

WHAT CAN ONE REASONABLY SAY ABOUT NONEXISTENCE?  
A TIBETAN WORK ON THE PROBLEM OF *ĀŚRAYĀSIDDHA*\*

The fallacy of *āśrayāsiddhahetu*, or a “logical reason whose basis is unestablished” arises when the subject of an argument is nonexistent; in usual cases, this subject failure implies that the proposition to be proved (*sādhya*) cannot be established – Buddhists such as Dharmakīrti repeatedly stress that when the subject fails, a debate about its properties ceases. To take an invented example, if one says that “Pegasus flies around the Aegean”, it suffices to show that there is no Pegasus and one will have, *ipso facto*, short-circuited the question of “his” flight, or even proved the contrary, i.e. that he does not fly. Similarly, if someone shows that the Primordial Matter (*pradhāna*) accepted in Sāṃkhya philosophy does not actually exist, then the Sāṃkhya’s own thesis that *pradhāna* has such and such properties will thereby be refuted.<sup>1</sup> The problem however becomes thorny when one is proving simple nonexistence of some pseudo-entity, for then the case should be different from that of Pegasus’s supposed flight. The height of absurdity would be if all proofs of nonexistence became self-refuting because the subject failed to exist.

The problem of *āśrayāsiddha* is taken up in various Buddhist contexts – typically in connection with proofs of momentariness (*kṣaṇabhāṅgasiddhi*)<sup>2</sup> and in connection with later Madhyamaka proofs of the absence of intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāvatā*). Although it is certainly not our intention to inventory all the considerable Indian and Tibetan Buddhist literature on this problem of *āśrayāsiddha*, or even the majority of texts in which the problem figures, certain seminal works do stand out and are repeatedly cited. Besides passages from Dignāga, we should mention the substantial and influential sections in Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇavārttika* IV, k. 136–148 and *Pramāṇaviniścaya* III, as well as those in the works of Kamalaśīla, in particular his *Madhyamakāloka*. The Tibetan treatment is largely centered around Tsong kha pa’s *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris*, his commentary on the *Madhyamakālamkāra* in which he integrates and elaborates upon the key passages in Dignāga, Dharmakīrti and Kamalaśīla. Although there are some relatively brief

passages in the Sa skya pa *Rigs gter* and *Pramāṇavārttika* commentaries (e.g. gSer mdog Paṅ chen Śākya mchog ldan sketches out some significant differences from the treatment in *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris*<sup>3</sup>), it does seem that the problem of *āśrayāsiddha* was not treated nearly as thoroughly in the other schools as in the dGe lugs, where it became a recurring topos figuring markedly in numerous works. The present article consists primarily in a translation of the section on *āśrayāsiddha* in a text by A lag sha Ngag dbang bstan dar (1759–1840), a dGe lugs pa scholar who was from the A la shan region of Inner Mongolia but wrote in Tibetan and who was, in our opinion, remarkable for his clear and often quite innovative thinking. His *gCig du bral gyi rnam bzhag* is a Madhyamaka work, one that treats of various problems centered around the Svātantrika Madhyamaka's use of the *ekānekaviyogahetu* (= *gcig du bral gyi gtan tshigs* “neither one nor many reason [for *sūnyatā*]”). For Ngag dbang bstan dar the problem of *āśrayāsiddha* arises when the Madhyamaka uses logical reasons like the *ekānekaviyogahetu* to prove ultimate voidness of things; it also occurs when he uses logical reasoning to prove that pseudo-entities do not exist at all. Ngag dbang bstan dar, thus, like his Indian and Tibetan Svātantrika predecessors, zig-zags between the Madhyamaka and logicians' positions, using the latter to buttress the former.

A striking aspect of the later Indian and Tibetan explanations of *āśrayāsiddha* is that certain earlier texts are almost invariably cited in later ones, giving a kind of “unfolding telescope” effect where each subsequent text includes its predecessors but seems to enlarge upon them and carry the ideas a few steps further, all the while seeking to remain faithful to the original intentions of Dignāga. This impression is, however, potentially misleading. In fact, be it the position of Kamalaśīla, that of Tsong kha pa or Ngag dbang bstan dar, what is at stake is a complex synthesis of disparate doctrine that has been elaborated over time; it would thus be a mistake if the seeming elegance of the unfolding telescope presentations lulled us into thinking that the later presentation was also ahistorically present *ab initio*. Lopez, in his *Study of Svātantrika*, has described the Tibetan theory on *āśrayāsiddha* as it is found in Tsong kha pa, rGyal tshab and lCang skya rol pa'i rdo rje and others: this constitutes the received position for Ngag dbang bstan dar. The section in *dBu ma rgyan gyis zin bris* treating of *āśrayāsiddha* has been translated in Tillemans (1984). As we shall try to show in the rather extensive explanatory notes to our translation, the positions that we find in Tsong kha pa, Ngag dbang bstan dar and others had an

intricate history that certainly did not just consist in bringing out what Dignāga and Dharmakīrti and Kamalaśīla had already understood.

Various works of bsTan dar have been studied by now, and it is becoming clear that this later dGe lugs pa thinker did make significant contributions, especially in the domain of ideas and arguments where he often shows originality in building upon and reinterpreting earlier writers.<sup>4</sup> The *gCig du bral gyi rnam bzhag*, and in particular the section on *āśrayāsiddha*, is a good case in point. On certain topics, such as avoidance of *āśrayāsiddha* in cases of simple, non-implicative, negation (*prasajyapratīṣedha*), bsTan dar makes a radical break with his Indian and Tibetan predecessors, and arguably he is right to do so. The rapprochement with the Madhyamaka debate on “concordantly appearing subjects” (*chos can mthun snang ba*) is also noteworthy for its philosophical interest, turning as it does on the general problem of the incommensurability of rival theories.

Readers will probably recognize that the problem of talking about non-being has a long history, not only in the East, but in the West, including its twentieth century technical treatment in formal logic’s theory of descriptions and in the theory of presuppositions. We add this later Tibetan position on what is one of the most recurrent and interesting problems of philosophy.

#### TRANSLATION

§1. Secondly, the doubt that the subject (*chos can; dharmin*) might be unestablished, when one presents the formal argument (*sbyor ngag; prayogavākya*). [Objection:] If we follow what is literally stated in the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, it is evident that one also presents partless consciousness, Primordial Matter (*spyi gtso bo; pradhāna*) and so forth<sup>5</sup> as subjects of enquiry (*shes ’dod chos can*) for a valid logical reason.<sup>6</sup> Thus this [reason] would have an unestablished basis (*gzhi ma grub pa; āśrayāsiddha*). Would it not then result that the reason would be one which is unestablished (*ma grub pa; asiddha*) because the entity of the subject does not exist?<sup>7</sup>

§2. By way of a reply to this [objection], many scholars have said that there is no [such] fault so long as one presents simple negations (*med dgag; prasajyapratīṣedha*) as both the reason and the property to be proved (*bsgrub bya’i chos; sādhyadharmā*), but that should one present a positive phenomenon (*sgrub pa; vidhi*) or an implicative negation (*ma yin dgag; paryudāsapratīṣedha*), it will then be an unestablished reason.<sup>8</sup> This does indeed seem to be based on certain statements [in

the works] of Tsong kha pa and his disciples, such as [the passage] in [Tsong kha pa's] *dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal* that reads:

The fact that there is no fault, even though the subject stated for that reason might be negated, is due to the essential feature that both the reason and the property [to be proved] are mere exclusions (*rnam bcad tsam; vyavacchedamātra*).

However this alone can not eliminate all doubt. Thus it is necessary to explain things as follows. There are cases where [the reason] would not be a reason that is unestablished, in spite of the fact that one might present either an implicative negation or a positive phenomenon for both the reason and the property to be proved. For example, an argument such as “Take as the subject, a rabbit’s horn; it is fitting to be designated by the word ‘moon’, because it exists as an object of conceptual thought.” – this [argument] is the idea of ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa’i rdo rje.<sup>9</sup> Alternatively [there could be the argument], “Take as the subject, being gored by a rabbit’s horn; this is a fallacious reason for proving that a person is in pain, because it is a reason that does not have the triple character [needed] for proving that a person is in pain” – this [argument] is the idea in [dGe ’dun grub pa’s] *Tshad ma rigs rgyan*.<sup>10</sup>

§3. The reason why these [arguments] are not reasons that are unestablished because the entity of the subject does not exist devolves from the essential feature that when something is [qualified by] either the reasons or properties to be proved in the proof of these [propositions], it need not be existent. So, even when simple negations are presented as both the reason and property [to be proved], there can also be the fault of the subject being unestablished provided that either the reason or property to be proved in the proof in question is pervaded by being existent, as for example when one proves that [something nonexistent like a rabbit’s horn] is the subtle selflessness of the elements (*chos kyi bdag med; dharmanairātmya*) by means of the reason, “being the consummate [nature]” (*yongs grub; pariniṣpanna*).<sup>11</sup> Consequently, when one presents an unestablished basis as the subject, then all cases where a thing’s being held to be [qualified by] the reason necessitates its being existent will [incur the fault of] being fallacious reasons unestablished because of the nonexistence of the entity of the subject, but when being held to be [qualified by] the reason does not necessitate being existent, then the [reason] will not be fallacious. The details of this way [of distinguishing between faulty reasons and valid ones] should be correctly brought out.

§4. In general, the subject of an argument is of two sorts, the subject that is the [proponent’s] own [intended] locus (*rang rten chos can*)<sup>12</sup> and

a nominal subject (*chos can 'ba' zhig pa; kevaladharmin*).<sup>13</sup> Between these two, the subject that is the [proponent's] own [intended] locus is, e.g., when one proves to a Sāṃkhya that sound is impermanent by means of the reason that it is produced, for at that time one proves impermanence based upon the simple [commonly recognized entity] sound. A nominal subject is, e.g., when one proves to a Vaiśeṣika that the space, which is [taken by the Vaiśeṣika to be] a real entity (*dnogs por gyur pa'i nam mkha'; vastubhūtākāśa*), is not [in fact] a permanent substance [as they maintain it is] by means of the reason that it does not serve as the locus for other qualities. [This is called a “nominal subject”] because, at that time, one is not proving that being a permanent substance is located in a real entity, space, and thus this type of space is just merely presented as the subject, but is not the locus or subject.<sup>14</sup> Now, something's being a “nominal subject” means that although it might be stated as the subject, it is not the locus of the property to be proved (*sādhya-dharma*), and is thus an unrelated subject. Consequently, although the nominal subject, i.e. the stated subject [as Tsong kha pa refers to it in §2 above], in the argument in question [against the Vaiśeṣika] is an unestablished basis, the subject that is the [proponent's] own [intended] locus does exist, because at that time it is what appears to the conceptual thought grasping the real entity space (*vastubhūtākāśa*) as excluded from the contrary of real space that is the [actual] subject or locus for the proof in question. It follows that this is so, because [this appearance] is like that [i.e. is the actual locus], due to the fact that the desire to know (*shes 'dod; jijñāsā*) occurs once the opponent has mistakenly taken this type of space and the [conceptual] appearance as such [a space] to be identical.<sup>15</sup> Therefore, in order that we understand this difference between the fact that in the argument in question the subject that is the [proponent's] own locus is an established basis, while the nominal subject that is presented in the actual words is not an established basis, [Dignāga] stated in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*:

With regard to the [proponent's] own locus (*rang rten la*), [a thesis is not opposed] by perceptible states of affairs, by inference, by authorities or by what is commonly recognized.<sup>16</sup>

The purpose behind [Dignāga's] not saying “the [proponent's] own subject” (*rang gi chos can; svadharmin*) here but rather “the [proponent's] own locus” (*rang gi rten*), was explained *in extenso* in thirteen verses from the *Pratyakṣapariccheda* in *Pramāṇavārttika*, verses that begin “*sarvatra vādino . . . sva<sup>o</sup> . . .*”.<sup>17</sup>

§5. [Objection:] Then, it would follow [absurdly] that the appearance as something excluded from not-sound (*sgra ma yin pa las log par*

*snang ba*) would also be the subject that is the [proponent's] own locus when proving that sound is impermanent by means of the reason that it is produced, because that is what you asserted [about space].

§6. [Reply:] This is not the same, because of the following: if something is a valid reason it must be established on the basis of the subject of enquiry in accordance with its mode of presentation ('*god tshul*),<sup>18</sup> and so, because the appearance to conceptual thought as something excluded from not-sound is an imagined entity (*kun brtags; parikalpita*), it does not concord at all with being a product.<sup>19</sup> This follows, for it was stated in [Tsong kha pa's] *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris*:

If one is proving that sound is impermanent because it is produced, then as the exclusion *qua* appearance (*snang ldog*), which appears to conceptual thought as excluded from not sound, is not a real entity (*dngos po*), the reason, i.e. being produced, does not qualify it. Rather, [being produced] must qualify the basis of the appearance (*snang gzhi*), i.e. sound. This is due to the essential feature that real entities (*dngos po*) are taken as the reason and property to be proved.

The [latter] necessary implication (*khyab pa; vyāpti*) holds, because (a) it is obvious that a conceptual appearance will not be established as the subject of enquiry of an argument where real entities are presented as the reason and property to be proved, and (b) it was stated in the *rNam nges dar ṭīk* [of rGyal tshab rje]:

The [two cases] are not the same, because the conceptual appearance of space is the subject that is the basis ascertained as [qualified by] the previous reason [in the argument against the Vaiśeṣika], but what appears to conceptual thought as sound cannot be the basis that is ascertained as produced.

