Effects of Education on Political Perspectives in Haiti

by

Marie N. Puccio

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Doctoral Committee:

      Professor Ronald F. Inglehart, Co-Chair
      Professor James D. Morrow, Co-Chair
      Associate Professor Karen M. Staller
      Assistant Professor Daniel Beers, James Madison University

Marie N. Puccio

mpuccio@umich.edu

ORCID iD: 0000-0002-6727-1847

Dedication

I dedicate this dissertation to my parents, Anya and John Puccio.

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List of Abbreviations

GSI	Graduate Student Instructor
ETS	Enstiti Travay Sosyal ak Syans Sosyal (Institute of Social Work and Social Science)
IHSI	Institut Haïtien de Statistique et D'Informatique
INURED	Interuniversity Institute for Research and Development
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
NGOs	Nongovernmental Organizations
U-M	University of Michigan
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
WVS	World Values Survey

Abstract

This dissertation explores the influence of education in general, and post-secondary education in particular, on the political views and values of Haitian adults. I ask two questions. First, does education produce an inclination towards democratic values? Second, does education produce a shift of values from survival to self-expression? I draw on the work of Lipset (1959) and the literature on political socialization to build my theory. I argue that 1) education makes individuals more supportive of democracy and 2) education produces a shift to self-expression values. To assess these arguments, I take a mixed methods approach. I use interviews with university students and original data from the World Values Survey fielded in Haiti. Most notably, the strongest support for democracy on the democracy-autocracy scale was from those who had graduated from a university preparatory high school program and had not attended post-secondary education and those who had graduated from university. Those who partially completed higher education were the most supportive of autocracy. Findings related to self-expression values were inconclusive, and I discuss the need for further research to evaluate this claim. There are three key implications of this research. First, encouraging the completion of higher education can have pro-democracy implications and partial completion of higher education can be counterproductive. Second, education has an impact on views, and thus should be taken seriously by those interested in influencing them. Lastly, institutions interested in advancing democratic values can do so through investment in education.

Chapter 1: Introduction

This dissertation aims to explore the influence that education in general, and post-secondary education in particular, has on the political views and values of Haitian citizens. This dissertation responds to the question: How does education influence shifts in viewpoints? It does this by focusing on two levels of analysis, the effect of education at any level and the effect of higher education. Throughout, I maintain that any level of education will influence views shifts, but that shifts are most dramatic in the process of higher education.

On the one hand, I wanted to better understand the shift from authoritarian to democratic preferences. Does education produce an inclination towards democratic values? Next, I was interested in the shift of values from survival to self-expression. Does the process of education move people from survival to self-expression values more quickly than societal-level modernization? I explored these questions through a mixed-methods study which is the basis for this dissertation. The theoretical framework for this dissertation comes in two parts. First, I explain why uneducated people are less likely to support democracy. To do this, I use the work of Lipset (1959) who provides a deep theoretical explanation with some limited empirical evaluation. Second, I explore the mechanisms behind political socialization.

There are several reasons educational impacts on views are interesting. First, this research can contribute to the broader literature on the impact of education on the lives and prospects of people. In particular, university may have a transformational influence on students. Second, it can help us better understand an understudied group, specifically, the educated minority in

developing world contexts. Third, over the past twenty years (and particularly since the 2010 earthquake), there was a massive influx of international aid organizations, many of which are still operating in Haiti. The professional lives of educated Haitians are likely to be saturated with international political issues. The political views of educated Haitian can be highly significant, since they are the key demographic that will replace aid-workers in social services and development jobs, providing most services in the country. Lastly, it can have development policy implications for the way education-related initiatives are prioritized in developing countries. If there are ideological implications for investment in education, more foreign aid may be attracted to education related initiatives.

University students are a particularly interesting population in the Haitian context. Locally generated human capital tends to be scarce and Haiti-based international organizations import professionals from around the world to fill the gap. This phenomenon existed before the earthquake, but it became ubiquitous post-disaster with foreign professionals brought in to do everything from construction work to public service administration. Suitable jobs exist for Haitians upon graduation, but foreign internationals are providing heavy competition for these early-career professionals. As international organizations begin downsizing operations, however, university students gaining more opportunities to populate social and economic infrastructural jobs. For this transition to happen, educated young people will need to be integrated into existing structures and eventually take them over.

This study had two parts to its data collection, one qualitative and one quantitative. The first phase of data collection involved interviews with undergraduate students. I conducted semi-structured interviews with university students about their views. This helped me understand the nuances of student political preferences and how students internalize these views. The second

phase of data collection utilized newly collected data using the World Values Survey

questionnaire in Haiti. Data collected in the survey allowed me to evaluate hypotheses on pro-

democracy and self-expression views shifts.

Motivation for Project

Since 2012, I have volunteered as an instructor of political science at a Haitian university,

Enstiti Travay Sosyal ak Syans Sosyal (the Institute of Social Work and Social Science, which is

known by its Haitian Creole acronym ETS), while sometimes simultaneously working as a

Graduate Student Instructor (GSI) at the University of Michigan (U-M). Working with both

American and Haitian students has opened up a unique opportunity to compare classroom

experiences in these two very different contexts. These students are from opposite ends of the

global development spectrum. Nearly all the Haitian students feel the day-to-day impact of

poverty, while experiences with poverty for U-M students tend to be the exception and not the

norm. The most notable implication of poverty in an educational context is the impact it has on

information access. Though my Haitian students were hungry to learn, I quickly found that not

having regular access to the Internet and news media had massive implications for their

understanding of international affairs. Much of what they knew was influenced by interactions

with foreigners working for international organizations in Haiti. For many of the students,

though, even that exposure had been incredibly limited.

The idea for this project came to me during the first session of an introductory political

science course at ETS with undergraduate first year students. After introducing the concept of

power, "the ability of actor A to get actor B to do something that actor B would not otherwise

do," I opened the floor to examples. Hands shot into the air, and one by one the students offered

responses. First, a student mentioned that the police in her area had put up a roadblock by her

house and were collecting bribes for traffic offenses. This, I thought, was an unusual example of power for a world politics class. The examples that followed ranged from the community leader level, all the way up to the Haitian president. However, there was never a single mention of any international issues. Though students engaged deeply with the concept of power, they tended to examine local power in lieu of thinking about things like trade and international security. The closest we came to discussing international issues that session was in the context of the MINUSTAH (the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti) peacekeeping presence and possible abuses of power that might come from them. Even then, however, the conversation stayed quite local.

I came to realize that the political views of the students that I was working with were colored by the day-to-day exposure they had to the world around them. However, throughout the semester, I witnessed the opening up of their worlds. They began to question deeply held beliefs, think critically about repressive power structures, and consider the world beyond their localities. I wondered if this transformation was something that was anomalous to my classroom, or if it was a widespread phenomenon. With this motivation, I decided to interrogate shifting political perspectives as a result of the educational process.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

Research Questions. This dissertation project was a process which began with a qualitative study aimed at understanding the political perspectives of Haitian university students. Extensive individual interviews were conducted with twenty-seven students in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. The focus of the interviews was to understand the political views of students, their experiences with education, and the areas in which those overlapped or influenced each other. A qualitative approach was used to guide the interviewing and data analysis process.

Based on preliminary findings from this qualitative study, it was determined that a broader understanding was needed of university students throughout the country and of the relationship between post-secondary education (of all types) and specific values which influence political views of Haitian citizens. The second phase of my dissertation study was to field the World Values Survey (WVS), which specifically examines some of the areas of interest which were identified in the qualitative study.

The WVS is an international research project which explores how people's values and beliefs change over time. It is operationalized in the form of nationally representative household surveys, which elicit information from respondents on their support for democracy, attitudes about social and political deviance, family experiences, views about work, tolerance for others, support for political issues such as gender equality, support for environmental conservation, and attitudes about religion, among other topics. The WVS has been fielded through a total of six completed waves since 1981, providing a rich dataset which allows social scientists to examine the impact that values have on social and political attitudes over time. Such data is useful in policy making, particularly in the development of emerging democracies such as Haiti.

I fielded the WVS in Haiti during a five-month period beginning November 12, 2015 and ending March 22, 2016. Fielding of the study was hampered by national protests over disputed presidential and local elections, a political crisis which left the government without an elected leader, and other regional and national crises. However, data collection of a nationally representative sample was completed with a total of 1996 with a response rate of 87.3%. This data was then analyzed to test the hypotheses below.

Hypotheses. This study proposes four hypotheses. Mixed support is found for these hypotheses, as discussed in chapter 6.

Hypothesis #1. Completing formal education produces more pro-democratic views.

Hypothesis #2. Completing post-secondary formal education will be associated with greater support for democracy.

Hypothesis #3. Formal education is associated with greater support for self-expression and less support for survival views

Hypothesis #4. Completing post-secondary education is associated with greater support for self-expression versus survival views

Dissertation Outline

I begin this dissertation with a theoretical review focusing on education and the process of democratization. Definitional questions are addressed in sections on assessing education and measuring views. I cover literature related to self-expression versus survival values and the relationship that this transformation of values has to both education and democratization. I also discuss how these concepts have been operationalized and applied to test theories by other researchers to form a basis for my own analysis.

Next, I have a chapter which provides background relevant to the current study. I discuss the role of education in Haiti and the types of education which may have been reported by survey participants or which may have been discussed in the qualitative interviews. Education is discussed within the larger framework of Haiti's tumultuous political history with particular attention to higher education and protest movements. I look at literature form a variety of disciplines, which has examined education and political views in Haiti specifically, and synthesize that which is useful for contextualizing my own findings.

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The fourth chapter of my dissertation outlines the qualitative component of this study. I begin with a description of the methods used and focus of the interviews. I then discuss findings thematically which emerged organically from the process of data collection and analysis. I conclude with a discussion of how the qualitative component of this study formed a foundation for further research which was best addressed using quantitative means.

Next, I discuss in length the sampling methodology and fielding of the WVS in Haiti. In this chapter, I outline the method used for sampling before discussing the process of fielding. I describe how the instrument was translated and tested and the procedures used for data collection. I also discuss logistical challenges experienced during fielding due to Haiti's ongoing political crisis and the impact that may have on the data itself. I outline steps used to clean and weight the data set. Lastly, I describe the data set and key demographic variables which establish representativeness of the data.

The sixth chapter of my dissertation begins by outlining and discussing the methodology specific to test my hypotheses. I describe the results of hypothesis testing and detail the findings for each hypothesis. I also discuss the limitations posed by the specific method used to test my hypotheses.

Lastly, I conclude with a discussion of the implications of this research. I discuss at length the impact that this information can have on policy making in the Haitian context and how education supports the process of democratization. I also discuss limitations of the research conducted for this dissertation and I posit suggestions for future research to deepen our understanding of the intersections of education and transformative views on democracy.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Introduction

In this chapter, I will review some of the relevant literature behind political socialization and political view formation as well as the literature on democratization and education which forms the foundation of my dissertation study. I will begin with a discussion of how decisions are made before examining how political preferences are learned. People acquire and re-formulate views throughout their childhoods and adult lives. It is important to understand political socialization because this will lend insight to how views are actually acquired. As we will see, views learned from the family and in childhood are sticky, but are changeable through the process of education and other outside factors.

Next, there will be deeper exploration of the acquisition of political views through education, in particular. The concept of the liberalizing effect of college is discussed, and the idea is exposed as being a bit more complicated than expected. I discuss the various mechanisms behind how students learn new political views. Though education is not the only mechanism for political socialization, it is one of the most effective ways to alter entrenched views. While a lot is known about developed world contexts, very little is known about developing world contexts. Does the conventional literature on political views acquisition hold true in developing countries? This section attempts to answer this question. It is ultimately concluded that more research is needed into developing world contexts is needed.

How Decisions are Made

An important source of political decision-making is the interaction of individuals with their environment. The mechanisms behind this process can be attributed to a series of internal processes and external influences, as outlined in Druckman & Lupia (2000). This study identifies two main kinds of models that have to do with internal processes for decision-making. First, memory-based models hold that people make their decisions based on information retrieved from memory. This can be contrasted with on-line models where people update their preferences every time they encounter a new situation. This is analogous to keeping a running tally.

The political world is complex and the sheer magnitude of political decisions an individual will face on a given day is exhausting. The political questions associated with day-to-day life constitute the political makeup of an individual. Do we think about all of these questions every day? Of course not. Individuals lack complete information about the world around them, and yet, are often called on to make decisions. To overcome this, people rely on information shortcuts and heuristics to simplify their decision-making process in the face of a complex political world (Downs, 1957; Lupia & McCubbins, 2000). To explain, people have simplified decision-making rules that make it easier to form an opinion. For example, someone might decide to align with the Republican Party. So, when faced with a political decision, they will generally choose whatever side of the debate the Republican Party tends to side on. These decisions of what and who to support rely, in part, on political socialization.

Political Socialization

Political socialization is the process of political views formation on the basis of a variety of sources. This section begins by reviewing the literature on some of the fundamental sources of political socialization. Next, it explores how political decisions are actually made, given that

people live in an infinitely complex world where the various agents of political socialization are at times at odds with each other. Lastly, this section reviews the idea of how views are transformed throughout the lifespan. This section draws on the persistence hypothesis as discussed in Sears & Funk (1999). Is education enough to stimulate new views formation? Or, are political views already fixed by the time an individual enters into college?

Before reviewing agents of political socialization, an important consideration is the question of how sticky political preferences are. Once political views are formed, is it possible to change them? According to the persistence hypothesis, changing political views is a difficult process because they become entrenched early in life (Miller & Sears, 1986). Early childhood political socialization is a strong force that has a lasting impact on one's life.

Political Attitude Change Over the Lifespan. Early political socialization can persist throughout the lifetime or can be shifted as one is exposed to different social contexts (Lyons, 2016). Of most relevance to this study is the question: are views already set by the time they reach college? In many cases, to change political views, it takes a major life event or a major stimulus to alter entrenched perspectives. College is such an experience. It gives people an opportunity to update their beliefs.

In formative years, families transmit values that are relevant to political decision-making. Connell (1972) is critical of the notion that the family plays a significant role in the political socialization process. He writes, "it appears that older and younger generations have developed their opinions in parallel rather than in series, by similar experiences in a common way of life." (p.330) Here, he hits on a stumbling block that is fundamental not only for the literature on family's role in political socialization, but also the role of all agents in political socialization. It is incredibly difficult to a) establish a causal relationship between the agent of political

socialization and the acquisition of political views and b) isolate the effects of any particular agent of political socialization from other agents. In his critique, Connell is pointing out that perhaps environmental factors are the true cause of the effects attributed to the family.

Diversity within families may shape the way that children experience political socialization. Some scholars argue that non-traditional family structures may lead to considerable differences in how children undergo political socialization. Dolan (1995) examines this assertion, and ultimately finds no difference in political efficacy, political knowledge, or patterns of political participation between families with traditional and non-traditional structures.

Parenting practices and early childhood experiences. There are critics of this perspective that political learning is a unidirectional process wherein parents pass political views on to their offspring. Palonsky (1987) encourages us to move away from positivist paradigms and to focus rather on how children gather information from their environment to create their own political realities. Also, along these lines, McDevitt and Chaffee (2002) hold that children may influence their parents in the political socialization process, thus making it more of an interactive process and not merely a hierarchical one. They present the argument that a "trickle-up" approach is more appropriate, since children come into the family with their own ideas and information and interact with parents mutually as they formulate their political views. Short-term civic education programs targeted at children may actually increase turnout among parents (Simon & Merrill, 1989).

Events later in life may also have an impact on people's political attitudes. Stoker & Jennings (1995) find that marriage has a notable impact on the propensity of an individual to participate politically. Spouses converge to be more like each other in the level of political

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participation. This demonstrates that political views are constantly in flux and can change in response to the environment around them.

Cognitive factors and aging. Another aspect that can have an impact on political decision-making is age. On one hand, mental facilities can deteriorate with age due to the onset of age-related illnesses and under-stimulation in retirement. On the other hand, however, the accumulation of knowledge over time may aid decision-making. Lau and Redlawsk (2008) explore these two competing ideas and find mixed effects of age. They find that age negatively impacts the ability of an individual to process information, lending to a weaker ability to access information and poorer information retention. However, in some situations, political knowledge accumulates with age and thus makes decision-making more consistent. They find that those in their mid 60s tend to be slightly more consistent than younger people in their voting. This trend declines sharply, however, for those over 65.

Agents of Political Socialization. There are numerous factors that go in to the formation of our political views. These factors can be loosely grouped into the categories of biology, family, personality, education, media, and religion. Each of these aspects is identified as playing a role in the initial formation of political views. However, not as much is known about how they influence the *changing* of political views over time.

Biology. Perhaps there is something innate about political views that is fixed upon birth. In a study of twins and their families, Kandler, Bleidorn, & Rainer (2012) find that genes play an explanatory role in the political views of an individual. Their study was based on a sample of 2,000 German individuals, including 390 pairs of twins (224 identical and 166 fraternal), 92 twins that participated without a sibling, 530 spouses of twins, and 590 parents of twins. They examined a left-right spectrum as it applies to inequality and system change, and did not find any

connection between parental offspring and transmission to offspring. Interestingly, they found that the correlations for both attributes were stronger for identical twins compared to fraternal twins. The results of this study lend evidence to the idea that genetics play a role in political views, independent of environment.

Voting behavior may be attributable to specific genes. One study found that there were pronounced effects of genetics on political attitudes and ideologies, but that the effects were much less pronounced when it comes to party identification (Alford, Funk, & Hibbing, 2005). In another study, researchers have identified two particular genes that may be linked to voter turnout (Fowler & Dawes, 2008). Another group of researchers found potential genetic links to how liberal-conservative political attitudes are made (Hatemi, Gillespie, Eaves, Maher, Webb, Heath, Medland, Smyth, Beeby, Gordon, Montgomery, Zhu, Byrne, & Martin, 2011). Ultimately, the research making genetic links to political attitudes and behavior is still in the exploratory stages. However, the initial evidence from this literature shows promise.

Another angle at with which researchers have approached the connection of biological traits with political attitudes and behavior is that of physiological traits. Oxley, Smith, Alford, Hibbing, Miller, Scalora, Hatemi, & Hibbing (2008) did a rich study of 46 participants with strong political views. They assessed the reaction of these individuals to sudden noises and visual images that were threatening. The study looked at such aspects as eye blink amplitude and skin conductance. The researchers were able to link physical sensitivities to the support of particular policy preferences.

Early Education. At the core of this study is an exploration of the role of education in political socialization. The particular role of higher education is given a much more thorough

treatment in another section of this study. However, later in this section I will review some of the literature on how education, generally speaking, influences political view development.

The impact of early childhood education is persistent, and some argue that the framework for adult political views is formed by the conclusion of elementary school (Hess & Torney, 1967). Students at the elementary school level already have a basic understanding of domestic politics and some understanding of international politics (Torney, 1970). In a study that spanned 27 different nations, it was found that civic education had significant impacts on civic skills, knowledge, and attitudes (Wiseman, Astiz, Fabrega, & Baker, 2011).

There is criticism of the idea that peer groups are also key drivers in the political socialization process for young people, not just for education. Langton (1967) provides a framework for how political culture can be transmitted by peer groups and also how peer groups can provide social systems through which young people learn new attitudes and behavior. Langton argues that political socialization happens in both the classroom and through peer interaction and is bolstered by heterogeneity. The normative implication of his work is that the process of political socialization can be strengthened by the promotion of diversity in the classroom.

Media. Media coverage can influence the acquisition of policy-specific knowledge (Barabas & Jerit, 2009). Ultimately, the media serves as a source for much of the information we take in about the world. Like any other information sources, we have some control over what type of media we consume. Studies have shown that people seek out specific media sources that confirm the worldview they already hold (Nickerson, 1998; Mitchell, Gottfried, Kiley, & Matsa, 2014).

Media messaging is often cited as a key component of the forces that shape people's political preferences. The way the media frames a particular issue can make people more or less likely to pay attention to it. Researchers have referred to this effect as priming and have found evidence for it in experiment-based research (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987). Lenz (2009) offers alternative explanations for shifts in people's preferences in response to media exposure. First is the idea that exposing people to new information allows them to learn, an effect that can be confounded with priming. Second, people are more receptive to political messages that conform to pre-existing beliefs. This is an issue because some of the studies that established the priming effect tested people's political opinions after treatment, leading to a post-treatment effect.

The Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion (ELM) draws out some of the nuances in the thought process. According to ELM, persuasion happens differently at different stages of thinking. Supporters of this approach point to a particular stage in the persuasive process, termed the "yielding" stage, where persuasion is more likely to occur. Thus, individuals who are exposed to the media during the yielding stage may be more susceptive to its influences (Petty, Briñol & Priester, 2009).

Religion. Religion is a highly variable agent of political socialization, since it is contingent on the level of religiosity in the context where an individual grows up. In the United States, in particular, there is a great deal of diversity in both religions and levels of religiosity. The general trend, however, in the US and in many developed countries is a decline in levels of religiosity in young people, thus resulting in decreasing relevance of religion in political socialization. The literature on the effect of religion on socialization is well developed (Wuthnow, 1976; Bartkowski, 2007). In a study that examined seniors in high school,

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Bartkowski (2007) found that students tend to agree with their parents' religious preferences and tend to have a generally positive view of religion.

Pearson-Merkowitz & Gimpel (2009) note that there have been studies on both political and religious socialization, but "little work has been done to relate the two." (p. 9) In their book chapter, they identify two other pieces of research that lend insight into political socialization through religion: Jennings and Niemi (1981) and Smith and Denton (2005). Jennings and Niemi (1981) observe family patters in opinions related to school prayers, the right to make speeches opposing religion, and the divine nature of the bible. (p. 107) Also, churches serve as a forum for youth interaction and can instill values and ideas in children (Smith & Denton, 2005).

Personality. Personality is an element that is difficult to define, but that may play a crucial role in formulating political beliefs. Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dowling, & Ha (2010) operationalize personality as the Big Five traits, a measure that was first proposed by John and Srivastava (1999). The five traits include extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, and openness to experience. Gerber et al. (2010) find a notable relationship between these personality traits and self-reported ideology, economic policy attitudes, and social policy attitudes. For example, those who scored high on the openness trait tended to be notably more liberal. There is, however, a potential endogeneity problem (which the study acknowledges) since political views may play a role in shaping personality.

Mondak, Hibbing, Canache, Seligson, & Anderson (2010) underscore the importance of accounting for environmental factors, biological factors, and additional mediating factors when modeling the influence of personality traits on political behavior. By taking a holistic approach, the complex relationship between personality traits and political behavior can be understood in context. Similarly, Renshon (1975) adds a complication to the conventional narrative of family-

driven political socialization. He suggests that political socialization may actually take place at the fundamental level of personality development. So, family shapes an individual's personality and the personality of that individual shapes their political views. He connects the beliefs of personal control and interpersonal trust to the idea of political views formation and finds a relationship.

Education and Political Views

The literature on political views is mixed. There is an extensive literature that supports a leftwards shift in political views (Bayer, Royer, & Webb, 1973; Beaton, 1975; Astin A. W., 1993) and, relatedly, increased radicalization (Hall, Rodeghier, & Useem, 1986) during the college years. However, it is important to note that the findings on political liberalism may be overstated, since an activist political environment may have driven the results of the significant findings from earlier work (Pascarella & Terenzini, 2005, p. 276).

Astin (2002) makes a plea to academics to cultivate civic engagement amongst their students. He writes, "if we want students to acquire the democratic virtues of honest, tolerance, empathy, generosity, teamwork, cooperation, service, and social responsibility, then we have to model these same qualities" (p. 101). The question of if such value transfers are possible is highly relevant to this study. Similarly, McCowan (2012) considers the matter of civic education. He asks, "with the creation of mass higher education states… how [can] higher education be engaged in governments' efforts to create cohesive and just societies?" (p. 51). In a study of three English universities, he uses the idea of curricular transposition as a framework for analysis for how democratic ideals are transferred to students. There are four phases in curricular transposition. First, there are the ideals that the person or society wants to communicate. Second, there is a curricular program which is based on these ideals. Third, the curricular program is

implemented. And lastly, the curriculum has effects on the students. He finds that lecturer engagement is important and that bottom-up approaches tend to be most successful. He concludes by identifying the tension between the university playing a role in promoting active citizenship or merely giving individuals the tools to engage critically with their world.

Three Models for Education Promoting Liberal Attitudes. Phelan, Link, Stueve, & Moore (1995) identify three models in the literature that explain why education promotes more liberal attitudes: the Developmental Model, the Socialization Model, and the Ideological Refinement.

The Developmental Model. First, there is the idea of the developmental model. This model holds that education communicates tolerance and democratic values while expanding the student's worldview and stimulating intellectual growth. In doing this, students have augmented social liberalism. According to this model, one might find that higher education produces a fundamental shift in who a student is as a person. Another variation of this model focuses on the role personality changes can have in changing how individuals process information and experience the world.

The Socialization Model. The socialization model emphases the idea of information transmission. Rather than holding that there is something fundamentally transformed in a student's personality or intellectual development, proponents of this model hold that messages are transmitted from teachers and peers to the students. According to this model, we would note a shift in how the student sees the world due to new information learned.

In their study of attitudes towards homeless youth, Phelan et al. (1995) evaluate all three of the models they discuss and find the most support for the socialization model. Thus, they conclude that education promotes the cultural values of the United States, which supports equal

opportunity but not equal distribution of resources. Students learn these cultural values through the course of their education.

Ideological Refinement Model. This view is largely based on an argument made by Jackman and Muh (1984). They argue that, other models of higher education are overstating the effect of education. The effect of higher education on views is related to the rights of individuals to equal access to opportunities. However, it does not have as large an effect on the view that there should be an equal distribution of resources when there is an erosion of group rights. Thus, they are saying that education influences some areas more than others.

Changes in Specific Values

Junior and senior college students surveyed by Lambert, Ventura, Hall, and Cluse-Tolar (2006) had more positive attitudes than freshman and sophomore college students. Students in their senior year are less likely than students in their freshman year to hold punitive views on criminal justice topics. As a notable exception, however, those students majoring in criminal justice did not experience this liberalizing effect. The researchers attribute this to a self-selection effect and caution us against overgeneralizing the political views of college students (Farnworth, Longmire, & West, 1998). When looking at the effects of education on liberalizing views on Anti-Semitism, researchers found that effects varied strongly from country to country. Thus, they did not find evidence for a uniform liberalizing effect of education with respect to this particular issue area (Weil, 1985).

Jenssen and Engesbak (1994) identify six possible explanations for why people with higher levels of education are more tolerant of immigrants. The first one fits in with the developmental model and argues that education teaches the values of tolerance and respect for others. The second view, which fits in well with political socialization, is that education teaches

factual information about immigrants, which makes people more receptive to their plight. Third, there is the idea that education augments cognitive competence and makes people more resistant to anti-immigrant propaganda. Fourth, is the idea that people who attain a higher level of education are no longer in direct competition for jobs with immigrants, and are thus more pro-immigrant in their views. Fifth, people with higher levels of education feel more in control of their life situations and therefore are less likely to have distaste for others. Lastly, running somewhat counter to hypotheses 1-5, is the idea that people with higher levels of education have a greater awareness of the fact that pro-immigrant views are socially desirable and will thus purport to hold pro-immigrant views (even if they do not actually). Their results are inconclusive for hypothesis one, negative for hypotheses two and three, and positive for hypotheses four, five, and six.

Using Higher Education as a Tool for Value Change

Nussbaum (2002) advocates for three particular approaches to global citizenship in the context of higher education. First, she promotes giving students the abilities of being self-critical and of arguing on the basis of reason. These abilities are based in the Socratic tradition and ultimately form the bedrock for a critical and introspective society. Second, she endorses teaching the ability to look beyond one's own boarders and to adopt a worldview as a global citizen. Lastly, she places importance on the ability to walk in someone else's shoes and imagine life from a different social position. All three of these elements call for a fundamental shift in worldviews, which falls most neatly under the developmental model of political socialization.

Molander (2002) provides a counterpoint to the idea of the advancement of democracy being a primary goal in higher education. Rather, he advocates for the idea of "academic citizenship" through open, critical, and informed argumentative practice. By learning through

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these "knowledge-making methods" with academic citizenship, people are preparing to become political citizens. By way of explanation, he writes, "the ethos within academia is one of learning together, and living together part of the time, while the ethos of political democracy is living together all of the time, and learning together part of the time" (p. 366). Thus, the discourse of the academic world does not necessarily need to mimic discourse in the political world to promote political values.

Developing vs. Developed Countries

Though there is little research on higher education in the developing world, some interesting work has been done on general education in this context (Arnove, Torres, Franz, & Stephen, 2013). Finkel (2003) finds that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that focus on teaching democratic values in new democracies tend to increase levels of political participation. The educational programs he studies, however, tend to focus on the effects of short-term NGO-led sessions that were designed for the expressed purpose of promoting civic engagement. There is other work with similar findings that focuses on the significance of civic education to shaping political attitudes and behavior (Brady, Verba, & Schlozman, 1995; Galston, 2004).

Some studies have focused on the role of university students in creating sustainable political change and democratic transition (Neocosmos, 2010). Other studies have focused on the process of identity transformation that occurs during the university years (Ptihouse-Morgan & Morojele, 2008; Takayama, 2011). The international identity formation literature has touched on the role of education (Hassan, 2011; Nyamnjoh, 2010; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013; Vandeyar, 2013). The formation of student political or issue-based organizations is an integral component of identity formation. Other studies have focused on university structure on how they relate to institutional decision-making (Sehoole, 2005).

In developing countries, there is a disparity in the resources and standards that exist behind education. A major challenge faced in this dissertation was the fact that so few people had completed higher levels of learning. This is emblematic of the fact that education is a highly scarce resource in developing world countries and few can get access and afford it. Often times, there are greater obstacles to accessing higher education in the developing world when compared to the developed world. There are fewer institutions operating, and many of those institutions may lack legitimacy from accrediting bodies (which may not exist).

Democratic Preferences

Preferences on democracy can be understood in many different ways across different cultural contexts. There is no one singular definition of democracy that is viewed as a gold standard in the discipline of political science. Even if there were, there would be fundamental disagreements about the best way to operationalize that definition. For this reason, several different approaches to understanding of democracy are used in this dissertation. In this section, I will consider some alternative approaches to understanding democratic preferences.

Defining Democracy. A challenge for any study on democratic preferences is the fact that the concept of democracy means different things to different people. Liberal democracy may include things like free and fair elections, regular elections, the right to vote, balance of power between branches of government, and term limits. Coppedge, Gerring, Altman, Bernhard, Fish, Hicken, Kroenig, Lindberg, McMann, Paxton, Semetko, Skaaning, Staton, & Teorell (2011) offer a fairly comprehensive list of democratic indicators, which are mid-level indicators in their proposed revised measurement of democracy: sovereignty, authority elective government, male suffrage, female suffrage, turnout, regular elections, free elections, access to media and campaign finance, executive rule of law, executive constraints, legislative power, judicial

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independence, judicial review, party strength, party ideology, party system size, electoral system proportionality, competitiveness, turnover, media development, civil society independence, civil society political engagement, subnational government elections, unevenness in democratic development, direct democracy, civil liberty, property rights, religious freedom, equal resources, gender equality, ethnic equality, and inclusive citizenship (2011, pp. 255-256). However, it is unlikely that survey respondents have all, or even any, of those things in mind when they are asked about democracy. In the Haitian system, for example, democracy might be viewed as a rejection of past violent semi-autocratic regimes.

Democracy can vary according to religion and culture. Using data on Russian democratic preferences, Carnaghan (2011) observes that assessing preferences for democracy in contexts with weak democratic institutions can be difficult because the concept of democracy may be interpreted in different ways. In another study Collins and Owen observe, "Islamic democracy may be a system in which some liberal democratic principles such as women's rights, religious minorities' freedoms, and other individual rights are circumscribed at the expense of religious norms or laws that privilege Islam" (2012, p. 501). Given that these differences in interpretation exist, Carnaghan advocates for the use of questions that ask about specific institutions and values, rather than casting the broad net of asking about 'democracy.' (2011)

Democratic Preferences and the World Values Survey. The World Values Survey has served as the data source for other studies that have assessed democratic preferences (Chong & Gradstein, 2015; Al-Ississ & Diwan, 2016). Chong & Gradstein (2015) create their own index to measure democratic preferences using questions from the World Values Survey. They create five proxies. The first one is based off of the question "Would you say having a democratic political system is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?" The

second, third and fourth are based off of the following statements, 1) "In democracy economic system does not run badly"; 2) "Democracies are good at maintaining order", and 3) "Democracy may have problems but is better." The last proxy uses the statement "How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically." The five proxies that these authors use are relatively straightforward measures of democracy, all of which mention democracy directly in the question.

Al-Issis and Diwan recognize that sometimes, regional factors complicate the use of democracy-related scales (2016). They advocate for the use of measures that are sensitive to the particular case of the Muslim world. They use three questions from the World Values Survey, all of which ask the respondent if they agree with a statement. The statements are: "people have more say in how things are done," "giving people more say in important government decisions," and "protecting freedom of speech, progress towards a less impersonal and more humane society." They also generate a scale for authoritarian preferences. By comparing the two, they are able to use a dichotomous approach to understanding democratic preferences.

