Journal of Applied Psychoanalytic Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, January 2003 (© 2003)

Crossing the Threshold: First Impressions in Psychoanalysis and Negotiation

Kimberlyn Leary[1,2,3,5] **and Michael Wheeler**[4]

This paper explores the role that first impressions play in two different relational contexts: psychodynamic treatment and negotiation. Although the goals of therapy and negotiation are very different, both endeavors rest on the capacity of the participants to engage in a process of constructive dialogue, and "to get things done" via a relationship. We argue for the utility of an interdisciplinary conversation between psychoanalysis and negotiation, and specifically suggest that exploring these similarities and differences about first steps in building a working relationship may be instructive for practitioners in both professions.

KEY WORDS: first impressions; psychoanalysis; negotiation; intersubjectivity.

Two strangers meet, Chris and Tony.

Tony arrives five minutes early and waits in a private anteroom. He leafs through the New Yorker, *regularly glancing at his watch. Chris opens an anterior door, smiles and invites him into her office. The room is serene and uncluttered. A small bookcase holds titles on psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. Following her gesture, Tony takes a seat at the armchair across from Chris.*

Hold on though. Maybe it isn't like that at all. Maybe these same two people meet under entirely different circumstances. Yes, here's how it goes:

Chris drives up to the dealership in her old Toyota. With winter coming, it's time to get something newer, more reliable. The plastic banners hung over

[1]Associate Director, University of Michigan Psychological Clinic, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
[2]Adjunct Associate Professor, Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
[3]Senior Researcher, Program on Negotiation, Harvard Law School, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
[4]Professor of Management, Harvard Business School, Soldier's Field. Boston, MA.
[5]Correspondence should be directed to Kimberlyn Leary, Associate Director and Adjunct Associate Professor, Univ. of Michigan; Senior Researcher, Program on Negotiation, Harvard Law School, 721 East Huron St. Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104; e-mail: kimleary@umich.edu.

1521-1401/03/0100-0081/0 © 2003 Human Sciences Press, Inc.

the lot snap in the chilly wind. Chris barely makes it through the showroom door, when Tony pops up from behind his desk and rushes over to greet her, all smiles. "Can I help you?" he asks.

But then again, their first encounter might be altogether different. Perhaps they frequent the same coffee shop. This particular morning they happen to be sitting next to each other on those counter stools near the side window. One of them says, "Could you pass that sugar please?"

Our topic is first impressions. One of us is a psychoanalyst and the other a professor of management in a business school. We come from very different practice domains and different theoretical traditions. Despite this, we have found common ground in the study of first impressions. We are specifically interested in how what we read in other people (and what they read in us) steers the interaction that follows—in the consulting room and around the negotiation table. In our prologue, Chris and Tony are fundamentally the same people in each of these scenarios yet they likely will see each other (and perhaps themselves) differently depending on whether they meet in Chris' consulting room, Tony's showroom, or in a neighborhood coffee shop.

The purpose of this paper is to construct an interdisciplinary conversation on the role of first impressions in different relational contexts. We will explore the impact of first impressions in psychoanalysis and in negotiation settings. Although the goals of therapy and negotiation are different, both endeavors rest on participants' capacity to engage in creative dialogue and get things done in relationships. Exploring similarities and differences of first impressions in clinical and negotiation practice should be instructive for practitioners in both professions. For instance, the way that an analyst thinks about the first steps of building a working relationship may be helpful to negotiators. Likewise, the ways in which negotiators frame their interactions (deliberately or not) may offer insight to therapists.

Our inquiry leads us to three broad conclusions. First, social roles, at least in these contexts, shape first impressions much more significantly than is (or could be) reflected in the experimental literature. Second, all impressions are jointly constructed through an interactive process. Third, accuracy of first impressions is a slippery concept as whether they are "right" or "wrong," in some sense, they can have self-fulfilling consequences in relationships—a matter of consequence for both clinicians and negotiators.

FORMING IMPRESSIONS

The process by which people form impressions has been studied by researchers from many traditions. Biologists, starting with Darwin, investigated the physical expression of emotion in animals and humans. Early

psychologists, including William James, followed suit, using a variety of clinical and experimental methods. Sociologists—notably Erving Goffman—weighed in on the interactive aspects of self-presentation. In turn, anthropologists like Ray Birdwhistle linked traditional cross-cultural studies with the analysis of communication channels.

Researchers in all these fields (and more) examining the topic from many perspectives have broadly agreed that impressions are powerfully molded by nonverbal communication (that is, everything beyond explicit words themselves). We know for instance that people send—and interpret—signals encoded in a laugh, an averted glance, a blush, a clenched brow, and countless bits of behavior. The importance and complexity of this behavior may be most apparent when it is truncated, such as when we can only gauge each other through email or faxes. (Small wonder in this environment that "emoticons" emerged to fill this void. Indeed, the latest version of Microsoft Word will call them up automatically: ϑ)

What actually prompts these signals, be they physical or typographic, is much debated, often along disciplinary lines. Some forms of nonverbal behavior look to be universal and could be considered biologically based. The ability to recognize aggression and submission, or attraction and disgust, would naturally be rewarded in the evolutionary scheme of things. But other forms of behavior are more subjective and seem to be specific to time and place. Direct eye contact is expected in some societies, for example, but avoided in others. Likewise, at a Texas football game, the up-raised index and little finger means "hook-em horns!" while in Sicily, the same gesture has a different connotation. Families also evolve idiosyncratic ways ways of signalling emotional safety and provocation. Social ritual and developmental history are thus very important in how we read one another.

The study of first impressions has been an important focus of attention among social psychologists. No approach to first impressions would be complete without a detailed account of the social psychology of the interpersonal judgments that are at the crux of first impressions. The research literature suggests that impressions are formed very quickly and remain robust. Across a variety of studies, people's impressions of videotaped subjects were the same whether viewers saw clips lasting five minutes or less than thirty seconds (e.g. Ambady & Rosenthal, 1992). Likewise student ratings of teachers are consistent whether or not they are seen for a long time or just a moment.

These subjects are clearly engaged in an interpretive process that begins immediately. People apparently extrapolate from brief glimpses of a person a much broader set of assumptions about their nature and intentions. Social psychologists (sounding very much like psychoanalysts) conclude: "Much of this expressive behavior is unintended, unconscious and yet extremely effective . . . These cues are so suble that they are neither encoded nor decoded at

an intentional, conscious level of awareness (p. 256)" (Ambady & Rosenthal, 1992).

For the social psychologist, first impressions are instances of social cognition—part of the way in which we form schemas or cognitive maps to organize and manage information about the social world. Encountering an ambiguous social situation, we automatically attempt to fit the unfamiliar behavior or relationship to the schemas we have already stored.

A considerable amount of research has convincingly demonstrated that these judgments are shaped by preconceptions and biases flourish outside of conscious awareness (Aronson, Wilson and Akert, 1997). Unlike the clinical situation in which the analyst's interest is focussed on the individually-articulated preconception or motivated transference, social psychologists think about these biases as automatic cognitive processes. Here, first impressions function as heuristics, enabling us to process social information quickly. On the other hand, they also lead us to discount the specific attributes of the person in front of us.

