The Shadow of the Object:
Narcissism and the Usefulness of the Death Drive

by

Dominique Gaston

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Bachelor of Arts with Honors
Department of Philosophy
in the University of Michigan
2022

Advisor: Professor Andreas Gailus
Second Reader: Professor Daniel Herwitz

…Darkling I listen; and, for many a time
I have been half in love with easeful Death,
Call'd him soft names in many a mused rhyme,
To take into the air my quiet breath;

John Keats, *Ode to a Nightingale*

Contents

Acknowledgements

Firstly, I would like to express my profound gratitude to Professor Andreas Gailus for advising this thesis. Professor Gailus has been a part of this thesis before I began to imagine it as one. I first encountered Freud in his philosophy course, and what began as an essay has transformed into this thesis. Through his thoughtful guidance, encouragement and the extensive scope of his psychoanalytic knowledge, this extended inquiry into the death drive has been in service to my own life drive.

Secondly, I would like to thank my second reader, Professor Daniel Herwitz, whose thought-provoking and insightful comments have helped bring together and clarify many aspects of these chapters.

I would also like to thank the incredible professors and GSIs in the University of Michigan's philosophy department. It has been a great privilege to learn from you, and as a result, to grow in both my analytic ability and humanity.

I would like to thank my peers in Philosophy 401, whose feedback and solidarity over this past year have been invaluable.

I would like to thank my parents; their continual love and support have made this thesis possible.

Finally, I would like to thank my analyst. Words fall so incredibly short.

Chapter 1

Critical Literature Survey

1.1 Objectives

This thesis concerns the psychoanalytic sense-making of the inward-directedness of the libido by way of the concepts of narcissism and the death drive. The questions I attempt to answer are:

1. *In which ways is the concept of the death drive useful for understanding narcissism?*
2. *What is the relationship between narcissism and the death drive?*

My primary objective in this thesis is to argue for the four ways the concept of the death drive is useful for understanding narcissism. Though the notion of narcissism has yielded an extensive amount of literature within psychoanalysis, yet there are only two facets that the wide-ranging literature agree upon: (1) that the concept of narcissism is important, and (2) that the concept of narcissism is confusing. Principally, psychoanalysis suggests that all people are narcissistic, and the difference between health and pathological narcissism is one of degree. Taking into account the vastness of the literature, my argument will focus centrally on two psychoanalytic theorists and clinicians, Herbert Rosenfeld and André Green.

I have chosen these two theorists because they both have attempted to theoretically reconcile the notion of the death drive with the notion of narcissism. Moreover, their divergent understanding of the concept of the death drive provides two critical entry-points into how the concept of the death drive is useful for understanding narcissism. A careful exploration and explication of each of these two theorist's theories will yield four ways in which the concept of the death drive is useful.

I begin my thesis by examining the Freudian literature on narcissism and the death drive, in addition to explicating the metapsychological landscapes of the topographical model and the structural model. This introduces the clinical phenomenon that Freud was wrestling with, as well as motivating the significance of the theoretical problems in respect to the clinical phenomena. In chapter 2, I introduce the post-Freudian, object relations theorists: Melanie Klein and Donald Winnicott; I explicate concepts posited by these two theorists and clinicians which are deeply influential to the thought of Rosenfeld and Green. Chapter 3 takes the form of an introduction to Rosenfeld and Green through a detailed exploration of the ways in which Freud was influential to their theories of narcissism. Finally, in chapter 4, after describing Rosenfeld's theory of destructive narcissism and Green's theory of negative narcissism, I provide an argument for the four ways in which the concept of the death drive is useful for understanding narcissism.

For my reader's convenience, I list the four conclusions regarding the usefulness of the death drive for understanding narcissism:

Rosenfeld and Green

1. *The usefulness of the death drive for understanding narcissistic object-relations.*
2. *The usefulness of the concept of the death drive for explaining the self foundationally turning against itself and attacking itself.*

Rosenfeld

3. *The usefulness of the concept of the death drive for providing an intrinsically aggressive aspect of the self with which the ego can identify.*

Green

4. *The usefulness of the concept of the death drive for theorizing the un-represented.*

1.2 The Freudian Literature

In this chapter, I survey the two primary metapsychological models of the psyche that Freud posited, the topographical model and the structural model. Furthermore, I survey the notions of narcissism and the death drive in Freud's corpus. I should note that this survey does not include all of the texts Freud published, far from it. Rather, the survey is comprised of the most important of Freud's texts that pertain to the topic of this thesis.

Topographical Model

In order to come to an understanding of the place and function of the concept of narcissism in Freud's ever-changing theory, I must describe the model of the psyche that Freud had espoused in 1914 when his essay entitled *On Narcissism: An Introduction* was published. The model of the psyche at this time is referred to as the topographical model, and was Freud's metapsychological model from 1897 to 1923 (Erwin, 2016, p. 57).

Freud's topographical model of the psyche, first appears in a systematic manner in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900) and received its most in depth discussion in the 1915 paper entitled *The Unconscious.* In this paper, Freud explicates that his model is one in which the psyche is divided into three functional systems: the conscious (*Cs*.), the preconscious (*Pcs*.), and the unconscious (*Ucs*.). The foundational reference point in the topographical model is the conscious, for the other two posited systems of the psyche are named to indicate their reference to consciousness. I will begin by explicating the system unconscious.

The system unconscious is the furthest away from the system conscious and, therefore, the furthest away from the external world. Primarily, the Unconscious is both rational and irrational, and it content is comprised of repressed content. The unconscious is irrational in that it

does not have access to language and cannot represent logical relations. That is, the unconscious is primarily affect-based and rooted in the body. Rather, Freud lists five distinctive characteristics of the unconscious as follows: "exemption from mutual contradiction, exemption from negation, displacement, condensation, timelessness, and disregard for reality" (Erwin, 2016, p. 578). In contradiction, the unconscious is rational for Freud insofar as it has the ability to make inferences about the content of other minds (Freud, 1915a).

Furthermore, the content of the system unconscious is comprised of unsatisfied drives, which can be conceptualized, from a quantitative point of view, "as a fluctuating quantity of energy that, having reached a certain level of intensity, seeks discharge" (Erwin, 2016, p. 73). Freud insisted that drives had a pressing quality as an essential characteristic of all instinctual drives (Freud, 1909a, pp. 140-141). In *Instincts and Their Vicissitudes* (1915), Freud defines a drive as:

> *"If we now apply ourselves to considering mental life from a biological point of view, a "drive" appears to us as a concept on the frontier between the mental and the somatic, as the psychical representative of the stimuli originating within the organism and reaching the mind, as a measure of the demand made upon the mind to work in consequences of its connection with the body"* (Freud, 1915, p. 121-22).

Freud hereby represents the drives comprise the unconscious as instinctual wishes, which seeks to satisfy themselves and achieve pleasurable discharge. In this regard, the drives because they exist "on the frontier between the mental and the somatic" (Freud, 1915, p. 122). Therefore, the psyche is the domain in which the demands of the body are carried out and allowed to be realized.

While there are many aspects of the system unconscious which are wildly important and complex, the salient aspect for this thesis resides upon two fundamental drives that Freud sets in opposition to each other: the self-preservation drive (also referred to as ego-drive) and the sexual

drive. These two drives, and all they comprise, can be differentiated by their respective aims. Generally summarized, the self-preservation drive is comprised of those drives whose aim is the preservation of the individual: safety and growth. In contrast, the sexual drive is comprised of those drives whose aim is the erotic pleasure through discharge and reproduction, serving the goal of the species (Akhtar & O'Neil, 2011, p. 2) (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988, p. 146). In Freud's words, "The individual does actually carry on a twofold existence: one to serve his own purposes and the other as a link in a chain, which he serves against his will, or at least involuntarily…The separation of the sexual instincts from the ego-instincts would simply reflect this twofold function of the individual" (Freud, 1914, p. 143). Resulting from these differing properties, the self-preservation drive operates in accord with the reality principle because a sound understanding of external reality is a necessary condition for serving the the aim of self-preservation.

Next, I will explicate the system preconscious. Though the system preconscious lies between the system unconscious and the system conscious, it contents also have the quality of unconsciousness (i.e. they are, descriptively speaking, unconscious). However, the content of the preconscious, while not momentarily conscious, can be readily accessible to consciousness. An example of such content is the memory of what was eaten for breakfast in the morning or the pleasureful feeling of love for one's dog. Stated differently, "the preconscious is understood to designate whatever is implicitly present in mental activity without constituting the object of consciousness" (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988, p. 327). Furthermore, the preconscious comprises a transformative function because the psychic qualities and processes of the conscious, the preconscious, and the unconscious are neither static nor permanent (Freud, 1940, p. 160). Indeed, what once was conscious can slip into the preconscious. Freud states that "material which was

ordinarily unconscious [in the usual dynamic sense] can transform itself into preconscious material and then becomes conscious" (Freud, 1940, p. 161). In fact, making the unconscious conscious is a central aim of psychoanalysis.

Finally, the system conscious is the system of the topographical model of the psyche which receives perceptual and sensate information from both external and internal sources. These sensations "impress themselves at some point on the pleasure-unpleasure scale, and of revived memories" (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988, p. 84). The details of the constitution of consciousness, however, were not defined by Freud. He considers the conscious to be a fact of individual existence, which is available to immediate intuition (ibid). He states that consciousness is "a fact without parallel, which defies all explanation or description… Nevertheless, if anyone speaks of consciousness we know immediately and from out most personal experience what is meant by it" (Freud, 1940, p. 79).

1.2.1 Narcissism

Freud officially introduced the concept "narcissism" in his 1914 essay entitled *On Narcissism: An Introduction,* after twenty years of theorizing. The introduction of the term was extremely important for Freud's metapsychology because it marked a watershed turning point in Freud's thought. Old and new concepts were inter-mingled, and the problems raised by the introduction of the concept of "narcissism" prefigured the changed that would follow in Freud's reworking of his metapsychological model. *On Narcissism: An Introduction* was transitional in nature because it described a psychological state that combined the two drives Freud had theorized as opposing each other, the self-preservation drive and the sexual drive, which rendered them no longer in opposition to each other. In essence, the notion of narcissism describes the phenomenon of the

inward-directedness of the libido[1]—the libidinal cathexis[2] of the self.[3] Therefore, narcissism brought to light the fact that Freud's previous theory of drives necessarily needed to be reworked. This problem eventually culminated in the introduction of the concept of the death drive.

There were a few clinical phenomena which galvanized this theoretical concept. First, and most important, is the phenomenon of *no transference.* Freud postulated that individual's suffering from narcissistic pathologies did not have a capacity for transference, or only insufficient remnants of ones (Rosenfeld, 1964, p. 332). Freud described the experience in analysis with these patients as akin to a stone wall that could not be penetrated. That is to say, Freud noted that in analysis, narcissistic patients related to the analyst not in hostility, but in indifference. Second, the phenomenon of schizophrenia, which was called dementia praecox at the time, where a patient would seemingly only be in relation to different repressed aspects of themselves which they were hallucinating; for schizophrenia, the external world is not related to.

The concept of narcissism in arcissism in Freud comes to be used in a broad manner, totaling nine different senses of the term (Fonagy, 2019, p. 109). (1) A developmental stage; (2) The processes that make this stage possible; (3) A certain kind of point of fixation corresponding to this stage of development; (4) Narcissistic object choice[4]; (5) The introjected narcissistic object choice; (6) A set of attitudes, states, or character traits, all by way of "degrees of self-evaluation or overvaluation of some characteristic of the subject or of himself as a whole"; (7)

[1] Libido is defined as: psychic "energy postulated by Freud as underlying the transformation of the sexual instinct with respect to its object (displacement of cathexes), with respect to its aim (e.g. sublimation), and with respect to the source of sexual excitation (diversity of erotogenic zones)" (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988, p. 239).
[2] Cathexis is defined as: "The fact that a certain amount of psychical energy is attached to an idea or to a group of ideas, to a body part, to an object, etc" (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988, p. 62).
[3] It is important to note during this time in his career, Freud uses the term "ego" interchangeably with "self," which would more accurately be called "self-representation."
[4] Object is defined as: "The thing in respect of which and through which the instinct seeks to attain its aim (i.e., a certain kind of satisfaction)" (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988, p. 273).

Narcissistic wound; (8) Narcissism of small differences; and (9) taking one's own body as an object of love (Fonagy, 2019, p. 110-11). However, these nine senses all have one common understanding of narcissism: *the libidinal investment in the self*.

In this chapter, I will explicate Freud's notions of primary narcissism, secondary narcissism, and the narcissistic object choice present in melancholia. These three forms of narcissism will be the prevailing forms of narcissism engaged with throughout this thesis.

Autoeroticism

In order to understand the concept of primary narcissism, which will be described in the following section, the psychological state and structure out of which it arises must be explicated. Autoeroticism was first mentioned by Freud in a letter to Fliess dated December 9, 1899. and is posited as "an instinctual state which 'dispenses with any psycho-sexual aim' and seeks only locally gratifying sensations" (Green, 2001a, p. 11).

Over the course of Freud's corpus, the term autoeroticism has had an ambiguous trajectory. Sometimes the term is used to describe the infant's original oral relation to the mother's breast, as in *On Narcissism: An Introduction* (1914). Other times, the autoerotic stage is dropped altogether from the developmental theory, as in *Instincts and Their Vicissitudes* (1915). For the purposes of this thesis, autoeroticism will be understood as Green describes Freud's understanding. Green presents Freud's description of autoeroticism wherein he notes that:

> *"…at the time at which the first beginnings of sexual satisfaction are still linked with the taking of nourishment, the sexual instinct has a sexual object outside the infant's own body in the shape of his mother's breast. It is only later that the instinct loses that object, just at the time, perhaps, when the child is able to form a total idea of the person to whom the organ that is giving him satisfaction belongs. As a rule, the sexual instinct then becomes auto-erotic"* (Freud, 1905, p. 222).

In this regard, autoeroticism is a stage which arises when the drives have lost their object, when the infant has lost its instinctual fusion with the mother's breast (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988, p. 45) Therefore, autoeroticism is the stage immediately before the psyche of the infant has acceded to the status of a unified subject. Yet, autoeroticism marks the stage when the mother's containing nourishment, which was hitherto outside, has been lost as an object (Green, 2001b, p. 73).

Furthermore, Freud describes the ideal of autoeroticism as "lips kissing themselves," which suggests notions of a re-gluing of a new unity that enables the infant to fall back on oneself for its own resources. Put succinctly, autoeroticism is a transitional stage, after the loss of the fusional object that the mother's breast, where the infant retreats back into themselves so that the infant's body can begin to satisfy their own drives, which is the case independently of the external object's presence or absence (Green, 2001b, p. 74). However, in the autoerotic stage, the subject has not yet developed the capacity to take oneself as object. There is a difference between the manner in which the infant nourishes oneself in autoeroticism and in primary narcissism. In autoeroticism, sexual pleasure is obtained *from* one's body without recourse to a real or imagined sexual object (Erwin, 2016, p. 37). In contradistinction, primary narcissism is the stage where one is being sexually excited *by* one's body as a sexual object.

Green summarizes Freud's stages leading to primary narcissism as follows:

"Stage 1: Infant-breast body; oral instinctual impulse.

Stage 2: Losing the breast; localizing the breast; narcissistic object; outside; perception of the whole of the mother's body; linking the breast with the mother's body; auto-eroticism (pleasure of sucking) …

Stage 3: Narcissism arises from the unification of the sexual drive in order to constitute an object based on the model (see Stage 2) of the object perceived in its totality." (Green, 2001a, p. 18-19).

Further exploration of the stage (and structure) of autoeroticism are engaged by Green in his theory of negative narcissism.

Primary Narcissism

The first major insight advanced by Freud in his 1914 essay, *On Narcissism: An Introduction,* is found in his notion of primary narcissism: "an early state in which the child cathects its own self with the whole of its libido" (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988, p. 337) In this way, primary narcissism is a stage in instinctual development between those of autoeroticism (in which there is no concrete subject-object bifurcation) and of object choice.[5] Consequently, for Freud, the emergent state of primary narcissism, where one takes oneself as an object for whom the libido can cathect, is necessary because it contemporaneous with the emergence of a felt sense of a unified subject within the psyche—it marks the emergence of an ego as "self-representation."

Stated differently, primary narcissism is the stage at which the ego as self-representation is experienced and apprehended (Green, 2001a, p.11). Freud describes the origins of narcissism in the case history of Schreber (1911):

> *There comes a time in the development of the individual at which he unifies his sexual instincts (which have hitherto been engaged in auto-erotic activities) in order to obtain a love-object; and he begins by taking himself, his own body, as his love-object, and only subsequently proceeds from this to the choice of some person other than himself as his object.* (Freud, 1911, p. 60).

[5] Definitionally, object choice is the stage when the ego and the narcissistic libido begins to cathex to (ideas of) objects. The ego thus begins to relate to external objects as follows: the aspect of the mother as mother, excluding all the other aspects of the mother that are not related to by the infant. (Fonagy, 2019, p. 14).

Importantly, Freud is careful to remind us that the ego is fundamentally a bodily ego, and he caveats this statement with the following utterance: "it [the ego] is not merely a surface entity; it is itself the projection of a surface" (Freud, 1923, p. 26). Moreover, it is important to note that the world as the potential space for separate, discrete objects for libidinal cathexis is not available to the stage of primary narcissism. This aspect of primary narcissism will become an important feature of the theories of narcissism explored in the fourth chapter.

Furthermore, the stage (and structure) of primary narcissism is characterized by omnipotent thinking and a sense of self-perfection (Fonagy, 2019, p. 15). Freud observes that omnipotent thinking is a result of a twofold cathexis: (1) overestimating the power of the ego (thus, the reversal of its impotence into omnipotence), and (2) the sexualization of the ego's thinking (Green, 2001a, p. 12). These properties of primary narcissism, while developmentally healthy, if they are disturbed by trauma and arrested, become some of the organizing properties of pathological narcissism in adulthood.

Secondary Narcissism

In *On Narcissism: An Introduction* (1914), Freud continues his account of narcissism by positing secondary narcissism, which I will also refer to as pathological narcissism in this thesis. Freud describes the secondary narcissism found in schizophrenic and psychotic patients as follows: "This leads us to look upon the narcissism which arises through the drawing in of object-cathexes as a secondary one, superimposed upon a primary narcissism that is obsecured by a number of different influences" (Freud, 1914, p. 140). In this way, secondary narcissism is considered by Freud to be a severely regressive psychological state within which the libido has

withdrawn from its investment in external objects (a negative symptom) and has re-invested itself in the ego itself (a positive symptom) (Fonagy, 2019, p. 11).

To make sense of the libidinal dynamic of secondary narcissism, Freud introduces the concepts of "ego libido" and "object libido," which indicates that with which the libido is invested (Fonagy, 2019, p. 13). Notably, during this middle period of Freud's thought, he espoused a economic conception of the libido; that is, the libido's investments are either in objects or in the self. These libidinal investments are a zero-sum game, wherein such increased investment in the ego results in decreased investment in objects, and vice-versa. Object love impoverishes narcissism, and narcissism is impoverished by love; which is to say, the overestimation of the object goes hand in hand with the underestimation of the ego (Green, 2001g, p. 221).

In order to adequately account for secondary narcissism, Freud's model needs to conceptually explain the psychic conditions for its possibility. To achieve this aim, Freud introduces two psychic structures: the ego ideal and the conscience. These concepts are central to some of the different meanings by which the term narcissism is used. When developing beyond primary narcissism and into the capacity for object relations, Freud considers that the state of primary narcissism does not simply fade into the subject's lost past. Rather, Freud postulates that primary narcissism is repressed by countervailing psychic structures, and thereby relegated to the individual's unconscious. Importantly, the necessary condition for this repression to occur is the subject's development of the ego ideal, which is "the agency of the personality resulting from the coming together of narcissism (idealization of the ego) and identification with the parents, with their substitutes or with collective ideals" (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988, p. 144).

Moreover, the ego ideal constitutes that to which the subject attempts to conform (ibid). As Willy Baranger states in his essay *Narcissism in Freud*, "the center of narcissism…consists not of the ego but of the…ego-ideal, to which it tries to adjust and which alone is truly admirable" (Fonagy, 2019, p. 110). That is, the ego ideal is thus the seat of narcissism in an adult. However, the ego ideal is also the agency from which self-aggression derives. This partially results from the fact that the ego ideal comes to hold the subject's cultural and ethical ideas. This is seen, for example, when instinctual impulses are repressed when they come into conflict with the subject's cultural norms. Such an ego ideal may also be modeled upon a revered leader, a parental figure, or an abstract conception of virtue. The ego ideal is, therefore, a kind of lure toward which the subject comes to strive, and which acts as a guiding principle. It is the means by which and against which the subject evaluates and measures one's self-representation.

Freud noted that there must necessarily be a psychic agency whose function is to secure the continued narcissistic gratification stemming from an alignment of ego and ego ideal. Importantly, this gratification is narcissistic merely because it has to do with the self, for this narcissism is not pathological. Narcissistic gratification is the means by which the psyche secures and perpetuates one's self-esteem. Freud designates this psychic agency the "conscience", which task is to observe the state of the ego and assess it from the standpoint of the ego ideal. As such, the conscience censures thoughts and behaviors which are inconsistent with the ego ideal. Saliently, the ego ideal and the conscience are proto-conceptions of Freud's later conceptualization of the "superego", within which the former conceptualization come to be subsumed. I will expand on the concept of the superego later in the essay.

Lastly, as this was Freud's first attempt as a metapsychological explanation of the clinical phenomenon of the withdrawal of libidinal investments from the world, it proved insufficient to

explain the nuance found in the inner world of narcissistic individuals and the pathological personality disorders that can subsumed under the broad definition of libidinal withdrawal. *On Mourning and Melancholia* (1917), was a second attempt to come to understand (part of) this phenomenon.

