

# Measuring Fundamentalism Across the Abrahamic Faiths

MANSOOR MOADDEL   
Department of Sociology  
University of Maryland

STUART A. KARABENICK  
Department of Psychology  
University of Michigan

*We develop a scale to measure fundamentalism among the followers of the Abrahamic faiths. The scale is intended to overcome the challenges that beset the comparative analysis of the subject: variability of religious fundamentalist movements historically, cross-nationally, and across these religions; differences in the definition of fundamentalism, and etymological ambiguity of the term. We conceptualized fundamentalism as a cluster of core orientations toward one's and others' religion. These orientations are categorized into four components: disciplinarian deity, inerrancy or literalism, religious exclusivity, and religious intolerance. Each component is measured by four survey questions. The 16 items make a single fundamentalism scale. We discuss the scale's validity, and then verify its statistical and predictive validity on nationally representative samples from Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Turkey, a total of 24,758 cases.*

**Keywords:** *fundamentalism, Abrahamic faiths, Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Middle East, cross-national survey.*

## INTRODUCTION

Fundamentalism in Islam, Christianity, and Judaism began to expand in the 1970s. The Arab defeat in the 1967 war with Israel followed by the decline of the reigning ideology of Arab nationalism and the rise of Sunni fundamentalism in the Arab world. The period also marked the decline of secularism and the rise of Shia fundamentalism among Iranians. More significant in the worldwide spread of fundamentalism and the popularization of its values (e.g., the headscarf, gender segregation, and Islamic government) was the outbreak of four major events in 1977–1979: (1) the military coup by General Zia ul-Haq in Pakistan in 1977 and the subsequent Islamization program launched by his regime; (2) the Iranian Revolution of 1979 that brought the Shia fundamentalists to power, creating euphoria among Muslim activists on how the Shia clerics succeeded to form an Islamic regime, while at the same time recast the status of the United States as the seat of the world's most powerful and stable democracy worthy of emulation to that of the “Great Satan” and a decadent culture; (3) the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 that provoked strong reactions from a significant segment of the Muslim populations, which was also generously assisted by Western governments in an effort to push the Soviet out of the country; and finally (4) the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979 by several hundred armed militants that revealed the vulnerability of the Saudi Kingdom. The United States in the 1970s also saw the revival of Christian fundamentalism organized as Moral Majority. Fundamentalism further expanded in the subsequent decades boosted by a religious broadcasting network of 250 Christian TV channels and 1,600 radio stations that promoted Rapture culture. Finally, Jewish fundamentalism in Israel emerged after the 1967 war but more so after the 1973 Yom Kippur war, when Gush Emunim was formally established to shape not only religious discourse in the country, but also expand

*Correspondence should be addressed to Mansoor Moaddel, Department of Sociology, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742–1315. E-mail: moaddel@umd.edu*

the Jewish settlements in the Palestinian territories. Fundamentalism continued its sociopolitical influence well into the twenty-first century and is still quite powerful in Christianity, Islam, and Judaism today (Ayubi and Nassif 1980; Hochschild 2016; Kepel 1985; Lustick 1988; Marsden 1980; Shahak and Mezvinsky 1999; Smith 1998).

These remarkable movements prompted growing scholarly interests on the subject. Yet, despite the proliferation of fundamentalism studies in recent decades, systematic comparisons of the subject among the followers of these faiths still encounter major challenges, including: (1) its variability historically, across nations, and among the adherents of these religions. Fundamentalism differs even within the same faith as well. Sunni fundamentalists differ from Shia, and fundamentalism among Christians and Jews is also diverse. (2) Adding to the confusion is the etymological variability of the term and the suitability of its usage in the faiths other than Christianity (Marsden 1980; Martin and Appleby 1991; Smith 1998; Wills 1990). Finally, (3) the definitions of the term vary widely and are sometimes constructed in ways that overlook its religious character (Almond, Appleby, and Sivan 2003; Antoun 2008; Barzilai-Nahon and Barzilai 2005; Kaplan 1992; Lawrence 1989; Lustick 1988; Riesebrodt 1993).

To meet these challenges, we draw on Altemeyer (2003) and Altemeyer and Hunsberger (2004) in conceptualizing the term as a cluster of core orientations toward religion. We propose that these core orientations are shared by all fundamentalists and, despite their diversity and often irreconcilable differences, manifested in a set of distinctive beliefs about and attitudes toward such aspects of religion as the deity, the scriptures, religious community, and relations with other religions. Whatever the similarities and differences between Christian, Islamic, and Jewish fundamentalists, they all espouse a disciplinarian conception of the deity, adhere to a literal reading of the scriptures, support religious exclusivity, and are intolerant of other religions.

Fundamentalist beliefs and attitudes are thus distinguishable from the belief in the basic tenets of the Abrahamic religions that the followers unquestionably uphold. These tenets in Judaism, for example, affirm the uniqueness of God who created the universe, established a covenant with the Jews, and revealed his laws of the Torah and the Talmud that all Jews must follow. In Christianity, they are the Trinitarian notion of God as Father, Son, and the Holy Spirit; Jesus as the Son of God; and the Virgin Mary. In Islam, they include the oneness of God, the Prophecy of Muhammad, the Quran as the word God, and the Resurrection and Day of Judgment. Jewish, Christian, and Muslim fundamentalists certainly believe in the tenets of their own religion. But the belief that one's religion is closer to God than other religions, that only Jews, Christians, or Muslims will receive heavenly reward, that God severely punishes people even though they have engaged in only a minor infraction of religious laws, or that the Torah, Bible, or Quran is literally true—all constitute fundamentalist beliefs, because they display distinctive religious orientations rather than asserting specific tenets of any of these faiths.

We consider fundamentalism as a multidimensional construct, consisting of four components: disciplinarian deity, inerrancy or literalism, exclusivity, and intolerance. These components were measured to create a Moaddel-Karabenick fundamentalism (MKF) scale and tested on nationally representative samples of 24,158 adult respondents in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Turkey (Moaddel and Karabenick 2018). While the overwhelming majority of these respondents were Muslim, this dataset included respondents from Christian populations in Egypt and Lebanon. However, there were no Jews in these samples, which leaves a critical gap on whether the construct is applicable to Judaism. The present study is designed to narrow this gap by assessing the validity of the fundamentalism scale among the Jewish citizens of Israel, comparing the results with the samples from previous studies of Muslims and Christians, and thus demonstrating the validity of the scale across the three Abrahamic faiths.

The appendix to this article provides detailed descriptions of the design and administration of multi-country survey data collection in the Middle East, including the standardization of the

sampling design, questionnaire development, and interviewers training. It also assesses the contributions and shortcomings of Altemeyer and Hunsberger fundamentalism (AHF) scale (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 2004) focusing on the quality and effectiveness of the questionnaire items particularly in comparative cross-national survey, the recruitment of the subjects, and predictive validity. It also discusses the incremental validity of MKF vis-à-vis AHF scale.

## METHODS AND RESULTS

### Sample and Data Collection

Jewish data were obtained from online interviews of a representative sample of 600 Israeli adults (age 18+) drawn from a nationally representative panel of 104,181 internet users (online penetration is 85 percent of the Israeli population of 7,968,300 in 2019). Excluded from this panel are the more extremist fundamentalist Israelis, including Haredim, who do not use the internet. The latter is estimated to be about 12 percent of the country's population.<sup>1</sup> As a result, the data may carry a degree of secular bias. Interviews were conducted in Hebrew by IPSOS, a survey-research firm, in January–February 2020. As detailed by Moaddel and Karabenick (2018) and in the appendix, a multi-stage probability sampling design was used to collect data from nationally representative samples of 3,496 Egyptian, 3,000 Iraqi, 3,008 Jordanian, 3,039 Lebanese, 3,523 Pakistani, 2,003 Saudi, 3,070 Tunisian, and 3,019 Turkish respondents in 2011–2013. Egypt and Lebanon have sizable Christian populations.

### Scale Construction

To establish the scale's effectiveness in measuring fundamentalist beliefs and attitudes among Jews, Christians, and Muslims, we consider its face, statistical, predictive, and incremental validity. *Face validity* requires that each of the items making the scale would logically and reasonably reflect different aspects of the construct so that the items are subjectively viewed as intended. For example, it is reasonable to view that those who uphold a disciplinarian conception of the deity, consider the scriptures literally true, believe in the exclusivity of their religious community, and are intolerant of other religions are more fundamentalist than those who think otherwise. *Statistical validity* refers to the strength of the empirical relations among the items of a construct. It indicates the existence of a characteristic root or a scale representing the items measured by the size of Eigenvalue, and the internal consistency of the items is measured by Cronbach's alpha. *Predictive validity* shows how well the scale predicts the characteristics of the fundamentalist movements like supporting conservative values and opposing individual autonomy, gender equality, secular politics, and generally liberal values, and that fundamentalists also tend to be fatalistic and xenophobic (Almond, Appleby, and Sivan 2003; Antoun 2008; Barzilai-Nahon and Barzilai 2005; Davidman 1991; Emerson and Hartman 2006; Grasmick, Wilcox, and Bird 1990; Hawley 1994; Kaplan 1992; Lawrence 1989; Lustick 1988; Moaddel 2005; Riesebrodt 1993; Smith 1998). A valid fundamentalism scale would predict these characteristics. Finally, *incremental validity* determines the extent to which a measure predicts more effectively a phenomenon of interest, compared to other measures (Haynes and Lench 2003). In the appendix, we assess the incremental validity of MKF scale by comparing its predictive validity with the predictive validity of AHF scale.