Some of the most important of these biases include: the ***fundamental attribution error*** (Ross, 1977) (overestimating the extent to which people act as they do because of internal dispositional rather than situational factors); ***self-serving attributions*** (Mullen & Riordan, 1988) (the tendency to make judgments that preserve the observer's self-esteem and power); and ***self-fulfilling prophecies*** (Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968) (the way in which we make our schemes come true by unconsciously treating others in such a way as to elicit a complementary reaction that we use to confirm that our initial schema was correct).

Despite the prevalence of these cognitive "errors," it is also clear that people are able to be more accurate about others in some situations more than others. For example, power affects accuracy. In hierarchical relationships of unequal power or status, the person with less power tends to formulate more complex and less stereo-typed impressions that those with more power (Fiske, Lin & Neuberg, 1999). People also make more accurate appraisals when they are motivated to do so such as when mutual understanding is necessary and beneficial to both (Fiske, Lin & Neuberg, 1999). Accuracy is also enhanced when people are able to interact without time pressures and when they are not subjected to stress (Nordstrom, Hall & Bartells, 1998).

Researchers have also identified differences between spontaneous impressions (e.g. as when you idly observe the person pulling up next to you at the stop light) and those we form intentionally (e.g. the hard look you give the driver who just cut you off at the last turn) (Uleman, 1999). Spontaneous impressions reflect the ***availability heuristic*** (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). The perceiver forms her impression based on those schemas that she can access most easily (i.e. those that are most familiar). The result is that some

first impressions may say more about the observer than they do about the observed.

Are first impressions "right" or "wrong?" This is a ticklish question. From the standpoint of social psychology, there is some evidence that personality ratings by strangers are surprisingly consistent with people's own self-ratings (Ambady & Rosenthal, 1992). First impressions could be viewed conservatively—as hypotheses to be tested out in the light of further experience. However, even when "wrong" per se, they may nonetheless reflect cues which the speaker himself may deny that he is sending (e.g. the forced smile of the public speaker may betray nervousness within). More fundamentally, even if impressions are somehow wrong at first, they can spawn an interaction in which they become self-fulfilling.

To take a simple example, imagine an encounter in which an observer reads someone's facial expression as hostile, when that grimace may only reflect fear or an upset stomach. That interpretation may prompt an aggressive response, which in turn could trigger a truly hostile encounter. Alternatively, smiles can also begat laughter. In the case of a teacher who makes a favorable first impression, students are drawn into deeper engagement, confirming the original response. The process of impression formation, communication, interpretation and reformation is highly interactive.

By contrast, serious research contradicts much of what passes for street wisdom. Many people commonly believe that they can tell when others are telling the truth, for example, but experiments indicate that this is a rare skill (Ekman & O'Sullivan, 1991).[6] It is said that the eyes are the windows of the soul, but physical signs of deception like pupil dilation and blinking are too transcient and subtle to be read by most observers. Indeed, some research suggests that focus on facial expression may distract from detecting more reliable cues, like tone of voice (DePaulo & Friedman, 1998).

Much of this laboratory research can be questioned for not replicating the real situations in which people form impressions of one another. In typical experiments, subjects view videotapes of other people and interpret their behavior. Using such tapes standardizes the experience, but the practice keeps the observers at a safe distance from the observed. By contrast, "(w)hen people are involved in actual interactions, they may be distracted by factors such as the verbal component of the interaction or the demands of impression management and self-presentation" (Ambady &

[6]Students and professionals, including judges, psychiatrists, and FBI agents perform little better than mere random guessing. Secret Service personnel have done better on some tests, but only aphasics (people who have been robbed of their ability to understand language by stroke or brain damage) seem to have a real gift at spotting deception (Cromie, 2000). In one study all the non-aphasics did no better than flipping a coin, but aphasics were correct 73 percent of the time when they judged facial expressions alone.

Rosenthal, 1992, p. 268).[7] As a result, the accuracy of their judgments may be affected.

In both therapy and negotiation, words are of great consequence. So is self-presentation. Both undoubtedly affect the way in which people read each other in these situations. But impressions are just as much cause, as they are effect, and affect the ways in which people subsequently interact. In the pages that follow, we will extend these findings from social psychology to explore the significance of first impressions and interaction in clinical work and negotiation.

FIRST IMPRESSIONS IN PSYCHOTHERAPY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS

The role of first impressions in clinical practice has not been studied widely, despite its potential importance to the field. Managed care protocols, for instance, heavily rely on first impressions. Gatekeepers often assign patients to therapy or approve medications with only a brief contact with the patient or therapist, sometimes over the phone.

In such circumstances, is the clinician likely to get it right? Perhaps some comfort can be drawn from research that indicates people can accurately generalize from brief observations in certain situations, though it is not clear that this holds true outside the lab, in complex relationships like psychotherapy or with respect to the complex mental states with which people present when they seek clinical treatment (Ambady & Rosenthal, 1992). Other studies show that our impressions of others become considerably more accurate over time. People make more accurate judgments of friends than those people they have only just met (Funder & Colvin, 1988).

The research findings from social psychology do suggest that all clinicians would do well to remain mindful of the schemas they may unwittingly employ in recommending different treatments. Superficial factors, including the patient's resemblance to social stereotypes of conventional attractiveness, can loom large if not consciously checked (Blaser, Abston & Bringmann, 1987). Studies of "implicit cognition," for example, demonstrate people's automatic preference for faces with a Euro-American phenotype over those with an African-American features, even on the part of those who profess non-racist values and ideologies (Greenwald, & Banaji, 1995; Rudman et al, 1999).[8] Stereotyped assumptions about racial difference (i.e.

[7] Ambady and Rosenthal (1992) suggest that "(t)oo much thinking and reasoning can sometimes be disruptive of judgmental accuracy," and concluded that "(j)udgments that are made on think slices of behavior may be accurate precisely because they are snap judgments."

[8] Such tests use word-pairing questions that elicit automatic associations to social groups (Greenwald and Banaji, 1995).

negative valance for non-white populations) underlie the frequent finding that minority patients are misdiagnosed in psychiatric settings (Lewis-Fernandez & Kleinman, 1994). It is striking to realize how easily we may flatter ourselves that while such stereotyping is common, we are somehow immune to it personally.

The social psychology of the clinical encounter has recently been incorporated into psychoanalytic thinking with the shift towards a "two person" model of clinical process. Traditional psychoanalysis focused on a "one person" model wherein the therapist was perceived an authoritative observer of the interior of the patient's mind (e.g. the analyst as "blank screen"). Contemporary analytic clinicians now view the clinical situation as one that is profoundly intersubjective and interactive.

