

**Ecstatic Empiricism  
Demonism without Despair in American Literature**

by

Ross Martin

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment  
Of the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy  
(English Language and Literature)  
in The University of Michigan  
2020

Doctoral Committee

Professor Branka Arsić, Co-Chair, Columbia University  
Professor Marjorie Levinson, Co-Chair  
Professor Gregg Crane  
Professor Kerry Larson  
Assistant Professor Antoine Traisnel

Ross Martin

[martross@umich.edu](mailto:martross@umich.edu)

ORCID iD: [0000-0002-2563-6465](https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2563-6465)

© Ross Martin 2020

DEDICATION

For Mary,

MY DEAREST,

This Dissertation is Inscribed in Token.

*To disperse the gathered, to assemble the scattered*

*Σκίδνησι καὶ συνάγει, πρόσσεισι καὶ ἄπεισι*

—Heraclitus of Ephesus

*Das Geeinte zu entzweien, das Entzweite zu einigen*

—Johann Wolfgang von Goethe

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation would not be possible without my mentors, for the condition of its possibility comes from their enduring kindnesses. I sincerely thank A. Riss, who points me to the page, B. Arsić, who reveals to me what is miraculous therein, M. Levinson, who guides me through, and G. Crane, who emboldens me to write. I also thank R. Posnock, who ties my relations, K. Larson, who deals only honestly with me, S. Parrish, who inspires my thoughtfulness, and W. Cohen, whose generosity I hold dear.

Over the years I have listened to every word of advice and so that, at moments when I seemed most adrift, I was always charting my course. When lost in seas of thought, their collective remarks illuminated the bespangled sky that I followed.

Many others have stood foreword to encourage me, and these include N. Schultz, R. Elia, A. Nersessian, F. Griffin, B. Robbins, L. Hartley, A. Traisnel, S. Otter, and J. Whittier-Ferguson.

Countless graduate students have meaningfully crossed my path since I began my studies. These peers bring out my best personal qualities, and among those who I most admire are A. Derosa, K. McIntyre, V. Tsygankova, W. Pruitt, C. Silverman, M. Krenzel, A. Akbari, K. Frisina, M. Behrend, M. Kennedy, B. Moore, L. Strout, C. Yin Lie, M. Kolenda-Mason, S. You, K. Grant, P. Godfrey, and E. Lichtenstein.

For giving me every investment that you reason and affection has to offer, from the very beginning and to this day, I sincerely thank L. Cohen. What you have taught me rings eternally. When you read these lines, you will understand.

I sincerely thank E. Wilkinson, who appeared in my life when I needed her most. Knowing you has shown me that sometimes gratitude exceeds expression.

To my family and friends, I owe so much for their unwavering support throughout my studies. Lastly, I thank M. Martin, my sycamore. You prove to me daily how we must branch outward or otherwise cease to grow.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION	ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	iii
LIST OF FIGURES	vi
ABSTRACT	vii
INTRODUCTION: American Demonology	1
CHAPTER 1: Hematological Life in Emerson	42
CHAPTER 2: ‘My Need of Manifold Being’: On Fuller’s Wildflower Ethics	84
CHAPTER 3: Geological Thinking: On Thoreau’s Fossilized Relics	122
CHAPTER 4: Out of Touch: On Melville and the Phantasmal World	167
AFTERWORD AND RECAPITULATION: Dr. Spurzheim’s Brain	214
BIBLIOGRAPHY	224

## LIST OF FIGURES

### FIGURE

A. Volvox Globator	44
B. Prairie in Illinois	113
C. <i>Bellum denunciandi ratio</i>	141
D. Fata Morgana	168
E. Looming First	173
F. Looming Second	173
G. Spurzheim's Tomb	220

## ABSTRACT

Understanding demonism in Socratic terms, scholars take antebellum American demonology to mean personal identification with an apophatic process that undoes empirical differences to reveal a single, monolithic identity. Against this dialectical orientation, my dissertation, *Ecstatic Empiricism: Demonism without Despair in American Literature*, uncovers an alternative demonological tradition in the context of American literature, a tradition that embraces what is irreducibly plural about sensuous life. Building on archival discoveries, *Ecstatic Empiricism* debuts Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's autobiography in the intellectual formation of Ralph Waldo Emerson, Margaret Fuller, Henry David Thoreau, and Herman Melville, who each read the volume and comment on its concept of the demonic as enabling ecological experience. Through both close and contextually dense study of the writings of Emerson, Fuller, Thoreau, and Melville, I track a strain of demonism that celebrates the revelatory power arising from episodes of sensory and material meltdown, whereby all that was interior gets externalized, and experience moves from a subjective to an impersonal register. Thoreau's famous Mount Katahdin epiphany, where "Demonic Nature" disperses him into agitated matter, is one clear instance of this pattern. Another irruption of "demonism in the world" occurs as the workings of Melville's whale make all that is not just incompatible but mutually exclusive in life collide, shattering—or releasing—Ishmael's humanity. Drawing on a set of post-humanist frameworks, I argue that the demonological tradition I uncover constitutes a historically specific and momentous attempt to replace a normatively centrist account of the human with a vision of radical and impersonal dispersion. By their demonism, Emerson, Fuller, Thoreau, and Melville reject the dilemma of fragmentary existence. Instead, they affirm and



embrace the tragic conditions of life through the ek-stasis—the standing outside of oneself—that demonism brings forth.

## Introduction

Like the metamorphosis of things into higher organic forms, is their change into melodies. Over everything stands its daemon

—Ralph Waldo Emerson

## American Demonology

While demonism appears throughout antebellum writing, during some significant moments, there exists no sustained study of its meaning for the American literary tradition. Perhaps demonism eludes criticism because, although it shines through everyday circumstances to reveal the extraordinary therein, it shows what is immanent to rather than what transcends life.<sup>1</sup> In other words, perhaps it has all been too familiar. However, something about demonism's externalizing force must, for America's most revolutionary writers, operate in some way to intervene in a state of affairs. For if demonism indicates that what is perceived as a deficit in existence is actually a surplus, then it enriches a radicalism in nineteenth-century thought that

seeks to redeem the world of appearances. World demonism, that is to say, unconceals what is otherwise habituated to the point of concealment, attuning sense to something more than enough in life. In the writing of Ralph Waldo Emerson, Margaret Fuller, Henry David Thoreau, and Herman Melville, demons are animals, like breaching whales and laughing loons; they emerge through natural occurrences, like volcanic eruptions; they are present in historical movements, like slave revolts; and they shift seemingly inanimate things, like glaciers. I thus propose at the outset that these many demonisms reveal something always happening—something often unnoticed because it is constant—made apparent when life overflows at its extremities to become something more. “We stand before the secret of the world,” Emerson clarifies the demonic ontology, “where Being passes into Appearance, and Unity into Variety.”<sup>2</sup>

World demonism,<sup>3</sup> as my introduction argues, is communicated to these American writers through certain German and English Romantics who revive a version of primitive Greek thinking—once toppled by Plato and submerged during his long afterlife in a Western metaphysics—that banishes, as Elaine Scarry terms it, “aliveness” from ontology and ethics.<sup>4</sup> Although unappreciated, primitive demonology makes its miraculous return to thinking in many important American texts, and thereupon threatens to upend the Platonic tradition, and so, I claim, dialectics.<sup>5</sup> How such demonism overturns Plato and the reversal’s significance will be discussed. For now, in prefatory remark, I take pre and post-Platonic thinking as the demonic shining of *something* unfolding what *is* into what *becomes*. And yet primordial thinking, that which comes before and after Plato, happens through non-dialectical experiences that only deal in convergences, divergences, and resonances to unfold without negativity into external relations.<sup>6</sup> The demoniacal world burns at its core, heaving outward to heap sediment upon itself by concentric expansions—forming layers—in series. “Everything is a series, and in a series,” as

Emerson puts it.<sup>7</sup> Such accretive logic is repeated beyond the terrestrial fire in the Sun, whose superabundance endlessly externalizes itself, irradiating the world to extravagance. We live amidst these excesses by calendrical and diurnal rhythms: rising each day and year in waves to emerge into what shines. In “Experience” (1844), the essay that critical consensus argues is indispensable to Emersonian thinking, he proposes that we find ourselves in the midst of things as they unfold. (“Where do we find ourselves? In a series of which we do not know the extremes,” he begins.) “We live amid surfaces,” since everything available to experience rushes outward, “life above life, in infinite degrees.” “Life has no memory,” is not, that is to say, retrospective, but just moves onward into greater degrees of excess. Emerson, without regret, also moves on, even from the devastating loss of his child. It might seem cruel to those who wish to despair, but life is indifferent to what has passed (as it has no memory), and so endlessly stacks additional layers. “My reception,” he confesses, “has been so large, that I am not annoyed by receiving this or that superabundantly.”<sup>8</sup>

To account for demonology in American literature, each of my chapters considers demonism by the Emersonian theme of *transformation into apparent multiplicity* in order to focus my readings around a philosophical intervention that oversteps the need to achieve meaning extrinsic to burgeoning vitality. This orientation means sympathy between my readings and the new materialism as well as the new vitalism, at least in regard to a non-dualistic conception of emergence and proliferation, much of what Marjorie Levinson denotes as “ontological materialism,” which is “now current in the discipline at large.”<sup>9</sup> Moreover, at the outset, I propose that by focusing demonism within the purview of American studies, we achieve a better vantage into the breadth of radical thinking in America. Following the Emersonian perspective (as always escalating serially), Emerson never experiences what is above or ahead of

his life as it rushes onward. “Everything runs to excess,” as he would say, already a superabundance, more than we will grasp, suggesting that life cannot be insufficient.<sup>10</sup> Even if Emerson, Fuller, Thoreau, and Melville think distinctly about the demonic, each meaningfully resonates with the intervention that is represented by the Emersonian worldview. Put simply, I adopt Charles Feidelson’s conviction, held by many Americanists both new and old, that the “Representative Man of the era was Emerson himself.”<sup>11</sup> In this introduction, therefore, I make my case mostly through Emerson not because all American demonologies are at base his own, but because his clarifies what it means to behold the world and affirm its overabundance, even its terrible generosity.

By collecting the writings of Emerson, Fuller, Thoreau, and Melville into an overlapping perspective, my dissertation attempts a focused revision in American studies whereby I generate a different constellation of writers who collectively write about ebullient ontologies and ethics through demonism. Significantly, in terms of upgrading canonical arrangements, I bring Fuller as an equal into the fold of these affirmative thinkers with more enjoyed, though perhaps unduly distributed, statuses. Notwithstanding Emerson’s prominence in this introduction, I treat all four thinkers equally chapter by chapter, demonstrating the depth and diversity of affirmative thought in America. Life affirming thought, which embraces upheaving fragmentation as an insurmountable condition (of the variety readily associated with Nietzschean thinking and its many aftermaths), already happens with these illustrious nineteenth-century American authors. While I make no claim that such affirmation delimits the thought of any beyond these four American authors, I do claim that they fleetingly conjure dissonance without unmaking their received intellectual heritage, at last overshadowed by the Civil War, only in part taken up again in what Emerson’s philosophical heir, William James, calls his radical empiricism.

Consequentially, I conceive of a surprising grouping in the American literary tradition correlating through a stance that, although failing in their time to upend established thought, still represents a countermovement, what I call Emerson-Fuller-Thoreau-Melville movement. This movement, which is not a movement through organization but rather through situated coincidences, is likely misapprehended if not totally unnoticed because, if not for other reasons, such grouping is unconventional, and so the thread connecting these authors—and therefore what they share in common—remains undisclosed. For example, D. H. Lawrence’s *Studies in Classic American Literature* (1923) focuses on Melville, but leaves the other three writers essentially out; F. O. Matthiessen’s *American Renaissance* (1941) groups Emerson, Thoreau, and Melville, but not Fuller; Feidelson’s *Symbolism and American literature* (1953) and John T. Irwin’s *American Hieroglyphics* (1980) group Emerson, Thoreau, and Melville, but not Fuller; Lawrence Buell’s *New England Literary Culture* (1986) only groups Emerson, and Thoreau. And so on. Why are not Emerson, Fuller, Thoreau, and Melville taken up together in any of our cornerstone criticisms? And if, as I say, demonism ties these thinkers together even as they continue falling short of collective recognition, what might we gain by reactivating their dormant relationship?

While the four authors that my dissertation groups never meet to resonate in venerated Americanist monographs, in *American Impersonal: Essays with Sharon Cameron* (2014) the authors all appear together in essays collected to recognize and elaborate upon Sharon Cameron’s contribution to and her ongoing influence on Americanist studies. Cameron’s writing suggests that American intellectual radicalism has always been perceivable in the mainstream if we only take our canonical authors seriously enough in what they posit about life to weaken if not override the distinction between fiction and ontology, or, to borrow a formulation from Kerry Larson’s contribution to the volume, certain writers “do not aspire to a world elsewhere” because

the “actual or given world is real enough.” Life is enough, in Cameron’s criticism, because it is already too much from the personal standpoint, confusing its boundaries through affective depersonalizations without negating personhood even in the presence of radical impersonality. From such ontological tension, Larson explains, “proliferates the bewildering array of divisions and displacements” that concern Cameron. In *American Impersonal*, Larson and his fellow Camronians collectively emphasize how what is organized opens into what becomes disorganized, placing Emerson, Fuller, Thoreau, and Melville in a genre that affirms the *something* present in transformative processes, *something* that is a non-dualistic: a third-entity.<sup>12</sup> I develop on this thesis, considering its unnamed demonological background, one that is affirmative even in rapturous events of self-externalization, a “volatile process” of “infinite proliferation.”<sup>13</sup>

Emerson explores such profligate ontology through hematological overpouring, a surging force that moves what is personal towards what is impersonal by affective, serial expansions. The heart, for Emerson, cannot be imprisoned but must always break free and so it is the philosophical impetus for his anti-slavery rhetoric. Emerson’s abolitionism is therefore as anatomical—held literally in every breast—as it is political. In Chapter 1, “Hematological Life in Emerson: And Swedenborg’s *Economy of the Animal Kingdom*,” I investigate Emerson’s abolitionist thinking through his engagement with Emanuel Swedenborg, the Enlightenment scientist turned mystic. In Swedenborg’s lost hematology (overshadowed by his theology), blood flows between personal organization and impersonal disorganization, traversing all things both inward and outward thought the heartbeat. In a cardiovascular context formed by promiscuous circulatory systems, Swedenborg argues that lives are both particular and limitless by their resistance from and exposure to elemental reality whereby that which resists is a stubborn

assemblage (accreted from many little stubborn forms) that withstands drifting apart, however momentarily. Moreover, through an extensive reconstruction of Emerson's Swedenborgianism, I uncover and demonstrate a battle plan unfurled over the course of his career. Beginning with "The American Scholar" (1837) and culminating in *Representative Men* (1850), I show that Emerson launches a sustained campaign to infuse Swedenborgian science with an emerging strain of radical American thought. Swedenborg, however, as with all of Emerson's representative men, possesses a fatal flaw, so that he cannot ultimately embody the doctrine of series and degrees, and thus the heart's courageous potential to rush beyond itself, releasing more than it holds. Turning to the Haitian Revolution, Emerson exemplifies the emancipatory capacity by Toussaint Louverture and thereby situates revolutionary change in an overactive heartbeat, one at the center of a momentous movement. With Louverture, the embodiment of anti-slavery, Emerson at last identifies the dawning of a new age, promising to finally overcome cultural inertia, causing an upheaval in experience through the upmost affirmation.

Fuller, on the other hand, situates ontological extravagance in her archetypal figures, Mariana and Leila, who strive to depersonalize themselves by flowering into both masculine and feminine forms that diverge in order to converge in an endless process of difference and repetition. Leila, for example, a figure borrowed by Fuller from the Persian tradition, reveals how life moves through events of terrifying merger, to fragment again into many little things. In Chapter 2, "My Need of Manifold Being': On Fuller's Wildflower Ethics," I consider personal unfolding in primarily botanical terms, going beyond a century of patronizing biographical interest in Fuller to disclose her serious sexual morphology, wherein she develops an ethics of eroticism. By a vegetal logic, Fuller writes about emphatic self-differentiation, undoing a self-consistency fashionable in her time, and proposing that life's continuity requires events of



ontological exaggeration and transgression determined by the inconsistency immanent to living things. Against the monoculture of Jacksonian era thinking, Fuller restores irony to the transformative forces that build up and break down lives, suggesting that self-culture is always already cultivation of something more complex. Turning to the wildflower as an emblem of indiscriminate proliferation—indeed, leaps of chance—, Fuller situates her ethics in the midwestern prairies, from which standpoint flowers disperse their seeds to drift and gather into new bodies that are, in turn, unfolding into infinite varieties.

Thoreau joins Fuller's interest in transformative terrains but in a more geological than botanical frame. In Chapter 3, "Geological Thinking: On Thoreau's Fossilized Relics," I uncover Thoreau's theory of geological proliferation in agricultural and paleontological terms. Until recently, Thoreau's fascination with Indian relics has represented his ethnology, or even his desire to "go native." The objects themselves—from arrowheads, to chisels, to axes and pottery—have thus been awarded no life of their own. Where readers traditionally view Thoreau's arrowhead collecting as related to this ethnology, I instead show that he cancels the distinction between artificial and organic stones, and so between mind and matter.<sup>14</sup> Facing Indian removal and genocide, Thoreau thus develops a theory of thinking whereby mind-matter and earth-matter rotate between people, things, and the world. Thoreau's ontology instigates a politics of resonance according to which he collects the scattered pieces of life to displace parts of himself. Life, in Thoreau's formulation, cannot be completely lost but rather returns to the surface of things in strange fragments or excessive formations. Traveling from the fields of Concord to Cape Cod's shoreline, Thoreau's relic theory alters to account for a form of thinking that transitions into an arrowhead and then into a horseshoe crab, wending its way to the sea and so carrying thought into vast inhumanity.

But such crabs annually return, ebbing thinking away from human minds to then flow it back transformed. Leaving the shore to test experience at its oceanic limits, in Chapter 4, “Out of Touch: On Melville and the Phantasmal World,” I address the nautical phenomenon of looming in Melville’s writing. Loomings are images of entities behind the horizon as seen flying clear over it, shapeshifting by elongating or collapsing or becoming altogether monstrous. A looming event is taken to its extreme in the Fata Morgana, whereby what looms transposes such that the horizon rises above itself in a superior image over which objects float and under which they hang. Into a levitating band of water, the twinned images descend right-side-up as they ascend up-side-down, disjoining bodies from their images and causes from their effects such that the world of body-cause and image-effect are totally divorced, creating a corporeal mixture above which looms a phantasmal surface, a field of transformation. For Melville, the phantasm’s historical significance is registered by the Spanish conquest of Peru as representative of epistemological corruption vis-à-vis the Inca embrace of verisimilitude. Ahab, a sort of Quaker Pizzaro, exemplifies negativity sinking as Ishmael buoys through affirmation, endlessly returning to a world of difference and its ecstasy of appearances. *Moby-Dick* (1851), as I show, is not just “the great American novel,” it enacts a demonological subversion in the context of America’s most enduring literature.

As I layout in these introductory pages, and as all of my subsequent chapters wager, negativity has no significant function in the Emersonian worldview; that, moreover, writers of his kind are robustly affirmative, which is to say that expansion triumphs over contraction in American literature.<sup>15</sup> That said, I ultimately distinguish this affirmation from the geopolitics of nineteenth-century culture associated with westward movement, expanding slavery, and the displacement of indigenous peoples. Rather, as my chapters will show, affirmation aspires to

overcome all negativity including colonizing and territorializing urges. For if to expand a national identity by increase happens through limiting divergence and variation, and so if a developing unity delimits to consume multitude, then negativity directs cultivation and reaps what it sows: monoculture and diminished experience. Conversely, affirmation means the deterritorialization and diversification of identity due to an inherent excess. Life always exceeds itself in Emersonian thinking, passing over all negativity. Nowhere—one might say ironically—in Emerson's writing is negativity more deactivated than in "Self-Reliance" (1841) where indwelling identities fracture and become confused with what is outside of their interiority. Even "intuition" for Emerson, in Gregg Crane's formulation, "is often experienced as a kind of rapture, a feeling of being carried away or overwhelmed...to create a sense of endless interconnection with other people and a blissful acceptance of the world and all its diversity." The inmost—in Emerson—almost always becomes the outmost and multiples. Intuition responds affirmatively to a vast exterior, thus "will always remain beyond."<sup>16</sup> But if our intimate experience compels us towards what is beyond, we are always dilating, perhaps at risk of becoming something else entirely, letting go of what is for what is to come. For Emerson, it remains the weightiest task to think loss with buoyancy, to, despite the vicissitudes of experience, affirm what life entails.

There are numerous moments when Emerson explicitly posits the personal rushing towards the impersonal. For example, in "The Poet" (1844) he "sees the flowing or metamorphosis; perceives that thought is multiform; that within the form of every creature is a force impelling it to life."<sup>17</sup> "All is in progress," he claims in "Art" (1861), "and ascension, and metamorphosis."<sup>18</sup> And, most famously, in "Circles" (1841) he proposes that "life" constantly "rushes on all sides onwards to new and larger circles, and that without end" and thus "tends

outward with a vast force, and to immense and innumerable expansions.”<sup>19</sup> As I postulated in opening, Emerson’s demonology assumes immanence, but he does not mean that what is immanent does not break through itself to transform. Rather, immanence equals transcendence insofar as life overflows (and so literally transcends itself) by endogenous force, a compulsion to change. In recent decades such long overlooked logic of concentric overflowing in Emerson’s writing has garnered some important critical attention. A significant and somewhat controversial reader of Emerson, Stanley Cavell follows the logic of overgrowth to question that if life unfolds itself onward, what departs? Since the “inmost becomes the outmost,” life “requires not inhabitation and settlement but abandonment, leaving,” Cavell notes. “Onward thinking,” as he terms Emersonian thought, thus involves an “enthusiasm” for “forgetting ourselves, together with what he calls leaving.” But if life rushes concentrically (and so nothing is expelled or excluded by its affirmative force), what could Emerson possibly mean by leaving? In order to leave, the forces that hold an identity together, however temporality, become unfixed through a momentum that weakens boundaries between interiority and exteriority, driving being towards becoming. What is fixed oversteps itself, enthusiastically. Emersonian thinking, according to Cavell, is therefore “not to be final but always to be leaving,” requiring an “abandoning of despair” which “is the task of onwardness.”<sup>20</sup> (A “new departure, and departure after departure, in long series.”)<sup>21</sup> Such dynamic, the particularity that despairs to be indrawn and the enthusiasm by which it exits its situation, is at the heart of Emersonian thinking, wherein that “way of life is wonderful: it is by abandonment.”<sup>22</sup>

Building upon Cavell’s insight—alongside its resonances with Richard Poirier, Cameron, and George Kateb’s criticism against a tradition of voluntary and stable individualism in Emerson—Branka Arsić diagnoses an entire philosophy of leaving in Emerson’s thinking

whereby fragile identities cannot withhold their transformative potential, and so depart from themselves to arrive somewhere else through “exaggeration and ecstasy.” She explains that Emerson’s “ontology of becoming is therefore fundamentally—almost analytically—an ontology of leaving. Since nothing *is* but everything *becomes*.” Crucially, I argue, Arsić advances on Cavell by returning becoming to its demonological context, accentuating previously downplayed lines in Emerson’s writing about demonism and life. “Emerson’s theory of life,” which is about “everyday life,” she in fact claims, requires an understanding of his “demonology.” Moreover, she raises the philosophical stakes, “there is no ‘true’ ontology—which for Emerson means no theory of our lives—if it does not incorporate” demonology into our understanding. For Arsić, Emerson’s demonology is about finding ourselves in transitional moments when lived boundaries rupture and overflow. There exists, that is to say, a borderline over which becoming happens and at that “threshold we encounter the demon.” We therefore experience our incorporation in transformative processes since demonism shines at the border between what is and what becomes by indicating the moment when we overstep ourselves by “point[ing] to a variety of phenomena that remain out of reach.” For we answer the call when the demonic appears at our threshold and invites us outside to experience the terrors and joys of abandonment. In Arsić’s reading, through demonism we thus “experience transformation” to notice “not only what one becomes, but the fact that one is ceaselessly becoming.”<sup>23</sup>

Beginning with the concept of relentless fecundity, we might regard the “upheaving principle of life,” so Emerson puts it, as a philosophically significant premise, something that places established metaphysics—and the residual beliefs therein—at risk. “Emerson is a radical thinker,” Arsić proposes, by affirming flights into transformation “precisely because he takes them literally and draws a series of consequences from them.”<sup>24</sup> For if metaphysics from Plato to

present registers life as in some way insufficient, the insurmountable emergence of life in Emerson's writing represents a radical perspective, an upheaval in philosophy. I take this as a possible response to Cavell's rhetorical prompt in *The Sense of Walden* (1972): "Why has America never expressed itself philosophically? Or has it—in the metaphysical riot of its greatest literature?"<sup>25</sup> Without making much commotion, the riot happens in the Emersonian worldview. The problem of recognition, however, has been due to an enduring critical assumption, as Cavell says, that Emerson "cannot be as philosophical" as he appears, and that his statements are often not "to be taken as serious philosophical observations." For if we otherwise allow Emerson "the right to philosophize," readers would take him literally, or how philosophers usually demand to be read.<sup>26</sup> "What seems to [Cavell] signature in Emerson is the weight that he puts on the obvious, where the difficulty is taking him at his word."<sup>27</sup> This everyday philosophy in Emerson has perhaps been additionally troublesome for readers to recognize since he upends their commonplace feelings with a certain degree of radicality that tests credulity to its breaking point, at last requiring a revolution in thinking within everyday experience. Put alternatively, Cavell finds Emerson unrecognized for his philosophical potential because we are not yet prepared to read what he writes, and so lack the courage to take his words seriously. Some readers, however, have borne the responsibility for taking Emerson to the extreme and thereby read him philosophically. But the efforts required to understand Emerson as a radical thinker are rarely undertaken, since Emerson is "to be taken literally, and that, of course, is most difficult to do," as Poirier explains. "Try instead to literalize," he encourages readers, "to believe what is being said, and take responsibility for the belief." For instance, he asks "what if" a "remark" by Emerson "is taken as seriously as I think it ought to be taken?" When do we decide that he has gone too far? At which moment do we turn away? "After all," he continues, "if you follow a writer into the

maze, you can at any time decide simply to leave him there.”<sup>28</sup> We can deny Emerson, of course. Readers are always endowed with the privilege to deny. But what if we stay with him? Where does he go?

To perceive how Emerson’s thinking is radical—to follow him towards his culminating thought—we must register what he considers as the standard philosophy from which he goes astray, or even seeks to overturn. If Emerson thinks by concentric emergence, Plato thinks conversely by drawing divergences into a fixed unity, a sphere. Emerson’s Plato bases philosophy in understanding how the changeless outshines change; how, that is to say, we prepare in essence to escape this unstable world for an ideal world elsewhere. In *Representative Men*, the text from which my introduction draws most of its philosophical consequences, Emerson explains that “Plato first drew the sphere,” an arrested form.<sup>29</sup> “Here,” Emerson identifies the emblem, “is the germ of” philosophical “Europe” where it is “already discernable in the mind of Plato,—and in none before him.”<sup>30</sup> Devaluing variable life, Plato speculates that another, higher way succeeds it, reevaluating values. Lived thinking, manifold by its embodiment in a world of diverse experience, would thus be for Plato overcome by an idea (*ιδέα*), a mental fixation (*νοῦς*) aspiring to a formal fixation (*εἶδος*).<sup>31</sup> Life, for Plato, is therefore overrun by specious shadows, even fleeting delusions of sensation. Accordingly, to uncover the truth Platonically is not by way of positive experience, which deceives even when it appears to enlighten, but rather by a negative process of disenchantment. For if experience is grounded in a sensorium that is in turn grounded in the transitory world, only through a technique of denial does Plato root out falsity. Because the fixed realm is empirically inaccessible, and because we must disbelieve what we experience, Platonic epistemology is only negative, for if our faculties cannot be trusted, only the power of denial remains at our disposal. But since the capacity to

deny cannot wholly originate from our lives, otherwise it could not be believed, it must contain some alien element that traverses both the corporeal and incorporeal realms with perspective on truth to reveal what is indeed untruth, casting the world in a negative light. Plato, Emerson consequently remarks, is thus “guided by his dæmon to that which is truly his own,” and labors to reject everything else.<sup>32</sup> Selecting Plato to represent philosophy, Emerson discloses in Platonism an enduring demonic intuition that enters personal thinking at inception to gainsay everyday experience. We readily recognize classical demonism masquerading in conventional hierarchies: mind over matter, thought over body, intellect over sense, and so on, each duality including an elusive, otherworldly ingredient. Persisting in subsequent philosophical doctrines, negative demonology thus delineates normative philosophy. “Plato is philosophy,” Emerson determines, “and philosophy, Plato,—at once the glory and shame of mankind.”

Emerson traces Plato’s negative demonology to his “master,” Socrates, but it is a mastery contrived by his student to fabricate a pedigree.<sup>33</sup> Plato’s “thoughts,” Emerson observes, assume “paternity” because “they carry, and enforce, and propagate his dogma.” “No doctrine has shown more vitality in this way than what is called the Platonic Philosophy. It had its own ancestry.”<sup>34</sup> Plato births his own master. “Socrates and Plato,” Emerson lays out the conditions of their bond, “are the double star which the most powerful instruments will not entirely separate.”<sup>35</sup> Long before *Representative Men* draws Plato and Socrates together into a Siamese philosopher, Emerson considers how the inextricable double star guides modernity. His college essay, “The Character of Socrates” (1820), stresses that “modern” philosophy “is more indebted to...Socrates and Plato than is generally allowed, or perhaps than modern philosophers have been well aware.”<sup>36</sup> Against life’s “frightful voluptuousness,” from Plato’s Socrates come “persevering habits of forbearance and self-denial” at the behest of his “δαίμων” (demon).<sup>37</sup> Continuing his



observation into *Representative Men*, Emerson clarifies that Socrates' demon "did not advise him to act or to find...it dissuaded him." Whatever "Socrates" beholds his "Dæmon opposes."<sup>38</sup> By such indwelling opposition, Socrates turns to arguing against everything apparent, engaging in agonistic dialogues that persuade by confounding and cast doubt upon everyday experience. However, his negativity, the driving force behind his dialogues, sufficiently annoyed the Athenians, who charged him accordingly for mischief. Embracing death, Socrates quaffed hemlock—proving his conviction—and negated himself to become a "martyr" for Plato.<sup>39</sup> This trial and death of Socrates, in Emerson's estimation, is "the best example of that synthesis which constitutes Plato's extraordinary power." He sees the moral to Socrates' story and none before him. Plato, "a man who could see two sides of a thing," the master dialectician, models thinking on contradictions resolved by a "union of impossibilities," overcoming multiplicity in life for unity in the afterlife. Such thinking "has clapped a copyright on the world," Emerson estimates the influence of Plato who "has the fortune in the history of mankind to mark an epoch." What do we call this patented thinking that we owe a debt to Plato for propagating? "I call it Dialectic," Emerson names the proprietary ingredient that backdrops occidental thinking.<sup>40</sup> Henceforth as Alfred North Whitehead famously declares and Emerson wholeheartedly anticipates, philosophy has been nothing but footnotes to Plato.<sup>41</sup>

Emerson finds himself at the edge of Plato's epoch, to either tip into reiteration and thus conformity, or to fly into different territory. He chooses the latter. Since Plato is philosophy, the only substantially philosophical intervention available to Emerson—the only possible revolution in philosophy—cannot be without Platonism. And since Plato cannot be dismissed without ending philosophy itself, the only intervention possible remains the most radical, totally reversing the primary conditions of Platonism, inciting a crisis in thought.<sup>42</sup> For everything that

Plato thinks, Emerson thus thinks the opposite without negation, indeed, without dialectics. Strictly speaking, the only substantially philosophical intervention after Plato is reverse Platonism, overturning unity into variety, being into becoming, and negation into affirmation without overcoming difference, to make it so that “philosophy is affirmative.”<sup>43</sup> (“Being is the vast affirmative, excluding negation.”)<sup>44</sup> He affirms the combined suffering and ecstasy that we otherwise resent, for “it appears to us that we lack the affirmative principle.” In “Experience,” Emerson thus proposes that we must overgrow “limitations of the affirmative” to “make affirmations outside of them” in a mood that salutes life as emphatic contradiction and multiplicity. “Life is not dialectics.”<sup>45</sup> In “Intellect” (1841), Emerson makes his definitive pronouncement: “let us end these dialectics.”<sup>46</sup> He therefore deserves advanced recognition for what Elizabeth Grosz now calls “a philosophical ‘lineage,’” one “counter to the Platonic,” a “counterphilosophy” with its “ethics of affirmation.”<sup>47</sup> We can trace this counterphilosophy from Emerson, to Nietzsche, to Gilles Deleuze, two serious Emersonians who champion affirmative thought.<sup>48</sup> As for Deleuze, to overturn Plato we must begin, again, with Plato. Given that “Platonism,” Deleuze repeats Emerson, “thus found the entire domain that philosophy will later recognize as its own,” the only authentically philosophical alternative to Platonism, since the refutation of Plato would end philosophy, is his reversal.<sup>49</sup>

Restoring affirmative thinking is thus about renewing a counterphilosophy, beginning again with Aristotle. “Overturning Plato” exchanges idealism for empiricism “to reverse Platonism,” so “then philosophy begins with Aristotle,” as Michel Foucault observes in his review of Deleuze’s counterphilosophy.<sup>50</sup> In *On Divination* (350 BCE) Aristotle accordingly inverts Plato’s demonology so that “nature is daemonic.” Since the “daemonic” is embedded within the common by virtue of “belonging to the natural order,” it radiates through the ordinary

and therein operates experientially.<sup>51</sup> Crucially, Foucault's reiteration of Deleuze's counterphilosophy also reiterates Martin Heidegger's revisionist lectures (1942–1943) on demonic thinking without Platonism. According to Heidegger, Aristotle, Plato's disciple, is the first to overturn him, rotating philosophy into thinking about "*δαιμόνια*, 'the demonic'" as "excessive" only "from the point of view of the ordinary." What exceeds everyday experience actually takes its abode therein, driving life outwards by increase. Being hence demonically "shows itself" through beings "present everywhere as the perfectly ordinary."<sup>52</sup> Clarifying this "ontology" (Heidegger's term) of unconcealment," Levinson has recently diagnosed "a new aspiration" in criticism that "[shifts] to the ontic—a call for thinking to attend...to the Thing ("Being") that underwrites that existence and plurality of things—" which "is a move toward 'radical objectivity' ...a kind of plenipotentiary relational field...that brings forth those entities...and brings forth, too, the working relations between them."<sup>53</sup> Levinson, that is to say, notes that Heidegger's ontology ushers in an objectivity that is radical insofar as it aspires to unconcealment and disclosure without eliding relational contingency and surprise. Heidegger therefore bases thinking in everyday experience as shining, appearing, and so opening, the condition of openness. Beginning his lectures with what is apparently true for thinking, Heidegger defines truth as unconcealedness (*ἀλήθεια*), and so the unfolding into appearance of what is otherwise concealed (*λήθη*) or hidden from thought. For him, this means that underlying ontological relations become manifest through unfolding into multiplicity, the condition of "appearance in the sense of pure shining and radiating." Plato, he argues, inverted primitive thinking's essential terms so that apparent manifestations become representative (*ψεῦδος*), and thereby "marks the inception of Western metaphysics." By restoring thinking to its primitive

ground in concealment and unconcealment, Heidegger therefore significantly contributes to Plato's reversal.

Overturing Plato is consequently about thinking before and after Plato, about thinking outside of the Platonic tradition. "Anaximander, Parmenides, and Heraclitus are the only primordial thinkers," Heidegger remarks in recognizing the origins of Presocratic and Postsocratic thinking. Where demonism reveals apparent life as falsity in Socratic thinking and so rejects making its home therein, for the Presocratics—take Heraclitus by way of example—the demonic shines through life. By virtue of its uncanniness, demonism arises through the conflictual movement from concealedness to unconcealedness to reveal life as transformation into openness. Disclosing the margins of experience, demonism faces experience towards what is necessary for such life: "emergence into the unconcealed." The "demonic" therefore indicates the "way a living thing is positioned...into the unconcealed" in order to "let play out the folds of the manifold into their multiplicity."<sup>54</sup> Taking this as the meaning behind Heraclitus' disputed fragment, "*ἦθος ἀνθρώπων δαίμων*," I translate it as "we are demonically situated."<sup>55</sup> The fragment is often translated as "man is characterized by his fate." However, reading "*δαίμων*" as "demon" and "*ἦθος ἀνθρώπων*" as "human ethos," the fragment means, on face, "the human ethos is demonic." Since "*ἀνθρώπων*" has a more general sense than "person," closer to suggesting "human quality," and "*ἦθος*" means more than ("character") "disposition," being also "habitat," home, or nature, then "*ἦθος ἀνθρώπων δαίμων*" proposes, in my translation, that demonism indicates our life as such, as what is true for beings, that is, unconcealedness. In Heidegger's understanding of Heraclitus' primitive thinking, a "living being" is thus "a being whose Being is determined by *φύσις* [(growth)], by emergence and self-opening."<sup>56</sup>

With Heraclitus, we perceive necessitarian thinking. But Heraclitus is not a necessitarian by resignation; rather, his thinking emerges from life and its affective unfolding—constituted by its outwardness—and so thinks affirmatively. “Life activates thought,” as Deleuze places this “pre-Socratic” thinking, “and thought in turn *affirms* life.” “In a way, this secret of the pre-Socratics was already lost at the start” and “remains to be discovered in the future.”<sup>57</sup> In the nineteenth-century, Thomas Carlyle’s everlasting yea—spoken by his Zarathustrian madman, Diogenes Teufelsdröckh—ruptures through centuries of despair to stir affirmative thinking and proclaim “open thy Goethe.”<sup>58</sup> Emerson, Fuller, Thoreau, and Melville all studied the everlasting yea and heeded Teufelsdröckh’s madness, which is only mad by diverting from the everlasting no’s cruel sanity, as what is sane is regularity within normative discourse. When naysaying pervades culture—when only the no seems possible—affirmation becomes the most revolutionary deed, a new possibility.

Resuscitating the affirmation lost to Platonic negativity, in *Representative Men* Emerson systematically overturns Plato into Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, a thinker “at home and happy in his century and the world. None was so fit to live.”<sup>59</sup> Most crucially for my reading, the overturning happens by comparative demonology. Emerson’s scheme in *Representative Men* is not innocent; in fact, by sequentially overturning demonism from Plato to Goethe, he activates affirmative demonology within a book whose importance in American literature cannot be overstated, the “autobiography, under the title of *Poetry and Truth*” (1811). Emerson describes how, in Goethe’s influential autobiography, “lurking dæmons sat to him” ordinarily—before his own eyes—so that he “saw the dæmons” as “metaphysical elements.”<sup>60</sup> What is concealed by experience in Plato thus becomes unconcealed for Goethe (who acts as a “secretary” recording “dæmons”), constituting an empirically available and unfolding surface.<sup>61</sup> For Plato, his

concealed demon sways him away from the world; for Goethe, on the other hand, demons multiply before him and intoxicate him with life, throwing (*Geworfen*) him further towards the world, the empirical condition (*Erfahrung*) of his life affirmation (*Weltfrömmigkeit*). David Farrell Krell, following what Walter Benjamin in his reading of Goethe notes as an “alarming ‘spread’ of the daimonic—of daimonic life, or ‘daimon life,’” understands demonism as sheer “ζα-μενής” (life-force), even “a strange...discourse of emphatic life, differentiation and proliferation.”<sup>62</sup> Therefore Heraclitus’ demon (“δαίμων”), I so develop upon what Angus Nicholls’ discerns in his groundbreaking *Goethe’s Concept of the Daemonic: After the Ancients* (2006), “first appears in pre-Socratic philosophy” and becomes submerged “before making a spectacular return to Western thought” primarily “in the works of Goethe.”<sup>63</sup> Overturned Platonic demonology permeates Goethe’s writing; for example, in his poem “ΔΑΙΜΩΝ, Daemon,” where he returns to the Presocratic notion of existential unfolding. “You grew forthwith,” Goethe writes, “and prospered, in your growing / Heeded the law presiding at your birth... You must be...minted from that lives and living grows.”<sup>64</sup>

For select American authors, Goethe therefore borrows his “Demonic” term for emphatic life “after the example of the ancients,” generating a complete categorical revision in philosophical history, so that, in Poirier’s words, “the implication is that the New World offers an opportunity less to disown the Old than to rediscover its true origins otherwise obscured within the encrustations of acquired culture.”<sup>65</sup> For if the ancients are primordial thinkers, and if Plato overthrows primordialism, then he disowns himself from the Greek thought to which Goethe achieves membership. Plato overturns thinking into philosophy, whereas Goethe overturns Platonism back into the primitive, what then also becomes the modern. From the Emersonian worldview, American writers register a new division in thinking whereby Goethe

becomes more Greek than Plato. In a letter to Emerson, Fuller thence expresses frustration with “Socrates.” “The mere Idealist vexes me,” she complains, “because he seems to me never to have lived.” She goes on attack “Plato” who too “is not Greek enough” since he is “forlorn” compared to how “ever vigorous nature delights to feel itself living.”<sup>66</sup> To the contrary, “Goethe was a Greek” who, unlike Socrates or Plato, is “constitutionally and by habit of his life averse to the worship of sorrow.”<sup>67</sup> “Writing is worthless except as a record of life,” and Goethe’s “works grow out of life.”<sup>68</sup> Greek thought comes before and after Platonism, making its return to “Goethe,” who is “in this very thing the most modern of the moderns, has shown us, as none ever did, the genius of the ancients” wherefore Emerson grants his importance to the American Renaissance, an authentic renaissance, a rebirth.<sup>69</sup> Consequently, Emerson, Fuller, Thoreau, and Melville all read about Goethe’s demonology in *Truth and Poetry (Dichtung und Wahrheit)*, experimenting with his perspective in some of their most essential writing.

Emerson delivers his last lecture on *Human Life*, “Demonology,” in Boston and at the Concord Lyceum in 1839. “Goethe, has,” Emerson announces on these occasions, “in his own autobiography recorded speculations upon the same topic, which are well worth citing,” and so recites the entire “*Demoniacal*” passage from *Book Twenty* of *Truth and Poetry*.<sup>70</sup> That same year, Fuller publishes her translation of Goethe’s *Conversations with Eckermann* and begins—despite existing editions—her own translation of *Truth and Poetry*. A few years later, in “Goethe” (1841), Fuller reviews *Truth and Poetry* for the *Dial*, translating and quoting Goethe’s entire demoniacal passage. Through Emerson and Fuller, Goethe’s demonology reaches many of America’s most recognizable thinkers, but it is already in the air by that time and continues to be studied for the next decade.<sup>71</sup> Thoreau knows about Emerson’s oration and Fuller’s essay, but he also reads *Truth and Poetry* on his own before traveling to climb Mount Katahdin in 1846,

whereupon summiting he experiences “nature primitive,” an “unhanselled and ancient Demonic Nature.”<sup>72</sup> Likewise, on Christmas Day, 1849, whilst planning *Moby-Dick*, Melville stops in a London bookshop and acquires some volumes written by Goethe, including *Truth and Poetry*, to eventually describe in his famed “Whiteness of the Whale” chapter how Ishmael recognizes “demonism in the world.”<sup>73</sup> While I am not claiming that these writers’ demonologies are totally limited to what they acquire from *Truth and Poetry* (indeed, they each go further), I do claim that Goethe’s sway over American literary history until now been unappreciated for its demonological significance, regardless of the otherwise rich appreciation for his influence.

While all four American writers take their inspiration from Goethe, Fuller explicates *Truth and Poetry* with the greatest precision and her summary bears repeating, for it gets at the heart of what my dissertation seeks to demonstrate about demonology in American literature, because to understand forthright superabundance requires understanding Goethe’s theory of existence according to how lives emerge (*Bildungstrieb*) and disintegrate (*Zersetzung*) within a general unfolding of life qua life.<sup>74</sup> “As to the Daemoniacal,” she remarks, “I know not that I can say to you anything more precise than you find from Goethe,” for its “existence” is something that “shines” by “calling forth.” “In nature, we trace it in all volcanic workings.” The demonic element in life “is not necessarily either malignant or the reverse, but it has no scope beyond demonstrating its existence.”<sup>75</sup> An “existence,” she translates directly, “which [seems to Goethe] to mingle with all others, sometimes to separate, sometimes to unite, [he calls] the *Dämonische*” (the demonic).<sup>76</sup> As Krell notes, the demonic appears to Goethe as an “essence [*Wesen*], which [seems] to advance into the midst of all the others, to separate them off, to bind them together.”<sup>77</sup> In Goethe, the demonic is a “something” (“*etwas*”) that “manifests itself only in contradictions”



to intimate a twoness between life in general and what lives, a *binding disjunction* through which it divaricates.<sup>78</sup>

Goethe's provisional selection of "the demonic" is therefore due to his need for an ultimately untranslatable term at the rudiments of life. In his 1821 correspondence, Goethe references the demonic ("*Dämonisch*") as a primeval phenomenon ("*Urphänomen*").<sup>79</sup> "*Urphänomen*," Goethe's own neologism, means a thing essential enough to bewilder sense, "something" not fully "captured under any concept, much less a word." Kirk Wetters has recently discussed Goethe's "riddle" through notable interpreters like Hans Blumenberg and Georg Lukács.<sup>80</sup> While Wetters maintains that Goethe's demonism "is designed tantalize" since the "referent remains a sheer *etwas*" (something), having "not been properly named," forever the "lack of a better word," and so a "*metaphor*," I follow a different belief, that demonism can be literal, taken seriously at face value, however frustratingly paradoxical in meaning.<sup>81</sup> By taking the term literally, I mean that otherwise taking it metaphorically risks its ungraspable past—an origin mysterious for Greeks themselves but somewhat perceivable by its various instantiations—that etymological reconstruction will not demystify, since the demonic is spoken through Homer and Hesiod from ancestral voices lost beyond our imagination, when words and things could not be told apart, what Emerson designates as the natural history of language.<sup>82</sup> For "as we go back in history" before the "corruption of language," Emerson writes in *Nature* (1836), a "radical correspondence" becomes evident in the "immediate dependence of language upon nature."<sup>83</sup> To overturn Platonism to the upmost is thus to reverse representation absolutely, to return words to things and therein they reverberate affirmatively. Behind all utterances of "the demonic" thus passes its Neolithic ground, a primordial sense that things (*τὸ δαιμόνιες*) manifest simultaneously through *connecting and dividing*, the relational basis of existence. Crucially, we

here take Goethe's demonism back to Arsić's Emersonian reading, repeating that "the demon," she clarifies, "is the power that connects while lacerating." Through the "endless doubling of the demonologically divided world," we overserve in Emerson that the "world is not one but rather that the one is a multiplicity."<sup>84</sup> At last we arrive at the double (but not traditionally dualistic) demonical aspects of the one and/as the many, according to which life-force proliferates and so moves (animates) manifold, serial embodiments.

Such processes of individuation and deindividuation (via *nature naturing*)<sup>85</sup> in Goethe's demonology are meaningfully joined by Nicolls to Spinoza. Even though my dissertation only gives peripheral attention to what Levinson notes as "Goethe's well-established interest in Spinoza" (while also acknowledging a broad indebtedness to that relationship), a brief paragraph here on the *Ethics* (1677) through the view of Levinson's Romantic Spinoza will serve to suggest additional disciplinary affinities, including between demonology and Spinozism's sway over ecological criticism.<sup>86</sup> Levinson's account provides significant insight into the reception of Spinoza in Romanticism, helping to illustrate, I so claim, the extensive cultural background of Goethe's demonology. Spinoza's "double-aspect monism," as Levinson formulates univocity of being, does not allow the unified aspect to supersede the pluralistic aspect, rather life doubles into two domains related through a disjunction in sense, the "differentiated but undivided states of being."<sup>87</sup> Each of the "two incommensurable attributes" thus "completely 'expresses'" being so that "neither can be reduced to the other," generating "two surfaces," an onto-topological fold so that what is infinitely singular is also an infinite multiplicity, "[saving] Spinoza's monism from meltdown into undifferentiated unity."<sup>88</sup> The irreducible difference in Spinoza's ontology, ensuring the productive and non-hierarchical contrast between the monistic and pluralistic aspects of being, is emblemized by Samuel Taylor Coleridge's marginalia in Georg Wilhelm

Friedrich Hegel's *Wissenschaft der Logik* (1816), writing that "Spinozism in its most superficial form," for him, ("=") equals "Oceans and Waves," life and lives.<sup>89</sup> Oceanic thinking manifests a world of *pure cause* and a world of *pure effect*, an insurmountable fissure between a *body* of water and the *motion* of waves—as verbs from the noun which they arise—that, by Levinson's formulation, "offers a picture of an immanent, nondualistic history of becoming."<sup>90</sup> Two parallel senses means that for Spinoza "causes" and "effects" are mutually affirmed, redeeming primitive thinking.<sup>91</sup>

Carrying our thinking to a "lower stratum of thought," Jane Ellen Harrison (1850-1928), the somewhat lost reader of Spinoza, calls for antiquarians "to do what Professor [Henri] Bergson bids modern philosophy to do," account for "life as one, as indivisible, yet as perennial movement and change," a return to "demonic nature."<sup>92</sup> In the Presocratic thought that Harrison aspires for, demonism is affirmed through the "seasonal *dromenon*" (*Δρώμενον*), agonistic rituals that embrace the conflicting drives for a life that is at once both one and many, a labor "eternally recurrent" (*παλιγγενεσία*).<sup>93</sup> There is no place for negativity in this ritualistic reverberation. The negative, seeking to overcome contradiction, to uplift something essential from agonism, makes no return. Only affirmation returns, is seasonal.<sup>94</sup> "Disciple" of "Nietzsche" (who is in turn the disciple of Emerson), Harrison thus situates affirmative thinking again on the horizon as radical thinking, so for her "contemporaries" she "has appeared dangerous. Their fear is justified." And yet, all must be risked. "I must set sail in seas as yet for me uncharted," Harrison writes.<sup>95</sup> Her writing demonstrates, at least gesturally, Nietzsche's well-established interest in Emerson, an interest that my dissertation hopes to clarify from the until now unexplored demonological perspective.

“—What, if some day or night,” Nietzsche queries, “a demon were to steal after you into your loneliest loneliness and say to you: ‘This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and everything unutterable small or great in your life will have to return to you, all in the same.’” When this demon arrives in your solitary hour, would you bargain away your doubts and eternally return to this life, just as it is, again and again? “Would you,” Nietzsche questions, “curse the demon who spoke thus?” Or would you affirm everything and cry “Yes!” to your own life? Nietzsche titles the *eternal recurrence of the same* as the “*greatest weight*,” an almost unbearable thought that must be borne out in every moment.<sup>96</sup> If we rejoice, we must will our fate evermore—submit our life to all that it entails—bringing it to an extreme as to embrace endlessly reliving all our joys and sufferings.<sup>97</sup> “‘*Will you or won’t you have it so?*’ is the most probing question we are ever asked; we are asked it every hour of the day,” so James echoes Nietzsche. “But the deepest question that is ever asked admits of no reply but the dumb turning of the will and tightening of our heartstrings as we say, ‘*Yes, I will even have it so!*’”<sup>98</sup> Demonism’s wager is the ultimate attitudinal decision, the two most essential ontological perspectives available: affirm or deny all that we experience, as there is at base no other impulse. Only through thinking the eternal return can negativity give way to thinking pure affirmation. Only when we crave every bit of this life to the extent that we would live it eternally down to the last detail is thought free of the negative. But this is the most difficult task, to think affirmatively.

Those who affirm are “perceivers of the terror of life” and believe “themselves to face it.” “If we must accept Fate, we are not less compelled to affirm,” Emerson writes, for to deny will not improve our lot, only weaken our living. “No picture of life,” Emerson confesses, “can have any veracity that does not admit of odious facts.” The unfolding of such picture cannot be avoided since “every man is haunted by his own daemon,” which will at one time or another disclose our latent conviction and await our making the pledge of pledges. Ambivalence will not suffice. The demon cannot be cheated.<sup>99</sup> From life arises qualia which take to either the negative or affirmative views. The heaviest thought drives thinking to its corner and therein forces what must be definitive, even emphatic. In Ned Lukacher’s wonderful summarization, “you must suffer when a daemon (ein Dämon) whispers to you that “everything unutterably small or great in your life will have to return to you.”<sup>100</sup> You must suffer affirmation, that is the point. For the reason of being the being which reveals itself as the conditions of being as such, thought appears in the midst of demonism and takes its home therein, which is why the Greek word for wellbeing is εὐδαιμονία. A eudaimonic (εὐδαιμονικά) life thus bears thinking, and so why Emerson discovers so much—too much—in Goethe. In *Truth and Poetry*, Goethe celebrates the “Daemonic” in Lamoral, Count of Egmont, who, despite his enviable endowments and an unassailable character, experiences an unjustifiable reversal of outrageous fortune to find himself on the executioner’s block. From his studies in sixteenth-century Netherlandish history, Goethe writes *Egmont* (1778) about a buoyant type who overrides all despair, regardless of inestimable wrongs, affirming his seeming misfortune to the last. For Egmont, Goethe says, “I ascribed to him unlimited enjoyment of life.”<sup>101</sup>

By suggesting that the inversion of demonic thinking occupies the pages of American writing in the context of Goethe, suddenly Emerson’s claim that “It was not possible to write a

story of Shakespeare till now” becomes sensible, “for [Shakespeare] is the father of German literature.” The return of Shakespeare to American thinking through German writing was a “rapid burst,” in Emerson’s words, meaning “It was not until the nineteenth century, whose speculative genius is a sort of living Hamlet, that the tragedy of Hamlet could find such wondering readers. Now, literature, philosophy and thought are Shakepearized. His mind is the horizon beyond which, at present, we do not see.”<sup>102</sup> By arguing that Hamlet’s mind expands such that we cannot think beyond him, Emerson delimits modernism by Shakespeare’s tragedy. When demonism manifests through a phantasm, the palace guards demand that Horatio, “a scholar,” must “speak to it,” and though the demon “harrows [him] which fear and wonder,” he begs it “Stay! Speak, speak!” Shakespeare’s play dramatizes the turn in demonism whereby life desires to overcome negativity. Horatio registers that the demon “bodes some strange eruption to our state,” a pun which both means the state of Denmark and ontology. While Horatio is a scholar, the ontological upheaval puzzles his thinking. “In what particular thought to work, I know not.” Since Hamlet’s mind represents the rupture of nineteenth-century thinking, he bears the responsibility of hearing the demon’s words. “Unto young Hamlet, for upon my life,” Horatio determines, “This spirit, dumb to us, will speak to him.”<sup>103</sup> The story of Hamlet, so familiar, can be noticed again differently: by affirming the demonic manifestation, the prince goes towards a love of fate, what Nietzsche names “*amor fati*” upon reading Emerson’s essay “Fate” (1860).<sup>104</sup> Hamlet’s reorientation anticipates Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence, which is presented to Horatio with the “fall of a sparrow” speech when Hamlet accepts “augury.” “Let be.”<sup>105</sup> These “Birds with auguries on their wings,” Emerson thus begins his essay “Fate” so formative for Nietzsche, they “Chanted undeceiving things,” the question of questions: “How shall I live?”<sup>106</sup>

I here end my introduction with a word on Emerson infamous “Divinity School Address” (1838) in light of what has been hitherto argued, to suggest more about why his remarks that day branded him a radical during what he describes as “these desponding days.”<sup>107</sup> “In this refulgent summer,” Emerson so begins, “it has been a luxury to draw the breath of life. The grass grows, the buds burst.” “The mystery of nature was never displayed more happily,” all is apparent, and so we must “respect the perfection of this world, in which our sense converse.” Take your “life” and “enjoy it.” What else “can be done by us?” “He saith yea and nay, only.”<sup>108</sup> What say you?

<sup>1</sup> In Fuller's words, "the ordinary contains the extraordinary." In *Summer on the Lakes* (1844), Fuller, in the context of explaining demonism, claims that "Nothing is truer than the Wordsworthian creed, on which Carlyle lays such stress, that we need only look on the miracle of everyday." Margaret Fuller, *Summer on the Lakes, The Essential Margaret Fuller* (New Brunswick: Rutgers UP, 1992), 148, 146.

<sup>2</sup> Ralph W. Emerson, "*The Poet*," *Essays: First and Second Series* (New York: The Library of America, 1990), 223.

<sup>3</sup> Otherwise known as the "Daemon in nature." Josiah Royce, *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1892), 423. Or what Werner Beyer eloquently describes as an "organic, animistic, and daemonic view of nature." Werner William Beyer, *Keats and the Daemon King* (New York: Oxford UP, 1947), 91.

<sup>4</sup> Elaine Scarry, *On Beauty and Being Just* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1999), 68.

<sup>5</sup> I claim, from the perspective of an overturned Plato, the exact opposite of what Harold Bloom writes of demonism in *The Daemon Knows: Literary Greatness and the American Sublime* (2015), that, "After Emerson, American makers themselves daemonize" like in "Ancient Greece." Harold Bloom, *The Daemon Knows: Literary Greatness and the American Sublime* (New York: Spiegel & Grau, 2015), 28. Unlike for Bloom, however, where the Platonic demon spontaneously imparts otherworldly genius to the mind, what I show to preoccupy the American canon is a rupture which, rather than divinizing works, provokes the weaving of contrasting textual threads across which manifests a literary demonism. The texts of Emerson, Fuller, Thoreau, and Melville are a sort of writing against dialectics—against thinking the negative—which affirms the primitive tension of being erupting with everyday phenomena.

<sup>6</sup> Anne Sauvagnargues aptly describes the negative as doing the labor of dialectics, a labor which is necessary to revolve contradiction. Anne Sauvagnargues, *Deleuze: L'empirisme transcendantal* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2009), 264.

<sup>7</sup> Ralph W. Emerson, *Journals*, Vol. 9, eds. Edward Waldo Emerson and Waldo Emerson Forbes (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1913), 326.

<sup>8</sup> Ralph W. Emerson, "*Experience*," *Essays: First and Second Series* (New York: The Library of America, 1990), 241, 248, 255, 254, 261.

<sup>9</sup> Marjorie Levinson, *Thinking Through Poetry: Field Reports on Romantic Lyric* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2018), 2. Richard Rorty might call these movements "Materialism without Mind-Body Identity." Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2009), 114.

<sup>10</sup> Emerson, "*Experience*," 252.

<sup>11</sup> Charles Feidelson, *Symbolism and American Literature* (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1960), 1.

<sup>12</sup> To gain purchase with Cameron's criticism, my claim should not reproduce the very "dualism" that Arsić, in her reading of Cameron, says motivates "American authors" to promote "non-dualistic ontologies." Arsić, still following Cameron, writes that "American thinkers 'posit a third term or entity'" into their ontology which, while manifesting in the twoness of being, determines the *disorganization* of things rather than organizing a divide. Branka Arsić, "Introduction," *American Impersonal: Essays with Sharon Cameron*, ed. Branka Arsić (New York: Bloomsbury Publishing Inc., 2014), 5, 4. The introduction of a third term does not exclude the possibility of doubling for Cameron, but is indeed a sign that "dualism can be renegotiated." The "third term or entity" used by American "works," to say it in Cameron's formulation, "knits the respective entities together." Sharon Cameron, *The Corporeal Self: Allegories of the Body in Melville and Hawthorne* (New York: Columbia UP, 1991), ix, 1.

<sup>13</sup> Kerry Larson, "Hawthorne's Fictional Commitments," *American Impersonal*, 220, 211. Branka Arsić, "Introduction," *American Impersonal*, 18.



<sup>14</sup> We encounter life, in Thoreau's writing, with stones, like arrowheads, dispersed across the surface of things. My chapter deals with demonic undecipherability in the material register through Thoreau's writing on arrowheads. I thus make much of, in the context of Thoreau, Heidegger's interpretation of Heraclitus' fragment, "τῷ ὄντι τόξῳ ὄνομα βίος ἐργον δὲ θάνατος" ("Bios means both 'bow' and 'life,'" translation my own), which he takes to be the "essence" of "δαίοντες—δαίμονες, the uncanny ones who present themselves to the ordinary." While *Bios* (βίος) gets accented by moderns to distinguish between "bow" and "life," Heidegger notices what Heraclitus himself "did not use accent marks," and so had an "original attentiveness" for the "ambiguity" of words in their doubled relation to things. Martin Heidegger, *Parmenides*, trs. André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1992), 108. The arrowhead is precisely that which demonically crosses two worlds, keeping its relation to endless life and its termination in everyday things.

<sup>15</sup> On Emerson's "affirmative attitude towards life," see Branka Arsić, "Against Pessimism: On Emerson's 'Experience,'" *Arizona Quarterly* 72.3 (2016): 25–45. "You shall not be negative," Emerson records in "Table Talk" (1864), "but affirmative. Do not worry people with your contradictions; do not give dismal views of politics or life." Ralph W. Emerson, *Later Lectures*, Vol. 2: 1855-1871, eds. Ronald A. Bosco and Joel Myerson (Athens: The U of Georgia P, 2001), 364. Hereafter abbreviated as *LL*, 2.

<sup>16</sup> Gregg Crane, "Intuition: the 'Unseen Thread' Connecting Emerson and James," *Modern Intellectual History* 10.1 (2013): 73, 74.

<sup>17</sup> Ralph W. Emerson, "The Poet," *Essays: First and Second Series* (New York: The Library of America, 1990), 226.

<sup>18</sup> Emerson, *LL*, 2, 221.

<sup>19</sup> Ralph W. Emerson, "Circles," *Essays: First and Second Series* (New York: The Library of America, 1990), 175.

<sup>20</sup> Stanley Cavell, *Emerson's Transcendental Etudes* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003), 18–19.

<sup>21</sup> Ralph W. Emerson, *Journals*, Vol. 7 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1912), 117.

<sup>22</sup> Emerson, "Circles," 184.

<sup>23</sup> Branka Arsić, *On Leaving: A Reading in Emerson* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2010), 9, 5, 14, 99, 100, 99, 101, 107.

<sup>24</sup> Arsić, *On Leaving*, 3. I contrast such literalism with the hermeneutics that Perry Miller hazards against. "Still," he remarks, "to take Emerson literally is often hazardous." Perry Miller, *Errand Into the Wilderness* (New York: Harper & Row, 1956), 188. If we take Georges Bataille seriously in his statement that "Literature is not innocent," then we might follow his formulation, when reading Emerson, "to take" an author "literally, seriously." Georges Bataille, *Literature and Evil: Essays by Georges Bataille*, tr. Alastair Hamilton (New York: Marion Boyars, 1997), x, 110. And if Bataille is responding to a particular philosophical orientation that by its nature seems averse to ungraspable expression, then to take writers at their word seems to put writing at risk. "How do you thus classify a writer like Georges Bataille," Roland Barthes asks? This question remains urgent. "Bataille, who, in fact, wrote texts," he spells it out, "always involves a certain experience of limits," and "the text is that which goes to the limit" to "place itself *behind* the limit" such to be "defined by its limits." I here follow Barthes back to Arsić's argument that philosophy, in the context of Deleuze's writing, is done by proposing "words and to take them to their extreme, even to the extent of accepting also their possible radicality, or indeed their madness." Branka Arsić, *The Passive Eye: Gaze and Subjectivity in Berkeley (via Beckett)* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003), xii. Stanley Cavell, *A Pitch of Philosophy: Autobiographical Exercises* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1994), 45. It is "a 'substantially' philosophical gesture to take things to their extreme," Arsić asserts in the context of Deleuze. Arsić, *Passive*, xii. By promoting what Deleuze says of philosophy, that "only one kind of objection is worthwhile: the objection which shows that the question raised by a philosopher...does not force the nature of things enough," Arsić asks if the writer takes their own claims far enough, and if they are committed enough to the radicality of their own words. Gilles Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature*, tr. Constantine Boundas (New York: Columbia UP, 2001), 107. But what, then, is a text, and why is it a more suitable term for demonic writing than

work? These writings are, “Taking the word literally,” demonically, since “it may be said that the Text is always *paradoxical*.” These writings are in fact defined by their paradoxes such that we cannot say that they resist resolution, and so we must treat their seeming trouble with language as only a problem for the Socratic, that is, a desire to break through the echoes of difference and repetition. “So the Text: it can be it only in its difference,” Barthes continues, which means its ontological status cannot be divorced from such difference. “Text” is “an overcrossing” even “a tissue, a woven fabric” it is “disconnected” and “heterogeneous.” But since the (“constitutive movement is that of cutting across”) text, we respond to certain ruptures, or, to put it in Barthes’ words, the text only “answers...to an explosion,” an alien identity which manifests itself with the text. The ontological reality of the text depends upon difference, the manifestation of an identity with the weave of difference—as an irreducible identity—becomes its emblem, or that which speaks on its behalf. This “demonical texture” of the text, Barthes concludes, must “bring with it fundamental changes to reading.” Roland Barthes, “From Work to Text,” *The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), 1471–1473. The pleasure of reading, which is to say its restorative ability, for Barthes is “eudæmonist,” and so the “demon of language” relates directly to the life of that which is textual. Roland Barthes, *A Lover’s Discourse: Fragments*, tr. Richard Howard (New York: Penguin Books, 1990), 80.

25 Stanley Cavell, *The Senses of Walden: an Expanded Edition* (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1981), 33.

26 *Ecstatic Empiricism* is only minimally concerned with hermeneutical problems, and so I take the view that insofar as I read American authors as philosophers, I tend towards philosophical interpretive norms rather than literary critical ones. “Thinking *with* (and not just about),” in Eduardo Kohn’s formulation. Eduardo Kohn, “Thinking with Thinking Forests,” *Comparative Metaphysics: Ontology after Anthropology* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), 181. Still, I look to be somewhat simpatico with what has been described as the anti-suspicious turn in literary theory that reads against skepticism, what Heather Love favors in practices of reading “description,” “gestures, trades, and activities” over “depth heremenutics.” Heather Love, “Close but not Deep: Literary Ethics and the Descriptive Turn,” *New Literary History* 41.2 (2010): 375. Love’s interests appear strikingly (if not surprisingly) similar to René Wellek’s New Criticism, set to “examine attitudes, tones, tensions, irony, and paradox.” René Wellek, “The New Criticism: Pro and Contra,” *Critical Inquiry* 4.4 (1978): 618. I summarize both positions in a third when Stephen Best and Sharon Marcus “take surface to mean what is evident, perceptible, apprehensible in texts,” what they identify as “*critical description*” to “indicate what a text says about itself.” Stephen Best and Sharon Marcus, “Surface Reading: An Introduction,” *Representations* 108.1 (2009): 9, 11. See also Rita Felski, *The Limit of Critique* (Chicago: The U of Chicago P, 2015.) *Critique and Postcritique*, eds. Elizabeth S. Anker and Rita Felski (Durham: Duke UP, 2017.)

27 Stanley Cavell, *Emerson’s Transcendental Etudes* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003), 2, 7, 6. Or better still, “let the materials speak for themselves as much as possible.” Feidelson, *Symbolism and American Literature*, 5.

28 Richard Poirier, *The Renewal of Literature: Emersonian Reflections* (New York: Random House, 1987), 194, 67, 73.

29 Ralph W. Emerson, *Representative Men: Seven Lectures* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1883), 55, 86. Hereafter abbreviated as *RM*.

30 Emerson, *RM*, 45.

31 “And Plato discovered, that no man could ever be lost, as long as he held fast to the possession of one single truth.” Emerson, *LL*, 2, 69. Plato situates “the mind as the source of things: it taught an absolute unity.” Emerson, *LL*, 2, 232–3.

32 Emerson, *RM*, 64. On Plato’s belief that each man is born with their own demon, see the *Phaedo* (360 BCE). Platonic guides, “individual *daimones*,” lead men “like shepherds.” Catherine Zuckert, *Plato’s Philosophers: The Coherence of the Dialogues* (Chicago: The U of Chicago P, 2009), 808, 715.

33 Emerson, *RM*, 40, 42.

<sup>34</sup> Ralph W. Emerson, *LL*, 2, 233. “All that is best and largest in his own matured genius he identifies with his master; and when we speak of Plato generally what we are really thinking of is the Platonic Socrates.” Walter Pater, *Plato and Platonism: A Series of Lectures* (London: Macmillan, 1922), 98.

