

WORKING PAPERS OF THE  
CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON SOCIAL ORGANIZATION  
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY  
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Paper #24

March, 1967

CLASSES, STRATA AND PARTIES  
IN WEST GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES

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Paper prepared for the International Conference on Comparative Electoral Behavior, Ann Arbor, Michigan, April 5-8, 1967. This report is based upon an on-going collaborative research effort between the author and Klaus Liepelt, DATUM, Bad Godesberg, West Germany. I am indebted to Margaret Woodward for her comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

## I INTRODUCTION

As a major socio-political doctrine in the industrializing West, Marxism has had great impact on the research and theory of political sociology and behavioral political science.<sup>1</sup> Particularly, a great deal of research energy has been expended on establishing the nature and degree of relationship between social class and political partisanship in Western democracies.<sup>2</sup> Historical developments have made the study of Communist Party organizations per se less relevant in such countries. In Italy, for example, the Communists have increasingly tried to elicit a base of support among that portion of the bourgeoisie not involved in industrial monopolies,<sup>3</sup> while in West Germany, the Communist Party was outlawed in 1956, and in recent years, the Social Democratic Party has tried to change its public image from a workers' party to that of a popular party. The Bad Godesberg program was one manifestation of this effort.

Nonetheless, the relevance of traditional Marxian class-conflict categories is still argued by some, although most current debate in the field is focussed on the implications for Marxist sociology of trends in the industrial sphere that Marx did not foresee - notably high rates of mobility into the middle-class, separation of ownership from management in capitalist enterprise, and the increased power of labor both in a bargaining relationship with management and directly in production decisions.<sup>4</sup> The arena of debate is defined largely by

the difference between the "middle-mass" theories and the "consensus and cleavage" approach to political partisanship, and this difference is more one of degree than of kind. The "middle-mass" theorists argue that as the labor force becomes concentrated in the upper-working and lower-middle classes, and management as well as labor becomes separated from capital ownership, the life styles of the two classes will become homogenized, ideological politics will decline, and political life will become increasingly consensual.<sup>5</sup> The "consensus and cleavage" orientation acknowledges the changing social structure of Western society, but argues for recognition of emergent bases of political cleavage and ideological dissensus unrelated to traditional social class notions.<sup>6</sup>

Studies that utilize the concept of class, whether they base their definition on broad occupational position (blue-collar vs. white-collar) or on subjective class identification, continue to show that some relationship exists between real or perceived economic position and political partisanship.<sup>7</sup> Specifically, membership in or identification with the working class is found to be associated with affiliation with the "left" major party: the Democratic Party in the United States, the Social Democratic Party in West Germany, the Labour Party in England, etc. Indeed, Hamilton has demonstrated that at equivalent income levels, the political choices of members of the German working-class and middle-class were quite different, the workers being more similar to other lower-paid workers than to members of the middle-class of similar income.<sup>8</sup> It is our

assumption, however, that such studies do not directly confront the hypothesized relationship between economic substructure and political superstructure because while they accept the methodology of Marxist sociology and choose economic indicators as independent variables, they reject Marxist economics, and choose indicators other than those specified in Marx' theory. A reevaluation of class as an historical as well as a sociological concept should enable us to explain differentials in the persistence of class-based politics in Western democracies as well as differentials in the emergence of alternative bases of social cleavage.

Class conflict, for Marx, was not a product of capitalist society, but an enduring state of human organization. "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles."<sup>9</sup> The class conflict of industrial society, in the Marxian view, is seen as a stage in the historical progression of conflict in which the "manifold gradation of social rank" prevalent under feudalism is simplified into a dichotomization of social rank based upon ownership of the means of production. We would thus, at a minimum, expect differences in the extent of class based politics among Western democracies to be related to differences in the structural complexity of the feudal organization that existed prior to capitalist industrialization. Since Marxism postulates a continuity of classes through the dialectical process of history, with the capitalist bourgeoisie developing out of the burgher classes

in the earliest towns, and these in turn springing from the serfs in the Middle Ages, class politics in this instance must be seen in terms of capital ownership relations. However, as we shall see below, industrial authority relations serve as bases of political differentiation both in the industrial West and in modern Communist states despite the bifurcation of ownership and management in these systems.<sup>10</sup> We therefore reject the assumption that census occupational categories or crude differentiations of white-collar and blue-collar jobs are operationalizations of the Marxian notion of class.