Many psychoanalysts understand the central task of the initial interview to be gauging relational possibilities (Gabbard, 1990) and the prospects for intimacy (Meltzer, 1986). This process of "sizing each other up" is increasingly recognized as a two-way street. The patient considering his or her degree of comfort with the therapist and interest in different possible approaches parallels the analyst's assessment of the patient.

Analysts of different theoretical types generally agree that the purpose of the clinical encounter is to create a collaborative encounter, one that helps patients to experience more pleasure and less pain in his or her life (Renik, 1998). The analyst must strive to appreciate the patient's point-of-view to see if the therapeutic situation can meet some part of the patient's expectations.

The fundamental attribution error if posited in its strongest form may represent a particular challenge to the analytic practitioner; given the fact that psychoanalytic knowledge is conceptually rooted in the projective hypothesis (i.e. that we imbue our social worlds with meaning via the projection of internal dynamics). However, the clinical literature of psychoanalysis has also long acknowledged the interactive nature of transference and relational experience. Meltzer (1986) (author of the sole paper on first impressions in the psychoanalytic literature) captures this well: "Our minds are full of characters in search, not of an author—for we ourselves are the author—but of players to fit the parts. Thus does transference people the intimate areas of our lives (p. 469)."

The analyst has in her toolbox; developed over time, her awareness of the verbal and nonverbal impact she tends to have on others. At the same time, in order to address the patient's perspective and point-of-view, she must be prepared to work—in the language of social psychology—within the patient's available schemas. Accepting the patient's transferences is akin to learning to wear the patient's attributions. Likewise, the whole of contemporary psychoanalysis also expects that the analyst will spontaneously engage with the patient (i.e. via enactments) in unplanned ways that will inform the

analytic couple about the their commitments to interactional roles of which they were previously unaware.

First impressions are therefore *virtual* for the analytic clinician—virtual in the sense that they simulate reality. It is not so much that the analyst discounts her first impressions as wrong or gives them special status as being right. Rather the therapist knows that it is only through sustained contact they she may form a picture of who her patient is "really." The therapist—and as we will see, like the negotiator—begins her work with an emergent sense of who the patient is for her and who she may be for the patient. We would argue that in order to work effectively, the analyst must be prepared to think through the highly interactive context of her unfolding exchanges with her patient, including the way in which patient and analyst may be accommodating to the other in a spiral of self-fulfilling prophesies.

This requires the analyst to take into account what she brings to the table—i.e. the ways in which she may speak and act towards her patient that, in turn, shapes the patient's transferences to her. A therapist with a playful, informal style tends to elicit a different transference reaction than an analyst whose personal aesthetic is serious and sober. This is consonant with the recognition that the particularities of the therapist and his or her person—including his or her race, ethnicity and gender—are always instrumental in evoking the clinical themes that develop in the course of the work (Price, 1997).

Patients, too, are also very sensitively attuned to their assessment of the therapist's participation in the clinical relationship (e.g. how involved/distant, etc.) (Smith, 1990). They seek "cues" about who the therapist is, and how the therapist is viewing the patient and the rules of the game. Patients use those cues to define themselves and guide their "free associations." In this way, patient and therapist each participate in the coconstruction of the clinical situation they inhabit together.

At the same time, therapists recognize that the manner in which a person makes someone new someone old is highly individual. A patient has to observe her therapist very carefully in order to discern where she can plausibly assign her therapist the role she needs her therapist to play. This is the difference between a "generic" transference (e.g. conferring authority on anyone assuming a helping role) and the specific and personal transferences that are invoked in the treatment situation.

Specific transferences occur when the patient finds in the therapist "something for real" that reminds the patient of someone he once encountered (or something he can locate within himself). Thus, with the shift in contemporary psychoanalysis the analyst no longer regards the transference as a distortion or misreading of the therapist ("You are treating me like someone I am not."). Rather, the patient's transference has been redescribed as

being an accurate—albeit highly selective reading—of the analyst (Hoffman, 1993 & 1998).[9]

Thus, one might say that a psychoanalysis, conversant with contemporary thinking in the social science, may be described as embodying a particular way of helping the patient to deal with the problem parts of the analyst's self in the here-and-now (and thereby clarify and work through similar problems the patient had in previous relationships). Clinical change is typically accompanied by the patient coming to have a more complex view of the therapist, just as the analyst develops a more three dimensional understanding of her patient.

IMPLICATIONS FOR CLINICAL PRACTICE

So how do patients and therapists navigate their opening contact with each other? Research on psychotherapy outcome suggests that many therapies succeed or fail on the basis of the therapist's ability to "recruit" the patient to engage in the work of creating the unique treatment relationship (Hatcher & Barends, 1996).[10] First impressions may well be crucial to this process.

Consider the following. In most cases, the first encounter between patient and therapist takes place over the phone—typically through voice mail or via an answering machine—when the patient calls to initiate a consultation appointment. Thus, when Tony sits in Chris' waiting room before his first session, he is really anticipating his *second* impression as we would expect him to have already formed an impression of Chris based on their contact over the phone. Something as mundane as Chris' outgoing voice mail message becomes quite important as it is the first representative of her clinical and personal self. More than likely, her voice mail would give away that Chris is a woman, something Tony may not have known before if he were

[9]Still, no therapist ever gives herself up fully to the patient's transference. If my patient says I am like his mother that may be true, but, of course, any similarity is also bounded by many traits and states that are not at all like my patient's mother. Further, even though I may be like my patient's mother, the reason I developed those parts of my personality probably occurred for very different reasons in me.

[10]Describing the initial sessions of a clinical treatment as involving a process of recruitment again shows some of the parallels between negotiation and psychotherapy. Although a prospective patient may seek out an analysis, he or she may have little idea of what the process should or could entail. The analyst's opening goals therefore include his or her effort to help the patient to navigate the unfamiliar relational terrain of the analytic relationship, and become more familiar with its emotional topography. The analyst, in effect, assists the patient to know how to be in an analysis. A business with a product it wishes to sell may function comparably. Advertising works to create customers. The work of recruiting the customer may quite legitimately require a sales representative to assist the potential customer to identify a need he or she had not previously recognized and the means to address it.

only given a referral for a therapist named "Chris." Other aspects of Chris' identity might also come to light if Chris spoke with a regional or ethnic accent.

Tony's experience of Chris is also likely to be shaped by other features of Chris' voice mail. Suppose Chris' message began by thanking the caller, indicated when she would return calls and how she could be immediately reached in an urgent situation or during evenings and weekends. On the other hand, Chris' message could have been polite but also a bit terse, only directing the caller that he or she had only 30 seconds in which to leave a message before being disconnected. Neither one is necessarily better than the other but the two messages do convey very different impressions about Chris' accessibility that are likely to affect how Tony feels while sitting in Chris' waiting room. Specifically, Tony's own openness towards Chris in the first interview may well be linked to his ideas about Chris' availability to him. Chris and Tony may find themselves engaged in a subtle process—each accommodating to their expectations of the other without full awareness of how they have created the transactions they are each observing.