<sup>1</sup>Hiddush News, "2019 Statistical Report on Haredi Society in Israel." [http://hiddush.org/article-23372-0-2019\\_Statistical\\_Report\\_on\\_Haredi\\_Society\\_in\\_Israel.aspx](http://hiddush.org/article-23372-0-2019_Statistical_Report_on_Haredi_Society_in_Israel.aspx). Accessed 12/26/2020.

The survey instrument used in the nine countries was first developed in English; then translated to Arabic, Hebrew, Kurdish, Pashto, Urdu, and Turkish; and finally back translated to English by an individual who had not seen the original English version and compared with the original version to ensure consistency of meaning between the languages. The 16 fundamentalism items were in a 4-point Likert scale format coded between 1 (strongly agree), 2 (agree), 3 (disagree), and 4 (strongly disagree). In this paper, we recoded the responses to the fundamentalism items so that higher values indicate stronger fundamentalist beliefs and attitudes. Table 1 reports the percent distribution of these items (agree + strongly agree) and the average of these percentages for each of the four components items—deity, inerrancy, exclusivity, and intolerance—and the 16 items for the nine countries.

Israeli respondents have significantly weaker fundamentalist orientations than respondents from the eight Muslim majority countries. On average, a much lower percentage of Israeli respondents either agree or strongly agree with disciplinarian deity than the respondents from the other eight countries: 18 percent of Israelis versus between 72 percent of Lebanese and 96 percent of Egyptians. Likewise, concerning inerrancy: 33 percent of Israelis versus between 73 percent of Lebanese and 95 percent of Pakistanis; exclusivity: 35 percent of Israelis versus between 64 percent of Lebanese and 94 percent of Pakistanis; and intolerance: 18 percent of Israelis versus between 38 percent of Tunisians and 75 percent Saudis; and finally, fundamentalism: 26 percent of Israelis versus between 63 percent Lebanese and 85 percent Pakistanis. This table also shows variation in fundamentalism scale across the countries, ranging from the 1.97 (Israel) to 3.42/3.44 (Pakistan/Egypt). For sure, a much higher percentage of the Israeli respondents had university education than those from Muslim majority countries. Furthermore, given that more extremist fundamentalists in Israel refrain from using the internet (e.g., Haredim), their number did not appear in the panel of Internet users. Therefore, the Israeli sample tended to be biased toward the more secular section of the Israeli Jews rather than if the respondents were directly selected from the country's population and interviewed face to face.

To demonstrate the validity of the fundamentalism scale among Israeli Jews and that the scale is applicable to the followers of three Abrahamic faiths, we organized the data by religion: Jews, Christians, Shia, Sunnis, and Muslims. The last group consists of the Muslim respondents who did not wish to be identified as either Shia or Sunnis. Then, we carried out across these groups a series of exploratory factor analyses (EFAs) of the four items related to each of the four components of fundamentalism. EFAs determined that each set of four items for each religious group in the samples yielded a single factor with Eigenvalues well above 1. As reported in Table 2, these ranged between 1.99 (Sunnis) and 2.66 (Jews) for deity, 1.98 (Sunnis or Christians) and 3.06 (Jews) for inerrancy, 2.18 (Sunnis) and 3.12 (Jews) for exclusivity, and 1.73 (Shia) and 2.72 (Jews) for intolerance. Eigenvalues for fundamentalism scale for these groups ranged between 2.33 for Sunnis and 3.35 for Jews. The four items in each of the four components and the entire 16 items also provided a reliable scale. Internal consistency estimates (Cronbach's  $\alpha$ ) across the religious groups were between .66 (Sunnis) and .83 (Jews) for deity, .62 (Sunnis) and .90 (Jews) for inerrancy, .69 (Sunnis) and .91 (Jews) for exclusivity, and .53 (Shia) and .84 (Jews) for intolerance. The entire 16 items also provided a reliable scale. Cronbach's  $\alpha$  was much higher for Israeli Jews (.96) than for all the other religions, which ranged from .74 for Sunnis to .84 Shia. Finally, the four items for each component were averaged to provide the component score, and a single fundamentalism score was also constructed by averaging the 16 items.

As Table 2 shows, mean fundamentalism score varied among different religious groups in Muslim-majority countries—2.84 for Christians, 3.01 for Shia, 3.23 for Muslims, and 3.28 for Sunnis—( $F_{3,20758} = 586.78, p < .00001$ ), with Christians scored significantly lower than any of the Islamic groups. However, Israeli Jews with mean fundamentalism score of 1.97 still scored lower than Christians ( $t = -28.72, p < .00001$ ). These results show that the Jews were much less

Table 1: Measures of religious fundamentalism by country (%agree/strongly agree and means)

Fundamentalism Items	Iraq	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Pakistan	KSA	Tunisia	Turkey	Israel
<i>Disciplinarian Deity</i>									
1. Any infraction of religious instruction will bring about Allah's (God's) severe punishment.	91	98	76	94	83	91	89	73	19
2. Only the fear of Allah (God) keeps people on the right path.	90	96	67	94	98	86	88	84	15
3. Satan is behind any attempt to undermine belief in Allah.	95	97	79	94	95	83	89	81	20
4. People stay on the right path only because they expect to be rewarded in heaven.	86	94	64	90	95	81	75	76	19
Average	91	96	72	93	93	85	85	79	18
<i>Inerrancy</i>									
1. The Quran (Bible, Torah) is true from beginning to end.	98	99	89	99	100	100	99	93	50
2. The Quran (Bible, Torah) correctly predicted all major events that have occurred in human history.	98	N/A	83	96	99	86	95	89	45
3. In the presence of the Quran (Bible, Torah), there is no need for man-made laws.	72	80	54	84	85	75	56	47	12
4. Whenever there is a conflict between religion and science, religion is always right.	90	98	67	93	97	89	89	72	26
Average	90	92	73	93	95	88	85	75	33
<i>Exclusivity</i>									
1. Only Islam (Christianity, Judaism) provides comprehensive truth about Allah (God).	92	95	68	91	96	88	86	88	43

(Continued)

Table 1: (Continued)

Fundamentalism Items	Iraq	Egypt	Lebanon	Jordan	Pakistan	KSA	Tunisia	Turkey	Israel
2. Only Islam (Christianity, Judaism) gives a complete and unfailing guide to human salvation.	93	N/A	71	96	97	88	92	89	35
3. Only Muslims (Christians, Jews) are going to heaven.	74	78	47	49	86	82	57	57	17
4. Islam (Christianity, Judaism) is the only true religion.	90	N/A	68	97	98	89	90	89	45
Average	87	87	64	83	94	87	81	81	35
<i>Intolerance</i>									
1. Our children should not be allowed to learn about other religions.	35	45	28	32	63	66	32	42	14
2. The followers of other religions should not have the same rights as mine.	32	30	25	20	9	73	22	37	13
3. Criticism of Islam (Christianity, Judaism) should not be tolerated.	82	77	65	67	86	86	67	69	27
4. Criticism of Muslim (Christian, Jewish) religious leaders should not be tolerated.	68	66	54	51	69	76	30	57	19
Average	54	55	43	43	57	75	38	51	18
<i>Fundamentalism</i>									
Average	80	81	63	78	85	84	72	71	26
Fundamentalism scale	3.27	3.44	2.80	3.26	3.42	3.39	3.18	2.97	1.97
% Variance	59%	45%	68%	52%	55%	71%	56%	68%	84%

fundamentalist than other religious groups.<sup>2</sup> There is also considerable cross-national variation in fundamentalism among Christians, Shia, and Sunnis. Christians in Lebanon were significantly less fundamentalist than their counterparts in Egypt; the fundamentalism score for Lebanese Christians was 2.62 versus 3.21 for Egyptian Christians ( $p < .001$ ). Likewise, Lebanese Shia

<sup>2</sup>Assuming the excluded 12 percent of the Israeli population affiliated with Haredim from the panel of respondents score 4 on the scale, the mean fundamentalism score for Jews would be 2.21 ( $= .12*4 + .88*1.97$ ), which is still significantly lower than mean fundamentalism for Christians ( $p < .01$ ).

