that data; a distinction that is at the heart of Broad's doctrine of Pickwickian senses. He believes that failing to recognize it can easily lead to 'unprofitable discussions' (1924: 95).

In his book, On Philosophical Method (1980), Hector-Neri Castañeda's articulates in detail something like this distinction.<sup>4</sup> However, whereas Castañeda speaks of "protophilosophical data" and philosophical theories that compete in trying to elucidate these data, Broad seems to believe that common sense contains or implies an articulate, although perhaps unacceptable, ontological theory of various phenomena. Indeed, his doctrine of "Pickwickian" senses is meant to highlight that the correct philosophical analysis of a category is intended to be taken in a sense other than the literal one implicit in common sense.

Of course, one may question, as I do, whether common sense or intuitive beliefs about the self, matter, consciousness, time or whatever, actually reflect an implicit ontology at all and even if they do, whether that has ontological significance.<sup>5</sup> However, regardless of whether or not ordinary concepts and beliefs have an implicit, unrecognized ontology, Broad and Russell are surely right in maintaining that the difference between the phenomenological data and pre-analytic, common sense facts, on the one hand, and the analysis of that data or the ontological facts that are their ground, on the other, is important and useful in arriving at the real truth that underlies the vague facts we start off with. In other words, even if common sense has an implicit theory about the meaning of a concept it employs, that does not imply that the proper ontological analysis of those facts is implicit in or given by common sense. In addition to overlooking a third metaphysic of time, one of the major pitfalls in Dolev's critique of "tenseless relations" and more generally his anti-metaphysical stance regarding the philosophy of time is his failure to

properly recognize Broad's Principle of Pickwickian Senses and, more broadly, the distinction between common sense and ontology that follows from it.

To begin to see what is involved in these claims and to defend them, I shall first turn to a brief discussion of temporal phenomenology. There are two aspects of our experience, thought and language of time that philosophers of time have taken to be of crucial importance. Broad refers to these features as the extensive and the transitory aspects of time. The extensive aspect of time consists in the fact that any two experiences of the same person stand to each other in a determinate temporal relation of earlier/later than or simultaneity.<sup>6</sup> The transitory aspect of time consists in the fact that events or experiences that are once wholly in the future keep on becoming less and less remotely future, eventually become present, and then cease to be present, recede into the immediate past, and then keep on becoming more and more remotely past. I should add that when some philosophers talk of the transitory aspect of time they also have in mind the idea that time is *dynamic*, that time involves a *flow* or *flux* from one event to another one, and not a *static* relation between them. Broad claims, regarding the transitory aspect:

There is no doubt that the sentences which I have just been quoting [e.g., "Thank God (on the theistic hypothesis) that's over now!"] record facts and that such facts are of the very essence of Time. But it is, of course, quite possible that the grammatical form of these sentences is highly misleading. It may dispose people to take for granted a certain view of the structure and the elements of these facts and this view may be mistaken and may lead to difficulties and contradictions.

(1938: 267)

This passage is ambiguous because the notion of 'fact' is ambiguous. At the level of common sense it is a fact—a 'common sense fact'—that events, including experiences, stand in the



relations of earlier/later than and simultaneous with, other events. It is also a common sense fact that events which were once in the future become present and then recede into the past. At the pre-analytic level of common sense the existence of such facts is ontologically neutral in that it may suggest a certain ontological analysis, but it does not commit one to that analysis. Thus, when Broad says that the facts recorded by sentences such as ‘I am going to have a painful experience at the dentist’s tomorrow’, are of the essence of time, he may be using ‘fact’ to refer to a common sense fact. In that case, no specific view of the ontological analysis of the structure of that fact is required or implied based on the grammatical form of the natural language tensed sentence used to record it or the phenomena on which it is based.

However, when Broad says that sentences about the becoming of events record facts that are of the ‘very essence of Time’, he may be using the notion of ‘fact’ in a metaphysically loaded sense. In that case, tensed sentences in a metaphysically perspicuous language represent ontological facts that are the result of philosophical analysis about the essence of temporal reality. Without prejudging what Broad takes the structure and the elements of the ontological facts of time to be, we can use these two notions of ‘fact’ to both clarify one understanding of “tenseless relations” and “tenseless time” found in Broad and Russell (hereafter called the ‘B/R’ theory), and demonstrate that Dolev fails to consider this version of “tenseless time” in his critique of the traditional problems of the metaphysics of time.

In his first writings on time, while under the influence of Russell (1915), Broad claimed that the experience of succession is the foundation of all other awareness of temporal phenomena; that all the common sense facts about time can be grounded in ontological facts based on the extensive aspect of time. Consider this passage from Broad’s encyclopedia article on ‘Time’,

Temporal characteristics are among the most fundamental in the objects of our experience, and therefore cannot be defined. We must start by admitting that we can in certain cases judge that one experienced event is later than another, in the same immediate way as we can judge that one seen object is to the right of another. A good example of the immediate judgment in question is when we hear a tune and judge that of two notes, both of which come in our specious present, one precedes the other. Another direct judgment about earlier and later is made in genuine memory. On these relations of before and after which we immediately recognize in certain objects of our experience all further knowledge of time is built. (1921: 143)

