

WORKING PAPERS OF THE
CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON SOCIAL ORGANIZATION
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Paper #21

February, 1967

SOCIOLOGY IN LAW ENFORCEMENT

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Chapter for Uses of Sociology, Basic Books.

Until recently, sociologists paid relatively little attention to police organization and behavior as an object of research. Within the last decade, however, a body of literature--much of it recent--has appeared. With what at first sight seems a peculiar perversity, the application of sociology to crime control began at the end of the process--with corrections--rather than at the beginning--with law enforcement and the police. There seem to be several reasons for this relative neglect. Police until recently have been relatively inaccessible to social science investigation. Sociology, itself, was identified with the 'good government' forces whose purpose was not to study and help the police but to 'expose' them. Moreover, sociologists have been until recently quite uncomfortable in the presence of coercion. They have made their way in the correctional field primarily by providing a 'scientific' underpinning to the humanitarian rhetoric that has been so prominent in the correctional reform field.^{1/}

The professionalization movement in police administration gave sociologists a social base for investigation in much the same way that the high status prison reform groups did in corrections. The professional administrators by the very fact that they want to professionalize the police emphasize education and the transition from a closed to an open occupation. Moreover, they are increasingly coming to recognize that sociological understanding of organization and behavior is a useful adjunct to the public administration training that most public professionals have gained.

The police can be viewed from a variety of sociological perspectives. Those that have informed recent sociological studies of the police have arisen less from the traditional interests in criminology than from more general sociological perspectives. One of these arises from the institutional analysis of the law in the sociology of law. The work of Skolnick especially falls in this category where his primary aim was to investigate how value conflicts in a democratic society create conditions that affect the capacity of the police to respond to the rule of law.^{2/} A second major perspective on the police derives from the study of occupations and social roles. The police are seen as a special occupation group in an occupational organization, the department. The authors of this paper have emphasized a third perspective, that which stresses the transactions between organization and environment.^{3/} In the case of the police in the United States, both organization and environment are highly complex for any given police organization and the variation in both are considerable. Moreover both have been changing over time so that understanding of current organization requires that attention be given to the historical development of the organization and its transactions with the environment.

Given the generally ahistorical character of American sociology, it is not surprising that sociologists have given little attention to the historical development of the organization of law enforcement systems. The writings of

Selden Bacon and more recently Allan Silver are the major sociological attempts at explaining the emergence of municipal police systems respectively in the United States and England.^{4/} No sociologist has as yet attempted to explain their development in the modern period.

Early Developments in Municipal Police Organization

Law enforcement was problematic throughout the history of cities. Yet the modern police department in the sense of an organization with city-wide jurisdiction, twenty-four hour responsibility for much of law enforcement, and a regular, salaried, fulltime, career police charged with general rather than specific police functions did not develop until the nineteenth century. The establishment of the London Metropolitan Police in 1829 and that of New York City in 1844 are the earliest examples of municipal police organization. The underlying social processes that contributed to their establishment were increasing economic specialization, increasing social differentiation, and a growing segregation and density of the urban population.^{5/}

Increasing economic specialization led to greater citizen dependence upon the economic performance of specialists whose performance no longer could be guaranteed by folk control or by market forces. Local governments responded by creating specialized officers of independent inspectors whose duty it was to insure that the populace was not cheated in the market or exploited by their

neighbors. As an example, the necessity in New Amsterdam to rely on specialized suppliers of firewood led as early as 1658 to the employment of firewood inspectors. Regulation of butchers, bakers, hack drivers, showed the same consequences of the inability of the citizen to rely on his own resources in a period of increasing specialization. By the time of the emergence of municipal police systems, the list of special regulatory or inspectorial officials had become quite vast.^{6/} At the time of their formation, some of these inspectors were incorporated into the police department, others were organized in a centralized bureau of inspectors. Though the title of inspector remains in many police departments, most of these inspection services have since been removed to more specialized municipal agencies.

Increasing social differentiation, heterogeneity and stratification of the population led to lowered consensus on major values and the necessity to develop formal controls if a heterogeneous community was to have at least a minimum of order. Bacon's interpretation covers the ground nicely and deserves quotation.^{7/}

"Another method of curbing any overt manifestation of class differences and trying to make compromises or substitute plans of action so that hostility and consequent loss of security will not occur is to set down the acceptable modes of behavior and then place agents at those places and in those times where conflict is likely to arise, to see that the accepted modes of behavior are not infringed upon and to curb at the outset any activity which tends in that direction; this is an expensive adjustment, but not as expensive as the evil it avoids. Like specialization, class stratification may have its values, but it also has its disadvantages and it is costly to overcome these last and enjoy the benefits."

The "class stratification" to which Bacon refers in the quotation corresponds to differences in "race, nationality, language, major economic function, education, religion, and so forth."^{8/} Within the rapidly growing American cities, the stage was set for conflict, and conflict there was; struggle over Sunday observance in Boston, near civil war between old inhabitants and immigrants in Philadelphia and between Yankee and Creole in New Orleans, disorders in New York culminating in the Doctors' Riot of 1788, and everywhere problems in the relations between the races. Even slavery under urban conditions became a menace to public order.^{9/} Matters did not change in the early nineteenth century. The depression years of the 1830's brought riots in three major American cities: a Negro riot in Philadelphia, flour riots in New York City, and riots between fire-fighting brigades in Boston.

Increasing population density heightened the need to regulate social activity in a variety of ways. It became impossible to continue using the streets as storage facilities, refuse dumps, pastures, or race tracks. Wooden chimneys under congested conditions became a public menace. It became necessary to regulate dogs, kite flying, refuse disposal, handling and storage of explosives to name but a few. The need for regulation was felt unevenly and regulation was not always successful. A particularly interesting example of resistance can be found in the swine problem faced by New York City.

"Edict after edict and officer after officer appeared to control this urban problem but their success was limited. The swine were dirty, they dug up the streets, weakened the underpinnings of buildings, attacked small children, were obstructions in the streets and appeared to many people as one of the most obnoxious sights in the city. On the other hand they were a cheap and important supply of food to the poorer people and also acted as a municipal streetcleaning and refuse-disposal department at no cost to the taxpayers.