§7. To summarize, although we present space as the subject to the Vaiśeṣika, it is not the subject, but the appearance of this [space] is the subject. And when we prove that sound is impermanent by means of the reason, being produced, what appears as sound to conceptual thought does not serve as the subject, rather it is mere sound itself that serves as the subject that is the [proponent's] own [intended] locus. The reason for this, if one carries it as far as possible, comes down to whether there is or is not a subject that appears concordantly (*chos can mthun snang ba*) to both the Buddhist and the Vaiśeṣika, for the Buddhist accepts space as being a simple negation (*med dgag*) consisting in the mere denial of obstruction and contact, whereas the Vaiśeṣika accepts that it is a real entity (*dngos po*) that is independent (*rang dbang ba*) and is a positive phenomenon (*sgrub pa*).<sup>20</sup>

§8. [Objection:] Then it would follow that even sound would not appear concordantly to both [parties], because the Buddhist asserts that sound is derived from the elements ('*byung 'gyur; bhautika*), whereas

the Vaiśeṣika asserts that sound is a quality of space (*nam mkha'i yon tan; ākāśagūṇa*).

§9. [Reply:] This is completely different on account of the essential feature that, to both these [parties], a mere object grasped by the auditive consciousness is established as appearing concordantly as an object found by non-erroneous means of valid cognition (*tshad ma; pramāṇa*),<sup>21</sup> whereas in the case of space, if [the parties] were to search for the designated object (*btags don*), they would find no object established as appearing concordantly apart from the mere verbal designation.

§10. Moreover, the omniscient ICang skya [Rol pa'i rdo rje] has said that rGyal tshab rje maintained that the conceptual appearance (*rtog pa'i snang ba*) was the subject, but that mKhas grub rje did not accept that verbal objects (*sgra don; śabdārtha*) [i.e. conceptual entities] were the subject.<sup>22</sup> And the omniscient 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa has said that taking Primordial Matter as the subject was Dignāga's idea, and that Dharmakīrti's idea was to take the conceptual appearance as the subject. However, suppose we examine their ideas carefully. Then whomsoever's position we might take, be it that of Dignāga and his disciple [Dharmakīrti] or that of Tsong kha pa and his disciples [rGyal tshab rje and mKhas grub rje], if we presented an argument like "Take as the subject, Primordial Matter; it is not the substratum (*nyer len; upādāna*) for its various manifestations (*rnam 'gyur; vikṛti*), because it is not perceived to be the substratum of its various manifestations",<sup>23</sup> none would deny that it is correct to take what appears as excluded from not-Primordial Matter to the conceptual thought grasping Primordial Matter (*gtso bo 'dzin pa'i rtog pa la gtso bo ma yin pa las log par snang ba*) as being the subject of this argument. For it was stated in the *Madhyamakāloka* [of Kamalaśīla]:

It is just what exists as an aspect of mind, but is metaphorically designated by the infantile as external and real, that is the subject. Therefore, one negates Primordial Matter and the like in dependence upon that.<sup>24</sup>

§11. There is a necessary implication (*khyab pa; vyāpti*) here [between what the passage from the *Madhyamakāloka* says and the fact that the subject is a conceptual appearance], because [Kamalaśīla's] words "It is just what exists as an aspect of mind that is the subject" make it clear that he holds the conceptual appearance to be the subject.<sup>25</sup> This is also the case because of the following quotations. It is said in the *Svārthānumānapariccheda* [of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*]:

A verbal object [can] be a *dharma* of three types [a basis for existence, for non-existence or for both].

[To which] [Dharmakīrti's] *Svavṛtti* states:

Thus, those who depend upon this subject [deliberate about existence and non-existence, asking whether] this object that is represented by the word “Primordial Matter” [does or does not have a real substratum].<sup>26</sup>

In the commentary on this [passage] Śākyabuddhi says:

What is expressed by the word “Primordial Matter”, that alone is the subject.

And in [mKhas grub rje’s] *rNam ’grel ṭik chen rigs pa’i rgya mtsho* it is said:

This means that because it is generally taught that all conceptual appearances are verbal objects (*sgra don*; *śabdārtha*),<sup>27</sup> what appears as Primordial Matter to the conceptual thought grasping Primordial Matter is also established as being a verbal object. And in this way it is the exclusion *qua* basis (*gzhi ldog*) of the verbal object for Primordial Matter, or [in other words] it is just what appears as Primordial Matter to conceptual thought, that is the subject of this argument.<sup>28</sup>

§12. Here an opponent might say: Take as the subject the verbal object for Primordial Matter (*gtso bo’i sgra don*); it would follow that this would be the subject of that argument [mentioned earlier], because the appearance as Primordial Matter to the conceptual thought grasping Primordial Matter (*gtso bo ’dzin pa’i rtog pa la gtso bor snang ba*) is the subject of that argument.

§13. [We would reply:] There is no necessary implication (*ma khyab*).

§14. [The opponent:] It would follow that there is a necessary implication, because the appearance as Primordial Matter to conceptual thought is the verbal object for Primordial Matter.

§15. [We would reply:] Again there is no necessary implication, because there is a difference between an exclusion *qua* thing itself (*rang ldog*) and an exclusion *qua* basis [of the thing] (*gzhi ldog*).<sup>29</sup> For it was stated in the same [*rNam ’grel*] *Ṭik chen* [of mKhas grub rje]:

Therefore, the subject when one says, “Primordial Matter is not existent, because it is not perceived” is neither a real (*dnegos po ba*) Primordial Matter, nor is it the exclusion *qua* thing itself of the verbal object for Primordial Matter (*gtso bo’i sgra don gyi rang ldog*). Why? This very appearance as Primordial Matter to conceptual thought is asserted by the Sāṃkhyas to be the [actual] Primordial Matter endowed with the five qualities, but in our own system we assert that it is a verbal object. Thus, the conceptual appearance as Primordial Matter is considered to be the subject, because it is the basis of the debate about whether [something] is or is not the Primordial Matter endowed with the five qualities.

A differentiation between the exclusion *qua* thing itself (*rang ldog*) and the exclusion *qua* basis [for the thing] (*gzhi ldog*) is extremely valuable in this context.<sup>30</sup>

§16. This [point] is related to the essential feature that although the Sāṃkhya believes in this type of conceptual appearance, he does not



believe that this appearance is a verbal object, for in [mKhas grub rje's] *Tshad ma yid kyi mum sel* it is said:

Also for the foolish opponent to say that the verbal object for this type of [autonomous and substantially existent (*rang rkya thub pa'i rdzas yod*)] self is the subject would be a proclamation of his own faults since he accepts that the verbal object of this type of self (*de lta bu bdag gi sgra don*) does not [really] exist.

§17. Thus, it is indeed correct that the conceptual appearance is the subject, but when one is refuting an opponent's position, one does not have to present literally the conceptual appearance as being the subject. Why? It is because the very Primordial Matter, permanent Īśvara, autonomous persons and so forth in which the opponent believes must be explicitly presented as the subjects in just the same way [as the opponent believes in them]. Otherwise there would be the fault that Primordial Matter and so forth would not be negated in themselves (*rang ldog nas*).<sup>31</sup> For in [rGyal tshab rje's] *rNam 'grel thar lam gsal byed* it was said:

Their thought according to the Lord of scholars, Kamalaśīla, was that Primordial Matter had to be refuted by [explicitly] taking it as the subject. Otherwise, although [the property of] being the substratum of various manifestations might be negated, Primordial Matter would not be negated in itself (*rang ldog nas*). The basis for ascertaining the reason with a *pramāṇa* is maintained to be just the appearance as Primordial Matter (*gtso bor snang ba nyid*).<sup>32</sup>

§18. [Objection:] In that case, it follows that the conceptual appearance cannot correctly be held to be the subject, because it is void of ability to perform a function (*don byed nus pa; arthakriyāsāmarthya*). There is a necessary implication, because whatever is void of ability to perform a function cannot properly be a basis of deliberation for the perspicacious (*rtog ldan; prekṣāvat*). In this vein, the *Pramāṇavārttika* stated:

What point is there, for those who have such an aim, in deliberations about a thing that has no ability to perform a function? Why should a woman filled with desire wonder whether a eunuch was handsome or not?

§19. [We reply:] There is no necessary implication (*ma khyab*). This is for the following reasons. The meaning of this quotation is that when someone hopes his desired effect will ensue from some basis, then the basis about which he deliberates must have the ability to perform the function. Thus, [Dharmakīrti] illustrates [his point about the uselessness of deliberation about inefficient things] saying that it is inappropriate, because it would be like, for example, a woman, intent upon sexual pleasure, who took as the subject [of her thought] a eunuch, and after [mistakenly] hearing that he could perform the acts that would give [her pleasure], wondered whether he was handsome or not. Nonetheless,

in general, things that are void of ability to perform a function can properly be bases for [positive] proofs and negations. Indeed, the direct basis (*dngos rten*) for proofs and negations must inevitably be a verbal object. This follows, because:

- (a) the reason why the direct basis must be a verbal object when one is denying that sound is permanent or proving that it is impermanent by the reason of its being produced is also grounded in the fact<sup>33</sup> that the conceptual thought that proves or negates relies upon verbal objects;
- (b) it was said in the *Parārthānumānapariccheda* [of *Pramāṇavārttika*],  
 . . . We accept that all [positive] proof and negation (*vidhiniṣedhana*) here [in practical activity (*vyavahāra*)] is in reliance upon a verbal object . . . , which has no external basis;<sup>34</sup>
- (c) when it is said that permanence is negated and impermanence is proved with regard to sound, what is meant [here] is the performance of the function of conceptual thought (*rtog pa'i don byed*), and thus, on such an occasion, particular (*rang mtshan pa; svalakṣaṇa*) sounds, impermanent things or products and so forth do not directly (*dngos su*) appear to the conceptual thought that proves or negates.

In this vein, it was stated in [Tsong kha pa's] *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris*:

The [*Pramāṇa*]vārttika, the sense of Dignāga's statements, states:

However, this condition of practical designations in terms of what infers (*anumāna*) [i.e. the logical reason] and the proposition to be inferred (*anumeyārtha*) is constructed in dependence upon a difference established by means of [conceptual] thought.<sup>35</sup>

Following this explanation, in cases where the basis must be a real entity (*dngos po*), [such as when one is] proving that sound is impermanent because it is produced or that there is fire on the smoky hill, the direct basis (*dngos rten*) for these proofs and negations is just the object that is the appearance of sound or hill to conceptual thought as things excluded from what they are not. Sound and hill are not, however, themselves direct bases, because they do not directly appear to the conceptual thought that proves or negates.

As for the meaning of conceptual thought performing the function of negation and proof, it is as follows. When, for example, the quality of the subject (*phyogs chos; pakṣadharmā*) is established for proving sound to be impermanent by the reason that it is a product, then from the perspective of the opponent, it is as if sound is initially established and after that producthood newly depends upon sound. There is such an appearance (*snang tshul*), but in reality (*gnas tshod la*) there is no such progression.

TIBETAN TEXT OF THE EXCERPT FROM THE *GCIG DU BRAL GYI RNAM BZHAG*

§1. [453.2; f. 16b] gnyis pa sbyor ngag tu bkod na chos can ma grub pa'i dogs pa ni / *dBu ma rgyan gyi tshig zin ltar na / shes pa cha med dang spyi gtso bo sogs kyang rtags sbyor yang dag gi shes 'dod chos can du bkod par mngon pas / de gzhi ma grub pa yin pas rtags de chos can gyi ngo bo med nas ma grub pa'i gtan tshigs su mi 'gyur ram zhe na /*

§2. de'i lan la mkhas pa mang pos / rtags dang bsgrub bya'i chos gnyis char med dgag yin pa bkod na skyon med kyang sgrub pa dang ma yin dgag bkod na ma grub pa'i rtags su 'gyur zhes smras so // de ni *rNam bshad dgongs pa rab gsal las /*

rtags des<sup>a</sup> smras pa'i chos can bkag kyang skyon med pa ni rtags dang chos gnyis ka nam bcad tsam<sup>b</sup> yin pa'i gnad kyis so //<sup>c</sup>

zhes pa lta bu **rJe yab sras** kyi gsung 'ga' zhig la brten par snang mod / de tsam gyis dogs pa'i mtha' sel mi nus pas 'di ltar bshad dgos te / rtags dang bsgrub bya'i chos gnyis char ma yin dgag dang sgrub pa gang rung bkod kyang ma grub pa'i rtags su mi 'gyur ba yang yod de / ri bong rwa chos [454; f. 17a] can zla ba zhes pa'i sgras brjod rung yin te / rtog yul na yod pa'i phyir zhes pa'i sbyor ba lta bu'o // 'di **Jam dbyangs bzhad pa'i rdo rje**'i dgongs pa'o // yang ri bong rwas phug pa chos can / skyes bu sdug bsngal bar sgrub pa'i rtags ltar snang yin te / skyes bu sdug bsngal bar sgrub pa'i tshul gsum ma yin pa'i gtan tshigs yin pa'i phyir zhes pa'i sbyor ba lta bu ste / 'di *Tshad ma rigs rgyan gyi dgongs pa'o //*

§3. de dag chos can gyi ngo bo med nas ma grub pa'i gtan tshigs su mi 'gyur ba'i rgyu mtshan de sgrub kyi rtags dang bsgrub bya'i chos gang rung yin na yod pa yin mi dgos pa'i gnad kyis yin pas / des na rtags chos gnyis kar med dgag bkod na yang de sgrub kyi rtags dang bsgrub bya'i chos gang rung yin na yod pas khyab pa can yin na chos can ma grub pa'i skyon du 'gyur ba yang yod de / dper na yongs grub kyi rtags kyis chos kyi bdag med phra mo sgrub pa lta bu'o // de'i phyir gzhi ma grub pa chos can du bkod pa'i tshe rtags su bzung ba de yin na yod pa yin dgos phyin chos can gyi ngo bo med nas ma grub pa'i gtan tshigs ltar snang du 'gyur la / rtags su bzung ba de yin na yod pa yin mi dgos na gtan tshigs ltar snang du mi 'gyur ba'i tshul la zhib cha legs par thon dgos so //

<sup>a</sup> *dGongs pa rab gsal: des. bsTan dar: de'i.*

<sup>b</sup> bsTan dar omits *tsam*.

