

The Pervasiveness of Party Identity: How do
Voters Form Opinions on the Electoral College?

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Contents

1	Acknowledgments	4
2	Abstract	5
3	Introduction	6
4	Understanding Opinion Formation	9
4.1	Partisanship	12
4.2	Political Sophistication	16
4.3	Political Knowledge	21
5	Background: Electoral College Reform	23
5.1	Brief History and Working Arguments	23
5.2	Low Salience of the Electoral College Issue	27
5.3	Hypotheses	30
6	Methodology	32
6.1	Methodological Approach	32
6.2	Survey Design and Question Wording	35
6.3	Treatment Design	38
7	Results and Data Analysis	42
7.1	Preliminary Results	42
7.2	Hypotheses and Theory-Based Results	46
7.2.1	Partisanship	47
7.2.2	Political Sophistication	59
7.2.3	Political Knowledge	71

8	Conclusion	73
8.1	Discussions	73
8.2	Areas of Bias and Limitations	78
8.3	Future Areas of Research	80
9	Appendix	83
9.1	Full Survey Questionnaire	83
9.2	Data Wrangling Procedures	96
9.3	Tables	97
10	References	116

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2 Abstract

We know that partisanship influences American voters' political behavior. This thesis explores how partisanship ties persist on less salient policy issues, specifically Electoral College reform and the proposition of a national popular vote. Recent public polls show the topic is divided on party lines, so we know that voters are responding to party cues, but the issue is not salient because it has only emerged in public attention through compacts and petitions rather than formal, proposed bills and campaign platforms. I hypothesize that partisans with low levels of political sophistication—conceptualized as a combination of media usage and political interest—and political knowledge will provide EC opinions dependent on their party cue. Additionally, I expect this effect to be magnified on the issue of the Electoral College because of its low salience and unfamiliarity to voters. I test these hypotheses through an experimental survey distributed to over 1,000 participants, measuring these factors of interest and their effects on likelihood of opinion stances on the Electoral College. Ultimately, I found that partisanship plays a strong role in voters' opinion formation on this less salient issue. For Democrats specifically, stronger partisans are more receptive to the cue, and Democrats with low levels of political sophistication are the only group with significant cue-taking patterns. This lends support to the fact that partisanship remains a relevant factor, but surprisingly, there may be different cue behaviors between groups of partisans. Finally, I found that certain demographic factors are significant and also varying by party. Overall, my research contributes to public opinion studies on policy issues that are not widely politicized. On the issue of Electoral College reform, while I expected larger differences from political sophistication and knowledge, we may be hesitant that voters can uniformly and easily make judgments without their partisanship roots.

3 Introduction

There exists a vast collection of research on public opinion in political science. Past studies on formation of public opinion have thoroughly researched factors of the individual voter such as political sophistication and knowledge, and additionally, the likelihood of cue-taking on certain policy topics. However, this research primarily focuses on well-known and politically relevant issues. Examined in the context of an issue of relatively lower salience, we may find that varying levels in political sophistication and knowledge have different effects on opinion-formation processes and levels of cue-taking. The Electoral College is a fitting example, in which we could expect people's cue-taking behavior to be more prominent, compared to more salient issues.

American voters elect the President and Vice President through an indirect popular election process called the Electoral College. The system and its rules are outlined in Article II, Section 1, clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution, which specifies that voters select electors to represent their vote in the general presidential election. Since it was first established in 1804, the electoral college system has worked fairly well; however, in five instances, the Electoral College winner did not receive a plurality of the popular vote. These electoral college "misfires" occur because the system only requires a majority of electoral votes, and not necessarily popular votes, to win the election [Neale, 2009]. This feature of the U.S. Constitution is a common subject of criticism and controversy that is frequently raised in the conversations of democracy, fair elections, and normative politics.

The most recent instance of a candidate winning the presidential election despite receiving fewer popular votes was in 2016. While Gallup poll results show consistent, nationwide majority support for reform from 2000 to 2015

(roughly around 60 percent), a November 2016 survey directly proceeding the election resulted in a figure of less than half (49 percent)[Gallup, 2016]. For the first time in the 49 years Gallup had administered this survey, less than half of Americans want to amend the Constitution and reform the Electoral College. This shift in public opinion can be attributed to the controversial election and collective opinion-changing within the Republican party; after Donald J. Trump won the presidential election, more Republicans changed their minds to support the electoral college system, enough to flip the nationwide opinion. Evidently, as visualized in the graph below, we can link fluctuations in partisan attitudes to major events. In other words, the more salient and relevant an issue is, people’s opinion-formation processes change and respond as well.




Figure 1: Republican Drop in Support for Reform Following 2016 Presidential Election

Moreover, the issue of Electoral College reform seems to be divided on partisan lines. Data from surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center supports this; for every year from 2000 to 2020, a majority of Democrats consistently support abolishing the Electoral College system, while a majority of Republicans remain in favor of the current system [Jones, 2021]. In 2019, Magellan Strategies conducted a survey sampling from likely general election voters in Colorado. Among the 500 respondents, support for a National Popular Vote law “is strongest among Democratic and younger voters, while opposition is strongest among Republican and older voters.” They also found that politically unaffiliated voters were equally divided on the issue [Magellan, 2019].

While these partisan divisions are historically evident, I believe that this may not be an entirely partisan issue. In fact, the most recent breakdown of support for the Electoral College between 2020 and 2021 show that the majority in each party is weakening. The same survey by Pew Research Center revealed an interesting outcome when administered in 2021. For Democrats, 71 percent of the party support reform, a 13 percent drop from the previous year. For Republicans, 37 percent of the party support reform, a four percent increase from the previous year. This statistic is contrary to the outcome of the 2016 election, where a distinct majority of Republicans supported the Electoral College system and divisions on party lines were clearly evident. It seems that, since the 2016 election, partisan biases may be less prominent. [Daniller, 2021].

I aim to explore how other factors of opinion formation, aside from partisanship, drive voters’ cue-taking in their attitude formation processes; specifically, how much do voters rely on party cues when presented with a newly salient policy issue? How does this differ with varying levels of political knowledge and sophistication? Given a partisan cue from partisan elites, how will voters’

opinions on the Electoral College change compared to being given no cue?

The results of my research will help expand on the conversation surrounding electoral reform as well as help understand citizens' perspectives and opinion formation processes. To critically understand public opinion on the issue of Electoral College reform is especially important in the ongoing discussion of a possible constitutional amendment. Using qualitative data in my survey, I hope to shed light on factors that differentiate the Electoral College from most other policy topics. Additionally, already knowing that partisanship plays an important role in public opinion, I'm curious to examine its effects on less salient, under-represented policy issues through the lens of Electoral College reform.

4 Understanding Opinion Formation

How does the average American voter actually form opinions? From what channels of information do they draw from to create a well-grounded opinion on policy issues? One of the first theories on voter opinion formation was developed in the 1920s. During this inter-war period, researchers collectively agreed that “the influence of political messages was substantial and direct” [Franz and Ridout, 2007]. This general consensus was premised on four concepts, as summarized by Curran et al. [1982]. First, novel technological innovation allowed for the creation of “mass audiences” on an unprecedented scale. Technologies like the rotary press, film, and radio essentially built the infrastructure to disseminate information both rapidly and directly in a novel way. Secondly, this audience was believed to exist in a society that was “volatile, unstable, rootless, alienated and inherently susceptible to manipulation” due to urbanization and industrialization. These first two concepts join to construct

the third claim, that the urbanized, mass audience is “an easy prey to mass communication.” Finally, scholars believed that mass media messaging during World War I served to validate this theory of “brainwashing.” This “hypodermic” model was a relatively straightforward and simple concept. However, in following decades, researchers would take on a slightly different view on the media’s role in mass communication.

In contrast to the one-step, hypodermic model of mass communication, which views the media as an all-powerful and direct influence on a highly susceptible mass audience [Bineham, 1988], Katz and Lazarsfeld [1955] theorize that messages in the media travel into the population through an intermediary, or a small group of elites. Coined the two-step flow model, this updated theory put less emphasis on the media and instead, focuses more on interpersonal relations and social networks as channels of communication.

Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet first discovered this concept of interconnected networks within society through their research in voters’ decision-making processes during the 1940 U.S. presidential election. Their book, “The People’s Choice” [1968], describes their study findings. Lazarsfeld et al. expected the evidence to show a direct influence of media messages on voting behavior, supporting the pre-existing hypodermic model. However, they were surprised to find that personal contacts were mentioned more frequently than exposure to mass media as sources of influence on voting behavior.

Several studies were conducted in an attempt to design novel research on interpersonal influence and either confirm or deny Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet’s theory. The following research helped clarify the criteria and purpose of so-called “opinion leaders” in the two-step flow model. First, the Rove study asked respondents to explicitly name the people to whom they turned for information and advice regarding a variety of matters, and names that

were mentioned four or more times were considered opinion leaders. The De-catur study in 1945 investigated these interactions through interviews, asking questions in order to find out if influencers were of a higher social class, older, or had greater access to media compared to their followers. Interestingly, the opinion leaders they spoke to often reported that their own decisions were influenced by other people. Additionally, an opinion leader is “influential at certain times with regard to certain substantive areas by virtue of the fact that he is ‘empowered’ to be so by other members of his group” [Katz, 1957]. In any given group, certain people are chosen as opinion leaders based on relevant demographic factors and the social values of the group (for instance, the backdrop of racial and gender structures in the U.S. contextualizes how white men came to rise to great influence and power). In other words, an opinion leader is someone whose power “derives from their informal status as individuals who are highly informed, respected, or simply ‘connected’” [Watts and Dodds, 2007, p. 442].

The two-step flow model of communication was revolutionary in that the idea of “influentials” came to occupy a central place in the research world [Watts and Dodds, 2007, p. 441]. By the late 1960s, the theory had been hailed as one of most important formulations in the behavioral sciences [Arndt, 1967], and in 1999, the two-step model was cited as “a guiding theme for diffusion and marketing research” [Burt, 1999]. An example of the two-step flow theory at work is Al Gore’s The Climate Project and his most recent We campaign [Nisbet and Kotcher, 2009]. Early 21st century survey trends showed that the American public was largely disengaged from the topic of climate change [Nisbet and Myers, 2009]. Knowing this disconnect, Al Gore recruited digital opinion leaders to disseminate information, boosting cognitive engagement on the issue, and ultimately promoting behavior that reduces

greenhouse gas emissions. In addition to the 10 million activists recruited, the We campaign consists of a variety of features designed to enhance the impact of the opinion leaders' messages, including highlighting spokespeople and celebrities, directing people to We's website, and utilizing Facebook as a social networking component [Nisbet and Kotcher, 2009]. The two-step flow model of communication maintains credibility today and continues to serve as the blueprint for many research study designs.

I use Katz and Lazarsfeld's model and definition of "opinion leaders" to create my survey treatment. Under the assumption that voters' opinions are influenced by partisan elites, the trusted group of individuals when it comes to policy issues, I implement an in-group, partisan cue to test levels of partisanship bias in Democrats and Republicans. I compare respondents' level of responsiveness against other factors of interest through observational survey questions, which I will list and explain in the following subsections.

4.1 Partisanship

The driving assumption behind my experimental design is that partisanship plays an important role in opinion formation. I believe that for all voters, regardless of differences in education level or political involvement, something as simple as a party label or party endorsement can act as a useful heuristic. In their book, *The American Voter*, Campbell et al. describe the party as "a supplier of cues by which the individual may evaluate the elements of politics" [Campbell et al., 1980, p. 128]. One of their most important arguments is that the average American voter is uninformed and thinks about politics in largely nonideological ways. In fact, voters make political decisions on the basis of partisan identification. First published in 1960, this book and its conclusions

have arguably set the foundation for large-scale electoral research. In another study evaluating voters' political behavior, researchers found that, even in new multiparty systems, voters use partisan cues to evaluate candidates in elections [Conroy-Krutz et al., 2016]. Despite the fact that Ugandans had had less time to develop psychological attachments to parties, the use of party labels on the ballot affected their assessments of candidates' abilities, preferences, and viability. The presence of a subtle partisan identifier can unconsciously implicate feelings, either positive and negative, that the voter assigns to a candidate. As a result, their political decision-making process is affected.

Partisanship needs to be defined in the context of U.S. politics specifically. For my research, understanding partisanship's roots in America sets the foundation for analyzing its role in opinion formation research today. Fundamentally, partisanship as an identity appears differently in the U.S. due to the two-party system. Campbell and Valen [1961, p. 524] explain that "in the American situation, the major cohesive force which gives the party system stability and continuity is the psychological attachment of the electorate to the parties." Instead of representing strong ideologies expressing special class interests, the parties tend to offer broad party virtues and general ineptitude of the opposition. This creates a public image of politics as a competition between two options, rather than a free choice among various policies. This type of framing encourages generational, strong party ties and loyalties. Muirhead [2013] states: "to accomplish something in politics, one has to win in the face of the opposition...Party loyalty is about remembrance." It works in both directions; the historical strength of these party attachments and the general weakness of the electorate work in conjunction to maintain the two-party system.

My research design is based on this "psychological attachment" voters feel

towards their political parties. Along with the idea that partisanship is largely nonideological, partisanship for the average U.S. voter has become deeply connected to social identity [Rosenblum, 2010]. In her book, *Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became Our Identity*, Mason [2018] attributes the rise of political and ideology polarization to changes in “social sorting.” Compared to the past, political parties are much more homogeneous; the Republican party is largely white, rural, Christian, and conservative while the Democratic party contains more non-Christians, non-whites, and urban liberals. Additionally, she found that these partisan loyalties made it difficult to accurately judge the opponent and view politics reasonably and objectively. Mason cites research from many psychologists to support her argument relating political polarization to social identities. Humans are naturally inclined to form an in-group and out-group, which inevitably results in conflict because simply being part of a group causes ingroup favoritism. Further, in an article by Harvard doctoral student Jacob R. Brown and Professor Ryan D. Enos, they found that most Democrats and Republican voters live in partisan bubbles, with “little daily exposure to those who belong to the other party.” Overall, the study concluded that most Democrats and Republicans live in levels of partisan segregation that exceed what scholars of racial segregation even consider highly segregated [Brown and Enos, 2021].

We can start to think of partisanship in the U.S. as membership in a social group. “Partisan self-conceptions much more closely resemble ethnic or religious self-conceptions than they do evaluations of political leaders or opinions about party platforms.” This sense of membership is so deeply ingrained that, like other identity groups, partisanship entails “loyalty to particular people, the sense of being at home with these people, the richness of a received tradition, and the longing for generational community” [Rosenblum, 2010, p. 341-

347]. Ultimately, we're observing a modern-day version of partisanship that is less ideological and more identity-based. The aforementioned characteristics of partisanship in the U.S.—the sentiment of competition and strong ties to identity—point to the durability of party identification and party loyalty. If we were to incorporate this assumption in our understanding of opinion formation, we expect partisanship to emerge as a powerful, and yet imperceptible, factor that sways one's judgment on policy.

In conjunction with Mason's view that partisanship is linked with social identity, Levendusky [2009] finds elite messaging as an encouraging influence on party loyalties. In "The Partisan Sort: How Liberals Became Democrats and Conservatives Became Republicans," Levendusky describes the interaction between elite polarization and resulting sorting effects among the electorate. As elites pull apart ideologically, ordinary voters use these cues to align their own partisan and ideology beliefs. Other research on elite influence also concurs that changes in public opinion reacts and mirrors changes among elites. On the policy issue of European integration, Gabel and Scheve [2007] found that more negative messages from European Union members decrease public support for Europe, measured from past Eurobarometer surveys. On average, a one-unit change in their variable, elite polarization, resulted in a .2 reduction in public support, which is statistically different from 0 [Gabel and Scheve, 2007]. In another study, it was found that the stark decline in public support for American welfare policies was somewhat shaped by elite rhetoric displayed in the media. Looking at the frequency and content of news coverage in major television networks and the *New York Times*, discussions on welfare reform policy were overwhelmingly negative. Schneider and Jacoby [2005, p. 372] argue that elite political discourse was the key factor affecting changes in public opinion, since welfare had only just recently "occupied a central place on the

government agenda in the mid-1990s.” I will discuss more about salience and the media in a later section, but what this research tells us is that voters are receptive to their political elites.

Voters internalize their political party as key to their social identity. Their membership as a Republican, Democrat, or something else suggests in-party loyalty and out-group competition. Combining partisanship with elite messaging and cue-taking, voters likely tend to follow these psychological shortcuts in developing their opinions.

4.2 Political Sophistication

Political sophistication is another important factor in opinion formation. I have designed my study so that I can learn how differences in political sophistication across individuals affect their level of cue-taking. To begin, we must accurately define political sophistication and its components.

There is an abundance of conflicting literature on exactly what political sophistication is and how to measure it. In 1983, Donald Kinder encouraged scholars to turn their attention away from merely ideas and opinions, and instead focus on the cognitive operations and processes that go into forming opinions [Kinder, 1983]. Before then, most research on political sophistication skimmed over the definition, briefly citing works by Campbell et al. [1980] and Converse [1964] that respectively asserted most voters were unsophisticated in their thinking and the general public has little desire to understand issues not directly affecting them. Converse [1964] represented the leading discourse at the time, that political behavior has less to do with decision-making processes and more to do with pure ignorance. Today, we know that political sophistication involves a dynamic relationship between a myriad of factors, all of which

play into how voters make political decisions.

In the beginning, there was no collective agreement on how to define, or even measure, political sophistication. Robert C. Luskin's research created a definition of political sophistication that is now widely-accepted by political scientists. He says it depends on the size, range, and interconnectedness of one's political belief system [Luskin, 1987]. In other words, it is the extent to which one's ability to process political information is large, wide-ranging, and organized. In contrast with previous claims, Luskin argues that "sophistication is a matter of how much and how a person thinks about politics, not what" [Luskin, 1987, p. 881]. It is not enough to study what people's opinions are; we must look at what shapes and affects their opinions. Measuring cognitive processes, however, is inherently difficult. According to Luskin, we can only infer these processes and their properties based on what a person says or does.

In fact, Robert C. Luskin operationalized political sophistication as an experimental variable in 1990. After explaining the deeper complexities behind political sophistication, he investigates the more fundamental question: why do people become politically sophisticated or unsophisticated? Although we can conclude that the American public is, in general, unsophisticated, Luskin is interested in "how far an unsophisticated public can become or be made more sophisticated" [Luskin, 1990, p. 333]. At the time, research on possible driving factors was extremely limited. Luskin cites Hamill, Lodge, and Blake's [1985] variable list as the cleanest and most sensible, and bases his research on theirs, creating the following variables of interest: cognitive ability, media exposure, education, income, and political participation.

In his paper, Luskin modifies Hamill et al.'s research methods by using a nonlinear, simultaneous model of the variables instead of a single-equation, linear one. His equations' components include: interest in politics, formal

education, exposure to mass media, overall intelligence, and occupation. After weighting and measuring these variables, he discovers that interest in politics and overall intelligence have major effects on sophistication, controlling for the other variables as exogenous. Holding all other factors constant, an increase in interest and intelligence drastically boosts sophistication [Luskin, 1990]. Meanwhile, education and exposure to media have very minimal effects. As a result, Luskin believes that sophistication is less a function of the information and resources to which people are exposed to, and more about what people can and are motivated to make of them.

Guo and Moy [1998], however, maintain a different view on what drives political sophistication. In their paper, “Medium or Message: Predicting Dimensions of Political Sophistication,” they agree that there are four main clusters of components making up political sophistication: political interest, knowledge, cognitive ability, and in-depth processing of information. Further, they claim that media consumption influences each of these dimensions, therefore arguing that media is an important predictor of political sophistication. This notion of media influence particularly emerged in the 1980s [Entman, 1989, Iyengar and Kinder, 1987, Page et al., 1987], and has then gained traction in recent research on public opinion and information processing. Through telephone surveys, Guo and Moy asked respondents about their media usage in addition to questions pertaining to their political sophistication. They constructed multiple models examining the effects on political sophistication between types of media, types of news within each medium, and the use of multiple media forms. Challenging earlier arguments that newspapers surpass television in effectively transmitting political information [Page et al., 1987], they found unsubstantial evidence that one is inherently superior over the other. On the other hand, an important takeaway from their study was that

their cross-medium model generated strong effects, revealing that using multiple media forms across different content levels strongly contributes to active information processing.

Luskin's definition and operationalization of political sophistication was groundbreaking and provided proper framework for future political science research. However, Guo and Moy highlight a more recent and increasingly influential factor—media consumption—that may have strong effects on political sophistication. Though the two represent opposing perspectives in an ongoing debate about framing political sophistication, I do not think they are mutually exclusive. I consider both views in my research. In my survey, my conceptualization of political sophistication incorporates both political interest and media usage.

How do voters with different levels of political sophistication respond to cues? Much of the foundational literature laments citizens' lack of knowledge on political issues [Campbell et al., 1980, Converse, 1964]. Other scholars demonstrate that these citizens who are particularly unsophisticated are also more susceptible to how the media frames issues [Iyengar and Kinder, 1987, Zaller, 1992]. Additionally, a common concern shared among political psychologists is that emotional, low information heuristics substitute for rational decision-making [Abelson et al., 1982, Brady and Sniderman, 1985]. This view purports the idea that low levels of political sophistication negatively affects the way voters react to cues, especially emotional and non-factual information presented in the media, which they are more susceptible to. In other words, given a lack of sufficient knowledge and awareness of political issues, voters turn to inferior substitutes for information.

While these early studies as well as basic assumptions lead us to believe that greater political sophistication allows citizens to form more informed, bet-

ter, and stronger opinions about issues, there is a growing body of research attempting to fill the gaps of unsophistication. The fact that unsophisticated voters rely on cues is undisputed; the new point of discussion is that this cue-taking behavior could actually be productive. Enns and Kellstedt [2008] find that even the least politically sophisticated citizens receive signals and change their political opinions at the same time, in the same direction, and to the same extent as their higher-sophisticated counterparts. Similarly, another study conducted by Boudreau discovered that institutions can assist even unsophisticated citizens in making informed decisions. She argues that there are “substitutes for sophistication embedded in the institutions of our political system” [Boudreau, 2009, p. 964]. Her experiment measures respondents’ success at answering math problems while varying the size of penalty, representing citizens’ welfare, and level of verification of the messenger, who delivers the math problem and represents a trusted party leader. When all conditions in the experiment are optimal, both sophisticated and unsophisticated subjects significantly improve in answering the math questions correctly. Thinking about our political system, it appears that institutions can “level the playing field” and reduce differences between sophisticated and unsophisticated citizens [Boudreau, 2009]. If it is true that unsophisticated voters can employ shortcuts and produce similar outcomes, the partisan cue in my survey may act as a useful signal for respondents who have low levels of sophistication. Then, I would expect to see similarly held opinions between respondents with high levels of political sophistication and respondents with low levels of political sophistication, within each respective party.

4.3 Political Knowledge

Setting aside the other complexities of cognition, such as measuring people’s “belief systems” and “levels of conceptualization” previously described, political knowledge is equally important both as a causal and intermediary variable in our studies. In fact, researchers agree that factual knowledge is the single best indicator of not only sophistication, but awareness, engagement, and even media exposure [Luskin, 1987, McGraw and Pinney, 1990, Zaller, 1990]. Mondak [2001] goes as far as to call it one of the central variables in research on mass political behavior.

The first thing to do is pinpoint the factors associated with political knowledge. Broadly, researchers know that those with lower socioeconomic status, especially the less educated, women, the very young, and Blacks tend to be less knowledgeable. In turn, the politically knowledgeable tend to be well-educated, middle-aged, and white men [Bennett, 1989]. Additionally, political knowledge is related to our other factors of interest; for partisanship, voters who more strongly identify with their party tend to have higher political knowledge [Shaul, 2019]. This relationship was only found to be slightly significant, however, and was not as powerful as the correlation between political knowledge and sophistication in Brittany Shaul’s [2017] study. She discovered that higher political knowledge is associated with paying more attention to national news about politics (media usage) as well as likelihood to vote in a primary election (political interest and engagement). Both are main components of my conceptualization of political sophistication.

I’m particularly interested in how media consumption impacts political knowledge, as the literature on this issue is starkly divided. While some scholars claim that the media is informative, mobilizing, and beneficial for civic

engagement [Neuman et al., 1992, Norris, 2000], others argue that the media is mainly disruptive and ineffective in helping voters accumulate political knowledge [Robinson, 1976, Putnam, 2001]. Because this is an ongoing debate with various nuances depending on how you choose to frame it, my goal isn't to arrive at a conclusive answer or measure of the media's impact. Instead, I choose to take a more optimistic approach. Citing de Vreese and Boomgaarden [2006] who also considered these arguments and conducted their own experiment, it is my belief that overall, news media exposure has net positive effects on political knowledge and participation. Especially when news contains "relevant and substantial content, that is when news is informative about the topic of interest," the effect on knowledge gains is stronger [de Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2006, p. 332].

How does political knowledge, which we know to be a composite of both interest and media usage, influence cue-taking behavior? We know that voters with low levels of political sophistication utilize cues to make political decisions, and as previously mentioned, the outcomes in these experiments turn out to be the same across all levels of political sophistication. Can we expect the same pattern with political knowledge, given that the two influence each other and are often interrelated in research? Many scholars actually corroborate the benefits of the cue-taking process and agree that it can help guide opinion formation, even for citizens with low political knowledge. In Jeffery Mondak's [1993] studies on heuristic processing, he found that respondents with low levels of education and political knowledge (in his words, a high level of "Cognitive Need") are more willing to rely on a cue.

With political cognition being an important dimension of public opinion research and cue-taking behavior, researchers operationalize and test it through a standard method. Knowledge tests, specifically those on the pieces of po-

litical information that citizens hold, is a key component of what we consider cognition, according to Carpini and Keeter [1993].