Table 2: Measures of religious fundamentalism by religion (agree/strongly agree and means)

Fundamentalist Components	Religious Affiliation				
	Christ.	Muslim	Shia	Sunni	Jews
<i>Disciplinarian Deity</i>					
1. Any infraction of religious instruction will bring about God's severe punishment	71	83	75	85	19
2. Only the fear of God keeps people on the right path.	80	81	83	88	15
3. Satan is behind any attempt to undermine belief in God.	77	87	78	91	20
4. People stay on the right path only because they expect to be rewarded in heaven.	85	94	86	91	19
Disciplinarian Mean	3.17	3.40	3.13	3.48	1.79
Eigenvalue	2.11	2.15	2.16	1.99	2.66
% Variance	53%	54%	54%	50%	67%
Cronbach's $\alpha$	.70	.72	.72	.66	.83
<i>Inerrancy</i>					
5. The Quran (Bible, Torah) is true from beginning to end.	90	98	95	98	50
6. The Quran (Bible, Torah) correctly predicted all major events that have occurred in human history.	78	97	90	94	45
7. In the presence of the Quran (Bible, Torah), there is no need for man-made laws.	48	68	66	70	12
8. Whenever there is a conflict between religion and science, religion is always right.	68	88	82	90	26
Inerrancy Mean	3.00	3.48	3.26	3.50	2.04
Eigenvalue	1.98	2.45	2.18	1.98	3.06
% Variance	49%	61%	55%	49%	77%
Cronbach's $\alpha$	.65	.75	.71	.62	.90
<i>Exclusivity</i>					
9. Only my religion provides comprehensive truth about God.	68	87	83	92	43
10. Only my religion gives a complete and unfailing guide to human salvation.	65	91	84	93	35
11. Only the followers of my religion are going to heaven.	42	72	63	73	17
12. My religion is the only true religion.	56	89	85	92	45

(Continued)

Table 2: (Continued)

Fundamentalist Components	Religious Affiliation				
	Christ.	Muslim	Shia	Sunni	Jews
Exclusivity Mean	2.78	3.44	3.12	3.48	2.13
Eigenvalue	2.27	2.66	2.41	2.18	3.12
% Variance	57%	67%	60%	65%	78%
Cronbach's $\alpha$	.73	.82	.77	.69	.91
<i>Intolerance</i>					
13. Our children should not be allowed to learn about other religions.	32	41	35	47	14
14. The followers of other religions should not have the same rights as mine.	26	30	27	30	13
15. Criticism of my religion should not be tolerated.	65	78	76	78	27
16. Criticism of my religious leaders should not be tolerated.	57	55	65	60	19
Intolerance Mean	2.42	2.61	2.54	2.65	1.86
Eigenvalue	1.86	1.83	1.73	1.82	2.72
% Variance	46%	46%	43%	46%	68%
Cronbach's $\alpha$	.61	.63	.53	.59	.84
<i>Fundamentalism</i>					
Fundamentalism Mean	2.84	3.23	3.01	3.28	1.97
Eigenvalue	2.45	2.62	2.70	2.33	3.35
% Variance	61%	66%	67%	58%	84%
Cronbach's $\alpha$	.78	.81	.84	.74	.96

scored significantly lower on fundamentalism than Iraqi Shia; 2.87 versus 3.25, respectively ( $p < .001$ ). However, Lebanese Shia scored higher than the Shia in Saudi Arabia, who scored 2.59 ( $p < .001$ ). Fundamentalism among Sunnis also varied across nations ranging from 2.98 (Turkey), 3.05 (Lebanon), 3.18 (Tunisia), 3.28 (Jordan), 3.32 (Iraq), 3.39 (KSA) to 3.44 (Egypt and Pakistan)—all the differences were significant at  $p < .01$  (not shown in the table).

Currently, there are no comparable data on fundamentalism among Jews in West Bank or other countries in the Middle East. Moaddel and Karabenick (2018) addressed factors affecting cross-national variation in fundamentalism in the region. However, the variation in fundamentalism within and between the followers of these religious groups poses interesting questions concerning the relations of macro and meso factors with religious beliefs and attitudes. Answering such questions requires an in-depth analysis of the interaction between the economic, cultural, and political makeup of the national context and the specific character of religious authorities within each nation. Such an analysis, however, is beyond the scope of the current paper.

The *predictive validity* of MKF scale is gaged by the strength of its associations with the values and beliefs supported by religious fundamentalists. Given that Christian, Jewish, and Islamic fundamentalists tended to promote patriarchal values, fatalism, ingroup solidarity, and a closer link between religion and politics (Almond, Appleby, and Sivan 2003; Antoun 2008; Barzilai-Nahon and Barzilai 2005; Davidman 1991; Emerson and Hartman 2006; Grasmick, Wilcox, and



Table 3: Correlations coefficient between fundamentalism and predictors across the Abrahamic faiths

	Self-Identified Religion				
	Christian	Muslim	Shia	Sunni	Jews
Expressive-individualism index	-.387	-.284	-.368	-.323	-.420
Gender-equality index	-.429	-.290	-.360	-.384	-.430
Secular-politics index	-.252	-.496	-.438	-.414	-.627
Liberalism index	-.506	-.469	-.522	-.499	-.689
Fatalism	.164	.254	.272	.206	.190
Xenophobia	.263	.129	.282	.216	.331

Note: All correlations  $p < .001$ .

Bird 1990; Hawley 1994; Kaplan 1992; Lawrence 1989; Lustick 1988; Moaddel 2005; Riesebrodt 1993; Smith 1998), the scale is expected to predict such values and beliefs. We propose that it is negatively linked to the indices of expressive individualism, gender equality, secular politics, and liberal values, but positively to fatalism and xenophobia.<sup>3</sup> Expressive-individualism index, measuring the degree to which respondents supported individual autonomy, averages responses to several questions on the basis for marriage (coded as 4 for love and 1 for parental approval), a woman's right to dress as she wishes (coded between 4 for strongly agreed and 1 for strongly disagree), and child qualities, where respondents select five from a list of 10 favorable qualities for children (summing and adjusting responses to vary between 1 and 4, coded as 1 for those selected "independence" or "imagination," or deselected "religious faith" or "obedience," and 0 otherwise). Gender-equality index averages responses to: Do you (1) strongly agree, (2) agree, (3) disagree, or (4) strongly disagree that: (a) It is acceptable for a man to have more than one wife, (b) A wife must always obey her husband, (c) Men make better political leaders, (d) University education is more important for boys, and (e) When jobs are scarce, men should have more rights to a job. Secular politics index is the average of responses to four questions: Do you (4) strongly agree, (3) agree, (2) disagree, or (1) strongly disagree that your country would be a better place, if religion and politics were separated; if its government was similar to Western governments; Would it be (1) very good, (2) fairly good, (3) fairly bad, or (4) very bad for your country to have an Islamic government (Christian/Jewish government for Christian/Jewish respondents); and Is it (1) very important, (2) important, (3) somewhat important, (4) least important, or (5) not at all important for a good government to implement only the sharia (for Muslims) or the laws inspired only by Christian/Jewish values (for Christians/Jews) (Answers adjusted to range between 1 and 4)? A liberalism index is created by averaging the three indices. All the indices vary between 1 and 4, with higher values indicating stronger support for liberal values. Xenophobia is a mean response to questions on whether respondents would like to have people from several countries as neighbors (coded as 1 for no, 0 for yes), and fatalism is measured by respondents choosing between 1 (people shape their fate themselves) and 10 (everything in life is determined by fate). The rationale for using these indices to assess the predictive validity of the scale, rather than using right-wing authoritarian (RWA) scale (Altemeyer 1996; Williamson et al. 2010), is presented in the appendix.

According to Table 3, the correlation coefficients of fundamentalism with these measures are significant and in the expected direction. The correlation coefficient of MKF scale with indices of expressive individualism is between  $-.284$  for Muslim and  $-.420$  for Jews, gender equality is between  $-.290$  for Muslim and  $-.430$  for Jews, secular politics is between  $-.252$  for Christian and

<sup>3</sup>For a discussion on the construction of these measures, see Moaddel (2020).

-.627 for Jews, and liberal values is -.469 for Muslim and -.689 for Jews. On the other hand, the scale is positively linked to both fatalism and xenophobia across all the religious groups. The correlation coefficient of fundamentalism with fatalism ranged between .164 for Christian and .272 for Shia, and with xenophobia is between .129 for Muslim and .331 for Jews.

We further demonstrate the predictive validity of MKF scale among Jews by showing that the scale effectively predicts the likelihood that the respondents espouse the specific beliefs adhered to by the Jewish fundamentalists in Israel. Such beliefs include: (a) strict conformity to the religious law and moral precepts of the Torah and the Talmud; (b) the unique character and the chosenness of the Jewish people; (c) the realization of God's will and Jewish rule in the Land of Israel; (d) exchanging land for peace with Palestinians as blasphemous; (e) Arab resistance to Israel representing the eternal battle to overcome the forces of evil; (f) the victory in the wars against Arabs as the sign from God signifying the redemption of Jews; (g) the possibility of peace only in the coming of the Messiah and the unity of the Jewish people with the entire holy land; and (h) the holocaust as punishment from God (Bermanis, Canetti-Nisim, and Pedahzur 2010; Lustick 1988; Munson 2006; Peretz 1989; Tepe 2008).

Considering these beliefs, we developed a questionnaire module consisting of 18 survey items in the Likert-scale format (ranging from 4-strongly agree, 3-agree, 2-disagree, and 1-strongly disagree). Our analysis of these items shows that all are significantly correlated. Applying exploratory factor analysis on the 18 items, one factor was extracted with Eigenvalue of 10.77, explaining about 60 percent of variance, and Cronbach's alpha of .96. The 18 items are averaged to make a scale of Jewish-specific fundamentalist beliefs. The percent frequency distribution of the responses to these items as well as the correlation coefficients of these items and the scale of Jewish-specific fundamentalist beliefs with MKF scale and the four components are reported in Table 4. Accordingly, all the items are significantly correlated with the fundamentalism components and MKF scale ( $p < .001$ ). Judging by the size of the correlation coefficients, the scale of Jewish-specific fundamentalist beliefs is even more significantly correlated with these components and MKF scale. It is .74 with disciplinarian deity, .83 with inerrancy, .82 with exclusivity, .76 with intolerance, and .86 with MKF scale ( $p < .001$ ).