Central to the Marxian notion of class conflict is the concept of class consciousness. Class, to Marx, did not imply consciousness. Indeed, prior to the revolution of the proletarians, the wage-workers existed as a social class. It was the development of class consciousness that transformed the wage earner class into a politically relevant proletariat. The extent to which social class identification as measured in contemporary social surveys is a reflection of ownership of productive facilities is an empirical question. We know that working-class men tend to aspire to self-employment.<sup>11</sup> Insofar as middle-class identification is associated with self-employment, some degree of blue-collar identification with the party of the right may be explicable in terms of Marx' theory. It has been previously demonstrated that independent small businessmen support the parties of the right.<sup>12</sup> Our test of the Marxian hypothesis then must define class in terms of

property relations, and must deal with the questions of historical continuity and the bases of class identification. These, in turn, may be rooted in the histories of labor movements in the nations involved. It is thus necessary for us to consider the relationship between union affiliation and subjective class identification, and the degree to which organized labor opposed the social order rather than attempting to improve the worker's lot within it.

Similarly, the role of religion in political life must be viewed in an historical context if one is to consider the relevance of Marxian propositions to the analysis of Western politics. Marx' condemnation of religion as the opiate of the people was not a rejection of the religious institution per se any more than his analysis of capitalism was a rejection of economic principles. Rather, he viewed the alliances between specific churches and the bourgeoisie as bases for false ideologies that left the workers complacent with their exploited condition. To the extent that such historical alliances do not exist, however, religious bodies may be seen as representing the interests of the working class or as an emergent basis of political cleavage independent of social class considerations.<sup>13</sup>

While one of our primary concerns here is in empirically testing, with behavioral data, the propositions of historical materialism, bases of political differentiation other than class must be identified and studied if only because industrial social structures have changed in ways unforeseen

by Marx. At a minimum, we may differentiate between social cleavage based upon class and that based upon status. Here we utilize Weber's definition of status as determined by social estimation of honor.<sup>14</sup> Unlike class, social status is not necessarily based upon market position, but upon style of life. The proposition that social honor may be independent of market position is supported by studies of occupational prestige in the United States. On the basis of data collected by the National Opinion Research Center, Hodge, et al found that scientists, government officials and professionals have higher social status than do members of the boards of directors of large corporations, and that these relations have been relatively constant since at least 1947. Among blue-collar workers there was no indication that prestige was based upon owning one's own business. The owner-operator of a printing shop had the same status as a trained machinist, and the owner-operator of a lunch-stand had the same prestige rating as barbers, factory machine operators, corporals in the regular army, and garage mechanics.<sup>15</sup> There is evidence, however, that these relations do not hold cross-nationally. A comparative study that included data from the United States and Germany revealed that while the prestige structures were similar in the two countries for white-collar occupations ( $r^2=.85$ ), the relative ranking for blue-collar occupations yielded the smallest relationship in the entire study ( $r^2=.42$ ).<sup>16</sup> This differential in an area that both over time and cross-nationally



yields little variations suggests that, at least for blue-collar workers, Marxian notions of class relations may be more important in the understanding of social position in Germany than in the United States. It should be noted that while we argue for the potential independence of status from class, we do not fully accept the notion that social strata, as the aggregates of individuals sharing given social statuses, are merely categories for "describing hierarchical systems at a given point in time."<sup>17</sup> Indeed, we are prepared to argue that status differences may serve as bases of persisting political differentiation, and even of ideological cleavage.