Tony's view of Chris would also likely be influenced by his previous encounters with therapists—therapists he has himself known previously or heard about from friends and family, as well as by the images of psychiatrists and psychologists in the popular media. Many people still expect that the prototypical therapist is an older man with a white beard. On the other hand, if Tony had seen "Good Will Hunting," his idealized of a therapist might just as easily be Robin Williams.

Tony's expectations of Chris are also based on his particular ideas of what he believes is troubling him and what sort of help he needs. Tony may not be right about what his problems are or the best solution for them, but his notions of what hurts and what will help will influence how he views Chris and whether or not he returns to see her. In other words, Tony will have a set of "conditions for safety" that underwrite his ability to participate in an exchange with Chris. While Tony should have every reason to be as honest as possible with Chris so that she can understand him and through her understanding, offer him effective help, he may also be motivated to keep himself under wraps to protect his vulnerabilities until he senses that revelation and exposure will not be unduly painful.

Most people would share some of his conditions for safety, wanting to feel accepted and respected, and to have his perspectives acknowledged, even if Chris had different views. But Tony would also have very personal, even idiosyncratic, conditions for safety that created by his particular history, childhood, and relational experience. For instance, Tony might only feel comfortable downplaying his emotions and keeping them in the background. If he were not aware of this part of his psychological economy, however, he

couldn't alert Chris to this fact about himself. Unless Chris picks up Tony's subtle retreat whenever she asks him about his feelings, she might jar him by prematurely asking too many questions about his emotions, even if that is where he needs help.

For her part, Chris faces her own parallel set of challenges. She must decide if she feels she can help Tony and if she *wants* to help Tony. This assessment is based on her expertise and something more. In effect, Chris must decide if she wishes to offer Tony an ongoing relationship. Does she feel she is up to the task? That is, can she feel like herself and also be the person Tony seems to need her to be?

Further, Chris must grasp accurately the nature of Tony's hopes, but she also has to tolerate being wrong. She must know how to learn and to correct herself in ways that preserve both her dignity and Tony's. To decide if she can be helpful, she will have to move back and forth between a patient-centered view (Tony's take on his problems), and her own perspective. That requires shuttling from Tony's world, specifically his schemas and biases, to one that includes an appreciation of how Tony's problems also embody complex, compensatory functions. From the start, she'll assume that Tony's hopes and fears represent some mixture of realistic and unrealistic ideas he developed over the course of his lifetime. Chris will need to hold in her mind the complex dialectic of accepting Tony as he is while simultaneously holding open the possibility that he (and they) will together become very different down the line.

Chris' own needs come into play. She may feel more inclined to take on certain challenging patients when she has open treatment hours. She may be more willing to tolerate the discomfort of working with certain types of people if a senior or esteemed colleague referred Tony to her. Like most therapists, Chris is sensitive to these issues because she earns her living as a clinician. Even if she doesn't talk openly about these concerns to people outside the profession, Chris is likely to be concerned about her public impression, especially if she feels that future referrals will be affected by her willingness to accept the person she was sent today.

Thus, from our study of first impressions in psychoanalysis we may conclude that the respective impressions that patient and analyst have of each other in the first session are significant and shape the interaction that follows. They are highly dependent on the relationship they manage to establish with each other—one that is idiosyncratic and custom-tailored to the needs and biases, hopes and dreads of the participants. This study of first impressions confirms the utility of an expanded definition of transference to include this interactive component. The impressions that the patient forms of the therapist (and the impression the therapist forms of the patient) may be understood as capturing something of their *relationship* with each other. First

impressions offer the observer a perspective of self-in-relationship-with-us and not, as we more commonly think, pictures of independent others being observed.[11]

NEGOTIATION THEORY AND FIRST IMPRESSIONS

Negotiation is a practice that spans many contexts from buying a house and forming a business relationship, to settling a strike or resolving a lawsuit. Whatever the situation, however, it involves two (or more) parties each of which sees some possible agreement as more preferable, on balance, to stalemate. For our purposes, we will use the term negotiation to refer to a process of dispute resolution that requires information gathering (including taking detailed histories) and dialogue whose purpose is to craft a mutually beneficial outcome (or at least one the parties can live with).

In spite of the highly interactive nature of the process, however, the most influential books on negotiation are also notably silent on the matter of first impressions.[12] The focus of standard negotiation theory is on the private interests of the parties and how they might be integrated to produce joint gain. Traditional models of negotiation implicitly posit the individual (person or party) as the unit of analysis and stipulate the external world, including other parties, as given and understood.

The classic book *Getting to Yes!* (Fisher, Ury & Patton, 1991) offers practical prescriptions on negotiating that are resolutely *not* contingent on how the other parties behave at the negotiating table. Whether the parties happen to be soft or hard bargainers, the aim is to foster an interest-based, option-generating process. The advice to "separate the people from the problem" is a caution against seeing others as adversaries, but it also underscores the degree to which the focus of that book is on the intrinsic interests of the

[11]The fact that the analytic clinician is engaged in a process of complex relational work may enhance her potential for accurate impressions as Ulemann (1999) and Nordstrom (1998) have suggested. When the patient and analyst conceptualize their work in collaborative and intersubjective terms, the outcome of the therapy depends on the efforts put forth by each member of the treatment couple. This functional interdependence and the provision of an "analytic space" (i.e. open-ended therapy sessions minimizing the pressure of external time constraints) increases the motivation for patients and therapists to attend to one another authentically (i.e. in nonstereotyped ways).

[12]See, for example, *Getting to Yes* (Fisher, Ury & Patton,1991), and *The Manager as Negotiator* (Lax and Sebenius, 1986). It's not as if the appearance of serious books on negotiation has driven out all the nonsense. There still is plenty of it published, including some on the specific topic of first impressions. Some of it is unintentionally hilarious. Take, for example, a book by a self-described jury selection expert that has five full pages on hair including the following observation: "Big, bushy, unkempt eyebrows, like excessive nose or ear hair, often indicate that grooming and personal appearance are not among a man's priorities, or that he's oblivious to how odd these features appear." (Dimitrius & Mazzarella, 1998, p. 51).

parties, not their subjective impressions or emotions. Clear-eyed rationalism and enlightened self-interest thus go hand-in-hand.[13]

During the last twenty years—paralleling shifts in contemporary psychoanalysis—the practice of dispute resolution has undergone something of a paradigm shift (Leary, 2001). Until recently, most models of negotiation have been based on models of economic rationality. Now, however, an increasing number of negotiation practitioners and scholars view conflict as a social process in which people in dispute shape the nature of the problem by how they talk about it, as well as by how they relate to one another. Successful negotiations require joint problem solving in which as many as possible of the interests of all parties are creatively represented. Responsible outcomes are now understood to exist in the context of effective relationships. The goal of transforming conflict often transforms the individuals involved in it.