These findings show that such historically specific perspective of Jewish fundamentalism in Israel as opposition to peace with the Palestinians, opposition to the idea of exchanging land for peace, perception of the holocaust, view of the chosenness of the Jewish people, attitudes toward Arab countries, and other conservative cultural values are all strongly linked to their fundamentalist beliefs and attitudes toward Judaism that uphold the conception of a disciplinarian deity, literalist or inerrancy view of the Tora or the Talmud, religious exclusivity, and religious intolerance. Considering face, statistical, and predictive validity of the fundamentalism scale, the foregoing analysis thus supports our contention that the scale is not only applicable to Christians and Muslims, but to Jews as well.

## DISCUSSION

We developed a fundamentalism scale as a tool to analyze the subject comparatively across nations and among the Abrahamic faiths: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. We drew on Altemeyer (2003) and Altemeyer and Hunsberger (2004) in conceptualizing fundamentalism as a cluster of core orientations toward religion. We also specified that these orientations are directed toward such aspects of religion as the deity, scriptures, religious community, and relations with other religions. Religious fundamentalism is thus viewed as a multidimensional concept consisting of four components: disciplinarian deity, inerrancy or literalism, exclusivity, and intolerance. We measured each of these components by four survey questions in Likert-scale format, with the entire 16 items making the fundamentalism scale.

Table 4: Fundamentalist-related beliefs and attitudes of Jewish respondents and correlations with fundamentalism

Beliefs and Attitudes	Correlations*									
	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Deity	Inerrancy	Exclu.	Intoler	Fund	
1. Jews are different from others (non-Jews) in being the chosen people.	21	31	25	24	.58	.77	.80	.62	.76	
2. The Arab resistance to Israeli state represents the forces of evil.	18	32	30	20	.48	.51	.52	.46	.53	
3. The Holocaust was punishment from God for Jews straying from the right path.	6	7	33	55	.66	.62	.61	.62	.67	
4. Regarding the West Bank, it is sacrilegious to exchange land for peace with Palestinians.	15	20	39	26	.56	.71	.72	.59	.71	
5. Israelis victories in six wars in the 20th century are the manifestations of redemption for the Jews.	15	27	29	29	.58	.73	.73	.57	.72	

(Continued)

Table 4: (Continued)

Beliefs and Attitudes	Correlations*								
	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Deity	Inerrancy	Exclu.	Intoler	Fund
6. Israelis victories in six wars in the 20th century are the manifestations of the return of the Messiah.	9	12	39	41	.69	.72	.72	.62	.74
7. A good government must make laws according to the moral precepts specified in the Torah and Talmud.	6	15	34	45	.66	.77	.73	.66	.76
8. The goal of the state of Israel is to hasten the return of the Messiah.	7	12	35	45	.65	.72	.71	.68	.75
9. Israel would be a better place if religion and politics were merged into a single political system.	7	14	34	45	.61	.71	.65	.66	.71
10. Muslims are the enemies of the Jews.	14	30	33	24	.42	.44	.44	.46	.47
11. Christians are the enemies of the Jews.	4	7	45	43	.52	.57	.57	.56	.60
12. Arabs are the enemies of the Jews.	15	27	34	24	.43	.46	.49	.46	.50

(Continued)

Table 4: (Continued)

Beliefs and Attitudes	Correlations*								
	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Deity	Inerrancy	Exclu.	Intoler	Fund
13. Secular Jews have bad influence on the state of Israel.	3	7	33	57	.59	.55	.56	.57	.62
14. Academic education undermines Judaism.	4	6	36	55	.54	.41	.41	.54	.51
15. Israeli government should actively expand the settlements.	17	27	27	28	.46	.63	.67	.49	.63
16. The interest of the religious sector is more important than the state's national interest.	4	8	33	55	.55	.55	.53	.57	.59
17. Secular studies are less important than religious studies.	4	10	36	51	.51	.58	.58	.52	.59
18. Going to Yeshiva is far more important than being drafted into the Army.	3	6	27	64	.55	.57	.54	.53	.60
A scale of Jewish-specific fundamentalist beliefs (average of the 18 items)					.74	.83	.82	.76	.86

\*All correlations  $p < .001$ .

Our analysis of the data across the nine countries showed that the scale has face, statistical, and predictive validity among Jews, Christians, and Muslims, including Shia and Sunnis. This analysis showed that fundamentalism as a set of beliefs about and attitudes toward religion exist in these societies. Even though Israel is a more secular society than any of the other Muslim-majority countries, and as a result fundamentalism is lower among Israeli Jews than it is among Christians or Muslims in the samples, the empirical relationships between the items of each component of fundamentalism and between the components are much higher among the Jews than they are among the followers of the other two religions, as shown by the size of Eigenvalues and Cronbach's  $\alpha$ . The scale has also a higher predictive validity among Israeli Jews. The size of the correlation coefficient of the fundamentalism scale with expressive individualism, gender equality, secular politics, liberal values, and xenophobia is higher for Israelis than it is for other religions. The only exception is that the correlation coefficients of the scale with fatalism among Jews is higher than it is among Christians but lower than among Muslims. We further demonstrated the predictive validity of the fundamentalism scale among Israeli Jews by showing that it strongly predicted the Jewish-specific fundamentalist beliefs.

Although our scale predicts the conservative political and cultural beliefs and attitudes adhered by the fundamentalists in the three faiths, for future research, it is important to assess whether the fundamentalism score is significantly higher among the members of religious fundamentalist groups or organizations among the followers of the three religions, for example; among the Jordanian Muslim Brothers compared to other Sunnis in Jordan, the followers of Hezbollah in Lebanon compared to other Shia in the country, and among Haredim compared to other Jews in Israel.

## APPENDIX

### Measuring Fundamentalism Across the Abrahamic Faiths

The study of religious fundamentalism was part of a broader project to explore and explain cross-national variation in human values in the Middle East. This project initially focused on Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. It was led by the members of the U.S.-based research team: Mansoor Moaddel (PI, sociologist), Arland Thornton (Co-PI, family sociologist/social demographer), Stuart Karabenick (cognitive and educational psychologist), Linda Young-DeMarco (project manager with expertise in cross-national survey design and administration), Julie de Jong (research associate with expertise in cross-national survey design), and Serap Kavas (predoctoral Fulbright scholar from Turkey). Involved were also investigators from all the study countries who conducted the national survey in these countries. de Jong and Young-DeMarco (2017) provide an overview of the ideal protocols that are most critical to the design and administration of multi-country survey data collection in the Middle East and discuss in detail how the team addressed the specific challenges the project faced in standardizing the sampling procedure, questionnaire development, and interviewers training.

### Research Process: Questionnaire Development, Interviewer Training, and Sampling Design

Our study developed the fundamentalism scale in order to: (1) overcome the definitional variability that existed in the literature and conceptualize the term in a way that was applicable to the three Abrahamic faiths; (2) operationalize the construct in a manner that went beyond the historical, national, and religious specificities of the fundamentalist movements with the expectation that

the measures of the construct would predict these specificities; and (3) remove the etymological ambiguities in analyzing fundamentalism by more clearly separating the factors that defined the subject from those that predicted it. Drawing on Altemeyer (2003) and Altemeyer and Hunsberger (2004), we proposed that despite their differences, Christian, Islamic, and Jewish fundamentalists share a cluster of core orientations that are manifested in a set of distinctive beliefs about and attitudes toward their own and other religions. We also reasoned that since an Abrahamic religion is identified by its: (1) deity, (2) scriptures, (3) religious community, and (4) boundaries with other faiths, then fundamentalism is comprised of distinctive orientations toward each of these dimensions. Adhering to this stipulation, fundamentalism was conceptualized as a multidimensional construct, consisting of four interrelated components that together constitute such orientations. These are beliefs in: (a) a *disciplinarian deity*; (b) the *inerrancy* of the scriptures; (c) religious *exclusivity*; and (d) religious *intolerance*. Although the strength of these components may vary among individuals and groups, we proposed that they are coterminous with one another and form a single fundamentalism construct (Moaddel and Karabenick 2018).

In formulating the questions to measure religious fundamentalism, our research team followed the standards of the best practice in questionnaire development. We strictly adhered to the principle that each of the indicators of the four fundamentalism components must probe respondents about only one issue. Each question must be unambiguous and simple enough for an ordinary individual with no formal education to be able to understand. It must also convey the same meaning across different settings/countries so that the observed differences in responses could be construed as the effect of the differences in the social context rather than attributable to measurement error.