By taking the relation of before and after (or earlier than/later than) as fundamental and indefinable, and claiming that all further knowledge of time is built from those relations Broad is asserting that temporal relations must be taken as simple, unanalyzable entities of one's ontology. To say that they are simple and undefined implies that they are irreducible and so cannot be analyzed or reduced to the non-relational temporal properties of pastness, presentness and futurity of their terms and for the early Broad (and Russell) there are no such mind-independent *or* mind-dependent monadic temporal properties.<sup>7</sup> It means, moreover, that temporal relations can exist even if their terms do not have non-relational temporal properties. On the TENSEless (B/R) theory, time consists solely of relations. Of course, there are other temporal entities. The terms of temporal relations, and the ontological facts that have temporal relations as constituents, may also be called "temporal" in virtue of their connection with temporal relations which are thereby the only intrinsically temporal entities in this relational ontology of time. On the B/R-theory, there are no temporal individuals, such as moments or

time points; there are no monadic temporal TENSED properties; and there is no absolute becoming understood either as the coming into and going out of existence of objects or events, as the donning and doffing of TENSED properties, or in any other way, for example, the accretion of facts.<sup>8</sup>

When Broad asserts that all further knowledge of time is built up from the relations of before and after we should not take him to be denying the reality of passage or the transitory aspect of time, nor need he be interpreted as claiming that the passage of time is an illusion, but rather to be claiming that the common sense fact that time passes or flows can be grounded with ontological facts involving exclusively temporal relations between events including mental events. Dolev claims that ‘phenomenology preempts ontological issues before they can rear their head’ (p. 10), but for some, and I would count Broad among them, ontology and phenomenology go together. Phenomenology provides the subject matter of ontology, it does not preempt ontological issues since different ontological theories may be claimed to comport with the temporal phenomena.

The B/R theorist can agree that the passage of time involves an experience of ‘the flow of successively existing events’ (Paul 2010, ) or as Donald C. Williams once put it, ‘we are immediately and poignantly involved in the jerk and whoosh of process, and the felt flow of one moment to the next’ (Williams 1951, 465-456). What I am suggesting is that when Broad and Russell appeal to the experience of succession and characterize that relation as the simple and unanalyzable ground of ‘all further knowledge of time’, it is consistent with such a view and the phenomenological data to maintain that the ground of the flow of successively existing events, and the felt flow from one moment to the next is in these B/R TENSEless relations alone. On this interpretation of Broad and Russell, TENSEless relations are dynamic and not static, and the

ontological ground of the extensive and transitory aspects of time is built up from those relations. On this version of the TENSEless view, although not on some others, it is a mistake to claim that on the TENSEless view, TENSE is a mind-dependent illusion. In this regard the B/R view is a third metaphysical alternative distinguishable from other versions of the tenseless view.

Thus, for example, Laurie Paul sets herself the task of explaining how the existence of a static, four-dimensional universe of a series of changeless events standing in unchanging temporal relations can explain the ‘flow of successively existing events ... responsible for the animated character or flow of change’. (Paul, 2010: 334). Paul responds by arguing that even in the static universe of the four-dimensionalist the reductionist can provide, “an account of how temporal experience could arise from the way the brains of conscious beings experience and interpret cognitive inputs from series of static events’ (2010: 339). Her explanation goes something like this:

When we have an experience as of passage, we can interpret this as an experience that is the result of the brain producing a neural state that represents inputs from earlier and later temporal stages and simply “fills in” the representation of motion or of changes. Thus, according to the reductionist, there is no real flow or animation in changes that occur across time. Rather, a stage of one’s brain creates the illusion of such flow, as the causal effect of prior stages on (this stage of) one’s brain. (Paul, 2010: 352)

Paul is claiming that our experience as of passage is an illusion, and therefore while time seems to pass from one moment to the next it does not really do so, it is just a mind-dependent phenomenon with no objective reality.

Paul's B-theoretic move is to make transition something that does not exist in the world. On her version of the tenseless theory, there are durationless events that are temporally related, but there is no objective transition or becoming. Thus, the tenseless view is called the "static view" of time because the experience of dynamism does not represent any flow from one to time another since there is none. The assumption of this line of reasoning is that the only kind of objective flow is A-theoretic or TENSED. Actually, Paul's view is that transition is a double illusion. First, it is not a feature of the static events that cause it, and furthermore, we are not really aware of transition. Temporal phenomena seem to pass, but passage as we experience it is different from how it seems, if that makes any sense. The experience of flow between events 'just gives the impression of being filled in. There is no 'figment' as Dennett would say'. (Paul, 2010: 353, footnote 33). Thus, the second illusion consists in the fact that what appears to be the experience of transition is not really the experience of transition at all.<sup>9</sup>

Barry Dainton criticizes Paul and adopts a weaker (less illusory) form of the experience of passage, compatible with a different version of the tenseless view. He maintains that our experience of the dynamic aspects of time are fully real experientially, and they do possess dynamic qualities—the flux and flow we find in our experience is not illusion—but what is an illusion is the belief that these features of experience represent a mind-independent reality that contains metaphysical, that is, A-theoretic passage. Dainton claims that

if our universe is of the Block variety then it is certainly the case that no form of M- [metaphysical] passage exists—this holds by definition. But we can be certain that E [experiential]-passage exists, as certain as we are of anything and we can conclude from this that our universe contains at least one significant form of passage—that certain regions of it have an inherently dynamic intrinsic nature.

And this result holds even if our universe is entirely devoid of any form of M-passage.’ (2012: 132)

Like Paul, Dainton’s assumption is that if mind-independent (metaphysical) passage exists, then it must be A-theoretic or TENSED. Nevertheless, he claims that

There is thus a substantial difference between the position that I have been recommending, and what is being advocated by Paul. I agree that E-[experiential] passage exists in the realm of appearances, and that to the extent that these appearances misrepresent the (non-dynamic) external physical reality they can in this respect be construed as misleading or illusory. Nonetheless, the appearances in question are nonetheless fully real experientially, and the experiences in question really do possess dynamic characteristics. In this sense, there is nothing in the least illusory about the flux and flow we find in our experience. (2012: 133; emphasis added.)

In asserting the appearance/reality distinction with regard to temporal passage or dynamism Dainton is clearly assuming that our experience of passage is TENSED in an A-theoretic sense, and for that reason ‘misrepresents the (non-dynamic) external physical reality’ (2012: 133).