Mourning and Melancholia

The role of aggression in narcissism—specifically self-aggression—is taken up in Freud's 1917 essay entitled *On Murder, Mourning and Melancholia*, in which he describes how the two phenomena of mourning and melancholia are distinguished on the basis of the presence of narcissism in melancholia—and the *absence* of narcissism in mourning. This narcissism in melancholia is present in two ways: (1) in the narcissistic object-choice and (2) the metapsychological explanation of self-aggression.

I will firstly examine the few but salient points of convergence. Both mourning and melancholia emerge as a reaction to the real loss of a love-object. What is more, both states are characterized by "painful depression, loss of interest in the outside world, the loss of the ability to love, [and] the inhibition of any kind of performance" (Freud, 1917, p. 204). As a result, both the mourner and the melancholic are unable to choose a new love-object, because the energy of their libido is fully involved in the demands of their current psychological state. Importantly, depression marks melancholia as an account of *one kind of pathological narcissism, depressive narcissism*. In the work of the contemporary psychoanalytic theorist André Green, this will be referred to as death narcissism and moral narcissism.

For the melancholic, the lost love-object is unconscious and can be "more notional in nature" (Freud, 1917, p. 205). That is, the lost love-object can be something such as one's

freedom; it does not have to be another physical being. Further, the properties of the lost love-object are a consequence of the melancholic's narcissistic object-tie; that is to say, the subject unconsciously models oneself on the object. In this regard, the melancholic introjects aspects of the other, resulting in the subject confusing self and other. Therefore, the loss of the object is experienced as a loss of self. Put differently, the subject cannot really tell the difference between oneself and the other. To illustrate this point, consider the case of a person who, whenever befriending someone, begins to model who they are and how they act onto the qualities and characteristics of their new friend. The conditions for the possibility for this relational phenomenon to occur is resides in an impoverished sense of independent selfhood and a psychological need for fusion with an object. The melancholic is someone whose ego has not yet been developmentally achieved. This is a pathological state because, in a healthy individual, such ego achievement ought to have already occurred. Consequently, there was a developmental failure in the history of the melancholic which was the cause of a weak sense of self. Saliently, this self-state is an essential property of pathological narcissism, which will be further explicated the fourth chapter.

Furthermore, the loss of the love-object comes about through "insult, slight, setback, and disappointment," which is to say that the loss arises when the love-object acts in a manner that violates and disrupts the subject's self-regard (Freud, 1917, p. 211). The love-object's otherness cannot be tolerated by the melancholic's psychic structures, because the love-object is many times more complex than the shallow aspect of them that the melancholic has identified with and introjected. What is more, the melancholic feels ambivalently about the love-object; there is both love and hate. One cause of melancholia is the subject's inability to bear such feelings of ambivalence (Freud, 1917, p. 210). Moreover, and most importantly, due to the narcissistic

object-tie, the melancholic cannot bear to face such object loss because he would thus be losing a part of himself that had come to be projected onto the love-object.

As a result of the subject's inability to bear a disruption in self-regard, in terms of ambivalence and the inextricable otherness of the love-object, the melancholic ego splits into two autonomous structures. The ambivalence present in the relationship with the (now lost) love-object is internalized; one structure of the ego identifies with the object, while the opposing ego-structure becomes a moral judge and enters into an attacking relationship with the part of the ego which identified with the object (Freud, 1917, p. 208-209). Saliently, this moralized attacker is a proto-conception of what will, in Freud's later thought, be developed into the notion of the superego. As a result of this self-aggression, the melancholic ego is rendered "poor and empty" with a reduced sense of self-esteem (Freud, 1917, p. 206).

To summarize, the psyche of the melancholic is comprised of three internal structures, one object and two part-egos: (1) an introjected object, (2) the ego identified with the object, and (3) the moralizing and judging attacker, or proto-superego. The splitting of the ego and the critical turning of the ego against itself is therefore is an enactment of the ambivalence which the melancholic subject feels towards the love-object.

To help elucidate how and why this splitting takes place, consider the example of Mary. Mary is the child of a mother who has neglected an essential need of hers. However, Mary is not in a position in which she can or would want to end the relationship with her mother (Freud, 1917, p. 209). As a consequence, for this essential relationship to continue, Mary's internalizes the ambivalence she feels towards her mother; her ego identifies with the aspects of the mother that she loves and needs, while the other part-ego unconsciously attacks the identified ego. This is phenomenally experienced by Mary as incessant self-criticism whenever she attempts to do

anything on her own. Therefore, outwardly, Mary acts in conformity with her mother's needs and desires, never swaying from being the attentive and perfect daughter, all while unconscious of the dramatic self-attack within her.

Examination of the phenomenon of melancholia offers many important insights into the nature of the human psyche, and of the narcissistic psyche in particular. Firstly, we come to see the manner in which the fissured or compartmentalized psychic structures are able to operate in an autonomous manner, which is in many ways independent of the psyche of the individual as a whole. Secondly, we see that the state of melancholic malaise results from the incapacity of the melancholic subject to contend with the frictions which necessarily arise due to the otherness of the love-object; the melancholic cannot enter into a state of grieving, loss or mourning. Freud argues that this is the case because of the melancholic's identification with the love-object. In order for one to mourn the loss of something or someone, there needs to be a *separate* thing or has been lost.

Due to the melancholic's inability to see the love-object as other, the abandoned love-object is preserved in the form of an identification of the melancholic ego-structure with the object itself—the external love-object is transformed into a wholly internal object. As a result, what had been an external love-object becomes instead a wholly internalized object over which the ego is able to wield omnipotent knowledge and control, thereby precluding the possibility of loss by a neutralization of the otherness of the love-object. Interestingly, the self-aggression is an outlet for feelings of anger towards the love-object proper (Freud, 1917, p. 211). Freud suggests the melancholic does not suffer the feeling of shame because their worth is not at stake; the self-attack serves as a kind of hydraulic outlet or release for ambivalent libidinal energies that cannot be released outwardly toward the proper receipient (Freud, 1917, p. 207).

Freud's insight into the role of self-aggression in the process of introjecting the love-object relates significantly to the central theme of this thesis regarding narcissism as a relation between external otherness and the ego-structures of the narcissistic subject. That is, the weakened sense of self of the melancholic influences the manner in which the individual relates to others, which is central in cases of pathological narcissism. This view of pathological narcissism invites empathy, for this pathology is the psyche's way of attempting to experience and achieve the developmental nourishment that they never fully experienced.

1.2.2 The Death Drive

In 1920, with the publication of the essay entitled *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, Freud significantly revise his previous dual drive theory of the self-preservation drive and the sexual drive. These two drives were replaced with the life drive and the death drive—put mythologically, Eros and Thanatos. The publication of *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* changed the psychoanalytic landscape and is a requirement to understand Freud's later works; that is to say, *The Ego and the Id* (1923) and *Civilization and its Discontents* (1930) would be inconceivable without the notion of the death drive.

The clinical phenomena which primarily galvanized Freud to overturn his old theory of drives were masochism, repetition compulsion[6], and negative therapeutic reaction. The psychoanalyst W. Craig Tomlinson notes that:

> *"the central problem of repetition compulsion in Beyond the Pleasure Principle loses an essential resonance for anyone who has not experienced the emotional intensity of trying to help a human being suffering from the recurrent nightmares, vivid flashbacks, waking*

[6] Repetition Compulsion is defined as: "At the level of concrete psychopathology, the compulsion to repeat is an ungovernable process originating in the unconscious. As a result of its action, the subject deliberately places himself in distressing situations, thereby repeating an old experience, but he does not recall this prototype" (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988, p. 78).

> *daydreams, and autonomic hyperarousal of post-traumatic stress—or, for that matter, the patience required when working through the memories and endless repetition encountered in people with especially prominent obsessional character problems*" (Akhtar & O'Neil, 2011c, p.76).

To deepen our understanding, let us quickly consider the severity of a case of a woman patient suffering from alcohol abuse, poor affect regulation, sexual acting out, and a series of unstable relations with men. Her personal history is that of an unavailable father, poor parental boundaries, and adolescent sexual abuse. Her constant re-enactments and inability to let go of these extremely self-destructive behaviors offer a glimpse into the relentless centrality of self-destruction. It was face-to-face with this type of clinical phenomena where Freud describes as giving the impression of a "demonic power." This solidified his decision to elevate aggression in the hierarchy of drives, no longer subsuming them under expressions of the sexual drive. Additionally, Freud came to the realization that all human behavior could not be explained by the pleasure principle; namely, the sexual drive and the self-preservation drive. These are the drive that make us act in accordance with the maximization of pleasure and the minimization of pain.

As previously explicated, the introduction of the notion of narcissism by Freud in 1914 supported the idea that the sexual drive and the self-preservation drive were not truly opposed to each other. The phenomenon of the inward-directedness of the libido could thus not be accounted for in an adequate manner. As we will see through the exploration undertaken in this thesis, the notions of narcissism and death drive are deeply entangled in Freud's corpus through their ability (or inability) to explain the inward-directedness of the libido. Moreover, with the introduction of narcissism and the modal differences between ego-libido and object-libido, hatred could no longer adequately be explained through "the ego's struggle to preserve and maintain itself" (Freud, 1915b, p. 138).

However, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, the introduction of both the life drive and the death drive permitted that the sexual drive and the self-preservation drive could be combined; together they denote the life drive. In opposition to the life drive, Freud posits the death drive:

> "*It seems, then, that an instinct is an urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things which the living entity has been obliged to abandon under the pressure of external disturbing forces; that is, it is a kind of organic elasticity, or to put it another way, the expression of the inertia inherent in organic life"* (Freud, 1920g, p. 36).

In this quote, Freud defines the death drive as an urge "inherent in organic life" to return to a state of earlier affairs, an inorganic state. This aim of the death drive is understood as the aim to free oneself of all stimulation and all tension—"that is, to achieve death" (Akhtar & O'Neil, 2011, p. 98). Thus, the primordial principle governing the death drive is the Nirvana principle, which is the governing principle of the elimination of all stimulation. Previously, the elimination of stimulation was only imagined through the lens of the discharge and fulfilment of the sexual drive and of the self-preservation drive. Green notes that the referent of the concept of the death drive is described by other concepts throughout the entirety of Freud's work before it acquired its central place in the second theory of drives. For example, in his 1895 paper entitled *Project for a Scientific Psychology*, Freud introduces the psychological principle of inertia, which explains the un-excitability of non-cathected systems (Green, 2001g, p. 220).

Important to Freud's postulation of the death drive is that it is essentially a *primordial repetition compulsion*; "When life began, simultaneously there began a tendency to return to the earlier state of total absence of stimulation, or, in other words, to an inanimate state" (Akhtar & O'Neil, 2011, p. 98). Stated differently, when life emerged from inanimate matter, the first drive was to return to the inanimate state. Significantly, in line with Freud's metaphysical placement of

drives in the organism, death is understood as biological death.[7] Moreover, Freud imagines that, in the beginning, to die must have been easy. In fact, life must have been created and recreated a myriad of times. The death drive is the first drive, one drive that drives life itself; "death is life's primordial tendency" (ibid). Freud continues this line of thought by postulating that the components of the life drive are subservient to the death drive and are only there to aid the individual to its death. The question, then, arises about how an individual life grows and ages. The drives of self-preservation, self-assertion, and mastery are essentially to "assure that the organism shall follow its own path to death" (Freud, 1920, p. 41). As such, the self-preservation drive makes capable the postponement of satisfaction. Yet, the drive toward self-preservation is responsible for the growth and safety of the individual before the death drive's inevitable prevalence by way of the individual's death.

In this way, human motivation was radically re-imagined to include a primordial self-destructiveness and self-aggression. Before the introduction of the death drive, Freud regarded sadism as an expression of the drive of mastery, with masochism as a secondary phenomenon (Akhtar & O'Neil, 2011, p. 2). With the introduction of the death drive, the primacy of sadism and masochism is reversed, with masochism as the primordial phenomenon. Importantly, Freud describes that the life and death drives are never seen as acting in the psyche in an isolated manner; they are always operating by way of some form of fusion. In this viewpoint, outwardly directed aggression and destruction are the result of the inability of the death drive to achieve the predominance of self-destruction due to the involvement of the life drive.

In Freud's later work, the life drive and the death drive were reworked in such a manner that the life drive is conceptualized as a principle of cohesion: "The aim of [the life drive] is to

[7] This property of the concept of death will become salient to the differences between the death drive as understood by Rosenfeld and the death drive as understood by Green.

establish even greater unities and to preserve them thus—in short, to bind together; the aim of [the death drive] is, on the contrary, to undo connections and to destroy things" (Freud, 1940, p. 71) This is especially salient to the development of the concept of the death drive in contemporary psychoanalytic though, such as in the thought of André Green.

The Id

Freud's 1923 essay, The Ego and the Id, introduced the structural model of the psyche, which marked a significant shift as to how inner psychic conflicts were understood. Freud postulated three new psychical agents: (1) the id, (2) the ego, and (3) the superego. In this section, I will briefly describe Freud's newly developed concept of the id, with the notion of the ego and the superego explicated in the next two sections.

The first agency in Freud's new model is the id. It consists in the instinctual pole and repressed content of the psyche (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988, p. 197). Differently stated, in a departure from the system unconscious in the topographical model, the id is comprised of more than just repressed content; some of the id is repressed and some is not. Furthermore, the contradiction within the concept of the system unconscious in Freud's topographical model—that the unconscious was described as postulated as both rational and irrational—was resolved by Freud in 1923 with the publication of *The Ego and the Id*. In the structural model, Freud uses the term "unconscious" to merely denote a *descriptive property* of mental events, as opposed to of the three mental systems (Erwin, 2016, p. 578). This contradiction is resolved by the concluding that the id contains the irrational portion; "the logical laws do not apply to the id" due to the absence of negation in its mental operations (Freud, 1923, p. 25). The id is timeless; it is not measured by the standards of chronological, linear time. As a result, in Freud's structural model,

the rational portion are identified with aspects of the ego in the structural model, any rational content is identified with the ego given that it represents "reason and common sense" (Freud, 1923, p. 25).

The content of the id in the structural model, however, is elusive and unknowable; "the dark inaccessible part of our personality" (Freud, 1933, p. 73). Freud refers to the id as "the core of our being" with its "sole prevailing quality" is that it is descriptively unconscious (Freud, 1940, p. 163). Despite these apophatic claims, we do know some properties of the id through Freud's discussions of its content; namely, that the landscape of the drives from *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* was imported as the content of the id. Consequently, the id consists of two aforementioned drives: the life drive and the death drive. Besides these two fundamental drives, the id is described as chaos, as having no organization nor collective will (Freud, 1933a, p. 80). In his structural model, humans are seen as creatures who are inherently comprised of competing desires, needs and drive. The id is thus primarily experienced as demanding the ego to carry out its wide-ranging and conflictual desires and needs. Importantly, the life drive and the death drive are the main components of the id, which are the central theme of the present thesis.

The Ego

In *The Ego and the Id*, the third agency of the psyche posited by Freud is the ego. The concept of the ego in his corpus is a complex one. This concept has undergone a significant evolution in line with the changing nature of Freud's thought over his career. Therefore, a full exploration of the development of the concept of the ego in Freud's corpus would merit a thesis in itself and of itself. For the present purposes, I will primarily explicate the organization of the ego in Freud's structural model, introduced in 1923 in the essay entitled *The Ego and the Id*,

which is contrasted to the topographical model. This decision to focus on the structural account of the ego is predicated upon the fact that both Herbert Rosenfeld and André Green will be elaborating their own theories using this later model and its understanding of the ego.

Importantly, in the topographical model of the psyche, which introduced a model of three psychic systems of the unconscious, preconscious, and the conscious. The preconscious and the conscious systems are in close relationship; when the structural model was first introduced, the preconscious and the conscious systems were combined to form the content of the ego. However, in his topographical model of the psyche, Freud does not mention the notion of the "ego" whatsoever. As to what had previously and will later on be referred to as the defenses pertaining to the ego, Freud argues that there is a process of censorship between these three systems of the topographical model, which controls and inhibits the transposition of libidinal energy from system to another.

The introduction of the notion of narcissism in 1914 required that the ego refers to the part of oneself which is in contradiction to the object and is taken as a love-object. The psychiatrist and psychoanalyst Heinz Hartmann argued that this use of the term "ego" necessitated a differentiation between two uses of this term. Firstly, the term "ego" refers to one's own person, which is in contrast to the external object. Secondly, the term "ego" refers to one of the three systems, or substructure, of the psyche (Hartmann, 1950, p. 84-85). Given this differentiation of meanings, the usage of the term ego in Freud's 1914 paper entitled *On Narcissism: An Introduction* would refer to the ego in the first manner, that is, with the ego as the person. This usage reconciles Freud's attempt to theoretically account for the inward-directedness of the libido.

While this differentiation has its advantages in understanding the use of the term "ego" in Freud's 1914 essay, the term "ego" is, nonetheless, used in a more complex fashion in *On Narcissism: An Introduction*. The most prominent manner by which the term "ego" is complicated resides in Freud's introduction of the stage of primary narcissism, which posits that the ego is developmentally achieved and is not present at birth. This central notion does not encompass the entirety of the individual's inner world and can be thought of as self-representation (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988, p. 137).

The use of the term "ego" becomes even more complicated in Freud's *Mourning and Melancholia* because the ego is here described as being able to split. As it was discussed in detail previously in this chapter, splitting involves that one portion of the ego identifies with the lost object in an effort to incorporate the object into itself. This mechanism represents the internalization of a relationship, which is comprised of the conflictual ambivalence the individual feels towards the object. As a result, the other half of the split ego acts out the negative, critical side of this ambivalence toward the other part of the ego which has identified with the lost object. Most significantly for our understanding of the term "ego," this split of the ego brings to light the fact that the narcissistic-libido can cathect to many agencies and/or a complex system which comprises the totality of the ego-system (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988, p. 138).

Finally, in structural model of the psyche proposed by Freud in 1923, the ego operates both consciously and unconsciously, encompassing what was previously denoted as the conscious and preconscious systems. As one of the three agents in the tripartite structural model, the ego "processes all experience, responds to all conflicts and needs, and is the filter through which the significant objects in the child's world are passed" (Erwin, 2016, p. 551). In this way, the ego has an essential mediating function between the id's drives and desires, the superego's

prohibitions and idealizations, and the external reality's adaptive necessities. To aid the ego in it mediating task are the many useful capacities of: perception, will, memory, synthetic ability, defense, etc. (Erwin, 2016, p. 170). One of the most defining features of the ego is that it is an organization; Freud notes that "it is the mental agency which supervises all its own constituents" (Freud, 1923, p. 17). This property of the ego is essential because the id does not have any organization. Having such capacities, the ego can secure its limits and cohesion.

In comparison to the other two mental agencies, the ego is fragile because its sense of being distinct and separate from the object can be severely limited by the fact that the ego serves many masters in its role as mediator. Firstly, the ego serves the id by way of its role of carrying out, ensuring, and providing real satisfaction for its desires and needs (Green, 1980, p. 233). Secondly, the ego serves the demands of external reality because the outer world is the stage upon which the desirous demands of the id are satisfied and fulfilled, and because the ego has the task of securing the survival of the organism. In this way, the ego binds the often-conflicting instinctual energies of the id in service of the contending external reality and maximizes the pleasurable release of libidinal energy (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988, p. 130). Thirdly, the ego serves the superego, especially when the ego is attacked by and largely submits to the superego's critically punishing attacks. In addition, the ego accomplishes the ego ideal's tasks and imperatives, which are highly valued due to the ego's desire to feel secure and at peace.

According to Green, here arises the ego's contradiction; the ego is caught between compulsion and synthesis (Green, 2001c, p. 115). On the one hand, due to its dependence upon and functional relation with the id, the ego desires to become one with the object. Out of the impossibility of this compulsion arises the solution of identification: "a compromise between ego and object" (ibid). On the other hand, the ego desires to synthesize all of its inputs into one

cohesive, unified, self-sufficient center of experience with a fortified frontiers with limited permeability. Yet, the ego has unconscious defenses at the service of the ego's aim for synthesis. The function of these defenses is to help to manage the intensity of needs, desires, and affects. Otherwise, without these defenses, the inevitable end would be conflict, both within themselves and in the encounters the needs and desires of others around him (Cooper, 1998, p. 948).

The ego's defense against the seething and unacceptable conflicts of the conscious were so central to Freud that he termed the study of psychological defenses or defense mechanisms as "the cornerstone on which the whole structure of psychoanalysis rests" (Freud, 1894, p. 43–61). In this regard, a central aim of Freud's concept of psychotherapeutic work is an attempt to make the unconscious conscious. The analyst would help to soften the grip of the unconscious defense mechanisms at work in the analysand, because they defend against the "troublesome thoughts and affects in the unconscious realm" (Cooper, 1998, p. 950). For example, a patient's idealization of the analyst might be been seen as a defense against aggression.

Moreover, Freud argues that defenses are part of the ego's functioning whose aim is to keep the unconscious forbidden impulses unconscious given the fact that forbidden impulses produce unwanted anxiety. We could say that the true end of the defense's aim is the mitigation of anxiety. The forms taken by defenses include projection, isolation, regression, reaction formation, undoing, and splitting of the ego (Cooper, 1998, p. 951). Cooper explicates that Freud's elaborations on defenses have helped to delineate the role played by defenses in "the individual's adaptation to conflict, the maintenance of psychopathology, and ego functioning, as well as in such areas as reality testing, judgment, and aspects of cognition" (Cooper, 1998, p. 949). Importantly, as is brought to light by later theorists such as Brenner, a defense is not necessarily *only* a defense; that is, a behavior can serve as both a defense and an expression of

something else, such as an expression of the very feelings that are being defended against and play out in the transference relationship (Cooper, 1998, p. 952).