## II BACKGROUND AND PROPOSITIONS

Our choice of West Germany and the United States as units for comparative analysis was based upon both pragmatic and theoretical considerations. In the first instance, they are the nations with which the researcher had the most intimate knowledge. Secondly, we were familiar with large data archives available for secondary analysis in each country.<sup>18</sup> Finally, we had collaborated earlier on a more limited attempt at comparative analysis along the present lines, and felt that our accomplishments in that earlier effort justified further research.<sup>19</sup>

On the other hand, the histories of these two nations differ in precisely those respects that will enable us to con-

sider the relationships between historical variations and contemporary partisan structures. We are not arguing here that such relationships can be ultimately tested on the basis of the experiences of these two nations. Indeed, it should be possible to test these notions using data from a large number of nations. The present effort, however, exemplifies the kind of comparative analysis that can be undertaken through the juxtaposition of historical and survey data. Moreover, we argue specifically for the utilization of paired comparisons, with analyses carried out within countries and comparisons between them. The alternate strategy - that of carrying out multivariate analyses among nations, as though they were elements of a sample, obscures the very historical idiosyncracies that we are trying to preserve.

a. The feudal backgrounds. It is difficult to imagine two Western nations that differ more in their historical backgrounds. Germany was the center of the Holy Roman Empire at least as far back as 824 A.D., and while the Empire as a political form can be said to have terminated with the revolt of the Church against political domination in the early 11th century, or with the beheading of Konradin in 1268, feudalism remained the dominant form of social organization in the German domains at least through the 16th century, although the formal institutions of feudalism, primarily vassalage and the law of the fief, were less bound up in the structure of society here than in other areas of Europe.<sup>20</sup> It might be argued that

feudalism was in fact stronger following the collapse of the Empire, since highly centralized authority probably mitigated against the full utilization of feudal privilege at the local level. Under the Hohenzollerns, class relations in Prussia were feudal in form into the 19th century, and it was common for peasants to owe compulsory service on the estates of the nobility. One of the major legacies of this agrarian feudal organization was that Germany did not develop a large commercial middle-class until relatively late in its history - after the middle of the nineteenth century. Thus, the "middle-mass", so important to contemporary theories of consensus politics, is a recent phenomenon in Germany.

The social structure of the United States, on the other hand, had a very different history. A much younger country, America was born with a large middle-class. A great majority of the population were small property owners. At the same time, the wealthier class held a much smaller proportion of the national wealth than has been the case in more recent times, and a very small proportion of the population were wageworkers.<sup>21</sup>

We are not arguing here that all historical differences must necessarily be related to differences in present day patterns of partisanship. Rather we argue that the effects of historical patterns on contemporary phenomena may be seen through two manifest linkages. On the first hand, despite convergences in the technologies of industrialized Western

nations, the present social structure of any single country must be seen in part as the product of historical trends within that country. Table 1 presents the industrial distributions of the labor forces of West Germany and the United States. While certain similarities are evident, particularly in the areas of transportation, utilities and construction, there are several important differences. The legacy of the peasant agricultural past of Germany is reflected in the proportion of its current population that is involved in agriculture; a figure more than twice as large as the same parameter for the United States. The United States, with a commercial heritage,

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Table 1 Percentage Distribution of Labor Forces of West Germany and the United States, by Industry.

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<u>Industry</u>	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>United States</u>
Agriculture	13.4	6.6
Manufacturing	37.2	26.9
Construction	7.5	6.2
Utilities, sanitary services and mining	3.0	2.4
Commerce	13.4	21.9
Transport	5.5	5.4
Service	8.5	20.4
Unclassified	<u>11.5</u>	<u>10.2</u>
Total	100.0%	100.0%
N =	68,877,476	26,821,112

SOURCE: United Nations Demographic Yearbook, 1964 (New York: Statistical Office of the United Nations, 1965) 255-256, 275.

