Gibson, James E.

A study of peasant uprisings in the Tokugawa Era; their causes types and effects.

Masters Thesis. Jan. 1948

RULES COVERING USE OF MANUSCRIPT THESES
IN THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LIBRARY
AND THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OFFICE

Manuscript copies of theses submitted for the doctor's degree and deposited in The University of Michigan Library and in the Office of the Graduate School are open for inspection, but are to be used only with due regard to the rights of the authors. For this reason it is necessary to require that a manuscript thesis be read within the Library or the Office of the Graduate School. If the thesis is borrowed by another library, the same rules should be observed by it. Bibliographical references may be noted, but passages may be copied only with the permission of the authors, and proper credit must be given in subsequent written or published work. Extensive copying or publication of the thesis in whole or in part must have the consent of the author as well as of the Dean of the Graduate School.

This thesis by .....
has been used by the following persons, whose signatures attest their acceptance of the above restrictions.

A Library which borrows this thesis for use by its readers is expected to secure the signature of each user.

NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE

PRESENTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE DEGREE:

MASTER OF ARTS

James E. Gibson
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, Michigan
September 20, 1948

A Study of Peasant Uprisings in the Tokugawa Era: Their Causes, Types, and Effects

In my first brief encounter with Japanese history and the subsequent effort to categorize the story of Japan into convenient niches in my mind, I was impressed with the Tokugawa Era. Here was a separate and unique phase, almost discontiguous from the body of Japanese history. Here, in a one hundred and fifty year span, was a picture of history done in still photography. Here, no progress or motivation for change; civilization frozen in its tracks by a static social order dedicated to stagnation. Here, a whole nation, drugged by feudalism, waited in Rip van Winkle fashion to be stirred to action by the march of western technology. Here, we find a halcyon epoch unequalled in space of time by any nation on earth. Initially, this impression of Japan left my imagination quite content, then questions began to arise that hastened me back to the story so as to inquire into the ridiculous paradox of social serenity on the one hand and feudalism on the other. A broad knowledge of European feudalism had impressed me that it was a singularly unsavory institution, entirely incomparible with human contentment; and if Japanese feudalism was in any manner similar

to its European prototype, then my assumption of a peaceful Japan within a hermetically sealed feudal social order must surely be incorrect.

I had only to scratch the surface of the subject to realize the misconception. All was not serene and calm within Japan. The social order was in a state of ferment, the nature of which foretold its eventual downfall, and if the term peace--the absence of actual foreign war--must be applied, it was indeed a furious peace. For the regime had characteristics within itself that led to its inevitable collapse. The particular characteristic the writer wishes to discuss is the peasant unrest and disaffection with the social order. This unrest added impetus to the breakdown, materially changed the course of political events in Japan, and was one element in making her political isolation of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries finally come to its end.

This point concerning the degree of importance the peasant uprisings had on the ultimate dissolution of the Shogunate should be discussed for there exists among Japanese scholars on the subject a divergence of opinion concerning the fundamental characteristics of them. Takeo Ono is of the opinion

that the insurrections of the Tokugawa Era, and especially those toward the end, were the vanguard of the fighting which finally brought about the overthrow of the Bakufu.[1.] Kokusho Iwao disavows this emphatically by saying that although they stimulated the downfall of feudalistic society, their motive was not to transform society.[2.] I maintain that at the very outset the Bakufu political structure contained elements that predetermined its final dissolution. The uprisings were the inevitable result of the evolution of the social system as founded by the Tokugawas. These were not conscious revolutionary movements, but a continual protest against economic distress. There was no concern by the peasant for the downfall of the Bakufu Government, just a concern about the immediate prospects of starvation if the situation was not hastily remedied. True, the whole movement did in some fashion undermine the government, but it is stretching the point to postulate any political consciousness on the part of the peasant.