Stone, Patton and Heen's (1999) *Difficult Conversations* draw on this perspective in their advice to negotiators. The authors acknowledge that while first encounters are the most stressful, they also offer opportunity. "It's when you have the greatest leverage to influence the entire direction of the conversation (p. 147)." They warn against statements that unwittingly trigger identity battles in which people feel they have to justify their actions and their values. Instead, the authors suggest that negotiators "begin from the third story," or to "think like a mediator." (This strategy, from the vantage point of clinical psychoanalysis, is similar to contemporary Kleinian perspectives organized around the emergence of the "analytic third").

Because the field of negotiation encompasses many disciplines and contexts, there is not a dominant form of academic research or practice. Although the traditional models do not accord first impressions much significance, there has been some interesting experimental work on the first moments and initial conditions in negotiation. In a recent study (Moore et al, 1998), participants in a role-playing exercise were asked to "schmooze" before actually bargaining. Another group was simply told to begin the negotiation. Even though both groups negotiated through email, rather than face-to-face, those who exchanged seemingly irrelevant (to the task) personal information had much more success in reaching agreement. In the experimental setting, at least, electronic small talk prompted people to see

[13]Ury's (1991) subsequent *Getting Past No: Negotiating with Difficult People* goes somewhat farther in this regard. The subtitle is telling, as is the soft cover illustration: two outstretched hands about to shake, one is normal but the other is prickly with cactus spikes. (The book is thus pitched to people who perceive themselves as reasonable and others as potentially aggressive and uncooperative.) The text itself is more nuanced, however. It advises the reader to "go to the balcony," that is, to view his or her own negotiation drama both as a leading player and as a member of the audience. Ury offers specific process techniques for adopting such a stance, including active listening and reframing, but gives little explicit attention to how we formulate our impressions of people and situations.

each other somewhat less as opponents and somewhat more as partners. Defenses were tempered, allowing interests to emerge.

As intriguing as these studies are, they have yet to be linked together in a broader theoretical construct. Ironically, the remarkable Mary Parker Follett[14] sketched out the architecture for such a negotiation framework in 1924:

> In human relations, as I have said, this is obvious: I never react to you but to you-plus-me; or to be more accurate, it is I-plus-you reacting to you-plus-me. 'I' can never influence 'you' because you have already influenced me; that is, in the very process of meeting, by the very process of meeting, we have both become something different. It begins even before we meet, in the anticipation of meeting (Graham, 1995, p. 420).

Follet's insight captures the circular interactivity at the heart of negotiation. Traditional models that extract the individual from a situation and his or her relations with others may have the virtue of simplicity, but at the significant cost of obscuring the process by which impressions form and evolve.

IMPLICATIONS FOR NEGOTIATION

Consider our prologue about Chris and Tony: what if they first meet when she walks into his car dealership? In a narrow sense, their negotiation begins when Tony rises from his desk to greet her. His smile is that of a salesman, eager to make a deal. His eyes spark not just with anticipation, but also with the impressions that he quickly—and consciously—processes as he qualifies Chris as a customer. Is she here to buy or merely to look around? Can she afford a new car or will she want something that is preowned?

In another sense, however, the negotiation actually began earlier, when Chris started thinking about replacing her old Toyota. Perhaps she considered going to a Saturn or some other dealership with a "no-haggle" policy. Maybe she thought about bringing her brother along. He doesn't know anymore about cars than she does, but he has no shame when it comes to bargaining. It's even possible that Chris had been to other show rooms that very day. Some other salesman might have been overbearing or patronizing before she headed over to Tony's.

Our point is that her experience—good or bad—will certainly shape her expectations and color his impressions. This is certainly true for negotiations that carry as much cultural weight as does car-buying. Salesmen may come in all sizes, shapes, and temperaments, too, but the stereotypes are so strong

[14]Follet's keen insights remain fresh and relevant many decades after she offered them. In the field of negotiation, she deserves credit for many ideas that others popularized many years later.

that it may be hard for Chris to see whether Tony fits the norm. His warmth and his willingness to help may even be quite sincere, yet read by her as so much snake oil.

It may be difficult, therefore, to distinguish Chris' first impressions of Tony and her larger assumptions about his role and hers in this specific setting. She may be suspect that salesman generally take advantage of people like her. She may feel awkward in this situation, unsure of the rituals of the game. These preconceptions may well dominate whatever specific cues Tony offers. This is a form of the "fundamental attribution error," noted earlier. That is, the tendency to assume that other people's behavior simply reflects their personality, not the context.

A disinterested observer, discreetly watching this encounter, might easily decode Chris's response, but Tony himself may feel as though it is directed towards him personally. Even if he does read it properly, he must find some way of demonstrating that he is an exception to her unstated rule. Ironically, the harder he tries to establish his sincerity, the more Chris may interpret his behavior as confirming her worst expectations.

Then again, Chris may have it exactly right. All of Tony's little gestures of helpfulness may be straight out of the last motivational tape he bought. Behind that too-wide smile, he may be conniving a way to sell her a car loaded with extras she doesn't really need.

If that's the case, Tony is busily assessing his first impressions, the most important of which is his getting a fix on how sophisticated a negotiator Chris may be. A key part of that assessment may be nothing more—or less—than registering her race and gender. A study by Ayres (1991) indicated that on average, car sales people quoted white women higher prices that they offered to men. Black women, in turn, were quoted higher prices than white women, and black men were quoted the highest prices of all. The study found these differences even though all of the purchasers had been trained to introduce themselves and negotiate in exactly the same way. With everything else standardized, the first impressions were thus of race and gender.

The research was conducted in order to identify different forms of discrimination (like red-line policies in mortgage lending). There is no evidence of an overt conspiracy among the major automobile manufacturers or among the many independent dealerships, but a pernicious dynamic exists that explains the differential pricing as the aggregated consequences of countless individual transactions. Those transactions, in turn, tell us a lot about the primacy of first impressions.

Women are quoted higher prices because sales people have learned over time that women pay more in the end. This is hardly surprising. A woman who is quoted a higher price may have to negotiate long and hard just to

get down to where a man would begin. On a relative basis, she may actually knock more off the original price than he does, but she has much further to go.

In an important respect, the practice of quoting women higher prices has a self-fulfilling, self-perpetuating quality. When Tony sees that Chris is a woman, he can hardly ignore that experience has taught him that women usually pay more: if you don't ask, he may remind himself, you don't get. By contrast, if Chris were somehow able to negotiate by email, Tony couldn't identify her androgynous name. The only impressions he could form would come from whatever words she used in her messages.

How sales people qualify customers (here, by gender) is really a specialized example of a more general negotiation process. At some level, Tony is not just deciding what price to ask, but more fundamentally how he relates to his customer.

This question may never consciously emerge in his thoughts. He has probably decided some time ago, perhaps by default. His approach to his customers flows out of the schemas he has constructed from past experience. In countless negotiations, he has adopted a role in which he sees himself in relationship to customers generally. Just as Chris likely has preconceptions of sales people, Tony can probably tick off a list of five different kinds of customers (and have schemas for dealing with them). Chris' gender may label her as a particular type. Then again, if she happens to be carrying a copy of *Consumer Reports*, Tony may read her as a well-informed customer and behave very differently.