Various limitations were imposed upon swine: they were ringed; they were forbidden to appear in this or that part of town. Various methods were attempted to enforce the regulations: informers were allowed large fees; the poorhouse officers were allowed to pick up all the hogs they could find and keep the profits for the benefit of their institutions; the constables were ordered to enforce the law; special informers were appointed; any citizen was allowed to claim any swine he might find running loose; hogreeves were appointed."^{10/}

The problem persisted however for 150 years and finally disappeared due to increasing land values and the attendant lack of vacant lots and to the development of street paving and sanitation services. The persistence of the problem despite long efforts at enforcement illustrated the difficulty of regulation in the face of deep-rooted need and marked division in public opinion and was to presage many other enforcement problems in American cities.

City administrations did not respond directly to these underlying processes of specialization, differentiation and density however but rather to the various specific ills which they produced.^{11/} The rhythms of people, time, and place of city life then as now constituted the basic police reality. Crucial times were night time and holidays; the

arrival of many strangers; war, epidemic, or conflagration. Crucial places were those where people of diverse backgrounds and interests were gathered in a limited area, street, marketplace, transport terminal, or theater. Significant objects comprised animals, weapons, liquor, explosives, and hanging signs, among others. Especially important people were the civic and social "outsiders"--transients (vagabonds), sailors in port, young immigrants, free or slave Negroes.^{12/}

Situations comprising several of these symptoms were particularly likely to cause trouble. Negroes were dangerous; Negroes with weapons were so dangerous that they were forbidden to have even walking sticks; a drunken Negro with a weapon on a Saturday night at a theater was likely to result in a felony."^{13/}

The cities studied by Bacon--Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Charleston, and New Orleans--were all important port cities and early in their histories began to display characteristics of many modern American cities. One of the most significant of these being the existence of large populations who were functionally but not normatively integrated into the city. Whole districts became specialized as relatively "lawless", i.e., they housed and catered to the illegal desires of populations especially likely to be disorderly and violent. The "underworld" in early American cities like that in the cities of old were special areas of the city where the "lawless" dwelled, not a dispersed minority of criminals organized as a syndicate.

Such "lawless" populations still loom large in the routine problems of policing cities and their ecology helps account for the distribution of police within and among cities. A recent study by Shafter sought to discover why in two small cities of similar populations located sixty miles apart in a Midwestern state there was such a difference in the size of their police departments. "Carbon" with a population of 9004 in 1960 had 5 policemen. "Delta" with a population of 9348 had 18 policemen. "Carbon" is a market town that serves a rural hinterland. "Delta" is a river port and a center for traveling salesmen and seasonal hunters. Moreover one-third of Delta's population in 1960 was Negro and except for residence, segregation is complete. Delta could be said to specialize in illegal services and the provision of opportunity for disorder, i.e., in liquor, gambling, prostitution. It is a crime-dependent community and its economy and social structure require a large police establishment.^{14/}

Emergence of A Career Police

Public response to the problem of order generated by urban change was piecemeal. Not until the establishment of modern police in the middle of the nineteenth century were enforcement officers with general powers and functions to appear. Bacon describes the development of

"--the night police, the market police, street police, animal police, liquor police, the vagabond and stranger police, vehicle police, fire police, election police, Sunday police and so on."^{15/}

Similarly, we noted that a special inspector office was created each time a new activity had to be regulated. Only slowly did regulation for the public good and the maintenance of order become themselves specializations and the full time career police develop. The process was however extremely slow. In New York it was not until 1741 that a regularly paid night watch was established. These men held down full time jobs in addition and were on duty every third night. It took approximately a century from this point before all the police were organized into a special department of the city.

One of the reasons for the slowness of development was the fiscal problem. Policing is expensive. Financing it on the general tax roles was politically unpopular. Fiscal difficulties helped account for the widespread reliance on informers to be paid out of fines. The financial lure here of course was the thought that law enforcement could be partially self-supporting. Also relevant was the idea that paying informers would motivate the citizenry to perform its functions in something like the rural folk pattern.

Paid Gemeinschaft, especially on piece rates, had its disadvantages however. Special classes of "professional" informers arose who could use the widespread illegal conduct as a means of livelihood. As would be expected they themselves tended to be recruited from the less stable and civically integrated segments of the community and, further, they tended to exploit even weaker and more estranged segments.

The very threat to inform became a powerful weapon. Informers were under no organizational discipline whatever.

The most egregious abuse of the informer system in New York was in connection with the control of the behavior of slaves. As early as 1681 the control of slaves "abroad" on the streets became a serious problem. Fees for informers were increased to be paid out of fines levied on the masters who would pay because they disliked seeing their slaves whipped and thereby incapacitated. It was also to the advantage of the city to hold masters responsible for the conduct of slaves. The slave master as a link to the civic outsider seems therefore to have preceded by some years the detached worker in a similar role. Slaves were especially lucrative targets for informers because they as civic nonpersons could not testify in court and challenge the informer's testimony.

The informer system was an attempt to solve several problems that plague policing of cities--how to motivate citizens, how to secure information on crime and evidence for court, how to do so without a politically unsupportable drain on the public purse. The decline of the informer as a paid free lancer still leaves the problem of information and evidence largely unsolved despite the rise of the specialized detective role. Indeed it makes the matter even more complex since the informer was not ordinarily subject to the restrictions on the penetration of private systems which have been increasingly applied to the police in American society.^{16/}

So also is the motivation of citizen participation very much a live one. While full discussion must be foregone we may point out that broadly speaking the evolution in the United States (and in England also) has been from "folk" enforcement based on the solidarities of kin and locality units to an essentially market mechanism based heavily upon paid informants (and also piece rate officers and justices) to a combination of a formally bureaucratized police and the citizen complainant. There is still however a widespread use of what are now called informants in police work especially in offenses where there is no citizen complainant or "self-defined victim".

The modern informant is however "paid" either in foregone prosecutions or in money channeled through police units on a somewhat surreptitious basis. Also of central importance is the fact that informants are not sources of evidence and indeed testimony of paid informants not only has no special legal standing but is easily assailed by the defense. Modern informants provide tips, not testimony. Indeed it is possible to describe much modern detective work as the process whereby information satisfactory to the police--tips--is translated into information satisfactory to the courts--evidence.^{17/}

Formal organization of the police while a response to the underlying processes and symptoms to which Bacon directs our attention was also a response to weaknesses and abuses displayed in the informer system. Ideally formal organization--or bureaucratization--means the interposition between victim or complainant and offender of a disciplined and

disinterested body of men whose decisions are affected by canons of law and formalized bureaucratic discipline rather than by thoughts either of private vengeance or of private gain. Police in a democratic society are to enforce the law and maintain order under the rule of law.