First, we must understand the overall nature of the feudal regime of the Tokugawa before

a satisfactory understanding of the problem of peasant uprisings can be attained. With some conception of the political organization, the methods and amounts of taxation, the village with its peculiar form of government, and the position of the farmers in feudal society after 1600, it will be possible to study the uprisings in their relation to that society. The body of the paper will deal with various types and causes of the peasant uprisings. Some uprisings were mere appeals, others were concentrations of thousands of peasants determined to have their grievances rectified; preferring death by violence to death by starvation. We will find the causes to be economic, political, and administrative, all closely connected with the unseen currents of change that permeated feudal society.

Tokugawa feudalism dates from the early seventeenth century when Tokugawa Iyeyasu established the hegemony of his family over a large part of Japan. Thus was inaugurated a dual system of government with a rigid social hierarchy that maintained itself by a skillful system of checks and balances; by the geographical distribution of hereditary vassals among the outside lords; and by the sankin kotai (參勤交代) or hostage system, which required that all daimyo

reside alternately in their domains and in Edo, leaving their wives and children behind them in Edo when they returned to their own fiefs.[3] In this stratified society, the warrior was at first supreme, but with the introduction of firearms and the penetration of money economy into society, his position was overthrown. This re-shuffling of the social classes was a step that heralded the rise of the merchant classes, coincided with demands by the foreign powers that Japan open her gates and take her place among the world powers and adumbrated the movement within Japan that the real power and control of the land revert to the Emperor. Erupting in such a society were the peasant uprisings, outbursts on the most part, of peasants who were unwilling to endure oppression any longer and willing to die for their cause if necessary.[4]

In view of the fact that the peasant was taxed on either assumed or actual yield per chobu (町歩) and excessive taxation was one primary cause of uprisings, we must certainly investigate the official productive capacity of Japan. A random selection of two typical annual yields in rice shows: 1600-18,000,000 koku, and in 1730-26,000,000 koku.

By means of a further breakdown in the total 1730 production we get an idea of the apportionment of ownership.

3.28 million koku was public domain
.9 million koku was city owned
.1 million koku was Imperial Household owned
22.1 million koku was private fiefs[5].

For tax assessment purposes the land was graded into two classes of fertility. First grade land produced fifteen koku (75 bushel) per chobu (2.45 acres), while the poorer second grade soils yielded from eight to ten koku per chobu. Just prior to the Tokugawa Period the tax was forty per cent of the total crop for the lord and sixty per cent for the farmer; however, in 1684 the tax increased to a 5:5 ratio.[6] Had this been the extent of taxation, there doubtless would have been no uprisings. It was the excessively objectionable miscellaneous taxes that irked the peasant to revolt. Among these should be noted the komononari (小物成), or additional miscellaneous taxes; the fuyaku (夫役), or labor required by the daikan (代官), later being changed to a payment in money; the kammai (缶夫米), or supplementary rice necessary to pay the loss sustained in transport; the kayaku (課役), or

service for repairs on dykes, roads and bridges and finally the sukego (助郷), a tax levied on villages near the stations along the main highways for transporting goods or furnishing horses and men for trips to Edo of daimyo or visiting dignitaries from the continent.[7] Perhaps here I should cite the sample situation of a fief in the Koyasan Temple realm in Kii. Here the avowed tax ratio was 5:5, but over a period of years the rate rose to eighty per cent and when it reached ninety three per cent of the total yield twelve thousand peasants marched upon the castle town.[8] Admittedly this is an extreme example, but how better could I depict the "let the peasants neither live nor die" attitude of many Tokugawa officials?

Taxes on a rice crop were determined by either a flat rate on the total crop for a period of years, or a yearly examination of the standing grain and then assessment.

The local administrative unit through which the taxes were collected was the village, of which there were in excess of sixty-three thousand. Peasants were divided into gonin kuni (五人組), or five family groups. These groups took joint

responsibility for the collection of taxes. Village officials whose responsibilities to the peasant and daimyo were pertinent to our study were the nanushi (名主), village heads appointed by the daimyo; the kumigashira (組頭), head of a small group of gonin kuni (五人組); and the hyakushodai (百姓代), who represented the farmers. The above rather drab summary of facts and statistics are a necessary basis for an analysis of the peasant uprisings.