<sup>c</sup> *dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal f. 200a.*

§4. spyir sbyor ba'i chos can la rang rten gyi chos can dang chos can 'ba' zhig pa gnyis las / rang rten gyi chos can ni / **Grangs can pa'i** ngor<sup>d</sup> byas pa'i rtags kyis sgra mi rtag par sgrub pa lta bu yin te / de'i tshe sgra nyid la mi rtag pa brten [455; f. 17b] par sgrub pa yin pa'i phyir ro // chos can 'ba' zhig pa ni / **Bye brag pa'i** ngor yon tan gzhan gyi rten mi byed pa'i rtags kyis dngos por gyur pa'i nam mkha' rtag rdzas ma yin par sgrub pa lta bu yin te / de'i tshe dngos por gyur ba'i nam mkha' la rtag rdzas brten par sgrub pa ma yin pas / de 'dra'i nam mkha' de rten gzhi chos can du ma song bar chos can du bkod pa 'ba' zhig pa yin pa'i phyir / chos can 'ba' zhig pa zhes pa'i don yang chos can du smras kyang bsgrub bya'i chos kyi rten du ma song bar chos can yan gar bar song ba'i don yin pas / de'i phyir sbyor ba de sgrub kyi chos can 'ba' zhig pa ste smras pa'i chos can gzhi ma grub kyang rang rten gyi chos can yod pa yin te / de'i tshe dngos gyur gyi nam mkha' 'dzin pa'i rtog pa la dngos gyur gyi nam mkha' ma yin pa las log par snang ba de sgrub kyi rten gzhi'i chos can du song ba yin pa'i phyir / der thal / phyi rgol gyis de 'dra ba'i nam mkha' dang der snang ba gnyis gcig tu 'khrul nas shes 'dod zhugs pa'i rgyu mtshan gyis de ltar yin pa'i phyir / des na sbyor ba de sgrub kyi rang rten gyi chos can gzhi grub cing tshig yin la bkod pa'i chos can 'ba' zhig pa gzhi ma grub pa'i khyad par 'di 'dra shes pa'i ched du / *Tshad ma kun btus* las /

mngon sum don dang rjes dpag dang yid ches grags pas rang rten la'o //<sup>e</sup>

zhes rang gi chos can ma smos par rang gi rten smos pa'i dgos pa / *rNam 'grel mngon sum le'u* las /

kun tu<sup>f</sup> rgol ba bdag nyid kyi //<sup>g</sup>

zhes sogs kyi tshigs bcad bcu gsum gyis rgyas par [456; f. 18a] 'chad pa yin no //

§5. 'o na sgra ma yin pa las log par snang ba'ang byas pa'i rtags kyis sgra mi rtag par sgrub pa'i rang rten gyi chos can yin par thal / 'dod pa'i phyir zer na

§6. mi mtshungs te / rtags yang dag yin na shes 'dod chos can gyi steng du 'god tshul dang mthun par grub dgos pas / rtog pa la sgra ma yin pa las log par snang ba kun btags yin pas byas pa dang mthun lugs med pa'i phyir / der thal / *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris* las /

<sup>d</sup> bsTan dar: *bor*.

<sup>e</sup> *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*(a) ad III.2cd See n. 12.

<sup>f</sup> PV Tib.: *tu*. bsTan dar: *du*.

<sup>g</sup> *Pramāṇavārttika* IV.136. See n. 17.

byas pas sgra mi rtag par sgrub pa na / rtog pa la sgra ma yin pa las log par snang  
 ba'i snang ldog<sup>h</sup> dngos por med pas byas pa'i rtags de la 'grub pa<sup>i</sup> min<sup>j</sup> gyi / snang  
 gzhi sgra la grub<sup>k</sup> dgos te / dngos po<sup>l</sup> rtags dang bsgrub bya'i chos su byed pa'i  
 gnad kyis so //<sup>m</sup>

zhes gsungs pa'i phyir / khyab ste / dngos po rtags dang bsgrub bya'i  
 chos su bkod pa'i rtags sbyor gyi shes 'dod chos can la rtog pa'i snang  
 ba mi 'jog par shin tu gsal zhing / *rNam nges dar t̄ik* las kyang /

rtog pa la nam mkha' snang ba sngar gyi rtags de nges pa'i gzhi chos can yin la /  
 rtog pa la sgrar snang ba byas par nges pa'i gzhir mi rung ba'i phyir mi mtshungs  
 so //<sup>n</sup>

zhes gsungs pa'i phyir /

§7. mdor na **Bye brag pa**'i ngor nam mkha' chos can du bkod kyang  
 de chos can du ma song bar de'i snang ba chos can du song zhing /  
 byas pa'i rtags kyis sgra mi rtag par sgrub pa'i tshe rtog pa la sgrar  
 snang ba chos can du mi 'gro bar sgra nyid rang rten gyi chos can du  
 'gro ba'i rgyu mtshan mthar gtugs na / **Sangs rgyas pa dang Bye brag  
 pa** gnyis ka'i ngor chos [457; f. 18b] can mthun snang ba yod med la  
 gtugs pa yin te / **Sangs rgyas pas** nam mkha' thogs reg bkag tsam gyi  
 med dgag tu 'dod pa gang zhig / **Bye brag pas** sgrub pa rang dbang  
 ba'i dngos por 'dod pa'i phyir /

§8. 'o na sgra yang de gnyis ka'i ngor mthun snang du grub pa med  
 par thal. **Sangs rgyas pas** sgra 'byung 'gyur du 'dod pa gang zhig /  
**Bye brag pas** sgra nam mkha'i yon tan du 'dod pa'i phyir zhe na /

§9. shin tu mi mtshungs te / de gnyis ka'i ngor nyan shes kyi gzung  
 byar gyur pa'i don tsam zhig ma 'khrul ba'i tshad mas rnyed don du  
 mthun snang du grub pa yod la / nam mkha' la ming tsam ma gtogs  
 mthun snang du grub pa'i don btags don btsal na mi rnyed pa'i gnad  
 kyis so //

§10. gzhan yang **lCang skya** thams cad mkhyen pas / **rGyal tshab  
 rjes** rtog pa'i snang ba chos can du bzhed kyang / **mKhas grub rjes**  
 sgra don chos can du mi bzhed par gsungs la / kun mkhyen 'Jam  
**dbyangs bzhad pas** / gtso bo chos can du bzung ba **Phyogs glang** gi  
 dgongs pa dang / rtog pa'i snang ba chos can du bzung ba **Chos grags**  
 kyi dgongs pa yin gsungs kyang / dgongs pa zhib tu brtag na **Phyogs**

<sup>h</sup> *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris* f. 10a and other editions in Tillemans (1984) p. 385:  
*snang ldog*. bsTan dar: *snang ldog dang*.

<sup>i</sup> *Zin bris*: 'grub. bsTan dar: *sgrub*.

<sup>j</sup> *Zin bris*: min. bsTan dar: *ma yin*.

<sup>k</sup> *Zin bris*: grub. bsTan dar: *sgrub*.

<sup>l</sup> *Zin bris* f. 10a and other editions: *dngos po*. bsTan dar: *dngos pos*.

<sup>m</sup> *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris*, f. 9b–10a. See Tillemans (1984) p. 385.

<sup>n</sup> *rNam nges dar t̄ik*, f. unidentified.

**glang yab sras dang rJe yab sras** su'i lungs byas kyang / gtso bo chos can / rnam 'gyur sna tshogs kyi nyer len du med de / rman 'gyur sna tshogs kyi nyer len du ma dmigs pa'i phyir / zhes pa'i sbyor ba 'di la mtshon na / gtso bo 'dzin pa'i rtog pa la gtso bo ma yin pa las log par snang ba rtags sbyor de'i chos can du 'dzin rigs pa la sus kyang bsnyon du med de / *dBu ma snang ba las* /

byis pa rnams kyi phyi rol dang dngos po nyid du nye bar btags pa blo la rnam pa<sup>o</sup> yod [458; f. 19a] pa nyid chos can yin te / de'i phyir de la brten nas gtso bo la sogs pa 'gog par byed do //<sup>p</sup>

zhes gsungs pa'i phyir /

§11. khyab ste / blo la rnam pa yod pa nyid chos can yin zhes pas rtog pa'i snang ba chos can du 'dzin par gsal zhing / *Rang don le'ur* / sgra don chos ni rnam pa gsum //<sup>q</sup>

zhes dang / *Rang 'grel las* /

de bas na chos can de la brten nas ci<sup>r</sup> gto bo'i sgra las snang ba'i don 'di ni / [dngos po nye bar len pa can nam ma yin zhes yod pa dang med pa nyid dpyod par byed do]<sup>s</sup>

zhes dang / de'i 'grel bshad du / **Śā kya blos** kyang /

gtso bo la sogs pa'i sgras brjod par bya ba de nyid ni chos can yin la /<sup>t</sup>

zhes dang / *rNam 'grel t̄ik chen rigs pa'i rgya mtsho las* /

de ltar rtog pa'i snang ba thams cad sgra don yin no zhes spyir bstan pas gtso bo 'dzin pa'i rtog pa<sup>u</sup> la gtso bor snang ba'ang sgra don du grub la / de ltar gtso bo'i sgra don gyi gzhi ldog rtog pa la gtso bor snang ba de nyid rtags sbyor de'i chos can yin zhes bya ba'i don no //<sup>v</sup>

zhes gsungs pa'i phyir /

§12. de la kho na re / gtso bo'i sgra don chos can / rtags sbyor de'i chos can yin par thal / gtso bo 'dzin pa'i rtog pa la gtso bor snang ba rtags sbyor de'i chos can yin pa'i phyir na /

<sup>o</sup> *rnam pa* not in Peking and sDe dge editions of *Madhyamakāloka*. See n. 24

<sup>p</sup> P. 190a, D. 174a. See n. 24.

<sup>q</sup> *Pramāṇavārttika* I.205cd: *śabdārthas trividho dharmo bhāvābhāvobhayāśrayaḥ* //.

<sup>r</sup> *Svavṛtti* Tib.: *ci*. bsTan dar: *spyi*. See n. 26.

<sup>s</sup> *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* ad PV I.206 (P. 477a3–4; D. 321a2): *de bas na chos can 'di la brten nas ci gtso bo'i sgra las snang ba'i don 'di ni [dngos po nye bar len pa can nam\* ma yin zhes yod pa dang med pa nyid dpyod\*\* par byed do] /*. (\*P. omits *nam*. \*\*P.D. *spyod*) Skt. ed Gnoli p. 106: *tad atra dharmiṇi vyavasthitāḥ [sadasattvaṃ cintayanti] (/) kim ayaṃ pradhānaśabdapratibhāsy artho [bhāvopādāno na veti]*. See n. 26.

<sup>t</sup> *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā* P. 279b7, D. 238a3.

<sup>u</sup> *rNam 'grel t̄ik chen*: *gtso 'dzin rtog pa*.

<sup>v</sup> Vol. *tha* f. 149a.

§13. ma khyab /

§14. khyab par thal / rtog pa la gtso bor snang ba gtso bo'i sgra don yin pa'i phyir na /

§15. yang ma khyab / rang ldog dang gzhi ldog gi khyad par yod pa'i phyir te / *Tik chen* de nyid las /

des na gtso bo ni yod pa ma yin te ma dmigs pa'i phyir zhes pa'i rtags kyi shes 'dod chos can ni / gtso bo dngos po ba yang ma yin la / gtso bo'i sgra don gyi rang ldog kyang ma yin gyi / 'o na ci zhe na / rtog pa la gtso bor snang ba de nyid **Grangs can [459; f. 19b]** pa<sup>w</sup> dag gtso bo khyad par lnga ldan du 'dod la / rang lugs la sgra don du 'dod pas / khyad par lnga ldan gyi gtso bo yin min rtsod pa'i gzhi yin pa'i phyir rtog pa la gtso bor snang ba chos can du gzung bar byas pa yin no //<sup>z</sup>

zhes gsungs pa'i phyir / rang ldog dang gzhi ldog gi khyad par phye ba skabs 'dir shin tu gces so //

§16. de yang **Grang can pas** de lta bu'i rtog pa'i snang ba khas len kyang snang ba de sgra don du khas mi len pa'i gnad la thug pa yang yin te / *Tshad ma yid kyi mun sel* /

yang blun po kha cig gis de lta bu bdag gi sgra don chos can yin no zhes zer ba ni / de lta bu bdag gi sgra don med par khas blangs pa yin pas rang gi mtshang bsgrags pa yin no //<sup>y</sup>

zhes gsungs pa'i phyir /

§17. de ltar rtog pa'i snang ba chos can du rigs mod / 'on kyang pha rol po'i 'dod pa 'gog pa na rtog pa'i snang ba tshig zin la chos can du 'god dgos pa yang ma yin no // 'o na ci zhe na / spyi gtso bo dang rtag pa'i dbang phyug dang gang zag rang rkya ba sogs pha rol pos gang khas blangs pa de nyid ji lta ba bzhin chos can du dngos su 'god dgos te / de lta ma yin na gtso bo la sogs pa rang ldog nas mi khegs pa'i skyon yod pa'i phyir te / *rNam 'grel thar lam gsal byed* las /

de dag gi dgongs pa mkhas pa'i dbang po **Ka ma la sr las** / gtso bo nyid chos can du bzung nas dgag dgos kyi / de min na rnam 'gyur sna tshogs kyi nyer len yin pa khegs kyang / gtso bo rang ldog nas mi khegs par 'gyur la / rtags tshad mas nges pa'i gzhi ni gtso bor snang ba nyid la bzhed do //<sup>z</sup>

zhes gsungs pa'i phyir /

§18. de la gal te rtog pa'i snang ba [460; f. 20a] chos can du 'dzin mi rigs par thal / de don byed nus stong yin pa'i phyir / khyab te / don byed nus pa ma yin na rgol ba rtog ldan gyi dpyad gzhir mi rung bas khyab pa'i phyir / de skad du *rNam 'grel* las /

<sup>w</sup> *rNam 'grel tik chen* reads *gangs can pa*, which is surely wrong.