It is perhaps of some significance at this point that the sequence folk to market to bureaucratic organization may be rather general in modern societies and can be seen in the development of armies, of educational systems and in many other areas where society became too complex for functions to be performed on a folk basis but where the market mechanism proved unsatisfactory precisely because it made no provision for either reliable execution of collective tasks or for principled conduct and restraint. It is reasonable to suggest that even today police bureaucracy struggles against the modern versions of these two tendencies--on the one hand for law enforcement to become overwhelmed by private self-help or vigilantism and on the other for protection to be "sold" like a market commodity. Both of these constitute illicit "private" usurpation of "public" functions and they define as central not the relationship of citizen to state but neighbor to neighbor and buyer to seller. Such "private arrangements" are commonly discussed as a feature of civil law, but of course it is quite appropriate to see them as of much more generic significance.^{18/}

The early form of police bureaucracy was that of paramilitary organization, a form of organization that continues

to characterize the police and to render its professionalization not unlike that of the military.^{19/} The paramilitary form of early police bureaucracy was a response not only or even primarily to crime per se, but to the possibility of riotous disorder. Not crime and danger, but the "criminal" and "dangerous classes" as part of the urban social structure led to the formation of uniformed and militarily organized police. Such organizations intervened between the propertied elites and the propertyless masses who were regarded as politically dangerous as a class.

In a recent paper, Allan Silver describes the development of the London Metropolitan Police in these terms and points out that a significant difference between England and the United States lies in the tradition of politically articulate riot among the poor in England.^{20/} The development of the modern police was part of a larger process of expanding normative consensus while solving the political problem by political means, e.g., the eventual reform of the franchise. The "outsiders" of the industrial city were incorporated in the civic body by a combination of legal process and democratic political change.

Police above all link daily life to central authority; moral consensus is extended through the police as an instrument of legitimate coercion. At the same time the police in doing so often function to deflect the hostility of the mass from the class targets to the police themselves. Police in modern societies therefore often serve the dubious function

of becoming substitute targets of hostility for problems of moral consensus. Much of the difficulty in the relations between Negroes and police in present day American cities stems from the fact that the appropriate spheres of legal and political process have been confused. Attempts to provide adequate police protection for the Negro populace while at the same time protecting them from police violation of due process constitute a significant step in the progressive inclusion of this group of civic "outsiders". Nevertheless no amount of sophistication by police and courts will overcome by itself the effects of housing, employment discrimination, or other problems of urban ghettos. Indeed it is not too improbable a generalization to point out that the police in many American cities are far ahead of other segments of civil society in their race relations practices.^{21/} American Negroes will get due process and protection from "whitey's" police long before they get due fellowship from "whitey's" churches.

The problem of civic inclusion of outsiders in Britain was made much simpler by the fact that lines of division were mainly class and not a combination of class, ethnic origin, religion, and race as in the United States. The main "minorities" in the British Isles--the Scots and the Welsh--were integrated into the larger polity partly by allowing local autonomy in legal administration and in the case of Scotland even a semi-autonomous corpus juris.^{22/}

Bureaucratization and Civic Accountability of Police

Bureaucratization of the police and the attendant control from the top largely solves one crucial problem which confronts societies with organized police--the problem of the political neutrality of the police as a body. Bureaucratization is a device whereby commitment to the occupational organization, to the occupational community, and to its norms of subordination and service take precedence over extra-occupational commitments. In modern societies the political neutrality and legal reliability of the police is a matter less of the social sources of recruitment than it is a matter of the nature of internal organization, training and control. Thus the insulation of police from populace which is so often cited as a "problem" in law enforcement is not only a requisite for principled conduct in daily law enforcement but also a requisite for the removal of police from "high politics" however much they be involved in the "low politics" of patronage and local discretion.

The English solution to the problem of the political reliability of the police was to disarm them and make them directly responsible to the central government. This situation made it possible for England to have the "best of all possible worlds". It could have a highly effective police which would not be an internal military threat and therefore did not have to be politically balanced by a large standing army. The London Metropolitan Police were after all in the nineteenth century a local police from the law enforcement

standpoint but a national police from the national political standpoint. In countries centered on a metropolis the way England is centered on London the high politics of municipal police is of clear significance.^{23/} Thus in England, the bureaucratic professionalization of the police and the demand that they be able to police the population without firearms were responses not only to the requirements of urban law enforcement but also to the requirements of high politics.

In the United States, on the other hand, the federal constitution coupled with the nonmetropolitan character of most seats of national and state government meant that the problem of political neutrality of the police was never one of "high" politics but only of low. Correlatively the demand for rigid internal control of police by administrative elites directly responsible to the executive was less strongly pressed. This coupled with the general underdevelopment of government services, the successful translation of immigrant votes into municipal patronage and the restriction of recruitment to local sources meant that while the purpose of the organized police may have been to suppress the "dangerous classes" the outcome of the development was to staff the police largely with persons drawn from the "dangerous classes" themselves. The mechanisms of staffing the police then were one of the principal devices whereby excluded classes were integrated into the structure of government. "No Irish need apply" definitely did not apply to the police.

The inevitable consequence of this situation was police organization of a markedly less "bureaucratic" cast in the United States and a strong tendency for immigrant and machine influenced police to act not as insulated enforcers-of abstract law but rather as intermediaries between the legally and symbolically dominant white Anglo-Saxon Protestant culture and the diverse adaptations of immigrant groups. Through machine politics and ethnic patronage immigrant groups in the United States were able to some degree to govern the speed of coerced assimilation.^{24/}

A major organizational dimension of police systems is their accountability to political authority. In modern democratic societies a crucial feature of the accountability of police organizations are the forms of political authority that protect the rights of citizens vis-a-vis the police organization. The mass is in a paradoxical situation in relation to governmental police systems. On the one hand they are vulnerable to state tyranny enforced through the police organization, i.e., a "police state". On the other hand they are vulnerable to police tyranny when State authority is unable to directly control the public police organization or hold it accountable.

The organizational form of the accountability system in modern societies bears an important relationship to this paradox. The vulnerability of the citizens to state tyranny has led in some societies to the development of local government police organizational systems that are

directly accountable to local authority. Local police systems such as in the United States are relatively inaccessible to centralized State control unless their allegiance or compliance can be obtained by other means. These organizational safeguards against state tyranny lead, however, to greater vulnerability of the citizen to local police tyranny since the State's right and opportunity to intervene generally is limited.