Cultural and Democratic Preferences

Although economic stability is often identified as a necessary prerequisite to the maintenance of a democratic system, "cross-national historical evaluations of the correlates of democracy have found that cultural factors appear even more important than economic ones" (Lipset 1994, p. 5). The widespread existence and acceptance of cultural values that view democratic practices and processes in a positive light - what is often referred to as democratic values - can not only facilitate a democratic transition but aid in maintaining an already functioning democratic system.

The precise cultural values associated with democracy and the process through which those values come to take root individually and socially has been the subject of considerable research and analysis. According to Sullivan and Transue (1999), two psychological orientations are necessary for the individual support of democratic governance: the desire and will to participate in political processes and tolerance of the efforts others to participate. Participation, in this view, includes, but is not limited to voting.

Political involvement, as Almond and Verba (1963) argued, requires a degree of interpersonal trust. Comprehensive global research carried out by Inglehart (1977, 1990, 1997, Inglehart & Baker, 2000, Inglehart & Welzel, 2005) has both supported this assessment and enhanced our understanding of the complex manner in which cultural values and political systems interact. At the heart of his theory, Inglehart examines the role of modernization in the process of democratization. According to him, modernization theory is the process by which socioeconomic development brings about major social, cultural, and political changes. By surveying populations around the world, he demonstrates that "basic values and beliefs of the citizens of advanced societies differ dramatically from those in less-developed societies. In addition, he asserts that values change in a predictable direction as socioeconomic development takes place. Changing values, in turn, have important consequences for the way societies are governed" (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 1). He distinguishes between materialist (an emphasis on survival values) and post-materialist values, asserting that the rise of knowledge brings about a transition to post-materialist values, or an emphasis on individual autonomy, self-expression, and free choice.

In contrast to Inglehart, Muller & Seligson (1994) argued that "democratic values themselves do not contribute to the maintenance of democratic institutions" (cited in Abramson

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& Inglehart, 1995, p. 3). Yet, as Abramson and Inglehart point out, the relationship between values and democracy is far more complex than presented by Muller and Seligson and must necessarily attend to the long-term stability or failure of democratic institutions as opposed to short-term fluctuations. To declare that "democratic values do not contribute to democracy" swings too far in the other direction (Abramson & Inglehart, 1995, p. 3). The correlation between particular values and democratic systems has been demonstrated empirically; however, the process through which values change is one that demands further attention. Fluctuations in terms of social and economic conditions do indeed lead to short term value change. The more important analysis, however, is the long-term shifts in the direction of post-materialist values as delineated in Inglehart's theory. Indeed, Reisinger, Miller, Hesli, and Hill Mayer (1994) support Inglehart's observations pointing to modernization as the most likely explanation as to how and why particularly societies come to embrace democratic values, especially when we look at transitioning or previously authoritarian societies. From this view, educational systems have the potential to play a significant role in stabilizing or maintaining democratic institutions.

Working Class Authoritarianism

The idea of working class authoritarianism is difficult to contend with because of the expectations of the working classes to be the source for social movements for social progress. This "myth" of a progressive working class is pushed aside by Lipset (1959) in favor of the contention that the working class actually has more autocratic preferences (p. 483). They tend to be the most extremist, to have prejudice against minority groups, and to exhibit nationalism. Lipset contends that the working classes are the base of support for communist movements, much more than the middle and upper classes that support socialism and democracy. He is careful to make the distinction between the idealized form of communism and what it is in

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reality. The working classes are supporters of communism in its real autocratic form, not its idealized form (p. 483).

Low levels of education are a factor behind these views. He writes, "the social situation of the lower strata particularly in poorer countries with low levels of education, predisposes them to view politics in simplistic and chiliastic terms of black and white, good and evil. Consequently, other things being equal, they should be more likely than other strata to prefer extremist movements which suggest easy and quick solutions to social problems" (p. 483). Thus, they are not alienated by the absence of democracy in extremist movements (p. 484).

Lipset distinguishes between economic and non-economic liberalism. Economic liberalism refers to redistributive issues like "income, status, and power among the classes," while liberalism includes "civil liberties for political dissidents, civil rights for ethnic and racial minorities, internationalist foreign policies, and liberal immigration legislation" (p. 485). He argued that the working class might be more economically liberal but that they tend to be unsupportive in the case of liberal values. He argues that working class individuals are less sophisticated, are detached from democratic activities, and lack economic security (p. 489-492). Since accepting democratic norms necessitates "a high level of sophistication and ego security," the working class is resistant to support democracy (p. 492).

One critique of Lipset's work empirically demonstrates that almost all of the effect of working class authoritarianism can be attributed to education (Dekker & Ester, 1987). Lipset's argument with respect to the uneducated is particularly interesting. He provides a detailed justification for why he believes that uneducated people are more likely to support autocratic regimes. Most interestingly, he argues that lower class people will have higher levels of suggestibility due to 1) a deficient mental context, and 2) a fixed mental context. This fixed

mental context means that uneducated people have difficulty changing their perspectives (p 492-493). This falls in line with the idea that people's political perspectives are sticky absent a major catalyst for change.

This theory can be used as an explanation for why working-class voters tend to vote seemingly against their own interests. Though lower-class voters favor economic redistribution, their attitudes on social issues make them support right wing parties in some cases (Achterberg & Houtman, 2006; Derks, 2006). Achterberg and Houtman (2006) attribute "unnatural" voting to cultural conservatism due to limited cultural capital. They think of cultural capital in terms of cultural participation. The educated people in society have more of an active role in shaping culture, which marginalizes the lower classes. Thus, they are less likely to support cultural progress and will be more culturally conservative.

Survival versus Self-Expression. There are two dimensions that Inglehart and Welzel (2005) use to assess value change: survival vs. self-expression and traditional vs. secular-rational. Contrary to secular-rational values, traditional values emphasize a high level of religiosity, a more right-leaning political orientation, and more socially conservative viewpoints. Survival values go against gender equality, favors discrimination against foreigners and homosexuals, and rejects non-essential aspects of life like imagination, leisure, and friends. Self-expression values embody the opposite.

In Table 2.4 of their book, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence*, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) generate a comprehensive list of survival values (and state that self-expression values are the opposite). For the listed values, see Table 1. Shifts in these values are strongly linked to inter-generational value change. Inglehart

(2009) puts forth two hypotheses to explain the mechanisms behind intergenerational value change.

Table 1. Comprehensive list of survival values (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005)

Men make better political leaders than women
Respondent is dissatisfied with financial situation of his or her household
A woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled
Respondent rejects foreigners, homosexuals, and people with AIDS as neighbors
Respondent favors more emphasis on the development of technology
Respondent had not recycled things to protect the environment
Respondent has not attended a meeting or signed a petition to protect the environment
When seeking a job, a good income and safe job are more important than a feeling of accomplishment and working with people you like
Respondent is relatively favorable to state ownership of business and industry
A child needs a home with both a father and a mother to grow up happily
Respondent does not describe own health as very good
One must always love and respect one's parents regardless of their behavior
When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women
Prostitution is never justifiable
Government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for
Respondent does not have much free choice or control over his or her life
A university education is more important for a boy than a girl
Respondent does not favor less emphasis on money and material possessions
Respondent rejects people with criminal records as neighbors
Respondent rejects heavy drinkers as neighbors
Hard work is one of the most important things to teach a child
Imagination is *not* one of the most important things to teach a child
Tolerance and respect for others are *not* the most important things to teach a child
Scientific discoveries will help, rather than harm, humanity
Leisure is not very important in life
Friends are not very important in life
Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections would be a good form of government
Respondent has not and would not take part in a boycott
Government ownership of business and industry should be increased
Democracy is not necessarily the best form of government
Respondent opposes sending economic aid to poorer countries

According to the scarcity hypothesis, those in dire economic conditions will favor more "materialistic" goals because they lack "material sustenance and physical security." During prosperous conditions, people will be more likely to adopt "postmaterialist" goals as they are free to move past day-to-day survival. In the socialization hypothesis, the values that are prevalent during one's younger years tend to persist throughout a lifetime. Younger people are exposed to values that are more postmaterialist than older cohorts. Thus, younger cohorts tend to favor self-expression values over survival values. The replacement of old people by younger people in society is one of the strongest drivers of value change (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Inglehart, 2009).

The Effect of Education. Many academic observers assert that educational expansion is crucial to stabilizing democratic systems (Harber, 2002). From this view, education is understood as a site where democratic values are taught and practiced, either directly or indirectly. Education is seen not as a private, individual good, but a public good directly affecting the health and stability of democratic systems (McNeil, 2002, Reid, 2010). But what are the specific benefits offered by education in relation to democratic systems? What is it about education, whether at the primary or secondary levels, or at the tertiary level, that encourages support for democratic values?

According to Glaeser, Ponzetto, and Shleifer (2006, 2007), the most plausible theory that best explains all the facts is that formal education socializes children to interact with one another which ultimately benefits civic knowledge and participation. They argue that although democracy has a wide base of potential supporters, it suffers from weak incentives whereas authoritarian systems have a small base of support but strong incentives. Education contributes to democracy by raising the benefits of civic participation and support for democratic regimes

across the population more generally. In this way, education works to shape group incentives (Glaeser et al., 2007). Cohen concurs and adds that the social-emotional skills, knowledge, and dispositions acquired through formal educational institutions "provide the foundation for participation in a democracy and improved quality of life" (2006, p. 201). Not only can education teach civic values directly, indoctrinating students to support and appreciate democratic practices, but there are also more generalized benefits of education. Those benefits include respect for others, the ability to collaborate, regard for fairness and justice, concern for the commonwealth, and voluntary, active participation in society (Cohen, 2006, p. 203).

In a similar vein, education and intelligence, as Rindermann (2008) observes, has a strong positive impact on democracy, rule of law, and political liberty. This correlation remains independent of socioeconomic status. He postulates that education and intelligence result in higher stages of moral judgment and decision-making on account of greater cognitive ability. His argument is supported by Dee (2004) and Miligan, Moretti & Oreopoulos (2004) who state that education and intellectual ability lend positive influence to democracy in terms of both level of involvement on an individual level as well as the quality of that involvement. "Education and cognitive abilities have a positive impact on all analyzed political outcomes including democracy, rule of law, and political freedom. This result is stable across the very different samples of countries for educational and ability variables" (Rindermann, 2008, p. 319). Educated people are more likely to vote, read newspapers, and support free speech (Dee, 2004).

Research attending to the correlation between education and stable democratic political systems has generally approached the topic from two theoretical angles: The political modernization (individual) perspective and an institutional perspective. From the individual angle, analysts report a clear correlation between an educated citizenry and democratic stability.

Schooling produces individuals with both the desire and ability to participate in democratic systems (Hannum & Buchmann, 2005, p. 345). In contrast, the institutional perspective takes a macro-level analysis in looking at educational systems "as part of a broader process in the social and political construction of society, in which highly institutionalized social roles and categories are created and legitimated" (ibid, p. 346; see also Benavot, 1996, p. 385). In contrast to the individual perspective which emphasizes the importance of expanding mass schooling at the primary and secondary levels, proponents of the institutional perspective emphasize the importance of tertiary education (Hannum & Buchmann, 2005, p. 346). After reviewing research from both the individual and institutional perspectives, I then present a review of civic education programs as a short-term educational option aimed more directly at political knowledge and participation.

Individual Perspective. From an individual perspective, the relationship between education, cultural values, and democratization rests on theories of modernization and the effect such processes have on individual citizens in relation to political systems. Education, from this view, creates "modern" citizens with both the desire and ability to effectively participate in democratic institutions. Thus, research has proceeded from a starting point of the existing or changing political system, seeking to identify the role and place of education in relation to political institutions. Research focused on already democratic societies, especially those within developed countries, identifies a clear correlation between mass schooling and democratic values. As is typical of the individual perspective, the emphasis has largely been on modernization processes and their impact on educational expansion and individual political attitudes and participation (Almond & Verba 1963; Glaeser et al., 2006; Evans & Rose, 2007b,

Bobo & Licari, 1989; Hyman & Wright, 1979; Lipset 1959, 1994; Nie, Junn, & Stehlik-Barry 1996; Nie, Verba, & Petrocik, 1979; Sullivan & Transue, 1999).

Attention has also focused on transitional societies, such as countries of Eastern Europe and, more generally, the "third wave" of democratization that took place throughout the 1990s. According to Evans & Rose (2007b), the positive correlation between education and democratic values also exists in Eastern European countries where democratization took place more recently (Diamond 1999; Evans 1995; Gibson, Duch & Tedin 1992; Miller, Hesli & Reisinger 1994; Reisinger, Miller, Hesli & Hill Mayer 1994; Rose, Mishler & Haerpfer 1999). Research focusing on the post-Soviet transition to democracy demonstrates a link between education, gender, and age. Given the rapid shift to democratization, this survey research sought to examine whether or not those political institutional changes were happening faster than cultural values could keep up with at the time. What was discovered, however, is that democratic values were well represented, particularly among those with more education, those of a younger age, and men. In a similar vein, research by Reisinger, Miller, Hesli & Hill Mayer (1994), comparing survey data from Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania, challenges assumptions that the political cultures of those post-Soviet transitioning countries were not yet ready for democratization. They show that pro-democratic values are significantly correlated with not only urban dwelling citizens but also those with more education.

Research focused on democratization in various African countries has yielded similar results, even in countries identified as transitioning or those with less stable democratic systems. Unlike their developed counterparts, developing countries tend to have less encompassing systems of mass schooling and access remains tenuous and limited. For these reasons, it remains necessary to avoid assuming a similar relationship exists between education, cultural values, and

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democratization as does in developed countries (Evans & Rose 2007b). Based on their extensive survey of African countries, the 2005 Afrobarometer survey of 18 countries, Evans and Rose conclude that "by improving cognitive and communicative skills education can increase civic involvement and support for democratic practices in developing societies to a greater degree than any other social structural factor" (2007a, p. 2). In other words, controlling for economic inequality does not weaken the effects of education. As their case study example of Malawi demonstrates, even educational attainment limited to primary schooling results in generalized support for democracy (Evans & Rose 2007b). In fact, they note, the most significant stratification in terms of democratic attitudes is between those with no schooling and those with some primary education. Thus, they conclude, "education strongly predicts mass endorsement of democratic procedures and rejection of commonplace non-democratic alternatives" (ibid, p. 916).

The role of higher education within this theoretical paradigm is one of accumulation. That is, the more education an individual acquires, the more correlation with support for democratic values (Evans & Rose 2007a, 2007b). This research demonstrates a "significant progression in political sophistication and knowledge as adolescents advance to higher levels of schooling" (Hess & Torney, 1967; Merelman, 1971; Torney, Oppenheim, & Farnen, 1975; Westholm, Lindquist, & Neimi, 1990). This perspective differs from an institutional one, however, in that it asserts that any amount of primary school education, even if never completed, positively affects an individual's support for democratic governance.

As Bratton & Mattes (2001a, 2001b) demonstrate, in former British colonies of Africa, "of all demographic factors, education has the greatest observed effects on attitudes to democracy" (2001a, 117). They urge caution however, as higher levels of education were also

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associated with greater dissatisfaction with the current functioning of their democratic government. Although Lipset (1994) attributes the correlation between early democratic transitions in those former British colonies with gradual transitional processes set in place prior to independence, Benavot (1996) and Brown (2000) explain it differently. They see the early expansion of mass schooling during the colonial period as setting the stage for later transitions to democracy after independence. In general, citizens in surveyed countries of Africa demonstrated overwhelming support for democracy and rejection of authoritarian practices. Analyzing relative late-comers to democratization, as is the case with many of the African countries surveyed, can yield instructive results given that those societies cannot be assumed to have political cultures favoring democracy as a result of established political practices over a significant period of time.

Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008) attempted to provide a broader survey of countries in an effort to identify any prerequisites necessary for successful transitions to democracy. Focusing on what's referred to as the "third wave of democratization," they surveyed a total of 174 countries, identifying 63 that successfully transitioned to democracies beginning in the 1990s. They demonstrated that democracies are more likely to emerge in affluent and well-educated societies. Those factors also contributed to the intensity of democratic reforms and the speed with which those democratic transitions occurred. Testing for alternative factors that may have contributed to the transition process in one way or another - including political fractionalization, religion, natural resources, economic liberalism, and the existence of early institutions - they found that even when controlling for other factors, education and development remained statistically significant. This research not only sought to examine a broader range of countries but also looked at political shifts and stability over time. Long-term stability of democratic institutions may persist despite short-term fluctuations.

Institutional Perspective. According to proponents of an institutional perspective, the individual perspective may successfully identify correlation but fails to determine causality. It also suffers weakness due to assumptions as to a linear effect of education on individuals (Hannum & Buckmann, 2005, p. 346). From the institutional perspective, individuals are likewise considered as significant players. The expansion of education affects political systems by way of individual factors. Yet wider social meaning that different levels of education carry within a system of expanded educational opportunities is also significant (Hannum & Buchmann, 2005). According to Kamens (1988), expanding education can serve to legitimate democratic political systems already in place and can serve to expand participation within those systems by encouraging involvement and awareness.

From a macro-level analysis, education is a tool of socialization and role allocation. Yet it is also an important institutional means to achieving democratization. That is, education aids in stabilizing already existing democratic institutions and processes. An institutional perspective, similar to the individual perspective, also goes hand in hand with modernization processes. Modernity demands expansion of education as an institutional given and, at the same time, has the potential to affect the character of national political systems (Kamens 1988). The ability and willingness to expand access to education within a democratic society, as Engelbrecht (2006) notes, largely depends on factors specific to the society in question. For instance, in South Africa, historic marginalization has led to significant problems imagining and implementing inclusive educational programs, particularly for those identified as having special needs.

As Westholm, Lindquist, & Neimi (1990) argue, many analysts proclaim the importance of education to democracy but actual empirical studies show mixed results. Unlike those that approach the relationship between education and democratic values from an individual

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perspective, the institutional perspective insists that there is no clear correlation between educational expansion of mass, primary schooling and greater or more stable democratization. They do, however, identify a link between the expansion of access to higher education and stable democratization (Benavot, 1996). This research purports to take a wider lens to the topic. Utilizing longitudinal research, it aims to identify which macrolevel conditions and mechanisms have affected the process of democratization (and the reverse phenomenon) over the previous three decades. In doing so, it shows a more nuanced causal link, with the independent variable set as the degree of educational expansion at different levels, including primary, secondary, and tertiary education. In identifying a positive correlation between education and democratization in the case of higher education but not primary education, this research directly contradicts the individual perspective. Benavot points to differences in research design, with other research identified as more limited, and attention to dynamic versus static variables. Benavot postulates that one of the reasons higher education correlates with stable democratization is due to the fact that university education lends a new dimension to student awareness as they become cognizant of different political systems and simultaneously more concerned about their own political rights and liberties.

From this perspective, the expansion of education results in greater organization of education and the benefits this has to democratic systems ultimately depends on how education and educated elites "are incorporated into the political system of a country" (Hannum & Buchmann, 2005, p. 346). Once democratic political systems have been institutionalized, educational expansion may produce a shift in cultural resources among competing status groups. Such effects may operate differently from individual levels of education (Kamens, 1988). For those with access to higher education, the greater availability of cultural resources works in

tandem with support for democratic practices. Higher education has been shown to increase

political activity among elites and in doing so, has an effect on political culture, further

institutionalizing democratic institutions (Benavot, 1996, p. 385). This understanding of the

correlation between higher education and democratic practices often carries the assumption that

educated elites are directly involved in creating and running political institutions and

guaranteeing basic political liberties and civil rights.

As Stasavage (2005b) argues, there is significant incentive for democratically elected

political elites to expand access to education. Democratically elected governments may see the

necessity of providing services, such as education, to the population as a means to garner or

maintain support. Indeed, it may very well be in the interest of the elite to promote education and

support for democracy (Bourguignon & Verdier, 2000, Papaioannou & Siourounis, 2008). As is

the case in some countries of Africa, multiparty electoral competitions appear to be associated

with greater government spending on education (Stasavage, 2005b). In Uganda, educational

expansion was notably linked to democratic stability so long as it remained a salient issue for

constituents and pressure was placed on government officials to deliver on promises to expand

mass schooling (Stasavage, 2005a). Democracy, in this way, can have a positive impact on the

expansion of mass schooling. A virtuous cycle is thus created with education enhancing

democracy and democratic systems increasing the likelihood of educational expansion

(Stasavage 2005a, 2005b).

Civic Education. Another approach to spreading democratic values via education has

been through short-term civic education programs. Many observers tout the benefits of programs

focused solely on political knowledge and the encouragement of democratic participation

(Galston, 2004). Such programs are described as a "crash course" in democracy for those not

having grown up with democratic values. "Civic education programming, which in effect seeks to jump-start the long democratic socialization process by rapidly enhancing the skills, values and behavioral aspects that citizens will need if their newly democratic politics are to survive" (Blair, 2003, p. 54). By attending to diversity and culture by way of developing civic skills, civic education programs can create a vision for the potential of democratic action. Yet, as Westheimer and Kahne point out, civic programs must be combined with attention to academic knowledge in order for students to become effective democratic citizens (2003, p. 13). The importance of civic courses is clear even in developed societies with a long history of democratic institutions. As research in Sweden demonstrates, the lack of civics courses within the secondary level vocational track results in students with significantly less political sophistication and knowledge (Westholm, Lindquist, & Neimi, 1990).

Although most civic educational courses are aimed at adults in newly transitioned societies, Chaffee, Morduchowicz, and Galperin (1997) attended to democratic socialization of pre-teens in Argentina. Their research evaluated a "newspapers-in-school" program that aimed to socialize students to not only attend to political events as they unfolded but sought to teach students to understand and tolerate different points of views. They report that, among participants, the program resulted in higher news media usage, more discussions of political topics with peers and family, a greater interest in political issues, more expressions of personal opinion, general support for democracy and a greater tolerance of diversity. Although socioeconomic status was a strong predictor of tolerance in their study, the interaction of participation in the program and socioeconomic status effectively closed the gap between different social strata.

Studies focusing on adult civic education programs in similarly transitioning societies have reported mixed results. Research comparing programs in Poland, the Dominican Republic and South Africa demonstrate that civic education programs do help to increase participation in local political matters (Blair, 2003, Finkel, 2003). Yet those same studies show that those with more education tended to participate more and appeared to benefit more fully from such programs. Yet, as Blair (2003) argues, there is some limited evidence that less educated non-elites benefit as well. The success appears to largely depend on the program itself and the frequency of sessions, instructional methods aimed at increasing classroom participation, and perceived instructor quality. Bratton & Alderfer's (1999) analysis of an adult civic education program in Zambia similarly reports the greatest gains as associated with privileged participants. Their results, overall, were complicated and contradictory. Although participants appeared to walk away with greater political tolerance of views differing from their own, they also seemed to be less supportive of an inclusive model of voting. Program participants also reported less trust of others and their government. Most were supportive of democracy in general and when asked to choose between an elected government versus an effective one, the majority chose an elected government. For those participants with no formal education and limited access to media, the civic education program did not have a significant effect.

Another form of civic education, service learning, has shown promising results. "Service learning is a form of experiential education that combines structured opportunities for learning academic skills, reflection on the normative dimensions of civic life, and experiential activity that addresses community needs or assists individuals, families, and communities in need" (Hunter & Brisbin, 2000, p. 623). Differing from traditional civic education programs which tend to resemble a more typical classroom environment, service learning places students in direct

relation to the communities within which they live. As a result, such courses provide a frame of reference to students, encouraging them to see links between theory and practice, and develop problem solving, critical thinking and interpersonal skills, as well as a sense of citizenship. Drawing on before and after surveys, these programs had a positive effect on students' future participation within their communities (ibid, p. 624). The manner in which this translates into political knowledge and values remains unclear.

The Effect of Higher Education

The global increase university attendance provides us with new opportunities to understand student views formation outside of the North American context (Schofer & Meyer, 2005). UNESCO estimates current worldwide enrollment of students at the tertiary-level education to be 26% in 2007, which is up from 19% in 2000. Expectedly, low-income countries had the lowest 2007 enrollment rates (7%), with increasing rates for lower middle income (20%), upper middle income (44%), and high-income (67%) countries (Altbach, Reisberg, & Rumbley, 2009). However, university enrollment is still on the rise throughout the world, particularly in developing nations, giving researchers new opportunities to understand student life in lower-income countries. Though there has been decades of research on higher education in western contexts, there are now more opportunities for garnering insight in developing world contexts.

The study of American university students has been the primary source of research on higher education.[1] The first year of university, in particular, has is an important time for knowledge acquisition and views formation (Pascarella & Terenzini, 2005). In general, studies focusing on American students have found mitigating effects of specific aspects of college

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[1] For comprehensive literature reviews, see the following: Feldman, K., & Newcomb, 1976; Pascarella and Terenzini (1991; 2005).

student lives on the formation of their political views (Karen, 1991; Astin, 1996). There are potential demographic effects such as gender (Astin & Kent, 1983; Jacobs, 1996; Lie, Malik, & Harris, 1994) and race (Solorzano & Villalpando, 1998). Furthermore, exposure to diverse groups and viewpoints in the classroom can shape views formation and intellectual development (Gurin, Dey, Hurtado, & Gurin, 2002; Hurtado, 2002; Pascarella, Salisbury, Martin, & Blaich, 2012). Flowers, Osterlind, Pascarella, and Pierson (2001) conducted a large-scale study at 56 universities where student scores on the College Basic Academic Subjects Examination were compared. They found that sophomores did, in fact, have higher scores on the exam when compared to freshman students, demonstrating that they had acquired more knowledge.

Pascarella and Terenzini (1991; 2005) generated the most comprehensive review of the literature on higher education, with a particular focus on the American setting. They published an authoritative review of the pre-1990s literature called *How College Affects Students* and, in 2005, published a second volume that covers 1990s research. The increase in demographic diversity in American universities, as well as the emergence of additional literature focusing on community colleges and other less-traditional four-year institutions, was among the key factors motivating Pascarella and Terenzini to update their meta-analysis of the literature. The original volume (1991) covered literature on both academic performance and post college success, but also on the personal transformative aspects of the university experience. The second volume (2005) updates this literature and offers particular insight into the impact higher education has on the attitudes and values of undergraduate students.

Classical versus Professional Education

There is very little research that looks at professional or vocational education and its impact on political socialization. As Westholm, Lindquist, & Neimi (1990) note, vocational

tracks at the secondary level tend to include fewer, if any, civics courses. Thus, students who follow such tracks have less political sophistication and knowledge. This is unsurprising as most vocational programs are aimed at immediate practical knowledge and job training. Focusing on outcomes of three different educational tracks in Sweden, their research demonstrates that even basic civics or social studies courses have an impact on political knowledge among students. Given that vocational students received no civics training at all, students who entered that track tended to have a wider gap of political knowledge in relation to their counterparts in all other tracks, even those not aimed at entering the tertiary level. Civics training, the authors contend, has the most success with those that started out a lower cognitive level regarding political knowledge. It follows that even vocational track students would benefit from even limited exposure to civics education. In their analysis of what they refer to as "non-universities", Sirowy & Benavot (1986) argue that these institutions represent a vocational equivalent at the post-secondary level. Thus, students who complete secondary education but then enter a non-university vocational school, may have more political knowledge as a result of mandated civics and social studies courses completed at the secondary level. More research is needed to support or refute this assumption.

Ultimately, education is in an important agent for political socialization. However, it can only play that role if people are able to access it. In developing countries access is often limited, which poses methodological problems for researchers attempting to study it. The following chapters will address this issue head on and will begin to consider what kinds of values are transferred through education.

Education and Value Change Internationally

Value change is an international phenomenon that has been assessed in the literature based in the World Values Survey. In this section I review how the process of value change has been influenced in different cultural contexts. In this examination, I rely heavily on the work of Duch and Taylor (1993) and chapter 5 of Abramson and Inglehart (1995). These two sets of scholars offer a point and counterpoints on the role of education in the shift of individuals from materialist to postmaterialist. In this section, I will begin by comparing the theoretical arguments of Duch and Taylor (1993) and chapter 5 of Abramson and Inglehart (1995). I will then review their research on the eight western European countries that they analyzed.

Duch and Taylor (1993) offer a challenge to the revised theory of modernization advanced by Abramson and Inglehart (1995). They advance a particular explanation for why we see the gradual transition from materialists to postmaterialists over time. They believe that this trend is driven by the education and economic conditions at the time of the survey. In arguing this, they reject the idea that early economic conditions influence the formation of these views (which is something that Abramson and Inglehart (1995) support). Both sets of authors advance generational replacement as an explanation for shifts towards postmaterialism, but Abramson and Inglehart (1995) take a more holistic approach than Duch and Taylor (1993), who identify these two particular variables as the main causal factors.

Conveniently, for my purposes, both sets of authors provide detailed empirical information about the role education plays in the modernization process. In the cases of France, Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, Italy Denmark, and the United Kingdom, Duch and Taylor (1993) find statistically significant results for the effect of education on postmaterialism where

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education makes individuals more likely to be postmaterialists. Solely in the case Ireland did the effects fail to be statistically significant.

Abramson and Inglehart (1995) provide very detailed empirical data on the effect of level of education on the shift from materialist to postmaterialist. Here, I will generate a table for each country, based on table 5-1 in Abramson and Inglehart (1995) titled, "Distribution of Materialist/Postmaterialist Values, by Years of Birth and Level of Education in Eight Western European Societies, 1980-89." Though these authors provide data for primary education, secondary education, and higher education, I will only be reviewing primary and higher in order to provide a stark contrast. Below, you will see each of the tables. Following the tables, there will be a brief analysis to highlight predominant trends.

Table 2: Germany: Levels of education (age left school)

Years of birth by country	Primary (through age 14)			Higher (ages 19+)		
	Materialist	Postmaterialist	(N)	Materialist	Postmaterialist	(N)
After 1965	10%	40%	30	4%	43%	56
1956-65	32%	16%	284	11%	41%	811
1946-55	26%	13%	504	14%	37%	796
1936-45	31%	11%	723	19%	28%	619
1926-35	35%	10%	857	19%	21%	325
1916-25	41%	7%	882	24%	19%	271
1906-15	45%	5%	569	35%	19%	146
1896-1905	52%	6%	112	35%	6%	31

Table 3: Britain: Levels of education (age left school)

Years of birth by country	Primary (through age 14)			Higher (ages 19+)		
	Materialist	Postmaterialist	(N)	Materialist	Postmaterialist	(N)
After 1965	--	--	11	13%	27%	128
1956-65	21%	28%	29	13%	31%	573
1946-55	24%	12%	75	16%	30%	757
1936-45	26%	16%	133	21%	25%	370

1926-35	25%	19	1166	23%	19%	210
1916-25	31%	9%	1636	24%	19%	189
1906-15	36%	7%	1212	26%	10%	87
1896-1905	34%	6%	345	--	--	21

Table 4: The Netherlands: Levels of education (age left school)

	Primary (through age 14)			Higher (ages 19+)		
Years of birth by country	Materialist	Postmaterialist	(N)	Materialist	Postmaterialist	(N)
After 1965	--	--	9	15%	38%	101
1956-65	30%	15%	110	12%	34%	1384
1946-55	30%	14%	520	11%	38%	1384
1936-45	33%	10%	560	15%	29%	980
1926-35	35%	8%	717	23%	21%	694
1916-25	38%	8%	888	23%	16%	574
1906-15	45%	6%	732	28%	9%	243
1896-1905	46%	6%	217	37%	3%	60

Table 5: France: Levels of education (age left school)

	Primary (through age 14)			Higher (ages 19+)		
Years of birth by country	Materialist	Postmaterialist	(N)	Materialist	Postmaterialist	(N)
After 1965	--	--	19	15%	26%	120
1956-65	36%	14%	154	18%	27%	1267
1946-55	42%	7%	770	18%	27%	1524
1936-45	45%	6%	859	16%	26%	654
1926-35	49%	5%	1314	27%	21%	369
1916-25	50%	5%	1241	29%	19%	345
1906-15	55%	3%	1014	34%	7%	149
1896-1905	55%	3%	302	44%	7%	43

Table 6: Belgium: Levels of education (age left school)

Years of birth by country	Primary (through age 14)			Higher (ages 19+)		
	Materialist	Postmaterialist	(N)	Materialist	Postmaterialist	(N)
After 1965	24%	9%	80	32%	15%	101
1956-65	36%	11%	307	24%	22%	1392
1946-55	45%	6%	393	25%	23%	1273
1936-45	43%	6%	620	29%	18%	853
1926-35	47%	6%	914	34%	16%	544
1916-25	54%	5%	1064	34%	14%	288
1906-15	58%	3%	878	32%	8%	126
1896-1905	66%	3%	293	33%	10%	30

Table 7: Italy: Levels of education (age left school)

Years of birth by country	Primary (through age 14)			Higher (ages 19+)		
	Materialist	Postmaterialist	(N)	Materialist	Postmaterialist	(N)
After 1965	34%	6%	285	19%	12%	108
1956-65	41%	7%	863	24%	17%	1107
1946-55	46%	6%	1570	24%	17%	1122
1936-45	52%	5%	2306	34%	13%	615
1926-35	54%	4%	2712	41%	8%	374
1916-25	57%	3%	2062	46%	8%	213
1906-15	59%	3%	1191	49%	4%	57
1896-1905	62%	2%	208	--	--	8

Table 8: Denmark: Levels of education (age left school)

Years of birth by country	Primary (through age 14)			Higher (ages 19+)		
	Materialist	Postmaterialist	(N)	Materialist	Postmaterialist	(N)
After 1965	--	--	23	14%	25%	149
1956-65	37%	11%	118	13%	32%	1057

1946-55	33%	10%	558	13%	34%	1332
1936-45	34%	8%	1179	15%	26%	889
1926-35	34%	7%	1288	17%	20%	505
1916-25	36%	5%	1547	25%	10%	396
1906-15	44%	4%	1194	26%	5%	181
1896-1905	45%	2%	444	34%	4%	56

Table 9: Ireland: Levels of education (age left school)

	Primary (through age 14)			Higher (ages 19+)		
Years of birth by country	Materialist	Postmaterialist	(N)	Materialist	Postmaterialist	(N)
After 1965	20%	18%	80	23%	13%	71
1956-65	33%	6%	348	31%	12%	562
1946-55	34%	7%	619	30%	14%	553
1936-45	42%	4%	633	36%	11%	319
1926-35	40%	5%	886	39%	12%	240
1916-25	53%	2%	898	41%	9%	149
1906-15	53%	3%	580	46%	5%	112
1896-1905	52%	3%	143	--	--	20

The starkest thing about these tables is that the trends in each are almost entirely consistent (with the exception of those who did higher education in Belgium.) Two trends emerge. First, those who are younger tend to shift towards more postmaterialist values, regardless of their education level. This is as both Duch and Taylor (1993) and Abramson and Inglehart (1995) predict. The second, and most relevant, trend is the fact that within each age group, those who have completed higher education are more likely to be postmaterialist than their less educated counterparts (with some limited exceptions). This data demonstrates that the theoretical predictions that I make regarding self-expression (which is a key component of materialism/postmaterialism) have an empirical basis.