<sup>x</sup> *rNam 'grel tik chen* vol. *tha* f. 149a–b.

<sup>y</sup> F. 151b.

<sup>z</sup> F. 95b–96a.

don byed nus pa ma yin la //  
 don gnyer brtag pas ci zhid bya //  
 ma ning gzugs bzang mi bzang zhes //  
 'dod ldan<sup>aa</sup> mams kyis brtag ci phan //<sup>bb</sup>

zhes gsungs pa'i phyir na /

§19. ma khyab ste / lung de'i don ni rang 'dod pa'i 'bras bu gzhi  
 de las 'grub tu re nas dpyod pa'i gzhi la don byed nus pa dgos zhes  
 pa yin pas / de ni dper na 'khrig pa'i bde ba don du gnyer ba'i bud  
 med kyis / ma ning khyad gzhir bzung nas des skyes pa'i bya ba byed  
 par go nas de'i gzugs mdzes mi mdzes la dpyod pa dang 'dra bas mi  
 'thad ces ston pa yin gyi / spyir dgag sgrub kyis gzhi la don byed nus  
 stong rung bar ma zad / dgag sgrub byed pa'i dngos kyis rten la sgra  
 don nges can du dgos pa'i phyir / der thal / byas pa'i rtags kyis sgra  
 la rtag<sup>cc</sup> dgag pa dang mi rtag pa sgrub pa'i dngos kyis rten sgra don  
 yin dgos pa'i rgyu mtshan yang / dgag sgrub byed pa'i rtog pa rnam  
 sgra don la brten pa'i rgyu mtshan gyis yin pa'i phyir / *gZhan don le'u*  
 las /

phyi rol rten min sgra don la //  
 brten nas 'dir ni sgrub pa dang //  
 dgag pa thams cad 'dod pa yin //<sup>dd</sup>

zhes gsungs pa'i phyir dang / sgra'i steng du rtag pa dgag pa dang mi  
 rtag pa sgrub ces pa'i don yang rtog pa'i don byed pa yin pas / de'i  
 tshe dgag sgrub byed pa'i rtog pa de dag la sgra dang byas mi rtag  
 sogs rang mtshan pa dngos su mi [461; f. 20b] snang ba'i phyir / de  
 skad du *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris las* /

**Phyogs glang** gis gsungs pa'i don *rNam 'grel las* /

dpag bya dpog par byed pa yi<sup>ee</sup> //  
 don gyi tha snyad gnas pa 'di //  
 shes pa la grub tha dad la //  
 brten nas rnam par brtags pa<sup>ff</sup> yin //<sup>gg</sup>

<sup>aa</sup> PV Tib.: 'dod ldan (= *kāminyāḥ*). bsTan dar: *rtog ldan*.

<sup>bb</sup> *Pramāṇavārttika* I.211: *arthakriyāsamarthasya vicāraiḥ kiṃ tadarthinām / ṣaṅ-  
 ḍhasya rūpavairūpye kāminyāḥ kiṃ parikṣayā //*.

<sup>cc</sup> bsTan dar: *rtags*.

<sup>dd</sup> *Pramāṇavārttika* IV.228bcd: [*tasmād*] *āśritya śabdārthaṃ [bhāvābhāvasamāś-  
 rayam] / abāhyāśrayam atreṣṭaṃ sarvaṃ vidhiniṣedhanam /*. See n. 34.

<sup>ee</sup> PV Tib, *Zin bris*: *yi*. bsTan dar: *dag*.

<sup>ff</sup> PV Tib, *Zin bris*: *brtags pa*. bsTan dar: *dag pa*.

<sup>gg</sup> *Pramāṇavārttika* IV.183: *anumānānumeyārthavyavahārasthitis tv iyam / bhedaṃ  
 pratyayaśamsiddham avalambya prakalpyate //*. The text of PV Tib. cited in *dBu ma  
 rgyan gyi zin bris* shows none of bsTan dar's "variants".



zhes gsungs pa ltar / gzhi dngos po dgos pa byas pas sgra mi rtag pa dang du ba la la<sup>hh</sup> me yod du sgrub pa la yang / rtog pa la sgra dang la gnyis de gnyis ma yin pa las log par snang ba'i don nyid dgag sgrub kyi dngos rten yin gyi / sgra dang la nyid dngos kyi rten ma yin te / dgag sgrub byed pa'i rtog pa la dngos su mi snang ba'i phyir dang<sup>ii</sup>

zhes gsungs pa'i phyir / dgag sgrub rtog pa'i don byed ces pa'i don yang dper na byas pa'i rtags kyis sgra mi rtag par sgrub pa'i phyogs chos grub pa na / phyi rgol de'i rtog ngo na / sgra dang por grub nas de'i rjes su sgra la byas pa gsar du brten pa lta bu'i snang tshul yod cing / gnas tshod la rim pa de 'dra med pa'i don no //

## NOTES

\* This article is the result of a collaboration that took place between the authors in seminars at Lausanne in May 1996 and at Ann Arbor in September 1997 as part of the exchange agreement between the University of Lausanne and the University of Michigan. The authors would like to gratefully acknowledge financial support from the two universities and from the Elisabet de Boer Foundation.

<sup>1</sup> See n. 17 and 7.

<sup>2</sup> See Mimaki (1976) pp. 60–61.

<sup>3</sup> See e.g. his *Tshad ma rigs gter dgongs rgyan smad cha* f. 76a1–7 (p. 151). Śākya mchog ldan's position turns on the Rigs gter ba *apoha* theory's contrast between theoretical explanation ('*chad pa*) and practical application ('*jug pa*) and especially the contrast between an object of conceptual thought as it really is (*song tshod*) (i.e. a mental representation) and what we mistakenly assume it to be (*rlom tshod*). See Tillemans (1995) p. 869 and n. 19, Dreyfus (1997) pp. 161, 163, 167 *et passim*. Note that this latter schema, i.e. *song tshod kyi chos can* and *rlom tshod kyi chos can* is applied to the problem of *āśrayāsiddha* in a way that does not seem to coincide fully with the *svadharmin* and *kevaladharmin* contrast. See n. 13 on *svadharmin* vs. *kevaladharmin*.

<sup>4</sup> Selections from his work on particulars and universals, i.e. his *Rang mtshan spyi mtshan gyi nram bzhang rtsom 'phro*, have been translated in Klein (1991). A translation of his commentary on the *Heart Sūtra* appears in Lopez (1988), pp. 137–159. His work on the proof of the Buddha's authority in Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*, i.e. the *sTon pa tshad ma'i skyes bur sgrub pa'i gtam*, has been translated and studied in Tillemans (1993). Lopez (1987) refers to many parts of bsTan dar's *gCig du bral gyi nram bzhang*. Finally, elements of bsTan dar's grammatical work, the *Sum cu pa dang rtags 'jug gi don go sla bar bsdus pa'i bshad pa skal ldan yid kyi pad ma 'byed pa'i snang ba'i mdzod*, have been studied in T. Tillemans and D. Herforth, *Agents and Actions in Classical Tibetan*, Vienna, 1989.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. *Madhyamakālamkāra*, k. 1: *niḥsvabhāva amī bhāvās tattvataḥ svaparoditāḥ / ekānekasvabhāvena viyogāt pratibimbavat //* – Śāntarakṣita proposes to show that entities accepted by Buddhists as well as those advocated by non-Buddhist adversaries are without any intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) because of being neither one nor many different things. Skt. in *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* 173.17–18; translation Ichigo (1985) p. cxxxv. Note that following rGyal tshab's *dBu ma rgyan gyi brjed byang* (Sarnath

<sup>hh</sup> See Tillemans (1984) p. 385, n. 12 on *du ba la la*. bsTan dar: *du bas la. Zin bris* f. 9b: *du ba la*.

<sup>ii</sup> F. 9a–b. Tillemans (1984) p. 384.

edition, 1976) p. 80, the refutation of partless consciousness is in the context of the refutation of the Sautrāntika view that the “manifold is non-dual” (*sna tshogs gnyis med pa*). The Madhyamaka argues that the aspects/images (*rnam pa; ākāra*) cannot be substantially distinct (*rdzas tha dad*) from each other, because they are not substantially distinct from a partless unitary consciousness (*shes pa cha med gcig*). *mDo sde pa'i lugs dgag pa la / sna tshogs gnyis med pa / sgo nga phyad tshal ba / rnam shes grangs mnyam pa'i lugs dgag pa'o // dang po ni / shes sogs bzhi la / shes pa gcig la sngo ser dkar dmar sogs rnam pa du ma shar ba'i tshe rnam pa de rnams rdzas tha dad min par thal / de rnams shes pa cha med gcig dang tha dad min pa'i phyr /*. Cf. *Madhyamakālamkāra* 34 et sq.; cf. also Tsong kha pa's *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris* f. 8a (Sarnath ed. p. 41; transl. Tillemans [1984] p. 365): *gal te sbyor ba 'di rang rgyud du byed na / gzhan gyis smras pa'i bdag dang dbang phyug la sogs pa dang / rang sdes smras pa'i sdug bsngal dang/ shes pa cha med kyi chos can ma grub pas / phyogs chos ma grub par 'gyur bas mi 'thad do zhe na /* – the entities accepted by others include the *ātman* and *Īsvara*, while those accepted by the Buddhists include suffering, partless consciousnesses and so forth.

<sup>6</sup> The term is an adaptation of the Indian Buddhist requirement that debate be about what the opponent desires to know (*jijñāsā, jijñāsita*), i.e. whether a certain property qualifies a certain subject. Cf. e.g. *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* ad III. 92: *prativādino hi yaj jijñāsitaṃ tat prakaraṇāpannam /*. On the term *shes 'dod chos can* (\**jijñāsītadharmin*), see the definition in *Yongs 'dzin rtags rigs* (ed. Onoda) p. 17.

<sup>7</sup> For the varieties of *asiddhahetu*, see *Nyāyabindu* (NB) III.57 et sq. (transl. Stcherbatsky p. 172ff.) and in particular NB III.65 on *dharmyasiddha*; for the dGe lugs pa classification see *Yongs 'dzin rtags rigs*, p. 57, which speaks of a triple classification of *asiddhahetu*, those which are due to objective facts (*don la ltos pa*), due to attitudes (*blo la ltos pa*) such as doubt, and those which are due to the debaters (*rgol ba la ltos pa*) having incompatible views on the nature of the subject. The “reason that is unestablished (*asiddha*) because of the nonexistence of the entity of the subject” (*chos can gyi ngo bo med nas ma grub pa'i gtan tshig*) is a subdivision of the first category.

<sup>8</sup> On these two types of negation, see Kajiyama (1973) p. 167f. and the references in his n. 1. Indian Buddhist logicians had the important insight that proving a mere negation of existence is, in its logical structure, quite different from proving positive qualities, and that in the former case (i.e. simple denial along the lines of “it is not so that S is existent”) subject failure is not a problem at all whereas in the latter case it is. Cf. Matilal (1970). Tibetan explanations of *āśrayāsiddha*, such as those found in *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris* and *lCang skya grub mtha'*, generally cite a passage from Kamalaśīla's *Madhyamakāloka* as being the source for this idea. The quotation in question is found in *Madhyamakāloka* D. 172a6–b1, P. 188a3–6: *gang la dngos po'i chos yod pa'i ngo bor sgrub par mi 'dod kyi don kyang sgro btags pa'i chos rnam par gcead pa sgrub pa tsam zhig brjod par 'dod pa de la ni ma grub pa nyid la sogs pa'i nyes pa brjod pa tha snyad du yang dngos por gyur pa'i chos can mi dgos te / de ni de'i chos ma yin pa'i phyr ro // de la ltos nas kyang de'i chos can nyid du mi 'thad pa'i phyr ro // de ma grub tu zin kyang bsgrub par bya ba med na de mi 'byung ba'i gtan tshigs mngon par 'dod pa'i don grub pa la gegs byed pa med pa'i phyr ro //*; translated in Lopez (1987) p. 358. On Kamalaśīla's different treatment of *āśrayāsiddha* in his earlier *Madhyamakālamkārapañjikā* and in the later *Madhyamakāloka*, see Kobayashi (1989). The Tibetan dGe lugs pa treatment of the problem has been developed in detail in Lopez (1987) pp. 168–180, Klein (1991) pp. 118–119, 173–181 et passim.