The Superego

The third mental agent of Freud's tripartite structural model is the superego. The notion of the superego has its genesis in *On Mourning and Melancholia* (1917), where the melancholic suffers the feeling of being on the receiving end of criticism and denigration: "We see how…one part of the ego sets itself over against the other, judges it critically, and, as it were, takes it as its object" (Freud, 1917, p. 247). In addition to cases of melancholia, Freud's attention toward cases of paranoid delusions of being watched led to the conjecture of the entirely unconscious agency of the superego, which is thought of as a developmental achievement (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988, p. 436).

Freud describes the superego, in its draconian punishments, as a function as if it were a pure derivative of the death drive (Freud, 1923, p. 53). In this way, the superego as a critical agency comes into being by way of an internalization of the superegos of the parents, which includes both their conscious and unconscious values (Erwin, 2016, p. 552). Significantly, the enforcement of these values upon the rest of the psyche of the infant is the role of the critical punisher. As the infant ages and the experienced world expands, the superego expands as well to include the values of the culture and other people in the child's life. For example, the sadistic value system of an elementary school teacher can inform the constitution of the child's superego; also, the intense and demanding military training in their late teenage years would influence this person's superego constitution. Along these lines, the pathological bent of a parent's superego would likely create a parallel, albeit not identical, superego in the child.

The superego has an important subsection to its constitution, namely, the ego ideal. While the ego and the superego are largely indistinguishable, the two aspects allow for their differentiation, and their content is later discussed in this thesis. The first aspect of the ego ideal, in addition to ideal values, includes aspirations based on wishes and identifications. In this way, the ego ideal can also be pathological if, for example, the omnipotent and fantastical aspirations akin to becoming a superhero; we can find a real-life referent to this kind of pathological ego ideal in Elizabeth Holmes, the founder and CEO of Theranos, who has been recently convicted of criminal fraud. The second aspect of the ego ideal resides in the fact that it is the heir of primary narcissism: "What a man projects before him as his ideal is the substitute for the lost narcissism of his childhood in which he was his own ideal" (Freud, 1914, p. 161). Though this property was discarded by Freud, who did not recognize this aspect of the ego ideal in *The Ego and the Id* (1923), the ego ideal as the seat of primary narcissism is central to Green's theorization on the metapsychology of pathological narcissism.

Chapter 2

Influential Post-Freudian Theorists

2.1 Introduction to Object Relations Theory

In response to Freud, an innovative branch of psychoanalytic theory emerged, namely, object relations theory. This branch emphasized that the drive towards human relationship—the desire to love and be love—is the fundamental human need. As such, in the drive-object dyad, the pole of the object, specifically the transferential object in analysis, is posited to be the most intelligible and interpretable for psychoanalytic theorization (Scuderi, 2015, p. 19). As a result of the fact that object relations is a branch of psychoanalytic theory, there are many object relations theorists who have radically differing theories regarding the notion of the drive. Melanie Klein, a theorist whose model will be discussed below, completely adopted Freud's second dual drive theory which recognizes the existence of both the life drive and the death drive. Her focus differed, however, from Freud's in that she interpreted the drives through the lens of their psychological and phenomenological derivatives; for example, she interpreted persecutory anxiety in the light of the death drive, while she viewed guilt and reparations in the light of the life drive (Scuderi, 2015, p. 19).

Another theorist explored in this chapter is Donald Winnicott, who completely rejected Freud's second dual drive theory of the life drive and the death drive. He also contested Freud's notion of the infant's isolated development of an individual ego, favoring instead the theorization of the infant-mother dyad; that is, the manner in which the infant is relationally constituted by the mother and others as their environment. Therefore, Winnicott largely focused on the theorization

of overlap between inner and outer, self and other, the subjective and the objective (Winnicott, 1971).

A proto-conception of object relations by Freud can be found in *On Mourning and Melancholia* with the notion of a narcissistic-object-tie. In this viewpoint, the other person exists to the melancholic insofar as they represent an aspect of who the melancholic is, was, or wishes to be. Therefore, there is distance between who the other person is and who the other person is represented *in the psyche of the melancholic*. Importantly, the particular objects which populating one's psyche are internalized and incorporated into one's self-structure and self-understanding.

The differences among the object relations theorists are united in their common focus on transference, which is posited to replicate the infant-caregiver dyad (Scuderi, 2015, p. 19). Therefore, the cornerstone of both object relations theory and clinical practice is the achievement of properly experiencing dependent relationships.

In this chapter, I will explore the key concepts offered by Melanie Klein and Donald Winnicott, which immensely influenced both Rosenfeld and Green in their theories of narcissism.

2.2 Melanie Klein

Melanie Klein (1882-1960) was born to Jewish parents in Vienna, Austria. In 1914, upon Freud's work on dreams, an intense curiosity and fascination with psychoanalysis overtook her. This discovery prompted her to begin analysis with a disciple of Freuds', Sándor Ferenczi in Budapest, then with Karl Abraham in Berlin, and finally with Ernst Jones in England. Her impact upon the field of psychoanalysis as a theoretician and clinician has been tremendous. Klein is considered to "more impact on contemporary psychoanalysis than any other psychoanalytic writer since Freud" (Mitchell and Black, 1995, p. 85). This is the case because, as psychiatrist Thomas Ogden argues,

"much of the development of object relations theory has been made up of Klein's ideas and reactions against them" (Kolchin-Miller, 2015, p. 28).

Klein stated that her intent was to "validate and extend Freud's hypotheses through direct observation and clinical work with children" (Mitchell & Black, 1995, p. 85). However, her work with children from birth, and her work on child analysis, led her to espouse a model of psychic development and therapeutic technique that differed radically from Freud's. Klein's view of the psyche was "a continually shifting, kaleidoscopic stream of primitive, phantasmagoric images, fantasies, and terrors" (Mitchell & Black, 1995, p. 87). Kleinian psychoanalyst Juliet Mitchell describes Klein's "descriptive unconscious" as "an area where present and past are one and time is spatial, not historical" (Mitchell, 1986, p. 28).

Paranoid-Schizoid Position

Most importantly for this thesis was Klein's influence on the thought of Herbert Rosenfeld. An important aspect of her work involved working through the integration of the opposing life and death drives and theorizing about their functions in early-child development. Thomas Ogden describes the Kleinian conception of the life drive as including "the loving, sexual, nurturing, attachment-seeking, and generative motivations," while death drive included "destructive, disintegrative, envious, and hostile motivations" (Ogden, 1984, p. 525). As a result of this investigation, she proposed two developmental stages in a person: the paranoid-schizoid position and the depressive position.

Klein concluded that the paranoid-schizoid position corresponds with the first three months of an infant's life, in which the infant only relates to part-object instead of whole objects (Kolchin-Miller, 2015, p. 31). According to Klein, the most important of these part-objects is the mother's

breast. Importantly, the death drive is operative most prominently as persecution anxiety, which the infant experiences as a fear of annihilation (Klein, 1946, p. 4). As a result of the opposites of the life drive and the death drive, there can be seen a "the separation of good and bad (gratifying and frustrating) aspects of the same object into putatively different objects," which is termed by Klein as "splitting" (Kolchin-Miller, 2015, p. 31) Furthermore, Klein postulated that projective identification is utilized by the infant to separate the good and the bad, which helps the completely dependent infant to manage their terror and aggression. Such use of the splitting defense by the infant creates the "bad breast." As a consequence, the infant can create and cling onto a "good breast," which is appeasing to the infant because the bad is denied. The good breast ought, thus, to be protected because it provides nourishment and comfort.

While Klein's concept of the paranoid-schizoid position and its implications are far more nuanced than this thesis can cover, the important takeaway from her insight is the psychic activity of the infant in their separation of the attribution of good versus bad. Though this separation is theorized to occur in the first three months of an infant's life, it is a psychological state into which adults can regress. In addition, this separation can be used to separate objects into two categories or to differentiate the individual as a subject from the world of objects. This latter notion has many complexities, once of which will be especially critical to Rosenfeld's theory of destructive narcissism in the form of envy.

In a brief summary, the depressive position follows the paranoid-schizoid position. This is a psychological stage where "the loved and hated aspects of the mother are no longer felt to be so widely separated" (Klein, 1946, p. 14); that is, an object can be tolerated to hold both the attribution of good and bad, rendering the object a whole object. Such psychological accomplishment leads to "an increased fear of loss, states akin to mourning, and a strong feeling of guilt because the

aggressive impulses are felt to be directed against the loved object" (ibid). In this way, the experiential properties of the depressive position may be escaped if they become too intense for the individual's ego to bear, by causing the individual to regress to the paranoid-schizoid position. Conversely, stubborn affects such as envy can be problematic and become pathological when they actively work against the ability to tolerate depressive anxieties and mourning processes (Kolchin-Miller, 2015, p. 32).

Envy

Describing envy, Melanie Klein quotes Chaucer's *The Parson's Tale*: "It is certain that envy is the worst sin that is; for all other sins are sins only against one virtue, whereas envy is against all virtue and all goodness" (Klein, 1957, p. 189). Envy was central to Klein's thought because this concept attempts to answer a salient question that especially plagued analysts who were interested in understanding the inner world of individual's suffering from schizophrenia: "why is it that some infants struggle to integrate the good object and even appear to develop largely hostile relations with it?" (Hinshelwood, 1991). Envy interferes with the process of internalizing the good object, which results in the development of a subject who does not deeply feel that they are good. Therefore, in response to the external goodness of the breast, envy consists in "a destructive attack on the sources of life, on the *good* object, not on the bad object" (Hinshelwood, 1991, p. 167, original italics). Klein argues that the infant "to put badness, primarily bad excrements and bad parts of the self, into the mother, and first of all into her breast, in order to spoil and destroy her" (1957, p. 181) Klein views envy as destructive towards objects which are valued as good by the individual. An example of such a psychological instance is Rosenfeld's destructive narcissism, which will be explored in great length in the fourth chapter.

2.3 Donald Winnicott

Born in 1896, forty years after Freud, Donald Winnicott (1896-1971) came to psychoanalysis in the midst of the growth and legitimization of the field. Before becoming a psychoanalyst, Winnicott attended medical school at Cambridge University and worked as a pediatrician both in hospitals and in private practice. This formation would deeply inform his psychoanalytic theories regarding the psychological development of a child. Winnicott would later be recognized as "one of the most original of psychological and philosophical thinkers" and "a clinician of extraordinary skill" (Rodman, 2003, p. 5).

Though Klein did not refer to Winnicott's work, Winnicott consistently referred to both Freud and Klein throughout his corpus (Abram and Hinshelwood, 2018, p. xxii). In fact, Winnicott studied under Klein, and he attributed much of his initial knowledge of child analysis to her supervision and guidance (Winnicott, 1965, p. 177). However, as he developed as a clinician and came into his own theories, he ardently remained an independent thinker.

Winnicott is a great thinker for whom thinking and experiences are deeply bound up with together. While he did not produce a theory of thinking, as Bion did, Winnicott remained close to his clinical experience throughout his career. This methodology did not result in a coherent system at the end of his career, but rather a body of work changing with the manner in which he changed as a clinician in the light of his experiences with patients in the temenos of the analytic relationship as a container.

In this next section, I will explicate the concepts which greatly influential upon the French psychoanalyst André Green, who was deeply inspired by Winnicott's theories and independent spirit.

Holding Environment

"There is no such thing as a baby." – Donald Winnicott, 1964, p. 88

In contrast to Freud's theoretical attention to the constitution and function of the psyche's internal structure, Donald Winnicott theoretical gaze focused its attention on the relationship between the infant's innate qualities and the caregiving properties of the maternal environment. In this way, for Winnicott, there is no such thing as a *discrete* baby who persists as an individual substance absent from their environment and relationships; "if you set out to describe a baby, you will find you are describing a *baby and someone*. A baby cannot exist alone but is essentially part of a relationship" (Winnicott, 1964, p. 88, italics added). Moreover, thr infant-mother dyad "cannot be disentangled," for the infant is initially absolutely dependent upon the mother (Winnicott, 1960, p. 586). If the infant is provided sufficient care—good enough care—then the infant will naturally progress towards independence. To this point, Winnicott believed that children inherently strive toward independent existence, and he believed that mothers (barring abnormal cases) inherently know how to provide the appropriate conditions for nurture and developmental support (Borg, 2013, p. 8).

Winnicott posits that, when the infant is in the initial stage where they are entirely dependent upon the mother and their environment in order to know and have their needs met, the mother is able to focus completely upon the needs of the infant and disregard her own needs. Winnicott referred to this phenomenon as "primary maternal occupation" (Winnicott, 2002, p. 33). This heightened attunement of the mother goes far beyond an adult's normal ability to imagine and experience what another is experiencing (Borg, 2013, p. 11). By way of this primary maternal occupation, a *holding environment* is created. Importantly, "holding" in this Winnicottian sense does not refer to physical holding, but rather to "the total environmental

provision," which includes the "management of experienced that are inherent in existence" (Winnicott, 1960, p. 589). Winnicott continues by explaining that he is "contented to use the word hold, and to extend its meaning to cover all that a mother is and does at this time…where she acts naturally. It is here that she cannot learn from books" (Winnicott, 2002, p. 13).

Although Winnicott's notion of holding remains vague, for it is defined as "all that a mother is and does," the salient aspect of this notion is that it is captures all of the inherent and supportive activities that arises when the mother and infant are merged. Holding includes meeting all of the infant's physiological needs and protecting them from physiological insult in a manner that is attuned to the infant's unique and heightened sensitivity (Winnicott, 1960, p. 592). This is the state before the infant has developed a psychological capacity for object-relations, and when the infant, as pure id, and the mother's id are fused. This fusion and the responsive activity of the mother's id acts as the supportive structure for the infant's psyche.[8] A good enough holding environment will ensure that the infant is (for the most part) unaware of their lack of control over the environment and will thus safeguard their omnipotence (ibid). Consequently, Winnicott contends that, if the holding environment is good enough, the infant will be able to achieve "personal development according to inherited tendencies" (Winnicott, 1986, p. 28). Furthermore, it follows that, if the holding environment is insufficient (or not good enough), then the child's psychological development will be stalled.

Winnicott primarily uses the phrase "good enough" to describe the good enough mother. This "good enough" quality presents a two-fold importance. First, a mother is good enough in that she is able to sufficiently attune to and meet her infant's needs and desires, as described above. Second, a mother is just good enough in that she can never perfectly meet her infant's

[8] The reader might notice similarities between Winnicott's notion of "holding environment" and Bion's notion of "container-contained." Unfortunately, explicating this connection is beyond the limits of this thesis.

needs and desires; “this is where the differences come in between mechanical perfection and human love. Human beings fail and fail; and in the course of ordinary care a mother is all the time mending her failures” (Winnicott, 2002, p. 76). By falling short and disappointing the infant, the mother slowly frustrates the infant’s omnipotence. The imperfection of the mother is what reveals to the infant the mother as other, as not-I, as an object. Consequently, the revelation of the mother as object necessarily reveals the infant as a separate subject to themselves.

Winnicott’s reference to the good enough mother as “mending her repairs” is also important because the revelation of the mother as other is slow and unfolds over a long period of time. Therefore, the return and reparation of the fusion by the mother is essential to help the infant in their psychological task of ego development and introjection of the maternal setting (Borg, 2013, p. 14).

Subjective Object

Winnicott’s notion of the subjective object is found in the holding environment that a good enough mother provides. To bring this concept to life, let us consider the experience of the infant being held to the mother’s breast:

> *“…the baby has instinctual urges and predatory ideas. The mother has a breast and the power to produce milk, and the idea that she would like to be attacked by a hungry baby. These two phenomena do not come into relation with each other till the mother and child live an experience together”* (Winnicott 1945, p. 152).

This reference to the joint experience the mother and infant is made possible by the mother having the capacity to meet the needs and desires of the infant for nourishment and by the physically presenting her breast to the infant. However, the infant’s psyche is the other half of the equation.

When the infant meets the mother's breast, this is an encounter with an object, with external reality. At this moment, in parallel, there is an encounter between the mother's and infant's psyche, which is the place of the infant's creation of the subjective object. The infant "*finds* an object that he himself *creates*" (Fabozzi, 2018, p. 86, original italics). This creation of an object which his mother is offering her infant is a moment of *illusion,* which protects the infant's healthy sense of omnipotence (Winnicott 1945, p. 152).

Winnicott's notion of illusion hereby is different than Freud's notion of illusion in some important ways. Freud's notion of illusion is a function or aspect of the self-deception of thought, and this function is characterized by the omnipotence of thought (Freud, 1938, p. 299). In contradistinction, Winnicott's notion of illusion only amounts to the *experience* of omnipotence, which is a vital function of the infant's creation of reality (Fabozzi, 2018, p. 86). In an object-relational fashion, such experience of omnipotence is relationally grounded so that, if facilitated by a good enough mother and thus a holding environment, it becomes an experience of effortless fusion. As such, the particular participation of the mother, in the fact she allows her breast and the care she offers to be "experienced by the child as if they were under his magic control," is the condition for the possibility of the creation of a subjective object (ibid).

Simply stated, the subjective object is not the same thing as the external object. Rather, the subjective object is the way the breast is experienced by the infant; the subjective object is a way of acknowledging the nature of the relationship between the infant and the breast, from the point of view of the infant's subjectivity.

Negative Side of Relationships

One of the concepts of utmost influence upon the thinking of André Green was Winnicott's concept of the "negative side of relationships." Let us recall the two core aspects of a good enough mother: (1) to be sufficiently attuned to the infant's needs and desires to meet them, and (2) to fail to perfectly and mechanically meet the infant's needs and desires. The second reason is particularly important because it slowly introduces the infant to the otherness of their mother, and thus the separateness of oneself. However, a good enough mother, in her failing, will continue to reappear to the infant, make reparations, soothe frustrations, and demonstrate that her failings are not world destroying. Such repeated experiences with the mother will help the infant to develop a sense of object permanence, to introject the mother's supportive care, and to be able to form their own object representations.

The mis-attunements provided by the good enough mother are not what Winnicott refers to as the negative side of relationships. Regarding the negative side of relationships, Winnicott writes: 'If the mother is away over a period of time which is beyond a certain limit measured in minutes, hours, or days, then the memory of the internal representation fades. As this takes effect, the transitional phenomena[9] become gradually meaningless and the infant is unable to experience them. We may watch the object becoming decathected' (Winnicott, 1971, p. 15). When this "certain limit" or threshold of tolerated absence is surpassed, the mother is experienced as dead from the point of view of the infant. Winnicott interprets this as traumatic because, for example, no explanation can be given to a 2-year-old child. Therefore, after a certain limit of time, whether

[9] Transitional phenomena refer to an intermediate aspect of human experience that is between (and involving both) internal and external reality. These phenomena helps the child separate from the fusion with their mother and develop the capacity to have object-relations.

absent or present, the mother can no longer be experienced as alive, even if she returns; tragically, affective contact can no longer be re-established according to Winnicott.

This psychical death can obviously be galvanized by the physical absence of the mother. However, it can also be galvanized by the emotional distance of the mother; for example, whenever a mother becomes depressed and is no longer emotional available or responsive to her infant. Stated differently, this death of the contact with the mother, whether it is due to long enough psychical or emotional distance, and "her death when she is able to reappear and therefore to come alive again" are completely different phenomena (Winnicott, 1971, p. 22). The former is what Winnicott refers to as the negative side of relationships.

Though the separation from the affective connection is irreversible, the infant is still desirous for a fusional experience with their mother and a sufficient holding environment. Therefore, the absence of the mother—the void-like negative space, as Green would phrase it—will be that is invested in more than her presence; "the real thing is the thing that is not here" (Winnicott, 1971, p. 24). Winnicott condenses many ways the mother's absence is experienced--absence of memory, absence in the mind, absence of contact, absence of feeling alive, etc.—into the notion of a gap. Green notes that this gap, "instead of referring to a simple void or to something which is missing, becomes the substrate for what is real" (Green, 1997, p. 1075). This is different than the psychic activity of forgetting in that what is forgotten has lost its reality, while what is blotted out and experienced as absent has reality. Significantly, this gap prevents internal representations within the infant from constellating, which prevents the development of a sound psychical structure (Winnicott, 1971, p. 15).

Furthermore, for Winnicott, the judgement of existence and the judgement of attribution coincide in Winnicott's notion of the "negative side of relationships." It is negative in two ways:

as bad or as non-existent (Green, 1997, p. 1075). As a result, the child's relationship to the negative side of the relationship is also two-fold. One type of response can be aggression, anger, destruction, being in a state of agitation and turmoil, etc., which is in relation more to the attribution of "bad" in contrary to "good." The other type of response can be a "fading of internal representation" (Winnicott, 1971, p. 21). Operative in this second response is decathexis with the mother as an object; indeed, the child is more related to the absence of the object than to the object per se. The negative aspect of this second reaction is more related to the non-existence, which as felt as a void and an emptiness. Winnicott pustulates that the infant not only relates to the non-existence, but, in some cases, it will become the only thing that is real to the infant (Green, 1997, p. 1082). In such cases, the return of the mother is not enough to heal the effects of her absence.

Chapter 3

Introducing Rosenfeld and Green

In this chapter, I will introduce the two theorists which I will be working with to explore the usefulness of the concept of the death drive, Herbert Rosenfeld and André Green. This undertaking will be accomplished primarily through recourse to how Freud has influenced their thinking and how they have advanced Freud's thought in response to demanding clinical phenomena.

3.1 Introducing Herbert Rosenfeld

Herbert Rosenfeld (1910-1986) was born in Nuremberg, Germany, to a middle-class Jewish family. In 1935, after studying medicine at a few German universities, Rosenfeld fled his country for England to escape Nazi persecution (Steiner, 2008, p. 58). Following his arrival, he retook his medical exams. He studied and worked at the Warneford Hospital near Oxford and at the Maudsley Hospital in London. While he was at these hospitals, Rosenfeld worked primarily with hospitalized psychotic patients, which was to become an important foundation for his later theoretical work.