There is an interesting question whether the obverse cases obtain, e.g., is the citizen less subject to local police tyranny in centrally organized and controlled police systems? Such systems (at least in the more populous democratic societies) are large-scale bureaucracies. Bureaucratization, of course, is a major way for governments to neutralize civic power. For the police, bureaucratization increases their legal reliability. The neutralization of civic power through bureaucracy while making the citizen less vulnerable to local police tyranny due to local interests opens the way to local bureaucratic tyranny, particularly where the central bureaucracy cannot insure local accountability. To be sure, the central features of bureaucratic "tyranny" apply whether the bureaucracy is local or State controlled, but in a police bureaucracy, one need only assure the allegiance of the central commanders to the political elites to insure reasonably effective control of the local organization.

There are a number of important consequences that follow from the organizational form of control and accountability in police systems. In democratic societies, the police bear an important relationship to the resolution of value conflicts in the society, particularly in situations where there is direct civic protest. It would appear that some of the important differences in the form and consequences of protest are related to whether the police system is centrally or locally organized and controlled. When there is civic protest on issues of values in the society and the police are centrally organized and controlled, the State is more immediately involved as an organizational actor. The protest is more likely to be defined as an action against the State; if sanctions are applied, they tend to be made across the system. On the other hand, in societies where the police are more locally organized and controlled, such situations are more likely to be defined as protests against local authority; then both sanctions and action taken as a consequence of local protest are defined as local rather than society-wide. Indeed, one might hypothesize that political revolutions and revolutionary situations are more likely to arise in societies with highly centralized bureaucratic police systems. It would follow, then, that where citizens are vulnerable to State tyranny, the State is more vulnerable to revolutionary protest.

One of the major problems in holding the police accountable in all democratic societies is to insure their neutrality from local elites and interest groups. The criteria governing the legality of police-civil relations in a democratic society are universalistic. A centralized bureaucracy probably is more effective in insuring the legal neutrality of the police from local interests and elites than is a local one.

Yet, this very neutralization of local interests in a centralized system can substantially affect their opportunity to change the police bureaucracy. The problems of civil rights and minority groups in the United States serve as a case in point. The organization of most policing on a local basis has meant that the American Negro minority has had less equity in the legal system, particularly in its Southern states. National control of the police undoubtedly would result in a more equitable distribution of justice. At the same time, precisely because of patterns of local control, the Negro minority where effectively organized politically in American cities has changed the quality of police-civil relations and their organizations, changes that have benefited the white majority citizen as well as the Negro minority.

Quite clearly, local organization of the police leads to greater variability among police organizations in the society, both in form and in practice, than does centralized control. Such variability seems conducive to innovation as

well as differential application of universalistic norms. It perhaps is not surprising, therefore, that police organization in the United States shows both more innovation toward modern police systems and more variability in police-citizen relations than do more centralized systems in other countries.

The organization of police on a local versus a centralized basis also is related to the nature of corruption of the police system when it occurs. In a local system, corruption is linked to local government and insulated from the State. Thus the State can neither corrupt or be corrupted by the police. The situation in a centralized system is quite different. While local bureaucratic corruption occurs, it becomes possible for the police to be corrupted by the State, as well as vice versa.

In the United States where one has a primarily local system of policing, one finds again and again instances of a "police scandal" involving local government officials and the police, or involving local political elites and the police. One can easily be misled to conclude that corruption among the police and government officials is widespread in the United States. Yet, clearly that is far from the case. By the very nature of the local organization of the police, the corruption of both the State political system and of the police is restricted. The recent "Ben Barka" case in France illustrates the contrasting case. Where one has a more centralized police system, the State may

corrupt the police or, alternatively, be corrupted by it.

Thus the problems of crime and public order, of the patterns and varieties of bureaucratization, and of their relationship to the government and organization of cities along with problems of the divergence between formal law and subcultural organization set the stage for the analysis of the police in modern democratic societies.

Police Professionalization and Applied Sociology

Sociologists seldom pay attention to budgets. As Bacon pointed out in his discussion of the development of modern police however, policing is expensive. We can gain some understanding of the significance of more recent police history and of the professionalization movement in the police by examining briefly the expenditure on police. From 1902 to 1960 annual expenditures for local police in the United States increased from 50 to 1,612 millions of dollars--an increase of 3124%. When account is taken of inflation, population growth, urban concentration, increases in motor vehicles, and increases in the per hour cost of police salaries, the net increase in funds available to the police is about 20 per cent. Although the study from which these data are drawn is still incomplete and considering the extreme difficulty of drawing unequivocal conclusions from trend data, it seems accurate nevertheless to conclude that during the first six decades of the twentieth century, there has been no appreciable real increase in funds available to the local police for crime control use.^{25/}

Small wonder then that the main thrust of the professionalization movement in the United States has been in the direction of improving operating efficiency, in communications systems and administrative competence, and in the search for ways of conserving and more effectively controlling scarce police manpower. From the beginning of the century to the present we can only conclude that there must have been a dramatic increase in police productivity as a consequence of the technological and managerial rationalization which has accompanied professionalization. Managerial rationalization and increased productivity have not been the only results of the professionalization movement. There can be little doubt that in some cities at least there have been significant gains in the degree to which the police conform to due process. Such conformity is difficult, however, even in the most professionalized departments both because the translation of elite professional perspectives to the rank and file is difficult and because the demands of some enforcement jobs create severe conflict between the requirements for effective enforcement and the demands of due process as enunciated by the courts. 26/

The emergence of a self consciously professional police elite coupled with its increasing (though far from complete) success in tightening internal control over department operations for the first time in American history provides the organizational conditions whereby not only public demands for efficiency and productivity but also judicial demands

for legality can be translated into operations.^{27/} Developing professionalization of the police also provides the necessary base for the application of sociology to law enforcement concerns. Perhaps even more appropriately put, it provides the base for carrying out the necessary sociological research which in the near future will be translatable into application.

Areas of Application

Applied sociology cannot prosper in the absence of some criteria of effectiveness of personnel and of organization. The police professionalization movement has provided sociologists with a social base and a body of consumers of its material but it has not provided solid criteria of effectiveness which can guide research contributions. Unlike early industrial sociology which could get along on simple criteria like increased production or decreased turnover, the problem of criteria in the effectiveness of law enforcement and of policing is extremely complex.