The peasant class numbered twenty-four millions, a figure that remained practically stationary from 1600 to 1850.[9] They were the economic backbone of Japanese economy, and were socially placed a niche above the chonin (町人), but fell far below them in actual power. They did, however, not go without glory, for they were constantly referred to as the essence of the country. But in spite of the superficial praise meted out to the peasant by many Tokugawa statesmen, I am inclined to agree with Sir George Sansom's neat expression on Tokugawa policy to the effect that statesmen thought highly of agriculture but not of agriculturists.[10] Actually, the policy of the Tokugawa government was to keep the peasants content, but the sincerity of their efforts was

continually thwarted in the lower levels of shogunate bureaucracy by the corrupt practices of the daikan (代官), shoya (庄屋), and the gundai (郡代). The government advised these officials to consider the peasants as the foundation of the state, to study their hardships and to see that they did not go hungry or cold. Yet the peasant classes were continually admonished by the central government to be frugal, never enjoy themselves, practice restraint in every way, and always work.

Peasant uprisings were of two general types: those that had no relationship with the peasants' relation to the governing classes, and those that were brought about by the association of the peasant with the governing classes. Of the former type perhaps the regional or boundary disputes among fiefs was the most frequent uprising that had no relationship with the governing classes. This type was especially frequent in the much segmented feudatories of Sanuki and Iyo. Other types that had little or nothing to do with the officials were the struggles over water rights, mountain lands and timber rights, and occupational and religious reasons.

By far the majority of uprisings of the Tokugawa Period, however, are of a type having direct

relationship between the peasants and the governing class that controlled them. When one realizes that there were over a thousand separate uprisings from the soil between the years 1600 and 1850, mostly instigated by taxation, one wonders why there was no general insurrection amounting to a revolution over the entire country. This never occurred because of the very nature of taxation. It was an entirely local affair and its oppressiveness varied both in locale and time. Actually every peasant in Japan suffered from tax oppression but not at any one time or area general enough to precipitate nation-wide revolt. From a social standpoint, the uprisings were directed against the village officials, who, as representatives of the controlling class, collected the taxes, spied upon the plans of the farmers for revolt, and added special taxes for their own profit. These uprisings were concentrated in the western provinces where village officials were frequently wealthy. There, having power delegated to them by the ruling classes, they cleverly oppressed the farmers economically to their own advantage. This factor led to a series of sanguinary uprisings in Kyushu, Shikoku, and Western Honshu in the early

nineteenth century.[11.] The disturbances broke out in protest against the severe government imposed upon the peasants by the unscrupulous officials who planned, with the local merchants, for their mutual self-aggrandizement.

The types of peasant uprisings can be categorized with much greater facility than the causes of the uprisings which in many cases were complex and overlapping in their instigation. I have subdivided the study of the causes of peasant insurrections into the underlying or primary causes and the immediate and motivating causes.

The regional disposition and temperament of the people, influencing both their economic and social life, can be considered as an underlying cause. So, uprisings were numerous in districts where many stragglers settled after the incessant civil wars between 1467 and 1600. This situation occurred in Iyo where the civil strife was especially bitter. Historically, the inhabitants of Mimasaka have been noted for their violent dispositions and in this province there occurred more uprisings than in areas where there lived Japanese of more docile temperament.

Another primary cause may be ascribed to

increasing distress experienced by the farmer when the fiefs were split into increasingly smaller units as a result of favoritism shown by Edo toward certain daimyo. In these instances occasionally we find total peasant populations of fiefs suddenly uprooted from their homes to make way for the retainers a new daimyo possesses who is to occupy the domain. This occurred especially frequently in the outlying fiefs such as Mino and Iyo. In certain provinces, such as Shonai, the peasants were loyal to their daimyo to the extent of rising en masse in revolt in 1840 when another daimyo suddenly on orders from Edo superceded the authority of their lord. They arose with such convincing vigor that the central government had to reinstate the dispossessed lord.