Following his time in these hospitals, Rosenfeld began training to become a psychotherapist at the Tavistock Clinic, which culminated in the beginning of his psychoanalytic training at the Institute of Psychoanalysis and starting his training analysis with Melanie Klein (Steiner, 2008, p. 58). His training reflected in his theoretical work, especially given that Klein was his training analyst and one of his most notable influences. This is especially evidenced in Rosenfeld's espousal of Freud's second dual drive theory, of which Klein was an ardent

supporter. More specifically, as I will explicate later in this chapter, the death drive postulated by Freud played a critical role in Rosenfeld's theorizing about pathological narcissism.

Prefigured by his time working at the Warneford and Maudsley hospital, from 1946 to 1978, Rosenfeld was recognized by the psychoanalytic community as an authority on the treatment of psychosis. This notoriety was due to the fact that, while breaking with the theory that was previously espoused by psychoanalysis, Rosenfeld demonstrated that "psychotic transference can be observed and analyzed" (Steiner, 2008, p. 58). This contention originated in a training case, namely 'Mildred', wherein the patient had a psychotic breakdown, characterized by what Rosenfeld called "a schizophrenic state with depersonalization" (Steiner, 2008, p. 43). Rosenfeld published a paper in which he described Mildred's treatment using traditional psychoanalytical interpretations without any changes to both setting and technique.

Along with other leading and contemporary psychoanalysts such as Wilfred Bion and Hanna Segal, Rosenfeld helped to foster an atmosphere within the psychoanalytic community of curiosity, initiative, and experimentation regarding psychosis. This galvanized a new understanding of psychosis without requiring a change in "the setting or in the analytic attitude towards patients" (Steiner, 2008, p. 58). His contribution to psychoanalysis was consistent with his personal demeanor.

John Steiner, a fellow psychoanalyst and student of Rosenfeld, described him as "a tall friendly man with a warm smile but always a serious purpose, even though expressed with a twinkle in his eye" (Steiner 59). Moreover, as an analyst, Rosenfeld had an extraordinary capacity to imaginatively put himself in the patients' experience to see things from their subjective point of view. When Riccardo Steiner described his first meeting with Rosenfeld, he noted that Rosenfeld had stated, "Ich bin kein Theoretiker" ("I am not a theorist") (Steiner, 2008,

p. 39). This statement perfectly describes Rosenfeld's orientation towards his own theoretical musings; namely, his hypothesis were derived from clinical experience. Indeed, Rosenfeld's insights and syntheses were all in service to an understanding of clinical phenomenon which he felt had not been adequately accounted for; "Rosenfeld saw theory as a way of informing practice: technique was all-important" (Menon, 76). This guiding principle is especially salient to understand Rosenfeld's theories.

In addition to the enormous influence of Klein on the development of Rosenfeld's theories, his main influence were Freud's writings, especially his later work. Through the end of his career, Rosenfeld operated within a strict Freudian lexicon (Steiner, 2008, p. 44). As such, it is impossible to understand Rosenfeld without understanding Freud. Therefore, in this chapter, I illuminate the theoretical influence of Freud on Rosenfeld's thought, which will serve as base to unpack Rosenfeld's contribution to the psychoanalysis' understanding of pathological narcissism: destructive narcissism.

3.2 Freud's Influence on Rosenfeld

Rosenfeld introduces a dual narcissism, a libidinal narcissism and a destructive narcissism, which is the result of a theoretical reconciliation of narcissism with the life and death drives. The primary manner in which Rosenfeld accomplishes this task is by connecting aggression and the death drive, found in destructive narcissism, with envy. In this perspective, envy is the affect which galvanizes, motivates, and conditions the pathological fusion of the life and death drives, a concept I will define later. This is postulated as such because the emotion of envy arises in response to the recognition of the goodness in the object, which occurs whenever there is the experience of difference and separateness. Even though consciousness of one's envy is part of

what is being defended against one's destructive narcissism, the destructiveness embedded in envy, towards objects and oneself, conditions the pathological constellation which constitutes destructive narcissism. In the next chapter, I will explore the metapsychological landscape of destructive narcissism, while this brief introduction aims at presenting a basic understanding of the theoretical and clinical realm in which Rosenfeld's model operates.

Firstly, according to Rosenfeld, envy functions to provide a bridge between the notions of narcissism and the death drive, which were never reconciled by Freud. In Freud's 1914 paper entitled *On Narcissism: An Introduction*, the notion of secondary narcissism corresponds to the withdrawal of libidinal investments in objects and the return of libidinal investments back to the self. However, Rosenfeld points out that, one year later in *Instincts and their Vicissitudes* (1915), Freud began to connect primary narcissism with "hatred or destructiveness towards the external object when the object begins to impinge on the individual" (Rosenfeld, 1971, p. 170). It is from this paper that Freud's famous utterance is found: "Hate, as a relation to objects, is older than love" (Freud, 1915). This is significant because hatred or destructiveness toward external objects constitutes one kind of relationship with external objects. Thus, this later hypothesis of Freud's contradicts his previously postulated hypothesis of total withdrawal of libido from objects; that is, primary narcissism did not have any kind of object relations.

Though Freud penned this phrase before the introduction of the death drive, it naturally lends itself to a reconciliation with the death drive, because the notion of the death drive is a theory that explains the psyche's fundamental aggression (first toward itself in the pursuit of Nirvana, then directed towards the external object). Rosenfeld brings hatred and destructiveness towards external objects present in primary narcissism to theoretical fruition in his theory of destructive narcissism. Indeed, the aim of an envious attacks is to destroy any difference by

reducing both subject and object to a deadly nothingness (Steiner, 2008, p. 67). Moreover, recognizing the salient presence of envy, following Abraham and Klein, Rosenfeld moves beyond Freud by affording more explanatory power to the profound obstacles to psychic change inherent in pathological narcissism. In this manner, Rosenfeld places a theoretical emphasis on the disruption in the developmental process of achieving and bearing separation from the primary caregiver. Therefore, when the psychotic structure overwhelms and grabs hold of the destructive narcissist, the desire to destroy the external world of objects may manifest into murderous rage, which would accomplish the permanent destruction of the goodness in the separate object.

Through the introduction of a dual narcissism, Rosenfeld (and later Green) introduce two means of achieving narcissistic object-relations. In contrast, Freud had only posited one type of narcissism in *On Narcissism: An Introduction*. In the book *Rosenfeld in Retrospect*, Ronald Britton describes the difference between Freud's and Abraham's conceptions of the relationship to objects in pathological narcissism:

> *"Freud made clear he saw secondary narcissism as a means of preserving or restoring love when object love was impossible, whilst Abraham's emphasis was on the hostility of the transference objects that could be found in narcissistic disorders. Freud described self-love as substituting for the mother love in narcissistic characters whilst Abraham described envy as promoting narcissism and retarding object love"* (Steiner, 24).

The difference between Freud and Abraham here is roughly the difference between Rosenfeld's notions of libidinal and destructive narcissism.

As a greater departure from Freud's model, the notions of omnipotence and idealization that are critical to Rosenfeld's secondary narcissism. Said otherwise, the mechanism of projective identification is not only present but crucial to understanding pathological narcissism. Through projective identification, the subject relates to the object, not as a separate person with

his own characteristics, but as if he is relating to himself (Rosenfeld, 1971, p. 173). As such, the narcissist ignores aspects of the object which do not fit their projection and unconsciously attempts to force or persuade the object into enacting the role the narcissist desires of them. According to Rosenfeld, the impact of omnipotence on narcissistic object relations in as follows: "omnipotently incorporated and treated as the infant's possession, and good and bad parts of the self can be projected into it, so that they are lost or diffused" (Flynn and Skogstad, 40). The narcissistic pathology is not understood as mere libidinal recourse to the ego. Rather, aspects of the subject's narcissistic, developmental experience through their narcissistic object relations are taken into themselves, mixed with aspects of the subject and rendered omnipotent.

Moreover, as Rosenfeld explicates in *Impasse and Interpretation* (1987), there are two poles to self-idealization, positive and negative. Of these two poles, the negative pole is operative in destructive narcissism. The destructive aspects of the object are idealized and omnipotently incorporated. The opposite is the case in libidinal narcissism, namely, the pathological narcissism Rosenfeld connected to the life drive.

Furthermore, Rosenfeld introduces the concept of pathological fusion as a way of explaining destructive narcissism. The pathological fusion of the life and death instincts is introduced by explicating that it signifies "processes where in the mixing of libidinal and destructive impulses the power of the destructive impulses is greatly strengthened, while in normal fusion the destructive energy is mitigated or neutralized" (Rosenfeld, 1971, p. 172). While these drives are intertwined in destructive narcissism, it is the death drive which predominates and forms a narcissistic organization that resembles a criminal gang. This contention is exemplified by the tension between (1) the gang-like organization of the pathological fusion of destructive narcissism which ardently defends itself and (2) the aim of the

death drive, physical death. Inversely, the life drive is operative in the cohesion of the narcissistic state which keeps the ego intact in destructive narcissism.

Notably, the augmented activity and expression of the death drive in the pathological fusion of destructive narcissism is another critical way that Rosenfeld advances psychoanalytic theory. That is, Freud notes that neither the life drive nor the death drive are ever present in isolation; the two drives are always fused together in one way or another (Rosenfeld, 1971, p. 169). However, with pathological fusion, where the cruelty and destructiveness of the death drive is significantly augmented, Rosenfeld is able to account for clinical phenomena, such as destructive narcissism, wherein the patient's psychological state exhibits an activity which closely resembles the death drive in isolation. For the destructive narcissist, "death is idealized as a solution to all problems" (Rosenfeld, 1987, p. 106-7).

Lastly, Rosenfeld emphasizes the biological basis of the death drive which is present in Freud's structural model. That is, the aim of death (and aggression as a means to this end) is understood as biological in its most extreme form (and therefore purest) form; death hereby corresponds to the death of the biological organism, not merely a psychological death. For example, destructive narcissism expresses itself in suicidality, which is destruction turned towards the libidinal self (Rosenfeld, 1971, p. 173). This is critical because the pathological fusion of destructive narcissist targets the dependent, libidinal self who yearns for an object. Not only does suicide involve biological death, but suicide is in line with Freud's original conception of the death drive as fundamentally as being oriented toward the organism—as a drive to return to the inorganic state.

3.3 Introducing André Green

André Green (1927-2012) was born into a Sephardic Jewish family in Cairo, Egypt. When he was 19 years old, he immigrated to Paris, France, to study medicine, which was the prerequisite to become professionally involved in both psychiatry and psychoanalysis. After seven years of study, Green began his schooling in psychiatry at St. Ann's Hospital, which he considered as the "year of [his] birth" (Chervet, 2013, pg. 159). According to Green, "St. Ann's Hospital was a special place in Paris" (Kohon, 1999, pg. 16). This was so because, in contrast to the other hospitals in Paris, St. Ann's was populated with leftist intellectuals who were interested in "all the great theories that lay behind psychiatry" (Hunter, 1990, pg. 160). These constituents sparked passionate discussions on the mind-body problem, which considered the perspectives of psychoanalysis, phenomenology, Marxism, and structuralism. Though Green himself was an organicist, which is the belief that the universe is orderly and alive, the multitude of perspectives to which he was exposed to seems to have influenced him in many ways (Scuderi, 2015, p. 4).

After three years at St. Ann's, following some transferential reactions which Green found himself ill-equipped to handle by himself, he entered analysis and sought analytic training at the Paris Psychoanalytic Society (Scuderi, 2015, p. 6). During this period, French psychoanalysis has split due to the popularity and influence of Jacques Lacan. As a result, there were two psychoanalytic training institutes in Paris, and Green chose to train at the more classically-oriented Freudian institute out of a desire to avoid being taught the theory of "Lacan and Lacan alone" (Hunter, 1990, pg. 164). His choice marked the beginning of the well-known complicated relationship between Green and Lacan.

During his time at the Paris Psychoanalytic Society, "Lacan started an enormous game of seduction" (Kohon, 1999, pg. 22) towards Green to lure him to his institute and to adopt his

ideas. This situation challenged the independent and pluralistic spirit of French psychoanalysis and psychiatry to whom Green desired to remain loyal. However, following a conference in which both psychoanalytic institutes came together, Green began attending Lacan's seminars as a visitor. During this time, Green engaged Lacan's ideas intensely. Nevertheless, when Green published a seminal paper entitled *Primary Narcissism: State or Structure?* and did not cite Lacan, the atter took this as an "indefensible betrayal" (Scuderi, 2015, p. 8).

While Green was attended Lacan's seminars, he was also exposed to British psychoanalysis, which came first in the form of a pre-congress conference put together by the British Psychoanalysis Society in London (Hunter, 1990, pg. 168). Most significantly was his encounter with the famous object-relations theorist Donald Winnicott, who became one of the most important influences on Green's thinking. When recalling this encounter, Green described it as "unforgettable because he was extraordinary" (ibid, p. 169). Moreover, at this pre-congress meeting, Green attended a seminar by Herbert Rosenfeld, who would prove to be influential in thinking through his theoretical reconciliation of the death drive and narcissism (Kohon, 1999, pg. 23). Furthermore, Green's encounter with Bion, the final theorist who significantly influenced Green, was not until the 1970s, "which eventuated in a meeting in 1976 that initiated a friendship that lasted until Bion's death in 1979" (Hunter, 1999, pg 169) (Scuderi, 2015, p. 9).

Given his theoretical grounding in Freudian metapsychology, as it is traditional in French psychoanalysis, Green spent the rest of his life working through and integrating the influences of Lacan, Winnicott, and Bion (Scuderi, 2015, p. 10). This dual orientation, a loyalty towards both Freud's fundamental assumptions and an independent spirit guarding against dogmatism, afforded Green an utterly unique manner of integrating the thoughts of these pioneers. Most importantly, Green's theoretical integration, especially regarding "the work of the negative"

(Green 1993/1999), was of clinical importance by virtue of its explanatory ability to conceptualize some of the most disturbed and destructive modes of psychic functioning seen on analysts' couches (Scuderi, 2015, p. 10).

3.4 Freud's Influence on Green

Besides Freud, the most important influences on Green's thoughts are Winnicott, Lacan, and Bion. Through his grounding in Freudian metapsychology, Green was able to integrate the hypotheses brought forth by Winnicott, Lacan, and Bion into the Freudian drive model of the psyche, which preserved Freud's fundamental assumptions. In this section, I will address how Green's work is both grounded in Freud's contributions and evolved beyond Freud.

A fundamental assumption shared by both Freud and Green is the psyche's somatic origins. The concept of the drive garners its importance through its ontological placement between soma and psyche. For both Freud and Green, the mind-body connection espouses a two-way causality; namely, the body affects the mind and, reversely, the mind affects the body. This point is critical for placing the drives in between body and mind because the body constantly makes a "demand for work" upon the mind (Freud, 1917a).

In the wake of Freud's varied and discontinuous corpus, psychoanalytic theorists seemed to pick and choose aspects of his thought – the ego, the object, the self, etc. - as the vista from which to view and interpret the psyche. According to Scuderi, Freud's early writing revolved around the "vicissitudes of the libido and its [ideational] representatives … and the results of the repression of each" (Scuderi, 2015, p. 14). Said otherwise, specifically, one central theoretical concern of Freud was the status of representation in different parts of the psyche. This contention

led to the development of the topographical model, which posits the different modes of functioning as conscious, preconscious, and unconscious (Freud, 1900).

Freud turned from emphasizing unconscious representations in his first topology to privileging instinctual drive impulses in both (a) his second dual theory of drives in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920) and (b) the structural topology of id, ego, and superego in *The Ego and the Id* (1923). This shift had a clinical source, for the problems Freud was confronting and wrestling with were negative therapeutic reactions, acting outs, and the compulsion to repeat. This turning point was extremely important for Green because it constituted a paradigm shift in Freud's psychoanalytic theory. In the first topology, the content of the instinctual world consisted of *mere* representations. However, post-1920, the question arises regarding the place of representations amongst the dual drives of the id and the relationships between the three major components of the psyche. Stated differently, in the id there is "an absence of any reference to representation" (Green, 2005, p. 101); the id consists in "contradictory tensions seeking release" (ibid).

The drives were fundamentally a source of pressure, resulting in "com-pulsion" (Green, 2005, p. 101) of the psyche to seek release or discharge of the drive through fulfillment of achieving that which the drives are seeking. Importantly, these com-pulsions largely consisted in blindly repeating primitive acts. In Green's own words, the drive "owes its place and heuristic value within the psyche to the fact that it offers a model of internalized action no longer dependent on an external source, but finding within itself its own triggering mechanism" (Green, 1997, p. 91). As such, perception is expanded to include not only that which comes from without and is captured by our sense organs, but also to perception of the life of one's own drives. Howard Levine describes Freud's thought as expanding perceptions to include "the interior, the

body in the first place, in the form of sensations and feelings, adding to them the thinking processes, which will be perceptible to the consciousness thanks to word-presentations" (Reed and Levine, 2018, p.125). Here, Freud's theorizing on the link between thought, language, and the representation–perception sphere offers an explanation for the mechanism by which there is communication and causation between the different components of the psyche.

Finally, Freud's first topography of the psyche takes mental representation for granted as a necessary aspect of mental functioning. However, drive impulses in the later structural model of the psyche has only the *potential* for mental representation. Put concisely, Green considers it to be critical to psychoanalytic theorization that the structural model of the mind makes possible the theorization of the un-representable (Green, 2005, p. 101) (Scuderi, 2015, p. 18) (Reed and Levine, 2018, p. 68).

The Drives

The complementary opposites of life and death drives create a dialectical relationship which is addressed by Green in a manner which both extends and reformulates the Freudian model. We will recall that, in *Instincts and Their Vicissitudes* (1915), Freud defines a drive as:

> *"If we now apply ourselves to considering mental life from a biological point of view, a "drive" appears to us as a concept on the frontier between the mental and the somatic, as the psychical representative of the stimuli originating within the organism and reaching the mind, as a measure of the demand made upon the mind to work in consequences of its connection with the body"* (Freud, 1915, p. 121-22).

To understand this quote, it is essential to remember that Freud's notion of the whole person includes both the soma (the body) and the psyche (the mind). Freud considered psychoanalysis to be the study of the "life of the mind," therefore excluding the body from the realm of psychoanalysis.

Due to the mind-body connection and the significant effect the body has on the mind, psychoanalysis must consider the body in order to arrive at an adequate view of the mind. This hypothesis largely consists in thinking about the nature of the drives because they exist "on the frontier between the mental and the somatic," thus stipulating that the drives are within the realm of what psychoanalysis can hypothesize about within entering the field of biology (ibid). Further, as drives exist at the frontier of soma and psyche, the stimulus that originating in the body moves through the drives and transforms into a psychical reality; that is, the bodily stimulus becomes a mental representation of its content. Green summarizes this process elegantly: "Drives, although localized between mind and body, acquires the status of psychical representative, and tips the balance to this side whenever it reaches the neighborhood of the psychical, although it arises within the body" (Green, 1980, p. 232).

In addressing the manner in which the psyche receives the stimulus from the body, Green continues by stating that, "…the psychical submits to the quantity that comes from the body to which it is bound" (Green, 1980, p. 232). Stated differently, the psyche is the domain in which the demands of the body are carried out and are allowed to be realized. That is, the ego is dominated by the drives: "He is no longer acted but acted upon; he puts on an act" (Green, 1980, p. 233).

In his explanation of the impact of the soma upon the psyche, Green illustrates how his conceptualization of the drives is somewhat similar to Freud's. Namely, the fulfillment of the "demand made upon the mind to work" is the condition for the possibility of psychical development. Our psychical development occurs, once established, through the activity of psychical representations. "[Representation] acquires the power to present itself as a substitute object for the object of the drive. Thanks to representation, force is displaced; it is used

advantageously to hold together the elements of representation and to fix them, relatively speaking, thus allowing their transformation" (Green, 2002, p. 60). Which is to say, representation makes possible psychic activities such as introjection, which is a psychical mechanism that loosens and frees the infant's dependence upon the mother. As explicated by Scuderi, the process of developing the ability to form representations—and thus, the foundations of the psyche—emerges from both (a) the infant's ability to "tolerate frustration" (Bion, 1962) and (b) the mother's attuned responses to the infant's needs and desires (Scuderi, 2015, p. 25). This is to say, "the proliferation of representational activity is dependent on the infant's ability to maintain a cathexis of the primary object, which is in turn heavily dependent on her caregiver's attuned responses" (Scuderi, 2015, p. 26). Here, beyond this concept being rooted in Freud's model, we can observe the influence of the thoughts of both Winnicott and Bion upon Green's thinking.

Notably, Green emphasizes that the infant will not be able to achieve complete satisfaction and fulfillment from the object or its fantasy. This confrontation with such an inevitable lack of satisfaction will galvanize the infant's fantasies, and as a compensatory effort, will result in the development of a "subjective object" (Winnicott, 1971) with which the infant's drives can cathect. As suggested above, this psychical evolution creates the conditions for the possibility of (a) the relinquishment of the infant's narcissistic cathexis with the mother and (b) the possibility of a greater diversity of objects and aims. Scuderi explicates that such psychical development is realized during the Oedipal phase, where two objects and a multiplicity of aims exist for the child (Scuderi, 2015, p. 27). Significantly, this process also supports the developmental binding process of the life drive.