In fact the central idea in the *Madhyamakāloka* that one avoided *āśrayāsiddha* when the property being proved was a simple negation was already clearly formulated well before Kamalaśīla. What we find in the Indian Buddhist literature is that Dharmakīrtian commentators, like Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi, in their explanations of

*Pramāṇavārttika* IV k. 136–148, emphasize the idea that subjects, like space, taken as real (*dn̄gos por gyur pa = vastubhūta*) by the opponents, are *kevala* in nonexistence proofs where the property to be proved and the reason are “mere exclusions” (*rnam par gcod pa tsam = vyavacchedamātra*); in these special cases, the subjects can be negated with impunity. Although Devendrabuddhi himself does not gloss these “mere exclusions” by the notion of non-implicative negations (*prasajyapraṭiṣedha*) so often invoked in Buddhist philosophy, the transition is very natural and is, indeed, explicitly made by Śākyabuddhi: mere exclusion means that no entity or positive property is stated, implied or presupposed. See *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā* D. 296b4 *et seq.* and *Pramāṇavārttikāṭikā* D. 269a4–5: *gtan tshigs rnam par gcod pa'i ngo bo ma grub pa nyid ma yin no zhes bya ba ni / cig car sgra sogs rgyu min phyir / zhes bya ba'i gtsan tshigs rnam par gcod pa tsam gyi ngo bo med par dgag pa tsam gyi mshan nyid ma grub pa nyid ma yin te / dn̄gos por gyur pa'i chos can med na yang tha snyad pa'i chos can rnam par gcod pa tsam la gnod pa med pa'i phyir ro //*. “When [Devendrabuddhi] says ‘a logical reason that is of the nature of an exclusion is not unestablished’, he means that a logical reason like ‘because it is not the cause for [producing its various effects like] sound etc. all at once’, which is of the nature of a mere exclusion, i.e. which has the character of a simple *prasajyapraṭiṣedha*, is not unestablished. This is because in spite of there being no subject that would be a real entity, there is no invalidation of the mere exclusion of the conventionally designated subject”. Our thanks to Mr. Ryusei Keira for making us aware of this passage from Śākyabuddhi.

This position concerning “mere exclusion” was adopted by later Indian writers such as Prajñākaragupta, Kamalaśīla and by Tibetans such as Tsong kha pa *et al.*, with the further development that it was argued that when a Buddhist logician was proving a mere exclusion, or non-implicative negation (e.g. that such and such a pseudo-entity did not exist), the Buddhist proponent’s intended subject, the *svadharmin*, was just the conceptual image. (In the case of Dharmakīrti and Devendrabuddhi it is not at all clear that this last additional development is also attributable to them. See n. 13.) Ngag dbang bstan shows the rough edges and pitfalls of this Indo-Tibetan attempt to use the distinction between the two types of negation as a watertight way to delineate between harmless subject failures and genuine *āśrayāsiddha*.

<sup>9</sup> Unidentified in 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa. The example purports to show that the property being predicated of a nonexistent subject (like a rabbit’s horn) can be a positive entity (*vidhi*) or an implicative negation: it need not necessarily be a *prasajyapraṭiṣedha* if we are to avoid *āśrayāsiddha*. The property being proved here, viz. “being fitting (*rung ba = yogya*) to be designated by the word ‘moon’”, is itself a positive entity. Ngag dbang bstan dar, supposedly following 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa, has hearkened back to the argumentation found in the *pratītibādhā* section in *Pramāṇavārttika* (PV) IV.109–130, *Nyāyabindu* III, *Pramāṇaviniścaya* III etc., where Dharmakīrti develops the idea that any word is fitting (*yogya*) to designate any object, the use and correctness of words depending only upon the speaker’s linguistic intention (*vivakṣā*). Cf. PV IV. 109: *artheshv apratisiddhatvāt puruṣecchānurodhinah / iṣṭaśabdābhidheyatvasyāpto 'trākṣatavāg janah //* “An intended word’s designatum (*abhidheya*), which is in keeping with people’s wishes, is unrestricted with regard to objects. Therefore, the person [i.e. the user of language], whose speech is unopposed, is an authority here [i.e. with regard to the designatum of the word]”. This doctrine of unrestricted *yogyatā* is being alluded to in the present argument. Thus, a rabbit’s horn is indeed fitting to be the designatum (*abhidheya*) of the word “moon”, in that there is no objective or intrinsic nature found in words or objects that would preclude such a use.

Ngag dbang bstan dar is obviously playing with a frequently found reasoning (*prayoga*) called *grags pa'i rtags* (“reason for a conventional concept” [*grags*

*pa* = *prasiddha*, *pratīti*). This reasoning is given in Indian and Tibetan texts to establish the fact that *śāśin* (*ri bong can*, “that which has a rabbit”, “that which is hare-marked”) is fitting to be the designatum of the word *candra* (“moon”). The trick is to change *ri bong can* to *ri bong rwa* (“the rabbit’s horn”). On the Indian reasoning, see *Dharmottarapradīpa* 184.16–17: *evaṃ tu prayogo draṣṭavyaḥ yo ’rtho vikalpavijñānaviṣayaḥ sa sāmketikena śabdena vaktuṃ śakyaḥ / yathā śākhādīmān artho vrkṣaśabdena / vikalpavijñānaviṣayaś ca śāśīti* / “The formal argument (*prayoga*) should be regarded as follows: ‘Whatever entity is the object of a conceptual cognition, can be designated by an agreed upon word, just like the entity having branches and so forth [can be designated] by the word ‘tree’. Now, *śāśin* is the object of a conceptual cognition’”. (The conclusion is that *śāśin* can be designated by the agreed upon word *candra*.) The usual Tibetan formulation of the *prayoga* is: *ri bong can la zla ba zhes pa’i sgras brjod rung ba yin te / rtog yul na yod pa’i phyir* / “That which is hare-marked is fitting to be designated by the word ‘moon’ because it exists as an object of conceptualization”; see *Yongs ’dzin rtags rigs* p. 46.

<sup>10</sup> See *Tshad ma rigs rgyan* f. 117a.

<sup>11</sup> See Lopez (1987) pp. 173–174. Just as it was shown that avoidance of *āśrayāsiddha* is possible even where the property is a positive entity, so now Ngag dbang bstan dar shows that the reason and property being non-implicative negations will not guarantee that *āśrayāsiddha* is avoided. To say that the rabbit’s horn is the subtle selflessness of the elements because it is their consummate nature is a case of *āśrayāsiddha*, even though both the reason and the property are simple negations. In short, it is not so that *āśrayāsiddha* is avoided if and only if the reason and property are *vyavacchedamātra*. Ngag dbang bstan dar, to his credit, proposes a stricter criterion than had his Indo-Tibetan predecessors: *āśrayāsiddha* will be avoided if and only if the reason and property do not imply existence. The innovation here is discrete, but it represents a radically different, and even in some ways better, approach: it turns on the sound logical insight that certain properties (like being blue, etc.) imply existence, while others (like “being thought of”) do not, and that subject failure will lead to refutation in all and only the former types of cases.

<sup>12</sup> The term *rang rten chos can* is most likely a Tibetan invention, based on Tibetan writers’ choice of a rather misleading Tibetan translation of the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (PSV), a translation which was also reflected in the sDe dge and Co ne editions of *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (PS) III.2. See Tillemans (1984) n. 42 for the details. In brief, PSV(a) *ad Pramāṇasamuccaya* (PS) III.2cd reads *de yang ma bsal ba’o // mngon sum don dang rjes dpag dang // yid ches grags pas rang rten la’o*, whereas the Peking version of PS III.2cd and of PSV(b) have: *rang gi chos can la mngon sum don dang rjes dpag dang // yid ches grags pas ma bsal ba’o* //. See Kitagawa (1973) pp. 471–472. What happened is that major dGe lugs and Sa skya writers cited PSV(a)’s text *mngon sum . . . rang rten la’o* without the initial *de yang ma bsal ba’o*, which they probably considered to be an independent sentence due to its final particle. Now, we do have Sanskrit fragments of PS III.2: *svarūpeṇaiva nirdeśyaḥ svayam iṣṭo ’nirākṛtaḥ / pratyakṣārthānumānāptaprasiddhena svadharmiṇi* // “[A valid thesis] is one which is intended (*iṣṭa*) by the [the proponent] himself (*svayam*) as something to be stated (*nirdeśya*) according to its essence alone (*svarūpeṇaiva*) [i.e. as a *sādhyā*]; [and] with regard to [the proponent’s] own subject (*svadharmīn*), it is not opposed (*anirākṛta*) by perceptible objects (*pratyakṣārtha*), by inference (*anumāna*), by authorities (*āpta*) or by what is commonly recognized (*prasiddha*)”. It can be seen that *anirākṛta* = *ma bsal ba*, and that placing this before *mngon sum . . . rten la’o* is an attempt to follow the Skt. word order, but is virtually incomprehensible in Tibetan: hence PSV(b) and the Peking version of PS III.2 is preferable, also because it reads *rang gi chos can* (= *svadharmīn*). Nonetheless, most Tibetan writers seem to have chosen PSV(a)’s reading; such is the case for Tsong kha pa, Go rams pa bSod nams seng ge, Śākya mchog ldan, but also for the earlier writer bTsun pa

ston gzhon (13th C), who in his *rNam 'grel gyi rnam bshad gangs can gyi rgyan*, p. 438 clearly gives credence to PSV(a): *rang rten la'o zhes rang gi chos can smos pa la dgos pa ci yod* . . . Finally not just Tsong kha pa, but rGyal tshab in his *rNam 'grel thar lam gsal byed* to PV IV k. 136–148 repeatedly phrased his explanations in terms of *rang rten chos can*. In what is an ironic, but understandable blunder, Ngag dbang bstan dar will subsequently on p. 455 argue that Dignāga himself did not speak of *rang gi chos can* (*svadharmin*), but rather *rang gyi rten*.

<sup>13</sup> Ngag dbang bstan dar has introduced one of the key themes in the Indo-Tibetan explanations of *āśrayāsiddha*, viz. the contrast between *svadharmin* and *kevaladharmin*. Amongst Indian authors, the starting point in their discussion of *āśrayāsiddha* consists in Dignāga's definition of the thesis (*pakṣalakṣaṇa*) in *Pramāṇasamuccaya* III.2, in particular, the specification that the thesis should not be opposed (*anirākṛta*) by perception and other means of valid cognition *with regard to the proponent's own intended subject* (*svadharmini* “with regard to his own subject”). See n. 12. While Dignāga only spoke of *svadharmin*, Dharmakīrti in *Pramāṇavārttika* (PV) IV, k. 136–148 introduced the idea of a contrast between *svadharmin* and *kevaladharmin*, the latter being a nominal or unrelated subject, one which may be merely stated but which is not actually what is qualified by the property to be proved. This contrast comes up again and again in Ngag dbang bstan dar, and indeed he mentions the twelve *Kārikās* in *Pramāṇavārttika* IV (not III!) as being the Indian source.

Important in the philosophical background to this discussion of *svadharmin* and *kevaladharmin* (although not so often explicitly cited in Tibetan texts) is Dignāga's treatment in the *Nyāyamukha* of the Sāṃkhya's arguments concerning Primordial Matter (*pradhāna*) and other such postulates in the Sāṃkhya system. Dignāga had argued “*pradhāna* and so forth do not exist because they are not perceived” (*na santi pradhānādayo 'nupalabdheḥ*) and spoke of “non-perception being a property of an imagined object (*kalpitasyānupalabdhir dharmah*)”. See Katsura (1992), pp. 230–231; G. Tucci, *The Nyāyamukha of Dignāga*, Heidelberg, 1930 pp. 16–17; Skt. fragments in *Svavṛtti* (ed. Gnoli) pp. 105 and 107. This idea of an imagined subject was then generalized by Dharmakīrti to form a key part of his *apoha* theory. In particular, he took the anti-Sāṃkhya argument in Dignāga's *Nyāyamukha* proving the nonexistence of *pradhāna* as well as the *Nyāyamukha*'s phrase *kalpitasyānupalabdhir dharmah* to lead to the general principle in PV I, k. 205–212, the *Svavṛtti* and *Pramāṇaviniścaya* III that the directly designated objects of words were always conceptual representations (*kalpanā*); he then maintained that although *pradhāna* did not exist as something real and external, its conceptual representation, or in other words, the verbal object (*śabdārtha*) existed, so that the charge of *āśrayāsiddha* did not apply.