Whatever their source, the impressions he forms not only shape his expectations of the bargaining range, but fundamentally influence the way in which he characterizes and values his relationship with Chris. This particular example of car selling illustrates an important aspect of first impressions in negotiation generally. Right from the start, negotiators weigh in whether one is dealing with a friend or a foe, whether the interaction is going to be easy or hard, whether one is in a position of weakness or strength. Again, these readings may not be conscious or even accurate, but they trigger behaviors that, in turn, draw responses that quickly lead the parties down very different paths to cooperation or conflict.

This suggests another interpretation of the Ayres data. Cultural norms and expectations may also explain why women and people of color tend to pay more for automobiles. A white man may be able to bluff and banter when buying a car and get away with it, yet a woman who uses those same words and tone might be seen as shrill—or worse. If the negotiation with the salesperson is going poorly, a white man can demand to talk with the manager. A black man carrying the burden of second-class treatment may not want the risks of his escalating any dispute. Once again, impressions

of the person cannot be disentangled from the setting or the larger social context.

We're aware that our choice of car buying as an example of negotiation may be problematic. The peculiar rituals of this trade may seem to have little to do with the range of circumstances in which people negotiate (recruiting a new person into a company, crafting a joint venture or resolving a complex law suit). The process of negotiation in other settings will be different from what takes place in an automobile show room. Yet for all those differences, the ways in which Chris and Tony form impressions of each other really may reveal more general patterns.

One way of testing this possibility is to imagine they meet in the coffee shop. After some idle conversation, Tony fishes around for an index card on which he has written, "Car for Sale." He is about to post it on the bulletin board, when Chris sees it, and asks for more information.

Now consider the form and substance of the negotiation that might follow. The conversation likely will be very different from what would have transpired at the dealership. But why? The physical setting probably matters; so too, their casual talk. Each will have had at least a glimpse of the other in a comfortable environment, one in which neither party was asking anything of the other, at least until the possible sale of Tony's car came up. But probably most important would be what is not present—namely people's assumptions about their roles and the process that will likely ensue. In no one eyes is Tony a car salesman or Chris, a customer. Nor for that matter, will the conversation that follows feel precisely like a negotiation. Whatever impressions they form of one another are not weighted with all of the stereotypes, rituals and norms that are in the car showroom.

At the same time, although Tony and Chris won't see each other as customer or salesman, even their casual impressions of each other will have been shaped by other cues. Isn't it likely that their prior talk would be different, for example, if Chris had been a guy and not a woman? Would they have talked at all for that matter? Does one of them feel the slightest buzz of sexual interest? Without sustained inquiry, it would be impossible for them to be aware of all the factors that shape their impressions in the immediate moment—the slant of light through the window, an engaging accent, the sugar level in their blood. Likewise, their transferences to each other would play a role. Something about one person's manner dimly recalls for the other a memory of someone they liked years ago. First impressions are never written on a blank page.

Whatever sense each has developed of the other is background to what happens when the conversation turns to Tony's car. No referee is there to blow a whistle, signaling the start of the negotiation. At some point, a simple comment or question leads to a more focused exchange. With it comes an

awareness that a deal might be made, if—and only if—it meets both of their interests. Maybe the atmosphere turns a little more formal, as the parties begin to see themselves at arms length.

The intriguing—and probably unanswerable—question is how the unfolding of that negotiation is influenced by their earlier impressions of one another. It is possible that each may have revealed things about themselves that they would not necessarily divulge in the first moments of a negotiation. While the specific disclosures might have been immaterial to the sale of the car, the state of being open and comfortable might lay the foundation for a more open and balanced negotiation. In a corresponding way, it is also possible that whatever was said or done in their first few minutes of conversation could have been heard in ways that would have been invisible or distorted if they had been expressed in the course of a negotiation.

Negotiations involving people who are seeing each other for the first time may be special cases. As with Chris and Tony, the parties may have known each other only a very short time; in other situations, there may be a long history. In the pure case, however, when parties first see each other as negotiators, the nature of that role is bound to color how each of them interprets what they do and say. Moreover, if a negotiation is seen, as a contest in which one person's gain necessarily must come out of the other person's hide, perception of social roles may overwhelm individual personality.

If the parties regard negotiation as joint problem solving, the fact that each is dependent on getting the assent of the other makes the process uncertain and ambiguous. Even when we have reached a satisfactory deal, it is hard to know how well I have done in this regard. There is no obvious way in which I can check my impressions of you against some objective reality, or to see for sure where an alternative reading may have taken our negotiation down an entirely different road. Nevertheless, it may be possible for negotiators to adopt a general stance that will make them somewhat less prone to misreading the people with whom they deal. One element of such a stance is giving due recognition to the importance of social role, or in other words, avoiding what the social psychologists call the "fundamental attribution error." As noted earlier, it is easy to fall into the trap of attributing hostile motives to another person, when the actions are really due to circumstances.

A second element is awareness of the importance of openings, particularly in cases where people's first impressions are being formed in the context of explicit negotiations. If people already see each other in opposing positions, it will be easy for them to find confirming evidence in early statements and actions.

The third element is understanding the interactive nature of negotiation, notably how expectations and first impressions can quickly become

self-fulfilling, particularly if they are negative. The very nature of negotiation inevitably involves a chain of responses to statements, questions, actions and even silences. Each such response rests on the parties' respective interpretations of what preceded it and their expectations of what may follow.

Often these interpretations may be at odds. Tony might begin his negotiation by saying that he already has a good offer for his car. Chris could take that statement as an ultimatum, an attempt by Tony to throw his weight around. All he meant to do—or so he says—was to be sure that they didn't waste their time if Chris were hoping that she could get a real bargain. Chris takes Tony to be a hard bargainer. To him, she seems suspicious and quick to take offense.

In other settings, an apology might clear the air, but the fact that they are negotiating may make it harder to recover from such moments, particularly if they are operating from the assumption of having opposed interests to begin with. The problem is compounded if they are not all that comfortable negotiating. When things go badly from the start, their worst fears may be confirmed. Even if they are more at ease, they may be cautious about being open, lest the other side misread that as naïveté or weakness. While it is possible to correct misimpressions and to recover from a poor start, the process of negotiation may not be very forgiving.

FROM ANALYTIC THERAPY TO NEGOTIATION AND BACK: CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE INQUIRY

What can negotiators learn from analysts and analysts learn from negotiators? We believe that the study of first impressions is a fruitful area for interdisciplinary collaboration among social psychologists, clinical analysts and dispute resolution professionals. To summarize, first impressions are simultaneously revealing and influential in both clinical and negotiation settings. They often say as much about the observer as they do the observed, in respect to the person's outlook, expectations, values and self-conception. This proposition may not sit comfortably for those who like to regard their gut reactions as a form of special intuition about the other.