Life Drive

Following Winnicott's notion of the subjective object, Green argues for an interpretation of the life drive as the objectalising function. In describing the objectalising function, Green states that, "the ego is not content with changing the status of its objects with which it enters into relationship; it creates objects out of instinctual activity, when the latter, by transforming itself, becomes an object. Thus, psychic functions assume the status of objects" (Green, 2005, p. 119). Differently stated, our inner worlds are supplied by our psyche's capacity to create objects—objects that are not only from our relations with the outside world. Green notes that the notion of an objectalising function is prefigured in Freud's description of melancholia, where the ego can offer itself as a sacrifice to replace the lost object (Green, 1997, p. 1083); Freud imagines that the ego whispers, "Look, you can love me too—I am so like the object" (Freud, 1923, p. 30). The ego is not the only object that is created. In the psychological mechanism of sublimation, new and non-existent objects are created, which included both "the objects that are involved in the process of sublimation and *the activity of sublimation itself*" (Green, 1997, 1083, italics added). In this way, the objectalising function of the life drive has the capacity (1) to create a relation or link with an object or an intrapsychic aspect of the psyche such as the ego and (2) to transform structures or things into objects of representation, which can receive drive investments, to which the ego can relate.

Similar to the notion introduced by Winnicott (1971) in which an infant must create a breast feeding her in her imagination, "…psychic life continually creates object forms which nourish psychic life" (Green, 2005, p. 119). Saliently, this psychic investment can take place "even when the [outer] object is no longer directly in question" (Green, 1988a, p. 64). For example, the mother as object can be related to as an object, either introjected or projected, even

when the mother is not in the direct environment or in the life of the infant. (Reed and Levine, 2018, p. 90).

To make sense of the varying manner in which the function of the life drive is the creation of objects, let us consider the notion of an object. Weinberger and Stein summarize the concept of object for Freud as:

> *"The object of the drive is the thing or person through which the drive achieves its aim of being expressed…No object is automatically connected to a drive but comes to be associated with it if it allows for satisfaction of drive expression. Possible objects are not infinitely variable, however. They must allow for expression of drives and so have some limitations"* (Erwin, 2016, p. 165).

In this way, the notion of an object is the same for Green as it is for Freud. Thus, the work of the life drive for Freud is the transformation of *both* the drive activity and the thing which will (or wishes will) satisfy the appetitive nature of the drive into representation; the thing, either external or internal, needs to be represented as an object to the psyche.

In this way, the function of the life drive as objectalising also functions to *unify and integrate*. Thus, the bringing together and synthesis of different parts to form a new whole: the capacity for thinking. As such as a new category or insight, is an aspect of the activity of the life drive. In a way, this is an aspect of what is happening when the drive and the object fuse; there is two in One. This notion of unification will become salient to Green's differentiation between positive narcissism and negative narcissism, as will be explicated in the following chapter.

Death Drive

Green's interpretation of the death drive is that of a disobjectalising function, which can happen to objects (objective, subjective, or transitional), the ego, and even objectalising process itself. The this-ness of the object is undone. Green summarizes the disobjectalising function as "the

process by which an object loses its specific individuality, its uniqueness, and becomes any object, or no object at all" (Green, 1997, p. 1083). Stated differently, this work is achieved through unbinding, decathexis, and unweaving representational fabrics and libidinal objects (Reed and Levine, 2018, p. 69).

As a result, these aspects of the death drive which are viewed as fundamental, Green considers aggression, destruction and sadism as secondary expressions (Green, 1986). However, Green does not offer an explanation for why it is the case that aggression, destruction and sadism as secondary expressions. I will return to this explanatory gap in the following chapter. Nevertheless, with this understanding of the death drive that has its origins in Bion's thought, Green's conceptualization of the death drive differs from the definitions advanced by Freud and Klein. As such, Green's view of the death drive as essentially unbinding reflects clinical phenomena such as negative narcissism, wherein the aim of death is not biological.

Importantly, contra Freud, Green's conceptualization of the death drive is not teleological in character. The death drive does not necessarily pursue the aim of death, of returning the organism to the state before life, of a biologically understood "zero" state. Rather, the death drive can both co-operate with and antagonize the life drive (Reed and Levine, 2018, p. 69). Stated differently, while the death drive performs a certain function, it can serve many different ends. Accordingly, Freud's hypothesis also suggests that the death drive is only available to observation in its mixing with the life drive. Indeed, Green is in agreement with Freud that that is not possible; instead, the activity of the death drive reigns supreme but in a pathological constellation, such as negative narcissism. The interpretation of the death drive as the disobjectalising function is analogous to Bion's (1959) "attacks on linking," Lacan's (1966) "foreclosure," and Winnicott's (1971) "negative sides of a relationship" (Scuderi, 2015, p. 27).

Notably, Green's reformulation of the concept of the life drive and the death drive into "binding and unbinding, or conjunction and disjunction" (Green, 2001a, p. 23), also reformulates slightly the notion of a drive. One could question if whether the transmutation of the meaning of drive undermines its own foundations and has strayed too far from the course to be still considered a drive. On this point, Green reflects that his only response is "one of silence" (Green, 2001a, p. 24). Green strongly espoused and argued for this notion of the death drive because of its explanatory strength for reconciling and rendering intelligible "the shift from the theory of drives in which narcissistic-libido and object-libido were opposed, to the final drive theory of the life and death drives" (ibid). The conceptual gain as a result of espousing this theory of the life drive and death drive will be unpacked in the following chapter, as well as its shortcomings.

The Work of the Negative

> *"The life of God — the life which the mind apprehends and enjoys as it rises to the absolute unity of all things — may be described as a play of love with itself; but this idea sinks to an edifying truism, or even to a platitude, when it does not embrace in it the earnestness, the pain, the patience, and labor, involved in the negative aspect of things."*
> – Hegel, 1807, §19

Another aspect of Green's understanding of the death drive is the work of the negative. Green's abiding interest in negativity as a theoretical concept is two-fold: (1) as an adjective which conditions pre-existing concepts, and (2) as a noun which refers to a psychic process in its own right. The ways in which this is the case will be unpacked in this section. When discussing the negative, Green emphasizes that the notion of the negative in psychoanalytic theory is one which can be traced back to Freud. First, in the *Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams* (Freud, 1917b), Freud briefly mentions the notion of negative hallucination before abandoning

the concept. The notion of negativity also appears in Freud's well-known dictum stipulating that "neurosis is the negative of perversion" and in the concept of negative therapeutic reaction (Scuderi, 2015, p. 48). Most notably, however, in a paper entitled *Negation* (1925b), Freud describes negations in connection to intellectualization, judgement, and repression.

In order to illustrate the essence of the work of the negative in itself, for it is operative in both the example of repression and negative hallucination offered above, we may consider this quote by Green:

> "*Let us note these processes have in common a decision, thus form a judgment. This judgment has the task of deciding yes or no; which is not the case for other mechanisms of defenses such as reversal against the self, turning something into its opposite, isolation, cancelling out reaction formation and sublimation… At bottom there is a fundamental choice to be made, in the first person, between, 'I accept' or 'I refuse,' which has far reaching repercussion for the psyche"* (Green, 2005, p. 217).

The negative is thus a pole, paired with the positive as part of the life drive, which constitutes the process by which psychic elements are deemed to be desirable or undesirable. This basic understanding is heavily informed by Freud's 1925 paper entitled *Negation*. In this paper, Freud argues that the primary form of judgement is between good and bad. He then issues the astonishing claim that "the judgement of existence occurs after a judgement of attribution has occurred" (Scuderi, 2015, p. 50). That is, the condition for the possibility of recognition of something's existence is the judgement of that thing as good. As such, when something is judged as bad, it can easily and readily be deemed to be non-existent. Differently stated, its existence is negated and not perceptually represented to the psyche. For example, when hints that one's romantic partner is having an affair could be valued as ultimately bad, an individual would unconsciously negate these hints, rendering them non-existent; there simply is no evidence of an affair. Importantly, this generalization is neither definitive nor exact.

Through the means of the life and death drives, the defense mechanisms of regression, negation, splitting, and disavowal are the psyche's attempts at achieving harmony between what is acceptable and unacceptable (Scuderi, 2015, p. 51). As the death drive attributes existence and non-existence, the work of the negative can serve the aim of both the life drive's demands for unification and enjoyment and the death drive's demands for disunification and nothingness.

Critically, in accord with Freud's claims in *Civilization and its Discontents* (1930), Green states that "we would not survive, in our current state of civilization, if we did not recognize that everything begins with the idea of the drives being excessive or prone to excess, immoderation, *hubris*" (Green, 2005, pg. 218, original italics). This is the case because, in final analysis, the excess of the drives must be rejected and negated in order to become civilized and function in relation to other beings. The psyche must censor itself in order to make itself palatable to and able to enter civilization. As Scuderi notes, "it is the work of the negative that maintains a degree of harmony between the poles of omnipotence and self-disappearance, a desire to live and love and to die and destroy, absolute satisfaction and bare renunciation" (Scuderi, 2015, p. 52). Thus, for Green, the work of the negative is the necessary foundation for the psychic organization described in Freud's structural model. Tn order to become a subject, some aspects of the id must be accepted and other aspects must be rejected.

The role of the death drive reaches further than self-censorship, however. Green argues that the death drive is an integral aspect of the development of the ego—of a unified sense of selfhood.

Negative Hallucination

The negative as it appears in Green's work is also significantly influenced by Winnicott's notion of the "negative side of relationships," wherein the absence of the object is more invested than the object's presence (Scuderi, 2015, p. 48). This notion significantly influenced Green's thought concerning the work of the death drive, such as negative hallucination and negative narcissism. The former will be described in this chapter; the latter in the next.

For Green, the death drive can co-operate with the life drive to serve many ends. One crucial way this occurs is the death drive's role in the developmental achievement of the ego. This which marks the achievement of a sense of selfhood that is separate from the primary caregiver. Here, the activity of the death drive is primarily in the negative hallucination of the mother, which is centrally operative in autoeroticism. To explain this process, I will outline the role of the death drive in this developmental process as described by Green in his 1967 (published in English in [2001b]) paper *Primary Narcissism: Structure of State?*

Green strongly disagrees with the psychoanalytic use of "genetic" propositions; that is, purely speculative claims that emerge from infant observation with the assumption that these speculative claims have relevance for clinical psychoanalysis with adults (Green, 2001b, pg. 56). In Green's opinion, primary narcissism is important insofar as it raises "particularly pressing theoretical problems for psychoanalysis, especially in regards to the status of the ego" (Scuderi, 2015, p. 32). That is, primary narcissism is important insofar as it raises questions regarding what psychic structure is necessary for primary narcissism to be developmentally achieved. Therefore, Green argues that it is a useless endeavor to debate whether primary narcissism, as Freud understood it or otherwise, is "real" or not. The distinction between these two modes of approaching the theoretical understanding of primary narcissism can be understood as the

difference between (1) a theory of states, under which genetic speculations fall, and (2) a theory of structures. The latter constructs theoretical models, though abstract in their essence, that attempt to describe both the psychic architecture underpinning these states, and thus explain the conditions that make them possible (Green, 2001b, pg. 56).

Simply put, the theory of states is a theory of the modes of the psyche's self-organization. An individual will pass through psychic states both in their development and in day-to-day adult existence; they are transitory. For example, the transition from the psychic state within which the individual dwells while giving an important presentation at work differs significantly from the more regressive state that same individual transitions to when returning home to their romantic partner with whom they have a co-dependent relationship. Here, the object relational conditions caused a change in the state of the individual. Moreover, the time between states can also be significantly shorter, as might be the case within the situation where the individual giving an important presentation at work. For example, the presenter receives a critical comment that reminds them of their critical father, which galvanizes a shift into the childhood state reaction to his father. In contradiction, a theory of structures is a theory of the psychic mechanisms and organization that constitute the condition for the possibility of Freud's structural model of the psyche. That is, Green is theorizing about a supportive structure that makes structurally possible the psychic processes of representation and discourse (Green, 2001b, p. 57). For Green, this pertains to one's development through autoeroticism into primary narcissism; autoeroticism is the stage through which a sufficient psychic framing structure is solidified. Consequently, if the development of the structure is disturbed, as is the case for individual's suffering from pathological narcissism, then the work of analysis is the help finish the development and establishment of the structure.

There is a critical tension in Freud's notion of primary narcissism that Green views as having immense theoretical importance because it highlights the theoretical need for his concept of the negative hallucination of the mother: "How can one adhere to a line of development which goes from non-differentiation or primitive fragmentation to unified image of the ego, whereas the epistemological revolution, based on the concept of the unconscious, postulates an insurmountable split?" (Green, 2001b, p. 49). This tension is, on the one hand, a development towards a unified ego. On the other hand, the psyche always remains a split subject. Here is the need for a theory of structure, of the negative hallucination of the mother.

Freud prefigured Green's thought on the negative hallucination of the mother in autoeroticism in his 1923 essay *The Ego and the Id*:

> *"By thus getting hold of the libido from the object-cathexes, setting itself up as the sole love-object, and desexualizing or sublimating the libido of the id, the ego is working in opposition to the purposes of Eros and placing itself at the service of the opposing instinctual impulses"* (Freud, 1923, p. 54).

Here, Freud brings to light that the ego "risks" enlisting the death drive in order to enrich itself with libidinal cathexis, in order to be taken as an object by the life drive (Scuderi, 2015, p. 40). This dangerous operation makes the libido vulnerable to the effect of the death drive, which includes the potential to thrust the ego into a pathological state such as positive or negative narcissism (Green, 2001b, pg. 69). Stated differently, for Freud, the work of the death drive is necessary for the ego to be taken as an object by the life drive, but they participation can go awry. Though Freud does not expand upon the manner in which the death drive's participation can go awry, Green takes up this task through the influence of Winnicott's notion of the "negative side of relationships."

Green introduces the concept of negative hallucination of the mother by making an analogy to prehistoric representations. On the one hand, some of the prehistoric cave drawings were representations of women, wild animals, rhinoceros', lion, mammoths, etc.; these are positive representations. On the other hand, there were negative hands, which were achieved though placing another hand on the wall of the cave and spreading colors around the hand. Thus, when the hand withdraws from the wall, "a non-hand appears" (Green, 1997, p. 1083). This non-hand, Green suggests, is analogous to the negative hallucination of the mother, wherein the absence of the mother is that with which the infant cathects.

First, I must define hallucination, in order to get at how Green understands negative hallucination. Succinctly, in psychoanalytic theory, hallucination is intimately connected to perception and representation. As Freud demonstrated in his analysis of Judge Schreber, a hallucination marks the return of something which has been unconsciously abolished from the subject's perceptual field. As a result, a positive hallucination is a positive appearance of psychic phenomena which were previously not perceived nor detected (Scuderi, 2015, p. 48). For Green, a positive hallucination is the result of the activity of the life drive, specifically its representational capacity, as its existence constitutes the activity of an objectalising function. In contradistinction, a negative hallucination is "the non-perception of an object or of a perceptible psychic phenomenon" (Green, 2005, pg. 218), "a representation of the absence of representation" (Green 1997, p. 1074). Stated differently, the death drive works to undo or erase aspects of the perceptual field and thus interferes with the representation of specific objects or psychic phenomena. For Green, there are two kinds of negative hallucination, healthy (as part of the structure of autoeroticism) and pathological.

Developmentally, negative hallucination ministers two functions that help the infant's psyche negotiate separation from their mother. It is important to remember that this is happening in a developmental moment before repression is available to the psyche (Scuderi, 2015, p. 42). With this restriction taken into account, Green bases his theorization off of Freud's thought in the 1915 paper *Repression*:

> *"This view of repression would be made more complete by assuming that, before the mental organization reaches this state, the task of fending off instinctual impulses is dealt with by the other vicissitudes which instincts may undergo – e.g. reversal into the opposite or turning round upon the subject's own self"* (Freud, 1915, p. 147).

Firstly, negative hallucination of the mother renders possible the paradox of the internalization her absence, while at the same time, "maintaining traces of her caretaking activities" (Scuderi, 2015, p. 44). That is, in her absence, the negation of the mother is able to still be identified and performing caretaking and containing functions; "… the mother is caught in the empty framework of negative hallucination and becomes a framing structure for the subject himself" (Reed and Levine, 2018, p. 93). In this way, the fusion with the mother's id is still providing a supportive structure for the infant. This conceptualization resembles Winnicott's thought of the internalization of the maternal setting, in which the enmeshment between the infant's id and the mother's id become the matrix of the infant's subjectivity; it becomes the infant's framing structure (Green, 2001b, p. 87). Green describes this process as: "introjection becomes merged with the inscription of the framing circuit, thereby constituting the matrix of identifications and corresponding with the object's disappearance" (Green, 2001b, p. 87).

Secondly, the negative hallucination of the mother functions as the condition for the possibility of representation; ontologically, the negative in negative hallucination is functions and is experienced as a *blank slate* or *potential space* for representations. "In the negative

hallucination, the primordial function of "the work of death" is to "absent" the mother. In other words, the negative hallucination creates the "blank screen" on which the representational "film" and figurative flow can be projected and framed" (Reed and Levine, 2018, p. 70). This is how the seeming paradox the internalization the mother's absence, while at the same time, traces of her caretaking activities are maintained through fusion between the infant's and the mother's id. The internalization the mother's absence occurs, metaphorically put, "on top of" the maternal fusion. In this way, the internalization of her absence functions as blank and potential slate upon which representation can occur. This function is analogous to the activity of projecting a film: there is a blank, white screen upon which light is cast in changing shapes and colors. As such, the negative hallucination of the mother is the necessary structure for the infant to begin to form representations, both of themselves (which makes possible narcissistic cathexis) and of external objects.

The negative hallucination of the mother also has a pathological valence; it can also be the cathected stated within which the child becomes paralyzed. This pathological valence of negative hallucination is deeply influenced by Winnicott's notion to "negative side of relationships," which was explicated in the previous chapter. The premise for both Green and Winnicott is the same: it is "a consequence of unbearable separation that which is usually described in terms of aggression, anger, destruction etc. can manifest itself in a very different way" (Green, 1997, p. 1081). This unbearable separation from the mother can occur by way of both physical or emotional means. An example of physical distance would be that the mother of a 2-year-old must be separated for, say, three years; "The return of the presence of the object is not enough to heal the disastrous effects of its too long absence. Non-existence has taken possession of the mind, erasing the representations of the object that preceded its absence. This is

an irreversible step, at least until treatment" (Green 1997, p. 1082). The more common instance would be the emotional separation. For example, the mother of a 2-year-old becomes overwhelmingly depressed and completely withdrawal from her emotional investment in her child. In both of these cases, the negative hallucination of the mother "expresses itself in terms of…void, emptiness or, to a lesser degree, futility, meaninglessness" (Green 1997, p. 1074).

Usually, the absence of the mother is identified and experienced as bad, in contradiction to good. However, the other way the absence of the mother is experienced as not-present, void emptiness, and/or blankness; "I do not use the word absence, because in the word absence there is the hope of a return of the presence. It is also not a loss because this would mean that the loss could be mourned." (Green, 1997, p. 1082). Green builds on Winnicott's contribution that the non-existence will become the only real thing for the infant, rendering the individual unable to reliably form positive cathexes; "non-existence has taken possession of the mind, erasing the representations of the object that preceded its absence" (ibid).

Green describes instance where the pathological valence of the negative hallucination of the mother would be present in analysis:

> *"What is described here is constant in these cases, many of them presenting negative therapeutic reaction. In fact, in these cases neither the analyst nor the patient exists periodically in the session. These defenses are mobilized each time the material comes closer to anything that is significant. The patient's mind stops registering the interpretations of the analyst. The interpretations are blotted out, the patient says his mind is blank, no associations are produced. The analytic process is paralyzed for some time…One is struck by the fact that they seem so vulnerable, so fragile, and though they have an extreme rigidity and stubbornness, are animated with hidden feelings of revenge, which they express in an impossibility to change, or to invest new fields of experience. They seem to be bound to repetition compulsion."* (Green, 1997, p. 1082).

This pathological valence of the negative hallucination of the mother will be central to Green theory of negative narcissism, which will be explored and analyzed extensively in the next chapter.

Finally, the negative hallucination of the mother ought to be differentiated from phenomena such as repression, though they both involve the work of the death drive. Repression, which tends to involve forgetting, might evidence itself in moments when patients *share* that they have forgotten what they were just thinking. In such an instance of repression, the patient would attempt to recover the lost thought. In contrast, negative hallucination might evidence itself when patients are entirely unable to hear a word or phrase uttered by the analyst with no consciousness that there was something to be heard. Importantly, the involvement of the death is one of degree. In the case of repression, the patient retains a desire to re-remember the repressed thought or the interpretation offered by the analyst. While, in the case of negative hallucination, the unheard phrase desires to remain unconscious.

Narcissism

Before, explicating the details of Green's theory of narcissism in the next chapter, I will unpack the ways in which Freud has influenced Green's theory and the ways in which Green has theoretically moved beyond Freud. Green's theorizing on narcissism, as is also the case with Rosenfeld, reconciles the subject of narcissism with Freud's second drive theory in which the life drive and the death drive are postulated as two kinds of pathological narcissism. This work of reconciliation between two major parts of Freud's theory, especially with respect to the conceptualization of the drives espoused by Green, offers a theoretical account of the clinical phenomena that he terms "negative narcissism," which had not previously been adequately

accounted for. While the specifics of these two types of narcissism will be explicated in the following chapter, I will offer a few reflections of the influence of Freud in the formation of Green's theory.

Green elucidates positive narcissism as a kind of pathological narcissism tied to the life drive. In essence, positive is reminiscent of Freud's original conception of narcissism as libidinal cathexis in oneself. That is to say, the object with which the life drive has cathected (and objectalised, ala Green) is the ego. We will recall, however, that Freud had stipulated an economic conception of the libido, due to the monistic theory of the libido that he had hypothesized at that time in 1914; the object-cathexis of the libido was a zero-sum game, in which cathexis to oneself was necessarily accompanied by an equal and opposite de-cathexis with the world. Resulting from the fact that Green is working with the second dual theory of drives, he is not constrained by a conception of the libido that is economic. Therefore, while in Green's positive narcissism the object with which the life drive has cathected is (primarily) the ego, the positive narcissist can and does still have libidinal investments in external objects insofar as they adhere to the positive narcissist's omnipotent sense of self and do not violate this identification by way of their otherness.