Because of its emphasis on education the professionalization movement has opened the way for what is probably the most significant "application" of sociology to date. While no definitive data are available the exposure of police students to sociology in police academies or at the college, junior college, and graduate levels is increasing very rapidly, though in absolute numbers the exposure is probably still small. While the immediate effect on police performance

of exposure to academic sociology may be minimal or at best undemonstrable, the probable long run effect of helping define policing as an open profession which participates in the general academic dialogue should be of great significance.

Other than applications in general education of police officers and the specific concerns with crime and criminals, applications of sociology to law enforcement and police organization can be divided into those touching upon internal organizational structure and process and those dealing with transactions between police organization and the surrounding environment. In both of these broad areas, in the immediate future the application of sociology is more likely to be a matter of providing more sophisticated information and analysis than a matter of operations research.

Changes in internal organization of police departments have resulted in a considerable tightening of internal discipline and centralization of control.^{28/} At the same time, the police seek to attract more intelligent and better educated personnel. The potential conflict between these objectives of professionalization and centralization of command has been remarked upon in the police literature.^{29/} The sociological analysis of professions and their practice in bureaucratic settings is applicable to the professionalization of the police.

It is common even among sociologists to think of a profession as a special kind of occupation where the job of the

professional is technical, the technical knowledge generally having been acquired through long prescribed training, and the knowledge itself being systematic in nature. Furthermore, it is assumed that the professional person follows a set of professional norms that may include a code of ethics that binds the professional to behave ethically toward his clients. Both the training and norms generally fall under legal or professional organizational control, specifying who can practice.

All of these things usually characterize persons who are called professionals. But they miss a central feature that characterizes any profession.^{30/} At the core of any profession as distinct from a scholarly discipline is a relationship with clients. Professions are based on practice, and a major element in all practice is the relationship with clients. What is crucial in defining the professional is the nature of this relationship with clients. We can say that it is technical in nature where the specialized knowledge is utilized in practice, as when the physician calls upon his specialized knowledge to diagnose illness. We can say that it is moral or ethical, as when the lawyer treats information from his client as privileged or confidential. Yet a core feature of the relationship with clients is a decision about the client--a decision in which the professional person decides something about the client that relates to his future. In some professions this decision is given largely in the form of advice. The client

presumably is free to ignore or follow the advice. But in other professions and in certain roles within other professions, it is a decision over which the client can exercise little if any choice. We speak of this as a coerced decision, an evaluation, judgment, or a determination. The teacher decides whether the pupil shall pass or fail. The social worker decides whether the applicant is eligible for additional welfare awards. The judge decides whether or not the defendant is guilty and what disposition shall be made for the case. Jurors, by the way, are not professionals and some of the conflict in the criminal trial procedure today arises over the very question of competence of jurors to decide what have come to be called technical questions. Police are empowered with a decision that involves the fate of their clients--a decision to arrest, a discretionary decision. Police, therefore, are among the few occupations seeking professionalization that share the core feature of a decision that affects the fate of the client.

Studies of the "professionalization" of the police conclude that changes within modernizing police departments have led to professionalization of the department through bureaucratization and centralization of command. These changes work against professionalization of the line officer, particularly the patrol officer where contact is initially made with the public. Three main changes within the organization of police departments militate against professionalization of the line officer.31/

First, there is the increasing centralization of both command and control in departments--a centralization of decision making. Some police departments have been reorganized so that most of the command and control functions are essentially removed from the precinct level of organization. The precinct functions then primarily to allocate men to assignments and supervise them in their work roles. The core of many modern police departments is the centralized communications center where allocative decisions are made under centralized command. The line officer on patrol is commanded from a central headquarters and reports directly to them by radio, with reports in some cases being made directly to central headquarters by radio or telephone. Furthermore, the bounds of decision making by the line are officially narrowed so that the officer is left without functions of investigation or, at most, a preliminary report. Although such moves toward a centralized bureaucratic system have not necessarily limited the discretionary decision in practice, they structurally limit professionalization of decision making by the line. A bureaucratic system where decision making is decentralized would be more consistent with professionalization of the line.

Second, most modern police departments centralize the investigative function in a "more technical" elite of the department--the detective bureau. Much overrated in its capacity to investigate and certainly to "solve" most crimes, it nonetheless increasingly bears the "professional"

label. Though there is much evidence of increasing bureaucratization of the investigative functions within police departments leading to a large number of special investigation units over and above that of the detective division, there is much less evidence that the requirements of technical knowledge and training are consistent with professionalization of personnel in these units. It is in this sense that we speak of the professionalization of the organizational system, leaving the corollary development of professional role specialization relatively untouched.

Finally, there is a growing tendency to make decisions at the staff rather than the operating levels of the department and to introduce professional specialists at the staff rather than the operating level. This is partly due to the fact that increased bureaucratization and introduction of a complex technology necessitate the utilization of other professions within the police system. But such professionals are generally introduced at the staff level or as special consultants inserted for a special reason into operating units. Thus a department employs medical internists and psychiatrists to perform certain applicant or promotion screening functions. The planning or analysis sections may include professional specialists. These professional specialists are generally referred to as "civilians" within the department, separating them not only from the line but in many cases from the "sworn" staff as well.

The tendency to make decisions at staff rather than operating levels is readily apparent when one examines the staff units of a department. There is considerable evidence that the handling of "human relations" within police departments is largely a staff function. Despite a spate of human relations training for the line, it is the staff units that are regarded as "professional" in human relations work. The training division and the human relations unit of the department is more "professionalized". There is almost no provision for actual implementation of "human relations" in the line except by "central order" and some training of the line in the classroom of the Academy. Without explicit provision for implementation in the line, there is little opportunity for professional treatment of clients in what is bureaucratically referred to as human relations. That this characterization is not unique to the more recently developed specialized staff functions in departments cannot be demonstrated here, but a careful examination of almost all such units in most modernizing police departments serves to bear this out.

A metropolitan police organizational system faces considerable penetration of its organizational environment from organizations and interest groups that lie outside its boundaries. This is so for a number of reasons. Legally charged with responsibility for law enforcement, it nonetheless faces problems of overlapping jurisdiction with county, state, and national enforcement agencies. Law

enforcement likewise is intricately linked with a larger organizational system of criminal justice such that its output is an input into the criminal justice system where it is evaluated. Furthermore, it is directly linked to a municipal, county, or state organizational system that controls at least its budget and it also maintains a host of transactions with other municipal and community organizations in providing "police service". A police system thus engages in transactions not only with its clients who are citizens demanding a service, and with victims and their violators, but with a multiplicity of organizations where problems of service, its assessment, resource allocation, and jurisdiction are paramount.