<sup>35</sup> Emerson, *RM*, 70.

<sup>36</sup> “Let us not, then, refuse to believe even what we do not behold, and let us supply the defect of our corporeal eyes by using those of the soul,” the “motives which Socrates enforced upon men.” Ralph W. Emerson, *Two Unpublished Essays* (Boston: Lamson, Wolfe, & Co., 1896), 27.

<sup>37</sup> Emerson, *Two Unpublished Essays*, 4, 24, 20, 29. Socrates demon tells him to deny everything in life, as seen in the *Apology* (399 BCE). Socrates’ “daemon,” Nietzsche regrets, “*always dissuades*” him. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, tr. Clifton P. Fadiman (New York: Dover, 1995), 47. What Jane Bennett calls “the naysaying voice of Socrates’ demon,” drives him to deny everything until nothing apparent of himself remains. Jane Bennett, *Vibrant Matter: a political ecology of things* (Durham: Duke UP, 2010), 17. Charlene Elsby remarks that the Socratic daemon always negates Socrates’ world, “engaging with him only negatively.” Charlene Elsby, “Socrates’s Demonic Sign,” *Philosophical Approaches to Demonology*, eds. Benjamin W. McCraw and Robert Arp (New York: Routledge, 2017), 96. “The first point necessary to be distinctly understood is, that Socrates believed in... a *daemonic something* (τὸ δαιμόνιον, δαιμόνιον τι)... The Second point necessary to be remembered is, that this ‘divine voice’...exercised only a *restraining* influence.” George Henry Lewes, *The History of Philosophy: Ancient Philosophy* (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1880), 175. Finally, “Address to the Temperance Society” (1843), Emerson states that “Socrates, when he saw the luxuries of the Athenians, said, ‘How many things so I not want!’” Ralph W. Emerson, *Later Lectures*, Vol. 1: 1843-1854, eds. Ronald A. Bosco and Joel Myerson (Athens: U of Georgia P, 2001), 74. Hereafter abbreviated as *LL*, 1.

<sup>38</sup> Emerson, *RM*, 66, 33. However, before Emerson there already exists a certain anxiety for American writers about how Socratic demonology informs dialectical thinking, perceiving how synthesis acts out negativity in bad faith, even violently. For if life expresses itself variously, dialectics seeks to negate difference through sacrificing what cannot be synthesized. In a way, the Puritans viewed demonism as intrusive thinking, as witchcraft. The fear, which Hawthorne tells children in *Grandfather’s Chair* (1841) occupied Cotton Mather’s era, that “demons were everywhere,” approaching solitary people “in the sunshine as well as in the darkness,” was because “they were hidden in mean’s hearts, and stole into their most secret thoughts.” Nathaniel Hawthorne, *Grandfather’s Chair: A History for Youth* (Caslisle: Applewood Books, 2010), 118. By embodying Eugenia Delamotte’s claim that “the Gothic” took up an interest “private demons” as instigators of violence, American writers of the Early Republic perceived negative thinking in a negative light, such that demonic positivity could occur at the dawn of the new century. Eugenia Delamotte, *Perils of the Night: A Feminist Study of Nineteenth-Century Gothic* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1990), vii. By way of example, Charles Brockden Brown affiliates Socratic demonology with bloodshed. In *Wieland* (1798), the “Dæmon of Socrates” decomposes life. Charles Brockden Brown, *Wieland; or the Transformation. An American Tale* (New York: Oxford UP, 1998), 45, 161. The destructive “influence of dæmons” too happens in *Edgar Huntly* (1799), where “the dæmon that possessed” is red in tooth and claw. For this reason, Fuller sees that Brown’s “demoniacal attributes only represent a morbid state.” Margaret Fuller, *The Writings*, ed. Mason Wade (New York: The Viking Press, 1941), 379. Consequently, for Brown, the Socratic “dæmon” is “the worm that gnaws” until life “itself be extinct.” Charles Brockden Brown, *Edgar Huntly; or, Memoirs of a Sleep-Walker* (New York: Literary Classics of the United States, Inc., 1998), 710, 670. Such resignation is mocked by Washington Irving whose Ichabod Crane, the hobbledehoy Yankee in “The Legend of Sleepy Hollow” (1820), is bullied by the New York Dutch who see his earnest study of Mather’s *Wonder of the Invisible World* (1693), a book about demons, as an opportunity to stage his fears and run him out of town. The story situates the vivacious Knickerbockers against the paranoid Crane, who is set affright by his own paranoia. Similarly, in “The Adventure of the German Student” (1824), Gottfried Wolfgang, a student from Göttingen, is thrown into madness and decay by his “inner daemon.” See also Elizabeth MacAndrew, *The Gothic Tradition in Fiction* (New York: Columbia UP, 1979), 7.

<sup>39</sup> Emerson, *RM*, 70–1, 75. Socrates, who Emerson calls an old uncle, is perhaps the most famous bachelor in history, yet he is also credited with nurturing Western metaphysics, such that it is not really a metaphor when Immanuel Kant calls him “mid-wife to the mind.” Immanuel Kant, *Theoretical Philosophy: 1755–1770* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007), 278. Socrates is “a man of a humble stem,” or “personal homeliness,” Emerson explains, the

“rare coincidence” of one incredible thought “in one ugly body” which “had forcibly struck the mind” of “Plato.” Emerson, *RM*, 70–1, 75. Nietzsche read Emerson’s *Representative Men* on Socrates’ ugliness. See Thomas H. Brobjer, *Nietzsche’s Philosophical Context: An Intellectual Biography* (Urbana: U of Illinois P, 2008). But he took it further, completely detesting how the sage opposed his personal appearance to Athenian values. He calls Socrates “rabble,” “retarded by inbreeding,” and “ugly.” Friedrich Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, tr. R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Penguin, 1990), 40. By example, the “real” for Plato, “lacking flesh” in Ludwig Feuerbach’s words, left him “ashamed to have a body.” Feuerbach, Ludwig, *The Fiery Book: Selected Writings of Ludwig Feuerbach*, tr. Zawar Hanfi (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1972), 221. “Plato,” says Matthew Arnold, thus “calls life a learning to die.” “Socrates has drunk his hemlock and is dead; but in his own breast does not every man carry about with him a possible Socrates, in that power of a disinterested play of consciousness upon his stock notions and habits, of which this wise and admirable man gave all through his lifetime the great example, and which was the secret of his incomparable influence?” Matthew Arnold, *Culture and Anarchy* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1955), 233, 211.

40 Emerson, *RM*, 70, 54, 77, 81, 62.

41 “The safest general characterization to the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato.” Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (New York: The Free Press, 2010), 39.

42 To overturn Platonism, according to Deleuze, is to reverse his perspective on what is “subterranean” and what is “surface.” The “two dimensions” of sense for Plato which constitute “Platonic dualism” casts a borderline between “things” which are “limited,” “measured,” “fixed” on the one hand, and “pure becoming” on the other. Things which become in a necessary way, which is to say a common sensible way, are in the realm of effects. Necessary things are grammatically related to verbs, that is to say, they transform. Things which become in a fatalistic way, conversely, which is to say a nonsensible way, exist in the realm of causes. Fated things are grammatically related to nouns, which is to say are immanent. The exaggerated possibilities, at polar ends of Plato’s logical disjunction of being, are the pure Ideas which proceed causes, and pure Simulacrum which follow effects. Deleuze’s Plato thus distinguishes between realms of finite and infinite becoming. Since “pure becoming,” by definition, is without a metrical sense, it manifests itself as an “infinite identity.” Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, trs. Mark Lester and Charles Stivale (New York: Columbia UP, 1990), 2. In Plato’s view, the infinite identity, existing in a logic of endlessness and timelessness, is purely metaphysical, whereas the realm of metamorphosis is physical. Things which are physical can be seen, disturbed by the eye’s conduct, and so constitute the surface of reality. Whereas things unaffected by sight, or phrased another way are ontologically indifferent to vision, constitute subterranean reality. How Plato comes to order the ontological perspective should by this moment seem familiar, obvious, and inevitable. To imperil our usual commitments to Platonism entails an inversion of things radical enough to risk madness. It is only, in fact, when we push Plato to his most extreme that the full possibility of his reversal becomes available. But by this we mean that Platonism always had its mad element, the aspect of pure becoming, which (of nonsense) is not touched by good sense, or put otherwise, is madness. While pure becoming exists, for Plato, in the subterranean realm, Deleuze notices the occurrence of the opposite ontological perspective, its existence on the surface of things, in the Stoics. In ancient Greece, the Stoics already “are the first to reverse Platonism,” returning the light of the extraordinary “bodies” to the everyday “entities.” Deleuze’s Stoics present an “entirely new cleavage,” or a “new dualism of bodies or states of affairs and effects or incorporeal events” which “entails an upheaval in philosophy.” By crossing the world of pure becoming with everyday experience, the metaphysical leaps back to and overtakes the surface before our eyes. A corporeal totality of unlimited “mixtures” turns at a side of the Stoics’ doubled world, the causes of bodily “passions” and “actions” melting into other bodies. The pure fire is flamed by the excessive density of bodies. On the other side, phantom effects, “which are the result of these mixtures,” float freely from the causal “states of affair” and so do not represent the hidden mass. By the Stoics’ two temporal senses, corporeality becomes extraordinary, while ordinary empirical reality is exposed to restless phantasmagoric differentiation. Stoic ontology, by surfacing pure becoming, cancels ordinary experience’s right to naked corporeality. (“*Everything now returns to the surface.*”) All sensible life must, rather, become the drama of incorporeal phantasms. “Becoming-mad, becoming unlimited,” in his words, “climbs to the surface of things” of “impassive” veils or “phantasms.” Deleuze’s Stoics refer “causes to causes” and “effects to effects,” *the solar demon returning to itself*, shining through the “demonic character of the simulacrum.” Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, 7, 2, 6, 5, 6, 7, 258. The demonic shines back through to the everyday surface and overtakes it—becomes impassible—and so characterizes it as a “demonic world,” Arsić further explains, “which is demonic not because simulacra lie, but because they do not reveal the truth of the world in its wholeness.” Arsić, *The Passive Eye*, 58. Since demonism is defined by the disclosure of being, the simulacra achieve a full ontological status by their demonic character, and so phantoms double the corporeal ontology into the

incorporeal too, reveal themselves as wholly different from bodies but rendered in contrast. We know when Plato has been overturned when the mind is emptied of its demon which then comes to characterize instead a world of pure difference. Foucault, in awe of Deleuze's *Différence et Répétition* (1968) and *Logique du sens* (1969), outlines his "phanasmaphysics" in his "Theatrum Philosophicum" (1970). He summarizes Deleuze's ontology as "a metaphysics where it is no longer a question of the One." Above the One corporeal fire looms an "incorporeal (a metaphysical surface)" world endlessly spreading being into "extrabeings." This is what Grosz calls "extramaterialism." Elizabeth Grosz, *The Incorporeal: Ontology, Ethics, and the Limits of Materialism* (New York: Columbia UP, 2017), 5. Corporeal wholeness and incorporeal variety each lay claim to the extent of being—each constitute a realm of being—and so possess a side of being, but being of incommensurable logics cause a rupture in being itself making a chasm of pure difference across which the Demonic shines. "In any event," he further summarizes, "here is Deleuze, His 'reverse Platonism,'" demonstrated in "order to disclose" ontological "division." To "summarize" more still, Foucault raises the stakes of Deleuze's ontology to the pitch of its perspective, a world of "dense bodies" and a world of "incorporeal event," distinguished by an insurmountable fissure, yet demonically coincident. "Perhaps," he asks, "we arrive here" at an ethics which "does not search for the truth, but repeats the thought," something which cancels "the neurosis of dialectics" since "dialectics does not liberate difference; it guarantees, on the contrary, that they can always be recaptured." "The freeing of difference requires thought without contradiction, without dialectics, without negation; thought that accepts divergence; affirmative thought." Michel Foucault, "Theatrum Philosophicum," *Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology* (New York: The New Press, 1998), 348, 350, 347, 344, 350, 354, 358. In the context of Emerson's 1839 "Demonology" oration, the reversal of Platonic demonism and the affiliated affirmative thought too appears to be his project. Arsić, in her reading of the oration, claims that he proposes that "thinking doesn't exclude its contrary (the demonic)," and so "it embodies affirmative or healed thought," which to the nineteenth-century "Emerson wants to restore." Arsić, *On Leaving*, 311.

<sup>43</sup> Ralph W. Emerson, "Spiritual Laws," *Works*, Vol. 1 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1880), 125. "And the practical rules of literature," Emerson announces, "ought to follow from these views, namely...that none but a writer should write; that he should write affirmatively...—that we must affirm and affirm...that we must hope and strive, for despair is no muse." Ralph W. Emerson, *Natural History of the Intellect, The Complete Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson*, Vol. 7 (New York: AMS Press, 1904), 78.

<sup>44</sup> Ralph W. Emerson, "Compensation," *Essays: First and Second Series* (New York: The Library of America, 1990), 69.

<sup>45</sup> Emerson, "Experience," 241, 257, 248.

<sup>46</sup> Ralph W. Emerson, "Intellect," *Essays: First and Second Series* (New York: The Library of America, 1990), 197.

<sup>47</sup> Grosz, *The Incorporeal*, 5–8. According to Bataille, a reversal of thinking entails a reversal of ethics. He thus claims "a reversal of thinking—and of ethics." Georges Bataille, *The Accursed Share: An Essay on General Economy, Volume I: Consumption*, Translated by Robert Hurley (New York: Zone Books, 1988), 25.

<sup>48</sup> Deleuze is "antidialectic" because, in Alain Badiou's estimation, "the negative is totally impossible" in his writing. Alain Badiou, *Deleuze: The Clamor of Being*, tr. Louis Burchill (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2000), 31. "The relationship between Deleuze and Emerson is established via Nietzsche." Branka Arsić and Cary Wolfe, "Introduction," *The Other Emerson*, eds. Branka Arsić and Cary Wolfe (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2010), xxviii. To put it another way, "it is the American tradition that shaped Deleuze's theory," as Arsić points out, and thus insofar as he intensifies Emerson in his own writing, his words restore to America the potential of its own philosophical thinking. Arsić, "Introduction," *American Impersonal*, 23.

<sup>49</sup> Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, 259.

<sup>50</sup> Foucault, "Theatrum Philosophicum," 343. G. E. L. Owen argues that "Plato calls 'dialectic'" is not possible in Aristotle's writing. Aristotle does not do dialectics because his pluralistic ontology has an insurmountable "many sense." G. E. L. Owen, *Logic, Science, and Dialectic: Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy*, ed. Martha Nussbaum (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1986), 214, 216. Or, in Paul Ricoeur's words, "the affirmation" in Aristotle's writing is anti-dialectical because "the notion of being cannot be univocally defined" where "multiplicity cuts across the whole of discourse." As Ricoeur argues, "Univocity" is only "grounded in" something "one and self-identical." Since

“plurivocal” beings, which Ricoeur associates with “Aristotle” instead of Plato, “open a breach” in the “ontological theory of univocity,” the demonic manifestations as I have described in the writing of American literature perhaps require us to rethink our commitments to the univocity of being. Paul Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation*, tr. Denis Savage (New Haven: Yale UP, 2004), 23–24. On the other hand, we might consider how Deleuze’s writing salvages univocity from Platonism and restores it to empiricism through Spinoza.

<sup>51</sup> David Gallop, *Aristotle on Sleep and Dreams* (Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1996), 43. “Aristotle might here be said to have ‘demythologized’ the daemonic.” Gallop, *Aristotle*, 47. Stuart Clark reflects Gallop’s observation in noticing that “Aristotle” by placing “demonism to ultimately natural causes had the necessary consequence of tying orthodox demonology to a particular natural philosophy.” Stuart Clark, *Thinking with Demons: The Idea of Witchcraft in Early Modern Europe* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1997), 153. Marion Gibson and Jo Ann Esra, in the context of Shakespeare, note that demonology “is not just the study of demons,” but a “genre,” or “a way of structuring basic perceptions of the universe.” Marion Gibson and Jo Ann Esra, *Shakespeare’s Demonology* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2014), 1, 2.

<sup>52</sup> Heidegger, *Parmenides*, 100, 102.

<sup>53</sup> Levinson, *Thinking Through Poetry*, 27–28.

<sup>54</sup> Heidegger, *Parmenides*, 136, 48–49, 7, 67, 99, 133.

<sup>55</sup> Heraclitus, *Fragments*, tr. Brooks Haxton (New York: Penguin, 2003), 82.

<sup>56</sup> Heidegger, *Parmenides*, 68. We might translate *φύσις* into the German *Naturmacht* (nature-force), meaning the indwelling compulsion towards growth. For more on self-generation, see Denise Gigante’s *Life: Organic Form and Romanticism* (2009).

<sup>57</sup> “The secret of philosophy, because it was lost at the start, remains to be discovered in the future.” Gilles Deleuze, *Pure Immanence: Essays on A Life*, tr. Anne Boyman (New York: Zone Books, 2001), 66, 67, 68.

<sup>58</sup> In “Literary and Spiritual Influences” (1843), Emerson makes the following remarks: “Mr. Carlyle’s genius is a genuine fruit of the nineteenth century.” “Goethe led Carlyle.” “A remarkable characteristic of Mr. Carlyle’s mind... will not look grave even at dullness and tragedy.” “He gave impulse to the study of German writers and mainly of Goethe.” Emerson, *LL*, 59, 61, 63, 65.

<sup>59</sup> Emerson, *RM*, 288. As for “Goethe,” in Thoreau’s words, “it was one of his chief excellencies as a writer, that he was satisfied with giving an exact description of things as they appeared to him, and their effect upon him.” Henry D. Thoreau, *A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1980), 325–326.

<sup>60</sup> Emerson, *RM*, 285–6.

<sup>61</sup> Emerson, *RM*, 262, 285.

<sup>62</sup> David Farrell Krell, *Daimon Life: Heidegger and Life-Philosophy* (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1992), 17, 16, 21.

<sup>63</sup> Angus Nicholls, *Goethe’s Concept of the Daemonic After the Ancients* (Rochester: Camden House, 2006), 10–11, 24.

<sup>64</sup> Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *CW*, Vol. 1, *Poems*, trs. Michael Hamburger, David Luke, Christopher Middleton, John Frederick Nims, and Vernon Watkins (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1983), 231. As Stefan Zweig perspicaciously notices, for “Goethe, all forces work centripetally, moving from the periphery towards the core; in the daimonics the will-to-power operates centrifugally, striving away from the innermost circle of life, inevitably disrupting it.” Stefan Zweig, *Hölderlin, Kleist, and Nietzsche: The Struggle with the Daemon* (London: Transaction Publishers, 2011), 253.

<sup>65</sup> Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Truth and Poetry: from My Own Life*, Vol. 2 (London: Bell & Daldy, York Street, Covent Garden, 1868), 157. Poirier, *The Renewal of Literature*, 45. I take Poirier's over R. W. B. Lewis' position, who in, *The American Adam* (1955), argues that antebellum American writers made an "effort to define" the "life worth living" by the condition of being "newborn," facing "complete emancipation from the history of mankind." R.W.B. Lewis, *The American Adam* (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1955), 3, 6, 41.

<sup>66</sup> "I have many feelings in reading Plato, perhaps not orthodox. So many words often weary me. I am often so impertinent as to think I know it all, and it is not Greek enough to keep me so long on my way." Margaret Fuller, *The Letters of Margaret Fuller*, Vol. 2, ed. Robert N. Hudspeth (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1983), 39, 104, 159.

<sup>67</sup> Margaret Fuller, *The Writings*, 235.

<sup>68</sup> Margaret Fuller, "Goethe," *The American Transcendentalists*, ed. Perry Miller (New York: Doubleday, 1957), 157, 165.

<sup>69</sup> Ralph W. Emerson, "The American Scholar," *Political Writings*, ed. Kenneth Sacks (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2008), 25. "Goethe, the surpassing intellect of modern times." Emerson, *LL*, 121, 166.

<sup>70</sup> Ralph W. Emerson, "Demonology," *The Early Lectures*, Vol. 3: 1838–1842, eds. Robert E. Spiller, and Wallace E. Williams (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1972), 163.

<sup>71</sup> James Russell Lowell calls "daemonic" Amos Bronson Alcott's "favorite word." James Russell Lowell, *Literary Essays, Vol 1*. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1891), 87.

<sup>72</sup> Henry D. Thoreau, *The Maine Woods* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1972), 58. Thoreau, *PJ*, 2, 278. Thoreau's edition of *Truth and Poetry* was Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *The Autobiography of Goethe. Truth and poetry. From my life*, ed. Parke Godwin (New York: Wiley and Putnam, 1846). See Robert Sattelmeyer, *Thoreau's Reading: A Study in Intellectual History* (Princeton UP, 1988), 188. Thoreau references Goethe's "autobiography," where he bemoans that the German "was even too well-bred" to embrace the demonic, being "defrauded of so much which the savage boy enjoys." Henry D. Thoreau, *Journal, Vol. 2: 1842-1848*, ed. Robert Sattelmeyer, in *The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1984), 356. Hereafter abbreviated as *PJ*, 2. "Let the youth seize upon the finest and most memorable experience in his life." Thoreau, *PJ*, 2, 357. Thoreau indexes these pages "Goethe" with his own pencil. Thoreau, *PJ*, 2, 389. Thoreau also quotes the Goethe's autobiography in *A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers* (1849). On Thoreau's reading of the autobiography, see Robert Sattelmeyer, *Thoreau's Reading: A Study in Intellectual History with Bibliographical Catalogue* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 187.

<sup>73</sup> Specifically, Melville acquires the second volume of *Truth and Poetry*, which is where Goethe discusses the demonic. "*M* inscribes one of his new books, The Auto-Biography of Goethe; Truth and Poetry; from My Own Life; The Concluding Books [Vol 2]." Jay Leyda, *The Melville Log: A Documentary Life of Herman Melville, 1819–1891*, Vol. 1 (New York: Harcourt and Brace, 1951), 354. Melville lists acquiring the book in his notebook. Herman Melville, *Journals*, eds. Harrison Hayford, Hershel Parker, and G. Thomas Tanselle (Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern UP and the Newberry Library, 1989), 144, 377, 518. William Dillingham has identified Melville's acquisition of Goethe's autobiography with his understanding of "The Demonical." William Dillingham, *Melville's Later Novels* (Athens: U of Georgia P, 1986), 176. William Braswell echoes Dillingham. William Braswell, *Melville's Religious Thought: An Essay in Interpretation* (New York: Pageant Books, 1959), 15–16. Jonathan Arac accordingly argues that "*Truth and Poetry* was the title of Goethe's autobiography, which was one of a cluster of important works of Romantic literature that Melville had bought and read" when writing *Moby-Dick*. Jonathan Arac, *The Emergence of American Literary Narrative, 1820-1860* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2005), 169. On Melville's ownership of Goethe's autobiography, see Mary K. Bercaw, *Melville's Sources* (Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1987), 84. Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 194.

<sup>74</sup> For a sampling of alternative readings of Goethe's demonism, to which I oppose my own, see Albert Bielschpowsky's *The Life of Goethe* (1905), Karl Vietor's *Goethe The Thinker* (1950), Richard Friedenthal's *Goethe: His Life and Times* (1963), K. R. Eissler's *Goethe: A Psychoanalytic Study, 1755-1786*, Vol. 2 (1963), Derek Van Abbe's *Goethe: New Perspectives on a Writer and his Time* (1972), Liselotte Dieckmann's *Johann Wolfgang*

Goethe (1974), Pietro Citati's *Goethe* (1974), Ilse Graham's *Goethe: Portrait of the Artist* (1977), Edward T. Larkin's *War in Goethe's Writings* (1992), and David John's *Images of Goethe through Schiller's Egmont* (1998).

<sup>75</sup> Margaret Fuller, *Letters*, Vol. 6, ed. Robert Hudspeth (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1994), 141.

<sup>76</sup> Margaret Fuller, "Goethe." *The Writings*, 250. Published only a year prior to *Truth and Poetry*, in *Theory of Colors (Zur Farbenlehre)* we find Goethe's demonic existence behind his vitalistic principle. "To divide the united, to unite the divided, is the life of nature." Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Theory of Colors*, tr. Charles Lock Eastlake (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 294).

<sup>77</sup> Krell, *Daimon Life*, 7.

<sup>78</sup> Goethe, *Truth and Poetry*, 157. A "Demon," Foucault elaborates, is "something strange, bewildering, which leaves one speechless," due to "the subtle insinuation of the Double." Michel Foucault, "The Prose of Actaeon," *Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology* (New York: The New Press, 1998), 123.

<sup>79</sup> Johann Wolfgang Von Goethe, *Briefe, Band III, Textkritisch durchgesehen und mit Anmerkungen versehen von Bodo Morawe* (Hamburg: Christian Wegner Verlag, 1965), 504.

<sup>80</sup> Kirk Wetters, *Demonic History from Goethe to the Present* (Evanston: Northwestern UP, 2014), 3, 10.

<sup>81</sup> Wetters, *Demonic History*, 3–4, 11.

<sup>82</sup> The term *δαίμων* (*daimon*), Latinized subsequently as "dæmon" from which we acquire "demon" into the English language, is formed by a prefix meaning to cut and a suffix implying division by force, something that drives itself between. For the Greeks, demon, in its most abstract and usual sense, means to double. It first appears in Homer and Hesiod as if from a distant, Neolithic ground long spoken before recorded. In Indo-European etymology, it retains its primal status.

<sup>83</sup> Ralph W. Emerson, *Nature, Addresses and Lectures, The Complete Works*, ed. Edward Waldo Emerson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1903), 29.

<sup>84</sup> Arsić, *On Leaving*, 99, 113–114. "Two cardinal facts lie forever at the base," the twins "Oneness and otherness. It is impossible to speak or think without embracing both," he admits. "If speculation tends thus to a terrific unity, in which all things are absorbed, action tends directly back to diversity." Emerson, *RM*, 47–48, 51. Emerson's ontological distinction between one and many doubles as a schism in our senses by which each compensates: we "speculate" into unity and "act" into diversity. Our internal life is associated, we may understand Emerson to mean, with a proclivity towards monism while our external life behaves pluralistically. Life, being of two sides, is lived also by us in two ways, counterbalancing on either end of an insurmountable difference. This is how I interpret Deleuze cryptic "pluralism = monism," as well as James' "pluralistic monism."

<sup>85</sup> I take the following to be Emerson's reasoning about individuation and deindividuation in demonology. "I will tell you what I think of it," Emerson so divulges, that the "principle is nothing but a great name for a very common and well known tendency of the mind,—an exaggeration, namely, of the Individual, of the personal bodily man which nature steadily postpones. In nature the race never dies,—the individual is never spared." Emerson, "Demonology," 165.

<sup>86</sup> Marjorie Levinson, "On Being Numerous," *Studies in Romanticism* 49.4 (2010): 638. Amanda Jo Goldstein's *Sweet Science* (2017) duly credits Levinson with brining "Romantic Spinoza" and his "heretic ontology" into relation with ecological thinking. Amanda Jo Goldstein, *Sweet Science: Romantic Materialisms and the New Logics of Life* (Chicago: The U of Chicago P, 2017), 25. But Levinson's Spinoza's generates a more complicated view within ecological criticism than most. Recent ecological thinking exemplified by writers like Bruno Latour, Jane Bennett, and (among many others) Timothy Morton, takes its cue from Spinoza's rise in ecocriticism, especially through Romanticism, meaning that "Spinoza's" persuasive "monism," as Lawrence Buell puts it, has informed a recent bundling of bacteria, animals, technologies, plants, garbage, minerals and parasites into a single organic economy. Lawrence Buell, *The Future of Environmental Criticism: Environmental Crisis and Literary Imagination*



(Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 101. While ecological monists look to overcome traditional dualisms, the “doubleness” of ontology, as Laura Dassow Walls might put it, plots out two other senses of our life, a twoness which has nothing to do with binaries. Walls, *Seeing New Worlds: Henry David Thoreau and Nineteenth-Century Natural Science* (Madison: The U of Wisconsin P, 1995), 49. Two senses, together strange, means we cannot deterritorialize ourselves enough to be at home everywhere, resident of what Donald Worster names the “web of life.” Donald Worster, *Nature’s Economy: The Roots of Ecology* (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1977), 50. From Worster’s *Nature’s Economy* (1977), to Timothy Morton’s *Ecological Thought* (2010), ecocritics have insisted that “we live in the mesh” to dispel the notion that Man stands against Nature—Mind against Body. Timothy Morton, *The Ecological Thought* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2010), 119. I potentialize Leo Marx’s claim, in *The Machine in the Garden* (1964) of “two worlds” into something ontological across which ecocriticism may mature itself out of its callow monism. Leo Marx, *The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000), 19. By way of example, I identify a maturation in Morton’s own writing, from *Ecology without Nature* (2007) and *The Ecological Thought* (2010) to “Deconstruction and/as Ecology” (2014) where he admits our sense of the “environment” must account for a “difference” of “sides,” even an “irreducibly hidden dimension of things.” By admitting thus, we can practice an “ecological ethics” without “holism,” a demonic ethics of life at an environmental scope. Timothy Morton, “Deconstruction and/as Ecology,” *The Oxford Handbook of Ecocriticism*, ed. Greg Garrard (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2014, 291, 300).

<sup>87</sup> Marjorie Levinson, “Pre- and Post-Dialectical Materialisms: Modeling Praxis without Subjects and Objects,” *Cultural Critique* 31 (1995): 119. Levinson, *Thinking Through Poetry*, 18.

<sup>88</sup> Marjorie Levinson, “A Motion and a Spirit: Romancing Spinoza,” *Studies in Romanticism* 46.4 (Winter 2007): 378, 379, 382. See also Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, tr. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1987), 254.

<sup>89</sup> Samuel Taylor Coleridge, *CW, Marginalia*, Vol. 2, ed. George Whalley (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1984), 995. The “univocity of being does not directly attach the multiple to unity itself,” meaning that there is an insurmountable “difference” in Spinoza’s ontology between the monistic and pluralistic aspects. Foucault, “Theatrum,” 360. “Such a distribution is demonic.” *Ecstatic Empiricism* takes much interest in the “disjunctive conjunction” of Deleuze’s Spinoza, “demonic intervals” for which univocity is key. “Multiple doublings of multiple series intersect and interact, constituting and producing events. Univocity is the only way to make sense of this ontological multiplicity.” Clayton Crockett, *Deleuze beyond Badiou: Ontology, Multiplicity, and Event* (New York: Columbia UP, 2013), 31, 60, 61, 70. Spinoza’s “remarkable division,” as Deleuze calls it, makes a “univocal being,” an ontological difference demonically affirmed. Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, tr. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia UP, 1994), 40.

<sup>90</sup> Levinson, *Thinking Through Poetry*, 275–76. Otherwise in Plato the “wave is quickly lost in the sea.” Emerson, *RM*, 77. Like Coleridge’s water and waves, Bataille’s ontology is also emblemized by “*water in water*.” Benjamin Noys, *Georges Bataille: A Critical Introduction* (London: Pluto Press, 2000), 137.

<sup>91</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, tr. Robert Hurley (San Francisco: City Light Books, 1988), 19, 53.

<sup>92</sup> Jane Ellen Harrison, *Themis: A Study of the Social Origins of Greek Religion* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1927), *Themis*, xi, xxii, viii. Harrison (1850-1928), a Classicist (at Newnham College, Cambridge) whose scholarship was derided by contemporaries for her “affinity to feminism” which had “run riot” and caused “hallucinations,” in the words of Clement Webb, fellow at Oxford. Clement Webb, *Group Theories of Religion and the Individual* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1916), 167.

<sup>93</sup> Harrison, *Themis*, xvi, xix.

<sup>94</sup> “*Car la volonté de puissance fait que les forces actives affirment, et affirment leur propre différence: en elle l’affirmation est première, la negation n’est jamais qu’une consequence, comme un surcroît de jouissance.*” “*Affirmation et negation sont donc les qualia de la volonté de puissance, comme actif et réactif sont les qualités des forces...il appartient essentiellement à l’affirmation d’être elle-même multiple, pluraliste, et à la negation d’être une, ou lourdment moniste.*” “*L’affirmation est la plus haute puissance de la volonté. Mais qu’est-ce qui est affirmé? La Terre, la vie.*” Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1974), 25, 33.

95 Harrison, *Themis*, viii, x.

96 By way of difficulty and so the triumph that must be celebrated over the negative, Bernard Reginster can see “why Nietzsche regards the *affirmation of life* as his defining philosophical achievement” Bernard Reginster, *The Affirmation of Life: Nietzsche on Overcoming Nihilism* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2006), 3. And “to affirm life is to will its eternal recurrence.” “The eternal return is the ultimate affirmation,” the only step beyond negativity, the most radical upheaval in thought. Grosz, *The Incorporeal*, 14, 118. Thinking which entails the greatest weight is similar to what James calls a “strenuous mood,” the ethics of which have been revered in Hunter Brown’s *William James on Radical Empiricism and Religion* (2000). We must either affirm or deny when we are driven to the fundamental question, something avoided by skepticism, what Emerson defines as an incapacity, a cowardice to “neither affirm or deny.” The skeptic evaluates (“σκοπεῖν”) without deciding in order to “keep the balance.” Emerson, *RM*, 156.

97 Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, tr. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 2010), 273.

98 William James, *The Principles of Psychology*, Vol. 2 (New York: Dover, 1918), 578–579.

99 Ralph W. Emerson, “Fate,” *Political Writings*, ed. Kenneth Sacks (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2008), 196, 203, 215.

100 Ned Lukacher, *Time-Fetishes: The Secret History of Eternal Recurrence* (Durham: Duke UP, 1998), 124. “Living, naturally, is never easy.” Albert Camus, *The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays*, tr. Justin O’Brien (New York: Vintage Books, 1991), 5.

101 Goethe, *Truth and Poetry*, 148.

102 Emerson, *RM*, 204.

103 William Shakespeare, *The Tragedy of Hamlet, Prince of Denmark*, The Norton Shakespeare: Third Edition, Vol 2. (New York: W. W. Norton, 2016), 1.1, 41, 43, 50, 68, 66, 169–70.

104 Thomas H. Brobjer, *Nietzsche’s Philosophical Context: An Intellectual Biography* (Urbana: U of Illinois P, 2008), 117. Emerson’s “Fate” is an overlooked chapter/essay in the overlooked *Conduct of Life* (1860), but, as Brobjer discovered, it was central to Nietzsche thinking when formulating the eternal return. “If we must accept Fate, we are no less compelled to affirm.” Emerson, “Fate,” 196.

105 Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, 5.2, 191.

106 Emerson, “Fate,” 195.

107 Ralph W. Emerson, “Divinity School Address,” *Political Writings*, ed. Kenneth Sacks (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2008), 40.

108 Emerson, “Divinity School Address,” 29, 40.

## Chapter 1

### Hematological Life in Emerson

And Swedenborg's *Economy of the Animal Kingdom*

I enjoy hunting for the sake of it, and there are few hunts more challenging than tracking down  
the mysterious Swedenborg

—Paul Valéry<sup>1</sup>

*The Age of Swedenborg*

*This age is Swedenborg's*

—Ralph Waldo Emerson, 1854<sup>2</sup>

In 1868, Ralph Waldo Emerson delivers his brief “Leasts and Mosts” lecture to Meionaon Hall in Boston. During his lecture, Emerson draws a relationship by degrees between things miniscule and massive; for example, “the snow-flake is a small glacier, the glacier a large snowflake.” While the snowy and glacial forms radically diverge in magnitude, they are made up from the same stuff, only manifest at different scales of being. “Size is of no account.” Without ontologically privileging the earth-shifting glacier over the delicate snowflake, Emerson recasts elemental forces by lateralizing them so that ice crystals—whether embodied as glaciers or snowflakes—exist on a nonhierarchical scale of leasts and mosts. Extrapolating his theory through increasingly complex forms, Emerson’s discourse moves from chemistry, to geology, to zoology, culminating in a provocative claim about human life. Unseating mankind from its ascended status, Emerson situates our developmental history in direct decent from the lowliest creatures in primordial swamps. “*Volvox globator*, the initial microscopic mite from which man draws his pedigree.”<sup>3</sup> The *volvox globator* is a small person, and a person is a large *volvox globator*. Like snowflakes and glaciers, animalcules and animals—even humans—become various articulations of their life held in common.

First seen in 1700 by Dutch microscopist Antonie van Leeuwenhoek and taxonomized in Carl Linnaeus’ 1758 edition of *Systema Naturae*, the *volvox globator* (or wheel-insect) is an aquatic microorganism encompassing multiple monads in a spherical membrane.<sup>4</sup> Suspended in its fluid universe, the *volvox globator* promiscuously aerates water through its skin and reaches into and beyond itself with its bristling filaments. Rhizomatically permeated, the *volvox*




Figure A. Volvox Globator. Charles Williams, *Curiosities of Animal Life; with The Recent Discoveries of the Microscope* (London: The Religious Tract Society, 1848), 133., HathiTrust, accessed January 20, 2020, <https://www.hathitrust.org>.

globator's fibers spread within and without its integumentary organization to enmesh each monad with it, each other, and the environment. Disorganizing itself, the volvox globator ruptures to release its monads which then, in turn, transform into more volvox globators. Each volvox globator, for this reason, exists as part and whole, least and most.

Emerson reads a number of scientific texts published in the 1840's that revise Linnaean taxonomy to class the volvox globator as a complex organism comprised of multiple monads, each representing an accumulated and distributed animal life.<sup>5</sup> This means that when Emerson positions the volvox globator and man on an ontological continuum, he understands that the manifold animalcule exists according to a logic of leasts and mosts that includes human life. "The microscope observes a monad or wheel-insect among the infusories circulating in water," Emerson remarks at the outset of *Representative Men* (1850).<sup>6</sup> "Man," Emerson concludes the text, "is the most composite of all creatures; the wheel-insect, *volvox globator*, is at the other extreme."<sup>7</sup>

When Emerson visits England in 1848 to deliver his *Mind and Manners of the Nineteenth Century* lecture series to the Literary and Scientific Institution of London, he is introduced to Gideon Algernon Mantell who then recently published an authoritative description on the volvox globator which—observed at five-hundred times the magnification of Leeuwenhoek’s initial study—ignited a frenzy of renewed interest in microscopic life.<sup>8</sup> Beyond the animalcular enthusiasm, London was then in the midst of a Swedenborgian craze, and Emerson could not resist seeing a connection. In his second lecture, “The Relation of Intellect to Natural Science,” Emerson contrasts idealism to materialism, including Emanuel Swedenborg among the materialists. To the dismay of the Swedenborg Society members in the audience, Emerson reformulates Swedenborg’s metaphysics as, in fact, a physics. The

“*leasts*’...of Swedenborg; that, fire is made of little fires; and water, of little waters; and man, of manikins; drops make the ocean, and sands compose its shores. A drop of water and a grain of sand give you the whole economy. A man is a developed animalcule; animalcule is an arrested Man, but animalcule, again, is made up of atoms, the same atoms of which water, fire, or sand are composed, and, on each atom, the whole atomic power is impressed.”<sup>9</sup>

Without taking any creative license, Emerson’s invokes the material universe’s “whole economy” of leasts and mosts directly from his previous decade spent studying Swedenborg’s multi-volume *The Economy of the Animal Kingdom, Considered Anatomically, Physically, and Philosophically* (1740–41), amounting to over a thousand pages about the human’s anatomical relation to elemental reality. In *Economy of the Animal Kingdom*, Swedenborg situates his writing within the materialist tradition, beginning from ancient atomism and ending with modern nosology, laying great stress upon the importance of Leeuwenhoek’s observations on globular

life as exemplified by the volvox globator.<sup>10</sup> Drawing out Leuwenhoek's example, Swedenborg notices how everything globs together as "one particle or globule of an atmosphere in an infinite number of modulations; one corpuscle of salt in an infinity of flavors and one color in an infinity of pictures. One thing may be grafted upon another as one tree upon another."<sup>11</sup>

Emerson is deeply engaged with "the new molecular philosophy," remarking that it "shows astronomical interspaces between atom and atom, shows that the world is all outside: it has no inside."<sup>12</sup> Shortly after giving his lectures in London, Emerson publishes *Representative Men*, including a chapter on Swedenborg describing how the "economy of the universe" operates by releasing bodies into "atoms" to coalesce into new "bodies."<sup>13</sup> After publishing *Representative Men*, elemental economics continue preoccupying Emerson. In "Economy" (1851), he speculates that when life is "economist" it takes "crumbling atoms, seizes them as they fall, and redistributes them instantly, into new bodies."<sup>14</sup> At the one end, bodies gather together; at the other end, they scatter. For every life—including human life—momentarily holds a multiplicity which must break loose to become something else, free to transform.

Emerson's vitalism takes as its premise that all life, including mammalian vertebrate life, expands like the volvox by self-multiplication into manifold relations. (In his 1860 "Fate," he remarks that "the papillae of man runs out to every star.")<sup>15</sup> But this is not an analogy. People and volvox globators *literally* transform *exactly* the same way. "In the animal," as Emerson describes transformation in his "Swedenborg" chapter of *Representative Men*,

"nature makes the vertebra, or a spine of vertebrae, and helps herself still by a new spine...—spine on spine, to the end of the world...We are adopted to infinity...and love nothing which ends: and in nature it's no end, but everything...is lifted into a superior, and the ascent of these things climbs into daemonic...natures."<sup>16</sup>

Régis Michaud calls this the “fantastic dorsal spine” of Emerson’s Swedenborgianism, a materialist theory of transformation without center or termination. All animals, down to their bones, expand outward by fractalizing their appendages.<sup>17</sup> Each body’s explosion into demonic natures sounds idealistic, but since such self-overgrowth occurs dorsally, demonism becomes part of spinal anatomy. In light of a new understanding about Swedenborgian vitalism, one that is materialist and demonic.

Through Swedenborg’s science—what Emerson calls demonology, or the shadow of theology—we disclose an alternative demonism that overcomes the distinction between bodily interiority and the vast exteriority across which it increases. In other words, it was not the clairvoyant’s angelic visions that impressed Emerson, for “Swedenborg’s theology,” he confesses, “is nothing to me.”<sup>18</sup> In fact, in *Representative Men* Emerson distinguishes Swedenborg’s theology from a completely different discourse in *Economy of the Animal Kingdom*. But what rests on the other side of his theology? “Demonology,” he proposes, “is the Shadow of Theology,” and he cannot “deny” Swedenborg his “demonology.”<sup>19</sup> In 1838, “inclined to concede to [Swedenborg]” that his “intellectual powers had grown by the study of his writings,” the following year Emerson delivered his “Demonology” oration in Boston.<sup>20</sup> The problem of defining demonology immediately arises from Emerson’s claim, however. What exactly makes Swedenborg’s science demonic? “Demonology seems to me,” Emerson so defines it, “to be the intensation of the individual nature, the extension of this beyond its due bounds and into the domain of the infinite and universal.”<sup>21</sup>

Still, Emerson’s Swedenborgianism accounts for an unlimited bodily relation to the universe without canceling multiplicity, variety, and divergence. “Our organs are opened only by degrees,” as Swedenborg puts it.<sup>22</sup> The human body is not only an organized body, but also a



disorganized body.<sup>23</sup> Bodies experience, by virtue of their infusion with blood, a continuity with all life; however, the coincidence with bodies and organs does not entail a complete bodily organization. While each organ appears in a network and partakes of blood, each creates discord by obeying its own logic of leasts and mosts: each spine, for example, is built up from many little spines and multiples into many bigger spines. Expanding by diverse processes of multiplication, the body's organs are in some sense always exceeding what demarcates their boundaries, for even the skin, itself an organ, is not that which contains other organs. "Swedenborg," as Branka Arsić observes in Emerson's writing, "whose internal organs are not 'united' but made of 'so many little organs,' and whose stomach is made 'of so many little stomachs.'"<sup>24</sup> Every organ, in other words, is in an endless chain of self-same organs existing on a scale of decrease and increase.

Seeing a "multiplicity of things" in life, Leeuwenhoek demonstrates for Swedenborg how bodies economize themselves according to what constitutes them, and what they in turn constitute.<sup>25</sup> For each elemental assemblage, a lifeform; for each lifeform (whether it be a star, mountain, a tree, a bird, or a person), a cluster; for each cluster (whether it be a constellation, a range, a forest, a flock, or a community), a most; for each most, a least. To take account of Emerson's ontology of leasts and mosts in the context of Swedenborg, including both the personal and impersonal, I take up Arsić and Cary Wolfe's landmark *The Other Emerson* (2010), a collection of essays that has reoriented American studies towards the coincident relationship between personalized and depersonalized identities. "Arsić," in other words, "sees it as inclusive: the fact that the impersonal operates within persons does not annul their personalities... In the same way in which the fact that we all share one universal life doesn't prevent us from having and living our particular lives."<sup>26</sup> We find ourselves, Swedenborg thus makes his remarkable

formulation, in the thick of things: “universals in individuals, and of individuals under universals.”<sup>27</sup>

Despite his openhearted proposition, Swedenborg’s ontology makes no reference to discontinuous life; indeed, his vitalism accounts for elemental exchange without composing or decomposing anatomical people. Leeuwenhoek, who Swedenborg confesses to “quote so often,” backdrops his theory of permeable anatomy whereby the body retains its personal boundaries and depersonalizes with the universe. For Swedenborg, this is not a mystical vision, but rather an empirical experience of blood. “Leeuwenhoek,” he asserts, “who, so far as I know, is the only person that has applied himself with complete success to the investigation of the blood-particles,” reveals that a single drop of blood “contains salts of every kind, both fixed and volatile, and oils, spirits, and aqueous elements; in fine, whatever is created and produced by the three kingdoms of the world, the animal, the vegetable, and the mineral.”<sup>28</sup> Therefore “blood,” in Swedenborg’s evaluation, is the “common” and “complex of all things that exist” in “life.” Pumping throughout the body, “the red blood is” the “means of which the animal microcosm is connected with its macrocosm or world.”<sup>29</sup>

By inhaling (or influxing), our lungs oxygenate blood that is then driven by the heart throughout a labyrinthine system of arteries, veins, and capillaries to distribute elements bodily; by exhaling (or effluxing), we exhaust carbonated breath. “Moreover,” blood “imbibes the treasures that the atmosphere carries in its bosom, and to this end exposes itself to the air through the medium of the lungs.” “Hence,” Swedenborg deduces, “the blood is not only a treasury and storehouse of all things in nature, and thereby ministers to its offspring, the body, whatever is requisite to its various necessities and uses, but it is actually all in all; and contains within itself

the ground and the means by which every man is enabled to live a distinctive life, in his own body, and in the ultimate world.”<sup>30</sup>

With reference to such transfluxing and embodied life, my chapter reveals Swedenborg’s misunderstood and unacknowledged influence on Emerson’s vitalism. In my second section, *Return to the Animal Kingdom*, I reconstruct Emerson’s Swedenborgianism and seek to understand why such a robust influence has been overlooked by even notable readers. In my third section, *Animated America*, I draw further connections between Emerson and Swedenborg’s writing, arguing that he posited his particular Swedenborgianism as a radical upheaval in the philosophy of life. My intervention into the history of Emerson biography and criticism is extreme and not without risk, for my chapter seeks to contradict an entire tradition of scholarship and inherited wisdom about one of America’s most recognized and studied authors. As I seek to demonstrate against this tradition, Emerson’s engagement with Swedenborg is in fact sustained, discerning, and formative. In “Over-Soul” (1841), for instance, he explicitly references Swedenborg thrice by name in the context of discussing the confluence of personal and impersonal life. “And this,” Emerson writes, “because the heart in thee is the heart of all; not a valve, not a wall, not an intersection is there anywhere in nature, but one blood rolls uninterruptedly an endless circulation through all men, as the water of the globe is all one sea, and, truly seen, its tide is one.”<sup>31</sup>

My chapter thus traces the hematological life in the background of Emerson’s abolitionism to Swedenborg and towards its ethical consequences in antebellum America. As Emerson declares in “Self-Reliance” (1841), blood ties us together as much as it keeps us apart. “All men have my blood, and I have all men’s.”<sup>32</sup> By emerging through Emerson’s philosophy at the moment in American history when perceived differences in blood justified chattel slavery,

Swedenborg's ontology therefore incites a revolution in thinking whereby sanguine discontinuity is overturned, enabling a politics that must include all people as part of one life.

\*  
\*\*

“The animal kingdom,” Swedenborg names his vitalistic principle in *Economy of the Animal Kingdom*, takes “blood as its common fountain,” even “the relation of all things,” a basis of “whatever is created and produced by the three kingdoms of the world, the animal, the vegetable, and the mineral,” and so the “whole world and all its kingdoms.”<sup>33</sup> Since “blood” is the material “relation of all things,” what “permeates and vivifies” everything, and since our own heart draws inward and expels outward such relations, Swedenborg's ontology assumes each cardiovascular system as a hub of relations. The heart, therefore, is the boundary across which innumerable elements collect and in turn disperse without end. Emerson's Swedenborgianism thus illustrates Sharon Cameron's remark about an “ultimate discovery” in antebellum American writing which “concerns a perceived *identity* among animal, vegetable, mineral.” The identity partakes of its tributaries and flows through our bodies, such that we perceive “a discrepancy between container (the human body) and the thing contained (the blood).”<sup>34</sup> Blood, by an economy of exchange and renewal, is pumped by each heart, influxing elements towards an organized body, and in return effluxing them to disorganized diversity. Accordingly, Emerson begins *Representative Men* by claiming that each “man is the center for nature,” even “running out threads of relation through every thing, fluid and solid, material and elemental.”<sup>35</sup>

“We must extend the area of life and multiply our relations,” Emerson thus prefaces *Representative Men*.<sup>36</sup> From our center, our “heart”—he reasons in “Circles” (1841)—“refuses to be imprisoned; in its first and narrower pulses, it already tends outward a vast force, and to

immense and innumerable expansions.”<sup>37</sup> For Emerson to reference such cardiovascular power during the decades before the Civil War, his emphatic cardiology would need to account for the emancipatory potential in *each and every* heart, including those bound by law and custom. Without example of heart’s self-manumitting power, Emerson’s Swedenborgianism would not conjure up a potent enough ethics to satisfy an (uncompromising) ontological abolitionism.<sup>38</sup> In “Emancipation in the British West Indies” (1844), delivered in Concord, Emerson celebrates the decade since the British abolition of slavery took effect. Where “ill blood continually grew worse” in Britain due to race-based captivity—so that each person “felt his heart sink” with those under the weight of subjugation—, the legislature’s abandonment of the practice, Emerson assents, “does the heart good” as the way “animalcules” do when “unfolding gigantic.”<sup>39</sup>

However, unlike the biblical appeal of Theodore Dwight Weld, or the constitutional of William Lloyd Garrison, or the political of John Greenleaf Whittier, or the sentimental of Harriet Beecher Stowe, Emerson’s abolitionism resonates with Frederick Douglass’ irrepressible rise to liberty. For this reason, the British abolition of slavery is, by Emerson’s estimation, insufficient. As for his own nation’s struggle to overcome the temptations of Southern slavocracy and its congenial relationship with Northern industry, Emerson’s oration daringly turns away from Britain’s legislative resolution towards Toussaint Louverture and the Haitian Revolution.<sup>40</sup> On the point around which this chapter will later draw to a close, Emerson identifies his Swedenborgianism with a radicalism in life that must break free to outgrow itself. (“The blood is moral: the blood is anti-slavery.”) With an overflow immanent to *each and every* drop of blood, Emerson’s aspirations for America become based on cardiovascular impulses beating beyond things that momentarily depress life. Historical “determinations of blood” that slow the fluid into racial categories, as Gregg Crane notes about Emerson’s antislavery thinking, must rather

become transformative indeterminacy, “energy surging outward, an inspiration that movement and change must be undertaken despite the uncertainty of the outcome.”<sup>41</sup> As Emerson’s “Emancipation in the British West Indies” reaches its denouement, he exclaims that the excessive energies coursing through the heart cannot be repressed “because it is in the voice of the universe, pronounces Freedom. The Power that built this fabric of things affirms it in the heart.”<sup>42</sup>

### *Return to the Animal Kingdom*

It is very pleasant to me to hear of any fine person that he or she is a reader of Swedenborg. It is an uncomputed force,—his influence on this age, his genius is still unmeasured<sup>43</sup>

Very dangerous study will Swedenborg be to any but a mind of great elasticity<sup>44</sup>

—Ralph Waldo Emerson

Emerson’s writing is haunted by Swedenborg. Yet despite spending decades—even entire years, as he says—reading nothing but Swedenborg, his Swedenborgianism remains vague, and to this day no significant analysis of their relationship exists. Still, for Emerson, Swedenborg is a representative man who casts a daunting shadow over the present age. “Swedenborg is one of the eternal men,” he declares, who remains, though “strangely loomed up in the last age,” of “yet, an unsettled reputation.”<sup>45</sup> Emerson himself could never settle it, but he hoped that future scholars would at last realize Swedenborg’s force in the coming age. Today, however, we feel burdened by Swedenborg’s “rotting corpse,” as one reader puts it, which Emerson left for us to bury, and so the task still sits before us, only the more unappealing for its exposure.<sup>46</sup>

In “Religion” (1837), Emerson bemoans that “Emanuel Swedenborg, a man of sublime genius,” does “not seem yet to have attracted the attention of any philosopher capable of giving a just theory of his mind.”<sup>47</sup> If no philosopher had found Swedenborg all that interesting at the height of his fame, what are the chances that one comes now? Maybe we simply find him boring, and there it ends. “No other writer,” Julian Hawthorne states it squarely, “is so unmagnetic as Swedenborg.”<sup>48</sup> After all, “pages of Swedenborg to one who does not yet penetrate to the man’s thought,” Emerson confesses, are “dull and stifling.”<sup>49</sup>

Emerson delivered only a single work about Swedenborg, “Swedenborg, or the Mystic,” orated from 1845 to 1846 and then published in *Representative Men*. Before composing *Representative Men*, Emerson believed that “of the last and present century,” Swedenborg remained “still of unexhausted virtue.”<sup>50</sup> While Emerson’s “Swedenborg” chapter is not exhaustive, Swedenborg’s greater importance unfolds over the entire book, perhaps culminating in a challenge: “He will render,” we are enticed, “the greatest service to criticism which has been known for ages who shall draw the line of relation that subsists between Shakespeare and Swedenborg.”<sup>51</sup> Given such flagrant inducement, if such fruit lowly hangs, it would have been picked long ago.

While the “greatest” task remains open, my chapter seeks a simpler “service to criticism.” We have not, all said, exhausted the relationship between Emerson and Swedenborg, never mind Shakespeare. This section thus begins by suggesting that we take another, more focused glance at Emerson’s Swedenborgianism. To do so, I overlook rumors and read exactly what Emerson tells us that he reads. I pay attention where he remarks about Swedenborg’s importance and the reasons that he explicitly provides. Fortunately for such interpretive strategy, Emerson only fully endorses one text: “the ‘Economy of the Animal Kingdom’ is one of those books which, by the

sustained dignity of thinking, is an honor to the human race.” *Economy of the Animal Kingdom*, Emerson decides, completes Swedenborg’s scientific career, after which he “ceased to publish any more scientific books.”<sup>52</sup> Everything written by Swedenborg after this scientific period, Emerson emphatically insists, can go unread.

However, those writings that Emerson dismisses are all of Swedenborg’s “voluminous theological works.” As my chapter reveals, Swedenborg’s revival during the 1840’s is the context of *Representative Men*, and so, while Swedenborg gained theological recognition, Emerson places his theology below his science.<sup>53</sup> While it was standard practice by 1850 to describe Swedenborg’s early scientific and late theological periods, revivalists argued for biographical continuity. Furthermore, these revivalists claimed that Swedenborg’s mysticism follows directly from his empiricism, and so his science progresses into theology. Emerson, on the other hand, rejects all the theology: for “Swedenborg’s theology,” he confesses, “is nothing to me.”<sup>54</sup> He therefore characterizes Swedenborg’s career by rise and fall, not evolution. *Economy of the Animal Kingdom*, in Emerson’s opinion, is the grand finale of a brilliant person who could not survive his own flight into spirit-seeing. From then on, everything changes. From “his fifty-fourth year” onward, Emerson describes Swedenborg’s decline, “these thoughts held him fast, and his profound mind admitted a perilous opinion, too frequent in religious history, that he was an abnormal person, whom was granted the privilege of conversing with angels.”<sup>55</sup> His “theological bias thus fatally narrowed his interpretation of nature,” Emerson reads out his indictment, ending a profoundly scientific career and so committing a “capital offence.”<sup>56</sup>

According to Emerson’s biographical division, he details how Swedenborg begins life scientifically, and how for “thirty years was employed in the composition and publication of his scientific works.” Swedenborg, Emerson reports, wrote about twenty-five works on topics



ranging from minerology to anatomy until “1743” when from “like force he threw himself into theology.”<sup>57</sup> “In 1743, when he was fifty-four years old, what is called his illumination began.”<sup>58</sup> Since Swedenborg published all of his theological works after *Economy of the Animal Kingdom*, for Emerson to insist we stop there is to also insist we ignore everything shaped by his mysticism. Emerson calls Swedenborg’s transition from science to theology, without mixing words, madness.<sup>59</sup>

Moreover, by dating Swedenborg’s transition, Emerson marks a gap between his two *Animal Kingdom* books and thereby characterizes the first as scientific and the second as theological. At the moment when Swedenborg’s primary revivalists argued that these *Animal Kingdoms* displayed a continuity between science and theology, Emerson’s clear stance is nothing less than controversial. Instead of—as the established revivalists argued—forming a sequence emblematic of how science expands into theology, Emerson argues that Swedenborg’s career most dramatically diverges from itself and rushes apart into the two *Animal Kingdoms*. According to Emerson, in radical opposition to the revivalists, (*Oeconomia Regni Animalis*) *Economy of the Animal Kingdom* (1740–41) is Swedenborg’s last scientific work whereas (*Regnum Animale*) *The Animal Kingdom* (1744–45) is his first theological work. (Hereafter referenced as *EAK* and *AK*.) However, the fact that Swedenborg even published two *Animal Kingdoms* has confused many readers of Emerson.<sup>60</sup> And yet, I claim, without understanding what these two works are and why they differ, we cannot begin to understand Emerson’s Swedenborgianism.

Beyond exploring Emerson’s Swedenborgianism, this section discusses its polemical context before the 1840’s revival began. Emerson’s drafting of *Representative Men*, in which appears his most definitive statements about Swedenborg, situates his thinking within an ongoing

battle over Swedenborg's reputation. I further discuss how two schools, those who promoted empirical science and those who promoted mystical theology, jostled over translating the two *Animal Kingdoms*. London's Swedenborg Society, against Emerson and the Swedenborg Association's efforts, crafted the Swedenborg that we know today. Unnoticed still, Emerson and his English rival, James John Garth Wilkinson, the homeopathist described in *English Traits* (1856), worked against each other during the revival, even at times exchanging thinly veiled insults. Since Emerson could not overtake Wilkinson, we assume his Swedenborgianism as defined by Wilkinson when, in fact, he believed the opposite.<sup>61</sup>

To reconstruct Emerson's lost view, I will show how he fought Wilkinson's attempt to obscure *EAK*. Whilst chronologically overstepping a translation of *EAK*, Wilkinson proceeds translating *AK* (1844) to which he affixes a lengthy introduction celebrating the growth of science into theology. In place of translating *EAK*, Wilkinson publishes *Remarks on Swedenborg's Economy* (1846), a copy of which he sends to Emerson.<sup>62</sup> In *Remarks*, Wilkinson frames Swedenborg's *EAK* as a supplemental prequel to the *AK*.<sup>63</sup> Shortly after Emerson delivers his "Swedenborg" lecture in 1846, he receives *Remarks* from Wilkinson.<sup>64</sup> It must be emphasized that, when editing his lecture to be a chapter in *Representative Men*, he directly refutes (by name) Wilkinson's scheme, praising *EAK* and systematically denigrating the *AK*. Wilkinson, upon receiving a copy of *Representative Men* from Emerson, was appalled.

Since the bulk of "Swedenborg" is directed at stripping away *AK* from *EAK*, dismantling Wilkinson's lifework, I argue that Emerson sought to punctuate Swedenborg's career with the only book that Wilkinson, the head revivalist, diminished. For this reason, Emerson calls the translation of *EAK*, by Augustus Clissold and the Swedenborg Association, "poetic justice done."<sup>65</sup> Wilkinson's strategy nevertheless survives. If Emerson instead had been successful, we

would today remember Swedenborg through the multivolume *EAK* with its detailed physical, anatomical, and chemical descriptions from which arise an ontology.<sup>66</sup> Swedenborg's materialist ontology, about which Emerson credits *EAK*, motivates my chapter. Not only do I argue that *EAK* informs Emerson's Swedenborgianism, even more, I show how it backgrounds his philosophy.

\*

\*\*

While finishing his *AK* books, Swedenborg began recording strange dreams. He wrote his *Journal of Dreams* privately, noting the unsettling nocturnal experiences in every detail. These included disturbing hybridizations and transformations of a violent and sexual nature.<sup>67</sup> Such visions, however, began to spill over into Swedenborg's waking hours. In 1744, he suspended the *Journal of Dreams* to begin recording his conversations with angels, and his eyes never again shut. "*Swedenborg*," Emerson muses, "reminds me again and again of our Jones Very," who also spoke with angels and fancied himself Christ resurrected.<sup>68</sup> Very's friends, including Emerson, endorsed his institutionalization, which suggests that he too sees no sanity in Swedenborg's clairvoyance. However, a century of scholarship since has diverted attention away from Swedenborg to save Emerson's reputation from the occultism that he never, in fact, embraced.

Our confusion is compounded by incoherent opinions: some note Swedenborg's influence on Emerson,<sup>69</sup> some his unserious curiosity,<sup>70</sup> and others a reckless concoction including Böhme and Spinoza,<sup>71</sup> what Lawrence Buell refers to as his "mystical humanism" at best "jerry-built" with "Swedenborg" among others.<sup>72</sup> The range of opinions span Emerson's

acceptance of Swedenborg,<sup>73</sup> to his full dismissal.<sup>74</sup> Both extremes are mistaken in that they overlook how Emerson simultaneously embraces and rejects Swedenborg.

Along with Swedenborg, Plato, Montaigne, Napoleon, Shakespeare, and Goethe would represent the universal man's faculties and flaws in *Representative Men*.<sup>75</sup> In a 1903 evaluation, however, F. B. Sanborn details "the remarkable biographical criticism of Plato, Shakespeare, Montaigne, and Napoleon in *Representative Men*."<sup>76</sup> Swedenborg was, apparently, unworthy of mention. It was not the first strike. "We will leave Mr. Emerson to his own ruminations on Swedenborg," as an early reviewer put it.<sup>77</sup> Recent critics have continued the campaign, describing the chapter as "ultimately unsatisfying," something which "has never been popular," so "why," we might ask, would Emerson "include Swedenborg at all?"<sup>78</sup> Buell, deciding the inclusion arbitrary, claims that "Emerson could easily substituted Jonathan Edwards for Emanuel Swedenborg."<sup>79</sup> And said bluntly, Perry Miller calls the inclusion a "perversity."<sup>80</sup> These repeated insults to Emerson's own judgment have become a standard reprimand laid upon him at one point or another, mostly in passing, as if he is running an endless gauntlet of admirers with a bone to pick.

Not everyone has been so unreceptive. Oliver Wendell Holmes Sr., Emerson's first illustrious biographer, did not deny his life-long preoccupation with Swedenborg, calculated by the numerous mentions in his available writing, twice as often as most.<sup>81</sup> Beyond citations, Swedenborg's presence in Emerson's library is undeniable.<sup>82</sup> He owned, not counting lost and borrowed volumes, many books by or about Swedenborg, including *EAK* in both Latin and English editions.<sup>83</sup> From this surviving portion of his collection, a picture emerges: first, he read Swedenborg in Latin (we know as early as college); second, he acquired most of his Swedenborg books in the 1840's, when most translations happened; third, many volumes thus entered his

library during the decade, indicated by his journals, that he drafted *Representative Men*; fourth, by giving him copies, both London based Swedenborgian organizations, the Association and Society, wanted sway over Emerson's opinion. By 1847, Emerson "read," and we must *here emphasize*, "little but Swedenborg."<sup>84</sup>

Yet Emerson's total immersion in Swedenborg has, somehow, gone unspoken and makes no discernable mark upon the vast body of criticism. In a near hit, F. O. Matthiessen noticed how Swedenborg held Emerson's attention.<sup>85</sup> As David Van Leer has discovered, Matthiessen even planned to write a book, *Age of Swedenborg*, "to examine the philosophies of the period," but the project was canceled by his suicide.<sup>86</sup> Through merely identifying *EAK*'s gravitational pull on Emerson, Matthiessen strode furthest towards figuring out why Emerson became so selective in his study.<sup>87</sup> Having likely paid attention due to Emerson's unequivocal—and so rare by Emersonian standards—praise of *EAK*, Matthiessen began what my chapter seeks to continue: to build a theory of Swedenborgianism from *EAK* without reference to the mysticism that Emerson abandons.

It is not only uncharacteristic for Emerson to fully endorse something without complication, he too uncharacteristically—in the case of *EAK*—threw his lot into a debate with a living adversary. Without coincidence, Emerson focuses on Swedenborg's *EAK*, the only work that Wilkinson avoided translating. By contradicting Wilkinson, Emerson draws an unbridgeable line between two halves of a life that his adversary claimed was whole.<sup>88</sup> Notwithstanding Emerson's best efforts, his counterpart's translations and articles dominated Swedenborg's revival. In 1848, *The Southern Quarterly Review* thus acknowledged that Wilkinson was at the helm, but warned how "labor" done by scholars "influenced" by "religious principles" could not be fully trusted. "The Philosophical Character of Swedenborg," by the *Review*, divided

Swedenborg, the scientific and the theological, promoting the scientific works to “stand on their own merits,” against Wilkinson’s evaluation, perhaps encouraging Emerson to take the distinction to its extreme.<sup>89</sup> To overtake Wilkinson’s labor, Emerson could not outpublish him, so he got strategic, following up on the *Review*’s distinction and dismissing all of Swedenborg’s religious writing as insanity.<sup>90</sup> Wilkinson, who by 1850 considered Emerson a friend, felt betrayed.

“Wilkinson, Swedenborg’s pupil,” Emerson regretted, could not see beyond the bounds of the New Church. The “Swedenborgian church an imprisonment,” he continued, and “never a hero stirs out of it,” not even Wilkinson.<sup>91</sup> While Emerson corresponded with Wilkinson through Carlyle and Henry James Sr., they socialized in 1848 to Emerson’s disappointment.<sup>92</sup> He soon came to understand that his once worthy opponent was “spoiled” by spiritualism.<sup>93</sup> Wilkinson, generally unguarded, received an unanticipated emotional blow when Emerson sent him a copy of *Representative Men*, to which he fired back a response in gentlemanly terms. Wilkinson was, the letter reads, “especially grateful to [Emerson’s] *Swedenborg, the Mystic*, which to reverse will require some tough work at long arts and sciences.” But pleasantries complete, “It seems to [Wilkinson], however, that there is yet to be a consideration of some things that [Emerson had] dismissed. The Spiritual world...is...not easily to be shelved.”<sup>94</sup> Inspired by Wilkinson’s plea to not shelve spiritualism, Emerson began lending out his books, insisting that they “need not be returned.”<sup>95</sup>

### *Animated America*

Swedenborg threw a formidable theory into the world

—Ralph Waldo Emerson<sup>96</sup>

Wilkinson's *Remarks* places *EAK* at the limits of materialism, and so there Swedenborg, in his opinion, "exceeds the most adventurous materialist."<sup>97</sup> He therefore identifies *AK* as the advanced sequel, to be "a step beyond ordinary materialism."<sup>98</sup> The physical body, the primary topic of *EAK*, is thus, in Wilkinson account, brought into full correspondence with the spiritual body in the *AK*, and thence achieves its transcendence. Claiming in *Remarks* that the "human body" cannot be denied its "unlimited anatomy," he argues that the material and spiritual bodies rise together into complete harmony (or correspondence) as Swedenborg progresses through his *Animal Kingdom* books' four volumes from 1740–1745. For chronological reasons, Wilkinson proposes that Swedenborg's vision remains intact as it passes from a scientific to a theological domain. (That is to say, "his scientific and theological works...continued from the one to the other.") *EAK*, on his account, looks to elevate the physical man into the "Divine Man, the central object of the Christian faith."<sup>99</sup>

As for Wilkinson, demoted to an "editor," Emerson "lays no stress on his discoveries." While Emerson credits Wilkinson for his role in reviving Swedenborg's science along with his theology (which "was written with the highest end,—to put science and the soul, long estranged from each other, at one again"), he reverses *Remarks* to instead claim that the *AK* limits the anatomical possibilities proposed in *EAK*.<sup>100</sup> Because "Mr. Wilkinson," by his "preliminary discourses," when prefacing his translation of the *AK* "throws all" materialism "into shade," he overshadows Swedenborg's science with the theology to which it becomes subservient. When overshadowing corporeal life by shrouding it with theological images, Emerson observes how the divine form actually diminishes human anatomy, encumbering it with shadows and reducing its extensive relationship with the material universe.