To ensure the equality of meaning across different languages, as well as within the same language (i.e., Arabic) but in different contexts, we adopted a decentering approach, where questions were first developed in the source language (i.e., English), then translated to another, and next it was back translated to English by someone who had not seen the original English version. This process was iterated back and forth in a team translation approach with representatives from all study countries until it was determined that the questions had the same meaning in both languages. Finally, the questionnaire was rigorously pretested in the six study countries on respondents with different education, religious affiliation, gender, and ethnicity. It was further discussed with researchers from the six countries in workshops in Cairo, Egypt, and Istanbul, Turkey *before* being administered on nationally representative samples of about 18,000 respondents in face-to-face interviews across these countries.

Moreover, realizing that our efforts to achieve valid data by establishing questionnaire comparability may not be possible without adequate interviewer training; that poorly trained interviewers affect the quality of data, which may result in sampling, nonresponse, and measurement errors; and that such errors undermine the comparability of cross-national data, our project extensively engaged in training interviewers. We used well-established interviewer training protocols to reduce bias and differences in delivery of questions, implemented a standardized questionnaire, with only minor well-documented local adaptations, to safeguard comparability of data collection, and held joint “train-the-trainer” workshops for each of the countries’ research managers and their field supervisors before commencing data collection. Finally, in order to compare populations of different countries accurately during the analysis stage, survey respondents must come from comparable target populations, with the precision of sample estimates be high enough so that effective probability estimates of the values of the population’s target parameters can be obtained, and with every member of the country’s population have a known and nonzero chance of being selected. To meet these requirements, we defined in each country the target population as those citizens having reached age 18 or older. Excluded were (noncitizen) migrant workers, and those in prisons, nursing homes, military bases, student dormitories, and other institutional settings. Certain hard to reach areas, such as remotes desert regions in Egypt or rural areas or military zones in Saudi Arabia, were also excluded due to fiscal constraints and security concerns.

Households were selected from each study country using a multistage area probability design. A respondent was selected from each household using either the Kish table or the next-birthday method, and replacement at the household or individual respondent level was not permitted (de Jong and Young-DeMarco 2017).

We followed this methodological procedure in expanding our dataset by including Tunisia in 2013 and Jordan in 2016. In Israel, the interviews of a nationally representative sample of 600 Jewish respondents were conducted online. Thus far, this project has collected data from nationally representative samples of 24,758 respondents in nine Middle Eastern countries: Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Turkey, using face-to-face interviews (except in Israel).

### **Altemeyer-Hunsberger Fundamentalism Scale: Contributions and Shortcomings**

In developing the fundamentalism scale, we considered some of the questionnaire items in Altemeyer (2003) and Altemeyer and Hunsberger (2004). During our investigation, we determined that several aspects of their research strategy in the study of the subject could be improved. First, their definition of fundamentalism highlighted the literal or inerrant dimension of the construct and, as a result, produced an unbalanced fundamentalism scale. For them, fundamentalism rests on the belief that [a] “there is one set of religious teachings that clearly contains the fundamental, basic, intrinsic, essential, inerrant truth about humanity and deity; [b] that this essential truth is fundamentally opposed by forces of evil which must be vigorously fought; [c] that this truth must be followed today according to the fundamental, unchangeable practices of the past; and [d] that those who believe and follow these fundamental teachings have a special relationship with the deity” (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 2004:48). Accordingly, 7 of the 12 items in AHF scale, reported in Table 5, measure attitudes toward the inerrancy of the religious teachings either directly (questions 1, 5, and 11) or in reverse (questions 2, 7, 10, and 12), two questions measure attitudes toward Satan, one directly (question 3), and the other in reverse (question 9). The remaining three questions measure attitudes toward the belief in “one true religion” (p. 50) directly (items 6 and 8) or in reverse (item 4).

We believe that it is difficult to justify why the inerrancy dimension should be stressed so much more than the other dimensions of fundamentalism, including religious intolerance, religious exclusivity, and the belief in a disciplinarian God. These dimensions have in fact been among the hallmarks of the fundamentalist movements within the Abrahamic faiths throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries (Sayyid Qutb 1964; Ahmad; 1967; Abrahamian 1982; Moaddel 2005; Shahak and Mezvinsky 1999, 2020; McLean 2016; Searle 2018). Yet, unfortunately, AHF scale included no questions concerning religious intolerance or a disciplinarian God, although a single measure of the latter did appear in an earlier twenty-item fundamentalism scale; “God will punish most severely those who abandon his true religion” (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 2004:48, Table 1, question 11; Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992:130–131). Given the significance of the disciplinarian deity for fundamentalists, we considered this question to be an important measure of the construct. We thus added a revised version of this item to our scale, which captured a clearer and more explicit image of a disciplinarian God: “Any infraction of religious instruction will bring about God’s severe punishment” (Moaddel-Karabenick 2018: 9). In addition, we felt the measures of the belief in one true religion (items 4, 6, and 8) did not clearly highlight the belief in the exclusivity of one’s faith in the fundamentalist perspective. For example, a religiously tolerant Christian, Muslim, or Jew may consider any of three Abrahamic faiths to be a true religion and thus agree with item 8.

Second, the measurement of the construct and the wordings of many AHF scale items did not always adhere to best-practice guidelines for questionnaire development (de Jong and Young-DeMarco 2017). Some items were hard to understand for non-Western respondents or were difficult to translate into the diverse languages used in our cross-national study in the Middle East



Table 5: Religious fundamentalism among Egyptian and Saudi youth

Altemeyer-Hunsberger fundamentalism scale (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 2004)	The items used in the Egyptian-Saudi youth survey (Moaddel and Karabenick 2008)
1. God has given humanity a complete, unfailing guide to happiness and salvation, which must be totally followed.	1. God has given humanity a complete, unfailing guide to happiness and salvation, which must be totally followed.
2. No single book of religious teachings contains all the intrinsic, fundamental truths about life.*	2. The basic cause of evil in this world is Satan, who is still constantly and ferociously fighting against God.
3. The basic cause of evil in this world is Satan, who is still constantly and ferociously fighting against God.	3. It is more important to be a good person than to believe in God and the right religion.*
4. It is more important to be a good person than to believe in God and the right religion.*	4. There is a particular set of religious teachings in this world that are so true, you can't go any "deeper" because they are the basic, bedrock message that God has given humanity.
5. There is a particular set of religious teachings in this world that are so true, you can't go any "deeper" because they are the basic, bedrock message that God has given humanity.	5. When you get right down to it, there are basically only two kinds of people in the world: The Righteous, who will be rewarded by God; and the rest, who will not.
6. When you get right down to it, there are basically only two kinds of people in the world: The Righteous, who will be rewarded by God; and the rest, who will not.	6. The Quran may contain general truths, but they should not be considered completely, literally true from beginning to end.*
7. Scriptures may contain general truths, but they should not be considered completely, literally true from beginning to end.*	7. To lead the best, most meaningful life, one must belong to the one, fundamentally true religion.
8. To lead the best, most meaningful life, one must belong to the one, fundamentally true religion.	8. Whenever science and religion conflict, religion is always right.
9. "Satan" is just the name people give to their own bad impulses. There really is no such thing as a diabolical "Prince of Darkness" who tempts us.*	9. The fundamentals of God's religion should never be tampered with or compromised with others' beliefs.
10. Whenever science and sacred scripture conflict, science is probably right.*	10. God will punish most severely those who abandon his true religion.
11. The fundamentals of God's religion should never be tampered with, or compromised with others' beliefs.	
12. All of the religions in the world have flaws and wrong teachings. There is no perfectly true, right religion.*	

in a manner that people with no formal education would be able to clearly understand. Questions 2, 5, 6, 7, and 9 are examples of this kind of issues. Question 9 is particularly problematic. It is not only very difficult to translate but also tends to shape the respondent's opinion on the subject: "'Satan' is just the name people give to their own bad impulses. There really is no such thing as a diabolical 'Prince of Darkness' who tempts us."

Moreover, 9 of the 12 scale items (1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, and 12) were double-barreled; that is, they probed respondents about more than one issue within the question while allowing the respondent to express only a single answer. For example, question 1 asks respondents about three issues: (a) "God has given... guide to happiness," (b) "God has... guide to... salvation," and (c) "[God's] guide... must be totally followed." Similarly, question 3 assesses attitudes toward two ideas: (a) "The basic cause of evil in the world is Satan," and (b) "[Satan] is still constantly and ferociously fighting against God." In this case, one may argue that the latter statement is contrary to Islamic belief about Satan. In Islam, Satan is at work to undermine the religious beliefs of humans but is no position to *fight against God*. An observant Muslim or a fundamentalist may agree with the first part of the question, but not necessarily with the second.