A limitation, however is that all the countries discussed are from Western Europe, and are thus not emblematic of developing world contexts. In an attempt to remedy this, I have aggregated data from all the countries in the most recent administration of the World Values Survey to see if the trends hold up. In addition to looking at the materialism/postmaterialism index, I also examine data related to individuals rating the importance of democracy. Those with no formal education are compared with those who have university level education, for the sake of contrast.

Table 10: Importance of Democracy (1= Not important at all; 10= Absolutely important)

	No formal education	University level education- with degree
Algeria	7.68	8.37
Argentina	6.84	8.91
Australia	7.30	9.08
Armenia	4.93	8.74
Azerbaijan	4.50	8.05
Belarus	7.50	9.06
Brazil	5.60	7.74
Colombia	7.61	9.02
Cyprus	9.03	9.28
Chile	8.05	9.10
China	8.13	8.61
Ecuador	8.45	8.67
Egypt	8.74	9.04
Estonia	--	8.75
Georgia	--	8.72
Germany	8.64	9.36
Ghana	8.55	8.52
Haiti	6.59	6.88
Hong Kong	7.30	8.03
India	7.45	8.10
Iraq	7.46	8.09
Japan	--	8.78
Jordan	7.96	8.54

Kazakhstan	8.78	8.56
Kuwait	8.77	8.85
Kyrgyzstan	6.38	8.04
Lebanon	7.74	8.60
Libya	8.38	8.56
Malaysia	8.75	8.51
Mexico	8.96	9.09
Morocco	8.32	8.63
Netherlands	7.43	8.98
New Zealand	6.67	9.17
Nigeria	7.51	8.33
Pakistan	7.33	8.03
Palestine	7.26	7.98
Peru	7.35	8.65
Philippines	8.94	8.39
Poland	7.00	9.24
Qatar	8.04	8.60
Romania	7.98	9.11
Russian Federation	4.48	7.69
Rwanda	7.09	8.44
Singapore	7.49	7.83
Slovenia	7.60	8.60
South Africa	7.08	8.96
South Korea	8.67	8.56
Spain	8.67	9.03
Sweden	8.39	9.66
Taiwan	8.32	8.83
Thailand	8.22	9.07
Trinidad and Tobago	8.91	8.30
Tunisia	8.14	9.06
Turkey	8.81	8.73
Ukraine	--	8.03
United States	6.12	8.90
Uruguay	9.25	9.35
Uzbekistan	9.00	9.00
Yemen	8.00	9.19
Zimbabwe	8.31	8.61

Table 11: Post-Materialist Index (Percent "Materialist" and not "Mixed" or "Postmaterialist")

	No formal education	University level education-with degree
Algeria	27.6	27.4
Argentina	100	23.1
Australia	29	39.8
Armenia	100	39.6
Azerbaijan	50	45.1
Belarus	45	21.1
Brazil	100	36.4
Colombia	28.9	7.5
Cyprus	50.8	37.7
Chile	25	10.4
China	47.1	49.3
Ecuador	36.4	20.1
Egypt	65.3	59.9
Estonia	--	27
Georgia	--	35.5
Germany	36.7	5.7
Ghana	48.3	32.3
Haiti	1.5	0
Hong Kong	26.1	15.8
India	42	40.2
Iraq	50.8	35.9
Japan	--	17.3
Jordon	72.9	49.7
Kazakhstan	0	52.6
Kuwait	--	--
Kyrgyzstan	12.5	40.6
Lebanon	13.6	29.0
Libya	29.6	31.9
Malaysia	44.6	31.1
Mexico	29.2	14.0
Morocco	39.0	29.6
Netherlands	42.9	11.9
New Zealand	0	14.9
Nigeria	44.5	42.3

Pakistan	33.9	33.3
Palestine	56.8	43.9
Peru	30.9	17.4
Philippines	49.0	31.2
Poland	0	17.5
Qatar	44.4	36.2
Romania	30.0	14.2
Russian Federation	48.2	48.7
Rwanda	57.4	48.7
Singapore	47.1	34.2
Slovenia	60.0	16.8
South Africa	36.7	32.4
South Korea	77.8	38.7
Spain	62.4	15.1
Sweden	0	3.5
Taiwan	27.8	45.8
Thailand	33.4	23.3
Trinidad and Tobago	57.1	29.8
Tunisia	76.3	60.6
Turkey	33.4	30.9
Ukraine	--	38.8
United States	30.2	23.4

Both tables demonstrate the trends that were expected for both developing and developed countries. Those who have more education were consistently more supportive of democracy. Also, as seen in the analysis of Western European countries, education made individuals more supportive of democracy. With this data providing substantiation for predicted trends, we can now turn our attention to the Haitian case.

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Chapter 3: The Haitian Context

In this chapter, I provide some background to the Haitian case with respect to political history and the educational system. First, I explore the case of Haitian democracy further and dig into some of the history which colors the political views of the populous. Through it's often tumultuous past, Haiti has proven to be a challenging forum for the emergence of democratic governance. Pervasive poverty, power hungry elites, a politicized military, and international forces have all had a hand in slowing Haiti's democratic transition. If Haiti, even now, is deserving of the label of "democracy" is truly debatable. With rampant reports of fraud and misconduct in the most recent presidential election, working class and poor Haitians have been slow to warm to the elite-friendly newly elected president. However, in spite of widespread protests, there was a peaceful transition of power, a true rarity in the Haitian political system.

Next, I turn my attention to the Haitian educational system and its history. Education in Haiti is severely limited by the lack of resources invested by the state into educational institutions. Free education in Haiti is virtually nonexistent, and close to half of the population never attends school at all. In spite of this, Haitians value education highly and it is a point of pride to have attended school. University is often only available to the French-speaking elites, and the monolingual Creole-speaking poor are both financially and linguistically excluded from these opportunities. In spite of being elite-dominated, however, universities have served as ground zero for many of the major protest movements in recent history.

Through this chapter, I hope to provide appropriate context for later theoretical and analytic

material. The next chapter will focus more on theoretical background, which will build on the

case-specific background discussed here.

Political History and Transition to Democracy

Understanding the "poorest country in the Western hemisphere" and the endemic

political instability of Haitian society necessitates a historical understanding of the social

divisions that characterize Haitian politics. Born a colonial society, Haiti was once the most

successful plantation economy of the French empire. By 1791, everything changed when the first

and only successful slave rebellion broke out in the western half of the island shared with what is

known today as the Dominican Republic. The Haitian Revolution began as a fight to abolish

slavery and eventually resulted in political independence in 1804.

Despite the important moments of unity that culminated in successfully driving out

French, British and Spanish armies, the process was plagued by political in-fighting and

divisions based on class and race. Following independence, those social divisions became further

entrenched in the new republic and an economic hierarchy based on land ownership was put into

place. Land was divvied up and awarded primarily to officers of high rank in the revolutionary

military. This preference, and the existing status of those who already owned and cultivated land,

created distinct classes. The country split politically, with Henri Christophe declaring himself

king in the north and Alexandre Pétion becoming the elected president of the southern half of the

country. The difference was as much about political systems as it was based on differences of

race and class. The northern half was predominantly made up of former slaves, with the south

representing the majority of those of African descent and mixed-race individuals. Following

Christophe's death in 1820, Haiti was once again united under a single leadership, with mulattos controlling political and governmental institutions.

Thus, political divisions based on race and class were established early on with a "legacy of those divided loyalties" (Danner, 2009, p. 50) continuing to have a significant influence on Haitian society to this day. The revolution left the country "not only with its peculiar social structure and violent, autocratic politics but with an entire stock of heroes and symbols that gave flesh to the enduring themes of Haiti's history: brutal repression, often foreign-aided; heroic revolt; miraculous liberation" (Danner, 2009, p. 50).

Haiti's independence was not welcomed with open arms by the international community. In 1825, France demanded reparations from the newly sovereign republic, totaling 150 million francs. Although it was later reduced to 90 million in 1838, the debt had significant economic consequences for the country. Of note is the fact that Haiti actually paid off this debt and associated interest, completing payments in 1947. In a similar fashion, the Vatican's refusal to recognize Haiti's independence until 1860 had consequences for the early development of social and educational institutions in the country. As Michel-Rolph Trouillot (Trouillot, 1990, p. 51) puts it, "the contempt of Rome cost Haiti dearly, both in terms of its internal development and in the international arena… it crippled the Haitians' chances of building a solid and wide-ranging system of formal education." Largely ostracized by its slave-holding neighbors, Haitian society turned inward and became a predominantly peasant society. Early forced isolation "increased its self-absorption and its nationalism, and deepened its internal divisions, cultural and economic, and its suspicion of the colonial powers" (Danner, 2009, p. 54) What had been an export led economy, became a nation of small land holders.

Land reforms enacted early in Haiti's history ultimately contributed to the manner in which political and economic power went hand in hand for the country's elite. Wealth could not be obtained by way of land ownership, as is the case in other societies. That system had fallen along with the colonial plantation economy. Thus, control of the government and its extractive potential became a lucrative site for the development of elite wealth (Danner, 2009; Lundahl, 1989). In this way, elites looked to politics and the presidency as a source of wealth and power. As Michel-Rolph Trouillot argues, the targeting of coffee exportation for taxation was "the first in a series of steps taken against the interests of the growing peasantry, and set the tone for Haiti's economic policy for the next two centuries" (1990, p. 60). In his important analysis of Haitian history, *Haiti: State Against Nation*, Trouillot demonstrates an historically developed division between the state and the nation (civil society) has played an integral part in Haiti's historical development. He characterizes the nation as the "culture and history of a class-divided civil society, as they relate to issues of state power" (Trouillot, 1990, p. 25). Haitian society is "undeniably a society split in two" in which the "mechanisms that have produced the split keep the two parts in an unequal but complementary relationship" (Trouillot, 1990, p. 50). Along similar lines, Robert Fatton characterizes the history of the Haitian state as "predatory" in that it is "a despotic structure of power that preys on its citizens without giving much in return; its total lack of accountability suppresses even the murmurs of democracy" (2002, p. 27). While the urban elite have traditionally controlled state and private interests, this control has long been maintained through extraction of profit from the rural, laboring classes. Wealthy landowners are the locus of power and were at the forefront of this extraction.

The political results of this division between the state apparatus and the majority population has largely been characterized as chronic political instability, with regular "political

succession, numerous constitutional crises, and recurring armed feuds" (Trouillot, 1990, p.83).

This political instability can be attributed to three factors: (1) growing economic divisions between the peasantry, on the one hand, and the governmental and merchant classes on the other. This division was largely the result of increasing unproductivity among the peasant classes due to the decreasing availability of fertile land and the systematic siphoning off of resources by merchants and state institutions through taxes and other mechanisms; (2) the expanding role and size of state institutions as resulting from the "extraction of surplus and its monopoly of the labor market"; and (3) "political marginalization of the peasantry and the concentration of urban demands in the narrow sphere of governmental decisions" (Trouillot, 1990, pp. 84-85). Haiti's political history is one of autocratic rule (Lundahl, 1989). Politics, in this context, is a constant battle of legitimacy as actors contest those in power in an effort to take power for themselves (Danner, 2009, p. 56). In addition, political in-fighting within the elite has always involved the Haitian masses as both a marginal and instrumental force. In this way, political leaders use populist energy if and when it suits them (Sprague, 2012).

By 1915, this political instability culminated in six presidents holding office over the course of a four-year period and included significant political violence. On July 28, 1915, American President Woodrow Wilson ordered the invasion of Haiti by the US Marines. Thus, began the US occupation of Haiti, lasting from 1915-1934. Although the occupation resulted in a number of infrastructural developments, it also further entrenched divisions based on race and class, and worked to centralize government control (Smith, 2009; Renda, 2001; Trouillot, 1990; Dubois, 2012). Resistance to the occupation, and the political activism that followed the period of occupation, drew on black nationalist movements such as *négritude* and *noirisme.* It is within this context that François "Papa Doc" Duvalier, a black middle class country doctor, came to

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power. Although Duvalier's election was marred by inconsistencies and fraud, it was also successful due to his capitalizing on widespread opposition to foreign intervention and festering resentments aimed at a mulatto-dominated political elite. As Farmer notes, "an expert in both Haitian history and culture, Duvalier knew what he must do to acquire personal power" (1994, p. 107).

Duvalier was a pragmatic authoritarian strategist who quickly consolidated power by way of fear tactics aimed at centralizing and maintaining control. As with many other Latin American countries at the time, the Haitian military could make or break a political actor and agenda. Duvalier understood this and worked to swiftly put in place top ranking officials that would remain loyal to him and not threaten his presidency. Duvalier's success is most often attributed to the development of a nationwide paramilitary force colloquially known as the Tonton Macoutes. Macoutes were drawn from the ranks of an impoverished majority. In his way, Duvalier gave power to many who previously had very little (Girard, 2005, p. 97). As a diffused and brutal system of control, Duvalier's Macoutes were quite effective at stemming and rooting out political opposition. As "president for life," Duvalier succeeded in centralizing government power and institutions. Despite his success, however, he did little to improve living conditions for the majority of the population. Although Duvalier did secure a fair amount of foreign aid - particularly from the United States as he took a strategic stance in opposition to communism - little of this aid reached the peasantry. Those in the countryside continued to be highly taxed through both formal and informal means (Bellegarde-Smith, 2004).

Even Papa Doc's death in 1971 did not bring an end to authoritarian rule in Haiti. Before he passed, François named his son, Jean-Claude, the next president for life. Jean-Claude, nicknamed "Baby Doc," was only 19 when he ascended to power. Baby Doc maintained

similarly repressive practices, however, he was most widely known for his liberalizing and kleptocratic tendencies. Foreign aid, in this way, allowed him to maintain a particular lifestyle even despite declining conditions in the country. His liberalizing policies encouraged and courted foreign private investment and aid to the country. Despite significant increases in aid dollars during his tenure, nothing of substance changed. Corruption was rampant while the country became "virtually dependent on international charity by the late 1970s," a level of aid that represented nearly 70 percent of the national treasury. (Girard, 2005, p. 101)

Haiti as a Nascent Democracy

Frustration at the lack of change and growing problems with deforestation, overcrowding in the capital, and both natural and man-made disasters eventually led to a popular uprising against Baby Doc. This grassroots movement culminated in Duvalier fleeing the country in 1986. The period that followed is referred to as *dechoukaj* (uprooting) as many sought to upend any remaining vestiges of Macoutism and Duvalierism. It was only partially successful as the population endured the waves of violence and political instability that followed (Danner, 2009). Most government and military efforts to quash Duvalier sympathizers were half-hearted and many recognized that Duvalierism remained alive and well despite the departure of Duvalier himself. "With the fall of Jean Claude Duvalier in 1986, the Macoutes were officially disbanded but many were carried over into new non-uniformed attachés" (Sprague, 2012, p. 15).

The period that followed is commonly understood as Haiti's transition to democracy. As Danner writes, "in what had been a political and intellectual desert, the floodgates had opened, and suddenly politics had become a growth industry. Overnight, a small, dead country had been transformed, in the words of the Haitian sociologist Laënnec Hurbon, into 'an immense social and political laboratory'"(2009, p. 12). Despite these first tentative steps toward democracy,

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many recognize that even today the project remains incomplete. A new constitution was drafted in 1987, instilling hope in many. Yet attempts at implementing democratic practices were hobbled by violence early on. Despite elections in 1988, a series of coup d'états ultimately thwarted hopes of bringing about a successful democratic transition. After a quick campaign, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a Catholic priest, was elected president. His popular movement and political party, *Lavalas* (the flood) sympathized with, and represented, the poor majority. The election is widely considered the first successfully free and honest election in Haitian history. Aristide's presidency, however, threatened the established political and economic elite (Dupuy, 2007, p. 101). As Farmer notes, "the elections of December 16 had given voice to the popular will, but had done little to allay the tensions between the Haitian people and the country's powerful. The army was restless, and the commercial elite had never masked its horror over Aristide" (1994, p. 157). After only eight months in office, a coup d'état forced Aristide out. Another wave of violence ensued, mostly aimed at Lavalas supporters, especially those residing in Port-au-Prince's most notorious slum, Cité Soleil. It wasn't until 1994, a mere four months prior to the end of Aristide's term, that the U.S. government under President Clinton, took action and assisted in restoring Aristide to the presidency. Prior to stepping down, Aristide succeeded in disbanding the Haitian military.

Rene Préval, Aristide's former Prime Minister, was elected in 1996. After finishing a full term and stepping down peacefully, Aristide was once again elected. When Aristide took office again in 2001, the aid embargo that had begun under Préval threatened to stall or otherwise prevent any meaningful government action. As Dupuy (2005, p. 61) argues, "the suspension of aid was political in the strict sense of the term, based as it was on those entities' disapproval of the political party and president who came to power." This contributed significantly to political

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gridlock and an inability to bring about much-needed infrastructural development and the delivery of social services. Some Haitians who had previously supported Aristide became fierce opponents, others who had always opposed democracy were reinvigorated by the turn of public opinion as frustration at the government's ability to provide basic services created a general disenchantment with the incumbent regime. In 2004, with support from foreign governments including the United States, Aristide was once again ousted in a coup d'état. Yet another wave of military and paramilitary violence swept the country (Sprague, 2012). This time, the UN became involved, dispatching a stabilization force known as MINUSTAH. MINUSTAH has a controversial history and has long overstayed its welcome according to many of the Haitian people. The United Nations remains active to this day, despite considerable controversy and a recent shift in focus from peacekeeping to security sector reform.

In 2006, Préval was re-elected and although elections were delayed on account of the January 12, 2010 earthquake, Préval once again completed his term and peacefully handed over power to Michel Martelly in 2011. Opposition to Martelly's presidency began even before officially taking office. As a popular *konpa* musician performing under the name "Sweet Micky," Martelly's political alliances remained relatively ambiguous despite the claims made by political opponents and critics who unequivocally labeled him as a Duvalierist (Joersz, 2016, p. 67). Martelly's presidency, lasting from 2011 to early 2016, was marked by significant contestation and political opposition. Although he stepped down as planned in February 2016, marred electoral processes resulted in no democratically elected predecessor taking his place. Jocelerme Privert served as interim president until Jovenel Moise was sworn in on February 7, 2017. The transition of power was predominantly peaceful, despite widespread concerns of fraud in the electoral process (Kolbe, Cesnales, Puccio, & Muggah, 2015).

Development and the Parallel State of NGOs

Given its history of political in-fighting and authoritarianism, including the many periods

of instability and violence, it should come as no surprise that sustainable and widespread

development in the country has been elusive. Over-reliance on foreign aid and the short-lived

nature of foreign funds available for development projects, also significantly hampered the

ability of the state to bring about long-term change and effectively invest in infrastructural

projects (Joersz, 2016). Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) make up the bulk of

development activities and social service provisions in the country. Given the instability of

funding within the NGO system (Cooley & Ron, 2002), this community of international NGOs

has contributed to the lack of development in the country. "The prominent role and place of

NGOs in Haitian society directly undermines the ability of the state to set priorities and govern

effectively" (Joersz, 2016, p. 78). As Schuller notes, most donor policies and practices favor

funding NGOs instead of the Haitian government thus, "nearly all 'development' occurs through

the many NGOs that exist in Haiti" (2007, p. 100). In this way, the relationship between the

Haitian economy, state institutions, and aid dollars makes for a volatile situation of dependency

(Étienne, 1997; Ramachandran & Walz, 2012).

International missionaries and other religious-based development organizations provide

many social services. Historically, Haiti has been a predominantly Catholic country. Catholicism

in Haiti has largely tolerated practitioners simultaneous following Haiti's popular religion,

Vodou. As a direct result of the growing number of missionaries and Protestant-based activities

in the country, however, the religious make-up of the country has shifted. According to Durban-

Albrecht, military and religious interventions in Haiti have resulted in a large-scale shift from

Catholicism to Protestantism in the last century (2015, p. 95). As she argues, this shift was the product of Baby Doc's efforts at "liberalization":

> Mid-century missionaries initiated significant human development projects, particularly in the realms of education and healthcare, that were within the scope of bringing Christianity to the Black republic. These projects would come to have a larger than expected impact as Haiti became the laboratory for neoliberalism, or as Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier called it, turning the country into the "Taiwan of the Caribbean" through post-Fordist manufacturing and benefits to attract foreign business while diminishing any potential of developing a social safety net for the Haitian population. United States policies after the ousting of Duvalier in 1986 continued this trend, and faith-based and other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) grew ten-fold during the 1990s. (2015, p. 102)

In this way, Protestant missionaries positioned themselves as an intermediary between foreign aid and the Haitian population. Although Protestantism represented only 20% of the population in 1970, by 2008 nearly 40% of Haitians claimed affiliation with one of many Protestant sects (Durban-Albrecht, 2015, pp. 101-103). In comparison with the relative tolerance Haitian Catholicism had in relation to the practice of Vodou, Protestant Haitians openly reject and fear Vodou. This situation has created a number of hostile and sometimes violent clashes. The percentage of Protestant Haitians has skyrocketed from 20% in 1980 to 40% in 2000, making this an ever-present issue in Haitian society. (Durban-Albrecht, 2015, p. 103)

Educational System and Impact on Development

An analysis of Haitian history from the perspective of a sharp division between the state and the nation factors heavily in the early development of a formal education system. As a result

of its quick and unexpected break with tradition that the revolution brought about, Haiti was unable to gain international recognition from countries and institutions like France and the Vatican. As Trouillot states, "in Catholic Europe, as in the current and former colonies of Catholic nations, religious orders have always been the backbone of the formal educational system" (1990, p. 51).

Thus, while in other colonial run territories, the Vatican was an early source of investment and motivation to establish a centralized educational system aimed at educating the masses (as opposed to reserving education largely for elites and upper class families), in Haiti this was not the case: The Vatican's early refusal to recognize Haiti as independent diocese prevented assistance in laying the foundation of an educational system. As Trouillot states, "the contempt of Rome cost Haiti dearly, both in terms of its internal development and in the international arena… it crippled the Haitians' chances of building a solid and wide-ranging system of formal education" (Trouillot, 1990, p. 51). Education in Haiti remained solely an option for urban elites. By the end of the 19th century, 350 schools existed and by 1917, 730 schools were in operation. While the number of schools doesn't necessarily reveal anything significant about how extensive the school system was at the time, the fact that only 11% of the reference age group was actually attending school reveals a lack of effort to make education widely available (Salmi, 2000, p. 164).

Bringing the analysis to more recent historical events reveals very little progress by the way of educational expansion between 1917 and throughout the two Duvalier dictatorships. The lack of motivation by the upper-class elites to create a centralized educational system continued up until Papa Doc came into power. Through his "auto-neutralization" tactics of breaking down hierarchies, including those of cultural and civil society, Papa Doc acted on his belief that

"power was more easily maintained through extreme centralization" (Trouillot, 1990, pp. 161-185)..During this period, political polarization and brutal repression reigned, however, "the political polarization may have mattered less than the economic and social polarization that it helped to mask" (Trouillot, 1990, p. 181). Duvalier's consolidation of every aspect of state institutional activities and civil society did not result in increasingly effective institutions but rather resulted in more tightly controlled operations that hinged on suppressing opposition. Both Papa Doc and Baby Doc failed to invest in state institutions, preventing further development and availability of educational opportunities within the country. Trouillot notes this lack of investment when he demonstrates that Jean-Claude Duvalier spent merely $3.70 per inhabitant, per year on education (1990, p. 181).

School enrollment numbers also demonstrate a lack of effort to increase literacy and educational availability during this period: In 1950, 10% of school age children attended school and in 1970 that number had only increased to 12% (Hadjadj, 2000, p. 16). Following the fall of the Duvalier dictatorship in 1986, violence, upheaval, and uncertainty resulted in 13 governments in a 20-year period (Hadjadj, 2000, p. 13). This instability did little to assist the struggling country in developing institutional framework that it continues to lack even today, especially in terms of education, healthcare, electricity, sanitation, environmental management, maintenance, and expansion of roads.

While demand for education has significantly increased since the 1980s, public funding for education has not followed suit (Easton & Fass, 1989). For those schools that are available, access to an affordable education has prevented many school-age children from attending. While in theory, public education is free, school attendance almost never is. Lack of sufficient financial support from the government has forced most public schools to require fees from

students to pay for materials and/or teacher salaries (Salmi, 2000, p. 170). These fees have created a situation in which public schools are often comparable in cost to private schools and in some cases, private schools are cheaper. In addition to fees, the sheer lack of public schools has led to greater competition in accessing them, one in which some public schools require students to already know how to read and write prior to being admitted (Salmi, 2000, pp. 170-171).

Private schools, through religious and non-governmental organizations, have seemingly filled the gap in educational options, springing up in areas where public schools are not an option or where demand for schooling is high. While only about 55% of school age children (ages 6-12) actually attend school, 75% of those children attend private schools. Of all the schools in Haiti, nearly 92% of them are privately run. The vast majority of private schools are religiously oriented and funded (World Bank, 2006; Salmi, 2000).

The rapid increase in private school numbers has also mirrored the rapid increase in private, external funding that has been increasingly channeled through NGOs rather than the Haitian state, creating a parallel state which provides educational services in addition to other municipal services traditionally provided by the state and paid for through taxation (Cantave, 2006). Due to Haiti's education system being privately and/or externally controlled, it has become difficult to control oversight of curriculum, teacher qualification and overall educational quality. It is for this reason that Haiti's education system has been referred to as a *lekòl bolet* (school lottery) in which parents are gambling with their children's future in sending their children to one school over another (Doucet, 2003; Easton & Fass, 1989; World Bank, 2006; Salmi, 2000).

While in many areas of the world, private schools are either believed to be of higher quality or are in practice better schools than local public options, private schools in Haiti

represent both some of the *best* schools available as well as some of the *worst* schools available. With few schools falling in the average quality range, choosing a school is often comparable to playing the local lottery (*bòlet*). As Doucet clarifies, private schools "should not be automatically associated with 'better conditions or more affluent', as usually obtains in other countries… In Haiti, the majority of private schools are given the label of *lekòl bòlet* (lottery school) which alludes to their overall patent deficiencies both from material to pedagogical perspectives" (2003, p. 34).

Since Haiti's transition to democracy, the government has been in perpetual crisis, suffering from corruption and a lack of funds for social services. Increasing availability and affordability of public schools has been, and continues to be, a low priority. Additionally, extending funds for the Ministry of Education to sharpen its oversight capabilities has lacked significantly. In comparison with countries in the Latin American & Caribbean region, Haiti spends the lowest percentage of its GNP on education (at the same time it has the lowest GNP in the region). With the highest regional illiteracy rate and lowest school attendance rate, Haiti has an unusually high percentage of students in the private sector – a rate that only compares to some of the poorest nations on the African continent (Salmi, 2000, p. 167).

The Formal Haitian Educational System

The Haitian educational system is dominated by private academic institutions, which can be attributed to the fact that funds are limited for public education in Haiti. The payment of school fees is an issue that plagues poor and working-class Haitian households throughout the educational process. Fewer than 50% of individuals aged 6-24 attended school or university during the 2001-2002 academic year, with rural individuals being less likely (40%) to attend

than those from urban areas (58.45%) (Institut Haïtien de Statistique et D'Informatique (IHSI), 2009).

Children begin with elementary education, which is compulsory according to the Haitian state. Even at this early stage, education is predominantly done in French and not Haitian Creole. Students advance through the educational system by level, as opposed to by age. Since many families have limited funds, children will often take time off of school while their families save up for school fees. Thus, classes will be a mix of younger students and older students. Only a small minority of students who start elementary education make it to secondary education. Students spend 6-7 years in secondary school. The quality of this schooling is severely limited by the fact that teachers at this level often lack basic training and many have not had any education past secondary school themselves. For those students who finish secondary school, there is a university preparatory level. Philo is level of education that exists between high school and university. It is a short (1 or 2 year) university preparatory level, where students specialize in either in math and science, social sciences, or in the arts and humanities.

Advancement to the university level of education is incredibly rare. There is some empirical uncertainty over the number of Haitian university students following the earthquake. One of the most frequently cited figures is that 40,000 university students in an aggregate population of just fewer than 10 million were estimated to be enrolled in university in 2006 (Ministère de L'éducation Nationale et de la Formation Professionnelle, 2007). However, I tasked a small group of Haitian research assistants with exploring the question, "how many university students are there in Haiti?" They spoke with the state university and six additional large universities (Université de la Caraibe, Université de Port-au-Prince, Inuka (formerly known as Unica), Hautes Études, Faculty Lecompte D'Haiti, and Quisqueya University. The cumulative

number of university students was 45,197, and they really only covered a small fraction of all universities in the country. What this information tells us is that we should be cautious of the existing estimates.

Approximately 3,586 Haitian university students enrolled in foreign universities outside Haiti in 2010 (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2012). These students were not included in the survey even though they are of Haitian descent. Future research may include them. However, the resources needed to track down these individuals who are predominantly in France, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and Venezuela are beyond the scope of this project. While there is a great deal of migration from Haiti, the immigrant population in Haiti is extremely low. The primary race-based social class divisions are those between darker-skinned Haitians and Mulatto Haitians (lighter-skinned) Haitians who are mixed race. There is also an extremely small minority of people who identify as white Haitians.

The average Haitian university student is upper middle class, male, and is 26 years old (Kolbe and Muggah, 2009). Fewer than 10% of university students are women (Kolbe and Muggah, 2009). Since the average age of completion for secondary school is 22 years old, the average Haitian university student tends take approximately two or three years off of school prior to starting university. Thus, resulting cohorts are slightly older than they are in American universities. Anecdotally, in my time at ETS, I have had several students in their mid-fifties and have most typically had students in their mid- to late- 20s.

Student Movements

Students, particularly those enrolled in the State University of Haiti (UEH), have historically taken up various political causes, both aimed at national political issues as well as university-level concerns. Protests are a regular event at various campuses in Port-au-Prince,

especially those university departments with more social and economic awareness such as the Department of Human Sciences (FASCH) and the Department of Ethnology. Leading up to the 2004 coup that ousted Aristide a second time, university students regularly protested, expressing their disappointment with his presidency.

In 2009, students led a series of protests aimed at pressuring President Préval to raise the minimum wage from 70 gourdes a day ($1.74) to 200 gourdes ($4.97). A prominent professor at the Department of Human Sciences, Jean Anil Louis-Juste, was at the heart of this protest movement. Anil was well known for his militant activism as a student during the period leading up to the downfall of Jean-Claude Duvalier's in 1986. After completing his Ph.D. abroad, Louis-Juste returned to Haiti in 2004 and became a central figure of university activism. He helped establish the Association of Dessalinin University Students (ASID) in 2007: "Unlike other radical student groups, this organization joined Marxist analysis to a nationalism that venerated Jean-Jacques Dessalines, the first ruler of independent Haiti, as an antiliberal socialist" (Losier, 2013, p. 215). As a militant organization, ASID succeeded in mobilizing large numbers of workers from assembly zones in the movement to raise the minimum wage. Anil's radical activities brought on a series of death threats and he was eventually shot dead a mere two hours before the devastating earthquake hit Port-au-Prince on January 12, 2010. His importance to the culture of resistance within some university departments remains to this day.