We can only illustrate how these relationships tend on the whole to militate against the professionalization of the line and to suggest how they militate against the professionalization of the staff as well. The recent decisions of criminal and appellate courts defining the limits of interrogation, search of the person and property and the seizure of evidence, and of the use of force have been defined by the police and the courts as limits on discretionary decision making. The general public and legal view is that the police have exercised too much discretion in their relationships with the public and that decision as to method is to be defined on legal professional rather than police professional grounds. In short, the prevailing view is that the police must be controlled by

more legitimate authority--authority that is invested in either the law, the public prosecutor, and the courts or in a civil review procedure.

Apart from the emphasis on civil review procedures this dilemma faced by the police is a classic case of dispute over jurisdiction; indeed of professional jurisdiction. A group of professionals--in this case largely made up of lawyers and jurists--seeks to restrict the powers of "would-be-professionals"--in this case the police. This conflict is not unlike that between medical doctors and nurses or prosecutors and judges. What is generally characteristic of such conflicts are questions of jurisdiction. But over and above that is an equally important consideration: such conflicts generally arise where one group of professionals controls the fate of another group of professionals (or aspirants to professional status) in an intricately balanced organizational system. Much of the conflict between the courts and the police is in this sense inevitable, given the American system of law enforcement and criminal justice. For in that system we have on the one hand institutionalized the introduction of clients into the larger system in the hands of the police, since operationally at least it is they who largely exercise the power of arrest. Yet on the other hand we have institutionalized the power of assessing outcome of arrest of the client and assessment of police procedure in the prosecutor and the court. When the ultimate fate of clients rests in

another group of clients--and particularly when they are removed from the situation that precipitated the client relationship--conflict is endemic in the system.

Civil review boards pose some barrier to professionalization of the police, attenuating the latitude an occupation or an organization based on an occupation has to "police" itself. That the police have not been altogether ineffective in preventing the creation of civil review boards in the United States is apparent. Much of their success probably is due to the effective organizational effort of the line organizations of police officers backed by legitimation of their claims from the police chief. Locally organized they bring local pressures. Yet lacking effective organization on "professional grounds" across local departments, their long-run effectiveness may be more restricted. Unlike trade unions that increased their bargaining power through extra-local organization, the only extra-local police organization of consequence is the International Association of Chiefs of Police. The line, therefore, is without national power.

The issue for professionalization of the police is one of whether civic accountability will take the form of an inquiry into an individual's work within an organization, whether it will take the form of accountability of an occupational organization of police, or whether accountability rests with a local police organizational system headed by a chief as the "accountable officer".

Traditionally line organizations of police have "protected" the rights of the officer in charges involving the local organization. Traditionally the local police organization has been held accountable through control by the mayor, the occasional appointment of "civilian" chiefs, and the sporadic investigations of the department under charges of scandal by "blue-ribbon" committees. Traditionally the organization of the line has failed to develop standards for control of practice by members of the occupation. The dilemma that exists for the line then is that the police occupation exists within a local formally organized police department that controls practice rather than with a professional organization of the police. To shift the balance of review and control to an external review system, however, creates problems both for the operating departmental organization and the occupational association. This is particularly the case when there is external review of an individual's performance within an organization. For this form of accountability interferes with both institutionalized forms of professional control of practice in the United States and with organizational forms of control to protect its boundaries. The same kind of dilemma was presented to public school teachers. Historically they were under review from both a school organization and a civil review agency--respectively, the school administration and the school board. Increasingly the professional organization of teachers has resisted such review on "professional

grounds", thereby coercing the relationship of public school teachers to organizations, employers, and clients more along the lines of traditional professional organizations. It is obvious that police now lack the effective extra-local organization developed among public school teachers.

Administrative centralization within police departments seems partly a consequence of the fact that professionalization often arrives in a department in the form of crisis-produced reform. One area of research and application of great potential benefit to the police involves sociologists in studying the nature and consequences of patterns of supervision and control with a view to the design of systems which maintain the gains of professionalization without the loss of more desirable personnel.

A recent study of police reform indicates that the reform-centralization-professionalization process heightens the significance of organization rather than public as a base for police self-esteem indicating perhaps also that the reform process has increased member attachment--a necessary requisite to any eventual decentralization.^{32/} Another study of a department in the throes of change indicates that traditional techniques of control coupled with professionalization creates a punishment-centered bureaucracy with high levels of uncertainty among young officers and the attendant development of a reliance on personal ingratiation with superiors. In this department

the formal rules seem more a set of opportunities for punishing officers than a set of bureaucratic imperatives.^{33/}

These results also indicate that reform based centralization may be necessary to produce sufficient trust and due process within the police department in order that more decentralized decision making may eventually be possible.

The methods of maintaining internal control in a police department have great relevance not only to police decision making but, as the study by McNamara just cited makes clear, also to problems of recruitment training and selection for promotion. Beyond the use of written civil service tests which function more as instruments of equity than of effective selection there is little sophistication of a social science sort in police selection procedures. Psychiatric screening to try and spot "bad apples" at the recruit level has appeared in some departments but there has been little or no contribution by sociologists or sociology. One study in New York City attempts to use a modification of job analysis and the critical incident technique to develop selection instruments at the recruit evaluation level.^{34/} The study draws upon sociological ideas and techniques. It does not however display the necessary sensitivity to the organizational position of the policeman which the previously cited study by McNamara indicates to be crucial for the role.^{35/} Relations between training and role perception and performance are also central to a recently published study of a state police unit.^{36/}

Studies of the external performance of the police are even more rare than studies of intra-organizational events. The early work by Westley, and the more recent work by Piliavin and Briar, Bittner, the Cummings, Skolnick, and Black and Reiss are among the few sociological studies of the external performance of the police.^{37/} Apart from the work by Black and Reiss, these studies generally lack criteria of effectiveness of police performance.