In contradistinction, Green postulates a negative narcissism, which is form of pathological narcissism in which the death drive predominates (Green, 2001b, p. 61). Green mentions that the birth of the theoretical understanding of negative narcissism can be found in Freud's comparative works on neurosis and psychosis, such as *The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis* (1924b). In these works, Freud posits the beginnings of the notion of withdrawal of investment from both inner and outer reality thought investigation into the constitution of psychosis. In negative narcissism, as shall be explicated in more detail in the following chapter,

these same attacks and withdrawals on libidinal investment in both outer and inner objects is undertaken. In this way, negative narcissism's aim is the psychic state of "zero," of the cessation of all excitement and investments; negative narcissism aims to become no-thing.

Chapter 4

The Usefulness of the Death Drive

In this fourth and final chapter, I will delve into Rosenfeld's theory of destructive narcissism and Green's theory of negative narcissism. Each of these respective theories, I argue, yield critical insights into how the concept of the death drive is useful for understanding narcissism.

4.1 The Death Drive in Destructive Narcissism

For understanding pathological narcissism, the concept of the death drive in the thought of Herbert Rosenfeld has a twofold use.

Firstly, the concept of the death drive is useful for the three theoretical possibilities it affords. The first possibility is the power of this concept for theoretically explaining narcissistic object-relations; that is, explaining the inward-directedness of the libido and the theoretical possibility of a more extreme form of narcissistic object-relations. The second theoretical possibility the death drive affords is that of the self foundationally turning against itself and attacking itself. The third theoretical possibility the death drive affords is the recognition of an intrinsically aggressive aspect of the self with which the ego can identify.

Secondly, for Rosenfeld, the concept of the death drive is particularly useful to explain the clinical phenomena of what Rosenfeld terms "destructive narcissism." In such a case, the person exhibits narcissistic object-relations and is predominantly aggressive towards both other people (when they do relate) and towards themselves (as exemplified in the transference, dreams, behaviors, fantasies, etc.).

The Case of Michelle

This clinical case concerns the treatment of a 16-year-old girl who evidenced both libidinal narcissism and destructive narcissism. I have chosen this case because it exemplifies the difference between Rosenfeld's two types of pathological narcissism. This case was presented in a 2006 essay entitled *Facing Towards or Turning Away from Destructive Narcissism* by Denis Flynn and Helga Skogstad.

When Michelle began treatment, she was suffering from destructive narcissism. As both her treatment and her psychic state progressed, a more libidinal narcissism emerged. Michelle received twice weekly analysis for the duration of her stay at an in-patient therapeutic community, and all of her progress recounted by Flynn and Skogstad occurred during her stay there. Although she had previously been in a psychiatric ward due to anorectic symptoms and self-harm such as overdoses and frequent cutting, her current and most-prevalent symptom was addictive self-strangulation (Flynn and Skogstad, 2006, p. 42). Her personal history is described as:

> *"Until the age of two, Michelle was brought up on her own by her mother, who later married and had three more children. Michelle, who hated her stepfather, felt deeply betrayed by mother. She experienced her as playing mind-games and giving messages she could not understand. When she was 12, mother invited Michelle's birth father to meet his daughter for the first time. He flooded her with gifts, which she found increasingly strange, but she was unable to withdraw… She seemed to describe a narcissistic relationship, in which she and a mother object are entangled with each other, which protects her from jealousy and envy."* (ibid).

At the beginning of treatment, Michelle recounted how vividly maddening her thoughts were, for they seemed to be comprised of other people's voices. She recounted how her body and mind were not her own. During analytic sessions, Michelle relaxed in response to the analyst's

interpretations, and it seemed like she wanted him to be her voice. The general pattern in sessions was that she would flippantly talk about how great her life was and acquiesced to the analyst's interpretations, while hiding any sense of turmoil. One striking way this was demonstrated was that she wore a black scarf which hid her marks of self-strangulation on her neck (Flynn and Skogstad, 2006, p. 43). In describing these sessions with Michelle, the analyst recounts how he felt pulled to trust her blindly. This was interpreted as a projective identification with a seductive internal object, which "lured her into the belief that everything was fine even though she somewhere knew better… [and] attacked her own sanity and my thinking mind. It made her believe that strangling herself was safe and the best way to get rid of pain" (ibid).

Michelle's progress was marked by slowly choosing to remain with a thoughtful internal object instead of the seductive, abusive one. This marked her shift from destructive narcissism to libidinal narcissism. This shift was from (a) psychological state of self-erasure in order to fuse with the analyst to (b) a psychological state of insisting that everyone was to follow her own thinking to maintain fusion. In this way, though she was progressing, Michelle's libidinal narcissism was far from allowing separateness (Flynn and Skogstad, 2006, p. 44). "Sessions showed a typical pattern. She talked a lot, but when I tried to say something, she shouted: I should listen, it was her session, she wanted to talk…If I listened and gave her space, she became calmer and thoughtful…At the end of such sessions, she became anxious and apologized several times, wanting reassurance that I did not hate her" (ibid). Notably, the analyst's presence was still of utmost importance for Michelle because she needed his presence in order to have her own thoughts. In this way, when the analyst listened, Michelle was able to use the analytic container to think about herself (Flynn and Skogstad, 2006, p. 45).

Theoretical Account of Destructive Narcissism

To understand how the concept of the death drive allows for the theoretical possibilities it affords, I will first explicate the details of the two narcissistic pathologies postulated by Rosenfeld, libidinal and destructive narcissism. These two types of pathological narcissism which were introduced in his 1971 essay entitled *A Clinical Approach to the Psychoanalytic Theory of the Life and Death Instincts: An Investigation into the Aggressive Aspects of Narcissism*.

For Rosenfeld, libidinal narcissism is conditioned by the properties of the life drive, and destructive narcissism is conditioned by the properties of the death drive. In order to make sense of the prevalence of the life and death drives in their respective forms of narcissism, Rosenfeld introduces the concept of "pathological fusion", which is the "processes where in the mixing of libidinal and destructive impulses the power of the destructive impulses is greatly strengthened, while in normal fusion the destructive energy is mitigated or neutralized" (Rosenfeld, 1971, p. 172). In this respect, the prevalence of the death drive in destructive narcissism is not a psychic instance of the death drive functioning in isolation from the softening influence of the life drive. Rosenfeld is thus in agreement with Freud that the independent activity of one of the drives in isolation from the other is impossible under the psychoanalytic model of the psyche.

Rather, pathological fusion is a state where the intermixing of the life and death drives is such that the dominant drive is amplified and strengthened. Rosenfeld does not explain exactly *how* this is the case; he only states *that* it is the case. Presumably, however, the dominant drive is strengthened by the energy of the other drive. As it is always the case that the activity of the other drive is present in the endured psychological state, Rosenfeld is bound by the limits of the necessary intermixing of the drives. This conjecture arose from a need to explain some

pathological states, as in destructive narcissism, which evidence especially strong prevalence of the properties of one of the drives over the properties of the other. Importantly, the concept of the pathological fusion of the drives ought to be understood in contrast with the normal fusion of the drives, where the good and bad parts of the self are integrated. This integration leads to the amelioration and modification of the self's destructiveness by bringing it in contact with loving feelings (Steiner, 2008f, p. 67). Indeed, as it will also be contended by Green, the integration of the death drive softens the object-seeking life drive and makes possible the infant's separation from the mother.

In both the libidinal and destructive narcissism, projective and introjective identification[10] of self and object is central to the narcissistic object-relations; this results in a fusion of self and object. Notably, this state, with the added element of projective identification, is recalling the melancholic state Freud introduced in 1917 in his essay entitled *On Mourning and Melancholia*. This fusional state, within which the melancholic persists, is disturbed when the otherness of the object violates the melancholic's experience of the self-object, which galvanizes ambivalent feelings toward the object. Therefore, in both the libidinal and destructive narcissism, the violation of this fusion by the otherness of the object causes the individual recognizes the separateness between themselves and the object. Consequently, a feeling of dependency arises in the individual, and this feeling frightens the ego (Rosenfeld, 1971, p. 172).

When the two types of pathological narcissism recognize the separateness between themself and the object, they also recognize the goodness of the object. Indeed, the goodness of

[10] Projective identification is a term introduced my Melanie Klein, and is defined as: "a mechanism revealed in the phantasies in which the subject inserts his self—in whole or in part—into the object in order to harm, possess or control it" (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988, p. 356).
Introjection is defined as: "in phantasy, the subject transposes objects and their inherent qualities from the 'outside' to the 'inside' of himself" (ibid).

the object no longer belongs to the narcissist through an omnipotent fusion with the object. Given their insecure sense of self, both in the sense of structural integrity and lack of self-assurance, envy emerges into their psyches (ibid). Notably, this split between the values of good and bad, and how the recognition of the goodness in the object galvanizes the recognition of the badness of oneself, is the direct influence of Melanie Klein's notion of the paranoid-schizoid position and envy.

Both types of pathological narcissism have the above-mentioned core aspects to their pathology. Their differences arise as a result of the two types of objects that are omnipotently identified with, both in a projective and introjective manner. For libidinal narcissism, self-idealization is maintained by "omnipotent introjective and projective identifications with good objects and their qualities" (ibid). As such, the pathological fusion present in libidinal narcissism augments and strengthens the self-idealization through the introjected good objects and identification with the libidinal aspects of the id. If we recall, this was exemplified in Michelle when she strongly enforced that her thoughts and feelings be the only presence in the room; the only opinions that were allowed to persist were ones identical to hers. In this way, Michelle's libidinal narcissism was one where she had primarily identified with her libidinal drive. This phenomenon is possible because libidinal narcissism is organized around the prevalence of the life drive in the pathological fusion. Indeed, envy is only marginally present in libidinal narcissism, breaking through into behavior in extreme situations, such as when "the narcissistic belief system is punctured" (Steiner, 2008c, p. 27). Such an eruption of aggression is reintegrated into the libidinal narcissist's positive self-understanding through de-valuation of the object.

In contradistinction, Rosenfeld postulates that the pathological fusion present in destructive narcissism idealizes omnipotently the destructive aspects of the self (Rosenfeld,

1971, p. 173). As such, the death drive is strengthened and augmented by way of the pathological fusion and "death is idealized as a solution to all problems" (Rosenfeld, 1987, p. 106-7). For Michelle this was the idealization of self-strangulation and other forms of self-harm as the answer to her problems. Nevertheless, envy, especially its relational aggression, is a central facet of destructive narcissism, and is more violent and more unconscious than in libidinal narcissism (Steiner, 2008c, p. 27). in destructive narcissism, envy has a twofold function: (1) envy is the affect which galvanizes, motivates, and conditions the pathological fusion of destructive narcissism, and (2) envy is the affect against which destructive narcissism is defending (Rosenfeld, 1971, p. 174).

With respect to the first point, the destructive narcissist is unconscious of the fact that they feel envy toward objects and the good recognized within these objects. However, the death drive is active in the aggressive and destructive manner in which objects are related to, especially "positive libidinal objects" (Rosenfeld, 1971, p. 173). Stated differently, the death drive attempts to reduce the object to a deadly nothingness, either through an attack or a re-integration into and identification with the destructive narcissist's psyche (Steiner, 2008f, p. 67). Said otherwise, the separateness of the object, and thus object as an object, must be demolished, which is accomplished either biologically or psychologically. In the case of Michelle's destructive narcissism, this was accomplished through acquiescence to the analyst's thoughts and interpretations; Michelle's destructive narcissism was not outwardly aggressive in her envy. This is likely the result of many factors, such as her temperament. However, a different case of destructive narcissism might emphasize a more outwardly aggressive envy.

Notably, in most cases of destructive narcissism, the influence and presence of the life drive in the pathological fusion softens the nature of these envious attacks. For example, a mild

destructive narcissistic condition can still allow for decent functioning in a workplace. The violence will not take the form of physical violence and will once become overtly apparent only when there is an overwhelming moment wherein the narcissist feels humiliated by "the revelation that it is the external object which, in reality, contains the valuable qualities he had attributed to his own creative powers" (Rosenfeld, 1971, p. 173). Only in the most extreme cases, such as psychotic episodes, does the attempt to reduce the object to a deadly nothingness become murderous and result in physical death (Rosenfeld, 1971, p. 175). As such, this murderous rage can either (a) be outwardly-directly and can result in the murder of another person or (b) be inwardly-directed and can result in suicide.

Essentially, psychotic presentation of destructive narcissism consists of all the same core aspects of destructive narcissism, except that the life drive has acquiesced to the psychotic structure's "false promises…designed to make the normal self of the patient dependent on or addicted to his omnipotent self, and to lure the normal sane parts into this delusional structure to imprison them" (ibid). Rosenfeld describes an extreme psychotic version of destructive narcissism wherein the sane, libidinal part of the patient is completely drawn into a delusional world which promises omnipotent solutions to their desperate and painful psychological state. In such cases, the libidinal self is sufficiently weakened, while the pathological fusion of destructive narcissism has completely taken over. It is important to note Rosenfeld's use of the terms "normal" and "sane" to describe the libidinal self, which is lured into the psychotic state, because this phenomenon accounts for the breakdown of the ego's capacity to accomplish reality testing. Rosenfeld describes a shift of dependent object for the libidinal self in the psychotic presentation of destructive narcissism; the life drive is now dependent upon the inner object of the omnipotent self.

The second function of envy refers to the strength of defensive aggression found in the psychological organization of the state of destructive narcissism. Rosenfeld describes this defensive organization as analogous to a criminal gang whose purpose is to "keep itself in power and to maintain the *status quo*" (Rosenfeld, 1971, p. 174, original italics). Rosenfeld explicitly states that the gang-like organization is defending against the feeling of weakness, in addition to consciousness of envy (ibid). This notion is supported by the psychoanalyst Hanna Segal, a contemporary of Rosenfeld, who stated that "of all situations the hardest one to bear for the patient is the realization of his primitive envy" (Steiner, 2008d, p. 38). This defense against weakness is another salient factor that influences the destructive narcissist's relationship with objects, specifically the analyst, for weakness is connected with needfulness and seeking help (ibid). Therefore, the destructive aspects of the gang consistently work to keep external objects permanently devalued (Rosenfeld, 1971, p. 173).

Furthermore, not only is the death drive turned against external objects, but the death drive also aims at reducing the libidinal aspect of the self to a deadly nothingness (Steiner, 2008f, p. 67). For clarity, Rosenfeld uses the term the libidinal self to refer to the life drive; that is, the part of the id that is seeking (and dependent upon) relations with external objects. In destructive narcissism, the death drive aims to destroy both (1) the relations with the objects themselves and (2) the libidinal part of the psyche which desires to achieve and is the source of these relations. Rosenfeld states that the destructive narcissist would "prefer to die, to be non-existent, to deny the fact of his birth, and also to destroy his analytic progress and insight representing the child in himself, which he feels the analyst, representing the parents, has created" (Rosenfeld, 1971, p. 173). As such, any expression of the id which does not serve the pathological end of narcissism, ideally, is annihilated under the pathological constellation of destructive narcissism.

For this reason, Rosenfeld posits that the destructive narcissist has lost their connection to their "sane dependent self which is related to the capacity for thinking" (Rosenfeld, 1971, p. 175). We will recall that this was especially prevalent for the case of Michelle. Moreover, the libidinal self also includes and represents the destructive narcissist's inner child (Rosenfeld, 1971, p. 173). Rosenfeld recounts how this rejection and repression sometimes shows itself in the destructive narcissist's belief that he has destroyed his caring self, his capacity to love, and there is nothing that anybody can do to change the situation (ibid).

4.2 The Usefulness of the Death Drive in Rosenfeld

Now that the metapsychology of Rosenfeld's destructive narcissism has been presented, a sufficient conceptual foundation has been laid, allowing for the subsequent exploration of the three theoretical possibilities affording by the concept of the death drive affords in understanding of narcissism. This further exploration will be accomplished partially by way of exploration of the clinical phenomena for which the concept of the death drive explanatorily useful. For example, a person who is exhibiting narcissistic object-relations and is predominantly aggressive towards other people (when they do relate to others) and towards themselves (as exemplified in the transference, dreams, behaviors, fantasies, etc.).

First Possibility

The first possibility is the explanatory power of the concept of the death drive to understand narcissistic object-relations. Here, narcissistic object-relations are understood in two ways. First, there is the inward-directedness of the libido; that is, the libidinal cathexis with the self. This is exemplified in the properties of the life drive and the death drive that Rosenfeld

brings to bear in destructive narcissism. For Rosenfeld, the life drive is alternatively termed the libidinal self and is understood in the manner that Freud understood the life drive; that is, as fundamentally object-seeking (specifically the sexual drive within the life drive) and containing the part of the self which cathexis with objects.

It is important to recall that Freud collapsed the self-preservation drive and the sexual drive of his first theory of the unconscious into aspects of the life drive when he introduced his second dual drive theory of the life drive and the death drive. For Freud, the drive towards self-preservation is also part of the life drive. However, the drive towards self-preservation is less like a drive in the manner that the other aspects of the id are drives. Instead, self-preservation is more like an instinct in the colloquial usage of the term; it is akin to the reflex for one's leg to swing forward when the doctor lightly taps just under one's kneecap. Therefore, the fundamental *drive* activity of the life drive is the outward facing sexual drive, which aims to achieve cathexes with objects.

In contrast, as espoused by both Freud and Rosenfeld, the orientation of the death drive in isolation is inward facing. Here, the Nirvana principle governs the activity of the death drive, which aim to free oneself of all stimulation and all tension—to return to the previous inanimate state. Therefore, since the object and the external world is an excitement monger, the ultimate aim is to return to an inorganic state, to die.

Ronald Britton describes one of the ways in which the term narcissism is used in the psychoanalytic literature as "a force within the personality that opposes relationships to any objects other than the self" (Steiner, 2008c, p. 23). If we take this notion of narcissism, as the notions of libidinal and destructive narcissism seem to support, then it is necessary to have a force within the psyche that is inward-facing in order to ensure the possibility of the libidinal

orientation away from world and toward the self. Stated differently, the inward-facing libidinal orientation of pathological narcissism correlates with the inward-facing libidinal orientation of the death drive. As such, only in its most extreme form of destructive narcissism, where the activity of the death drive is exhibited in its purest form, does the destructive narcissist commit suicide, fulfilling the aim of the death drive.

In this vein, not only does the concept of the death drive provide the necessary theoretical condition to explain narcissistic object-relations, but it also makes meta-psychologically possible a more extreme form of narcissistic object-relations as is found in destructive narcissism. The inward-facing libidinal nature of the death drive has a more extreme nature in that it aims for an inanimate, "zero" state. This is exemplified in the unfortunate successful attainment of suicide in the extreme case of destructive narcissism. Furthermore, due to the nature of the destructive aspects of the self that the destructive narcissist omnipotently idealizes and identifies with, the outward-facing relationship with objects is more fraught with envy in the destructive narcissist than in the libidinal narcissist. While the libidinal narcissist primarily identifies with and merges with good objects, the destructive narcissist attempts to destroy good objects. Destroy, here, is understood as freeing oneself from the fact of the existence of separate objects. This can manifest itself as freeing oneself from any attachments because the freedom from the separate existence of objects can be achieved in three ways: collapse into the external object, destruction of the object, or withdrawal from the object. While the case of Michelle exemplified the collapse into the external object, this is not necessarily the only presentation of destructive narcissism.

Additionally, Rosenfeld does not explicitly mention that the destructive narcissist identifies with destructive objects. In fact, Rosenfeld recounts the "apparent indifference of the narcissistic individual towards external objects and the world" (Rosenfeld, 1971, p. 174).

Therefore, the primary mode of relatedness to object and the world present in destructive narcissism is either that of a destructive attack, as present in the transference with the analyst according to Rosenfeld, or that of a withdrawal from the world. The latter follows because a contentious and hate-filled relationship to objects would, in some cases, move the individual to avoid relating in order to achieve a greater sense of peace in their lives. Most importantly, the more successful the gang-like organization of destructive narcissism is in attacking the libidinal self, the less the libidinal self is able to cathect with objects. Therefore, the concept of the death drive makes theoretically possible a further withdrawal from object-relations. This is the case because a more extreme case of narcissistic object-relations not possible to the metapsychology of libidinal narcissism proper.

Second Possibility

Secondly, the concept of the death drive introduces the theoretical possibility of the self foundationally turning against itself and attacking itself. This insight was a central reason Freud postulated the death drive, and the theory of destructive narcissism supports this theoretical conclusion. One example of this phenomenon supporting Rosenfeld's postulation of destructive narcissism consists of a patient's dream. The dream is of "… a small boy who was in a comatose condition, dying from some kind of poisoning. He was lying on a bed in a courtyard and was endangered by the hot midday sun which was beginning to shine on him. The patient was standing near to the boy but did nothing to move or protect him. He only felt critical and superior to the doctor [that was] treating the child, since it was he who should have seen that the child was moved into the shade" (Rosenfeld, 1971, p. 174). Rosenfeld interprets the dream figure of the child as symbolizing the patient's dependent libidinal self. He posits that the dream is

communicating to the patient's ego that his current psychological state is one in which he is keeping his dependent libidinal self in a dying condition because the (dream) ego is preventing his libidinal self from receiving help and nourishment from the analyst, who is symbolized as the doctor (ibid). As related to destructive narcissism, this interpretation reflects the sense of superiority and self-admiration which is part of the omnipotent identification with the destructive aspects of the death drive. Moreover, this dying condition must be continuously enforced due to the pressure of the repressed to return and the fact that most cases of destructive narcissism as not ones in which the pathological fusion around the death drive has completely overtaken the individual.