The B/R-theory rejects both the strong (there is no passage phenomenologically or ontologically) and weak versions of the tenseless view (there is experiential, but no mind-independent passage) since it affirms that we do experience passage and that in so doing we are directly aware of mind-independent—albeit B/R-theoretic and not A-theoretic—passage. Thus, the B/R-theory rejects the assumption that if metaphysical or experiential passage exists then the TENSED theory in some form must be true. As we have just seen, Paul and Dainton believe that assumption, but there is an alternative.

Recalling our earlier discussion of Broad and Russell, we can say that the vague truth that we start off from is that time has a dynamic character. There is a flow, flux or whoosh to time and that is something that is given to us in our immediate experience. This experience is open to many different ontological interpretations, but the real truth that underlies the experience and is its ontological ground, is the existence of unanalyzable temporal relations between temporal objects. The B/R-theorist who is a phenomenological realist will reject the view that our experience of passage is an illusion or an appearance that ‘misrepresent the non-dynamic external physical reality’ (Dainton 2012: 133). The experience of the dynamic aspect of time is not the experience of a mind-dependent object that misrepresents a static reality, but it is the perception of a mind-independent reality that is grounded in a temporal (dynamic) simple B/R-relation that is different from all other relations. Thus, it is a mistake to claim that there is a distinction between the succession as we experience it and succession as it is in itself; the former being dynamic and illusory and the latter static and real. In our experience of the phenomenon of succession which grounds the dynamic aspect of time we are directly acquainted with a TENSEless B/R-theoretic mind-independent feature of reality. To think otherwise is to assume that the dynamic aspect of time given in experience is founded on the subjective appearance of ontological TENSE, and it is that a B/R theorist will deny.<sup>10</sup>

There is more that can and should be said about the B/R account of the transitory aspect of time, and the various phenomenological data that are connected with it, for example, the different psychological attitudes toward past, present and future events. Enough has been said, however, to see how the B/R theory I have described is a third metaphysics of time distinguishable from the tensed theory and both Paul’s and Dainton’s versions of the tenseless

view. With this background we are, therefore, ready to turn to Dolev's critique of the metaphysics of time.

The overall structure of Dolev's argument against tenseless time can be stated as follows: Dolev construes our ordinary concept of time, as well as our experience and language of time as inescapably and indispensably tensed. He also maintains that the tenseless theory, while maintaining that tense is an indispensable and inescapable mode of thought, experience and language, denies the reality of temporal passage and past, present and future, claiming that it is an illusion. He concludes that the 'tenseless view is in a way self-refuting' (p. 99); that 'the notion of purely tenseless relations is empty' (p. 95) and that the tenseless view is unknowable.

We shall see, however, that Dolev's arguments against the coherence of tenseless relations fail primarily for two reasons. First, they ignore Broad's *Principle of Pickwickian Senses*, since he confuses the pre-analytic data or common sense facts, with the ontological analysis of them. This error manifests itself in an equivocation of the notion of 'tenseless relations'. Second, Dolev does not consider the B/R analysis of TENSEless temporal relations. For those reasons his overall argument that the metaphysical theories and the queries they give rise to are empty since the notion of 'tenseless relations' is unintelligible, can be set aside. To establish his conclusion he would have to establish that the same arguments apply equally to B/R relations and that he does not and cannot do. To see why, I shall next turn to his account of 'tenseless relations'.

Dolev initially defines 'tenseless relations' as follows: 'In general tenseless relations are defined to be relations of succession: we give the tenseless relation between events  $e_1$  and  $e_2$  when we say that  $e_1$  is later than, or earlier than, or simultaneous with  $e_2$ ' (pp. 4-5). This way of defining 'tenseless relations' suggests that the copula is tenseless, that is, does not involve



grammatical tense *or* ontological TENSE. For that reason, the meaning of “tenseless” cannot be cashed out in terms of “is now” “was” or “will be” (as some have claimed<sup>11</sup>) since a tenseless sentence is not omnitemporal, but literally without tense. To interpret tenselessness as omnitemporal would make Dolev’s claim that there are no purely tenseless sentences about events trivially true, and it would support the thesis that relations of succession are permanent. Critics of the tenseless view often argue that since ‘ $e_1$  is earlier than  $e_2$ ’ is always true it follows that the fact in virtue of which it is always true is eternal. Since to be ‘eternal’ is to be ‘everlasting’ or to ‘always exist’ or to have ‘endless duration’, it is concluded that tenseless facts are eternal facts and so are permanent. That, however, is a mistake since temporal relational facts do not exist at any time; much less do they exist at every time.<sup>12</sup> Nor does ‘tenselessness’ mean the same thing as ‘timelessness’ since the terms of the tenseless relation of earlier than are not timeless entities like numbers, but temporal objects like particulars. Furthermore, the copula involved in sentences expressing TENSEless temporal relations is tenseless, but temporal, because it is asserting that one temporal object is earlier than another temporal object.<sup>13</sup> So, just as is now is a temporal copula (although a tensed one), is earlier than is temporal copula as well (although a tenseless one). Leaving these distinctions aside, insofar as Dolev’s initial characterization of ‘tenseless relations’ is simply meant to be ‘relations of succession’ without ontological implications, his description is unproblematic.

Dolev makes other remarks about tenseless relations that are more controversial. He says: ‘Such relations, we are told, are easily recognized: their conspicuous hallmark is that sentences describing them are true, if true, regardless of when they are tokened’ (p. 94). Indeed, he claims that ‘the tenseless view is sustained by the straightforward distinction between tenseless and tensed sentences... tenseless sentences state tenseless relations, namely, relations

of precedence, succession, and simultaneity' (p. 79; emphasis added). Thus, Dolev views tenseless relations as "sustained" and "recognized" by certain facts about the sentences describing or stating them.