Another basic cause of disturbance that also occurred in outlying provinces was the widespread policy of absentee ownership aggravated by the sankin kotai (參勤交代) system. Uprisings resulting from this may be seen in Echigo province where the fief of the Makino (牧野) family in Nagaoka (長岡) arose to mitigate suffering brought upon them by the absent lord's representatives. I must add that in each case of a primary cause for revolt there must be understood as contributing factors the ignorance of the peasant, the increasing chasm

between rich and poor, and the disproportion of males in the society. Mimasaka (美作) province had twenty per cent more males than females.

One other major underlying cause of revolt was the widespread disaffection against the officials brought about by their insistence that the cultivatable land be continually expanded. Thus in 1600 there were in Japan five million acres under cultivation and in 1868 there were over eleven million acres under the plow, while the population of Japan remained almost a constant thirty million during the Tokugawa Era.[12.] We see that the labor load was more than doubled by the peasant. This point is certainly well taken, but I feel that it was not given its just importance by the various authorities.

With the above primary causes there are the immediate and motivating causes that fall into the economic and administrative categories. Of the economic motivating causes, the first is the natural calamities that the peasant frequently suffered during the Tokugawa Era. These resulted in famines that in turn resulted in uprisings. Three very important famine periods were those of 1732-33, 1783-87, and 1836-37. These

famine periods were each followed by a marked increase in peasant disturbances. There occurred over one hundred seventy-five in the five-year period of the Tempei Famines of 1783-87.[13]

The oppressiveness of taxation has already been discussed in some detail, but it should certainly be mentioned here as an economic factor in peasant unrest. The special taxes that were added to the ordinary taxes provided most of the difficulties. One special category of added taxation was the goyokin (御用金) or forced levies. This special levy was assessed on rich merchants and daimyo to help meet the recurring deficits in Bakufu spending. This levy was always passed on to the peasant. Uprisings directly attributable to taxation alone account for twenty-five per cent of the total number of insurrections.

The most despicable and culpable act of planned interference in the peasants' financial affairs is a further economic factor. Here the daimyo, realizing the worth of money, by nefarious methods gained control of the townsmen's industries by monopolistic methods. Here we have the first beginnings of monopoly control that grew to such monstrous proportions before the last war. Originally, different influential daimyo

had monopolies on the manufacture and sale of various products to the peasants and townsmen.

And finally among the economic causes for peasant uprisings in Japan was that of financial disorder within the fief itself. Usually this meant that the daimyo would overissue paper money and have it circulate at par value with its metal counter-type. In 1754, in Kurume (久留米) in Chikugo (筑後), fifty-two thousand farmers rose in revolt as a result of this policy, while in Akita the farmers were accompanied by the townsmen the next year in protest to the new fiat currency.[14.]

Administrative causes that motivated peasants to rise up against injustice were principally due to the unlawfulness and duplicity of the Bakufu representatives to the feudal domain or the double-dealing of the various shoya (庄屋), the absentee lord's representatives at the fiefs. As for the special envoys of the Bakufu an excellent example is found in the case of a surveying party sent to the province of Omi (近江) in 1842. When the farmers once became aware of the corruption of the leader of the party, his willingness to receive bribes, and his false measuring stick, they retaliated by an uprising in the districts concerned, forty-two thousand strong.

Their efforts caused the cessation of the survey and the Bakufu representatives fled for their lives.[15]

Data concerning peasant uprisings as distinct and separate case histories exist in great quantity. It would be impossible to draw a general picture of the situation during the Tokugawa by citing these individual cases. Therefore, from my readings I have synthesized many isolated studies into what I believe is a typical fabrication of the cycle through which most of the peasant uprisings passed to failure or fulfillment of the peasant's objectives.