In *EAK*, Emerson proposes that Swedenborg “saw that the human body was strictly universal,” and that it “feeds and is fed by the whole of matter.” To promote Swedenborg’s legacy through *EAK* alone, Emerson needed to disassociate it from the theological investments of the subsequent *AK*, which he considers corrupted by religious symbolism. In other words, Emerson demarcated Swedenborg’s early scientific from his later theological writing by drawing a distinction between the two *Animal Kingdoms* based upon symbolic representation. Swedenborg’s scientific writing, according to Emerson, is about releasing life from images, and so reacquainting sensation with corporeality. Emerson, however, notices that where Swedenborg’s early science seeks to unfix elements from their symbols, his late theology reattaches all matter to a symbolic relationship with the heavenly kingdom: for each mundane atom an incorporeal double. Emerson calls this correspondence theory unscientific because it arrests the transformative force of life by a stasis that puts living things in agreement with changeless dogma. Swedenborg’s theology is thus not unscientific for disregarding the elemental, but exactly for symbolically arranging things into a stable picture. Not a single particle escapes the symbolic correspondence of Swedenborg’s theology, where elements meet images to spark intelligibility between body and soul.

Emerson condemnation of symbolism defines his disappointment with Swedenborg’s theology, by which his “science...was narrowed and defeated by the exclusively theologic direction which his inquiries took.” For this reason, Emerson describes how Swedenborg’s “perception of nature” becomes “not human and universal, but mystical and Hebraic. He fastens each natural object to a theologic notion.”<sup>101</sup> When Swedenborg transitions to writing the *AK*, “symbolism pervades the living body,” forecasting a moratorium on scientific writing. (“And down to this hour, literature has no book which the symbolism of things is scientifically



opened.”) By representing the uncommon through personalizing sensible life, Swedenborg’s mysticism only sees things as they are pictured by a clairvoyance in the oppressive shape of his mind. What is “mystical, that is, as a quite arbitrary and accidental picture of the truth,—not as the truth. Any other symbol would be as good.”<sup>102</sup>

Where *EAK* is exploratory, *AK* becomes tyrannical. “As for King Swedenborg,” Emerson protests, “too much dogma, too much government,” nothing more than a “theosophist of the present age.”<sup>103</sup> Symbolic choice being arbitrary, the mystical Swedenborgian is no closer to seeing reality because all symbolism works by a logic of stability, while the universe by a logic of variance.<sup>104</sup> The terms mandated by the mad dictator clap everything under symbols; “Metamorphosis,” however, “is the law of the Universe. All forms are fluent,” each only “pauses for a moment in any form, but pass into a new form.”<sup>105</sup>

Such unsymbolic logic traverses *EAK*’s pages as the early Swedenborg strains to unfix corporeal reality, in all its restless force, from the weight of representation. (“The occult can give birth to nothing but the occult.”) Without the assurances of occultism, he deploys “anatomy, medicine, chemistry, and physics,” in short, “the science of the blood [that] includes all the sciences that treat of the substances of the world, and of the forces of nature.” Beyond such scientific discourses, Swedenborg pleads with his readers to cast down their books, renounce their priestly muses, and turn away from the learned institutions of Europe to feel and think for themselves. “On all occasions it is desirable to take experience as our guide, and to follow the order of nature.” In seeing nature “itself naked,” “nothing but experience can guide us.”<sup>106</sup> Since nature is ordered by a metamorphic capacity that makes forms fluent to each other (enough so that they pass into each other), Swedenborg’s science, following and affirming nature, decouples experience from its proprietary relationship to human experience. By depersonalizing experience

to make it operate fluently between endogenous and exogenous relations, such experience (what Emerson's heir and raised Swedenborgian William James terms "pure experience") would open the way for a new (and radical) empiricism that accounts for a field of sensation traversing both personal and impersonal life.<sup>107</sup>

To experience life in motion as one form passes into another requires an empiricism that is both personal and impersonal, and one that operates under two modes of experience, what Swedenborg identifies as "particular experience" and "general experience."<sup>108</sup> According to Swedenborg, the heart beats to alternate these modes, putting itself in the rhythm of metamorphosis:

Whether we contemplate the sphere of generals or particulars, we always behold nature busied in alternations. She pours around the world the light of day, and then the darkness of night, and from darkness leads on a new day through the gates of the breaking dawn. She advances from spring to summer, and from summer to autumn, and returns through winter to spring-time. She guides the infant through youth and manhood to old age, while at the same time she is preparing a new generation to enter on the years of infancy and youth.<sup>109</sup>

The heart thus both circulates fluid and renews what passes through it as the diurnal and seasonal wheels turn, and like those ancient rituals that tied agricultural cycles to spilling blood, Swedenborg's science revives primitive Greek thought.<sup>110</sup> From the Greeks, Swedenborg outlines that the "animal kingdom" takes its "general principle" from the ancient "doctrine of the blood."<sup>111</sup> By returning to the ancients, Swedenborg makes his Dionysian pronouncement that "all things were created for the purpose of administering to the composition and continued renewal of the blood." Invoking the Dionysian cult philosophy for his modern day, "we,"

Swedenborg continues, are “their posterity and children,” having inherited their theory of “life.” But Swedenborg further proposes that “the ancients surpassed us,” and so remain ahead of us, or come after modernity.<sup>112</sup>

Regardless of Swedenborg’s eventual mysticism, Emerson maintains that *EAK* is unarrested by the emerging symbolism in Swedenborgian thought. The “excellent edition” of Clissold’s *EAK* is the only Swedenborg text that Emerson praised without qualification and continued to quote from until his late years.<sup>113</sup> He repeats his 1850 assertion that the book “is an honor to the human race” five years later. There, he declares “Swedenborg” to be “a sublime genius” for his “scientific” ideas. Five years later still, Emerson ranks Swedenborg among the greatest scientists.<sup>114</sup> In the end, Emerson categorized Wilkinson’s labors as “preliminary,” advanced upon “by the munificence of Mr. Clissold,” who duly translated *EAK*, “and also by his literary skill, this piece of poetic justice done.”<sup>115</sup>

Emerson felt that when Swedenborg’s “scientific works” became “translated into English,” and so “restored” to the world “from their forgotten Latin,” that everything had changed. Given the Angelo-American imposition upon the nineteenth-century world, he sensed that Swedenborg’s science would “go round the world in our commercial and conquering tongue.” My chapter ends by spelling out just how consequential Emerson feels scientific Swedenborgianism is for his country and why the world would become—at least in sentiment—altered by *EAK* in the American perspective. “This startling reappearance of Swedenborg, after a hundred years,” Emerson insists, “is not the least remarkable fact in history.”<sup>116</sup>

To consider our own lives as a manifold of leasts and mosts—and then to further determine how to live without at last encircling our ontological status with an integral identity—is a heavy thought. Emerson is aware that such thought exceeds him, which is to say, he was not

yet ready to think it to its end. To graduate into the age of Swedenborg entails a rupture or even a revolution in thinking, one which Emerson entrusted to the following generation. If America was to live up to the promise of its American Revolution, if it was at last to leave Europe behind, if these were, as Emerson puts it in *Nature* (1836), indeed “new lands” populated by “new men,” Americans would too require “new thoughts.”<sup>117</sup>

At the close of *EAK*'s introduction, Swedenborg launches us into the unknown. He means what he says. Nothing ontologically or ethically established is allowed to survive into the coming age. “Swedenborg,” Emerson deduces, must thus be the last of a people, “the last Christian.”<sup>118</sup> He must get the “news that the old god is dead” Friedrich Nietzsche supposes, who encountered Swedenborg when he read *Representative Men*, “as if a new dawn shone on us.” “At long last,” he resumes, “our ships may venture out again” to the “sea, *our* sea, lies open again; perhaps there has never yet been such an ‘open sea.’”<sup>119</sup> By opposing the old view to the sea, Nietzsche reflects Swedenborg's claim, at the beginning on *EAK*, that “the time is at hand when we may quit the harbor and sail for the open sea,” which “is like embarking on a shoreless ocean that environs the world;” prepared or not, “Nevertheless we are bound to attempt the abyss.”<sup>120</sup>

Even among empiricists in Swedenborg's day, all theologians, none would go as far as to at last overturn thinking, for that would risk madness. But Swedenborg does. These “retributions” are a “service to mankind,” Emerson concludes, which are only “now beginning to be known.” But Swedenborg himself was not ready for what he saw. “If the glory was too bright for his eyes to bear, if he staggered under the trance of delight, the more excellent is the spectacle he saw.”<sup>121</sup> When passing from one set of *Animal Kingdom* books to the next, Swedenborg went adrift. “In the shipwreck,” Emerson guides us through Swedenborg's madness, “some cling to the running rigging, some to the cask and barrel, some to the spars, some to the mast; the pilot

chooses with science.”<sup>122</sup> This is the point of “Swedenborg” in *Representative Men*: if you follow Swedenborg to the end, stick with *EAK*—hold to the science—or be lost at sea.

Swedenborg’s vision sounds mad. After all, his own sanity could not withstand such radical empiricism. But Emerson earnestly heeded Swedenborg, soon after leaving his relatively liberal Unitarian education. When he returned to Harvard College to deliver the Phi Beta Kappa address, “The American Scholar” (1837), he challenged the honorees to cast off their newly minted educations, abandon the old world, and think for themselves. In Emerson’s Latin copy of *EAK*, he dates “30 Aug. 1837,” Harvard’s graduation day that year. He delivered “The American Scholar” on August 31, 1837.<sup>123</sup> We must not underestimate the occasion: these graduates were considered the finest of America’s educated youth, expected to lead the new nation into an uncharted future. Holmes Sr. goes as far as to name the oration his country’s “intellectual Declaration of Independence.”<sup>124</sup> “Our day of dependence,” Emerson proclaimed, “to the learning of other lands, draws to a close. The millions, that around us are rushing into life, cannot always be fed on the sere remains of foreign harvests.”<sup>125</sup> “The harvest is waiting,” as Emerson interpreted Swedenborg’s words, “shall we not put in the sickle?”<sup>126</sup>

After haranguing the recent graduates, Emerson announced “Swedenborg” a “man of genius who has done much for this philosophy of life, whose literary value has never rightly been estimated.”<sup>127</sup> Two decades later, Emerson still situated Swedenborg, who “is not to be measured by whole colleges of ordinary scholars,” in advance of the young scholars. “His stalwart presence,” he elaborates, “would flutter the gowns of an university.”<sup>128</sup> In 1848, a few years before Emerson makes this statement, the *Southern Quarterly Review* wagers that in the future “any American scholar will regard it as discreditable, not merely not to have read them, but not to be intimately acquainted with” Swedenborg’s “great philosophical works.”<sup>129</sup> Their

predication turned out to be completely misguided: in this future, anyway, American scholarship regards Swedenborg's work as discreditable. We may thus read the epigraph prefixed by Swedenborg to *EAK*, taken from Seneca, as prophesy:

'He who pleases his own age serves but a few. There are many ages still to come: look beyond your day to those yet unborn who will appreciate you.'<sup>130</sup>

\*

\*\*

To achieve their American Revolution, something more courageous was still needed to be done, and for that reason the approaching Civil War promised to open a wound and let loose national ambivalence through unspeakable bloodshed. Few have argued that anything could have curtailed the forecasted horrors, and language falls short to describe the bloodiest days of Chickamauga or Gettysburg. These many hearts pounded with pride towards the battlefields despite the certainty that they would burst and release the life that surged. "Courage," Emerson writes, "—the old physicians thought, (and their meaning holds, if their physiology is a little mystical),—courage, or the degree of life, is as the degree of circulation of the blood in the arteries." "Where the arteries hold their blood, is courage and adventure possible."<sup>131</sup> If blood boils, the risk of overflowing is inevitable. Such risk was memorialized by Emerson when he sung his "Concord Hymn" (1836) in memory for those minutemen who ignited the American Revolution. "Spirit, that made those heroes dare / To die, or leave their children free."<sup>132</sup>

To return now where this chapter began, Emerson's Swedenborgianism could rightly be called his abolitionist ontology upon which is predicated an ethics of a surplus life that overcomes the historical decadence weakening his countrymen's heartbeats. Where such hearts

beat faintly, institutions like slavery cannot be abolished. Ice-creams and other frivolous treats made inexpensive by slave labor,—Emerson chides his countrymen about their complacency in “Emancipation in the British West Indies,”—have stilled what was an otherwise revolutionary people. With reference to the principles sold cheaply by those new Americans who could not live out their *Declaration of Independence* to its extreme, Emerson turns America’s condescension towards Britain into admiration through its abolition of slavery, “an event singular in the history of civilization,” “a day, which gave immense fortification of a fact” to make a “settlement” of “ethical abstractions.”<sup>133</sup> Settling the ethical abstractions of antislavery in the legislature, the British accomplished something that American abolitionists hoped to repeat when seeking to amend their Constitution. In these terms, radicalism in the American hemisphere became belated to the radicalism of the nation it once sought to exceed.

On the other hand, freedoms gained by the stroke of a pen draw words whereas those won with a saber draw blood. Furthermore, the various insurrections cheered by Emerson’s friends—some of them, including Henry David Thoreau, publicly extolling the virtuous raid on Harpers Ferry and Nat Turner’s Rebellion—quickened the pulse but did not become hypertensive enough to rupture the state of affairs when their hero lost momentum.<sup>134</sup> In “Politics” (1844), Emerson accordingly remarks that “society is fluid” and so always open to change, “but any particle may suddenly become the center of the movement.”<sup>135</sup> While men like John Brown, despite being called “meteor of the war” by Herman Melville, failed to transcend portentous nature to incite another American Revolution with his own hands, Toussaint Louverture and the Haitian revolutionaries in Saint-Domingue did just that.<sup>136</sup>

But if the black man carries in his bosom an indispensable element of a new and coming civilization, for the sake of that element, no wrong, nor strength, nor circumstance, can

hurt him: he will survive and play his part. So now, the arrival in the world of such men as Toussaint, and the Haytian heroes, outweighs in good omen all the English and American humanity.

In Concord, where the American Revolutionary War began, Emerson thus praises, while delivering his “Emancipation in the British West Indies” oration, the very Britain that his rebellious forefathers rejected and prophesizes that the courageous Haitian revolutionaries, rather than the American ones, carry the “new and coming civilization” in their bosoms. Where Emerson surveys his countrymen’s breasts only to sense weak heartbeats, “here,” he declares of Louverture, “is the anti-slave: here is a man: and if you have a man, black or white is an insignificance.” With this “transparent” hero, an aspiring life that is impersonal may “shine through” and become the beating heart at the center of a movement.<sup>137</sup> A movement to what sort of new and coming age, we might ask?

“A nation of men unanimously bent on freedom,” Emerson so reasons in “Politics,” thus “can easily confound the arithmetic of statist, and achieve extravagant actions.” Approaching according its *extravagance*,—a word, in fact, meaning transgressive or revolutionary behavior—, the new and coming age cannot be predicted by that which it confounds precisely because it is always outside, always a just beyond the bounds of what it exceeds. In a word, the new and coming age does what is impossible for the present, “and there are now,” Emerson announces, “men,—if indeed I can speak in the plural number,—more exactly, I will say, I have just been conversing with one man, to whom no weight of adverse experience will make it for a moment appear impossible.”<sup>138</sup>



<sup>1</sup> “*J’aime la chasse pour la chasse, et il est peu de chasses plus prenantes et plus diverse que la chasse au Mystère Swedenborg.*” Paul Valéry, “Préface,” *Swedenborg* (Paris: Librairie Stock, 1936), xxii. Translation my own.

<sup>2</sup> Ralph W. Emerson, *Journals*, Vol. 7 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1912), 477. Hereafter abbreviated as *J7*.

<sup>3</sup> James Eliot Cabot, *A Memoir of Ralph Waldo Emerson* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1887), 798. “Nature,” Emerson tells us, “is a tropical swamp in sunshine, on whose purlieus we hear the song of summer birds, and see prismatic dewdrops,—but her interiors are terrific, full of hydras and crocodiles.” Light, refracting through the “tropic swamp” dew, reveals a terrible hidden side of tranquility. “See,” he gestures, “what the microscope reveals,—unmitigated savage;—ant and biter, and insects of the drop,—*volvox globator*.” Emerson, “Moral Sense,” *LL*, 2, 147. This line first appears in “War” (1838), and then his *Journal* (1849), and finally most refined in “Moral Sense” (1860). Full of microorganisms, pleasant scenes remind Emerson that his ordinarily world hides the extent of its relations to invisible things. Furthermore, Emerson’s account about invisibility raises a question about idealism’s claim to the unseen. An animalcule of interest to Emerson, the *volvox globator* suggests that we do not ordinarily see all of the immediate world’s complexity. Since our everyday sight cannot grasp the limit of corporeality, we are not fit to see the point at which life stops multiplying.

<sup>4</sup> Melville praised “Leeuwenhoek” for his “microscopic diligence.” Herman Melville, *Moby-Dick; or The Whale*, eds. Harrison Hayford, Hershel Parker, and G. Thomas Tanselle (Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern UP and the Newberry Library, 2001), 119. Leeuwenhoek invented glass orbs to magnify everything from feathers, to water drops, to his own blood. He first observed, among other things, bacteria and spermatozoa. Exceeding existing lenses, Leeuwenhoek’s glass revealed a world teeming with bodies. Importantly, Leeuwenhoek demonstrated that microbes exist without and within us, suggesting all things are manifold. This overturns the logic of performationism, which presupposes animal development in terms of enlargement rather than multiplication. Where homunculus theories show matured animals growing from miniatures, Leeuwenhoek notices instead that animals develop by accumulation. The human, supposed to be the most complex of all animals, thus stands out as the most diversely constituted. Being the least complex of all animals, the *volvox globator*, for Leeuwenhoek, represents man’s extreme opposite.

<sup>5</sup> Among these include Andrew Prichard’s *Infusoria, Living and Fossil* (1845).

<sup>6</sup> Ralph W. Emerson, *Representative Men: Seven Lectures* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1883), 30. Hereafter abbreviated as *RM*.

<sup>7</sup> Emerson, *RM*, 290.

<sup>8</sup> “The *Volvox globator*,” says Gideon Algernon Mantell, “was discovered 150 years ago by Leeuwenhoek, and was supposed to be a single animal, until recent improvements in the microscope revealed its true character, and shewed it to be composed of a group of monads.” Suddenly all animals down to the animalcules became multiple. Each animal, variously composed, suggests that the only thing separating us from the *volvox globator* is our greater self-diversity. If humans retain any special status, it is predicated on the extent of our relations to not our transcendence from other animals. Following reading Leeuwenhoek, Emerson visited Mantell during his 1848 trip to England. Mantell’s *Thoughts on animalcules: or, A glimpse of the invisible world* (1846), which Emerson read, imaged the *volvox globator* in (five-hundred times) resolution, adding elaborate anatomical and behavioral descriptions. It, Mantell writes, is “composed of a group of monads, fixed in a globular integument.” All monads being “in organic connexion with the case and the surrounding monads,” he claims that “the globe is shewn to consist of a family of polygastric animalcules” each “has a red eye speck, two long spines or horns, and six processes by which it is connected with its kindred animalcules.” The *volvox* thus has two ontological aspects, its parts (monads, connections, animalcules), and the fluid globe by which they relate. Through a globular field, monads are “uniformly distributed,” expanding “by spontaneous fissuration” (cellular division). While the globular dimension remains whole, the monads constantly duplicate and extend out from and are thus not limited by the globe. Reaching (“with long filaments”) into the surrounding water (by “aëreation of the tissues and fluids”), the *volvox*’s monads extend beyond their singular identity. Ontologically speaking, the *volvox* is therefore doubled into limitless and limited senses—is both singular and plural. Gideon Algernon Mantell, *Thoughts on Animalcules; or, a Glimpse of the Invisible World* (London: John Murray, 1846), 39–41. Such logic for Mantell demonstrates that all living things,

from the volvox to the human, are singular spheres bristling with animals which reach beyond into the unlimited relations of things. According to degrees of fractalization, animals are ordered by Mantell according to the extent of their branching outward which is predetermined by their cellular potential. Life, however, is not the animation of cells by spirit, rather the many monads each vibrate with their own life. Each “monad,” claims Mantell, “embodies vitality” for the volvox globator, “the same immutable organic laws which preside over the complicated machinery of Man.” “There is an *analogy*,” he continues, “between the human embryo and the monad of the Volvox, in that each consists of simple cells; but there is no more *identity* between the human and the polygastric cells, than between the perfect man and the mature animalcule.” Mantell’s science thus accounts for a vast animal kingdom in which taxon are differentiated by their most essential elemental lives. In other words, animal difference is cellular. However, there is no “organic law” separating man from the volvox, for human and animalcule cells are equally alive; it is only, rather, that our cells divide into people and their cells divide into the volvox. With Mantell’s science, a different animal kingdom arises, one which is no longer predicated on comparative anatomy, but one which recognizes the cellular potential for differentiation. Classification, however, becomes so inescapable that even a single cell betrays its culmination. Mantell’s polygenesis takes the Cuvierian system to its extreme at which point each cellular type has a developmental destiny, a self-culture. Built up from cells, Mantell ultimately argues that animals remain distinct down to their most elementary parts. According to degrees of fractalization, animals are thus ordered according to the extent of their outward branching which is predetermined from their conception. Mantell, *Thoughts*, 24. We hardly are pressed to ponder why Georges Cuvier’s *The Animal Kingdom* (1817) became authoritative in Mantell’s era. Oliver Goldsmith’s *History of the Earth and Animated Nature* (1774), John Charles Hall’s *Interesting Facts Connected with the Animal Kingdom* (1841), and Charles Knight’s *Knight’s Pictorial Museum of Animated Nature* (1856-8) are similar. By branching animals into types, families, and species, Cuvier solidified their isolation. Cuvier’s animal kingdom unfolds chronologically, charted from crude origins into widening fields of variation, forming into myriads of mammals, crustaceans, birds, and insects zoologically arranged according to “organization.” Depending upon the relation of an animal’s organs (form, mass, distribution, and function), it becomes seated on an appropriate branch of the animal kingdom. Mantell’s extreme take on Cuvier fixes taxonomy at the cellular level, meaning that once one animal branches off from another in time, its subsequent generations are even elementally distinct.

<sup>9</sup> Emerson, *LL*, 1, 160. “The near explains the far. The drop is a small ocean.” Ralph W. Emerson, “The American Scholar,” *Political Writings*, ed. Kenneth Sacks (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2008), 25.

<sup>10</sup> These early materialists include “Aristotle, Hippocrates, Galen, Archimedes, Euclid, and others,” and the later include “Eustachius, Malpighi, Ruysch, Leeuwenhoek, Harvey, Morgagni, Vieussens, Lancisi, Winslow, Ridley, Boerhaave, Wepfer, Heister, Steno, Valsalva, Duverney, Nuck, Bartholin, Bidloo, and Verheyen.” Swedenborg, *Economy*, Vol. 1, 13, 7.

<sup>11</sup> Swedenborg, *Economy*, Vol. 1, 7.

<sup>12</sup> Ralph W. Emerson, “Experience,” *Essays: First and Second Series* (New York: The Library of America, 1990), 252.

<sup>13</sup> Emerson, *RM*, 136.

<sup>14</sup> Emerson, *LL*, 1, 240.

<sup>15</sup> Ralph W. Emerson, “Fate,” *Emerson: Political Writings*, ed. Kenneth Sacks (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2008), 212. Or, “observe how far the roots of every creature run, or find, if you can, a point where there is no thread of connection. Our life is consentaneous and far-related.” Emerson, “Fate,” 211.

<sup>16</sup> Emerson, *RM*, 107.

<sup>17</sup> “In Swedenborg Emerson outdid himself. He traced a haunting portrait of the man and the mystic. Mineralogist, chemist, zoölogist, mathematician, physicist, engineer, astronomer, anatomist, theologian, mystic, and visionary, Swedenborg in his velvet coat, sword at his side, traveled about haunted by the demon of analogy, of identity. What a nightmare, this universe! this mystic quadrant of which man and the serpent form the two legs, vertical and horizontal, and between which swarms the whole animal kingdom. The length of a fantastic dorsal spine, from the

worm, from the atom, to God, climb all beings, pushing one another on, overlapping, coupled together, duplicating one another, in a whirlwind of angels, spheres, spirals, amid angels beating their wings and grinning devils, to infinity, each close to each. Geometry gone mad, a world opaque and black, fallen into epilepsy and trance, a lackluster landscape, gardens of the dead amid cypresses where never a bird has sung.” Régis Michaud, *Emerson: The Enraptured Yankee*, tr. George Boas (New York: Harper, 1930), 343.

<sup>18</sup> “Swedenborg’s theology... This is nothing to me... This is the excess of form.” Emerson, *J7*, 116. “There is no such problem for criticism as his theological writings.” *RM*, 123.

<sup>19</sup> Emerson, “Demonology,” 170. “I will not deny him,” Emerson submits to Swedenborg, his theory of “demonology.” Emerson, *J7*, 123. In “To the Public” (1847), he announces that “Swedenborg has in this very time acquired new honors,” and how might his refreshed emergence inform “demonology?” Ralph W. Emerson, *CW*, Vol. 10, eds. Roland A. Bosco, and Joel Myerson (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2013), 346.

<sup>20</sup> Emerson, *J4*, 497.

<sup>21</sup> Emerson, *J5*, 163.

<sup>22</sup> Swedenborg, *Economy*, Vol. 1, 3.

<sup>23</sup> Or what Deleuze, one of Emerson’s most careful readers, might term a body without organs. To put it another way, “it is the American tradition that shaped Deleuze’s theory,” as Arsić points out, and thus insofar as he intensifies Emerson in his own writing, his words restore to America the potential of its own philosophical thinking. Arsić, “Introduction,” *American Impersonal*, 23.

<sup>24</sup> Arsić, *On Leaving*, 149.

<sup>25</sup> Swedenborg, *Economy*, Vol. 1, 8–9.

<sup>26</sup> Branka Arsić and Cary Wolfe, “Introduction,” *The Other Emerson*, eds. Branka Arsić and Cary Wolfe (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2010), xii–xiii. My reading of Emerson’s Swedenborgianism is therefore in resonance with what Stanley Cavell names “a world new... of Emersonian reception.” Stanley Cavell, “Afterword,” *The Other Emerson*, 301.

<sup>27</sup> Swedenborg, *Economy*, Vol. 1, 8. Swedenborg’s claim is similar to Novalis, who Emerson also read: “It is *all one* whether I posit the universe in myself or myself in the universe.” Novalis, *Philosophical Writings*, tr. Margaret Mahony Stoljar (Albany: State U of New York P, 1997), 131.

<sup>28</sup> Swedenborg, *Economy*, Vol. 1, 1–2.

<sup>29</sup> Swedenborg, *Economy*, Vol. 2, 147, 142, 195.

<sup>30</sup> Swedenborg, *Economy*, Vol. 1, 1–2.

<sup>31</sup> Ralph W. Emerson, “The Over-Soul,” *Essays: First and Second Series* (New York: The Library of America, 1990), 169. As for Emerson’s “Over-Soul,” “In one way or another, everything is water.” “In Emerson’s oceanic ontology,” according to Arsić, including “the circulation of blood in the body,” “everything is in migration, mutation, and metamorphosis. *MMM*, the great formula of Emerson’s thinking.” Branka Arsić, *On Leaving*, 4, 6.

<sup>32</sup> Ralph W. Emerson, “Self-Reliance,” *Essays: First and Second Series* (New York: The Library of America, 1990), 43. We can find examples of the period’s literature of blood, as a diverse substance, becoming the grounds for determining racial divisions. As decades of miscegenation through abuse and rape occurred on plantations, skin color became a less plausible determination of race, demanding that those invested in proving such differences to seek evidence in less visible ways. In the antebellum era, the institution of slavery only required that an enslaved maternal bloodline ensured children, even in some cases sired by their own masters, be legally (through *partus sequitur ventrem*) determined chattel slaves. The *Fugitive Slave Act* (1850) further upheld that runaway slaves

would remain without Constitutionally defined personhood. Further clarifying the standard by the *Dred Scott v. Sandford* decision (1857) decision, Chief Justice Taney declared black people not be not citizens of the United States, and thus under no protection of the *Constitution*. The definition of “Negro” proposed by Taney was “a person ‘whose ancestors were imported and sold as slaves,’ but,” asks the *Chicago Tribune* in “Who Are Negroes?” of 1857: “are persons who are part white—mulattoes, for instance—not citizens...How much white blood” does it take to make a white man? Paul Finkelman, *Dred Scott v. Sandford: A Brief History with Documents* (Boston: Bedford Books, 1997), 157. After the passing of the *Thirteenth Amendment* and the end of the Civil War—with slavery abolished—the postbellum period commenced a project of redefining the legal definition of race with an increased emphasis on blood. The extreme manifestation of this policy found as little as a single drop of “black blood” to determine a man black. Albion Tourgée, the famed defense lawyer of Homer Plessey, protested, at the end of the century, “will the court hold that a single drop of African blood is sufficient to color a whole ocean of Caucasian whiteness?” Albion Tourgée, *Undaunted Radical: The Selected Writings and Speeches of Albion W. Tourgée*, eds. Mark Elliot and John David Smith (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UP, 2010), 321. The response to such question appears critiqued in many novels of the period, from Rebecca Harding Davis’ *Waiting for the Verdict* (1868), to Francis Harper’s *Iola Leroy* (1893), to Mark Twain’s *Pudd’nhead Wilson* (1894).

<sup>33</sup> Swedenborg, *Economy*, Vol. 1, 1–2. Through circulation, by “an epitome of the riches of the whole world and all its kingdoms,” Swedenborg makes his ultimate pronouncement, “all things were created for the purpose of administering to the composition and continued renewal of the blood.” Swedenborg, *Economy*, Vol. 1, 2.

<sup>34</sup> Cameron, *The Corporeal Self*, 98.

<sup>35</sup> Emerson, *RM*, 9. Through the heart “our philosophy finds one essence collected or distributed.” *RM*, 5. A “heart,” unlike a brain, “refuses to be imprisoned; in its first and narrower pulses, it already tends outward a vast force, and to immense and innumerable expansions.” Emerson, “Circles,” 175. Prior to Emerson’s study, Samuel Taylor Coleridge produced detailed marginalia in his copy of *Economy*, disclosing Swedenborg’s ontology (“utmost reality”) as “the equilibrium of the antagonistic forces,” or contradicting aspects. Samuel Taylor Coleridge, *CW, Marginalia*, Vol. 5, eds. H. J. Jackson, Kathleen Coburn, and Barth Keith Winer (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1992), 442.

<sup>36</sup> Emerson, *RM*, 14.

<sup>37</sup> Emerson, “Circles,” 175.

<sup>38</sup> For more on Emerson and abolitionism, see Philip L. Nicoloff’s *Emerson on Race and History: an Examination of English Traits* (1961).

<sup>39</sup> Ralph W. Emerson, *CW*, Vol. 10, eds. Roland A. Bosco, and Joel Myerson (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2013), 311, 326, 305, 324.

<sup>40</sup> For an ambitious and authoritative account of how Americans imagined the Haitian Revolution, see Joan Dayan, *Haiti, History, and the Gods* (Berkeley, U of California P, 1995). My chapter thus elaborates upon Arsić’s argument that “Toussaint embodies a principle that Emerson affirms: as a slave becoming a non-slave and anti-slave, Toussaint is the figure par excellence of revolutionary becoming that transforms a person and personhood as it reforms the world.” In light of my study on Emerson representative man, Swedenborg, I continue on Arsić’s point that “Toussaint becomes the concrete instantiation both of Emerson’s desired self—sufficiently unconcerned about the security of life to abandon itself to a multiple and discontinued world—and of the revolutionary action that such a self enacts, a model candidate for addition to the list of Emerson’s representative men.” Branka Arsić, “Revolutionary Shattering: Emerson on the Haitian Revolution,” *Telos* 170.1 (2015): 129, 130.

<sup>41</sup> Gregg D. Crane, *Race, Citizenship, and Law in American Literature* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2002), 99, 103.

<sup>42</sup> Ralph W. Emerson, *CW*, Vol. 10, eds. Roland A. Bosco, and Joel Myerson (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2013), 304, 327.

<sup>43</sup> Ralph W. Emerson, *Journals*, Vol. 5 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1911), 350. Hereafter abbreviated as *J5*.

- 44 Ralph W. Emerson, *Journals*, Vol. 6 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1911), 185.
- 45 Ralph W. Emerson, *The Letters*, Vol. 4, ed. Ralph L. Rusk (New York: Columbia UP, 1939), 266.
- 46 Kenneth Harris, *Carlyle and Emerson: Their Long Debate* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1978), 87–8.
- 47 Ralph W. Emerson, *The Early Lectures*, Vol. 2: 1836-1838, eds. Stephen E. Whicher, Robert E. Spiller, and Wallace E. Williams (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1964), 92.
- 48 Julian Hawthorne, *The Memoirs* (New York: MacMillan, 1938), 130.
- 49 Ralph W. Emerson, *Journals*, Vol. 4 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1910), 482. Hereafter abbreviated as *J4*.
- 50 Ralph W. Emerson, “Literature [First Lecture],” *The Early Lectures of Ralph Waldo Emerson*, Vol. 1: 1833-1836, eds. Stephen E. Whicher, and Robert E. Spiller (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1959), 223.
- 51 Ralph W. Emerson, *Representative Men: Seven Lectures* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1903), 70. Hereafter abbreviated as *RM*.
- 52 Emerson, *RM*, 105–106, 119, 100.
- 53 Nathaniel Hobart’s *Life of Emanuel Swedenborg* (1840), Enoch Pond’s *Swedenborgianism Reviewed* (1846), and Elihu Rich’s *Biographical Sketch of Emanuel Swedenborg* (1849) each advertise extensive readings of *EAK*, and, as I have shown, Emerson took an active part in the promotion of the book.
- 54 “Swedenborg’s theology... This is nothing to me... This is the excess of form.” Emerson, *J7*, 116. “There is no such problem for criticism as his theological writings.” *RM*, 123.
- 55 Emerson, *RM*, 18. “A man should not tell me that he has walked among the angels.” *RM*, 142.
- 56 Emerson, *RM*, 121, 140.
- 57 Emerson, *RM*, 99. “[Swedenborg’s] printed works amount to about fifty stout octavos, his scientific works being about half of the whole number.” *RM*, 110.
- 58 Emerson, *RM*, 100.
- 59 While *The Southern Quarterly Review* placed Swedenborg’s scientific writing “up to 1743,” Emerson pushed the date to 1744. “The Philosophical Character of Swedenborg,” *The Southern Quarterly Review*, Vol. 26 (Charleston: Burges & James, 1848), 432. The *Larousse Dictionary of Scientists* says that by 1773 Swedenborg had “resigned his scientific post.” *Larousse Dictionary of Scientists*, ed. Hazel Muir (New York: Larousse, 1994), 497.
- 60 In 1843, Henry James Sr. visited James John Garth Wilkinson in England, when, Feinstein says, his “translation of Swedenborg’s *Economy of the Animal Kingdom* was in press.” Howard Feinstein, *Becoming William James* (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1999), 71. Wilkinson never translated *EAK*, however. So when it is hypothesized that “What Emerson knew” of Swedenborg “he got second-hand from J. J. Garth Wilkinson’s English translation of *The Economy of the Animal Kingdom*,” we are certainly a few steps removed from even a basic historical understanding. Sherman Paul, *Emerson’s Angel of Vision: Man and Nature in American Experience* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1952), 63. As early as 1896, W. J. Underwood, who attempted to explain Emerson’s Swedenborgianism, failed to understand that *EAK* and *AK* are separate works.
- 61 A *Spectator* reviewer of *Representative Men* therefore insinuated that Wilkinson’s “zeal” could not be overcome by the American pretender. *Spectator*, “Emerson’s Representative Men,” *Emerson among His Contemporaries*, ed. Kenneth Walter Cameron (Hartford: Transcendental Books, 1967), 39.

<sup>62</sup> On May 15, 1846, Wilkinson signs a copy and sends it to Emerson. Albert J. Von Frank, *An Emerson Chronology* (New York: Macmillan, 1994), 206.

<sup>63</sup> Instructing Wilkinson's pen, Christian Wolf "blighted and superseded the *Economy of the Animal Kingdom*, almost as soon as published, by the *Prologue* to the *Animal Kingdom*." William White, *Life and Writings of Swedenborg* (London: Simpkin Marshall, 1868), 107. The coronation of AK demoted EAK. He withheld publishing a translation of EAK to first translate AK, out of chronological order. In his translator preface to AK, Wilkinson promised that his translation of EAK is "virtually completed, and...publication will not be delayed beyond the time necessary." The translation never came. Pages later, he cast doubt on EAK's merits. Two years after, *Remarks* was published. James John Garth Wilkinson, *Remarks on Swedenborg's Economy of the Animal Kingdom* (London: Walton and Mitchell, 1846), vii, viii, lv-lvi.

<sup>64</sup> "Swedenborg, or the Mystic" in *Representative Men* was the final draft, orated first on Christmas Day, 1845. Ralph W. Emerson, *Letters*, Vol. 8, ed. Ralph L. Rusk (New York: Columbia UP, 1939), 66. Hereafter abbreviated as *L8*.

<sup>65</sup> Emerson, *RM*, 110.

<sup>66</sup> For Emerson, such text does ontology from the body's extensive perspective. In "Perpetual Forces" (1862), he summarizes Swedenborg's ontology: "His whole frame is responsive to the world, part for part, every sense, every pore." Ralph W. Emerson, "Perpetual Forces," *Lectures and Biographical Sketches* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1904), 74.

<sup>67</sup> Emanuel Swedenborg, *Journal of Dreams 1743–1744*, tr. J. J. Garth Wilkinson (London: Swedenborg Scientific Association), 1989. 15, 18, 34, 63, 65, 37, 46, 49, 103, 55, 71, 94, 66, 83.

<sup>68</sup> Emerson, *J7*, 136.

<sup>69</sup> That Swedenborg "influenced" Emerson. Henry B. Parks, "Emerson," *Emerson: A Collection of Critical Essays*, eds. Milton R. Konvitz and Stephen E. Whicher (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1962), 125. That Emerson was "influenced" by Swedenborg. Kenneth Harris, *Carlyle and Emerson: Their Long Debate* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1978), 6, 57. That Swedenborg made a "deep impression" on Emerson. Frederick Tolles, "Emerson and Quakerism," *On Emerson: The Best from American Literature*, ed. Edwin H. Cady and Louis J. Budd (Durham: Duke UP, 1988), 26. That Emerson was "receptive" to Swedenborg. B. L. Packer, *Emerson's Fall: A New Interpretation of the Major Essays* (New York: Continuum, 1982), 39. That Emerson was "appropriating" Swedenborg. William Rossi, "Emerson, Nature, and Natural Science," *A Historical Guide to Ralph Waldo Emerson*, ed. Joel Myerson (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000), 116. That Emerson was "considering" Swedenborg. Armida Gilbert, "Emerson in the Context of the Women's Rights Movement," *A Historical Guide to Ralph Waldo Emerson*, ed. Joel Myerson (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000), 225). That Swedenborg had "appeal" for Emerson. Vivian Hopkins, *Spires of Form: A Study of Emerson's Aesthetic Theory* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1951), 127. That Emerson "had borrowed from Swedenborg." Frederic Ives Carpenter, *Emerson Handbook* (New York: Henricks House, 1953), 53. That Swedenborg "made a strong impression on Emerson." David Robinson, "Transcendentalism and Its Times," *The Cambridge Companion to Ralph Waldo Emerson*, eds. Joel Porte and Sandra Morris (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999), 19. That Emerson had a "haunting fondness" for Swedenborg. Joel Benton, "Emerson's Optimism," *Emerson among His Contemporaries*, ed. Kenneth Walter Cameron (Hartford: Transcendental Books, 1967), 446. That Emerson was "attracted" to Swedenborg. Alan D. Hodder, *Emerson's Rhetoric of Revelation: Nature, the Reader, and the Apocalypse Within* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State UP, 1989), 144. That "We should acknowledge Emerson's serious interest in Swedenborg." Anders Hallengren, "The Importance of Swedenborg to Emerson's Ethics," *Swedenborg and His Influence* (Bryn Athyn, Pennsylvania: The Academy of the New Church, 1988), 230.

<sup>70</sup> That Swedenborg was important to Emerson "for a time." David Porter, *Emerson and Literary Change* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1978), 51. That Emerson had a "waning respect" for Swedenborg. W. J. Underwood, *Emerson and Swedenborg: A Review of Emerson's Lecture on Swedenborg* (London: James Speirs, 1896), 185. That Emerson became "dissatisfied with...Swedenborg." William J. Schieck, *The Slender Human Word: Emerson's Artistry in Prose* (Knoxville: The U of Tennessee P, 1978), 134-5. That Emerson realized that Swedenborg was a "novice." Leonard Neufeldt, *The House of Emerson*. Lincoln: University of NP, 1982), 206. That Emerson's "initial

attraction to Swedenborg was quickly followed by serious and permanent disillusionment with him;” that the “initial praise gets drastically qualified.” Richard O’Keefe, *Mythic Archetypes in Ralph Waldo Emerson* (Kent: The Kent State UP, 1995), 106, 200. That Swedenborg’s early influence on Emerson led to his eventual abandonment. David Robinson, “Transcendentalism and Its Times,” *The Cambridge Companion to Ralph Waldo Emerson*, eds. Joel Porte and Sandra Morris (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999), 19. That Emerson’s Swedenborg “interest” diminished “eventually.” Louis Menand, *The Metaphysical Club: A Story of Ideas in America* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002), 89. That “For a brief” time “Emerson was attracted to Emanuel Swedenborg...After that time he became increasingly conscious of Swedenborg’s limitations.” Stephen E. Whicher, *Freedom and Fate: An Inner Life of Ralph Waldo Emerson*. Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P, 1953), 87.

<sup>71</sup> These claim he was “appropriating” Swedenborg in a concoction of thinkers. William Rossi, “Emerson, Nature, and Natural Science,” *A Historical Guide to Ralph Waldo Emerson*, ed. Joel Myerson (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000), 116. See Hyatt H. Waggoner, *Emerson as Poet* (Princeton, Princeton UP, 1974), 108. See Steven E. Whicher, “The Dream of Greatness,” *Ralph Waldo Emerson: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. Lawrence Buell (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1993), 63. See Irena Makarushka, *Religious Imagination and Language in Emerson and Nietzsche* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 51. See Joel Porte, *Emerson and Thoreau: Transcendentalists in Conflict* (Middletown: Wesleyan UP, 1966), 49. See Leonard Neufeldt, *The House of Emerson* (Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1982), 172. See O. W. Firkins, *Ralph Waldo Emerson* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1915), 201. See Gertrude Reif Hughes, *Emerson’s Demanding Optimism* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UP, 1984), 148, 159. See Newton Dillaway, *Prophet of American: Emerson and the Problems of To-day* (Boston: Little Brown, 1936), 324. See Philips Russell, *Emerson: The Wisest American* (New York: Brantano’s Publishers, 1929), 130. See Frederic Ives Carpenter, *Emerson and Asia* (New York: Haskell House, 1968), 138, 139, 141. See Jerome Loving, “Emerson’s Foreground,” *Emerson Centenary Essays*, ed. Joel Myerson (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois UP, 1982), 51.

<sup>72</sup> Lawrence Buell, “Emerson in His Cultural Context,” *Ralph Waldo Emerson, A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. Lawrence Buell (New York: Prentice Hall, 1992), 57.

<sup>73</sup> That “he was a great reader of Swedenborg.” Edwin D. Mead, *The Influence of Emerson* (Boston: American Unitarian Association, 1903), 254. That Swedenborg is “champion” to Emerson. Arthur Hill, *Emerson and His Philosophy* (London: William Rider & Son, 1919), 112. That Emerson had the “greatest admiration” for Swedenborg. James Truslow Adams, “Emerson Re-read,” *The Recognition of Ralph Waldo Emerson: Selected Criticism Since 1837*, ed. Milton R. Konvitz (Ann Arbor: The U of Michigan P, 1972), 184. That “Emerson read and valued [Swedenborg].” Frederic Ives Carpenter, *Emerson Handbook* (New York: Henricks House, 1953), 220. That “Emerson prized Swedenborg,” and “venerated” him. David Lee Maulsby, *The Contribution of Emerson to Literature* (Medford: The Tufts UP, 1911), 70, 73. That Emerson is “indebted” to “Swedenborgian Philosophy.” Wesley Mott, “‘The Age of the First Person Singular’: Emerson and Individualism,” *A Historical Guide to Ralph Waldo Emerson*, ed. Joel Myerson (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000), 84. That Emerson “[shows] indebtedness” to Swedenborg. Sherman Paul, *Emerson’s Angel of Vision: Man and Nature in American Experience* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1952), 66. That Emerson “looked on [Swedenborg] as one of the great men of all time.” Sig Synnestvent, *The Essential Swedenborg: Basic Teachings of Emanuel Swedenborg, Scientist, Philosopher, and Theologian* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1970), 1. That Emerson “vaunted” Swedenborgian ideas. August Derleth, *Emerson, Our Contemporary* (London: Crowell-Collier Press, 1970), 121.

<sup>74</sup> That Emerson came to “condemn Swedenborg.” Joel Porte, *Representative Man: Ralph Waldo Emerson in His Time* (New York: Oxford UP, 1979), 240. That Emerson “rejects” Swedenborg. Christopher Newfield, *The Emerson Effect: Individualism and Submission in America*. Chicago: The U of Chicago P, 1996), 139. That Emerson’s words were spent “Dismissing” Swedenborg. David Jacobson, *Emerson’s Pragmatic Vision: The Dance of the Eye* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State UP, 1993), 65. That Emerson “[discarded] Swedenborg.” David Van Leer, *Emerson’s Epistemology: The Argument of the Essays* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1986), 29. That “his interest in Swedenborg was short-lived.” Kris Fresonke, *West of Emerson: The Design of Manifest Destiny* (Berkeley: U of California P, 2003), 99. That “Emerson found Swedenborg wanting.” Kent Ljungquist, “The Aftermath of Poe’s Boston Lyceum Appearance,” *Emersonian Circles: Essays in Honor of Joel Myerson*, eds. Wesley T. Mott and Robert E. Burkholder (Rochester: U of Rochester P, 1997), 183. That Swedenborg disappoints Emerson. John Harrison, *The Teachers of Emerson* (New York: Sturgis & Walton, 1910), 306–8. That Emerson has a “deep a

revulsion” towards Swedenborg. Maurice Gonnaud, *An Uneasy Solitude: Individual and Society in the Work of Ralph Waldo Emerson* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1987), 369. That Emerson abandoned Swedenborg, “whose oeuvre Emerson reluctantly dismisses as too dogmatic.” Lawrence Buell, *New England Literary Culture from Revolution Through Renaissance* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1986), 182.

<sup>75</sup> In terms of what Kerry Larson identifies as the “self-betrayal” behind all of Emerson’s representative men, they thus “sacrificed” themselves “on the altar of their own excesses.” Kerry C. Larson, *Whitman’s Drama of Consensus* (Chicago: The U of Chicago P, 1988), 37, 38.

<sup>76</sup> F. B. Sanborn, *The Personality of Emerson* (Boston: Charles E. Goodspeed, 1903), 2.

<sup>77</sup> *British Quarterly Review*, “Representative Men. Seven Lectures,” *Emerson among His Contemporaries*, ed. Kenneth Walter Cameron (Hartford: Transcendental Books, 1967), 51.

<sup>78</sup> This seems why many agree with Robinson that Emerson’s Swedenborg chapter is “ultimately unsatisfying.” David Robinson, *Apostle of Culture: Emerson as Preacher and Lecturer* (Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P, 1982), 66. So Carpenter is honest when saying that “Swedenborg; or, the Mystic’ . . . has never been popular.” Frederic Ives Carpenter, *Emerson Handbook* (New York: Henricks House, 1953), 64. This has, as Gonnaud proposes, “[us wondering] why he chose to include Swedenborg at all.” Maurice Gonnaud, “*An Uneasy Solitude: Individual and Society in the Work of Ralph Waldo Emerson* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1987), 369–70?”

<sup>79</sup> Buell, “Emerson in His Cultural Context,” 48.

<sup>80</sup> Perry Miller, “Emersonian Genius and the American Democracy,” *Emerson: A Collection of Critical Essays*, eds. Milton R. Konvitz and Stephen E. Whicher (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1962), 80. Julian Hawthorne and Leonard Lemmon warned schoolchildren that the more Emerson sounded like Swedenborg, the more he spoke nonsense. Julian Hawthorne and Leonard Lemmon, *American Literature* (Boston: D. C. Heath, 1891), 128.

<sup>81</sup> Oliver Wendell Holmes, *Ralph Waldo Emerson* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1884), 382.

<sup>82</sup> He was proud of his formidable Swedenborg collection, noting its value in 1849. Emerson, *L8*, 208.

<sup>83</sup> He owned, at least, seventeen works by Swedenborg, including Wilkinson’s translation of *AK*, both volumes (1843–44); Augustus Clissold’s translation of *EAK* “gift of the London Swedenborg Association,” both volumes (1845–46), *Æconomia regni animalis* (1847). Walter Harding, *Emerson’s Library* (Charlottesville: U of Virginia P, 1967), 203, 30, 263, 264, 262–264. See Clarence Paul Hotson, “Emerson’s Biographical Sources for ‘Swedenborg,’” *Studies in Philology* 26.1, 23–46.

<sup>84</sup> Emerson, *L8*, 387.

<sup>85</sup> F. O. Matthiessen, “The Democratic Core of Representative Men,” *Critics on Emerson*, ed. Thomas J. Rountree (Coral Gables: U of Miami P, 1973), 100.

<sup>86</sup> David Van Leer, *Emerson’s Epistemology: The Argument of the Essays* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1986), X. “Swedenborg’s influence can be seen in almost every innovative philosophy or movement of the nineteenth century.” Robert C. Fuller, *Spiritual, But not Religious: Understanding Unchurched America* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2001), 24. Matthiessen must have has the same insight.

<sup>87</sup> By selecting *EAK*, using the skill David L. Maulsby has identified in Emerson to “pick and choose” his Swedenborg, *Representative Men* pinned up James John Garth Wilkinson’s problem book. David Lee Maulsby, *The Contribution of Emerson to Literature* (Medford: Tufts UP, 1911), 74.

<sup>88</sup> George Trobridge gets Emerson wrong by putting the two *Animal Kingdoms* in a sequence and saying that Emerson praises Wilkinson. George Trobridge, *A Life of Emanuel Swedenborg* (London: Frederick Warne, 1912), 68.



89 “The Philosophical Character,” 428, 429. On the eve of publishing *Representative Men* Emerson knew that, making such a sharp divide of “Swedenborg,” his book was “[daring],” undoing Wilkinson’s attempt to draw the two discourses into a single *Animal Kingdom*. Emerson, *LA*, 149, 153.

90 In “New England” (1843), Emerson describes the “insanity” of “Swedenborg” in the context of the “strange prose poems which he called *The Apocalypse Revealed, Heaven and Hell, The Heavenly Secrets, The Doctrines of the Lord*, and the like.” In “The Tendencies and Duties of Men of Thought” (1848), Emerson remarks that Swedenborg is “crazed.” Emerson, *LL*, 1, 186.

91 Ralph W. Emerson, *Journals, Vol. 8* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1912), 21. Hereafter abbreviated as *J8*. “No professional proofreader,” Emerson so claims in “Truth” (1861), “believes that an author can rightly correct his own proof. The Swedenborgians say with despair that there seems a fatality to hang over Swedenborg’s texts, that, though with honest purpose, he cannot be correctly quoted by one out of their own church.” Emerson, *LL*, 2, 265.

92 He reports that he “saw Wilkinson three days—He is in regular homœopathic practice—& goes it seems to me too much into the quasi-quack line—as for example, he believes in the importance of table turning.” Ralph W. Emerson, *Letters, Vol. 3*, ed. Ralph L. Rusk (New York: Columbia UP, 1939), 359, 414. In a letter to Thoreau, he notes meeting with Wilkinson; and a month later again to Lidian. Emerson, *L8*, 164. Emerson, *L6*, 55.

93 Emerson, *L8*, 224.

94 Emerson, *LA*, 175. Wilkinson was grounded by the impressive chapter. Ralph L. Rusk, *The Life of Ralph Waldo Emerson* (New York: Scribner’s, 1949), 377.

95 Ralph W. Emerson, *Letters, Vol. 5*, ed. Ralph L. Rusk (New York: Columbia UP, 1939), 43.

96 Ralph W. Emerson, *CW, Vol. 8* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2010), 104.

97 James John Garth Wilkinson, *Remarks on Swedenborg’s Economy of the Animal Kingdom* (London: Walton and Mitchell, 1846), 83.

98 Emanuel Swedenborg, James John Garth Wilkinson, “Introduction,” *The Animal Kingdom, Considered Anatomically, Physically, and Philosophically*, Vol. 1, tr. J. J. Garth Wilkinson (London: W. Newbery, 1843), *xlvi*.

99 Wilkinson, *Remarks*, 58, 77.

100 Emerson, *RM*, 102, 111–112.

101 Emerson, *RM*, 111, 106, 120–121.

102 Emerson, *RM*, 116–117, 132. “The vice of Swedenborg’s mind is its theologic determination.” “Swedenborg and Behmen failed by attaching themselves to the Christian symbol.” Emerson, *RM*, 134, 135. Anticipating his diagnosis, in “New England” (1843) Emerson notes that “Swedenborg had this vice: that he nailed one sense to each image; one and no more.” Emerson, *LL*, 1, 69.

103 Emerson, *J7*, 123–24, 507.

104 In 1867, Emerson complains that “intelligence stops, as usual, at the Hebrew symbolism,” even the “well-versed on Swedenborg” fail to read past it. Ralph W. Emerson, *Journals, Vol. 10* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1914), 199, 198.

105 Emerson, *RM*, 117.

106 Swedenborg, *Economy*, Vol. 1, 2–4. “Whether a statement be true or not, is easily ascertained. If it be true, all experience spontaneously evidences and favors it, and likewise all the rules of true philosophy: and what have often wondered at, various hypotheses, in proportion as they are founded on some common notion, either coincide with it,

or else indicate particular points of contact or approximation; much as the shadowy appearances of the morning are shewn in their connexion with real objects by the rising sun. When the truth present to everything yields suffrage in its favor; and therefore it immediately declares itself and wins belief; or, as displays itself naked.” Swedenborg, *Economy*, Vol. 1, 4.

<sup>107</sup> We still remember Henry James Sr., William’s father, as one of America’s leading Swedenborg scholars, publishing such works as “The Ontology of Swedenborg” in the *North American Review* (1867). He raised his children in what George Santayana names a “Swedenborgian household,” and named his fourth son after Wilkinson. James’ eldest children, William and Henry Jr., became two of the most recognizable names in American philosophy and literature. George Santayana, *The Genteel Tradition in American Philosophy* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1992), 13. “As a debt to his father, [William] James published *The Literary Remains of the Late Henry James* in 1884. This was basically William’s first and only formal attempt to interpret his father’s Swedenborgian philosophy. After more than a one-hundred page introduction, he came up blank.” Eugene Taylor, “The Appearance of Swedenborg in the History of American Psychology,” *Swedenborg and His Influence* (Bryn Athyn, Pennsylvania: The Academy of the New Church, 1988), 161. Understanding his father’s view was always troublesome. “In October 1869 William read Father’s new book, *The Secret of Swedenborg*, published in July.” William and his colleague, C. S. Pierce, both rejected it. Robert Richardson, *William James: in the Maelstrom of American Modernism* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2006), 106, 107. James Sr. first read Swedenborg’s *The Divine Love and Wisdom* and *The Divine Providence*. These works “altered the course of his life.” Paul Jerome Croce, “A Scientific Spiritualism: The Elder Henry James’s Adaptation of Emanuel Swedenborg,” *Swedenborg and His Influence* (Bryn Athyn, Pennsylvania: The Academy of the New Church, 1988), 8. “Henry James was an enthusiastic but not wholly devoted follower of Swedenborg. Yet when he criticized Swedenborg and tried to move beyond him, he invariably did so with a view toward carrying Swedenborgian principles to new terrain” Howard M. Feinstein, *Becoming William James* (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1999), 254. James Sr. has his own “brand of Swedenborgianism” which provides “a unique version of Swedenborgian” “ontology.” In 1843 James Sr. visited Wilkinson in England to nurture his “lifelong friendship” with Wilkinson. Feinstein, *Becoming*, 40, 62, 236, 71. Henry James Sr. converted to Swedenborgianism in 1844, but he disagreed with the church, whose followers, by “institutionalizing,” Swedenborg, “[betrayed],” according to James, his “teachings.” Menand, *The Metaphysical Club*, 82. “[Henry James Sr.’s] relation to Swedenborg... was a private understanding rather than an influence; the Swedenborgians excommunicated James regularly” R.W.B. Lewis, *The American Adam* (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1955), 55.

<sup>108</sup> Swedenborg, *Economy*, Vol. 1, 5.

<sup>109</sup> Swedenborg, *Economy*, Vol. 1, 14.

<sup>110</sup> The Greeks celebrated Pan by cyclical response to unfavorable climates. In return of their paeon, a strange song sweeps across barren (unfruitful or hollow) lands. Dreadful, Pan’s approaching music terrifies the ears of men (from which we get the word “panic”), and throws open otherwise closed doors. The approach of wholeness causes panic because the Universe’s two sides suddenly are thrown open to each other, and so the excessive, terrible inbreeding of Pan’s passions (musically sensed) and the delight of nature’s diverse finery (visually sensed) agonistically renegotiate their domains: bodies and pictures might be torn and reassembled into monstrous formations, terrific metamorphoses and strange migrations, untimely rebirths and glutinous harvests. At such periods nymphs, dyads, and satyrs are spawned, unnatural participations which sow the chimerical seeds of a subsequent season. Something terrible permeates the ancient world: a primal overabundance which threatens the boundaries of animals, of earth, and of people, to take things into its corporeality and become a new mixture, born again with a different reality, perhaps unfamiliar, even unjustified. Pan, the god of corporeal mixing, has an emphatic, unabridged, savage sexuality which embraces beasts, plants, yeomen and even kings. Echoes of Pan’s lute and hoofs can be heard whispering through the trees—somewhere they must exist—but periodically fall silent, seeming to disappear. At those restful intervals, life stills and its vibrant pictures fade, and so shepherds murder their flocks and quaff blood to reawaken Pan (bred in the image of human and goat passion), asking a return—by *panics* it comes—a rebirth of frightful cries. In “The Tragic,” Emerson describes that the “earth moans aloud” when Pan returns, and so “chaos is come again.” Ralph W. Emerson, “The Tragic,” *CW*, Vol. 7 (New York: AMS Press, 1979), 410, 413. Because Pan rests and awakes, wholeness passes into diversity and returns to itself only by sacrificial bloodshed. The goat’s sanguine scream, whose blood cannot be disassociated from the desperate animal, or the all-god for which it flows, becomes the dithyrambic music (*διθυραμβος*), an afterbirth, the god Dionysus. Passionate cries spilled from the sacrifice become hymns and dances, the blood a liquor, and Dionysus a seasonal worthy. The festival’s annual

songs, performance, and drunkenness celebrate its honoree's Promethean charity of giving wine to mankind. By drinking excessively, the holiday's intoxication sublimates the desire to flood the farmlands with blood. Dionysian festivities became the Dionysia, and subsequently the theatrical celebration, tragedy (*τραγωδία*), originally meaning goat song. "Tragedy," so teaches Aristotle's surviving fragments on drama, "originated with...the Dithyramb." Aristotle, *Poetics*, tr. S. H. Butcher (New York: Hill and Wang, 1961), 57. Aristotelian tragedy "was derived," Francis Fergusson explains, from "Dionysian ceremonies;" but that "Aristotle did not mean" for the traditional spilling of blood to be understood "*literally*" in the later age ritual. Francis Fergusson, "Introduction," *Poetics*, 34, 35. In Fergusson's understanding, we are supposed to take the cathartic quality of tragedy as substantially symbolic, perhaps more civilized, than its pastoral ancestor. But "blood" for the ancients meant corporeal fire, something which *mixes things together* and thus cannot be reduced to the essence of any particular life. To make a blood sacrifice, in these terms, means to completely risk one's individuality for the sake of healing (return of life), the end sought both upon Greece's pastures and stage. In the sense, the tragic theater never called for a moratorium on gore spilling. We have, rather, misunderstood the offering. Blood, Emerson, following the ancients, would say is the literal mixture of life, the offering of which demands a renewal of corporeal combinations. To make a blood sacrifice is thus to release from yourself that of you which is not personal at all, the same liquid flame of all things. By returning blood from the personal to the impersonal, healing can happen; and due to seasonal demand, we can suppose that by consuming blood and regurgitating it back, health is tied to the balance of unity and diversity, a manumission from which would mean sickness and plague. Swedenborg's *Economy of the Animal Kingdom*, by crowning blood the means by which life diversifies and renews, recovers ancient ontology as a background for modern philosophy. But it also shows just how robustly tied the etymological roots of economy (*οίκος-νέμω*) and ecology (*οίκος-λογία*) are through the structure of domains (houses), and the conduct of thresholds (doorways). The universe, by way of Swedenborg's recovery of the ancient dithyrambic cycle, must for Emerson be made of houses, which in the Greek sense (*οίκος*) always entail bloodlines (lineage, or house *of*), and so each house (*οίκοι*) must have familial roots.

111 Swedenborg, *Economy*, Vol. 1, 1.

112 Swedenborg, *Economy*, Vol. 1, 2, 13. I here related Swedenborgian rejuvenation to how Arsić and Wolfe describe Emerson "formulating an ontology of becoming, and developing an ethics of self-renewal." Arsić and Wolfe, "Introduction," *The Other Emerson*, xxiv.

113 Emerson, *RM*, 112. In 1863, he's writing series of quotes from Clissold's *EAK*. Emerson, *J7*, 480–81.

114 Emerson, *LL*, 2, 106, 24, 163.

115 Emerson, *RM*, 110. Clissold, the translator of *EAK*, does justice to Wilkinson's neglect, and provides the greatest gift to Swedenborg's legacy. Clissold worked with the Swedenborg Association, separate from Wilkinson's Swedenborg Society, to have *EAK* translated. "Forgotten as soon as published, Swedenborg's" scientific books were unknown until "*The Swedenborg Association* was formed in London for their revival." William White, *Life and Writings of Swedenborg* (London: Simpkin Marshall, 1868), 107.

116 Emerson, *RM*, 111.

117 Ralph W. Emerson, *Essays & Lectures* (New York: The Library of America, 1983), 7. Stephen Whicher agrees that "*Nature* is written under several strong and not always harmonious influences—Coleridge, Swedenborg and various varieties," although I emphasize Swedenborg. Stephen E. Whicher, "The Dream of Greatness," *Ralph Waldo Emerson: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. Lawrence Buell (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1993), 63.

118 Emerson, *J8*, 22.

119 Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, tr. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 2010), 280. Nietzsche confessed it necessary to follow his mentor Emerson's reading of Swedenborg, though it remains unclear how much he ever read. By 1883, Nietzsche appears to be intensely reading Emerson and *Representative Men*, planning to read Swedenborg. Thomas H. Brobjer, *Nietzsche's Philosophical Context: An Intellectual Biography* (Urbana: U of Illinois P, 2008), 224).

120 Swedenborg, *Economy*, Vol. 1, 14-16.

121 Emerson, *RM*, 145–146.

122 Emerson, *RM*, 135.

123 Harding, *Emerson's Library*, 263. “Swedenborg knew,” Emerson posits his revolutionary thinking in “The Scholar” (1863), “that a text...would make men black in the face,—drive them out of their houses,—pull down towns and states;—or build up new, on despised or unthought foundations.” Emerson, *LL*, 2, 312.

124 Holmes, *Emerson*, 115.

125 Ralph W. Emerson, “The American Scholar,” *Political Writings*, ed. Kenneth Sacks (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2008), 11.

126 Swedenborg, *Economy*, Vol. 1, 14.

127 Emerson, “American Scholar, 98. Two years later, he writes “It is very pleasant to me to hear of any fine person that he or she is a reader of Swedenborg. It is an uncomputed force,—his influence on this age, his genius is still unmeasured.” Emerson, *J5*, 350.

128 Emerson, *RM*, 143.

129 “The Philosophical Character,” 443. Henry Steele Commager writes about the significance of Emerson’s call for graduates to consider Swedenborg in their nascent development of a unique national philosophy. “The responsibility,” he argues, “of the American Scholar weighed heavily on the conscience of that generation.” Henry Steele Commager, *Theodore Parker: Yankee Crusader* (Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1978), x.

130 “*Paucis Natus est, qui populum aetatis sure cogitate. Multa annorum millia, multa populorum supervenient: ad illa respice, etiamsi omnibus tecum viventibus silentium...[aliqua causa] indixerit: venient qui sine offensa, sine gratia judicent.*” Swedenborg, *Economy*, Vol. 1, i. Translation my own.

131 Ralph W. Emerson, “Power,” *Emerson: Political Writings*, ed. Kenneth Sacks (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2008), 220.

132 Ralph W. Emerson, *Poems* (New York: Everyman, 2004), 53.

133 Ralph W. Emerson, *CW*, Vol. 10, eds. Roland A. Bosco, and Joel Myerson (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2013), 301. If all men are free and equal, an overwhelming victimization of the black race (“one race was victim”) in “the history of mankind” always kept the ethical principle abstract and unrealized. Emerson, *CW10*, 302.

134 For example, see Thomas Treadwell Stone’s “Man of the Ages” (1841) published in the *Dial*.

135 Ralph W. Emerson, “Politics,” *Emerson: Political Writings*, ed. Kenneth Sacks (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2008), 116.

136 Herman Melville, *Battle-Pieces and Aspects of the War* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1866), 12.

137 Ralph W. Emerson, *CW*, Vol. 10, eds. Roland A. Bosco, and Joel Myerson (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2013), 325.

138 Ralph W. Emerson, “Politics,” *Emerson: Political Writings*, ed. Kenneth Sacks (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2008), 119, 126.

## Chapter 2

### “My Need of Manifold Being”

On Fuller’s Wildflower Ethics

To me, our destinies seem flower and fruit  
Born of an ever-generating root

—Margaret Fuller, “The One in All”

*Mariana*

With blackest moss the flower-plots  
Were thickly crusted, one and all:  
The rusted nails fell from the knots  
That held the pear to the gable-wall.

The broken sheds looked sad and strange:  
Unlifted was the clinking latch;  
Weeded and worn the ancient thatch  
Upon the lonely moated grange.  
She only said, 'My life is dreary,  
He cometh not,' she said

—Alfred Lord Tennyson, “Mariana”

In the meditative *Summer on the Lakes* (1843), a difficult to define and somewhat autobiographical travel narrative, Margaret Fuller describes a schoolgirl named Mariana, who, despite her gifts, faces ridicule and rejection by her classmates for her excessive vivacity.<sup>1</sup> Externalizing her energies, “she had shed her animation through their lives” with a generous outpouring that became too much for them to tolerate. Rising through the common to become something stranger still, she is just as revered as repudiated by those around her. In the Mariana episode of *Summer on the Lakes*, Fuller thus details how an embodied force overgrows only to diminish through triumphs and disappointments. This episode is not about maturation—not of a girl becoming a woman—but rather about an emphatic life that manifests with an exceptional person who must release and share surplus energies that otherwise cannot be withheld. But with overflowing energies, Mariana only animates her peers until threatening to overtake them, at which time they reject her— isolate her—and torment her until she dashes her own brains against an iron grate to curtail her suffering. Regardless of the resistance, her “demon rose within her” and could not be denied “discord,” so she “spontaneously” rose ever and again to search out other discordant lives.<sup>2</sup>

“Mariana wanted to open her heart,” for she was “born to shed life” with a “heart capable of the highest Eros.”<sup>3</sup> Her overflowing life thus relates to her eroticism, a desire to rupture her interiority into the world through a passion, a “strong affection or a pure enthusiasm” sustained by moving onwards. “Her excitement,” Fuller explains, “seeks to create an atmosphere round it, and makes the chain through which to set free its electric sparks” and to live a “wild and exuberant life.” However, such life only achieves exuberance when spreading beyond itself into manifold lives. With pluralistic passions thwarted by her classmates, Mariana eventually sought a husband who also tragically failed to nurture her need to become more numerous. “She did not expand into various life” and so, sickened with solitude and “with an unsatisfied heart,” she fell inwards. Like her classmates, her husband refused her and thus, “more solitary than ever,” she “died.”<sup>4</sup> Mariana rose, indeed, to rise beyond herself into other beings, only to at last expire when she was refused absolutely, ceasing to multiply and grow.