These claims clearly show that Dolev assumes that the bases of the notion of tenseless relations are tenseless sentences, but that is incorrect. The existence of TENSEless temporal relations as entities in the ontology of time is recognized by our experience of time, and not by the language that philosophers may use to express that experience. For that reason, Dolev is mistaken in claiming that the notion of a TENSEless relation depends upon a language from which tense has been eliminated. The language that philosophers use to express temporal relations between and among events starts from phenomenology and then attempts to ground that phenomenology in an ontology that can account for it. To consider and further clarify his remarks concerning 'tenseless relations' I want to discuss his account of the debate between tensed and tenseless views of time.

Dolev explains what he takes to be at issue between the tensed and tenseless views in the following passage:

We all know that the American Revolution preceded the French Revolution. We supposedly all know, or at least ready to admit once it is explained to us, that this fact constitutes a tenseless relation between the two events. Indeed, tenseless theorists take it for granted that there are such tenseless relations. Their quarrel with tensed theorists concerns the question of whether in reality the only type of temporal relations are tenseless relations, or whether there are in addition, also tensed relations. The point of contention concerns the

exclusivity of tenseless relations, not their existence. (p. 79; emphasis in last sentence added)

Before proceeding to criticize the contents of this passage I shall explain Dolev's notion of a 'tensed relation'. He says 'The location of an event with respect to the present is referred to as the tensed relation of the event ... Now we may ask: are tensed relations part of reality, is there a present with respect to which events really stand in a temporal relation, or is it the case that, as was claimed about color at one time ... there is no present outside our apprehension and so nothing for events to have a tensed relation to?' (p. 5) A tensed relation is a temporal relation (presumably earlier/later than) between the present and past and future events, but what is the ontological status of this relation? Is it an entity in its own right over and above the terms it relates, or is it grounded in the non-relational properties of its terms? And if it is an entity, does it depend on its terms having TENSED properties? Dolev clearly believes that the tensed view is committed to (non-relational) TENSED properties, since he treats the tensed view as maintaining that 'tensed properties of events must be included in our conception of reality' (p. 39), and 'The difference between the tensed and the tenseless accounts is that in the former truth conditions are non-relational, whereas in the latter they are relational' (p. 21). However, as we shall see, these remarks concerning tensed and tenseless relations render his account of the difference between these two theories of time problematic.

Dolev claims that 'the American Revolution preceded the French Revolution' states a tenseless fact whose constituents are a tenseless relation and two events, but surely that the American Revolution preceded the French Revolution does not constitute a tenseless relation between the two events, but a tensed relation since the events related are past in relation to the present. Furthermore, given Dolev's characterization of 'tenseless relations' as those described

by sentences with an unchanging truth value, it follows that ‘the American Revolution preceded the French Revolution’ is a tensed sentence, since it has a changing truth value; false before the American Revolution and true after the French Revolution. Therefore, the fact constitutes a tensed relation between events, and the sentence describes a tensed fact, not a tenseless one.

Dolev claims that that there is a basic agreement between the tensed and tenseless views and in so doing his characterization of the debate begs the question against the tenseless view and misses the ontologically fundamental issue between them, an issue that is more basic than the ontological assumption he rejects. Clearly, no tenseless theorist, including the B/R theorist would accept that the ontological fact that the American Revolution preceded the French Revolution constitutes a tenseless relation between two events, since the sentence expressing this fact is tensed and therefore from an ontological point of view reflects that the terms of the relation have the TENSED property of pastness. Thus, Dolev’s characterization of tenseless relations assumes that the ontological analysis of them is that they are relations with TENSED determinations, and that the tenseless facts temporal relations enter into exist in time since the sentences that express them, for example, ‘the American Revolution preceded the French Revolution’, change their truth value. In so doing his characterization of tenseless temporal relations renders the tenseless view contradictory and so in the debate with tensed theorists begs the question against it.

Furthermore, to assume at the outset that the tensed and the tenseless views agree on the existence of tenseless relations and only disagree about the existence of tensed relations is to misunderstand the metaphysical dispute in the philosophy of time since on the B/R theory, “TENSEless” relations are universals whose terms are particulars that do not exemplify TENSED properties (pastness, presentness and futurity), and the facts they enter into are timeless

in just this sense: though they do not exist in time since they do not exemplify temporal relations, time (temporal relations) exist in them. No tensed theorist could accept that time contains a conjunction of such ontological facts. Hence there is a fundamental dispute about the existence of, and not merely the ‘exclusivity’ of tenseless relations that Dolev fails to see by overlooking the B/R account.

Admittedly, if by ‘tenseless relations’ Dolev means the common sense fact that events stand in temporal relations or even more neutrally that sentences like, ‘the American Revolution preceded the French Revolution,” are true, then both the tenseless and the tensed views agree, pre-analytically, that there are tenseless relations.<sup>14</sup> However, they would disagree about the analysis of tenseless relations or the ontological facts they involve, as well as the relation of those facts to time. Of course, if Dolev then shifts from common sense to the ontological ground of the pre-theoretical data, and claims that the tensed and tenseless views disagree with regard to the existence of tensed relations, then what he saying would be true. That is, the tensed and tenseless views agree commonsensically that there are temporal relations and disagree ontologically over whether or not there are TENSEless or TENSED temporal relations and facts. However, once common sense and ontology are kept separate, it should be clear how and why these views do not even partially agree.