Next, the reversal items carry conceptual ambiguity and pose empirical problems in measuring the construct. It is not clear how to conceptualize the reversal of the belief that "there is one set of religious teachings that clearly contains the fundamental, basic, intrinsic, essential, inerrant truth about humanity and deity" (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 2004:48) in a way that it distinguishes nonfundamentalists from those who are fundamentalists. In religious orientation, the nonfundamentalist segment of any population is a heterogeneous category, consisting of atheists, secularists, those who are religiously observant, the followers of religious orthodoxy, and people with no opinion. Thus, it is difficult to conceptualize nonfundamentalism, draft a question that captures attitudes of respondents from a heterogeneous segment whose only denomination is being nonfundamentalist, and then expect that these attitudes to be negatively correlated with fundamentalist attitudes. For example, the wording of this question is confusing for Muslim respondents: "No single book of religious teachings contains all the intrinsic, fundamental truths about life" (Altemeyer-Hunsberger fundamentalism scale, Table 1, item 2). If it is revised to read that "the Quran does not contain all the intrinsic, fundamental truths," then both observant Muslims and Muslim fundamentalists may disagree. But the question may be confusing for the secular respondents who do not believe in any religious teachings to begin with. To give another example, "Scriptures may contain general truths, but they should NOT be considered completely, literally true from beginning to end" (item 7). Leaving aside the fact that the question is double-barreled and difficult for a person with no formal education to answer, it is unclear whether disagreeing with the question indicates a fundamentalist or secularist orientation, because for the former the scriptures are literally true, and the latter does not believe in the scriptures. Part of the problem with such questions is that not only there may be more than one way of formulating a reversal question, but also answering such a question may require a degree of intellectual sophistication wanting among many respondents. This may explain why researchers using the AHF scale reported little difficulties with the reversals because their respondents were almost all drawn non-probabilistically from the population of university students.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup>These criticisms are also applicable to the conception of fundamentalism as "an intratextual disposition toward the text that a tradition holds as sacred" (Williamson et al. 2010:722). Not only this conceptualization is one sided, overlooking other dimensions of fundamentalism, but also many of the items measuring the construct are double-barreled and hard to understand for many respondents (e.g., "The Sacred Writing is not really the words of God, but it is an extraordinary book of human wisdom, truths, and understanding about life," or "Authorities like science and history are much better at unraveling the real meaning of the Sacred Writing than a person just reading and studying the plain truth of what the Sacred Writing says for itself" (Williamson et al 2010:725). Except for one item that measures religious exclusivity (i.e., "The Sacred writing is the only one that is true about all Holy Books or sacred texts of other religions," p. 725), all other items revolve on the notion of inerrancy.

Findings from our earlier study of Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt and Saudi Arabia that used AHF scale showed that the reversal items did not significantly correlate with many of the items that directly measured fundamentalism.<sup>5</sup> The items in the right column of Table 5 are adopted from AHF scale. Table 6 reports the correlation coefficients between these items. The first two questions—"It is more important to be a good person than to believe in God and the right religion" and "The Quran may contain general truths, but they should NOT be considered completely, literally true from beginning to end"—are reversals and expected to have negative relationships with the other eight items. Considering the size and sign of the correlation coefficients, contrary to our expectation, the first variable is either significantly and positively correlated with most of the direct measures of fundamentalism (items 3–7 and 10) or not significantly correlated with the rest (items 8 and 9). Again, contrary to our expectation, the second variable has no significant relationship with four of the direct measures of fundamentalism (items 3–5 and 10). With the rest of the items (6–9), it was only weakly correlated and in the expected direction. However, the direct measures of fundamentalism are all significantly linked and in the expected direction.<sup>6</sup>

Similarly, our cross-national study of religious fundamentalism showed that the reversal items in the fundamentalism module having inconsistent relationships with the direct measures. The reversal items were: (1) The Quran's (Bible's [for Christian respondents]) description of past historical events is not always accurate (inerrancy reversal); (2) The Quran (the Bible [for Christian respondents]) contains general facts, but some of its stories need to be interpreted (inerrancy reversal); (3) Different interpretations of the Quran (the Bible [for Christian respondents]) are equally valid (inerrancy reversal); (4) All religions are equally acceptable to Allah (exclusivity reversal); (5) The followers of all religions should have equal rights to practice their religion in my country (intolerance reversal); and (6) Non-Muslims (Non-Christians [for Christian respondents]) should be free to build their places of worship in my country (intolerance reversal). These six reversals were expected to have significant relationship with one another and with all the indices of the four components of fundamentalism.

Table 7 shows the correlation coefficients between the reversals and the indices of the four components of religious fundamentalism in the pooled sample. As shown, the six reversals having inconsistent relationships with one another and with the indices the fundamentalism components. Items 1–4 are significantly correlated and in the expected direction but, contrary to our expectation, they are negatively linked to items 5–6. Some of these four items have either weak or no significant relationship with the indices of fundamentalism components. Moreover, the reversals of intolerance (5–6) have weak significant positive, weak negative, or no significant relationships with the fundamentalism components. Considering Tables 6 and 7 together, it is reasonable to argue that the reversal items produce inconsistent results in the Middle Eastern context.

### Testing the Fundamentalism Scale on University Students

Third, the assessments of AHF scale were conducted by recruiting the participants almost always from university students. It is not quite clear how the findings can be generalized to wider and more heterogeneous populations. The users of AHF scale claimed that the measure had strong psychometric properties (Altemeyer 1996; Altemeyer and Hunsberger 2004; Hunsberger, Owusu, and Duck 1999). Because AHF scale has been tested predominantly on university students rather

<sup>5</sup>The surveys of late adolescents and young adults (ages 18–25) were conducted in Egypt and Saudi Arabia in the spring and summer of 2005. Surveys required approximately 45 minutes on average to complete and were conducted in face-to-face interviews in respondents' residences. The Egyptian sample included three cities: Alexandria, population 3.8 million; El-Minya, population 225,100, and Cairo, population 7.7 million. The Saudi survey also included three cities: Jeddah, Riyadh, and Dammam-Khobar.

<sup>6</sup>The reversal items in our cross-national survey project did not pan out either.

Table 6: Correlation coefficients between fundamentalism items among youth in Egypt and Saudi Arabia (pairwise deletion). Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree that...?

1. It is more important to be a good person than to believe in God and the right religion.									
2. The Quran may contain general truths, but they should NOT be considered completely, literally true from beginning to end.	.226*								
3. God has given humanity a complete, unflinching guide to happiness and salvation, which must be totally followed.	.122*	-.031							
4. The basic cause of evil in this world is Satan, who is still constantly and ferociously fighting against God.	.133*	.007	.254*						
5. There is a particular set of religious teachings in this world that are so true, you can't go any "deeper" because they are the basic, bedrock message that God has given humanity.	.141*	-.065	.274*	.210*					
6. When you get right down to it, there are basically only two kinds of people in the world: the Righteous, who will be rewarded by God; and the rest, who will not.	.119*	-.137*	.317*	.231*	.339*				
7. To lead the best, most meaningful life, one must belong to the one, fundamentally true religion.	.100*	-.091*	.370*	.249*	.375*	.380*			
8. Whenever science and religion conflict, religion is always right.	-.052	-.096*	.422*	.182*	.325*	.413*	.464*		
9. The fundamentals of God's religion should never be tampered with or compromised with others' beliefs.	.011	-.159*	.272*	.127*	.240*	.312*	.334*	.531*	
10. God will punish most severely those who abandon his true religion.	.110*	-.008	.379*	.292*	.313*	.378*	.446*	.425*	.303*
10 Number of cases	876	1,803	1787	1776	1767	1803	883	1772	1802

\*p < .01.

Table 7: Correlation coefficients between reversals and indices of fundamentalism components in the pooled sample of the seven-country survey

1. All religions acceptable to Allah.																					
2. Quran/Bible not always accurate.	.237 <sup>a</sup>																				
3. Quran/Bible need to be interpreted.	.369 <sup>a</sup>	.139 <sup>a</sup>																			
4. Different interpretations are valid.	.363 <sup>a</sup>	.094 <sup>a</sup>	.394 <sup>a</sup>																		
5. All religions have equal rights.	-.114 <sup>a</sup>	-.057 <sup>a</sup>	-.093 <sup>a</sup>	-.101 <sup>a</sup>																	
6. Non-Muslims/Christians free to build	-.138 <sup>a</sup>	-.047 <sup>a</sup>	-.102 <sup>a</sup>	-.111 <sup>a</sup>	.605 <sup>a</sup>																
7. Disciplinarian-deity index	.077 <sup>a</sup>	.170 <sup>a</sup>	.011	-.203 <sup>a</sup>	-.133 <sup>a</sup>	-.074 <sup>a</sup>															
8. Inerrancy index	.147 <sup>a</sup>	.272 <sup>a</sup>	.008	-.187 <sup>a</sup>	-.131 <sup>a</sup>	-.085 <sup>a</sup>	.634 <sup>a</sup>														
9. Exclusivity index	.227 <sup>a</sup>	.286 <sup>a</sup>	.047 <sup>a</sup>	-.113 <sup>a</sup>	-.066 <sup>a</sup>	-.006	.578 <sup>a</sup>	.641 <sup>a</sup>													
10. Intolerance index	.011	.098 <sup>a</sup>	-.039 <sup>a</sup>	-.205 <sup>a</sup>	.084 <sup>a</sup>	.103	.356 <sup>a</sup>	.377 <sup>a</sup>	.366 <sup>a</sup>												
N	10,419	10,524	13,160	14,266	13,886	20,591	20,562	20,480	20,607												

<sup>a</sup> p < .01.

than on nationally representative samples from large populations, empirically, these studies may be overestimating the scale's efficacy. Considering that people with university education are more skilled in analyzing issues, assessing alternative perspectives, and making sense of the world autonomously than those less educated (Krueger and Malečková 2003; Schussman and Soule 2005; Davis and Robinson 2017), the university-educated respondents who partook in these studies were probably able to grasp the conceptual underpinning of the double-barreled and complex fundamentalism items. This proposition may be particularly true under Western democracies, where the issues and the undesirability of religious fundamentalism, authoritarianism, cultural intolerance, and exclusivity are widely discussed and debated. Being more frequently exposed to such debates, the university students tend to adopt clearer positions on these issues than the ordinary citizens, particularly those from the Middle East. This context may explain why the fundamentalism items administered on such unrepresentative samples in the United States or Canada generated stronger correlation coefficients between these items than when they are administered on a representative sample from a Middle Eastern country.