Another clinical example from Rosenfeld's professional life is one about a different patient's reoccurring fantasy from childhood, in which the devil would attack what the patient called "the good people" and would keep them tied up in dungeons. Whenever they managed to get free, the devil reappears and attacks them violently. Afterward, the devil would tie them up even more tightly than before (Steiner, 2008f, p. 61). In this dream, we can see that a similar identification can be made between the libidinal self and 'the good people," as well as between the devil and the omnipotent identification with destructive aspects of the self. However, the figure of the devil in this fantasy is distinctly more malicious in nature than the dream ego is in the previous example. I would suggest that Rosenfeld might interpret this difference as reflecting that idea that the life-attacking nature of the destructive narcissism's gang is more palatable to the conscious psyche when it takes the form of a separate character, rather than itself. In this way, the harder-to-swallow reality is imaged by the unconscious more explicitly in the fantasy-figure of the devil.

Both clinical examples offer psychic images of different parts of the psyche which are foundationally at war with each other. The devil versus the good people; the dream ego versus the dying child and the efforts of the doctor. Not only are these aspects of the psyche at war with each other, but this war is undertaken within the psychic organization of narcissistic object-relations; that is to say that the good people and the dying child are not kept in a hazardous condition in order to protect them, while a certain way of being in relationship in the world is adopted. Instead, one aspect of the psyche has overtaken, through pathological fusion, and is attacking the other part which contains the affects that cannot be tolerated nor faced.

Third Possibility

Lastly, the third theoretical possibility afforded by the death drive is an intrinsically aggressive aspect of the self with which the ego can identify. Rosenfeld describes a crucial aspect of pathological narcissism as the omnipotent identification with the destructive aspects of the self. For an identification to occur, there must necessarily be something with which to identify—a hook. In this way, the pathological narcissism elevates and aggrandizes themselves. However, this aggrandizement is much less socially dependent upon the recognition of their goodness, as is the case for the libidinal narcissist who has omnipotently identified with good objects in addition to the life drive.

The theorization about the death drive complexifies rapidly when the role of the superego is neglected as in Rosenfeld's discussion of destructive narcissism. In his 1971 paper entitled *A Clinical Approach to the Psychoanalytic Theory of the Life and Death Drives: An Investigation into the Aggressive Aspects of Narcissism*. This lack of consideration of the superego is also noticeable in the previous discussion regarding the theoretical possibility of the

self turning against itself and attacking itself. Could the activity of the superego have been sufficient to account for self-attacking activity in destructive narcissism?

Beyond the scope of this thesis are the nuances regarding (a) the potential role of the superego in the unfolding of destructive narcissism and (b) whether or not the death drive is necessary for the mechanism of identification to occur. However, it is important to note that the properties and aims of the death drive are different from those of the superego. Briefly summarized, the aim of a "zero" state and the cessation of excitation differ from an adherence to parental and cultural rules. Therefore, the consideration of the concept of the death drive is advantageous to clinical practice in order to comprehend the murderous envy and self-attack ever-so-present in destructive narcissism. In this way, the bound of the concept of the superego cannot account for clinical examples such as suicide or envious attack that are not caused by the environment such as plots to murder the analyst, as Rosenfeld recounts Rosenfeld, 1971, p. 174).

4.3 The Death Drive in Negative Narcissism

In the thought of André Green, the concept of the death drive has a threefold use for understanding both developmental and pathological narcissism.

Theoretically, the concept of the death drive is useful for the three possibilities it affords. The first two possibilities are the same as for Rosenfeld, but Green's reformulation bring to light different aspects supporting these conclusions. The reader will recall that the first theoretical possibility is its capacity to explain narcissistic object-relations, in terms of explaining both the inward-directedness of the libido and the possibility of a more extreme form of narcissistic object-relations. The second theoretical possibility is that, in narcissism, the self is foundationally turned against itself and represses libidinal cathexis. Lastly, the third theoretical possibility afforded by the concept of the death drive according to Green is the postulation of a psychic condition allowing to explain the un-represented, in both developmental and pathological narcissism.

Clinically, the concept of the death drive is useful for explaining the phenomenon termed by Green as negative narcissism. In this narcissistic condition, the individual is completely withdrawn from the world, never going anywhere (except perhaps analysis) and never fantasizing or dreaming.

The Case of Jennifer

Before exploring the details and nuances of Green's theory of negative narcissism, let us consider the clinical example. Green presented Jennifer's case in his 2002 paper entitled *A Dual Conception of Narcissism: Positive and Negative Organizations*, which summarized his theory of negative narcissism.

Jennifer was referred to Green after an episode of severe depression, for which she had to be hospitalized. Jennifer had been a philosophy professor for one year before falling ill. Despite contrary accounts from her previous pupils, she insisted that she was the worst philosophy professor who had ever lived. All of her days were spent locked in her apartment alone. She only ate prepackaged ham and yogurt. She never socialized or went anywhere other than analysis, except when she saw her sister one week per year. Most of her time was spent reading "philosophy with religious undertones, though she did not practice herself" (Green, 2002, p. 642). Moreover, she almost never dreamed and absolutely never fantasied.

Despite having a strong transference on Green as a person (and not as an analyst), Jennifer never had a single insight. Despite fiercely loving Green as a person, she could not receive or make use of anything Green could give ger as an analyst: "no change took place" (ibid). Moreover, her analysis with Green lasted ten years. Perhaps the only change was a negative change wherein she developed an addiction to alcohol which could not be stopped. The analysis ended as a result of her death, which was caused by suffocation "after greedily trying to ingest an excessive amount of food" (ibid).

In discussing this case, Green mentions how "impoverishment of object relationships is not indicative of a narcissism whose aim is to assert one's own selfhood, or to nourish feelings of grandiosity or mirroring relationships [as found in positive narcissism]" (Green, 2002, p. 645). Stated differently, positive narcissism is the type of narcissism whose object-relations consider others as low value: ignorant, vulgar, common, cheap, etc. In contradistinction, negative narcissism describes patients who do not look for anything and await their inevitable death. Green notes the manner in which Jennifer's affects are always dull, life does not have any joy,

and “pain remains a basic tonality made up not so much of suffering as of sadness or deadness” (Green, 2002, p. 646).

Negative Narcissism

Green’s theorization on the relationship between narcissism, both developmental and pathological, and the death drive has spanned over many decades, beginning in 1967 and lasting until the end of his life in 2012. The forms of narcissism aligned with the predominance of the death drive have been identified by many names: including moral narcissism, dead mother, and negative narcissism. For simplicity, I will refer to Green’s theory regarding the type of narcissism aligned with the death drive as negative narcissism.

Green’s theory on narcissism encompasses all the names by which it has been called, reconciling the subject of narcissism with Freud’s second drive theory. In his 2001 book entitled *Life Narcissism, Death Narcissism*, in which all of his essays on the topic are compiled, Green postulates that the life drive and the death drive serve as a foundation for two different types of pathological narcissism, a positive narcissism and a negative narcissism.

Green elucidates positive narcissism as a pathological narcissism in which the life drive predominates. If we recall, Green’s conceptualizes the life drive as having an objectalising function; that is, our inner worlds are supplied by our psyche’s capacity to create objects—objects that are not only from our relations with the outside world. In this way, the life drive (1) creates a relation with an object or an intrapsychic aspect of the psyche such as the ego, and (2) transforms structures or things into objects, which can receive drive investments to which the individual can relate. Therefore, positive narcissism is the psychological constellation wherein “the ego finds satisfaction in itself, creating the phantasy of liberation from the feeling of

dependence to which it is submitted by the desire, which off-centers it in the search of the object, variable for its inherent otherness" (Reed and Levine, 2018, p. 113). Essentially, in positive narcissism, the individual's libidinal investments are satisfied through investing into the subject's ego. The outer objects are related to, but only as extensions, reflections, or pawns of the positive narcissist's inner world.

In parallel, Green summarizes positive narcissism as:

> *"… a way of living—sometimes parasitically, sometimes self-sufficiently—with an impoverished ego that is limited to illusory relationships that support the self, but without any involvement with objects. Here I refer to living objects, not those that are essentially idealized"* (Green, 2002, p. 645).

According to Green, the death drive is operative in positive narcissism in the de-cathexis of libidinal investments in objects; for example, the infant's dependence upon their mother's breast for nourishment. In this way, the world of external objects and the majority of the outward-facing cathexis of the life drive are negated by the death drive of the individual in favor of their own ego. In contrast, beginning with the creation of the subjective object of their drive activity, the libido of the life drive objectalizes and cathects to the ego and defends its unity and content. As further details on Green's theory of positive narcissism are beyond the scope of this thesis, only the crux of the innovations in Green's theorizing on negative narcissism is expanded below.

In contradistinction, negative narcissism is the form of pathological narcissism in which the death drive predominates. Instead of aspiring towards a unified ego which is "the narcissism of the One," negative narcissism aims toward a state of "zero"; that is, a state where there is neither tension nor desire (Green, 2001b, p. 61). The death drive follows its *modus operandi*; unbinding, de-cathexis, and unweaving representational fabrics and libidinal objects. These attacks are undertaken against the entire spectrum of the work of the life drive, not only against those which desire to relate to outer objects. Indeed, negative narcissism does not include

libidinal investment in the ego, as found in positive narcissism. In contrast, neither objects nor the ego receives libidinal investment. Furthermore, the work of the death drive includes attacks on the objectalising process of the life drive itself. Such defensive attacks have to be repeated *ad infinitum* due to the pressure of the repressed to return.

Importantly, negative narcissism remains a type of narcissism because the subject has turned away from the world of objects, toward oneself. The subject suffers from narcissistic object-relations, wherein the inward-directedness of the libido monopolizes. Green describes the goal of negative as "the obliteration of the trace of the Other in one's desire, therefore the abolition of the primary difference, the difference between One and the Other" (Green, 2001d, p. 149). Differently stated, such turning away from the world does not involve a turning towards the ego as an object, because the death drive undoes the psyche's investments in both external and internal reality.

Furthermore, in negative narcissism, the attacks on the id are undertaken until the id undermines the libidinal foundations of its own ego. The goal of this double disinvestment is two-fold: first, to achieve an active disposition against awareness of external and internal reality; and, second, to restore the fusion with the mother, the primordial object, from whom no adequate separation has been achieved, which takes the form of aiming to become no-thing. Therefore, the pathological state of negative narcissism self-inflicts destruction upon oneself in order to return to this sought-after relational state of non-being. In this way, psychical non-being or achievement of the "zero" state is the achievement of maternal fusion—or, more accurately stated, the achievement of the fusion with the way the mother was experienced by the infant: in her absence.

These destructive attacks on the life drive are the same in both Rosenfeld's destructive narcissism and Green's negative narcissism. The two theories of pathological narcissism differ as a result of the difference between their notion of the life drive. For Rosenfeld's destructive narcissism, a relational aggression seated in envy is central. For Green's negative narcissism, the work of the death drive in its disobjectalising function and the work of the negative in the negative hallucination of the mother.

Moral Narcissism

In the form of negative narcissism which Green terms moral narcissism, which was explicated in a 1969 (2001d) paper, the role of shame and its connection to the death drive is brought to the forefront. Green argues that shame is the primary emotion that drives the pathology of negative narcissism; shame is understood as "…merciless punishment barely related to an objective fault…[that] falls upon its victims inexorably" (Green, 2001d, p. 132). As Green metaphorically states, shame is the omnipotent father who knows no authority above his own and is therefore irrational (Green, 2001d, p. 132 & 148). Therefore, the subject afflicted with this affect is overwhelmed with a sense of their own impurity and pollution (Green, 2001d, p. 132). Moreover, the irrationality associated with shame is such that it cannot be shared, for there is no logic or ordered world in which other can co-participate. The individual is alone in their impurity, which generates a narcissistic object-cathexis. In this way, shame is both (a) affect against which negative narcissism is defending, and (b) the affect which galvanizes, motivates, and conditions the pathological fusion of negative narcissism.

Opposed to shame is guilt, which Green metaphorically pictures as the rational, moral law existing above the father. The priority of the rational law over the authority of the father is

inverted. Consequently, guilt burdens the individual with a sense of transgression against the shared law and against another (ibid). Stated differently, the law-like aspect of guilt renders guilt capable of being shared, for many people can have internalized such particular notion of fault or sin (Green, 2001d, p. 131). Not only that, but guilt generates libidinal object-cathexis because there are actions that can be taken toward reconciliation with the transgressed against (Green, 2001d, p. 148). Thus, for Green, guilt is a central aspect of masochism, due to the fact that masochism "…demands the presence of the Other" (Green, 2001d, p. 135). The masochist's negation of pleasure and their search for unpleasure necessitates an Other, whose role is to inflict unpleasure.

Green introduces the differing concepts of guilt and shame, and their differences, to give form to the manner in which narcissistic-cathexes are present in negative narcissism: (a) completely withdrawn from the world and (b) denying their instinctual nature, both the objectalising function of the life drive and the representations to the ego. Here, we can see the function of shame in galvanizing both the world-denying and self-denying orientation of negative narcissism. These rejecting and disobjectalising functions operative in both shame and in negative narcissism are the work of the death drive. This is summarized by Green as "the obliteration of the trace of the Other in one's desire, therefore the abolition of the primary difference, the difference between One and the Other" (Green, 2001d, p. 149).

Firstly, the activity of the ego, which Green names as perception, is repressed (Green, 2001d, p. 140). Not only is the object of the world decathected, but the representational fabrics which construct objects as libidinal objects are unwoven. This is the case because to perceive the world is to recognize the world as a place populated by objects with which one can cathect. Rather, the negative narcissist has entered into a negative relationship with the world, negating

its existence through the disobjectalising function of the death drive. To the negative narcissist, the worlds is, “a battlefield upon which human appetites indulge in an endless combat”; that is, the world populated by objects does not merely reveal the objects but also reveals oneself and the competing multitude of one’s (life) drive activity (Green, 2001d, p. 141). In this way, object and drive are a co-arising pair that mutually determines each other and cannot be separated. As such, the mutual revelation of external objects and one’s drive activity cannot be tolerated in negative narcissism because they are a “sign that one is limited, unachieved and incomplete” (Green, 2001d, p. 149). Therefore, he shame about one’s dependence and weakness are central affects against which negative narcissism is constantly defending.

Secondly, negative narcissism rejects and represses the libidinal, object-seeking and object-creating activity of the life drive (Green, 2001d, p. 140-1). Desire is limited to absolutely necessary needs, such as eating the minimal amount of food necessary to survive another day. No pleasure-inducing desires nor desires involving idiosyncratic aspects of the personality with which one could be differentiated are allowed. As such, the work of the death drive is operative in repressing and unweaving the fabric of representing the content of the id, in all its desires and satisfaction-seeking content. Green mentions that this repression of the instinctual life can be aided by the intellect through philosophical justification; for example, many religious orders utilize their intellect to give “reasons for an ethic which opposes an instinctual life” (Green, 2001d, p. 142). In response to the shame experienced due to one’s deficiencies and dependence, privation becomes the ultimate value: “self-privation becomes the best bulwark against castration” (Green, 2001d, p. 149). As such, negative narcissism aims to reducing the self into no-thing, which achieves the abolition of the difference between themselves and the Other.

In this way, the ego ideal, by way of its unchanging nature, becomes the negative narcissist's refuge of security. Differently stated, the shame in negative narcissism is associated with dependence upon the ego ideal because the latter provides the vision and the goal of how the negative narcissist ought to be in order to alleviate oneself from the shame (Green, 2001d, p. 139). However, in the negative narcissist's failure to merge perfectly with the ego ideal, the latter comes to bear the representation of (m)Other, whispering unceasingly: "'You must only love me. No one but me deserves to be loved" (Green, 2001d, p. 150).

Green remarks that negative narcissism has tightly linked love and security, resulting in the ego ideal functioning as "the frame of the negative hallucination of the mother" (Green, 2001d, p. 150). *Essentially, the content of the ego ideal is the negative hallucination of the mother.*

If we recall, the negative hallucination of the mother is an aspect of autoeroticism, which has a healthy and pathological valence. In the instance of negative narcissism, it is the pathological valence that is operative. In negative narcissism, as is described in the essay *The Dead Mother* (2001f), the negative hallucination of the mother is a consequence of an early unbearable separation from the mother where "the return of the presence of the object is not enough to heal the disastrous effects of its too long absence. Non-existence has taken possession of the mind, erasing the representations of the object that preceded its absence. This is an irreversible step, at least until treatment" (Green 1997, p. 1082). Therefore, the absence of the mother—her non-presence—becomes more real than her presence. Consequently, the negative narcissist attempts to return to maternal union by way of conforming to their ego ideal. In this way, the ego ideal's notion of perfection is that of nothingness—being no-one. Therefore, by

way of the ego ideal, negative narcissism aims at the "abolition of the primary difference, the difference between One and the Other" (Green, 2001d, p.149).

The negative narcissism's connection and dependence on the ego ideal is the best attempt at an approximation of love and support: "the narcissistic wound leads to excessive dependence upon the maternal object providing security" (Green, 2001d, p. 145). This is evidenced in the transference upon the analyst, which emerges in negative narcissism as progress is made in analysis and the fierce dependence upon the ego ideal has loosens. As such, the dependence and desire for unconditional love from the ego ideal pivots to a dependence and desire for unconditional love from the analyst (Green, 2001d, p. 146). For example, such transference could manifest as a change from (a) cold, unemotional distance in analysis where the same monotone aspects of the patient's life are recounted every week and eye contact is largely avoided to (b) acting-out every time there is a seasonal break in weekly analytic sessions and metamorphosis to the manner in which the analyst thinks and relates to the patient.

Furthermore, as a result of the fact that the negative hallucination of the mother functions as the condition for the possibility of representation, the work of the death drive in negative narcissism is present in the individual's undeveloped ability to form stable and object-permanent representations. Differently stated, the psychological state of negative narcissism has not developed an adequate framing structure in the stage autoeroticism and, therefore, cannot adequately support the process of representation (Reed and Levine, 2018, p. 123). Not only does the negative narcissist flee from being something determinate, but they have not acquired the sufficient psychological apparatus necessary to coalesce self-representations and object-representations.

Finally, in addition to the ego ideal, there is another aspect of the superego which is operative in negative narcissism, namely, the critical punisher. Henceforth, I will refer to this aspect as the superego in the same manner as Green does in his text. Critically, negative narcissism can never (as long as the individual is alive) fully obliterate the demands and desires of the id, due to the tendency of the repressed to return. As such, the negative narcissist can never rid themselves of the aspects of themselves of which they are ashamed. The superego as critical punisher is the agent of the omnipotent father who knows no authority above his own and is therefore irrational; the superego is the agent which enforces shame. While negative narcissism aims to merge with the ego ideal as the negative hallucination of the mother, the superego is "not so easily fooled" by the psyche's ability to achieve this goal (Green, 2001d, p. 145). The superego knows that the individual is an impure human being with needs and desires of their own, and that the individual is defiled by their sinful libidinal ground. As such, the negative narcissist "lives in a state of constant tension between the ego ideal and the super-ego" (Green, 2001d, 147).

4.4 The Usefulness of the Death Drive in Green

Now that the metapsychology of Green's negative narcissism has been presented, a sufficient conceptual foundation will been laid, allowing for the subsequent exploration of the three theoretical possibilities affording by the concept of the death drive affords in understanding of narcissism.

First Possibility

First, the concept of the death drive is theoretically useful for its explanatory power regarding for narcissistic object-relations. Here, narcissistic object-relations are understood in two ways: (1) explaining the inward-directedness of the libido and (2) the theoretical possibility of a more extreme form of narcissistic object-relations.

Regarding the first possibility, we will recall Green's notion of negative hallucination and its healthy function in autoeroticism. To briefly summarize, as this notion as previous been unpacked in detail, in Green's account of the developmental trajectory of the individual and the psychological structures, the negative hallucination of the mother is the *sine qua non* condition for the possibility of the inward-directness of the libido because it provides the *blank slate* or *potential space* for (self-)representations to be projected and framed. In the negative hallucination, the primordial function of the work of the death drive is to "absent" the mother. This explains the seeming paradox the internalization the mother's absence, while at the same time, traces of her caretaking activities through fusion between the infant's and the mother's id in autoeroticism are maintained; the internalization the mother's absence occurs, metaphorically put, "on top of" the maternal fusion. The reader will recall the analogy to projecting a film: there is a blank, white screen upon which light is cast in changing shapes and colors. As such, the negative hallucination of the mother is the necessary structure for the infant to begin to form representations, both of themselves (which makes possible narcissistic cathexis) and of external objects.

In this way, Green argues that, in all infants, the negative hallucination of the mother is a necessary facet of autoeroticism which renders possible the development of the ego by way of self-representation. As a psychological structure, the negative hallucination of the mother

supports the structure of the ego, and marks the achievement of a sense of selfhood that is separate from the primary caregiver. Therefore, the death drive is useful for explaining the possibility of the inward-directedness of the libido; the inward-directedness of the libido in primary narcissism arises as a result of the separation from the mother by virtue of the work of the death drive in the negative hallucination of the mother.

Secondly, the theoretical possibility of a more extreme form of narcissistic object-relations, one in which neither the world nor the ego is libidinally cathected, is made possible by way of the concept of the death drive. Negative narcissism as a pathological state in an adult individual, as previously described, is an example of this. That is, an individual who is completely withdrawn from the world and is completely void of any inner life, per say. In this way, Green's conceptualization of the death drive as unbinding, disinvestment, and de-cathexis is operative in the working to undo and prohibit the binding qualities of the life drive. This is different than Freud's original conception of secondary narcissism, which utilized an economic, zero-sum notion of the libido. The libido has not simply been redirected away from the outward orientation toward the world to an inward orientation toward the self. The activity of the life drive itself has been prohibited and, most saliently, *undone*. This necessary un-doing generates the theoretical possibility of a complete lack of libidinal investments altogether—or as close to this ideal that an individual can obtain. Green poetically recounts this deep-rooted disinvestment in negative narcissism as: "I love no one. I love only myself. I love myself. I do not love. I do not. I. O. The progression is the same for hate: I hate no one. I hate only myself. I hate myself. I do not hate. I do not. I. O" (Green, 2001d, p. 157).