Despite the growing interest surrounding studying political cognition today, the use of knowledge tests was only recently incorporated. Political knowledge tests were rarely employed in early public interest polls in the 20th century, and even the American National Election Studies (ANES) surveys from 1964 to 1980 asked very few knowledge questions Carpini and Keeter [1993]. The ANES surveys, conducted by the University of Michigan’s Center for Political Studies, are the largest source of data for public opinion and voting behavior. However, it wasn’t until 1985 when the NES first included a module of political knowledge questions in a pilot study. This pilot study evaluated knowledge on domain-specific issues of race, economics, and foreign policy [Zaller, 1986]. Unlike many current knowledge tests that cover a wide range and breadth of issues and American institutions, I will be structuring my knowledge test with a domain-specific focus on the Electoral College system.

5 Background: Electoral College Reform

5.1 Brief History and Working Arguments

The United States was founded upon the idea of political compromise. This was true in 1787 at the Constitutional Convention, when the framers of the Constitution explored several options for electing a national president. One option was to have Congress elect the president, however this idea was rejected out of concern that there would be an imbalance of power between the legislative and executive branches. A second idea was to have state legislatures vote for and elect the president. This idea was also discarded because the framers

wanted to ensure an independent federal government from the states. And finally, the possibility of a direct, popular vote by American citizens [Clayton, 2007]. There are multiple reasons as to why the framers opposed this idea in the historical literature. First, many convention delegates doubted public intelligence and the electorate's ability to make rational, political decisions. Most famously, James Madison's concept of "mob rule" conceptualized Americans as susceptible to rule by demagogues, populist passions, and the formation of dangerous factions [Madison, 1787]. Other scholars argue that this was not the leading sentiment. They posit that "direct election was rejected not because the framers of the Constitution doubted public intelligence but rather because [the delegates] feared that without sufficient information about candidates from outside their state, people would vote for a 'favorite son' from their own state or region" [Kimberling, 1992, p. 2]. Another point of contention against a popular vote system was that the southern states' votes would be disadvantaged; at the time, roughly 40 percent of people living in the Southern states were enslaved Black people who couldn't vote [Clayton, 2007]. Today, these points are raised and reevaluated among critics calling for a revision of an institution that may not serve its purpose anymore.

The Electoral College reform debate can be boiled down into the following two arguments.

1. Defenders of the system emphasize the concept of compromise and federalism, claiming that the Electoral College helps control the federal government's power and preserve states' sovereignty. Additionally, though not the original intention of the framers, the Electoral College has evolved into a long-standing, working institution that maintains crucial aspects of the American political system. The two-party system was formed in part as a consequence of the electoral process. While some may argue that a multiparty system as a

result of an alternative voting process, such as ranked voting, would be a beneficial outcome of Electoral College reform, defenders claim that the two-party system acts as a balance in the election process and government. In a way, the Electoral College acts as a necessary political stabilizer that a multiparty system would not be able to replicate [McCollester, 2007, Best, 2004].

2. The other side of the argument advocates for Electoral College reform. Proponents of reform point to the disproportionate representation between large and small states, since electoral votes are allocated by population size. Dewey M. Clayton [2007] highlights that, due to the advantage in numbers, presidential candidates focus their campaigns in large swing states that could just barely give them the majority needed to win. To ensure a truly fair and democratic form of representing the electorate, a popular vote system is frequently suggested [Edwards III and Peirce, 2005]. There are other, less radical levels of reform studied in the literature, but for my research that depends on limited survey data, I will only be offering the direct, popular vote system through a Constitutional amendment as the alternative.

Give the public polling results, what are the possible origins of these partisan patterns? In light of controversial elections, scholars have raised claims of certain party advantages. During the aftermath of the 2000 presidential election in which Republican George W. Bush narrowly lost the popular vote to Democrat Al Gore but defeated him in the electoral vote, many had questioned the legitimacy of the votes, specifically in Florida. Ultimately, Bush won the 25 electoral votes in Florida, giving him 271 total electoral votes, one more than the required 270 to win the election. This was the closest election in U.S. history; only 537 votes separated Bush's victory over Gore in Florida [Bast, 2020]. Here, the idea of inherent partisan bias in the electoral system

was raised by scholars.¹

For voters, the debate is highly active and recently relevant as well. The stark difference in party support began in 2000, where 75% of Democrats and 40% of Republicans opted for a nationwide, popular vote system, likely due to increasing doubt caused by the previous election and accusations of party advantage. Additionally, in the aftermath of the 2016 election, which was essentially a repeat of the contested 2000 election between Bush and Gore, Democrats became further opinionated in their position on Electoral College reform. Whether there is actual bias in the system or not, the 2000 and 2016 elections exposed an institution that produces incongruent results, and in voters' minds, this was cause for concern.

All of these arguments and points considered, the Electoral College reform

¹Grofman and Feld [2005] calculate that, "had there not been the two-seat electoral vote bonus for senators, even with a Bush victory in Florida, a 435 seat Electoral College would have elected Gore by a 51.9% margin," and with D.C.'s electoral votes, Gore would still have won with a 51.6% margin [Grofman and Feld, 2005, p. 3]. This analysis was used to argue that the Electoral College has a small, built-in bias in favor of the Republican party. Many other methods of recalculating votes in hypothetical systems, varying in complexity and mathematical approaches attempt to uncover some evidence of partisan advantage [Miller, 2013, Nelson, 1974, Banzhaf, 1964, Hinich and Ordeshook, 1974]. Other scholars' calculations find no evidence. Jonathan N. Katz et al. [2002] creates a set of statistical models based on historical elections showing that party "advantage" fluctuates over time. He analyzes that only when the nationwide vote is close between the top two candidates is when the electoral system produces an outcome incongruent with the popular vote. Currently, neither party holds a mathematical advantage. Most surprisingly, he shows that the voting power of individuals, a probability he created trying to measure the decisiveness of one single vote, would not likely increase under a popular vote system (but this is under the assumption that neither voters nor candidates would behave differently in the new system) [Katz et al., 2002].

issue is highly complex and multi-sided. Though I won't be taking a theoretical or mathematical perspective to the reform debate, there is huge potential to learn more about the policy discussions surrounding it. How is the issue framed by legislators? To what extent is this messaging received and relevant to voters? In the next subsection, I dive deeper into examining the fundamental differences that make the Electoral College unique as a policy and public opinion issue.

5.2 Low Salience of the Electoral College Issue

The aspects of public opinion and their patterns described in this thesis so far cannot be automatically generalized across all policy issues. For one, much of existing public opinion research measures these variables on politically relevant issues, which are undeniably important, but leaves little room to apply these findings on less salient topics like the Electoral College. For instance, Page, Shapiro, and Dempsey [1987] conducted noteworthy research that thoroughly investigates the media, political elites, and special interest groups, but only looking at policy questions for which TV news data made readily available. They acknowledge that their selected cases “are not, strictly speaking, a sample from the universe of policy issues.” For policy issues that are less represented in the media, there is a lack of public opinion research. In Donald Wittman's [1997] book, *The Myth of Democratic Failure: Why Political Institutions Are Efficient*, he examines methodological shortcomings of political science research. In his chapter, “Measuring the Unobserved,” he explains the inherent difficulty of a researcher trying to observe an agent, or a policy issue in our case, if it is not already monitored by the principal, or representatives in Congress. Additionally, hypothesis testing is inherently restricted to a small

set of policy issues, because fundamentally, researchers are limited in resources available. This leads to a collective problem of issues being unrepresentative and policy research being ungeneralizable [Burstein, 2003].

In addition to extent of research applicability, issue salience is an important factor on voter perception and responsiveness, a key element in my public opinion studies. Policy topics that matter more to voters will end up being represented in politicians' political agendas, and in turn, these candidates continue to be elected as long as their platform issues remain salient. The process by which a particular issue rises in salience is also convoluted. Part of how legislators choose which policies to focus on depends on their predictions on citizens' true preferences and whether they think those preferences will remain relevant in subsequent elections [Arnold, 1992, p. 14]. R. Douglas Arnold's dedicates an entire chapter on the policy strategies legislators employ, solely for the goal of reelection. This lends itself as a possible issue, because if only a few issues can be salient to the public and the legislature at one time, and these policies are stringent to change, only those will be represented in policy formation [Jones, 1995]. Paul Burstein [2003] attempts to measure exactly how much the impact of opinion on policy increases as salience increases. First, he found that, of 52 total cases, three-fourths of the relationships between policy and opinion are statistically significant. The impact was "nearly always substantial," suggesting that the relationship between public opinion and policy is a causal one. And when salience is incorporated in the measure of public opinion in addition to substantive preferences, the combination of salience and substantive public opinion "always has an effect and is of substantial policy importance over three-fifths of the time" [Burstein, 2003, p. 33-34]. The salience of an issue thus has an effect on the strength of public opinion which has an extremely powerful influence on policy formation.

As for the issue of Electoral College reform, it is fairly new and less familiar to voters. As shown in polling from the past two decades, there are partisan patterns emerging among the electorate, however the issue is not consistently salient; according to Google Search trends, the keyword “electoral college” only becomes popular every four years during the U.S. presidential election. Moreover, Electoral College reform is not a wedge issue that can be compared to other policy issues run in campaigns, such as the economy, immigration, or civil rights. Scholars have tossed around the idea of pushing for reform through state legislative action instead of a constitutional amendment, recognizing the 700+ past proposals that have been introduced in Congress but failed [Neale and Nolan, 2019]. Unknown to many people, Electoral College reform was actually a highly contested issue in Congress between 1948 to 1979. “[Reform proposals] were the subject of hearings in the Senate and House Judiciary Committees on 17 different occasions, while Electoral College reform was debated in the Senate on five occasions and twice in the House” [Neale and Nolan, 2019, p. 4]. But, after a direct popular election amendment failed in the Senate in 1979, Electoral College reform finally subsided from public attention and the number of reform proposals in Congress dwindled. Only recently has new policy advocacy for Electoral College reform emerged, most notably the National Interstate Popular Vote Compact from 2006 which requires the electors in every state to vote for their respective winner of the national popular vote [Gaines and Jenkins, 2009]. As of January 2022, the compact has been adopted by fifteen states and the District of Columbia. Overall, recent proposals for reform through alternative routes are gradual steps and part of a greater conversation that is growing more and more active.

5.3 Hypotheses

On partisanship as a factor, I hypothesize that party affiliation is a driving factor for expressing EC attitudes in both Republicans and Democrats. The presence of a party label will increase the likelihood of answering both questions on Electoral College reform respectively. There will also be fewer “No opinion” responses. I expect this pattern to show itself for both parties answering both sides of the argument. Looking at partisanship further, I hypothesize that strong partisans have a higher tendency to rely on the cue compared to their weak counterparts, due to the socialization effect that is associated with party. I posit that this psychological bias of seeking in-group approval and therefore agreeableness to a cue will be stronger for those who self-identify as a strong partisan. By the same token, all self-identifying partisans will rely on their respective party cue more often than Independents. In fact, with partisanship being the only differing characteristic, I expect Independents’ stances on the issue and responsiveness to any cue to be relatively unaffected and unvarying.

For left-leaning and right-leaning Independents, however, there will be an association with the party-congruent side of the argument. In their book, *The Myth of the Independent Voter*, Keith et al. [1992] recognize that many Independents will, if asked, concede that they are closer to the Democratic or Republican party. As the number of self-identifying Independents in the U.S. grew larger in the mid-20th century, literature in public opinion research supports the idea that many Independents are actually “closeted partisans.” For Klar and Krupnikov [2016] [2016], they rely on survey data to demonstrate that this growth is driven by Americans becoming more hesitant to make public displays of partisanship, particularly in environments where partisan

disagreement is high. However, this does not affect their political engagement. Therefore, I also predict that, when prompted, Independents will indicate a partisan preference and additionally, express party-congruent attitudes.

I believe the factor of political sophistication to influence one's formed opinions as well. Already assuming party bias in opinion formation processes, Cindy Kam [2005] investigated *which* voters are more or less likely to rely on party cues through survey experiments, and found that the use and impact of party cues is higher among the least politically aware and virtually 0 among the most politically aware. Additionally, as citizens become more politically aware, they rely more on value-based, issue-relevant information when forming opinions on a novel issue. The particular issue Kam examined in her experiment was food irradiation, because of its low salience. Thinking about how the Electoral College is similarly not campaigned in elections or prioritized on political agendas and policy, we can also assume its low salience will produce similar patterns. Therefore, in my experiment, I hypothesize that respondents with low levels of political sophistication rely on the party cue more frequently and strongly. The outcomes of opinions will appear similar across all respondents, but upon closer investigation into the less sophisticated group, their opinions will be more driven by cues. For the purposes of my study, I conceptualize political sophistication as a component of media usage shown by level of media consumption, and political engagement including voting behavior.

Political knowledge also has its supporting literature in influencing cue-taking behavior. In Mondak's [1993] aforementioned political knowledge study, he discovered that reliance on cue-taking is magnified when the issue is less familiar and less salient to voters. The piece of motivating research that he draws from tests the effect of California State Supreme Court justices' names on voter opinion. The impact of the cue, the California justice name in this

case, “was greatest when the citizen’s evaluation of the political leader is most intense;” This shows that the force of cues on opinion depends on “the salience of the cued political leader” [Mondak, 1993, p. 178]. Since the Electoral College carries low salience and is unfamiliar to voters, I hypothesize that the impact of the partisan cue will show itself to be impactful for voters with low levels of political knowledge as well. Similar to political sophistication, respondents with low knowledge will form opinions that are more reliant on cues.

Drawing from these research findings on issues of low salience, I hypothesize that: survey respondents with lower levels of political knowledge and engagement will be more dependent on the party cue attached to an Electoral College argument. Though the correct outcomes will be the same (Republicans oppose reform and Democrats support reform), a higher pattern of cue usage in the less sophisticated and knowledgeable groups will indicate that party cues are a helpful heuristic.

6 Methodology

6.1 Methodological Approach

I conduct my research through a survey with a random treatment design. The survey method proves useful in political science research, especially when investigating what drives public opinion and voter behavior. Much of the literature that gives background into my factors of interest is based on the survey method. And, given the recent salience of the Electoral College reform issue, there is a lack of survey research on this subject area. With no existing data to work with, this opens an opportunity for me to create my own questionnaire and investigate known patterns of public opinion on this new topic.

I chose Qualtrics as the appropriate survey platform because of its user-friendly interface and my prior experience using its tools. The key elements of a survey I had to include were a consent form, clear page breaks between series of questions, a variety of question formats such as multiple choice, text paragraphs, and write-in answers, and generation of a unique code for respondents to receive compensation. Moreover, Qualtrics' ease of converting data into visual breakdowns as well as simple csv files was helpful. Even after I finished collecting data, Qualtrics had many helpful tools for me to rework the data into new, usable formats. For example, I created a new "knowledge score" variable from calculating respondents' performance in the political knowledge section; later, this became a useful variable for me to use in linear regressions. I used Amazon Mechanical Turk to field my survey, because of its accessibility to a high number of on-demand survey workers that is (mostly) representative of the general population.² After publishing my study on the crowdsourcing

²Before distributing the survey, I was aware of Amazon Mechanical Turk's disproportionate representation of Democrats/Independents compared to Republicans. Compared to 2012 American National Election Studies web samples, the MTurk respondent pool had 8% more respondents identify as Democrat and 13% less identify as Republican [Levay et al., 2016]. Since my design is unable to filter partisans and guarantee consistent response levels across all parties, I was prepared to expect disproportionate results. An alternate treatment design that would potentially resolve the issue of underrepresentation of certain ideological groups is distributing the survey to only liberals, which can be applied as a qualification for workers on Amazon MTurk. However, recent literature shows that ideology and partisanship are growing more distinct, and the two are not synonymous [Kinder and Kalmoe, 2017]. I would not be able to make the assumption that my survey would sufficiently restrict access to only Democrats. Moreover, limiting the survey to only liberal respondents would severely shrink the range of education levels, political knowledge, demographics, and other factors that I plan on studying as factors of opinion formation, when collecting and analyzing data from diverse backgrounds is more important to me.

website, I was able to surpass the number of survey responses I needed in three days.

A crucial aspect of planning for an experimental survey is the sample size. Choosing a large enough sample size is imperative to ensure a sufficient level of statistical power. I held power and significance at conventional levels of .8 and 95%, respectively which produces $n = 174$, the minimum number of people I should have per treatment group.

I determined the survey compensation amount of one dollar by using the federal minimum wage as a benchmark. Based on a pay of \$7.25 per hour, I can find a comparable level of compensation based on my survey's response time. Qualtrics' predicted duration was 8.9 minutes, which is equivalent to about \$1.08. I also administered a trial run of a final draft of my survey to confirm this estimation; some of my respondents took as short as three minutes, and others longer than 10 minutes, with the average response time was around seven minutes.

Additionally, research on the marketplace of Amazon Mechanical Turk gave me insight on the price distributions for other surveys. Ipeirotis [2010] collected data on the platform from January 2009 to April 2010 and found that only 15% of HITs (survey tasks) are priced at \$1 or higher. 90% of tasks are priced between one and 10 cents.

Based on price distribution statistics, my compensation amount of \$1 may be overpriced compared to other tasks on Amazon MTurk. However, I am expecting a high level of attentiveness from my respondents to justify this price level. My survey's treatment condition requires careful reading and processing of visual and textual information, so I hope to incentivize respondents to pay close attention and produce high quality responses. Moreover, having a higher compensation rate increases the likelihood of workers completing my task.

Underpaying workers, on the other hand, would present a greater concern of not having enough respondents.

Finally, I employed preemptive measures to maximize the reliability of my survey data. Using features on Amazon’s MTurk, I vetted out “lazy” workers. I added certain qualifications for workers to be able to complete my survey, specifying location to be within the United States, requiring a HIT approval rate of 98% (which means their survey responses get approved 98% of the time or more), and requiring a history of 10,000 approved HITs. These are all recommended best practices for collecting reliable data [Turk, 2021]. I also manually picked out unreliable survey responses after my survey was completed. Respondents who finished early without answering the substantive questions on their Electoral College opinion were filtered out. Additionally, there were Amazon MTurk workers who, after I cross-checked their worker ID with their detailed survey response in Qualtrics, did not even begin the survey in order to get compensation. Finally, workers who failed the attention check question in the knowledge test were automatically excluded.

After collecting survey data, I performed statistical analyses using linear regressions in R. These regressions helped illustrate the strength, direction, and significance of my factors of interest.

6.2 Survey Design and Question Wording

I designed an online survey through Qualtrics and then administered and distributed an anonymous link to the survey through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. There was a total of 1,054 survey responses. Subjects ranged in age from 21 to 89, and the average age is 41. The sample was 54.74% male and 44.4% female. 22.27% of the sample identified as Republican, 50.57% as Democrat,

and 24.38% as Independent.

Following agreement to a consent form with information about the study and research intentions, subjects first responded to a set of demographic questions, including gender, age, race, and education level. The specific wording and provided options under these demographic questions were drawn from past ANES surveys, a reliable source for repeatable survey research. I then ask about party identification, which branches out into a question about party strength, or any partisan leanings for Independents, or a write-in response for “Something else” partisans. This question wording and flow were also taken from ANES survey examples.

Next, I organize my survey into sections that target a factor of interest. On political sophistication, I ask a set of questions relating to respondents’ sources of media and average political news consumption. Since my conceptualization of political sophistication includes interest in addition to media usage, I also include questions on respondents’ political involvement. These are Yes/No questions relating to voter registration and voting history, also pulled from past ANES surveys.

The next section is the knowledge test, where respondents are tested on five aspects of the Electoral College system. Modeling off Carpini and Keeter’s [1993] paper on how to accurately design knowledge tests, I ensure content validity and make sure the items being tested are specific and relevant to the domain of interest. In my survey, the questions only pertain to facts about the Electoral College. For item format it was suggested I use a short, true/false section. While there are downsides to relying on true/false answer types such as the high likelihood of lucky guessing, I felt that alternative formats such as short-answer or multiple choice would be too difficult on the topic of the Electoral College. After establishing that the topic was of low salience, I did

not want to overestimate the average voter’s knowledge. Additionally, forcing respondents to spend more time and effort on short-answer or multi-option questions would incentivize them to look up answers online. I also decided to omit the ‘Don’t Know’ option, because although previous researchers thought that this led to misrepresentation of respondents’ actual knowledge, more recent research supports the idea that offering a ‘Don’t Know’ option leads to less engagement, an even worse problem [Qualtrics, 2015]. At the outset of the knowledge test, I encourage respondents to simply give their best guesses. Even if they’re not confident in their answer, the best guess still produces valuable data over a ‘Don’t Know’ response. Finally, Qualtrics automatically computes a “score” variable based on respondents’ performance in this section, with the minimum score possible being 1 because of the attention check question.³

After displaying one of six statements about the Electoral College reform debate (the treatment in my survey experiment), the final section gauges respondents’ opinions on the issue. The first question directly asks them whether or not an amendment should be made to the Constitution to abolish the Electoral College with a third option of ‘No Opinion.’ The specific wording of the question and options were taken from the annual public opinion polls conducted by Pew Research Center. Phrasing the question in a way that asks for the respondent’s preference encourages them to make a decision rather than opting out even if they do not fully agree with either position on the

³The attention check question assists in ensuring that respondents are fully participating in the survey, and not just skimming. The wording of my question was direct and explicit, instructing them to select “True” for the question to prove they are paying attention. Of course, there is no guaranteed method to verify all respondents are reliable, however implementing an attention check helps rule out lazy workers.

issue. Though I chose to include the third ‘No Opinion’ option, past polling certifies that this strategy still works and most people will pick a side. The second question asks respondents to select one in five wide-ranging statements to best describe the system, incorporating common sentiments expressed in the debate. I chose to add this second, more wide-ranging question gauging respondents’ attitudes on the Electoral College to give respondents an opportunity to either affirm their position with a reason (‘Undemocratic and elitist’ or ‘Valued part of American democracy and federalism’) or explain their uncertainty (‘Too Complicated’). For this question, I also included an opt-out, ‘Don’t Know/Unsure’ option. I took this choice of wording and selection of options from Mark J. McKenzie’s [2009] survey questionnaire on the Electoral College. In McKenzie’s study, he studies opinion formation through this issue of EC reform and utilizes these responses as the dependent variable, which mirrors my methods. See Appendix 1 for full survey questionnaire.

6.3 Treatment Design

The treatment design in my survey experiment tests the effectiveness of a party heuristic or cue. By randomly displaying statements from both sides of the debate, with either party label attached, I can compare the strength of in-party loyalties between Republicans and Democrats, in addition to other interparty comparisons. Additionally, by also including statements with no party cue but are exactly identical in wording, I can truly observe the effective difference of the party label. Figure 2 shows an example of what a respondent who receives Treatment statement #5 would see during the survey.




Figure 2: Treatment statement #5

My treatment design underwent several development stages. I began with a complex, 14-treatment group plan involving separate surveys to Democrats and Republicans and a pure control group that would receive neither side of the argument for EC reform. Then, from this ambitious starting point, I started

to think about which treatments I should be prioritizing over others, especially with sample size being a significant concern. I removed the pure control group, realizing that my research question was more focused on the effect of a party cue and not access to information, although it would be fascinating to see how a control group of no information impacts voters' opinion formation.

In November, after receiving funding from the Gerstein Family Research Stipend and Undergraduate Research Fund, I could now determine how to conduct my treatment even more precisely. I decided to consolidate my treatment groups into one survey to be distributed to respondents of any party. The result is a two-by-three treatment design, where both sides of the Electoral College reform debate are displayed with no partisan cue, a Democrat cue, and a Republican cue. See Figure 3 below for a visual table of the six random treatment statements.



	Keep EC		Abolish EC	
No cues	Treatment #1	Some legislators in Congress say we should preserve the Electoral College system of electing a President because it preserves the ideal of federalism and protects the voices of small states. They argue that a direct, popular election of the president could lead to what James Madison called tyranny of the majority without consent of the minority. They say that the founding fathers knew what they were doing and succeeded in creating a stable democracy. Finally, the Electoral College protects the two-party system and political moderation.	Treatment #2	Some legislators in Congress say we should abolish the Electoral College system of electing the President because it is undemocratic and elitist. They argue that the candidate who receives the most votes should win the Presidency. It bothers them when there's a mismatch in the outcome that voters want and what the Electoral College produces. Opponents argue that the Electoral College is a "distorted" way of counting votes, because states with small populations get more than their fair share of Electoral College votes.
Democrat cue 	Treatment #4	Some Democrats in Congress say we should preserve...	Treatment #3	Some Democrats in Congress say we should abolish...
Republican cue 	Treatment #6	Some Republicans in Congress say we should preserve...	Treatment #5	Some Republicans in Congress say we should abolish...

Figure 3: Treatment Design

Since the only subtle difference across statements would be the use of the party label (“**Democrats** say,” “**Republicans** say,” etc.), any response to the cue would be weak, if anything. Therefore, to strengthen the potential cue effect, I also implemented visual cues of the Democrat donkey and Republican elephant symbols attached to their respective statements.

In the final version of my data set, distribution across the six treatments was almost perfectly even: treatment statements #1, #2, #5, and #6 was

seen by 176 respondents, and statements #3 and #4 by 175 respondents.

7 Results and Data Analysis

7.1 Preliminary Results

I will summarize the descriptive results from my survey first. On the first question of reform, 55.98% of respondents voted to ‘Amend the Constitution,’ 36.53% voted to ‘Keep the current system,’ and 7.50% had ‘No opinion.’ Interestingly, these results are roughly consistent with Pew Research Center’s survey from January 2021; they had found support for reform by a ratio of 55% to 43%. It appears that a majority of Americans remains in favor of Electoral College reform.