The Mariana episode in *Summer on the Lakes* has always been taken by readers to reflect Fuller’s own traumas and aspirations, her uneasy precocity, her perceived abnormality, her desperation to reach others who shied away from her intensity, and the way that she sought soulmates and aspired for romantic love and literary success. Fuller herself admitted the similarity, and her friends often mentioned it, so much so that at times she was called “Mariana.” Recent scholarship rehearses this affinity, describing how the troubles that Fuller faced as a student at Miss Susan Prescott’s school gave shape to her character, Mariana.<sup>5</sup> While such blending of fact and fiction is to a degree inevitable, my chapter takes a less biographical look at Fuller through her similarities with Mariana, looking instead at how life seeks expansion through a demonic impulse in Fuller’s writing. In other words, this chapter is less about Fuller the person and more about Fuller the philosopher, a move more radical than it seems, especially considering the

dearth of attention given to her philosophy, a significant contribution in itself to American thought.

Ultimately, my chapter searches to understand Fuller's demonology by exploring her philosophical eroticism, and so further seeks to promote her status as a writer of philosophy, something which has been obscured by the preponderance of biographical attention given to her writing. Both bold and elegant, Fuller's philosophy should neither be considered in subsidiary relation to her more illustrious colleagues' philosophies, nor peripheral to her career, nor just an expression of or outlet for her emotional struggles, but rather one of many distinct and powerful modes of thought emerging from the Transcendentalist movement. While such contribution has been little recognized, there are some hints of recognition, however. In the earliest attunement to Fuller's philosophy, Thomas Wentworth Higginson argued that previous "biographers have sometimes been too influenced by their own point of contact with her to see that the self-culture which brought her to them was by no means the whole of her aim" and how "she yearned for something more." Taking up Higginson's point that Fuller wanted more, my chapter develops on his claim that Fuller's brand of self-culture is distinguishable and in excess of what could otherwise be available to her through the intellectual movements of her time. In a word, she contributes something more. "Her life," I here emphasize Higginson's formulation, "far from being selfish, overflowed."<sup>6</sup>

My chapter thus picks up on Vesna Kuiken's "On The Matter of Thinking: Margaret Fuller's Beautiful Work" (2014), the most serious and focused prognosis in recent years of Fuller's philosophy, outlining a materialist account (of "mysticism to be essential to understanding her work.") Such account, Kuiken argues, "complicates the feminist perspectives through which Fuller's work has been traditionally viewed" due to "a person's capacity to be



dissapropriated of their personal identity.” According to Kuiken, these “self-exhaustion procedures” are pervasive in Fuller’s writing, and an “example is Mariana.”<sup>7</sup> Following from Kuiken’s reading, my chapter begins with Mariana as a clear example of Fuller’s impersonality instead of her personality as she has been typically understood. But that is not to say that we should totally avoid Fuller’s own, personal investment in her thinking. Admittedly, her demonology is a point of confused identities: she experienced “High rapture” in “Presence of my Daemon.”<sup>8</sup> Throughout her public and private writings, Fuller divulges many feelings about her own demonism, appearing differently between moods and circumstance. Notwithstanding these intermittent references, her demonology results from deep thinking about questions material to her theory of life.

Following from the established consensus that Fuller’s editorship of the *Dial* held the otherwise desultory group of Transcendentalist thinkers in a shared literary context, I argue that we must also explore her own contributions to the journal on their own merits. Focusing on a series of Fuller’s essays in the *Dial* from 1841 to 1843, my chapter introduces “Goethe” (1841) to reveal the background behind her claim in *Summer on the Lakes* that the “demoniacal impulse and power” is always present in “every-day society” as a life-force, at times to disclose itself through an exceptional being.<sup>9</sup> As my chapter shows, Fuller develops her demonology from studying Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s *Truth and Poetry: From My Own Life* (1811), which she read in the original German. “As to the Daemonical,” she writes, “I know not that I can say to you anything more precise than you find in Goethe.”<sup>10</sup> In “Goethe,” Fuller reviews *Truth and Poetry* for the *Dial* and defines the demonic with a representative quote in her own translation as an “existence” which manifests “sometimes to separate, sometimes to unite.”<sup>11</sup> Manifesting itself in events or identities in the process of pulling themselves apart from or assembling themselves

together with the flux of things, the demonic can only be known in moments of irrepressible transformation. The divergent patterns that elemental movements make when matter flows to coalesce or be redistributed occur frequently in Fuller's writing when a life-force becomes embodied exceptionally to such a degree that it threatens to consume or inundate its environment. Those event-beings are Fuller's demons.

In my second section, *Germination*, I will suggest how Fuller's demonology unfolds through her *Dial* essays "The Magnolia of Lake Pontchartrain" (1841) and "Yuca Filamentosa" (1842) to form what I call her *floral thinking*.<sup>12</sup> By cross pollinating Goethe's demonology with his botany, Fuller predicates how "every vigorous nature delights to feel itself living" by a "need of a manifold being" through the demonic nature of floral strivings. Embodying life's swelling, overflowing, and transformative excesses in a logic of plant morphology and change, Fuller claims that living things propagate themselves vegetally, verging on an all-encompassing theory of botanical life.<sup>13</sup> "Truly" Fuller explains, "you say I have not been what I am now yet it is only transformation, not alteration. The leaf became a stem, a bud, is now in flower."<sup>14</sup>

Since Fuller's ontology is often articulated through literary figures and botanical species alike, each section of this chapter explores the particular things both humanoid and vegetal that she imbues with philosophical meaning. In my third section, *Leila*, I move beyond Mariana to another demonic exceptional appearing in Fuller's *Dial* essay "Leila" (1841). With fewer autobiographical affinities, Leila exceeds Mariana by overtaking all external resistance to her passion. Leila turns people mad and, by their madness, atomizes them into fragments that form an atmosphere around her in ever expanding rings (asteroid belts) through which her energy radiates. Transitioning from the terrestrial (and vegetal) propagation excited by surplus solar

radiation, Fuller characterizes Leila's pure externalization as celestial, a force known only by its effect on outside entities.

Unlike Mariana, whose center can only rush outwards to vivify or collapse inwards to exhaust, Leila is nothing in-and-of-herself, but always beyond herself, "indissolubly linked with the existence of matter"<sup>15</sup> in her orbit, and that through her force "the redemption of matter was interwoven." After dissolving people into particles, Leila redeems them through an ontology of coalescence and radiation whereby that which is shattered generates the appearance of a celestial orb whose surfeit of energy exceeds itself, and so must overflow. For this reason, Fuller compares Leila to a heavenly body after the ancient bards who first sang about her passion. By releasing outward ever more than she pulls inward and shining through the panoply of shards which adorn her sphere, Leila, unlike Mariana, does not have a demonic impulse, she *is the impulse*, and so is herself a "Demon."<sup>16</sup>

\*  
\*\*

"Man is a being of two-fold relations," Fuller proclaims in what has been called her magnum opus, *Women in the Nineteenth Century* (1845), and the "growth of man is two-fold, masculine and feminine."<sup>17</sup> Having been editor and contributor to the then recently failed *Dial*—the journal for likeminded New English firebrands (and their increasingly secularized Unitarianism), what Perry Miller calls the "pantheism" of "varying degrees"—Fuller took up the Transcendentalist sense that each person is partially expressive of a *sui generis* Universal Man and admixes the feminine in an otherwise masculine discourse.<sup>18</sup> Indeed, the life of "Man" must diverge into "man" and "woman" and form a relationship. Life as such—(called the Emersonian Over-Soul, or the Swedenborgian *Maximus Homo*, or otherwise)—only discloses force through

its form. Fuller therefore intervenes in the discourse by doubling Man's embodiment into two forms, both masculine and feminine.

As editor the *Dial*, and thus the somewhat curatorial high priestess of the Transcendentalist movement, Fuller reshapes the central topic of Man by way of activating both masculine and feminine aspects. "By Man," she explains from the outset of *Women in the Nineteenth Century*, "I mean both man and woman: these are two halves of one thought" or "twin exponents" and "one cannot be effected without that of the other."<sup>19</sup> The demonic, my chapter argues, the element that relates these two thoughts, is that "third thought," in Fuller's words, "which is to link together each conflicting two," and so "is of course the secret of the universe."<sup>20</sup> Without understanding Fuller's demonism we cannot understand the logic by which the masculine and feminine forms constantly either stand apart or melt together in her philosophy.

From the early essays, my chapter traces its way to Fuller's later and most anthologized *Dial* essay, "The Great Lawsuit" (1843), written after awakening from her decade immersed in Goethe's writing. In *Women in the Nineteenth Century*, Fuller's famous book which grew from the "The Great Lawsuit," she fully expands Goethe's morphology into the context of a human sexual dimorphism that violates the very bounds of its twoness. Informed in part by German Romanticism's elective affinities (*Wahlverwandschaften*), Fuller's interest in the formal manifestations of subterranean chemical processes is modeled clearly on vegetal morphology, "a plant-like gentleness in the development of energy."<sup>21</sup> Reaching Goethe's theory into the realm of human relations, expression, and the depersonalizing threat of passion, Fuller charts a natural history of human sexual selection that accounts for the doubling, divergence, and convergence of masculine and feminine difference without excluding hybridization.<sup>22</sup> "Male and female," Fuller

thus argues, “represent the two sides of the great radical dualism. But, in fact, they are perpetually passing into one another. Fluid hardens to solid, solid rushes to fluid. There is no wholly masculine man, no purely feminine woman.”<sup>23</sup>

Despite Fuller’s complicated theory about what counts as male, female, and what runs between, and so her politics of the feminine, many have taken *Women in the Nineteenth Century* to be what Lawrence Buell terms a “feminist manifesto.”<sup>24</sup> With manifesto in hand, Fuller is remembered as “the most radical feminist of the time,” as Sacvan Bercovitch memorializes her.<sup>25</sup> Doubtless, Fuller vehemently and righteously argues for the equality of the sexes, but *Women in the Nineteenth Century* does more than advocate such political and social equality, it ontologizes equality as the equalizing pressures at play behind plant, human, and sexual expression. In my last section, *Prairie Flowers*, I thus move to reevaluate Fuller’s role in the formation of radical American thought and query how her demonology, taken in botanical, cosmological, and erotic terms, seeks to outgrow normative thinking with a (neuter) view that her colleagues did not take.

Fuller thus addresses Transcendentalist self-culture, the movement’s version of *Bildung*, as shortsighted monoculture and puts it to account for the sexes, and thereby ontologically grounds her ethics. In short, Fuller deepens the debate about her role in society, asking why law and custom do not register the shared soul between men and women. If the Transcendentalists argue, at least in part, that Man—as a microcosm of the Universe—can be realized through endogenous sense, and can irradiate boundaries through cultivating such sensation, then Fuller’s contribution requires the cultivation of the manifold being “that unimpeded clearness of the intuitive powers” reveals. “It enables Cassandra to foresee the results of actions passing round her; the Seeress to behold the true character of the person through the mask of his customary life.

(Sometimes she saw a feminine form behind the man, sometimes the reverse.) It enabled the daughter of Linnæus to see the soul of the flower.”<sup>26</sup>

### *Germination*

But Mariana, I was determined, should be more fortunate, for, until her lover appeared, I myself would be the wise and delicate being who could understand her. It was not, however, easy to approach her for this purpose... The bunch of wild flowers which I timidly laid beside her plate was left there

—Margaret Fuller

During her term as editor for the *Dial*, Fuller published a series of flower-essays. In addition to a bundle of flower-pieces in her unpublished writing, these two essays, “The Magnolia of Lake Pontchartrain” and “Yuca Filamentosa,” appeared as part of a larger series about floral strivings and aspirational life.<sup>27</sup> Expressive outgrowth, a perennial concern in the *Dial*, is thus addressed by Fuller in botanical terms according to a principle of germination whereby plants are distributed into germs that carry the potential to flourish and redistribute, scattering themselves into new fragments. Since seeds hold the potential for their own unfolding, the logic of germination grounds Fuller’s theory of self-cultivation (which I call self-horticultural) in a transformative process that multiplies and releases the seed that was overcome in flowering. In light of this vegetal growth, Fuller’s ontology identifies developmental forces not by the maturation of form, but rather by occurrences of disclosure, divarication, and self-exhaustion. Life, along these lines, must ever overgrow its manifold being to become more than itself.

However, such manifold is already present before seeds disperse, for the flower blossoms into both masculine and feminine forms, a mode of self-differentiation already foregrounding viviparous reemergence and diffusion. My chapter will therefore propose that Fuller's pluralist ontology is recursive without abatement, revising the terms of cyclical processes to account for a life that rushes outward to become ever more numerous.<sup>28</sup>

When Fuller says that life functions botanically, she means that things vegetal and human operate by the same developmental principles. However, that is not to say people and plants are exactly the same; rather, Fuller means that vegetative behaviors reveal themselves even in human life. As detailed in her most famous works, Fuller's radical contribution to the conversation had among her Transcendentalist colleagues about extravagant experience requires that life be considered as nothing less than a confluence of male and female forces that diverge, converge and crosspollinate. Strict sexual dualisms, that is to say, are canceled in Fuller's ontology by the differentiated but undivided relationship between male and female. The univocity of *Man*, in other words, includes both *masculine and feminine* attributes, finding its being in self-difference. (A "center with the male and female organs arranged around it.")<sup>29</sup> This is why, in reference to botany, a self becomes more-than-itself and its energies multiply by the opposing interaction of sexed aspects that nevertheless arise from the same being.

The sexualization of being, that is to say, is the basis of difference, allowing modes of divergence and convergence necessary for an ethics derived from Fuller's ontology to emerge, what she describes as "unison in variety, congeniality in difference."<sup>30</sup> How life takes its mergers and flights, how it makes joiners with or departures from itself, is thus based in the capacity for self-differentiation that for Fuller is exemplified by but not exclusive to the flower's affirmative potential, and, indeed, the possibility for a collective embrace of multiplicity without seeking to

overcome it.<sup>31</sup> Moreover, Fuller's confusion of floral life with human life in the contexts of sexualization and transformation picks up from what Robert Darnton classifies as a botanical discourse of polarized metamorphosis beginning when Carl Linnaeus sought to "explain plant life by reference to a subtle, magnetized fluid."<sup>32</sup> From there, Erasmus Darwin, who saw the possibilities of botanical sexual reproduction described in Linnaeus' work, wrote *The Botanic Garden* (1789) and *Zoonomia* (1794) in admiration of and elaboration upon *Systema Naturae* (1736) in what has at times been identified as a transmutation theory forerunning his grandson's evolutionary theory. In the elder Darwin's writings, he goes as far as to ask if vegetal life is not so unlike our own, in sensations, passions, and even feelings of love.

Another noteworthy admirer of Linnaeus, Goethe extensively traveled through Italy at the end of the eighteenth-century, detailing his experience—including an abundance of botanical observations and meditations upon plants—in *Italian Journey* (1817), which Fuller read. While Goethe carried a cherished copy of Linnaeus with him, the trip further reshaped his Linnaean view to account for the movement in vegetal life from "simplicity to multiplicity."<sup>33</sup> "Professional botanists," Goethe remarks in understanding how others will respond to his experiential method,

will no doubt think it very naïve of me when I say that, day after day, from all the gardens, and on every walk and excursion, I carried away specimens of plants. I was particularly anxious to learn how, as seeds begin to germinate, they appear...and was delighted to see that it unfolded into two.

"The vitality and reproductive powers" of plants, in other words, is something that Goethe sought to witness in its most nascent stages to see if, even in those early moments, vegetal life is already becoming-manifold.<sup>34</sup> And "from the study of" burgeoning plants, Goethe thus wished



“to obtain a better insight into the fundamental principle of metamorphosis.”<sup>35</sup> (“The same law will be applicable to all other living organisms.”)<sup>36</sup> His “botanical speculations” therefore became “botanical philosophy” during his Italian voyage, of “profound and far reaching consequence.”<sup>37</sup>

Taking up such philosophy that radicalizes Linnaean taxonomy and tabulation, Fuller’s version of sexual morphology thus engages directly with her most studied influence, Goethe, whose *Metamorphosis of Plants* (1790) revolutionized the topic of growth and variation in the botanical sciences. As my chapter argues, Goethe’s morphology—detailing the how flowers’ “Twin forms” that repeatedly “Spring forth” in “Profusion”—is logically extended in complexity by Fuller to human life, a move already anticipated and welcomed by *Italian Journey*.<sup>38</sup> Fuller’s ontology, she would cite Goethe, seeks the “propagation through two genders” in a “relationship between the female and male parts” that reach full “anastomosis” to join and multiply.<sup>39</sup> Forming “the seed” which “is in the most extreme state of contraction and inner development,” the process begins again towards the “expansion” of difference.<sup>40</sup> “If we consider,” Goethe summarizes, “the plant in terms of how it expresses its vitality, we will discover that this occurs in two ways: first through growth (production of stem and leaves); and secondly, through reproduction (culminating in the formation of flower and fruit).”<sup>41</sup> It “expands,” “contracts,” and “expands.”<sup>42</sup> The plant “itself repeating, recreating” itself through “infinite variety.”<sup>43</sup>

In an account of Goethe’s romantic morphology that resonates with Fuller, Marjorie Levinson considers such theory as a “way of being numerous,” even a version of developmental “agency as distributive across a very wide spectrum of life forms.” Levinson accordingly observes in Romanticism a circulatory concept that replenishes life “with interest,” a fecundity that oversaturates those “gifted with a material overflow” such that beneficiaries must too gift

something in surplus of themselves, what she names “consumption *as* production.” This means that even in extreme moments when individualities turn inward to enjoy themselves privately, the most intimate memories, throngs of golden daffodils in Levinson’s Woodsworthian example, reveal an “enlarged form of the private I” that only becomes more creative, generating an excess.<sup>44</sup>

Beyond Goethe, Fuller’s floral thought incorporates the writing of other German Romantics, including Novalis (Georg Friedrich von Hardenberg) whose essay-poem “Flower Pollen” (1798) reverses idealism into a materialism whereby the apotheosis of spirit is instead a terrestrial suffusion of life.<sup>45</sup> A center, according to Novalis, finds its ontic status as a calyx, and earth dust acts as flower pollen, exploding and spreading outward into disorganized elements that then gather into various formations that break apart to be carried off into new lifeforms.<sup>46</sup> For this reason, Novalis considers in “nature” how “*a closed body*” might “*blossom*” so that an “individual soul” enters into “in agreement with the world soul” through processes of “unceasing eating and giving birth,” or “fructifying” as he calls it. “We are seeds for becoming I;” or, put another way, each of us is the coalescence of things shed to the earth and endowed with a capacity for metamorphosis to become something more than we find ourselves now.<sup>47</sup>

In excess, life thus overspends itself on extravagances. What is extra must be released and cannot be conserved. For Fuller, flowers thus represent the capacity to take metamorphosis’ overabundant energies and dispense them immoderately, even beautifully. Each generous flower, Fuller accordingly proposes, must gift itself and so render itself selfless and objective. As an object, the flower’s self-objectification thus further opens its relations with other things and intensifies its propagation. Fuller’s aesthetics is therefore uneasy about energies withholding themselves, behaving greedily when “the cold breeze of selfishness has nipped every flower; the

dull glow of prosaic life overpowers the beauties of the landscape.”<sup>48</sup> Whereas a repressed life chills and decapitates flowers, rendering fields ugly, munificent life turns everywhere into a garden. In such places, floral impersonality excites a chain of reciprocity from honeybees to people so that even two lovers may exchange a bud. From pollinating economies to courtship rituals, the flower’s generosity is not wasted upon the kingdoms of nature, from entomological to anthropological, that borrow floral energies to excite the expansion of innumerable lives beyond the vegetal kingdom.

Crucially, then, Fuller does not take gift giving lightly. Indeed, she predicates personal flourishing on self-relinquishment, meaning that only when one life has contributed itself may another life begin. From ontological largesse arises what I call Fuller’s wildflower ethics according to which overly full lives exhaust themselves so that life might begin again with something else. In “The Magnolia of Lake Pontchartrain,” for example, Fuller claims that “man is a plant of slow growth, and great heat is required to bring out his leaves,” to become, like the flower, “full of life.”<sup>49</sup> Heat, what for our world originates from the sun’s bountiful radiation, is communicated to us in many ways, but most intimately through sun-kissed flowers. A life in excess gives abundantly because it must return what has already been given. (“The stars tell all their secrets to the flowers, and, if we only knew how to look around us, we should not need to look above.”)<sup>50</sup> According to Fuller’s wildflower ethics, we thus need not gaze expectantly towards the heavens because those secrets already emerge from the dirt. “‘Flowers,’ it has been truly said, ‘are the only positive present made us by nature.’” Magnanimous vitality is thus not withheld and deferred until an afterlife, for flowers give us more than we need:

Man has not been ungrateful, but consecrated the gift to adorn the darkest and brightest hours. If it is ever perverted, it is to be used as a medicine, and even this vexes me. But

no matter for that. We have pure intercourse with these purest creations; we love them for their own sake, for their beauty's sake. As we grow beautiful and pure, we understand them better.<sup>51</sup>

Fuller's ethical orientation might thus be considered in reverse that of Nathaniel Hawthorne's "Rappaccini's Daughter" (1844), where the corrosive force instilled in flowers is absorbed by people and made poisonous between them, stopping the spread of life.<sup>52</sup> In Hawthorne's story, flowers thus break our hearts, ending our relationships and constricting us in sorrow.

Conversely, in Fuller's "Yuca Filamentosa," the "heart swelled." "Life was in the plant; birds sang and insects hovered around; the blue sky bent down lovingly, the sun poured down nobly over it."<sup>53</sup> Fuller's eroticism is a form of passion that expresses a will-to-live-on by dismantling itself to join with other lives, which is to say that it seeks manifold relations that overcome the conditions of individual nature.<sup>54</sup> By disorganizing itself and rupturing outward, a life does not shatter its essence to thereby cease living, but rather emphatically grows beyond itself to mix and become something else entirely. Fuller models such process of self-propagation without reference to genealogical selectivity: it is rather the wildflower—the life that eternally casts its lot into the currents of winds and insects—upon which she identifies the risk embraced by all living things. With seed developing by rooting downward as its springs upward, by spreading into dirt as it aspires towards sunlight, as it partakes in terrestrial and solar energies, that once self-contained seed branches outward until it swells and flowers, eroticizing itself atmospherically and thus risking itself by splitting into male and female—performing the leap of chance ever occurring down to cellular mitosis—, a repetition in difference that can only differentiate itself through repeating itself. "In the metamorphosis of life," Fuller might put it,

“the soul assumes the form, first of man, then of woman, and takes the chances, and reaps the benefits of either lot.”<sup>55</sup>

*Leila*

Leila in the Arabian zone  
Dusky, languishing and lone  
Yet full of light are her deep eyes  
And her gales are lovers' sighs.

Io in Egyptian clime  
Grows an Isis calm sublime  
Blue black is her robe of night  
But blazoned o'er with points of light  
The horns that Io's brow deform  
With Isis take a crescent form  
And as a holy moon inform.  
The magic Sistrum arms her hand  
And at her deep eye's command  
Brutes are raised to thinking men  
Soul growing to her soul filled ken.

Dian of the lonely life  
Hecate fed on gloom and strife  
Phebe on her throne of air  
Only Leila's children are.

—Margaret Fuller, “To Sarah”

Prior to writing her poem “To Sarah” about the enigmatic force called Leila, Fuller composed an essay entitled “Leila” and published it in the *Dial*. Inspired by the subject of an early Persian poem by Nizami Ganjavi, who Fuller learns about through the German poets, “Leila” describes a female figure by ““a deep vision’s intellectual scene”” that exaggerates its literary reference to a philosophical extreme. In Ganjavi’s narrative poem, *Layla and Majnun* (1188), Leila’s lover is forbidden to marry her and he goes mad from longing—because his is a type of (*majnun*) madness identified with demonic (or djinn) possession—and is lost to the howling desert. Wandering alone, Leila’s lover slowly dissolves into the wild as fragments of his life are traded with critters and sand. But Leila, in Fuller’s reading, also molds in the absence of her Majnun. “Leila kneels in the dust, yea, with her brow in the dust,” and dissipates.<sup>56</sup> Where they were once held apart in their personal existences, through falling apart the two lovers meet only at the moment when they become lost to themselves, desiccate, crumble, and break down into elements.

Described as decomposing, the Majnun drifts with his blown matter, touching upon everything but Leila, the object of his desire, the catalyst for his dissipation, and the moon around which his fragments orbit. He becomes “a lonely demon; his body was so wasted that every bone was visible,” “nothing was left but his bones,” so much so that he was “hardly resembling a human being, a living skeleton, almost beyond this world.”<sup>57</sup> His blood flows out, his skin dries to dust and blows away, and, as a skeleton, he collapses on Leila’s grave, whereby their two evaporating corpses intermingle. Both lovers fall apart after their passion cannot be consummated, and so as their desire to be together heightens, each simultaneously collapses in solitude and shatters, releasing their solitary lives into disorganization. “Love retired back into the bosom of chaos,” in Fuller’s words.<sup>58</sup>

For reason of such depersonalization into the flux, Leila “suggests all the elemental powers of nature” to Fuller, who sees her as “one of those rare beings who seem a key to all nature.” It is not her lover, the Majnun, who suggests the power, but the one who is intensely loved. Since she is the one who externalizes him and scatters his life, by “her touch all became fluid.” But the extreme way that she disperses him only happens in the context of a strong pull towards her center which also reduces him, crushing him to atoms which are then cast away. “She is, like it, her own light, and beats with the universal heart, with no care except to circulate as the vital fluid.”<sup>59</sup> She embodies the “vital principle, principle of flux and influx,” and her Majnun circulates through her.<sup>60</sup> In light of Leila’s impersonal heart, overruling the final distinction between the interiority that binds two lovers together and the exteriority that holds them apart, Fuller reveals a cardiovascular continuity between people when a shared passion causes someone to literally fall in love, even to slip out of themselves.

According to such erotic cardiology, Fuller’s philosophy places the boundaries between flesh and spirit, man and woman, numbness and sensation, reason and madness at risk transgression, even verging towards an irrepressible cancellation. In *Transfiguring America: Myth, Ideology, and Mourning in Margaret Fuller’s Writing* (2001), Jeffrey Steele indulges “Leila” as “one of the most important texts that Fuller wrote,” something “heterodox” in the history of philosophy.<sup>61</sup> Steele, taking seriously the “female energy” of Fuller’s writing, reports how biographers often obscure a philosophical radicalism running through texts like “Leila.”<sup>62</sup> Against Steele’s reading, the recent biographical criticism undertaken by John Matteson characterize—with other “scholars and biographers”—“Leila” as exemplifying Fuller’s “strange self-indulgences and metaphysical excesses” peripheral to rather than at the heart of her intellectual intervention.<sup>63</sup> Resisting such aversions to Fuller’s (excessive) philosophy, Kuiken’s

review essay on recent Fuller biographies takes Steele's point an additional step to declare that "the radical potentials of [Fuller's] work are yet to be interrogated as seriously as they deserve." Disclosing Fuller's "theory of impersonality" through examples of bodily pain and ecstasy, Kuiken argues that Fuller's impersonality is "*an intervention in itself*." Fuller's experiences, Kuiken elaborates, make "a fundamental intervention into the very nature of being, they engender a strange ontology of a material, de-spiritualized self...evacuated from psychology and, ultimately, from personhood."<sup>64</sup> In light of Kuiken's formulation, Leila's power to externalize everything with her influence underlines how the force of impersonality outwardly materializes even the parts of ourselves most normatively belonging to intimate feelings, even love.

Circulating a life that includes her identity while also exceeding it, Leila's heart draws in what it then pushes out, confusing what separates her from her lover and their surroundings. Each person is thus a sort of heart through which elements enter and out of which they are expelled, mixing with and so transforming the entity through which they circulate. Each person becomes a center that elements move through until decentered and depleted into fragments moved by other heartbeats. And such centers, even when held together, always remain on the verge of breaking apart: hearts are always in danger of breaking, and that is how love takes its chances. ("Mostly those we know seem struggling for an individual existence.")<sup>65</sup> For Fuller's cardiological impersonality, the heart draws inward that which it cannot withstand driving outwards: it beats to at once hold the life that it must at last release, losing itself.

But since each individual existence entails elemental pumping—drawing inward the elements external to it and externalizing the elements internalized—and since each individual is itself a precarious mixture of elements, Fuller views our relationships as posing great risks to the integrity of those who fall in love. For if to become enamored with someone is to fall towards



their center, we risk the very integuments that hold us coherently together and so apart from the bosom of chaos. To fall hopelessly in love is therefore indistinguishable from personal dissipation and falling apart. Leila is thus, according to Fuller, “a reminder to man of the temporary nature of his limitations.”<sup>66</sup> Love makes everything possible because the boundaries which limit (and so define) the desiring person evaporate, and thereby the possibilities for their unsettled elements become limitless, which is another way of saying that they become free to change. We fall in love to become something else, even at the risk of canceling the identity that carries the desire for transformation.

Here, Fuller’s impersonality resonates with David Wills’ account of erotic cardiology brought into focus through Goethe. Arising from the archeology of life and writing undertaken by *Inanimation: Theories of Inorganic Life* (2016), Wills traces a theory of passion running through “literature, high and low, poetry and prose,” that can be noticed in “one of the most exemplary texts of the Western modern canon, Goethe’s *Sorrows of Young Werther*,” where the “cardiovascular exertion” “overflows” such that the personal body “becomes all heart.”<sup>67</sup> Beating at a pitch, any personal “interiority” exceeds its own boundaries to impersonally “unite all the better with another such self” to form “two hearts beating as one, a blood bond constituted by” irresistible “mingling.” This “conception of love” entails “swelling, as life is lived to the utmost, and its rupturing by means of exposure to radical, even inanimate otherness.”<sup>68</sup> A type of love, on Wills’ account, that “breaks the heart” by “breaking open both the body and self within which it is supposed to be enclosed, exposing our whole being” to a position of “corporeal exteriorization” whereby the “life-affirming function” of pulsation performs an “externalization of the heart” to put “life on the edge, in the extreme, assenting to life all the way to death as Bataille formulated it.”<sup>69</sup> “What,” in Bataille’s own words, “I love in the person I love—to the

point of wanting to die from this love—isn't some individualized existence but the universal aspect of that person. Although this aspect is what risks itself, risks me.”<sup>70</sup>

From the standpoint of vital motion, Leila becomes nothing in-and-of-herself but the beating force that organizes disparate elements into a circulatory system. In that sense, timid men fear to know her, to know what she knows, so risking their depersonalization. “She *knows* all, and *is* nothing.”<sup>71</sup> Perceiving a universality that threatens our identity through the person who we are enamored with, we are presented with the choice to risk losing ourselves to madness by embracing love, or to preserve our particular existence by rejecting the heart which beats beyond the limits of our skin. Unlike her Majnun, most men shield themselves from what Leila represents. “Most men,” uneasy about love, “as they gazed at Laila were pained” by a “perception of boundlessness.” Unwilling to embrace the transformative force of impersonality, these onlookers “shrink from the overflow of the infinite,” the terrific sense of merger.<sup>72</sup> But mistaking Leila’s force that crushes inwards as discontinuous with her force that distributes outwards, these men nervously forsake her: “thou art an abyss,” they decide.<sup>73</sup>

Returning to Fuller’s “Leila” after considering Bataille, individual existences—always in the process of changing—are therefore vulnerable to less fragile individuals, getting caught in their orbits and decomposing by their gravitational forces. Unlike her lover, the Majnun, who loves by becoming-skeleton and then crumbling to bone dust, Leila’s elements become heavier at her center, causing the outside dust to gravitate around her in an atmosphere. While her lover’s life multiplies into fragments, “her life is true, full, and more single by day.”<sup>74</sup> Orbiting as a particle cloud, the dispersed individual—a multiple—makes a sphere around and so expands the compact individual’s boundary, and so too their identity. Leila and her lover, her satellite,

become a lunar system whereby a moon maddens what is caught up in its gravity, breaking it down into many little lunatics.

Since there are no absolute centers but rather innumerable singularities of varying density, this is why Fuller, following Ganjavi, describes Leila as a “moon” (herself decentered and in orbit of more potent bodies), orbited by the pieces of her lunatic, Majnun. As one (“of those rare beings”) who moves other beings, Leila’s powerful heart asymmetrically overpowers her lover and so decenters him such that she becomes the center of his universe in a chain of other centers. Leila’s Majnun can thus no longer distinguish his acute obsession *with* her *from* her; cannot, that is to say, tell the difference between his becoming-mad and her being-mad. (“And men called Laila mad, because they felt she made them so.”)<sup>75</sup> Love, as a madness indistinguishable from that which maddens, draws multiple individualities around a center which, by virtue of its heavy singularity, reveals a relation or a twoness. Or “only those who have known the one can know the two,” as Fuller describes what is signified by Leila’s influence.<sup>76</sup> Only those centered around something have access to a relationship; only those centered can know what it means to be separate, to be alone.<sup>77</sup>

### *Prairie Flowers*

All things grow; in a living mind, the thoughts live and grow;  
and what happens in the vegetable happens to them...multiplies itself into many

—Ralph Waldo Emerson<sup>78</sup>

In her *Summer on the Lakes*, Fuller chronicles her travels in the Great Lakes region. Viewing the American wilderness from a new perspective, Fuller gains an intimate appreciation

for the animal, native, and elemental life that her reformist Puritan ancestors saw as existential threats to be tamed, reformed, or destroyed. The dark wood, brimming with devils, always pushed menacingly close to Massachusetts Bay Colony's edges, sometimes transgressing its territory, threatening to bewitch the communities that sought a New World by fleeing the corruption of European culture.<sup>79</sup> Like her forbearers, Fuller's radicalism became tied to American possibilities, both treacherous and redeeming. But against her inherited orientation, Fuller notices how seekers of redemption had smuggled old fears to new lands. The American wild, to Fuller's eyes, would not hide the "frightful" devil of the "German forest," so a totally different path to redemption "with all the peculiar expression we see lurking in the Indian eye" was recognized, a "demon" which is "terribly human."<sup>80</sup>

By seeking her humanity through a form of self-abandonment that even leaves behind her community, the liberal Unitarian class to which she belongs tolerates her for what only a century before the Calvinist past would have capitally punished. Put differently, Fuller's radicalism not only seeks to overcome her European heritage, it seeks to overcome the conditions of its radicality to operate as a new mode of thinking only possible in her time. In other words, if Fuller was reared in seventeenth-century Salem Village instead of nineteenth-century Cambridgeport, the revelations gained through her voyage into the woods would have been denied favorable audience. Indeed, as Margaret Bell bluntly observes, "she doubtless would have been burned as a witch."<sup>81</sup>

In 1846, not long after an extended tour around frontier America, from Niagara Falls to Mackinaw Island and beyond, Fuller penned an essay about the state of writing in her new nation. Away from New England, Fuller got a sense of how much remained to be seen and done. Following Emerson's view, she determined that the character of the emerging American

literature—whatever it might be—would only reveal itself when its writers has finally turned their backs on European writing and its residual afterlife in America.<sup>82</sup>

But while Fuller understands the renouncement of old-world habits more clearly after her westward journey, nothing about such process can rightly be called symptomatic of the pioneering spirit related to Manifest Destiny. Rather, Fuller would only have words return to the condition of life, for “life is our dictionary,” as Emerson puts it during his “The American Scholar” (1837). “Our day of dependence,” Emerson proclaims, “to the learning of other lands, draws to a close. The millions, that around us are rushing into life, cannot always be fed on the sere remains of foreign harvests.” If the call is heeded, something differently would at last occur in America, Emerson thought. “A nation of men will for the first time exist.”<sup>83</sup> “The Sage of Concord,” as Fuller names Emerson in “American Literature” (1846), “is a harbinger.” In her essay on the status of American literature, Fuller reiterates Emerson’s formulation of American literary independence, in nearly the same terms. “Books,” she explains, “which imitate or represent the thoughts and life of Europe do not constitute an American literature. Before such can exist, an original idea must animate this nation and fresh currants of life must call into life fresh thoughts along its shores...there is nothing wanting but preparation of the soil and freedom in the atmosphere, for ripening of a new and golden harvest.”<sup>84</sup> Julian Hawthorne, looking back and remarking on the intervention of American literature, thus observes that life could not be encountered in a “logical” way, and so “the new birth of literature” could no longer “imitate life” through symbolical reconciliations. Instead, he reflects on the antebellum revolution in writing, authors sought to “vamp-up afresh the methods of the past” to write “life itself.”<sup>85</sup>

My chapter thus draws to its close with Fuller’s sense that to “become Man Thinking,” as Emerson’s “The American Scholar” entreats, does not fully explore the feminine side of life,

what is subordinated through “the meaning of household life” in Emerson’s phrasing.<sup>86</sup> Beyond Emerson, Fuller takes sexual dimorphism seriously at both ends and in-between, all the conceivably sexed aspects life. If America’s nascent literature was to blossom into something responsive to life, it would have to finally recognize that that Man encompasses masculine, feminine, and androgyne forces.

Fuller’s assertion, however, was somewhat lost upon those colleagues who trusted that she was intellectually akin, on board with their program and, while temperamentally divergent at times, a true believer. After all, when the nineteenth-century neared its end, Fuller achieved a conspicuous place amongst her literary peers. In the American Men of Letters series—presenting biographies about famous men of letters, from Benjamin Franklin to Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, authored by other famous men of letters, from Oliver Wendell Holmes Sr. to Charles Dudley Warner—Fuller was the only illustrious woman writer to be included when Thomas Wentworth Higginson’s 1884 text joined the series. In a way, Higginson sought to revise the earliest biographical takes on Fuller’s legacy in antebellum America to admit of her distinguished contribution to the intellectual scene. “Coming from the most cultivated American woman of her day, it meant that there was something more than culture—namely, original thoughts and free action. Whatever else she was, she was an American.”<sup>87</sup>

But Higginson’s writing advanced an already growing biographical interest in Fuller’s life, begun with the multi-volume *Memoirs of Margaret Fuller Ossoli* (1852), edited by Emerson, William Henry Channing, and James Freeman Clarke; Julia Ward Howe’s *Margaret Fuller (Marchesa Ossoli)* (1883); and Jennie Bingham’s *Margaret Fuller* (1883).<sup>88</sup> Her *Love-Letters*, published in 1903, are introduced by Howe with suggestive remarks about the neglect of Fuller’s intellect. From that point forward, however, nearly everything written about Fuller has

been inordinately biographical, overshadowing her deep thoughts. While much ink has been spilled over the biographies of Fuller's contemporaries, only she goes to Europe and secretly weds a disinherited—scandalously Catholic—Italian aristocrat turned radical, has a child perhaps outside of marriage, gets caught up in a revolution, and founders in a shipwreck. Prolific correspondents with tragic tales are, we might expect, destined to be remembered more for their stories and less for their ideas.

A founding mother of the equal rights battle in antebellum America, Fuller has been described as a “women’s woman” who Elanor Roosevelt names the suffrage movement’s pioneer.<sup>89</sup> At other times, Fuller has been described as a socially awkward, intellectually masculine, and stubbornly ambitious woman who only softened on the eve of her death. A “detestable old maid” in Edgar Allan Poe’s scurrilous estimation.<sup>90</sup> Despite having habits that always threatened her career, she was a successful educator, editor, and journalist paid competitively and granted academic privileges otherwise withheld from her gender. Furthermore, despite the chronic pain and the precarity of impoverished gentility, she steadfastly demanded great things from the worthies who she held her own lofty ambitions against, and so she was often disappointed in the very people who inspired her. Even Emerson was not intense enough for her, and the demand that she placed on him ultimately wore their relationship threadbare.

Furthermore, while Fuller’s private affairs, professions, and political contributions remain important, such touchstones have generated a constellation of scholarship that has obscured her philosophical radicalism. Indeed, without Fuller’s role as editor of the *Dial*, her extensive correspondence, her enthusiasm for lectures, and her organization of otherwise incompatible personalities, American Transcendentalism—as desultory as it may be—may never have gained the cohesiveness necessary to be remembered as named. That said, Fuller was not simply the

manager of a movement, she thought as intensely as her male counterparts. Such statement implies the greatest trouble in promoting Fuller's status while also leaving room to explore her ideas: beyond figures like Elizabeth Peabody, Fuller gets assigned the labor of demonstrating that women too are philosophical radicals.

I finish this chapter discussing Fuller's biography—to do an archology of biography—to get past biographical criticism into something more. By focusing on Fuller's ontology and ethics, this chapter has made a contrast that reveals her overlooked thinking, radical in its own right and in serious conversation with incipient American philosophy. And yet to cast Fuller as the antebellum writer who informs American philosophy with questions of sexual continuity and difference theretofore unaddressed, to have her do such work on behalf of the tradition, is a burdensome gesture towards a figure already taken for granted. It might be inevitable when thinking her thought in relation to Emerson, Thoreau, and Melville, who each seldom write about women. Nevertheless, Fuller's thought is frequently preoccupied with questions about human life that take into account masculine and feminine forces, and these questions are not without value. And Fuller's stance during the "Flowering of New England" or the "American Renaissance," as the movement has been called, is prominent, at the forefront of a daring attempt at American self-expression.

\*  
\*\*

When Fuller goes westward in 1843 and records her experience, she often notes the capacious prairie landscapes that, in their wideness, encourage life to expand and flourish. Many antebellum writers adopted the prairies as emblematic of solitary overplus, and Fuller is no



exception. For some, these prairies are desolate abysses; for others, they represent oceanic movement on land. In some cases, they are instead seen as lifeless repositories of drifting matter; in other cases, buzzing with activity. Understood symbolically, they came to represent the hollowness of existence or the vastness of spirit. At times they became sorrowfully associated with Indian removal, the corruption of primeval hunting grounds, or as the possibility for pioneering migration.<sup>91</sup> Against these representational modes, I here aim to end this section by briefly discussing the prairie in Fuller's more literal terms such that the material conditions of life clarify processes of individuation and self-dispersal, and so the ethics of extravagance embodied by the wildflower.

Despite all that the prairies were identified with, there is a more focused alignment, for example, between how William Cullen Bryant's "The Prairies" (1832) describes them and Fuller's own description. In Bryant's poem, which like Fuller's *Summer on the Lakes* is composed after observing Illinois' prairies, he credits that "this great solitude is quick with life" and is "gaudy as the flowers." Visiting the prairies, Bryant's otherwise contracted self becomes incorporated into the vibrant expanse. "I behold them for the first, / And my heart swells, while the dilate sight / Takes in the encircling vastness." Imbibing the vast scenes, Bryant takes in more than he can hold, and so he overflows and risks himself among the "flowers whose glory and whose multitude / Rival the constellations!"<sup>92</sup> With an expanded self that increases its manifold relations, Bryant further describes the prairie as a field of transformation across which life individuates and deindividuates. ("Thus change the forms of being. Thus arise / Races of living things, glorious in strength, And perish, / as the quickening breath of God Fills them, or is withdrawn.")<sup>93</sup> Such transformative principle becomes, for Bryant, something exceptional in American, "For which the speech of England has no name— / The Prairies."<sup>94</sup>



Figure B. Prairie in Illinois. Margaret Fuller, *Summer on the Lakes* (Boston: Little Brown 1844), 73, Rare Book Collection Library, Library of Congress, accessed March 20, 2020, <https://www.loc.gov/resource/lhbum.01714/?sp=81>.

Similar to Bryant, Fuller senses that prairie “solitudes are not savage...but all is gentle, mild, inviting,—all is accessible” and thus welcomes what is personal and withheld to become open. Receptive, Fuller “counted at least a dozen new kinds of wild flowers, not timid, retiring little plants...but bold flowers of rich colors, covering the ground in abundance.” “Imagine,” she invites her reader to picture the scene,

a vast and gently-swelling pasture of the brightest green grass, stretching away from you on every side, behind, toward these hills I have described, in all other directions, to a belt of tall trees, all growing up with noble proportions, from the generous soil. It is an unimagined picture of abundance and peace. Somewhere about, you are sure to see a huge herd, of cattle, often white, and generally brightly marked, grazing...but you see no vestige of man.<sup>95</sup>

But to “imagine” the “unimagined” precisely betrays Fuller’s sense that these novel fields of experience are where residual thoughts become revised into something strange and American. In the prairies, a person feels most solitary—most by themselves—and yet “you see no vestige of man.” Losing track of personal likeness, the stranger makes their peace with the plants and animals that appear to have arisen miraculously from the superabundant earth. Lost in an endless expanse, all is rather impersonal, for only when we know such solitudes does everything else suddenly exceed our personal boundaries to exist radically apart. Only when so lonely do we find ourselves lost amongst a multitude; only upon arriving at a prairie do we discover ourselves in a diversity. Only then do we begin life again.

<sup>1</sup> Fuller's Mariana is partly inspired by the character of the same name in William Shakespeare's *Measure for Measure* (1604), and Alfred Lord Tennyson's "Mariana" (1830). Mariana, isolated yet reaching, is depicted by John Everett Millais' painting "Mariana" (1851).

<sup>2</sup> Margaret Fuller, *Summer on the Lakes, The Essential Margaret Fuller* (New Brunswick: Rutgers UP, 1992), 122. Hereafter abbreviated as *SL*. "This demoniacal impulse and power, which were ascribed to the Canidias of ancient superstition, may be seen subtly influencing the members of every-day society." Fuller, *SL*, 154.

<sup>3</sup> Fuller, *SL*, 126.

<sup>4</sup> Fuller, *SL*, 127.

<sup>5</sup> School in Groton, Massachusetts. Mariana is often personally identified with Fuller; "Mariana, Margaret's double," for example. By "representing herself as Mariana," Megan Marshall claims about Fuller, she reiterates that she "is different from the other girls." Megan Marshall, *Margaret Fuller* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2013), 54, 30–31. John Matteson therefore calls Mariana a "manifestation of Fuller's own personality," which "reflects the very real discomforts she endured at Miss Prescott's" school. He goes on to say that "Mariana is the fictionalized vehicle that Fuller uses to revisit her unhappy days at Miss Prescott's." John Matteson, *The Lives of Margaret Fuller* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2012), 56, 240–1.

<sup>6</sup> Thomas Wentworth Higginson, *Margaret Fuller Ossoli* (Houghton Mifflin, 1884), 300–301.

<sup>7</sup> Vesna Kuiken, "On the Matter of Thinking: Margaret Fuller's Beautiful Work," *American Impersonal: Essays with Sharon Cameron*, ed. Branka Arsić (New York: Bloomsbury, 2014), 102, 105, 110–111.

<sup>8</sup> Margaret Fuller, "Self-Definitions," *The Essential Margaret Fuller*, ed. Jefferey Steele (New Brunswick: Rutgers UP, 1992), 8. For an account of Fuller's personal identification with the demonic, see Arthur Brown's *Margaret Fuller* (1964).

<sup>9</sup> Fuller, *SL*, 154.

<sup>10</sup> While scholars from Madeleine B. Stern, to Margaret Vanderhaar Allen, to Meg McGarvan Murray have noted the importance of demonism in Fuller's thinking, the term has evaded rigorous description, which is odd considering just how often it appears in her writing. My essay thus picks up on Frederick Augustus Braun's often overlooked *Margaret Fuller and Goethe* (1910), in which he argues that Goethe's "daemonology" not only "charmed her," but become central to Fuller's thinking about life. "Her whole life," Braun further argues, "was in conformity to the great principle which she had learned from Goethe." Braun proposes a radically philosophical Fuller whose feminine exceptionals, like Mariana, are not simply extensions of a troubled psychology, but rather strange beings where life's conflicting behavior—the way that matter moves to diverge and converge—tips at the moment of extreme divergence or convergence into its opposing motion. In other words, Mariana's erotic life, her desire for impersonal expansion, is made only the most desperate by her personal contraction. As her heartbeat increases, the pumping, its inward and outward motion, the pulling in and throwing out of her blood, affirms the rhythm of life. "The fundamental characteristic," Goethe recited to Fuller's embrace, "of the living unity is: to separate, to unite, to lose itself in the universal, to abide in the particular, to transform itself, to specify itself, and as the living, to demonstrate itself under a thousand conditions...to solidify and melt, to coagulate and flow." Braun, *Margaret Fuller and Goethe*, 53, 70, 97. Fuller's first biographers, her friends, greatly underestimated the force by which she studied and was shaped by Goethe's demonology. From the beginning, even in her lifetime, her demonology was not taken seriously. Once, during a carriage ride, in a passing conversation about demonism, Fuller boasted to her companions that "'Goethe's demonology and mine go hand and hand.'" James Freeman Clarke, belittling her personal promotion, scoffed: a "women's contribution to demonology—amulets." For such dismissal, he received Fuller's ire. "Woman's contribution!" she protested, suggesting that if Clarke wants "a very fine women's contribution," he should read Hawthorne! Madeleine B. Stern, *The Life of Margaret Fuller* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1942), 66–67. Fuller was, contrary to Clarke's opinion, an expert, publishing articles on and teaching about Goethe's "Demonology," Julia Ward Howe's notes, to her students during her famous Conversations. Julia Ward Howe, *Margaret Fuller (Marchesa Ossoli), Famous Women* (Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1883), 114. In fact, despite the

uptake of Goethe's demonology by American writers, the author found no more attentive a disciple than Fuller. Fuller was enchanted by German writing from about 1830 to 1840, especially by Goethe, perhaps culminating in her 1839 translation of Eckermann's *Conversations with Goethe*, as has often been noted. Unfinished, she labored for years on his full biography, seeking to understand everything before making a claim.

<sup>11</sup> Margaret Fuller, "Goethe," *The Writings*, ed. Mason Wade (New York: The Viking Press, 1941), 250. Stern's reading of Fuller's demonic as a "life enigma" is a helpful description. Madeleine B. Stern, *The Life of Margaret Fuller* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1942), 171.

<sup>12</sup> For another view on Fuller's floral thinking, see Dorri Beam's *Style, Gender, and Fantasy in Nineteenth-Century American Women's Writing* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2010).

<sup>13</sup> "Plants of great vigor will almost always struggle into blossom, despite impediments." Margaret Fuller, *Women in the Nineteenth Century* (New York: Dover, 1999), 22. Hereafter abbreviated as *WNC*.

<sup>14</sup> Margaret Fuller, *The Letters of Margaret Fuller*, Vol. 2, ed. Robert N. Hudspeth (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1983), 159, 167. Accordingly, Vesna Kuiken has identified that "Fuller's life was not singular but multiple." Vesna Kuiken, "The impersonal lives of Margaret Fuller: a problem of biography," *Nineteenth-Century Prose* 42.1 (2015): 97.

<sup>15</sup> Margaret Fuller, *The Letters of Margaret Fuller*, Vol. 6, ed. Robert N. Hudspeth (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1994), 142.

<sup>16</sup> Margaret Fuller, "Leila," *The Essential Margaret Fuller*, ed. Jefferey Steele (New Brunswick: Rutgers UP, 1992), 57. Hereafter abbreviated as *L*.

<sup>17</sup> Fuller, *WNC*, 92.

<sup>18</sup> Perry Miller, *Errand into the Wilderness* (New York: Harper & Row, 1956), 187.

<sup>19</sup> Fuller, *WNC*, 1.

<sup>20</sup> Margaret Fuller, *The Letters of Margaret Fuller*, Vol. 3, ed. Robert N. Hudspeth (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1984), 154.

<sup>21</sup> Fuller, *WNC*, 61.

<sup>22</sup> Fuller's Mariana is a primary example of how German Romanticism enters into its American context and intensifies upon conceptions of life. My chapter thus also takes up the question of Fuller's contribution to American thought as both a purveyor and amplifier of Romanticism, moving past Novalis, Schiller, and her revered Goethe to botanical extremes.

<sup>23</sup> Fuller, *WNC*, 62. Where Russell B. Goodman claims that "Fuller develops a dynamic, gendered psychology, according to which masculinity and femininity pass into one another," I instead argue that she develops a circulating, sexualized ontology, according to which masculine and feminine forces intersect as often as they diverge. Russell B. Goodman, *American Philosophy before Pragmatism* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2015), 167.

<sup>24</sup> Lawrence Buell, *The American Transcendentalists: Essential Writings* (New York: Random House, 2006), 301.

<sup>25</sup> Sacvan Bercovitch, *The American Jeremiad* (Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 1978), 158. For accounts of Fuller's feminism, see, among others, Bell Gale Chevigny's *The Woman and the Myth: Margaret Fuller's Life and Writings* (1976), Christina Zwarg's *Fuller, Emerson, and the Play of Reading* (1995), Nancy M. Theriotand's *Mothers and Daughters in Nineteenth-Century America* (1995), Tiffany K. Wayne's *Feminism and Transcendentalism in Nineteenth-Century America* (2005).

<sup>26</sup> Fuller, *WNC*, 62.

<sup>27</sup> "Among her unpublished papers there are several similar flower-pieces; one upon the Passion Flower." Higginson, *Margaret Fuller*, 96.

28 In an ordinary way, we might call floral life a type of organic, dialectical process. I here conjure up Marjorie Levinson's note on Hegel and flowers: "*Aufhebung*, typically translated as surpassing or overcoming, is Hegel's terms (from *the Phenomenology of Spirit*) and subsequently a rich concept in the history of ideas...It means a mix of preservation and cancelation--more precisely (and herein lie both the difficulty and the power of the concept), preservation by means of annihilation. A class example is the growth of a plant, where the flower cancels or annihilates (in the sense of relaxing) the bud, at the same time preserving the bud at a higher level (in the sense of realizing, actualizing, instantiating it). Marjorie Levinson, *Thinking through Poetry: Field Reports on Romantic Lyric* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2018), 21. Moreover, in Fuller's view, the dialectical repetition of Hegelian ontology is altered to account for the irrepressible spread of matter. What becomes more numerous, in other words, is only changed in the sense of gathering into an ever-increasing complexity and variation. Put simply, there is no sublation of being in Fuller's ontology. As transformation happens, the cancelation and preservation of matter does not modify minor fragments into major wholes, but rather suggests that all minors and majors of something are in process of becoming their opposite to no end; and, as each seed becomes a flower and each flower becomes new seeds (*ad infinitum*), the chain of being that includes each element of floral life always somewhat undergoes patterns of adjustment and variability.

29 Goethe, *MP*, 93.

30 Fuller, *WNC*, 26.

31 As Elizabeth Grosz's argues about vitality, the force of growth and change is "the consequence of sexual difference or morphological bifurcation—one of the earliest upheavals in the evolution of life on earth and undoubtedly the most momentous invention that life has brought forth, the very machinery for guaranteeing the endless generation of morphological and genetic variation, the very mechanism of biological difference itself—is also, by this fact, the opening up of life to the indeterminacy of taste, please, and sensation." "The earth can be *infinitely* divided, territorialized, framed. But unless it is in some way demarcated, nature itself is incapable of sexualizing life, making it alluring, lifting life above mere survival." Elizabeth Grosz, *Chaos, Territory, Art: Deleuze and the Framing of the Earth* (New York: Columbia UP, 2008), 6, 17.

32 Robert Darnton, *Mesmerism and the End of the Enlightenment in France* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1968), 12.

33 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Italian Journey [1786–1788]*, trs. W. H. Auden and Elizabeth Mayer (New York: Penguin Books, 1970), 263. Hereafter abbreviated as *IJ*. "I carried my Linnaeus with me and had his terminology firmly stamped on my mind." Notwithstanding the deep impact that Linnaeus has on Goethe, the development of his botanical studies primarily becomes derived from his experience, and Italy plays a large part. "I shall pay a visit to the Botanical Garden where I hope to learn a good deal. Nothing, above all, is comparable to the new life that a reflective person experiences when he observes a new country. Though I am still always myself, I believe that I have been changed to the very marrow of my bones." Goethe, *IJ*, 33, 147. "In the journal of his epoch-making trip to Italy, Goethe records the emergence of his theory of plant metamorphosis." M. H. Abrams, *The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1971), 206.

34 Goethe, *IJ*, 367.

35 Goethe, *IJ*, 368.

36 Goethe, *IJ*, 311.

37 Goethe, *IJ*, 147, 71. "As Goethe developed his studies of metamorphosis in meteorology, in insects, in animal skeletons, in plants, and in color, he came to the conclusion that the principle of all organic nature *was* metamorphosis, a phenomenon that depends upon both form and force. The natural entity that demonstrates the principle of metamorphosis with greatest clarity, according to Goethe, is the plant." Elaine P. Miller, *The Vegetative Soul: The Philosophy of Nature to Subjectivity in the Feminine* (Albany: State U of New York P, 2002), 49.

38 Goethe, *MP*, 3.

<sup>39</sup> Goethe, *MP*, 6, 57.

<sup>40</sup> Goethe, *MP*, 75, 92.

<sup>41</sup> Goethe, *MP*, 99.

<sup>42</sup> Goethe, *MP*, 100.

<sup>43</sup> Goethe, *MP*, 2.

<sup>44</sup> Marjorie Levinson, "Of Being Numerous," *Studies in Romanticism* 49.4 (2010): 634, 635, 640.

<sup>45</sup> For Fuller, the soul is thus not the life which moves material differences from the perspective of a transcendent cause, but as a oneness which is rendered so mysterious as to be meaningless without the blending of its manifold forms. The continuity of such life is identified by Fuller as a soul only made sensibly identified when sprouting forms meet, blend, and grow beyond themselves. Each form practices an exuberance for life in company—or what is called love, the passions which draw forms together—to transcend themselves not to overcome their alienation through a higher unity, but rather to repeat what life does with a difference: to make fragments. To endorse such theory, Fuller takes what is learned from observing flowers and exaggerates it into a human life that is generally regarded as developmentally expressed through sexual dimorphism. This life will normatively develop either as male or female until reaching sexual maturity when each individual seeks to remix with its opposite in a new individual. Sometimes it will develop rather strangely. ("But there is a perfect harmony in human nature, and the two parts answer to one another only now and then." Fuller, *WNC*, 93. Such story, in terms scientific, literary, or otherwise, is familiar, however it might be complicated or varied in telling. Margaret Fuller recognizes this life cycle in terms of a soul (neuter) endlessly renewing itself though self-differentiating singularities from whose mixture arises different singularities. ("There will be unison in variety, congeniality in difference.") Fuller, *WNC*, 26. Those singularities do not immediately arise from the univocal being to which they immanently relate, but from other singularities—at times diminishing, growing, or multiplying—each something by its own right, a "self-centered" identity open to transformation. Fuller, *WNC*, 97.

<sup>46</sup> As Margaret Stoljar has indicated, Novalis thinks of "nature" "embryonically" and in terms of pollen. Novalis, "Introduction," *Philosophical Writings*, tr. Margaret Mahony Stoljar (Albany: State U of New York P, 1997), 15, 5. Fuller drafted a number of unpublished writings on Novalis and he is often mentioned in her private writings, and there has been some conversation on the relation between flowers and Novalis in Fuller's thought. Charles Capper, *Margaret Fuller: An American Romantic Life: The Public Years* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007), 45. "With Novalis she was charmed." Frederick Augustus Braun, *Margaret Fuller and Goethe* (New York: Henry Holt, 1910), 49. I here, accordingly, quarrel with Arthur W. Brown's opinion that Fuller is "at her worst when she is carried away by the extravagance and rhapsody...when she attempts to imitate the mystical outpourings and esoteric utterances of Novalis." Arthur W. Brown, *Margaret Fuller* (New York: Twayne, 1964), 121. Rather, Novalis provides Fuller with a materialist (and mystical) basis from which to build her theory of floral life that is not carried away from ordinary things, but indeed everywhere present an empirically available.

<sup>47</sup> Novalis, *Philosophical Writings*, tr. Margaret Mahony Stoljar (Albany: State U of New York P, 1997), 80, 113, 125, 127.

<sup>48</sup> Margaret Fuller, *Life Without and Life Within* (Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1895), 280.

<sup>49</sup> Margaret Fuller, "The Magnolia of Lake Pontchartrain," *The Dial* 1.3 (1841): 299–300.

<sup>50</sup> Fuller, "Magnolia," 299.

<sup>51</sup> Fuller, "Magnolia," 300.

<sup>52</sup> What Fuller calls the "feminine purity" in her review of Hawthorne's tale thus signals a demarcation of masculinity that undercuts her view of floral life. People cannot mix in Hawthorne's ethics because they are pure

and so separate. Margaret Fuller, "Hawthorne's Mosses from an Old Manse," *Essays on American Life and Letters* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1978), 373. For critical connections between Fuller and Hawthorne, see Thomas R. Mitchell *Hawthorne's Fuller Mystery* (1998), and Thomas R. Mitchell's "Rappaccini's Garden and Emerson's Concord" in *Hawthorne and Women: Engendering and Expanding the Hawthorne Tradition* (1999).

53 Margaret Fuller, "Yuca Filamentosa," *The Dial* 2.1 (1842): 287, 288.

54 I associate this process of self-distribution with Fuller's materialist account of mysticism. I oppose such account to the way it has been described as immaterialist, something "metaphysical, privileging mindful consciousness in divine experience," like in the work of Michelle Sizemore, *American Enchantment: Rituals of the People in the Post-Revolutionary World* (Oxford UP, 2017), 21.

55 Fuller, *WNC*, 97.

56 Fuller, *L*, 57.

57 Nizami, *The Story of Layla and Majnun*, tr. R. Relpke (London: Bruno Cassirer, 1966), 48, 212, 118.

58 Fuller, *L*, 56. The ways that the feminine and masculine forms unite to divide, a "shattering," as we find in Fuller's reading of Ganjavi's tale, has Roland Barthes questioning if ontology neuter, the androgyne life (as one which "mixes" the masculine and feminine) has its "origin in the Iranian world?" Roland Barthes, *The Neutral*, tr. Rosalind E. Krauss and Denis Hollier (New York: Columbia UP, 2005), 194, 190, 192).

59 Fuller, *L*, 53, 57, 55.

60 Fuller, *SL*, 146.

61 Jeffrey Steele, *Transfiguring America: Myth, Ideology, and Mourning in Margaret Fuller's Writing* (Columbia: U of Missouri P, 2001), 83.

62 Fuller, *L*, 93.

63 John Matteson, *The Lives of Margaret Fuller* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2012), 188. Some recent biographers take Fuller's most extravagant thoughts seriously, however. For example, Charles Capper's *Margaret Fuller: An American Romantic Life: The Private Years* (1992) and *The Public Years* (2007).

64 Vesna Kuiken, "The impersonal lives of Margaret Fuller: a problem of biography," *Nineteenth-Century Prose* 42.1 (2015): 107, 99, 108.

65 Fuller, *L*, 53.

66 Fuller, *L*, 54.

67 David Wills, *Inanimation: Theories of Inorganic Life* (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2016), 204. For an account about the translation, reception, and inference of *Werther* in antebellum Boston, see Frank G. Ryder's *George Ticknor's The Sorrows of Young Werther* (1952).

68 Wills, *Inanimation*, 205.

69 Wills, *Inanimation*, 204, 205, 205, 212, 213, 214.

70 Georges Bataille, *Essential Writings*, ed. Michael Richardson (London: Sage, 1998), 101.

71 Fuller, *L*, 54.

72 Fuller, *L*, 53.



73 Fuller, *L*, 56.

74 Fuller, *L*, 55.

75 Fuller, *L*, 54.

76 Fuller, *L*, 58.

77 A oneness that disagrees with itself expresses twoness and becomes the basis for self-differentiation. Moreover, it become the basis of desire for emphatic mergers that risk shattering again into greater multiplicity. Leila, it can be said, thus embodies the wildflower's aspirations, that, despite the costs, it must expend itself. Scrolled in her diary, Fuller meditates: "Leila, of all demanding heart / By each and every left apart; / Leila, of all pursuing mind / From each goal left far behind; / Strive on, Leila, to the end, / Let not thy native courage bend; / Strive on, Leila, day by day, / Through bleeding feet stain all the way; / Do men reject thee and despise?— / An angel in thy bosom lies / And to thy death its birth replies." Higginson, *Margaret Fuller*, 102.

78 Emerson, *LL*, 1, 121, 166.

79 In his essay "Witchcraft," James Russell Lowell states remarks that "Puritan emigration to New England took place at a time when the belief in diabolic agency had been hardly called in question, much less shaken. The early adventurers brought it with them to a country in every way fitted, not only to keep it alive, but to feed it with greater vigor." The "wilderness" worked "by dis-furnishing the brain" to fill it with "that measureless mystery of the unknown." "The leaders of that emigration believed and taught that demons lived to dwell in waste and wooded places." James Russell Lowell, *Literary Essays*, Vol 2. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1891), 376.

80 Fuller, *SL*, 196. Fuller's sympathies towards native life has been described in a number of ways, well represented by the words of Abby Slater: "And her summer in the West only increased Margaret's dissatisfaction with things as they were. As the trip continued, and she began to meet Indians and to talk to them, she became increasingly angered at the treatment her countrymen were meting out to them. The Indians had about them an innate courtesy and dignity, and innate sense of beauty and respect for the land—qualities, so Margaret thought, that the white man did not even begin to appreciate." Abby Slater, *In Search of Margaret Fuller* (New York: Delacorte, 1978), 75.

81 Margaret Bell, *Margaret Fuller* (New York: Paper Books, 1930), 17.

82 "Like other nineteenth-century American writers, Fuller appears to have been not only quite self-conscious about the struggle to invent a literary past but also acutely aware of what was at stake in that struggle." Nancy Armstrong and Leonard Tennenhouse, *The Imaginary Puritan: Literature, Intellectual Labor, and the Origins of Personal Life* (Berkeley: U of California P, 1992), 11. "Fuller worked hard to create an American criticism" that "could not look to the structures of a literary establishment." Stephen Railton, *Authorship and Audience: Literary Performance in the American Renaissance* (Princeton UP, 1991), 19.

83 Ralph W. Emerson, "The American Scholar," *Political Writings*, ed. Kenneth Sacks (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2008), 19, 11, 27.

84 Margaret Fuller, *The Writings of Margaret Fuller*, ed. Mason Wade (New York: Viking Press, 1941), 363, 358, 360.

85 Julian Hawthorne, and Leonard Lemmon, *American Literature* (Boston: D. C. Heath & Co., 1891), 170.

86 Emerson, "American Scholar," 20, 24.

87 Higginson, *Margaret Fuller*, 312.

88 The insatiable curiosity for Fuller's personal intimacies began early, with Thomas Carlyle. "Margaret was a great creature," he writes, "but we have no full biography of her yet. We want to know what time she got up in the

morning, and what sort of shoes and stockings she wore.” Allison Lockwood, *Passionate Pilgrims: The American Traveler in Great Britain, 1800–1914* (New York: Cornwall Books, 1981), 188. Biographers answered the (odd) call, Madeleine B. Stern’ *The Life of Margaret Fuller* (1968) laying out every detail down to her attire.

<sup>89</sup> Margaret Bell’s *Margaret Fuller* (1930), with an introduction by Eleanor Roosevelt reminding her peers that Fuller pioneered their movement. Fuller’s meaning to social reform is emblemized by Chicago’s Margaret Fuller Society, established in 1880.

<sup>90</sup> Edgar Allan Poe, *Complete Works*, Vol. 17, ed. James A. Harrison (New York: AMS Press, 1965), 333.

<sup>91</sup> For a concentrated study of the prairie in American literature, see Steven Olson’s *The Prairie in Nineteenth-Century American Poetry* (1994).

<sup>92</sup> William Cullen Bryant, “The Prairies,” *The Poetical Works*, Vol. 1, ed. Parke Godwin (New York: Appleton and Co., 1883), 232, 228, 229.