In Chapter 4 Tense Beyond Ontology, Dolev gives his main arguments against the tenseless view. He reasons that since tense is inseparable and ineliminable from language, thought and experience, ‘the notion of “tenseless relations” remains empty’ (p. 94); ‘there is not one fact we can point to as truly tenseless’ (p.94); there is not a separable concept of tenseless time, and indeed, tenseless relations are something ‘we-know-not-what’ beyond the veil of perception. In what follows I shall consider his arguments for these radical theses beginning

with the claim that since tense is ineliminable from language and ‘all factual utterances are always infused with tense’ (p. 92) there are no tenseless facts.

My first response to Dolev’s argument against tenseless facts is that it equivocates on the notion of ‘factual utterance’ when he says that ‘all factual utterances are always infused with tense’ (p. 92). If a factual utterance is one that states a common sense fact, then even if in ordinary language all common sense facts are infused with tense, it does not follow, given Broad’s Principle of Pickwickian Senses, that all ontologically factual utterances are infused with TENSE. On the other hand, if by ‘factual utterances’ Dolev means ‘utterances that state ontological facts’, then what he is saying is either false or begs the question of whether from the ineliminability of tense in ordinary language, thought and experience it follows that all factual utterances in a metaphysically perspicuous language are infused with TENSE.

Dolev argues that the ineliminability and indispensability of tense in ordinary language, thought and experience is evidence that TENSE is ineliminable from all factual utterances and hence from the ontological facts they describe. In other words, if there are no factually tenseless sentences then there can be no TENSEless facts. How then does he argue that all purportedly tenseless sentences are in fact tensed? He considers two sentences that are or contain tenseless sentences and argues they are tensed: ‘John Kennedy was assassinated in 1963’ and ‘Event e occurs in 2007’. His argument against both is that they involve dates, and dates assume a prior understanding of tense. Thus, he says,

Consider again the sentence “Kennedy was assassinated in 1963.” To understand it—for such a sentence to transmit knowledge—one must know what “1963” refers to. It is not enough to know that these numerals indicate a counting that starts at a certain chosen point in time, that 1,963 years separate between that

point of origin and the assassination. This tenseless fact is a useless fact to anyone who does not know when the point of origin is with respect to the present.

(p. 91)

Of course, Dolev is correct that ‘Kennedy was assassinated in 1963’ presupposes the concept of tense since it is a tensed sentence! The question, however, is whether present tense is necessary and indispensable to understand dates and our ability to act and communicate successfully. If so, then presumably that is because reality is TENSED; that TENSE must figure in some way in the fact that event e occurs at time t, or that e<sub>1</sub> is earlier than e<sub>2</sub>, and thus that there are no TENSEless facts. Dolev argues that, ‘If one never knows the present date, then one can never use information about the dates of events to act successfully’ (p.91). Thus, for example, it is not sufficient to know that the meeting starts (or tenselessly occurs) at 1 pm, to know that I need to take action to go to the meeting which starts now, that is, that it is now 1pm, and that the further knowledge involves the time possessing the tensed property of presentness. Since the tensed thought is indispensable to timely action, tensed facts or relations are indispensable too.

However, tensed thoughts are not indispensable. Admittedly, knowing the TENSEless fact that the meeting starts at 1 pm, is not sufficient to get me to act, nor is the clock reading 1 o’clock sufficient, but I can know it is time to act by being conscious of perceiving the clock striking one, and judging that this perception of the clock is roughly simultaneous with the start of the meeting. In other words, I can know what event or time is present without knowing that the event or time has the TENSED property of presentness. Similarly, I can understand that the date 1945 is the date of my birth without taking that date to be in a tensed relation to the present. I can understand ‘today is the date of my birth’ by judging reflectively that the date of my birth is 68 years earlier than this thought (of being born in 1945), and ‘the date of my birth is 1945’

simply means that the event of my birth is simultaneous with the 1945<sup>th</sup> revolution of the sun around the earth since the birth of Christ or some other suitable event.

Dolev is perfectly aware that there are tenseless theorists such as Mellor who agree that tense is ineliminable from ordinary language (and common sense facts), but deny that therefore TENSE is a feature of reality since the ontological facts that ground tensed sentences in ordinary language can be given in terms of tenseless sentences that express TENSEless facts.

Nevertheless, Dolev objects that the purported tenseless sentences are not purely tenseless, since they presuppose a tensed context. Thus, he argues that the token-reflexive account, according to which the truth condition of ‘x is present’ is the fact that ‘x is simultaneous with the utterance “x is present”’ or ‘x is simultaneous with this utterance’ does not eliminate tense. As he puts it,

The problem with the token-reflexive account is that, contrary to the supposition of those who rely on it, the sentences and relations employed in handling tensed relations are not themselves purely tenseless. It is true that “Today’s date is February 15, 2007” can be explained by saying that the date of the tokening of this sentence is February 15, 2007. But that is only because the context makes it clear that the phrase “this sentence” refers to the sentence tokened now. Before the “tenseless” formulation is “tense-ized” by the context, it cannot do anything by way of clarifying the original sentence. (p. 92-93)

Is Dolev correct that the use of the phrase “this sentence” or “this perception” refers to the sentence or perception tokened *now* and thus cannot be part of an analysis that eliminates tense or TENSE? I think not. In fact, Smart (1963, p. 194) has already replied to this line of thinking by noting that ‘it is simply a dogmatic rejection of the analysis in terms of token-reflexiveness. On this analysis “now” is elucidated in terms of “this utterance”, and not vice



versa'. This elucidation, notes Smart, relies on taking a token of 'this utterance' (or 'this token',) as referring to itself directly, i.e., without recourse to properties that identify it, and thus, in particular, without recourse to a tensed property of presentness or nowness. Dolev and other objectors (Broad 1928; Gale 1967; Ludlow 1999) appear to claim precisely the opposite, but I agree with Smart (1963, p. 195) that 'it is not at all evident why the objector should think that an utterance like "this utterance" cannot be directly self-referential. We hear a token of the form "this utterance" and simply understand that this token utterance is the one referred to'. That Dolev thinks otherwise and insists on bringing TENSE into the picture may well be a byproduct of a presupposed allegiance to the tensed theory, but the B/R-theorist will of course disavow this.<sup>15</sup>