First impressions cannot be divorced from the context in which they are formed. Chris and Tony are the same two people whether they meet in her consulting room, his car showroom or in the neighborhood Starbucks. But are they really the same? The way that each person sees himself or herself also depends on the respective roles associated with these different environments. Those roles include the ones we adopt and claim as our own, and those attitudes and positions in which we find ourselves unwittingly positioned.

First impressions accordingly can shape the process that follows, whether at the bargaining table or in the consulting room. The classic advice to be self-aware is especially valuable in these contexts, though it may not be without costs. Recognizing that the other person with whom you are dealing sees the world very differently (including the world of dialogue in which you are engaged) requires acknowledging that perceptions are subjective and prone to change through interaction.

For all the virtues of a self-reflective stance, self-awareness may be difficult to sustain, particularly if it means abandoning the comfort of long held verities about the world and one's place in it. Such a stance might even entail genuine risk at times, if it undermines the resolve or persuasiveness of the negotiator or uncouples the analyst from his or her established clinical theory. A negotiator who is wholly immersed in intersubjectivity might feel adrift, without any confidence about the durability of his goals or the values he would apply in seeking them. Matched up against the archetypal car salesman, a negotiator lost in a philosophical fog might end paying top dollar for a Yugo (though perhaps loving the car, of course). So, too, for an analyst the notion of intersubjectivity can sow doubt about her own judgments and authority, if taken to the extreme.

We have stated that social roles play an important part of the context that shapes any interpersonal transaction. The roles of negotiator, analyst, or patient, of course, are not costumes one whimsically pulls out of a trunk. Moreover, they may be roles in which we are not always comfortable. The patient may agonize about going to an analyst. Likewise, the car buyer likewise may dread the prospect of haggling, particularly if that anticipated ritual harkens up memories of being pressured or exploited. These roles are anchors, and like their nautical equivalents, they can drag people down unless enough line is paid out ("scope," to use the proper marine term) to allow one to swing a bit in response to shifting currents. Do you want to be the hard-nosed customer, intent on getting the best price, or are you a comparison shopper trying to learn as much as you can about the pros and cons of various models? Your provisional answer may be revised in view of your first reactions to the salesman who greets you.

Someplace between a rigid enactment of roles and an utterly decontextualized approach, there surely must be a middle ground bounded on one side by recognition of the situational determinants of behavior, and on the other by an openness to learning and adaptation. Such a stance allows effective analysts and negotiators to develop recovery routines and reframing techniques. Their self-awareness allows them to steer an interaction, at least to the extent that the other party is subject to influence. This kind of nimble control may come with experience, but it also is a function of the felt stakes in a situation. An analyst who is generally confident of her abilities may not

feel that the each arrival of a potential new patient is a test of her basic competence. A negotiator can be relaxed when buying a car, knowing that there are other dealerships up and down the street. Of course, that same person might be very tense trying to close a deal that will make or break his company.

When self-doubt and anxiety surface, they of course hinder a person's ability to be self-reflective about the impressions that they form of others—and to be accurate about the impressions that others are forming of them. Unlike the laboratory subjects in the experiments described earlier in this paper, the negotiators, analysts, and patients whom we have been describing must simultaneously perceive and act. Even if their perceptions are "wrong,"[15] they likely take on a life of their own and influence the critical first moments of interaction.

We believe that first impressions provide a context for actionable response. Even though first impressions are both intersubjective and partially unconscious, they are nonetheless addressable. To offer a simple example, negotiators and analysts should be able to work more effectively if they are mindful of the "fundamental attribution error," that is, the tendency to ignore the situational influences on other people's behavior. Avoidance of this error can foster better diagnoses, whether in service of a patient's treatment or more creative problem solving.

For example, if my first impression coheres in a view of you as tendentious and uncooperative, I might do well to take stock of my own intentions vis-à-vis our interaction. It may be that your uncooperative attitude has been shaped by my investment in a subtle insistence that we transact our concern in a particular way. In some important sense, "we" are failing to cooperate with each other. The problem is situated in the interpersonal matrix. If I understand our problem to partly concern me, I am in a position to consider what I would like to do differently.

Attention to first impressions offers the opportunity to observe one's unintended psychological commitments, and if desired to subject them to further reflection. This can be done best within the working relationship. The understanding of self-in-relation to other must be a custom fit for each particular interaction. This requires an ability to make distinct, sometimes subtle, online adjustments of one's goals and methods. This does not mean that either negotiation or analysis should degenerate into gamesmanship. Instead, both can be processes in which learning is an important domain. The skillful negotiator and the effective analyst become adept at learning from and in the immediate moment. The trajectory of the work may well be propelled by such microoutcomes.

[15] "Wrong" here would simply mean that the impressions do not square with the self-perceptions of the perceived or with what a noninvolved observer might see.

In spite of their importance, however, first impressions have been largely ignored in the mainstream literatures of both psychoanalysis and negotiation. Acknowledging their significance poses a challenge to the dominant paradigms of each field. Conventional negotiation theory is outcome focused, for example, with an eye towards maximizing and distributing economic value. Such a perspective allows for general prescriptions that transcend the personality and style of the parties at the table. Psychoanalysis continues to wrestle with the notion of the objective or at least a less conflicted analyst who somehow sees things as they more truly are. By contrast, the idea of first impressions as specific to the interaction between two individuals might seem antagonistic to general theory in both fields.

We believe that the conceptual lines should not be drawn so starkly. It should be possible to recognize the dynamic possibilities in particular moments—the idea that conversations might take decidedly different turns, depending on parties' first reactions—while still seeing value in larger conceptual models. This should not be a controversial notion. No practitioner worth his or her salt would advocate a rigid adherence to faltering technique. Nevertheless, negotiations and analyses break down because the participants fail to recruit each other into a meaningful way of relating to each other and to the problem at hand. The guiding theories and operating principles of both disciplines have tended to assume that best practices are transcendent. We question this assumption. Specifically, we urge attention to the importance of local, contingent events.

Sensitivity to how impressions are formed and then recast reveals constructive opportunities to move the process forward in both domains of practice. Analysts and negotiators endeavor to build trust, for example, but mere declarations of good intentions seldom suffice. Instead, it is the small moments of disclosure, generosity, discretion, and apology that a foundation of trust is built, brick by brick. Even when it is impossible to see precisely where a dialogue may go, skilled practitioners can deftly attend to a particular exchange so that the parties to the conversation can move beyond position-taking to a deeper level of communication. This is more than simply saying that the journey of therapy (or negotiation) begins with a single step. Rather, the way those early steps are taken influences the steps that follow. Behavior often is mimicked, be it formal or open, friendly or hostile. Instead of seeing this as a spontaneous process, observant professionals can help shape it, so that the contours of the ultimate terrain are more likely to resemble the turf on which they work in specific moments.

It would be facile to say that negotiators and clinicians are engaged in the same fundamental activity. There are important distinctions. In theory, at least, the analyst and patient are working together for the good of patient. Even when the separate interests of the analyst are acknowledged, the

relationship between analyst and patient may be closer to that of mediator to disputant, than that of one negotiator to another.