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still has a larger proportion of its population engaged in commerce than does Germany. The fact of America's earlier industrialization is reflected in the shift of its labor force into the tertiary service industries.<sup>22</sup> The German labor force is more heavily concentrated in secondary manufacturing industries. This difference has important implications for the degree to which authority relations in the two countries are class-based. Germany, with a greater agricultural and manufacturing labor force has a proportionately larger group of manual workers, while the United States, with its concentration in commerce and in service industries has a preponderance of white-collar functionaries. Therefore, industrial authority relations are more likely to cross manual - non-manual lines in Germany than in the United States. We hypothesize that because of this difference, the German major party of the left, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), is more likely to have a traditional working-class base than the American major party of the left: the Democratic Party.

Secondly, because class relations have historically been more strongly polarized in Germany than the United States, we suggest that class identifications are likely to persist longer through the generations in the former than in the latter. Lipset and Bendix found that the proportion of sons of manual workers who achieved non-manual positions was between 26 and 30 per cent in Germany, and between 31 and 35 per cent in the United States.<sup>23</sup> This rather minimal difference, we suspect, is

amplified by the fact that an American upwardly mobile from the working-class is more likely to assume a middle-class identification than is an upwardly mobile German, who is more likely to retain an identification with the class of his origin. We hypothesize then that the social class of one's father will prove to be a more important determinant of partisanship in Germany than in the United States.

b. Religious cleavages. The meaning of religious differences in Germany and the United States is also a function of historical experiences. In Germany, there was an historical alliance between the feudal nobility and the Catholic Church, dating at least as far back as the tenth century, when counties were granted as fiefs to bishops. At this time, there was no religious cleavage because there was no religious differentiation. In the 16th century, however, the German peasantry, largely in response to Martin Luther's criticisms of the Roman Church, revolted against the Empire and the Church. While Luther disclaimed responsibility for the uprising, and sharply criticized the peasants, and despite the fact that the peasants suffered a tremendous military defeat, Luther's new theology succeeded in leading the peasants of northern Germany out of the Church.<sup>24</sup> In Germany today, approximately 51 per cent of the electorate is Protestant, 46 per cent is Catholic, and the remainder is unaffiliated. Assuming historical continuity, we would expect the Catholics to support the major party of the right, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU),

and indeed they do. Roman Catholics in the German Federal Republic account for at least 60 per cent of the CDU vote. Among Catholics in Germany, moreover, support of the CDU is directly proportional to church activity, since the Catholic Church and its lay organizations actively encourage their members to vote for the CDU. Protestants, for their part, disproportionately support the SPD. Interestingly, the Protestant population in Germany has experienced more rapid social mobility than has the Catholic population, so that the German middle-class today is disproportionately Protestant.<sup>25</sup> There are thus a large number of cross-pressured individuals - people who on the basis of religion would be expected to vote for one party, and on the basis of social class for another. Because of the greater political involvement of the Catholic Church, as compared to the Protestant churches, we hypothesize that for such cross-pressured individuals, the Church will have more influence in the partisan choice of Catholics than of non-Catholics, and that among Catholics, the influence of the Church will be directly proportional to the church-related activity of the individual.

The relationship between religion and politics in America is somewhat different. First of all, while the Catholic Church was the established church in Europe, America was settled by religious deviants who established Protestant churches in the new world. The American upper-class churches were Episcopalian in the South and the Congregationalist in New

England. Secondly, although it has been common to regard "Protestants" in America as a homogeneous aggregate supporting the Republican Party, the dissenting sects - the Methodists and the Baptists - supported the Democrats in the early years of the Republic while the "high" churches supported the Federalists,<sup>26</sup> and partisan cleavage is still evident among Protestants in the United States. Recent studies have placed the Baptists in the Democratic camp along with Catholics and Jews - largely, it should be noted, because of the preponderance of Baptists in the South.<sup>27</sup>

Third, in America we have seen the upward mobility not only of individuals, but of denominations as well. Thus, for example, as the social status of members of the Presbyterian Church has risen, it has not been necessary for them to join new churches to find religious affiliations congruent with their status. The status of the church has risen with them. Baltzell argues against the hegemony of the Establishment churches in the American upper-class, and puts forth the thesis that if the American upper-class is going to retain any legitimacy, it must become representative of the population as a whole.<sup>28</sup>