<sup>93</sup> Bryant, “The Prairies,” 231.

<sup>94</sup> Bryant, “The Prairies,” 228.

<sup>95</sup> “One very common flower resembles our cardinal flower, though not of so deep a color, another is very like rocket or phlox, but smaller and of various colors, white, blue and purple. Beautiful white lupines I find too, violets white and purple. The vines and parasites are magnificent.” Fuller, *SL*, 114.

## Chapter 3

### Geological Thinking

#### On Thoreau's Fossilized Relics<sup>1</sup>

*'Strata jacent passim suo quaeque sub' lapide—corpora, we might say*

*—A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers, 1849<sup>1</sup>*

#### *Living Relics*

Humble in humble estate, lofty in lofty,

I will be; and the attending dæmon

I will always reverence in my mind

—Pindar, Henry David Thoreau's translation<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> A later draft of this chapter appeared in *ESQ: A Journal of the American Renaissance*. Copyright 2020 by the Board of Regents of Washington State University. Ross Martin, "Fossil Thoughts: Thoreau, Arrowheads, and Radical Paleontology," *ESQ* 65.3 (2019): 424–46.

The question of being at home is thrown completely into doubt in Henry David Thoreau's *Walden* (1854). Dispose of mortgages and superfluous furniture, abolish inheritance and taxes, evict tenants, bring up the floor and down the ceiling, sweep the chimney and scrub the threshold, yet still we are never fully at home. Since a house cannot be reduced enough into a proper dwelling place, we must start again, he proposes, with it from beginning to end, built and demolished on our own terms and with our own hands. We must honestly chronicle the experience, detail all our expenses and tasks in its construction, explain how we lived therein, and the stakes of our abandonment, insisting the endeavor not be repeated. Nothing about the process is intentional, however. But neither is it entirely accidental. Thoreau's proposal, made in "Economy" at the outset of *Walden*, to forsake our given homes, dispense with our possessions, and start again comes to him from a push, a "demon" that persuades him to flee his familiar ways and form another life. "I hear an irresistible voice," he admits, which "invites me away," the same demonic call everyone heeds and "abandons" their homes.<sup>3</sup>

We also leave our homes to begin again. "Man is an animal," Thoreau writes, "who more than any other can adapt himself to all climates and circumstances," living almost anywhere.<sup>4</sup> Because "our lives, like the tenement of the shellfish," involve transitioning between domains, we share a nomadic life with even crustaceans.<sup>5</sup> "Every soul," Emerson would elaborate, "is by this intrinsic necessity quitting its whole system of things," even "as the shell-fish crawls out of its beautiful but stony case, because it no longer admits of its growth, and slowly forms a new house."<sup>6</sup> The shellfish relocates homes by instinct ("intrinsic necessity"), and man by a demon ("irresistible voice"), both human and crustacean compulsions migrating in two senses: leaving one home and arriving at another, a restlessness that never settles down and resides. Our

migratory habits are, however, philosophically troublesome insofar as the boundaries between our lives appear mysterious enough to throw habitation into question. If we are so suited for change and can arrive home almost anywhere, but foreclose on previous dwellings as we cross borders, then our lives cannot be incorporated fully. Aspects of the world, in other words, must be strange to us as others familiar, and so as we become acquainted with new things, we sever old ties.

A surveyor, Thoreau economics is rooted in a theory of borders, what he calls “usual daily boundaries of life” that form between territories.<sup>7</sup> But this demands a totally different sense of economics, of the environment, and of houses.<sup>8</sup> A theory of houses, Thoreau’s economic understanding of our divided domains intrudes upon our recent tendency to incorporate our (human) self into the environment in indiscriminate, economic terms. If we read, as Thoreau does, Novalis seriously that “Philosophy, properly speaking, is homesickness—*the drive to be at home everywhere*,”<sup>9</sup> then the domestic perseverance at root of Thoreau’s economics incites an upheaval in philosophical thinking, as well as recent ecological thought. By situating economy at the ontological foundation (“*sedes*”) of life, the question of *where* we live becomes inseparable from the ethics of *how* we live, which for Thoreau is a paradoxical coincident of departure and arrival.<sup>10</sup>

“Economy” in *Walden*, for this reason, is followed by “Where I Lived, and What I Lived For,” suggesting that after he establishes the domestic ontology, the question turns to ethics. How do we settle into these habitats, which are our own, if we are always in the middle of things, packing on one end and unpacking at the other, compelled by a demon that inexplicably redraws the borders of our life? “Economy is a subject,” Thoreau stresses, that will not “be disposed of,” because *so much* “depends on how you are yarded,” he concludes.<sup>11</sup> In this economic sense, our

life manifests yarded by demonism. “*Extra vagance!*” Thoreau exclaims, “it depends on how you are yarded.” Unlike the “migrating buffalo,” he takes his inspiration from the “extravagant” “cow” who, transgressing its bounds, literally “leaps the cowyard fence.” “I,” he admires, too “desire to speak somewhere without bounds.”<sup>12</sup> Thoreau spells out “extravagance” for us by slipping the Latinate prefix from its suffix, meaning to wander (*vagari*) outside (*extra*). To be extravagant, in these terms, means to buck the milkmaid, jump the fence, and wander outside the farmyard. While extravagance appears for some readers as *Walden’s* concluding ambition and therein means the personal liberation from boundedness, nothing about Thoreau’s numerous descriptions of boundaries should be canceled by a single bovine vagary which never outgrows a “desire.” “Our life,” Thoreau cautiously foregrounds the whimsical hurdle, “is like a German Confederacy, made up of petty states, with its boundary forever fluctuating, so that even a German cannot tell you how it is bounded at any moment.”<sup>13</sup> Since we cannot anticipate our own boundaries, we cannot intentionally overstep them.

By taking Thoreau’s theory at face value, we disassociate his economic thought from what readers like Leonard Neufeldt, in *The Economist: Henry Thoreau and Enterprise* (1989), describe as participation in “political economy,” instead registering *Walden* as about “the economy of nature.” We need not strain to propose such semantic substitution, as the author himself explicitly regrets that “the poor student studies and is taught only political economy, while that economy of living which is synonymous with philosophy is not even sincerely professed in our colleges.”<sup>14</sup> Unlike political economy, Thoreau’s economics informs the migratory patterns of his own life, including the many famous excursions he takes across New England. The finite Walden Pond experience was preceded and followed by other adventures that provided Thoreau with situations in which he could become temporality uprooted and

freshly grounded. However, he thinks about these excursions and his presence therein in a completely material way, which is to say his ontological reality transforms depending upon his movements. This means that as he moves from one place to another, pieces of his life fall away as new fragments gather, such that Thoreau's identity manifests two aspects, one of erosion and another of accretion. While trips from Concord to Cape Cod or Maine might seem ordinary, for Thoreau they provided the context to exist in distinct realities as part of his process of self-depletion and growth, two distinct logics that participate in opposing directions as his identity transforms according to his physical locomotion.

In late August of 1846, Thoreau departed from his cabin, making an excursion to Mount Katahdin in Maine. Upon reaching the summit, he records an extravagant view rushing beyond the limits of his ordinary perception. By exemplifying feelings of boundlessness, Thoreau's experience has drawn interest from those who try thinking about sublimity. However, before Thoreau wrote on Katahdin's unbounded indifference in *The Maine Woods* (1864), he first described it in his *Journal* with different words, ones withheld from the published book. After September tenth—having summited the mountain by himself—he heads “down” and “first most fully realized” what he witnessed. There he experienced “nature primitive,” he recalled, an “unhanselled and ancient Demonic Nature.”<sup>15</sup> On Katahdin, nature manifested a demonism, what Thoreau subsequently calls “primeval, untamed, and forever untamable *Nature*” in *Maine Woods*.<sup>16</sup>

The relation of the “Demonic” to the “ancient,” “primitive” and “primeval” defines demonism as primordial force manifest in a contrast which pushes us to think two, irreconcilable things.<sup>17</sup> Rather than regretting the seemingly irreconcilable demonism, Thoreau affirms it: “Talk of mysteries! Think of our life in nature—daily to be shown matter,” he emphatically writes.<sup>18</sup>

The manifestation of the demonic in matter for Thoreau is literal, “to come in contact with it—rocks.”<sup>19</sup> If Katahdin is demonic because its summit provides an overwhelmingly vast view, it is also demonic because it is physical and present to the observer, inciting a contrast between the touchable and the ungraspable natures of stone. Katahdin is material, a collection of matter which Thoreau can touch, but also expresses itself beyond his reach, even sight.

“The mtn was” thus for Thoreau both singularly massive and “a Vast conglomerate or aggregation of loose rocks—as if sometime it had rained rocks.”<sup>20</sup> Demonism arises in the “Vast conglomerate” of Katahdin’s identity, illogically experienced as both a collection of “loose” matter, and as a “Vast” body. To put Thoreau’s thinking into the context of Georges Bataille’s question, “how can we find ourselves in this world” (?), I borrow his claim that “the fragments are to be found on the peak—it is there that we grasp the truth, which is composed of opposites.”<sup>21</sup> If the truth is made of opposing things, an ontological identity is found where the world peaks or comes to a point. In tension between two logics of loose matter and vast unity, the mountain’s ontological status runs between fragmentary and whole. But since Katahdin emerges through difference, the demon must be a third term of its being, which Thoreau writes is “Pomola,” as the “Penobscot” Indians call it, the mountain’s demon.<sup>22</sup>

In the poem “To the Mountains,” Thoreau associates “demons,” which have an “Indian” “aspect,” with a crisis of sense—a “savage” experience—by which he means “untamed” or primal nature.<sup>23</sup> Thoreau’s confusion of Indians with stones, especially stone fragments which build up into natural formations, makes sense of his persistent picking up of relics as he traverses Maine and Katahdin. In his book, the very fragmented stone relics spread in relation to the mountain’s looming shadow, but because (the demon) Pomola made it taboo for the Penobscot people to hunt Katahdin,<sup>24</sup> loose relics are completely alienated from the firm mountain, sharing



a mineral identity while nevertheless expressing two independent sides of reality. When Thoreau summons with pockets full of arrowhead relics, he produces a novel relationship between stones, and so he must register these two contradictory thoughts simultaneously. The “arrow headed character” becomes equally mysterious (and “has not been deciphered”) matter which by its touchable individuality suggests a second side so extravagant as to be ungraspable.<sup>25</sup> What follows from Thoreau’s view is an ontological orientation that includes stones in the form of relics and of mountains. Yet even the notion that stone relics are incorporated in life generally—whatever that ultimately is—is not without controversy; in fact, it throws completely into doubt any presupposition that things which are touched by the demonic are exposed to the negative process of absolute decay. Thoreau’s demonology, as is the case, must be a positive one, which affirms the life of all ordinary things, even rocks, however strange.

\*  
\*\*

On an early autumn day in 1837, Thoreau picked up “a most perfect arrowhead.” Thoreau had previously shelved Emerson’s advice to keep a journal, but, with the noteworthy arrowhead at hand, he found his pen.<sup>26</sup> During the following month, recalling “searching” alongside his dear brother John “for Indian relics,” he begins his *Journal* with “The Arrowhead.” Vibrant, the relic seemed to him as fresh as ever before, “as sharp as if just from the hands of the Indian fabricator!!!”<sup>27</sup> Thenceforth, the brothers Thoreau continued their “search for Indian relics” together until John suddenly perished in 1842.<sup>28</sup> While the remarkable arrowhead launched Henry’s journaling and relic obsessions, John’s anguishing death further motivated his writing about life.

Since the perfect arrowhead is tied to Thoreau's brotherly love, collecting, and writing, it has not eluded readers, indeed, it has framed familiar scholarship. Robert Richardson begins *Henry Thoreau* (1986) by proposing that the arrowhead inspired Thoreau's relic finding talents.<sup>29</sup> Broadening the arrowhead's significance, Richardson ends with Edward Emerson carrying an arrowhead westward at Thoreau's dying request, seeking its craft's secrets.<sup>30</sup> By biographically bookending with arrowheads, Richardson raises but leaves unaddressed a serious question: if relics flank Thoreau's career, what is their meaning for him? While scholars typically see Thoreau's arrowhead collecting as ethnological, few have written about "Indian relics" themselves, their "rugged forms," and, in his own phrasing, "the vital energy of the people who made them."<sup>31</sup> Recently, however, Laura Dassow Walls' *Henry David Thoreau: A Life* (2017) returns to the brothers' 1837 adventure, focusing on the perfect arrowhead's materiality. "The arrowhead," she explains, "didn't feel like a relic from the past," to Thoreau, "but like a live thing," "as if" Indian life "materialized."<sup>32</sup> By distinguishing the arrowhead's vitality, Dassow Walls marks a drift in new materialist criticism towards object-oriented ontologies, what Marjorie Levinson identifies as an "ontological materialism."<sup>33</sup> In other words, arrowheads are not only part of Thoreau's life, but are themselves worthy of consideration as lives.

Arrowheads *resemble* life in Dassow Walls' reading, but they are surely not *literally* alive? Lifelikeness suggests Thoreau's own sense about arrowheads as "mind-print," thinking impressions that become "fossil thoughts."<sup>34</sup> According to normative paleontology, arrowheads would be lifeless stones imitating life, appearing thus lifelike. Yet a completely different Thoreauvian paleontology has appeared in Branka Arsić's *Bird Relics: Grief and Vitalism in Thoreau* (2016), encouraging us to see arrowheads as not stones simulating life, but as actual "living relics."<sup>35</sup> If we take Thoreau at his word, as Arsić invites us, we imperil fossils' status

as metaphorically alive, granting arrowheads life in the fullest and most literal sense.<sup>36</sup> Arsić's vitalism comes to foreground my chapter's critical intervention as much as it will backdrop how I describe Thoreau's theory about arrowheads as living fossils.

Following Stanley Cavell's remark that Thoreau's writing "means in every word it says," and that he "also means what his words say," Arsić further proclaims that "*Thoreau means every word he says, in the exact way he says them; he means it literally.*"<sup>37</sup> By doing "affirmative reading," as she calls it, we register a "different ontology" which "is so radical as to be almost unthinkable."<sup>38</sup> Since Thoreau is read earnestly enough by Arsić to be taken "radically or ontologically," to evoke John Crowe Ransom's formulation, she affirms an upheaval in thinking that renders ordinary words into strange relations which—if taken literally—upsets "noncontradictory" orders, threatening to push everyday things to an extreme, even to "madness."<sup>39</sup> Because Thoreau takes words "to their extremes," Sharon Cameron would say there are "lapsed distinctions between literature and philosophy" in his writing.<sup>40</sup> His writing thus becomes "radical in the personal demands that Thoreau makes," as George Kateb suggests, so readers risk "philosophy's threat of madness," in Cavell's phrasing, by exposing our thinking to his own.<sup>41</sup> "Affirmation" through reading commits us to Thoreau's strangeness, which means that our thinking tempts transformation, even so "we may be undone."<sup>42</sup>

Since Arsić's Thoreau believes that arrowheads literally "embody" life, the materiality of "stones" accordingly partakes in everything entailed by being "alive."<sup>43</sup> Arsić thus reactivates Frederick Garber's overlooked consideration in *Thoreau's Redemptive Imagination* (1977) that "arrowheads" are "pieces of a life."<sup>44</sup> Potentializing Garber's vitalism, Arsić incorporates relics into an ontological archive which cancels the process by which death erodes material.<sup>45</sup> Because "life overcomes death, thus inverting the laws of causality," causes are referred back to causes in

“a world affecting itself.”<sup>46</sup> Thoreau’s world of “pure materiality,” as Arsić calls it, is a philosophy of immanence, a “state of affairs” where the “causes” of bodies return “to causes,” or bodies.<sup>47</sup> By confusing bodies and causes, nothing efficaciously evaporates from the world’s corporeality, suggesting, in Thoreau’s words, that Indians (“stone upon stone”) make arrowheads to “live an enduring life,” mingling “vital energy” with “the constant flux of things.”<sup>48</sup> Without disturbances—since the world cannot stop for death—dispersion is not a loss but rather a participation in bodily recombinations.<sup>49</sup>

If stones embody our thoughts enough that the world recalls them, then arrowheads result from personal forgetting, abandoned things for other creatures—even other people—to recollect. As fragments disperse from people, they experience accretion, remembered materially by inhuman bodies. Arsić thus claims that “life,” in Thoreau’s ontology, has impersonal “memory.”<sup>50</sup> My chapter exaggerates Arsić’s Thoreauvian ontology to an extreme, arguing that arrowheads are lifeforms which themselves think, and so may return to minds beyond their crafter. The consequences of Thoreau’s theory are radical: our human thinking scatters into objects which traverse animal, plant, and mineral life to be remembered by totally different minds.<sup>51</sup>

Yet by granting arrowheads’ corporeal form and not ethnological theme endurance, Thoreau refuses an epistemology which, when unearthing relics, would expose residual Indian culture to appropriative interpretations. Instead, Thoreau’s excavation attunes to embodied thinking without deciphering its formations. While gathering living fragments, he withholds interpreting them enough that we must question if he ever identified arrowheads as artifacts at all. In fact, while most scholars have seen his collecting as archeological or even symptomatic of him playing Indian, their conclusions cannot be grounded—even superficially—in any evidence from his own words. To put it another way, since Thoreau’s arrowhead interest is vitalistic rather

than ethnological, we must rewrite his relic ontology to anticipate how he accounts for Indian genocide, albeit in still uncharted terms. For if Thoreau cares broadly about life, scholars still struggle to reconcile his outspoken activism against the abuses of chattel slavery and Mexican-American War with his apparent insensitivity to manifest destiny's drive to displace and eradicate Indians. Given that Thoreau sweepingly respects life even in its meekest forms, it is unconscionable if not outright unfathomable for him to exclude Indians from his ethics.

Perhaps we will at last resolve Thoreau's ethics in a vitalistic *mise en scène*, registering ancient deeds slowed into stones which, by their excessive relations to things, make untimely returns to the present. An arrowhead, we may with him ponder, "shall perhaps never cease to wing its way through the ages to eternity."<sup>52</sup> His spectral theory suggests recurring materializations of thinking, an entirely different antebellum account about Americans experiencing Indian disappearance from New England. Ghosts are not, by his view, disembodied figures from another realm, but rather material fragments which haunt the present world.<sup>53</sup> For Thoreau, despite the ongoing Indian holocaust sanctioned by his nation, fragmented thinking endlessly springs forth from the earth—slowing him down on his path—provoking unusual recollections. While Nathaniel Hawthorne, in terms of haunting, believes an arrowhead "builds up again the Indian," Thoreau believes that Indian people have "decayed" away from arrowheads remaining on the "ground—awaiting me," he remarks, apart from their crafters about whom he learns nothing.<sup>54</sup> An arrowhead thinks for itself, defiantly emerging to remind Thoreau that someone emptied a part of themselves into a thing.<sup>55</sup> The preservation of sheer thinking, an arrowhead points to something, but what?

### *Thoreau's Arrowheads, a Reintroduction*

While Thoreau—by his own words—describes relics ontologically, from his contemporaries forward, on the other hand, we inherit a narrative about arrowheads as part of his desire to cultivate an Indian identity.<sup>56</sup> By characterizing Thoreau thus, collecting merely services his Indian habits, either about ornamental curation, or worse, a Yankee fetishizing going native. Assuming appropriation by Thoreau, recent scholars overlook arrowheads to passively distance him from the naïve practices with which he has been associated. Yet by doing so, they miss his arrowhead ontology based in a memorialization theory which occludes relics as props for impersonation.

Modern interpretations of Thoreau's arrowheads begin with Albert Keiser's *The Indian in American Literature* (1933), noting the brothers Thoreau as "connoisseurs," decadently put, "of Indian antiquities," on "a systematic search" for indigenous "indications."<sup>57</sup> Robert F. Sayre follows Keiser's reading in his *Thoreau and the American Indians* (1977), proclaiming that "John and Henry Thoreau were Savage Brothers" who employed "finding arrowheads" to "learn" about "Indian life" and so "imitate it."<sup>58</sup> He thus concludes that "Thoreau was indeed the most Indian-like of classical American authors."<sup>59</sup> While some see Thoreau's merrymaking, for Sayre it was more serious—about acquiring a lifestyle—even about *becoming* Indian. Above Thoreau's many talents, "strangest of all was his skill in finding arrowheads," which Sayre believes realizes "the popular American fantasy of going off to live like an Indian," as far as "embracing the Indian way and becoming a white Indian."<sup>60</sup> Thoreau, for him, is a bookwormish Hawkeye, the white Indian in James Fennimore Cooper's frontier tales.

Anticipating Sayre, Bronson Alcott, Ellery Channing, Hawthorne, and Emerson nicknamed Thoreau "the Indian" after his arrowhead tracking.<sup>61</sup> To students a generation later, Julian Hawthorne's textbook teaches that Thoreau "assumed" in his life "the habits of the

Indian.”<sup>62</sup> Generations since, Thoreau’s Indian “identification” stands, to borrow Richard Slotkin’s term, and so Richard Fleck concludes that Thoreau “search[ed] of arrowheads” because he was “obsessed by primal cultures” and learning the “American Indian’s life-style.”<sup>63</sup> While some frame cultural admiration as rectifying condescension, paternalism, and racism, they still tiresomely repeat Thoreau’s desire to become Indian, arrowheads remaining a means to that end.

Even among today’s readers, Thoreau’s collecting is seen as cultural rather than ontological, endlessly rescuing Thoreau from regressive politics without ever activating his vitalism which would, ironically, reveal his progressivism.<sup>64</sup> As long as arrowheads remain about ethnology, Thoreau’s collecting will need redeeming from antiquated views of and harmful practices against indigenous people. While my proposed reorientation could be seen as dubious about violence against Indian life, I claim that Thoreau’s arrowhead ontology widens our understanding about his sensitivity to mistreatment. Rather than indifference to Indian suffering, Thoreau’s ontology demonstrates a both careful and exhaustive respect for life. His ethnological scholarship should therefore be differentiated from his field excursions, his arrowhead gathering’s actual context and the source for his *Journals*.

Despite guessing that Thoreau’s voluminous, unpublished *Indian Notebooks* and related studies subsume arrowheads, textual evidence suggests the opposite. During his final decades, Thoreau wrote nearly a dozen volumes on a staggering range of ethnographical, archeological, and religious American Indian history.<sup>65</sup> His *Notebooks* include accounts of explorers, missionaries, and adventurers, nearly three hundred sources on encounters, wars, conversions, treaties, and colonization. Scholars generally agree that Thoreau wrote eleven “Indian Books,” sometimes described as commonplace books, and yet his intentions about publication are subject

to irresolvable disagreement.<sup>66</sup> If he wanted their eventual release, he died before moving towards that end.

A conspicuous fact stresses the difference between Thoreau's *Journals* and his *Indian Notebooks*, however. If Thoreau's collecting fosters his *Journals* and he discusses arrowheads ontologically therein, rather than his prodigious *Indian Notebooks* where his ethnological writings happen, why are relics often considered part of a grand Indian project?<sup>67</sup> Arrowheads are, after all, scarce in his *Indian Notebooks*' volumes, while frequently theorized in his *Journals*. If Thoreau demarcated his Indian research from his ontology, his writing about arrowheads in purely physical terms imperils understanding them as artifacts informing his scholarship. Though he amassed a collection, arrowheads remained categorically deactivated as specimens.

While Thoreau's *Notebooks* stayed provisional, most telling, then, is his arrowhead collection, which he curated, catalogued, and prepared for release. Accompanying Thoreau's writing in his *Journals*, he extensively keeps relics, apparently indexing them by sharpness. When he dies, two seemingly related but actually unrelated Indian interests remain: his *Notebooks* and relics, one set unfinished and the other bequeathed.<sup>68</sup> I thus claim that Thoreau's arrowheads are meant to endure, while the *Notebooks*, though imposing, are set to expire.<sup>69</sup>

Emerson's brother-in-law, Charles T. Jackson, curator of minerals and geodes for the Boston Society of Natural History (formally the Linnaean Society), courted Thoreau's collection for his institution. After Thoreau's death, "the most valuable of his treasures," his "Indian relics, were given, at his request" for Jackson's care, which, in an 1862 inventory, he reports acquiring.<sup>70</sup> If Thoreau and Jackson arrived at some amicable arrangement, his sister Sophia, as executor, may have superseded the deal when delivering her brother's arrowheads to the most



authoritative scientific establishment in Boston, or even America, which in turn housed the “stone implements of war” in the Society’s “Ethnological collection.”<sup>71</sup> Or maybe Jackson reimagined Thoreau’s sentiment. Regardless, categorized thus, the collection moved from Boston to Cambridge at Harvard’s Peabody Museum in 1869, rendering them objects of indophilia and racial difference.<sup>72</sup> Yet while Thoreau entrusted his arrowheads to posterity, he did not want them in any museum’s ethnological store, tucked away or displayed. He would find them, in such context, out of place. “I hate museums,” he puts it bluntly.<sup>73</sup>

“As for museums,” Thoreau argues, “I think it is better to let Nature take care of our antiquities.” When walls decay, “the arrowheads which the museum contains will perhaps find themselves at home again in familiar dust,” to be gathered anew, and “once more suggest their story.”<sup>74</sup> Though his claim seems innocent enough, it directly contradicts tradition, exemplified in Hawthorne’s writing. In “Main-Street (1849), Hawthorne describes how New English “Angelo Saxon energy,” mimicking vocabulary found in works such as *History of the Conquest of Mexico* (1843) by William Hickling Prescott, is “trampling” over native life, their “heavy tread will find its way over all the land,” and so even “the wild Indian, will alike be trembled beneath it,” covered over by “pumpkin-beds and rows of cabbages and beans.” Upon a hill of corpses, the Yankee village becomes a city which “will contain a noble Museum, where, among countless curiosities of the earth and sea, a few Indian arrow-heads shall be treasured up as memorials of a vanished race!”<sup>75</sup> Within museums, arrowheads are trophies, contrasting Thoreau’s odd demand to replant them, enriching the soil.

Thoreau’s preference for the outdoors is not accidental, rather, “fate” brings arrowheads “near the surface of the earth.”<sup>76</sup> “Arrowheads,” he theorizes, are “part of the sands of almost every field,”<sup>77</sup> misreading Henry Schoolcraft’s image in *The Red Race of America* (1847) of

them planted across globe.<sup>78</sup> Even Charles Darwin notes that “stone arrow-heads” traverse the earth, found in “the most distinct parts of the world.”<sup>79</sup> Taking liberties with his century’s belief that (“broadcast over the earth”) arrowheads are not uniquely Indian, Thoreau more strangely is struck by “what a demand for arrowheads there must be, that the surface of the earth should be thus sprinkled with them.”<sup>80</sup> Since arrowheads yearn for soil, the earth—not museums—reclaims them, but “sprinkled” thus, relics like seeds are sowed. Yet by landing arrowheads in fields over cultural institutions, Thoreau provokes a crisis in thinking whereby suddenly the relic’s ontological status is exposed to a completely different, agricultural logic. Behaving as crops, arrowheads are vitally tied to farming, and so a cultivation ritual.

### *Farming for Arrowheads in Concord*

See how these fruitful kernels, being cast  
Upon the earth, how thick they spring! how fast!  
A full ear’d crop and thriving, rank and proud!  
Prepost’rous man first sow’d, and then he plough’d

—Francis Quarles, *Emblems*, 1634

In “The Old Manse” from *Mosses from an Old Manse* (1846), Hawthorne recalls his early marriage spent in Concord, idyllically nestled by the Old North Bridge. Within the introduction’s rolling scene, he describes various episodes of husbandry, from the planting of orchards to the farming of root crops. During his long honeymoon in Concord (which was more agrarian than his native maritime Salem), the agriculturally inept Hawthorne spoke with “Thoreau about” flowers, vegetables, and the “Indian relics” he harvested while turning soil to

grow beans by “Walden” Pond.<sup>81</sup> But Thoreau would also gather arrowheads from his neighbors’ land. “It is a characteristic trait,” Hawthorne notes, “that he has a great regard for the memory of the Indian,” he “seldom [passes] over a ploughed field without picking up an arrow-point.”<sup>82</sup> Concord’s fields are overabundant with arrowheads to pick, turned up by soil rotation, and so “with every fresh ploughing their surface is strewn with the relics.” Thoreau wanders “where these fields have been harrowed and rolled for grain in the fall—their surface yields its annual crop arrow heads.”<sup>83</sup>

Many arrowheads meant for war or hunting were not retrieved, errantly landing instead in fields to rest undisturbed for centuries.<sup>84</sup> Although the arrowhead’s thought missed being imbedded in an enemy or prey’s flesh, it lodges in the earth to become dormant. Spilling thinking into other bodies provokes, for Thoreau, a complex theory of bodily transformation which includes his own community’s agriculture whereby Yankee famers sow seeds to grow vegetables; yet, in so doing, they inadvertently reap Indian relics. When visiting Hawthorne at the Old Manse, Thoreau discoursed about Concordians sowing corn, wheat, or potatoes to inadvertently, on occasion, harrow up arrowheads. Hawthorne concludes it happenstance that arrowheads are uprooted, meaning that yeoman farmers gather them accidentally to be discarded like any other fieldstone.<sup>85</sup> From Thoreau, Hawthorne alternatively learns how to distinguish arrowheads and appreciate their “individuality.”<sup>86</sup>

Confrontation, or what Hawthorne calls an “incident,” between past Indians and present Yankees by tillage means that cultivation prematurely harvests life when an arrowhead springs to the surface.

Here, in some unknown age, before the white man came, stood an Indian village, convenient to the river, whence its inhabitants must have drawn so large a part of their

subsistence. The site is identified by the spear and arrow-heads, the chisels, and other implements of war, labor, and chase, which the plow turns up from the soil. You see a splinter of stone, half hidden beneath a sod; it looks like nothing worthy of note; but, if you have faith enough to pick it up—behold a relic! Thoreau, who has a strange faculty of finding what the Indians have left behind them, first set me on the search; and I afterwards enriched myself with some very perfect specimens, so rudely wrought that it seemed almost if chance had fashioned them. Their great charm consists in their rudeness, and in the individuality of each article, so different from the productions of civilized machinery, which shapes everything to one pattern. There is an exquisite delight, too, in picking up, for one's self, an arrow-head that was dropt centuries ago, and has never been handled since, and which we thus receive directly from the hand of the red hunter, who proposed to shoot it at game, or at an enemy. Such an incident builds up again the Indian.<sup>87</sup>

While Hawthorne terms arrowheads “article” and “specimen,” insinuating dispassionate study, he also endorses Thoreau's sense that a “relic” is “an exquisite delight” by which he “enriches himself,” suggesting nourishment. Where farmers passively uproot arrowheads, Thoreau, without accident or faith, picks them to eat; where they carelessly plow up gluts, he harvests them seasonally, enjoying choice (“perfect”) ones to consume, reversing cannibalism as a savage sign of sheer otherness.<sup>88</sup>

Beyond Hawthorne, Thoreau taught others to forage in fields for arrowheads. Since many relics turn up after being disturbed by his neighbors' plows, the seemingly palimpsestic relationship (where one set of cultural markings covers over another's trace) between present Yankee framing and past Indian hunting is redefined as stirring upward what would otherwise be

hidden. Sustaining new people on old soil by cultivation ironically returns relics to the surface of things. When H. Daniel Peck claims that “the Indians have in effect fallen out of human memory,” and so by Thoreau’s “search for arrowheads” he sought to “re-member the Indians” to be “redemptive,” we can imagine that he felt particularly responsible for remembering life that was, at the same time, believed to be lost.<sup>89</sup> I further radicalize Peck’s claim by saying to “re-member” he means what Thoreau means, the return of thinking to bodies different from the one which it was dis-membered, fomenting disruption in the logic of “fallen out of human memory” insofar as it entails re-membrance. It may seem that antebellum agriculture practices the labor of eroding Indians, but Thoreau sees arrowheads erupting with each rake’s blow, and so fly forth to volley thoughts upon farmers, but of what?

By metabolization, arrowheads are food for Thoreau. He apprehends thoughts by digesting, thereby transforming them back into human life. “It is a stone fruit,” Thoreau calls the arrowhead, “Each one yields me a thought.”<sup>90</sup> Frequently he gathers arrowheads come springtime. Then they are ripe to pick, “crops of philosophers,” choice thoughts, a delicacy.<sup>91</sup> Emerson too promoted a “philosophy” where “material elements” can gain “their origin from his thought,” and that “our philosophy finds” thoughts “collected or distributed.”<sup>92</sup> Thoreau endorses Emerson’s ontology when he remarks “I would have my thoughts, like wild apples, to be food for walkers.”<sup>93</sup> Walkers, reaping fruitful thoughts, swallow them. But to enjoy the meal, they yield some thoughts to others. A harvest must therefore be compensated, and so the earth is always exchanging thoughts between people.



Figure 3. *Bellum denunciandi ratio*. Jacques Le Moyne, *Bellum denunciandi ratio*, in Theodore de Bry, *Brevis narratio eorum quae in Florida Americae* (Frankfort, 1591), plate XXXIII Courtesy the author's rare print and manuscript collection.<sup>94</sup>

If arrowheads move thus between people, Thoreau's agricultural ontology is informed by a migratory logic. Atop Thoreau's own garden—"this portion of the earth's surface"—grows, he recounts in "The Bean-Field" of *Walden*, "cinquefoil, blackberries, johnswort," and before "sweet wild fruits and pleasant flowers," but it becomes his legume patch. Before harvesting arrowheads, he sows seeds to "learn of beans or beans of [him]?" By planting his bean-thoughts, Thoreau poured himself into the earth, making room (in himself) for different thinking. "It was no longer beans that [he] hoed, nor [he] that hoed beans," but arrowheads, his "hoe tinkled against the stones." So, "by the arrow-heads which [he] turned up in hoeing," Thoreau learned something after all, not from his bean seeds forgotten to the earth, but from the stone thoughts "planted," he remarks, by "extinct" life.<sup>95</sup> Thoreau's *Journal* describes how these thoughts are from "primeval lives" to be "hoed and gathered" in the present day.<sup>96</sup>

If Thoreau characterizes arrowheads as “thought” by “extinct” people, he exposes relics’ agricultural status to paleontology, hence calling them “fossil thoughts.”<sup>97</sup> Since planted arrowheads excessively mature in soil, harvests must uncover crops which are rendered so completely stone to be counted as fossils. Calling Indians “extinct” and their arrowheads “fossils,” the “thoughts” for Thoreau are living fragments memorized by geological time, forms of earth thinking extracted by later people. In order to make such a claim, however, Thoreau completely redefines some essential paleontological logics, otherwise fossilization, in ordinary terms, would impede him endorsing arrowheads’ metabolization. For arrowheads to survive while passing between people and the earth, Thoreau’s paleontology overcomes petrification’s morbidity.

### *Hints towards a Radical Paleontology*

Because Thoreau’s paleontology is vitalistic enough to be agricultural, he believes that arrowheads mineralize without passing into death, or, as he writes in *Week*, “fossils are organic.”<sup>98</sup> However, a paleontology positing living fossilization is not without controversy, indeed, it causes a further ontological upheaval. John Lee Comstock’s landmark *Elements of Geology* (1847), representative of traditional doctrine, teaches that fossils “lost all their” organic “matter,” though “still maintain their original shapes,” being “turned into stone.” Fossils, in Comstock’s authoritative view, look lifelike, but they are lifeless replicas. Though “the fossil may, and does often retain the exact form of the animal,” even “still there has been no transformation from one to the other,” so “the stone imitates the organic relic.” After an animal dies and “evaporates,” a relic is leftover to imitate life.<sup>99</sup>

Paleontologists following Comstock typically discuss fossils as “memorials,” dead stones representing extinct organisms.<sup>100</sup> The *Penny cyclopaedia* (1833) makes the “memorial” a synecdoche, so that fossilized fragments represent total, imagined fauna.<sup>101</sup> Accordingly, Richard Owen describes the paleontologists’ task as differentiating fossils from the stratological material in which they form. Once identified, fossils become memorialized by the “Cuvierian system,” taxonomically reconstructing the bygone animal kingdom.<sup>102</sup> Submitted to the classificatory system, a fossil registers as two parts: the tangible but fragmented stone and the fully suggested but forever lost life. For Thoreau’s contemporary paleontologists, unearthed fossil fragments resurrect full specimens from bygone ages, but the models remain as lifeless as the pieces which indicate them into our imaginations.

By contrast, Thoreau cancels the fossil as laboriously representing life. He insists, as Arsić holds he does, that life is continuous and uninhibited regardless of fragmentation and vast geological time.<sup>103</sup> As active memories and not inert memorials, fossils overturn normative demarcations between animals and minerals as fundamentally without life. Fossils, the transitional form between animal and mineral life, allow thinking to persist while migrating through materials, why Garber remarks that an “arrowhead reveals the essence of a life,” even “the life of the mind,” and so they are, in Thoreau’s radically paleontological terms, “fossil thoughts.”<sup>104</sup>

Given that mainstream paleontology is predicated upon osteological material hardening into stratum, fossils are bones transformed until indistinguishable from the earth’s crust by everything except shape. According to disciplinary doctrines, “The shell of the earth,” Sir Charles Lyell remarks on fossils, “has preserved the memorials.”<sup>105</sup> Promoting the stratum’s endurance, Lyell claims that fossils harden therein, thus becoming statues. When a decomposing



body exchanges materially with the earth, the skeletal form becomes composed of soil. Because, in his representative view, the ossiferous transition slows to such a degree that it appears geologically frozen, it even snapshots metamorphosis itself, producing a fossil record.<sup>106</sup> But if Thoreau understands fossils as memories rather than memorials, he throws their enshrinement's setting completely into question. Arrowheads "are not fossil bones—but as it were fossil thoughts," in Thoreau's words, and since thinking (unlike bones) cannot happen in dead things, its geological identity becomes unclear. While Lyell names the earth's surface a "shell," Thoreau strangely calls it a "skin," and so fossilization happens dermatologically. He writes that "arrow points lie sleeping in the skin of the revolving earth," meaning, if taken literally, that thinking rests in the earth's tissues.<sup>107</sup> Following the logic of remembering (which is another way of saying awakening), the thought is aroused when plucked from the skin.

While maybe Thoreau does not literally mean that the earth has skin, he says exactly that in "Spring" of *Walden*, where, to borrow Cameron's formulation about "American writers" from Emerson to Herman Melville, Thoreau "insistently confuses distinctions between the body of a person and the body of the land."<sup>108</sup> In "Spring," Thoreau describes winter's thawing period, which exfoliates the ground, loosening it up to wiggle. ("The earth is all alive and covered with papillæ.") An erupting vibrancy suggests to Thoreau that this is "not a fossil earth, but a living earth; compared with whose great central life all animal and vegetable life is merely parasitic. Its throes will heave our exuviæ from their graves."<sup>109</sup> The earth, not itself fossilized, bleeds through its thawing skin the animal and vegetable ("exuviæ") fossils which rested below during winter. Spring, in these terms, not only excites the earth's skin to bristle, but too releases fossil fragments.

Thoreau's actual belief that fossils are alive, embedded in skin, totally restates paleontology's logic. Ontologically speaking, arrowheads are fossil thoughts, forgotten by (and so materially dismembered from) the crafter, lodging into the earth's skin, and eventually remembered—skin to skin—by another person. When Thoreau gathers arrowheads, he is struck by thoughts long dormant in the earth. By passing from the earth to Thoreau, fossils thoughts can change minds. Dermatological in nature, however, the earth passes fossils through its layers, rising to the epidermis and releasing either by laceration or secretion. A sort of lumping, Indian burial mounds, which assemble pottery, bones, and relics, drove Colonial Americans to consider how arrowheads appeared from the land. By the Federal period, as Thomas Jefferson puts it, Americans did not believe mounds, including “arrow points,” as “Indian monument.” Since they were not monumental, for Jefferson, they could be disturbed, and so he “determined to open and examine” some “repositories,” deconstructing one in Virginia.<sup>110</sup> Jefferson's contemporaries, William Bartram and Philip Freneau, on the other hand, refused to disrupt mounds. In “Indian Burying Ground,” Freneau argues that remains are alive (“Activity, that knows no rest”), buried with relics (“arrows, with a head of stone”), and that the “stranger” should not “commit” a “fraud” by thinking otherwise.<sup>111</sup> Apart from Jefferson's surgical intrusion, Freneau anticipates Thoreau's later vitalism, which identifies arrowheads restlessly swelling the earth into mounds.

Thoreau earth, covered in skin, blisters into mounds which rupture to expose itself to other surfaces. Having an open relationship with human skin, the ground swells into abscesses, becoming contagious to people. Sharing bodily excretions as if communicating a disease, information is passed from one being to another. We cannot thus trace any Indian's expelled thoughts any more than we can know about an anonymous person when sickened by a germ once their own. Nothing total about bodily assemblages can be reconstructed from their dispersed

fragments, suggesting that Thoreau registers partial lives without attempting to gather pieces together into a narrative by which he would gain an advantage over retired existences. In fact, he throws the notion of whole bodies—past or present—totally into doubt given that arrowheads gain momentary affinity to Thoreau without entailing a proprietary relation to Indians who thought them. The arrowhead itself, in other words, thinks freely while migrating from people to things, to places, and, sometimes, back to people.

But the fertile mounds in Jefferson’s Virginia were rare for Concord, where the rocky New England dirt—especially in Maine—instead grew shell middens. Vast repositories, middens incorporate animal and human bones, pottery, shells, antlers, and arrowheads.<sup>112</sup> Due to the preponderance of alkaline carapace and seashell fragments, middens become dense, which is why they were by some classified as artificial, while by others as natural.<sup>113</sup> Part of a repository, arrowheads are forgotten thoughts waiting to be remembered; but since they are by Indians deliberately associated with other relics, middens do not shed arrowheads like the ones found in fields or riverbeds. Rather, they show that natural history is a process in part formed by an intention to remember.

Melville, who wrote *Moby-Dick* (1851) while living in Pittsfield at the aptly named “Arrowhead” house, shared with Thoreau a similar sense of geological memory. In Melville’s *Clarel* (1876), the Indian mound is compared to the Egyptian pyramid. For repositories, relics of human, plant, animal, and mineral matter, await being remembered but never die.<sup>114</sup> Thoreau’s ontology is thus reminiscent of Melville’s famous letter to Hawthorne, writing that his forgotten thinking will, “like one of those seeds taken out of the Egyptian Pyramids, which, after being three thousand years...[grow] to greenness,” remembered again, which is to say, thought by a

different mind.<sup>115</sup> Thoreau and Melville consider the endurance of thought to be paleohorticultural, the sowing and cultivation of life however ancient.

Since Thoreau's vitalism presupposes an essence traversing all things, each animal, mineral, and vegetal body is exposed to other stuff fertilizing and consuming them. Arrowheads essentially, in Thoreau's view, exemplify taxonomical transgression, as Cameron claims in *Impersonality* (2007), "exemplified in Melville's writing," that "the essence of a stone and the essence of a mind are the same (not just the same kind of) thing."<sup>116</sup> Arrowheads for Thoreau, as for Melville, are "mind" things, stone matter forgotten from one person to be remembered again by another.<sup>117</sup> Garber's Thoreau thus renders arrowheads in "physical terms" to such an extreme that a "mind" passes thoughts to a stone, indicative of nature's "intense vitality" whereby materials endlessly transform in piecemeal drifts. Relics are an exchange between people and stones, about a "relation to nature" which entails "the interflow of mind and nature."<sup>118</sup> In Thoreau's words, the Indian's "body mingled with the elements."<sup>119</sup> Because "sharing is so extreme," enough to transform people (even their minds) into mineral life, Thoreau's "Indian," Garber concludes, "slipped out of his humanity" by making arrowheads, migrating his thoughts into mineral life by a completely physical process.<sup>120</sup> Arsić, in "What Music Shall we Have" (2014), clarifies Garber's reading by explaining that Thoreau's ontology presupposes that minds are "[emptied]...into what is corporeal and material." Affirming Arsić's intention to "potentialize" Cameron's "argument" on Thoreau's materialism, I detail her own argument by saying that "self-emptying" informs Thoreau's stranger still idea that thinking migrates from people into the earth through a process of dehumanization, and back to people by rehumanization, suggesting that no thought can be entirely forgotten.<sup>121</sup>

Yet if a person “slipped out of his humanity,” in Garber’s phrasing, by making an arrowhead, what was spilled into being if not merely a stone? If Arsić claims that Thoreau confused things, like arrowheads, with animated bodies, then perhaps we can push things and say that Thoreau confused some animated bodies with arrowheads. Allowing arrowheads to also be animated creatures that move, eat, and breed is Thoreau’s most extreme paleontological turn. He left Concord to push the bounds of his theory, traveling to Cape Cod in 1849. He gathered “arrow-heads” as he grazed along the Cape, and “filled [his] pockets with them.” While, in 1842, Thoreau notes in his *Journal* that Concordian farming reveals Indian “tracks,” the Cape trip seven years later provided a completely different landscape. Unlike the Middlesex County fields where, as I have described, plowing constantly turns up arrowheads, the Cape’s shoreline strips away all human tracks. Away from the agrarian domain and by the howling ocean, Thoreau finds “Indians [having] left no traces on its surface.”<sup>122</sup>

The tide’s rotation, despite washing away ordinary arrowheads, compensates by returning completely different varieties. The relic crop, along with seaweed and kelp, must be washed ashore by the ocean. Cape Cod’s shores, which in Thoreau’s book are transient repositories of oceanic vomit, include live animals, human corpses, and shipwreck debris, becoming a totally different type of ontological archive. Like middens and mounds, the shore offers Thoreau a bountiful though perhaps unappetizing banquet. “The sea-shore,” he writes, is “Strewn with crabs, horse-shoes, or razor-clams, and whatever the sea casts up,—a vast *morgue*.”<sup>123</sup>

“Objects on the beach,” Thoreau remarks about the deposited morgue, are “much larger and more wonderful,” and even sometimes include an “arrow-head.”<sup>124</sup> As a living fossil, the “Horse-shoe Crab” (or king crab in the antebellum’s common parlance), tumbled into the morgue, “used as arrow-heads by the Indians.”<sup>125</sup> Since Indians spilled thinking into inhuman

things in a broad sense, Thoreau notices that arrowheads are not limited to stones. An antediluvian relic, the horseshoe crab or the “Saucepan Fish (*Limulus Polyphaemus*),” is too a fossil thought.<sup>126</sup> Named by Linnaeus, the horseshoe crab originated in the Ordovician period, returning to beaches for nearly five million centuries before Thoreau’s excursion. Early paleontologists, through the horseshoe crab’s example, identified the possibility of an enduring animal form resistant to absolute extinction.<sup>127</sup> “The history of this genus is important,” they claim about the “fossil,” being “most abundant” today, and in “Jurassic limestone.”<sup>128</sup> Despite the paleontological interest in horseshoe crabs, Thoreau registers such a prodigious pedigree as indifferent, even defiant to human life. While human thinking can spill into the inhuman crab, it somehow, unlike stones, balks us and refuses to reciprocate.

On Cape Cod’s shores, where crabby arrowheads crawl, “is naked Nature,—inhumanly sincere,” Thoreau concludes, “wasting no thought on man.”<sup>129</sup> Since thinking empties into crabs but cannot be cultivated back into human thought, even by Thoreau, they imperil his ontology. We should see this complicated move, however, as Thoreau’s final gesture towards rewriting paleontology, challenging what leading fossil ichthyologist and Louis Agassiz’s Scottish colleague, Hugh Miller, claims about arrowheads. “The great column of being,” Miller argues, is based in the “sea, and inscribed,” he says “with many a strange form,—at once hieroglyphic and figure.”<sup>130</sup> Despite admitting oceanic fossils as hieroglyphic, Miller, taking up Thomas Brown’s “principle,” believes that our “mind” is fit to reclaim whatever figure life produces, regardless of how “labyrinth” in form.<sup>131</sup> Because fossils, Comstock agrees, are “natural memorials” with “hieroglyphics,” they are decipherable by our minds.<sup>132</sup> Thoreau, on the other hand, identifies the horseshoe crab as the thing which completely escapes us, absconding away with our thought. Crab behavior thus either ruptures Thoreau’s theory, or it insinuates that while the human spills

into the world, only so much can be cultivated, meaning that our horizon is limited even by invertebrates. Why, then, entrust a crabby thing which exceeds our own possibilities with thinking?

### *Hieroglyphic Crabs and Inhuman Thinking*

What's lighter than the mind? A thought. Than thought?

This bubble world. What, than this bubble?

Naught

—Francis Quarles

All “fossils,” argues Miller in *The Testimony of the Rocks* (1857), belong to the “hieroglyphic record.”<sup>133</sup> While Miller says it is “obnoxious to supposition” an “arrow-head” as a fossil, Thoreau claims them to be categorically fossils and so hieroglyphs.<sup>134</sup> However, despite Thoreau’s arrowhead interests, he never claims to comprehend them, maintaining as late as 1859 that the “arrow headed character is probably more ancient than any other, and to my mind it has not been deciphered.”<sup>135</sup> But the undeciphered character becomes even more strange when embodied by an aquatic creature. The “hieroglyphical” character of Moby Dick, Melville’s Ishmael might elaborate, like “Indian rocks,” he continues, “those mystic rocks too, the mystic-marked whale remains undecipherable.”<sup>136</sup> If horseshoe crabs, like Moby Dick, are unthinkable enough withstand the mind’s decryption, then their hieroglyphic form draws Thoreau’s thinking to its upmost limits at which edge it passes into complete and irrecoverable inhumanity.

While scholars have not noticed Thoreau’s interest in horseshoe crabs as arrowheads, never mind their undecipherability, some have gathered the overall gist regarding stone relics.

John T. Irwin in *American Hieroglyphics* (1980) argues that Thoreau's "natural writing," including the "geo-logic," is "hieroglyphic."<sup>137</sup> To the enduring "hardness" of the "stone" Thoreau associates the "hardness" to "decipher" its hieroglyphic emblems.<sup>138</sup> Early Thoreau scholarship, however, registers the hieroglyphics as Indian language which Thoreau, despite him saying otherwise, might translate. Keiser (*borrowing* Thoreau's own phrase) names each arrowhead a "red man's mark," meaning a "letter" to be pieced into a readable language and build up again the Indian.<sup>139</sup> Fleck is thus led to conclude that the "mystical 'arrowheaded' character of Indian culture had to be deciphered," and that Thoreau meant to conquer its "hieroglyphs."<sup>140</sup> For these critics, the difficulty in deciphering petroglyphs was just another task in Thoreau's "perpetual conquest," by Charles Feidelson's formulation, "of an alien world."<sup>141</sup>

Garber's *Thoreau's Fable of Inscribing* (1991), on the other hand, restates Irwin's reading, accounting for Thoreau's explicit comment that arrowheads have not been deciphered, arguing that "hieroglyphics" remain "illegible."<sup>142</sup> Since arrowheads are thought up but uncompromising, sheer thinking materialized, their ontological status bespeaks purposiveness unburdened from comprehensibility. The hieroglyphic character, that is to say, cannot be translated, but its inscrutability does not entail its ineffectiveness as a body, which can strike. In *Emblems* (1634), studied by Thoreau, Francis Quarles proposes that all lifeforms are such "Hieroglyphics," bodies purposefully mixing with other bodies, willing the recombination of things.<sup>143</sup> For Quarles, things suggest meaning by their ever-transforming corporeality while staying mystified. Bodies melt into bodies, in *Emblems*, minds into minds, arrowheads winging through his pages, his poems, and his emblematic illustrations.

Little if any notice has been given to Thoreau's admiration of the Early Modern writer Quarles, who seems to push Thoreau's already strange arrowhead theory to be more strange. In



an 1843 letter to Emerson's wife and geologist Charles T. Jackson's sister, Lidian, Thoreau remarks that "I have been reading lately what of Quarles's poetry I could get." Despite his obscurity, "Quarles surely ought not to be forgotten."<sup>144</sup> Rather than reading the famous spirit seer Emanuel Swedenborg's *Hieroglyphic Key* (1784), Thoreau consults Quarles' materialist mysticism in *Emblems* and *Hieroglyphikes of the Life of Man* (1638) to develop his hieroglyph theory. Since, for Quarles, "the earth" itself and even "every creature" are "Hieroglyphics," at last our thoughts themselves creep beyond our human conquest as thoroughgoing characters or bodies.<sup>145</sup> Because thoughts are creatures, he believes that thinking "Crab-like, creeps."<sup>146</sup> Because crabs will not return Indian thinking to Thoreau's humanity, he must spill his entire self across the beach's morgue in order to creep along. In *Cape Cod*, he thus concludes that "Creeping along the endless beach...it occurs to us that we, too, are the product of sea-slime."<sup>147</sup> And so Thoreau strangely remarks, reading Quarles at the time, that "Our least deed," as a "crab, wends its way to the sea."<sup>148</sup>

But if our thoughts become embodied in crabs and go out to sea, what characterizes their return if not the form of human memory? Horseshoe crabs only emerge from the sea to breed. By breeding, they swarm by hordes to carve orgy-shaped markings upon the shore. The horseshoe crab etchings result from a messy affair, and thus are indistinguishable from the creatures' seasonal mating ritual. By this ritual, hundreds-of-millions-of-years in practice, the crab mass tumbles with the tide, a foam of sand, water, sperm, and eggs, mixed with human thinking, relics, and bones, making dirty-minded drawings. Though it might seem strange, Thoreau's ontology demands thinking's embodiment by an arrow-headed character, fully potentialized by horseshoe crabs which partake in sexual frenzy, the "flux of things," the only way to "live an

enduring life.”<sup>149</sup> Drifting from crab to crab and from beach to beach, the hieroglyphic flux overwhelms human thinking, so must, in its identity, exhaust man’s horizon.

Horseshoe crab orgies spell out, in some sense, amnesic inhumanity. But because their impersonal character is purposive—even while being indecipherable—they become the emblematic language of natural writing. Spilled upon the shore, people mix with oceanic material, their thoughts creeping into an uninhibited body (or morgue) in which crabs, kelp, shells, corpses, and gulls gather across the sand to be washed away or enriched by the sea. But they leave markings, however temporary. A form of embodied and irregular scribbling, the thinking mixed on Cape Cod’s shores, etching hieroglyphics into the sand, emblemizes how Thoreau’s reads Quarles’ corporeal semiotics, where thoughts emphatically cross bodies from whose passions arise rumbustious signs. “I am pleased,” Thoreau writes, “with the manner in which Quarles and his contemporaries speak of nature.” “He uses many able bodied and strong-backed words,” corporeal language that “stutters” out its markings. Because his words “stand cheek by jowl with nature,” they are hard but misshapen.<sup>150</sup> As arrow-headed characters, Quarles’ words make an “irregular form.”<sup>151</sup> Yet this arrow-headed character, staunchly aberrant, is at the rudiments of signification, what Emerson might call a fossil in the natural history of language.

“Every line,” Emerson says, “we can draw in the sand, has expression.”<sup>152</sup> Tumbling across Cape Cod’s shoreline, human, crab, and innumerable other essences express something, but what?<sup>153</sup> While the “arrow headed character,” as Thoreau calls it, remains undeciphered, its marks are meaningful insofar as they are purposive nature, which is to say, intentional. As it is “difficult,” Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels reason, “to imagine,” despite our best efforts, “intentionless meaning,” the construction is oxymoronic. “Suppose,” they entertain, that

“you’re walking along a beach and you come upon a curious sequence of squiggles in the sand. You step back a few paces and notice that they spell out.” For horseshoe crabs to make “curious squiggles” that “spell out,” Knapp and Michaels argue that we must decide if these are “words” or if they merely “resemble words.” They are only meaningful, according to these provocateurs, if “language,” and thus must be intended, *even if* that intention is as inhuman as the “living sea.” “This question” they thus conclude, “is and always was an empirical question.”<sup>154</sup> The only requirement, therefore, for these marks to suggest meaning to a beach walker, in other words, is an arrow-headed character to point somewhere.

“How does it come,” however, “about that this arrow,” Ludwig Wittgenstein illustrates about the character, “*points?*” “This pointing,” he continues, after all “is *not* a hocus-pocus,” but rather “points only in the application that a living being makes of it,” invests (“to carry in it something besides itself”) in hitting a mark, however estranged it has become from the wayward arrowhead.<sup>155</sup> The Indian’s intention, Thoreau believes, to fulfil his promise to endure in the flux, the ability to realize such promise, what Nietzsche says in the *Genealogy of Morals* (1887), requires a lasting memory and will. For the arrowhead maker to keep his promise, to breed human memory in crabs, and for them to spill that thinking upon the sand, to be stumbled upon by beachcombers, Nietzsche would propose that the intention must overcome “forgetfulness.” Its memory must outlast the author, and thus the crafter embodies his memory in a fossil, the horseshoe crab, entrusting his promise with the most dependable creature known to life.

Though spineless, the horseshoe crab is reliable. In order to “breed an animal with the prerogative to promise,” Nietzsche asserts, is to face the “problem of humankind.” But to face that problem, man must deface himself. By disfiguring himself, man’s “will’s memory” spills into “a world of strange new things,” and thus Thoreau’s horseshoe crab orgy is an “actual,”

literal “discharge of the will,” “without breaking this long chain of the will,” being the kept promise of the crafter’s lasting memory.<sup>156</sup> By disfigurement, Thoreau anticipates Michel Foucault’s speculative bet, “man would be [forgotten], like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea.”<sup>157</sup>

\*  
\*\*

“The finer particles of sand are blown away and the arrow-points remains.”<sup>158</sup>

- <sup>1</sup> Henry D. Thoreau, *A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers*, eds. Carl F. Hovde et al., in *The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1980), 169. Hereafter abbreviated as *AW*.
- <sup>2</sup> Henry D. Thoreau, *Early Essays and Miscellanies*, eds. Joseph J. Moldenhauer and Edwin Moser, in *The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1975), 346.
- <sup>3</sup> Henry D. Thoreau, *Walden*, ed. J. Lyndon Shanley (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2016), 11. Hereafter abbreviated as *W*. The four other times that Thoreau mentions demonism in *Walden* it is manifest in animals.
- <sup>4</sup> Thoreau, *W*, 63.
- <sup>5</sup> Thoreau, *W*, 40.
- <sup>6</sup> Ralph W. Emerson, “Compensation,” *Essays: First and Second Series* (New York: The Library of America, 1990), 71. Reflecting his claim about shell-fish, Emerson remarks that each “spirit makes its house; but afterwards the house confines the spirit,” so it moves outward. Ralph W. Emerson, “Fate,” *Emerson: Political Writings*, ed. Kenneth Sacks (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2008), 198.
- <sup>7</sup> Henry D. Thoreau, *Journal, Vol. 2: 1842-1848*, ed. Robert Sattelmeyer, in *The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1984), 177. Hereafter abbreviated as *PJ*, 2. Our domestic migrations renounce economies consistent enough to escape contradiction, even paradox. Stanley Cavell has described the economic perambulation of Thoreau as “the riddle, or you may say the paradox, the book proposes.” Stanley Cavell, *The Senses of Walden* (Chicago: The U of Chicago P, 1992), 45.
- <sup>8</sup> The etymological interest of economy (*οἶκος-νέμω*) and ecology (*οἶκος-λογία*) share “house” (*οἶκος*) in common. Lawrence Buell’s definition of “economy” in *The Future of Environmental Criticism* (2005) as “See ecology” is emblematic of the etymological slippage. Lawrence Buell, *The Future of Environmental Criticism* (Malden: Blackwell, 2005), 140.
- <sup>9</sup> “*Economics*,” Novalis thus claims, “in the broadest sense also embraces the theory of the order of life.” Novalis, *Philosophical*, 107. Margaret Fuller also quotes this line: “Philosophy is peculiarly home-sickness; an overmastering desire to be at home.” Margaret Fuller, *The Letters: Vol. 1, 1817-1838*, ed. Robert Hudspeth (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1983), 182.
- <sup>10</sup> Thoreau, *W*, 81.
- <sup>11</sup> Thoreau, *W*, 29, 324. Thoreau’s persistent obsession with etymology cannot escape us, since our yardedness (*geard*) relates to the Old English sense of how boarders define feeding grounds for animal husbandry, the territories across which herds are driven. (“Ancient poetry and mythology suggests, at least, that husbandry was once a sacred art.”) Thoreau, *W*, 165. Economy comes from the Greek *οἰκονομία*, typically defined as household management, from the prefix *οἶκος* (house) and *νέμω* (distribution). Economics, in Thoreau’s day, usually meant domestic conduct, but his study of ancient languages always tends towards primal, prelinguistic roots. *Οἶκος* suggests “habitat” and *νέμω* “herding” (to drive from pasture to pasture). The demonic aspect of economics, therefore, is that which shepherds us from place to place because life cannot be sustained by the crop of a solitary field.
- <sup>12</sup> Thoreau, *W*, 324.
- <sup>13</sup> Thoreau, *W*, 92.
- <sup>14</sup> Thoreau, *W*, 52.
- <sup>15</sup> Thoreau, *PJ*, 2, 278.
- <sup>16</sup> Henry D. Thoreau, *The Maine Woods* (Portland: WestWinds Press, 2013), 58. Hereafter abbreviated as *MW*.

- 17 Thoreau, *MW*, 58. Thoreau references Goethe's "autobiography," where he bemoans that the German "was even too well-bred" to embrace demonism, being "defrauded of so much which the savage boy enjoys." Thoreau, *J*, 2, 356. "Let the youth seize upon the finest and most memorable experience in his life." Thoreau, *J*, 2, 357. Thoreau indexes these pages "Goethe" with his own pencil. Thoreau, *Journal*, 2, 389. Thoreau also quote the autobiography in *AW*. On Thoreau's reading of the autobiography, see Sattelmeyer, *Thoreau's Reading*, 187.
- 18 Thoreau, *MW*, 59.
- 19 Thoreau, *MW*, 59.
- 20 Thoreau, *PJ*, 2, 339.
- 21 Georges Bataille, *Literature and Evil: Essays by Georges Bataille*, tr. Alastair Hamilton (New York: Marion Boyars, 1997), 146.
- 22 Thoreau, *J*, 2, 340. Fanny Hardy Eckstorm, for similar reasons, calls Katahdin "a very Indian among mountains," and that "heads of arrows" can make up "a whole mountain of the same stuff." Fanny Hardy Eckstorm, "Thoreau's 'Maine Woods,'" *Thoreau: A century of Criticism* (Dallas: Southern Methodist UP, 1954), 116, 117.
- 23 Henry D. Thoreau, "To the Mountains," *Collected Poems* (Chicago: Packard and Company, 1943), 200.
- 24 For Thomas Wentworth Higginson, Katahdin was the "awful home of the Indian's Pomola. [He] remembered what Thoreau said, that perhaps it was an insult to the Gods to climb their mountains, and shuddered to think that our night's camp would be within the skirt of white, soft, impenetrable material. Should we dare it?...Who might it be? Some said 'Demons.'" Thomas Wentworth Higginson, *Letters and Journals of Thomas Wentworth Higginson*, ed. Mary Thacher Higginson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1921), 120.
- 25 Thoreau, *TJ*, 18, 91.
- 26 The "perfect arrow-head" of Thoreau's *Journal* is also recounted in *A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers* (1849). Thoreau, *AW*, 146.
- 27 Henry D. Thoreau, *Journal, Vol. 1: 1837-1844*, eds. Elizabeth Witherell et al., in *The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1981), 8-9. Hereafter abbreviated as *PJ*, 1.
- 28 Annie Russell Marble, *Thoreau: His Home, Friends, and Books* (New York: Thomas Y. Marble, 1902), 50. Even before amassing his arrowhead collection, Thoreau counts "some hundreds" of "Arrow heads" with John "which we have ourselves collected." Henry D. Thoreau, *Journal, Vol. 2: 1842-1848*, ed. Robert Sattelmeyer, in *The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1984), 39. Hereafter abbreviated as *PJ*, 2.
- 29 Robert Richardson, *Henry Thoreau: A Life of the Mind* (Berkeley: U of California P, 1996), 6.
- 30 Richardson, *Henry Thoreau*, 389.
- 31 Thoreau, *PJ*, 2, 4.
- 32 Laura Dassow Walls, *Henry David Thoreau: A Life* (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2017), 3-4.
- 33 Levinson, *Thinking Through Poetry*, 1. Levinson has recently grouped some prominent "new materialisms" as "digital-and-network-theory, animal and ecostudies, biopolitics, and object-oriented ontology." Levinson, *Thinking Through Poetry*, 255.
- 34 Henry D. Thoreau, *The Journal, March 2, 1859–November 30, 1859*, eds. Bradford Torrey and Francis H. Allen, *Vol. 18* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1906), 92, 91. Hereafter abbreviated as *TJ*, 18.

35 Branka Arsić, *Bird Relics: Greif and Vitalism in Thoreau* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2016), 26. See also Branka Arsić, "Our Things: Thoreau on Relics, Objects, and Archives," *Qui Parle*, 23.1 (2014).

36 Edward F. Mooney, referencing Arsić's forthcoming *Bird Relics* in *Excursions with Thoreau* (2015) notes, contradicting the ethnological given, that by "archiving the remains of human life through collecting local arrowheads" Thoreau had a "serious business, not an idle pastime." *Excursions with Thoreau: Philosophy, Poetry, Religion* (New York: Bloomsbury 2015), 116.

37 Cavell, *The Senses of Walden*, 4, 10. Arsić, *Bird Relics*, 15. Or maybe what Cleanth Brooks calls good "old fashioned" reading. Cleanth Brooks, "In Search of the New Criticism," *The American Scholar*, 53.1 (Winter 1984), 53.

38 Arsić, *Bird Relics*, 17, 22. Prior to Arsić, Frederik Garber endorsed Cavell's literalism, given that it shows "just how much attention Thoreau's words demand." He also, on the same topic, endorsed Sharon Cameron, who is "literal in her understanding of the *Journal*," where most all of Thoreau's remarks on arrowheads exist. Frederik Garber, *Thoreau's Fable of Inscribing* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1991), 13. Arsić's "formulation of affirmative reading," however, beyond Cavell's influence, takes a cue from French philosophy. Arsić, *Bird Relics*, 390. Her affirmation follows from what Michel Foucault calls thinking "without dialectics, without negation," which is "thought that accepts divergence; affirmative thought." Michel Foucault, "Theatrum Philosophicum," *Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology* (New York: The New Press, 1998), 358. Foucault's "affirmative thinking" is borrowed from "Deleuze," who Arsić too keeps in "the background" of her writing. Branka Arsić, *The Passive Eye: Gaze and Subjectivity in Berkeley* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003), xii. Levinson characterizes Arsić's affirmation as the "gold standard" of "an enlarged notion of thinking." Levinson, *Thinking Through Poetry*, 255.

39 John Crowe Ransom, *Beating the Bushes: Selected Essays 1941-1970* (New York: New Directions, 1952), 3. Arsić, *Bird Relics*, 4. Arsić's philosopher's use "words and to take them to their extreme, even to the extent of accepting also their possible radicality, or indeed their madness." Arsić, *Passive Eye*, xii. In Thoreau's words, "If one listens to the faintest but constant suggestions of his genius, which are certainly true, he sees not to what extremes, or even insanity, it may lead him; and yet that way, as he grows more resolute and faithful, his road lies." Thoreau, *W*, 216.

40 Sharon Cameron, *The Corporeal Self: Allegories of the Body in Melville and Hawthorne* (New York: Columbia UP, 1991), 12, 3, 4. It is "a 'substantially' philosophical gesture to take things to their extreme," Arsić asserts in the context of Deleuze. Arsić, *Passive Eye*, xii. By promoting what Deleuze says of philosophy, that "only one kind of objection is worthwhile: the objection which shows that the question raised by a philosopher...does not force the nature of things enough," Arsić's reading of literature asks if the writer takes their own claims far enough away from the everyday, if they are committed enough to the radicality of their own words. Gilles Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity* (New York: Columbia UP, 1991), 107.

41 George Kateb, "Thoreau's Journal: Reading Nature," *American Impersonal: Essays with Sharon Cameron*, ed. Branka Arsić (New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, Inc., 2014), 131. Stanley Cavell, *A Pitch of Philosophy: Autobiographical Exercises* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1994), 45.

42 Cavell, *Senses of Walden*, 133.

43 Arsić, *Bird Relics*, 19. Arsić's claim that "Stones are animated" informs Thoreau's favorite stone, the arrowhead. *Bird Relics*, 187.