In later developments, including what we find in the dGe lugs pa positions and clearly in Ngag dbang bstan dar, the Dharmakīrtian general principle of designata being only concepts will be combined with the *svadharmin* vs. *kevaladharmin* contrast to explain when *āśrayāsiddha* is avoidable and when it is not. *Grosso modo*, in nonexistence proofs the *svadharmin* is the concept and no more; the *kevaladharmin* is the pseudo-entity. Ngag dbang bstan dar here (following Tsong kha pa and others) applies this point of view to PV IV.141–142's discussion where the Buddhist refutes the Vaiśeṣika's version of space. Thus the Vaiśeṣika's space becomes the *kevaladharmin*, whereas the conceptual representation of space is the *svadharmin*, i.e. the subject accepted by the Buddhist himself. Although the *kevaladharmin* is obviously refuted, the *svadharmin* is not and hence *āśrayāsiddha* is avoided. However, this synthesis is arguably a later invention. Tillemans is of the opinion that while for a writer like Kamalaśīla (who figures so prominently in the Tibetan theories) this move to combine the notions of *svadharmin* and conceptual subjects is present in his *Madhyamakāloka*, in the case of Dharmakīrti this combination is not very likely. The *kārikās* in PV IV (viz. k. 141–142) that are often interpreted as supporting this combination are probably better interpreted differently. First of all, Prajñākaragupta's

*Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya* (PVBh) ad PV IV. 141–2 clearly specified two interpretations of the *kārikās* at stake. One advocates proving nonexistence with regard to a subject that is “completely derived from conceptual thought” (*vikalpapariniṣṭhite dharmiṇi*) and thus that the conceptual subject is the *svadharmin*. The other paraphrases the controversial reasoning about space in such a way that the *svadharmin* becomes a real entity acceptable to the Buddhist, namely the impermanent space that Buddhists themselves accept. See PVBh 550.18: *tathāpy anityam ākāśam dharmī bhaviṣyati*. Secondly, this latter interpretation in PVBh fits noticeably better into the rest of the argumentation in PV IV, k. 136–148, where a completely parallel reasoning against the Sāṃkhya *sukhādi* (“pleasure, etc.” = the three *guṇas*) is introduced by *tathaiva* (“in precisely this way”) in k. 144–145. This time the *svadharmin* is clearly taken by Dharmakīrti as *not* being the conceptual representation of *sukhādi*, but as being the ordinary, impermanent sensations of pleasure that the Buddhist himself acknowledges. The impression is that reading an advocacy of the combination of *svadharmin* with conceptual subjects into Dharmakīrti is a later position that may well change Dharmakīrti’s own stance. The *svadharmin* may well have been no more than an entity acceptable as real (and not conceptual) to the Buddhist himself. And determining what this actual subject was seems to have involved paraphrasing of the explicitly stated arguments, but had little to do with postulating conceptual subjects.

<sup>14</sup> Ngag dbang bstan dar is (correctly) simplifying the argument. As it stands in Dharmakīrti, the reasoning at stake seeks to prove that space does not have “a novel nature unproduced by other conditions”, in other words, a permanent but real intrinsic nature. Cf. *Pramāṇavārttika* IV.141-2: *yathā parair anutpādyāpūrvarūpan[1] na khādikam / sakṛc chabdādyahetuvād ity ukte prāha dūṣakah // tadvad vastusvabhāvo ’san dharmī vyomādir ity api / naivam iṣṭasya sādhyasya bādha kācana[2] vidyate //* “When [the Buddhist] states that space, etc. do not have a novel nature unproduced by other [conditions] because they are not causes for [producing their qualities such as] sound, etc. all at once, then the [Vaiśeṣika] adversary might say that like that the subject, space, etc., would also not have the nature of a real entity. [Dharmakīrti’s position:] In this fashion [even though the subject is invalidated(3)], there is in fact no invalidation of the intended [proposition] to be proved (*sādhyā*) at all.” [1] Miy. *anutpādyā pūrvarūpan* is wrong; [2] Miy. *kvacana* – cf. Tib. ‘ga’ yang; [3] PVV *evam dharmibādhanē ’pi*.

<sup>15</sup> The argument presupposes some fundamental positions in the dGe lugs pa understanding of *apoha*. In brief, the dGe lugs pa explain the conceptual representation of real space (*dngos gyur gyi nam mkha’* = *vastubhūtākāśa*) as being “what appears as excluded from the contrary of real space” (*dngos gyur gyi nam mkha’ ma yin pa las log par snang ba*). They then add the additional step that not only does the conceptual appearance/representation (*snang ba*) itself appear in this way but real space itself (albeit nonexistent) also appears (*snang*) as excluded from the contrary of real space. The result is that the dGe lugs pa can argue that the *svadharmin*, the actual *dharmīn* that is being argued about, i.e. the conceptual representation, appears concordantly (*mtshun snang*) to both parties in the debate. However, the Vaiśeṣika, who believes in *vastubhūtākāśa*, does not know that it is only a mentally invented concept being argued about rather than *vastubhūtākāśa* itself. The opponent thus has the impression that he is arguing about actual space, while the Buddhist proponent knows that they are both only arguing about the concept. This is said to be possible because both real space itself and the representation/appearance (*snang ba*) appear erroneously mixed together (*’dres nas*) to conceptual thought. An analysis of this type of argumentation is to be found in Tillemans (1995); see Lopez (1987) pp. 178–179 for rGyal tshab’s use of the same type of argument; see Klein (1991) pp. 35–36 on lCang skyas and bsTan dar’s position that “the actual object appears, mixed with its image, to thought”; see also Yoshimizu (1997) pp. 1107–1108; Dreyfus

(1992) p. 36 *et sq.* Tillemans stresses that the position that X itself appears (*snang ba*) to the conceptual thought about X is by and large a dGe lugs pa-gSang phu ba development, with problematic or no antecedents at all in India. It seems to be equally rejected by Sa skya pas like Śākya mchog ldan; see *op. cit.* p. 872 *et sq.* In part, the position was facilitated by the syntactical ambiguities in the Tibetan term *snang ba*, which can mean “appears”, “what appears” and “appearance”.

<sup>16</sup> See n. 12 for *Pramāṇasamuccaya* III.2cd.

<sup>17</sup> These verses are not from the *Pratyakṣa* (PV III) chapter; they are from the *Parārthānumāna* chapter, i.e. PV IV.136–148. Nor did Dignāga use *rang rten* instead of *rang gi chos can* (= *svadharmin*); see n. 12. Here are some of the principal verses amongst the twelve. Additions generally follow Manorathanandin’s *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti*.

136 *sarvatra vādino dharmo yaḥ svasādhyatayepsitaḥ / taddharmavati[1] bādhā  
syān nānyadharmena dharmini //*

“Always, invalidation (*bādhā*) [of the thesis] would occur in a case of [invalidation of] the possessor of that property (*dharmā*) that the proponent himself intends to prove (*sādhyā*), but not in the case of a subject (*dharmin*) [that is qualified] by some other property.”

143 *dvayasyāpi hi sādhyatve sādhyadharmoparodhi yat /  
bādhanaṃ dharminas tatra bādhye etena varṇitam //*

“Indeed, given that both are to be proved (*sādhyatva*), then when invalidating the subject negates the property to be proved, in that case there will be an invalidation [of the thesis]. Such is what is expressed by the [words ‘his own subject’ (*svadharmin*)].”

147 *svayam iṣṭo yato dharmāḥ sādhyas tasmāt tadāśrayaḥ /  
bādhyo na kevalo nānyasaṃśrayo veti sūcitam //*

“It was asserted [by Dignāga] that as the property that [the proponent] intends himself is what is to be proved (*sādhyā*), therefore, the basis of this [property] is what is to be invalidated, and not something nominal or the basis for a [property] other [than the one being proved].”

[1] Read *taddharmavati* instead of Miyasaka’s *tad dharmavati*.

<sup>18</sup> Ngag dbang bstan dar refers here to one of the three characteristics (*rūpa*) of valid reasons: the *paḥṣadharmatva* (“[the reason’s] being a quality of the subject”). Cf. the definition of the *paḥṣadharmatva* in *Yongs ’dzin rtags rigs* p. 23: *de sgrub kyi shes ’dod chos can skyon med kyi steng du ’god tshul dang mthun par yod pa nyid du tshad mas nges pa* “It [i.e. the reason] is ascertained by a *pramāṇa* to exist relative to the faultless subject of enquiry in accordance with the mode of presentation”. The *’god tshul* “mode of presentation” in Ngag dbang bstan dar (as in *Yongs ’dzin rtags rigs*) refers to the type of verb stated in the reason, i.e. the copula *yin* as in e.g. *byas pa yin pa’i phyir* or *byas pa’i phyir* “because ... is a product” or the existential *yod* as in *du ba yod pa’i phyir* “because there is smoke” – we thus have the possibility of *yin ’god* or *yod ’god*. The point of including *’god tshul dang mthun par* in the definition of the *paḥṣadharmatva* is a rather cumbersome way to guarantee that the subject possesses the property of the reason in the very same way as the proponent has stated, i.e. *yin* or *yod*.

<sup>19</sup> Ngag dbang bstan dar’s reply here and in what follows turns on the principle that the reason must be a property of the subject, i.e. of the *svadharmin*: in other words, the reason must be a *paḥṣadharmā* (see n. 18). Now, when we prove that space is not a permanent substance, the conceptual representation of space is indeed not a substance, and will also be qualified by the reason. Thus the *paḥṣadharmatva*

will hold. On the other hand, if we are validly proving that sound is impermanent because it is produced, then sound itself (and not the concept of sound) must be the *svadharmin*. This is because sound is both impermanent and something causally produced – hence the *pakṣadharmatva* holds with regard to that subject, i.e. sound *qua* particular, rather than the concept of sound. See Lopez (1987) pp. 175–176.

<sup>20</sup> On the Tibetan development of the problem of *chos can mthun snang ba* (“concordantly appearing subjects”) see D. Lopez (1987), p. 78 *et passim*; Hopkins (1989); Yotsuya (1995); Tillemans (1990), p. 42f.; Tillemans and Tomabechi (1995) n. 25. The term *chos can mthun snang ba* is a Tibetan invention with no Sanskrit equivalent. The notion is developed by Tsong kha pa in *Lam rim chen mo*, *Drangs nges legs bshad snying po* and other works as a philosophical elaboration upon a section in the Bhāvaviveka-Candrakīrti debate in *Prasannapadā* I, p. 26 *et sq.* (ed. L. de la Vallée Poussin, Bibliotheca Buddhica, reprint Osnabrück, 1970), where Realist and Śūnyavādin conceptions are argued to be radically incommensurable so that there are no commonly acknowledged (*ubhayaprasiddha*) subjects when the two parties are debating about ultimate truth – see Tillemans (1992) n. 5 for a translation of the passage from *Prasannapadā*. The issue is also taken up by non-dGe lugs pa writers (such as Go rams pa bSod nams seng ge in his *lTa ba'i ngan sel* f. 41af.), but plays a particularly important, and undeniably complex, role in the dGe lugs pa Svātantrika Madhyamaka system.

Ngag dbang bstan dar is presupposing an understanding of Tsong kha pa's position on Svātantrika. The point in the argument is delicate. Judging by the previous discussion, bsTan dar seems to accept that the *svadharmin* in the Buddhist-Vaiśeṣika arguments, viz. the concept of space, is what both parties are actually arguing about – nonetheless this conceptual *svadharmin*, as he had said earlier, could not be *explicitly* acknowledged by the Vaiśeṣika opponent, who thinks he is arguing about real space (*vastubhūtākāśa*). bsTan dar then argues that space itself is incommensurable for both parties, i.e. given the parties' differing respective views on what space is, a concordantly appearing and commonly acknowledged (*ubhayaprasiddha*) space cannot be what they are arguing about: space is thus the *kevaladharmin* and cannot be the *svadharmin*. (Here one could reasonably ask if the *svadharmin*, i.e. the concept, appears concordantly to both, given their respective positions.) In what follows, Ngag dbang bstan dar alludes to an objection in *Prasannapadā* that if the Realist and Śūnyavādin have no commonly recognized subject, then nor do Buddhists and Vaiśeṣikas when they argue about sound being impermanent or not, given that both have different conceptions of what sound is; see *Prasannapadā* p. 29. The dGe lugs pa reply, based on Candrakīrti, is that sound, irrespective of one's philosophical theories, is *heard* commonly by both parties, whereas space is just a purely theoretical notion without any perceptual content in common for both parties.