Amend the Constitution	Keep the current system	No opinion
55.98%	36.53%	7.50%

On the second question gauging respondents’ most accurate sentiment toward the Electoral College, 36.24% of respondents describe it as ‘Undemocratic and elitist,’ 28.94% call it a ‘Valued part of American democracy and federalism,’ 15.84% call it ‘Too complicated,’ 14.04% admit it’s ‘Not a great system, but better than any alternative,’ and 4.93% ‘Don’t Know’ or are ‘Unsure.’

Undemocratic and elitist	Valued...	Too complicated...	Not a great system...	Don’t Know/Unsure
36.24%	28.94%	15.84%	14.04%	4.93%

Compared to the first question, I included this question to provide a more descriptive, possibly clearer idea of respondents’ actual attitudes, instead of forcing respondents to select between two drastically different options that may

not accurately represent their opinions. I will continue to use this variable in proceeding regressions when helpful.

As we would expect, Democrats and Republicans are divided on the issue of Electoral College reform. On the question of whether or not to amend the Constitution, almost four-fifths of Democrats expressed they want to amend the Constitution. Roughly four-fifths Republicans also voted to keep the current system. Both parties have a similar proportion of in-party support for their positions, but also, interestingly, distribution for the other two options were the same in each party within three percentage points. Independents tend to be in favor of reform, but not to the extent of a true majority. A higher proportion of Independents have no opinion, relative to Republicans and Democrats. The table below shows the breakdowns for each response by party.

	Amend the Constitution	Keep the current system	No opinion
% of Democrats	78.24	17.45	4.32
% of Republicans	19.58	76.67	3.75
% of Independents	45.43	37.74	16.73

Regardless of party label, we can see if a cue endorsement influences respondents' likelihood to respond in agreement for either side of the argument. The broad effectiveness of a cue is not one of my hypotheses, but is something that can be observed in my collected data. To do this, I turned the three treatment statements in support of reform into a dummy variable, and did the same for the other three statements against reform. With separate regressions, I can see if, and how strongly, observing a 'support reform' cue or an 'against reform' cue influences respondents' opinions.

When controlling for race, education level, gender, age, and party, the effect of the ‘support reform’ cues was significant, but surprisingly in the opposite direction (which I will discuss later) on the likelihood of a respondent to indicate ‘Amend the Constitution.’ The coefficient estimate was -0.0892 with a p-value less than .01. This means that the presence of a ‘support reform’ cue is associated with a 8.92 percentage point decrease in likelihood to support reform, compared to reading the opposing argument’s cues and controlling for potentially confounding variables. The low p-value indicates that this correlation is very significant.

When testing for the effect of the ‘against reform’ treatment cue, I found similar results. The presence of any of the three treatment cues representing the other side of the argument is associated with a 6.32 percentage point decrease in likelihood to respond ‘Keep the current system,’ compared to reading the opposing argument’s cues and controlling for race, education level, gender, age, and party. This coefficient estimate had a p-value less than .05.

Table 1 below shows a condensed version of my regression results for both party cues. A full table of results is included in the Appendix.

In the last three rows of the table, notice significant and high coefficient values for all party controls. Already knowing that a high majority of Republicans want to keep the current system, these results tell us that Republicans’ opinion on the Electoral College is significantly different than Democrats’, the reference category. For Independents, though a high proportion of them indicated to ‘Amend the Constitution’ overall, they are actually more likely to support the Electoral College when compared to Democrats. I will study these inter-party patterns in following regressions on specific factors regarding my hypotheses.

As for why both effects on each type of response are very small in mag-

Table 1: Effect of Argument Cues on Likelihood of EC Attitudes

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Amend the EC	Keep the EC
	(1)	(2)
amendcues	-0.089*** (0.027)	
keepcues		-0.063** (0.026)
raceBlack (African American)	-0.107 (0.072)	0.117* (0.070)
raceHispanic or Latino	-0.028 (0.087)	0.026 (0.084)
raceNative American	0.045 (0.184)	0.043 (0.178)
raceWhite	-0.063 (0.056)	0.079 (0.054)
eduHigh school	-0.018 (0.047)	-0.041 (0.046)
eduLess than high school	-0.387 (0.250)	0.144 (0.243)
eduMaster's degree	-0.047 (0.041)	0.053 (0.040)
eduPhD or some professional degree	-0.026 (0.079)	-0.017 (0.077)
eduSome college	0.049 (0.035)	-0.052 (0.034)
genMale	-0.088*** (0.027)	0.114*** (0.027)
birth year	0.001 (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)
partyIndependent	-0.319*** (0.033)	0.197*** (0.032)
partyRepublican	-0.583*** (0.034)	0.578*** (0.033)
partySomething else	-0.393*** (0.092)	0.263*** (0.090)
Constant	-0.118 (2.123)	4.802** (2.060)
Observations	1,054	1,054
R ²	0.272	0.272
Adjusted R ²	0.251	0.251

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

nitude and in the negative direction, which is contrary to what I originally expected from a cue's impact, I believe that it is because respondents across all parties were randomly distributed to each treatment and side of the argument, and that these various effects offset each other. Respondents are already biased by their party's views, as shown in the recent public polls and history of election outcomes. The data in question contains very pro-reform Democrats and very pro-EC Republicans seeing the same type of cues, but still remaining loyal to their parties' views; after all, the coefficient estimates for each party turned out to be more powerful than those attached to the 'amendcues' and 'keepcues.' Regardless, the effects for both types of cues are significant, which is interesting. What this immediately implies is that seeing a cue for an argument, whether in favor or against the Electoral College, (slightly) lowers the likelihood that someone will respond accordingly.

7.2 Hypotheses and Theory-Based Results

The following subsections are organized by each factor of interest. For all regressions, I control for race, education level, gender, and age. When I conduct regressions testing for general differences using a data set of all respondents, I control for party as well, and these party variables will show up as constants in my output.

In my output tables, note that certain rows of factors are omitted (but are statistically represented in the correlation coefficient), when irrelevant to my hypothesis. Unless otherwise noted in the footnotes, the control factors of race, education level, gender, and age are the only rows I omit. I also omit the Residual Standard Error and F Statistic estimates. While the following tables 2-15 are only condensed tables showing results relevant to my hypotheses, all

full tables including the omitted factors are listed accordingly and in order in the Appendix section.

7.2.1 Partisanship

I first examined how respondents self-identify and their likelihood to provide pro-reform responses to Electoral College questions. I found that identifying as a Democrat is associated with a 44.64 percentage point increase in the likelihood of responding ‘Amend the Constitution’ with a p-value less than .01, compared to non-Democrats. This is an extremely strong correlation of high magnitude. Additionally, identification as a Democrat is associated with a 29.42 percentage point increase in the likelihood of best describing the Electoral College as ‘Undemocratic and elitist’ with a p-value less than .01. These results indicate that identification as a Democrat is associated with an increase in likelihood to agree with these statements of an extremely high magnitude.

I applied the same regression analyses to Republicans, testing for the likelihood of their pro-Electoral College responses. Self-identification as a Republican is associated with a 50.90 percentage increase in likelihood of indicating ‘Keep the current system’ in the first Electoral College question, with a p-value less than .01, compared to non-Republicans. The strength and significance of these results are very similar to the same analysis in Democrats. On the second question, compared to non-Republicans, being a Republican is associated with a 40.48 percentage point increase in likelihood of best describing the Electoral College as a ‘Valued part of American democracy and federalism,’ also with a p-value less than .01. Though all four of these regressions linking party identification and types of Electoral Responses are impressive, it is worth noting that the associations for Republican self-identification are of slightly higher

magnitude than those of Democrats'. These regressions for Democrats and Republicans are displayed in Table 2.⁴

Table 2: Effect of Party ID on Likelihood of EC Attitudes

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Valued...	Keep the EC	Undemocratic...	Amend the EC	No Opinion	Don't Know/Unsure
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Rep ID	0.405*** (0.031)	0.509*** (0.032)				
Dem ID			0.294*** (0.029)	0.446*** (0.028)		
Ind ID					0.117*** (0.019)	0.064*** (0.016)
Constant	7.813*** (2.048)	5.250** (2.102)	2.492 (2.270)	-1.266 (2.173)	-3.643*** (1.244)	-0.394 (1.063)
Observations	1,054	1,054	1,054	1,054	1,054	1,054
R ²	0.184	0.238	0.106	0.232	0.101	0.030
Adjusted R ²	0.164	0.218	0.083	0.212	0.079	0.006

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The aforementioned results indicate that partisanship alone has a strong correlation with types of responses to Electoral College questions, in both Democrats and Republicans. Not only is support for Electoral College reform simply split among party lines, but as I hypothesized, party is a driving factor in how people express opinions on the Electoral College. This is also supported by the coefficients associated with identifying as an Independent in the third row. Independents are more likely to express 'No Opinion' and 'Don't

⁴Based on the party distributions shown in public polls, I only tested for each party's congruent statements. Since this correlation was somewhat established already, I did not need to test for the likelihood of statements representing the opposing party's views (i.e. Republicans' pro-reform statements and Democrats' pro-Electoral College statements), hence the blank cells in Table 2. The remaining tables in this section depicting correlations between party identification and opinion will also only test for respective party-congruent views.

Know/Unsure’ to the two Electoral College questions with a p-value smaller than .01, compared to non-Independents. I study Independent respondents’ opinion-formation and cue-taking patterns more in-depth later on.

I also observe how partisanship strength in Democrats and Republicans influences their responses to the same Electoral College questions. Using a subset of just Democrats, I ran a regression analysis using whether they identify as a strong Democrat and testing for these same responses. It turns out that identifying as a strong Democrat is associated with a 16.79 percentage point increase in likelihood of responding ‘Amend’ at a p-value less than .01, compared to weaker Democrats. On the second, more descriptive question about the Electoral College, I discover that identification as a strong Democrat is associated with a 16.69 percentage increase in likelihood of selecting ‘Undemocratic and elitist’ at a p-value less than .01, compared to weak Democrats.

Does strength of Republican identification significantly influence opinions, as we observed in Democrats? I narrowed my data down to a subset of just Republicans and ran the same regressions. I did *not* find significant correlations between association as a strong Republican and a pro-Electoral College response for either of the two questions. What these results tell us is that strong Republicans are not much different in their Electoral College opinion expressions than their weaker counterparts. Examining the coefficients in the ‘strongrepdummy’ row, not only are they insignificant, but they’re of smaller magnitude than those of strong Democrats. The results for strong Democrats and strong Republicans are displayed in Table 3.

Though Table 2 showed that Republican self-identification has strong correlations with pro-Electoral College responses, Table 3 testing for party strength revealed interesting results. Within their respective party, it appears that strong Democrats have higher associations with pro-reform attitudes than

Table 3: Effect of Strong Partisanship on Likelihood of EC Attitudes

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Amend the EC	Undemocratic...	Keep the EC	Valued...
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Strong Dem ID	0.173*** (0.046)	0.168*** (0.037)		
Strong Rep ID			0.057 (0.064)	-0.011 (0.057)
Constant	6.863* (3.553)	1.726 (2.885)	15.029*** (4.991)	8.339* (4.440)
Observations	533	533	240	240
R ²	0.052	0.083	0.139	0.092
Adjusted R ²	0.011	0.043	0.073	0.022

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

strong Republicans do with pro-Electoral College attitudes. In fact, the coefficient values for Republicans are not only insignificant but not convincingly pointing to a positive direction either. Identifying as a Strong Republican could have a reverse effect, associated with a 1.10 decrease in likelihood to express that the Electoral College is a ‘Valued part of American democracy and federalism’ in the rightmost column. Thus, the results for Democrats provides evidence for my hypothesis that stronger partisans hold stronger attitudes on the Electoral College, but the same conclusion cannot be drawn for Republicans.

Next, I measured the impact of my manipulated, partisan cue to test for any further partisan biases. To do this, I identified each party’s in-party and out-party cue, turning these into the dummy variable and comparing its effect to that of the statements with no party cue. Figure 4 displayed below visually shows how I created the dummy variable for Republicans, with treatment statements #3 and #6 having the congruent, correct party cue represented in green and treatment statements #1 and #2 having no party affiliation, represented in red and essentially acting as a control baseline. Similarly for Democrats, treatment statements #3 and #6 represent their congruent party attitude and I compared its effect with that of treatment statements #1 and #2. For the purposes of covering all potential opportunities for party bias, I assume that partisans will respond to an incorrect, out-party cue by rejecting it and remaining loyal to their in-party attitudes, which is why I included treatment statement #3 for the Republican test and treatment statement #6 for the Democrat test in addition to their in-party cues. I also chose to include both sides of the argument as the control baseline for both parties’ tests, instead of just the statement that is congruent with their party views, because I previously established that partisan biases inherently exist for both Repub-

licans and Democrats. To a partisan, neither non-party affiliated statement will impact their already existing attitudes on the issue. For the purposes of my analysis, including both statements would provide a sufficient data set of baseline responses, and would produce a stronger analysis.

	Keep EC		Abolish EC	
No cues	Treatment #1	Some legislators in Congress say we should preserve...	Treatment #2	#2: Some legislators in Congress say we should abolish...
Democrat cue	Treatment #4	Some Democrats in Congress say we should preserve...	Treatment #3	#3: Some Democrats in Congress say we should abolish...
Republican cue	Treatment #6	Some Republicans in Congress say we should preserve...	Treatment #5	#5: Some Republicans in Congress say we should abolish...

Figure 4: "Dummy Variable Design for Testing Party Cue in Both Parties"

I find the following: for Democrats, seeing a cue that is congruent with their party attitude, in support of Electoral College reform, is associated with a 9.13 percentage point increase in likelihood to respond 'Amend the Constitution' with a p-value less than .05, compared to Democrats who saw statements with no party cue. I ran this regression for the second EC question as well. Democrats who saw a cue congruent with their party attitude are associated with a 9.72 percentage point increase in likelihood to express that the Electoral College is 'Undemocratic and elitist' with a p-value less than 0.1, compared to Democrats who read statements with no party cue.

For Republicans, seeing a cue that is congruent with their party attitude (pro-Electoral College) is actually associated with a 0.16 percentage point *decrease* in likelihood to respond 'Keep the current system' compared to Republicans that read the non-treated statements, but at no significant level. As suspected after seeing weak results with the first question, I did not collect statistically significant evidence that Republicans who saw their party cue

were more likely to indicate that the Electoral College is a ‘Valued part of American democracy and federalism’ either. Compared to Republicans that read the control treatments, they were also associated with a 5.03 percentage point decrease in likelihood to respond ‘Valued part of American democracy and federalism’ with no significance. A summary of the results is displayed below in Table 4.

Table 4: Effect of Party Cue on Likelihood of EC Attitudes

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Amend the EC (1)	Undemocratic... (2)	Keep the EC (3)	Valued... (4)	No Opinion (5)	(6)
Dempartycue	0.091** (0.044)	0.097* (0.056)			-0.006 (0.018)	
Reppartycue			-0.002 (0.068)	-0.050 (0.078)		0.045 (0.036)
Constant	1.047 (3.592)	5.950 (4.531)	7.056 (5.026)	15.096*** (5.777)	-2.176 (1.505)	-3.300 (2.674)
Observations	339	339	169	169	339	169
R ²	0.072	0.052	0.128	0.135	0.235	0.116
Adjusted R ²	0.011	-0.011	0.049	0.056	0.184	0.035

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The results above show that Democrats are more responsive to the party cue and express party-congruent attitudes than Republicans. My hypothesis, that the presence of a party label will increase partisans’ likelihood to respond accordingly to both EC questions, was only proven for Democrats. In fact, the coefficients for Republicans were slightly negative, which is interesting and contrary to what I expected. It may seem like Republicans are actually *less*

likely to indicate ‘Keep the EC’ and that it’s a ‘Valued part of American democracy and federalism’ after seeing the party cue. The second part of my party cue hypothesis was that, given a party cue, partisans will be less likely to respond ‘No Opinion.’ In the rightmost column of Table 4, only Democrats observe a .55 percentage point decrease associated with this likelihood, compared to other Democrats who did not see the party cue. Republicans, on the other hand, experience a 4.46 percentage point increase. Neither coefficient, however, is statistically significant.

The final part of my partisanship regression tests will look at Independents. First, to test this broadly among all Independents, I test whether or not a respondent self-identified as an Independent on both responses ‘Amend the Constitution’ and ‘Keep the current system.’ I find no statistical significance in correlation between identifying as an Independent and responding ‘Keep the current system.’ However, self-identifying as an Independent is associated with a 12.84 percentage point decrease in likelihood of responding ‘Amend the Constitution,’ the statement congruent with Democrats’ attitudes, with a p-value less than .01, and a 6.17 percentage point decrease in likelihood of expressing ‘Undemocratic,’ compared to non-Independents. Finally, as highlighted previously in Table 2, identifying as an Independent is highly correlated with expressing ‘No Opinion’ and ‘Don’t Know/Unsure’ in both EC questions, with a percentage point increase of 11.70 and 6.37 respectively with p-values less than .01. These results are summarized below in Table 5.

My hypothesis that Independents’ EC attitudes will be unassociated with their partisanship was only partly true. I did find that identifying as an Independent was statistically and positively correlated with an increase in likelihood to have ‘No Opinion’ and indicate ‘Don’t Know/Unsure.’ What I didn’t expect, however, was for there to be another significant relationship between

Table 5: Effect of Ind Party ID on Likelihood of EC Attitudes

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Amend the EC (1)	Undemocratic... (2)	Keep the EC (3)	Valued... (4)	No Opinion (5)	Don't Know/Unsure (6)
Ind ID	-0.128*** (0.036)	-0.062* (0.035)	0.011 (0.035)	0.027 (0.033)	0.117*** (0.019)	0.064*** (0.016)
Constant	-3.392 (2.411)	1.063 (2.372)	8.035*** (2.342)	10.007*** (2.203)	-3.643*** (1.244)	-0.394 (1.063)
Observations	1,054	1,054	1,054	1,054	1,054	1,054
R ²	0.050	0.019	0.048	0.049	0.101	0.030
Adjusted R ²	0.026	-0.005	0.023	0.025	0.079	0.006

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

identifying as an Independent and pro-reform attitudes. This relationship is actually negative, which means that identifying as an Independent is associated with a decrease in likelihood to support EC reform. One interesting point to highlight is that there was no significant increase in likelihood to support the current system either, in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5. Though they are in the positive direction, they have no statistical significance. Given the statistical increase in ‘No Opinion’ and ‘Don’t Know/Unsure’ statements, I can assume that Independents are less likely to support reform, and instead, more likely to not have an opinion on the issue, due to their party identification.

I also looked at the Independents who indicated they were closer to either the Democratic or Republican party to see if some correlation exists for their respective attitudes. Independents indicating as closer to the Democratic party are associated with a 42.38 percentage point increase in likelihood to re-

spond ‘Amend the Constitution’ with a p-value less than .01, compared to Independents that do not identify as closer to the Democratic party. Likewise, identifying as an Independent who is closer to the Republican party is associated with a 58.86 percentage point increase in likelihood to respond ‘Keep the current system’ with a p-value less than .01, compared to other Independents.

I observed strong results associated with left and right-leaning Independents for the second EC question as well. Left-leaning Independents were associated with a 29.88 percentage point increase in likelihood to express that the Electoral College is ‘Undemocratic and elitist’, and right-leaning Independents were associated with a 51.14 percentage point increase in likelihood to indicate that the Electoral College is a ‘Valued part of American democracy and federalism, both with high significance. A summary table displaying the effects of identifying as a left-leaning and right-leaning Independent on respective EC attitudes for both questions is below in Table 6.

My hypothesis that left and right-leaning Independents, compared to other Independents, will hold party biases when expressing EC opinions was true. Left-leaning independents are more likely to respond ‘Amend’ and indicate ‘Undemocratic,’ and likewise, right-leaning independents are more likely to respond ‘Keep’ and indicate ‘Valued.’ All four correlations have a p-value less than .01, and are high in magnitude. These numbers are even almost comparable with the correlations between partisans’ party identification and their party-congruent attitudes, from Table 2. This pattern may reveal deeper complexities about Independents in general. My hypothesis was based on an instinct that, despite originally identifying as Independent, many left and right-leaning Independents hold partisan biases to the same degree as their actual partisan-identifying counterparts. These results provide evidence for the theory that many Independents may be “hidden” or “closeted” partisans.

Table 6: Effect of Left and Right-Leaning Independent ID on Likelihood of EC Attitudes

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Amend the EC	Undemocratic...	Keep the EC	Valued...
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Left Ind ID	0.424*** (0.058)	0.299*** (0.057)		
Right Ind ID			0.589*** (0.059)	0.511*** (0.058)
Constant	-0.721 (4.315)	-1.748 (4.290)	5.172 (3.914)	12.342*** (3.823)
Observations	257	257	257	257
R ²	0.289	0.193	0.386	0.362
Adjusted R ²	0.226	0.121	0.331	0.305

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

While some level of party bias may exist for Independents, I find that they do not take party cues like their partisan counterparts. When testing how left and right-leaning Independents respond to the party cue, both groups did not see significant results for either EC question. Left-leaning Independents were actually associated with a decrease in likelihood to give pro-reform responses—a 3.43 percentage point decrease in likelihood to indicate ‘Amend’ and a 1.13 percentage point decrease in likelihood to express ‘Undemocratic.’ The positive coefficients associated with right-leaning Independents and pro-Electoral College responses were relatively weak and statistically insignificant. Table 7 below displays these results.

Table 7: Effect of Party Cue on Left and Right-Independents’ Likelihood of EC Attitudes

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Amend the EC (1)	Undemocratic... (2)	Keep the EC (3)	Valued.. (4)
leftindpartycue	-0.034 (0.126)	-0.011 (0.134)		
rightindpartycue			0.030 (0.124)	0.013 (0.175)
Constant	-1.244 (8.855)	2.324 (9.427)	1.705 (9.515)	10.877 (13.434)
Observations	73	73	41	41
R ²	0.165	0.224	0.266	0.150
Adjusted R ²	-0.037	0.037	-0.012x	-0.172

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

So, while left and right-leaning Independents are statistically more likely to indicate their respective opinions either in favor or opposed to EC reform, they are not easily influenced in the presence of a party cue. This lends support to the idea that Independents lack the psychological attachment felt towards party labels.

7.2.2 Political Sophistication

On political sophistication, I hypothesize that respondents with low levels of political sophistication rely on the party cue more frequently and strongly, compared to their more politically sophisticated counterparts. Since my political sophistication variable is conceptualized as the combination of the media usage and political interest variables, I first conduct regression tests for each of these factors individually.

The media usage variable is a numbered scale from 1 to 5 corresponding to level of media usage the respondent self-reported. To test differences between those with high levels of media usage and others, I created a dummy variable to separate and categorize the two groups. I chose to classify the top four groups as “high media usage” due to the distribution of my data. With 44% of respondents scoring in the lowest level of media usage, for the purposes of my analysis, I selected only these respondents to most precisely aim for the 50th percentile of my data.

After making separate subsets of respondents with low and high media scores, I tested the effect of whether or not they saw the party cue (treatment statements #3 and #6) on their likelihood to provide each response of the two EC questions. I test for all possible responses, because I do not have any assumptions about low and high media users’ pre-existing EC attitudes to only

test for one argument, unlike my tests for partisanship. At the same time, I control for party as a factor to ensure that the party cue is the only effect I am measuring in both subgroups of low and high media users.

In the group with low media usage scores, three significant relationships arose. I observed a 9.51 percentage point decrease in likelihood to respond ‘Keep the EC’ associated with seeing the party cue, which was statistically significant with a p-value less than .05. Compared to other low media users who did not see the cue, seeing the party cue was associated with a 7.73 increase in likelihood to respond ‘No Opinion’ when asked about reform with a p-value less than .05. Additionally, there was a significant correlation between seeing the party cue and answering ‘Don’t Know/Unsure’ for the second EC question for low media users. Overall, there is a slightly higher tendency to support reform, however these positive coefficients are statistically insignificant. Table 8 displaying the correlation coefficients associated with each response is below.

For respondents with high scores of media usage, there were no significant correlations that emerged from seeing the cue. Table 9 shows the effects of seeing the party cue on each response to both EC questions.