As a direct result of some grievance, natural disaster, or displeasure on the part of the peasants, there would arise from among them some leader who could express their humiliation best to the authorities. The date of the uprising would be passed around the domain by word of mouth or secret circular and the signal for assembly was usually the local temple bell. Every single male peasant over fifteen was obliged to attend, and any recalcitrant peasant suffered the destruction of his house and property. They would then assemble into a party or "mob" (totō)(徒党) for the purpose of presenting an appeal (esso)(直訴) to the authorities concerned. Sometimes the peasants

would appoint a delegation to appear at the castle to air their grief, but more often, especially in later Tokugawa times, the appeal was presented by the mob as a whole in the form of a "mob-appeal" (gōso)(強訴), before the lord's castle. The peasants, hoisting mat flags and brandishing bamboo spears marched against the castle towns shouting war threats and sometimes dragging with them unwilling associates they had pulled into their ranks along the route.[16.]

The peasants were surprisingly well-behaved, and oftentimes crowds numbering into the hundreds of thousands maintained good discipline. Only when brigands, thiefs and vandals joined their ranks en route for loot purposes did they get out of hand. Upon arrival the peasants appointed an intermediary and the demands were then presented to the property authorities for their consideration. If the demands were granted, the peasants would return home. If unsuccessful, there would occur enforced pacification by the daimyo's soldiers with some loss of life. When they were ordered by the lord to disperse they were promised no harm if they disbanded in orderly fashion. In many cases, however, the lord, fearing further trouble from the same source, would abduct the peasant leaders

of the insurrections. As for some of the ringleaders of these uprisings, they were usually crucified or beheaded, while the others were banished with their families. This judgment was meted out to the intransigent ones that were permeated with the idea of rebellion.[17] The forms of punishment directed against the peasant leaders of uprisings took on geographical specialization in time, and one particularly diabolical lord of Mino created his own form of torture, the Mino odori (美濃踊り). The peasant was tied up in a woven straw coat, led to a public place, and set afire.[18] This set quite an example to those peasants who harbored ideas of insurrection. Regardless of this cruelty, we find that between 1758 and 1836 there were twenty-five serious uprisings in Mino province.

In further consideration of the esso and gōso type appeal made by the peasant to the authorities, it seems relevant to clarify the two terms somewhat. First it must be understood that the esso was a mere appeal made by an appointed delegation to the proper authorities, while the gōso was actually a more mandatory and pressing demand made by a mob at the oppressor's door. I will cite translations of each type of appeal after which their nature will become more clarified.

An example of the gentle, orderly esso-type 19.
appeal occurred in the district of Kambara (神原村). This area, in the seventh year of Entoku (延徳) (1711), was transferred to the Matsudaira Terusada (松平輝貞) fief. The land had previously been in public domain and the peasants were almost at once dissatisfied with their new status as a private domain. Therefore, their first act was for the 85 villages in the domain to appoint daihyōsha (代表者), or representatives, to state their case before the Kanjo Bugyō (勘定奉行) in Edo. In the meantime the peasants on the Kambara fief withheld their taxes from Matsudaira collectors. At the hearing given the representatives in Edo Arai Hakuseki (新井白石), famous Japanese economist, acted as intermediary for the peasants. Arai sympathized with the peasants' plight and advised the Shōgun to grant the people their demands. This was done; however, by special arrangement, the land remained in the Matsudaira fief. Here we see that the farmers' wishes were placated without disorder by the peasants or retribution by the authorities.

Usually, the gōso, or "mob-type" appeal came as a consequence of some much more serious social

or physical disorder. The Province of Echigo on the northwestern coast of Japan, isolated from Edo and the central government by mountain ranges, subject to heavy snowfall in winter from the winds blowing down from the Japan Sea, and a district where farming at best is marginal, affords an excellent opportunity for study of the goso type uprising. The apex of uprisings in Echigo district was reached in the summer of 1814. In the winter of 1813 there was a disastrous crop failure. The gravity of this situation was not appreciated by the authorities for the taxes were not eased. This precipitated seven separate uprisings, in six different districts from the fourth to the sixth months. Of these, Kuromasa Kichi (黒正) takes great interest in the one that occurred in the fourth month of 1814. Here the farmers in the entire 30,000 koku domain of Hori naokata (堀直方) began a destructive march toward the castle town of Muramatsu (村松), wrecking scores of houses as they advanced. This riot was instigated not only by high prices plus poor crops, but also by the misgovernment of the daikan of the Hori fief who had established a system of special taxes and there was much patronage and corruption in the entire tax collecting set-up. The daikan had likewise ordered a new inspection of the land in order that taxes might