To test this proposition, we compare the correlation coefficients between the fundamentalism items in the pooled Middle East (ME) sample with the same coefficients obtained from a sample of students at the University of Maryland (UM). In the UM survey, a selected number of fundamentalism items were included, and a nonprobability sample was used—similar to many of the samples where AHF scale was administered (Altemeyer 1996; Altemeyer and Hunsberger 2004; Hunsberger, Owusu, and Duck 1999; Williamson et al. 2010).<sup>7</sup> The results, reported in Table 8, show that without exception the size of the correlation coefficient between every two items in the UM sample is significantly larger than the size of the corresponding correlation coefficient in the pooled sample of more than 20,000 respondents from several Middle Eastern countries.

### Predictive Validity

Based on the premise that fundamentalism is “a religious manifestation of authoritarianism” (Altemeyer 1996:161; cited also in Williamson et al. 2010:726), the predictive validity of the FHA scale is assessed by estimating the strength of its association with the RWA scale (Altemeyer 1996; Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992; Hunsberger, Owusu, and Duck 1999; Williamson et al. 2010). Such an estimate may provide clues concerning the connection between fundamentalism and authoritarianism in the respondent's mind, but it may be misleading in explaining the fundamentalists' historical behavior. A more convincing approach would be to validate the fundamentalism scale by assessing how well it predicts the cultural and political characteristics of the *fundamentalist movements* in different Abrahamic faiths. Such characteristics were reported by historians and social scientists, who have employed alternative methods of data collection, including comparative historical, qualitative approaches, and cases studies.

For sure, the notion of a disciplinarian God, exclusivity, and intolerance in the MKF scale (Moaddel and Karabenick 2018) implies that the premise is true insofar as authoritarianism is understood as a particular form of domination that promotes religious domination. But it is problematic to presume the existence of a uniform RWA orientation in all societies and that AHF scale is validated by the strength of its association with the RWA scale (Altemeyer 1996; Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992; Hunsberger, Owusu, and Duck 1999; Williamson et al. 2010). First, the items comprising the RWA scale are imbued with the same shortcomings as AHF scale. Many of its items are double-barreled, hard to understand for people with little or no formal education, and difficult to translate to other languages. Examples of such items are: “Our country desperately

<sup>7</sup>The interviews were carried out by about 50 undergraduate students enrolled in Introduction to Sociology class that I taught at the University of Maryland in the fall of 2017. Each student was instructed to interview 10 students at the university. In this nonprobability survey, only eight fundamentalism items were used.

Table 8: Correlation coefficients between select fundamentalism items in MENA and UMD samples

	ME	UM	ME	UM	ME	UM	ME	UM	ME	UM	ME	UM	ME	UM
Any infraction of religious instruction brings about Allah's severe punishment.	.356	.545												
Only Islam/Christianity provides comprehensive truth about Allah.	.363	.560	.442	.645										
Only the fear of God keeps people on the right path.	.261	.519	.421	.659	.416	.614								
Quran/Bible is true beginning to end.	.292	.600	.580	.682	.460	.712	.519	.741						
Only Islam/Christ. gives a complete and unflinching guide to human salvation.	.297	.568	.377	.618	.315	.588	.237	.591	.361	.758				
Only Muslims/Christians go to heaven.	.257	.462	.516	.625	.430	.602	.445	.681	.535	.764	.394	.739		
Islam/Christianity is only true religion.	.339	.508	.440	.586	.428	.635	.412	.633	.475	.677	.346	.657	.558	.695
Whenever there is a conflict b/w religion and science, religion is always right.														

The difference between each pair of correlation coefficient is significant at  $p < .001$ ;  $N_{me} = 20,782$ ;  $N_{um} = 475$ .

needs a mighty leader who will do what has to be done to destroy the radical new ways and sinfulness that are ruining us..., [or] “The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get back to our traditional values, put some tough leaders in power, and silence the troublemakers spreading bad ideas” (cited in Williamson et al. 2010:731; Altemeyer and Hunsberger 2005).

It may be possible to obtain a strong empirical correlation between the two scales to validate AHF scale on a sample of university students under Western democracies, where fundamentalism is linked to RWA, the measurement defects of both scales notwithstanding. Nonetheless, findings from comparative historical research and comparative cross-national survey have shown that this relationship is complicated. Considering the historical context of the Muslim world since the eighteenth century, the relation of fundamentalism with authoritarianism appears nonlinear. In this period, there have been varied forms of authoritarianism, and fundamentalism tended to reinforce one form, weaken another, and have no relationship with some other forms. The fundamentalism of Shah Waliullah (1703–1762) in India and Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab (1703–1792) in the Hejaz (part of Saudi Arabia today), for example, first, contributed to the rise of militant religious movements (Ahmad 1964; Ahmad 1966; Hardy 1972; Hourani 1983), but later “inspired the technique of religious reform in... pro-Western Indian Wahhabism as represented by Sayyid Ahmad Khan” (Ahmad 1964:217). By attacking the spiritual claim of the sultan, the dogmatism of the ulama, unlawful innovations in Islam, reverence for the saints and the worship of their shrines, and various forms of superstition, the teachings of these theologians opened the Pandora’s box of rational criticism, expanding the range of permissible expressions in Islamic theology (Rahman 1968; Troll 1978), weakening the rigidity of the Islamic orthodoxy, giving religious authenticity to the worldviews of the Islamic modernists, and enabling the latter to respond to the criticisms of their conservative colleagues (Moaddel 2005).

The historical experience of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers (MB) also demonstrates the complexity of fundamentalism-authoritarian relationship. Founded in 1928, the MB emerged as a religious oppositional response to the critical attitudes of liberal intellectual leaders toward Islam and the secularist policies of the nationalist politicians in the 1920s–1930s. It was, however, a pragmatic movement, often allying with the palace and the conservatives against the liberals and the left. The MB’s turn against the constitutional democracy was, at least in part, an outcome of its tug of war with the nationalist government and the exclusionary policies of the ruling elite, which had forced the MB to withdraw from participating in the 1942 parliamentary elections, rigged the elections after it was allowed to participate in 1945; dissolved the MB in 1948; and assassinated its leader Hasan al-Banna in 1949. Other factors contributing to MB radicalization were the British meddling in Egypt’s political affairs, the Zionist movement in Palestine that culminated in the formation of the state of Israel, the country’s economic difficulties, and the selfishness of the members of dominant classes—all prompted the MB to ally with the Arab nationalists in the military who in the 1952 coup overthrew the constitutional monarchy. The formation of the socialist-oriented Arab nationalist military regime under the personal dictatorship of Jamal Abdul Nassir paralleled the rise of religious extremism in the country from the 1960s on. The radicalization of the Syrian MB followed a similar pattern. The Jordanian Muslim Brothers receiving better treatments under the Hashemite Kingdom and observing the repression of the Egyptian MB under the military regime opted to support the Hashemites vis-à-vis the threats from the Arab nationalists in the military. The Fed’iyan-i Islam in Iran, on the other hand, remained consistently a violent Shia fundamentalist movement since its formation in 1946 (Mitchell 1969; Vatikiotis 1980; Ayubi and Nassif 1980; Moaddel 2002, 2005).

Another suggestive example of how the available historical options prompted a fundamentalist group to take antiauthoritarian posture is Abu Ala Maududi, the leader of *Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan*, endorsing the candidacy of Fatima Jinnah who was running against General Muhammad Ayub Khan in the 1965 presidential elections in the country, even though Maududi “had persistently asserted that a woman could not legally be appointed as the head of an Islamic state” (Ahmad 1967: 209). Unmarried and appeared in public unveiled, Jinnah was criticized by the



group in 1950 for violating the norms of *purdah*. Yet, the Jamaat opted to support her against the General, because the latter had seized power militarily in 1958 purportedly to curb the electoral victory of *Jamaat-e-Islami* and foil the “insidious plans” of the Islamic parties at political manipulation (Nasr 1994; Siddiqui 2010). It is thus curious to note that the 1940s Egyptian liberal politicians being frightened by the impressive rise of the Muslim Brothers engaged in illiberal behavior, while the Pakistani fundamentalists being frightened by the authoritarian rule of General Ayub Khan opted to follow a liberal strategy in the presidential elections. These examples imply that the relationship between fundamentalism and authoritarianism could be spurious, depending on, as will also be shown below, the type of authoritarian rule that is dominant in society.