Comparing the previous two tables on low and high media usage respondents reveals several findings. First and most importantly, low media users saw a significant increase in expressing indifferent opinions to both EC questions. Furthermore, the coefficients attached to these attitudes of indifference (‘No Opinion’ and ‘Don’t Know/Unsure’) are very high in magnitude. Though there was a significant decrease in likelihood to support the current system, there is no consistent evidence across the other questions pointing to the conclusion that they are more pro-reform as a result of the cue. Though no correlations were significant in the high media usage group, I compared the coefficients attached to these aforementioned questions of interest. Contrary to low media

Table 8: Effect of Party Cue on Likelihood of EC Responses for Low Media Users

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Amend the EC	Keep the EC	No Opinion	Undemocratic...	Valued...	Too Complicated	Better Than Alt	Don't Know/Unsure
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
partycue	0.018 (0.049)	-0.095** (0.047)	0.077** (0.034)	0.005 (0.034)	-0.061 (0.046)	0.015 (0.045)	-0.035 (0.039)	0.080*** (0.030)
partyIndependent	-0.286*** (0.059)	0.110* (0.057)	0.176*** (0.041)	-0.203*** (0.043)	0.097* (0.055)	-0.124** (0.053)	0.007 (0.046)	0.127*** (0.036)
partyRepublican	-0.644*** (0.065)	0.544*** (0.063)	0.101** (0.045)	-0.432*** (0.043)	0.401*** (0.061)	-0.122** (0.059)	0.076 (0.051)	-0.001 (0.040)
partySomething else	-0.472*** (0.171)	0.124 (0.165)	0.348*** (0.118)	-0.089 (0.114)	0.034 (0.160)	-0.219 (0.156)	-0.057 (0.135)	0.270** (0.105)
Constant	-3.010 (4.091)	7.502* (3.942)	-3.491 (2.831)	0.931 (2.727)	12.766*** (3.817)	-0.160 (3.722)	-6.452** (3.223)	-3.073 (2.520)
Observations	312	312	312	703	312	312	312	312
R ²	0.322	0.298	0.196	0.157	0.210	0.073	0.126	0.106
Adjusted R ²	0.268	0.242	0.131	0.123	0.147	-0.002	0.056	0.035

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 9: Effect of Party Cue on Likelihood of EC Responses for High Media Users

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Amend the EC	Keep the EC	No Opinion	Undemocratic...	Valued...	Too Complicated	Better Than Alt	Don't Know/Unsure
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
partycue	-0.011 (0.045)	0.029 (0.044)	-0.017 (0.019)	0.027 (0.046)	0.009 (0.043)	0.038 (0.035)	-0.055 (0.037)	-0.018 (0.016)
partyIndependent	-0.369*** (0.059)	0.323*** (0.058)	0.047* (0.025)	-0.277*** (0.061)	0.224*** (0.056)	-0.035 (0.046)	0.060 (0.049)	0.027 (0.021)
partyRepublican	-0.568*** (0.055)	0.577*** (0.053)	-0.009 (0.024)	-0.483*** (0.056)	0.526*** (0.052)	-0.125*** (0.043)	0.081* (0.045)	0.001 (0.019)
partySomething else	-0.288** (0.143)	0.305** (0.139)	-0.018 (0.061)	-0.152 (0.147)	0.412*** (0.136)	-0.090 (0.112)	-0.161 (0.118)	-0.008 (0.051)
Constant	-3.085 (3.463)	6.006* (3.377)	-1.921 (1.489)	1.902 (3.555)	8.364** (3.292)	-1.920 (2.703)	-7.824*** (2.861)	0.477 (1.232)
Observations	391	391	391	391	391	391	391	391
R ²	0.302	0.321	0.135	0.214	0.295	0.088	0.081	0.029
Adjusted R ²	0.252	0.273	0.073	0.158	0.244	0.023	0.016	-0.040

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

usage respondents, respondents with high media usage observed a decrease in likelihood to express indifferent responses to both questions. And, compared to low media usage respondents that had negative correlations with giving pro-Electoral College responses ('Keep the EC' and 'Valued part...'), high media users saw increases in these likelihoods. These results show that respondents with low media usage may be adversely affected by the party cue. Rather than picking a stance, they are statistically likely to express indifference after seeing the party cue.

Even though I controlled for 'party' in the aforementioned tests on low and high media usage, I wanted to see if some cue-taking patterns emerged within each party. I created subgroups of low and high media users for each party, and tested their likelihood to express party-congruent opinions influenced by the cue. Republicans with low media usage saw a 1.67 percentage point increase in likelihood to respond 'Keep the current system,' and Republicans with high media usage saw a 1.55 percentage point increase in likelihood. Neither correlation was significant.

For Democrats, however there was an unexpected, very significant positive relationship among those with low media usage. Seeing the party cue was associated with a 21.29 percentage point increase in likelihood to respond 'Amend the Constitution' with a p-value less than .001. For Democrats with high media usage scores, seeing the party cue was associated with a 1.25 percentage point increase in likelihood to respond 'Amend,' but this was not statistically significant. See Table 10 below for this surprising finding associated with Democrats with low media usage.

Table 10: Effect of Party Cue on Likelihood of EC Responses for Partisans with Low Media Usage

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Keep the EC (1)	Valued... (2)	Amend the EC (3)	Undemocratic... (4)
Rpartycue	0.017 (0.113)	-0.114 (0.141)		
Dpartycue			0.213*** (0.069)	0.145 (0.089)
Constant	3.630 (7.929)	12.776 (9.854)	-0.974 (5.684)	0.768 (7.295)
Observations	65	65	145	145
R ²	0.260	0.112	0.161	0.114
Adjusted R ²	0.139	-0.034	0.049	-0.005

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The second and final component of political sophistication is political interest. I used a similar approach to divide respondents in equal groups. The political interest variable is a score from 0 to 4, calculated from their self-reported political engagement activity in the survey. Those in the bottom half of respondents with low scores of political interest correspond with a score of 0, 1, or 2; those with “high” political interest have a score of 3 or 4.

In the two separate subsets of low and high politically interested respondents, I measured the effect of whether or not they saw the party cue (treatment statements #3 and #6) on their likelihood to provide each response of the two EC questions. I test for all eight possible responses to both EC questions, similar to my previous tests on low and high media users. Like media usage, I also add a control for party to ensure that the party cue is the only effect I am measuring in both subgroups of low and high political interest.

First, in the group of respondents with low scores of political interest, Table

11 shows no significant results associated with any of the eight EC questions. Looking at the coefficient magnitudes, I notice that the greatest correlations associated with seeing the party cue is an increase with the response ‘Too Complicated’ and a decrease in responding ‘Not a great system, but better than any alternative’ in answer to the second EC question. There is slight evidence that seeing the party cue is associated pro-EC opinions, as shown by the increase with the ‘Keep the current system’ response and decrease in having ‘No Opinion’ for the first question, however there are no consistent opinion holdings across the other EC questions. Table 11 below summarizes these results.

Table 11: Effect of Party Cue on Likelihood of EC Responses for Low Political Interest Respondents

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Amend the EC (1)	Keep the EC (2)	No Opinion (3)	Undemocratic... (4)	Valued... (5)	Too Complicated (6)	Better Than Alt (7)	Don't Know/Unsure (8)
partycue	-0.009 (0.091)	0.045 (0.089)	-0.036 (0.076)	-0.015 (0.081)	-0.010 (0.081)	0.062 (0.084)	-0.066 (0.073)	0.030 (0.058)
partyIndependent	-0.250** (0.106)	0.059 (0.103)	0.191** (0.088)	-0.080 (0.094)	0.023 (0.094)	-0.145 (0.097)	0.037 (0.085)	0.166** (0.068)
partyRepublican	-0.581*** (0.120)	0.514*** (0.117)	0.067 (0.100)	-0.270** (0.107)	0.265** (0.106)	-0.126 (0.110)	0.186* (0.097)	-0.056 (0.077)
partySomething else	-0.451** (0.223)	0.240 (0.217)	0.211 (0.185)	0.112 (0.197)	0.057 (0.197)	-0.312 (0.204)	0.017 (0.179)	0.126 (0.143)
Constant	-6.215 (7.588)	7.966 (7.384)	-0.751 (6.311)	1.849 (6.718)	17.150** (6.711)	10.051 (6.947)	-19.440*** (6.090)	-8.610* (4.854)
Observations	118	118	118	118	118	118	118	118
R ²	0.310	0.252	0.213	0.287	0.215	0.201	0.292	0.165
Adjusted R ²	0.176	0.107	0.061	0.149	0.062	0.046	0.155	0.003

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

For respondents with high scores of political interest, like those of the low politically interested group, the coefficients across all EC responses were not statistically significant. See Table 12 for a summary of the findings.

Table 12: Effect of Party Cue on Likelihood of EC Responses for High Political Interest Respondents

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Amend the EC	Keep the EC	No Opinion	Undemocratic...	Valued...	Too Complicated	Better Than Alt	Don't Know/Unsure
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
partycue	0.001 (0.035)	-0.029 (0.035)	0.028 (0.017)	0.008 (0.038)	-0.010 (0.034)	0.021 (0.029)	-0.038 (0.028)	0.019 (0.016)
partyIndependent	-0.347*** (0.045)	0.279*** (0.045)	0.068*** (0.022)	-0.207*** (0.049)	0.210*** (0.044)	-0.076** (0.037)	0.022 (0.036)	0.051** (0.020)
partyRepublican	-0.622*** (0.044)	0.589*** (0.043)	0.034 (0.021)	-0.456*** (0.048)	0.524*** (0.043)	-0.125*** (0.036)	0.054 (0.035)	0.003 (0.019)
partySomething else	-0.274** (0.131)	0.272** (0.129)	0.002 (0.062)	-0.089 (0.141)	0.351*** (0.127)	-0.106 (0.106)	-0.139 (0.105)	-0.017 (0.058)
Constant	-2.621 (2.797)	5.158* (2.759)	-1.537 (1.334)	-1.105 (3.026)	7.144*** (2.720)	-2.581 (2.274)	-3.579 (2.244)	1.122 (1.233)
Observations	577	577	577	577	577	577	577	577
R ²	0.322	0.318	0.087	0.179	0.262	0.079	0.063	0.034
Adjusted R ²	0.289	0.285	0.042	0.138	0.226	0.034	0.017	-0.014

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

From looking at the previous two tables comparing low and high politically interested respondents, though no correlations were statistically significant, some coefficients that flipped direction and are high in magnitude can be analyzed. For the first EC question, the party cue seemed to have the largest positive effect on ‘Keep the EC’ for the low political interest group, and conversely, the ‘No Opinion’ stance for the high political interest group. Further, both groups saw negative and similar-in-magnitude correlations for the other response (and very slight, roughly 1 percentage point effects on ‘Amend the EC’), which leads me to assume that the party cue swayed the groups in opposite directions. For the first EC question alone, it can be concluded that respondents with low political interest are more likely to assume a pro-EC position on the issue after being given a party cue. However, the largest correlation remains with a decrease in likelihood to express that the EC is better

than any alternative system. And, there is still a relatively large increase in likelihood to admit that the EC is ‘Too Complicated.’ These inconsistent results may not show that respondents with low political interest are affected by the cue in either direction, and instead, reveal that the issue is still unfamiliar to them.

Similar to the first component of media usage, I was curious to see if partisans within each group were particularly swayed by the party cue. I conducted low vs. high political interest scores analyses after further narrowing the data sets by party. Republicans with both low and high political interest saw a decrease in likelihood to express ‘Keep the current system’ with insignificant results.

Low politically interested Democrats emerged again with significant results. For them, seeing the party cue was associated with a 7.41 percentage point increase in likelihood to respond ‘Amend the Constitution,’ compared to other Democrats with low political interest who did not see the cue. This was statistically significant with a p-value less than 0.1. When I ran the same test comparing party cue reception within the group of Democrats with high political interest scores, there was also a positive correlation of 6.96 percentage points, but was statistically insignificant. See Table 13 below for the significant correlation associated with Democrats with low political interest.

Table 13: Effect of Party Cue on Likelihood of EC Responses for Partisans with Low Political Interest

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Keep the EC (1)	Valued... (2)	Amend the EC (3)	Undemocratic... (4)
Rpartycue	-0.030 (0.069)	-0.037 (0.080)		
Dpartycue			0.074* (0.044)	0.103* (0.057)
Constant	6.551 (5.107)	13.657** (5.962)	0.988 (3.625)	5.344 (4.672)
Observations	164	164	323	323
R ²	0.161	0.129	0.079	0.048
Adjusted R ²	0.082	0.047	0.014	-0.019

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Finally, I combined the two scores representing media usage and political interest to create the political sophistication variable. This variable is represented by a score ranging from 1 to 9. To compare respondents with low and high levels, I made two categories where if the total score was a 5 or higher, they were considered someone with high political sophistication. By my methods of separating the groups, roughly 54.31% of the data set fell into this category. I also control for party to isolate the effect of the party cue.

In the group of respondents with low political sophistication scores, I observed two significant correlations. Compared to other low political sophistication respondents who did not see the cue, seeing the party cue is associated with a 5.93 percentage point increase in likelihood to respond ‘No Opinion’ with a p-value less than 0.1. Additionally, for the second EC question, there is an associated 6.07 percentage point increase in likelihood to respond ‘Don’t Know/Unsure’ with a p-value less than .05. Table 14 displays a summary of

these results.

Table 14: Effect of Party Cue on Likelihood of EC Responses for Low Political Sophistication Respondents

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Amend the EC (1)	Keep the EC (2)	No Opinion (3)	Undemocratic... (4)	Valued... (5)	Too Complicated (6)	Better Than Alt (7)	Don't Know/Unsure (8)
partycue	-0.0003 (0.048)	-0.059 (0.047)	0.059* (0.034)	-0.012 (0.052)	-0.060 (0.047)	0.022 (0.044)	-0.011 (0.038)	0.061** (0.029)
partyIndependent	-0.294*** (0.058)	0.134** (0.057)	0.160*** (0.041)	-0.097 (0.062)	0.099* (0.056)	-0.132** (0.053)	0.006 (0.046)	0.125*** (0.034)
partyRepublican	-0.671*** (0.063)	0.571*** (0.062)	0.100** (0.045)	-0.381*** (0.068)	0.387*** (0.061)	-0.153*** (0.058)	0.149*** (0.050)	-0.003 (0.038)
partySomething else	-0.423** (0.184)	0.204 (0.180)	0.219* (0.130)	0.064 (0.198)	0.072 (0.177)	-0.290* (0.168)	0.025 (0.145)	0.128 (0.110)
Constant	-1.671 (3.958)	7.286* (3.866)	-4.615* (2.797)	-0.889 (4.255)	13.630*** (3.801)	-0.315 (3.605)	-8.761*** (3.112)	-2.665 (2.355)
Observations	315	315	315	315	315	315	315	315
R ²	0.327	0.287	0.160	0.162	0.191	0.083	0.128	0.095
Adjusted R ²	0.279	0.236	0.100	0.102	0.133	0.017	0.066	0.030

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

For respondents with high political sophistication scores, there were no statistically significant results across all EC responses. See Table 15 for these results.

The two tests comparing respondents with low and high political sophistication shows several relationships. In regards to my hypothesis, which stated that respondents with low levels of political sophistication will rely on the party cue more frequently and strongly, I first find that neither group had strong opinions influenced by the party cue. The first EC question provides some insight into how strongly each group leans on either side of the argument; the party cue in both groups have a very minimal, less than 1 percentage point influence on the likelihood of ‘Amend the EC’ and the strongest correlation is in Table 12, a decrease in likelihood to ‘Keep the EC’ among low politically

Table 15: Effect of Party Cue on Likelihood of EC Responses for High Political Sophistication Respondents

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Amend the EC	Keep the EC	No Opinion	Undemocratic...	Valued...	Too Complicated	Better Than Alt	Don't Know/Unsure
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
partycue	-0.002 (0.046)	0.013 (0.045)	-0.011 (0.018)	0.040 (0.048)	0.001 (0.043)	0.026 (0.036)	-0.050 (0.038)	-0.018 (0.017)
partyIndependent	-0.356*** (0.061)	0.323*** (0.060)	0.033 (0.024)	-0.275*** (0.064)	0.228*** (0.057)	-0.038 (0.048)	0.054 (0.050)	0.032 (0.022)
partyRepublican	-0.548*** (0.056)	0.566*** (0.055)	-0.018 (0.022)	-0.467*** (0.058)	0.548*** (0.052)	-0.107** (0.044)	0.023 (0.046)	0.003 (0.020)
partySomething else	-0.280* (0.144)	0.295** (0.140)	-0.015 (0.056)	-0.150 (0.149)	0.413*** (0.134)	-0.087 (0.112)	-0.170 (0.118)	-0.006 (0.052)
Constant	-4.024 (3.551)	6.182* (3.470)	-1.158 (1.382)	1.350 (3.684)	7.500** (3.327)	-2.993 (2.762)	-5.414* (2.907)	0.556 (1.277)
Observations	380	380	380	380	380	380	380	380
R ²	0.297	0.316	0.140	0.200	0.307	0.082	0.074	0.029
Adjusted R ²	0.246	0.266	0.077	0.141	0.256	0.014	0.006	-0.042

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

sophisticated respondents. However, this attitude is inconsistent across the other EC questions so I cannot conclude that respondents with low political sophistication are uniformly pro-reform. The most important result that arose is the significant relationships between seeing the party cue and an increase in likelihood to have ‘No Opinion’ and indicate ‘Don’t Know/Unsure’ among low politically sophisticated respondents. This is seemingly the opposite of what I expected, because I theorized the cue would act as a useful heuristic that would prompt respondents to form opinions. Not only are these surprising correlations significant, but they are of higher magnitude compared to all other correlations in Table 15.

Like its components, the factor of political sophistication and its two levels were analyzed by party as well. Republicans did not have significant results, with a 7.05 percentage point decrease in Republicans with low political so-

phistication and a 2.16 percentage point decrease in Republicans with high political sophistication, in regards to likelihood to respond ‘Keep the EC’ as a result of the cue. Democrats, on the other hand, saw a significant party cue influence in Democrats with low political sophistication. Seeing the party cue is associated with a 24.38 percentage point increase in likelihood to indicate ‘Amend the EC’ at a p-value of less than .01. Highly political sophisticated Democrats also saw a positive relationship, 3.25 percentage points, but this was insignificant.

To highlight the significant effect in Democrats that is absent in their Republican counterparts, see Table 16 below illustrating party cue effects on the two groups of partisans reporting low political sophistication.

Table 16: Effect of Party Cue on Likelihood of EC Responses for Partisans with Low Political Sophistication

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Keep the EC (1)	Valued... (2)	Amend the EC (3)	Undemocratic... (4)
Rpartycue	0.069 (0.112)	-0.168 (0.133)		
Dpartycue			0.181*** (0.068)	0.112 (0.088)
Observations	69	69	143	143
R ²	0.199	0.123	0.162	0.115
Adjusted R ²	0.076	-0.011	0.055	0.002

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

7.2.3 Political Knowledge

My hypothesis on political knowledge influencing cue-taking behavior follows the same pattern as political sophistication, in that respondents with low political knowledge will form opinions that are more reliant on party cues. Moreover, I expect this cue-taking behavior to be stronger, because research supports the theory that these patterns are magnified when pertaining to issues of low salience.

I measure political knowledge through respondents' scores on the knowledge section of the survey. Not including the attention check question, there were a total of five questions pertaining to the Electoral College as an institution, how it works in the election process, and the processes outlined in the Constitution. Scores ranged from 1 to 5, which means that everyone answered at least one question correctly. I create two groups of respondents with low and high political knowledge to compare cue-taking behaviors. Respondents with a score of 4 or above are considered "highly knowledgeable," and they make up a proportion of roughly 76% of my data.

In the group with low knowledge scores, seeing the party cue is not statistically correlated with any of the EC responses. The highest correlation by magnitude appears to be associated with the 'Too Complicated' response, an increase of 4.91 percentage points. See Table 17 for a summary of the results.

For respondents with high knowledge scores, there were also no statistically significant relationships associated with any EC responses. See Table 18 below.

The two tables of low and high political knowledge respondents appear to have very similar correlations associated with each response, in terms of direction and magnitude. For the first EC question, the impact of the cue seems to be slightly stronger for respondents with high knowledge scores for

Table 17: Effect of Party Cue on Likelihood of EC Responses for Low Political Knowledge Responses

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Amend the EC	Keep the EC	No Opinion	Undemocratic...	Valued...	Too Complicated	Better Than Alt	Don't Know/Unsure
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
partycue	0.001 (0.077)	-0.017 (0.076)	0.016 (0.036)	-0.023 (0.077)	-0.018 (0.070)	0.049 (0.054)	-0.017 (0.059)	0.008 (0.042)
partyIndependent	-0.288*** (0.100)	0.088 (0.099)	0.200*** (0.047)	-0.138 (0.100)	0.041 (0.090)	-0.185*** (0.070)	0.126 (0.077)	0.157*** (0.055)
partyRepublican	-0.461*** (0.093)	0.467*** (0.092)	-0.007 (0.043)	-0.275*** (0.092)	0.361*** (0.084)	-0.132** (0.065)	0.066 (0.071)	-0.020 (0.051)
partySomething else	-0.386 (0.303)	0.071 (0.300)	0.315** (0.142)	-0.186 (0.301)	-0.213 (0.273)	0.067 (0.213)	0.364 (0.232)	-0.032 (0.165)
Constant	10.917* (6.005)	-6.533 (5.955)	-3.383 (2.813)	12.237** (5.977)	0.738 (5.427)	-0.489 (4.220)	-9.821** (4.596)	-1.664 (3.271)
Observations	168	168	168	168	168	168	168	168
R ²	0.192	0.179	0.212	0.119	0.185	0.189	0.127	0.100
Adjusted R ²	0.106	0.092	0.128	0.025	0.099	0.103	0.034	0.005

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 18: Effect of Party Cue on Likelihood of EC Responses for High Political Knowledge Respondents

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Amend the EC	Keep the EC	No Opinion	Undemocratic...	Valued...	Too Complicated	Better Than Alt	Don't Know/Unsure
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
partycue	0.013 (0.036)	-0.026 (0.035)	0.014 (0.023)	0.024 (0.039)	-0.033 (0.035)	0.032 (0.032)	-0.049 (0.030)	0.026 (0.017)
partyIndependent	-0.344*** (0.044)	0.258*** (0.043)	0.086*** (0.028)	-0.238*** (0.048)	0.210*** (0.044)	-0.040 (0.039)	0.010 (0.037)	0.058*** (0.021)
partyRepublican	-0.650*** (0.046)	0.608*** (0.045)	0.042 (0.029)	-0.483*** (0.049)	0.510*** (0.045)	-0.116*** (0.041)	0.084** (0.038)	0.005 (0.022)
partySomething else	-0.397*** (0.115)	0.311*** (0.111)	0.085 (0.072)	-0.116 (0.123)	0.333*** (0.112)	-0.179* (0.101)	-0.168* (0.095)	0.130** (0.055)
Constant	-6.046** (2.857)	10.062*** (2.764)	-3.016* (1.797)	-2.189 (3.062)	11.541*** (2.802)	-2.027 (2.525)	-5.794** (2.375)	-0.530 (1.365)
Observations	535	535	535	535	535	535	535	535
R ²	0.357	0.360	0.094	0.216	0.268	0.074	0.092	0.041
Adjusted R ²	0.323	0.326	0.045	0.174	0.229	0.025	0.044	-0.010

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

both sides of the issue, ‘Amend’ and ‘Keep’ the EC. In turn, there is also a lower tendency to have ‘No Opinion.’ The correlations associated with all five responses to the second EC question have no major differences between the groups; the only exception is that respondents with low knowledge scores are associated with a 2.29 *decrease* in likelihood to respond ‘Undemocratic and elitist,’ while respondents with high knowledge scores are associated with a 2.44 *increase* in likelihood. However, both of these correlations are statistically insignificant, and similar to the factor of political sophistication, these pro-Electoral College and pro-reform attitudes are not consistent across the table for the rest of the questions.

In terms of my hypothesis, there is no evidence that points to respondents with low political knowledge following the party cue for either side of the argument. Unlike the results for political sophistication, there is no evidence that they steer the other direction and take indifferent attitudes on the issue either. What is highly interesting is the fact that the results for both groups are almost identical, when compared side-by-side. This implies that knowledge on the Electoral College cannot be assumed as a factor that differentiates respondents’ cue-taking behavior in the first place.

8 Conclusion

8.1 Discussions

Several conclusions can be drawn from my collected data. First of all, on cue-taking effects controlling for party, the party cue had almost no effect on the ‘Amend the EC’ response across all factors; this correlation was consistently insignificant only around 1 percentage point (see Tables 8 through 18).

In other words, regardless of differing levels of media usage, political interest, political sophistication, and political knowledge, the party cue does not have a strong effect on making people more, or even less, pro-reform. Instead, the influence of the party cue was directed towards the other two responses, ‘Keep the EC’ and ‘No Opinion,’ in either positive or negative directions.

Second, although no decisive conclusions can be drawn about how respondents with low political knowledge or low political sophistication respond to a party cue, certain patterns emerged when I investigated the individual components of sophistication—media usage and political interest. Those with low levels of media usage, or with political media consumption levels between 0 and 30 minutes a day, were affected by the party cue in such a way that encouraged them to take a neutral stance. For both EC questions, they were statistically more likely to elect the indifferent response choice over other options. This implies that the relationship between level of media usage and cue-taking behavior may be different than I originally assumed. Perhaps consuming less media does not automatically make someone more susceptible to party and/or elite cues. For my research, I rely on Guo and Moy’s [1998] operationalization of media usage as a crucial component of political sophistication and therefore do not study media consumption in isolation. Other scholars, however, have conducted vast research on media studies and posit relevant theories. Higher exposure and use of media is associated with higher political knowledge and efficacy [Kenski and Stroud, 2006, Aarts and Semetko, 2003], so it may be that their higher tendency to provide responses speaks more to their knowledge on the issue, and not necessarily that they responded to the party cue. If this relationship is true, for people who consume less media, they are simply not knowledgeable enough to pick a stance even when provided a party cue.

For political interest as a component, as in how politically active one is,

comparing the same EC questions between low and high scoring respondents revealed a positive effect associated with the ‘Keep the EC’ response in respondents with low political interest, and a decrease in likelihood for respondents with high political interest. While this may lead me to believe that the former is influenced by the cue to hold pro-Electoral College views, especially when compared to their higher scoring counterparts, I would still be hesitant. Given that there remains a high correlation associated with the response describing the Electoral College as ‘Too Complicated’ and that none of these coefficients are statistically significant, I do not think merely comparing numbers and directions between the two groups on certain questions is enough to draw conclusions on opinion-changing patterns.

Additional and unexpected cue-taking patterns appeared when I separated these groups further by party. Democrats with low media usage and low political interest scores were the only groups with a significant, positive correlation associated with their party-congruent, ‘Amend the EC’ response. When these components were combined into the political sophistication factor, Democrats with low levels of political sophistication also remained the only impacted group. Their Democratic counterparts with higher scores, in addition to Republicans separated by low and high scores for both components, did not see significant relationships and had correlations of much lesser magnitude. This implies that examining low and high scorers on various factors do not directly reveal differences in cue-taking behavior. Sometimes, these patterns only exist for certain political parties. Interestingly, these regressions also illuminated the fact that Republicans sometimes experience a *reverse* effect from the party cue. In all but one regression, Republicans of low and high levels of media usage, political interest, and political sophistication saw a decrease in likelihood to respond ‘Keep the EC.’ This affirms something peculiar I found in Table 3

analyzing strong partisanship, that strong Republicans saw a negative correlation in one of the EC responses, ‘Valued part of American democracy and federalism.’