Several of these studies focus on the relationship between the demeanor of the citizen and the performance of the police. Westley was concerned with the transfer of violence by the police from a legal to a personal resource where violence becomes acceptable to the police as a generalized means. His most significant finding was that at least 37 per cent of the police officers he interviewed believed that it was legitimate to use violence to coerce respect, suggesting that policemen use violence to coerce their audience to respect their occupational status.^{38/} Piliavin and Briar's studies of police encounters with juveniles likewise emphasizes the importance of client demeanor in police behavior. Other than prior record of delinquency, they conclude that the youth's demeanor was the most important factor in apprehension of juveniles by police officers. If the youth's behavior was uncooperative, he was highly unlikely to receive either informal reprimands or admonishment and release while cooperation with the officer usually brought forth these outcomes.^{39/} Skolnick's study of the

processing of traffic violators, narcotic users and peddlers, and of prostitutes raises some doubts about personal prejudices and client demeanor in police practice. While he found that the police wanted to implicate the traffic offender more seriously in the criminal process when the violator abused the officer in some way, was an habitual violator who refused to 'cop out', or when there were continuing and exacerbated relationships between the officer and the offender, he also found that in police relationships with prostitutes, the interest of the policeman is less likely to involve how he personally feels about the suspect. With prostitutes, their relationship to other police goals, such as their informant status, may be more important.^{40/}

Among the more controversial areas of police behavior in the United States are those pertaining to police conduct in searches, in interrogation, and in confession. Seriously lacking in both public and judicial consideration of these issues has been reliable information about police conduct in these situations. The mass observation studies of Black and Reiss report data on the relative frequency of personal and property searches and interrogations, some of the conditions under which they occur, the response of persons to these practices in settings where they take place, and what the police learn in such situations.^{41/} They observed that officers very rarely ask for permission to conduct a search or an interrogation; most suspects do not object. The probability that the police will find a

dangerous weapon or other evidence in property and personal searches is quite high for the high crime rate areas where the observations took place; about one in five frisks, for example, produced a dangerous weapon while almost one-half of all property searches produced something that the suspect did not wish the police to find. Contrary to expectations, at least a third of all field interrogations involved the interrogation of more than one person concomitantly. In only one in 10 situations was there an objection to the interrogation. When objections occurred they were far more likely to be objections to how information was obtained than to the fact that they were questioned. For confessions, it was found that 7 in 10 of the confessions were obtained at the beginning of the police-citizen encounter; in fact, about one-half confessed before any interrogation on the part of the officer. Other than questioning, little or no pressure was applied in 70 per cent of the interrogations. Quite clearly this research shows that much of the police behavior occurs in field settings and outside of the interrogation room or police station where it generally is presumed to occur. Furthermore, given the fact that the research was conducted in the period following the Miranda decision by the U. S. Supreme Court, compliance with court decisions on informing citizens of their rights was generally quite low, emphasizing again that decision-making without organizational implementation generally brings low compliance, if not patterned evasion.

Despite generations of criminological research it is doubtful that sociology can in the near future contribute to the social technology available for apprehending criminals. It has contributed to police sophistication and success in maintaining order in potentially riotous situations and especially in dealing with potentially dangerous racial tensions.^{42/} Some recent efforts at crime analysis show the indirect effect of sociological perspectives such as the attempt by to develop a typology of sex offenses that would be useful for modus operandi files.^{43/} In general the police have provided more information on crime to sociologists than the reverse. The new computerized information systems provide an opportunity for sociologists to help construct more rationalized information gathering strategies as work by Wolfgang demonstrates.^{44/} Sociologists will have to do much more research on the patterning and determinants of criminal conduct in the field rather than in the prison and they will have to face up to the fact that offenders must be caught before they can be humanely rehabilitated if there research is to be relevant to police organization and policy.

Historically in Western democratic societies, the emergence of a police system distinct from the militia and "voluntary service" in a watch system, led to the development of a tradition oriented rather than a rationally efficient bureaucratic system. Primary group loyalties, often based on a cohort effect of common movement through

the ranks, and devotion to duty and honor bound the men in the organization together and brought the commanders close to the men in the line, particularly in those countries that did not recruit a distinct elite corps of staff and command. The rational bureaucratic departments sought to break these traditional loyalties and in part they disintegrated with technological innovation. Their disintegration, however, has created a new set of problems of how the command can insure control--how it could make its orders stick--with less reliance on traditional forms of allegiance to the command.

A related dilemma arises at the staff and command level as well. One might almost paraphrase Janowitz's characterization of the dilemma for the military profession in this respect,^{45/} since the dilemma is rapidly growing with the emergence of a highly centralized command that increasingly relies on communications and computer technology to make operating decisions. To do so, the professional police must recruit and retrain men for its elite who are skilled in police management. Yet at the same time it must recruit many officers who can command the allegiance of the men in the line. The problem is particularly acute in departments that do not recruit solely into the line. While some men fulfill both role-set requirements, many do not.

In rational bureaucratic organizations, symbolic appeals to courage, devotion to duty, and honor do not ring true. Yet they are essential elements in a police system. The

modern trends in police departments make it difficult to perpetuate these elements and the "new" cohorts of officers in the more modernized American police department display fewer of these elements. Furthermore, an increasing emphasis on civic control of the police in the United States serves further to weaken them--one does a "professional" job, not his duty. How far one can go in dispensing with these elements remains an open question. Potentially one should be able to go much further with the police than with the military, since, unlike the military, much more depends upon the necessity for and willingness of a population to be policed, and their demand for police service. There is not essentially a conflict relationship with the police and the elements of heroic leadership necessary in combat perhaps can altogether disappear for the police.

The fact that no bureaucracy conforms to a model of rational organization is well established. While the modernizing police department places heavy organizational emphasis on modern techniques of personnel selection and training, on technology and technical efficiency, and on rational planning and management, it cannot dispense with charisma in its leaders and a commitment to duty and honor, particularly in democratic societies, like the United States that are fundamentally inhospitable to the police.^{46/}

A paramilitary organization like the police displays, and perhaps must continue to display, elements of traditional and rational bureaucracies. In modern democratic

societies, however there are increasing demands that they be human relations centered bureaucracies.

Ideally the police should be able to secure compliance with lawful commands while incurring a minimum of citizen hostility. The ability to do so in a heterogeneous society requires formal training in human management rather than merely participation in a common culture. McNamara's study of recruit training and performance indicates that neither selection nor training nor post academy probationary experience provides the necessary sensitivity to differences in values and interpersonal expectations. As a consequence the police tend to become over authoritative in socially ambiguous situations--securing compliance but at the cost of unnecessary levels of hostility.^{47/} Formal human relations training is an increasingly common feature of police training and at least some semi-sociological ideas have been important in the development of training materials.^{48/}

There is considerable evidence that the American populace, particularly in its larger cities, is no longer content with either the traditional or the rational bureaucratic solutions to police-citizen relations. As noted earlier, the tradition-oriented departments in American society were peculiarly adapted to the accommodation of immigrant interests. More recently, the rational bureaucratic department has moved somewhat to guarantee equity both as to discretionary decisions in application of the law and the legality of means in law enforcement. Yet

more is demanded of the officer. He must not only be civil in a rational bureaucratic sense but he must be "human" or "personal" in his relations with citizens. He must not only be "professional" in his relations with citizens but he must be "client-centered". He must not only be a responsible civil servant but responsive as well.