Conclusion

This chapter provided background relevant to the current study. I began by discussing the role of education in Haiti and the types of education which may have been reported by survey participants or which may have been discussed in the qualitative interviews. Education was placed within the larger framework of Haiti's tumultuous political history with a particular

attention to higher education and protest movements. By integrating research literature from a

variety of disciplines I was able to explore education and political views in Haiti specifically and

synthesize that which is useful for contextualizing my own findings which are discussed in the

next few chapters.

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Chapter 4: Qualitative Component

The first phase of data collection involved interviews with Haitian undergraduate students. Semi-structured interviews with university students were conducted about their views and a variety of topics. This helped me understand the nuances of student political preferences and how students internalize these views; it also provided a foundation on which to base my quantitative analysis. Because my qualitative interviews focused broadly on the impact of education, I was able to identify issues and outcomes which would not have otherwise been highlighted as either an explanation or contextualization. I begin this chapter with a description of the methods used and focus of the interviews. I then discuss findings thematically; these findings emerged organically from the process of data collection and analysis. I conclude with a discussion of how the qualitative component of this study formed a foundation for further research which was best addressed using quantitative means.

Qualitative Methodology

The interview portion of this study was based on semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions. I used a conventional content analysis approach to both guide the interviews and to analyze the data. The purpose of the interview portion of the study was to gather data on both the political viewpoints of students. Including these interviews in this study allowed me to gain traction on the nuances of political preferences held by Haitian undergraduate students. Furthermore, this adds richness to the data collected in the survey-based portion of the study and allows me to elaborate on findings from the

survey. Each interview was conducted by the research team and tape-recorded. The interviewer then transcribed in Haitian Creole. All interviews were aggregated and translated by a Creole-English translator.

Scope and focus. The research instrument included a list of open-ended interview questions which followed the explanation of the study and confidentiality protocols recommended by the University of Michigan Institutional Review Board (IRB). As previously explained, the interviews were semi-structured. Research team members were provided with a list of questions which must be included in each interview however the questions were intended to elicit narrative or conversation, rather than static answers. The intention was that respondents could answer the question if they chose, or use it as a jumping board to move on to more important or interesting topics.

The focus of the interviews was on pre-university and university-period political views development; participating students were asked to tell anecdotes of views formation. This was an important opportunity to better understand what specific political issues university students tend to be interested in. To generate the initial list of questions, I took the portion of the World Values Survey most relevant to my research and asked the questions in an open-ended format. The questions were based on agree/disagree statement variables [V131 to V139] in the WVS questionnaire. The variables were:

V131: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor.

V132: Religious authorities ultimately interpret the laws.

V133: People choose their leaders in free elections.

V134: People receive state aid for unemployment.

V135: The army takes over when government is incompetent.

V136: Civil rights protect people from state oppression.

V137: The state makes people's incomes equal.

V138: People obey their rulers.

V139: Women have the same rights as men.

Interviewers posed the statements and then asked students what they thought about this idea or statement. For instance, is this true? Where did this idea come from? Do people always have to obey their rulers? When was a time that you felt it was very important to obey a ruler? What if the ruler is corrupt or they order the police to do something which violates the law? What are the circumstances under which a person is morally obligated to not obey their ruler? As a child or student, how did you learn to obey or disobey rulers? How does this impact your own views now on rulers? How does it impact your willingness to take actions like protesting against rulers or voting for someone in an election? These follow up questions and the related probes varied from person to person as the interviews developed based on the respondents own interests and articulated thoughts.

Sampling. Snowball sampling was used to recruit active university students. In this part of the study, I neither targeted nor excluded students from the study on the basis of gender, age, or additional educational background. The requirements for inclusion in the interview portion of the study were 1) to identify as "Haitian" and 2) to be currently enrolled in a bachelors-level university program. Each member of the research team referred a research subject to a different member of the research team. Interviewers were instructed not to interview their own friends and acquaintances. The only stipulations were that the research subject had to be a member of the study population and that they

could not be a student at ETS. After a person was interviewed, they were asked to refer another person or persons to participate in the study. This sampling procedure produced a wide variety of research subjects in different programs at different institutions. To protect confidentiality, research subject names and university institutions were not recorded or if they were accidently included in the audio files, these identifiers were deleted.

This approach was particularly useful because it circumvented the administrative blockage problem that I experienced when attempting to work through university administrations. I approached a number of universities over a two-year period but all were reluctant to allow such research to take place, fearing that it could be viewed as politicized or connected to current controversies in the national political government. By drawing on the various networks of the interviewers (who were themselves university students) more ground was covered more efficiently. Interviews were completed until information saturation was reached.

Fielding process. Data collection for this portion of the study took place during April and May 2014. The interviewers began by contacting an eligible individual and explaining the study purpose. If the student was interested and willing to participate, they established a suitable private location for the interview which was mutually agreed upon between the student and the interviewer. The research team was instructed to find a private space either on or near the university campuses to conduct the interviews. If no private space was available on the university campuses, the interviewers arranged a meeting at a private off-campus location. As per Internal Review Board (IRB) ethical stipulations, the interview location was considered private only if the research subject considered it to be private. Interview locations included homes, dormitory rooms (with

roommates absent), unused classrooms, friends' homes, quiet and deserted workplaces, and public parks, among others.

After explaining the purpose of the research and reviewing confidentiality, the interviewer obtained consent to record the interview. Interviews were conducted and recorded. After the interviews occurred, all recordings were transcribed and translated. Interviewing continued until data saturation was reached; that is, until no new information, ideas, or insights were presented by the interviewees. According to Fusch & Ness (2015, p. 1408), "data saturation is reached when there is enough information to replicate the study, when the ability to obtain additional new information has been attained, and when coding is no longer feasible." A rule of thumb that I used in my application of the idea of data saturation was that when I started to hear the same thing over and over, I was approaching data saturation.

In this case, saturation was reached with 27 interviews. Data saturation as a method for selecting the best sample size is well-established (Elo, Kääriäinen, Kanste, Pölkki, Utriainen, and Kyngäs, 2014). Using data saturation to choose an optimal sample size facilitates later coding as categories are easier to recognize when the data is comprehensive (Elo, et al., 2014).

To motivate participation in the semi-structured interview portion of the study, I considered a raffle for a small, culturally appropriate gift. Though the practice of offering compensation for participation in a qualitative interview is common in the United States, my research team advised me that it was inappropriate in the Haitian context and could produce bias. There is often an expectation for payment from the researcher, particularly if there is a foreign group or aid organization involved. However, providing payment can

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skew responses in that people will deliberately respond in ways they think might attract

funding and additional resources to either themselves or to their universities. For this

reason, I decided to avoid offering any compensation or gifts associated with

participation in this research.

Research team. My role as a researcher in this study was challenging, given that I

am not Haitian. I considered the possibility of participating in the interviews alongside a

Haitian research assistant. However, being non-Haitian had the potential to significantly

bias the responses of the interview subjects, since there are many cultural predispositions

about foreigners. Though I speak the local language (Haitian Creole), I was concerned

that students might feel uncomfortable expressing views critical of Americans or other

foreigners who are operating in Haiti. Thus, I chose forgo participation in the interview

and instead to train research assistants to fill the interviewer role. Ultimately, utilizing

trained Haitian staff to conduct the interviews, helped keep the research process sensitive

to local knowledge.

Thus, Haitian undergraduate research assistants conducted all of the interviews. In

collaboration with these research assistants, I prepared a protocol for the interviewers that

stipulated a list of "must-ask" interview questions. The uniformity of these questions has

allowed me to compare the experiences of students across the sample. However, I gave

interviewers the flexibility to ask probing follow-up questions, to explore additional

topics. Somewhat disappointingly, some of the research assistants did not ask follow-up

questions. Interviewers also defaulted to a more conversational interview style,

sometimes disregarding the "must-ask" questions (in spite of being trained to the

contrary). This fact was discovered after it was too late to coach them to change interview strategies. However, the questions that were asked yielded rich data.

There were requirements for the research assistants:

1. Enrollment at *Enstiti Travay Sosyal ak Syans Sosyal* or another institution that provides training in research methods

2. Participation or enrollment in a semester-long training course where research assistants learn skills pertinent to this project

Members of the research team were students who I have worked with in the classroom and many of whom have experience doing projects with other researchers. I did practice interviews and ran an extensive semester-long training with the research team. They all participated in a class where they did a series of practice interviews with each other in their training seminar and engaged in peer-observation. We worked specifically on skills like interview time management, how to ask follow-up questions, and how to ask neutrally phrased questions. Through this training, members of the research team gained experience as well as a basic understanding of the research process.

Finally, a pilot was conducted with the research team. Interviews chose the name of volunteer respondent (who was also a university student) at random to interview. They followed the same protocols which were later used for the actual data collection. Following the interviews, we had a group meeting to discuss the experience and uncover themes which emerged from the interviews. Though none of the questions were changed based on this pilot, some prompts were added and research team members received extensive coaching on how to follow the interview protocols.

Qualitative Data Representation

The qualitative data had both recurring themes and outlier portions of data. Every effort was made to ensure that the data presented in this chapter was representative of the data as a whole. This was done with the aim of intellectual honesty. It was very important to me that I not make misleading generalizations that would detract from the rigor of this analysis. Thus, the data presented in this chapter is emblematic of prevailing themes these unless otherwise noted.

In the interest of transparency, I would like to discuss some of the specifics of the coding process and how I made meaning of the data. In the data, eight overarching themes emerged: 1) behaviors & activities, 2) events & experiences, 3) strategies, practices, and tactics, 3) states of being, 4) meaning, 5) involvement, 6) relationship & interaction, and 7) conditions & constraints. Within each of these categories there were sub-categories that related loosely to each theme. In this section, I will review some of the key ideas that emerged in the coding scheme and will discuss how the codes relate with each other.

In the discussion of behaviors and activities, the students discussed their specific interactions with political phenomena and explored how they and others actuated these political ideas into behavior. A code that frequently emerged was dialogue & debate, which was applied when students engaged political ideas critically. They sometimes speculated on turning ideas into behaviors and spoke about what political actions they and others have taken. The role that their education & school experience played in political beliefs was something that I asked directly about, so it is unsurprising that it was something that emerged in the coding.

The codes associated with events & experiences tended to be somewhat abstract. These codes were based on an analysis of student perceptions and reflections on their experiences. Students discussed their exposure to new or different ideas and their first experiences with inequality. They also discussed the process of realizing they were wrong and how they knew things had changed.

Strategies, practices and tactics was a theme that encompassed a broad range of ideas. This category ended up including some of the ideas that did not easily fit in the other categories. Some of the codes referred to things that are not easily defined, such as truth and violence. The rest of the codes were more reflective and prescriptive, with the students reflecting on what they could do to become better people. These included the idea of acting responsibly, taking a communal approach, and learning on my own.

Next, I coded for states of being. Unsurprisingly, the idea of globalization emerged, which is something that some university students learn about but that is not well known in the population. Students reflected on how the world really is according to their often-cynical analysis of the global system. Also, important to note was that the students attempted to distinguish themselves from non-students. They often viewed themselves as superior to the non-students and more sophisticated in their thinking.

Meaning was a particularly noteworthy theme, because it captured efforts of the students to articulate the things they had learned and discuss their significance. Students attempted to define concepts, such as equality, human rights, democracy, authority, law, and society. They also engaged more abstractly with ideas of law, society, religion, human rights, equality, and use of violence. Within this theme, it was possible to observe the details of the views that students held. A potential direction for future research may

be to do a similar set of interviews with non-students and compare how the two groups make meanings of these concepts.

The involvement theme was relatively straightforward, with only two main codes associated with it: participation and adaptation. The participation code captured some of the ways that students interact with day to day life, including not only political life, but also things like university, family, and community. The adaptation code was perhaps the hardest code of all of them to come up with and to distinguish from the participation code. Adaptation signified some sort of change to conform to different conditions, and the most notable sub-code was adaptation to university.

The relationships and interactions theme captured how students interact with those in their lives. While I expected interactions with other students to dominate the interviews, students were actually more interested in discussing their relationship to authority figures. These authority figures included parents/elders, those in the community or groups, political party authorities, government leaders, and rulers. This is in keeping with the idea that as a semi-autocratic state, those in power dominate the political and social discourse. Thus, it makes sense that students would want to discuss them in the interviews.

Lastly, the theme of conditions and constraints covered some of the limits that existed on student self-reflections. Socio-economic class was something that played a major role in the interviews. Students reflected on how their own economic class shaped their political perspectives and also gave aspirations about their economic futures (as discussed in the analysis section). Students also reflected on conditions caused by laws and norms, resources, and by the constraints surrounding political engagement.

Overall, a diverse set of themes and codes emerged, but clear relationships and patterns were predominant. The theme of 'meaning' was the culmination of the process associated with several of the other codes combined. 'Behaviors and activities' covered the process through which political ideas were acquired. 'Events and experiences' captured the times that actually impacted the formation of these ideas. 'Involvement' was a theme that came from the way forces, individuals, and institutions influenced the meanings of political ideas both directly and indirectly. Lastly, 'conditions or constraints' showed the lens through which these ideas are learned. All of these themes result in transmitting the ideas that students then interpret and make meaning of. 'Behaviors and activities' and 'events and experiences' are prerequisites to value formation and change.

The code 'states of being' could easily be categorized as a subset of 'meaning.' However, I chose to give it its own category because it captured a special set of phenomenon. While some of the work of identifying 'states of being' is meaning-making, fundamentally what the students were trying to do was describe the way things are. This is different from the meaning category where there was more of a discussion of why things are the way they are.

The theme of 'strategies, practices, and tactics' was mixed in terms of how it relates to the idea of 'meaning.' The 'learning on my own' code was very much related to the process of making meaning. Individual students analyze and their own circumstances and make use of the information surrounding them to make political decisions. The other codes in this theme were highly reflective and didn't make meaning in particular. Rather, they were methods of making meaning. In particular, the code of 'truth' offered

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opportunities to reflect on the veracity of political information while also expressing a healthy dose of skepticism about the level of honesty in the political process.

'Meaning' was thus the dominant theme that emerged and much of the data included in the analysis section originates from this theme. The process of value change originates from the creation and questioning of new meanings of ideas. In the analysis section, some of these meanings will become evident as I analyze the data.

Qualitative Data Analysis

I used a content analysis approach to analyze my qualitative data. Hsieh and Shannon (2005) describe three different approaches to content analysis. The three approaches are conventional, directed and summative. In the conventional approach the text is the source of the categories for coding. This is the approach that I use in this analysis. The conventional approach can be inductive rather than deductive; it is best used when there is a lack of previous research on an issue or for areas where the existing research is fragmented (Vaismoradi, Turenen, & Bondas, 2013). In the second approach, directed, a theory or research finding serves as the starting point for initial coding. Lastly, the summative approach is quantitative in nature. It focuses on summing and comparing important aspects like keywords, in addition to subsequent analysis. The latter are deductive approaches which are best used for testing theories or in cases where there already a rich tradition of research on which one may draw. (Stemler, 2015; Vaismoradi, et al, 2013)

Conventional content analysis is a systematic approach to the analysis of qualitative data. It borrows from quantitative analysis, while adapting to a broader qualitative context (Mayring, 2000). The process begins with a reading, and re-reading of the text to get a holistic sense of it (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). The next aspect of content analysis is inductive category

development. Through this process, categories are formulated from the text and are systematically revised throughout the initial text review process. Revision of the categories is essential as they are refined into useable categories for analysis (Mayring, 2000).

Next, the researcher applies the use of the categories to the current text(s). The researcher defines the category, provides examples, and comes up with coding rules (Mayring, 2000). The researcher may also choose to incorporate subcategories and to define a relationship between the categories and subcategories (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). This provides a systematic framework within which the researcher can do analysis.

Elo et al. (2014) outline a framework of steps that qualitative researchers can take to improve the trustworthiness of their research. This goes beyond simply representing the results or themes accurately, but also guides the researcher in choosing a methodology, sampling frame, interviewing strategy, and analysis procedure that safeguards the integrity of the data, reduces bias, and assures that the research is credible and "worth paying attention to" (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, as cited in Elo et al, 2014). I used this framework to guide my qualitative research process from initial sampling through data analysis. Elo, et al (2014) emphasize the importance of dialogue with co-researchers and others to establish face validity of the findings; this became an essential element of my research process as I engaged in ongoing discussions with my students, research assistants, colleagues, and other experts in various areas touch on in the interviews. These conversations contextualized the findings and helped me tie the qualitative and quantitative findings together.

Figure 1. Coding Scheme

Behaviors & Activities
- Dialogue & debate
- Education & school experience
- Political actions
- Turning ideas into behaviors
- Consequences
- The act of questioning

Events & Experiences
- Exposure to new ideas or difference
- Realization that assumptions are wrong
- First experience of inequality
- When I knew things had changed

Strategies, Practices, Tactics
- Violence
- Accepting responsiblity
- Communal approach
  - History and culture
  - Unity as power
  - Difficulties
- Truth
  - Trust-worthiness
    - government
    - institutions
    - foreigners
  - Lying
    - Accept-ablity
    - Omni-presence
    - As a tactic
    - Logistics of lying
  - Honesty
    - Identifing
    - Views on people who are honest
- Learning on my own
  - Access to information
  - Critical thinking
  - My own opinions

States of Being
- How the world really is
- Emotions
- Global-ization
  - Haiti versus the rest of the world
- Student versus non-student status

Meaning
- Defining terms & concepts
  - Equality
  - Human Rights
  - Democracy
  - Authority
  - Law
  - What is society?
- Motivation for taking action (or not)
  - Interests and benefits
- Abstract conceptuali-zations of purpose
  - Law
  - Society
  - Religion
  - Human Rights
  - Equality
  - Use of violence
- Symbols
  - of democracy
  - of progress
  - of equality
  - of politics
  - of class
  - of conflict
- Roles
- Norms

Involvement
- Participation
  - In politics
  - In university life
  - In family life
  - In the community
- Adaption
  - To university
  - To adulthood
  - To the political system
  - To conflict
  - To being in a different social class

Relationship & Interaction
- to authority
  - parents/ elders
  - community or group
  - political party
  - government
  - rulers
- with other students
- with the community
- with the government

Conditions or Constraints
- socio-economic class
- laws and norms
- resources
- for engaging in politics

Procedures. Interviews were audio recorded by the interviewer and then transcribed by them and shared with the both myself and the other research team members. Interviews varied in length and depth; some were as short as 20 minutes while others lasted for hours. Next, the interviews were translated by the research team into English; these translations were checked by an independent consultant engaged from a translation service to assure that translations were accurate and that no parts of the conversation were missed. I did an initial reading of the transcripts during data collection so that I could make a decision about when data saturation had been reached.

Next the interview texts, in both English and Haitian Creole, were downloaded in the Apple iPad application AtlasTi. I read and reread the transcripts, immersing myself in the interviews, over a period of many months, during which time I continued to engage in dialogue with Haitian students, my research assistants, area experts, and community members about the ideas and issues communicated in the interviews. I developed an initial list of codes (figure 1) and began to code the text. Later, these codes were used to create thematic categories. Finally, I created a summative description of thematic category findings, which I present here.

Findings

    Social and Political Tolerance. The theory of working class authoritarianism holds that lower-class individuals will be more likely to favor economic redistribution and to support socially conservative views (Lipset, 1959). Education is one of the key determining factors, since those who are in lower classes tend to be less educated. According to this theory, I would expect uneducated Haitians to be more socially conservative and thus be more anti-gay, anti-abortion, xenophobic, and anti-democracy. I would also expect uneducated Haitians to be more supportive of social aid policies, like public assistance for the poor, state-sponsored health care, and public housing.

    Since there was insufficient existing research, it wasn't known if these views would hold true for poor and working-class students who are in the midst of, or about to complete, their university education. I found that such students were at the beginning stages of experimenting with views associated with the upper classes. While they may not be accepting of homosexuality, they were able to demonstrate tolerant views. A second-year student from a poor, urban family noted that his views had changed since he started university. "If you asked me a year ago, what do I think of the gays, I'd say 'kill them all'…. Now, yes, it's different. I don't know any of them

personally. I don't want to associate with them. You asked, do I want them to live on my street? Of course not! But I see they suffer a lot. People call them names. If they are beaten and robbed, the police will do nothing! I have sympathy for them."

Other students noted that university was their first experience of interacting with a diverse group which included students from different religions, political parties, and a few openly gay students. One female student explained that "before [university] I had no opinion because I didn't know of them [homosexuals]… now I am confronted with this and I must say I support this or I oppose this." The student had not yet decided what her opinion on homosexuality would be, but she stressed that it would be based on "science and research."

For poor and working class students I found that, unlike most of their non-student contemporaries, abortion was seen as justifiable in extreme circumstances. As one female student from a low-income suburb put it, "As a Christian I oppose abortion. This is murder, to kill your child. But some women, they have no choice. They have hard lives, maybe their body is sick, broken. As we say, the rock in the water does not feel the pain of the rock in the sun. If your life is hard, you do what you must do to survive." Another male student in his first year of university explained, "I would not want my girlfriend to have an abortion. Never! No! Because that's my child she was trying to murder … But if she was going to die and the baby was young, maybe before it had a biological formation, maybe if the doctors said it was necessary and she was in the hospital, I would consent. … I don't know when the life begins. Is it when the cells split and form? Is it when the heart beats? I don't know. I am not a scientist. I am still a student."

Views on outsiders and immigrants were similarly tolerant, though they fall short of acceptance. For instance, a student from a working-class background said, of a new program by mosque a that was recently established in his area, "I didn't ask them to move here, but I won't

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stop them. I won't do anything to them!" Comparatively, a student from a wealthy background discussing the same subject was excited to welcome new Muslim neighbors, "I thought they were from [the United Nations mission in Haiti] but, there are some Haitians! You're surprised, yes! They look just like us. Like me. I said, hey, good afternoon. I don't know, maybe we can be friends. They're cool. They're relaxed, like me, so yes. I was surprised [to hear of the mosque] but it's interesting to me, I am curious."

Another student, from an upper-middle class background, discussing the same subject said he was curious to meet people of a different religion, drawing a tie to oppression experienced due to other minority statuses, "they are persecuted because people think they are terrorists… people are beaten, arrested because they are Black [in the United States] and it's the same [United States] who has a problem with Islam... I would invite them to sit down and talk, to know them, to understand them, because some of them are oppressed twice: once for being Haitian the descendants of slaves, and again for being Islamic."

Such views were often posed in definitional terms as students created meaning for their experiences by defining the ideas and associated terms and behaviors. A consistent theme throughout most of the interviews was of students' ongoing struggle to define terms, to make those terms or definitions relevant to their own lives, and to apply terms and concepts to both abstract arguments and to real world experiences. Commonly defined terms included politics, democracy, rulers, society, laws, equality, authority, and human rights. Working class and poor students appeared to struggle with the academic or abstract definitions they were learning in university and the values and pre-existing ideas they brought about these concepts to the classroom. For instance, one male student from a very poor rural area described a situation in which a child ran away from home because her parents would not send her to school as this was

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a waste of school fees since she was a girl. In this hypothetical situation, he wanted justice for the girl. He said the father should be taken before the judge and the judge should threaten to send him to jail if he did not agree to send his daughter to school. "Just because she's a girl," he explained, "doesn't mean she has less value. [Abraham] Maslow says everyone has needs, and education is a need for all humans, just a little bit higher than food and water." But a few minutes later, when discussing feminism, the same student declared that equality for women destroys the family and society, that feminism was an idea spread by communists to make woman unhappy and create political upheaval in society (this had been taught, he explained, in a history course in *philo*). The student struggled to connect the desire he had for educational equality for a hypothetical female child and her right to have her needs (as expressed in Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of human needs, presumably learned in university) with the political rhetoric he had learned in high school.

Students often defined terms and concepts by discussing or explaining the purpose they associated with a related concept. For instance, one female student from a working class urban family defined society as "a mix of different elements, without which the others will not work... the purpose of society is to care for the people who are members of the society." For this student, the concept of caring for others, particularly those who are most vulnerable, was important; she mentioned in dozens of times throughout an hour-long interview.

The same student later discussed the challenge of living in a religiously diverse society: "You see there's a lot of division, based on the church you go to. The pastors, some of them create hate for other religions. They say, my church is the only way. Maybe I am Catholic, he's a Jehovah Witness, my neighbor is a Pentecostal. We must accept and respect each person even with difference. I used to think, they are so different from me!… No, no, this is never easy

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because a person might think the Rastafarian doesn't worship my God so he doesn't have the same human rights, but we are all children of God. Everyone has the same rights. We all have needs…. If I limited [disaster aid] to just Catholics, or just Mormons, or just Methodists, then it's discrimination because each person has the right to have food to eat. No one should suffer because they are a different religion. A child is hungry whether he is Baptist or Adventist. He should be fed."

Similar to the ideas posed by Lipset, I found that on economic factors, poor and working class students were more economically conservative. They opposed charitable programs operated by the state and preferred a tax system which benefited larger and established businesses. Some expressed the view that the upper classes are more deserving of economic privilege. For instance, one male student from a low-income urban background discussed his understanding of economic equality, "if everyone is equal it poses big problems. Depending on each person's competencies, skills, and intelligence, they receive opportunities… They [wealthy students] are from a higher background so it's normal that they should succeed. It's their right, their destiny… If people are equal, then there is no competition in society. Even with competition, a person from a low background doesn't have the same right to demand equality or human rights or a job, not like the person from the high background." Despite working hard to get accepted to university and working hard to stay in university, this student continued to feel that that economic class of his parents weighed less in light of the obvious skills, competencies, and intelligence held by the upper classes, who thus were destined to succeed.

Income equality was a frequently discussed topic. Working class and poor students frequently expressed the idea that simply going to university or completing university entitled individuals to be in a different economic class or make more than other vulnerable groups. This

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was a view not expressed by middle class, upper middle class, and wealthy students. One working class student in his third year at the State University said, "we have a proverb that says, 'the higher you get the further you see', if I know that if I work hard I will make more money, then I have reason to work hard. But if there is equality in pay, if the poor make the same as me, if my wife makes the same as me, oh, that will make so many problems." The student no longer defined himself as poor, despite the fact that his family had been displaced by the earthquake and he had lived in a tent for three years after the 2010 earthquake. By economic standards, the family was at the very low end of working class (his father was a skilled laborer and his mother was a laundress). But the student no longer affiliated himself with his socioeconomic class of origin, even though he had yet to graduate or hold a job.

Another put it bluntly, "if I graduate, I do my thesis, then I should make more than the man who only went to professional school. There shouldn't be equality in that aspect. Not for income." A female student studying to be a doctor explained her decision to go to university as one that was closely related to a transition from one economic class to another, "it is an investment. If I work hard, I deserve to make a lot of money. I don't deserve to starve. This is an investment for my family, to raise all of us up."

Students from upper middle class and wealthy backgrounds also discussed income equality, often from a protectionist or pragmatic perspective. One male student put it this way, "if we don't feed the poor, they will riot in the streets. They will overthrow us and kill us all. You cannot treat a man like that, humiliate him so he cannot feed his family. People need jobs and they need to make enough to live or everything will collapse." Another student from a wealthy background who was completing his studies that year, had this to say, "[poor people] don't make as much money as someone who had skills, education, a certificate, so it is morally

obligatory to help the poor…. At [my church] we do some charity, a program, we give them rice, oil, flour, beans, sugar. Some of the families they are a woman who has no husband. Maybe her husband died. If we don't look after people, they can die of hunger…. Am I saying they should be paid more? No, that's not what I'm saying. I'm not saying equality of pay. I'm saying that we recognize that they don't have the possibility to make the same money as an educated person so we help them. We don't want them to starve, to live in misery."

The literature on political socialization makes a wide range of predictions about how political views can change. Phelan et al. (1995) put forth three models for education promoting liberal attitudes: the developmental model, the socialization model, and the ideological refinement model. According to the developmental model, a student's worldview will be expanded as they grow intellectually. In this case, I would expect to see Haitian students engage with a broader range of issues as they become more educated. This was evident in the interviews, though certainly much more prevalent with students who were towards the end of their university education that those in the beginning. With advanced students, I saw that many had begun to consider issues that don't impact their day-to-day lives, like international politics and minority rights. A student from a middle-class background studying anthropology and nearing the end of his education, segued from a definition of politics to a discussion of trade policy. "I personally understand politics as a device of those who rule that are considered privileged. It has relevance to every person. The peasant might think that there is no relationship between his life and politics. But there is connection… If the IMF says to [the Haitian president] to allow imports with no taxes, the peasant will suffer. His business is selling his wheat. But the Miami [imported] wheat, it's cheaper. Maybe he goes out of business. So, it [politics] touches everyone."

Relatedly, the socialization model holds that there is a transfer of information that allows students to shift their perspectives. According to this model, I would expect to see students play with more ideas as they learn more. Their arguments and opinions should be backed up with facts and information. While students at every level of their education did seem to enjoy playing with ideas, and those with greater levels of education were often quicker or more apt to do so during their interviews, students often struggled to connect their arguments or opinions to facts and information. Sometimes the facts and information they presented were not empirically supported or were applied carelessly or without critical thinking. This may be related to the method of teaching in Haiti, which emphasizes the route memorization of knowledge without focusing on application, analysis, evaluation, or creation of new knowledge/theories.

The ideological refinement model underscores a limitation of the effect of education on views. Education is not likely to shift views on equal distribution of resources. Some areas of the students' ideology will be shaped by education, such as those having to do with "individual rights." According to this model, education will have limited impacts on the views of students shifting. While this model makes an important theoretical contribution, and certainly there seemed to be some limitations on the impact that education had on some student's views regarding controversial topics (e.g. income equality), overall I found that the effects of education were much broader than what this model predicts.

Important Elements of Democracy. Democracy was often defined by opposition to something else. For instance, democracy is not "demagogues who demand another mandate [term in office]", "a society where the people never benefit," "dictatorship," "[when] that guy lied and got elected, has made promises and not kept them," "the so-called capitalist system," "rule by the army or by a single person who makes a declaration that he is [president]." Overall

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I found that students in the middle and later part of their education had begun thinking about elements of democracy directly and indirectly. Some students lack the vocabulary and knowledge to discuss the nuances of democratic institutions. However, there were key elements of democracy that students appeared to be thinking about.

Importance of Elections. Despite the fact that these interviews were conducted in an "off" year when no national elections were scheduled, I saw that students frequently discussed the importance of elections to democracy. They often discussed the importance of elections being free of fraud and being trustworthy. Haitian elections have a long history of fraud and are frequently disputed, so most students recognized fair elections as an essential element. They also frequently discussed the importance of free elections. The poorest people in Haiti are frequently disenfranchised, so I assumed more educated students should support greater inclusion of the poor in the electoral process.

This was true, to an extent, but still limited by student's experiences and access to ideas and information. Students were quick to decry various forms of corruption and human rights violations which prevented free and fair elections. But many (nearly half) also expressed a concern that elections could not be "free" if those voting were uneducated about the issues, processes, or impact of their elections. About a third of respondents expressed concerns that democracy was usually defined, often by foreigners, in respect to free and fair elections but that elections allow uneducated citizens to vote. As one male student put it, "There's some advantages to [allowing] people to choose their leader, but there's a dark side too. Who are the people that choose? What is the level of education [among the voters]? When people choose, then that person gets the legitimacy of the majority; it is assumed that the population chose him. But if we consider the population is not educated and do not know whom to choose, then they

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really need an engineer to build a road to show them how to vote. This is the problem with [democracy]."

Some students recounted times they had seen votes "purchased" with bags of rice or money. Others suggested improving civic education in primary and secondary schools, going back to limited suffrage (with a required literacy test!) of only educated citizens, or using public information campaigns. Only two students, both at the very end of their education, and both from middle class urban backgrounds, suggested punishing or prohibiting the exchange of votes for food and other similarly manipulative practices which undermine the electoral process. One suggested that the politicians who engage in food for votes should be excluded from the elections while the other said that this should be made illegal.

Executive Powers. Second, Haitian democracy has a long history of executives with broad sweeping powers. As students became more educated I saw some references to the idea that executive power must be curtailed. Themes of political accountability were present in many interviews with references to executive power in four interviews. Comments addressed how and when executive power should be limited in the Haitian system.

More common was discussion of social liberties. Gender equality, for example, was supported by more educated students. Examples of gender equality from more educated students included providing equal access to political office, voting rights, support for equal pay, and greater support for reproductive rights. Examples of gender equality from students early in their education focused on practical matters of women being allowed to date, whether it was permissible for a man to hit a woman, women in non-traditional jobs, and a man's obligation to provide for his children and female partner (who, it was assumed, would be the primary caregiver of the children). Religious liberty was another important element. More educated

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students expressed greater tolerance of religious plurality. Students with greater education had a more nuanced respect for both Vodou and Christian religions, which are the two most common religious backgrounds in Haiti, and were apt to give examples of friendships, ideas, or practices they engaged in which expressed religious tolerance (such as being friends with someone of another denomination).