Discovering significant cue-taking patterns for Democrats, specifically those with low media usage and low political interest, is plausible, given my results in the ‘Partisanship’ section. I not only established partisanship as a powerful factor influencing EC opinion formation, but on cue-taking, found significant party cue influence for Democrats and not Republicans. In combination with my initial instincts that those with lower scores in these aspects will be more receptive to the cue, it makes sense that low-scoring Democrats are the most susceptible group. It is interesting to note that even though low-scoring Democrats and Republicans were scored on the same scale, there is something about identifying as a Democrat that magnifies the disparity between the low and high scoring groups.

In addition to the evidence presented in the ‘Partisanship’ results section, party remained a significant factor in the rest of the regression tables as well. Independents, Republicans, and even sometimes the ‘Something else’ write-in partisans consistently have different likelihoods of responding to EC questions when compared to Democrats, the reference category. These correlations exist across all factors, are statistically significant, and are of high magnitude. Even when compared to the party cue variable (the independent variable) in the respective column for a given EC response, these party factors are often four to five times the magnitude. This points to the true power of partisanship that persists and underlies a party cue.

While the control factor of partisanship proved to be highly influential across all tests, some demographic factors emerged as significant too. Compared to Female as the reference category, identifying as Male was almost

always significant and biased towards pro-Electoral College response types. This was evident in one, or both, of the coefficients under ‘Amend the EC’ and ‘Keep the EC,’ and sometimes a few responses under the second EC question. Slightly less frequently significant but also evident was the race factor of identifying as White. Compared to Asians as the reference category, identifying as White is associated with a positive likelihood in holding pro-Electoral College attitudes, corroborated by responses to both EC questions. For both Male and White variables, the correlations were more significant and larger in magnitude in Republicans than Democrats, which is something I observed in certain regressions where I measured effects by party (Tables 2 through 4). For age, a couple of responses consistently came up with significant correlations. For each year someone is born after 1932, there appears to be a slight decrease in likelihood to express ‘Keep the EC’ and/or believe that the EC is a ‘Valued part of American democracy and federalism.’ This means that the younger someone is, the more they hold attitudes that reject the Electoral College. However, the associations are only with these two responses and is not consistent with other pro-reform expressions. Additionally, a statistically significant, positive correlation frequently shows up with the response ‘Not a great system, but better than any alternative’ for younger people as well. Finally, some education level variables significantly associated with certain responses, however the attitudes were not consistent across other EC responses or corroborated by other tables; it is unlikely to conclude that, for example, having less educational background makes one either more prone to either position or indifferent on the issue.

8.2 Areas of Bias and Limitations

As my first long-term, independent research project, I encountered many bumps along the way. From redesigning my treatment plan multiple times to writing over 100 lines of code just to wrangle my data, I tried to overcome these challenges by seeking outside guidance. But, like any other project, this thesis is not perfect. There are certainly biases and research errors that I would be remiss not to acknowledge.

The issue of priming bias was something that frequently came up as I was developing my survey. I knew which sections and questions I wanted to include in my survey, but ordering them in any particular way was crucial. An important decision I made was where to insert the Electoral College treatment statements and the subsequent questions on attitude. There are certain benefits to providing it upfront, so I can get a top-of-the-mind reaction without the influence of anything they could have read prior [SurveyMonkey, 2022]. However, it's beneficial to get crucial, background data at the outset of the survey, on both ends for research purposes and also for the respondent who is familiarizing themselves with the survey. Additionally, it is common for these questions to come first in other survey studies, and it does not produce any major biases. I chose to put the Electoral College treatments and questions at the end, after the demographic questions (omitting the question on yearly income) and questions about political party and behavior. Although I was still prone to priming biases, such as the possibility of respondents adjusting their reaction to the party cue because they are aware their self-identified party is relevant to my research, but after weighing multiple options with Dr. Valentino, we decided this was the safest design that would produce the best quality results.

Many of my survey questions asked respondents to self-report information, and therefore my data collection methods were undoubtedly affected by this bias. On media usage, respondents first selected all of the media sources they use for political news to get them thinking about their media usage, and then was asked to compartmentalize the average amount of time they spend consuming political news in 30 minute increments. Not only is this extremely hard to remember, but Price and Zaller [1990] find that self-reports of media exposure are weak reports of actual news reception. The general consensus is that, when asked to self-report, respondents tend to overestimate their news exposure [Prior, 2009]. Moreover, many studies conducted on political news usage find considerable differences in content and quality across various media outlets and platforms, which I did not consider [Guo and Moy, 1998, Aarts and Semetko, 2003, Neuman et al., 1992]. Secondly, I ask survey respondents to self-report their political engagement, including voter registration, turnout in local and presidential elections, and rally attendance. Though these are simple yes/no questions, people tend to give themselves the benefit of the doubt in many situations. In fact, self-reported voter turnout has averaged about 20 times higher than actual turnout in ANES surveys [Bernstein et al., 2001]. The level of overreporting for both media usage and political engagement varies across surveys and over time, but my survey was definitely prone to these biases.

Finally, a foundational aspect of my research that may have gone awry was my conceptualization of factors, such as political sophistication and political knowledge. In an ideal world, I would have conducted exhaustive research, collecting and synthesizing all surveys and their results to come up with my own working definition of these factors. Additionally, I would consult a guide that instructed how to properly operationalize and test my factors of interest.

Unfortunately, neither of these were in my capabilities.

8.3 Future Areas of Research

My theory-based regressions and overall patterns from my data indicate that there is large potential for future research in several directions.

On the issue of Electoral College reform, I was surprised by how frequently respondents relied on responses of indifference, such as ‘No Opinion’ and ‘Don’t Know/Unsure,’ and other moderate sentiments, like ‘Too Complicated’ and ‘Not a great system, but better than any alternative.’ Though I provided a party cue with the aim that it will act as a useful heuristic, American voters are still hesitant to take a stance on the issue. Opinions are driven by partisanship, a correlation that is bolstered by past research testing party cues on low salience topics, so what is the disconnect when it comes to the Electoral College?

I posit several research ideas to explain why the party cue was largely ineffective. First, I would be curious to collect data on where voters receive information on the Electoral College issue. Knowing that it is not as salient as other policy issues in the media, I should not have assumed that information on the issue is disseminated through traditional media. Pinpointing how voters learn about the issue may provide a better idea on how they will be most receptive to a party cue. Another possible explanation points to the current state of partisanship. Perhaps Lilliana Mason [2018] was on the right track when she believed that partisan identity is most pervasive at the social level. The label ‘Democrat’ or ‘Republican’ could mean nothing more than a feeling of association with others sharing similar interests, and not as a heuristic voters look to for guidance on policy issues. To test this theory, I would implement a

treatment cue that shows varying levels of partisan support for the argument (i.e. 50% of Democrats believe, 60% or most of Democrats believe, 90% or nearly all Democrats believe...) and see if partisans are swayed to take the same stance.

Knowing that partisanship is a strong predictor of EC attitudes for even left and right-leaning Independents, I would be interested in studying Independent behavior and looking more into the phenomenon of “hidden partisans.” Klar and Krupnikov [2016] contend that the presence of partisan disagreement and increased concern for how one is perceived leads to Americans concealing their partisanship. But, they are still politically active and, as my results show, subject to partisan biases. Given that Independents make up nearly a fourth of my data and are growing in numbers in the American electorate, studying their motives would reveal information about the state of polarization today and the persistence of party identity, even if it is not explicitly stated.

If given more resources and time, I would be curious to investigate the Electoral College as an information issue in my survey. I would expand my treatment design to include a group that gauges opinion on the Electoral College reform issue after providing *no information at all*. This way, I can compare the responses from those who received a partisan cue, those who received no cue, and those who received no background information. I suspect that there will be the largest lack of attitude consistency in the group that received no information.

Other psychological aspects of how the Electoral College issue is presented adds further complexity to the research. Michael D. Cobb and James H. Kuklinski [1997] comparatively test the effects of pro and con arguments, hypothesizing that con arguments will be most persuasive; they discover that, after measuring subjects’ opinions at different points in time, arguments against

the policy issues of NAFTA and healthcare changed more minds than those in support. Even in survey variations that rearranged the arguments, the con argument continued to have a larger effect on citizens' opinions than the pro argument.

Also mentioned in the article, the distinction between “hard” and “easy” arguments influence how citizens form opinions. Both policy proposals of NAFTA and healthcare were complicated, however the researchers expected the content of the NAFTA proposal to be less familiar to the average voter. The results from their study confirmed that the NAFTA, hard-con argument was the most persuasive, displayed by its largest primacy and recency effects. Edward G. Carmines and James A. Stimson [1980] define hard issues as technical, concerning means, and relatively new in politics. Meanwhile, easy issues are symbolic, refer to policy ends rather than means, and are familiar to voters. It is interesting to think about the psychological factors that play into studying public opinion, especially when using less salient policy issues where these psychological biases might be more prevalent. Existing public opinion research covers relevant political characteristics of the individual, such as voting behavior and media usage, but I would be curious to study the influence of personality on forming opinions on policy. A few examples of personalities that have been linked to political behavior are authoritarianism and traits such as openness to experience and conscientiousness as part of the “Big Five Framework” [Altemeyer, 2008, Carney et al., 2008]).

Finally, the surprising finding that some Democrats are highly influenced by the cue, whereas their Republican counterparts are not at all, can support future studies on partisan attachment. Though I didn't hypothesize any difference to arise, which is why I only tested for the party congruent response ‘Amend the EC,’ I would be curious to conduct more regressions on this group

of Democrats to see if other types of EC responses were likewise affected. Moreover, if this group of Democrats are as highly impacted by the cue as the figures suggest, other studies could examine how they respond to more subtle, implicit party cues.

These findings can also be useful for researchers interested in normative political science. Studying the underlying values and characteristics of Democrats that possibly differentiate them from other partisans can have deeper implications. What does this tell us about the purpose of partisanship in the U.S. today, and could Mason's [2018] theory be updated? Do different partisans hold different perceptions on the importance of partisanship? What are the basis of these nuances? These are open-ended questions on partisanship that I have only begun to develop and would be excited to explore further.

9 Appendix

9.1 Full Survey Questionnaire

Attitudes Toward the Electoral College - survey

Start of Block: Intro

Hello! Welcome to my survey.

The researcher is asking for your consent to participate in a study about your opinions on the Electoral College. Participation in this study is completely voluntary, and your answers will remain anonymous.

If you do decide to participate, you may stop and withdraw from the study at any time. The study should take approximately 10 minutes to complete. Upon completion of the survey, you will receive a small compensation of \$1 for your participation. Note: if you fail the attention check question, the survey will end and you will not receive compensation.

We will protect the confidentiality of your research records by maintaining anonymity. Information collected in this project may be shared with other researchers, but we will not share any information that could identify you.

By proceeding, you are indicating that you have read the description of the study, are over the age of 18, and that you agree to the terms as described. If you have any questions, contact the researcher, Isabelle Zhan (izhan@umich.edu), or the faculty advisor, Lisa Disch (ldisch@umich.edu).

Thank you in advance for your participation!

End of Block: Intro

Start of Block: Worker ID

What is your Worker ID?

Start of Block: Demographics

Q1 What gender do you identify as?

- Male (1)
 - Female (2)
 - Non-binary / third gender (3)
 - Prefer not to say (4)
-

Q2 In what year were you born?

▼ 2004 (1) ... 1914 (91)

Q3 What racial or ethnic groups best describes you?

- Black (African American) (1)
- Asian (2)
- Native American (3)
- Hispanic or Latino (4)
- White (5)
- Other/Unknown (7) _____
- Prefer not to say (8)

Q4 What is the highest degree or level of education you have completed?

- Less than high school (1)
- High school (2)
- Some college (3)
- College degree (4)
- Master's degree (5)
- PhD or some professional degree (6)
- Prefer not to say (7)

End of Block: Demographics

Start of Block: Party Question

Q5 Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?

- Republican (1)
- Democrat (2)
- Independent (3)
- Something else (4)

End of Block: Party Question

Start of Block: If Independent

Q5a Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party?

- Closer to the Republican Party (1)
- Closer to the Democratic Party (2)
- Neither (3)

End of Block: If Independent

Start of Block: If something else

Q5b What is that?

End of Block: If something else

Start of Block: If Democrat

Q5c Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat?

- Strong Democrat (1)
- Not Very Strong Democrat (2)

End of Block: If Democrat

Start of Block: If Republican

Q5d Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican?

- Strong Republican (1)
- Not Very Strong Republican (2)

End of Block: If Republican

Start of Block: Political Awareness

Q6 Through which forms of media do you consume political news? Select all that apply.

Print publications (1)

Television (2)

Social media (3)

Digital newsletter (4)

Website/App (5)

Radio (6)

Q7 How much time do you spend consuming political news per day?

▼ 0 to 30 minutes (1) ... More than 2 hours (5)

Q8 In the past year have you attended any political rallies, demonstrations, protests, meetings, or any other such events?

Yes (1)

No (2)

Page Break

Q9 Are you registered to vote?

- Yes (1)
 - No (2)
 - Don't Know (3)
-

Q10 In the last 5 years did you vote in a local election? This includes voting for sheriffs, mayors, or school board members.

- Yes (1)
 - No (2)
-

Q11 Have you ever voted in a Presidential election?

- Yes (1)
 - No (2)
-

Q12 How confident are you that your vote is counted in the presidential election?

- Very confident (1)
- Somewhat confident (2)
- Not very confident (3)
- Not at all confident (4)
- Don't know (5)

End of Block: Political Awareness

Start of Block: EC True/False

The following questions will ask about the Electoral College.

Answer the following true/false questions to the best of your ability.

Q13 The presidential candidate who receives the most number of votes from U.S. citizens always wins the election.

- True (1)
 - False (2)
-

Q14 A state's share of Electoral College votes are apportioned according to the number of representatives and senators it sends to Congress.

- True (1)
 - False (2)
-



Q15 It is important that you pay attention during this survey. Please select "True" for this question.

- True (1)
 - False (2)
-

Q16 A presidential candidate must win a majority of Electoral College votes — at least 270 — in order to win the election.

- True (1)
 - False (2)
-

Q17 Members of the Electoral College are required by the Constitution to cast their vote for the candidate who received the most votes in their respective state.

- True (1)
 - False (2)
-

Q18 If no candidate wins a majority of Electoral College votes, a runoff election is held in the House of Representatives.

- True (1)
 - False (2)
-

End of Block: EC True/False

Start of Block: Treatment #1

Please read the following passage carefully:



Some legislators in Congress say we should preserve the Electoral College system of electing a President because it preserves the ideal of federalism and protects the voices of small states. They argue that a direct, popular election of the president could lead to what James Madison called tyranny of the majority without consent of the minority. They say that the founding fathers knew what they were doing and succeeded in creating a stable democracy. Finally, the Electoral College protects the two-party system and political moderation.

End of Block: Treatment #1

Start of Block: Treatment #2

Please read the following passage carefully:



Some legislators in Congress say we should abolish the Electoral College system of electing the President because it is undemocratic and elitist. They argue that the candidate who receives the most votes should win the Presidency. It bothers them when there's a mismatch in the outcome that voters want and what the Electoral College produces. Opponents argue that the Electoral College is a "distorted" way of counting votes, because states with small populations get more than their fair share of Electoral College votes.

End of Block: Treatment #2

Start of Block: Treatment #3

Please read the following passage carefully:





Some Democrats in Congress say we should abolish the Electoral College system of electing the President because it is undemocratic and elitist. These Democrats argue that the candidate who receives the most votes should win the Presidency. It bothers them when there's a mismatch in the outcome that voters want and what the Electoral College produces. Opponents argue that the Electoral College is a "distorted" way of counting votes, because states with small populations get more than their fair share of Electoral College votes.

End of Block: Treatment #3

Start of Block: Treatment #4

Please read the following passage carefully:



Some Democrats in Congress say we should preserve the Electoral College system of electing a President because it preserves the ideal of federalism and protects the voices of small states. These Democrats argue that a direct, popular election of the president could lead to what James Madison called tyranny of the majority without consent of the minority. They say that the founding fathers knew what they were doing and succeeded in creating a stable democracy. Finally, the Electoral College protects the two-party system and political moderation.

End of Block: Treatment #4

Start of Block: Treatment #5

Please read the following passage carefully:



Some Republicans in Congress say we should abolish the Electoral College system of electing the President because it is undemocratic and elitist. These Republicans argue that the candidate who receives the most votes should win the Presidency. It bothers them when there's a mismatch in the outcome that voters want and what the Electoral College produces. Opponents argue that the Electoral College is a "distorted" way of counting votes, because states with small populations get more than their fair share of Electoral College votes.

End of Block: Treatment #5

Start of Block: Treatment #6

Please read the following passage carefully:



Some Republicans in Congress say we should preserve the Electoral College system of electing a President because it preserves the ideal of federalism and protects the voices of small states. These Republicans argue that a direct, popular election of the president could lead to what James Madison called tyranny of the majority without consent of the minority. They say that the founding fathers knew what they were doing and succeeded in creating a stable democracy. Finally, the Electoral College protects the two-party system and political moderation.

End of Block: Treatment #6

Start of Block: Block 8

Thinking about the way we elect presidents in the United States...

Q19 Would you prefer to amend the Constitution so the candidate who receives the most total votes nationwide wins the election, or to keep the current system, in which the candidate who wins the most votes in the Electoral College wins the election?

- Amend the Constitution (1)
 - Keep the current system (2)
 - No opinion (3)
-



Q20 Which description most accurately describes the Electoral College?

- Undemocratic and elitist (1)
- Valued part of American democracy and federalism (2)
- Too complicated (3)
- Not a great system, but better than any alternative (4)
- Don't Know/Unsure (5)

End of Block: Block 8

Start of Block: Block 10

Q41 Here is your ID: [\\${e://Field/Random%20ID}](#)

Copy this value to paste into MTurk. When you have copied this ID, please click the next button to submit the survey.

End of Block: Block 10

9.2 Data Wrangling Procedures

Before exporting my survey responses out of Qualtrics, I added two columns of necessary data. First, the 'score' variable calculates the respondents' score on the political knowledge section, which makes it easier to compare scores across responses. I also needed a column showing which treatment cue each respondent saw, which becomes integral when I conduct regressions comparing the effect of different cues.

After exporting the survey responses from Qualtrics to a CSV file and then into R, I cleaned the raw data to make them usable. In order to run basic regressions and descriptive statistics, I first eliminated columns that contained irrelevant survey data, such as the Worker ID which was only useful for my organizational purposes, the start and end times, and IP address attached to each response. I then renamed the columns into meaningful variable names. "Q1" was now "gen" representing gender, "Q2" was now "birth_yr" for the respondent's year of birth, and so on.

I had to reformat my variables of interest so they were usable in my regressions, usually turning them from character to numeric format. I made a new column converting the 30 minute increments of media consumption into a numbered scale ('0 to 30 minutes' = 1, '30 minutes to an hour' = 2, etc.). To count the number of media sources they use, I used a command in R to literally count the commas in their response plus 1 and created a numbered scale. I also made a numbered scale for the political interest variable by counting whenever they indicated 'Yes' to any of the four questions asking about their political engagement. Finally, I simply added the scores from media usage and political interest to make a new column for political engagement, a scale of larger range from 1 to 9.

To set up my regressions, I created a lot of dummy variables to be usable as either the dependent variable (a particular response to one of the EC questions) or the independent variable (whether or not they saw the party cue). For example, I made a dummy variable for whether or not the respondent indicated ‘Amend the EC’ and used the ‘ec_reform_Amend’ variable as the dependent variable, and so on for the other seven possible responses. For the independent variable, whether or not they saw the cue, I dummified if the respondent saw either treatment statements 3 or 6 (the statements with the party-congruent attitude) or statements 1 or 2 (the statements with no party label, acting as a control). I made so many dummy variables that my full data set had around 80 total columns, with over half of them just being binary variables. I repeated this regression design in different data subgroups (just Democrats, or just right-leaning Independents, or respondents with low media usage scores, or Republicans with high political sophistication, as examples).

9.3 Tables

Table 1: Effect of Argument Cues on Likelihood of EC Attitudes

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	ec_reform_Amend	ec_reform_Keep
	(1)	(2)
amendcues	-0.089*** (0.027)	
keepcues		-0.063** (0.026)
raceAsian,White	0.016 (0.153)	-0.014 (0.148)
raceAsian,White,Other/Unknown	0.561 (0.434)	-0.381 (0.421)
raceBlack (African American)	-0.107 (0.072)	0.117* (0.070)
raceBlack (African American),Hispanic or Latino	0.179 (0.309)	-0.133 (0.300)
raceBlack (African American),Hispanic or Latino,White	-0.853** (0.434)	-0.098 (0.421)
raceBlack (African American),White	-0.319 (0.200)	0.041 (0.194)
raceHispanic or Latino	-0.028 (0.087)	0.026 (0.084)
raceHispanic or Latino,White	0.186 (0.157)	-0.104 (0.152)
raceNative American	0.045 (0.184)	0.043 (0.178)
raceNative American,Hispanic or Latino,White	-0.349 (0.444)	0.598 (0.431)
raceNative American,White	-0.096 (0.255)	0.166 (0.247)
raceNative American,White,Other/Unknown	-0.304 (0.435)	0.366 (0.423)
raceOther/Unknown	-0.211 (0.161)	0.202 (0.157)
racePrefer not to say	-0.002 (0.203)	0.028 (0.197)
raceWhite	-0.063 (0.056)	0.079 (0.054)
eduHigh school	-0.018 (0.047)	-0.041 (0.046)
eduLess than high school	-0.387 (0.250)	0.144 (0.243)
eduMaster's degree	-0.047 (0.041)	0.053 (0.040)
eduPhD or some professional degree	-0.026 (0.079)	-0.017 (0.077)
eduPrefer not to say	-0.473 (0.291)	-0.036 (0.282)
eduSome college	0.049 (0.035)	-0.052 (0.034)
genMale	-0.088*** (0.027)	0.114*** (0.027)
genNon-binary / third gender	0.137 (0.251)	-0.067 (0.244)
genPrefer not to say	-0.067 (0.242)	-0.109 (0.235)
birth_yr	0.001 (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)
partyIndependent	-0.319*** (0.033)	0.197*** (0.032)
partyRepublican	-0.583*** (0.034)	0.578*** (0.033)
partySomething else	-0.393*** (0.092)	0.263*** (0.090)
Constant	-0.118 (2.123)	4.802** (2.060)
Observations	1,054	1,054
R ²	0.272	0.272
Adjusted R ²	0.251	0.251
Residual Std. Error (df = 1024)	0.430	0.417
F Statistic (df = 29; 1024)	13.197***	13.164***

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 2: Effect of Party ID on Likelihood of EC Attitudes

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Valued...	Keep the EC	Undemocratic...	Amend the EC	No Opinion	Don't Know/Unsure
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Rep ID	0.405*** (0.031)	0.509*** (0.032)				
Dem ID			0.294*** (0.029)	0.446*** (0.028)		
Ind ID					0.117*** (0.019)	0.064*** (0.016)
raceAsian,White	0.158 (0.148)	0.004 (0.151)	-0.028 (0.164)	0.015 (0.157)	-0.003 (0.090)	0.037 (0.077)
raceAsian,White,Other/Unknown	-0.214 (0.418)	-0.245 (0.429)	0.740 (0.464)	0.617 (0.444)	-0.167 (0.255)	-0.117 (0.218)
raceBlack (African American)	0.075 (0.069)	0.093 (0.071)	-0.093 (0.077)	-0.107 (0.073)	-0.009 (0.042)	0.0003 (0.036)
raceBlack (African American),Hispanic or Latino	-0.165 (0.298)	-0.216 (0.306)	-0.050 (0.331)	0.163 (0.317)	-0.051 (0.182)	-0.046 (0.155)
raceBlack (African American),Hispanic or Latino,White	-0.175 (0.418)	-0.219 (0.429)	-0.543 (0.464)	-0.838* (0.445)	0.931*** (0.255)	-0.055 (0.218)
raceBlack (African American),White	0.064 (0.193)	0.062 (0.198)	-0.247 (0.214)	-0.317 (0.205)	0.284** (0.118)	0.103 (0.100)
raceHispanic or Latino	0.001 (0.084)	-0.011 (0.086)	-0.013 (0.093)	-0.056 (0.089)	0.003 (0.051)	0.027 (0.044)
raceHispanic or Latino,White	-0.136 (0.151)	-0.064 (0.155)	0.104 (0.168)	0.166 (0.161)	-0.076 (0.092)	-0.075 (0.079)
raceNative American	0.406** (0.177)	0.023 (0.182)	-0.079 (0.197)	0.001 (0.188)	-0.090 (0.108)	-0.077 (0.092)
raceNative American,Hispanic or Latino,White	0.745* (0.420)	0.786* (0.431)	-0.275 (0.467)	-0.372 (0.447)	-0.117 (0.256)	-0.035 (0.219)
raceNative American,White	0.148 (0.246)	0.132 (0.252)	-0.160 (0.273)	-0.056 (0.261)	-0.077 (0.150)	-0.060 (0.128)
raceNative American,White,Other/Unknown	0.448 (0.420)	0.371 (0.431)	-0.358 (0.466)	-0.509 (0.446)	-0.050 (0.256)	-0.030 (0.219)
raceOther/Unknown	0.266* (0.156)	0.236 (0.160)	-0.144 (0.173)	-0.209 (0.165)	0.013 (0.095)	-0.071 (0.081)
racePrefer not to say	0.150 (0.195)	0.128 (0.200)	-0.084 (0.216)	-0.032 (0.207)	0.012 (0.119)	-0.062 (0.101)
raceWhite	-0.004 (0.054)	0.056 (0.055)	-0.076 (0.060)	-0.089 (0.057)	-0.018 (0.033)	-0.013 (0.028)
eduHigh school	0.049 (0.045)	-0.026 (0.047)	0.018 (0.050)	-0.013 (0.048)	0.063** (0.028)	-0.019 (0.024)
eduLess than high school	-0.141 (0.241)	0.148 (0.248)	-0.409 (0.268)	-0.325 (0.256)	0.236 (0.147)	-0.090 (0.126)
eduMaster's degree	-0.036 (0.040)	0.052 (0.041)	-0.033 (0.044)	-0.058 (0.042)	-0.006 (0.024)	-0.034* (0.021)
eduPhD or some professional degree	0.035 (0.076)	-0.017 (0.078)	-0.001 (0.085)	-0.009 (0.081)	0.041 (0.047)	-0.037 (0.040)
eduPrefer not to say	0.060 (0.280)	0.057 (0.288)	-0.170 (0.312)	-0.410 (0.298)	0.501*** (0.171)	-0.044 (0.146)
eduSome college	-0.032 (0.033)	-0.033 (0.034)	0.066* (0.037)	0.058 (0.035)	0.006 (0.020)	-0.043** (0.017)
genMale	0.096*** (0.026)	0.133*** (0.027)	-0.014 (0.029)	-0.082*** (0.028)	-0.024 (0.016)	-0.023* (0.014)
genNon-binary / third gender	-0.083 (0.242)	-0.129 (0.249)	0.145 (0.269)	0.152 (0.257)	-0.078 (0.148)	-0.070 (0.126)
genPrefer not to say	-0.199 (0.233)	-0.204 (0.240)	-0.105 (0.260)	-0.085 (0.248)	0.157 (0.142)	-0.016 (0.122)
birth_yr	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.0002 (0.001)
Constant	7.813*** (2.048)	5.250** (2.102)	2.492 (2.270)	-1.266 (2.173)	-3.643*** (1.244)	-0.394 (1.063)
Observations	1,054	1,054	1,054	1,054	1,054	1,054
R ²	0.184	0.238	0.106	0.232	0.101	0.030
Adjusted R ²	0.164	0.218	0.083	0.212	0.079	0.006
Residual Std. Error (df = 1027)	0.415	0.426	0.460	0.441	0.253	0.216
F Statistic (df = 26; 1027)	8.934***	12.310***	4.681***	11.912***	4.452***	1.235