In our view, fundamentalism is a religious manifestation of a *form* of communal, gender, and political domination. This theoretical abstraction rests on empirical generalization, or *inductive reasoning*, from the observation and analysis of specific cases of the fundamentalist movements in the Abrahamic faiths in different social contexts (Lawrence 1989; Lustick 1988; Almond, Sivan, and Appleby 1995; Almond, Appleby, and Sivan 2003; Antoun 2008; Barzilai-Nahon and Barzilai 2005; Emerson and Hartman 2006; Kaplan 1992; Moaddel 2005; Riesebrodt 1993). Therefore, a more fruitful approach to gauge the scale’s predictive validity is to consider how well it correlates with such features of the concrete fundamentalist movements as adherence to patrimonialism, support for patriarchal values and male supremacy, and opposition to secularism. In other words, an effective fundamentalism scale must be inversely correlated with the indices of expressive individualism, gender equality, secular politics, and liberal values.

### Data Collection versus Data Production

There may be another more serious methodological issue in the AHF-RWA validation procedure. AHF, RWA, MKF scales are all essentially *deductive*; the items making the scales are deduced from a *a priori* definition of fundamentalism and authoritarianism. Based on the *a priori* definition of these terms, a series of questions are designed, and the respondents’ answer to these questions generated empirical data. These data are thus *produced* by the investigators rather than being *collected*. A respondent’s answer in some rural area in Egypt or Tunisia, for example, to a fundamentalism item on whether he or she (strongly) agrees or (strongly) disagrees that “when there is a conflict between religion and science, religion is always right,” constitutes a datum that is produced. Such a dataset is the product of the investigators’ deductive reasoning. It is not out there to be collected. Many of the people who participated in our cross-national survey had perhaps never contemplated the idea of conflicts between religion and science. On the other hand, questions about the respondent’s age, gender, income, or place of residence are facts that exist out there. These are examples of the data that are collected.

It does not seem to be an adequate validation procedure to assess how the distribution of one set of data that is produced by the investigator relates to another distribution that is also produced. This practice establishes that one constructed scale is related to another constructed scale, but the jury is still out concerning the scale’s effectiveness in predicting the real, not imputed, character of authoritarianism. The validation procedure throws little clarity on how fundamentalism and authoritarianism relate in the real life. This approach thus tends to overlook the significance of religious, national, and historical contexts that shape the specific fundamentalist attitudes and beliefs. Moreover, insofar as the fundamentalism scale is constructed based on a formal *a priori* definition of the construct without considering how well the scale predicts religiously and historically specific fundamentalist attitudes and beliefs, it almost always remains vulnerable to the criticisms of other investigators who have studied the subject as a case in a concrete historical setting. After all, what is the use of a scale if it cannot account for the historical specificities of the phenomenon that the scale purportedly measures?

As an alternative, we suggest that the predictive validity of a constructed scale like AHF or MKF may be assessed by the strength of its correlation with a scale that is inductively constructed, the scale that rests on empirical generalization from observing the phenomenon in its concrete historical settings. We argued that the indices of expressive individualism, gender equality, secular politics, and liberal values rest on the generalization of the behaviors and expressed attitudes of the fundamentalist movements across the Abrahamic faiths. MKF scale has consistently negative relationships with all these indices among Christians, Jews, Shia Muslims, and Sunni Muslims. An additional utility of this validation procedure is that it links survey research to such other methods in the study of the subject as comparative historical and case studies.

### Incremental Validity

Turning to incremental validity, we suggest that while both MKF and AHF scales predict the indices of expressive individualism, gender equality, secular politics, and liberal values, MKF scale has stronger relationship with these indices than AHF scale. Therefore, MKF scale has incremental validity vis-à-vis AHF scale. We also propose that the link between fundamentalism and authoritarian political values is indeterminate. The measures of political authoritarianism are based on responses to two questions in our survey:

I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing your country. For each one, would you say it is a (1) very good, (2) fairly good, (3) fairly bad, or (4) very bad way of governing your country?

1. Having a strong head of government who does not have to bother with parliament and elections (**strongman**).
2. Having the army rule (**army rule**).

Answers to both questions are recoded so that a greater value indicates a more favorable attitude toward a strong leader and army rule. The caveat in empirically juxtaposing the two scales is that the items making AHF scale were included only in the 2005 survey in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and MKF items were included in the 2011 survey in the same countries. Therefore, it is not possible to compare the predictive validity of the two scales in the same dataset. As an approximation of this comparison, we first constructed AHF scale from the 8 of the 10 items reported in Table 1 (excluding the two reversals, items 3 and 6), and then used the 2005 Egypt and Saudi Arabia survey data to calculate its correlation coefficients with the indices of liberal values and authoritarianism. We then compared the size of these coefficients with corresponding coefficients with MKF scale, using the data from the 2011 survey in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, to evaluate the incremental validity of MKF scale. The findings are reported in Table 9. As this table shows, across the two countries, both scales significantly predict indices of expressive individualism, gender equality, secular politics, and liberal values. However, the size of the correlation coefficient of MKF scale with expressive individualism, gender equality, secular politics, and liberal values is significantly larger than the corresponding coefficients of AHF with the indices. The MKF-AHF difference in correlation coefficients with the indices is statistically significant, indicating MKF scale's incremental validity.

The two questions measuring authoritarianism were asked in the 2011 survey in Egypt, only the first question was asked in the 2005 youth survey in Egypt, and none of these questions were allowed in the 2005 and 2011 surveys in Saudi Arabia. Accordingly, fundamentalism has no significant relationship with favorable attitude toward a strong leader among Egyptians in either of the two surveys. Favorable attitude toward army rule is linked to fundamentalism ( $r = .099$ ) in the 2011 survey. Far from indicating fundamentalist support for authoritarianism, this relationship,

Table 9: Corr. coef. of MKF and AHF scales with indices of liberal values and authoritarianism

Indices\Scales	Egypt			Saudi Arabia		
	MKF	AHF	MKF-AHF	MKF	AHF	MKF-AHF
Expressive individualism	-.148 <sup>e</sup>	-.046 <sup>a</sup>	.102 <sup>c</sup>	-.120 <sup>c</sup>	-.067 <sup>b</sup>	.053 <sup>a</sup>
Gender equality	-.312 <sup>e</sup>	-.197 <sup>e</sup>	.115 <sup>d</sup>	-.248 <sup>c</sup>	-.177 <sup>e</sup>	.071 <sup>b</sup>
Secular politics	-.222 <sup>e</sup>	-.170 <sup>e</sup>	.051 <sup>a</sup>	-.310 <sup>c</sup>	-.087 <sup>c</sup>	.223 <sup>e</sup>
Liberal values	-.328 <sup>e</sup>	-.185 <sup>e</sup>	.143 <sup>c</sup>	-.315 <sup>e</sup>	-.153 <sup>e</sup>	.162 <sup>e</sup>
Strongman as leader	-.013	-.022	.009	–	–	–
Army rule	.099	–	–	–	–	–
Listwise N=	3,424	892		1,629	934	

<sup>a</sup>  $p < .1$ .

<sup>b</sup>  $p < .05$ .

<sup>c</sup>  $p < .01$ .

<sup>d</sup>  $p < .001$ .

<sup>e</sup>  $p < .0001$ .

however, reflects the political condition of the time. The survey was carried out about 6 months after the overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak in 2011. At that time, the Egyptian army was quite popular not because of Egyptians turned authoritarian right after the dictator was overthrown. Rather, it was an indicative of the fact that the army remained neutral during the upheaval and eventually took the side of the protestors by asking the president to step down (Abdelhadi 2011). Witnessing the role of the army in persuading or even pressuring Mubarak to resign, those having a stronger fundamentalist orientation appear to display a more favorable attitude toward army rule. On the other hand, following the army overthrow of President Mohammad Morsi, who was a member of the Muslim Brothers, the attitudes of the fundamentalists toward army rule changed. Findings from the second wave of a panel survey carried out in Egypt in 2016 showed that the correlation coefficients of fundamentalism with strongman and army rule were insignificant; .011 and .001, respectively (not shown in Table 9).<sup>8</sup> However, after seizing power in 2012, the Muslim Brothers showed no qualms about religious-cum political authoritarianism, as Morsi clearly displayed authoritarian proclivity during his 1-year presidency. These findings again underscore the complexity of the relationship between fundamentalism and authoritarianism.

## CONCLUSIONS

We followed Altemeyer and Hunsberger in conceptualizing fundamentalism as an orientation toward religion, but we found serious problems in their conceptualization that overly stressed the belief in inerrancy as the key aspect of fundamentalism, operationalization of the construct that rendered some of the questionnaire items problematic, administering the questionnaire haphazardly and predominantly on university students which made it hard to generalize findings to larger and more heterogeneous populations, and considering an RWA scale to assess the predictive validity of AHF scale.

We tried to overcome these shortcomings by advancing a multidimensional conception of fundamentalism, measuring the construct by carefully following best-practice guidelines in cross-national multi-country survey, questionnaire development, the translation of the questionnaire to different languages, and interviewers' training. We have shown that our conceptualization of

<sup>8</sup>Of nationally representative sample of 3,496 adults interviewed in Egypt in 2011, 2,430 were reinterviewed in 2016 (response rate of 70%). To compensate for sample attrition, 1,428 additional interviews were conducted, bringing the total of interviews to 3,858.

fundamentalism and measurement of the construct are applicable to the three Abrahamic faiths—Christianity, Islam, and Judaism.

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