Fourth, it should be noted that cleavages exist within religious groupings other than the Protestants. Because successive waves of Catholic immigrants to America arrived at different times, they were differentially able to elicit the representations of American political parties. In the case of New Haven, Connecticut, for example, Dahl points out that because



the Democratic Party represented the Irish-Catholics, it could not represent the interests of the more recent Italian-Catholic arrivals as well. The Republican Party was therefore able to elicit the support of this latter community.<sup>29</sup>

We hypothesize, than, that in general, in the American case, core Protestant churches will support the Republican Party while the neo-fundamentalist churches, the Catholics, and the Jews will support the Democratic Party. We anticipate however, that there may be cleavages within any of these groups on the basis of socio-economic or ethnic differences. As between America and West Germany, we hypothesize that religious cleavage will be sharper in the latter than in the former, and operate in greater relative freedom from other factors in determining political partisanship.

c. Trade unions. The comparison of the political effects of trade unions in Germany and in the United States is especially interesting because while industrial development was similar in the two countries, the ongoing authority relations upon which trade unionism was superimposed differed greatly.

In both Germany and the United States, the technological bases of industrialism were similar, for both required means of transporting heavy mineral resources from inland locations. The railroads fulfilled this need. This common technology, however, appeared in the German case in the context of a society with a rigid class system, in which the

state, the military and private concerns were highly bureaucratized, and in which guild organizations already had a niche in the social structure.<sup>30</sup> Trade unions as such were born in the latter part of the nineteenth century, with the approval of the Catholic Church. Through the Weimar period the non-Catholic unions, with their strong social democratic bent, and the more conservative Catholic unions remained independent of each other. Unionism had been used as an effective political weapon as, for example, the general strike at the time of the Kapp putsch indicated. However, there was an avoidance of radical politics, and at times, an unwillingness to act in accord with their own political interests. In 1932, for example, when the government of Prussia was overthrown by von Papen, the trade unions did not resist forcefully.<sup>31</sup> It might be argued that the unionists felt that in a time of mass unemployment, a strike could not have been effective. Nonetheless, the unions bore part of the cost of the toppling of democracy in Germany. In 1933 the offices of the unions were occupied by storm troopers, and the unions were replaced by the Nazi-run German Work Front (DAF).

In the post-war years, the unions have regained an important position in the German social structure. About 35 per cent of the wage-earning class, as well as 85 per cent of the civil servants and more than 20 per cent of the white-collar employees are unionized. The most important labor organization is the German Confederation of Trade Unions (DGB)

which, unlike the Weimar period, unites the social democratic unions with the Christian Trade Unions. Because of the Catholic factions within the organization, the DGB cannot make a strong partisan commitment to the SPD. Indeed, very much in keeping with the propositions of the "middle-mass" theory of partisanship, the DGB stresses the common interests of wage-earners, civil servants and white-collar employees. This is not to say that the unions have moved completely to the right. Indeed, there still exist historical affinities between the policies of the SPD and the interests of the non-Catholic trade unions. We therefore hypothesize that in studying the relationship between unionism and partisanship in Germany, we will find an interaction effect between religion and union membership, with Catholic unionists leaning toward the CDU and non-Catholic unionists favoring the SPD. Moreover, we would expect people involved in union during the Weimar period to be more likely to support the SPD than would members of the labor force who affiliated with the unions at a later period. Thus, in a sense, we anticipate a generational difference.