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3: Effect of Strong Partisanship on Likelihood of EC Attitudes

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Amend the EC	Undemocratic...	Keep the EC	Valued...
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Strong Dem ID	0.173*** (0.046)	0.168*** (0.037)		
Strong Rep ID			0.057 (0.064)	-0.011 (0.057)
raceAsian,White	-0.259 (0.301)	0.072 (0.244)	0.641* (0.372)	0.217 (0.331)
raceBlack (African American)	-0.128 (0.113)	-0.182** (0.092)	0.552** (0.234)	0.043 (0.208)
raceBlack (African American),Hispanic or Latino	-0.111 (0.364)	0.084 (0.295)		
raceBlack (African American),Hispanic or Latino,White	-0.594 (0.506)	-0.957** (0.411)		
raceBlack (African American),White	-0.218 (0.300)	-0.586** (0.244)		
raceHispanic or Latino	0.014 (0.132)	-0.060 (0.107)	-0.076 (0.255)	-0.257 (0.227)
raceHispanic or Latino,White	0.052 (0.363)	0.207 (0.295)	0.248 (0.371)	0.410 (0.330)
raceNative American	-0.247 (0.301)	-0.267 (0.244)	0.759** (0.377)	-0.053 (0.336)
raceNative American,White	0.033 (0.365)	0.248 (0.296)		
raceNative American,White,Other/Unknown			0.709 (0.507)	0.476 (0.451)
raceOther/Unknown	0.143 (0.301)	-0.254 (0.244)	0.663 (0.504)	0.220 (0.449)
racePrefer not to say	-0.625 (0.619)	0.302 (0.503)	0.663 (0.504)	0.220 (0.449)
raceWhite	-0.048 (0.092)	-0.105 (0.075)	0.339** (0.164)	0.151 (0.146)
eduHigh school	-0.067 (0.079)	-0.111* (0.064)	0.071 (0.109)	-0.031 (0.097)
eduLess than high school	-0.480 (0.354)	-0.284 (0.287)		
eduMaster's degree	-0.032 (0.067)	-0.116** (0.054)	-0.136 (0.094)	0.028 (0.083)
eduPhD or some professional degree	0.033 (0.123)	-0.004 (0.100)	-0.143 (0.219)	-0.217 (0.195)
eduPrefer not to say			-1.084 (0.675)	0.132 (0.601)
eduSome college	0.016 (0.059)	0.017 (0.048)	-0.018 (0.080)	-0.065 (0.072)
genMale	0.027 (0.045)	-0.020 (0.037)	0.142** (0.064)	0.151*** (0.057)
genNon-binary / third gender	0.166 (0.293)	0.170 (0.238)		
genPrefer not to say	0.154 (0.357)	-0.123 (0.290)		
birth_yr	-0.003* (0.002)	-0.0005 (0.001)	-0.008*** (0.003)	-0.004* (0.002)
Constant	6.863* (3.553)	1.726 (2.885)	15.029*** (4.991)	8.339* (4.440)
Observations	533	533	240	240
R ²	0.052	0.083	0.139	0.092
Adjusted R ²	0.011	0.043	0.073	0.022
Residual Std. Error	0.498 (df = 510)	0.404 (df = 510)	0.471 (df = 222)	0.419 (df = 222)
F Statistic	1.280 (df = 22; 510)	2.096*** (df = 22; 510)	2.103*** (df = 17; 222)	1.322 (df = 17; 222)

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4: Effect of Party Cue on Likelihood of EC Attitudes

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Amend the EC	Undemocratic...	Keep the EC	Valued...	No Opinion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dempartycue	0.091** (0.044)	0.097* (0.056)			-0.006 (0.018)	
raceAsian,White	0.069 (0.295)	-0.111 (0.372)			-0.024 (0.123)	
Reppartycue			-0.002 (0.068)	-0.050 (0.078)		0.045 (0.036)
raceBlack (African American)	-0.198* (0.108)	-0.156 (0.137)	0.384 (0.312)	0.846** (0.359)	0.001 (0.045)	0.104 (0.166)
raceBlack (African American),Hispanic or Latino	0.069 (0.295)	-0.132 (0.372)			-0.016 (0.124)	
raceBlack (African American),White	-0.927** (0.409)	-0.546 (0.516)			0.987*** (0.171)	
raceHispanic or Latino	-0.230* (0.127)	-0.205 (0.161)	0.181 (0.311)	0.220 (0.357)	0.108** (0.053)	-0.122 (0.165)
raceHispanic or Latino,White	-0.005 (0.408)	0.340 (0.515)	0.750* (0.384)	0.427 (0.441)	0.025 (0.171)	-0.031 (0.204)
raceNative American	-0.293 (0.245)	-0.282 (0.310)	-0.162 (0.487)	1.049* (0.560)	-0.021 (0.103)	-0.132 (0.259)
raceNative American,White	0.072 (0.410)	0.402 (0.517)			0.008 (0.172)	
raceOther/Unknown	-0.518* (0.297)	-0.124 (0.375)			0.485*** (0.124)	
racePrefer not to say	0.782 (0.575)	-1.073 (0.725)	0.547 (0.490)	0.957* (0.564)	-0.920*** (0.241)	0.034 (0.261)
raceWhite	-0.148* (0.089)	-0.116 (0.112)	0.509** (0.246)	0.545* (0.283)	0.030 (0.037)	0.004 (0.131)
eduHigh school	-0.092 (0.082)	0.064 (0.103)	0.009 (0.125)	0.066 (0.144)	0.005 (0.034)	0.115* (0.067)
eduLess than high school	-0.318 (0.284)	-0.489 (0.358)			-0.023 (0.119)	
eduMaster's degree	-0.070 (0.068)	0.030 (0.086)	0.068 (0.096)	-0.133 (0.110)	0.055* (0.028)	-0.040 (0.051)
eduPhD or some professional degree	0.099 (0.131)	0.196 (0.165)	-0.304 (0.223)	-0.279 (0.256)	-0.007 (0.055)	0.226* (0.118)
eduPrefer not to say			0.190 (0.599)	-1.129 (0.688)		-0.117 (0.319)
eduSome college	-0.0003 (0.058)	0.019 (0.074)	-0.006 (0.083)	0.017 (0.095)	0.023 (0.024)	-0.009 (0.044)
genMale	-0.014 (0.045)	0.004 (0.057)	0.164** (0.067)	0.095 (0.077)	-0.027 (0.019)	-0.097*** (0.035)
genNon-binary / third gender	0.143 (0.292)	0.520 (0.369)			-0.069 (0.122)	
genPrefer not to say	-0.802** (0.405)	0.383 (0.511)			0.932*** (0.170)	
birth_yr	-0.0001 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.008*** (0.003)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)
Constant	1.047 (3.592)	5.950 (4.531)	7.056 (5.026)	15.096*** (5.777)	-2.176 (1.505)	-3.300 (2.674)
Observations	339	339	169	169	339	169
R ²	0.072	0.052	0.128	0.135	0.235	0.116
Adjusted R ²	0.011	-0.011	0.049	0.056	0.184	0.035
Residual Std. Error	0.399 (df = 317)	0.503 (df = 317)	0.416 (df = 154)	0.478 (df = 154)	0.167 (df = 317)	0.221 (df = 154)
F Statistic	1.178 (df = 21; 317)	0.823 (df = 21; 317)	1.615* (df = 14; 154)	1.710* (df = 14; 154)	4.640*** (df = 21; 317)	1.439 (df = 14; 154)

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 5: Effect of Ind Party ID on Likelihood of EC Attitudes

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Amend the EC	Undemocratic...	Keep the EC	Valued...	No.Opinion	Don't Know/Unsure
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Ind ID	-0.128*** (0.036)	-0.062* (0.035)	0.011 (0.035)	0.027 (0.033)	0.117*** (0.019)	0.064*** (0.016)
raceAsian,White	-0.042 (0.174)	-0.067 (0.171)	0.045 (0.169)	0.189 (0.159)	-0.003 (0.090)	0.037 (0.077)
raceAsian,White,Other/Unknown	0.489 (0.494)	0.642 (0.487)	-0.322 (0.480)	-0.287 (0.452)	-0.167 (0.255)	-0.117 (0.218)
raceBlack (African American)	-0.067 (0.082)	-0.064 (0.080)	0.076 (0.079)	0.064 (0.075)	-0.009 (0.042)	0.0003 (0.036)
raceBlack (African American),Hispanic or Latino	0.344 (0.352)	0.077 (0.347)	-0.293 (0.342)	-0.221 (0.322)	-0.051 (0.182)	-0.046 (0.155)
raceBlack (African American),Hispanic or Latino,White	-0.660 (0.494)	-0.417 (0.486)	-0.271 (0.480)	-0.210 (0.452)	0.931*** (0.255)	-0.055 (0.218)
raceBlack (African American),White	-0.278 (0.228)	-0.224 (0.224)	-0.006 (0.221)	0.008 (0.208)	0.284** (0.118)	0.103 (0.100)
raceHispanic or Latino	-0.013 (0.099)	0.021 (0.097)	0.009 (0.096)	0.021 (0.090)	0.003 (0.051)	0.027 (0.044)
raceHispanic or Latino,White	0.097 (0.179)	0.056 (0.176)	-0.021 (0.173)	-0.103 (0.163)	-0.076 (0.092)	-0.075 (0.079)
raceNative American	-0.035 (0.209)	-0.100 (0.206)	0.125 (0.203)	0.490** (0.191)	-0.090 (0.108)	-0.077 (0.092)
raceNative American,Hispanic or Latino,White	-0.610 (0.497)	-0.422 (0.489)	0.727 (0.482)	0.705 (0.454)	-0.117 (0.256)	-0.035 (0.219)
raceNative American,White	0.036 (0.290)	-0.099 (0.285)	0.041 (0.282)	0.076 (0.265)	-0.077 (0.150)	-0.060 (0.128)
raceNative American,White,Other/Unknown	-0.750 (0.496)	-0.508 (0.488)	0.800* (0.482)	0.796* (0.453)	-0.050 (0.256)	-0.030 (0.219)
raceOther/Unknown	-0.236 (0.184)	-0.165 (0.181)	0.223 (0.179)	0.254 (0.168)	0.013 (0.095)	-0.071 (0.081)
racePrefer not to say	-0.194 (0.230)	-0.193 (0.226)	0.182 (0.223)	0.192 (0.210)	0.012 (0.119)	-0.062 (0.101)
raceWhite	-0.091 (0.064)	-0.073 (0.063)	0.109* (0.062)	0.041 (0.058)	-0.018 (0.033)	-0.013 (0.028)
eduHigh school	-0.033 (0.054)	0.003 (0.053)	-0.029 (0.052)	0.045 (0.049)	0.063** (0.028)	-0.019 (0.024)
eduLess than high school	-0.276 (0.285)	-0.381 (0.281)	0.040 (0.277)	-0.230 (0.261)	0.236 (0.147)	-0.090 (0.126)
eduMaster's degree	-0.060 (0.047)	-0.033 (0.046)	0.065 (0.046)	-0.025 (0.043)	-0.006 (0.024)	-0.034* (0.021)
eduPhD or some professional degree	0.024 (0.090)	0.020 (0.089)	-0.066 (0.088)	-0.005 (0.082)	0.041 (0.047)	-0.037 (0.040)
eduPrefer not to say	-0.592* (0.332)	-0.303 (0.326)	0.092 (0.322)	0.078 (0.303)	0.501*** (0.171)	-0.044 (0.146)
eduSome college	0.032 (0.039)	0.047 (0.039)	-0.038 (0.038)	-0.038 (0.036)	0.006 (0.020)	-0.043** (0.017)
genMale	-0.112*** (0.031)	-0.036 (0.031)	0.136*** (0.030)	0.097*** (0.029)	-0.024 (0.016)	-0.023* (0.014)
genNon-binary / third gender	0.291 (0.286)	0.241 (0.282)	-0.214 (0.278)	-0.147 (0.261)	-0.078 (0.148)	-0.070 (0.126)
genPrefer not to say	0.108 (0.276)	0.029 (0.272)	-0.265 (0.268)	-0.243 (0.252)	0.157 (0.142)	-0.016 (0.122)
birth_yr	0.002* (0.001)	-0.0003 (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.0002 (0.001)
Constant	-3.392 (2.411)	1.063 (2.372)	8.035*** (2.342)	10.007*** (2.203)	-3.643*** (1.244)	-0.394 (1.063)
Observations	1,054	1,054	1,054	1,054	1,054	1,054
R ²	0.050	0.019	0.048	0.049	0.101	0.030
Adjusted R ²	0.026	-0.005	0.023	0.025	0.079	0.006
Residual Std. Error (df = 1027)	0.490	0.482	0.476	0.448	0.253	0.216
F Statistic (df = 26; 1027)	2.092***	0.780	1.973***	2.055***	4.452***	1.235

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 6: Effect of Left and Right-Leaning Independent ID on Likelihood of EC Attitudes

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Amend the EC	Undemocratic...	Keep the EC	Valued...
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Left Ind ID	0.424*** (0.058)	0.299*** (0.057)		
Right Ind ID			0.589*** (0.059)	0.511*** (0.058)
raceAsian,White	-0.101 (0.241)	0.023 (0.240)	0.187 (0.218)	0.269 (0.213)
raceAsian,White,Other/Unknown	0.442 (0.451)	0.525 (0.448)	-0.213 (0.407)	-0.315 (0.397)
raceBlack (African American)	0.002 (0.135)	-0.085 (0.134)	0.193 (0.122)	-0.127 (0.119)
raceBlack (African American),White	0.145 (0.327)	-0.246 (0.325)	0.189 (0.296)	-0.387 (0.289)
raceHispanic or Latino	-0.222 (0.219)	-0.111 (0.218)	0.299 (0.198)	0.225 (0.194)
raceHispanic or Latino,White	0.372 (0.242)	0.200 (0.241)	-0.067 (0.219)	-0.155 (0.214)
raceNative American	0.645 (0.451)	0.754* (0.448)	-0.017 (0.408)	-0.132 (0.398)
raceNative American,White	-0.431 (0.456)	-0.377 (0.453)	0.990** (0.412)	0.824** (0.402)
raceOther/Unknown	-0.230 (0.243)	-0.358 (0.241)	0.424* (0.220)	0.274 (0.214)
racePrefer not to say	-0.174 (0.326)	-0.245 (0.325)	0.298 (0.295)	0.182 (0.288)
raceWhite	0.050 (0.098)	-0.040 (0.097)	0.084 (0.089)	-0.111 (0.086)
eduHigh school	0.132 (0.096)	0.145 (0.095)	-0.183** (0.087)	-0.063 (0.085)
eduLess than high school	-0.136 (0.487)	-0.139 (0.484)	-0.303 (0.440)	-0.326 (0.430)
eduMaster's degree	0.023 (0.094)	-0.114 (0.093)	0.157* (0.085)	0.053 (0.083)
eduPhD or some professional degree	0.023 (0.158)	0.027 (0.158)	-0.039 (0.143)	0.065 (0.140)
eduPrefer not to say	-0.732 (0.497)	-0.454 (0.494)	0.074 (0.448)	0.078 (0.437)
eduSome college	0.086 (0.069)	0.151** (0.069)	-0.056 (0.063)	-0.073 (0.061)
genMale	-0.221*** (0.059)	-0.069 (0.059)	0.193*** (0.054)	0.177*** (0.052)
genPrefer not to say	0.557 (0.661)	0.466 (0.657)	-0.714 (0.598)	-0.221 (0.584)
birth_yr	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.002)
Constant	-0.721 (4.315)	-1.748 (4.290)	5.172 (3.914)	12.342*** (3.823)
Observations	257	103	257	257
R ²	0.289		0.193	0.386
Adjusted R ²	0.226		0.121	0.305
Residual Std. Error (df = 235)	0.439		0.437	0.388
F Statistic (df = 21; 235)	4.553***		2.671***	7.028***

Table 7: Effect of Party Cue on Left and Right-Independents' Likelihood of EC Attitudes

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Amend the EC	Undemocratic...	Keep the EC	Valued..
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
leftindpartycue	-0.034 (0.126)	-0.011 (0.134)		
raceAsian,White	-0.243 (0.469)	-0.125 (0.499)		
raceAsian,White,Other/Unknown	0.502 (0.508)	0.535 (0.541)		
raceBlack (African American)	-0.038 (0.263)	-0.303 (0.280)		
rightindpartycue			0.030 (0.124)	0.013 (0.175)
raceBlack (African American),White			-0.641 (0.413)	-0.589 (0.583)
raceHispanic or Latino	-0.243 (0.392)	-0.169 (0.417)	0.117 (0.429)	0.586 (0.605)
raceHispanic or Latino,White	0.333 (0.395)	-0.295 (0.421)		
raceOther/Unknown	0.008 (0.467)	-0.340 (0.498)	0.268 (0.451)	0.175 (0.636)
raceWhite	0.183 (0.185)	-0.067 (0.197)	0.211 (0.191)	-0.039 (0.270)
eduHigh school	0.362 (0.246)	0.582** (0.262)	-0.141 (0.186)	0.014 (0.263)
eduMaster's degree	-0.122 (0.160)	-0.047 (0.170)	0.180 (0.262)	-0.342 (0.370)
eduPhD or some professional degree	-0.073 (0.507)	-0.283 (0.540)	0.123 (0.217)	-0.066 (0.306)
eduSome college	0.050 (0.148)	0.315* (0.158)	0.096 (0.182)	0.011 (0.256)
genMale	-0.223* (0.123)	-0.043 (0.131)	0.061 (0.138)	0.152 (0.195)
birth_yr	0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.007)
Constant	-1.244 (8.855)	2.324 (9.427)	1.705 (9.515)	10.877 (13.434)
Observations	73	73	41	41
R ²	0.165	0.224	0.266	0.150
Adjusted R ²	-0.037	0.037	-0.012	-0.172
Residual Std. Error	0.464 (df = 58)	0.494 (df = 58)	0.333 (df = 29)	0.471 (df = 29)
F Statistic	0.817 (df = 14; 58)	1.195 (df = 14; 58)	0.956 (df = 11; 29)	0.467 (df = 11; 29)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8: Effect of Party Cue on Likelihood of EC Responses for Low Media Users

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Amend the EC	Keep the EC	No Opinion	Undemocratic...	Valued...	Too Complicated	Better Than Alt	Don't Know/Unsure
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
partycue	0.018 (0.049)	-0.095** (0.047)	0.077** (0.034)	0.005 (0.034)	-0.061 (0.046)	0.015 (0.045)	-0.035 (0.039)	0.080*** (0.030)
raceAsian,White	0.316 (0.317)	-0.126 (0.305)	-0.190 (0.219)	-0.131 (0.214)	-0.231 (0.296)	-0.123 (0.288)	-0.063 (0.250)	-0.096 (0.195)
raceAsian,White,Other/Unknown				0.593 (0.457)				
raceBlack (African American)	-0.123 (0.133)	0.060 (0.129)	0.063 (0.092)	-0.176* (0.093)	-0.114 (0.125)	0.007 (0.121)	0.237** (0.105)	-0.042 (0.082)
raceBlack (African American),Hispanic or Latino				-0.134 (0.327)				
raceBlack (African American),White	-0.587 (0.439)	0.898** (0.423)	-0.311 (0.304)	-0.505* (0.271)	-0.291 (0.409)	-0.099 (0.399)	1.082*** (0.346)	-0.244 (0.270)
raceHispanic or Latino	-0.110 (0.149)	0.149 (0.143)	-0.039 (0.103)	-0.166 (0.109)	0.182 (0.139)	-0.128 (0.135)	0.021 (0.117)	0.038 (0.092)
raceHispanic or Latino,White	0.376 (0.234)	-0.155 (0.225)	-0.221 (0.162)	0.100 (0.198)	-0.237 (0.218)	0.117 (0.213)	-0.009 (0.184)	-0.158 (0.144)
raceNative American	0.129 (0.438)	-0.058 (0.422)	-0.071 (0.303)	-0.111 (0.214)	-0.205 (0.409)	-0.210 (0.399)	0.028 (0.345)	-0.050 (0.270)
raceNative American,Hispanic or Latino,White				-0.570 (0.473)				
raceNative American,White	0.154 (0.440)	-0.106 (0.424)	-0.048 (0.305)	-0.058 (0.328)	-0.288 (0.411)	-0.208 (0.400)	0.071 (0.347)	-0.030 (0.271)
raceOther/Unknown	-0.661** (0.317)	0.290 (0.305)	0.370* (0.219)	-0.341 (0.215)	-0.178 (0.295)	0.328 (0.288)	0.422* (0.250)	-0.122 (0.195)
racePrefer not to say	-0.443 (0.439)	-0.372 (0.423)	0.815*** (0.304)	-0.259 (0.226)	0.581 (0.410)	-0.040 (0.400)	-0.024 (0.346)	-0.132 (0.271)
raceWhite	-0.006 (0.099)	0.070 (0.095)	-0.064 (0.069)	-0.124* (0.074)	-0.095 (0.092)	0.052 (0.090)	0.115 (0.078)	-0.008 (0.061)
eduHigh school	-0.003 (0.087)	-0.007 (0.084)	0.011 (0.061)	0.050 (0.063)	0.025 (0.082)	-0.022 (0.080)	0.099 (0.069)	-0.101* (0.054)
eduLess than high school	-0.378 (0.252)	0.142 (0.242)	0.237 (0.174)	-0.424 (0.263)	-0.194 (0.235)	0.514** (0.229)	0.242 (0.198)	-0.126 (0.155)
eduMaster's degree	-0.063 (0.092)	0.187** (0.089)	-0.123* (0.064)	0.014 (0.052)	-0.037 (0.086)	0.074 (0.084)	0.107 (0.073)	-0.062 (0.057)
eduPhD or some professional degree	0.074 (0.166)	-0.152 (0.160)	0.078 (0.115)	0.086 (0.103)	-0.040 (0.155)	-0.041 (0.151)	-0.002 (0.131)	-0.044 (0.102)
eduPrefer not to say	-0.161 (0.607)	0.303 (0.585)	-0.142 (0.420)	-0.108 (0.464)	-0.815 (0.566)	-0.061 (0.552)	1.077** (0.478)	-0.126 (0.374)
eduSome college	0.003 (0.061)	0.030 (0.059)	-0.032 (0.042)	0.042 (0.044)	0.045 (0.057)	0.057 (0.056)	-0.040 (0.048)	-0.054 (0.038)
genMale	-0.114** (0.049)	0.152*** (0.048)	-0.037 (0.034)	-0.027 (0.035)	0.029 (0.046)	-0.044 (0.045)	0.091** (0.039)	-0.023 (0.030)
genNon-binary / third gender	0.099 (0.438)	0.060 (0.422)	-0.160 (0.303)	0.445 (0.325)	-0.106 (0.408)	-0.226 (0.398)	0.044 (0.345)	-0.140 (0.270)
genPrefer not to say				0.040 (0.339)				
birth_yr	0.002 (0.002)	-0.004* (0.002)	0.002 (0.001)	-0.0001 (0.001)	-0.006*** (0.002)	0.0002 (0.002)	0.003** (0.002)	0.002 (0.001)
partyIndependent	-0.286*** (0.059)	0.110* (0.057)	0.176*** (0.041)	-0.203*** (0.043)	0.097* (0.055)	-0.124** (0.053)	0.007 (0.046)	0.127*** (0.036)
partyRepublican	-0.644*** (0.065)	0.544*** (0.063)	0.101** (0.045)	-0.432*** (0.043)	0.401*** (0.061)	-0.122** (0.059)	0.076 (0.051)	-0.001 (0.040)
partySomething else	-0.472*** (0.171)	0.124 (0.165)	0.348*** (0.118)	-0.089 (0.114)	0.034 (0.160)	-0.219 (0.156)	-0.057 (0.135)	0.270** (0.105)
Constant	-3.010 (4.091)	7.502* (3.942)	-3.491 (2.831)	0.931 (2.727)	12.766*** (3.817)	-0.160 (3.722)	-6.452** (3.223)	-3.073 (2.520)
Observations	312	312	312	703	312	312	312	312
R ²	0.322	0.298	0.196	0.157	0.210	0.073	0.126	0.106
Adjusted R ²	0.268	0.242	0.131	0.123	0.147	-0.002	0.056	0.035
Residual Std. Error	0.426 (df = 288)	0.410 (df = 288)	0.295 (df = 288)	0.450 (df = 675)	0.397 (df = 288)	0.387 (df = 288)	0.335 (df = 288)	0.262 (df = 288)
F Statistic	5.945*** (df = 23; 288)	5.308*** (df = 23; 288)	3.047*** (df = 23; 288)	4.650*** (df = 27; 675)	3.322*** (df = 23; 288)	0.979 (df = 23; 288)	1.804** (df = 23; 288)	1.487* (df = 23; 288)