<sup>21</sup> Ngag bstan dar is arguing from a Svātantrika position where concordantly appearing subjects and especially non-erroneous valid cognitions must be possible for both parties, as this is a condition for the logical reasons being “autonomous” (*rang rgyud = svatantra*). The phrase *ma 'khrul ba'i tshad ma'i rnyed don du mthun snang du grub pa* (“established as appearing concordantly as an object found by non-erroneous means of valid cognition”) alludes to the dGe lugs pa view that for a Svātantrika, who holds a type of limited realism, a *pramāṇa* is non-erroneous in apprehending its objects as being established by their own intrinsic natures (*rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa*). Note that for a Pasaṅgika, by contrast, a *pramāṇa* can supposedly never be correct in this way, because these intrinsic natures do not exist at all, and thus for him all *pramāṇas* without exception would be erroneous. The incommensurability between Realist and Śūnyavādin then lies in the fact that the way the subject is established by a *pramāṇa* (*tshad mas grub tshul*) will differ for the two parties, the realist taking the *pramāṇa* as non-erroneous and the Śūnyavādin



holding it to be erroneous. Cf. *sTong thun chen mo* p. 496 (f.157b3–6): *des na mdor bsdus te go bde bar brjod na / rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa'i gzhal bya la ma 'khrul pa'i tshad mas rnyed don yin par snga rgol phyi\* rgol gnyi ga'i lugs la mthun snang du grub pa'i chos can gyi steng du / snga rgol gang la dpag 'dod zhugs pa'i bsgrub bya'i chos sgrub byed kyi gtan tshigs su bkod pa / zhes pa rang rgyud kyi rtags kyi don yin la / chos can de nyid tshad mas 'grub tshul snga rgol phyi rgol gnyi ga'i mthun snang du grub pa med kyang spyir chos can de nyid snga rgol gyi lugs la'ang tshad mas grub phyi rgol gyi lugs la'ang tshad mas grub cing chos can dang phyogs chos sogs phyi rgol lugs la tshad mas grub pa'i khas blangs la 'khrid nas bkod pa'i gtan tshigs ni gzhan la grags kyi rjes dpag ces bya'o //* \*Text has *gyi*. “So let us summarize and explain [things] in an easily comprehensible manner (sic!). The meaning of ‘autonomous logical reason’ (*rang rgyud kyi rtags = svatantrahetu*) is: what is presented as a logical reason establishing the *sādhyadharmā* that the proponent wishes to infer on the basis of a *dharmin* established as appearing concordantly (*mthun snang du grub pa*) for both the proponent’s and the opponent’s traditions, namely, [appearing concordantly] as being an entity found by a *pramāṇa* that is unmistakable with regard to *prameyas* established by their own characters (*rang gi mtshan nyid = svalakṣaṇa*). [As for ‘opponent-acknowledged’ inferences:] Although the way in which this *dharmin* is established by *pramāṇas* does not appear concordantly for both the proponent and opponent, nonetheless in general (*spyir*) this *dharmin* is established by a *pramāṇa* in the opponent’s tradition and is also established by a *pramāṇa* in the opponent’s tradition; when the logical reason is presented after we have ‘guided’ (*khrid nas*) the *dharmin*, *pakṣadharmā* and so forth in terms of positions established by a *pramāṇa* in the opponent’s tradition, this is said to be an ‘opponent-acknowledged inference’ (*gzhan la grags kyi rjes dpag*).”

<sup>22</sup> See Lopez (1987); pp. 178–179.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. n. 13 for Dignāga’s arguments against the Sāṃkhya.

<sup>24</sup> bsTan dar cites *Madhyamakāloka* somewhat out of context, as if the quote was unproblematically Kamalaśīla’s own position. In fact, it is to be found in a very long *pūrvapakṣa* where a logician’s position is presented, one which Kamalaśīla replied to by drawing partial parallels with his own philosophical project of proving ultimate lack of intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāvatā*). The logician’s position, which looks to be a type of *Alīkākaravāda* (“false images”), held that: (a) the *dharmin* is said to be a mental entity, but in reality is not mind and has no real existence at all, being only an imagined and unreal mental image (*ākāra*); (b) the ordinary person erroneously conflates the image with the objects themselves; (c) mind really exists although the images are unreal. (Note that Santarakṣita and Kamalaśīla are usually represented in texts on philosophical tenets (*grub mtha' = siddhānta*) as leaning towards *Satyākāravāda* (*rnam bden dang mthun pa*); see Mimaki (1982) pp. 29–31, 35.) See *Madhyamakāloka* D. 174a–175al (P. 190a–191a): *ji ste thog ma med pa'i rang gi sa bon yongs su smin pa las yang dag par byung ba'i rnam par rtog pas yongs su bsgrubs pa / byis pa rnams kyis phyi rol dang dngos po nyid du nye bar brtags pa blo la yod pa nyid chos can yin te / de'i phyir de la brten nas gtso bo la sogs pa 'gog par byed do // de ni don dam par ngo bo nyid med kyang rnam par 'khrul pa'i dbang gis phyi rol lta bu dang / gtso bo la sogs pa dang / tha mi dad pa lta bu dang / nus pas pas stong pa la sogs pa'i chos mtha' dag dang ldan pa lta bur rtog go // de la gtso bo la sogs pa'i ngo bo nyid dgag pa sgrub pa la gtso bo la sogs pa dgag pa bsgrub par bya ba dang / sgrub pa dag gzhi gcig pa nyid kyang grub pa kho na yin te / 'di lta de nyid byis pa rnams kyis phyi rol dang / gtso bo la sogs pa nyid du nye bar gzung ba rgol ba dang phyir rgol ba dag kyang rab rib can gyis zla ba gnyis su mthong ba bzhin du de dang tha mi dad par sems pa kho nas tha snyad 'dogs pa'i phyir // de ni blos kun brtags pa yin yang de'i*

*mam pa nyid kyis blo zhes nye bar 'dogs te / 'di dngos su ni blo'i ngo bo yang ma yin te / de ni de dang mtshan nyid mi mthun pa'i ngo bo nyid du snang ba'i phyir ro // de'i phyir de ngo bo med pa nyid du rab tu bsgrubs kyang blo ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du thal ba ni ma yin te / de la phyi rol dang gtso bo la sogs pa'i ngo nyid dgag pa tshad mas sgrub par byed kyi / de nyid dgag pa'i phyir gtan tshigs sbyor ba ma yin no / ... de'i phyir rjes su dpag par bya ba dang / rjes su dpag pa la sogs pa'i tha snyad 'di thams cad ni blo la yod pa'i chos can kho na brten nas 'jug pa nyid de / rnam pa gzhan mi srid pa'i phyir ro zhes bya bar 'dod na / gal te de lta yin na / 'o na don dam par ngo bo nyid med kyang kun brtags pa'i chos can la brten nas dgag pa la sogs pa rab tu sgrub par byed pa la yang gchi ma grub pa nyid la sogs pa'i nyes pa mi 'jug na ci ste nan gyis kho bo cag la klan ka tshol byar byed / ji ltar khyed don dam pa la 'jug par bya ba'i phyir gtso bo la sogs pa dgag par kun brtags pa'i chos can kho na la bsgrub par bya ba dang / sgrub pa'i sems pa rgyas par byed pa de bzhin du kho cag kyang gzugs dang sgra la sogs pa grags pa dag la / yod pa dang med pa la sogs pa'i ngo bo nyid du sgro btags pa dgag par byis pa mams la de dag sgyu ma dang / smig rgyu dang / rmi lam dang / gzugs brnyan dang mtshungs pa nyid du ston par byed do // de la ji ltar brtags pa'i chos can la dngos po'i ngo bo nyid du sgro btags pa la sogs pa bkag tu zin kyang rgol ba dang phyir rgol ba dag la snang ba'i phyir ma grub pa nyid la sogs pa'i nyes pa mi 'jug pa de bzhin du gzugs la sogs pa yang gnag rdzi'i chung ma yan chad kyi skye bo la snang ba'i phyir ji ltar ma grub pa nyid du 'gyur //.*

“[Objection:] – It is just something existing in the mind that is the subject, [something] established by conceptualisations stemming from the ripening of their own beginningless [karmic] tendencies [and] which is metaphorically designated by the infantile as being external and real. Thus it is with reference to that [fictional mental existent] that one negates *pradhāna* and so forth. Although that [mental existent] does not ultimately have any nature, still, due to error, it is conceived of as if it were external, as if it were not different from *pradhāna* and the like, and as if it had all the various properties like being void of efficacy and so forth. In that case, when we negate the natures of *pradhāna* and so forth, the *sādhya* consisting of negations of *pradhāna*, etc. and the *sādhana* [for these negations] not only have the same locus but are in fact established. This is because the infantile grasp this [mental existent] alone as being external and as being *pradhāna*, etc. and the proponent and opponent both apply conventional designations simply because they think that this [mental existent] is not different from [the pseudo-entities themselves], just as when a person suffering from [the eye-disease] *timira* sees the moon as two. Although this [mental existent] is something [merely] imagined by the mind, it is metaphorically designated as the mind due to its being an image. In reality, however, it is not of the nature of the mind, in that it appears as something different in character from the [mind]. Hence even though it is acknowledged that this [mental existent] is without any nature, it does not follow that the mind is without nature. In that case, the negations of natures such as the external and *pradhāna*, etc. are proven by means of a *pramāṇa*. But one does not apply the logical reasons in order to negate the [mind] itself. . . . Consequently, all these conventions, like inferable objects (*anumeṃya*), inferring [reasons] (*anumāna*) and so forth, operate only in reliance upon subjects existing in the mind. Any other way is impossible.

[Reply:] Suppose this were so. Now, even when one proved negations and so forth in reliance upon imagined subjects, though they be ultimately without any nature, no fault like *āśrayāsiddha*, etc. would be committed. So then why direct your criticisms so vociferously against us! Just as you develop ideas of *sādhya* and *sādhana* in reliance upon imagined subjects in order to negate *pradhāna* etc. so that you may have access to the ultimate, in the same fashion we too, in order to negate superimpositions of natures like existence and nonexistence, etc. upon commonly recognized things

like form and sound, demonstrate to the infantile that these [commonly recognized things like form, etc.] are like illusions, mirages, dreams and reflections. In that case, just as [for you], even though [you] do negate the superimposed nature of being a real entity with reference to imagined subjects [like *pradhāna*, etc.], there are no faults like [*āśraya-jaśiddha[hetu]*] because these [subjects] appear to both the proponent and the opponent, so too, since form and so forth also appear to everyone from cowherds' wives on up, how is it that they would be unestablished (*asiddha*)?"

<sup>25</sup> See n. 24.

<sup>26</sup> *bsTan dar* has truncated the passage from the *Svavṛtti*. The additions to our translation follow the missing portions of the Skt. and Tib. of the *Svavṛtti*. Note that it is clear from the Skt. that Ngag dbang bstan dar is wrong in reading *spyi gtso bo'i sgra*, and that the reading *ci (= kim) gtso bo'i sgra* in the *bsTan 'gyur* is the correct one. Ngag dbang bstan dar seems to have been seduced by the homonymity of *spyi* and *ci*, plus the fact that *pradhāna* is usually rendered as *spyi gtso bo* by indigenous Tibetan authors of the dGe lugs school. Our translation of the quotation follows the *Svavṛtti*'s Sanskrit and the Tibetan in the *bsTan 'gyur*, which must yield a different understanding from that of Ngag dbang bstan dar himself. Unfortunately, it is difficult to guess how the latter would have understood the passage. But a natural reading of *bsTan dar*'s version of the *Svavṛtti* passage would be something like: "Thus, in dependence upon this subject, this object that appears due to the word *pradhāna* . . .".

<sup>27</sup> "Verbal object" (*sgra don; śabdārtha*) is, for a logician, always a conceptually created entity, one having no real existence. Cf. *Pramāṇavārttika* III.287ab: *śabdāthagrāhi yad yatra taj jñānaṃ tatra kalpanā* // "Wherever a consciousness apprehends a verbal object, it is conceptual".

<sup>28</sup> On *gzhi ldog* and the argument at issue, see n. 30.

<sup>29</sup> See n. 30.

<sup>30</sup> The term *ldog pa (= vyāvṛtti)* is a pivotal term in the Indian and Tibetan *apoha* theories of meaning; see Tillemans (1993) pp. 69–70, n. 6 for explanations and references to *Pramāṇavārttika* I. The fundamental idea is that the object directly designated by a word for X is a conceptual construction proceeding by exclusion of all which is non-X. As for *rang ldog* and *gzhi ldog*, these are terms whose Indian origins, if indeed they have any, seem quite obscure. The terms figure preeminently in the *bsDus grwa* literature (and hence in dGe lugs pa *pramāṇa* commentaries) as part of a scholastic category of different sub-types of the Indian logician's notion of *vyāvṛtti*, including also *don ldog* ("exclusion *qua* object") and *spyi ldog* ("exclusion *qua* universal"). Given their place in a literature heavily influenced by the *Tshad ma bsdus pa* texts of gSang phu traditions, it is not unlikely that the interpretation of these four sub-varieties of *vyāvṛtti*, and possibly even their origin, is due to the gSang phu traditions stemming from Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge. See e.g. the third chapter of *Yongs 'dzin bsdus grwa chung*, the chapter concerning *ldog pa ngos 'dzin* "recognizing exclusions" (in *Textbooks of Se-ra Monastery for the Primary Course of Studies* ed. T. Kelzang and S. Onoda, Kyoto, 1985). The argumentation in Ngag dbang bstan dar turns essentially on the distinction between knowing an object X as being simply an X itself (*rang*), and knowing an instance, or basis (*gzhi*), of X but under some other name or description – the first case is that of *rang ldog* and the second *gzhi ldog*. Thus, for example, the *rang ldog* pertaining to a vase (*bum pa'i rang ldog*), is just the vase and not, e.g., some particular bulbous golden object that is able to carry water – the latter would be a *gzhi ldog* of vase. In the context at hand, a Buddhist and a Sāṃkhya, when arguing about Primordial Matter, are both arguing about a mere concept of Primordial Matter, i.e. a verbal object (*sgra don*). Nonetheless they cannot be arguing about the *rang ldog* of the verbal object (*sgra don gyi rang ldog*) of Primordial Matter because this would mean that both know

the verbal object to be just a verbal object, i.e. a conceptually and verbally created fiction; clearly, the Sāṃkhya does not know this, but thinks that Primordial Matter is more than just a verbal object, because it is for him fully real. Thus they are both thinking and arguing about a type of verbal object, but one that both parties don't consciously recognize as such – hence the insistence on the subject of their deliberations being the *gzhi ldog* of a verbal object. See also n. 15 on the dGe lugs pa idea of an object (like Primordial Matter, etc.) and its conceptual representation appearing “mixed” (*'dres nas snang ba*) and hence indistinguishable to the opponent.

<sup>31</sup> Literally, “from their exclusions *qua* the things themselves”. On *rang ldog*, see n. 30. On the argument at stake, see n. 32.