In the American case, the political stance of labor unions has been different. In fact, the basic cleavage among unions has been political rather than religious. Evolving in a society in which egalitarianism rather than class differentiation prevailed, the labor movement in America emphasized advancement within the established social structure, rather than basic changes in that structure.<sup>32</sup> The preeminence of the

American Federation of Labor (AFL), resulting from a conflict which started in the 1890's and extended until World War I, signalized the dominance of Gompers' pragmatic orientation to politics. The AFL emphasized the role of the unions as integral social elements with a voice in policy debates but a commitment to no party. "Defeat labor's enemies and reward its friends," Gompers admonished. While labor has most frequently been aligned with the Democratic Party, as early as the 1900's the AFL demonstrated its non-partisanship by joining the Republican-dominated National Civic Association. As early as 1874, the approach taken by the AFL was opposed by the more radical unions, which were concerned with altering the social structure rather than improving the workers' lot within it. The Socialist Labor Party - a product of the First International - attempted to form a rival body to the AFL in 1895, and starting in 1901, socialists concerned with winning American labor to their cause without resorting to "dual unionism" formed the Socialist Party and tried to change the AFL from within. These efforts, and later efforts by the International Workers of the World, failed to win American labor's support for socialist ideologies, and the dominant political orientation of American labor today is pragmatic and non-ideological.<sup>33</sup>

In terms of the political relevance of trade unions, two parameters are important for present consideration. First, in terms of membership, American labor unions are not par-

ticularly strong. Roughly 30 per cent of the non-agricultural labor force is affiliated with unions. This percentage is not large enough to win national elections in its own right. On this basis alone we would expect unionism to be a less important determinant of partisanship in the United States than in Germany. Secondly, we know that historically, while American unions have to some extent been able to exercise a veto over candidates unacceptable to labor, particularly in urban areas where union members are concentrated, the combined factors of traditional nonpartisanship, cross-pressures upon union members, and non-responsiveness of members to union political advice have minimized the relevance of union appeals in American elections. There are indications, however, that the import of union membership in determining political style is increasing.<sup>34</sup>

In summary, labor unions today are associated strictly with the major party of the left in neither West Germany nor the United States. In the former case, this is due to the recent marriage of the Catholic and non-Catholic unions, while in the latter it is due to traditional non-partisanship. Despite this similarity, German unions - particularly the non-Catholic unions - have a history of class-consciousness and alliance with socialist political interests. We would expect historical continuities to lead to a closer association between unionism and left partisanship in Germany than in the United States. Moreover, because of the relatively higher level of

unionization in Germany than in the United States, we suggest that this relationship has important social structural implications.

d. Emergent bases of political cleavage. While we are arguing for the continuity of historical influences on social structure, and for the sociological relevance of historical experience, we regard history as an ongoing process. Therefore, it is important to attend to the effects of recent events both for their contemporary significance, and because they will affect party alignments of the future. On the basis of increased military capabilities and the potential for wars of total annihilation, attitudes toward warfare, which cut across class lines, have become increasingly polarized.<sup>35</sup> Evidence from the United States, for example, indicates that more people want to withdraw from military commitments in Asia and that more people want to increase our military activities there in the interest of containing the spread of communism than was the case during the Korean police action.<sup>36</sup> Similarly, domestic policy issues may have important implications for party alignments and partisan strength. Thus, in the United States, the increasing integration of the Negro in American society has been accompanied by the alignment of the Negro vote with the Democratic Party. Indications are that the distinctiveness of a racial vote will be maintained for some time.<sup>37</sup> In the German case, there seems in recent months to have been an increase in support for nationalistic

right-wing politics, during a period when the relative strength of the SPD in government was on the increase. While the increased strength of the SPD seems in part to be a function of the domestic policies pursued by the CDU, the increase in nationalistic sentiment may be more a reflection of Gaullist ideas than a reaction of domestic political issues. Thus, in both Germany and the United States, new political alignments are emerging on the basis of both domestic and international events.