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 9: Effect of Party Cue on Likelihood of EC Responses for High Media Users

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Amend the EC	Keep the EC	No Opinion	Undemocratic...	Valued...	Too Complicated	Better Than Alt	Don't Know/Unsure
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
partycue	-0.011 (0.045)	0.029 (0.044)	-0.017 (0.019)	0.027 (0.046)	0.009 (0.043)	0.038 (0.035)	-0.055 (0.037)	-0.018 (0.016)
raceAsian,White	-0.444 (0.270)	0.142 (0.263)	0.302*** (0.116)	-0.552** (0.277)	0.434* (0.257)	0.256 (0.211)	-0.141 (0.223)	0.003 (0.096)
raceAsian,White,Other/Unknown	0.379 (0.444)	-0.361 (0.433)	-0.018 (0.191)	0.613 (0.456)	-0.378 (0.422)	-0.036 (0.347)	-0.173 (0.367)	-0.027 (0.158)
raceBlack (African American)	-0.205* (0.122)	0.178 (0.119)	0.027 (0.053)	-0.245* (0.126)	0.150 (0.116)	0.002 (0.096)	0.036 (0.101)	0.056 (0.044)
raceBlack (African American),Hispanic or Latino	0.017 (0.320)	-0.021 (0.312)	0.004 (0.138)	-0.209 (0.329)	-0.071 (0.305)	0.345 (0.250)	-0.059 (0.265)	-0.005 (0.114)
raceBlack (African American),White	-0.380 (0.323)	-0.089 (0.315)	0.470*** (0.139)	-0.527 (0.332)	0.356 (0.307)	0.332 (0.252)	-0.130 (0.267)	-0.031 (0.115)
raceHispanic or Latino	-0.233 (0.150)	0.106 (0.146)	0.127** (0.064)	-0.202 (0.154)	-0.096 (0.142)	0.106 (0.117)	0.182 (0.124)	0.010 (0.053)
raceHispanic or Latino,White	-0.456 (0.325)	0.463 (0.317)	-0.007 (0.140)	-0.223 (0.334)	-0.103 (0.309)	-0.008 (0.254)	0.340 (0.269)	-0.006 (0.116)
raceNative American	-0.040 (0.239)	0.045 (0.233)	-0.005 (0.103)	-0.259 (0.245)	0.518** (0.227)	-0.152 (0.186)	-0.098 (0.197)	-0.009 (0.085)
raceNative American,Hispanic or Latino,White	-0.631 (0.471)	0.635 (0.459)	-0.004 (0.202)	-0.598 (0.483)	0.316 (0.447)	0.111 (0.367)	0.127 (0.389)	0.043 (0.167)
raceNative American,White	-0.668 (0.449)	0.764* (0.438)	-0.096 (0.193)	-0.479 (0.461)	0.733* (0.427)	-0.148 (0.350)	-0.066 (0.371)	-0.040 (0.160)
raceOther/Unknown	-0.124 (0.273)	0.167 (0.267)	-0.042 (0.118)	-0.230 (0.281)	0.378 (0.260)	-0.092 (0.213)	-0.035 (0.226)	-0.021 (0.097)
racePrefer not to say	-0.094 (0.254)	0.230 (0.248)	-0.135 (0.109)	-0.240 (0.261)	-0.147 (0.242)	0.103 (0.199)	0.280 (0.210)	0.004 (0.091)
raceWhite	-0.209** (0.102)	0.179* (0.099)	0.030 (0.044)	-0.156 (0.105)	-0.010 (0.097)	0.055 (0.080)	0.089 (0.084)	0.022 (0.036)
eduHigh school	-0.076 (0.084)	0.028 (0.082)	0.048 (0.036)	0.088 (0.087)	0.128 (0.080)	-0.094 (0.066)	-0.087 (0.070)	-0.034 (0.030)
eduMaster's degree	-0.048 (0.061)	0.009 (0.060)	0.039 (0.026)	0.066 (0.063)	-0.119** (0.058)	0.054 (0.048)	0.001 (0.050)	-0.002 (0.022)
eduPhD or some professional degree	0.068 (0.124)	-0.095 (0.121)	0.028 (0.053)	0.119 (0.127)	0.063 (0.118)	-0.147 (0.097)	0.016 (0.102)	-0.050 (0.044)
eduPrefer not to say	0.017 (0.544)	0.358 (0.530)	-0.375 (0.234)	0.049 (0.558)	-0.577 (0.517)	-0.357 (0.424)	0.882* (0.449)	0.004 (0.193)
eduSome college	0.021 (0.059)	-0.080 (0.057)	0.059** (0.025)	0.088 (0.060)	-0.094* (0.056)	0.044 (0.046)	-0.018 (0.049)	-0.020 (0.021)
genMale	-0.064 (0.047)	0.100** (0.046)	-0.036* (0.020)	0.006 (0.048)	0.092** (0.045)	-0.087** (0.037)	0.017 (0.039)	-0.028* (0.017)
genNon-binary / third gender	0.154 (0.449)	-0.007 (0.437)	-0.147 (0.193)	0.553 (0.461)	0.086 (0.426)	-0.277 (0.350)	-0.326 (0.371)	-0.035 (0.160)
genPrefer not to say	-0.332 (0.330)	-0.226 (0.322)	0.559*** (0.142)	-0.029 (0.339)	-0.001 (0.314)	0.216 (0.258)	-0.160 (0.273)	-0.026 (0.118)
birth_yr	0.002 (0.002)	-0.003* (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.004** (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	-0.0002 (0.001)
partyIndependent	-0.369*** (0.059)	0.323*** (0.058)	0.047* (0.025)	-0.277*** (0.061)	0.224*** (0.056)	-0.035 (0.046)	0.060 (0.049)	0.027 (0.021)
partyRepublican	-0.568*** (0.055)	0.577*** (0.053)	-0.009 (0.024)	-0.483*** (0.056)	0.526*** (0.052)	-0.125*** (0.043)	0.081* (0.045)	0.001 (0.019)
partySomething else	-0.288** (0.143)	0.305** (0.139)	-0.018 (0.061)	-0.152 (0.147)	0.412*** (0.136)	-0.090 (0.112)	-0.161 (0.118)	-0.008 (0.051)
Constant	-3.085 (3.463)	6.006* (3.377)	-1.921 (1.489)	1.902 (3.555)	8.364** (3.292)	-1.920 (2.703)	-7.824*** (2.861)	0.477 (1.232)
Observations	391	391	391	391	391	391	391	391
R ²	0.302	0.321	0.135	0.214	0.295	0.088	0.081	0.029
Adjusted R ²	0.252	0.273	0.073	0.158	0.244	0.023	0.016	-0.040
Residual Std. Error (df = 364)	0.430	0.420	0.185	0.442	0.409	0.336	0.356	0.153
F Statistic (df = 26; 364)	6.064***	6.628***	2.189***	3.808***	5.845***	1.353	1.237	0.418

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 10: Effect of Party Cue on Likelihood of EC Responses for Partisans with Low Media Usage

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Keep the EC	Valued...	Amend the EC	Undemocratic...
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rpartycue	0.017 (0.113)	-0.114 (0.141)		
Dpartycue			0.213*** (0.069)	0.145 (0.089)
raceAsian,White			-0.053 (0.414)	0.272 (0.531)
raceBlack (African American)	-0.133 (0.401)	0.475 (0.498)	-0.260 (0.190)	-0.055 (0.243)
raceHispanic or Latino			-0.113 (0.188)	-0.112 (0.241)
raceHispanic or Latino,White			0.020 (0.414)	0.363 (0.531)
raceNative American			0.160 (0.413)	0.417 (0.530)
raceNative American,White			0.172 (0.416)	0.416 (0.534)
raceOther/Unknown			-1.066** (0.414)	-0.727 (0.531)
raceWhite	0.394 (0.316)	0.380 (0.393)	-0.050 (0.135)	-0.105 (0.173)
eduHigh school	0.205 (0.248)	0.162 (0.309)	-0.189 (0.116)	-0.083 (0.149)
eduLess than high school			-0.361 (0.282)	-0.505 (0.361)
eduMaster's degree	0.077 (0.199)	0.045 (0.247)	-0.219 (0.133)	-0.187 (0.171)
eduPhD or some professional degree	0.045 (0.272)	0.062 (0.338)	0.095 (0.204)	0.208 (0.262)
eduSome college	0.089 (0.131)	0.202 (0.163)	-0.064 (0.085)	-0.147 (0.110)
genMale	0.389*** (0.118)	0.045 (0.147)	-0.074 (0.069)	-0.091 (0.088)
genNon-binary / third gender			-0.058 (0.413)	0.273 (0.530)
birth_yr	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.005)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.0001 (0.004)
Constant	3.630 (7.929)	12.776 (9.854)	-0.974 (5.684)	0.768 (7.295)
Observations	65	65	145	145
R ²	0.260	0.112	0.161	0.114
Adjusted R ²	0.139	107 -0.034	0.049	-0.005
Residual Std. Error	0.411 (df = 55)	0.511 (df = 55)	0.391 (df = 127)	0.502 (df = 127)
F Statistic	2.146** (df = 9; 55)	0.768 (df = 9; 55)	1.434 (df = 17; 127)	0.957 (df = 17; 127)

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 11: Effect of Party Cue on Likelihood of EC Responses for Low Political Interest Respondents

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Amend the EC	Keep the EC	No Opinion	Undemocratic...	Valued...	Too Complicated	Better Than Alt	Don't Know/Unsure
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
partycue	-0.009 (0.091)	0.045 (0.089)	-0.036 (0.076)	-0.015 (0.081)	-0.010 (0.081)	0.062 (0.084)	-0.066 (0.073)	0.030 (0.058)
raceAsian,White	0.127 (0.479)	-0.130 (0.466)	0.003 (0.399)	0.490 (0.424)	-0.200 (0.424)	-0.326 (0.439)	0.137 (0.385)	-0.101 (0.306)
raceBlack (African American)	-0.338* (0.184)	0.045 (0.179)	0.293* (0.153)	-0.484*** (0.163)	-0.022 (0.163)	0.250 (0.168)	0.187 (0.148)	0.069 (0.118)
raceHispanic or Latino	-0.664*** (0.207)	0.287 (0.201)	0.377** (0.172)	-0.361* (0.183)	0.298 (0.183)	-0.010 (0.189)	0.033 (0.166)	0.042 (0.132)
raceHispanic or Latino,White	0.137 (0.485)	-0.036 (0.472)	-0.101 (0.403)	-0.756* (0.429)	-0.078 (0.429)	1.053** (0.444)	-0.087 (0.389)	-0.132 (0.310)
raceOther/Unknown	-0.636 (0.504)	0.809 (0.491)	-0.174 (0.420)	-0.551 (0.447)	0.539 (0.446)	-0.245 (0.462)	0.293 (0.405)	-0.036 (0.323)
racePrefer not to say	-0.677 (0.482)	-0.192 (0.469)	0.870** (0.401)	-0.685 (0.427)	0.713* (0.426)	-0.074 (0.441)	0.154 (0.387)	-0.109 (0.308)
raceWhite	-0.250* (0.137)	0.145 (0.133)	0.105 (0.114)	-0.387*** (0.121)	0.011 (0.121)	0.112 (0.125)	0.219** (0.110)	0.045 (0.087)
eduHigh school	0.084 (0.133)	-0.088 (0.129)	0.004 (0.111)	0.106 (0.118)	-0.060 (0.118)	-0.048 (0.122)	0.122 (0.107)	-0.120 (0.085)
eduLess than high school	0.181 (0.341)	-0.327 (0.332)	0.146 (0.284)	-0.099 (0.302)	-0.315 (0.302)	0.759** (0.313)	-0.104 (0.274)	-0.241 (0.218)
eduMaster's degree	-0.224 (0.207)	0.134 (0.202)	0.090 (0.172)	-0.358* (0.183)	-0.217 (0.183)	0.154 (0.190)	0.506*** (0.166)	-0.085 (0.132)
eduPhD or some professional degree	0.251 (0.283)	-0.060 (0.276)	-0.190 (0.236)	0.236 (0.251)	-0.003 (0.251)	-0.043 (0.260)	-0.136 (0.227)	-0.053 (0.181)
eduPrefer not to say	0.050 (0.659)	0.008 (0.642)	-0.058 (0.548)	0.255 (0.584)	-0.928 (0.583)	-0.102 (0.604)	0.937* (0.529)	-0.162 (0.422)
eduSome college	0.110 (0.108)	-0.072 (0.105)	-0.038 (0.089)	0.086 (0.095)	-0.029 (0.095)	-0.023 (0.099)	0.035 (0.086)	-0.069 (0.069)
genMale	0.095 (0.092)	-0.007 (0.089)	-0.088 (0.076)	0.230*** (0.081)	-0.066 (0.081)	-0.115 (0.084)	0.018 (0.074)	-0.066 (0.059)
genPrefer not to say								
birth_yr	0.004 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	0.0004 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.009** (0.003)	-0.005 (0.003)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.004* (0.002)
partyIndependent	-0.250** (0.106)	0.059 (0.103)	0.191** (0.088)	-0.080 (0.094)	0.023 (0.094)	-0.145 (0.097)	0.037 (0.085)	0.166** (0.068)
partyRepublican	-0.581*** (0.120)	0.514*** (0.117)	0.067 (0.100)	-0.270** (0.107)	0.265** (0.106)	-0.126 (0.110)	0.186* (0.097)	-0.056 (0.077)
partySomething else	-0.451** (0.223)	0.240 (0.217)	0.211 (0.185)	0.112 (0.197)	0.057 (0.197)	-0.312 (0.204)	0.017 (0.179)	0.126 (0.143)
Constant	-6.215 (7.588)	7.966 (7.384)	-0.751 (6.311)	1.849 (6.718)	17.150** (6.711)	10.051 (6.947)	-19.440*** (6.090)	-8.610* (4.854)
Observations	118	118	118	118	118	118	118	118
R ²	0.310	0.252	0.213	0.287	0.215	0.201	0.292	0.165
Adjusted R ²	0.176	0.107	0.061	0.149	0.062	0.046	0.155	0.003
Residual Std. Error (df = 98)	0.456	0.444	0.379	0.404	0.403	0.417	0.366	0.292
F Statistic (df = 19; 98)	2.314***	1.735**	1.398	2.074**	1.410	1.297	2.126***	1.019

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 12: Effect of Party Cue on Likelihood of EC Responses for High Political Interest Respondents

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Amend the EC	Keep the EC	No Opinion	Undemocratic...	Valued...	Too Complicated	Better Than Alt	Don't Know/Unsure
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
partycue	0.001 (0.035)	-0.029 (0.035)	0.028 (0.017)	0.008 (0.038)	-0.010 (0.034)	0.021 (0.029)	-0.038 (0.028)	0.019 (0.016)
raceAsian,White	-0.092 (0.227)	-0.004 (0.224)	0.095 (0.108)	-0.217 (0.246)	0.132 (0.221)	0.223 (0.185)	-0.105 (0.182)	-0.033 (0.100)
raceAsian,White,Other/Unknown	0.518 (0.428)	-0.385 (0.422)	-0.134 (0.204)	0.670 (0.463)	-0.445 (0.416)	-0.033 (0.348)	-0.128 (0.343)	-0.065 (0.189)
raceBlack (African American)	-0.079 (0.106)	0.164 (0.104)	-0.086* (0.050)	-0.053 (0.114)	0.041 (0.103)	-0.056 (0.086)	0.049 (0.085)	0.018 (0.047)
raceBlack (African American),Hispanic or Latino	0.142 (0.307)	-0.056 (0.303)	-0.086 (0.147)	-0.086 (0.333)	-0.152 (0.299)	0.327 (0.250)	-0.057 (0.247)	-0.031 (0.136)
raceBlack (African American),White	-0.395 (0.257)	0.223 (0.253)	0.171 (0.123)	-0.474* (0.278)	0.078 (0.250)	0.194 (0.209)	0.289 (0.206)	-0.086 (0.113)
raceHispanic or Latino	0.065 (0.123)	0.048 (0.121)	-0.113* (0.059)	-0.041 (0.133)	-0.113 (0.119)	-0.002 (0.100)	0.130 (0.099)	0.026 (0.054)
raceHispanic or Latino,White	0.084 (0.206)	0.059 (0.203)	-0.143 (0.098)	0.264 (0.223)	-0.251 (0.200)	-0.097 (0.167)	0.127 (0.165)	-0.044 (0.091)
raceNative American	0.068 (0.205)	0.066 (0.202)	-0.133 (0.098)	-0.074 (0.222)	0.338* (0.199)	-0.152 (0.167)	-0.055 (0.165)	-0.056 (0.090)
raceNative American,Hispanic or Latino,White	-0.498 (0.451)	0.577 (0.444)	-0.079 (0.215)	-0.562 (0.487)	0.302 (0.438)	0.141 (0.366)	0.062 (0.362)	0.057 (0.199)
raceNative American,White	-0.248 (0.309)	0.371 (0.305)	-0.124 (0.148)	-0.010 (0.335)	0.213 (0.301)	-0.136 (0.252)	-0.009 (0.248)	-0.058 (0.136)
raceOther/Unknown	-0.238 (0.226)	0.130 (0.223)	0.108 (0.108)	-0.265 (0.245)	-0.020 (0.220)	0.150 (0.184)	0.188 (0.181)	-0.053 (0.100)
racePrefer not to say	0.053 (0.242)	0.208 (0.239)	-0.260** (0.115)	-0.143 (0.262)	-0.216 (0.235)	0.105 (0.197)	0.287 (0.194)	-0.033 (0.107)
raceWhite	-0.056 (0.085)	0.132 (0.084)	-0.076* (0.041)	-0.039 (0.092)	-0.097 (0.083)	0.060 (0.069)	0.076 (0.068)	-0.001 (0.038)
eduHigh school	-0.060 (0.073)	0.050 (0.072)	0.010 (0.035)	0.112 (0.078)	0.119* (0.071)	-0.147** (0.059)	-0.032 (0.058)	-0.053 (0.032)
eduLess than high school	-0.769* (0.420)	0.757* (0.414)	0.012 (0.200)	-0.496 (0.454)	-0.145 (0.408)	-0.167 (0.342)	0.822** (0.337)	-0.014 (0.185)
eduMaster's degree	-0.052 (0.051)	0.063 (0.050)	-0.011 (0.024)	0.030 (0.055)	-0.080 (0.050)	0.055 (0.041)	0.011 (0.041)	-0.015 (0.022)
eduPhD or some professional degree	0.038 (0.103)	-0.086 (0.102)	0.048 (0.049)	0.093 (0.112)	0.066 (0.101)	-0.145* (0.084)	0.044 (0.083)	-0.059 (0.046)
eduPrefer not to say	0.068 (0.527)	0.367 (0.520)	-0.435* (0.251)	0.035 (0.570)	-0.556 (0.513)	-0.349 (0.429)	0.872** (0.423)	-0.002 (0.232)
eduSome college	-0.008 (0.046)	-0.006 (0.046)	0.014 (0.022)	0.046 (0.050)	-0.013 (0.045)	0.048 (0.038)	-0.046 (0.037)	-0.035* (0.020)
genMale	-0.127*** (0.036)	0.158*** (0.036)	-0.031* (0.017)	-0.069* (0.039)	0.106*** (0.035)	-0.064** (0.030)	0.053* (0.029)	-0.027* (0.016)
genNon-binary / third gender	-0.002 (0.304)	0.062 (0.300)	-0.060 (0.145)	0.405 (0.329)	-0.040 (0.296)	-0.193 (0.247)	-0.112 (0.244)	-0.059 (0.134)
genPrefer not to say	-0.399 (0.320)	-0.163 (0.315)	0.563*** (0.152)	-0.023 (0.346)	0.020 (0.311)	0.218 (0.260)	-0.171 (0.256)	-0.044 (0.141)
birth_yr	0.002 (0.001)	-0.003* (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.004** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
partyIndependent	-0.347*** (0.045)	0.279*** (0.045)	0.068*** (0.022)	-0.207*** (0.049)	0.210*** (0.044)	-0.076** (0.037)	0.022 (0.036)	0.051** (0.020)
partyRepublican	-0.622*** (0.044)	0.589*** (0.043)	0.034 (0.021)	-0.456*** (0.048)	0.524*** (0.043)	-0.125*** (0.036)	0.054 (0.035)	0.003 (0.019)
partySomething else	-0.274** (0.131)	0.272** (0.129)	0.002 (0.062)	-0.089 (0.141)	0.351*** (0.127)	-0.106 (0.106)	-0.139 (0.105)	-0.017 (0.058)
Constant	-2.621 (2.797)	5.158* (2.759)	-1.537 (1.334)	-1.105 (3.026)	7.144*** (2.720)	-2.581 (2.274)	-3.579 (2.244)	1.122 (1.233)
Observations	577	577	577	577	577	577	577	577
R ²	0.322	0.318	0.087	0.179	0.262	0.079	0.063	0.034
Adjusted R ²	0.289	0.285	0.042	0.138	0.226	0.034	0.017	-0.014
Residual Std. Error (df = 549)	0.418	0.412	0.199	0.452	0.407	0.340	0.336	0.184
F Statistic (df = 27; 549)	9.651***	9.496***	1.940***	4.421***	7.233***	1.742**	1.377*	0.716

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 13: Effect of Party Cue on Likelihood of EC Responses for Partisans with Low Political Interest

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Keep the EC	Valued...	Amend the EC	Undemocratic...
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rpartycue	-0.030 (0.069)	-0.037 (0.080)		
Dpartycue			0.074* (0.044)	0.103* (0.057)
raceAsian,White			0.064 (0.290)	-0.100 (0.373)
raceBlack (African American)	0.770** (0.353)	0.856** (0.412)	-0.175 (0.109)	-0.129 (0.140)
raceBlack (African American),Hispanic or Latino			0.064 (0.290)	-0.118 (0.374)
raceBlack (African American),White			-0.943** (0.402)	-0.536 (0.518)
raceHispanic or Latino	0.556 (0.354)	0.224 (0.413)	-0.141 (0.133)	-0.165 (0.171)
raceHispanic or Latino,White	1.115*** (0.413)	0.454 (0.483)	0.006 (0.401)	0.359 (0.517)
raceNative American	0.231 (0.511)	1.077* (0.597)	-0.296 (0.242)	-0.274 (0.311)
raceNative American,White			0.056 (0.403)	0.418 (0.520)
raceOther/Unknown			-0.517* (0.292)	-0.122 (0.377)
racePrefer not to say	0.923* (0.511)	0.958 (0.597)	0.793 (0.565)	-1.043 (0.728)
raceWhite	0.879*** (0.297)	0.572 (0.346)	-0.142 (0.089)	-0.091 (0.115)
eduHigh school	0.082 (0.128)	0.127 (0.150)	-0.123 (0.087)	0.078 (0.112)
eduLess than high school			-0.778** (0.394)	-0.447 (0.508)
eduMaster's degree	0.077 (0.096)	-0.118 (0.112)	-0.065 (0.068)	0.035 (0.087)
eduPhD or some professional degree	-0.318 (0.219)	-0.271 (0.256)	0.072 (0.135)	0.157 (0.174)
eduPrefer not to say	0.209 (0.590)	-1.081 (0.689)		
eduSome college	-0.013 (0.084)	0.024 (0.098)	-0.008 (0.058)	0.024 (0.075)
genMale	0.173*** (0.066)	0.120 (0.077)	-0.024 (0.046)	-0.011 (0.059)
genNon-binary / third gender			0.090 (0.288)	0.506 (0.371)
genPrefer not to say			-0.811** (0.398)	0.363 (0.513)
birth_yr	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.007** (0.003)	-0.00002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
Constant	6.551 (5.107)	13.657** (5.962)	0.988 (3.625)	5.344 (4.672)
Observations	164	164	323	323
R ²	0.161	0.129	0.079	0.048
Adjusted R ²	0.082	0.047	0.014	-0.019
Residual Std. Error	0.409 (df = 149) ¹¹⁰	0.478 (df = 149)	0.392 (df = 301)	0.505 (df = 301)
F Statistic	2.042** (df = 14; 149)	1.575* (df = 14; 149)	1.225 (df = 21; 301)	0.716 (df = 21; 301)

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 14: Effect of Party Cue on Likelihood of EC Responses for Low Political Sophistication Respondents