Overall, I found that students were more open to democratic values as they became more educated. While first and second year students were frequently superficial or confused in their ideas about democracy, those with four or more years of education had, for the most part, a deeper and more critical engagements with the idea of democracy in the course of their interviews. Though students are, of course, individuals with their own unique perspectives, overall I found that their views leaned more towards democratic values.

Directions for Future Qualitative Research: The Process of Value Formation.

Students in the process of higher education are going through a reconsideration of the views that they hold deeply, as evidenced by the analysis above. The question remains, however, of how these views actually change. A key limitation of this qualitative study was that, in most cases, research subjects did not attempt to reflect on this question of "why." Even if they had, however, it is incredibly difficult for an individual to speculate about how exactly they have changed, since the process can be quite gradual. In this section, I will offer some limited theoretical insight into the process of views formation.

There are several things, in particular about university life that may be a contributing factor to views formation. First, students are exposed to new ideas from professors in the classroom. Instructors draw their lectures largely from the general political discourse and some outdated text-based sources in the Haitian context. The views that the instructor holds are likely

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to be reflective of the highly-educated elites and of the prevailing ideas coming from Haitian academia. Also, those with higher education frequently have received their education in the United States or in another country abroad. Thus, views are sometimes acquired internationally and are transmitted to Haitian students in-country. This may contribute to pro-democracy value change in Haitian students.

Another source of possible views shifts is exposure to peer groups that are also enrolled at institutions of higher learning. Students interact with others who are thinking critically about the world around them. As a student processes views, they speak with each other and engage in secondary transmission. Also, students are exposed to people who come from different communities. Almost all universities in Haiti are in Port-au-Prince, so students come from all over the country to get the opportunity to study (usually at the state university).

These two factors, exposure to professor's views and interaction with university peers are important aspects to the shift of political views. Further research can be done to really explore these two aspects. However, this study has hopefully offered some insight into the "how" question of views formation.

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Chapter 5: Sampling Methodology and Fielding of the World Values Survey

In this study, I used mixed-methods approach for data collection. In this chapter I describe sampling and fielding of the World Values Survey (n=1996), which I fielded in Haiti with the aim of using the data to assess values in relation to educational level. To supplement this data, I also conducted a relatively small-scale set of interviews (n=27) with university students, which were discussed in the previous chapter. The focus of the data analysis was statistical and utilized the World Values Survey. The interview data was used to illustrate key points in the analysis and to highlight tensions in the data.

World Values Survey

The World Values Survey (WVS) is a heavily vetted questionnaire that is governed by the World Values Survey Association. The survey, conceived in 1981, and has become one of most highly regarded surveys on value shifts and social and political views. Currently on its 7th wave, the survey has grown to include over one hundred countries. The website associated with the survey notes that 90% of the world's population are included in WVS countries. (World Values Survey, n.d.)

A major advantage of the survey is that you are able to compare the data from one place and time to a wealth of data capturing the world over time. This enables researchers to do two things. First, a researcher is able to compare findings from one country to findings from other countries. This enables a researcher to do things like situate a country on the Inglehart-Welzel cultural map, which groups countries on according to two key dimensions: traditional values vs.

secular-rational values and survival values vs. self-expression values. There is also incredibly

detailed data on political, economic, and social views.

Second, researchers can also track changes over time. With most countries participating

in the World Values Survey, there are previous iterations of the survey done in the prior waves.

In those cases, there are opportunities to view how the process of modernization has unfolded.

Unfortunately, since this is the first time the WVS has been fielded in Haiti, there is not currently

any survey data from previous waves to use as a basis for comparison.

Population

The World Values Survey is a random nationally representative study that was

administered in Haiti for the first time as part of this dissertation research. The bulk of the

analysis in this study looks at a broad range of educational backgrounds, including those who

have no experience with education. Some of the analysis hones in on those who have experience

with higher education. All educational levels in the population were self-identified.

Sampling Method

Doing research in the Haitian context poses unique challenges because there is very little

publicly available information that can be used to contact people. Even the geographic locations

of houses are not available and the occupants tend to be comprised of large, extended families.

Shannon et al. (2012) formalize a Geographic Information Systems (GIS) sampling strategy for

researching in these conditions of uncertainty. They use Global Positioning System (GPS)

coordinates and aerial photographs of a specified geographic region. GPS coordinates are

randomly selected and a 20-meter radius is drawn from that specific GPS point. Houses inside

this circle are identified and one is randomly chosen. GIS based sampling was first used in a

post-war Iraq study (Roberts, 2004) and this approach has been adapted to Haiti-based research (Kolbe & Hutson, 2006; Kolbe, Hutson, Shannon, Trzcinski, Miles, Levitz, Puccio, James, Noel, & Muggah, 2010).

Haiti has 571 communal sections. Of these, fifty were randomly selected using PPS methods with the probability based on the population of the administrative district as reported by the national statistics institute in 2012. A random GPS coordinate in the administrative district was be generated using a random number generator. This was the cluster. Every nth house due north was visited and invited to participate until reaching minimum number of households based on the population of the administrative district. The interval was randomly selected from a small set of numbers (i.e between three and seven). Selected households were visited up to four times before the house was labeled a non-responder. The adult with the most recent birthday was selected as the primary respondent.

A potential concern was that an individual may misrepresent themselves as an active university student when in-fact, they are not. There are very high attrition rates for university programs. An individual who attended briefly, but dropped out, may have an incentive to represent themselves as an active university student since there is prestige associated with the status. I considered a number of options to verify self-reported educational status including asking for the name of the program or the most recent date of attendance, asking to see evidence such as a school identity card, or verifying the information with an outside source. The latter two options were dismissed as overly invasive for a household survey since they would involve accessing identifiable information about the household. The first option, of asking detailed follow up questions about the name of the specific program, date of last class attendance, or the name of the degree program were tried in several smaller studies fielded by the same team in the

months leading up to the WVS fielding and these questions proved cumbersome in the field. Also, they relied on respondent self-report as well, so though the more detailed probes might highlight a some people posing as students or adopting the title based on a short stint in an educational institution years prior, such questions still rely on self-report and those motivated by social desirability bias to intentionally misrepresent themselves may continue to do so despite follow up questions being asked.

Description of the Sample

The sample is as close to representative of the population as possible. My sampling procedure was to include adults aged 18 and over, so children were not included in the study. The population included individuals at all different levels of education. Of particular interest in this study were those who are better educated, especially those who have gone to college. While it would have been ideal to over-sample highly educated people, logistical constraints made it impossible. To compensate for this limitation, we exceeded the minimum number of survey respondents (n=1200) and collected close to 2000 (n=1996) responses to ensure sufficient variation in educational levels. We also oversampled in metropolitan Port-au-Prince, where higher levels of education are most common, and weighted the final data accordingly.

Data Collection Procedures and Timeline

The survey was administered through GIS sampling and typically did not exceed 90 minutes. After collecting basic demographic information, the survey was administered verbally to selected participants. I used an experienced and highly trained research team led by research assistants who have worked on previous studies.

Haitian Creole was the language that the questionnaire was translated to, in spite of the fact that the educational system is in French. Though Haitian students are educated in French at

the secondary and post-secondary level, they have much higher levels of comprehension in Haitian Creole since it is the language that is spoken in society day-to-day (Doucet, 2003). The questionnaire has been heavily vetted in its use in over twenty countries. Typically, the WVS instrument is translated and administered in the local language, rather than the language of the educated class, whenever possible.

The enumerators were trained to use a program called iSURVEY administered through tablets. This software allows users to easily advance through questions and record data electronically offline. The surveys are then later uploaded to the server when a wifi connection is made. A key advantage to this program is that it is capable of recording the GPS coordinates where the survey took place. This was invaluable in ensuring that the correct geographic department was identified in the data and was also useful in identifying fraud.

The pilot portion of the survey served several purposes. First, it was used to train research assistants. They administered informed consent protocol and questionnaires to randomly selected participants in the metropolitan Port-au-Prince area and were observed to ensure that appropriate confidentiality procedures and research protocol are followed. Any behavior that violated research protocol was to be changed and, two enumerators were removed from the project for committing systematic fraud. Second, I was able to gather information on research questions that were poorly translated, and thus confusing to research subjects. This information was later used to adjust translations and improve the efficacy of the questionnaire. Lastly, the process of piloting the survey helped illuminate areas where probing questions and prompts needed to be inserted to facilitate survey completion. The length of the survey interview was so great that some respondents became exhausted or bored. By including prompts such as "we just have a few more questions" and training the research team to pick up on and respond to

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verbal and non-verbal cues of imminent survey fatigue, I was able to reduce drop outs and assure higher quality data in the final product.

Description of the Data

The demographics of the data obtained in the survey was similar to that found in other national household surveys in Haiti. In this section I present description of the unweighted demographics. The majority of those who participated in the study (71.3%; n=1424) lived in urban areas while a little less than a quarter (23.3%; n=465) were from rural areas. The average age of respondents was 32.09 years (range 18-84; standard deviation 13.46 years) and 54.3 percent (n=1083) were female. This is slightly more females than most national surveys in Haiti which use repeated home visits to capture data on households; there are typically about one percent more women than men. Only 6.1 percent (n=122) of respondents were married, though many more (23.5%; n=469) were living together as if married, a common practice in Haiti where weddings are prohibitively expensive for most families (figure 2). While most respondents reported that they did not have children, some did, and the mean number of children for all respondents was 1.25 children with a range of zero to eight and a standard deviation of 1.81 children.

Religion. As expected based on other recent research (Durban-Albrecht, 2015) more than a third of all respondents identified as protestant Christians while only a quarter claimed to be Roman Catholic (figure three). Of all respondents, 27% said they practice Vodou, a traditional Haitian religion that combines elements of historically African worship with Christian ideas and symbolism. Slightly more than ten percent of respondents said they were not affiliated with any religious denomination. Minority religious membership included Muslims and Rastafarians (see figure 3).

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Employment and Education. Roughly one in every five respondents (18.5%; n=365) claimed to be the chief wage earner in their household. Unemployment was, not surprisingly, quite high (figure 4). Only nine percent of respondents claimed to be working full-time for an employer. Two thirds of respondents (66.2%; n=1306) said the chief wage earner in the household was currently unemployed. Of respondents, most were unemployed (33.8; n=665) or self-employed (27.1%; n=533). One out of every ten respondents (10.9%; n=214) claimed to currently be a student. When asked about social class, roughly half of all respondents said they were "working class" (figure 5) though this result should be viewed within the complexity of social class, family background, and skin color within Haitian society. Of all respondents, 17% (n=336) said they did not know their own social class.

Closely tied to employment and social class is education. Of all respondents, 14% (n=260) had no formal education (Figure 6). This reflects gains made in recent years to promote education for both adults and children. In the 1980s, Haiti's illiteracy rate topped 86% but in recent years, government efforts to increase access to education have led to a number of options for students including the creation of primary school education programs for adult learners. As previously mentioned, about ten percent of all respondents said they were currently in school. This makes sense, as most students do not complete high school until their late teens or early 20s. When looking at respondents aged 18 to 25 years of age, a third (28.0% n=262) had started, but not yet completed, secondary school. Overall, 7.0% (n=189) of respondents reported some post-secondary university-type education with 2.5% (n=50) stating that they had earned a post-secondary degree.

Figure 2. Marital Status of Respondents

Figure 3. Religious denomination of respondents

Figure 4. Employment status of respondents

Figure 5. Self-reported social class of respondents

Figure 6. Highest level of education completed by respondents

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Roberts, L., Lafta, R., Garfield, R., Khudhairi, J., & Burnham, G. (2004). Mortality before and after the 2003 invasion of Iraq: cluster sample survey. *The Lancet*, 1857–1864.

Chapter 6: Quantitative Analysis

My analysis, overall, focuses on examining the impact that formal education has on Haitian values related to democracy. There are two main areas of analysis which I explain in this chapter. The first is an examination of approaches to democratic values. First, I posited that individuals who have completed post-secondary education are more likely to have pro-democratic views (hypothesis #1). Related to this, I also hypothesized that higher levels of formal education would be associated with greater support for democracy (hypothesis #2). I began my quantitative analysis by examining the three approaches to democratic values outlined in Inglehart and Welzel (2005). I assumed that increases in education would be associated with one or more of these approaches to understanding the development of democratic values. Hence, I posed and tested hypotheses related to these approaches.

The second area of analysis tackles a more abstract question of personal values. I posited that formal education would be associated with greater support for self-expression and less support for survival views (hypothesis #3). I also hypothesized that completing post-secondary education would be associated with greater support for self-expression versus survival views (hypothesis #4.). In this second section, I look at the impact that formal education has on self-expression versus survival. Related to this was the question of traditional versus rational values.

Approaches to Democratic Values

As previously discussed, I hypothesized that, in general, education increases adoption of democratic values. However, in the literature this process is clearly nuanced. I used Inglehart and

Welzel (2005) to guide my exploration of the approaches to democratic values and how these are

reflected in the data collected in Haiti. Figure 7 reflects the political culture approach used by

Inglehart and Welzel (2005, p.5). Though most of this graphic is taken directly from their paper,

to represent their approach, text in italics was added by me to guide the reader of this dissertation

in understanding how the approach is being applied to the current data set.

Figure 7. Political Culture Approaches (from Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p.5)

Common Premise:

There is a population-system linkage, such that mass tendancies in individual-level attitudes and value orientations impact on the preformance and stability of democratic insitutions at the system-level.

"Civics Camp":

Attitudes and value orientations of a broader social concern impact most of the stablity and performance of democratic institutions.

"Legitimacy Camp":

Legitimacy assigned to political objects impacts most of the stability and preformance of democractic institutions

- *confidence in state institutions (v113, v114, v1117)*

- *confidence in non-state institutions (v108, v110, v112, v113, v114, v117 v121)*

- *satisfaction with and support for democracy (v110, v141) - autocracy democracy preference (v127, v130)*

Human development approach:

Self-expression values based on liberty aspirations and liberty tolerance have the strongest impact.

Communitarian approach:

Voluntary activity in associations, interpersonal trust, and norm orbedience have the strongest impact

- *voluntary activity in social organizations (v25, v27, v30, v32)*

- *overall voluntary activity in organizations (v25, v27, v28, v29, v30, v31, v32)*

Systems support approach:

Mass confidence in public institutions, satisfaction with systems preformance, and system preference for democracy have the strongest impact.

The Legitimacy Approach. The Legitimacy Approach, as outlined by Inglehart and Welzel (2005), tested five areas, some of which used data included in the World Values Survey: 1) confidence in state institutions as operationalized by the creation of a subscale based on responses to three survey variables; 2) overall confidence in institutions, as operationalized by the creation of a subscale based on responses to seven survey variables; 3) satisfaction with democracy as operationalized responses to a single survey question; 4) support for democracy, as operationalized by responses to a single survey question; and 5) autocracy-democracy preference, as operationalized by a subscale created using responses to two additional survey variables.

Confidence in Institutions. I posed the hypothesis that individuals who have more education will view institutions, both state institutions and other types of institutions, as more legitimate as measured by the "confidence in state institutions scale" and the "confidence in non-state institutions" scale. The World Values Survey includes a question which reads: "I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?" A list of 19 institutions follows, and respondents are asked for their amount of confidence in each institution on a four point Likert scale ranging from "a great deal [of confidence in this institution]" at one, to "none at all" at four.

Following the steps taken by Inglehart and Welzel (2005), I began by recoding variables V113 (Confidence in the police), V114 (Confidence in the courts), and V117 (Confidence in parliament) such that responses 1 ("a great deal") and 2 ("quite a lot") were coded as 1 ("confident") and responses 3 ("not very much") and 4 ("none at all") were coded as 0 ("not confident"). I did the same for four additional variables for non-state institutions: V108

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(churches), V110 (the press), V112 (unions), and V121 (banks). Inglehart and Welzel (2005) originally included V109 (the armed forces) but this was substituted with V121 (banks) as Haiti has not had an official military since President Jean Bertrand Aristide disbanded the army in 1995. It should be noted that in recent years there has been legislation passed to authorize re-creation of the Haitian army and on July 17, 2017 public recruitment for a new army began throughout the country.

Next, I created a subscale to measure confidence in state institutions by adding the values of the recoded variables V113, V114, and V117 where the value of the subscale potentially ranges from 0-3. I similarly created a subscale of confidence in non-state institutions by adding the values of the recoded variables V108, V110, V112, and V121 where the value of the subscale potentially ranges from 0-4. Since I was controlling for income and gender, I excluded cases with missing information (or those where the respondent refused to respond) for gender and income; likewise, I excluded cases where education level was missing or the respondent has refused to respond to that question. Also excluded from my analysis were the cases where one or more of the three subscale variables was skipped or where the respondent stated that they "did not know" how much confidence they had in the institution. Notably, there was very little confidence in state institutions among the study population.

I chose to use an ordinal logistic regression to analyze this data and determine the potential impact of education on confidence in institutions. Ordinal logistical regression appeared to be the best fit for this analysis as it recognizes that the subscale is ordinal in that the difference between a score of 0 and 1 is the same amount of difference as the difference between a score of 1 and 2. This option also allowed me to control the scale variable of income (as a covariate). My analysis is expressed as follows where m is the categories of education.

$$\log(\theta_j) = \alpha_j - \sum_{k=1}^{m} \beta_{0k} \, 1(Education = category \; k) - \beta_2(Income)$$

Using a generalized ordered logistic regression model results in a unique set of

coefficients for each category of comparison where the odds of being in category 2 (more

confidence in state institutions) versus category 1 is treated the same as the odds of being in

category 1 versus category 0. Though the resulting model is more complicated than using a

proportional odds model in that having more response categories means also having more sets of

regression coefficients, it is also more nuanced and can show interesting patterns, even when no

single effect is evident. In this case, individuals with no formal education at all had more

confidence in state institutions than those who had the most education (table 16). However,

confidence in state institutions did not decrease or increase in a linear fashion relative to amount

of education; those who had some education were more confident in state institutions than those

with no education (though this was not statistically significant); however, people with post-

secondary education were less confident in state institutions (tables 13-16).

I replicated this same analysis looking at confidence in non-state institutions as Inglehart

and Welzel's (2005) findings regarding public confidence in institutions and the effect on

society's democratic performance held when examining confidence in both state institutions and

institutions in general. I found that there was a lot more variation in the data when it came to

confidence in the included non-state institutions. There was a statistically significant relationship

between some types of formal education and support for non-state institutions in that some such

individuals were less likely to express confidence in these institutions, however, not all these

findings were statistically significant (table 20). Interestingly, people who reported incomplete

secondary or university preparatory type-high school were most likely to express confidence in both state and non-state institutions.

Based on these findings, I found that my hypothesis that education increases confidence in state and non-state institutions was partially unsupported. There is evidence that people with greater education are less likely to support state institutions. However, it was not possible to prove or disprove my stated hypothesis regarding support for non-state institutions as there was no linear relationship between increased education and increased or decreased confidence in non-state institutions.

Satisfaction with and support for democracy. The two original variables used by Inglehart and Welzel (2005) to operationalize satisfaction with democracy and support for democracy are no longer included in the survey in the same form. Instead, two alternative questions were chosen. The first, chosen to substitute as a measure of support for democracy was V140, which reads: "How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is 'not at all important' and 10 means 'absolutely important' what position would you choose?" The second, which measures satisfaction with democracy, is V141 which asks, "And how democratically is this country being governed today? Again, using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that it is 'not at all democratic' and 10 means that it is 'completely democratic,' what position would you choose?" These are presented as individual variables rather than as a subscale.

Contrary to my assumption that university education would be associated with viewing democracy as something of greater importance, people who indicated that they had begun but not yet completed university had the lowest mean score on the 1-10 Likert scale for V140 which asked "How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically?" where a

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higher score indicates that the respondent feels is it most important and a lower score indicates that the respondent thinks it is not important at all (table 22). The mean score for V140 for this group was 3.10 (SD: 2.918) compared to 6.18 (SD:3.406) for people with no formal education and 5.83 (SD 2.535) for people who completed university preparatory high school but never attended university. However, those university students who do graduate are significantly more likely to believe that democracy is important (table 23) with a mean of 6.13 (SD: 3.173) compared to those who have some university education but do not complete their studies.

Diversity in opinion is also found when examining responses to V141 "And how democratically is this country being governed today?" where a higher response on the ten-point Likert scale indicates a greater belief that Haiti is currently being governed democratically. People with no formal education were most likely to say that Haiti was being governed democratically (mean: 4.96, SD:2.808). Those with some university education had a mean of 3.13 (SD: 2.40) and those with a university degree had a mean of 2.84 (SD: 1.275).

Autocracy versus Democracy Preference. To create this subscale, I subtracted the responses for v127 "Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections" from v130 "Having a democratic political system." I excluded the two other variables used in the Inglehart and Welzel (2005) analysis as one of these which indicated support for democratic rule is no longer included in the survey. The resulting scale ranges from -3 to 3 with lower numbers indicating more support of autocracy and higher numbers supporting democracy. The mean Autocracy versus Democracy Preference was -1.33 (SD: 1.23) indicating that Haitian respondents were slightly more supportive of autocracy than democracy. This result may have been different had a proxy for the missing question been available and the "having the army rule" variable had been included in the creation of this subscale as intended.

I assumed that education would increase both support for and satisfaction with democracy as measured by these variables. I found support for democracy was highest among people who had graduated from a university preparatory high school program and then had not attended post-secondary education and those who had graduated from university. Interestingly, support for autocracy was highest among those who said they had completed some, but not all, of their post-secondary education. Again, we see that there is some confounding variable which appears to have influence on those who have begun but not yet completed or have dropped out of post-secondary education which may be associated with a preference for autocracy. It seems likely that in the process of views formation, individuals become more autocratic as they are exploring new views before arriving at a more pro-democracy stance after having gone through the process.

The Communitarian Approach. To examine support for the Communitarian Approach I posed the hypothesis that increased education has a positive impact on engagement with voluntary associations. In the World Values Survey, respondents are asked to indicate their active, inactive, or non-involvement in a variety of voluntary associations: "Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary organizations. For each organization, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization?" A list of eleven categories of voluntary organizations follows, and respondents indicated whether they were (2) an active member, (1) and inactive member, or (0) did not belong, with such an organization.

Following the steps taken by Inglehart and Welzel (2005), I began by recoding variables V32 (humanitarian or charitable organization), V25 (church or religious organization), V30 (environmental organization), and V27 (art, music, or educational organization) as active (1) for

responses where the individual chose "active member" or not active (0) when the individual

respondent indicated that they were an inactive member or did not belong to such an

organization. I followed similar steps to record variables V28 (labor union), V29 (political

party), and V31 (professional association).

Next, I created two subscales, as outlined by Inglehart and Welzel (2005). The first, a

subscale of "voluntary activity in social organizations," was created by summing the recoded

variables for V32 (humanitarian or charitable organization), V25 (church or religious

organization), V30 (environmental organization), and V27 (art, music, or educational

organization) (table 21). The potential range of this subscale was, according to Inglehart and

Welzel (2005), intended to be a fraction between 0-3, however, the range for Haiti was 0-2 with

a mean of 0.3749 (SD: 0.53250). The second subscale of "overall voluntary activity in

organizations" was created by summing the previous four variables with V28 (labor union), V29

(political party), and V31 (professional association) (table 22).

I again chose to use an ordinal logistic regression to analyze this data and determine the

potential impact of education on confidence in institutions. This option also allowed me to

control the scale variable of income (as a covariate) and gender (as a factor). My analysis is

expressed as follows where *m* is the categories of education. I included gender as a factor as

prior research in Haiti (James, 2010; Kivland, 2012; McAlister, 2002) has indicated gender

differences in regards to participation in some types of voluntary organizations.

$$\log(\theta_j) = \alpha_j - \sum_{k=1}^{m} \beta_{0k}\, 1(Education = category\ k) - \beta_2(Income) - \beta_3(Gender)$$

I excluded cases where the data was missing or the individual did not indicate their

education level, income, or gender. This analysis (tables 23-26) demonstrates that within some

education groups (particularly those who attended but did not complete high school, higher

income levels are associated with lower engagement in voluntary social organizations. These interaction effects are statistically significant.

I replicated this same analysis looking at overall engagement in voluntary organizations as Inglehart and Welzel (2005) argue that voluntary engagement "feeds communal life and the civil-societal grounds on which strong democracy rests" (p.20). I found that involvement in voluntary organizations did vary with education level, but that involvement did not necessarily increase with education. Some changes were noted, as well as a slight increase in engagement when comparing secondary school completers with different levels of education, but these were not statistically significant. There also appears to be a decrease in engagement in voluntary organizations among those who attended but did not complete post-secondary education. Based on these findings, it was not possible to prove or disprove my stated hypothesis regarding the Communitarian Approach. There are appear to be other confounding factors which influence engagement in voluntary organizations which are not included in this analysis.

At the outset, I presented two hypotheses related to democratic values: 1) individuals who have completed post-secondary education are more likely to have pro-democratic views, and 2) higher levels of formal education are associated with greater support for democracy. I found partial support for both of these hypotheses, but there does not seem to be a linear relationship with education and views about democracy when using the approaches to political culture approaches outlined in Inglehart and Welzel (2005). Instead, an unexpected picture emerged. While education was, on the whole, associated with increased support for and engagement in democracy, something odd emerges when examining those who attend university but do not complete their studies. People in this situation are less supportive of democracy and are less likely to

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believe the country is being governed democratically. It is unclear if this is because 1) there is something unique to the experience of university education which decreases support for democracy; 2) this is a temporary stage that individuals go through as they attend university but which changes as university is completed; or 3) there is something fundamentally different about the individual who starts university and quits that is associated with being less supportive of democracy. Because this was a cross sectional study, it was impossible to determine which of these three explanations was true. However, it is clear that completing university is strongly associated with being prodemocracy, so if this is a temporary condition related to the student experiences, it appears that those individuals who are able to push past this experience and graduate do demonstrate the expected positive effects of education on pro-democracy views.

Cultural Values of Self-Expression versus Survival

I posed two hypotheses related to self-expression values. Inglehart and Welzel (2005) found that people who have stronger self-expression versus survival values are more supportive of democracy. I hypothesized that formal education would be associated with greater support for self-expression versus survival views (hypothesis #3) and that completing post-secondary education would be associated with greater support for self-expression versus survival views (hypothesis #4).

To test hypotheses #3 and #4, I began by creating two the indexes which are used to create the Self-Expression versus Survival subscale. The Autonomy Index (variable Y003) was computed based on responses to questions about what the respondent valued most in terms of qualities children should be taught. The four included variables were religious faith (v19), obedience, (v21), independence (v12), and determination/perseverance (v18).   The mean

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Autonomy Index score for respondents was -.078 (SD:0.800) with a range of four, from -2.00 to 2.00. The median score was -1.00.

Next, I created the four item Post-Materialist Index (variable Y002) by taking the responses to variables 62 and 63. For each variable, respondents were asked "If you had to choose, which one of the things on this card would you say is most important? And which would be the next most important?" Only one answer was coded for first choice and one for second choice. A respondent was not allowed to choose the same answer for both first and second choice. Response options included two materialist options ("Maintaining order in the nation"; "Fighting rising prices") and two post-materialist options ("Protecting freedom of speech"; "Giving people more say in important government decisions"). If the respondent chose both of the post-materialist options they were coded as a 3 on this index. If they chose only one, for option one or two, they were coded as a 1 on this index. If the person did not choose either post-materialist response, they were coded as a 0 on this index. The mean score for this index was 2.01 (SD: 0.11) though it is presented in the literature and in the main WVS dataset itself as a categorical variable (table 40).

I found that there was some difference in both indexes between people with formal education and those with no formal education with those who have no education being 0.01 point lower than those with education on the post-materialist index and those without education being .1 point lower on the autonomy index, however, neither of these differences was statistically significant. I did not find support for hypothesis #3 that formal education was associated with greater self-expression views. Similarly, I did not find support for hypothesis #4, that completing post-secondary education would result in greater self-expression values. Rather, I saw that there was no linear relationship between education and self-expression values as

measured by these to indexes. Indeed, primary school students scored higher on the autonomy

scale than did secondary school graduates. It does not appear that self-expression versus survival

values can used to explain variance in support for democratic values among Haitians with

differing levels of education.

Table 12. Frequencies: Confidence in State Institutions

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	1034	63.6	65.0	65.0
	1	507	31.2	31.9	96.9
	2	49	3.0	3.1	100.0
	Total	1590	97.8	100.0	
Missing	System	35	2.2		
Total		1626	100.0		

Table 13. Frequencies: Confidence in Non-State Institutions

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	623	38.3	38.5	38.5
	1.00	632	38.9	39.1	77.5
	2.00	230	14.1	14.2	91.7
	3.00	123	7.5	7.6	99.3
	4.00	11	.7	.7	100.0
	Total	1618	99.5	100.0	
Missing	System	8	.5		
Total		1626	100.0		

Table 14. Model Fitting Information: Confidence in State Institutions

Model	-2 Log Likelihood	Chi-Square	Df	Sig.
Intercept Only	731.131			
Final	459.929	271.202	17	.000

Link function: Logit.

Table 15. Goodness-of-Fit: Confidence in State Institutions

	Chi-Square	df	Sig.
Pearson	321.390	81	.000
Deviance	303.025	81	.000

Link function: Logit.

Table 16. Pseudo R-Square: Confidence in State Institutions

Cox and Snell	.157
Nagelkerke	.202
McFadden	.113

Link function: Logit.

Table 17. Parameter Estimates: Confidence in State Institutions

	Estimate	Std. Error	Wald	df	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval Lower Bound	Upper Bound
[LegitState = 0]	5.835	2.066	7.976	1	.005	1.786	9.884
[LegitState = 1]	8.902	2.072	18.450	1	.000	4.840	12.964
[V248=1]	1.436	2.513	.327	1	.568	-3.489	6.362
[V248=2]	5.177	2.083	6.176	1	.013	1.094	9.260
[V248=3]	4.958	2.104	5.551	1	.018	.834	9.082
[V248=4]	3.672	2.088	3.093	1	.079	-.420	7.765
[V248=5]	4.238	2.084	4.135	1	.042	.153	8.323
[V248=6]	6.665	2.089	10.185	1	.001	2.572	10.759
[V248=7]	4.014	2.093	3.676	1	.055	-.089	8.117
[V248=8]	4.075	2.291	3.165	1	.075	-.415	8.565
[V248=9]	0[a]	.	.	0	.	.	.
V239	.786	.307	6.571	1	.010	.185	1.388
[V248=1] * V239	.170	.724	.055	1	.815	-1.249	1.588
[V248=2] * V239	-.527	.320	2.704	1	.100	-1.155	.101
[V248=3] * V239	-.608	.332	3.355	1	.067	-1.258	.043
[V248=4] * V239	-.159	.319	.247	1	.619	-.785	.467
[V248=5] * V239	-.557	.322	2.989	1	.084	-1.188	.074
[V248=6] * V239	-1.006	.328	9.394	1	.002	-1.649	-.363
[V248=7] * V239	-.332	.326	1.036	1	.309	-.972	.307
[V248=8] * V239	-.987	.386	6.542	1	.011	-1.743	-.231
[V248=9] * V239	0[a]	.	.	0	.	.	.

Link function: Logit.
a. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.

Table 18. Model Fitting Information: Confidence in Non-State Institutions

Model	-2 Log Likelihood	Chi-Square	Df	Sig.
Intercept Only	1351.207			
Final	1153.575	197.633	17	.000

Link function: Logit.

Table 19. Goodness-of-Fit: Confidence in Non-State Institutions

	Chi-Square	df	Sig.
Pearson	1172.695	179	.000
Deviance	843.140	179	.000

Link function: Logit.

Table 20. Pseudo R-Square: Confidence in Non-State Institutions

Cox and Snell	.115
Nagelkerke	.125
McFadden	.049

Link function: Logit.