be increased. As a consequence of this unbearable situation one thousand peasants attacked the daikan's office and forced him to flee. Then they went about wrecking the houses of the daimyo officials. After a week of this disorder, Hori Naokata returned from Edo and presented three thousand koku of rice to the farmers. There then followed a purge of officials in his fief; some were exiled and others dispossessed of their properties and families. Of the peasants in the uprising, some forty were arrested and the two leaders received the death penalty. [20].

By far the greater number of ikki were of the latter, more serious type and to give them just proportion in this study I will relate a translation of Kokusho Iwao's famous aoboi sōdō (青ぼ"い' 騒動) case.[21] This concerned the eighty-six villages of Tochio (木所尾) in Bingo (備後) on the Fukuyama fief in 1828 (Temmei rokunen). As a result of absentee landlordship the daimyo resided in Edo in a lavish manner. Taxes were increased, and this became more burdensome when the discipline and honesty of the fief officials deteriorated. On this particular fief, in addition to rice and money, taxes were also paid in paper and charcoal. One would believe that the diversity of the taxation would obviate a burdensome

tax on the rice crop, and yet the very fact that the peasants were forced by hunger to arise and emancipate themselves from starvation attests to the severity of the taxes. Therefore on a certain day at a certain time one male member from each household came forward to a mustering place with aoboi (kindling) on his back. Apparently the arrangement was to fire the houses of the officials. The peasants gathered at Tochio and stormed the gates of the daikan, closing all exits. They then lay seige to the place with the idea of starving the officials into an audience or compromise. But before many days the Nagaoka no monogashira (長岡の物頭) was sent to the scene and arrested the peasant leaders. The murayakunin (村役員) and the daikan were reprimanded, the peasant leaders were exiled and the tax was subsequently reduced.

In conclusion, I must admit that my study has only been the barest glance at the situation, but the scope of the paper has been realized. I have made it quite obvious to the reader that the basic characteristics, causes, and types of uprisings were both divergent and varied. Certain regions of Japan were more affected than others. The more remote the domain the easier for corruption to enter administration of the

fief and result in peasant revolt. To the factors of natural disaster, mal-administration, disposition of the people, and crop failures must be ever applied the policy of tax ruthlessness of the officials. Taxes were always burdensome, but the addition of any of the aforementioned factors with taxation often created an unbearable situation for the peasant whose only relief was gained through the peasant uprisings that belied an impression of internal peace in the Japan of the Tokugawa Period.

APPENDIX --- Chart I

Rice Price Chart

Year	Kind of Rice	Silver	Price per koku
1616		Keicho Gin	18.2-20 momme
1626		"	20. -23.6 "
1636		"	43.0-50.0 "
1642		"	54.0-60.0 "
1647		"	24. -26.0 "
1660		"	69. -70.0 "
1670		"	56. -59.0 "
1680		"	67.0-70.0 "
1694		"	65. -69.0 "
1695	Higo	Genroku Gin	70. -80.0 "
1703	"	"	92. -93.0 "
1705	"	"	-41.0 "
1713	"	Hoji Gin	- 155.0 "
1725	Hiroshima	Kyoho Gin	-50.3 "
1732	"	"	67 -90.0 "
1735	"	"	31 -41.0 "
1745	"	Monji Gin	-69.7 "
1755	"	"	-81.3 "
1765	"	"	-64.9 "
1775	Higo rice used as standard henceforth.	"	51 -56. "
1781	"	"	54 -56. "
1783	"	"	-98.0 "
1784	"	"	130 -140.0 "
1785	"	"	-61.0 "
1786	"	"	101.5 "
1787	"	"	181-187 "
1788	"	"	66.0 "
1798	"	"	58-60.0 "
1808	"	"	80.0-83. "
1818	"	"	54.5 "
1830	"	Shimmonji Gin	88.5 "
1833	"	"	119.9 "
1836	"	"	155.7 "
1837	"	"	250 - 94.0 "
1840	"	"	63.4 "
1848	"	Hoji Gin	89.8 "
1849	"	"	100.1 "
1850	"	"	147.9 "
1851	"	"	81.2 "
1857	"	"	106.3 "
1858	"	"	131.5 "
1859	"	Seiji Gin	203.0 "