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Amend the EC	Keep the EC	No Opinion	Undemocratic...	Valued...	Too Complicated	Better Than Alt	Don't Know/Unsure
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
partycue	-0.0003 (0.048)	-0.059 (0.047)	0.059* (0.034)	-0.012 (0.052)	-0.060 (0.047)	0.022 (0.044)	-0.011 (0.038)	0.061** (0.029)
raceAsian,White	0.294 (0.312)	-0.134 (0.305)	-0.161 (0.221)	0.440 (0.336)	-0.217 (0.300)	-0.102 (0.284)	-0.052 (0.246)	-0.070 (0.186)
raceBlack (African American)	-0.154 (0.133)	0.025 (0.129)	0.129 (0.094)	-0.198 (0.142)	-0.130 (0.127)	0.151 (0.121)	0.154 (0.104)	0.024 (0.079)
raceHispanic or Latino	-0.201 (0.139)	0.133 (0.136)	0.068 (0.098)	-0.190 (0.150)	0.182 (0.134)	-0.071 (0.127)	0.013 (0.109)	0.067 (0.083)
raceHispanic or Latino,White	0.333 (0.229)	-0.160 (0.223)	-0.174 (0.161)	0.235 (0.246)	-0.217 (0.220)	0.121 (0.208)	-0.006 (0.180)	-0.133 (0.136)
raceNative American	0.095 (0.434)	-0.045 (0.424)	-0.050 (0.307)	0.411 (0.466)	-0.202 (0.417)	-0.225 (0.395)	0.056 (0.341)	-0.040 (0.258)
raceOther/Unknown	-0.660** (0.260)	0.433* (0.254)	0.227 (0.184)	-0.476* (0.280)	0.046 (0.250)	0.154 (0.237)	0.363* (0.205)	-0.088 (0.155)
racePrefer not to say	-0.515 (0.434)	-0.348 (0.424)	0.863*** (0.307)	-0.445 (0.467)	0.572 (0.417)	-0.037 (0.396)	0.023 (0.342)	-0.113 (0.258)
raceWhite	-0.043 (0.090)	0.072 (0.088)	-0.029 (0.064)	-0.109 (0.097)	-0.078 (0.087)	0.049 (0.082)	0.127* (0.071)	0.010 (0.054)
eduHigh school	-0.035 (0.083)	0.006 (0.081)	0.029 (0.059)	0.083 (0.089)	-0.001 (0.080)	-0.086 (0.076)	0.106 (0.065)	-0.102** (0.049)
eduLess than high school	-0.358 (0.250)	0.149 (0.244)	0.209 (0.176)	-0.408 (0.268)	-0.203 (0.240)	0.485** (0.227)	0.252 (0.196)	-0.127 (0.149)
eduMaster's degree	-0.069 (0.093)	0.152* (0.091)	-0.083 (0.066)	-0.117 (0.100)	-0.041 (0.090)	0.130 (0.085)	0.091 (0.073)	-0.063 (0.055)
eduPhD or some professional degree	0.083 (0.156)	-0.154 (0.152)	0.071 (0.110)	0.205 (0.167)	-0.084 (0.150)	-0.084 (0.142)	0.004 (0.122)	-0.042 (0.093)
eduPrefer not to say	-0.097 (0.603)	0.231 (0.589)	-0.134 (0.426)	-0.035 (0.648)	-0.806 (0.579)	-0.078 (0.549)	1.033** (0.474)	-0.115 (0.358)
eduSome college	0.023 (0.060)	0.024 (0.058)	-0.047 (0.042)	0.034 (0.064)	0.011 (0.057)	0.032 (0.054)	-0.027 (0.047)	-0.050 (0.036)
genMale	-0.077 (0.048)	0.117** (0.047)	-0.040 (0.034)	-0.036 (0.052)	0.033 (0.047)	-0.051 (0.044)	0.088** (0.038)	-0.034 (0.029)
genNon-binary / third gender	0.088 (0.433)	0.036 (0.423)	-0.123 (0.306)	0.419 (0.465)	-0.101 (0.416)	-0.249 (0.394)	0.041 (0.340)	-0.109 (0.257)
genPrefer not to say								
birth_yr	0.001 (0.002)	-0.004* (0.002)	0.002* (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.007*** (0.002)	0.0003 (0.002)	0.004*** (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)
partyIndependent	-0.294*** (0.058)	0.134** (0.057)	0.160*** (0.041)	-0.097 (0.062)	0.099* (0.056)	-0.132** (0.053)	0.006 (0.046)	0.125*** (0.034)
partyRepublican	-0.671*** (0.063)	0.571*** (0.062)	0.100** (0.045)	-0.381*** (0.068)	0.387*** (0.061)	-0.153*** (0.058)	0.149*** (0.050)	-0.003 (0.038)
partySomething else	-0.423** (0.184)	0.204 (0.180)	0.219* (0.130)	0.064 (0.198)	0.072 (0.177)	-0.290* (0.168)	0.025 (0.145)	0.128 (0.110)
Constant	-1.671 (3.958)	7.286* (3.866)	-4.615* (2.797)	-0.889 (4.255)	13.630*** (3.801)	-0.315 (3.605)	-8.761*** (3.112)	-2.665 (2.355)
Observations	315	315	315	315	315	315	315	315
R ²	0.327	0.287	0.160	0.162	0.191	0.083	0.128	0.095
Adjusted R ²	0.279	0.236	0.100	0.102	0.133	0.017	0.066	0.030
Residual Std. Error (df = 293)	0.423	0.413	0.299	0.454	0.406	0.385	0.332	0.251
F Statistic (df = 21; 293)	6.778***	5.608***	2.657***	2.696***	3.293***	1.255	2.054***	1.460*

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 15: Effect of Party Cue on Likelihood of EC Responses for High Political Sophistication Respondents

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Amend the EC	Keep the EC	No Opinion	Undemocratic...	Valued...	Too Complicated	Better Than Alt	Don't Know/Unsure
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
partycue	-0.002 (0.046)	0.013 (0.045)	-0.011 (0.018)	0.040 (0.048)	0.001 (0.043)	0.026 (0.036)	-0.050 (0.038)	-0.018 (0.017)
raceAsian,White	-0.435 (0.277)	0.131 (0.271)	0.304*** (0.108)	-0.533* (0.288)	0.410 (0.260)	0.284 (0.216)	-0.163 (0.227)	0.002 (0.100)
raceAsian,White,Other/Unknown	0.390 (0.450)	-0.381 (0.440)	-0.009 (0.175)	0.630 (0.467)	-0.397 (0.421)	-0.010 (0.350)	-0.190 (0.368)	-0.032 (0.162)
raceBlack (African American)	-0.189 (0.136)	0.200 (0.133)	-0.011 (0.053)	-0.170 (0.141)	0.154 (0.127)	-0.036 (0.106)	-0.007 (0.111)	0.059 (0.049)
raceBlack (African American),Hispanic or Latino	0.024 (0.326)	-0.023 (0.319)	-0.001 (0.127)	-0.204 (0.339)	-0.075 (0.306)	0.380 (0.254)	-0.097 (0.267)	-0.004 (0.117)
raceBlack (African American),White	-0.491* (0.279)	0.186 (0.273)	0.305*** (0.109)	-0.495* (0.290)	0.113 (0.261)	0.202 (0.217)	0.216 (0.228)	-0.036 (0.100)
raceHispanic or Latino	-0.175 (0.164)	0.109 (0.160)	0.066 (0.064)	-0.153 (0.170)	-0.143 (0.153)	0.080 (0.127)	0.204 (0.134)	0.011 (0.059)
raceHispanic or Latino,White	-0.457 (0.331)	0.463 (0.323)	-0.007 (0.129)	-0.211 (0.343)	-0.156 (0.310)	-0.006 (0.257)	0.381 (0.271)	-0.007 (0.119)
raceNative American	-0.057 (0.247)	0.064 (0.241)	-0.006 (0.096)	-0.270 (0.256)	0.506** (0.231)	-0.122 (0.192)	-0.104 (0.202)	-0.009 (0.089)
raceNative American,Hispanic or Latino,White	-0.615 (0.477)	0.605 (0.466)	0.010 (0.186)	-0.555 (0.495)	0.269 (0.447)	0.119 (0.371)	0.124 (0.390)	0.043 (0.171)
raceNative American,White	-0.341 (0.331)	0.392 (0.323)	-0.051 (0.129)	-0.048 (0.343)	0.277 (0.310)	-0.118 (0.257)	-0.073 (0.271)	-0.037 (0.119)
raceOther/Unknown	0.141 (0.333)	-0.107 (0.325)	-0.034 (0.129)	-0.072 (0.345)	0.210 (0.312)	-0.042 (0.259)	-0.085 (0.272)	-0.012 (0.120)
racePrefer not to say	-0.091 (0.262)	0.232 (0.256)	-0.141 (0.102)	-0.229 (0.272)	-0.172 (0.246)	0.131 (0.204)	0.269 (0.215)	0.002 (0.094)
raceWhite	-0.207* (0.117)	0.182 (0.114)	0.024 (0.046)	-0.143 (0.121)	-0.030 (0.110)	0.087 (0.091)	0.065 (0.096)	0.021 (0.042)
eduHigh school	-0.076 (0.093)	0.048 (0.091)	0.028 (0.036)	0.060 (0.097)	0.156* (0.087)	-0.083 (0.072)	-0.096 (0.076)	-0.036 (0.033)
eduMaster's degree	-0.048 (0.061)	0.019 (0.060)	0.029 (0.024)	0.068 (0.063)	-0.128** (0.057)	0.042 (0.047)	0.022 (0.050)	-0.003 (0.022)
eduPhD or some professional degree	0.030 (0.130)	-0.067 (0.127)	0.037 (0.051)	0.064 (0.135)	0.097 (0.122)	-0.134 (0.101)	0.025 (0.107)	-0.052 (0.047)
eduPrefer not to say	0.004 (0.546)	0.373 (0.534)	-0.376* (0.212)	0.039 (0.566)	-0.595 (0.511)	-0.371 (0.425)	0.927** (0.447)	0.001 (0.196)
eduSome college	0.007 (0.060)	-0.072 (0.059)	0.065*** (0.023)	0.055 (0.062)	-0.056 (0.056)	0.054 (0.047)	-0.032 (0.049)	-0.021 (0.022)
genMale	-0.093* (0.048)	0.129*** (0.047)	-0.036* (0.019)	-0.007 (0.050)	0.096** (0.045)	-0.088** (0.037)	0.027 (0.039)	-0.028 (0.017)
genNon-binary / third gender	0.086 (0.451)	0.0001 (0.441)	-0.086 (0.176)	0.505 (0.468)	0.113 (0.423)	-0.235 (0.351)	-0.348 (0.370)	-0.035 (0.162)
genPrefer not to say	-0.342 (0.332)	-0.210 (0.324)	0.552*** (0.129)	-0.046 (0.344)	0.028 (0.311)	0.233 (0.258)	-0.192 (0.272)	-0.024 (0.119)
birth_yr	0.003 (0.002)	-0.003* (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.0004 (0.002)	-0.004** (0.002)	0.002 (0.001)	0.003* (0.001)	-0.0003 (0.001)
partyIndependent	-0.356*** (0.061)	0.323*** (0.060)	0.033 (0.024)	-0.275*** (0.064)	0.228*** (0.057)	-0.038 (0.048)	0.054 (0.050)	0.032 (0.022)
partyRepublican	-0.548*** (0.056)	0.566*** (0.055)	-0.018 (0.022)	-0.467*** (0.058)	0.548*** (0.052)	-0.107** (0.044)	0.023 (0.046)	0.003 (0.020)
partySomething else	-0.280* (0.144)	0.295** (0.140)	-0.015 (0.056)	-0.150 (0.149)	0.413*** (0.134)	-0.087 (0.112)	-0.170 (0.118)	-0.006 (0.052)
Constant	-4.024 (3.551)	6.182* (3.470)	-1.158 (1.382)	1.350 (3.684)	7.500** (3.327)	-2.993 (2.762)	-5.414* (2.907)	0.556 (1.277)
Observations	380	380	380	380	380	380	380	380
R ²	0.297	0.316	0.140	0.200	0.307	0.082	0.074	0.029
Adjusted R ²	0.246	0.266	0.077	0.141	0.256	0.014	0.006	-0.042
Residual Std. Error (df = 353)	0.432	0.422	0.168	0.448	0.405	0.336	0.354	0.155
F Statistic (df = 26; 353)	5.746***	6.287***	2.217***	3.384***	6.022***	1.206	1.092	0.411

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 16: Effect of Party Cue on Likelihood of EC Responses for Partisans with Low Political Sophistication

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Keep the EC	Valued...	Amend the EC	Undemocratic...
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rpartycue	0.069 (0.112)	-0.168 (0.133)		
Dpartycue			0.181*** (0.068)	0.112 (0.088)
raceAsian,White			-0.044 (0.406)	0.316 (0.526)
raceBlack (African American)	-0.143 (0.414)	0.530 (0.493)	-0.263 (0.181)	-0.310 (0.235)
raceHispanic or Latino			-0.212 (0.171)	-0.188 (0.221)
raceHispanic or Latino,White			-0.016 (0.406)	0.354 (0.525)
raceNative American			0.137 (0.407)	0.429 (0.526)
raceOther/Unknown			-1.069*** (0.407)	-0.690 (0.527)
raceWhite	0.373 (0.324)	0.310 (0.385)	-0.059 (0.125)	-0.105 (0.161)
eduHigh school	0.017 (0.203)	0.112 (0.242)	-0.188* (0.107)	0.033 (0.139)
eduLess than high school			-0.384 (0.279)	-0.504 (0.361)
eduMaster's degree	0.076 (0.216)	0.175 (0.257)	-0.280** (0.132)	-0.220 (0.171)
eduPhD or some professional degree	0.042 (0.280)	-0.019 (0.333)	0.120 (0.183)	0.287 (0.237)
eduSome college	0.048 (0.130)	0.107 (0.155)	-0.076 (0.085)	-0.113 (0.110)
genMale	0.342*** (0.116)	0.007 (0.138)	-0.030 (0.068)	-0.038 (0.088)
genNon-binary / third gender			-0.055 (0.406)	0.314 (0.525)
birth_yr	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.009* (0.005)	0.002 (0.003)	0.0004 (0.004)
Constant	6.280 (8.073)	18.823* (9.608)	-2.586 (5.553)	-0.269 (7.182)
Observations	69	69	143	143
R ²	0.199	0.123	0.162	0.115
Adjusted R ²	0.076	-0.011	0.055	0.002
Residual Std. Error	0.425 (df = 59)	0.506 (df = 59)	0.387 (df = 126)	0.501 (df = 126)
F Statistic	1.624 (df = 9; 59)	0.918 (df = 9; 59)	1.519 (df = 16; 126)	1.021 (df = 16; 126)

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 17: Effect of Party Cue on Likelihood of EC Responses for Low Political Knowledge Responses

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Amend the EC	Keep the EC	No Opinion	Undemocratic...	Valued...	Too Complicated	Better Than Alt	Don't Know/Unsure
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
partycue	0.001 (0.077)	-0.017 (0.076)	0.016 (0.036)	-0.023 (0.077)	-0.018 (0.070)	0.049 (0.054)	-0.017 (0.059)	0.008 (0.042)
raceBlack (African American)	-0.053 (0.190)	0.087 (0.189)	-0.034 (0.089)	0.081 (0.189)	0.126 (0.172)	-0.184 (0.134)	-0.052 (0.146)	0.029 (0.104)
raceHispanic or Latino	0.023 (0.275)	0.068 (0.272)	-0.092 (0.129)	-0.271 (0.273)	0.112 (0.248)	-0.062 (0.193)	0.036 (0.210)	0.185 (0.150)
raceNative American	0.295 (0.289)	-0.136 (0.287)	-0.160 (0.136)	-0.056 (0.288)	0.516* (0.261)	-0.291 (0.203)	-0.088 (0.221)	-0.082 (0.158)
raceOther/Unknown	-0.116 (0.377)	0.285 (0.374)	-0.170 (0.177)	0.015 (0.375)	0.274 (0.341)	-0.239 (0.265)	0.052 (0.288)	-0.103 (0.205)
raceWhite	0.050 (0.170)	0.030 (0.169)	-0.080 (0.080)	-0.014 (0.169)	-0.043 (0.154)	-0.132 (0.119)	0.154 (0.130)	0.036 (0.093)
eduHigh school	-0.153 (0.123)	0.189 (0.122)	-0.036 (0.057)	-0.194 (0.122)	0.173 (0.111)	-0.004 (0.086)	0.110 (0.094)	-0.086 (0.067)
eduLess than high school	0.274 (0.482)	-0.238 (0.478)	-0.036 (0.226)	-0.423 (0.480)	-0.142 (0.435)	0.836** (0.339)	-0.170 (0.369)	-0.101 (0.262)
eduMaster's degree	-0.029 (0.109)	0.093 (0.108)	-0.064 (0.051)	-0.012 (0.109)	-0.184* (0.099)	0.266*** (0.077)	-0.025 (0.084)	-0.045 (0.060)
eduPhD or some professional degree	0.074 (0.221)	-0.041 (0.220)	-0.033 (0.104)	-0.209 (0.220)	0.038 (0.200)	0.142 (0.156)	0.091 (0.169)	-0.062 (0.121)
eduSome college	0.035 (0.125)	-0.002 (0.124)	-0.033 (0.059)	0.056 (0.125)	0.015 (0.113)	0.128 (0.088)	-0.149 (0.096)	-0.050 (0.068)
genMale	-0.033 (0.075)	0.016 (0.075)	0.018 (0.035)	-0.016 (0.075)	-0.020 (0.068)	0.024 (0.053)	0.050 (0.058)	-0.038 (0.041)
birth_yr	-0.005* (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.002 (0.001)	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.0003 (0.003)	0.0004 (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
partyIndependent	-0.288*** (0.100)	0.088 (0.099)	0.200*** (0.047)	-0.138 (0.100)	0.041 (0.090)	-0.185*** (0.070)	0.126 (0.077)	0.157*** (0.055)
partyRepublican	-0.461*** (0.093)	0.467*** (0.092)	-0.007 (0.043)	-0.275*** (0.092)	0.361*** (0.084)	-0.132** (0.065)	0.066 (0.071)	-0.020 (0.051)
partySomething else	-0.386 (0.303)	0.071 (0.300)	0.315** (0.142)	-0.186 (0.301)	-0.213 (0.273)	0.067 (0.213)	0.364 (0.232)	-0.032 (0.165)
Constant	10.917* (6.005)	-6.533 (5.955)	-3.383 (2.813)	12.237** (5.977)	0.738 (5.427)	-0.489 (4.220)	-9.821** (4.596)	-1.664 (3.271)
Observations	168	168	168	168	168	168	168	168
R ²	0.192	0.179	0.212	0.119	0.185	0.189	0.127	0.100
Adjusted R ²	0.106	0.092	0.128	0.025	0.099	0.103	0.034	0.005
Residual Std. Error (df = 151)	0.473	0.469	0.222	0.471	0.427	0.332	0.362	0.258
F Statistic (df = 16; 151)	2.236***	2.062**	2.534***	1.272	2.143***	2.203***	1.369	1.053

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 18: Effect of Party Cue on Likelihood of EC Responses for High Political Knowledge Respondents

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Amend the EC (1)	Keep the EC (2)	No Opinion (3)	Undemocratic... (4)	Valued... (5)	Too Complicated (6)	Better Than Alt (7)	Don't Know/Unsure (8)
partycue	0.013 (0.036)	-0.026 (0.035)	0.014 (0.023)	0.024 (0.039)	-0.033 (0.035)	0.032 (0.032)	-0.049 (0.030)	0.026 (0.017)
raceAsian,White	-0.194 (0.198)	0.105 (0.191)	0.089 (0.124)	-0.206 (0.212)	0.177 (0.194)	0.151 (0.175)	-0.058 (0.164)	-0.066 (0.094)
raceAsian,White,Other/Unknown	0.415 (0.417)	-0.332 (0.403)	-0.083 (0.262)	0.602 (0.447)	-0.387 (0.409)	-0.031 (0.368)	-0.098 (0.346)	-0.086 (0.199)
raceBlack (African American)	-0.113 (0.102)	0.059 (0.099)	0.054 (0.064)	-0.251** (0.109)	-0.025 (0.100)	0.054 (0.090)	0.220*** (0.085)	0.003 (0.049)
raceBlack (African American),Hispanic or Latino	0.054 (0.299)	-0.028 (0.289)	-0.026 (0.188)	-0.175 (0.320)	-0.113 (0.293)	0.375 (0.264)	-0.045 (0.248)	-0.041 (0.143)
raceBlack (African American),White	-0.488* (0.249)	0.279 (0.241)	0.209 (0.156)	-0.526** (0.266)	0.135 (0.244)	0.165 (0.220)	0.337 (0.207)	-0.111 (0.119)
raceHispanic or Latino	-0.185* (0.111)	0.114 (0.107)	0.071 (0.070)	-0.128 (0.119)	0.001 (0.109)	-0.004 (0.098)	0.153* (0.092)	-0.021 (0.053)
raceHispanic or Latino,White	0.062 (0.183)	0.040 (0.177)	-0.102 (0.115)	0.085 (0.196)	-0.204 (0.180)	0.087 (0.162)	0.096 (0.152)	-0.063 (0.088)
raceNative American	-0.026 (0.417)	0.076 (0.403)	-0.051 (0.262)	0.338 (0.447)	-0.107 (0.409)	-0.169 (0.368)	-0.008 (0.346)	-0.053 (0.199)
raceNative American,Hispanic or Latino,White	-0.569 (0.434)	0.733* (0.420)	-0.165 (0.273)	-0.694 (0.465)	0.510 (0.426)	0.197 (0.384)	0.103 (0.361)	-0.116 (0.207)
raceNative American,White	-0.304 (0.301)	0.388 (0.291)	-0.084 (0.189)	-0.056 (0.322)	0.224 (0.295)	-0.138 (0.266)	0.031 (0.250)	-0.061 (0.144)
raceOther/Unknown	-0.408 (0.250)	0.173 (0.241)	0.235 (0.157)	-0.568** (0.267)	0.031 (0.245)	0.295 (0.221)	0.305 (0.207)	-0.063 (0.119)
racePrefer not to say	-0.111 (0.208)	0.073 (0.202)	0.038 (0.131)	-0.254 (0.223)	-0.007 (0.204)	0.117 (0.184)	0.230 (0.173)	-0.086 (0.100)
raceWhite	-0.142* (0.076)	0.149** (0.073)	-0.007 (0.048)	-0.145* (0.081)	-0.040 (0.074)	0.104 (0.067)	0.094 (0.063)	-0.012 (0.036)
eduHigh school	0.029 (0.069)	-0.109 (0.067)	0.080* (0.044)	0.170** (0.074)	-0.008 (0.068)	-0.092 (0.061)	-0.028 (0.058)	-0.042 (0.033)
eduLess than high school	-0.654** (0.294)	0.258 (0.285)	0.396** (0.185)	-0.399 (0.315)	-0.207 (0.288)	0.346 (0.260)	0.313 (0.244)	-0.054 (0.141)
eduMaster's degree	-0.053 (0.055)	0.053 (0.054)	-0.0003 (0.035)	0.036 (0.059)	-0.060 (0.054)	-0.016 (0.049)	0.061 (0.046)	-0.022 (0.027)
eduPhD or some professional degree	0.059 (0.108)	-0.108 (0.104)	0.049 (0.068)	0.193* (0.115)	0.049 (0.106)	-0.203** (0.095)	0.018 (0.090)	-0.057 (0.051)
eduPrefer not to say	-0.045 (0.422)	0.131 (0.409)	-0.087 (0.266)	-0.066 (0.453)	-0.407 (0.414)	-0.436 (0.373)	0.915*** (0.351)	-0.006 (0.202)
eduSome college	0.002 (0.045)	-0.025 (0.044)	0.023 (0.028)	0.067 (0.048)	-0.034 (0.044)	0.009 (0.040)	-0.007 (0.037)	-0.034 (0.022)
genMale	-0.107*** (0.037)	0.166*** (0.036)	-0.059** (0.023)	-0.029 (0.040)	0.087** (0.037)	-0.101*** (0.033)	0.071** (0.031)	-0.027 (0.018)
genNon-binary / third gender	0.023 (0.296)	0.086 (0.287)	-0.109 (0.186)	0.375 (0.318)	-0.031 (0.290)	-0.195 (0.262)	-0.091 (0.246)	-0.059 (0.142)
genPrefer not to say	-0.337 (0.308)	-0.104 (0.298)	0.441** (0.194)	0.014 (0.331)	-0.099 (0.303)	0.212 (0.273)	-0.112 (0.256)	-0.015 (0.147)
birth_yr	0.004** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.0003 (0.001)
partyIndependent	-0.344*** (0.044)	0.258*** (0.043)	0.086*** (0.028)	-0.238*** (0.048)	0.210*** (0.044)	-0.040 (0.039)	0.010 (0.037)	0.058*** (0.021)
partyRepublican	-0.650*** (0.046)	0.608*** (0.045)	0.042 (0.029)	-0.483*** (0.049)	0.510*** (0.045)	-0.116*** (0.041)	0.084** (0.038)	0.005 (0.022)
partySomething else	-0.397*** (0.115)	0.311*** (0.111)	0.085 (0.072)	-0.116 (0.123)	0.333*** (0.112)	-0.179* (0.101)	-0.168* (0.095)	0.130** (0.055)
Constant	-6.046** (2.857)	10.062*** (2.764)	-3.016* (1.797)	-2.189 (3.062)	11.541*** (2.802)	-2.027 (2.525)	-5.794** (2.375)	-0.530 (1.365)
Observations	535	535	535	535	535	535	535	535
R ²	0.357	0.360	0.094	0.216	0.268	0.074	0.092	0.041
Adjusted R ²	0.323	0.326	0.045	0.174	0.229	0.025	0.044	-0.010
Residual Std. Error (df = 507)	0.409	0.396	0.257	0.438	0.401	0.361	0.340	0.195
F Statistic (df = 27; 507)	10.422***	10.548***	1.942***	5.169***	6.871***	1.501*	1.904***	0.805

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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