Recent studies of the behavior of officers and citizens in police-citizen transactions show that in about three-fourths of police-citizen transactions, the officers behaved in a rational bureaucratic manner.^{49/} Their conduct could be characterized as routinized, impersonal, or businesslike. Only in 16 per cent of the encounters could they be characterized as human-relations oriented where humor, interest in the citizen or similar interpersonal tactics characterized their behavior. For only six per cent of the encounters did the officers behave in a negative or hostile fashion toward the citizen. Human relations was more characteristic of relations with white than Negro citizens, however. Correlatively, the behavior of citizens toward the police was characterized in three-fourths of the cases as civil with eleven per cent behaving deferentially and the remainder with some form of hostility.

The typical encounter between the citizen and a police officer then is one characterized by civility. The officer regards the citizen in a rational bureaucratic framework of civility while the citizen treats the officer with civil conduct. Yet paradoxically, the citizen who is civil toward the officer often regards civility in the officer as a sign

of disrespect and a failure to regard him in human or personal terms. And, the officer perceives civility in the citizen as a failure to command respect. Rational bureaucratic treatment is insufficient for many citizens in their encounters with the police.

Encounters between police and populace with which human relations training deals have an even broader significance in police work. The populace is, after all, the source of suspects. Moreover segments of the populace may not only individually but collectively adopt a stance of principled opposition to the police. Where this occurs police practices of field inquiry, i.e., the systematic search for suspects to match known offenses, may simultaneously result in a challenge to police authority and a further alienation of the suspect group. Nowhere is this problem more apparent than in dealing with slum gangs. In a recent paper Werthman and Piliavin describe encounters between patrol police and Negro gang boys and indicate that the outcome of these encounters may increase hostility, strengthen gang solidarity, threaten police authority and even help increase social tensions to the point of contributing to violent disorder--all without producing any great pay-off to law enforcement.^{50/}

This study by Werthman and Piliavin also indicates the very real differences in the police role played by patrol police as compared to juvenile officers who are more a combination of detective and magistrate.

Yet it remains unclear how much and to what extent the relationship between the police and citizens account for the failure of citizens to mobilize the police and to cooperate with them in investigation. Recent studies for the National Crime Commission show that most police officers believe that minority group persons are uncooperative when they attempt to gain information from them.^{51/} Studies of citizen experiences with crime and the police, however, fail to support the contention that it is police behavior that accounts for citizen failure to mobilize the police or to cooperate with them. Biderman found that of the 42 respondents who had witnessed a crime and failed to report it to the police, only three of them gave as a reason for their failure to report a negative expectation about dealing with the police.^{52/} Furthermore, although about four in ten experiences by 104 victims were not reported to the police, citizens rarely gave as their reason for nonreporting a negative expectation about encounters with the police. Rather they emphasized such things as they saw no useful purpose in doing so as there was nothing that could be done about it or that they wished to avoid the trouble associated with getting involved, such as being a witness later in court. A few feared reprisals from offenders. But two citizens gave a response that they feared the police would give them trouble. Such studies suggest that citizen-police relations are determined more by the general orientations of citizens in American society

and the structure of the legal system than by specific experiences with the police or negative images of potential encounters. Clearly further research is necessary to determine how police-citizen encounters influence police-citizen relationships.

One of the few sociological studies that tries to measure the effects of varying techniques among policemen is the attempt by Wattenberg and Bufe to study the effectiveness of juvenile officers.^{53/} The authors conclude that differences in interpersonal style among officers are related to the probability of later recidivism. If this finding should replicate, it promises to have considerable significance as a guide to juvenile officer training and supervision. Specialized juvenile officers playing quasi-judicial roles are an increasingly significant part of American municipal police systems and a considerable amount of research has been done or is under way on their interactions with juveniles and on the factors involved in police decisions with juveniles.^{54/}

This review of actual and potential applications of sociology to police and law enforcement can appropriately conclude by pointing out that its central theme--the importance of formal organization--can be applied to the clients of the police as well as to the police themselves. In an increasingly bureaucratized society police decisions may be affected by interorganizational relations. In a recent study Skolnick and Woodworth show that statutory

rape complaints may originate in a public welfare agency and the police morals detail studied was involved not only in the difficult and morale lowering business of interrogating for statutory rape but also in a complex interagency information sharing system.^{55/} Future developments in centralized information systems and interagency cooperation will raise whole new issues not only of police expertise but of the balance between organizational goals and personal liberties.

Epilogue: Some Issues of Sociological Research
on Law Enforcement

We began by noting that sociological studies of law enforcement and the police were neglected until recently, partly because of the discomfort sociologists experience in the presence of coercion. One might add further that studies of law enforcement and the police create discomfort because they inevitably raise certain ethical issues, particularly, if as has been the case, much of the data must be gathered by observational techniques.

Skolnick has made a beginning in the discussion of these ethical issues. There are important questions of the invasion of privacy, the effect of an observer's presence on a defendant's fate or constitutional rights, and the deception of his role both for officer and for citizen.^{56/} Inevitably there are other issues as well, issues that relate to disclosure of information and to an observers legal obligations as a citizen. Though such issues arise in many

social observation studies, they are of particular importance where one is emeshed in studying the legal system and where legal sanctions on the investigator may be more germane. Quite clearly, continued work on the sociology of law enforcement to the degree that it partakes of social observation must cope with the ethical and legal issues generated by the research process.

Sociologists in the field of corrections increasingly have entered prominent roles as administrators and as counsel in the formation of public policy. Within the field of law enforcement, such a role has not as yet clearly emerged. Despite the fact that sociologists were involved in the work of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, no social scientist was a member of the Commission. The Commission's report itself while clearly reflecting the research investigations of sociologists displays less clearly their effectiveness in molding policy recommendations.^{57/} The entry of sociologists as policy scientists in the field of law enforcement poses problems of relationships not only with the "professionals" in police administration but with the "professionals" in the law as well. Consequently their role as policy scientists may be shaped as much by the future development of the sociology of law as by the sociology of law enforcement as an aspect of social organization and deviant behavior.

FOOTNOTES

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