1860	Higo	Seiji Gin	142.0 momme
1862	"	"	100.0 "
1863	"	"	325.0 "
1864	"	"	530. "
1865	"	"	1300. "
1866	"	"	590. "

(The above chart is taken from Honjō, E., Tokugawa Bakuju Beika Chosetsu, pp. 407-415.)

APPENDIX :-

Chart II

Density and re-appearance of uprisings according to provinces (1603-1867).

Number of Occurrences	Names of Provinces	Number of Provinces
None	Iga and Iki	2
1	Shima, Satsuma, Osumi	3
2	Kwachi, Awaji	2
3	Izu, Awa (Tokaido), Oki, Bizen	4
4	Sagami, Shimosa	2
5	Yamashiro, Owari	2
6	Izumi, Suruga, Shimo-zuke, Noto, Aki, Chikuzen	6
7	Totomi, Wakasa, Inaba, Matsumae	4
8	Kazusa	1
9	Yamamoto, Chikugo	2
10	Ise, Izumo	2
11	Kai	1
12	Tango, Tajima, Hizen	3
13	Hitachi, Iwaki, Rikuzen, Mutsu, Iwami, Tosa	6
14	Sado, Nagato	2
15	Settsu, Ugo, Bingo, Buzen	4
16	Bitchu	1
17	Kii	1
18	Musashi, Hida, Kaga Sanuki	4
19	Etchu, Hoki, Tamba, Mimasaka	4
20	Harima, Suwo	2
24	Mikawa	1
25	Higo	1
27	Kozuke	1
28	Mino	1
30	Awa (Nankaido)	1
32	Hyuga	1
34	Iwashiro, Bungo	2
35	Omi	1
41	Uzen	1
42	Echizen	1
51	Iyo	1
54	Rikuchu	1
55	Shinano, Echigo	2



NUMBER OF PEASANT UPRISINGS PER 10-YEAR PERIOD 1603-1872

The above table is taken from Kokushō's Hyakushō-ikki no Kenkyū, p. 263.



NUMBER OF UPRISINGS AS CORRELATED WITH THE PRICE OF RICE PER KOKU
The above table is taken from Kokushō's Hyakushō-ikki No Kenkyū, p. 264.

FOOTNOTES

1. Ono Takeo, Tokugawa jidai hyakushō ikki sōdan, Vol. I, 1927, p. 387.

2. Kokushō Iwaō, Hyakushō ikki no kenkyū, 1928, p. 27.

3. E. Herbert Norman, Japan's emergence as a modern state, 1946, p. 13 et seq.

4. Hugh Borton, "Peasant uprisings in Japan," TAJS, Vol. XVI, 2nd series, May, 1938, p. 18 et seq.

5. Ibid., p. 5 et seq.

6. Hugh Borton, trans., Sawada Sho's "Financial difficulties of the Edo Bakufu," Harvard journal of Asiatic studies, Vol. I, no. 3, pp. 316-18.

7. Hugh Borton, op. cit., p. 6 et seq.

8. Kokusho Iwao, op. cit., p. 86.

9. Garret Droppers, "The population of Japan in the Tokugawa Period," TASJ, Vol. XXX, 1893, p. 253 et seq.

10. George Sansom, Japan, a short cultural history, 1938, p. 506.

11. Hugh Borton, op. cit., p. 17.

12. K. Asakawa, "Notes on village government in Japan after 1600," Journal of American Oriental society, Vol. XXI, 1910, p. 287.