Dolev's also argues that there are no tenseless facts on other grounds, namely, that we have no notion of purely tenseless relations or facts since tensed and tenseless concepts are inseparable. Thus, he claims that

we need to have some grasp of temporal succession in order to understand sentences about the present; and vice versa, we need to have some mastery of tense to understand succession. To understand the tensed sentence "What you are hearing now is the sound of thunder" we need to know that the explanation refers to the sound that is simultaneous, or cotemporal, with it [the sentence "What you are hearing now is the sound of thunder."]. And we are made to understand the succession report "Thunder comes after lightning" on occasions in which we can associate these words with sounds and sights that are experienced now. (p. 92)

In other words, Dolev's point is that since our experience of the relation of succession is tensed, 'there is no fact that we can point to as truly tenseless' (p. 94), and the notion of 'tenseless

relations' remains empty. Again, we must distinguish the pre-analytic data and temporal phenomena from the ontological analysis or fact that is its ground. Even if our concept of succession (or objects experienced in succession) is inseparable from objects that are experienced now and in that sense the concept of succession is inseparable from the concept of now, it would not follow that there are there are no TENSEless relations in reality. For the ontological ground of the presentness of objects experienced is simply that they are presented in perception. In a specious present one experiences a temporal relation but does not experience the property of presentness. As Russell once put it,

Succession is a relation which may hold between two parts of one sensation, for instance between parts of a swift movement which is the object of one sensation; it may then and perhaps also when one or both objects are objects of immediate memory, be immediately experienced, and extended by inference to cases where one or both of the terms of the relation are not present. (Russell 1915: 213)

Thus, for Russell (as for Broad), temporal phenomenology is mind-independent since we are acquainted with the (TENSEless) relation earlier than when see a rapid movement or hear a sequence of two tones, and there is no tense involved.

Dolev's argument that we cannot conceive of tenseless relations is based on the thesis that our experience is intrinsically tensed, i.e., that we do not have non-tensed experiences. This view has been echoed by Jonathan Tallant when he says:

Our experience of this 'earlier' and 'later' structure is intrinsically tensed.

That is to say that when I experience the extended nature of the specious present, when I experience temporal priority, it is as a part of the now. There are B-

theorists [Falk] who have explicitly acknowledged this: “I for one cannot have non-A-perceptions” (Falk 2003: 221). (Tallant 2007: 152)<sup>16</sup>

There are, however, two problems with this argument. First, I do not accept the claim that one cannot have non-A- (TENSED) perceptions. We do not experience the property of presentness when we perceive a present event or a succession of rapid events. When we have an unreflexive awareness of a present event, we are in fact experiencing nothing more than the occurrence of the event; we are not apprehending the irreducible property of presentness. Clifford Williams supports this very line of argument by means of a spatial analogue.<sup>17</sup> Williams writes: ‘There are occasions, perhaps quite numerous, when we unreflexively experience, simply as existing, objects that happen to be in the proximity of our locations, without also experiencing them as being here’ (1992: 370). Just as it is the case that we do not experience or apprehend the hereness of objects when we unreflexively experience objects that are here, so it is the case that we do not experience the presentness of events when we unreflexively experience present events. In other words, to experience something as now does not imply that what is experienced is TENSED or has the property of presentness, but only that it is experienced as presented.

Second, and more importantly, it is simply not the case that our experience of the ‘earlier’ and ‘later’ structure is intrinsically tensed, i.e., somehow founded on A-properties or A-facts. Since the ‘now’ is, for Russell, what is simultaneous with *this*, where *this* is an object of perception, it is consistent to say that I experience temporal priority as part of the now without that implying that the temporal phenomena, that is, the experience of succession, is intrinsically tensed, or founded on tensed properties or facts. All that is required, as in fact occasionally is the case, is that we can unreflectively perceive a durational present within which a rapid succession or change can occur.<sup>18</sup>

Dolev continues his attack on the intelligibility of the tenseless theory by arguing that on the tenseless view tense is an inescapable global illusion and thus tenseless reality is an unknowable –“we-know-not-what” (p. 94). On the tenseless view, as Dolev characterizes it, nothing is in reality past, present or future and thus our experience of time is an illusion; it belongs to how we experience things, but not to how they are. As Dolev also puts it “in relation to time our experience is quite unlike what we experience” (p. 29); although time is TENSEless, our experience of time TENSED.

Dolev claims that events we perceive are tensedly located and that to be tensedly located is for them to possess tensed attributes (pp. 4, 97). One could no more perceive objects as lacking TENSE than one could perceive objects as lacking color. Indeed, he construes the tenseless view as maintaining that tense is analogous to color, that is, a secondary quality that exists in the mind, but not in reality. Consider the following passage:

Tense—as ubiquitous in experience, thought, and language as, say, color—gives rise today to questions of the sort that troubled early modern philosophers concerning the so-called *secondary qualities*: does it belong to the things perceived or only to our perceptions of things? Or, more generally, is reality tensed, or does it only appear tensed to us? (p. 4)

As Dolev interprets it, the tenseless view denies the existence of TENSED properties and so must claim that although we cannot help *experiencing* TENSE, we mistakenly believe it exists in reality. For that reason, the defender of tenselessness will argue, we perceive events as though they are tensely located, “But this is nothing but the way the inescapable global illusion of tense manifests itself” (p. 100).