Analysis, moreover, is inherently asymmetric. Patients undertake the process in some state of distress, or at least out of needs that may not be fully understood or articulated. Their analysts (we hope) are not precisely in the same emotional condition. Patients may come to the clinician's office with worry and shame. For them it is usually their only such relationship, while for the analyst, it is one of many. At the same time, contemporary clinical practice recognizes that analysts are by no means truly neutral about treatment events. The analyst always has her professional stake in the work. Analysts bring a complex set of needs and aims to the consulting room, including the need to experience themselves as helpful facilitators. Power and status also come into play even when they are not explicitly acknowledged. For both parties, it is usually a paradoxical relationship: intensely intimate on certain levels, yet also bounded by professional norms and legal strictures. The old adage "once a patient, always a patient" is intended to remind clinicians of their obligation to remain in a position to serve the patient even after the formal therapy concludes.

Negotiations, on the other hand, can be either symmetrical or balanced. In one instance, a desperate buyer may meet a desperate seller. In another, a sophisticated dealmaker may meet a rube. Who is up and who is down tends to be particularized, that is, dependent how each party interprets the circumstances. Roles thus are not as crisply defined as they are in analysis. Contrary to the stereotypes, there even are no-haggle car salesmen and belligerent customers.

For all these differences, however, there are also potentially instructive parallels, as we have tried to illuminate here. In each setting, relationships, good and bad, are jointly constructed through a series of interactions, the first of which may set the pattern for those that follow. To return to the social psychology with which we began:

> One of the fundamental processes in social psychology is the rapid creation of social reality in face-to-face dyadic interaction. When two people come together, it is quickly negotiated whether or not there will be an interaction, its approximate duration, and whether it will be friendly or hostile, distant or intimate (Gilbert, Fiske and Lindzey, 1998, p. 27).

Going forward, the challenge for researchers and practitioners alike is to uncover how relationships are negotiated in their earliest moments.

REFERENCES

Ambady, N. & Rosenthal, R. (1992). Thin slices of expressive behavior as predictors of interpersonal consequences: A meta-analysis. *Psychological Bulletin*, 111, 2, 256–274.

Aronson, E., Wilson, T. & Akert, R. (1997). *Social psychology*. New York: Longman.

Ayres, Ian. (1991) Fair driving: Gender and race discrimination in retail car negotiations. *Harvard Law Review*, 104,4, 817–873.

Blaser, A., Abston, N. & Bringmann, W. (1987). The assignment of patients to psychotherapy by lay judges. *Educational and Psychological Research*, 7,4, 205–213.

Cromie, W. (2000). Researchers Face Up to Liars: Expressions Speak Louder than Words. *Harvard University Gazette*, May 18, 2000, p. 1.

DePaulo, B. & Friedman, H. (1998) Nonverbal communication. In D. Gilbert, S. Fiske & Lindzey, G. (Eds.), *The handbook of social psychology,* vol. 2 (4th ed.), pp. 3–40.

Dimitrius, J. & Mazzarella, M. (1998) *Reading people: How to understand people and predict their behavior-Anytime, anyplace*. New York: Random House.

Ekman, P. & O'Sullivan, M. (1991). Who can catch a liar? *American Psychologist*, 46, 913–920.

Fiske, S., Lin, M. & Neuberg, S. (1999). The continuum model: Ten years later. In S. Chaiken & Y. Trope (Eds). *Dual-process theories in social psychology*. New York: The Guilford Press, pp. 231–254.

Funder, D. & Colvin, C. (1988). Friends and strangers: Acquaintanceship, agreement, and the accuracy of personality judgement. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 55, 149–158.

Gabbard, G. (1990). *Psychodynamic psychiatry in clinical practice*. Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Press, Inc.

Gilbert, D., Fiske, S. & Lindzey, G. (1998). The handbook of social psychology. Boston: McGraw Hill.

Graham, P. (1995). *Mary Parker Follett: Prophet of management*. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

Greenwald, M. & Banaji, M. (1995). Implicit social cognition. *Psychological Bulletin*, 102, 1, 4–27.

Fisher, R., Ury, W. & Patton, B. (1991). *Getting to yes*. New York: Penguin Books.

Hatcher, R. & Barends, A. (1996). Patients' view of the alliance in psychotherapy: Exploratory factor analysis of three alliance measures. *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology*, 64, 1326–1336.

Hoffman, I. (1993). The patient as the interpreter of the analyst's experience. *Contemporary Psychoanalysis.*, 19, 389–422.

Hoffman, I. (1998). *Ritual and spontaneity in the psychoanalytic process: A dialectical-constructivist view*. Hillsdale, NJ, USA: The Analytic Press

Lax, W & Sebenius, J. (1986). *The manager as negotiator*. New York: Free Press.

Lewis-Fernandez, R. & Kleinman, K. (1994) Culture, personality, and psychopathology. *Journal of Abnormal Psychology: Special Issue: Personality and psychopathology*; 103, 1, 67–71.

Meltzer, D. (1986). On first impressions. *Contemporary Psychoanalysis*, 22, 467–470.

Moore et al (1998). Long and short route to success in electronically mediated negotiations: Group affiliation and good vibrations. *Stanford Business School working paper 1484*.

Mullen, B. & Riordan, C.A. (1988). Self-serving attributions in naturalistic settings: A meta-analytic review. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 18, 3–22.

Nordtsrom, C., Hall, R. & Bartels, L. (1998). First impressions vs. good impressions: The effect of self-regulation on interview evaluations. *Journal of Psychology*, 132, 2, 477–491.

Price, M. (1997). The power of enactments and the enactment of power. Paper presented at the American Psychoanalytic Association, New York.

Renik, O. (1998). Getting real in analysis. *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, 67, 4, 566–593.

Rosenthal, R. & Jacobson, L. (1968). *Pygmalion in the classroom: Teacher expectation and pupils' intellectual development*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Ross, L. (1977). The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings: Distortions in the attribution process. In L. Berkowtiz (Ed.) *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 10). NY: Academic Press, pp. 174–221.

Rudman, L., Greenwald, A., Mellott, D. & Schwartz, J. (1999). Measuring the automatic components of prejudice: Flexibility and generality of the Implicit Association Test. *Social Cognition*, 17, 4, 437–465.

Smith, H. (1990). Cues: The perceptual edge of the transference. *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, 71, 219–228.
Stone, D., Patton, B. & Heen, S. (1999) *Difficult Conversations*. New York: Viking.
Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1973). Availability for judging frequency and probability. *Cognitive Psychology*, 5, 207–232.
Uleman, J. (1999). Spontaneous versus intentional inferences in impression formation. In S. Chaiken & Y. Trope (Eds). *Dual-process theories in social psychology*. New York: The Guilford Press. Pp. 141–160.
Ury, W. (1991). *Getting past no: Negotiating with difficult people*. New York: Bantam Books.