Table 21. Parameter Estimates: Confidence in Non-State Institutions

		Estimate	Std. Error	Wald	df	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Threshold	Leg.nonstate = .00]	-1.241	.368	11.387	1	.001	-1.961	-.520
	Leg.nonstate = 1.00]	.628	.366	2.943	1	.086	-.090	1.346
	Leg.nonstate = 2.00]	1.857	.372	24.889	1	.000	1.128	2.587
	Leg.nonstate = 3.00]	4.469	.470	90.293	1	.000	3.547	5.391
Location	[V248=1]	-4.698	1.048	20.105	1	.000	-6.752	-2.644
	[V248=2]	-1.189	.442	7.234	1	.007	-2.056	-.323
	[V248=3]	-.999	.514	3.781	1	.052	-2.006	.008
	[V248=4]	-1.891	.436	18.857	1	.000	-2.745	-1.038
	[V248=5]	-1.548	.429	13.003	1	.000	-2.389	-.707
	[V248=6]	.476	.461	1.068	1	.301	-.427	1.380
	[V248=7]	-2.654	.472	31.642	1	.000	-3.579	-1.729
	[V248=8]	-1.935	.704	7.552	1	.006	-3.316	-.555
	[V248=9]	0[a]	.	.	0	.	.	.
	V239	-.132	.118	1.251	1	.263	-.364	.099
	[V248=1] * V239	1.113	.520	4.590	1	.032	.095	2.131
	[V248=2] * V239	.322	.146	4.845	1	.028	.035	.609
	[V248=3] * V239	.197	.165	1.421	1	.233	-.127	.522
	[V248=4] * V239	.490	.139	12.445	1	.000	.218	.762
	[V248=5] * V239	.408	.145	7.856	1	.005	.123	.693
	[V248=6] * V239	-.102	.160	.410	1	.522	-.416	.211
	[V248=7] * V239	.875	.156	31.468	1	.000	.569	1.181
	[V248=8] * V239	.584	.179	10.606	1	.001	.232	.935
	[V248=9] * V239	0[a]	.	.	0	.	.	.

Link function: Logit.
a. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.

Table 22. Comparison of means for "Importance of Democracy" and "Democratically Governed Today" by highest education level attained

Highest educational level attained		Importance of democracy	How democratically is this country being governed today
No formal education	Mean	6.18	4.96
	N	252	252
	Std. Deviation	3.406	2.808
Incomplete primary school	Mean	4.46	3.79
	N	244	244
	Std. Deviation	3.122	2.204
Complete primary school	Mean	7.79	2.65
	N	208	208
	Std. Deviation	3.043	2.106
Incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	Mean	6.45	3.65
	N	384	384
	Std. Deviation	2.859	2.276
Complete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	Mean	6.65	3.45
	N	324	324
	Std. Deviation	2.935	2.351
Incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type	Mean	7.44	2.63
	N	164	164
	Std. Deviation	2.626	1.827
Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type	Mean	5.83	4.07
	N	203	203
	Std. Deviation	2.535	1.951
Some university-level education, without degree	Mean	3.10	3.13
	N	138	138
	Std. Deviation	2.918	2.400
University - level education, with degree	Mean	6.57	2.84
	N	50	50
	Std. Deviation	1.655	1.275
Total	Mean	6.13	3.60
	N	1969	1969
	Std. Deviation	3.173	2.361

Table 23. Multiple Comparisons Table (Tukey HSD) for Highest Level of Education and "Importance of Democracy"

(I) Highest educational level attained	(J) Highest educational level attained	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
No formal education	Incomplete primary school	1.725[*]	.263	.000	.91	2.54
	Complete primary school	-1.606[*]	.275	.000	-2.46	-.75
	Incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	-.272	.238	.968	-1.01	.47
	Complete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	-.466	.246	.618	-1.23	.30
	Incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type	-1.255[*]	.294	.001	-2.17	-.34
	Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type	.354	.276	.937	-.50	1.21
	Some university-level education, without degree	3.085[*]	.310	.000	2.12	4.05
	University - level education, with degree	-.386	.454	.995	-1.80	1.02
Incomplete primary school	No formal education	-1.725[*]	.263	.000	-2.54	-.91
	Complete primary school	-3.331[*]	.277	.000	-4.19	-2.47
	Incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	-1.997[*]	.240	.000	-2.74	-1.25
	Complete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	-2.192[*]	.248	.000	-2.96	-1.42
	Incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type	-2.980[*]	.296	.000	-3.90	-2.06
	Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type	-1.371[*]	.278	.000	-2.24	-.51
	Some university-level education, without degree	1.360[*]	.312	.000	.39	2.33
	University - level education, with degree	-2.112[*]	.455	.000	-3.53	-.70

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Complete primary school	No formal education	1.606[*]	.275	.000	.75	2.46
	Incomplete primary school	3.331[*]	.277	.000	2.47	4.19
	Incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	1.334[*]	.252	.000	.55	2.12
	Complete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	1.140[*]	.260	.000	.33	1.95
	Incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type	.351	.306	.967	-.60	1.30
	Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type	1.960[*]	.289	.000	1.06	2.86
	Some university-level education, without degree	4.691[*]	.322	.000	3.69	5.69
	University - level education, with degree	1.220	.462	.170	-.21	2.65
Incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	No formal education	.272	.238	.968	-.47	1.01
	Incomplete primary school	1.997[*]	.240	.000	1.25	2.74
	Complete primary school	-1.334[*]	.252	.000	-2.12	-.55
	Complete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	-.195	.221	.994	-.88	.49
	Incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type	-.983[*]	.274	.010	-1.83	-.13
	Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type	.626	.254	.252	-.16	1.42
	Some university-level education, without degree	3.356[*]	.291	.000	2.45	4.26
	University - level education, with degree	-.115	.441	1.000	-1.48	1.25
Complete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	No formal education	.466	.246	.618	-.30	1.23
	Incomplete primary school	2.192[*]	.248	.000	1.42	2.96
	Complete primary school	-1.140[*]	.260	.000	-1.95	-.33
	Incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	.195	.221	.994	-.49	.88
	Incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type	-.789	.281	.114	-1.66	.08

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	Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type	.821[*]	.262	.047	.01	1.64
	Some university-level education, without degree	3.551[*]	.298	.000	2.63	4.48
	University - level education, with degree	.080	.446	1.000	-1.30	1.46
Incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type	No formal education	1.255[*]	.294	.001	.34	2.17
	Incomplete primary school	2.980[*]	.296	.000	2.06	3.90
	Complete primary school	-.351	.306	.967	-1.30	.60
	Incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	.983[*]	.274	.010	.13	1.83
	Complete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	.789	.281	.114	-.08	1.66
	Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type	1.609[*]	.308	.000	.65	2.56
	Some university-level education, without degree	4.340[*]	.339	.000	3.29	5.39
	University - level education, with degree	.869	.474	.660	-.60	2.34
Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type	No formal education	-.354	.276	.937	-1.21	.50
	Incomplete primary school	1.371[*]	.278	.000	.51	2.24
	Complete primary school	-1.960[*]	.289	.000	-2.86	-1.06
	Incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	-.626	.254	.252	-1.42	.16
	Complete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	-.821[*]	.262	.047	-1.64	-.01
	Incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type	-1.609[*]	.308	.000	-2.56	-.65
	Some university-level education, without degree	2.731[*]	.323	.000	1.73	3.73
	University - level education, with degree	-.740	.463	.805	-2.18	.70
Some university-level education, without degree	No formal education	-3.085[*]	.310	.000	-4.05	-2.12
	Incomplete primary school	-1.360[*]	.312	.000	-2.33	-.39
	Complete primary school	-4.691[*]	.322	.000	-5.69	-3.69
	Incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	-3.356[*]	.291	.000	-4.26	-2.45

	Complete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	-3.551[*]	.298	.000	-4.48	-2.63
	Incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type	-4.340[*]	.339	.000	-5.39	-3.29
	Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type	-2.731[*]	.323	.000	-3.73	-1.73
	University - level education, with degree	-3.471[*]	.484	.000	-4.97	-1.97
University - level education, with degree	No formal education	.386	.454	.995	-1.02	1.80
	Incomplete primary school	2.112[*]	.455	.000	.70	3.53
	Complete primary school	-1.220	.462	.170	-2.65	.21
	Incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	.115	.441	1.000	-1.25	1.48
	Complete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	-.080	.446	1.000	-1.46	1.30
	Incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type	-.869	.474	.660	-2.34	.60
	Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type	.740	.463	.805	-.70	2.18
	Some university-level education, without degree	3.471[*]	.484	.000	1.97	4.97
*The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.						

Table 24. Multiple Comparisons Table (Tukey HSD) for Highest Level of Education and "How democratically is this country being governed today?"

No formal education	Incomplete primary school	1.168[*]	.203	.000	.54	1.80
	Complete primary school	2.304[*]	.212	.000	1.65	2.96
	Incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	1.310[*]	.183	.000	.74	1.88
	Complete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	1.503[*]	.190	.000	.91	2.09
	Incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type	2.333[*]	.227	.000	1.63	3.04

	Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type	.892*	.213	.001	.23	1.55
	Some university-level education, without degree	1.828*	.239	.000	1.08	2.57
	University - level education, with degree	2.118*	.350	.000	1.03	3.21
Incomplete primary school	No formal education	-1.168*	.203	.000	-1.80	-.54
	Complete primary school	1.135*	.213	.000	.47	1.80
	Incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	.142	.185	.998	-.43	.72
	Complete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	.335	.192	.717	-.26	.93
	Incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type	1.164*	.229	.000	.45	1.87
	Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type	-.277	.215	.935	-.94	.39
	Some university-level education, without degree	.659	.241	.136	-.09	1.41
	University - level education, with degree	.950	.351	.147	-.14	2.04
Complete primary school	No formal education	-2.304*	.212	.000	-2.96	-1.65
	Incomplete primary school	-1.135*	.213	.000	-1.80	-.47
	Incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	-.993*	.195	.000	-1.60	-.39
	Complete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	-.800*	.201	.002	-1.42	-.18
	Incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type	.029	.236	1.000	-.70	.76
	Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type	-1.412*	.223	.000	-2.11	-.72
	Some university-level education, without degree	-.476	.248	.602	-1.25	.29
	University - level education, with degree	-.185	.357	1.000	-1.29	.92
Incomplete secondary	No formal education	-1.310*	.183	.000	-1.88	-.74
	Incomplete primary school	-.142	.185	.998	-.72	.43

school: technical/ vocational type	Complete primary school	.993*	.195	.000	.39	1.60
	Complete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	.193	.171	.970	-.34	.72
	Incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type	1.022*	.211	.000	.37	1.68
	Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type	-.419	.196	.450	-1.03	.19
	Some university-level education, without degree	.517	.224	.340	-.18	1.21
	University - level education, with degree	.808	.340	.299	-.25	1.86
Complete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	No formal education	-1.503*	.190	.000	-2.09	-.91
	Incomplete primary school	-.335	.192	.717	-.93	.26
	Complete primary school	.800*	.201	.002	.18	1.42
	Incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	-.193	.171	.970	-.72	.34
	Incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type	.829*	.217	.004	.16	1.50
	Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type	-.612	.203	.064	-1.24	.02
	Some university-level education, without degree	.324	.230	.894	-.39	1.04
	University - level education, with degree	.615	.344	.691	-.45	1.68
Incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type	No formal education	-2.333*	.227	.000	-3.04	-1.63
	Incomplete primary school	-1.164*	.229	.000	-1.87	-.45
	Complete primary school	-.029	.236	1.000	-.76	.70
	Incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	-1.022*	.211	.000	-1.68	-.37
	Complete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	-.829*	.217	.004	-1.50	-.16
	Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type	-1.441*	.238	.000	-2.18	-.70
	Some university-level education, without degree	-.505	.261	.591	-1.32	.31

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	University - level education, with degree	-.214	.366	1.000	-1.35	.92
Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type	No formal education	-.892[*]	.213	.001	-1.55	-.23
	Incomplete primary school	.277	.215	.935	-.39	.94
	Complete primary school	1.412[*]	.223	.000	.72	2.11
	Incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	.419	.196	.450	-.19	1.03
	Complete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	.612	.203	.064	-.02	1.24
	Incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type	1.441[*]	.238	.000	.70	2.18
	Some university-level education, without degree	.936[*]	.249	.006	.16	1.71
	University - level education, with degree	1.227[*]	.357	.018	.12	2.34
Some university-level education, without degree	No formal education	-1.828[*]	.239	.000	-2.57	-1.08
	Incomplete primary school	-.659	.241	.136	-1.41	.09
	Complete primary school	.476	.248	.602	-.29	1.25
	Incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	-.517	.224	.340	-1.21	.18
	Complete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	-.324	.230	.894	-1.04	.39
	Incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type	.505	.261	.591	-.31	1.32
	Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type	-.936[*]	.249	.006	-1.71	-.16
	University - level education, with degree	.291	.374	.997	-.87	1.45
University - level education, with degree	No formal education	-2.118[*]	.350	.000	-3.21	-1.03
	Incomplete primary school	-.950	.351	.147	-2.04	.14
	Complete primary school	.185	.357	1.000	-.92	1.29
	Incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	-.808	.340	.299	-1.86	.25
	Complete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	-.615	.344	.691	-1.68	.45

	Incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type	.214	.366	1.000	-.92	1.35
	Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type	-1.227[*]	.357	.018	-2.34	-.12
	Some university-level education, without degree	-.291	.374	.997	-1.45	.87
*The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.						

Table 25. ANOVA for relationship between highest education level and "Importance of democracy"/"How democratically is this country being governed today?"

			Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Importance of democracy * Highest educational level attained	Between Groups	(Combined)	2964.965	8	370.621	43.109	.000
		Linearity	54.574	1	54.574	6.348	.012
		Deviation from Linearity	2910.392	7	415.770	48.361	.000
	Within Groups		16849.389	1960	8.597		
	Total		19814.354	1968			
How democratically is this country being governed today * Highest educational level attained	Between Groups	(Combined)	927.793	8	115.974	22.644	.000
		Linearity	221.799	1	221.799	43.306	.000
		Deviation from Linearity	705.994	7	100.856	19.692	.000
	Within Groups		10037.912	1960	5.122		
	Total		10965.705	1968			

Table 26. Measures of association for highest education level attained and "Importance of democracy"/"How democratically is this country being governed today?"

	R	R Squared	Eta	Eta Squared
Importance of democracy * Highest educational level attained	-.052	.003	.387	.150
How democratically is this country being governed today * Highest educational level attained	-.142	.020	.291	.085

Table 27. Democracy versus Autocracy Preference: Comparison of Means

Highest educational level attained	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
No formal education	-1.0516	252	1.17020
Incomplete primary school	-1.9475	245	1.11895
Complete primary school	-1.4254	207	1.15548
Incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	-1.1742	384	1.32292
Complete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	-1.0691	324	1.11071
Incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type	-1.6384	164	1.18067
Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type	-.9227	203	1.25841
Some university-level education, without degree	-2.1278	138	.85031
University - level education, with degree	-.4849	50	.90932
Total	-1.3260	1969	1.23499

Table 28. Democracy versus Autocracy Preference: Measures of Association

	Eta	Eta Squared
Democracy versus Autocracy Preference * Highest educational level attained	.326	.106

Table 29. Democracy versus Autocracy Preference: ANOVA

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	319.276	8	39.909	29.149	.000
Within Groups	2682.200	1959	1.369		
Total	3001.476	1967			

Table 30. Autocracy versus Democracy Preference: Multiple Comparisons

(I) Highest educational level attained	(J) Highest educational level attained	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound

No formal education	Incomplete primary school	.89584[*]	.10494	.000	.5700	1.2217
	Complete primary school	.37377[*]	.10965	.019	.0333	.7143
	Incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	.12259	.09481	.934	-.1718	.4170
	Complete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	.01745	.09820	1.000	-.2875	.3224
	Incomplete secondary school: university- preparatory type	.58681[*]	.11736	.000	.2224	.9512
	Complete secondary school: university- preparatory type	-.12890	.11024	.963	-.4712	.2134
	Some university-level education, without degree	1.07619[*]	.12379	.000	.6918	1.4606
	University - level education, with degree	-.56671[*]	.18115	.047	-1.1292	-.0042

*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

Table 31. Frequencies: Voluntary Activity in Social Organizations

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	945	58.1	65.0	65.0
	1.00	474	29.2	32.6	97.5
	2.00	36	2.2	2.5	100.0
	Total	1454	89.4	100.0	
Missing	System	172	10.6		

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
	Total	1626	100.0		

Table 32. Frequencies: Overall Voluntary Activity in Organizations

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	865	53.2	59.9	59.9
	1.00	418	25.7	28.9	88.8
	2.00	128	7.9	8.8	97.6
	3.00	34	2.1	2.4	100.0
	Total	1445	88.9	100.0	
Missing	System	181	11.1		
Total		1626	100.0		

Table 33. Model Fitting Information: Voluntary Activity in Social Organizations

Model	-2 Log Likelihood	Chi-Square	df	Sig.
Intercept Only	1149.466			
Final	893.717	255.749	17	.000

Link function: Logit.

Table 34. Goodness-of-Fit: Voluntary Activity in Social Organizations

	Chi-Square	df	Sig.
Pearson	2189.674	159	.000
Deviance	744.631	159	.000

Link function: Logit.

Table 35. Pseudo R-Square: Voluntary Activity in Social Organizations

Cox and Snell	.161
Nagelkerke	.209
McFadden	.119

Link function: Logit.

Table 36. Parameter Estimates: Voluntary Activity in Social Organizations

	Estimate	Std. Error	Wald	df	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval Lower Bound	Upper Bound
[volsoc = 0]	18.313	1500.851	.000	1	.990	-2923.300	2959.927
[volsoc = 1]	21.814	1500.851	.000	1	.988	-2919.799	2963.428
[V248=1]	1.021E-7	8997.901	.000	1	1.000	-17635.562	17635.562
[V248=2]	16.558	1500.851	.000	1	.991	-2925.056	2958.172
[V248=3]	15.246	1500.851	.000	1	.992	-2926.368	2956.860
[V248=4]	16.688	1500.851	.000	1	.991	-2924.926	2958.302
[V248=5]	19.856	1500.851	.000	1	.989	-2921.757	2961.470
[V248=6]	20.291	1500.851	.000	1	.989	-2921.323	2961.905
[V248=7]	17.750	1500.851	.000	1	.991	-2923.863	2959.364
[V248=8]	15.081	1500.851	.000	1	.992	-2926.533	2956.694
[V248=9]	0[a]	.	.	0	.	.	.
V239	1.332E-8	.162	.000	1	1.000	-.317	.317
[V248=1] * V239	-1.248E-8	3266.851	.000	1	1.000	-6402.910	6402.910
[V248=2] * V239	.517	.216	5.744	1	.017	.094	.940
[V248=3] * V239	.245	.227	1.167	1	.280	-.199	.690
[V248=4] * V239	.242	.198	1.497	1	.221	-.146	.631
[V248=5] * V239	-.552	.197	7.828	1	.005	-.938	-.165
[V248=6] * V239	-.719	.243	8.746	1	.003	-1.196	-.243
[V248=7] * V239	-.023	.207	.012	1	.911	-.429	.383
[V248=8] * V239	.428	.000	.	1	.	.428	.428
[V248=9] * V239	0[a]	.	.	0	.	.	.
[V248=1] * [V240=1]	5.995E-10	6546.537	.000	1	1.000	-12830.978	12830.978
[V248=1] * [V240=2]	0[a]	.	.	0	.	.	.
[V248=2] * [V240=1]	.581	.483	1.447	1	.229	-.366	1.528
[V248=2] * [V240=2]	0[a]	.	.	0	.	.	.
[V248=3] * [V240=1]	2.109	.425	24.620	1	.000	1.276	2.942
[V248=3] * [V240=2]	0[a]	.	.	0	.	.	.
[V248=4] * [V240=1]	-1.578	.367	18.516	1	.000	-2.296	-.859
[V248=4] * [V240=2]	0[a]	.	.	0	.	.	.
[V248=5] * [V240=1]	-1.732	.324	28.626	1	.000	-2.367	-1.098
[V248=5] * [V240=2]	0[a]	.	.	0	.	.	.
[V248=6] * [V240=1]	-2.515	.522	23.251	1	.000	-3.537	-1.493
[V248=6] * [V240=2]	0[a]	.	.	0	.	.	.
[V248=7] * [V240=1]	-1.164	.435	7.167	1	.007	-2.016	-.312
[V248=7] * [V240=2]	0[a]	.	.	0	.	.	.
[V248=8] * [V240=1]	2.246	.773	8.444	1	.004	.731	3.761
[V248=8] * [V240=2]	0[a]	.	.	0	.	.	.
[V248=9] * [V240=1]	5.991E-8	3717.879	.000	1	1.000	-7286.909	7286.909
[V248=9] * [V240=2]	0[a]	.	.	0	.	.	.

Link function: Logit.

a. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.

Table 37. Model Fitting Information: Overall Voluntary Activity in Organizations

Model	-2 Log Likelihood	Chi-Square	df	Sig.
Intercept Only	1523.934			
Final	1260.501	263.432	17	.000

Link function: Logit.

Table 38. Goodness-of-Fit: Overall Voluntary Activity in Organizations

	Chi-Square	df	Sig.
Pearson	1491.671	247	.000
Deviance	1071.016	247	.000

Link function: Logit.

Table 39. Pseudo R-Square: Overall Voluntary Activity in Organizations

Cox and Snell	.167
Nagelkerke	.195
McFadden	.094

Link function: Logit.

Table 40. Parameter Estimates: Overall Voluntary Activity in Organizations

		Estimate	Std. Error	Wald	df	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
							Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Threshold	[overallvolorg = 0]	2.119	.658	10.354	1	.001	.828	3.409
	[overallvol = 1]	3.991	.664	36.142	1	.000	2.690	5.292
	[overallvol = 2]	5.696	.681	70.015	1	.000	4.362	7.030
Location	[V248=1]	-19.062	.000	.	1	.	-19.062	-19.062
	[V248=2]	3.518	.705	24.925	1	.000	2.137	4.900
	[V248=3]	1.019	.787	1.678	1	.195	-.523	2.561
	[V248=4]	.696	.733	.902	1	.342	-.740	2.132
	[V248=5]	3.283	.702	21.847	1	.000	1.906	4.659
	[V248=6]	3.441	.728	22.337	1	.000	2.014	4.868
	[V248=7]	1.400	.736	3.618	1	.057	-.042	2.843
	[V248=8]	3.010	.893	11.353	1	.001	1.259	4.760
	[V248=9]	0[a]	.	.	0	.	.	.
	V239	-.035	.223	.024	1	.876	-.472	.402
	[V248=1] * V239	.035	5625.570	.000	1	1.000	-11025.880	11025.950
	[V248=2] * V239	-.200	.239	.701	1	.403	-.670	.269
	[V248=3] * V239	.106	.261	.165	1	.684	-.406	.619
	[V248=4] * V239	.085	.243	.124	1	.725	-.390	.561
	[V248=5] * V239	-.484	.246	3.888	1	.049	-.965	-.003
	[V248=6] * V239	-.513	.260	3.904	1	.048	-1.022	-.004
	[V248=7] * V239	-.060	.253	.056	1	.813	-.556	.436
	[V248=8] * V239	-.075	.262	.081	1	.775	-.589	.439
	[V248=9] * V239	0[a]	.	.	0	.	.	.

Link function: Logit.

a. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.

Table 41. Post-Materialist index (4-item)

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Materialist	3	.2	.2	.2
	Mixed	1966	98.5	98.8	99.0
	Postmaterialist	21	1.0	1.0	100.0
	Total	1990	99.7	100.0	
Missing	Missing; Unknown	6	.3		
Total		1996	100.0		

Table 42. Mean scores on the Post-materialist index and Autonomy index for respondents with/without formal education

Report		Post-materialist index (4-item)	Autonomy Index
Does respondent have any formal education?			
No Formal Education	Mean	2.00	-.87
	N	258	260
	Std. Deviation	.090	.862
Has formal education	Mean	2.01	-.77
	N	1732	1735
	Std. Deviation	.112	.790
Total	Mean	2.01	-.78
	N	1990	1995
	Std. Deviation	.110	.800

Table 43. ANOVA table for those with/without formal education and the post-materialist index (4-item)/Autonomy index

ANOVA Table[a,b]			Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Post-materialist index (4-item) * FormalEducation	Between Groups	(Combined)	.033	1	.033	2.737	.098
	Within Groups		23.895	1988	.012		

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			Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
	Total		23.928	1989			
Autonomy Index * FormalEducation	Between Groups	(Combined)	2.305	1	2.305	3.603	.058
	Within Groups		1274.679	1993	.640		
	Total		1276.984	1994			

Table 44. Measures of Association for the Post-materialist index and the Autonomy index with those respondents who do/do not have formal education

Measures of Association		
	Eta	Eta Squared
Post-materialist index (4-item) * FormalEducation	.037	.001
Autonomy Index * FormalEducation	.042	.002

Table 45. Descriptives for the Post-materialist index (4-item) and Autonomy index by highest education level attained

Descriptives		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum	Between-Component Variance
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound			
Post-materialist index (4-item)	No formal education	258	2.00	.090	.006	1.99	2.01	1	3	
	Incomplete primary school	256	2.01	.084	.005	2.00	2.02	2	3	
	Complete primary school	211	2.00	.078	.005	1.99	2.01	1	3	
	Incomplete secondary school: technical/	385	2.02	.143	.007	2.01	2.03	1	3	

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		N	Mean	Std. Dev	Std. Error	Lower	Upper	Min	Max	
	vocational type									
	Complete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	324	2.01	.116	.006	1.99	2.02	1	3	
	Incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type	164	2.04	.186	.015	2.01	2.06	2	3	
	Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type	203	2.00	.032	.002	2.00	2.01	2	3	
	Some university-level education, without degree	138	2.00	.042	.004	1.99	2.01	2	3	
	University -level education, with degree	50	2.00	.071	.010	1.98	2.03	2	3	
	Total	1990	2.01	.110	.002	2.00	2.01	1	3	
	Model Fixed Effects			.109	.002	2.00	2.01			
	Random Effects				.004	2.00	2.02			.000
Autonomy Index	No formal education	260	-.87	.862	.053	-.97	-.76	-2	2	
	Incomplete primary school	257	-.64	.611	.038	-.71	-.56	-2	2	

Complete primary school		211	-.53	.669	.046	-.62	-.44	-2	2	
Incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type		386	-.60	.811	.041	-.68	-.52	-2	2	
Complete secondary school: technical/ vocational type		324	-.97	.802	.045	-1.05	-.88	-2	2	
Incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type		164	-1.02	1.001	.078	-1.17	-.87	-2	1	
Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type		203	-.80	.765	.054	-.90	-.69	-2	2	
Some university-level education, without degree		139	-1.07	.722	.061	-1.19	-.95	-2	2	
University -level education, with degree		50	-.70	.544	.077	-.85	-.54	-1	1	
Total		1995	-.78	.800	.018	-.82	-.75	-2	2	
Model	Fixed Effects			.781	.017	-.82	-.75			
	Random				.070	-.94	-.62			.035

	Effect s					

Table 46. ANOVA for Post-materialist index and Autonomy index by highest education level attained

ANOVA						
		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Post-materialist index (4-item)	Between Groups	.236	8	.030	2.470	.012
	Within Groups	23.692	1980	.012		
	Total	23.928	1988			
Autonomy Index	Between Groups	65.651	8	8.206	13.454	.000
	Within Groups	1211.333	1986	.610		
	Total	1276.984	1994			

Table 47. Multiple comparisons (Turky HSD) for Post-materialist index (4-item) by highest education level attained

Multiple Comparisons							
Tukey HSD							
Dependent Variable	(I) Highest educational level attained	(J) Highest educational level attained	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Post-materialist index (4-item)	No formal education	Incomplete primary school	-.009	.010	.992	-.04	.02
		Complete primary school	-.001	.010	1.000	-.03	.03
		Incomplete secondary school: technical/	-.021	.009	.270	-.05	.01

		vocational type					
		Complete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	-.008	.009	.992	-.04	.02
		Incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type	-.038[*]	.011	.017	-.07	.00
		Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type	-.003	.010	1.000	-.03	.03
		Some university-level education, without degree	-.004	.012	1.000	-.04	.03
		University - level education, with degree	-.007	.017	1.000	-.06	.05
	Incomplete primary school	No formal education	.009	.010	.992	-.02	.04
		Complete primary school	.008	.010	.997	-.02	.04
		Incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	-.012	.009	.895	-.04	.01
		Complete secondary school: technical/	.001	.009	1.000	-.03	.03

		vocational type					
		Incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type	-.029	.011	.176	-.06	.01
		Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type	.006	.010	1.000	-.03	.04
		Some university-level education, without degree	.005	.012	1.000	-.03	.04
		University - level education, with degree	.002	.017	1.000	-.05	.05
	Complete primary school	No formal education	.001	.010	1.000	-.03	.03
		Incomplete primary school	-.008	.010	.997	-.04	.02
		Incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	-.021	.009	.406	-.05	.01
		Complete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	-.008	.010	.997	-.04	.02
		Incomplete secondary school: university-	-.037[*]	.011	.033	-.07	.00

		preparatory type					
		Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type	-.002	.011	1.000	-.04	.03
		Some university-level education, without degree	-.003	.012	1.000	-.04	.03
		University -level education, with degree	-.006	.017	1.000	-.06	.05
	Incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	No formal education	.021	.009	.270	-.01	.05
		Incomplete primary school	.012	.009	.895	-.01	.04
		Complete primary school	.021	.009	.406	-.01	.05
		Complete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	.013	.008	.819	-.01	.04
		Incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type	-.016	.010	.805	-.05	.02
		Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type	.019	.009	.576	-.01	.05

		Some university-level education, without degree	.018	.011	.782	-.02	.05
		University - level education, with degree	.015	.016	.994	-.04	.07
	Complete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	No formal education	.008	.009	.992	-.02	.04
		Incomplete primary school	-.001	.009	1.000	-.03	.03
		Complete primary school	.008	.010	.997	-.02	.04
		Incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	-.013	.008	.819	-.04	.01
		Incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type	-.029	.010	.117	-.06	.00
		Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type	.006	.010	1.000	-.02	.04
		Some university-level education, without degree	.005	.011	1.000	-.03	.04
		University - level	.002	.017	1.000	-.05	.05

		education, with degree					
	Incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type	No formal education	.038[*]	.011	.017	.00	.07
		Incomplete primary school	.029	.011	.176	-.01	.06
		Complete primary school	.037[*]	.011	.033	.00	.07
		Incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	.016	.010	.805	-.02	.05
		Complete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	.029	.010	.117	.00	.06
		Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type	.035	.011	.061	.00	.07
		Some university-level education, without degree	.034	.013	.148	-.01	.07
		University - level education, with degree	.031	.018	.715	-.02	.09
	Complete secondary school: university-	No formal education	.003	.010	1.000	-.03	.03
		Incomplete primary school	-.006	.010	1.000	-.04	.03

preparatory type	Complete primary school	.002	.011	1.000	-.03	.04
	Incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	-.019	.009	.576	-.05	.01
	Complete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	-.006	.010	1.000	-.04	.02
	Incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type	-.035	.011	.061	-.07	.00
	Some university-level education, without degree	-.001	.012	1.000	-.04	.04
	University -level education, with degree	-.004	.017	1.000	-.06	.05
Some university-level education, without degree	No formal education	.004	.012	1.000	-.03	.04
	Incomplete primary school	-.005	.012	1.000	-.04	.03
	Complete primary school	.003	.012	1.000	-.03	.04
	Incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	-.018	.011	.782	-.05	.02

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		Complete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	-.005	.011	1.000	-.04	.03
		Incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type	-.034	.013	.148	-.07	.01
		Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type	.001	.012	1.000	-.04	.04
		University - level education, with degree	-.003	.018	1.000	-.06	.05
	University - level education, with degree	No formal education	.007	.017	1.000	-.05	.06
		Incomplete primary school	-.002	.017	1.000	-.05	.05
		Complete primary school	.006	.017	1.000	-.05	.06
		Incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	-.015	.016	.994	-.07	.04
		Complete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	-.002	.017	1.000	-.05	.05
		Incomplete secondary school:	-.031	.018	.715	-.09	.02

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		(J)	Mean Diff	Std. Error	Sig.	Lower	Upper
		university-preparatory type					
		Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type	.004	.017	1.000	-.05	.06
		Some university-level education, without degree	.003	.018	1.000	-.05	.06

*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

Table 48. Multiple comparisons (Turky HSD) for Autonomy index by highest education level attained

Multiple Comparisons							
Tukey HSD							
Dependent Variable	(I) Highest educational level attained	(J) Highest educational level attained	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Autonomy Index	No formal education	Incomplete primary school	-.232[*]	.069	.022	-.45	-.02
		Complete primary school	-.339[*]	.072	.000	-.56	-.11
		Incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	-.270[*]	.063	.001	-.46	-.08
		Complete secondary school:	.097	.065	.857	-.10	.30

		technical/ vocational type					
		Incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type	.151	.078	.588	-.09	.39
		Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type	-.073	.073	.986	-.30	.15
		Some university-level education, without degree	.198	.082	.280	-.06	.45
		University - level education, with degree	-.170	.121	.896	-.54	.21
	Incomplete primary school	No formal education	.232*	.069	.022	.02	.45
		Complete primary school	-.108	.073	.863	-.33	.12
		Incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	-.038	.063	1.000	-.23	.16
		Complete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	.329*	.065	.000	.13	.53
		Incomplete secondary school:	.383*	.078	.000	.14	.62

		university-preparatory type				
		Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type	.158	.073	.432	-.07	.39
		Some university-level education, without degree	.429[*]	.082	.000	.17	.68
		University - level education, with degree	.062	.121	1.000	-.31	.44
	Complete primary school	No formal education	.339[*]	.072	.000	.11	.56
		Incomplete primary school	.108	.073	.863	-.12	.33
		Incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	.070	.067	.982	-.14	.28
		Complete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	.437[*]	.069	.000	.22	.65
		Incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type	.490[*]	.081	.000	.24	.74
		Complete secondary school:	.266[*]	.077	.016	.03	.50

		university-preparatory type					
		Some university-level education, without degree	.537[*]	.085	.000	.27	.80
		University-level education, with degree	.170	.123	.904	-.21	.55
	Incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	No formal education	.270[*]	.063	.001	.08	.46
		Incomplete primary school	.038	.063	1.000	-.16	.23
		Complete primary school	-.070	.067	.982	-.28	.14
		Complete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	.367[*]	.059	.000	.18	.55
		Incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type	.421[*]	.073	.000	.19	.65
		Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type	.197	.068	.088	-.01	.41
		Some university-level education, without degree	.467[*]	.077	.000	.23	.71

		University - level education, with degree	.100	.117	.995	-.26	.46
	Complete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	No formal education	-.097	.065	.857	-.30	.10
		Incomplete primary school	-.329*	.065	.000	-.53	-.13
		Complete primary school	-.437*	.069	.000	-.65	-.22
		Incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	-.367*	.059	.000	-.55	-.18
		Incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type	.053	.075	.999	-.18	.29
		Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type	-.171	.070	.261	-.39	.05
		Some university-level education, without degree	.100	.079	.941	-.15	.35
		University - level education, with degree	-.267	.119	.374	-.64	.10
	Incomplete secondary school: university-	No formal education	-.151	.078	.588	-.39	.09
		Incomplete primary school	-.383*	.078	.000	-.62	-.14

	preparatory type	Complete primary school	-.490[*]	.081	.000	-.74	-.24
		Incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	-.421[*]	.073	.000	-.65	-.19
		Complete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	-.053	.075	.999	-.29	.18
		Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type	-.224	.082	.137	-.48	.03
		Some university-level education, without degree	.047	.090	1.000	-.23	.33
		University - level education, with degree	-.320	.126	.214	-.71	.07
	Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type	No formal education	.073	.073	.986	-.15	.30
		Incomplete primary school	-.158	.073	.432	-.39	.07
		Complete primary school	-.266[*]	.077	.016	-.50	-.03
		Incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	-.197	.068	.088	-.41	.01

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		Complete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	.171	.070	.261	-.05	.39
		Incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type	.224	.082	.137	-.03	.48
		Some university-level education, without degree	.271[*]	.086	.043	.00	.54
		University - level education, with degree	-.096	.123	.997	-.48	.29
	Some university-level education, without degree	No formal education	-.198	.082	.280	-.45	.06
		Incomplete primary school	-.429[*]	.082	.000	-.68	-.17
		Complete primary school	-.537[*]	.085	.000	-.80	-.27
		Incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	-.467[*]	.077	.000	-.71	-.23
		Complete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	-.100	.079	.941	-.35	.15
		Incomplete secondary school:	-.047	.090	1.000	-.33	.23

		university-preparatory type				
		Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type	-.271[*]	.086	.043	-.54	.00
		University - level education, with degree	-.367	.129	.102	-.77	.03
	University - level education, with degree	No formal education	.170	.121	.896	-.21	.54
		Incomplete primary school	-.062	.121	1.000	-.44	.31
		Complete primary school	-.170	.123	.904	-.55	.21
		Incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	-.100	.117	.995	-.46	.26
		Complete secondary school: technical/ vocational type	.267	.119	.374	-.10	.64
		Incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type	.320	.126	.214	-.07	.71
		Complete secondary school: university-preparatory type	.096	.123	.997	-.29	.48

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		Some university-level education, without degree	.367	.129	.102	-.03	.77

*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

Figure 8. Means plot for post-materialist index (4-item) by highest level of education attained

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
Figure 9. Means plot for autonomy index by highest level of education attained

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Chapter 7: Implications and Conclusion

Review of the Findings

In this study, I set out to answer the question, "how does education influence shifts in viewpoints?" I made two key predictions. First, I predicted that education produces a greater propensity for democratic values. This should be especially the case for those who undergo higher education. The second prediction that I made was that the process of education will make individuals more inclined to have self-expression values.