<sup>32</sup> The point is that if we *explicitly* presented the subject as being something along the lines of the concept of Primordial Matter, and not Primordial Matter itself, we would not actually succeed in refuting Primordial Matter. The argument would not tell against the Sāṃkhya opponent, who is convinced that there really is such an entity and that it is *a fortiori* not a mere concept. On the other hand, when we establish by means of a *pramāṇa* that the reason is a property of the subject (*pakṣadharmā*), then the subject can only be the conceptual construct, i.e. only the appearance as Primordial Matter (*gtso bor snang ba nyid*). The argument at stake is, in fact, that both the *kevaladharmin* and *svadharmin* have their purpose: the former assures that the refutation presents the subject as the opponent conceives it, while the latter is the proponent's actual subject that will serve as the basis upon which will be assessed the three characteristics of the logical reason. Finally, note that we cannot say with any certainty which exact passages from the *Madhyamakāloka* rGyal tshab rje had in mind.

<sup>33</sup> Literally: “the reason . . . (*. . . rgyu mtshan yang*) . . . is also due to the reason (*rgyu mtshan gyis yin*)”.

<sup>34</sup> *Pramāṇavārttika* IV.228bcd. The whole *kārikā* reads: *tasmād āśritya śabdārthaṃ bhāvābhāvasamāśrayam / abāhyāśrayam atreṣṭaṃ sarvaṃ vidhiniṣedhanam // (de phyir dngos dngos med rten can // phyi rol rten min sgra don la // brten nas 'dir ni sgrub pa dang // dgag pa thams cad 'dod pa yin //)* “Therefore, we accept that all [positive] proof and negation here [in practical activity (*vyavahāre*)] is in reliance upon a verbal object, which is the basis for being and non-being [and] which has no external basis.” For the interpretation of the compounds <sup>o</sup>*samāśrayam* and *abāhyāśrayam*, see *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti*: *tasmāc chabdasyārtham aropitabahrūpam anyavyavacchedam abāhyāśrayam bāhyaviṣayarahitam ya eva bhāvābhāvayor vidhipratīṣedhavigalpapratipādyayor samāśrayas tam āśritya vyavahāre sarvaṃ vidhiniṣedhanam iṣtam/*.

<sup>35</sup> The *kārikā* is closely related to the well-known fragment attributed to Dignāga's *Hetumukha* and cited in *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* (ed. Gnoli pp. 2–3): *sarva evāyam anumānānumeyavyavahāro buddhyārūdhena dharmadharmibhedena*. Note that the Tibetan of k. 183c reads *shes pa la grub* “established in/for thought”, whereas the *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* (PVV) reads *pratyayena vikalpakenaikavyāvṛttimātraviṣayena saṃsiddham* . . . “established by means of conceptual thought, which has as object only an exclusion of unity.” Finally, note that Manorathanandin in PVV takes *artha* as going only with *anumeya*, i.e. *anumeyārtha* which is also in keeping with PV Tib. Cf. PVV ad k. 183: *ato 'numānāhetutvād anumānasya liṅgasyānumeyārthasyānāyor upalakṣaṇatvāt (/) dharmiṇas ca vyavahārasthitis tv iyam* . . .

## REFERENCES

- Dreyfus, G. (1992). 'Universals in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism', in S. Ihara and Z. Yamaguchi (ed.), *Tibetan Studies*, Vol. 1, pp. 29–46. Narita.
- Dreyfus, G. (1997). *Recognizing Reality. Dharmakīrti's Philosophy and its Tibetan Interpretations*. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press.
- Hopkins, J. (1989). 'A Tibetan Delineation of Different Views of Emptiness in the Indian Middle Way School', *The Tibet Journal* 1: 10–43.
- Ichigō, M. (1985). *Madhyamakālaṅkāra of Śāntarakṣita with his own commentary or Vṛtti and with the subcommentary or Pañjikā of Kamalaśīla*. Kyoto: Buneidō.
- Kajiyama, Y. (1973). 'Three Kinds of Affirmation and Two Kinds of Negation in Buddhist Philosophy', *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 17: 161–175.
- Katsura, S. (1992). 'Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on *adarśanamātra* and *anupalabdhi*', *Asiatische Studien/Etudes asiatiques* 46(1): 222–231.
- Kitagawa, H. (1972). *Indo Koten Ronrigaku no Kenkyū. Jinna no Taikei*. Tokyo.
- Klein, A.C. (1991). *Knowing, Naming and Negation. A Sourcebook on Tibetan Sautrāntika*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications.
- Kobayashi, M. (1989). 'The Mādhyamika Argument for *niḥsvabhāvatā* and the Fallacy of *āśrayāsiddha*: Kamalaśīla's View in His *Madhyamakāloka*', *Bunka* 50(3): 218–199 (in Japanese with comprehensive English summary).
- Lopez, D. (1987). *A Study of Svātantrika*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications.
- Lopez, D. (1988). *The Heart Sūtra Explained: Indian and Tibetan Commentaries*. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press.
- Matilal, B. (1970). 'Reference and Existence in Nyāya and Buddhist Logic', *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 1: 83–110.
- Mimaki, K. (1976). *La Réfutation bouddhique de la permanence des choses (sthīrasiddhidūṣana) et la preuve de la momentanéité des choses (kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi)*. Paris: Publications de l'institut de civilisation indienne, fascicule 41.
- Mimaki, K. (1982). *Blo gsal sgrub mtha'*. Kyoto: Zinbun Kagaku Kenkyusyo.
- Tillemans, T. (1984). 'Two Tibetan Texts on the "Neither One nor Many" Argument for *sūnyatā*', *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 12: 357–388.
- Tillemans, T. (1990). *Materials for the Study of Āryadeva, Dharmapāla and Candrakīrti. The Catuḥśataka of Āryadeva, chapters XII and XIII, with the commentaries of Dharmapāla and Candrakīrti: Introduction, Translation, Sanskrit, Tibetan and Chinese Texts, Notes*. Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde 24(1) and 24(2). Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien.
- Tillemans, T. (1992). 'Tsong kha pa et al. on the Bhāvaviveka-Candrakīrti Debate', in S. Ihara and Z. Yamaguchi (ed.), *Tibetan Studies*, Vol. 1, pp. 315–326. Narita.
- Tillemans, T. (1993). *Persons of Authority. The sTon pa tshad ma'i skyes bur sgrub pa'i gnam of A lag sha Ngag dbang bstan dar, A Tibetan Work on the Central Religious Questions in Buddhist Epistemology*. Tibetan and Indo-Tibetan Studies 5. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.
- Tillemans, T. (1995). 'On the So-called Difficult Point of the *apoha* Theory', *Asiatische Studien/Etudes asiatiques* 49(4): 853–889.
- Tillemans, T. and T. Tomabechei (1995). 'Le *dBu ma'i byuñ tshul* de Śākya mchog ldan', *Asiatische Studien/Etudes asiatiques* 49(4): 891–918.
- Yoshimizu, Ch. (1997). 'Tsoñ kha pa on *don byed nus pa*', in H. Krasser et al. (ed.) *Tibetan Studies*, Vol. 2, pp. 1103–1120. Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.
- Yotsuya, K. (1995). 'An Introduction to the "Svatantra-reasoning"', *Sōtōshu kenkyūin kenkyū kiyō* 22: 1–28.

## ABBREVIATIONS

A lag sha Ngag dbang bstan dar. *gCig du bral gyi rnam bzhag = gCig du bral gyi rnam bzhag legs bshad rgya mtsho las btus pa'i 'khrul spong bdud rtsi'i gzegs ma*. In Vol. I of the *Collected gSung 'bum of bsTan-dar lha-ram of A-lag-sha*. Published by Lama Guru Deva, New Delhi, 1971.

bTsun pa ston gzhon. *rNam 'grel gyi rnam bshad gangs can gyi rgyan*. Qinghai: Zhonguo zangxue chubanshe, 1993.

D. = sDe dge edition of the Tibetan Tripiṭaka.

Devendrabuddhi. *Pramānavārttikapañjikā*. P. 5717. D. 4217.

dGe 'dun grub pa. *Tshad ma rigs rgyan = Tshad ma'i bstan bcos chen po rigs pa'i rgyan*. *Collected Works of the First Dalai Lama dGe 'dun grub pa*, Gangtok, 1978–1981, Vol. 4 (nga).

Dharmakīrti. *Nyāyabindu: with Dharmottara's Nyāyabinduṭīkā and Durveka Miśra's Dharmottarapradīpa*. Ed. by D. Malvania, Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1955, second edition 1971.

Dharmakīrti. *Pramānavārttika*. Ed. by Y. Miyasaka. *Pramānavārttika-kārikā (Sanskrit and Tibetan)*. Naritasan Shinshoji: Acta Indologica 2 1972, pp. 1–206. (PV I = *Svārthānumāna*; PV II = *Pramānasiddhi*; PV III = *Pratyakṣa*; PV IV = *Parārthānumāna*.)

Dharmakīrti. *Pramānavārttikavavṛtti*. Ed. R. Gnoli. *The Pramānavārttikam of Dharmakīrti*. Serie Orientale Roma 23, Rome, 1960.

Dharmottara. *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*. See Dharmakīrti's *Nyāyabindu*.

Dignāga. *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*. P. 5701, D. 4204 (i.e. PSVa) transl. Vasudhararakṣita and Seng rgyal; P. 5702 (i.e. PSVb) transl. Kanakavarman and Dad pa shes rab.

Dignāga. *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. P. 5700, D. 4203

Durveka Miśra. *Dharmottarapradīpa*. See Dharmakīrti's *Nyāyabindu*.

Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge. *lTa ba ngan sel = dBu ma la 'jug pa'i dkyus kyi sa bcad pa dang gzhung so so'i dka' ba'i gnas la dpyad pa lta ba ngan sel*. In *Sa skya pa'i bka' 'bum*, vol. 13, Tokyo, 1969.

gSer mdog Paṅ chen Śākya mchog ldan. *Tshad ma rigs gter dgongs rgyan smad cha = Tshad ma rigs gter gyi dgongs rgyan rigs pa'i 'khor los lugs ngan pham byed*. Volume 10 of *Collected Writings of gSer-mdog Paṅ-chen Śākya-mchog-ldan*. Reprinted by Nagwang Topgyal, Delhi, 1988.

k. = kārikā.

Kamalaśīla. *Madhyamakāloka*. P. 5287, D. 3887.

Manorathanandin. *Pramānavārttikavṛtti*. Ed. by R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana with the notes of Vibhūticandra in the appendices to the *Journal of the Bihar and*

*Orissa Research Society* 24 (1938) part III. Also ed. by D. Shāstrī, Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati 3, 1968.

Miy. = Y. Miyasaka's edition of *Pramāṇavārttika*. See Dharmakīrti, *Pramāṇavārttika*.

mKhas grub rje = mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang po. *rNam 'grel ṭik chen* = *rGyas pa'i bstan bcos tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi rgya cher bshad pa rigs pa'i rgya mtsho*. *Collected Works*, dGa' ldan phun tshogs gling edition, Vol. *tha, da*.

mKhas grub rje. *sTong thun chen mo* = *Zab mo stong pa nyid kyi de kho na nyid rab tu gsal bar byed pa'i bstan bcos skal bzang mig 'byed*. *Collected Works*, Vol. *ka*.

mKhas grub rje. *Tshad ma yid kyi mun sel* = *Tshad ma sde bdun gyi rgyan yid kyi mun sel*. *Collected Works*, Vol. *tha*.

P. = Peking edition of the Tibetan Tripiṭaka.

Prajñākaragupta. *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya*. Ed. R. Sāṅkrītyāyana, Patna: Tibetan Sanskrit Works 1, 1953.

rGyal tshab rje = rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen. *rNam 'grel thar lam gsal byed* = *Tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa'i rnam bshad phyin ci ma log par gsal bar byed pa*. *Collected Works*, Lhasa edition, Vol. *cha*.

rGyal tshab rje. *rNam nges dar ṭik* = *bsTan bcos tshad ma rnam nges kyi ṭik chen dgongs pa rab gsal*. *Collected Works*, Vol. *ja* and *nya*.

rGyal tshab rje; *dBu ma rgyan gyi brjed byang*. Popular edition, Sarnath, 1976.

Śākyabuddhi. *Pramāṇavārttikatīkā*. P. 5718, D. 4220.

Śāntarakṣita. *Madhyamakālamkāra*. See Ichigō (1985).

Tsong kha pa = Tsong kha pa Blo bzang grags pa. *dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal* = *bsTan bcos chen po dbu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bshad dgongs pa rab gsal*. In Vol. *ma of Collected Works*, reproduced from prints from the 1897 Lhasa old Zhol (dGa' ldan phun tshogs gling) blocks, New Delhi 1979.

Tsong kha pa. *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris*. In *Collected Works*, Vol. *ba*; popular edition, Sarnath 1976.

Yongs 'dzin Phur bu lcog Byams pa tshul khriims rgya mtsho. *Yongs 'dzin rtags rigs* = *Tshad ma'i gzhung don 'byed pa'i bsdus grwa'i rnam par bshad pa rigs lam 'phrul gyi lde'u mig las rigs lam che ba rtags rigs kyi skor*. References are to the edition by S. Onoda, *The Yōns 'dzin rtags rigs – A manual for Tibetan logic*. Nagoya: Studia Asiatica 5, 1981.

TOM J.F. TILLEMANS  
*University of Lausanne*

DONALD S. LOPEZ  
*University of Michigan*