13. Garret Droppers, op. cit., p. 264.

14. J. Rahder, "Record of Kurume uprisings," Acta Orientalia, Vol. XIV, 1935, pp. 84-108.

15. Hugh Borton, op. cit., p. 28.

16. Takikawa Seijiro, Nihon shakai shi, 1929, p. 304.

17. Ibid., p. 303.

18. James Murdoch, A history of Japan, 1903, p. 650.

FOOTNOTES (Cont'd)

19. Kokushō Iwao, Hyakushō ikki no kenkyū, 1928, p. 232

20. Hugh Borton, op. cit., p. 132

21. Kokushō Iwao, op. cit., p. 242

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Western Sources: Books

James Murdoch, A history of Japan, Kobe, Kobe chronicle, 1903, vol. 2, 714 pp.

Honjo Eijiro, The social and economic history of Japan, Kyoto, Institute for research in economic history of Japan, 1935, 410 pp.

George B. Sansom, Japan, a short cultural history, The Cresset historical series, New York, Appleton, 1938, 537 pp.

E. Herbert Norman, Japan's emergence as a modern state, I.P.R. inquiry series, New York, Institute of Pacific relations, 1946, 254 pp.

Y. Takekoshi, The economic aspects of the history of the civilization of Japan, London, Geo. Allen, Ltd., 1930, vol. 2, 430 pp.

Western Sources: Periodicals

K. Asakawa, "Some aspects of Japanese feudal institutions," TASJ, Vol. XLVI, 1918, pp. 76-102.

K. Asakawa, "Some of the contributions of feudal Japan to the new Japan," Journal of race development, Vol. III, 1912-13, pp. 386-94.

K. Asakawa, "Notes on village government in Japan after 1600," JAOS, Vol. XXX, 1910, pp. 259-300.

K. Asakawa, "Notes on village government in Japan after 1600," JAOS, Vol. XXXI, 1911, pp. 151-216.

Hugh Borton, "Peasant uprisings in Japan of the Tokugawa Period," TASJ, Vol. XVI, 2nd series, 1938, pp. 1-258.

J. H. Gubbins, "Some features of Tokugawa administration," TASJ, Vol. XL, 1922, pp. 59-77.

BIBLIOGRAPHY (continued)

Western Sources: Periodicals (cont'd)

Garret Droppers, "The population of Japan in the Tokugawa Period," TASJ, Vol. XXII, 1893, pp. 253-284.

Neil S. Smith, "Materials on Japanese social and economic history: Tokugawa Japan," TASJ, Vol. XIV, 2nd series, 1937, pp. 1-176.

Neil S. Smith, "An introduction to some Japanese economic writings of the 18th century," TASJ, Vol. II, 2nd series, 1934, pp. 32-104.

J. C. Hale, "Tokugawa legislation, parts I-III," TASJ, Vol. XXX, 1922, pp. 269-331.

Herbert Zachert, "Social changes during the Tokugawa Period," TASJ, Vol. XVII, 2nd series, pp. 238-54.

S. Sawada, "Financial difficulties of the Edo Bakufu," Harvard journal of Asiatic studies, Cambridge, Vol. 1, no. 3, 1936, pp. 316-18.

Japanese Sources

Kokusho Iwao 黒正巖, Hyakushō ikki no kenkyū 百姓一揆の研究 (Study of peasant uprisings), Tokyo, Iwanami shoten, 1928.

Ono Takeo 小野武夫, Tokugawa jidai hyakushō ikki sōdan 徳川時代百姓一揆叢談 (Selected materials concerning peasant uprisings of Tokugawa Era), Tokyo, Tōkōshōin, 1927, 2 vol.

Takikawa Seijiro 瀧川政次郎 Nihon shakai shi 日本社會史 (Social history of Japan), Tokyo, Otaka Toyosuke, 1929.