Second Possibility

The second theoretical possibility the death drive affords Green is that of the self foundationally turning against itself and repressing libidinal cathexis. This occurs differently than it did in Rosenfeld's theory of destructive narcissism. Despite Green's notion of "negative identification," from a 1964 paper on obsessional neurosis in which the identification with a parental figure takes up only the object's prohibiting and persecutory aspect (Reed and Levine, 68), his theory of negative narcissism does not expand upon the persecutory aspect of the death drive in this pathology. Rather, his metapsychology proposes that the self foundationally turns against itself through the work of the negative, which occurs by virtue of the work of the death drive in the content of (1) the ego ideal and (2) the inherent prohibiting activity of the death drive.

As described earlier in this chapter, Green argues that the ego ideal in negative narcissism is the negative hallucination of the mother. In this way, the death drive acts as the notion of perfection for which negative narcissism ultimately strives. Therefore, the negative hallucination of the mother conditions the properties delineating what does not cohere with the image of the ego ideal, and thus what ought to be prohibited and repressed. By this activity of the death drive in the metapsychology of negative narcissism, the object-seeking and object-creating essential properties of the life drive are thus repressed. If there were no notion of the negative as part of the death drive according to Green, the content of the ego ideal would be limited to the positive properties of the life drive, because they were operative in an alternate conception of autoeroticism and its framing structure. As such, this would not be sufficient to account for the psychological culture of void, emptiness, destructive withdrawal, and permanent self-depreciation found in negative narcissism.

Alternatively, the ego ideal could have acquired the content of negation by way of the infant's experience of the mother's absence. In this way, the infant could have cathected with the absence of the mother, which would provide an idea of the negative without the necessary factor of the death drive. This is even part of the conditions Green describes as generating the "Dead Mother" form of negative narcissism. *Without the concept of the death drive, this is insufficient to account for negative narcissism because this contention does not explain the extreme narcissistic object-cathexis present in negative narcissism*; that is, the aspects of the psyche at war with each other occurring in individuals who are extremely decathected from the world and themselves. As such, the concept of the death drive allows for the inner war to occur in an entirely internal and self-contained psychic expression. Counterfactually, if the absence of the mother is invested and becomes the content of the ego ideal—in reference to Winnicott's notion of the "negative side of relationships" (1971) wherein the lack or absence of the object is more invested than the object's presence—then the complete turn away from the world could not accounted for. For example, an individual could possibility be caught in a repetitive cycle of seeking out romantic relationships in which partners are always emotionally distant, cold, and absent.

Furthermore, the prohibition present in negative narcissism is the other manner in which the concept of the death drive affords the theoretical possibility of the self foundationally turning against itself. The brute fact that repression and negative hallucination are aspects of negative narcissism—that not all content (if any) is allowed to be represented to the ego—is evidence in support to the usefulness of the concept of the death drive. As in the clinical example of negative narcissism of Jennifer recounted above, she never fantasied and her sole relationship was with Green himself as her analyst. For psychoanalysis, this psychological state of affairs is unusual,

and it is not at all normal for one to never fantasize or seek relationships. Object seeking and relating is natural human psychological activity, as exemplified in the infant seeking the mother's breast. Rejection, repression, and general prohibition of object-seeking aspects of one's own id is an occurrence of an internal war within those individuals, who are fundamentally divided against themselves, with one aspect seeking relationships with objects and the other seeking the opposite.

Furthermore, Green mentions the way in which the critical punisher aspect of the superego is involved in the repression and prohibition of the object-seeking life drive. In this way, it is not just the work of the death drive in the negative hallucination of the mother which is present. Rather, the superego is a structure of the psyche that developmentally arises, and thus, is partially influenced by the infant's childhood environment. Therefore, it is possible that the prohibiting and negating aspects of the superego could have an aspect of the infant's environment as the *prima materia* for identification and introjection. However, such contention is not a satisfactory possibility because, in the majority of cases of negative narcissism, the infant's environment was not as severe as the self-persecutory attacks of the superego in negative narcissism. Therefore, the activity of the death drive in the agency of the superego is necessary.

While I cannot have knowledge of all the cases of negative narcissism in order to evaluate this claim, all of the cases I have read so far, in both primary and secondary literature, support this conclusion, as does the previously mentioned case of Jennifer. Green discusses how Jennifer's mother was unloving and always sadistically critical of her and how her father was weak and totally dominated by his wife (Green, 2002, p. 644). In the case of Jennifer, it is undeniable that the environmental origins of the critical punisher instilled an overbearing sense of shame in her mere existence. However, the sadistically critical aspect of her mother was not as

extreme in degree as the critical aspect of her superego. The environment of Jennifer's childhood cannot account for the self-persecution and utter void present in Jennifer, for she has completely collapsed under her psychological situation. Therefore, there must necessarily be an aspect of the psyche that is more destructive in degree to account for the phenomena of her negative narcissism. Such clinical phenomenon corresponds to situations where the concept of the death drive is theoretically useful and affords us a theoretical explanation for the destructive aspects encountered in analysis.

Third Possibility

The third theoretical possibility the death drive affords is a necessary condition for theorizing the un-represented, which is central to negative narcissism. As described in more detail in the third chapter, Freud's structural model of the psyche introduced in 1923 with the essay entitled *The Ego and the Id*, implies that the psyche has only the *potential* for mental representation. This proposition was a shift and constituted a turning away from Freud's topographical model of the psyche, which asserted that the content of the instinctual world consisted of *mere* representations. The introduction of the structural model was a turn toward the theorization of instinctual drive impulses, which Freud termed the id. As Green reminds us, there is "an absence of any reference to representation" in the id, which consists of "contradictory tensions seeking release" (Green, 2005, p. 101). These drive tensions act as their own triggering mechanisms and are thus an aspect of the self which could (or could not) be perceived; for example, a fantasy about a desire, which is one psychic mechanism wherein the content of the unconscious is being represented. (Whether or not the individual perceives the arising fantasy varies from case to case.)

To the contrary, the fact that Jennifer never had any fantasies is an example of many times where the desiring contents of the id are *not* represented. The difference between the represented and the un-represented—between the presence and absence of a subjective object—is the difference between the work of the life drive and the work of the death drive in the communication and causation between the different components of the psyche. As we will recall, the life drive for Green is the objectalising function of the psyche; the life drive both functions (1) to create a relation with an object or an intrapsychic aspect of the psyche such as the ego and (2) to transform structures or things into objects, which can receive drive investments, to which the ego can relate. The communicative psychic activity of representation is part of the work of the life drive. Consequently, the work of the death drive as the disobjectalising function of the psyche is un-representation. This phenomenon is exemplified in psychic mechanisms such as repression and negative hallucination.

Therefore, the theoretical possibility of the un-represented in the negative hallucination of the mother is made possible by the concept of the death drive. This possibility is useful for understanding both developmental (primary) narcissism and pathological (secondary) narcissism, as it is exemplified in the work of the healthy valance of the negative hallucination of the mother as the necessary condition for the generation of the representational activity of the life drive. This is the case because the infant must move beyond a fusion with the mother, into autoeroticism, in order for there to be a negative space upon which representations can arise. In autoeroticism, the negative hallucination creates a "blank screen"—a potential space—upon which the representational "film" and figurative flow can be "projected and framed" (Reed and Levine, 2018, p. 70).

4.5 Complementary Theories

In the final analysis, André Green's and Herbert Rosenfeld's theories of pathological narcissism and their conceptions of the death drive are inversely complementary, both in their strengths and weaknesses.

Rosenfeld's theory of destructive narcissism, which utilizes Freud's original conception of the death drive, falls short in its ability to clarify and explain the kind of narcissistic cathexis present in destructive narcissism as opposed to libidinal narcissism. Stated differently, Rosenfeld's theory of destructive narcissism seems to imply that the destructive narcissist undergoes a stronger pull, than the libidinal narcissist, away from the world—a more extreme form of inward-directedness of the libido. I argue that this is, in fact, the case and that it is a more extreme form of narcissistic cathexis.

If we recall, the destructive narcissist omnipotently idealizes and identifies with the destructive aspects of the self, which is to say the properties of their death drive. The resulting outward-facing relationship with objects by way of envy is characterized by attempts to destroy good objects. This destructive relationship with outer objects aims at reducing the objects to a deadly nothingness, to strip them of their (separate) existence because separateness and the goodness of the object reminds the destructive narcissist of their inadequate and weak self. This mode of relating (or non-relating) differs from the relationship established by the libidinal narcissism with outer objects, who primarily identifies with and merges with good objects. Indeed, a murderous and destructive relationship with outer objects does not reconcile well with the notion of persistent relationships to outer objects, as can be the case with libidinal narcissism when the objects comply with mirroring or supporting the libidinal narcissist's self-image.

Most importantly, in Rosenfeld's theory of destructive narcissism, the destructive narcissist attacks and attempts to destroy their own object-seeking libidinal self. Therefore, the stronger the destructive narcissism, the less libidinal object-cathexis is available and manifested within the individual. This conclusion is supported by Rosenfeld's characterization of the destructive narcissist's "…apparent indifference of the narcissistic individual towards external objects and the world" (Rosenfeld, 1971, p. 174).

Moreover, Rosenfeld's conception of the death drive does not provide an adequate explanation for the psychic mechanisms which are operative in the death drive in order to explain the manner in which the extreme narcissistic-cathexis found in destructive narcissism is achieved. This is only accounted for through a recourse to Freud's notion that the aim of the death drive is to maximize the "zero" state of Nirvana and to minimize the tension between competing desires and drives present in the id.

Where Rosenfeld's theory falls short, Green's theory finds its strength. Green's explanatory model of negative narcissism, including his concept of the death drive, provides an extremely intricate and detailed account of the psychic mechanisms by which the extreme inward-directedness of the libido becomes possible; that is to say that the primary mode by which Green conceptualizes the death drive is as unbinding, decathexis, unweaving representational fabrics and libidinal objects, and the work of the negative. Such conception of the death drive explicitly provides a multitude of ways by which the death drive is operative in patients whose dominant psychic characteristics are found to be centered around "self-disappearance and disinvolvement" (Green, 2002, p. 646).

Interestingly, Green's and Rosenfeld's conceptions of the death drive are inversely complementary because where Green's conceptualization falls short to explain negative

narcissism, Rosenfeld's model has its strength in explaining destructive narcissism. As introduced by Freud in his 1915 explication of melancholia, a central facet of depression is repressed anger. Surprisingly, Green does not provide an account of hatred, anger, or aggression in his concept of the death drive or in his theory of negative narcissism. As such, when providing an account of negative narcissism, Green rarely mentions depression. The primary instances in which Green considers depression are presented in his essay entitled *Moral Narcissism*, in which depression is described as the psychological state which arises when negative narcissism fails (Green, 2001d, p. 141), and when Freud's account of melancholia is alluded to by Green noting that "…any deception inflicted upon the ego ideal by the object being upon depression" (Green, 2001d, p. 147).

Importantly, the lack of theoretical account of both hatred and aggression in Green's concept of the death drive and theory of negative narcissism does not mean that the patient which Green is purporting to describe lacks these affects. This is exemplified in Green's description of the case of Jennifer, where he recounts that her "hatred of her mother was very intense and appeared to be permanent. [Jennifer] felt she had been persecuted by her mother—especially in regard to her sexuality, and without any reason for this; she had not even been sexually active" (Green, 2002, p. 644). According to Green's clinical experience, hatred in cases of negative narcissism were encountered—however frequently or infrequently, I cannot say.

Rosenfeld's model finds his strength in Green's theoretical weakness, for his concept of the death drive espouses the primary presence and activity of destructive aggression. What is more, through the placement of envy in his account of destructive narcissism, relational hatred and anger are both centrally featured and considered by Rosenfeld.

Closing Remarks

This thesis has attempted to examine the relationship between narcissism and the death drive by way of examining the usefulness of the latter for understanding the former. Looking back, there are two insights that bear themselves as note-worthy.

Firstly, there is a gap in my historical and theoretical engagement with post-Freudian psychoanalytic theorists who have significantly integrated and reformulated Freud's concept of the death drive. This theorist and clinician is Melanie Klein. While many psychoanalysts were wary of Freud's introduction of the death drive, Klein was the main theorist to support the concept. She held that the conflict the life drive and the death drive was engine of development and the foundation of mental functioning. Affectively, she described the dialectical relationship of these opposing drives as: love and hate. If I were to write this thesis again, I'd integrate Klein's insights and development toward the end of thinking through the relationship between the death drive and narcissism. For example, it would be fruitful to parse the differences and subsequent strengths of (a) Green's notion of the ego ideal as the negative hallucination of the mother, which implied that aiming for a "zero" state is aiming for fusion with the mother as she was known to the infant in her absence, and (b) Klein's concepts of aggression towards the mother—of the mother as the bad object.

Secondly, beginning with the concept of narcissism, the inward-directedness of the libido is a phenomenon that overturned Freud's metapsychological understanding of the psyche; it started Freud on a trajectory that came to its completion with the introduction of the concept of the death drive. This is the case because Freud had arrived as a concept which was superior in its ability to explain the inward-directedness of the libido. This is seen in the fact that the juncture at

which Freud dropped the notion of narcissism was when he introduced the concept of the death drive. The second dual drive theory had significant advantages that granted Freud theoretical freedom. As I have attempted to illustrate, the inward-directedness of the libido is best explained by a model of the psyche that is "half in love with easeful Death."

References

Akhtar, S., & O'Neil, M. K. (2011). *On Freud's "Beyond the Pleasure Principle"*. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.

Bion, W. (1959). Attacks on Linking. *International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 40*: 308-315.

Bion, W. (1962). *Learning From Experience*. London: Tavistock.

Borg, Lydia K. (2013). "Holding, Attaching and Relating: a Theoretical Perspective on Good Enough Therapy Through Analysis of Winnicott's Good Enough Mother, using Bowlby's Attachment Theory and Relational Theory," Master's Thesis, Smith College, Northampton, MA. https://scholarworks.smith.edu/theses/588

Chervet, B. (2013). Green 1927-2012: An Artisan of the Future. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 94*: 157-166.

Cooper, S. H. (1998). Changing Notions of Defense Within Psychoanalytic Theory. *Journal of Personality*, *66*(6), 947–964. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6494.00038

Erwin, E. (2016). *The Freud Encyclopedia: Theory, Therapy and Culture*. Routledge.

Fabozzi, Paolo. (2018). Winnicott's Subjective Object: Merging Experiences as Preconditions of Being, *The Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, 87:1, 73-99, DOI:10.1080/00332828.2018.1424437

Fink, B. (1995). *The Lacanian Subject*. New York: Princeton University Press.

Flynn, Denis & Skogstad, Helga (2006) Facing Towards or Turning Away from Destructive Narcissism. *Journal of Child Psychotherapy, 32*:1, 35-48,

DOI: 10.1080/00754170600563604

Freud, S. (1895d) (with Breuer, J.). *Studies on Hysteria.* S.E., 2.

Freud, S. (1900). *The Interpretation of Dreams*. S.E., V.

Freud, S. (1905). *Three Essays on The Theory of Sexuality*. S.E., VII.

Freud, S. (1914). *On Narcissism: An Introduction*. S.E., XIV.

Freud, S. (1915e). *The Unconscious.* S.E., 14: 161.

Freud, S. (1917a). *Instincts and Their Vicissitudes*. S.E., XIV.

Freud, S. (1917b). *A Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams.* S.E., 14: 217–235.

Freud, S. (1917c). *Mourning and Melancholia*. S.E., XVII.

Freud, S. (1920g). *Beyond the Pleasure Principle.* S.E. 18.

Freud, S. (1921b). *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego.* S.E., XVIII.

Freud, S. (1923). *The Ego and the Id*. S.E., XIX.

Freud, S. (1938). *Findings, Ideas, Problems*. S. E., 23.

Freud, S. (1940a [1938]). *An Outline of Psycho-Analysis.* S.E., 23: 141–207.

Fonagy, P., Sandler, J., & Person, E. S. (Eds.). (2019). *Freud's "On Narcissism: An Introduction"*. Routledge.

Green, A. (1980). Passions and Their Vicissitudes. (K. Aubertin, Trans.). In *On private Madness.* Madison, CT: International Universities Press.

Green, A. (1997). The Intuition of the Negative in Playing and Reality. *Int J Psychoanal*. 1997 Dec;78 (Pt 6):1071-84. PMID: 9513010.

Green, A. (2001a). One, Other, Neuter: Narcissistic Values of Sameness (Trans. A. Weller). In

Life Narcissism, Death Narcissism (pp. 3-47). London: Free Associations Press (originally published in 1976).

Green, A. (2001b). Primary Narcissism: Structure or State? (Trans. A. Weller). In *Life Narcissism, Death Narcissism* (pp. 48-90). London: Free Associations Press (originally published in 1967).

Green, A. (2001c). Anxiety and Narcissism (Trans. A. Weller). In *Life Narcissism, Death Narcissism* (pp.91-130). London: Free Associations Press (originally published in 1979).

Green, A. (2001d). Moral Narcissism (Trans. A. Weller). In *Life Narcissism, Death Narcissism* (pp. 131-157). London: Free Associations Press (originally published in 1967).

Green, A. (2001f). The Dead Mother (Trans. A. Weller). In *Life Narcissism, Death Narcissism* (pp. 170-200). London: Free Associations Press (originally published in 1967).

Green, A. (2002) A Dual Conception of Narcissism: Positive and Negative Organizations. *The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 71:4*, 631-649. DOI: 10.1002/j.2167-4086.2002.tb00020.x

Green, A. (2002) *Psychoanalysis: A Paradigm for Clinical Thinking* (A. Weller, Trans.). London: Free Associations Press.

Green, A. (2005). *Key Ideas for a Contemporary Psychoanalysis* (A. Weller, Trans.). New York, NY: Routledge.

Greenberg, Jay R. and Mitchell, Stephen A. *Object Relations in Psychoanalytic Theory*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983.

Guntrip, Harry. (1961). *Personality Structure and Human Interaction*. New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

Hartmann, H. (1950) Comments on the Psychoanalytic Theory of the Ego, *Psychoanalytic Study of the Child*, V, 84-85.

Hinshelwood, R. D. (1991). *A Dictionary of Kleinian Thought* (2nd ed.). New Jersey: Jason Aronson.

Hunter, V. (1990). Interview with André Green. *Psychoanalytic Review, 77*: 157- 173.

Keats, J. (n.d.). *Ode to a Nightingale by John Keats*. Poetry Foundation. Retrieved March 25, 2022, from https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/44479/ode-to-a-nightingale

Klein, M. (1946). Notes On Some Schizoid Mechanisms. In *Envy and Gratitude and Other Works* 1946-1963 (pp. 1-24). New York: The Free Press

Klein, M. (1957). Envy and Gratitude. In *Envy and Gratitude and Other Works* 1946-1963 (pp. 176-235). New York: The Free Press.

Kohon, G. (Ed.). (1999). *The Dead Mother: The Work of André Green.* New York: Routledge.

Kolchin-Miller, Maia. (2105). "Conceptualization and Treatment of Psychoanalytic Envy Through Kleinian/Bionian Lens". Master's Thesis, Smith College, Northampton, MA. https://scholarworks.smith.edu/theses/678

Koretz, J. P. (1986). *Passivity And Destructiveness: The Re-Integration Of Aggression Into Object Relations Theory* (dissertation).

Lacan, J. (2006). *Ecrits: The First Complete Edition in English* (B. Fink, Trans.). New York: Norton.

Laplanche, J., & Pontalis, J.-B. (1988). *The Language of Psycho-Analysis*. Karnac Books and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis.

Mitchell, J. (1986). Introduction. *The Selected Melanie Klein* (pp. 9-32). New York: The Free Press.

Mitchell, S. A., & Black, M. J. (2016). *Freud and beyond: A History of Modern Psychoanalytic Thought*. Basic Books, a member of the Perseus Books Group.

Ogden, T. H. (1984). Instinct, Phantasy, and Psychological Deep Structure: A Reinterpretation of Aspects of the Work of Melanie Klein. *Contemporary Psychoanalysis*, 20, 500-525.

Reed, G. S., & Levine, H. B. (2018). *André Green Revisited: Representation and the Work of the Negative*. New York: Routledge.

Rosenfeld, H. (1964) On the Psychopathology of Narcissism: A Clinical Approach. *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* 45:332-337

Rosenfeld, H. (1971). A clinical approach to the psychoanalytic theory of the life and death instincts: An investigation into the aggressive aspects of narcissism. *The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 52*(2), 169–178.

Rosenfeld, H. A. (1987). *Impasse and Interpretation*. Tavistock/Routledge.

Scuderi, Louis (2015). *The Work of André Green: An Introduction*. Master's Thesis, Smith College, Northampton, MA.

Steiner, J., & Rosenfeld, H. A. (2008). *Rosenfeld in Retrospect: Essays on His Clinical Influence*. New York: Routledge.

Winnicott, D. W. (1945). Primitive Emotional Development. In *Collected Papers,* pp. 145-156.

Winnicott, D.W. (1960). The Theory of the Parent-Infant Relationship. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis. 41*, 585-595.

Winnicott, D.W. (1964) *The Child, the Family, and the Outside World*. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books.

Winnicott, D.W. (1971). *Playing and Reality.* New York: Routledge.

Winnicott, D.W. (1986). Home is Where We Start From: Essays by a Psychoanalyst. In C. Winnicott, R. Shepherd, & M. Davis (Eds.) *Home is Where We Start From: Essays by a psychoanalyst*. NY & London: W.W. Norton and Company.

Winnicott, D.W. (2002). *Winnicott on the Child*. Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books Group.