44 Frederick Garber, *Thoreau's Redemptive Imagination* (New York: New York UP, 1977), 144.

45 To "potentialize," to borrow from Arsić's sense of Walter Benjamin, means to read out words to their limits at which point they form serious philosophical propositions. Branka Arsić, "Introduction," *American Impersonal: Essays with Sharon Cameron* (New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, Inc., 2014), 169.

46 Arsić, *Bird Relics*, 1. In the context of how Thoreau "puts it," Arsić borrows Colin Dayan's reading "regarding Poe" on causality's inversion. Arsić, *Bird Relics*, 1.

<sup>47</sup> Arsić, “What Music Shall We Have? Thoreau on the Aesthetics and Politics of Listening,” *American Impersonal: Essays with Sharon Cameron*, ed. Branka Arsić (New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, Inc., 2014), 169. Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* (New York: Columbia UP, 1990), 6. For Deleuze, the pre-Socratic Greeks divided their world between two coincident but incommensurable temporalities such that causes go to causes, and effects to effects, a divide between corporeal and incorporeal worlds. Related thinking develops into what might be called his final theory of life in *Pure Immanence: Essays on A Life*, tr. Anne Boyman (New York: Zone Books, 2001). By Arsić’s evaluation, “it is the American tradition that shaped Deleuze’s theory.” Arsić, “Introduction,” 23.

<sup>48</sup> Thoreau, *PJ*, 1, 39. “These Indian relics in our fields which have preserved their rugged forms so long are evidence of the vital energy of the people who made them.” Thoreau, *PJ*, 2, 4.

<sup>49</sup> In Emerson’s “Economy” (1851), he claims that life takes “crumbling atoms, seizes them as they fall, and redistributes them instantly, into new bodies.” Emerson, *LL*, 1, 240.

<sup>50</sup> Arsić, *Bird Relics*, 26.

<sup>51</sup> “All matter indeed,” in Thoreau’s words, “is capable of entertaining thought.” Thoreau, *PJ*, 2, 146.

<sup>52</sup> Thoreau, *TJ*, 18, 92.

<sup>53</sup> My materialist orientation reverses the terms of Renée Bergland’s thesis about Indian ghosts in relation to Thoreau’s writing. While she claims that American writers participated in Indian genocide by “describing them as insubstantial, disembodied” by a sort of “ghost metaphor,” I argue conversely that Thoreau believes in thoughts embodied by flint which are substantial as literal ghosts. Renée L. Bergland, *The National Uncanny: Indian Ghosts and American Subjects* (Hanover: UP of New England, 2000), 3. My chapter thus shares much ground with Juliana Chow’s reading of Thoreau’s dispersion ontology. “Thoreau’s method,” she posits, “offers a sense of coarticulated human and natural history—a partial view that palpably registers loss...discrete lives instead of the totality of life...a mode of being partial, partial *to* something, partial *of* something...as partial histories or partial knowings or not knowings.” Juliana Chow, “Partial Readings: Thoreau’s Studies as Natural History’s Casualties,” *Anthropocene Reading: Literary History in Geologic Times*, eds. Tobias Menely and Jesse Oak Taylor (University Park: Pennsylvania State UP, 2017), 118.

<sup>54</sup> Thoreau, *TJ*, 18, 91. Nathaniel Hawthorne, “The Old Manse,” *Mosses from an Old Manse, Tales and Sketches* (New York: The Library of America, 1982), 1129.

<sup>55</sup> I compare Thoreau’s encounters with arrowheads to how Geoffrey Sanborn describes Queequeg’s indexical thinking in the context of mana energies. Markings like tattoos are less about their meaning for Melville’s character, Sanborn explains, than about their manifestation of force. Additionally, Queequeg, like Thoreau, does not hierarchize such manifestations. Geoffrey Sanborn, *Whipscars and Tattoos: The Last of the Mohicans, Moby-Dick, and the Maori* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011), 123–125.

<sup>56</sup> The narrative has even appeared in F. O. Matthiessen’s famous *American Renaissance* (1941). F. O. Matthiessen, *The American Renaissance* (New York: Oxford UP, 1941), 180.

<sup>57</sup> Albert Keiser, *The Indian in American Literature* (New York: Oxford UP, 1933), 210, 219, 232.

<sup>58</sup> Robert Sayre, *Thoreau and the American Indians* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1977), 45, ix.

<sup>59</sup> Sayre, *Thoreau*, ix.

<sup>60</sup> Sayre, *Thoreau*, 61, 103. Sayre’s insistence that Thoreau “endeavored to be a synthesis of savage and civilized man himself,” in fact, recovers earlier remarks. Sayre, *Thoreau*, x. Prior to Sayre, John Burroughs remarks that Thoreau’s “blood seems to have turned toward the aboriginal,” so that he “probably picked up thousands of arrowheads. He had an eye for them. The Indian in him recognized its own.” John Burroughs, “Thoreau’s Wildness,” *Thoreau: A Century in Criticism* (Dallas: Southern Methodist UP, 1954), 89.



<sup>61</sup> “He has led a strange Indian life,” as Thomas Wentworth Higginson puts it in 1861. Thomas Wentworth Higginson, *Letters and Journals: 1846–1906*, ed. Mary Thacher Higginson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1921), 105.

<sup>62</sup> Julian Hawthorne and Leonard Lemmon, *American Literature* (Boston: D. C. Heath, 1891), 150.

<sup>63</sup> Richard Slotkin, *Regeneration through Violence: The Mythology of the American Frontier, 1600–1860* (Middleton: Wesleyan UP, 1973), 535. Richard Fleck, *Henry Thoreau and John Muir among the Indians* (Hamden: Archon Books, 1985), 3–4. Theodore Dreiser also calls Thoreau’s life “primitive,” the relics a feature of his Indian passions. Theodore Dreiser, *Theodore Dreiser Presents the Living Thoughts of Thoreau* (Greenwich: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1963), 20. Lawrence Buell disagrees with Dreiser, remarking that Thoreau “was no primitivist.” Lawrence Buell, *New England Literary Culture from Revolution through Renaissance* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1986), 324.

<sup>64</sup> For example, John Kucich’s “Native America” (2017) claims “arrowheads” are Indian “history” that Thoreau saw “embodied in stone tools.” John J. Kucich, “Native America,” *Henry David Thoreau in Context* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2017), 199. The implements are one influence showing that “Native Americans shaped his thinking to the end.” Kucich, “Native America,” 204. Joshua David Bellin has even, in “Red Walden” (2016), inverted Sayre and Fleck by looking at how Thoreau is “transmitted” to “Indian people today.” Joshua David Bellin, “Red Walden: Thoreau and Native America,” *Thoreau at Two Hundred: Essays and Reassessments* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2016), 83.

<sup>65</sup> Harding believes that Thoreau begins studying Indian history and culture in 1848. Walter Roy Harding, *A Thoreau Handbook* (New York: New York UP, 1959), 109.

<sup>66</sup> The *Notebooks* amount to twelve when the *Canadian Notebook* is counted. My facile conclusion about the *Notebooks*’ fate is that Thoreau simply did not develop his notes into a publishable form, so the pages remain today in the J. Pierpont Morgan Library.

<sup>67</sup> I agree with Joshua David Bellin that the *Notebooks* are not the location of Thoreau’s progressivism, indeed, they are “characteristic of antebellum ethnology,” and that “his radical position in other realms” escaped those pages. Joshua Bellin, “In the Company of Savagists: Thoreau’s Indian Books and Antebellum Ethnology,” *The Concord Saunterer* 16.1 (2008): 2–3.

<sup>68</sup> Thoreau contrasts “lifeless record” to “living testimony,” the former being books and the latter being relics. Thoreau, *PJ*, 2, 351. Loren Eiseley writes that by the scientific racism through which Victorians viewed “native” people, they “were often regarded as mentally inferior, living fossils,” whose relics became condescending examples of the harsh evolutionary realities. “Everything is flowing” on the other hand, Eiseley finds in Thoreau’s “nature.” “Museums, by contrast, are catacombs, the dead nature of dead men.” Loren Eiseley, *Collected Essays on Evolution, Nature, and the Cosmos*, Vol. 1, ed. William Cronon (New York: The Library of America, 2016), 76, 338.

<sup>69</sup> In addition to the object archive, Thoreau had considered publishing an official written volume, or even illustrated volumes, on his arrowheads. He withdrew the temptation. The prized arrowheads themselves are the nearest Thoreau ever came to publicly displaying his thinking about Indian life.

<sup>70</sup> Marble, *Thoreau*, 285. “Collection of Indian antiques, consisting of stone implements and weapons (chiefly) found by himself in Concord.” Thoreau’s “Vast collection,” all labeled, in presentation form, had been dutifully prepared for the anticipated donation. C. T. Jackson, *Proceedings of the Boston Society of Natural History, Vol. 9, 1862–1863* (Boston: Printed for the Society, William Wood, 1865), 72, 89, 72.

<sup>71</sup> *Proceedings of the Boston Society of Natural History, Vol. 10, 1864–1865* (Boston: Printed for the Society, William Wood, 1866), 128.

<sup>72</sup> Keiser, *The Indian*, 221. Researches can still view Thoreau’s arrowheads in the Peabody Museum, and the Concord Museum, where more relics like the ones that Thoreau would have collected are stored.

73 Thoreau, *PJ*, 1, 465. I agree with Léon Bazalgette's claim that each "arrow-head," for Thoreau, was left "on purpose," and so his "pile of flint-flakes" amounts to something "given him in trust." "Henry never believed in private property; if he has seemed to be collecting and treasuring things during his lifetime, it has always been with this legacy in view, always to enrich the common good." *Henry Thoreau: Bachelor of Nature*, tr. Van Wyck Brooks (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1924), 348.

74 Thoreau, *TJ*, 18, 92.

75 Nathaniel Hawthorne, "Main-Street," *Tales and Sketches* (New York: The Library of America, 1982), 1129, 1030, 1031, 1028, 1031, 1024.

76 Thoreau, *TJ*, 18, 92.

77 Henry D. Thoreau, *The Journal*, August 1, 1860–November 3, 1861, ed. Bradford Torrey, *Vol. 14* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1906), 201. Hereafter abbreviated as *J14*.

78 Henry Schoolcraft, *The Red Race of America* (New York: William H. Graham, 1847), 220.

79 Charles Darwin, *The Descent of Man* (New York: Prometheus Books, 1998), 186.

80 Thoreau, *J14*, 201.

81 Nathaniel Hawthorne, *The Scarlet Letter* (New York: The Library of America, 1983), 140.

82 Nathaniel Hawthorne, *Passages from the American Note-books*, Vol. 1 (Boston: James R. Osgood, 1875), 97.

83 Thoreau, *PJ*, 2, 39. "His collection of Indian relics has been commenced while he was still a youth, for the soil of Concord—an old settlement of Indian tribes—was rich in these treasures, arrow-heads, pottery, and stone implements being often turned up by the plough. Regularly every spring, when the field had been washed bare by rains and thawing snow, would Thoreau set out to gather his crop of arrow-heads." Henry S. Salt, *Life of Henry David Thoreau* (Chicago: U of Illinois P, 1993), 60. While it might seem strange to read Thoreau literally when saying that relics behave as plants, arrowheads "are sown," Burroughs quotes him, and so each a "crop." For this reason, these are "arrow-root instead of arrow-stones," he speculates. John Burroughs, *The Writings of John Burroughs, Vol. 8, Indoor Studies* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1904), 18. Due to Concord's arrowhead abundance, the brothers Thoreau used the land to educate their school children about relics. Raymond Adams, "Thoreau at Harvard: Some Unpublished Records," *The New England Quarterly* 13.1 (1940), 24–33. But the abundance also meant that other Concordians took up arrowhead gathering as a hobby, one individual quite competitively with Thoreau himself. A.R.M., "Arrowheads from Thoreau's Ground," *The Concord Saunterer* 10.3 (1975): 16–17. Thoreau's astonishing ability to gather arrowheads was theorized by Alcott who figured Thoreau to have a "seventh sense" to see the relics overlooked by his peers. Amos Bronson Alcott, "Thoreau and Emerson," *The American Transcendentalists*, ed. Perry Miller (New York: Doubleday, 1957), 95. His extra sense (beyond a fifth or sixth), as Van Wyck Brooks notes, made it seem that "Arrowheads...sprang from the ground when he touched it." Van Wyck Brooks, *The Flowering of New England 1815-1865* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1936), 287. "One day," while "walking with a stranger, who inquired where Indian arrow-heads could be found, [Thoreau] replied, 'Everywhere,' and, stooping forward, picked one on the instant from the ground." Ralph W. Emerson, "Thoreau," *Atlantic Monthly* (Boston: Ticknor and Fields, May, 1862), 14. Recently, Robert Thorson has discussed Thoreau's arrowhead collecting, the preponderance of them in Concord, and even their relation to geological time and the Anthropocene. Robert Thorson, *The Boatmen: Henry David Thoreau's River Years* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2017), 38–34.

84 "After all the labor expended on" the arrow, and perhaps only being "shot but once perchance—& the shaft which was devoted to it decayed—& there lay the arrowhead sinking into the ground—awaiting me," Thoreau remarks. Thoreau, *TJ*, 18, 89–90.

85 Thoreau relates the insouciance about arrowheads to "the transient curiosity of the farmer." Thoreau, *PJ*, 2, 39.

<sup>86</sup> Since “arrow heads are of every color and of various forms,” Thoreau believes the charter of each to be individuated by an “irregular form.” Thoreau, *PJ*, 2, 58–59.

<sup>87</sup> Hawthorne, “The Old Manse,” 1129.

<sup>88</sup> Thoreau does not forbid cannibalism as unthinkable, in fact he entertains it in “Higher Laws” when, overtaken by a “strange abandonment” and hunting for raw flesh, he realizes that “no morsel could have been too savage for me.” Thoreau, *W*, 210. Jane Bennett has called this “Thoreau’s cannibalistic urge.” Jane Bennett, *Thoreau’s Nature: Ethics, Politics, and the Wild* (London: Sage, 1994), 37.

<sup>89</sup> Daniel H. Peck, *Thoreau’s Morning Work: Memory and Perception in A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers, the Journals, and Walden* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1990), 18. To “redeem” the Indian, for Thoreau, is not an innocent claim during a moment when antebellum Americans supposed, in Max Cavitch’s formulation, “the inevitability of Indian disappearance even as the active and uncertain work of displacement and genocide proceeded.” Max Cavitch, *American Elegy: The Poetry of Mourning from the Puritans to Whitman* (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2007), 129. In Thoreau’s words, “For Indian deeds there must be an Indian memory—the white man will remember his own only.” Thoreau, *PJ*, 2, 39.

<sup>90</sup> Thoreau, *TJ*, 18, 91. According to Thoreau’s own definition of fruit, these arrowheads are to be brought into his life rather than coldly studied. “The very derivation of the word ‘fruit’ would suggest this. It is from the Latin *fructus*, meaning ‘that which is used or enjoyed.’” Henry D. Thoreau, *Wild Fruits*, ed. Bradley P. Dean (New York: Norton, 2000), 4. Hereafter abbreviated as *WF*. “These moldering elements are slowly preparing for another metamorphosis, to serve new masters, and what was the Indian’s will ere long be the white man’s sinew.” Thoreau, *AW*, 237.

<sup>91</sup> Thoreau, *TJ*, 18, 91.

<sup>92</sup> Ralph W. Emerson, *Representative Men: Seven Lectures* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1883), 10.

<sup>93</sup> Thoreau, *WF*, 87.

<sup>94</sup> “Bellum denunciandi ratio” (1591) by Theodor de Bry, engraver (1528-1598), from *Brevis narratio eorum quae in Florida Americae*, in *Quae est secunda pars Americae* from the volumes of *Collectiones peregrinatorum in Indiam orientalem et Indiam occidentalem* (1590–1634). Courtesy of the author’s rare print and manuscript collection (owned by Ross and Mary Martin). De Bry’s engravings are perhaps most famous from the 1590 edition of Thomas Hariot’s *A briefe and true report of the new found land of Virginia*. De Bry’s depiction of arrowheads being planted was known to Thoreau, the scholarship establishing him reading *Collectiones peregrinatorum, occidentalis* (*Grand Voyages, America*) in Harvard College’s library. He also references de Bry’s engraving in *The Maine Woods* (1864). Henry D. Thoreau, *The Maine Woods*, ed. Joseph J. Moldenhauer, in *The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1972), 134. I suggest that while the image is designed to specifically depict a declaration of war, since typically Early Modern engravings sought to empirically reproduce native life as a “hieroglyph” that hides European “ideology,” as Michael Gaudio’s *Engraving the Savage* (2008) considers, Thoreau would have noticed something fabulous lurking. *Engraving the Savage: The New World and Techniques of Civilization* (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2008), ix–xxv. After all, de Bry’s images themselves “are drawn as a European who had not been there might imagine them,” so Thoreau is no further away from reality than the engraver. Carl Ortwin Sauer, *Sixteenth Century North America: the Land and the People as Seen by Europeans* (Berkeley: U of California P, 1971), 207. Nuanced views of de Bry’s engravings include Bernadette Butcher’s *Icon and Conquest: A Structural Analysis of the Illustrations of de Bry’s Great Voyages* (1981) and Michiel van Groesen’s *The Representations of the Overseas World in the De Bry Collection of Voyages, 1590–1634* (2008).

<sup>95</sup> Thoreau, *W*, 155, 159, 156.

<sup>96</sup> Thoreau, *PJ*, 2, 130. There exists a reading of Thoreau’s hoeing sympathetic to my own in David Robinson’s writing. David M. Robinson, *Natural Life: Thoreau’s Worldly Transcendentalism* (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2004), 96-97.

<sup>97</sup> Thoreau, *TJ*, 18, 91.

98 Thoreau, *AW*, 64.

99 John Lee Comstock, *Elements of Geology; Including Fossil Botany and Pelaeontology, A Popular Treatise* (New York: Pratt, Woodford, and Co., 1847), 11.

100 As John Philips (the father of stratum) describes the paleontologist's task, they interpret such memorials underground, in the earth's shell, where life does not happen. John Philips, *Life on Earth: Its Origin and Succession* (London: MacMillan, 1860), 45.

101 Under the influence of Georges Cuvier, paleontology promotes the fossil as a "monument" for "dead" life. Arsić, *Bird Relics*, 164. Cuvier "read" fossils as "signifying" past, incommensurable lifeforms, and each one representing a discreet animal. Arsić, 164. Furthering Cuvierian paleontology, fossils, according to Comstock, quoting from Gideon Mantell's authority, are "natural memorials," sorted into an animal kingdom. Comstock, *Elements of Geology*, 10. Thus, for Thoreau to claim arrowheads as fossil memories, he must cancel the status of the still, dead monument organized in a system of signs corresponding to an elaborate taxonomy. For his arrowhead theory to fly, Thoreau must revise paleontology's monumental notions, and reject what Nietzsche calls "monumental history."

102 Richard Owen, *A History of British fossil mammals, and birds* (London: Van Voorst, 1846), 540–41.

103 See *Bird Relics* (2016).

104 Garber, *Thoreau's Redemptive Imagination*, 144.

105 Charles Lyell, *Principles of Geology, Literature and Science in the Nineteenth Century*, ed. Laura Otis (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009), 246.

106 On fossils as photographic, see Walter Benn Michaels, "Photographs and Fossils," *Photography Theory*, ed. James Elkins (New York: Routledge, 2007).

107 Thoreau, *TJ*, 18, 91.

108 Cameron, *The Corporeal Self*, 3.

109 Thoreau, *W*, 302, 309.

110 Thomas Jefferson, *Notes on the State of Virginia, Writings* (New York: The Library of America, 1984), 223.

111 Philip Freneau, *The Poems of Philip Freneau: Poet of the American Revolution, Vol. 2* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1903), 369. In the words of one of the era's leading ethnologist, the Indian, or "American race," are "restless," buried with arrowheads. Samuel George Morton, *Crania Americana* (Philadelphia: J. Dobson, Chestnut Street, 1839), 6, 64, 81.

112 In Thoreau's words, "oysters, clams, cockles, and other shells, mingled with ashes and the bones of deer and other quadrupeds." Henry D. Thoreau, *Cape Cod*, ed. Joseph J. Moldenhauer, in *The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1988), 66. Hereafter abbreviated as *CC*. For Thoreau's gathering of arrowhead fragments in Maine, see *Maine Woods*.

113 Bartram argued they were "natural formations," and even Charles T. Jackson ultimately "opposed" them as shaped by humans. According to Arsić's Thoreau, however, Indians intentionally deposited arrowheads with mollusks, crustaceans, corpses, and relics into a confusion of material memory which "archives" life. Arsić, *Bird Relics*, 201-206.

114 For more on *Clarel* and vital archives, see Branka Arsić, "Desertscapes: Geological Politics in *Clarel*," *Melville's Philosophies*, eds. Branka Arsić and K. L. Evans (New York: Bloomsbury, 2017).

- 115 Herman Melville, *Correspondence*, ed. Lynn Horth (Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern UP and the Newberry Library, 1993), 193.
- 116 Sharon Cameron, *Impersonality: Seven Essays* (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2007), x.
- 117 Thoreau, *TJ*, 18, 91.
- 118 Garber, *Thoreau's Redemptive Imagination*, 6, 29, 44, 44, 56.
- 119 Henry D. Thoreau, *Early Essays and Miscellanies*, eds. Joseph J. Moldenhauer and Edwin Moser, in *The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1975), 110.
- 120 Garber, *Thoreau's Redemptive Imagination*, 125.
- 121 Arsić, "What Music," 168–169.
- 122 Thoreau, *CC*, 66, 148.
- 123 Thoreau, *CC*, 147.
- 124 Thoreau, *CC*, 84, 86.
- 125 Thoreau, *CC*, 87. He also notes seeing a horseshoe crab in 1851. Henry D. Thoreau, *Journal, Vol. 3: 1848-1851*, eds. Robert Sattelmeyer, et al., in *The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1990), 350.
- 126 Thoreau, *CC*, 87.
- 127 John Philips, *Life on Earth: Its Origin and Succession* (London: MacMillan, 1860), 212.
- 128 William Buckland, *Geology and Minerology considered with Reference to Natural Theology* (London: William Pickering, 1836), 393.
- 129 Thoreau, *CC*, 147.
- 130 Hugh Miller, *The Testimony of the Rocks* (Edinburgh: William P. Nimmo, 1871), 99.
- 131 Miller, *The Testimony*, 2. Taking geologist John Philips' stratological ontology and calling it a monolithic pillar, Miller posits that the mind can be found etched upon the great hieroglyphic monument, because if the mind is endowed with the ability to decipher, it must present in the riddle.
- 132 Comstock, *Elements of Geology*, 10.
- 133 Miller, *The Testimony*, 1. Thoreau had read Miller's *Testimony*. Henry D. Thoreau, *Wild Apples and other Natural History Essays* (Athens: U of Georgia P, 2002), 212. For Thoreau's reading on Miller, see Robert Sattelmeyer, *Thoreau's Reading: A Study in Intellectual History* (Princeton UP, 1988), 86–88. See also Kateb, "Thoreau's *Journal*," 153.
- 134 Miller, *The Testimony*, 98.
- 135 Thoreau, *TJ*, 10, 118.
- 136 Herman Melville, *Moby-Dick; or The Whale*, eds. Harrison Hayford, Hershel Parker, and G. Thomas Tanselle (Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern UP and the Newberry Library, 2001), 306.
- 137 John T. Irwin, *American Hieroglyphics: The Symbol of the Egyptian Hieroglyphics in the American Renaissance* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1980), 72.

138 Irwin, *American Hieroglyphics*, 308.

139 Keiser, *The Indian*, 222.

140 Fleck, *Henry Thoreau*, 3, 17.

141 Charles Feidelson, *Symbolism and American Literature* (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1953), 137. According to Eiseley, who quotes from Thoreau's *Journal* extensively, "the arrowhead" is "the indestructible thought-print headed towards eternity—plowed and replowed in the same field," and so was Thoreau's favorites amongst the "harsh-etched things." Eiseley further notes that Thoreau summarized the arrowhead's significance with "so simple an expression as 'mindprint.' The lonely follower of the plow at Concord had provided both art and anthropology with an expression of horizon-reaching application which it has expressly chosen to ignore. Mindprints are what the first men left, mindprints will be what the last man leaves." "Thoreau had extended his thought-prints to something beyond what we of this age would call natural. He would read them into nature itself...He searches desperately, all senses alert, for a way to read these greater hieroglyphs in which the tiny interpretable minds of our forerunners are embedded." Loren Eiseley, *Collected Essays on Evolution, Nature, and the Cosmos*, Vol. 2, ed. William Cronon (New York: The Library of America, 2016), 401–404.

142 Garber, *Thoreau's Fable*, 67, 96.

143 Francis Quarles, *Emblems* (London: William Tegg, 1866), *b*. Quarles inspired Thoreau, who admits as much on a number of occasions, and we know he read *Emblems* early on because he quotes it in his *Journal*. Thoreau, *PJ*, 1, 448. The common figure across Quarles' emblems is the arrow, which manifests in each episode to strange hybridizations of animal, plant, and mineral life, each thing striving to transform.

144 Henry D. Thoreau, *Familiar Letters of Henry David Thoreau*, ed. F. B. Sanborn (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1894), 134. Allusions to and quotations from Quarles can be found throughout Thoreau's writing, most conspicuously in *Walden* and *A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers*, as well as his correspondence with the Emerson family.

145 Quarles, *Emblems*, 10.

146 Francis Quarles, *Emblems*, 305. Quarles' line is reminiscent of William Shakespeare, when Hamlet prophesizes, while mocking Polonius, that he too "shall grow as I am, if like a crab you could go / backward." William Shakespeare, *The Tragedy of Hamlet* 199–200.

147 Thoreau, *CC*, 147.

148 Thoreau, *PJ*, 1, 38.

149 Thoreau, *PJ*, 1, 28. In its origin, an arrowhead is the most durable aspect of the arrow, whose wooden shaft, sinuous thread, and guiding feathers, will rapidly deteriorate. It is asked of Hawkeye, In James Fenimore Cooper's *The Last of the Mohicans* (1826) "is there no difference...between the stone-headed arrow of the warrior, and the leaden bullet?" James Fenimore Cooper, *The Last of the Mohicans* (New York: Bantam Books, 1989), 22. To this query, Thoreau would offer a twofold answer: first, unlike the bullet, the arrowhead's construction assumes that it will outlast the other aspects of a larger entity of which it was a part; second, the material of the stone, unlike the leaden projectile, survives total reabsorption into the environment. In life after the shot, arrowheads migrate, for centuries, to sometimes be discovered as vibrant as they day they were created. Thoreau observed that Yankee relics are quick to rust, while Indian ones persist. Edward Emerson, *Henry Thoreau: As Remembered by a Young Friend* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1917), 133. Francis Parkman notes that the "stone" arrowheads of the Indian were being supplanted by European "iron," but lead and iron would come and pass without seeing flint arrowheads deteriorate. Francis Parkman, *The Jesuits in North America in the Seventeenth Century* (Boston: Little Brown, 1879), xxxi. So while metallic objects rapidly dissolve into an undifferentiated form, arrowheads indelibly hold a position in nature. In Thoreau's terms, arrowheads "are at peace with rust—This...character promises to out last all others—the larger pestles & axes may perchance grow scarce & be broken—but the arrowhead shall perhaps never cease to wing its

way through the ages to eternity.” Thoreau, *TJ*, 18, 91. The arrowheads vitality, it seems, is predicated upon its endurance. Any effort to “destroy...the Indian arrow head” it will “balk” until matter itself ceases. Thoreau, *TJ*, 18, 91.

150 Thoreau, *PJ*, 1, 448, 449, 454, 460.

151 Thoreau, *PJ*, 2, 59.

152 Ralph W. Emerson, “The Poet,” *Essays: First and Second Series* (New York: The Library of America, 1990), 222.

153 In Henry Ward Beecher’s terms, we stand “over the dust of many generations.” Henry Ward Beecher, *Star Papers; or Experiments of Art and Nature* (Boston: Phillips, Sampson & Co., 1855), 127. And so “Man,” in Emerson’s words, “made of the dust of the world, does not forget his origin; and all that is yet inanimate will one day speak.” Emerson, *RM*, 15.

154 Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels, “Against Theory,” *The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism* (New York: Norton, 2001), 2463–65.

155 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, tr. G. E. M. Anscombe (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1958), 454.

156 Friedrich Nietzsche, *On The Genealogy of Morality*, tr. Carol Diethe (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006), 35–36.

157 Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 422.

158 Thoreau, *TJ*, 10, 118. The “arrow-headed character promises,” it appears to Thoreau with or without us, “to out last all others.” Thoreau, *TJ*, 18, 92. “At the same time that we are earnest to explore and learn all things, we require that all things be mysterious and unexplorable, that land and sea be infinitely wild, unsurveyed and unfathomed by us because unfathomable. We can never have enough of Nature. We must be refreshed by the sight of inexhaustible vigor, vast and Titanic features, the sea-coast with its wrecks, the wilderness with its living and decaying trees, the thunder cloud, and the rain which last three weeks and produces freshets. We need to witness our own limits transgressed, and some life pasturing freely where we never wander.” Thoreau, *W*, 318.

## Chapter 4

### Out of Touch

#### On Melville and the Phantasmal World

Moby Dick had suddenly loomed up out of the water

—Herman Melville, *Moby-Dick; or, the Whale*, 1851

#### *Looming Life*

In its *looming* effect, or that property of it by which bodies on the horizon, or beyond, appear to be greatly elevated, or suspended, as it were, in air

—William Scoresby, *Journal of a Voyage to the Northern Whale-Fishery*, 1820





Figure D. Fata Morgana. *The Penny Magazine of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge* (London: Charles Knight, 1832), 352., HathiTrust, accessed March 2, 2020, <https://www.hathitrust.org.1>

In “Loomings” at the outset of *Moby-Dick; or, The Whale* (1851), Ishmael presents a theory of life that for many readers no more illuminates than cast a shadow over the novel. After all, to suggest that the story’s meaning—even a “still deeper meaning” about life—is disclosed by a strange “image” that cannot be grasped raises more questions than it answers.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, Ishmael insists that “the same image, we ourselves see.”<sup>3</sup> What seems unusual is thus actually quotidian, something we all see but do not yet recognize. Life’s image remains unrecognizable to us precisely because it is too ordinary—too familiar—and essential to conditions of everyday existence. In order to raise awareness, Ishmael raises the image at its extremes through *Moby Dick*, “one grand hooded phantom, like a snow hill in the air,” “Loomings” concludes.<sup>4</sup> *Moby Dick*’s appearance in the novel, I therefore claim, is an extraordinary event that discloses the relations of life otherwise unremarkable. By making an appearance, the unassailable white whale therefore surfaces to disclose the meaning of what is already habitual. Put alternatively, Melville’s story is not about something elusive and hidden from view, but rather about common

existence and a tantalizing element that takes its abode therein, made remarkable when an exceptional being breeches, looms, and so makes waves.

Life, by Ishmael's formulation, is a phantasmal shroud that reveals its secrets when disturbed not when lifted. But these disturbing images do not represent and so madden what they picture. I take Ishmael's formulation seriously if, for no other reason, this seemingly vague "key to it all" appears in "Loomings" and actually thus defines life according to the events called loomings.<sup>5</sup> These phenomena, which intrigued thinkers from Samuel Taylor Coleridge to Thomas Jefferson, were well known to sailors in Melville's day and, while remaining somewhat mysterious and plausibly supernatural, occupied the pages of nautical literature and scientific journals alike.<sup>6</sup> Loomings, most often observed at sea, *project images of entities from behind the horizon as flying clear over it*. Casting an apparition into view, loomings confuse what is hidden with is seen, what is steady with what is vaporous, and even what is real with what is illusion. Transforming with atmospheric variability, the images shapeshift to elongate or collapse, to ascend or descend, or to become altogether monstrous. Loomings are thus appearances detached from their entities, free to strangely transform, betraying a disjunction in the logic of sensation.<sup>7</sup> Verisimilitude gone mad, loomings suggest that any appearance may suddenly break from its original and transgress commonsense to become nonsense.

These appearances, in fact, reveal the madness of sense whereby phantasms overtake the world and thereupon assume the character of life.<sup>8</sup> Though freakish, loomings can at times be seen from shore—even from "the bay of New-York"—as one writer for *The Knickerbocker* notes in "The Phenomena of 'Looming'" (1838), as read by Melville. You must, however, quit the shore and sail to experience what strange effects are "familiar to seamen."<sup>9</sup> By such persuasion,

Ishmael leaves behind New York and his accompanying “water-gazers” of “Manhattoes” for New Bedford and Nantucket to finally casts off and “see the watery part of the world.”<sup>10</sup>

Once among the *Pequod's* crew, Ishmael describes the mast-head's parallax perspective, convenient for observing loomings at sea. In William Scoresby's *Journal of a Voyage* (1820), which Melville read, he studies loomings “when at the mast-head, where the phenomena are always the most striking.”<sup>11</sup> Following Scoresby, Ishmael comments on mast-head's perspective, including how from that position the “visible image” ever more “eludes him.”<sup>12</sup> While “Loomings” foregrounds the phenomena as a life-events, and so according to Scoresby the mast-header should feel most alive, Melville ironically says that in “modern standers-of-mast-heads we have but a lifeless set.” They are lifeless because despite manning “the one proper mast-head, that of a whale-ship at sea,” they “would rather not see whales.” Indeed, they would rather not see anything. But by atrophying their “visual nerve,” and thereby fading the looming effect by altogether eluding the apparent world, there is thus “no life in thee,” Ishmael concludes.<sup>13</sup>

Raising the philosophical stakes of mast-headers' blindness, Ishmael names these men “Platonist” who prefer to doze off while contemplating “the problem of the universe.”<sup>14</sup> Plato's problem—only made more problematic by loomings—is that we find ourselves in the ghostly world of appearances. In Plato's metaphysics, appearances arise from entities which already copy absolute forms, and so they are simulacra, appearances of appearances. (Simulacra are thus thrice removed from reality.) To grasp fixed forms underlying totally unfixed appearances becomes the Platonic desideratum, a dream for Ishmael that fails insofar as the world keeps idealists awake.<sup>15</sup> If unsettled reality cannot be slept away, then loomings further shake the Platonist into an empiricism so formless as to realizes their worst living nightmare.

Managing such view, Ahab suddenly awakes and reforms his Platonist crewmen, putting them on the lookout for Moby Dick, the ultimate phantasm to be overcome.<sup>16</sup> (“Skin your eyes for him men; look sharp.”) After arousing his men, Ahab then convinces them to disbelieve what they see. “All visible objects,” he protests, “are but pasteboard masks,” and so “strike through the mask!” No longer sleeping away appearance, Ahab thereafter enacts an industrious process of disenchantment whereby the crew painstakingly denies the sensible world. Undergoing this process, each whale captured on the way to nabbing Moby Dick serves to progressively grasp, disembody, and incinerate apparent life. Crucially, however, in “Loomings” their dialectical labor is forecasted to fail by sinking under the weight of desire.

And still deeper meaning of that story of Narcissus, who because he could not grasp the tormenting, mild image he saw in the fountain, plunged into it and was drowned. But the same image, we ourselves see in all rivers and oceans. It is the image of the ungraspable phantom of life; and this is the key to it all.

Since Ahab personally identifies with Moby Dick’s image (“at last came to identify with him”), “Loomings” thus anticipates that the Platonist’s epistemological ambition will be lost to phantasms, never reaching through appearances to at last lay hold of unapparent reality.<sup>17</sup>

Ahab, we might say, will not rid himself from the phantasms that involve him, rise, duplicate, and mirror themselves. Once a simulacrum becomes twined, its self-differentiating energies grow to exhaust, collapsing back into a field of undifferentiated appearance and thereby deindividuating itself through resonance. Appearance, therefore, reflects upon itself with repetitious, contrasting, and fleeting images. These images do not return to underlying entity, for they only reverberate, diverge, and fade back into the apparent life from which they arose to emerge again transformed.<sup>18</sup>

In “Dusk,” first-mate Starbuck thus realizes that “white whale is their Demogorgon” because “it pictures life” with “grim, phantom features.”<sup>19</sup> Considering *Moby Dick* as a demonic manifestation that pictures life, Ahab’s ambition enters a fuller view. Against appearance, Ahab’s personal torments (“all the subtle demonisms of life”) are mirrored and so “visibly personified, and made practically assailable in *Moby Dick*.”<sup>20</sup> Ahab’s orientation to demonism, focusing on *Moby Dick*, characterizes a normative viewpoint, I call it the negative, towards a primary concern for Melville summarized by Ishmael thus:

But in pursuit of those far mysteries we dream of, or in tormented chase of that demon phantom that, some time or other, swims before all human hearts; while chasing such over this round globe, they either lead us on in barren mazes or midway leave us whelmed.

By following after the demonic whale, Ahab ends up whelmed by appearances and so, like Narcissus, negates himself. A negative orientation, my chapter will hence argue, for Melville therefore always sinks under the weight of resentment and despair. There is another orientation, however. But what sort of thinking stands out from Ahab’s negative thought? What at last ecstatically overcomes heaviness—indeed all negativity—to rise again and again through phantasmal life?

At the end of the novel in “The Chase • Third Day,” from perspective of watching the *Pequod* sink, Ishmael reiterates his theory of life. “Soon they through dim, bewildering mediums saw her sidelong fading phantom, as in the gaseous *Fata Morgana*.”<sup>21</sup> “These monstrous appearances” forming “aerial demons,” as a contemporary of Melville describes them, are “denominated *fata Morgana*.”<sup>22</sup> When sinking, the *Pequod* appears as a “*Fata Morgana*,” a sort of looming taken to the non-representational extreme.<sup>23</sup> *Fata Morganas* transpose loomings such

that the horizon rises above itself in a superior image over which ships float and under which they hang upside-down.<sup>24</sup>




Figure E. Looming First. *The Penny Cyclopædia of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge*, XV, *Massagetae–Murida* (London: Charles Knight, 1841), 263. Figure F. Looming Second. Leonard Dunnell Gale, *Elements of Natural Philosophy* (New York: Newman, 1846), 126., HathiTrust, accessed March 2, 2020, <https://www.hathitrust.org>.

When the *Pequod's* sinking appears as a Fata Morgana, it thus too ascends. *Into a levitating band of water, the Pequod's twinned image descends right-side-up as it ascends up-side-down.*

Inverting self-reflection across the horizon, mirrored images collapse together.<sup>25</sup> Stranger still, in the *Pequod's* case, this means that the loomed horizon shows the sinking ship *subsiding into itself* until nothing remains but stripe of sea: “then all collapsed, and the great shroud of the sea rolled on as it rolled five thousand years ago,” so the story ends.<sup>26</sup>

*Moby-Dick's* concluding event, I accordingly argue, exemplifies an apparent life-event through which figures emerge and submerge. But while by the end Ahab sinks (“Sink all coffins...to one common pool!” he at last cries), Ishmael buoys to begin the same life again, eternally reliving his tale. By its configuration, *Moby-Dick* ending always—again and again—returns to its beginning from Ishmael’s perspective. The “Epilogue” therefore compares Ahab’s final departure to Ishmael return; everyone descends into the sea but only Ishmael simultaneously rises (“*Buoyed up by that coffin*”).<sup>27</sup> Unlike Ahab, Ishmael affirms the *Pequod's* fate and so he sinks into “the great shroud of the sea” that uplifts him. Ishmael thus cyclically

returns as a “slowly wheeling cycle, like another Ixion.”<sup>28</sup> But this means that Ishmael is restored to the (“madness and gladness”) contrast “of the demonic waves,” to unfixed appearances.<sup>29</sup> Embracing what is apparent, Moby Dick, for Ishmael, “seemed the gliding great demon of the seas of life,—all this to explain, would be to dive deeper than Ishmael can go.”<sup>30</sup>

\*  
\*\*

As my chapter will argue, Ahab’s personal identification with Moby Dick and his attempt to rectify his suffering by destroying the whale represents only *one of two* demonologies in the novel.<sup>31</sup> For this reason, Melville’s distinction between Ahab and Ishmael’s views is attitudinal, and so what Ahab rejects Ishmael must embrace. After detailing Ahab’s demonology in “Moby Dick,” Ishmael compares his perspective in the following chapter, “The Whiteness of the Whale.” (“What the white whale was to Ahab, has been hinted; what, at times, he was to me, as yet remains unsaid.”)<sup>32</sup> Though apprehensive, “explain myself,” Ishmael acquiesces, “I must, else all these chapters might be naught.”<sup>33</sup> Since Ishmael finds demonism “so mystical and well nigh ineffable,” even “vague” enough to be “nameless,” it is nearly unspeakable for him. Unable to plainly speak, Ishmael strangely invites his readers to imagine how a horse might experience demonism. To make a “comprehensible form” out of a “nameless horror,” he urges us to become a “young colt” safely feeding upon New England pastures, who suddenly, by an instinct of unseen, “strange” anxiety, not “associated with [his] experience,” is overtaken with paroxysms of fear.<sup>34</sup> Since the aberrant and fleeting thing, “stripped of all direct associations,” makes a contrast by unexpectedly doubling our senses, we abruptly sense two, incompatible sides of life, and so two incoherent senses become “coupled.”<sup>35</sup> Because there is a crack between the “visible world” and “invisible spheres,” what Ishmael calls “unnatural a contrast,” the colt’s senses

suddenly diverge. Ishmael's equine senses split enough to render them "unnatural" by "contrast," what he calls "demonism in the world." As "with me," he concludes, "as with the colt."<sup>36</sup>

I take such demonism as the question which Melville poses most drastically to Ahab and Ishmael. Their orientations, which I briefly here call negative and affirmative respectively, are addressed by the sequential "Moby Dick" and "The Whiteness of the Whale" chapters in *Moby-Dick*. In those chapters, we pass from Ahab's *no* to Ishmael's *yes*, which is another way of saying that Ahab rejects life where Ishmael embraces it. My chapter will therefore also explain how Ahab and Ishmael's demonological perspectives, as laid out in "Moby Dick" and "The Whiteness of the Whale," relate to their ethics. Ahab and Ishmael's divergent demonisms can be observed in their attitudes about the looming warp and woof by two moments; first, Ishmael in the "A Bower in the Arsacides,"<sup>37</sup> second, Ahab in "The Glider," where he bemoans.<sup>38</sup> The alternative perspectives arise as responses to the ceaseless and contrasting movements of life. The looming of threads thus also manifests a shroud—a textile—and so a texture or apparent text to which Ishmael and Ahab respond. Their focus thus hangs upon Moby Dick as text, and therefore subject to their debate.

In the following section, *Lima's Fire*, I trace how Melville registers the competing ethical qualia in the context of Peru and the clash between Incan and European epistemologies. By locating the philosophical debate in Peru, Melville associates Ahab's traditional perspective with bureaucracy gone mad, while Ishmael's is associated with the Inca belief in appearances lost to a history of conversion and genocide.<sup>39</sup> Melville thus too considers the conquest of Peru as a metaphysical dispute left unsettled by corruption and eventual revolution. In my final section, *A World of Difference*, I continue trace Melville's competing ethical orientations through his later



writing and alternative revolutionary perspectives to ultimately ask how life bears responsibility and does well when its effects cannot be directly attributed to causes.

Melville's *Moby-Dick* thus stages a heavily contextualized demonological comparison from Ahab and Ishmael's perspectives. While other perspectives in the novel remain important, notably Queequeg's, my chapter focuses on Ahab and Ishmael to not lose track of the demonic question. Ahab's fate, by exemplifying traditional demonism and taking it to the extreme, carries Western metaphysics to its furthest expression and there submerges it just as Ishmael buoys to the surface of things—a phantasmal field of transformation—a fate which he wills eternally. Melville, I therefore claim, registers a philosophical debate to which he opposes two views represented by Ahab and Ishmael, the former which sinks and the latter which floats. In their most basic terms, these views can be characterized as the rejection or acceptance of *apparent* life, regardless of how tormenting it manifests. Appearances are bulky and so life hangs over all things heavily. Living is something done at each moment, with every element, by its will to surface for air and not sink under weightiest thought of all.

### *Lima's Fire*

We now continued our course, still keeping the land in sight—the land of Peru, the land of gold, and of the sun-worshippers.

—Thomas Beale

In order to violate world demonism, Ahab goes after its enshrinement in blubber, encouraging his crew—while hunting Moby Dick—to capture and incinerate whales. While a seemingly ordinary objective for a whaling cruise, Ahab associates the menacing flames bursting

from the ship's tryworks with a process of total annihilation whereby—after the whale is decapitated, stripped of its blubber, and its discarded remains consumed by sharks—fat is melted down into oil to be burned away at the behest of hungry lamps. The members, who under their captain row out to kill, pull in to dismember, and hoist up to burn whales, transform bodies into oil, and then into fire. Whaling, in this sense, is the process by which animals are reduced to liquid and then to a pure flame, a sublimation of philosophical drive to reduce things to their most essential elements, which, in a literal sense, took modern philosophy to an extreme, the whaling industry producing the fuel for lamps which crushed the diurnal wheel and turned night into day.<sup>40</sup>

Rolling scenes of carnage, however, reveal just how challenging it is to fully burn up the gore produced by the whale fishery. Ahab's craft, the *Pequod*, like his peg leg, is composed of ivory white whalebones, the relic built up from his murderous parade. ("She was a thing of trophies. A cannibal of a craft, tricking herself forth in the chased bones of her enemies.")<sup>41</sup> The *Pequod's* morbidity reveals something accretive still problematic for Ahab's campaign. As the crew destroys more whales and the ship becomes weathered, it collects pieces of carnage and incorporates them into its structure, so much so that it begins to wear the appearance of that it opposes.

Prior to Melville, Percy Bysshe Shelley appears to inform, at least in part, the war on world demonism in *Moby-Dick*.<sup>42</sup> Shelley's *The Daemon of the World* (1816) contrasts two worldviews, that which denies and that which affirms demonism.<sup>43</sup> The former view occupies "Part I," while the latter "Part II." Shelley's poem provides *Moby-Dick* with a vocabulary to understand the *Pequod's* underlying compact with Ahab. In Shelley's words, overcome with resentment ("hate") a person embodies "A living light," and "pure as day thou burnest," and

must “flame to seize, the veil to rend.”<sup>44</sup> This sort of person is the “Socratic man” par excellence, in Nietzsche’s estimation, one who enjoys the “cast-off veil.”<sup>45</sup> Resentment, Shelley continues, set against life, sails across the centuries, laying gore-splattered laurels atop their kings, who “rend” the “veil” of appearance to liberate unreflected light.

And they did build vast trophies, instruments  
Of murder, human bones, barbaric gold,  
Skins torn from living men, and towers of skulls  
With sightless holes gazing on blinder heaven,  
Mitres, and crowns, and brazen chariots stained,  
With blood, and scrolls of mystic wickedness,  
The sanguine codes of venerable crime.  
The likeness of the thronèd king came by,  
When these had passed, bearing upon his brow,  
A threefold crown; his countenance was calm,  
His eye severe and cold; but his right hand  
Was charged with bloody coin, and he did gnaw  
By fits, with secret smiles, a human heart  
Concealed beneath his robe; and motley shapes,  
A multitudinous throng, around him knelt,  
With bosoms bare, and bowed heads, and false looks  
Of true submission, as the sphere rolled by.<sup>46</sup>

Revolting, the crew bows to their captain’s coin, which reflects upon them the blazing sunbeams, and they “did rage horribly, / Breathing in self-contempt fierce blasphemies / Against the

Daemon of the World.”<sup>47</sup> Shelley envision men set against life, even in “self-contempt” of their own, in their quest to overthrow the “Demon of the World.” Bathed in the solar reflection from their lord’s coin, they hunt, mutilate, dismember, and incinerates living things, and thereby attempt to transform everything material into gold, and then into pure light. But being “bloody,” the coin’s light maintains a tarnish, and so by attempting to decompose life into a pure essence, the crew reproduces with gore the surface through which it desires to pass. With each murder, the vessel gathers “trophies,” thereby accumulating remainders from what seeks to annihilate. By encumbering sense with matter, I mean what Colin Dayan describes as “a pile-up of matter so extreme that it becomes utterly mystical,” such that “the phantasmal or phantasmagoric everywhere in Melville becomes incarnate,” something “real” and “weighty.”<sup>48</sup>

In Melville’s poem, “Shelley’s Vision,” he describes how Shelley sees men, motivated by “Hate,” being “pelted” by a “phantom,” and so they too “pelt” it.<sup>49</sup> Because the object of their hate doubles as their own personal identification, their pelting means to *strike* and to *wear* what Shelley calls “skins.” To pelt, in the doubled sense, places unintuitive demands upon the action of assault. All attacks against a surface, Shelley observes, become masked in the opponent’s *hide* (again, double sense of the term).<sup>50</sup> Shelley’s vision of a resentful lord thus influences Melville’s Ahab, who desires to “wreck that hate upon” Moby Dick, the whale with which he personally “identifies.” By incorporating Shelley’s logic of resentment, Ahab designs to pull Moby Dick apart until nothing but an underlying essence remains, so that he himself becomes a pure essence, liberated from his own flesh. Ahab, like the lord of Shelley’s vision (and described in the same terms), is thus conceived of as being a “living light.”<sup>51</sup>

Whales, performing a sort of Inca practice of dying, give their bodies to the light by floating towards the Sun. In “The Dying Whale,” Ahab notices that “floating in the lovely sunset

sea and sky, Sun and whale both stilly died together.” He “sat intently watching,” battle done, “that strange spectacle observable in all sperm whales dying—the turning sunwards of the head, and so expiring—that strange spectacle, beheld of such a placid evening, somehow conveyed a wondrousness unknown before.” “He too worships fire,” Ahab realizes, and “life dies sunwards.”<sup>52</sup> By having Ahab meditate upon the whale’s fire-worship, Melville is actually extending thinking already accepted as cetological fact. According to Beale, the whale “always dies with his head towards the sun.”<sup>53</sup> Unlike a dying whale, thus Ahab in his final deed turns away from the Sun. (“I turn my body from the sun.”) (“I’d strike the sun if it insulted me.”)<sup>54</sup> In the context of Inca thinking, Ahab—a sort of Quaker Pizzaro—drives his crew to heretically undermine the Sun’s primacy. “Blasphemy against the Sun,” as William Hickling Prescott explains the Inca guidance, was “punished with death.”<sup>55</sup> In order for Ahab to convince his men to turn against the Sun, Ahab, like Pizzaro, will need to alter their personal identification towards something materially captivating, and so he raises a golden Spanish doubloon over his head and declares it the prize of tangible fire.<sup>56</sup>

Readers of *Moby-Dick* often note the crew’s plurality of opinion and sometimes disclose how it undermines a blind allegiance to Ahab. But little has it been said that the crew’s unflinching loyalty fixes upon the “coined sun,” which they all worship, but only one may finally possess. By hoisting up for his crew a “Spanish ounce of gold,” a doubloon, Ahab invites them to, like Hamlet with Marcellus and Horatio, “drink and swear” to his personal vendetta! For each crewmember, the task thus becomes personal because the prize is only claimed by one, and so each affixes one eye to the “bright coin in the sun” and the other out for Moby Dick. Like Ahab, the fixation increasingly sets upon the “gold coin,” and so each man turns a “monomaniac.” Knowing that they are “fire worshipers,” Ahab fixes their idol (“talisman”) as a tangible object

of their life yearning for Sunlight. “There is a sun on the coin—fire worshipper,” he cries, “depend upon it.” By reflecting upon the coin’s numismatic symbols (“strange figures and inscriptions stamped on it”), the sunbeams illuminate its markings as a “cipher” for “significance” unseen (“lurk in”), behind the impression.<sup>57</sup> Nailed to a mast, and even if tumbling free, the doubloon has two sides, and so its obverse and reverse can never be seen simultaneously, reminding us that to behold a coin is to always see one end that presupposes another, invisible aspect. But because the crew identifies the star light as concealable within themselves, the rays which shine upon its surface also reflect something secret. What lies “through the mask” for Ahab is what twinkles and flashes most persistently upon the coin’s surface, which for him, unlike the crew, is always a mere mirror of reality.<sup>58</sup> Resentful about his own demonic self as both solidly singular and fragmentedly plural, “the white whale is that wall” for Ahab to “wreak that hate upon him.”

Because the numismatic images are not, for Ahab, symbolic of light, but rather cave drawings (“the doubloon was of purest, virgin gold, raked somewhere out of the heart of gorgeous hills”), the coin’s subterranean image as pictured by its national mint (the Spanish Government), are what interest him. Like *Moby Dick*, the coin for him is not verisimilitude, but the literal borderline of life—the thread of transgression—or the unnatural deterritorialization of one surface to another, and so is an “equatorial coin,” both poles brought into a single relation. The coin’s symbols of polar balance, to Ahab’s eyes, are not imaginary, but literally stamped upon its material, being mined and minted at the equator. Dug out from equatorial hills (“this bright coin came from a country planted in the middle of the world”), its lettering proof marks its origin (“bore the letters, REPUBLICA DEL ECQADOR: QUITO”), and so it is from “beneath the great equator, and named after it.” Instead of the solar reflection, Ahab’s eye is drawn to the

pictured “sun” stamped upon the currency. He does not want the light reflected upon the inverse image of the die (stamp) sun, he wants the blistered, striated material thing which names itself part of an equatorial world, something *firm and centered*. Because “something ever egotistical” is what he *desires* from the coin’s pictured scene (“Andes’ summits,” “a tower,” “a crowing cock,” the “keystone sun”), and so concludes that the “firm tower, that is Ahab; the volcano, that is Ahab; the courageous, the undaunted, and victorious fowl, that, too, is Ahab; all are Ahab,” and so “every man in turn but mirrors back on his own mysterious self.” Because the egotistical is a material reflecting upon a material (mirror upon itself, a reflection of a reflection), the sun image becomes material (a “keystone”) and diminishes from Ahab’s interest in the coin. He is the tower, the volcano, the rooster, but not the Phoebus Apollo’s orb, dropped from his equation in place of two walls pushed against themselves.

By reflecting himself upon the world, man reveals himself to himself as an intangible reflection. But in reaching for his own image, man’s reach falls through the phantasms into a body unlimited. For Ahab, self-reflection is thus a problem of surfaces, the “phantom of life” rather than the “fathom-deep life” he desires to grasp.<sup>59</sup> Since particular images rise to the surface of some indiscriminate bodily reality and thereby multiply, Ahab senses his own consolidated identity as something singularized across the multiplicity. He sees, in other words, birds, structures, natural formations, and even whales as identities expressing the logic of self-unification with which he becomes personally identified, but therefore doubles himself over into twoness. To escape the tormenting twin images, Ahab denies all appearances for an entity which seems completely out of touch.

\*  
\*\*

When struggling to verbalize Moby Dick's terrible whiteness, Ishmael goes over examples to express something comprehensible. His meditation on whiteness eventually drifts to Peru's capital city,

tearless Lima, the strangest, saddest city thou can'st see. For Lima has taken the white veil; and there is a higher horror in this whiteness of her woe. Old as Pizarro, this whiteness keeps her ruins for ever new; admits not the cheerful greenness of complete decay; spreads over her broken ramparts the rigid pallor of an apoplexy that fixes its own distortions.<sup>60</sup>

A "white veil" has loomed over Lima since the Conquistadors arrived at her shores. "Old as Pizzaro," the whiteness has not lifted since the decline of Spain's colonial rise, still draping the city to suffocate what is needed to overgrow the wreckage of its history. Littering the Peruvian landscape, Spanish relics pollute the soil, a decay apparent in the cerement it wears.<sup>61</sup>

When the Spanish set out to conquer the Inca empire, they were both closing in on a prize and encountering the unknown. The empire, passing through the Andean ridge, was erected by the Children of the Sun, as they were called, for they worshiped the Sun, *Inti*, above all else, and soaked their edifices, crops, and skin with its light, its heat, and its fire. At the pinnacle of Pre-Columbian economy, the Inca enjoyed sprawling lands, and dealt honestly, were communally industrious and devoted to a calendrical life. Even as the Inca worshipped the stars, they lusted not for another world—since nothing ever dies—and their mummified ancestors, dressed, fed, and consulted, were often disinterred to receive solar baths. Their structures were fashioned of stone so carefully placed that, despite the frequent earthquakes, mortar was superfluous; their terraces of maize, agricultural steps of yucca and cocoa, lama and alpaca husbandry all appeared, to the Spanish imagination, reaching peacefully towards the Sun, receiving back the admiration



given, and, unlike the Aztec people to the north, there seemed no blood rituals to bother the image. Yet, for all its idyllic promise, and for all its achievements, the Inca became an ungraspable desideratum of Spain and their Queen, Isabella, for the coveted accoutrement of their world: gold. Thus, for many antebellum Americans, the Peruvian culture represented a prelapsarian ease fallen to the European madness for treasure.

Incan gold was not currency, and so remained mostly unrefined, adorning vestments and temples. Ahead of the Conquistadors, as written in the Romantic language of Prescott, rose the “frozen crest of the Andes, touched with the ardent sun of the equator, glowed like a ridge of fire,” across which glistened “the golden empire of the Incas,—the El Dorado.”<sup>62</sup> For the Europeans voyagers, this was the unknown country, and so its wealth grew to the imagination’s reaches, where promises are kept. In calling the empire El Dorado, Prescott’s popular *History of the Conquest of Peru* (1847)<sup>63</sup> suggests that the Spanish’s hopes ultimately rest in a fiction.<sup>64</sup> Francisco Pizarro’s campaign, after all, unlike Hernán Cortés’ conquest of Mexico, was frustrated and never fully threw off the shroud.<sup>65</sup> The Spanish cast their vision over Peru and yet could never realize their own fictions, and so became suspicious, further growing a cultural tension with the natives who believed everything as it appeared before their eyes, or so Prescott says.

In Prescott’s telling of Inca life, reality was at the surface, affirmed by the glimmering sunlight’s reflection. “Yet they did not attempt to penetrate,” Prescott explains, as “what they gleaned from the surface was more than adequate for all their demands.”<sup>66</sup> Since apparent life in Inca ontology, even mummified, constantly rises towards the sun, the Peruvian people had no reason to fear what they saw. In fact, the Spanish, with their introduction monist processes (as

apotheosis), made doctrinal the only Peruvian dread. "To the native Indian of Peru," Melville might explain,

the continual sight of the snow-howdahed Andes conveys naught of dread, expect, perhaps, in the mere fancying of the eternal frosted desolateness reigning at such vast altitudes, and the natural conceit of what a fearfulness it would be to lose oneself in such inhuman solitude.<sup>67</sup>

Individuality's overcoming of variation was the only dreaded thought, according to Melville, for the Inca. Such solitary death was unimaginable until the Spanish imposed their doctrine with the threat of death by fire. To swear against appearances or be incinerated, these were the options.<sup>68</sup>

In *Moby-Dick*, Ishmael remarks that though "Dame Isabella's Inquisition wanes in Lima," everything still happens by the swearing of dubious men. By characterizing testimony as insisting what appears to be false be sworn to be true, the people of Lima in effect cover up the corruption of their state. "Corrupt as Lima," Ishmael would elaborate, "you know the proverb." While Melville is certainly criticizing the Spain's atrocities, Ishmael's proverb takes the criticism to the utmost and therein turns it into a remark upon something beyond Lima, about a corruption of perspective. "No need to travel! The world's one Lima."<sup>69</sup> In the conquest of Peru, the Spanish not only attempted to overtake the Inca and harvest their gold, their colonization, to perform justification, demanded process of conversion and swearing upon a reality sight unseen.

With an unknown mercantile past, we receive an early indication that Ishmael knows the other side of Tierra del Fuego, since he is familiar with the western waters of South America overlooked by the Peruvian Andes.<sup>70</sup> For later we learn that, presumably on business or pleasure,

he had puffed cigars and sipped sherry with Spanish gentlemen in Lima, lounging upon some decadent seaside piazza. In “The Town Ho’s Story (*As told at the Golden Inn*),” the *Pequod* gams with the ship *Town-Ho* off the old port at the African Cape of Good Hope. During their gam, the *Town-Ho*’s Polynesian crew relates an unbelievable story privately to Tashtago, who then reveals it accidentally to Ishmael in his sleep, who then retells it to us from his perspective of having already told it at the Golden Inn to his Spanish associates. Once totally tangling the story’s perspective, Ishmael wants the “strange affair” to be “put on lasting record,” to “preserve the style in which I once narrated it at Lima.”<sup>71</sup>

Ishmael’s unbelievable story is about Moby Dick’s tendency to appear and swallow people, hinting “those so called judgements of God which at times are said to overtake men.”<sup>72</sup> His associates, the foppish Don Pedro and Don Sebastian, interject often into the story with inquires of “How? how?”, but the questions are suspended to “get more into the air.” In the end, they ask if it is “really true,” did Ishmael “get it from an unquestionable source?” and demand him to swear on his account, which he does on a “Holy Evangelists,” the “largest sized” procurable, in the presence of a priest. Either Ishmael already knew the story, in which case Tashtago inadvertently reminded him, or he steals the Indian’s secret, attesting that “I trod the ship; I knew the crew.”<sup>73</sup> And yet this incredible eye witness account of Moby Dick’s wrath, which Ishmael likely never witnessed, again alludes to Prescott, where, in “The Inca A Prisoner,” the Spaniards are outnumbered and cornered by their Inca adversaries. Suddenly, when nearly all hope seemed lost, “a horseman clothed in white on a milk-white charger,—doubtless the valiant St. James,—who, with his sword glancing lightning, smote down the infidel host.” Questioned about the miraculous rescue, the Conquistadors made a sworn “testimony.”<sup>74</sup> By alluding to this moment, Ishmael is actually making a serious claim about unspeakable things and testimony,

like when they are “personified by the evangelist,” who “rides on his pallid horse,” as he describes the whiteness of Moby Dick.<sup>75</sup> Ishmael never had to be aboard the Town Ho any more than he needed to ride with Pizzaro to witness the miraculous, since it is a “common, hereditary experience of all mankind” to “bear witness to the supernaturalism” and make an impersonal testimony.<sup>76</sup>

In “The Whiteness of the Whale,” Ishmael references a “snow-white quadruped,” “snow-white charger,” “milk-white steeds,” “White Steed,” “milk-white charger,” and a “pallid horse,” so we might call his allusion to Prescott, along with the biblical, heavy handed.<sup>77</sup> These horses appear supernatural because the “supernaturalism of this hue,” remaining “visible” on the surface of their coats, suggests something unseen, “idealized” meaning that they are inside out, wearing “the aspect of the dead.”<sup>78</sup> What is invisible and unbounded rises to the surface and clothes particular bodies with phantasmas. While Ishmael might appear to be referencing a division in Kantian philosophy between the noumenal and phenomenal worlds, he is actually making a second allusion to white horses, beyond Prescott, to Emanuel Swedenborg’s thinking, criticized by Kant’s “Dreams of a Spirit-Seer” (1766), where a phenomenological reality, which does not arise from the mind, hangs over things themselves as pure, depersonalized experience.<sup>79</sup>

Ishmael contextualizes the “white phantom” appearance in a particular horse, “famous in our Western annals and Indian traditions,” the “White Steed of the Prairies: a magnificent milk-white charger.” Galloping across infinite expanses of wild countries with a “flashing cascade of his mane, the curving comet of this tail, invested him more resplendent than gold and silver-beaters could have furnished him.” Indian spectators, Ishmael continues, were driven to terror by his rippling cloak which suggested the embodiment of divinity.

Nor can it be questioned from what stands on legendary record of this noble horse, that it was his spiritual whiteness chiefly, which so clothed him with divineness; and that this divineness had that in it which, though commanding worship, at the same time enforced a certain nameless terror.<sup>80</sup>

In *Concerning the White Horse* (1758), Swedenborg, on the topic of eschatological threat in regular experience, considers shining in everyday life as “real appearances,” essential to the “existence of all things.”<sup>81</sup> Appearances, according to Swedenborg, are “effects” rising over and “clothing” the behaviors of a thing “whereby it makes itself visible and apparent.”<sup>82</sup> The phantasmal, by unconcealing bodies to the sense of vision, suggests to Ishmael that his body, all bodies, are overhung by an incorporeal activity which includes the act of seeing.

These cases of equine brilliance are for Ishmael, as for Prescott and Swedenborg, examples of something terrible about the crossing of the supernatural into the empirical world to such a degree that it constitutes the way it looks. *Moby Dick*, so Ishmael will argue, is an extreme case of such sensorial rupture which drapes an observable and yet unspeakable veil across things which by virtue of their visibility require testimony. Ishmael, by affirming the contrast even through terror, reveals that to affirm life is not to seize it, but to register a feeling of the bodily, that which is unseen, as characterizing a disembodied field of appearances as intangible or indifferent to touch. But this raises the question: if my feelings are not my own (and even shared by animals), and everything sensible appears unaffected by my activities, and yet the world seems overwhelmed by scenes of violence in Melville’s writing, how is it that I—how is it that anyone—could be held to account for their doings? How are social obligations to be justified or defended in Melville’s phantom world?

## *A World of Difference*

Affirmation is itself essentially multiple and pluralist, whereas negation is  
always one, or heavily monist

—Gilles Deleuze

If to affirm, be to expand one's isolated self; and if to deny, be to contract  
one's isolated self

—Herman Melville

In Melville's writing, people have dubious origins, are without limbs or prosthetically altered, they carry false names, and appear or disappear without a trace. What counts as human—in the context of such innumerable aspects of composition and decomposition—is a life that at minimum registers its own transformation. With all these shifting attributes—unmanageable when considered in their excessive relations—Melville introduces a logic, or refined series of logics, to help readers navigate his writing. I propose that, despite his complexity, he intended to be understood, which is obvious from his correspondence. I further propose that he returns over and over again to certain facts which allow readers to follow logical series (within his particular thinking). *Moby-Dick* proposes such logical background that might be called a typology of life, placing things, even the human, into meaningful arrangements.<sup>83</sup>

Indeed, *Billy Budd, Sailor*, his unfinished final book, published posthumously in 1924, is his most committed writing on human types. Because *Billy Budd*, I claim, painstakingly distills the logical background of his early writing, these closing pages of my chapter will provoke certain questions about the human from the clarity of his last book, which informs how we navigate *Moby-Dick*. Almost despite his morally dubious remarks on the Civil War, and by resurrecting with a vengeance his pluralism, in *Billy Budd* Melville enacts a typology by which

people are sorted primarily according to their affinity to deny or affirm life. Negative thinking and affirmative thinking are Melville's primary logics which either strip away ontological relations towards a singular thought or spread out thinking into what is multiple and alive.

In *Billy Budd*, people become identified with an undercurrent of indeterminate animal diversity, which, in expressive moments, erupt to the surface, overtake it, and define its relations. Affects, in these terms, are indeed constituted by inhuman feelings, which, depending on certain arrangements of the animal kingdom, might be realized as docile or predatory, nurturing or destructive. By haunting the surface with an irregular plurality that cannot be hidden, Melville reverses his postbellum position on race such that the sign of difference rushes back to the skin but thereupon hovers as an effect. To see the status of human affairs as open to diverse animality, which hangs above and veils the state of affairs, Constitutional thinking (and so the American project as grounded in natural rights of man) appears—salvaged from wreckage of Civil War, at risk, even to total cancelation. In *Billy Budd*, people arrive out of thin air and manage their most consequential interactions as horses, dogs, sharks, or snakes. Melville's final word, since *Billy Budd* is set in the Federalist period when the American Constitution was first being shaped, asks that we reconsider the issue of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness when the benefactor is unstable, innumerable diverse, and hardly identifiable as fully human, rational agent.

Although Billy Budd is like "Caspar Hauser," without a personal history, he is not without qualities.<sup>84</sup> Hauser, who mysteriously wandered out into the populous world, hints at Billy's unknown origin. Towards the beginning of *Billy Budd*, we are introduced to the famously handsome and well constituted Billy. He is said to be like a "horse" or "dog" in his animal simplicity, though independent enough from mastery to be "barbaric," and yet still presents the "unaffectedness of natural regality." His nationality, class, and race all remain open to

interpretation, but certain attributes like his vitality, attractiveness, and good humor, all amount to a seeming dignified innocence. The look about him suggests he “not yet has been proffered the questionable apple of knowledge,” and outward glowing in many respects, “self-consciousness he seemed to have little of none.”<sup>85</sup> But the prelapsarian trappings, suggestive in Billy of a lost and primitive nature revived, are dispelled by an “imperfection,” a stammer, showing that, for all the intimations of “Eden,” he is a child of “Plant Earth.”<sup>86</sup> Even though Billy is exposed—even in the extreme sense—to the harsh molestation of earthly affairs, being an “impressed man” upon the ship *Bellipotent* in service to the Royal Navy, he did embrace his fate and “take on arbitrary enlistment so merrily and sensibly.” “Like the animals,” the narrator explains, “though no philosopher, he was, without knowing it, practically a fatalist.” Melville sets the stage in 1797 with the odd character of Billy, “a fine specimen of the *genus homo*, who in the nude might have posed for a statue of young Adam before the Fall,” joyfully resigned to his forced service upon a man-of-war ship.