My hope was that it would make a contribution to the literatures on education and value change. Also, this analysis offers insight into democratization, since it examines some of the potential causal mechanisms for value change. Another contribution this study can make is to understanding the effect of education in developing world settings. Since the literature on developing world phenomena tends to be sparse, this is sure to be a welcome contribution.

In this dissertation research, I found mixed support for my hypotheses. Some hypotheses were supported and others were lacking in support. This indicates that more research needs to be done to fully explore the complexities of the relationship of education and values. However, there are some useful findings from this study and I will highlight them in this section.

When I explored confidence in state and non-state institutions, the results were mixed. I found evidence that people with more education were less likely to support state institutions. This went against what I originally theorized. A possible explanation is that Haitian political institutions are non-democratic. So, it would make sense that less-

educated people would support these non-democratic state institutions because the process of education exposes people to democratic ideas. When it came to non-state institutions, there was no clear linear or non-linear relationship and thus the results were inconclusive.

Next, I considered support for democracy. Again, my hypothesis was not completely supported, but interesting trends emerged nevertheless. The question asked was "How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically?" The group who viewed it as least important were those who had begun but had not completed university. Those with no formal education and those who had completed university had comparable scores of 6.18 and 6.13 respectively. The interesting aspect about these findings is that there is a dramatic regression in pro-democratic views for those who receive partial higher education. The qualitative component of this dissertation can lend insight into why this is. Those who are in the beginning stages of higher education view themselves as being part of an elite class, and look down on those in society who they view as lesser. The idea of devolving power to the people through democracy may be distasteful to those who are in the beginning their higher education because they have not yet internalized the ideas they are exposed to in the classroom.

This group of students who had partially completed higher education stood out in the next component of the analysis as being the most supportive of autocracy on a democracy-autocracy scale. In support of my hypothesis, the strongest support for democracy was from those who had graduated from a university preparatory high school program and had not attended post-secondary education and those who had graduated from university.

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I also hypothesized that increased education has a positive impact on engagement with voluntary associations. The results for this particular component were inconclusive. While engagement with voluntary associations did vary, there was no discernable pattern. Those who attended but did not complete post-secondary education were the least likely to be involved in voluntary associations, thus continuing the trend of this particular group standing out.

Lastly, I examined the relationship between self-expression values and education. Ultimately, there was no statistically significant relationship between these two factors. I believe this is due, at least in part, to the fact that Haiti is only at the beginning of the modernization process. This may have something to do with the nature of education in Haiti. Educational systems reflect the prevailing views of the societies in which they exist. Haitian society is not at the Post-Materialist stage of modernization yet. Thus, when Haiti is assessed again after time passes, I believe there will be more of a divergence in scores.

Implications for Education

There are two major implications of this research for education. First, and most simply, education does matter. Even if education isn't directly focused on political themes, it has an impact. It does this by giving people the tools they need to engage critically with the world around them and by acting as a forum for political socialization. This research gives evidence that suggests that education is one of the drivers of cultural change. People are gaining their political values through education and are developing more self-expressive views as a result. Education is one of the mechanisms behind modernization and this is important because it means that we could potentially speed up the process of modernization with targeted investment.

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Second, understanding political views formation can relate to the literature on institutional political development and human capital accumulation. Acquiring political knowledge is a key component to human capital development through education and may have an impact on development prospects. The literature has demonstrated that the growth of local human capital is a key driver of economic development (Barro, 1991; Noorbakhsh, Paloni, & Youssef, 2001). In developing world contexts, where university-educated individuals are scarce, they are particularly significant in filling high-skilled jobs. Human capital development through higher education could lead to more support for consolidated democratic institutions. If this is the case, it helps develop the theoretical story in the political development literature by developing on the human capital and political development story.

Glaeser et al. (2004) identify two potential directions for the relationship between institutional political development and the growth of human capital that have emerged in the literature. We can call the first approach the "institutional view." It focuses on institutional development and regulation. This most notably includes property rights, which are crucial for investment by building institutional and political infrastructure; we enable human and physical capital accumulation. The second approach, the "development view," prioritizes human and physical capital accumulation as a catalyst for institutional growth and reform. Increased education and wealth produce democratic institutional change. Along this line of reasoning, they challenge the idea that institutions cause economic growth and demonstrate that years of schooling have a significant effect on the emergence of more democratic regimes. However, these results are somewhat preliminary because polity IV data tends to change dramatically from year to year based

on the political environment. However, they conclude that the emphasis on government-based poverty solutions may be shortsighted since investment in factor-based growth (including human capital) may be incredibly useful.

This theoretical approach relates to the "development view" argument that was formalized by Lipset (1960). Lipset considers the idea of social requisites of democracy, originally advanced by Tocqueville. He advances the idea a more "well to-do nation" have a greater chance of having a persistent democracy. (p. 50) He uses four indices of economic development: wealth, industrialization, urbanization, and education and establishes a correlational relationship between these factors and democratic countries. He notes, "If we cannot say that a 'high' level of education is a sufficient condition for democracy, the available evidence suggests it comes close to being a necessary one." (p. 57) His conditions for democratic emergence include an open class system, economic wealth, an egalitarian value system, a capitalist economy, literacy, and high participation in voluntary organizations. (p. 74)

Implications for Democratizing Countries

Another key theoretical implication of this research has to do with the democratization literature. To examine the idea of democratization, we must set aside a normative assessment of democracy as "good" or "bad," and rather focus on the fact that democratization is a foreign policy goal of the US and other countries. If there is, in fact, a clear connection between advanced educational outcomes and democratic support, then perhaps investment in higher education would accelerate the process of democratic change.

Higher education could potentially foster support for democratic institutions. We can think about democratization in three different ways. First, is the idea of democracy as something introduced to a non-democratic state; Second, as the deepening of democratic qualities in a democracy; and lastly, as the survival of a democracy (Welzel, 2009). Haitian democratization is currently a mix of the last two types of democratization. Haiti has a sordid history with democracy, having competitive elections for the first time in 1990. Following the 2004 coup d'état of the then sitting President Jean Bertrand Aristide, Haiti has slowly been rebuilding its democracy. The most recent (2009) polity score for Haiti is a 5, which is in the anocracy category and is just one point shy of the democracy category. (Marshall & Jaggers, 2011) This reflects contemporary debates over the classification of the Haitian political regime.

The adoption of democratic values could contribute to increased international political stability, according to the adherents of the democratic peace theory. The democratic peace theory is essentially the idea that two liberal democracies rarely (or never) go to war with each other. There is heavy debate over the efficacy of this theory, and it is not without its critics (Layne, 1994; Spiro, 1994; Dafoe, 2011). However, it has been clear in recent history that, at the very least, it is highly unlikely that established democracies will go to war with each other. Transitional democracies may actually be more belligerent (Mansfield & Snyder, 2002), which would have a clear implication for Haiti, which is just beginning to transition. However, in the long run, the implications would be positive.

Implications for Policy Formation and Funding at the International Level

The key policy implication of this study is that those institutions interested in advancing democratic values can do so through investment in education. Development agencies have invested millions of dollars into projects designed to produce different viewpoints. This study demonstrates that providing people with the highly useful tool of education may have the same desired results. Though this may seem like an indirect approach to changing people's values, it has been demonstrated that gradual change through societal forces produce lasting implications for modernization. In particular, investment in higher education has the capacity to produce lasting value change.

Empirical Considerations and Limitations

There are several empirical considerations and limitations. In this section, I review some of them.

Self-reported level of education. With this we may have faced some social desirability bias. Participants could have wanted to appear highly educated, since education is an indicator of social status. So, it may have been more likely for people to overestimate the amount of education they have received. This may be particularly true of vocational school and university.

Survey and interview timing. The survey was fielded over the span of six months, with the vast majority of the surveys being executed in the second half of the fielding period. This was due to political instability and also difficulty training and retaining competent survey enumerators.

The qualitative interviews took place a year before the survey began fielding. In several ways, this was an advantage. First, doing the interviews allowed me to explore themes of interest and get better traction in what I was studying. Second, carrying out the interviews allowed me to identify which research team participants were strongest. Those individuals received additional training and were offered spots on the survey team. Lastly, it was beneficial to have the interviews and survey fielded at different times, since the trained research staff was limited throughout.

Generalizability. The results of the survey only represent findings from the Haitian context. Though they are indicative of developing world conditions, the results from this study may not represent the developing world as a whole. Most notably, Haiti is one of the poorest countries in the world. The educational infrastructure in Haiti is weaker than that in other countries that still qualify as the developing world.

Causal mechanism unclear. It is not clear what aspect of education actually causes changes in political perspectives. It could just be the process of becoming literate and being exposed to a general curriculum. It could be the process of identity formation as an "educated person." It could be the ideas themselves that are introduced in the classroom, with instructors as agents of political socialization.

Ultimately, the ambiguity makes the causal mechanism difficult to discern. However, it is clear that education plays a role. There was also ambiguity in the type of education students were exposed to. This study does not differentiate between the impact of general education and more narrowly focused types of education. Theoretically speaking, we would expect exposure to curriculum on civic values or democracy to have a stronger impact on political views than science or math curriculums. Being able to

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assess the effects would better expose which forms of education should be promoted by policy makers as mechanisms for positive policy outcomes.

Societal events. A potential limitation is that the 2010 earthquake may be a potentially confounding factor in the domestic-international views prioritization portion of the analysis. I expect that the rapid and massive influx of international aid workers may have made this group of research subjects more attuned to international politics. I was also be upfront about this potential source of bias and will make careful note of the fact that my analysis is couched in the post-earthquake context.

Election season. The study was fielded during the election season. This election season ended up being quite long, due to the postponement of the elections. For this reason, citizens were particularly engaged with political ideas during the time of the survey. This may introduce some element of bias, since respondents may seem more politically inclined than they would in a non-election time.

***Intellectual curiosity related bi*as**. Another potential source of bias is that more engaged students will be more likely to consent to the qualitative interviews and the survey questionnaire. Illiterate and less educated people may find the exercise of participating in research less interesting than those students who have actually studied the research process. Amongst those who have attended university, I believe the most dedicated students were more likely to participate in the research out of interest. This could lead to over-inclusion of students with higher educational engagement. This limitation poses some problems for the generalizability of the study, but shouldn't have any noticeable impact the analysis in this dissertation.

The Road Not Traveled: Survey Questionnaire Sampling Limitations

There was a considerable amount of trial and error prior to the decision of executing the well-established and heavily vetted World Values Survey. There are few researchers working in Haiti, and those that are often blaze their own trails. What I had originally planned had never been attempted before and turned out to be impossible without considerably more funding and manpower. However, in this brief write-up of these missteps, I hope to learn from these difficult experiences in the field.

The first major obstacle was incomplete information about the number and location of Haitian universities. Pre-earthquake estimates show that approximately 87% of Haitian universities are located within or close to Port-au-Prince. (INURED, 2010) Furthermore, INURED reports that the earthquake impacted an estimated 87% of higher education institutions, though their data draw very limited conclusions on the post-earthquake closure rates of Haitian colleges. (2010) Based on this information, there are some serious geographic uncertainties about the extent to which overconcentration of Haitian universities is still prevalent.

I planned on limiting my sample from the metropolitan Port-au-Prince area in the commune of Ouest. The primary theoretical justification for this is that the commune offers a wide range of geographic variation and extends into the countryside, so I would be able to get a mixture of students who live in downtown Port-au-Prince and who also live in less densely populated regions. Furthermore, I do not expect major differences in the process of views formation for students in other regions of Haiti. Lastly, many students actually move to the Ouest commune in order to gain access to higher education. Since universities are so scarce outside of the Ouest commune (as explained above), the

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students who do gain access to these universities are likely to be disproportionately rich or more academically credentialed than the average Haitian student.

As discussed before, the comparatively high attrition rate of Haitian students to American students also poses a challenge to attaining a representative sample. Haitian students leave university and take breaks during their educational careers for numerous financial and familial reasons.

My original sampling plan was to select a representative sample of Haitian universities and to visit their campuses with a research team. This approach would have allowed me to control for varying institutional affects and would produce a greater probability that the individuals included in their study were, in fact, active university students. To prepare for this sampling strategy, I began to compile a list of universities with the help of Haitian research assistants. This was done by merging data from various online sources and giving the Haitian RAs phone credit and internet access to contact the administration of each university. Since the most extensive list published to date (from the INURED report) included 159 institutions, it was possible to generate a preliminary list.

There were, however, some significant limitations that moved me to consider an alternate sampling strategy. First, approximately half of the university administrations we spoke with were unwilling (or perhaps unable) to divulge even the most basic information about their student body. In one notable case, the administrator accused the research assistant of trying to make money off of her institutional information and demanded a cut. In some cases, however, it seemed like poor record keeping may have resulted in universities simply not knowing the number of active students. The thesis-

based graduation system results in the vast majority of university students not actually completing their degrees. Therefore, universities have an incentive to avoid keeping accurate enrollment and attrition rates. Furthermore, since academic records sometimes are not fully digitized, it is possible that some universities simply do not know how many students they have.

There are two large potential sources of bias embedded in the initial sampling strategy. First, the schools that we're able to locate are most likely to be institutionally strongest and have an online presence. Second, schools that are willing to engage with the research team are most likely to have the strongest administrative structures and may be disproportionately of a higher quality.

Due to the extremely low response and cooperation rate associated with this initial effort, I abandoned this initial plan. As absurd as this may sound, it was more feasible to do a nationally representative large n study than it was to do a small-scale study with a random sample of university students. Not only was it easier, but also, I am confident that the quality of the data and strength of the findings are much better than they would have been if I had pursued my original plan. In short, it all worked out in the end.

Directions for Future Research

Directions for future research on education and shifting views. This research only begins to explore the effects of education on shifting views. More research is needed to confirm (or contradict) the findings of this study. Also, it would be useful to explore the nuances of how these effects come to be. Additional research could look at some of the potential causal mechanisms more closely.

Some fundamental things are needed with respect to research on education in Haiti. There is so little research on education in Haiti that almost any study would be a significant contribution to research in the field. First, as mentioned before, there is very little accurate information on the number of universities and the number of university students in Haiti. A census-style study, perhaps in collaboration with the Ministry of Education, would provide a base for sampling university students and doing studies on the differential effects of different types of universities.

One potential study could look at the impact of foreign-led versus Haitian-led educational institutions on views. In a study like this, I would hypothesize that students in foreign-led universities would be more likely to be open to international influence. They would be more likely to adopt the cultural attributes of those running their institutions. Thus, if the foreigners who are running a university institution are from a developed country (which is usually the case), then views associated with developed countries will be more likely to be transmitted through the university education. Further research could also engage more directly with university students by sampling from that population directly. This would have been very difficult to do in 2014 and 2015. However, through the gradual process of research capacity building, it would now be more feasible if a study were well-funded.

Possibilities for the Haiti World Values Survey. Now that the World Values Survey has been fielded once in Haiti, it would be ideal for it to be fielded in subsequent waves of the survey. This would allow for valuable comparisons between different time points in the Haitian case. With this data, it would be possible to track Haitian value

change over time. That being said, there are many useful things that can be done with the Haiti data that has already been collected.

First, an interesting finding of the Haiti World Values Survey has to do with environmental attitudes. When Haitians were asked to prioritize values that were important for society, the environment was almost always amongst the lowest ranked values. Understandably, issues related to poverty and political instability were prioritized. More work should be done to understand why environmental issues fall to the wayside and what can be done to advocate for the issues more fully.

Second, there is a study that I am currently working on in collaboration with co-authors related to homosexuality. This study explores an unexpected observation about the relationship between people's ages and their acceptance of homosexuality. The well-established trend is that younger age cohorts are more accepting of homosexuality. However, in Haiti this is not the case. The explanation we give is that the influx of missionaries in Haiti has changed younger people's views to be more Christian and less accepting of homosexuality.

Lastly, one major advantage of this data is that it was collected prior to the damage caused by hurricane Matthew in the south of the country. Though the south of the country is in recovery, many people have had their homes and livelihoods destroyed. If another wave of the World Values Survey is administered, it will be possible to compare pre- and post- hurricane Matthew values. In the south, I would plan to add some post-disaster assessment questions to produce a richer analysis.

This data has a lot of potential and this dissertation research is not the last thing that I will publish based from it. I look forward to advancing research on the effects of education and values and plan on encouraging colleagues to do the same.

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APPENDICES

2010 -2012 WORLD VALUES SURVEY (Haiti)

V1. Survey wave number: *the constant*, 6 (for Wave six).

V2. Country code: _____

V3. Interview number (write in 4-digit number identifying each respondent): ____

(Introduction by interviewer):
Hello. I am from a University of Michigan research team. We are carrying out a global study of what people value in life. This study will interview samples representing most of the world's people. Your household has been selected at random as part of a representative sample of the people in Haiti. I'd like to ask your views on a number of different subjects. Your input will be treated strictly confidential but it will contribute to a better understanding of what people all over the world believe and want out of life. Do you have any questions?

Show card A

For each of the following, indicate how important it is in your life. Would you say it is (*read out and code one answer for each where 1 is very important and 4 is not at all important*):

V4.   Family
V5.   Friends
V6.   Leisure time
V7.   Politics
V8.   Work
V9.   Religion

NOTE: Code but do not read out-- here and throughout the interview:
-1   Don't know
-2   No answer
-3 Not applicable

V10.   Taking all things together, would you say you are (*read out and code one answer*):
1   Very happy
2   Rather happy
3   Not very happy
4   Not at all happy

V11.   All in all, how would you describe your state of health these days? Would you say it is (*read out*):
1   Very good
2   Good
3   Fair
4   Poor

Show card B

```
Card B (V12-V22) Chwazi 5 ou mwens


                    Independence
                     Hard Work
              Feeling of responsibility
                    Imagination
       Tolerance and respect for other people
          Thrift, saving money and things
            Determination, perseverance
                  Religious faith
                   Unselfishness
                    Obedience
                  Self-expression
```

Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? Please choose up to five! (*Code five mentions at the maximum; mention = 1, not mentioned = 2*):

V12. Independence
V13. Hard work
V14. Feeling of responsibility
V15. Imagination
V16. Tolerance and respect for other people
V17. Thrift, saving money and things
V18. Determination, perseverance
V19. Religious faith
V20. Unselfishness
V21. Obedience
V22. Self-expression

(Show Card C)

Card C (V23)

Completely Dissatisfied — 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 — Completely Satisfied

V23.   All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? Using this card on which 1 means you are "completely dissatisfied" and 10 means you are "completely satisfied" where would you put your satisfaction with your life as a whole? (*Code one number*):

V24.   Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people? (*Code one answer*):
      1. Most people can be trusted.
      2. Need to be very careful.

Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary organizations. For each organization, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization? (*Read out and code one answer for each organization*):

		Active member	Inactive member	Don't belong
V25.	Church or religious organization	2	1	0
V26.	Sport or recreational organization	2	1	0
V27.	Art, music or educational organization	2	1	0
V28.	Labor Union	2	1	0
V29.	Political party	2	1	0
V30.	Environmental organization	2	1	0
V31.	Professional association	2	1	0
V32.	Humanitarian or charitable organization	2	1	0
V33.	Consumer organization	2	1	0
V34.	Self-help group, mutual aid group	2	1	0
V35.	Other organization	2	1	0

(*Show Card E*)

```
Card D and E (V36-V44)

                    Drug addicts
            People of a different race
             People who have AIDS
          Immigrants/ Foreign workers
                   Homosexuals
          People of a different religion
                   Heavy drinkers
        Unmarried couples living together
          People who speak a different
                     language
```

On this list are various groups of people. Could you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbors? (*Code an answer for each group, 1= mentioned; 2= not mentioned*):

V36.   Drug addicts
V37.   People of a different race
V38.   People who have AIDS
V39.   Immigrants/foreign workers
V40.   Homosexuals
V41.   People of a different religion
V42.   Heavy drinkers
V43.   Unmarried couples living together
V44.   People who speak a different language

Do you agree, disagree or neither agree nor disagree with the following statements? (*Read out and code one answer for each statement; 1 = agree; 2 = neither; 3 = disagree*):

V45.   When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.
V46.   When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to people of this country over immigrants.

V47.   If a woman earns more money than her husband, it's almost certain to cause problems
V48   Having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person.

For each of the following statements I read out, can you tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with each. Do you strongly agree (1), agree (2), disagree (2), or strongly disagree (4)? (*Read out and code one answer for each statement*):

V49.   One of my main goals in life has been to make my parents proud
V50.   When a mother works for pay, the children suffer.
V51.   On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do.
V52.   A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl.
V53.   On the whole, men make better business executives than women do.
V54   Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay

V55.   Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use this scale where 1 means "no choice at all" and 10 means "a great deal of choice" to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out (*code one number*):

(*Show Card F*)

Card F (V56)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

People would try to
take advantage of you

People would
try to be fair

V56.   Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair? Please show your response on this card, where 1 means that "people would try to take advantage of you," and 10 means that "people would try to be fair" (*code one number*):

 (*Show Card G*)

```
Card G (V57)

              Married
Living together as married
             Divorced
            Separated
             Widowed
              Single
```

V57. Are you currently (*read out and code one answer only*)
   1. Married
   2. Living together as married
   3. Divorced
   4. Separated
   5. Widowed
   6. Single

V58. Have you had any children? (*Code 0 if no, and respective number if yes*):

(Show Card H)

```
Card H (V59)

    |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
    1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10

   Completely              Completely
   dissatisfied             satisfied
```

V59. How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household? Please use this card again to help with your answer (*code one number where 1=completely dissatisfied and 10=completely satisfied*):

(*Show Card I*)

```
Card I (V60 & V61)

        -A high level of economic growth
       -Making sure this country has strong
                  defense forces
      -Seeing that people have more say about
        how things are done at their jobs and in
                  their communities
      -Trying to make our cities and countryside
                  more beautiful
```

V60.   People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. On this card are listed some of the goals which different people would give top priority. Would you please say which one of these you, yourself, consider the most important? (*Code one answer only under "first choice"*):

V61.   And which would be the next most important? (*Code one answer only under "second choice"*)

	V60 First choice	V61 Second choice
A high level of economic growth	1	1
Making sure this country has strong defense forces	2	2
Seeing that people have more say about how things are done at their jobs and in their communities	3	3
Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful	4	4

(*Show Card J*)

Card J (V62 & V63)

-Maintaining order in the nation
-Giving people more say in important
government decisions
-Fighting rising prices
-Protecting freedom of speech

V62.   If you had to choose, which one of the things on this card would you say is most important? (*Code one answer only under "first choice"*):

V63.   And which would be the next most important? (*Code one answer only under "second choice"*):

	V62 First choice	V63 Second choice
Maintaining order in the nation	1	1
Giving people more say in important government decisions	2	2
Fighting rising prices	3	3
Protecting freedom of speech	4	4

(*Show Card K*)

V64.   Here is another list. In your opinion, which one of these is most important? (*Code one answer only under "first choice"*):

V65.   And what would be the next most important? (*Code one answer only under "second choice"*):

	V64 First choice	V65 Second choice
A stable economy	1	1
Progress toward a less impersonal and more humane society	2	2
Progress toward a society in which Ideas count more than money	3	3
The fight against crime	4	4

V66.   Of course, we all hope that there will not be another war, but if it were to come to that, would you be willing to fight for your country? (*Code one answer*)
1. Yes
2. No

I'm going to read out a list of various changes in our way of life that might take place in the near future. Please tell me for each one, if it were to happen, whether you think it would be a good thing (1), a bad thing (3), or don't you mind (2)? (*Code one answer for each*):

V67.   Less importance placed on work in our lives
V68.   More emphasis on the development of technology

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V69.   Greater respect for authority

(*Show Card L*)

Card L (V71-V79)

V71. It is important to this person to be rich; to have a lot of money and expensive things.

V72. Living in secure surroundings is important to this person; to avoid anything that might be dangerous.

V73. It is important to this person to have a good time; to "spoil" oneself.

V74. It is important to this person to do something for the good of society.

V74B. It is important for this people to help the people nearby; to care for their well-being

V75. Being very successful is important to this person; to have people recognize one's achievements.

V76. Adventure and taking risks are important to this person; to have an exciting life.

V77. It is important to this person to always behave properly; to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong.

V78. Looking after the environment is important to this person; to care for nature and save life resources.

V79. Tradition is important to this person; to follow the customs handed down by one's religion or family.

Now I will briefly describe some people. Using this card, would you please indicate for each description whether that person is very much like you (1), like you (2), somewhat like you (3), not like you (4), or not at all like you (5)? (*Code one answer for each description*):

V70.   It is important to this person to think up new ideas and be creative; to do things one's own way.
V71.   It is important to this person to be rich; to have a lot of money and expensive things.
V72.   Living in secure surroundings is important to this person; to avoid anything that might be dangerous.
V73.   It is important to this person to have a good time; to "spoil" oneself.
V74.   It is important to this person to do something for the good of society.
V74B. It is important for this people to help the people nearby; to care for their well-being
V75.   Being very successful is important to this person; to have people recognize one's achievements.
V76.   Adventure and taking risks are important to this person; to have an exciting life.
V77.   It is important to this person to always behave properly; to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong.
V78.   Looking after the environment is important to this person; to care for nature and save life resources.
V79.   Tradition is important to this person; to follow the customs handed down by one's religion or family.

V80. I'm going to read out some problems. Please indicate which of the following problems you consider the most serious one for the world as a whole? (*Interviewer: read out alternatives and mark only ONE*)

1. People living in poverty and need
2. Discrimination against girls and women
3. Poor sanitation and infectious diseases
4. Inadequate education
5. Environmental pollution

V81.   Here are two statements people sometimes make when discussing the environment and economic growth. Which of them comes closer to your own point of view? (*Read out and code one answer*):
1. Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs.
2. Economic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority, even if the environment suffers to some extent.
3. Other answer (*code if volunteered only!*).

During the past two years have you…

V82. Given money to an ecological organization?
    1. Yes
    2. No

V83. Participated in a demonstration for some environmental cause?
    1. Yes
    2. No

V84.   How interested would you say you are in politics? Are you (*read out and code one answer*):
    1. Very interested
    2. Somewhat interested
    3. Not very interested
    4. Not at all interested

(*Show Card M*)

```
Card M (V85-V89)

          -Signing a petition
          -Joining in boycotts
  -Attending peaceful demonstrations
            -Joining strikes
       -Any other act of protest?
```

Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it (*read out and code one answer for each action; have done=1, might do = 2; would never do = 3*):

V85.   Signing a petition
V86.   Joining in boycotts
V87.   Attending peaceful demonstrations
V88.   Joining strikes
V89.   Any other act of protest?

INTERVIEWER: ASK V90 – V94 ONLY TO THOSE WHO SAID THEY "HAVE DONE" THE GIVEN ACTIVITY

Tell me for each of these activities how often you have done it in the last year! (*Read out and code one answer for each action*):

	Not at all	Once	Twice	Three times	More than three times
V90. Signing a petition	1	2	3	4	5
V91. Joining in boycotts	1	2	3	4	5
V92. Attending peaceful demonstrations	1	2	3	4	5
V93. Joining strikes	1	2	3	4	5
V94. Any other act of protest?	1	2	3	4	5

(*Show Card P*)

Card (N, O, ak) P V95

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Left   Right

V95.   In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking? (*Code one number*):

(*Show Card Q*)

Card Q (V96-V101)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between. (*Code one number for each issue*):

V96. Incomes should be made more equal; We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort

V97. Private ownership of business and industry should be increased; Government ownership of business and industry should be increased

V98. Government should take more responsibility to ensure everyone is provided for; People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves

V99.   Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas; Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people

V100. In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life; Hard work doesn't generally bring success—it's more a matter of luck and connections

V101. People can only get rich at the expense of others; Wealth can grow so there's enough for everyone

I 'd like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not very much or not at all? (*Read out and code one answer for each*):

	Trust completely	Trust somewhat	Do not trust very much	Do not trust at all
V102. Your family	1	2	3	4
V103. Your neighborhood	1	2	3	4
V104. People you know personally	1	2	3	4
V105. People you meet for the first time	1	2	3	4
V106. People of another religion	1	2	3	4
V107. People of another nationality	1	2	3	4

I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? (*Read out and code one answer for each*):

		A great deal	Quite a lot	Not very much	None at all
V108.	The churches	1	2	3	4
V109.	The armed forces	1	2	3	4
V110.	The press	1	2	3	4
V111.	Television	1	2	3	4
V112.	Labor unions	1	2	3	4
V113.	The police	1	2	3	4
V114.	The courts	1	2	3	4
V115.	The government (in Port-au-Prince)	1	2	3	4
V116.	Political parties	1	2	3	4
V117.	Parliament	1	2	3	4
V118.	The Civil service	1	2	3	4
V119.	Universities	1	2	3	4
V120.	Major Companies	1	2	3	4
V121.	Banks	1	2	3	4
V122.	Environmental organizations	1	2	3	4
V123.	Women's organizations	1	2	3	4
V124.	Charitable or humanitarian organizations	1	2	3	4
V125.	CARICOM	1	2	3	4
V126.	The United Nations	1	2	3	4

I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? (*Read out and code one answer for each*):

		Very good	Fairly good	Fairly bad	Very bad
V127.	Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections	1	2	3	4
V128.	Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country	1	2	3	4
V129.	Having the army rule	1	2	3	4
V130.	Having a democratic political system	1	2	3	4

(*Show Card T*)

Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor.
Religious authorities ultimately interpret the laws.
People choose their leaders in free elections.
People receive state aid for unemployment.
The army takes over when government is incompetent.
Civil rights protect people from state oppression.
The state makes people's incomes equal.
People obey their rulers.
Women have the same rights as men.