Dolev argues that this account of temporal experience renders tenseless time an unknowable something “we-know-not-what” behind the veil of illusions. For in the case of tense there are no conditions that we are aware of that would present us with a nontensed reality that could be the backdrop against which how things appear could be labeled “an illusion” (p. 102). In other words, since tense is an *inescapable* illusion we cannot, under any circumstances, have access to veridical perceptions, and so are stripped of the condition that must obtain when one is subject to an illusion. Thus, there is a fundamental dissimilarity between the sense in which seeing the road as having a puddle is an illusion and seeing the presently setting sun is an illusion. In the one case we know it is an illusion because we can compare it with cases where a puddle on the road is real and cases where the reality is seen and known to be different from the appearance, but in the case of TENSE we cannot do that because TENSE is an inescapable illusion. To put the point otherwise, if all we perceive is an illusion, then the notion of an illusion becomes meaningless because we need to be able to compare the illusion with reality, and in the case of TENSE we cannot do that because we have no experience of a TENSEless reality.

Dolev summarizes his argument in the following passage I shall quote at length:

But, as before, this conclusion [that tense is an illusion] is self-refuting:

conceiving veridical perceptions as unattainable in principle nullifies the logical condition presupposed by any talk of illusion. Non-tensed reality is the only source of terms required for describing how things are, a description that is a necessary backdrop against which how things appear can be labeled “an illusion.”

But if tense is an inescapable illusion, we never access this non-tensed reality, and so are stripped of the condition that must obtain if we are to call tense “an

illusion.” So if tense is an inescapable illusion, we have no means for saying that it is.

Tenseless theorists help themselves to both ends of the stick: they acknowledge, and even insist, that tense is an inescapable mode of thought and experience, which veils tenseless reality from cognition and at the same time, they offer a theory that reveals the tenseless truth behind the veil. This cannot work. If tense is truly inescapable, then there is no way we can remove ourselves from our heads and take our invariably tensed minds *for a stroll in the hidden tenseless fields of reality*. And if, on the other hand, we can understand that reality is tenseless, then tense is no longer inescapable. Either way, tense cannot be thought of as an illusion. (p. 102; emphasis added)

The conclusion of this argument is true—tense cannot be thought of as an inescapable illusion or appearance—but that does not constitute a refutation of the tenseless view understood as the B/R theory. An illusion or appearance is a mind-dependent object of perception, but the B/R-theorist does not recognize TENSED properties as mind-independent *or* mind-dependent properties of experience since to do so is to give them ontological status—even mind-dependent entities are *existents*—and that is something the B/R view is not willing to do.

Thus, Dolev sets up a false dilemma when he asks: Are tensed properties real (that is, mind-independent) or do tensed properties belong merely to the way we perceive things—pure appearance, like secondary qualities and hence mind-dependent? Our experience of the present is not the experience of a mind-independent TENSED property, but it is not the experience of a mind-dependent non-relational TENSED property either. Nor is it correct to say that TENSEless reality is veiled behind the appearance of TENSE and so a something “we-know-not-what.” On

the B/R view, the perceptual now is mind-dependent only in the sense that we would have no idea of it without our *perception* of objects, but it does not follow that the objects we perceive do not contain real mind-independent time, that is, parts that occur in succession.

In summarizing the arguments of this paper I would say that Dolev's critique of the tenseless view and his attack on the metaphysics of time is based on two errors. First, he overlooks the implications of Broad's Principle of Pickwickian Senses by confusing the common sense facts regarding our ordinary concept of time with the ontological facts that, on the tensed theory, are their ground. For that reason Dolev assumes that if one rejects TENSED properties, as the B/R view does, then one must also reject the concept of time and the common sense fact that time has a transitory aspect. In other words, Dolev blurs the pre-analytic data or common sense fact, for example, that we can perceive an event as present, with a particular ontological analysis of it, and concludes that if one rejects the ontological analysis then one must reject the common sense fact as well, or that since the common sense fact is unassailable the TENSEless ontological analysis is thereby refuted. Thus he argues that since ordinary language, thought and experience time is tensed, an analysis that denies TENSE is incompatible with the language and concept of time, and the facts of temporal experience. This, however, is to misunderstand the dispute by confusing one theory about the correct ontological analysis of time with the concept of time itself. Moreover, it rests on the false premise that ordinary language, thought and experience is inescapably TENSED.

Second, Dolev overlooks the B/R version of the 'tenseless relations' by taking the tenseless and tensed views of time to agree about the existence of tenseless relations and in so doing he misunderstands the ontological nature of the dispute. Recall that Dolev claims that there is a basic agreement between the tensed and tenseless view regarding the nature of

temporal relations. He claims that both the tensed and tenseless views have in common the belief in tenseless relations. What then does he mean by ‘tenseless relations’? If ‘tenseless relations’ are B/R relations then since B/R relations are temporal relations between terms without TENSED properties, his claim that the tensed and tenseless views both believe in tenseless relations implies that there are no tensed relations, and that therefore, the tensed view is false. On the other hand, if ‘tenseless relations’ are also tensed relations (as Dolev implies in his characterization of the dispute, p. below) then temporal relations obtain between terms with TENSED properties and the tenseless view is false. For these reasons it is preferable and more accurate to treat the issue between tensed and tenseless (including the B/R) views, not as over the exclusivity of “tenseless” temporal relations but as about the ontological status—the existence and nature—of temporal relations, and their relation to time.