“Billy’s adieu to the ship *Rights-of-Man*,” his previous engagement, thus happens with more than a touch of irony for a story told in the during the Revolutionary Era.<sup>87</sup> The merchant ship *Rights-of-Man*, from which Billy is removed, is named after Thomas Paine’s *Rights of Man* (1791), which, echoing Thomas Jefferson’s remarks in *The Declaration of Independence* (1776) about natural rights and the duties of government, argues that constitutional laws should be subverted when they no longer serve the people according to their primordial states. For these thinkers, man’s primitive state is to be a free, self-determining, rational animal, something rendered improbable in Melville’s writing where everything happens by necessity, which suggests the possibility of another Enlightenment thinker behind the text. While Paine is referenced in the story by name, leaving nothing to doubt, the narrator also references his



colleague, Jean-Baptiste du Val-de-Grâce, baron de Cloots, known as Anacharsis Cloots, the French Revolutionary who Melville read about in Thomas Carlyle's *French Revolution* (1837). The baron de Cloots, an obscure figure, early on informs Melville's writing when, in *Moby-Dick*, he references the *Pequod's* crew as "An Anacharis Clootz deputation from all the isles of the sea," made up of islanders representing the far flung reaches of the globe. "Isolatoes" as a human type, "seem to make the best whalemens."<sup>88</sup> Islanders, or "Isolatoes," from around the globe to form a federation, a "body of whalemens," who are suited for whaling because the whale's body is an island—an "island bulk"—in the seas.<sup>89</sup>

Cloots, whose views on human culture emerged as extreme even in a time of dangerous notions, recognizes an uncommon humanity standing behind the rising democratic views. While many of his peers based their liberalism upon an ideal image of man—supported by natural rights—free and equal by birth, Cloots, on the other hand, was a radical materialist who felt that, since each person must by their anatomical constitution be somewhat different, humanity is made up of a world of human dissimilarity, and the new world order should account for representative types. Before Cloots was put to the guillotine, he was known as the Orator of Mankind, who paraded a disparate collection of people before the French Assembly, teasing out a radical tradition within the Enlightenment which is not about essential humanity, but rather an assembled disharmony of human beings, that, in his opinion, was a better basis for post-revolutionary global polity. Cloots' ethnology incites a debate in Enlightenment thinking between what Melville calls "man's essential nature" and "strange dubieties."<sup>90</sup> Melville returns to Cloots in *Billy Budd*, again in reference to the crew, with perhaps a mature or more developed understanding of his philosophy.<sup>91</sup> The story, however, withholds its worldview until certain

types of mankind are listed and described since “knowledge of the world assuredly implies the knowledge of human nature, and most of its varieties.”<sup>92</sup>

While it might seem that Melville, at the end of his life in 1891, is returning to the unfashionable human taxonomies prevalent in scientific discourse during his formative years, his theory actually disembodies taxa to typify each life in its habits and activities.<sup>93</sup> A theory of human difference based upon occupational relations to the sea means that Melville’s thinking generates a completely strange system of classification operating under a different logic than those associated with scientific racism.

Unlike the *Isolatoe* whalers of the ship *Pequod* in *Moby-Dick*, the *Bellipotent*’s crew of *Billy Budd* are “men-of-war’s men,” which as a type we were first introduced in *White-Jacket; or, The World in a Man-of-War* (1850).<sup>94</sup> Shaped by discipline, duties, and floggings, the frigate in *White-Jacket* takes all sorts of people and pounds them into *men-of-war-men*, which are inhuman muscular machines.<sup>95</sup> Since a man-of-war, like a whaler, is less discriminating with its recruits than many other nautical enterprises, the *Bellipotent* is “made up of such an assortment of tribes and complexions as would have well fitted them to be marched up by Anacharsis Cloots before the bar of the first French Assembly as Representatives of the Human Race.” Indiscriminately impressing any sort of man, the Royal Navy gathers together a super type, but one which maintains subsets. The narrator tells us that Billy is of a subtype, the “Handsome Sailor,” who receives the “spontaneous homage of his shipmates.” Billy is so beautiful and good spirited that his orbiting comrades pay him a “spontaneous tribute” infectious enough to draw in the usually unforgiving officers. Officers in British fleets, especially in light of increasing paranoia about mutiny, are a suspicious lot, quick to punish. And yet Billy, despite his frequent and accidental infractions, not only avoids reprimand, he gains the admiration of his superiors,

who laugh off all his peccadillos. Having openly embraced his fate, no one suspects him of concealing a secret mutinous plot to subvert his impressed service. When it came to any imposition upon his personal liberties, “Billy made no demur.”

Billy, an extreme type—who passes over and cancels negativity—assuring his company that all that glimmers is indeed gold. “Now Billy,” Melville comments on his affirmative nature, “like sundry other essentially good-natured ones, had some of the weaknesses inseparable from essential good nature; and among these was a reluctance, almost an incapacity of plumply saying *no*;” indeed, “he had not the phlegm tacitly to negative any proposition by unresponsive inaction.” Unable to refuse things passively or directly, Billy gains nearly total favor with the *Bellipotent*. Since the ship, however, activates an “irritating juxtaposition of dissimilar personalities,” Billy’s exaggerated life meets one that stands against it.<sup>96</sup> In states of radical diversity, each personality, regardless of how extreme, is compensation somewhere by its opposite. I consider the personalities to partake in what Gregg Crane describes in “Judgement in *Billy Budd*” (2014) as something that “involves the reader in a process of balancing various oppositions or contradictions” which manifest in spectrums of indetermination, rendering unavailable our ability to overcome tensions.<sup>97</sup> As readers, in the face of such insurmountable difference, we must learn to read by following the logics of divergence, even when they inexcusably cross normative givens of post-enlightenment law and ethics.

Just as the sailors spontaneously wassail Billy, Claggart, the ship’s master-at-arms, though suspecting that Billy might be (as “innocent”) as he appears, cannot help feeling an insidious side to all things, and so an “antipathy spontaneous and profound” grows against the handsome sailor. Since Melville biblically foregrounds Billy’s character as without “self-consciousness,” having not partaken of tree of knowledge, “the master-at-arms,” who opposes

him, “was perhaps the only man in the ship intellectually capable of adequately appreciating” Billy’s subterranean experience, causing himself a “distain of innocence—to be nothing more than innocent.”<sup>98</sup> If Billy’s hidden and revealed experiences were in agreement, he would be inside out, but Claggart, believing in a withheld private side, deduces Billy to be other than wholly innocent, and so perhaps secretly malevolent. The more he fixates upon Billy, who seems irreproachable, he intuits an opposing motivation growing behind what he sees, waiting for its moment to rise to the surface and strike.

If Billy cannot be more than innocent, it must so draw the bounds of his identity, against which faces Claggart’s “evil nature” build up from “elemental evil.”<sup>99</sup> The two characters’ essential incompatibility is primeval enough to be “tinctured with the biblical element” so that Billy is, when confronted with Claggart, “perhaps as Adam presumably might have been ere the urbane Serpent wriggled himself into his company.” A conflict in perspective, between seeing things only as they appear and seeing things as disguised, clamors to and reaches an extreme between Billy and Claggart. The spilled soup affair, when one afternoon Billy inadvertently overturns his bowl at Claggart’s feet, emblemizes a constitutional disagreement that could be called elementally unavoidable. The “spilled soup,” which for Claggart becomes a perceivable sign of Billy’s underlying malevolence, “he must have taken it—to some extent willfully, perhaps—not for the mere accident it assuredly was, but for the sly escape of spontaneous feeling on Billy’s part more or less answering to the antipathy on his own.” Despite intuiting “contempt” without sensation, what Claggart believes would warrant his admonishment of the veiled insubordination, the master-at-arms—to conceal his feelings—instead laughs off the spill, which Billy could only apprehend as good faith understanding and forgiveness. “He thought the master-at-arms acted in a manner rather queer at times. That was all.”

Spilled soup, as trivial as the affair might seem, only stoked Claggart's hatred of Billy. The sincerity with which Billy became identified reflected back to Claggart "a subterranean fire" that from behind his own dishonesty "was eating its way deeper and deeper in him." By consuming his insides and deepening his deepness, Claggart insinuated something ever more terrible lurking behind the Billy, perhaps his own bad faith and resentment. "As to Claggart, the monomania in the man," his heightening fixation upon imperceptible reality, "something decisive must come of it." And so as he framed Billy for a mutinous plot. Determining that he should—to anticipate Billy's treasonous potential—frame him of sedition, Claggart brings his suspicion to Captain Vere who then questions the two men. Distressed by Claggart's unfounded accusation while remaining constitutionally incapable of denial, an "organic hesitancy" manifests in Billy's "stutter," keeping him from verbally contesting the master-at-arms. More to the point, Claggart's "underhand" is an "entirely new experience" for Billy who is not only unable to respond, his very frame too seemingly will not gainsay. ("To deal in double meanings and insinuations of any sort was quite foreign to his nature.") Completely agreeable in nature and so unable to directly address the affair's underhandedness, Billy's stammering increases until it forecloses on the possibility of verbalizing his testimony, while he noticeably quakes in anticipation of making some declaration.

Such impasse, for Melville, occasions a debate between affirmative and negative thinking in animal types, Billy as a panic stricken "horse" and Claggart as a deep sea "creature," drawing our attention to how incompatible natures reach conflict when shoved into a shared environment. It is the necessary behaviors of people as animal types, ones so foreign to each other in nature (even down to an elemental level) that coexistence is rendered impossible, provoking a crisis in existence. Perspectival incompatibility, in other words, surfaces to ontological transgression

when the ““deadly space between”” is violated. In Claggart and Billy’s relation, mankind is positioned at its widest margins to rupture “normal nature” into a deadly space. But Claggart was always, truth be told, out of his element. In *Billy Budd*, as in other tales, Melville draws the distinction between “landsmen” and “sailors,” and Claggart, a landlubber, is “without prior nautical experience entering the navy at mature life.” In other words, it is not fully that Billy saw “frank manifestations in accordance which natural law,” but that, typologically speaking, he represented “sailors” who are without double dealings and insinuations. The sailor, “though indeed of the same species as a landsman, is in some respects singularly distinct from him. The sailor is frankness, the landman is finesse.” “And what could Billy know of man except of man as mere sailor?”<sup>100</sup> The difference between sailor Billy and landsman Claggart, grounded in their relationship to the sea, the former buoyed atop its waves and the latter obsessed with its secret interiors.

But such philosophical upending suggests a conceit in Melville’s writing about varieties of experience and their relation to “the watery part of the world.”<sup>101</sup> “Melville’s work exemplifies,” as Hester Blum puts it, “oceanic ways of being” which relate to “modes of thinking.”<sup>102</sup> Oceanic relations thus, for Melville, go beyond occupational types into thoughts, and so philosophies. Melville explores all these aquatic perspectives in *Moby-Dick*, where, beyond the islanders, he outlines many types and subtypes as early as the opening in “Loomings.” He further relates these types to philosophical orientations insofar “as everyone knows, meditation and water are wedded for ever.” In fact, in “Loomings,” Melville marks a significant distinction between landsmen and seamen, both drawn to water but while the former “water-gazers” speculate, the latter launch forth into the open ocean. Landman thinking goes to “the extremist limitation of the land” and there becomes “fixed in ocean reveries,” and “must go

just as nigh the water as they can without falling in.”<sup>103</sup> Any landsman, even in a country’s interior, will too be drawn to a shoreline. For reason of a ubiquitous relation to water, Melville’s typology includes “Canallmen,” like those who live on the Erie Canal, and “Lakemen,” who are basically the opposite of Islanders being “landlocked.”<sup>104</sup> In *Billy Budd*, Melville returns to his typology and related oceanic perspectives in order to bring the conflict between Ishmael and Ahab’s views into a refined, diagnostic process that tests Billy against Claggart. The final work, I so claim in closing this chapter, revisits the embattled nautical philosophies of *Moby-Dick* with a purpose and clarity.

After Billy spasmodically strikes Claggart dead and is dubiously judged by Vere, a dilemma which has provoked much critical interest, the *Bellipotent* continues “on her way to join the Mediterranean fleet,” and there the story gets submerged, and indictment upon readers of “News from the Mediterranean.”<sup>105</sup> But what, for Melville, is the significance in sinking all hopes of sensitive understanding in the Mediterranean sea; what is it about Billy’s story that cannot buoy to the surface of these waters? “Land-locked and tideless” is a fragment scribbled on an abandoned loose leaf from the unfinished manuscript of *Billy Budd*. Editors are unsure of how this moment fits into Melville’s writing, and it has yet to be touched by criticism.<sup>106</sup> The fragment reads: “LAND-LOCKED and timeless, the Mediterranean was the sole sea of antiquity—the sea of Plato as well as Theocritus. And, on its cultivated shores, Christ arose. But it is long since of our modern thought, instituted in part by the Twin Oceans.”<sup>107</sup> The history of thought from Plato onwards happens in the context of the Mediterranean, a “sole sea” surrounded by land from which “Christ arose.” Here, Melville draws out two further distinctions: first, there is a difference between a sea and an ocean, even between the Mediterranean Sea and the twin Atlantic and Pacific oceans; second, sea thinking is singular, paused, and cultivated on

land, whereas ocean thinking is multiple, restless, and insurmountable. In “the ocean,” *Billy Budd*’s narrator muses, “which is inviolate Nature primeval, though this be the element where we move and have our being as sailors.” He thus inundates ancient and modern thought in the context of waters which are too typological. From these layers of distinctions, we can begin to deduce why Melville considers whaling to have a special philosophical status. Whaling voyages lasted years, traversing the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and cultivated their product, whale oil, in the watery parts of the world. Categorically speaking, whaling is therefore a completely unusual and different mode of thinking taken to an extreme, and so for this reason Melville exchanges modern thinking with a reverse Platonism.

In risking a final word, it can be said that something about whaling makes apparent that normative thinking can be turned belly up. Such intervention is ethically tested in *Billy Budd* when Billy strikes Claggart. Billy, again and again, is described as having no independent will, cannot deny anything, so how does he come to strike? There is no centralized volition for Billy, but rather a “spasm,” a “horsepower” not “attributable” and so disembodied and distributed. ““It was phenomenal,”” the ship’s Surgeon claims in consideration of Billy’s strike, ““in the sense that it was an appearance the cause of which is not immediately to be assigned.”” To name the process by which a life is ended without clear indication of any cause, he further terms it “*Euthanasia*,” as “at once imaginative and metaphysical—in short Greek.”<sup>108</sup> *Eudaimonia*, the ethics of living, is complimented by *euthanasia*, of dying. If Georges Bataille is right that “the scream of the one that is killed is the supreme affirmation of life,” Claggart dies in silence.<sup>109</sup>



<sup>1</sup> A stooped looming pictured in “Fata Morgana in the Bay of Reggio,” *The Penny Magazine*. On Melville’s reading of this *Penny Magazine*, see Mary K. Bercaw, *Melville’s Sources* (Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1987), 108.

<sup>2</sup> Or Melville’s “intensely exclamatory” prose, as Geoffrey Sanborn puts it. Geoffrey Sanborn, “Melville and Nonhuman world,” *The New Cambridge Companion to Herman Melville*, ed. Robert S. Levine (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2014), 13.

<sup>3</sup> Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 5.

<sup>4</sup> Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 7. After introducing himself, Ishmael goes through his reasons—medicinal, financial, and philosophical—for taking to sea. (“Yes, as everyone knows, mediation and water are wedded for ever.”) All men, as he says,—even landsmen—are drawn to the water’s reflection. Few, however, take to the water and so learn at which point we become lost in reflection. Most men, Ishmael thus decides, know not what life is because they have not reflected enough upon it, or, that is to say, have not lived enough in reflection. Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 4. I thus follow Hester Blum’s insight that “Melville’s work exemplifies oceanic ways of being” which relate to “modes of thinking.” Hester Blum, “Melville and Oceanic Studies,” *The New Cambridge Companion to Herman Melville*, ed. Robert S. Levine (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2014), 24. *Moby Dick*, although illustrious, is not the only whale—or even thing—which looms in the novel. If you wish to know “what the whale really looks like,” the only way to trace out the “living contour, is by going whaling yourself” Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 264. If we follow Ishmael’s assertion that “The living whale, in his full majesty and significance, is only to be seen at sea in unfathomable waters,” we find that despite our trying to replicate looming, “out of that element it is a thing eternally impossible for mortal man to hoist him bodily into the air, so as to preserve all his mighty swells and undulations.” Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 263.

<sup>5</sup> Melville would have encountered the theory of looming from many sources, some heavily circulating through scientific journals and magazines at the time, but notably from William Scoresby’s *Journal of a Voyage to the Northern Whale-Fishery* (1820).

<sup>6</sup> In Thomas Jefferson’s *Notes on the State of Virginia* (1785) and in Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s “The Destiny of Nations” (1817), they describe a “phenomenon,” in Jefferson’s words, “which is rare at land, though frequent at sea. The seamen call it *looming*. Philosophy is as yet in the rear of the seamen, for so far from having accounted for it, she has not given it a name. Its principal effect is to make distant objects appear large, in opposition to the general law of vision, by which they diminish.” Thomas Jefferson, *Notes on the State of Virginia, Writings* (New York: The Library of America, 1984), 207. Loomings are visual reversals whereby closeness and distance gain inverted relations to diminishment and enlargement. The proximities of bodies, therefore, become completely detached from empirical sense, so much so that what *seems* far *appears* near. The “effect of looming” relates to “metamorphosis” and its dislocation from bodies, such that transformative *effect* does not seem to agree with the *cause* of corporeal states of affair. Jefferson, *Notes*, 208. By such dislocation of bodily and ocular sense, the *cause* (bodies) and *effect* (transformation) relation is not in agreement. By looming, demonism ruptures an entirely new fissure in ontology, between the world of cause and the world of effect. Ahab fails to strike through the mask of appearance, the “image” of “life,” because *striking* occurs for the world of effects—of phantoms—and thus never touches bodies. Similarly (in terms of a logic), in the context of *Moby-Dick*, Paul Hurh claims “If terror is affixed to phenomena rather than to substance, its urgency would be paradoxically raised from the consideration that it isn’t *about anything*; there is literally nothing to fear.” Paul Hurh, *American Terror: The Feeling of Thinking in Edwards, Poe, and Melville* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2015), 200.

<sup>7</sup> By sailing the Pequod around the Cape of Good Hope rather than Cape Horn, Melville references the most famous looming ever, Captain Hendrick van der Decken’s *Flying Dutchman*. Accounts of the Flying Dutchman first circulated as rumor amongst the Dutch East India traders but began appearing in travelogues. Sir Walter Scott’s *Rokeby* (1813) and the *Dutchman* legend of Frederick Marryat’s *The Phantom Ship* (1839) had made the story famous in Melville’s time. For some other contemporary accounts, see “Vanderdecken’s Message Home” in *Blackwood’s* (1821); “The Phantom Ship” in *Burton’s Gentleman’s Magazine* (1839); and Washington Irving’s “The Flying Dutchman on Tappan Sea” (1855).

<sup>8</sup> What Melville might call the “life-restless loom.” Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 449.

<sup>9</sup> George Hopkins, “The Phenomena of ‘Looming,’” *The Knickerbocker, or New-York Monthly Magazine* 11.1 (1838): 7. Extracted from *Observations on electricity, looming, and sounds; together with a theory of thunder showers, and of west and north west winds. To which are added, a letter from the Hon. Thomas Jefferson, and remarks by the Hon. Samuel L. Mitchill* (1825).

<sup>10</sup> Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 3–4.

<sup>11</sup> William Scoresby, *Journal of a Voyage to the Northern Whale-Fishery* (Edinburgh: Archibald Constable, 1823), 168.

<sup>12</sup> Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 159. Once the *Pequod* sails into cruising grounds and begins whaling, Ishmael spends chapter after chapter explaining the profession, in its diverse occupations and tasks—both thrilling and gruesome—as well as the vessel’s manifold parts and organizations. He carefully details the industry from the sighting of whales to the processing of their oil, and each step between, leaving nothing unexplored. His descriptions amount to no less than a comprehensive guidebook on the Whale Fishery, as it was called in antebellum America, which, taken together with the book’s equally exhaustive cetological studies, caused some, for a time, to consider *Moby-Dick* a book about whaling, not a work of literature, although there was too such a genre as whaling literature. Each role played aboard the *Pequod*, from Captain to Harpooner, from Cook to Carpenter, corresponds to the people employed thus exhibiting peculiarities and strange ways of thinking. To illustrate early on with a specific example, we find ourselves at the *Pequod*’s apex, nested in the mainmast-head. Many sailing terms relate to the ship’s masts, a central mainmast flanked aftwards and forwards by two others, which hold the ships sails and riggings. Ishmael, a merchantman but no experienced whaler, is “before the mast,” charged with basic labor and at times rotated up to a mast-head as a lookout. A whaleship like the *Pequod* has three mast-heads manned by three men, each rotated every few hours, who from their perches watch for and yell out after the sight of breaching whales, whose spouts of flukes might betray their location. By constantly rotating the mast-heads, sailors are expected to be wide awake when performing their task in either spotting fellow ships for gams (conferences), or whales to hunt.

<sup>13</sup> Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 156, 159. I here align myself with K. L. Evans’ recent study on Melville’s philosophical realism. “As *Moby-Dick* makes plain,” she argues “Melville’s desire to depict *what is* does not obligate him to adopt a contemptuous and dismissive attitude toward what can be readily perceived;” it is about the “appreciation of material life.” “In ‘The Mast-head,’ Melville names these fledgling philosophers, in whose hands lay the destruction of the phenomenal worlds, ‘young Platonists.’ This suggests, to be sure, that antiquity offers them most compelling reason to turn away from everyday life.” “*Moby-Dick* mounts a sustained attack” against “Philosophy’s distaste for or even antipathy toward worldly things,” and so “attending to rather than discounting, the appearance of things.” K. L. Evans, *One Foot in the Finite: Melville’s Realism Reclaimed* (Evanston: Northwestern UP, 2017), 39, 44–83.

<sup>14</sup> Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 158.

<sup>15</sup> Drifting atop the mast-head, the Platonist fails to ever close his eyes to appearance, however. Even “while this sleep,” Ishmael elaborates, “this dream is on ye, move your foot or hand an inch, slip your hold at all; and your identity comes back in horror. Over Cartesian vortices you hover.” The Platonic thought, if the flesh from which it is estranged is disturbed, falls back into the body and becomes troubled therein. Drifting away from everyday relations, Platonic thinking tenuously hangs above until recalled to differentiated feelings. “With one half-throttled shriek,” Ishmael says, “you drop through that transparent air into the summer sea.” Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 158–9. The process of sudden, terrifying embodiment is related to a drift in philosophical orientation, the passage from Platonism to Cartesianism. But Ishmael’s description, while seeming fantastical, is actually grounded in René Descartes meditative process when “a certain laziness” encourages “an imaginary freeing during his sleep, but when he later begins to suspect that he is dreaming, fears being awakened.” René Descartes, *Discourse on Method and Meditation on First Philosophy*, tr. Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1998), 63. Thinking, the thing which migrates between philosophies, moves from confusing itself with the unlimited to becoming cramped by a personal limit, and, since the passing is accompanied by terror, thinking yearns to once again become open. Continuing explaining philosophical drift in nautical terms, Melville takes up an illustration he

finds in Jeremiah Reynolds' *Mocha Dick*. "The look-out at the mast-head," Reynolds lays out the scene, "which cheek on his shoulder, was dreaming of the 'dangers he had passed,' instead of keeping watch for those which were to come;" and so floats past the pangs of life, "while the captain paced the quarter-deck with long and hasty stride, scanning the ocean in every direction, with a keen, expectant eye," fully awakened to the terrors of life. Reynolds, *Mocha Dick*, 17. Melville seizes on Reynolds' story to tease out the relationship between Captain Ahab and his crew, who, shaken awake from their Platonic slumber, which only ever imagines the mind and body apart, take up the Cartesian project of actively liberating thought from flesh. Fully awake, the Cartesian thought becomes aware of itself in the world and obsessed with liberation, even rejecting the demonical voice of an "evil genius." Descartes, *Meditations*, 62. The mast-head, when he falls and awakes a Cartesian, lands upon the planks, and notices Ahab restlessly pacing the quarter-deck with "his one unsleeping, ever-pacing thought." Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 160. Since Ahab's thought does not sleep, and therefore does not dream, he is by (Ishmael's) definition not a Platonist. He seems a Cartesian, a pure *cogito* "not heavy with sleep," in Descartes' words, not troubled by the "hyperbolic doubts" raised by distinguishing between "being asleep from being awake," the uncertainty of external experience, as "things would not be so distinct for someone who is asleep." Descartes, *Meditations*, 60, 10. Descartes attempts to cut ties with everything other than his thought, regarding them all as dreams of appearance. ("All external things [are] nothing but the bedeviling hoaxes of [his] dreams.") Descartes, *Meditations*, 60. While the Platonist moves to overcome by unmooring thinking, Cartesians confront the burdened status of thought as embodied. Descartes begins his meditations with a proposal to "raze everything," which, given the uncuttable nature of the *cogito*, would be to shave flesh away until only pure thought remained. Descartes, *Meditations*, 59, 65. Amputation, in theory, should thus not alter the essence of mind, but "So full of his thought was Ahab," Ishmael notices, that "you could almost see that thought turn in him as he turned, and pace in his as he paced; so completely possessing him, indeed, that it all seemed the inward mould of every outer movement." Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 160. Since Ahab's thought is embodied enough to overwhelm and define his body, and so is made partial when "Moby Dick had reaped away Ahab's leg," the thinking thing (*res cogitans*) is haunted enough by the dismemberable thing (*res extensa*) to suggest a multitude of thinking associated with the body. Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 184. Ahab's Cartesianism takes on the Leibnizian notion of mind spread into sensible matter, even a Kantian argument for the splinting off of the thinking thing across the sensible manifold. If thinking for Descartes, that is to say, is not divisible, then Ahab's obsession with his lost leg, which becomes a hobby of adding more legs, insinuates a thought of the multiple, "but Ahab never thinks; he only feels, feels, feels." Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 563. Rejecting all appearance including the thinking which appears on the surface of this body, Ahab aligns his essential self with internal sense, in other words, intuition. Descartes himself admitted that anguish demonstrates "not merely that I am present to my body in the way a sailor is present to a ship, but that I am most tightly joined," even "commingled with it, so much so that I and the body constitute one single thing;" but some people "whose leg," even though it "had been amputated," never fully divorced from thinking, and so it "seemed to them that they still occasionally sensed pain in the very limb they had lost." Descartes, *Meditations*, 98, 95. Ahab can feel his limb even though it is lost—and no longer his own—which from him means that he can feel any limb. ("I account no living bone of mine one jot more me, than this dead one that's lost.") Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 560. Feeling possession over bodies not his own, Ahab begins flexing his crewmen's arms and legs. Awakened by Ahab, the mast-heads' limbs which flapped dead in the wind during Platonic dreaming, came suddenly alive. "The rigging lives. The mast-heads, like the tops of tall palms, were outspreadingly tufted with arms and legs." Ahab awakens the mast-heads to activate their extremities and subject them to his construction of one leviathan body. "They are one man, not thirty," even "welded into oneness, and were all directed to that fatal goal which Ahab their one lord and keel did point to." Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 557. "Ahab's soul's a centipede, that moves upon a hundred legs." Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 561. He means "centipede" literally, since his dozens of crewmen lose their humanity to become Ahab's appendages. "Ye are not other men, but my arms and my legs; and so obey me." Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 568. We can thus consider Ahab's calling down of the mast-heads in terms of his promiscuous prosthesis. "Mast-heads, there!" Ahab calls, "come down!" Platonists, as Ishmael informs us, never spot any whales. Ahab demands the opposite, so thus wakes the dreamers. "What do you do when you see a whale, men?" Ahab questions. "'Sing out for him!' was the impulsive rejoinder" met by Ahab's approval. Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 161. Under Ahab's sway, the members reach out into the sea to fulfill his desire to "dismember my dismemberer." Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 168. Ahab sprouts many new appendages to crawl after Moby Dick and pull him to limb to limb.

<sup>16</sup> “Mast-heads, there!” Ahab demands as we transition from “The Mast-Head” to “The Quarter-Deck,” “come down!” Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 161.

<sup>17</sup> Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 162, 164, 5, 184, 5. An additional allusion to Shelley, Paul De Man argues that *Triumph of Life* is about the “unreachable reflection of Narcissus.” Paul De Man, “Shelley Disfigured: *The Triumph of Life*,” *Modern Critical Views: Percy Bysshe Shelley* (New York: Chelsea House, 1985), 132.

<sup>18</sup> A surface of pure difference, of crazed images, of copies on copies free of their originals, the flickering across the already unfixed horizon activates a relation between loomings and demonism. Melville’s account of phantasmal life is like what Deleuze calls the “demonic character of the simulacrum.” Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, tr. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale (New York: Columbia UP, 1990), 258. The demonic shines back through to the everyday surface and overtakes it—becomes impassible—and so characterizes it as a “demonic world,” Arsić further explains, “which is demonic not because simulacra lie, but because they do not reveal the truth of the world in its wholeness.” Branka Arsić, *The Passive Eye: Gaze and Subjectivity in Berkeley (via Beckett)* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003), 58. This is what Deleuze calls “pure becoming.” Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, 2. An “entirely new cleavage,” or a “new dualism of bodies or states of affairs and effects or incorporeal events.” *Logic of Sense*, 6. A complete rupture between “bodies” and “entities.” *Logic of Sense*, 7, 2. A corporeal totality of unlimited “mixtures” turns at a side of the doubled world, the causes of bodily “passions” and “actions” melting into other bodies. (“*Everything now returns to the surface.*”) All sensible life must, rather, become the drama of incorporeal phantasms. “Becoming-mad, becoming unlimited,” in his words, “climbs to the surface of things” of “impassive” veils or “phantasms.” *Logic of Sense*, 7. Michel Foucault, in awe of Deleuze’s *Différence et Répétition* (1968) and *Logique du sens* (1969), outlines his “phanasmaphysics” in his “Theatrum Philosophicum” (1970). He summarizes Deleuze’s ontology as “a metaphysics where it is no longer a question of the One.” Michel Foucault, “Theatrum Philosophicum,” *Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology* (New York: The New Press, 1998), 348. Above the singular looms an “incorporeal (a metaphysical surface)” world endlessly spreading being into “extrabeings.” “Theatrum Philosophicum,” 350, 347. Corporeal wholeness and incorporeal variety each lay claim to the extent of being—each constitute a realm of being—and so possess a side of being, but being of incommensurable logics cause a rupture in being itself making a chasm of pure difference. Foucault “Theatrum Philosophicum,” 344. To “summarize” more still, Foucault raises the stakes of Deleuze’s ontology to the pitch of its perspective, a world of “dense bodies” and a world of “incorporeal event.” Foucault, “Theatrum Philosophicum,” 350.

<sup>19</sup> Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 164, 169, 455, 376.

<sup>20</sup> When Ahab lost his leg, “then it was, that his torn body and gashed soul bled into one another; and so infusing made him mad” and “the final monomania seized him.” Supernaturally wounded, a “special lunacy stormed his general sanity,” converging the inverse flows of body and soul into an advanced form of madness. Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 185. While this could mean that his destruction of body includes thus the soul, his new problem becomes the opposite: matter increases as his soul strives to exceed it. With body and soul bled together—so ontologically confused—the associations between material surface and immaterial essence become unfixed for Ahab, and so everything appears to him as rising up to overburden him. Ahab’s negative orientation hence heightens and becomes rebellious. A philosophical madness, however, Ahab’s monomaniacally fails to differentiate himself from demonism. (“I’m demoniac, I am madness maddened! That wild madness that’s only calm to comprehend itself!”) Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 168. In “The Symphony,” Ahab concludes the he is “more a demon than a man!” Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 544. Since Ahab’s madness is maddened to comprehend itself, the demonic Moby Dick, present when his body and soul bled together, becomes identified with him. The demon, once unseen, by Ahab’s ontological catastrophe erupts to the surfaces of life and there becomes a visible demon in his own cast.

<sup>21</sup> Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 184, 237, 572. Bodies are out of relation with images, in other words, due to what Deleuze notices in Spinoza’s ontology as a radical divide between a realm of causes and a realm of effects, and “we never apprehend anything but the *effects*”—“an illusion”—the images of corporeal affections. A Fata Morgana, in other words, materializes when a chilled or slow current passes under a warm or rapid current, and so the event exemplifies what Spinoza calls “*conatus*,” an identity which takes shape by “relations of speed and slowness,” in Deleuze’s formulation. Gilles Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, tr. Robert Hurley (San Francisco: City Light Books, 1988), 19, 125. A cloudish form, the Fata Morgana is thus made up of actual elements, and so is illusory for

no other reason than how the corpuscular relations differ from those of the land, a transformative tendency so vibrant as to be fleeting and miraculous. I here invoke Marjorie Levinson's reading of Goethe on the "flicker" ("schwanken"), a "transitional state" ("vom überganglichen") of "the in-between as a form in its own right." Goethe's morphology would "make visible" how "clouds" transform by themselves, into each other, and even into the "ambient air" through "ceaseless transitions." In *Moby-Dick*, clouds even possess such transformative flicker in relation to sea fowl, people, and mountains. ("Strangest problems of life seem clearing; but clouds sweep between.") Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 567. These two principles—constitution transcending the constituent parts, relative autonomy of the constituent parts—order the existence of each 'being.'" Bataille, *Essential*, 11. The ocean is not a single body of water, it is also the waves which constitute its surface, an insurmountable fissure above which turn tides of pure becoming. Twin oceans, one which rests whole and the other a plurality of movements, and across which glides the demon of the sea.

<sup>22</sup> Edward Polehampton and John Mason Good, *The Gallery or Nature and Art* (London: R. Wilks, 1818), 504–505. We know that Melville read John Mason Good. Bercaw, *Melville's Sources*, 85. Polehampton's coauthor for *The Gallery*, Mason Good, plagiarizes his own phrasing of the Fata Morgana as an aerial demon from his own 1805 translation of Lucretius' *The Nature of Things*. In an incredibly protracted and dense note about the Fata Morgana, he explains what Lucretius seems to describe as a looming event in *Book IV*. I quote here his translation of the accompanying lines from Lucretius due to their striking resemblance to Melville's theory of life. We know that Melville knew about Lucretius from his marginalia, but we are not sure of which translation he read. I too thus propose that Mason Good's translation is likely the one he encountered. "Yet deem not thou such images alone / From things themselves emanate; spontaneous, too, / Spring they in heaven above, combining strange, Borne through th' aerial realms in modes diverse, / Their forms for ever shifting, till at length / Nought lives on earth the phantoms never ape. Hence clouds concrete, th' aerial vault serene / Shadowing with moisture, grateful as it moves: / Hence, shapes gigantic spread, protruding broad / Their interposing features; mountains hence, / And mountain-rocks, torn from their base abrupt, / Seem oft to hover, blotting now the sun / With front opposed, now deep diffused behind, / Gend'ring fresh clouds, a monster each to view. / Mark, now, how swift such phantoms form—how swift / Exhale from all things, and, when form'd, dissolve. / A steam there is that from the face of things / Pours forth perpetual. This, when urg'd amain / On porous textures, as the clothes we wear, / Pieces entire: when bold with wood, or stone / It cares conflict, the subtle membrane breaks, / Nor aught returns of semblance; but when flung / On dance and splendid objects (foremost such / Shines the pure mirror) nought of these ensures: / For then nor pierces the light lymph, nor quick / Breaks ere the mirror give the semblance sound. / Hence springs the vision, every object hence, / Oppos'd to splendors, pours perpetual forth / Its mimic likeness; and, perpetual too, Hence the pure effluence that the likeness yields / Must fleetly rise, reiterated urg'd / As from the sun each moment many a ray / Must flow that things with lustre may be fill'd, / so from each object and an image light / Streams without end; for, turn howe'er thou please / The splendid plate, still the same semblance springs, / Punctual in form, appropriate in its dyes." Titus Lucretius Carus, *The Nature of Things: A Didactic Poem*, Vol. 2, tr. John Mason Good (London: Longman Hurst, Rees, and Orme, 1805), 136–172.

<sup>23</sup> "The Fata Morgana seems to depend upon the general principles of looming...together with the reflection from particles of water floating in the air. These particles doubtless assume prismatic figures by coagulation; and it is, perhaps, a mistake, to suppose them to be spherical, even at their primary condensation, in the fluid state of minute floating particles." William Nicholson, *Second American Edition of Nicholson's British Encyclopedia: or Dictionary of Arts & Sciences*, Vol. 5 (Philadelphia: W. Brown, 1818), 126.

<sup>24</sup> (In Melville's time, Fata Morganas were associated with loomings but are now considered a different phenomenon. Fata Morganas and loomings are now both classed as superior mirages.) Coleridge here anticipates Melville's association of narcissism with the Fata Morgana in his notes on Shakespeare: "In the plats of *Sh* almost every man see himself without knowing that he sees himself as in the phenomena of nature a men sees in the mountains projected into mist not the same indeed but knows it so that is the same by trust in a glory round the head which distinguishes it from vulgar copy Or as travelers in the north of *Germ* when the sun rise at the immense tops of askance the mountain they see figure gigantic of dimensions so distant and mighty so great in size that they scarce think it credible but which corresponds with their own simulacrum so we may compare them with the famous *phata Morgana*." Samuel Taylor Coleridge, *CW, Lectures 1808–1819: On Literature*, Vol. 2, ed. R. A. Foakes (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1987), 441.

25 “Loom, at Sea,” “The most remarkable phenomena of this kind depend on the accidental variations of the temperature of the air at different parts, producing great irregularities in its refraction, especially near the horizon. Accordingly the refraction of the air in the neighborhood of the surface of water, of a building, or of the earth itself, occasions a distant object to appear depressed instead of being elevated, and to be sometimes seen at once both depressed and elevated, so as to appear double, one of the images being generally in an inverted position, as if the surface possessed a reflective power; and there seems to be a considerable analogy between this kind of refraction and the total reflection what happens within a denser medium. See FATA *Morgana*.” Abraham Rees, *The Cyclopaedia; or, Universal Dictionary of Arts, Sciences, and Literature*, Vol. 21 (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, & Brown, 1819), 6.

26 Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 572. “Fata Morgana. That was the pin he tortured himself on, the a pinned-down butterfly... There is no paradise. Right and laugh and feel bitter and feel bliss: and flight again. Fight, fight. That is life. Why pin ourselves down on a paradisaic ideal? It is only ourselves we torture.” D. H. Lawrence, *Studies in Classic American Literature* (New York: Thomas Seltzer, 1923), 207.

27 Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 572–573.

28 Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 573. “Only affirmation,” Gilles Deleuze would say, “comes back, only what can be affirmed comes back, only joy returns.” “The eternal return should be compared to a wheel whose movement is endowed with a centrifugal force that drives out everything negative.” Gilles Deleuze, *Pure Immanence: Essays on A Life*, tr. Anne Boyman (New York: Zone Books, 2001), 89.

29 Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 235.

30 Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 187. The Samuel Taylor Coleridge once asked within the margins of his *Bible* if soon the whale might “be rendered—the Dæmon of the Sea?” Samuel Taylor Coleridge, *CW, Marginalia*, Vol. 1, ed. George Whalley (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1980), 425.

31 Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 184. Despite Melville’s explicit remarks about demonology, little ink has spilled upon the topic. In the earliest and perhaps still only serious reading about demonology in Melville’s writing, Robert Milder’s “‘Nemo Contra Deum’” (1981) examines Socratic thinking exemplified by Ahab and tested at its absolute limit whereby it sinks. According to Milder, Babbalanja’s ontological anxiety is potently restated with Ahab’s frantic quest to disembodied Moby Dick. Having been dismembered by the whale, Milder argues that Ahab’s “painfully won right to rebel” is carried out excessively “towards some apocalyptic metaphysical action.” Moving from his own decomposition to the taking apart of whales, Ahab eschatologically escalates his violence until the whole of life seems to stand in the way of his vengeance. Given the impossible ambition to murder at such a scale, Ahab is emblematic “of thought ‘gone mad;’” and since “the rebellion of the demonic man” reaches so excessively of its grasp, the madman “destines his catastrophic defeat.” Robert Milder, “‘Nemo Contra Deum’ . . . : Melville’s and Goethe’s ‘Demonic,’” *Ruined Eden of the Present: Hawthorne, Melville, and Poe*, eds. G. R. Thompson and Virgil L. Lokke West (Lafayette: Purdue UP, 1981), 211, 216, 235. Ahab’s violence, exaggerated to the extent of the physical universe, cannot reach the end without first exhausting him, literally using him up as he fragments with each strike. Recently, Michael Jonik has commented in *Herman Melville and the Politics of the Inhuman* (2018) about what “Milder argues,” repeating that “the demonic allowed [Melville] to move from the philosophical wanderings of *Mardi* to *Moby-Dick*, in which a tragic character such as Ahab could be given full scope to confront the ‘universe itself.’” Michael Jonik, *Herman Melville and the Politics of the Inhuman* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2018), 94.

32 Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 188.

33 Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 187–188. Melville does comparative philosophy to “distinguish philosophical claims one from the other.” Branka Arsić and K. L. Evans, “Introduction,” *Melville’s Philosophies*, eds. Branka Arsić and K. L. Evans (New York: Bloomsbury, 2017), 1.

34 Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 187–188, 194.

35 Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 192–193, 188.

<sup>36</sup> Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 195, 194, 194–5. As with Ahab, Ishmael’s demonology transgress the boundaries between human and animal. In one of Herman Melville’s whaling sources for *Moby-Dick*, Jeremiah Reynolds’ “Mocha Dick: or the White Whale of the Pacific” (1839), the first-mate—so familiar with his craft—begins to drift apart from humanity and become something else, a whale. This is not to say, however, that the first-mate experiences a delusion, or that Reynolds is writing metaphorically. “Indeed,” the narrator writes about the transformation’s serious and even scientific character, “so completely were all his propensities, thoughts, and feelings, identified with his occupation: so intimately did he seem acquainted with the habits and instincts of the objects of his pursuit, and so little conversant with the ordinary affairs of life. That one felt less inclined to class him genus homo, than a sort of intermediate something between man and the cetaceous tribe.” If a whaler thinks, feels, and lives enough like whales to trouble the boundaries between species, then what seems taxonomically clear actually verges personal nature towards an “indeterminate something,” in Reynolds’ words. The first-mate in “Mocha Dick,” in other words, becomes unfastened from his humanity but, rather than totally becoming a whale, remains “something” between and identified with the relation itself. Reynolds’ first-mate did not transgress the boundaries between the “genus homo” and the “cetaceous tribe” to become an “extraordinary figure” only by being like a whale. Rather, it is by “his conquest of the redoubtable Mocha Dick,” the “renowned monster,” a real “freak of nature,” that his ontological convergence with the extraordinary whale reaches its “climax.” We might even say that the transformation reveals a third state of things—a betweenness—which “defies description.” J. N. Reynolds, “Mocha Dick: or the White Whale of the Pacific (Metguen: SicPress, 2013), 12, 11. Graham Burnett describes an antebellum battle over which sort of “whale-knowledge” counted, and what it had to say about taxonomy, and so Reynolds would be an extreme case. D. Graham Burnett, *Trying Leviathan: The Nineteenth-Century New York Court Case that Put the Whale on Trial and Challenged the Order of Nature* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2007), 191. Like Reynolds’ first-mate and Mocha Dick, the ways that Melville’s Ahab and Moby Dick merge into a frustratingly unfastened being has drawn endless attention from readers of *Moby-Dick*. While we lack a consensus about how to interpret their confused identity, the topic nevertheless remains important to Melville’s readers who explore his theory of ontological transgressions that change things like people into things like animals. Branka Arsić and K. L. Evans, for example, in their “Introduction” to *Melville’s Philosophies* (2017), propose a seriously philosophical Melville who troubles the boundaries between thing, even the distinguishing the “whale from Ahab” becomes practically impossible, so we must consider how they “merge and meet.” Branka Arsić and K. L. Evans, “Introduction,” 1. “Being a serious philosopher,” Melville after all writes, “is being whale-like, very like a whale, indeed.” Melville, *Correspondence*, 120. Here I reference what Colin Dayan has recently diagnosed as “the uneasy boundaries between human and nonhuman” which “obsessed” Melville. Colin Dayan, “Melville’s Creatures, or Seeing Otherwise,” *American Impersonal: Essays with Sharon Cameron*, ed. Branka Arsić (New York: Bloomsbury, 2014), 46. Philosophically speaking, Ahab’s entanglement with Moby Dick is addressed by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in *A Thousand Plateaus* (1980) where they claim that “*Moby-Dick* in its entirety is one of the greatest masterpieces of becoming: Captain Ahab has an irresistible becoming-whale, but one that bypasses the pack or the school, operating directly through a monstrous alliance with the Unique, the Leviathan, Moby-Dick.” Gilles Deleuze, and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, tr. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1987), 268. Anticipating Reynolds, Deleuze and Guattari posit that the cetaceous tribe forms into schools, and “wherever there is multiplicity, you will find an exceptional individual,” what they call a “Demon.” The “anomalous” demon, by *sticking out* from the pack, casts the line of contrast between itself and the group, and so manifests an identity between that which is same and that which is different. But “the contradiction is real,” and thus an embodied relation: a “*Line*.” The line, a “demonic *Term*,” acts “as the borderline” whereby becoming takes place,” and since Moby Dick “is the borderline,” Ahab’s identification with the boundary shapes his transformation. Deleuze and Guattari’s terminology is actually faithful to Melville’s own words. Deleuze and Guattari, *Thousand*, 286–9, 247. The line’s knitting is demonic because “becoming and multiplicity are the same thing” according to Deleuze, such that “a multiplicity is continually transforming itself into a string of other multiplicities.” *Thousand*, 249–50.

<sup>37</sup> “Yet, as the ever-woven verdant warp and woof intermixed and hummed around him, the mighty idler seemed the cunning weaver; himself all woven over with the vines; every month assuming greener, fresher verdure; but himself a skeleton. Life folded Death; Death trellised Life; the grim god wived with youthful Life, and begat him curly-headed glories.” Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 449–450.

<sup>38</sup> “Oh, grassy glades! Oh, ever vernal endless landscapes in the soul; in ye,—though long parched by the dead drought of the earthly life,—in ye, men yet may roll, like young horses in new morning clover; and for some few fleeting moments, feel the cool dew of the life immortal on them. Would to God these blessed calms would last. But

mingled, mingling threads of life are woven by warp and woof; calms crossed by storms, a storm for every calm. There is no steady unretracting progress in this life; we do not advance through fixed gradations, and at the last one pause.” Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 492.

<sup>39</sup> Here I agree with Eric Wertheimer. “The fact,” he argues, “of Spanish imperial influence is of great consequence to Melville.” The “territory of Peru...is a direct engagement with the with the destructive histories of imperial Spanish America.” In other words, that Melville is “mindful of the cultural violence of empire,” and “history continues to hurt.” Eric Wertheimer, *Imagined Empires: Incas, Aztecs, and the New World of American Literature, 1771–1876* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999), 139, 5, 138. Unlike Wertheimer, I not only believe that “Melville is a writer of post-colonial critique,” but also of philosophical critique. Wertheimer, *Imagined Empires*, 158. I here thus also agree with Michael Jonik’s focus on Melville’s metaphysics of Indian hating. His Melville “diagnoses” a “dehumanization” process by “metaphysics of Indian-hating,” which is “potentially murderous” since everything is philosophically wagered on the expansion of unity through the negation of difference. Michael Jonik, “Melville’s Misanthropology,” *Melville’s Philosophies* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2017), 363. Or, as Joyce Sparer Adler remarks about Melville’s view on colonialization, in the context of the South Pacific (and later in her text in the context of Spanish South America), as “presumably the ameliorator of life, brings death; Christianity, presumably the bearer of light, puts out the sun.” Joyce Sparer Adler, *War in Melville’s Imagination* (New York: New York UP, 1981), 6. Emerging from the shadow of such works as Joel Barlow’s *The Columbiad* (1807) and the detailed descriptions of Lima in Amasa Delano’s *A Narrative of Voyages and Travels* (1817), “Melville saw Spain,” Adler continues, “as America’s predecessor...to be a portent for his own country.” And so Melville thinks that a “connection should be made between the Spanish experience and the American one.” Adler, *War*, 106, 107. In his *Piazza Tales* (1856), Melville accordingly manifests two captains together, Benito Cereno and the fictionalized Amasa Delano, so that the Spaniards might more clearly pass off the torch to the Americas. Melville’s tale shows that spread of Spanish power from San Domingo to Lima, but when Melville wrote the story, the Spanish colonization of South America was already receding, and so his critique is set on its successor.

<sup>40</sup> According to Beale, “animal oil best adapted to the purpose of illumination.” Melville’s marginalia suggests by his markings that he was interested in the following phrase: “the necessary equilibrium between the water and the animal is produced by the oil.” Thomas Beale, *The Natural History of the Sperm Whale. to Which Is Added, a Sketch of a South-Sea Whaling Voyage* (London: John Van Voorst, 1839), 2, 88. Melville’s sources, beyond Henry Theodor Cheever’s *The Whale and His Captors* (1850), cannot be fully traced down and listed, but they include, both fictitious and factual, Owen Chase’s *Narrative of the Most Extraordinary and Distressing Shipwreck of the Whale-Ship Essex, of Nantucket* (1821), Joseph Hart Coleman’s *Miriam Coffin, or the Whale-Fishermen: a Tale* (1834), J. N. Reynolds’ *Mocha Dick* (1839), and Francis Allyn Olmsted’s *Incidents of a Whaling Voyage* (1841).

<sup>41</sup> “She was a thing of trophies. A cannibal of a craft, tricking herself forth in the chased bones of her enemies. All round, her unpanelled, open bulwarks were garnished like one continuous jaw, with the long sharp teeth of the sperm whale, inserted there for pins, to fasten her old hempen thews and tendons to. Those thews ran not through base blocks of land wood, but deftly travelled over sheaves of sea-ivory. Scorning a turnstile wheel at her reverend helm, she sported there a tiller; and that tiller was in one mass, curiously carved from the long narrow lower jaw of her hereditary foe. The helmsman who steered by that tiller in a tempest, felt like the Tartar, when he holds back his fiery steed by clutching its jaw. A noble craft, but somehow a most melancholy! All noble things are touched with that.” Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 169–170.

<sup>42</sup> Shelley, Sharon Cameron argues, affirms “demonic power.” Cameron, *Writing*, 89. For Melville’s extensive reading of Shelley, see Mary K. Bercaw, *Melville’s Sources* (Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1987), 119.

<sup>43</sup> Shelley “makes considerable use of the daemon of Greek philosophy,” James Notopoulos writes, so he “revised part of *Queen Mab* and later published it under the title *The Daemon of the World*.” James Notopoulos, *The Platonism of Shelley: A Study of Platonism and the Poetic Mind* (New York: Octagon Books, 1969), 159.

<sup>44</sup> Percy Bysshe Shelley, *The Daemon of the World, The Complete Poetical Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley*, ed. Neville Rogers, *Volume I 1802-1813* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 94-99.

<sup>45</sup> Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, 75, 52.



46 Shelley, *The Daemon of the World*, 263-279.

47 Shelley, *The Daemon of the World*, 282-283.

48 Dayan, "Melville's Creatures, or Seeing Otherwise," 52, 55.

49 Herman Melville, "Shelley's Vision," *Timoleon, Etc* (New York: The Caxton Press, 1891), 39.

50 Seeing that foes wear their adversary's image, Deleuze, paraphrasing Nietzsche, explains that an oppositional force would "not survive if it did not first of all borrow the feature of the forces with which it struggles," and so wear the competitor's "mask." Deleuze, *Nietzsche*, 5).

51 Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 202. "It can therefore be said," Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel might put it, "it is the very first-born Son of Light [Lucifer] himself who fell because he withdrew into himself or became self-centered, but that in his place another was at once created." G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, tr. A. V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1977, 468. Though Ahab is an insomniac, Ishmael describes such periods of sleep from which Ahab awakes in terror, and from his own dreams, as a beam of living light, flees towards the rising Sun. "For, at such times," considers Ishmael, "this Ahab that had gone to his hammock, was not the agent that so caused him to burst from it in horror again," it rather "was the eternal, living principle or soul in him; and in sleep, being for the time dissociated from the characterizing mind, which at other times employed it for its outer vehicle or agent, it spontaneously sought escape from the scorching contiguity of the frantic thing, of which, for the time, it was no longer an integral...Therefore, the tormented spirit that glared out of bodily eyes, when what seemed Ahab rushed from his room, was for the time but a vacated thing, a formless somnambulistic being, a ray of living light, to be sure, but without an object to colour, and therefore a blankness in itself. God help thee, old man, thy thoughts have created a creature in thee; and he whose intense thinking thus makes him a Prometheus; a vulture feeds upon that heart for ever; that vulture the very creature he creates." Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 202. With a second reference to Shelley (*Prometheus Unbound*, 1820), where Prometheus' observes that the "secret / powers of this strange world" transform him by his own rebellions to an "empty phantom," Ishmael imagines that Ahab's battles are suspended when he succumbs to sleep, returning him to a dreaming calm, but during which a light comes apart from him, awaking his "blazing brain" from which "a chasm seemed opening in him, from which forked flames and lightnings shot up." Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 202.

52 Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 496, 497.

53 Beale, *Natural History*, 161.

54 Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 571, 164.

55 Prescott, *Peru*, 42.

56 I agree with Cameron that "the doubloon passage is central to any interpretation of the novel." Cameron, *Corporeal Self*, 21.

57 Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 167, 161-166, 162, 430, 189, 431, 434, 430.

58 In "The Doubloon," Melville has Ahab, Starbuck, Stubb, and Flask explicitly perform individual meditations ("I look, you look, he looks; we look, ye look, they look," repeated thrice) upon the coin's meaning to make clear the Captain's view by contrast. Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 434.

59 Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 164, 169, 431, 184. Here I agree with the spirit of the reading of Ahab's anti-surface ontology in Hubert Dreyfus and Sean Dorrance Kelly, *All Things Shining: Reading the Western Classics to Find Meaning in a Secular Age* (New York: Free Press, 2011), 157-163.

60 Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 193.

<sup>61</sup> For Melville's time in Lima in 1844 while enlisted aboard the *United States*, see Hershel Parker, Herman Melville: A Biography, Vol. 1, 1819–1851 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1996), 279–282.

<sup>62</sup> William Hickling Prescott, *History of the Conquest of Peru* (New York: The Modern Library, 1998), 192, 193.

<sup>63</sup> For Melville on Peru (and reading of Prescott), see Wyn Kelley, “The Style of Lima: Colonialism, Urban Form, and ‘The Town-Ho’s Story,’” *Melville Among the Nations* (Kent: The Kent State UP, 2001) and John Cyril Barton “‘An Unquestionable Source?’ Melville’s ‘The Town-Ho’s Story,’ the Inquisition, and W. B. Stevenson’s Twenty Years’ Residence in South America, *Nineteenth Century Literature* 68.2 (September 2013).

<sup>64</sup> “The most sumptuous edifice in Cuzco, in the times of the Incas, was undoubtedly the great temple dedicated to the Sun, which, studded with gold plates, as already noticed, was surrounded by convents and dormitories for priests, with their gardens and broad parterres sparkling with gold. The exterior ornaments had been already removed by the Conquerors,—all but the frieze of gold, which imbedded with stones, still encircled the principal building. It is probable that the tales of wealth, so greedily circulated among the Spaniards, greatly exceeded the truth. If they did not, the natives must have been very successful in concealing their treasures from the invaders.” Prescott, *Peru*, 361.

<sup>65</sup> Because of disease, death often preceded the sword; because of its vast empire, land could not easily be held; because of its impressive vistas, its territories were difficult to traverse; because of its dispersed and resolved people, it could not simply be conquered. For such reasons, among many others including civil war, Peru seems to represent a shadowy desire of a misguided campaign. But there was also a crisis in perspective.

<sup>66</sup> Prescott, *Peru*, 114. “The Peruvian,” for Prescott, “is a materialist.” David Levin, *History as Romantic Art: Bancroft, Prescott, Motley, and Parkman* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1959), 150.

<sup>67</sup> Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 194. Related to Melville’s inhuman solitudes and Peru is the following: “And to make all this clearer, I would say that this land of Peru consists of three ranges or barren stretches unfit for human habitation. One of these is the range of the Andes Mountains, covered with dense woods, where the land is so poor that, except beyond the mountains, there are no inhabitants and never were. The other is the plateau running the length of this range of the Andes which is intensely cold and whose peaks are covered with deep snow which never stops falling. Nor can people live in these sierras on account of the snow and cold and also because the land produces nothing as it is buffeted by snows and winds which blow continuously. The other range, as I call it, is the sands which stretch from Tumbes to beyond Tarapacá, where all there is to be seen are deserts of sand baked by the sun, where there is neither water nor grass, nor trees, not any living thing.” Pedro de Cieza de León, *The Incas*, tr. Harriet de Onis (Norman: U of Oklahoma P, 1976), 17.

<sup>68</sup> Upon the arrival of the Spanish Conquistadors, with Sun reflecting off their bucklers and cuirasses, the Inca, Prescott speculates, questioned if these horsemen were glowing centaurs, gods even, the “true Children of the Sun,” and greeted with hospitality. Prescott, *Peru*, 357. However, with mounting examples of bad faith and mistrust, along with evidence of the Conquistador’s base humanity, the Inca people could see that these were men with shadowy motivations. And yet the tipping point came when the Inca’s belief in appearances was challenged by the imposition of Christian faith in the falsehood of the visible world, which, when rejected by the natives, ignited open conflict. The Spaniards, gaining the upper hand, captured the emperor, and Atahualpa, who offered the submission of his generals and rooms full of silver and gold in exchange for cessation. After ransoming the precious metals, the Spaniards broke their oath and baptized Atahualpa before strangling him. Soon following Atahualpa’s execution, the Spanish founded their city of Lima. The episode, of great historical interest, also opens a serious literary question about Melville’s tale “Benito Cereno” (1855), where at the end Babo, a Senegalese slave who rose up and overtook his Spanish captors, is arrested and transported to Lima to be decapitated and burned at the stake. Death by immolation was a common Inquisition punishment for heresy, why Atahualpa, to not preclude his culture’s traditional mummification, submitted to conversion. Babo, however, refused the Spaniards any concessions after they betrayed the terms of his mutiny, standing defiantly silent at trial. In face of the demanded testimony of his misdeeds, Babo refuses to swear any characterization of the events under oath, a quiet indictment upon Lima’s

corrupt views. Melville's thinking on Lima seems to further open the literary question into its philosophical potential related to the appearance and reality distinction, understood by the Spaniards to correspond with criminality and justice. In "Benito Cereno," Melville comes to challenge swearing in Lima, revealing through Babo's silence that testimonial records overcast voices that do not speak. Babo, the Senegalese slave taken from Africa by the Spanish ship *San Dominick*, incites an insurrection and overtakes his captors. They removed the ship's figure-head of Christopher Columbus and replace it with the skeleton of Captain Don Alaxandro, and order their return home by the surviving Spaniards, but the ship goes hopelessly adrift. When eventually spotted and gammed with the *Bachelor's Delight*, Captain Amasa Delano converses with Don Benito Cereno, whose captaincy the Africans require be performed so that the American does not detect their mutiny. After a series of nearly comical displays of Delano's credulity, encouraged by the crew's reflecting of his beliefs about race and servitude, the illusion fed to him is dispelled and the Africans recaptured after a panicked skirmish. Identified as leading the clandestine rebellion, Babo is called to testify in court, but refuses—the narrator suggests—because his account, regardless of its appeal to personal dignity and freedom, would only reinforce the narrative of unlawful slave insurrection. That is to say, the ideological masking, unmasking, and remasking of the plot—covering up strivings for liberty—leaves Babo speechless. Since any description of the event threatens to binarily resolve the tale, Melville's narrator chooses to let the silence speak for itself, and Babo's body is decapitated and burned to ashes. Where Queequeg's tattooed skin perhaps lovingly gestures towards Lima, Babo's head hangs there on a spike, representing either colonial power, or a putrid mortification of Spanish corruption, a morbid token of the tale's obsession with the appearance and reality distinction, which are related by the narrator to misrepresentation and honesty, and so injustice and justice. Insinuating also that the alignment of such terms always presupposes certain ideological commitments, and since the tale is unable to raise both perspectives to the surface as testimony, the narrator also hangs the cloud of Babo's misfortune over Cereno until his dying day. "Benito Cereno," by illuminating the philosophical aspect of the conquest of Peru, suggests that testimony, when the adjudicators deny the reality of appearances, must lie. It is perhaps further still for these reasons that Lima is present during significant moments in Melville's writing.

<sup>69</sup> Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 249, 249, 250. As Pizzaro fated it to be when he with his sword drew its famous line in the sand.

<sup>70</sup> After Ishmael and Queequeg spend the first night of their marriage at the Spouter-Inn in New Bedford, they honeymoon over breakfast. During their meal, Ishmael surveys Queequeg's tattoos which, "barred with various tints, seemed like the Andes' western slope, to show forth in one array, contrasting climates, zone by zone." Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 30.

<sup>71</sup> Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 243.

<sup>72</sup> "To some the general interest in the white whale was now wildly heightened by a circumstance of the Town Ho's Story, which seemed obscurely to involve with the whale a certain wonderous, inverted visitation of one of those so called judgements of God." Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 242.

<sup>73</sup> Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 256, 258, 259.

<sup>74</sup> Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 296. The "writers testify to the seasonable aid rendered by St. James, who with his buckler, displaying the device of his Military Order, and armed with his flaming sword, rode his white charger into the thick of the enemy." Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 398.

<sup>75</sup> Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 192.

<sup>76</sup> Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 192. For an account about Melville's understanding of yarnspinning, see Edgar A. Dryden's *Melville's Thematics of Form: The Great Art of Telling the Truth* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1968) and John Samson, *White Lies: Melville's Narrative of Facts* (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1989). Since the antebellum whaling genre was generally nonfiction, and, in fact, Melville belongs—along with Joseph Coleman Hart and Jeremiah Reynolds—to a select group who wrote whaling literature, and given that their narratives heavily sourced firsthand accounts, it remains unclear to what degree *Moby-Dick* is fictional. Dubious, whaling stories not only complicated the boundaries between fact and fiction, they often reversed them, provoking even Thomas Beale, a scientific writer on

the sperm whale fishery, to admit that “truth is stranger than fiction.” Beale, another of Melville’s prime sources, is well known for providing *Moby-Dick*’s chapters on the whale’s anatomy with detailed descriptions. He confesses, appropriate to his conveyance, not “the slightest pretension to literary tact,” and so tries to “be found somewhat interesting, and even useful, until some person better qualified for the task shall arise,” and was apparently heard by Melville, whose writing, according to Beale’s logic, turned whaling truth into fiction. Thomas Beale, *The Natural History of the Sperm Whale* (London: John Van Voorst, 1839), iii, 197. But since truth is stranger than fiction, literature—insofar as it is fictitious—makes truth appear less strange, even more ordinary, and so is it any wonder that Melville thinks Moby Dick a real and actual whale? In another letter to his literary liaison, Evert Augustus Duyckinck, the physical heft of Melville’s writing is further confused with a whale’s body. Although the letter is now lost, we know that Duyckinck sent Melville a newspaper clipping about the whaleship *Ann Alexander*, recently stove by a whale, and insinuates that the fictional Moby Dick is responsible, as we can infer from Melville’s reply, which is fascinating. “For some days past being engaged in the woods with axe, wedge, & beetle, the Whale had almost completely slipped me for the time (& I was the merrier for it) when Crash! comes Moby Dick himself (as you justly say) & reminds me of what I have been about for part of the last year or two. It is really & truly a surprising coincidence—to say the least. I make no doubt it is Moby Dick himself, for there is no account of his capture after the sad fate of the Pequod about fourteen years ago.—Ye Gods! What a Commentator is this Ann Alexander whale. What he had to say is short & pithy & very much to the point. I wonder if my evil art has raised this monster.” While Melville’s reply to Duyckinck seems to bespeak the scribblings of an overworked fiction writer losing touch with everyday reality, the topic of conversation is an actual event and whaling literature—not just by authors—was mistaken for fact in Melville’s day. And yet, if we take Melville’s correspondence with Hawthorne, Morewood, and Duyckinck together, he seems not mistaken, to even be saying something ontological about Moby Dick’s status, who “is” *real*. But Duyckinck also provokes, related to what had already been sent to Hawthorne and Morewood, a rather freakish reasoning by Melville. His reasoning indeed reiterates a theory of authorship, that his book is dangerous, that he is thrilled when it makes an impact, that he takes no responsibility. Raising his thinking to even more of an extreme, Melville’s writing comes alive, makes history, manifests its wickedness in the world, and commits an atrocity. Totally confusing fiction with reality, if that was not enough, Melville also suggests that the violence done by his written words, as embodied in a living monster, delivers a concise message, outdoing its author in reaching an audience. Melville, as in the example of his letter to Duyckinck, is surprised to hear the news of Moby Dick and his dark dealings. Being “short & pithy & very much to the point,” Moby Dick strikes the reader, literally, even violently without a trace of the sorcerer who sent it to press. “Evil art,” as Melville so calls his writing, in other words, irreversibility summons a “monster.” Melville, *Correspondence*, 209. Taking Melville’s ontology seriously makes available his theory of writing, embodiment, and violence, according to which the author’s deeds escape from their pages into the world as palpable misdeeds.

77 Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 188, 189, 192.

78 Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 192.

79 I want to recover Gleim’s claim, in 1929, that “Swedenborg excited a strong influence on Melville.” William Gleim, “A Theory of ‘Moby Dick,’” *Herman Melville*, ed. Paul Gerhard Buchloh and Hartmut Kruger (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1974), 77. Mary K. Bercaw Edwards argues, however, that there is limited evidence of Melville actually reading Swedenborg, beyond him noting conversations on the topic and the incredible fame of the Swedish mystic. Mary K Bercaw, *Melville’s Sources* (Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1987.)

80 Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 191.

81 Emanuel Swedenborg, *Concerning the White Horse described in the Apocalypse* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1907), 3485.

82 Swedenborg, *White Horse*, 6275, 6284, 6299.

83 I consider here Samuel Otter’s insight in “‘Race’ in *Typee* and *White-Jacket*” (1998), thinking finished in *Melville’s Anatomies* (1999), that Melville immanently critiques taxonomical ideologies of his day, ones which sought to become only skin deep and thus empirically available to realize the “extraordinary nineteenth-century effort to gain access to the depth and difference of human character.” Otter, “Race,” 19. Ideology, for Otter in terms of racial ordering, was no longer privileged as mental content, and in Melville’s moment occupied the surfaces of

things mapped, measured, tattooed, and flogged. Legible, ideology could be impressed upon and then read back from skin, interpreted hierarchically. Otter's thinking is particularly informative when considering a book which plunges race back into the depths, *Battle-pieces and Aspects of the War* (1866), Melville's collection of Civil War poems. After the Civil War, Melville's human classificatory system collapses into a racial binary. While the cause of unease over Melville's definitive position on race and slavery, the infamous "Supplement," affixed to the book's end, identifies a crisis in thinking which disrupts what otherwise seems a lifelong commitment by the author to think about race in an unusual way, imperiling his overall "tendency to," in Sanborn's words, "lateralize just about everything capable of being hierarchically arranged." Sanborn, "Melville," 13. In a period of ongoing upheaval, which Melville argues is not ended with the Confederacy's surrender, the Union was reforming (or reconstructing) dialectically, synthesizing the white race, both Southern and Northern, against the manumitted black race. He senses the postbellum division in a subterranean current of blood, considered the natural indication of human types. His defense of this thinking, and his ambitions for the higher American unity, is that he is only Christian, after all. Readers have found this unimaginative view to be indicative of Melville's desire to participate in national reconciliation, even at the expense of those now accounted citizens. But *Battle-pieces* was not Melville's final word on human typology.

84 Herman Melville, *Billy Budd, Sailor (An Inside Narrative)*, eds. Harrison Hayford and Merton M. Sealts (Chicago: The U of Chicago P, 2001), 53. Hereafter abbreviated as *BB*.