Many things are desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy. Use this scale where 1 means "not at all an essential characteristic of democracy" and 10 means it definitely is "an essential characteristic of democracy" (*read out and code one answer for each*):

	Not an essential characteristic of democracy							An essential characteristic of democracy		
V131 Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
V132 Religious authorities ultimately interpret the laws.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

V133 People choose their leaders in free elections.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
V134 People receive state aid for unemployment.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
V135 The army takes over when government is incompetent.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
V136 Civil rights protect people from state oppression.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
V137 The state makes people's incomes equal.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
V138 People obey their rulers.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
V139 Women have the same rights as men.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

(*Show Card U*)

Card U (V140)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Not important at all   Absolutely important

V140. How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is "not at all important" and 10 means "absolutely important" what position would you choose? (*Code one number*):

(*Show Card V*)

Card V (V141)

```
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10
```

Not at all   Completely
democratic   democratic

V141. And how democratically is this country being governed today? Again using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that it is "not at all democratic" and 10 means that it is "completely democratic," what position would you choose? (*Code one number*):

V142. How much respect is there for individual human rights nowadays in this country? Do you feel there is (*read out and code one answer*):

1	A great deal of respect for individual human rights
2	Fairly much respect
3	Not much respect
4	No respect at all

V143. Now let's turn to another topic. How often, if at all, do you think about the meaning and purpose of life? (*Read out and code one answer!*)

1	Often
2	Sometimes
3	Rarely
4	Never

V144. Do you belong to a religion or religious denomination? If yes, which one? (Code answer due to list below. Code 0, if respondent answers to have no denomination!)

No: do not belong to a denomination	0
Yes: Vodou	1
Vodou and Christian	2
Rasta	3
Roman Catholic	4
Protestant	5
Orthodox (Russian/Greek/etc.)	6
Jewish	7
Muslim	8
Hindu	9

Buddhist   1
                                            0

(*NOTE: If your own society does not fit into this coding system, please devise an alternative, following this as closely as possible; for example, in Islamic countries, ask about Sunni, Shia, etc. Send a list of the categories used here along with your data.*)

(*Show Card X*)

```
Card X (V145)

          1. More than once a week
              2. Once a week
              3. Once a month
         4. Only on special holy days
               5. Once a year
               6. Less often
          7. Never, practically never
```

V145. Apart from weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious services these days? (*Code one answer*):

1	More than once a week
2	Once a week
3	Once a month
4	Only on special holy days
5	Once a year
6	Less often
7	Never, practically never

(*Show Card X2)*

```
Card X2 (V146)
                1. Several times a day
                2. Once a day
            3. Several times each week
    4. Only when attending religious service
            5. Only on special holy days
                6. Once a year
                7. Less often
            8. Never, practically never
```

V146. Apart from weddings and funerals, about how often do you pray? (*Code one answer*):

1	Several times a day
2	Once a day
3	Several times each week
4	Only when attending religious services
5	Only on special holy days
6	Once a year
7	Less often
8	Never, practically never

V147. Independently of whether you attend religious services or not, would you say you are (*read out and code one answer*):

1	A religious person
2	Not a religious person
3	An atheist

V148. Do you believe in God?
1 Yes
2 No

V149. Do you believe in hell?

<blockquote>
1   Yes
2   No
</blockquote>

V150. With which one of the following statements do you agree most?
The basic meaning of religion is:
1   To follow religious norms and ceremonies
2   To do good to other people

V151. And with which of the following statements do you agree most?
The basic meaning of religion is:

1   To make sense of life after death
2   To make sense of life in this world

(*Show Card Y*)

Card Y (V152)

V152. How important is God in your life? Please use this scale to indicate. 10 means
"very important" and 1 means "not at all important." (*Code one number*):
Please tell us if you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the
following statements:

	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	DK
V153 Whenever science and religion conflict, *religion* is always right.	1	2	3	4	-1
V154 The only acceptable religion is my religion.	1	2	3	4	-1

| V155 All religions should be taught in our public schools. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | -1 |
| V156 People who belong to different religions are probably just as moral as those who belong to mine | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | -1 |

Now I'm going to ask you some questions about the position in society of people in different age groups.
(Show Card AB)

Card AB (V157-V159)

Extremely low position in society

Extremely high position in society

I'm interested in how you think most people in this country view the position in society of people in their 20s, people in their 40s and people over 60. Using this card, please tell me where most people would place the social position of …**READ OUT**

V157 … people in their 20's?
V158 … people in their 40's?
V159 … people over 60?

I see myself as someone who…	Disagree strongly	Disagree a little	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree a little	Agree Strongly	Don´t know
V160A …is reserved	1	2	3	4	5	9

V160B …is generally trusting	1	2	3	4	5	9
V160C …tends to be lazy	1	2	3	4	5	9
V160D …is relaxed, handles stress well	1	2	3	4	5	9
V160E …has few artistic interests	1	2	3	4	5	9
V160F …is outgoing, sociable	1	2	3	4	5	9
V160G …tends to find fault with others	1	2	3	4	5	9
V160H …does a thorough job	1	2	3	4	5	9
V160I …gets nervous easily	1	2	3	4	5	9
V160J …has an active imagination	1	2	3	4	5	9

(Show Card AC)

Card AC (V160)

```
 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10
```

Completely
unacceptable

Completely
acceptable

V160.   Please tell me how acceptable or unacceptable you think most people in Haiti would find it if a   suitably qualified 30 year old was appointed as their boss?

Use this card where 0 means they would find it completely unacceptable and 10 means completely acceptable.

(Show Card AD)

Card AD (V161-V163)


```
 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10
```

Not at all likely to be viewed that way

Very likely to be viewed that way

Now think about those aged over 60. Using the same card please tell me how likely it is that most people in Haiti view those over 60...**READ OUT…**

V161 … as friendly?
V162 … as competent?
V163… with respect?

(Show Card AE)

Card AE (V164)


```
  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10
```

Completely
unacceptable

Completely
acceptable

V 164. Please tell me how acceptable or unacceptable you think most people in Haiti
would find it if a suitably qualified 60 year old was appointed as their boss?
Use this card where 0 means they would find it completely unacceptable and 10 means
completely acceptable. DK = -1

Now could you tell me whether you agree, agree strongly, disagree or disagree strongly
with each of the following statements?

	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
V165. Older people are not respected much these days	1	2	3	4
V166. Older people get more than their fair share from the government	1	2	3	4
V167. Older people are a burden on society.	1	2	3	4

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| V168. Companies that employ young people perform better than those that employ people of different ages. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| V169. Old people have too much political influence. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

V170. Could you tell me how secure do you feel these days in your neighborhood ?

Very secure	1
Quite secure	2
Not very secure	3
Not at all secure	4
DK/NA	-1

How frequently do the following things occur in your neighborhood?

	Very frequently	Quite frequently	Not frequently	Not at all frequently	DK/ NA
V171. Robberies	1	2	3	4	-1
V172. Alcohol consumptio n in the streets	1	2	3	4	-1
V173. Police or military interfere with	1	2	3	4	-1

people's private life					
V174. Racist behavior	1	2	3	4	-1
V175. Drug sale in streets	1	2	3	4	-1

Which of the following things have you done for reasons of security? **(MULTIPLE RESPONSE)**

	Yes	No
V176. Didn't carry much money	1	2
V177. Preferred not to go out at night	1	2
V178. Carried a knife, gun or other weapon	1	2

V179. Have you been the victim of a crime during the past year?
V180. And what about your immediate family--has someone in your family been the victim of a crime during the last year ?

	V179. Respondent	V180. Family
Yes	1	1
No	2	2
DK/NA	-1	-1

To what degree are you worried about the following situations?

	Very much	A good deal	Not much	Not at all	DK/ NA
V181. Losing my job or not finding a job	1	2	3	4	-1
V182. Not being able to give my children a good education	1	2	3	4	-1
V183. A war involving my country	1	2	3	4	-1

V184. A terrorist attack	1	2	3	4	-1
V185. A civil war	1	2	3	4	-1
V186. Government wire-tapping or reading my mail or email	1	2	3	4	-1

V187.   Do you agree or disagree with the following statement:
"Under some conditions, war is necessary to obtain justice."
Agree
Disagree

In the last 12 month, how often have you or your family

	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	DK/NA
V188. Gone without enough food to eat	1	2	3	4	-1
V189. Felt unsafe from crime in your home	1	2	3	4	-1
V190. Gone without medicine or medical treatment that you needed	1	2	3	4	-1
V191. Gone without a cash income	1	2	3	4	-1

Now, I would like to read some statements and ask how much you agree or disagree with each of these statements. For these questions, a 1 means that you "completely disagree" and a 10 means that you "completely agree." (*Code one number for each statement*):

V192. Science and technology are making our lives healthier, easier, and more comfortable.

V193. Because of science and technology, there will be more opportunities for the next generation.

V194. We depend too much on science and not enough on faith.

V195. One of the bad effects of science is that it breaks down people's ideas of right and wrong.

V196. It is not important for me to know about science in my daily life.

V 197. All things considered, would you say that the world is better off, or worse off, because of science and technology? Please tell me which comes closest to your view on this scale: 1 means that "the world is a lot worse off," and 10 means that "the world is a lot better off." (*Code one number*):

(*Show Card AA*)

Card AE(A)/AA V198-V210

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Never Justified   Always Justified

230

Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card. (*Read out and code one answer for each statement*):

V198. Claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled
V199. Avoiding a fare on public transport
V200. Stealing property
V201. Cheating on taxes if you have a chance
V202. Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties
V203. Homosexuality
V203A. Prostitution
V204. Abortion
V205. Divorce
V206. Sex before marriage
V207. Suicide
V207A. Euthanasia
V208. For a man to beat his wife
V209. Parents beating children
V210. Violence against other people

V211. How proud are you to be Haitian? (*Read out and code one answer*):
1   Very proud
2   Quite proud
3   Not very proud
4   Not at all proud
5   I am not Haitian (*do not read out! Code only if volunteered!*)

(*Show Card AF*)

Card AF V212-V216

Strongly agree   Agree   Disagree   Strongly disagree

People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world. Using this card, would you tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about how you see yourself? (*Read out and code one answer for each statement*):

V212. I see myself as a world citizen.
V213. I see myself as part of my local community.
V214. I see myself as part of the Haitian nation.
V215. I see myself as part of the CARICOM
V216. I see myself as an autonomous individual.

People learn what is going on in this country and the world from various sources. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you use it to obtain information daily, weekly, monthly, less than monthly or never (*read out and code one answer for each*):

	Daily	Weekly	Monthly	Less than monthly	Never
V217. Daily newspaper	1	2	3	4	5
V218. Printed magazines	1	2	3	4	5
V219. TV news	1	2	3	4	5
V220. Radio news	1	2	3	4	5
V221. Mobile phone	1	2	3	4	5
V222. Email	1	2	3	4	5
V223. Internet	1	2	3	4	5
V224. Talk with friends or colleagues	1	2	3	4	5

V225. How often, if ever, do you use a personal computer? (*Read out and code one answer*):
1 Never
2 Occasionally
3 Frequently
4 Don't know what a computer is (*do not read out, code only if volunteered!*)

When elections take place, do you vote always, usually or never? Please tell me separately for each of the following levels (*Read out and code one answer for each item*):	Always	Usually	Never
V226. Local level	1	2	3

232

V227. National level   1   2   3

(SHOW CARD AI)

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┌────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  Card AI (V228)                                 │
│                                                 │
│  Inité                                          │
│                                                 │
│  Altenativ                                      │
│                                                 │
│  Ansanm Nou Fò                                  │
│                                                 │
│  Fanmi Lavalas                                  │
│                                                 │
│  Lòt_____                             │
│                                                 │
└────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

V228. If there were a national election tomorrow, for which party on this list would you vote? Just call out the number on this card. If DON'T KNOW: Which party appeals to you most?
1. No right to vote
2. I would not vote
3. I would cast a blank ballot; White vote
4. Bald Headed Party (Jovenel Moïse)
5. Alternative League for Haitian Progress and Empowerment (Jude Célestin)
6. Platform of the Son of Dessalines (Jean-Charles Moïse)
7. Lavalas Family (Maryse Narcisse)
8. Socialist Action Movement (Eric Jean Baptiste)
9. Love Haiti (Jean Henry Céant)
10. Struggling People's Organization (Sauveur Pierre Étienne)
11. Conviction (Irvenson Steven Benoit)
12. Réseau Bouclier National (Steeve Khawly)
13. Another Political Party

In your view, how often do the following things occur in this country's elections?

	Very often	Fairly often	Not often	Not at all often	DK/ NA

V228A.Votes are counted fairly	1	2	3	4	-1
V228B. Opposition candidates are prevented from running	1	2	3	4	-1
V228C. TV news favors the governing party	1	2	3	4	-1
V228D. Voters are bribed	1	2	3	4	-1
V228E. Journalists provide fair coverage of elections	1	2	3	4	-1
V228F. Election officials are fair	1	2	3	4	-1
V228G. Rich people buy elections	1	2	3	4	-1
V228H. Voters are threatened with violence at the polls	1	2	3	4	-1
V228I. Voters are offered a genuine choice in the elections	1	2	3	4	-1

V228 J Some people think that having honest elections makes a lot of difference in their lives; other people think that it doesn't matter much.

Do you think that honest elections play an important role in deciding whether you and your family are able to make a good living? (IF NO code as 4)
IF YES: How important would you say this is—very important, fairly important, not very important or not at all important?

Very important
Rather important
Not very important
Not at all important

V 228 K Do you think that honest elections are an important factor in whether or not this country develops economically? (IF NO code as 4)
IF YES: How important would you say this is—very important, fairly important, not very important or not at all important?

Very important
Rather important
Not very important
Not at all important

V229. Are you employed now or not? If yes, about how many hours a week? If more than one job: only for the main job (*code one answer*):

Yes, has paid employment:	
Full time employee (30 hours a week or more)	1
Part time employee (less than 30 hours a week)	2
Self employed	3
No, no paid employment:	
Retired/pensioned	4
Housewife not otherwise employed	5
Student	6
Unemployed	7
Other (*write in*):_____	8

V230. Are you working for the government or public institution, for private business or industry, or for a private non-profit organization? If you do not work currently, characterize your major work in the past! Do you or did you work for (*read out and code one answer*):

|	
1	Government or public institution
2	Private business or industry
3	Private non-profit organization

V231. Are the tasks you do at work mostly manual or mostly intellectual? If you do not work currently, characterize your major work in the past. Use this scale where 1 means "mostly manual tasks" and 10 means "mostly intellectual tasks" (*code one answer*):

V232. Are the tasks you perform at work mostly routine tasks or mostly creative tasks? If you do not work currently, characterize your major work in the past. Use this scale where 1 means "mostly routine tasks" and 10 means "mostly creative tasks" (*code one answer*):

V233. How much independence do you have in performing your tasks at work? If you do not work currently, characterize your major work in the past. Use this scale to indicate your degree of independence where 1 means "no independence at all" and 10 means "complete independence" (*code one answer*):

V234. Do you or did you supervise other people at work? (*Code one answer*):
1   Yes
2   No

V235. Are you the chief wage earner in your household? (*Code one answer*):
1   Yes
2   No

V236. Is the chief wage earner of your household employed now or not? (*Code one answer*):
1   Yes
2   No

V237. During the past year, did your family (*read out and code one answer*):
1   Save money
2   Just get by
3   Spent some savings
4   Spent savings and borrowed money

V238. People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the (*read out and code one answer*):
1   Upper class
2   Upper middle class
3   Lower middle class
4   Working class
5   Lower class

(*Show Card AE*)

```
Card A J (V239)



  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10


   Lowest                          Highest
   group                           group
```

V239. On this card is an income scale on which 1 indicates the lowest income group and 10 the highest income group in your country. We would like to know in what group your household is. Please, specify the appropriate number, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in. (*Code one number*):

DEMOGRAPHICS

V240. (*Code respondent's sex by observation*):
1   Male
2   Female

V241. [Not asked]

V242. This means you are ____ years old (*write in age in two digits*).

Are your mother and father immigrants to this country or not? Please, indicate separately for each of them (*read out and code one answer for each*):

	Immigrant	Not an immigrant
V243. Mother	1	2
V244.	1	2

Father

V245. Were you born in this country or are you an immigrant ?
                              1   I am born in this country.
                              2   I am an immigrant to this country.

V246. Are you a citizen of this country?
1   Yes, I am a citizen of this country.
2   Not, I am not a citizen of this country.

V247. What language do you normally speak at home? (*Code one answer!*
1   English
2   Creole
3   French
4   Spanish
5   German
[*NOTE: modify the list of languages to fit your own society. Optional if only one language is spoken!*]

V248. What is the highest educational level that you have attained? [*NOTE: if respondent indicates to be a student, code highest level s/he expects to complete*]:
1   No formal education
2   Incomplete primary school
3   Complete primary school
4   Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type
5   Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type
6   Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type
7   Complete secondary: university-preparatory type
8   Some university-level education, without degree
9   University-level education, with degree

V249. [Not asked]

V250. Do you live with your parents? (*Code one answer*):
1   Yes
2   No

OBSERVATIONS BY THE INTERVIEWER

V251. Respondent's Interest (*Code how interested the respondent was during the interview*):
1   Respondent was very interested.
2   Respondent was somewhat interested.
3   Respondent was not interested.

V252. Interview Privacy (*Code whether the interview took place in privacy or not*):
1   There were no other people around who could follow the interview.

2   There were are other people around who could follow the interview.

V253. (*Code size of town*):
1   Under 2,000
2   2,000 - 5,000
3   5 - 10,000
4   10 - 20,000
5   20 - 50,000
6   50 - 100,000
7   100 - 500,000
8   500,000 and more

V254. (*Code ethnic group by observation, modify for your own society*):
1   Black
2   White Haitian
3   Mulatto
4   Asian
5   Other (*write in*): _____

V 255.   Was the respondent literate or illiterate?
1   Literate
2   Illiterate

V256 (*Code region where the interview was conducted*):
1   Atibonit
2   Sant
3   Grand'Anse
4   Nippes
5   Nò
6   Nò- Ès
7   Nò- Lwès
8   Lwès
9   Sid
10   Sid- Ès

V257. (*Code language in which interview was conducted*):
1   Creole
2   French
3   English
4   Spanish

V258. Weight variable (*Provide a 4-digit weight variable to correct your sample to reflect national distributions of key variables. If no weighting is necessary, simply code each case as "1." It is especially important to correct for education. For example, if your sample contains 10 percent more university-educated respondents as there are in the adult population, members of this group should be downweighted by 10 percent, giving them a weight of .90*).

APPENDIX B: FIELDING DESCRIPTION FORM

WORLD
VALUES
SURVEY
2010

Methodological questionnaire

PLEASE WRITE IN THE NAME OF YOUR COUNTRY:	Hait i

Section 1: the questionnaire

1.Was the WVS questionnaire translated or adapted in any way from the English master questionnaire?

Yes ✔ ⟶ **ANSWER Q2**

No ☐ ⟶ **GO TO Q3**

IF QUESTIONNAIRE TRANSLATED/ADAPTED

2a. Who carried out the translation of the questionnaire?

A specialist translator ☐

A member of the research team ✔

Other (PLEASE WRITE DETAILS BELOW) ☐

_____

_____

b. Was the translated questionnaire then back-translated into English?

Yes ✔

No ☐

c. Was the translated questionnaire pre-tested?

Yes ✔ ⟶ **ANSWER d**

No ☐ ⟶ **GO TO e**

d. **IF'YES'**
How was the questionnaire pre-tested? How many pre-tests were carried out?
PLEASE WRITE IN:

We field tested 210 surveys with people in the metropolitan Port-au-Prince area.The GPS coordinates were randomly selected and enumerators practiced selecting the nth household and choosing an appropriate respondent (according to birthday). None of the pre-testing data was included in the final data. The questionnaire was modified after the pre-tests as several of the translations were difficult for people to understand, since they were worded in an overly complex way.

e. Were there any questions or concepts that caused particular problems when being translated into your language?

Yes ✔ ⟶ **ANSWER f**

No ☐ ⟶ **GO TO Q3**

IF 'YES'
f. Which questions or concepts caused particular problems?
PLEASE WRITE IN:

V73- the idea of "spoiling" ones self isn't understood by most Haitians
V199- the concept of avoiding public transport fare didn't translate well
V207A- most people are not aware of the concept of euthanasia

2

g. How were these problems solved?
   PLEASE WRITE IN:

   V73- we translated the concept as "buy things that you don't really need", which made sense to people
   V199- this problem was never fully resolved. We do not trust the results of this question and would be open to removing it from the dataset if the WVS leadership thinks we should.
   V207A- we translated it as "help someone kill themselves because they have a grave illness that will cause death by itself"

EVERYONE PLEASE ANSWER

3. Did you use other questionnaires to make the WVS questionnaire

   the German questionnaire ☐

   the French questionnaire ☐

   Other (PLEASE WRITE IN BELOW) ☑

   We used the French questionnaire to aid in translation, but the entire questionnaire was translated into creole.

   _____

4. Have any optional WVS questions and/or items been included?

   No ☑

   Yes (PLEASE WRITE IN QUESTION AND/OR ITEMNUMBERS BELOW) ☐

   I'm wasn't clear which items were optional and not-optional on the English version of the survey, so we just included everything

   on the English version (except for two questions that were inadvertently left out when programing the survey).

5. Were country-specific questions, and/or items i. e. neither compulsery nor optional WVS questions, or questions included in the survey?

   No country-specific questions included ☑ ⟶ **GO TO Q7**

   Country-specific questions were included ☐ ⟶ **ANSWER Q6**

IF THERE WERE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC QUESTIONS

6. Were country specific questions included at the end of the questionnaire, just before the demographics?

   Yes ☐ ⟶ **GO TO Q7**

   No ☑ ⟶ **GO TO Q6a**

3

6a Please indicate the location of the country-specific questions which were not at the end of the questionnaire
WRITE IN BELOW
No additional questions were included. However, at the end of the dataset, you will note that variables are included that reflect administrative district level variables. This includes population density of the third level administrative district, total population, urban vs. rural population, as well as longitude and latitude shape file data relative to the administrative district in which the respondent was sampled.

EVERYONE PLEASE ANSWER

7. Were all questions asked in the prescribed order?

Yes ☐

No ☑

8. Were all <u>core</u> WVS questions included in your questionnaire (by core we mean all items except those that were optional)?

No - some question(s) from WVS questionnaire **not** included ☐   ⟶   **ANSWER Q9**

No - some demographic question(s) **not** included ☑   ⟶   **ANSWER Q9**

Yes - all questions <u>included</u> ☐   ⟶   **SECTION 2**

IF ANY CORE WVS QUESTIONS WERE <u>NOT</u> INCLUDED

9. Please write in details of the items and the reasons why they were not included.

WVS question number or description of question:
V241: Can you tell me your year of birth please?
V249: At what age did you (or will you) complete your full time education, either at school or at an institution of higher education?

Reason(s) not included:

The exclusion of these questions was completely accidental. We wanted to ask these two questions either at the beginning of the survey or at the end, so that they were not right next to the other questions that asked for the same information. That way, we could use them to check for fraud more effectively. Unfortunately, the were accidentally left out of the survey program during the final edit. When we discovered the issue, it was too late to fix the problem because fielding was already well underway.

We used alternate strategies to monitor for fraud, to compensate for the accidental exclusion of the questions. First, we recorded the GPS coordinates of enumerators and checked to see if they were doing the surveys in the place where they were supposed to be. Second, we recorded the amount of time spent on each questions and on the entire survey to make sure that enumerators were not finishing suspiciously fast. Third, we periodically checked the data for internal coherence. Lastly, we sent the field supervisor into the field frequently to check on the enumerators.

4

Section 2: Sampling

10. Was your sample designed to be representative of the <u>entire</u> adult population, i. e. 18 years and older, of your country?

Yes ☑ ⟶ GO TO Q12

No ☐ ⟶ ANSWER Q11

IF NOT DESIGNED TO BE REPRESENTATIVE

11. Which groups were excluded from, under-represented or over-represented in your sample design?

Excluded (PLEASE SPECIFY):

Over-represented: (PLEASE SPECIFY):

Under-represented (PLEASE SPECIFY):

EVERYONE PLEASE ANSWER

12. What was the <u>lower</u> age cut-off for your sample?

Yes – please write in cut-off 18

No cut-off ☐

13. Was there any <u>upper</u> age cut-off for your sample?

Yes – please write in cut-off ☐

No cut-off ☑

14. What were the different stages in your sampling procedure?
    PLEASE WRITE IN:

1. Haiti has 572 administrative districts. According to the original plan, fifty will be randomly selected using PPS methods with the probability based on the population of the administrative district as reported by the national statistics institute in 2012. We decided to collect more data than was originally planned, and thus 72 sites were included.

2. A random GPS coordinate in the administrative district will be generated using an excel spreadsheet. This was a the cluster. Each cluster was supposed to have 28 observations. 20 of the clusters had an ineligable site and thus had 27 observations instead of 28.

3. Every nth house due north was visited and invited to participate until reaching minimum number of households based on the population of the administrative district. The interval was randomly selected from a small set of numbers (ie. Between 3 and 7). Selected households were visited up to four times before the house is labeled a no responder.

18. Were there <u>any</u> quota-controls on the type of individual selected to take part in the survey (for example, age or sex controls)?

Yes ☐ ⟶ **ANSWER Q19**

No ☑ ⟶ **GO TO Q20**

IF QUOTA CONTROLS

19. In what way were quota controls used?
PLEASE WRITE IN:

EVERYONE PLEASE ANSWER

20. Was substitution permitted at any stage of your selection process or during fieldwork?

Yes ☑ ⟶ **ANSWER Q21**

No ☐ ⟶ **GO TO Q22**

IF 'YES'

21. In what way was substitution permitted?
PLEASE WRITE IN:

If the randomly selected GPS point on the list was impassible, the next one on the list was selected.

EVERYONE PLEASE ANSWER

22. Did you use any stratification factors when drawing your sample?

Yes ☐ ⟶ **ANSWER Q23**

No ☑ ⟶ **GO TO Q24**

IF STRATIFICATION FACTORS USED

23. What stratification factors were used, and at what stage(s) of selection?
PLEASE WRITE IN:

7

24. All in all, what are the known limitations of your <u>realized</u> sample?

For example: non-response rate; is there differential coverage of particular groups, either because of sample design or response differences?

% response or % non-response: PLEASE WRITE IN:
A key limitation was that the time when we fielded during election season. A group that had a lower response rate were fishermen who lived in coastal villages. There were 112 cases where there were only children home for all four attempts at the survey. Approximately 3/4 of those 112 cases occurred in the households of fishermen.

I report below that 0 addresses were established as empty, demolished or containing no private dwellings. In the rare cases where this occurred, the next nth dwelling was selected. Unfortunately, these cases were not tracked.

I report below that 19 people were "too sick/incapacitated to participate" - of those people, 8 were cognitively impaired due to old age and 11 either had cognitive disabilities or were mute.

The 20 partially productive interviews were not included in the final data set because the respondents exited the survey very early.

The % response rate was 87.39% (1996 or 2284)
The % non-response rate was 12.6% (288)

---

25. Please fill in the following details about your sample. If some categories do not apply, please complete to the highest level of detail possible and use the 'other' box to give more information.

Total number of <u>starting</u> names/addresses	2284
- addresses which could not be traced at all	0
- addresses established as empty, demolished or containing no private dwellings	unknown
- selected respondent too sick/incapacitated to participate	19
- selected respondent away during survey period	53
- selected respondent had inadequate understanding of language of survey	0
- no contact at selected address	112
- no contact with selected person	0
- refusal at selected address	30
- proxy refusal (on behalf of selected respondent)	0
- personal refusal by selected respondent	74
- other type of unproductive (please write in full details in the box below)	0
- full productive interview	1996
- partial productive interview	20

IF 'OTHER' CATEGORY USED

26. Please specify

9

Section 3: Fieldwork

27. If interviews were not face-to-face, please specify the way of interviewing:

All interviews were face-to-face.

28. The next group of questions are about interviewers.
   If no interviewers were used at any point in the WVS survey, please go to Q32.

IF INTERVIEWERS USED

a. Were interviewers paid according to performance (for example,
   according to the number of interviews they obtained)?

   Yes ☑

   No ☐

b. Which, if any, of these rules governed how an interviewer
   approached an address/household?
   PLEASE TICK THOSE THAT APPLY

   Calls must be made at different times of day ☑

   Calls must be made on different days of week ☐

   Neither of the above ☐

c. Were interviewers <u>required</u> to make a certain number of re-calls before they stopped approaching an
   address or household?

   Minimum number of re-calls required - please write in number ☐ 3

   No minimum re-call requirement ☐

d. Were any interviews supervised?

   Yes - please write in approximate proportion ☐ 10   %

   No ☐

e. Were any interviews back-checked?

   Yes - please write in approximate proportion ☐   %

   No ☑

10

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EVERYONE PLEASE ANSWER

29. Please write in the approximate start and end dates of fieldwork.

	D D M M Y Y
Start date	12/11/2015
End date	22/03/2016

30. Please write in the name of the institute which has done the fieldwork.

Primary Investigators came from University of Michigan and the State University of New York. Enumerators came from Enstiti Travay Sosyal ak Syans Sosyal (The Institute for Social Work and Social Science).

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Section 4: Data

31. Were any measures of coding reliability employed?

Yes ☐ ⟶ **ANSWER Q31a**

No ☑

31a. Which one? Please specify

32. Were the data from the questionnaire keyed subsequent to the interview (that is, non-CAPI surveys)?

Yes ☐ ⟶ **ANSWER Q33**

No ☑ ⟶ **GO TO Q34**

IF DATA KEYED

33. Was keying verified?

Yes - please write in approximate level of verification ☐☐ %

No ☐

EVERYONE PLEASE ANSWER

34. Were any reliability checks made on derived variables?

Yes ☑

No ☐

35. Were data checked/edited to ensure that filter instructions were followed correctly?

Yes ☑

No ☐

36. Were data checked/edited for logic or consistency?

Yes ☑

No ☐

37. Were data checked/edited to ensure they fell within permitted coding ranges?

Yes ☑

No ☐

38. Have you answered 'yes' on any or all of questions 32 to 34 above?

Yes ☑ ⟶ **ANSWER Q39**

No ☐ ⟶ **GO TO Q40**

12

IF DATA CHECKED/EDITED

39. Were errors corrected individually or automatically (through, for example, a 'forced' edit)?

Yes - individual correction ☑

Yes - automatic correction ☐

No - not corrected ☐

EVERYONE PLEASE ANSWER

40. Did you add a weight variable?

Yes ☑ ⟶ **ANSWER Q.41**

No ☐ ⟶ **SECTION 5**

IF WEIGHT VARIABLE ADDED

41. Please describe the weighting or post-stratification strategy used.

PPS sampling weights were included. No other sampling weights have been done.

13

Section 5: Characteristics of National Population

45.   Each WVS member is asked to provide information on known characteristics of its national population, from census or the best available estimates from government surveys or other high-quality data-sources:

- sex distribution of the population
- age distribution of the population
- education (years of schooling) of the population
- other characteristics (PLEASE SPECIFY)

Please specify also the sources which have been used. Please note that the number of characteristics is what is minimal required. You can add as many characteritics as you like, but do not forget to specify them.

In the table below please present the information from census or from other government surveys or other high-quality data (column SOURCE 1) and the proportions obtained in your data, before and after weighting

	Source: Institut Haitien de Statistique et d'Informatique (Gender), CIA factbook (age)	Unweighted data	Weighted data
Gender			
Female	% 50.5	%	
Male	% 49.5	%	
Age Groups			
0-14	% 33.39	%	
15-24	% 21.35	%	
25-54	% 36.24	%	
55-64	% 4.94	%	
65 and older	% 4.09	%	
	%	%	
	%	%	
	%	%	
	%	%	
Years/Schooling Groups	No reliable information available		
	%	%	
	%	%	
	%	%	
	%	%	
	%	%	
	%	%	
	%	%	
	%	%	
	%	%	
	%	%	
	%	%	
Other characteristics Please specify			
	%	%	
	%	%	
	%	%	
	%	%	

THANK YOU VERY MUCH !

PLEASE RETURN THE QUESTIONNAIRE TO JAIME DIEZ MEDRANO jdiezmed@jdsurvey.net

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