Once we recognize a third metaphysical view of time, the B/R theory, then we can see that the ontological status of temporal relations is a more fundamental issue than the ‘ontological assumption’ that Dolev claims undermines the legitimacy of traditional metaphysical questions concerning time. Are temporal relations analyzable in terms of the TENSES or are TENSEless temporal relations simple and unanalyzable or analyzable in terms of say (non-A-theoretic) causal relations? The question of whether past, present and future, or present and past, or only present events and things exist is parasitic on this more fundamental question regarding temporal relations. If the B/R view is right then temporal relations are universals whose terms are temporal objects none of which are intrinsically past, present or future, that is, none of which exemplify TENSED properties and in that sense, past, present and future objects do not exist. If the ground of temporal relations is founded upon one of its terms—a strong version of internal relations—then only the present exists. If temporal relations are founded upon the coming into



existence and continued existence of what did not previously exist, then the past and present exist. If there can be temporal relations only if their terms have TENSED characteristics, then past, present and future exists and so does the moving now. So there is a debate over what he calls ‘the ontological assumption’, but that debate depends on the more fundamental issue of the ontological status of temporal relations. Since Dolev fails to recognize that debate, and the B/R version of TENSEless time that is at the heart of it, his arguments do not establish that both theories are untenable or that “we don’t really know how to understand either theory” (p. 60), much less that there is no genuine dispute in the metaphysics of time.

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## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Henceforth, following Dolev, I will just use the tense/tenseless distinction to characterize these views.

<sup>2</sup> For a discussion of these arguments and others surrounding the question of the genuineness of the so-called presentist/eternalist debate see, for example, Dorato (2002), Savitt (2002, 2006), Callender (2012), Crisp (2004a, 2004b), Ludlow (2004), Oaklander (2001, 2008, "General Introduction," vol. I, 1-11, 2012), Clifford Williams (1996, 1998a, 1998b, 2003), Lombard (1999, 2010), Meyer (2005), Sider (2001, 2006), Deng (2010), Burley (2006).

<sup>3</sup> See Tegtmeier (2012) and Grossmann (1992).

<sup>4</sup> My thanks to Francesco Orilia for this reference.

<sup>5</sup> In correspondence regarding the distinction between common sense and ontology, Erwin Tegtmeier commented that ‘The discussion in the analytical philosophy of time (as well as in other parts of analytical philosophy) seems to me unscientific. It does not take into account whole theories (in this case ontological theories) and it is unaware of the ontological alternatives. It is much too coarse. [Gustav] Bergmann would say that it is ontologically inarticulate and

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merely metaphorical. One could call it folk philosophy of time. The only technical component of it is mathematical logic (including set theory and the physics of time. Imagine folk physics thinking about mass without the context of a physical theory and starting from common conceptions or coarse-grained classifications. Imagine a discussion and a decision about the classical and the quantum theory of mass based on vague conceptions and without taking into account the whole of classical mechanics and the whole of quantum theory and their precise details’.

<sup>6</sup> This is somewhat inaccurate for two reasons. First, Broad also includes the fact that every experience has some duration as one aspect of the extensive aspect of time. Second, he claims, given that our experiences overlap it is not always true that there is a definite temporal relation between any two of them. Having mentioned these qualifications, we can, however, safely ignore them in what follows.

<sup>7</sup> The denial of A-properties as monadic is, of course, compatible with A-predicates being meaningful. The early Broad and Russell gave their meaning in terms of the token-reflexive of psychological approach. According to the former if I utter a token *n* of “now” in uttering “it is now raining” the sentence token can mean that rain is simultaneous with the utterance of *n*. According to the later, to say that an “event *e* is present” means that “*e* is simultaneous with this where this is an object of perception or the perception of an object. I shall have something more to say about both of these analyses when we consider Dolev’s arguments against tenseless time.

<sup>8</sup> For further explanation of the B/R-theory; its difference from some versions of the B-theory, and a defense of the legitimacy of the dispute against some who attempt to debunk it see, Oaklander (2012).

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<sup>9</sup> For a criticism of this aspect of Paul's view see, Barry Dainton (2011: 388-389 and 2012: 130-133).

<sup>10</sup> For these reasons, I find Paul's view that there is no passage a peculiar position to take since in countenancing "inputs from earlier and later temporal stages" (Paul, 2010: 354; emphasis added) Paul is already acknowledging TENSEless relations. Thus, unless Paul's temporal relations are unlike B/R-relations, her denial of the animated or dynamic character of change in our experience, which, on the version of the tenseless view I am suggesting, is grounded in primitive temporal relations, makes no sense. For if passage exists in reality in the form of inputs from earlier and later temporal stages, then any explanation of our experience as of passage that results from those inputs cannot demonstrate that passage does not exist phenomenologically or mind-independently since it assumes B/R-theoretic passage.

<sup>11</sup> See, for example, Dorato (2006), Savitt (2002).

<sup>12</sup> Dolev makes this error when he uses the permanence of tenseless facts in his support of arguments that Schlesinger and Prior give against the tenseless view (see, Dolev: 39-40). For a discussion of this error with regard to Prior's "Thank Goodness" argument see, Oaklander (1993).

<sup>13</sup> Since ersatz presentism takes temporal relations to be between times construed as *abstract* objects the B/R view is not compatible with presentism, contrary to Rasmussen (2012).

<sup>14</sup> Francesco Orilia has pointed out that this may be problematic because the presentist is an A-theorist but he may not want to agree pre-analytically that there is a relational fact 'e<sub>1</sub> before e<sub>2</sub>', because it may seem to commit him to the existence of a past entity, namely e<sub>1</sub>. See also, Crisp (2005). I would reply that since by "tenseless relations" Dolev means "relations of succession"

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at the pre-analytic level even a presentist cannot deny them since they are committed to the view that events come into and go out of existence successively.

<sup>15</sup> For a recent defense of the token-reflexive account of tense see Orilia and Oaklander (2013).

<sup>16</sup> For a critique of Tallant (2007) see, Oaklander and White (2007).

<sup>17</sup> C. Williams, (1992). See also, Oaklander, (2004c)

<sup>18</sup> Sean Power (2012) argues that for the B-theorist, the present is not “specious” since it is a present duration during which change can occur.

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