85 Melville, *BB*, 41, 43.

86 There was "just one thing amiss in him...an occasional liability to a vocal defect." Melville, *BB*, 53.

87 Melville, *BB*, 49, 95, 94.

88 Herman Melville, *Moby-Dick; or The Whale*, eds. Harrison Hayford, Hershel Parker, and G. Thomas Tanselle (Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern UP and the Newberry Library, 2001), 121.

89 Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 7.

90 Melville, *BB*, 96.

91 Stephen Matterson, during a rare explication of Cloots' thinking in the context of Melville, deduces that Melville must have had a "prolonged interest" in the revolutionary figure. Stephen Matterson, *Melville: Fashioning in Modernity* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2014), 44.

92 Melville, *BB*, 75. Hester Bloom notices that Melville "invokes Cloots" as a "figure to stand for a variegated collection of human types." Hester Bloom, "Atlantic Trade," *A Companion to Herman Melville* (Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley Blackwell, 2015), 113.

93 A short genealogical list of ethnographical human taxonomists might include Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, Comte Buffon, George Combe, and Samuel George Morton, somewhat culminated in Josiah Nott and George Gliddon's *Types of Mankind* (1854).

94 Melville, *BB*, 127.

95 In *White-Jacket*, the *HMS Neversink* produces such men, the prime example being Landless, who Samuel Otter calls a "perfect product." Samuel Otter, *Melville's Anatomies* (Berkeley: The U of California P, 1999), 55. Landless, flogged endlessly "was a favorite with the officers," White Jacket remarks, "so dead to the least dignity of manhood that he could hardly be called a man." Herman Melville, *White-Jacket; or, The Word in a Man-of-War*, eds. Harrison Hayford, Hershel Parker, and G. Thomas Tanselle (Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern UP and the Newberry Library, 1970), 384.

96 Melville, *BB*, 43, 43, 45, 81, 74.

97 Gregg Crane, "Judgement in *Billy Budd*," *The New Cambridge Companion to Herman Melville*, ed. Robert S. Levine (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2014), 147.

98 Melville, *BB*, 74, 78. Claggart grew together his desire to be handsomely adored like Billy with his feelings of resentment into a monomania: "so it was that into the gall of Claggart's envy he infused the vitriol of contempt." Melville, *BB*, 79.

99 Melville, *BB*, 76, 78. Melville considers "Plato" and "Calvinism" in reference to "'Natural Depravity: a depravity according to nature.'" Melville, *BB*, 75.

100 Melville, *BB*, 75, 52, 79, 88, 90. 53. 83, 49, 75, 52, 65, 52, 86.

101 Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 1.

102 Blum, "Melville and Oceanic Studies," *The New Cambridge Companion to Herman Melville*, ed. Robert S. Levine (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2014), 24.

103 Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 4.

104 Since *Moby-Dick* is written for landsmen from the perspective of Ishmael, an islander seaman who tries his hand at whaling, we can guess that Melville intended for specialty thinking to be shared with his audience. Why else would he spend so many pages detailing how whalers have a radical experience with the aquatic element, and why such living allows them to think in the extreme? Perhaps the subsequent miscarriage of apprehension (and so appreciation) by readers of rare whaling philosophy in Melville's lifetime, and his resulting discouragement, motivated his final work—on one last occasion—to return to the sailing type.

105 Melville, *BB*, 54.

106 Herman Melville, *Billy Budd, Sailor and Other Uncompleted Writings* (Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern UP and the Newberry Library, 2017), 885.

107 Melville, *Billy Budd, Sailor and Other Uncompleted Writings*, 241.

108 Melville, *BB*, 110, 124, 125.

109 Bataille, *Essential Writings*, 13.

## Afterword and Recapitulation

### Dr. Spurzheim's Brain

Once you hugged the ugly Socrates because you saw the flame in the mouth, and heard the rushing of the demon,—the familiar,—and recognized the sound; for you have heard it in your own solitudes

—Herman Melville to Nathaniel Hawthorne, 1851<sup>1</sup>

After publishing *The Constitution of Man* (1828), one of the most popular books printed in the nineteenth-century, George Combe meditated upon a bust of Socrates within the Edinburgh Phrenological Society.<sup>2</sup> Informed by the phrenological principles expounded in his recent publication and by the scientific organization in which he found himself, Combe's eyes began to examine Socrates' cranium, noticing how its exterior development betrayed a deep metaphysics.<sup>3</sup> Recalling Franz Joseph Gall's teachings that originated Combe's craft, he considered how the "organ" of "metaphysical" thinking, when supremely developed, "forms a prominent round swelling" on the skull, "to be observed on the forehead of Socrates."<sup>4</sup> Citing

“Dr. Gall,” Combe’s mediation progressed through physiognomy and phrenology to the mind enshrined behind Socrates’ distended forehead. He knew from appearance that Socrates had an exemplary philosophical mind taking its form in the brain and in turn the skull, but what element first shaped this formational series? What primal force remained hidden from view?

Upon further meditation, Combe perceived that something was going on inside of Socrates not reducible to his physical appearance. “Socrates spoke,” Combe continued his reasoning in light of Gall, “frequently and willingly to his disciples of a demon” that “served him as a guide.”<sup>5</sup> This demonic voice enlightened Socrates not by revealing the hidden truth, but by persuading him that everything he knew to be true was, in fact, false. Through such philosophical asceticism, Socrates renounced all ordinary life until he could only conclude that he knew nothing. To negate his own life was thus to liberate his fixed essence from unfixed existence, to migrate from the realm of pure becoming to the realm of pure being. Hence, if hidden truth remained concealed from Socrates, he prepared himself for the afterlife, its revelation, through dialectical labors, denying everything unsettled as mere appearances. Guided by his demonic voice, the devaluation of life thus became his doctrine.

Socrates’ philosophical intervention in Greek thinking, as well as its long afterlife in western metaphysics and ethics, has deep significance, the logic and influence of which bears clarification. To briefly clarify Combe’s understanding, in Hegel’s formulation, Socrates’ “daemon” generated an “ethical” orientation towards life.<sup>6</sup> Socrates “said that he had a *δαιμόνιον* [(demonic voice)] within him, which counselled him what to do,” Hegel remarks in qualifying such orientation as “always a negative.” Through his perspective, Hegel continues, “Socrates manifests a revolutionary aspect towards the Athenian State” for which he “is condemned to death.” The Athenians intervened too late to curtail the revolution in thinking, for



Socrates' teachings "already struck firm root among themselves."<sup>7</sup> By the time that Socrates is condemned for corrupting the youth of Athens with his philosophy, the revolution in thinking had already happened.

However, if Socrates was unprepared to fully negate his life, Combe speculated upon the bust statue, "the opinion that he had would have been lost in the twenty-three years during which Aristophanes made it the subject of ridicule," and his doctrine would have vanished with him. Mulling over the bust, Combe imagined the philosopher's last day: "Socrates," at last committed "only to that force and justness of his own understanding" clarified through total negation, staged his own death, called the Athenian bluff, and quaffed hemlock before his audience. With finger outstretched to resolutely chart his passage into another realm, he drank the poisoned chalice, becoming the first martyr to self-knowledge.<sup>8</sup> On the dais that day, faith in his conviction took hold of the Athenian imagination and therein planted the seed of western metaphysics. Moreover, as many scholars have noted, from this metaphysics was also born an ethics, a *εὐδαιμονία* (demonic wellbeing) according to which ideas abstract from life are given a higher value and priority.

Through hierarchical thinking based in mistrust of everyday experience, thought—for Socrates—begins again with attaining true self-knowledge by his inner light: his demon. Gall's disciple, Johann Gaspar Spurzheim, who first disseminated phrenological principles to Combe when lecturing in Britain, distinguishes the phrenological quest from this Socratic perspective, however. "Socrates gave a particular direction to philosophical investigation," Spurzheim explains.<sup>9</sup> For "ancient philosophers were," he elaborates the distinction, "metaphysicians, that is, they examined objects without...observation;" whereas, he "incessantly repeat[s], that the aim of Phrenology is never to attempt point out what the mind is in itself...Phrenologists are

observers of nature, and as such they examine only the manifestation of the mind and the circumstances under which these take place in this life.”<sup>10</sup>

Performing mental examination in reverse of Socratic philosophy by way of an empirical rather than an idealist direction, Spurzheim’s “manifestation” of “mind” in “life” generates a crisis by which determining human superiority in the general scheme of living things becomes difficult, if not impossible. If we examine the mind not transcendently but immanently (as manifest in life), by what measure, Spurzheim puzzles, is the human mind qualified to maintain its privileged place in the regime of inquiry?<sup>11</sup> By perpetuating mind measurement through brain magnitude according to Aristotelian standards, Spurzheim is pained to realize, we must grant the whale mind “superiority” over the human mind.<sup>12</sup> For when “the superiority of man was at once attributed to the absolute size of his brain,” “modern discoveries” prove that the “brains of whales” doubtless “are larger than that of man.”<sup>13</sup> Proposing a solution, Spurzheim figures that calculating the relative proportions between heads and bodies and geometric relations of the cranium could be the metric that resolves the issue of mental superiority. Herman Melville, upon reading “Spurzheim,” emphasizes what is at stake in settling such question “else, the sperm whale, with his tun of an occiput, would transcend us all.”<sup>14</sup>

In Melville’s writing, Ishmael thus picks up where “Gall and his disciple Spurzheim” left off when they “threw out some hints” about “other beings than man” and the bewildering whale mind.<sup>15</sup> To do “a thing which no Physiognomist or Phrenologist has as yet undertaken,” Ishmael’s direct “application” of physiognomy and phrenology “to the whale” situates him as a “pioneer,” open to a revolutionary perspective. After performing a physiognomical examination, the result of which suggesting that from “full front view, you feel the Deity and the dread powers more forcibly than beholding any other object in living nature” upon the whale’s forehead, a

“sublime” nothingness beyond our comprehension, Ishmael makes his phrenological intervention. Because the whale’s head “in life” is a “superincumbent mass” in excess of its bones, Ishmael’s phrenology must radicalize beyond the cranium in order to locate the “his true brain” and estimate the mind. If the skull does not surround (and so contain) the brain, and if the “vertebrae” make a “necklace” of little “skulls” descending down the spine, then the entire spine must be included in the phrenological investigation. For if the “cranial cavity is continuous with the first neck-vertebra” such that the brain is continuous with the spinal cord and branches nerves that diffuse throughout the blubbery body, approximating the mind includes the whale’s entire being, shifting phrenology back into the realm of ontology.

Once Ishmael brings “this spinal branch of phrenology to the Sperm Whale,” finding that the brain extends through “mass of tremendous life” therein, it becomes and “atmospheric” in “connexion with the outer” water “elements.” With this realization, the demonic relations of the mind appeared manifest in the whale, distributed throughout its system, and continuous with its externality. Moby Dick thus, for Ishmael, “seemed the gliding great demon of the seas of life,—all this to explain, would be to dive deeper than Ishmael can go.”<sup>16</sup>

\*

\*\*

With the promise of spreading his phrenology and intrigued by the prospect of examining Indian and Slave skulls, Spurzheim sailed to America in 1832 and planned to take up residency in metropolitan locations, to include field excursions across the country, searching out specimens unavailable in Europe.<sup>17</sup> His celebrity preceded him and the American appetite was already whetted for his theories. Upon landing in New York—although his tour was set to officially begin in Boston—even John James Audubon attempted to divert him to Philadelphia. Brushing

off such inducements, firmly grasping his copy of Thomas Paine's *Rights of Man* (1791), and with his luggage full of bird, mammalian, and human skulls, he soon arrived at Yale University *en route* to Boston where he took part in graduation ceremonies and performed a human dissection.

Taking up residency in Massachusetts, he was first recognized at Harvard College's famed Phi Beta Kappa address, followed by an unending onslaught of social and professional obligations. By day, in Cambridge at Harvard and in Boston at the Medical Association, he would instruct physicians and academics; by night, he gave popular talks at the Boston Athenaeum and Masonic Temple. Everyone rushed to make his acquaintance and engage him in conversation, so that he became the darling of Yankee society. Spurzheim's burdensome schedule, however, weakened his constitution so that when, after only three months into his American sabbatical, he rapidly developed a fatal fever and died. Immediately after, a death mask was cast, portraits commissioned, and then his vital organs were collected. Spurzheim's public dissection was undertaken by Dr. John Collins, who carefully separated and preserved illustrious skull and brain.<sup>18</sup>

After Spurzheim's brain was sent to the Athenaeum, mass mourning commenced: a precession of Medical Association physicians and surgeons carried Spurzheim's remains from Boston Medical College to the Old South Meeting House, where thousands came to pay final tribute, packing in beyond capacity so that the streets became thronged with mourners. The funeral then traveled from Boston to Cambridge for eulogy at Harvard, at last dirged away to his tomb by the Handel and Haydn Society. The procession then passed down Brattle Street—past Henry Wadsworth Longfellow's house—toward his internment at Mt. Auburn, the crown jewel of the rural cemetery movement, where a monument was erected at the cemetery's entrance. It

stands prominently there to this day wherein, in an attendant's words, "this hallowed retreat of the dead, rests the dust of men, women, and children, of families who, for many generations, have made Boston what it has been and what it is—the city where Spurzheim was advised, before he left home, first to make known his theories. This was a high compliment to the modern Athens of America."<sup>19</sup>



Figure G. Spurzheim's Monument. Courtesy the author.

Upon Spurzheim's death, the Boston Phrenological Society formed to promote his science in America, only to molder after a decade. Within their collection, and poorly preserved, Spurzheim's brain festered. His skull eventually went to Dr. John Collins Warren and is still held at Harvard's Warren Anatomical Museum. For better or worse, Spurzheim's life has become attached to the pseudothinking associated with phrenology, the criminology associated with physiognomy, and the scientific racism associated with craniology. When Combe arrived six

years later in Boston for his own tour, the reformulation of Spurzheim's legacy was complete. Where Spurzheim had been an empiricist, Combe's phrenology sought to assimilate classical Athenian thinking with modern science. Taking up his residency at the Boston Phrenological Society, Combe was thus perceived as uniting metaphysics with science. Horace Mann, Nathaniel Hawthorne's broth-in-law, even gossiped that Combe was the Francis Bacon of "metaphysical science."<sup>20</sup>

Despite the promise, by 1849—with the dissolution of the Phrenological Society and the scattering of its skull collection—phrenology's esteem waned in America. In 1851, Queequeg arrived from Polynesia to sell his heads only to find that the American market oversaturated. Wandering the streets of New Bedford, he peddled his heads, but they were shrunken and diminished in value. What happened? Where were the buyers that he had been promised? After meeting Ishmael, who detested this business of peddling heads, they went a-whaling together, a transition, I claim, full of meaning.

- 1 Melville, *Correspondence*, 213.
- 2 Stanley Finger, Paul Eling, *Franz Joseph Gall: Naturalist of the Mind, Visionary of the Brain* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2019), 449.
- 3 George Combe, *A System of Phrenology* (London: Neill & Co., 1830), 482.
- 4 Franz Joseph Gall, *Dr. Gall's New Theory of Physiognomy* (London: L Longman, Hurst, Rees, and Orme, 1807), xxv.
- 5 Combe, *A System*, 309.
- 6 Hegel, *Phenomenology*, 431.
- 7 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, tr. J. Sibree (New York: Dover, 1956), 270.
- 8 Combe, *A System*, 309, 374.
- 9 Johann Gaspar Spurzheim, *The Physiognomical System of Drs. Gall and Spurzheim* (London: Baldwin, Cradock, and Joy, 1815), 408, 409.
- 10 Johann Gaspar Spurzheim, *Phrenology, or the Doctrine of the Mental Phenomena* (Boston: Marsh, Capen, and Lyon, 1833), iv.
- 11 Spurzheim agrees with Socrates that the human must be regarded as the pinnacle of life and the core interest of epistemology. "Man," Spurzheim declares, "the most important being of creation, ought chiefly to interest every reflecting mind." Reflecting minds, self-reflecting, take themselves to be the most interesting object in existence. "As moreover," he expands, "we ourselves belong to this species of being" who follow the "divine precept" from Athens, "ΓΝΩΘΙ ΣΕΑΥΤΟΝ—Know thyself." Spurzheim, *Physiognomical System*, 2.
- 12 Spurzheim, *Physiognomical System*, 190.
- 13 Spurzheim, *Physiognomical System*, 190–192.
- 14 Herman Melville, *Mardi and A Voyage Thither* (Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1998), 516. Literary critics often use the episode, and even more the following one in *Moby-Dick*, to argue that Melville subverts phrenology. I claim the opposite: Melville used phrenology to subvert the human; or, more to the point, he potentialized phrenology, pushed it to limits that Spurzheim was too timid to go, to amplify the whale. Literary reviewers never get away from conditioning phrenology (along with conflating it with craniology) as pseudoscience. But claiming that phrenology was pseudoscientific is revisionary, and suggests that Melville expends otherwise serious words quibbling with something patently fallacious. The critical consensus that phrenology was always pseudoscientific seems to trace back to Harold Aspiz. Henceforth Melville criticism, I believe, has been convinced that we do not need to understand the history of phrenology before criticizing it, and that it is fine to presume a version of Melville who, by default, opposed a science that was always already pseudo.
- 15 Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 345. In one poetic celebration of Spurzheim's work, although there are many, Lord Francis Jeffrey and John Gordon write that "That size of mind depends on size of brain, / All human observation renders plain; / On size of body mind cannot demand, / Large men to little men, in wisdom, bend; / Whale are enormous creatures,—true, but then / They've smaller intellects than slender men: / Then surely talents don't depend on size, / Or else a whale might all the world surprise, / And prove genius, on a mighty scale! / A huge great man,—thought 'very like a whale.'" Francis Jeffrey, John Gordon, *The Craniad: Or, Spurzheim Illustrated, A Poem* (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1817), 33–34.
- 16 Melville, *Moby-Dick*, 345, 346, 348–349, 349, 187.

<sup>17</sup> For more details on Spurzheims tour, see Charles Colbert, *Perfection: Phrenology and the Fine Arts in American* (Chapel Hill: The U of North Carolina P), 1997.

<sup>18</sup> “Remains of Dr. Spurzheim,” *Boston Medical and Surgical Journal*, Vols. 6–7 (Boston: Clapp and Hull, 1832), 239–240. References to Spurzheim’s decapitation include “Spurzheim,” *American Magazine of Useful and Entertaining Knowledge*, Vol. 1, ed. Nathaniel Hawthorne (Boston: Bewick Company, 1835), 65–67. “Gaspard Spurzheim,” Hezekiah Butterworth, *Young Folks’ History of Boston* (Boston: Lothrop and Company, 1881), 459. For the most detailed and exhaustive account available on Spurzheim in America, see Anthony A. Walsh, “The American Tour of Dr. Spurzheim,” *Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences* 27.2 (1972): 187–205.

<sup>19</sup> Nahum Capen, *Reminiscences of Dr. Spurzheim and George Combe* (Boston: A. Williams & Co., 1881), 4.

<sup>20</sup> Mary Mann, *Life of Horace Mann* (Boston: Walker, Fuller, and Company, 1865), 105.



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abrams, M. H. *The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971.
- Adams, James Truslow. "Emerson Re-read." *The Recognition of Ralph Waldo Emerson: Selected Criticism Since 1837*. Edited by Milton R. Konvitz. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1972.
- Alcott, Amos Bronson, "Thoreau and Emerson." *The American Transcendentalists*. Edited by Perry Miller. New York: Doubleday, 1957.
- Allen, Margaret Vanderhaar. *The Achievement of Margaret Fuller*. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1979.
- Andriano, Joseph. *Our Ladies of Darkness: Feminine Daemonology in Male Gothic Fiction*. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993.
- Aristotle. *Poetics*. Translated by S. H. Butcher. New York: Hill and Wang, 1961.
- Armstrong, Nancy and Leonard Tennenhouse. *The Imaginary Puritan: Literature, Intellectual Labor, and the Origins of Personal Life*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992.
- Arsić, Branka. *The Passive Eye: Gaze and Subjectivity in Berkeley (via Beckett)*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003.
- . *On Leaving: A Reading in Emerson*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010.
- . "Introduction." *American Impersonal: Essays with Sharon Cameron*. New York: Bloomsbury Publishing Inc., 2014.
- . *Bird Relics: Greif and Vitalism in Thoreau*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2016.
- Arsić, Branka, and Cary Wolfe. "Introduction." *The Other Emerson*. Edited by Branka Arsić and Cary Wolfe. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010.
- Arsić, Branka, and K. L. Evans, "Introduction." *Melville's Philosophies*. Edited by Branka Arsić and K. L. Evans. New York: Bloomsbury, 2017.

- Badiou, Alain. *Deleuze: The Clamor of Being*. Translated by Louis Burchill. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000.
- Barthes, Roland. *A Lover's Discourse: Fragments*. Translated by Richard Howard. New York: Penguin Books, 1990.
- . "From Work to Text." *The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001.
- . *The Neutral*. Trs. Rosalind E. Krauss and Denis Hollier. New York: Columbia UP, 2005.
- Barton, John Cyril. "'An Unquestionable Source?' Melville's 'The Town-Ho's Story,' the Inquisition, and W. B. Stevenson's Twenty Years' Residence in South America" *Nineteenth Century Literature* 68.2 (September 2013).
- Bataille, Georges. *The Accursed Share: An Essay on General Economy. Volume I: Consumption*. Translated by Robert Hurley. New York: Zone Books, 1988.
- . *Literature and Evil: Essays by Georges Bataille*. Translated by Alastair Hamilton. New York: Marion Boyars, 1997.
- . *Essential Writings*. Ed. Michael Richardson. London: Sage, 1998.
- Beale, Thomas. *The Natural History of the Sperm Whale. to Which Is Added, a Sketch of a South-Sea Whaling Voyage*. London: John Van Voorst, 1839.
- Bellis, Peter J. *No Mysteries Out of Ourselves: Identity and textual Form in the Novels of Herman Melville*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990.
- Benton, Joel. "Emerson's Optimism." *Emerson among His Contemporaries*. Edited by Kenneth Walter Cameron. Hartford: Transcendental Books, 1967.
- Bennett, Jane. *Thoreau's Nature: Ethics, Politics, and the Wild*. London: Sage, 1994.
- . *Vibrant Matter: a political ecology of things*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2010.
- Bercaw, Mary K. *Melville's Sources*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1987.
- Beyer, Werner William. *Keats and the Daemon King*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1947.
- Bishop, Jonathan. *Emerson on the Soul*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964.
- Bloom, Harold. *The Daemon Knows: Literary Greatness and the American Sublime*. New York: Spiegel & Grau, 2015.
- Blum, Hester. "Melville and Oceanic Studies." *The New Cambridge Companion to Herman Melville*. Edited by Robert S. Levine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
- . "Atlantic Trade." *A Companion to Herman Melville*. Edited by Wyn Kelley. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley Blackwell, 2015.
- Bowen, Merlin. *The Long Encounter: Self and Experience in the Writings of Herman Melville*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960.

- Braswell, William. *Melville's Religious Thought: An Essay in Interpretation*. New York: Pageant Books, Inc., 1959.
- Braun, Frederick Augustus. *Margaret Fuller and Goethe*. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1910.
- Brobjer, Thomas H. *Nietzsche's Philosophical Context: An Intellectual Biography*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2008.
- Brown, Charles Brockden. *Wieland; or the Transformation. An American Tale*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- . *Edgar Huntly; or, Memoirs of a Sleep-Walker*. New York: Literary Classics of the United States, Inc., 1998.
- Brown, Hunter. *William James on Radical Empiricism and Religion*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000.
- British Quarterly Review*. "Representative Men. Seven Lectures." *Emerson among His Contemporaries*. Edited by Kenneth Walter Cameron. Hartford: Transcendental Books, 1967.
- Brooks, Van Wyck. *The Life of Emerson*. New York: The Literary Guild, 1932.
- Bryant, William Cullen. "The Prairies," *The Poetical Works*. Volume 1. Edited by Parke Godwin. New York: Appleton and Co., 1883.
- Bryant, John. "Moby-Dick as Revolution." *The Cambridge Companion to Herman Melville*. Edited by Robert S. Levine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- . "Wound, Beast, Revision: Versions of the Melville Meme." *The New Cambridge Companion to Herman Melville*. Edited by Robert S. Levine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
- Buckland, William. *Geology and Minerology considered with Reference to Natural Theology*. London: William Pickering, 1836.
- Buell, Lawrence. "Moby-Dick as Sacred Text." *New Essays on Moby-Dick*. Edited by Richard H. Brodhead. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
- . *The Environmental Imagination: Thoreau, Nature Writing, and the Formation of American Culture*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995.
- . *Writing for an Endangered World: Literature, Culture, and Environment in the U.S. and Beyond*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001.
- . *Emerson*. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003.
- . *The Future of Environmental Criticism: Environmental Crisis and Literary Imagination*. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2005.
- Burnett, D. Graham. *Trying Leviathan: The Nineteenth-Century New York Court Case that Put the Whale on Trial and Challenged the Order of Nature*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.

- Cabot, James Eliot. *A Memoir of Ralph Waldo Emerson*. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, and Company, 1887.
- Cameron, Kenneth Walter. *Emerson The Essayist*. Volume 1. Hartford: Transcendental Books, 1972.
- . *Emerson The Essayist*. Volume 2. Hartford: Transcendental Books, 1972.
- Cameron, Sharon. *Writing Nature: Henry Thoreau's Journal*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985.
- . *The Corporeal Self: Allegories of the Body in Melville and Hawthorne*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991.
- . *Impersonality: Seven Essays*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007.
- Camus, Albert. *The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays*. Translated by Justin O'Brien. New York: Vintage Books, 1991.
- Capen, Nahum. *Reminiscences of Dr. Spurzheim and George Combe*. Boston: A. Williams & Co., 1881.
- Capper, Charles. *Margaret Fuller: An American Romantic Life: The Public Years*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Carlyle, Thomas, Ralph Waldo Emerson. *The Correspondence of Emerson and Carlyle*. Edited by Joseph Slater. New York: Columbia University Press, 1964.
- Carpenter, Frederic Ives. *Emerson Handbook*. New York: Henricks House, Inc., 1953.
- . *Emerson and Asia*. New York: Haskell House Publishers, 1968.
- Cavell, Stanley. *The Senses of Walden: An Expanded Edition*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992.
- . *A Pitch of Philosophy: Autobiographical Exercises*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994.
- . *Emerson's Transcendental Etudes*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003.
- Cavitch, Max. *American Elegy: The Poetry of Mourning from the Puritans to Whitman*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007.
- Chantraine, Pierre. *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque: Histoire des mots*. Paris: Klincksieck, 1984.
- Cheever, Henry. *The Whale and His Captors; or The Whaleman's Adventures, and The Whale's Biography*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1850.
- Colbert, Charles. *Perfection: Phrenology and the Fine Arts in American*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997.
- Coleridge, Samuel Taylor. *The Notebooks of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Volume 1, 1794-1804*. Edited by Kathleen Coburn. New York: Pantheon Books, 1957.

- . *The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge: Shorter Works and Fragments I and II*. Edited by H. J. Jackson and J. R. de J. Jackson. *The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*. Volume 11. Kathleen Coburn. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.
- . *The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge: Poetical Works I.1 and II.1. Poems (Variorum Text): Part 1*. Edited by J. C. C. Mays. *The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*. Volume 16. Kathleen Coburn. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.
- Clark, Stuart. *Thinking with Demons: The Idea of Witchcraft in Early Modern Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.
- Combe, George. *A System of Phrenology*. London: Neill & Co., 1830.
- Commager, Henry Steele. *Theodore Parker: Yankee Crusader*. Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1978.
- Comstock, John Lee. *Elements of Geology; Including Fossil Botany and Pelaeontology, A Popular Treatise*. New York: Pratt, Woodford, and Co., 1847.
- Cooper, James Fenimore. *The Last of the Mohicans*. New York: Bantam Books, 1989.
- Cowan, Bainard. *Exiled Waters: Moby-Dick and the Crisis of Allegory*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982.
- Crane, Gregg. "Judgement in *Billy Budd*." *The New Cambridge Companion to Herman Melville*. Edited by Robert S. Levine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
- Croce, Paul Jerome. "A Scientific Spiritualism: The Elder Henry James's Adaptation of Emanuel Swedenborg." *Swedenborg and His Influence*. Bryn Athyn, Pennsylvania: The Academy of the New Church, 1988.
- Darnton, Robert. *Mesmerism and the End of the Enlightenment in France*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968.
- Darwin, Charles. *The Descent of Man*. New York: Prometheus Books, 1998.
- Dassow Walls, Laura. *Seeing New Worlds: Henry David Thoreau and Nineteenth-Century Natural Science*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1995.
- . *The Passage to Cosmos: Alexander von Humboldt and the Shaping of America*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009.
- . *Henry David Thoreau: A Life*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017.
- Dayan, Joan. *Haiti, History, and the Gods*. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1995.
- . "Melville's Creatures, or Seeing Otherwise." *American Impersonal: Essays with Sharon Cameron*. New York: Bloomsbury Publishing Inc., 2014.
- DeLamotte, Eugenia C. *Perils of the Night: A Feminist Study of Nineteenth-Century Gothic*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.
- Deleuze, Gilles. *Nietzsche*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1974.

- . *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. Translated by Hugh Tomlinson. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983.
- . Félix Guattari. *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Translated by Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987.
- . *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*. Translated by Robert Hurley. San Francisco: City Light Books, 1988.
- . *The Logic of Sense*. Translated by Mark Lester with Charles Stivale. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990.
- . *Difference and Repetition*. Translated by Paul Patton. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994.
- . *Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature*. Translated by Constantine Boundas. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.
- . *Pure Immanence: Essays on A Life*. Translated by Anne Boyman. New York: Zone Books, 2001.
- De Man, Paul. "Shelley Disfigured: *The Triumph of Life*." *Modern Critical Views: Percy Bysshe Shelley*. New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1985.
- Derleth, August. *Emerson, Our Contemporary*. London: Crowell-Collier Press, 1970.
- Descartes, René. *Discourse on Method and Meditation on First Philosophy*. Translated by Donald A. Cress. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1998.
- Devereux, George. *Dreams in Greek Tragedy: An Ethno-Psycho-Analytical Study*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976.
- Dillaway, Newton. *Prophet of American: Emerson and the Problems of To-day*. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1936.
- Dillingham, William. *An Artist in the Rigging: The Early Work of Herman Melville*. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1972.
- . *Melville's Later Novels*. Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1986.
- Dreiser, Theodore. *Theodore Dreiser Presents the Living Thoughts of Thoreau*. Greenwich: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1963.
- Drinnon, Richard. *Facing West: The Metaphysics of Indian Hating and Empire-Building*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980.
- Dunér, David. *The Natural Philosophy of Emanuel Swedenborg: A Study in the Conceptual Metaphors of the Mechanistic World-View*. Translated by Alan Crozier. New York: Springer, 2012.
- Elsby, Charlene. "Socrates's Demonic Sign." *Philosophical Approaches to Demonology*. Edited by Benjamin W. McCraw and Robert Arp. New York: Routledge, 2017.

- Emanuel Swedenborg: A Continuing Vision*. Edited by Robin Larsen, Stephen Larsen, James Lawrence, and William Ross Woofenden. New York: Swedenborg Foundation, Inc., 1989.
- Emerson, Ralph Waldo. "The Daemonic Love." *Selected Poems*. Boston: James R. Osgood and Company, 1876.
- . *Representative Men: Seven Lectures*. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1883.
- . *Representative Men: Seven Lectures*. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1903.
- . *English Traits*. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1903.
- . *Society and Solitude*. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1904.
- . "Perpetual Forces." *Lectures and Biographical Sketches*. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1904.
- . *Natural History of the Intellect. The Complete Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson*. Volume 7. New York: AMS Press, 1904.
- . "In New England." *Lectures and Biographical Sketches*. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1904.
- . *Journals*. Vol. 1. Edited by Edward Waldo Emerson and Waldo Emerson Forbes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1909.
- . *Journals*. Volume 2. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1909.
- . *Journals*. Volume 3. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1910.
- . *Journals*. Volume 4. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1910.
- . *Journals*. Volume 5. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1911.
- . *Journals*. Volume 6. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1911.
- . *Journals*. Volume 7. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1912.
- . *Journals*. Volume 8. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1912.
- . *Journals*. Volume 10. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1914.
- . *Letters*. Volume 1. Edited by Ralph L. Rusk. New York: Columbia University Press, 1939.
- . *Letters*. Volume 2. Edited by Ralph L. Rusk. New York: Columbia University Press, 1939.
- . *Letters*. Volume 3. Edited by Ralph L. Rusk. New York: Columbia University Press, 1939.
- . *Letters*. Volume 4. Edited by Ralph L. Rusk. New York: Columbia University Press, 1939.
- . *Letters*. Volume 5. Edited by Ralph L. Rusk. New York: Columbia University Press, 1939.
- . *Letters*. Volume 6. Edited by Ralph L. Rusk. New York: Columbia University Press, 1939.
- . *Letters*. Volume 7. Edited by Eleanor M. Tilton. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990.

- . *Letters*. Volume 8. Edited by Ralph L. Rusk. New York: Columbia University Press, 1939.
- . *The Early Lectures of Ralph Waldo Emerson*. Volume 1: 1833-1836. Edited by Stephen E. Whicher, and Robert E. Spiller. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1959.
- . *The Early Lectures of Ralph Waldo Emerson*. Volume 2: 1836-1838. Edited by Stephen E. Whicher, Robert E. Spiller, and Wallace E. Williams. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1964.
- . *The Early Lectures of Ralph Waldo Emerson*. Volume 3: 1838-1842. Edited by Robert E. Spiller, and Wallace E. Williams. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1972.
- . “Demonology.” *The Early Lectures of Ralph Waldo Emerson*. Volume 3: 1838-1842. Edited by Robert E. Spiller, and Wallace E. Williams. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1972.
- . “The Tragic.” *The Complete Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson*. Volume 12. New York: AMS Press, 1979.
- . “History.” *Essays: First and Second Series*. New York: The Library of America, 1990.
- . “Compensation.” *Essays: First and Second Series*. New York: The Library of America, 1990.
- . “Intellect.” *Essays: First and Second Series*. New York: The Library of America, 1990.
- . “Circles.” *Essays: First and Second Series*. New York: The Library of America, 1990.
- . “The Poet.” *Essays: First and Second Series*. New York: The Library of America, 1990.
- . “The Over-Soul.” *Essays: First and Second Series*. New York: The Library of America, 1990.
- . *The Later Lectures of Ralph Waldo Emerson 1843-1871*. Volume 1: 1843–1854. Edited by Ronald A. Bosco and Joel Myerson. Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 2001.
- . *The Later Lectures of Ralph Waldo Emerson 1843-1871*. Volume 2: 1855–1871. Edited by Ronald A. Bosco and Joel Myerson. Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 2001.
- . “The American Scholar” (1837) Emerson, Ralph Waldo. “The American Scholar.” *The American Transcendentalists: Essential Writings*. Edited by Lawrence Buell. New York: The Modern Library, 2006.
- . “Fate.” *Emerson: Political Writings*. Edited by Kenneth Sacks. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- . *The Collected Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson*. Volume 8. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010.
- . *The Collected Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson*. Volume 10. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2013.



- “Emerson’s Representative Men.” *Emerson among His Contemporaries*. Edited by Kenneth Walter Cameron. Hartford: Transcendental Books, 1967.
- Emerson, Edward. *Henry Thoreau: As Remembered by a Young Friend*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1917.
- Emerson, Ellen Tucker. *The Life of Lidian Jackson Emerson*. Edited by Delores Bird Carpenter. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1980.
- Emerson, Lidian Jackson. *The Selected Letters*. Edited by Delores Bird Carpenter. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1987.
- Feidelson, Charles. *Symbolism and American Literature*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960.
- Fernie, Ewan. *The Demonic: Literature and Experience*. London: Routledge, 2013.
- Feuerbach, Ludwig. *The Fiery Book: Selected Writings of Ludwig Feuerbach*. Translated by Zawar Hanfi. New York: Doubleday & Company, 1972.
- Firkins, O. W. *Ralph Waldo Emerson*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1915.
- Fleck, Richard. *Henry Thoreau and John Muir among the Indians*. Hamden: Archon Books, 1985.
- Foucault, Michel. “A Preface to Transgression.” *Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology*. New York: The New Press, 1998.
- . “The Prose of Actaeon.” *Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology*. New York: The New Press, 1998.
- . “Theatrum Philosophicum.” *Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology*. New York: The New Press, 1998.
- . “On the Ways of Writing History.” *Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology*. New York: The New Press, 1998.
- . *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*. New York: Routledge, 2002.
- . *History of Madness*. Edited by Jean Khalifa. Translated by Jean Khalifa and by Johnathan Murphy. New York: Routledge, 2006.
- François, Anne-Lise. *Open Secrets: The Literature of Uncounted Experience*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008.
- Freneau, Philip. *The Poems of Philip Freneau: Poet of the American Revolution*. Vol. 2. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1903.
- Fresonke, Kris. *West of Emerson: The Design of Manifest Destiny*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003.
- Fuller, Margaret, R. W. Waldo Emerson, W. H. Channing, J. F. Clarke. *Memoirs of Margaret Fuller Ossoli*. Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1884.

- . *Life Without and Life Within*. Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1895.
- . “Goethe.” *The Writings*. Edited by Mason Wade. New York: The Viking Press, 1941.
- . “Hawthorne’s Mosses from an Old Manse.” *Essays on American Life and Letters*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978.
- . *Letters*. Volume 1. Edited by Robert Hudspeth. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983.
- . *Letters*. Volume 2. Edited by Robert N. Hudspeth. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983.
- . *Letters*. Volume 3. Edited by Robert N. Hudspeth. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984.
- . *Letters*. Volume 6. Edited by Robert N. Hudspeth. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994.
- . *Self-Definitions. The Essential Margaret Fuller*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1992.
- . “Leila.” *The Essential Margaret Fuller*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1992.
- . *Summer on the Lakes. The Essential Margaret Fuller*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1992.
- . “To Sarah.” “1844 Poetry.” *The Essential Margaret Fuller*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1992.
- . *Women in the Nineteenth Century*. New York: Dover Publications, INC., 1999.
- Fuller, Robert C. *Spiritual, But not Religious: Understanding Unchurched America*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
- Fuller, Richard Frederick. “The Younger Generation in 1840 from the diary of a New England Boy.” *Emerson in His Own Time*. Edited by Ronald A. Bosco and Joel Myerson. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 2003.
- Gall, Franz Josph. *Dr. Gall’s New Theory of Physiognomy*. London: L Longman, Hurst, Rees, and Orme, 1807.
- Gallop, David. *Aristotle on Sleep and Dreams*. Warminster: Aris & Phillips LTD, 1996.
- Garber, Frederick. *Thoreau’s Redemptive Imagination*. New York: New York University Press, 1977.
- . *Thoreau’s Fable of Inscribing*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991.
- Garrard, Greg. *Ecocriticism*. New York: Routledge, 2004.
- Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von. *Truth and Poetry: from My Own Life*. Volume 2. London: Bell & Daldy, York Street, Covent Garden, 1868.
- . *Briefe. Band III. Textkritisch durchgesehen und mit Anmerkungen versehen von Bodo Morawe*. Hamburg: Chistian Wegner Verlag, 1965.
- . *Theory of Colors*. Translated by Charles Lock Eastlake. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1970.

- . *Italian Journey*. Translated by W. H. Auden and Elizabeth Mayer. New York: Penguin Books, 1970.
- . *Maxims and Reflections*. Translation by Elisabeth Stopp. New York: Penguin Books, 1998.
- . *Metamorphosis of Plants*. Translation by Gordon Miller. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2009.
- Gibson, Marion, Jo Ann Esra. *Shakespeare's Demonology*. New York: Bloomsbury, 2014.
- Gigante, Denise. *Life: Organic Form and Romanticism*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009.
- Gilbert, Armida. "Emerson in the Context of the Women's Rights Movement." *A Historical Guide to Ralph Waldo Emerson*. Edited by Joel Myerson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- Gleim, William. "A Theory of 'Moby Dick.'" *Herman Melville*. Edited by Paul Gerhard Buchloh and Hartmut Kruger. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1974.
- Goldstein, Rebecca. "Literary Spinoza." *Oxford Handbook of Spinoza*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
- Goldstein, Amanda Jo. *Sweet Science: Romantic Materialisms and the New Logics of Life*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2017.
- Gonnard, Maurice. *An Uneasy Solitude: Individual and Society in the Work of Ralph Waldo Emerson*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987.
- Grosz, Elizabeth. *Chaos, Territory, Art: Deleuze and the Framing of the Earth*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.
- . *The Incorporeal: Ontology, Ethics, and the Limits of Materialism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2017.
- Gaudio, Michael. *Engraving the Savage: The New World and Techniques of Civilization*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2008.
- Hallengren, Anders. "The Importance of Swedenborg to Emerson's Ethics." *Swedenborg and His Influence*. Bryn Athyn, Pennsylvania: The Academy of the New Church, 1988.
- Harding, Walter. *Emerson's Library*. Charlottesville: The University of Virginia Press, 1967.
- Harris, Kenneth. *Carlyle and Emerson: Their Long Debate*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978.
- Harrison, Jane Ellen. *Ancient Art and Ritual*. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1913.
- . *Themis: A Study of the Social Origins of Greek Religion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1927.
- Harrison, John. *The Teachers of Emerson*. New York: Sturgis & Walton Company, 1910.

- . *The Nature and Function of Dreaming*. Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Hawthorne, Nathaniel. *Passages from the American Note-books*. Vol. 1. Boston: James R. Osgood, 1875.
- . “The Old Manse.” *Mosses from an Old Manse, Tales and Sketches*. New York: The Library of America, 1982.
- . “Main-Street,” *Tales and Sketches*. New York: The Library of America, 1982.
- . *The Scarlet Letter*. New York: The Library of America, 1983.
- . *Grandfather’s Chair: A History for Youth*. Caslisle: Applewood Books, 2010.
- Hawthorne, Julian. *Nathaniel Hawthorne and His Wife*. Volume 1. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1884.
- . *Nathaniel Hawthorne and His Wife*. Volume 2. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1884.
- . *Hawthorne and His Circle*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1903.
- . *The Memoirs of Julian Hawthorne*. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1938.
- Hawthorne, Julian, Leonard Lemmon. *American Literature*. Boston: D. C. Heath & Co., Publishers, 1891.
- Hegel, G. W. F. *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Translated by A. V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.
- . *The Philosophy of History*. Translated by J. Sibree. New York: Dover, 1956.
- Heidegger, Martin. *Nietzsche*. Volume 1: *The Will to Power as Art*. Translated by David Farrell Krell. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1979.
- . *Nietzsche*. Volume 2: *The Eternal Recurrence of the Same*. Translated by David Farrell Krell. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1979.
- . *Parmenides*. Translated by André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992.
- Heraclitus. *Fragments*. Translated by Brooks Haxton. New York: Penguin Books, 2003.
- Higginson, Thomas Wentworth, Margaret Fuller Ossoli. Houghton Mifflin, 1884.
- . *Letters and Journals: 1846–1906*. Edited by Mary Thacher Higginson. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1921.
- Hill, Arthur. *Emerson and His Philosophy*. London: William Rider & Son, Limited, 1919.
- Hobart, Nathaniel. *Life of Emanuel Swedenborg with Some Account of His Writings*. Boston: T. H. Carter and Company, 1840.
- Hodder, Alan D. *Emerson’s Rhetoric of Revelation: Nature, the Reader, and the Apocalypse Within*. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1989.

- Hollier, Denis. "The Dualist Materialisms of Geroges Bataille." *Batiale: A Critical Reader*. Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 1998.
- Holmes, Oliver Wendell. *Ralph Waldo Emerson*. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1884.
- Hotson, Clarence Paul. "Emerson's Biographical Sources for 'Swedenborg.'" *Studies in Philology*, vol. 26, no. 1, 1929, pp. 23–46.
- Hopkins, Vivian. *Spires of Form: A Study of Emerson's Aesthetic Theory*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951.
- . "Emerson and the World of Dream." *Emerson's Relevance Today: A Symposium*. Edited by Eric. W. Carlson and J. Lasley Dameron. Hartford: Transcendental Books, 1971.
- Howe, Julia Ward. *Margaret Fuller (Marchesa Ossoli). Famous Women*. Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1883.
- Hughes, Gertrude Reif. *Emerson's Demanding Optimism*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1984.
- Hurh, Paul. *American Terror: The Feeling of Thinking in Edwards, Poe, and Melville*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015.
- Irving, Washington. "The Adventure of a German Student." *Fifty Great American Short Stories*. New York: Bantam Books, 1965.
- Irwin, John T. *American Hieroglyphics: The Symbol of the Egyptian Hieroglyphics in the American Renaissance*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980.
- Jackson, C. T. *Proceedings of the Boston Society of Natural History*. Vol. 9. Boston: Printed for the Society, William Wood, 1865.
- Jacobson, David. *Emerson's Pragmatic Vision: The Dance of the Eye*. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993.
- James, William. *The Principles of Psychology*. Volume 2. New York: Dover, 1918.
- . *Essays in Radical Empiricism*. New York: Dover Publications, 2003.
- Jefferson, Thomas. *Note on the State of Virginia. Writings*. New York: The Library of America, 1984.
- Jonik, Michael. *Herman Melville and the Politics of the Inhuman*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.
- Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Pure Reason*. Translated by Norman Kemp Smith. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
- . "Dreams of a spirit-seer elucidated by dreams of metaphysics." *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Keiser, Albert. *The Indian in American Literature*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1933.

- Kessels, A. H. M. *Studies on the Dream in Greek Literature*. Utrecht: Hes Publishers, 1942.
- Knapp, Steven and Walter Benn Michaels. "Against Theory." *The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism*. New York: Norton, 2001.
- Kohn, Eduardo. "Thinking with Thinking Forests." *Comparative Metaphysics: Ontology after Anthropology*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017.
- Krell, David Farrell. *Daimon Life: Heidegger and Life-Philosophy*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992.
- Kuiken, Vesna. "On the Matter of Thinking: Margaret Fuller's Beautiful Work." *American Impersonal: Essays with Sharon Cameron*. Edited by Branka Arsić. New York: Bloomsbury, 2014.
- Larousse Dictionary of Scientists*. Edited by Hazel Muir. New York: Larousse, 1994.
- Larson, Kerry. *Whitman's Drama of Consensus*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988.
- . "Hawthorne's Fictional Commitments." *American Impersonal*. Edited by Branka Arsić. New York: Bloomsbury, 2014.
- Levin, David. *History as Romantic Art: Bancroft, Prescott, Motley, and Parkman*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1959.
- Levinson, Marjorie. "Romantic Poetry: The State of the Art." *Modern Language Quarterly* 54.2 (June 1993): 183–214.
- . "Pre- and Post- Dialectical Materialisms: Modeling Praxis without Subjects and Objects." *Cultural Critique* (Fall 1995): 111–27.
- . "A Motion and a Spirit: Romancing Spinoza." *Studies in Romanticism* 46.4 (Winter 2007): 367–408.
- . "Of Being Numerous: Counting and Matching in Wordsworth's Poetry." *Studies in Romanticism* 49 (Winter 2010): 649.
- . *Thinking through Poetry: Field Reports on Romantic Lyric*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
- Lewis, R. W. B. *The American Adam: Innocence, Tragedy, and Tradition in the Nineteenth Century*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959.
- Leyda, Jay. *The Melville Log: A Documentary Life of Herman Melville, 1819-1891. Volume One*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1951.
- Liddell, Henry George, Robert Scott. *A Greek-English Lexicon*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1929.
- Lockwood, Allison. *Passionate Pilgrims: The American Traveler in Great Britain, 1800–1914*. New York: Cornwall Books, 1981.

- Lowell, James Russell. *Literary Essays*. Volume 1. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1891.
- . *Literary Essays*. Volume 2. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1891.
- Loving, Jerome. “Emerson’s Foreground.” *Emerson Centenary Essays*. Edited by Joel Myerson. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1982.
- . *Emerson, Whitman, and the American Muse*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1982.
- Lucretius, *The Nature of Things: A Didactic Poem*. Volume 2. Translated by John Mason Good. London: Longman Hurst, Rees, and Orme, 1805).
- Lukacher, Ned. *Time-Fetishes: The Secret History of Eternal Recurrence*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1998.
- Makarushka, Irena. *Religious Imagination and Language in Emerson and Nietzsche*. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994.
- . “Dreaming and Skepticism.” *Philosophical Essays on Dreaming*. Edited By Charles E. M. Dunlop. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977.
- Mann, Mary. *Life of Horace Mann*. Boston: Walker, Fuller, and Company, 1865.
- Mantell, Gideon Algernon. *Thoughts on Animalcules; or, a Glimpse of the Invisible World*. London: John Murray, 1846.
- Marble, Annie Russell. *Thoreau: His Home, Friends, and Books*. New York: Thomas Y. Marble, 1902.
- Marshall, Megan. *Margaret Fuller*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2013.
- Marx, Leo. *The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- Matterson, Stephen. *Melville: Fashioning in Modernity*. New York: Bloomsbury, 2014.
- Matteson, John. *The Lives of Margaret Fuller*. New York: W. W. Norton, 2012.
- Matthiessen, F. O. *American Renaissance: Art and Expression in the Age of Emerson and Whitman*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1941.
- . “The Democratic Core of Representative Men.” *Critics on Emerson*. Edited by Thomas J. Rountree. Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1973.
- Maulsby, David Lee. *The Contribution of Emerson to Literature*. Medford: The Tufts College Press, 1911.
- McAleer, John. *Ralph Waldo Emerson: Days of Encounter*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1984.
- McGann, Jerome. *The Romantic Ideology: A Critical Investigation*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983.
- Mead, Edwin D. *The Influence of Emerson*. Boston: American Unitarian Association, 1903.

- Melville, Herman. "Shelley's Vision." *Timoleon, Etc.* New York: The Caxton Press, 1891.
- . *Journal of a Visit to London and the Continent by Herman Melville 1849-1850*. Edited by Eleanor Melville Metcalf. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1948.
- . *White-Jacket; or, The Word in a Man-of-War*. Edited by Harrison Hayford, Hershel Parker, and G. Thomas Tanselle. Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern University Press and the Newberry Library, 1970.
- . *Journals*. Edited by Harrison Hayford, Hershel Parker, and G. Thomas Tanselle. Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern University Press and the Newberry Library, 1989.
- . *Correspondence*. Edited by Lynn Horth. Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern University Press and the Newberry Library, 1993.
- . *Mardi and A Voyage Thither*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1998.
- . "Benito Cereno." *The Piazza Tales*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2000.
- . *Billy Budd, Sailor (An Inside Narrative)*. Edited by Harrison Hayford and Merton M. Sealts. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001.
- . *Moby-Dick; or The Whale*. Edited by Harrison Hayford, Hershel Parker, and G. Thomas Tanselle. Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern University Press and the Newberry Library, 2001.
- . *Billy Budd, Sailor and Other Uncompleted Writings*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2017.
- Melville among the Philosophers*. Edited by Corey McCall and Tom Nurmi: New York: Lexington Books, 2017.
- Menand, Louis. *The Metaphysical Club: A Story of Ideas in America*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002.
- Messer, William Stuart. *The Dream in Homer and Greek Tragedy*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1918.
- Michaud, Régis. *Emerson: The Enraptured Yankee*. Translated by George Boas. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1930.
- Milder, Robert. "Nemo Contra Deum . . . : Melville's and Goethe's 'Demonic.'" *Ruined Eden of the Present: Hawthorne, Melville, and Poe*. Edited by G. R. Thompson and Virgil L. Lokke West. Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1981.
- Miller, Hugh. *The Testimony of the Rocks*. Edinburgh: William P. Nimmo, 1871.
- Miller, Perry. *Errand Into the Wilderness*. New York: Harper & Row, 1956.



- . “Emersonian Genius and the American Democracy.” *Emerson: A Collection of Critical Essays*. Edited by Milton R. Konvitz and Stephen E. Whicher. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962.
- Miller, Patricia Cox. *Dream in Late Antiquity: Studies in the Imagination of A Culture*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.
- Morton, Timothy. *Ecology without Nature: Rethinking Environmental Aesthetics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007.
- . *The Ecological Thought*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010.
- . “Deconstruction and/as Ecology.” *The Oxford Handbook of Ecocriticism*. Edited by Greg Garrard. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
- Mott, Wesley. “‘The Age of the First Person Singular’: Emerson and Individualism.” *A Historical Guide to Ralph Waldo Emerson*. Edited by Joel Myerson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- Neufeldt, Leonard. *The House of Emerson*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982.
- . *The Economist: Henry Thoreau and Enterprise*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.
- Newfield, Christopher. *The Emerson Effect: Individualism and Submission in America*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996.
- Nicholls, Angus. *Goethe’s Concept of the Daemonic After the Ancients*. Rochester: Camden House, 2006.
- Nicholson, William. *Second American Edition of Nicholson’s British Encyclopedia: or Dictionary of Arts & Sciences*. Vol. 5. Philadelphia: W. Brown, 1818.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Will to Power*. Translated by Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. New York: Random House, 1967.
- . *Twilight of the Idols*. Translated by R. J. Hollingdale. New York: Penguin Books, 1990.
- . *The Birth of Tragedy*. Translated by Clifton P. Fadiman. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1995.
- . “On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense.” *The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism*. New York. W. W. Norton & Company, 2001.
- . *On The Genealogy of Morality*. Translated by Carol Diethe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- . *The Gay Science*. Translated by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage, 2010.
- Nizami. *The Story of Layla and Majnun*. Translated by R. Relpke. London: Bruno Cassirer, 1966.
- Notopoulos, James. *The Platonism of Shelley: A Study of Platonism and the Poetic Mind*. New York: Octagon Books, 1969.

- Noys, Benjamin. *Georges Bataille: A Critical Introduction*. London: Pluto Press, 2000.
- Nussbaum, Martha. *The fragility of goodness: Luck and ethics in Greek tragedy and philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
- O'Keefe, Richard. *Mythic Archetypes in Ralph Waldo Emerson*. Kent: The Kent State University Press, 1995.
- Olmsted, Francis Allyn. *Incidents of a Whaling Voyage*. Rutland: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1969.
- Otter, Samuel. "'Race' in *Typee* and *White-Jacket*. *The Cambridge Companion to Melville*. Edited by Robert S. Levine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- . *Melville's Anatomies*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999.
- Owen, G. E. L. *Logic, Science, and Dialectic: Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy*. Edited by Martha Nussbaum. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986.
- Pahl, Dennis. *Architects of the Abyss: The Indeterminate Fictions of Poe, Hawthorne, and Melville*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1989.
- Packer, B. L. *Emerson's Fall: A New Interpretation of the Major Essays*. New York: Continuum, 1982.
- Parks, Henry B. "Emerson." *Emerson: A Collection of Critical Essays*. Edited by Milton R. Konvitz and Stephen E. Whicher. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962.
- Papanastassiou, Georges C. *Compléments au Dictionnaire étymologique du grec ancien de Pierre Chantraine*. Thessalonique: Éditions Magia, 1994.
- Paul, Sherman. *Emerson's Angel of Vision: Man and Nature in American Experience*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952.
- Peck, Daniel H. *Thoreau's Morning Work: Memory and Perception in A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers, the Journals, and Walden*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990.
- Philips, John. *Life on Earth: Its Origin and Succession*. London: MacMillan, 1860.
- Pierce, Charles Sanders. *The Essential Pierce*. Volume 1. Edited by Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992.
- Poe, Edgar Allan. *Complete Works*. Volume 17. Edited by James A. Harrison. New York: AMS Press, 1965.
- Poirier, Richard. *A World Elsewhere: The Place of Style in American Literature*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966.
- . *The Renewal of Literature: Emersonian Reflections*. New York: Random House, 1987.
- Porte, Joel. *Emerson and Thoreau: Transcendentalists in Conflict*. Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1966.

- . *Representative Man: Ralph Waldo Emerson in His Time*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979.
- . *Consciousness and Culture: Emerson and Thoreau Reviewed*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004.
- Porter, David. *Emerson and Literary Change*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978.
- Posnock, Ross. “The Earth Must Resume Its Rights: A Jamesian Genealogy of Immaturity.” *100 Years of Pragmatism: William James’s Revolutionary Philosophy*. Edited by John J. Stuhr. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010.
- Prescott, William Hickling. *History of the Conquest of Peru*. New York: The Modern Library, 1998.
- Quarles, Francis. *Emblems*. London: William Tegg, 1866.
- Railton, Stephen. *Authorship and Audience: Literary Performance in the American Renaissance*. Princeton University Press, 1991.
- “Ralph Waldo Emerson.” *Prophets of the Century*. Edited by Author Rickett. *Rare Early Essays on Ralph Waldo Emerson*. Edited by Joseph Dello Buono. Norwood: Norwood Editions, 1979.
- Ransom, John Crowe. *Beating the Bushes: Selected Essays 1941-1970*. New York: New Directions Publishing Company, 1952.
- Reginster, Bernard. *The Affirmation of Life: Nietzsche on Overcoming Nihilism*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006.
- Reynolds, J.N. “Mocha Dick: or the White Whale of the Pacific: A Leaf from a Manuscript Journal.” *New-York Monthly Magazine*. New York: May 1839. Metguen, Massachusetts: SicPress, 2013.
- Richardson, Robert. *Emerson: The Mind on Fire*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.
- . *Henry Thoreau: A Life of the Mind*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996.
- . *William James: in the Maelstrom of American Modernism*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2006.
- Ricoeur, Paul. *The Symbolism of Evil*. Translated by Emerson Buchanan. Boston: Beacon Press, 1969.
- . *Memory, History, Forgetting*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004.
- . *Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation*. Translated by Denis Savage. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004.
- Ridgeway, William. *The Origin of Tragedy: With Special Reference to the Greek Tragedians*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1910.

- Robinson, David. *Apostle of Culture: Emerson as Preacher and Lecturer*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982.
- Robinson, David. "Transcendentalism and Its Times." *The Cambridge Companion to Ralph Waldo Emerson*. Edited by Joel Porte and Sandra Morris. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Rorty, Richard. *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009.
- Rosenwald, Lawrence. *Emerson and the Art of the Diary*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.
- Royce, Josiah. *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1892.
- Rusk, Ralph L. *The Life of Ralph Waldo Emerson*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949.
- Russell, Philips. *Emerson: The Wisest American*. New York: Brantano's Publishers, 1929.
- Rossi, William. "Emerson, Nature, and Natural Science." *A Historical Guide to Ralph Waldo Emerson*. Edited by Joel Myerson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- Sachs, Aaron. *The Humboldt Current: Nineteenth-Century Exploration and the Roots of American Environmentalism*. New York: Penguin Group, 2006.
- Sanborn, F. B. *Familiar Letters of Henry David Thoreau*. Edited by F. B. Sanborn. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1894.
- . *The Personality of Emerson*. Boston: Charles E. Goodspeed, 1903.
- Sanborn, Geoffrey. *The Sign of the Cannibal: Melville and the Making of a Postcolonial Reader*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1998.
- . "Melville and the Nonhuman World." *The New Cambridge Companion to Herman Melville*. Edited by Robert S. Levine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
- . *Whipscars and Tattoos: The Last of the Mohicans, Moby-Dick, and the Maori*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Sattelmeyer, Robert. *Thoreau's Reading: A Study in Intellectual History*. Princeton University Press, 1988.
- Sauvagnargues, Anne. *Deleuze: L'empirisme transcendantal*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2009.
- Sayre, Robert. *Thoreau and the American Indians*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977.
- Scarry, Elaine. *On Beauty and Being Just*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.
- Schieck, William J. *The Slender Human Word: Emerson's Artistry in Prose*. Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1978.
- Schirmeister, Pamela. *Less Legible Meanings: Between Poetry and Philosophy in the Work of Emerson*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999.

- Schultz, Alexander. *Mind's World: Imagination and Subjectivity from Descartes to Romanticism*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009.
- Schwenger, Peter. *At the Borders of Sleep: on Liminal Literature*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012.
- Scudder, Townsend. *The Lonely Wayfaring Man: Emerson and some Englishmen*. London: Oxford University Press, 1936.
- Scoresby, William. *Journal of a Voyage to the Northern Whale-Fishery*. Edinburgh: Archibald Constable, 1823.
- Shakespeare, William. *The Tragedy of Hamlet, Prince of Denmark. The Norton Shakespeare: Third Edition. Volume 2*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2016.
- Shelley, Percy Bysshe. *The Complete Poetical Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley*. Edited by Neville Rogers. Volume 1: 1802-1813. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972.
- . *The Complete Poetical Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley*. Edited by Neville Rogers. Volume 2: 1814-1817. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.
- . *The Prose Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley*. Volume 1. Edited by E. B. Murray. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.
- Silver, Richard. "Spirit in American Art: The Image as Hieroglyph." *Emanuel Swedenborg: A Continuing Vision*. Edited by Robin Larsen, Steven Larsen, James F. Lawrence, William Ross Woofenden. New York: Swedenborg Foundation, Inc., 1988.
- Slater, Abby. *In Search of Margaret Fuller*. New York: Delacorte, 1978.
- Slotkin, Richard. *Regeneration through Violence: The Mythology of the American Frontier, 1600–1860*. Middleton: Wesleyan University Press, 1973.
- Sowder, William J. *Emerson's Impact on the British Isles and Canada*. Charlottesville: The University of Virginia Press, 1966.
- Spectator*. "Emerson's Representative Men." *Emerson among His Contemporaries*. Edited by Kenneth Walter Cameron. Hartford: Transcendental Books, 1967.
- Spinoza, Benedict. *Ethics*. Translated by W. H. White. Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Classics of World Literature, 2001.
- Spurzheim, Johann Gaspar, Franz Joseph Gall. *The physiognomical system of Drs. Gall and Spurzheim*. London: Baldwin, Cradock, and Joy, 1815.
- Stedman, Edmund Clarence. "Ralph Waldo Emerson." *Rare Early Essays on Ralph Waldo Emerson*. Edited by Joseph Dello Buono. Norwood: Norwood Editions, 1979.
- Steele, Jeffrey. *Transfiguring America: Myth, Ideology, and Mourning in Margaret Fuller's Writing*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2001.
- Stern, Madeleine B. *The Life of Margaret Fuller*. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., INC., 1942.

- Stewart, Charles. "Dreams and Desires in Ancient and Early Christian Thought." *Dreams and History: The Interpretation of Dreams from Ancient Greece to Modern Psychoanalysis*. Edited by Daniel Pick and Lyndal Roper. New York: Routledge, 2004.
- Sutcliffe, Emerson Grant. *Emerson's Theories of Literary Expression*. Champaign: University of Illinois Studies in Language and Literature, 1923.
- Synnestvent, Sig. *The Essential Swedenborg: Basic Teachings of Emmanuel Swedenborg, Scientist, Philosopher, and Theologian*. United States: Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1970.
- Swedenborg, Emanuel. *The Animal Kingdom, Considered Anatomically, Physically, and Philosophically*. Volume 1. Translated by James John Garth Wilkinson. London: W. Newbery, 1843.
- . *The Animal Kingdom, Considered Anatomically, Physically, and Philosophically*. Volume 2. Translated by James John Garth Wilkinson. London: W. Newbery, 1844.
- . *The Economy of the Animal Kingdom, Considered Anatomically, Physically, and Philosophically*. Volume 1. Edited by Augustus Clissold. London: W. Newbery, 1845.
- . *The Economy of the Animal Kingdom, Considered Anatomically, Physically, and Philosophically*. Volume 2. Edited by Augustus Clissold. Boston: T. H. Carter and Sons, 1868.
- . *Concerning the White Horse*. Roch Edition. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1907.
- . *Swedenborg's Journal of Dreams 1743-1744*. Translated by J. J. Garth Wilkinson. London: Swedenborg Scientific Association, 1989.
- Taylor, Eugene. "The Appearance of Swedenborg in the History of American Psychology." *Swedenborg and His Influence*. Bryn Athyn, Pennsylvania: The Academy of the New Church, 1988.
- Taylor, C. C. W. *Socrates*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- "The Philosophical Character of Swedenborg." *The Southern Quarterly Review*. Volume 26. Charleston: Burges & James, 1848.
- Thoreau, Henry David. *Miscellanies*. Volume 10. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1893.
- . *Familiar Letters of Henry David Thoreau*. Edited by F. B. Sanborn. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1894.
- . *Journal*. Volume 14. Edited by Bradford Torrey. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1906.
- . *Journal*. Volume 18. Edited by Bradford Torrey and Francis H. Allen. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1906.
- . "To the Mountains." *Collected Poems of Henry Thoreau*. Edited by Carl Bode. Chicago: Packard and Company, 1943.
- . *The Maine Woods*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972.

- . *Early Essays and Miscellanies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975.
- . *A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980.
- . *Journal*. Volume 1. Edited by Elizabeth Witherell et al. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981.
- . *Journal*. Volume 2. Edited by Robert Sattelmeyer. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- . *Cape Cod*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.
- . *Wild Fruits*. Edited by Bradley P. Dean. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000.
- . *Walden*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016.
- Tolles, Frederick. "Emerson and Quakerism." *On Emerson: The Best from American Literature*. Edited by Edwin H. Cady and Louis J. Budd. Durham: Duke University Press, 1988.
- Türchke, Christoph. *Philosophy of Dreams*. Translated by Susan H. Gillespie. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016.
- Underwood, W. J. *Emerson and Swedenborg: A Review of Emerson's Lecture on Swedenborg*. London: James Speirs, 1896.
- Underwood, Francis Henry. "Ralph Waldo Emerson." *Emerson among His Contemporaries*. Edited by Kenneth Walter Cameron. Hartford: Transcendental Books, 1967.
- Van Leer, David. *Emerson's Epistemology: The Argument of the Essays*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
- Van Zuylen, Marina. *Monomania: The Flight from Everyday Life in Literature and Art*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005.
- Von Frank, Albert J. *An Emerson Chronology*. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1994.
- Waggoner, Hyatt H. *Emerson as Poet*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974.
- Wahr, Frederick B. *Emerson and Goethe*. Ann Arbor: George Wahr, 1915.
- Webb, Clement. *Group Theories of Religion and the Individual*. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1916.
- Wetters, Kirk. *Demonic History from Goethe to the Present*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2014.
- Whicher, Stephen E. *Freedom and Fate: An Inner Life of Ralph Waldo Emerson*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1953.

- . “The Dream of Greatness.” *Ralph Waldo Emerson: A Collection of Critical Essays*. Edited by Lawrence Buell. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1993.
- White, William. *Life and Writings of Swedenborg*. London: Simpkin, Marshall, and Company, 1868.
- Wittenberg, David. *Philosophy, Revision, Critique: Rereading Practices in Heidegger, Nietzsche, and Emerson*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1958.
- Wilkinson, James John Garth. *Remarks on Swedenborg’s Economy of the Animal Kingdom*. London: Walton and Mitchell, 1846.
- . *Emanuel Swedenborg: A Biography*. Boston: Otis Clapp, 1849.
- Williams, Raymond. *The Country and the City*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975.
- Williams-Hogan, Jane K. “Swedenborg: A Biography.” *Swedenborg and His Influence*. Bryn Athyn, Pennsylvania: The Academy of the New Church, 1988.
- Wills, David. *Inanimation: Theories of Inorganic Life*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016.
- Wilson, Douglas B. “The Dreaming Imagination: Coleridge, Keats, and Wordsworth.” *Coleridge, Keats, and the Imagination: Romanticism and Adam’s Dream*. Edited by J. Robert Barth, S. J., and John L. Mahoney. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1990.
- Worster, Donald. *Nature’s Economy: The Roots of Ecology*. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1977.
- Wulf, Andrea. *The Invention of Nature: Alexander von Humboldt’s New World*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2016.
- Wyn, Kelley. “The Style of Lima: Colonialism, Urban Form, and ‘The Town-Ho’s Story.’” *Melville Among the Nations*. Kent: The Kent State University Press, 2001.
- Wynkoop, William M. *Three Children of the Universe: Emerson’s View of Shakespeare, Bacon, and Milton*. London: Mouton & Co., 1966.
- Yannella, Donald. *Ralph Waldo Emerson*. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1982.
- Yoder, R. A. *Emerson and the Orphic Poet in America*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.
- Zuckert, Catherine. *Plato’s Philosophers: The Coherence of the Dialogues*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009.
- Zweig, Stefan. *Hölderlin, Kleist, and Nietzsche: The Struggle with the Daemon*. London: Transaction Publishers, 2011.