### III THE DATA

Contrary to the usual practice of working with national samples of 1,500 to 2,000 respondents, we were concerned with cumulating large case bases in the interest of minimizing the relative amount of error variance in our data. This was accomplished through the collapsing of a series of national surveys. We assume that our indicators are not sensitive to the points in time at which our data were collected.<sup>38</sup>

The analysis of partisanship in Germany is based upon 9,493 interviews conducted by the Institut für angewandte Sozialwissenschaft between January, 1963 and April, 1964. In our earlier analysis of American data, we ran into problems of comparability from one survey to another because major American survey research agencies deal with the same variables in different ways, and a single agency is in fact likely to

alter its codes over a short period of time. In the present instance, we were able to get comparable data for 5,551 respondents who were interviewed in presidential election surveys conducted by the Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, in 1952 through 1964.<sup>39</sup> The statistical technique used was the so-called "tree-analysis", based upon the nonsymmetric splitting of social groups. Because of the different data-processing machinery available to the authors, somewhat different procedures were used in the two countries. The German data were analyzed using a program written by Stouthart and Seegers for the IBM 1401 computer.<sup>40</sup> The American data were handled with the AID program, developed by Morgan and Sonquist for the IBM 7090.<sup>41</sup> The basic differences in the two approaches are the amount of man-machine interaction required and the handling of the dependent variable: AID requires less operator intervention and deals with the dependent variable as a continuous attribute. Comparison of preliminary analyses of the American data with tabulations made earlier in Germany suggest that there are no essential differences in the results generated by the two programs.

Table 2 presents the results of the non-symmetric splitting of the German data. Slightly less than one-third of the sample constituted what we would consider a traditional left vote. The individuals in this group were members of the working-class, were non-Catholic or non-practicing Catholic, and tended to belong to trade unions or to identify with the



Table 2. Social Structural Cleavage in the German Population.

Category	N.	%	% SPD
1. Traditional Left			
1.1 Working-class, non-Catholic or non-practicing Catholic, trade union affiliation	1,707	18	77.4
1.2 Working class, non-Catholic or non-practicing Catholic, no trade union affiliation, working-class identification	1,335	14	63.5
2. Left Oriented			
2.1 Middle-class, non-Catholic or non-practicing Catholic, trade union affiliation	813	9	62.1
3. Middle-Class Oriented			
3.1 Middle-class, non-Catholic or non-practicing Catholic, no trade union affiliation, working class social origins	497	5	52.5
3.2 Working-class, non-Catholic or non-practicing Catholic, no trade union affiliation, middle-class identification	440	5	49.3
4. Catholic Oriented			
4.1 Practicing Catholics, working class, trade union affiliation	531	5	41.0
5. Traditional Middle-Class			
5.1 Middle-class (including self-employed), non-Catholic or non-practicing Catholic, no trade union affiliation, middle-class social origin	940	12	18.6
5.2 Middle-class (including clerical), non-Catholic or non-practicing Catholic, no trade union affiliation	1,125	10	32.0
6. Traditional Catholic			
6.1 Working-class, practicing Catholic, no trade union affiliation	678	7	28.7
6.2 Middle-class, practicing Catholic, trade union affiliation	297	3	21.5
6.3 Middle-class, practicing Catholic, no trade union affiliation	1,130	12	9.9
Total	9,493	100%	

working class. Of the individuals with these characteristics, 71.5 per cent supported the SPD. An additional 9 per cent of the sample were middle-class people who were affiliated with trade unions and tended to support the SPD. Here we have an example of the persistent effect of union affiliation regardless of objective social position.

At the other extreme, comprising 22 per cent of the sample, are the traditional Catholic voters. All of the individuals in this group are practicing Catholics, and at a minimum either hold middle-class occupations or are not affiliated with trade unions. Only 17.7 per cent of this group supported the SPD. Note that even among middle-class practicing Catholics, union affiliation was related to important differentials in SPD support.

The CDU also gained support from the traditional middle-class voters - those who were non-Catholic or non-practicing Catholic, but who had middle-class occupations and were not affiliated with trade unions. This group accounted for 22 per cent of the sample, and only slightly more than 25 per cent of its members claimed SPD affiliation.

There are, then, three dominant factions in the German population: the middle-class and the practicing Catholics supporting the CDU, and the traditional working-class left supporting the SPD. Each of these factions has its counterpart in the middle of the electoral spectrum. We have mentioned above the left-oriented middle-class. There are in addition a

Catholic-oriented group, composed of working-class people affiliated with trade unions, who due to the influence of the Church are affiliated with the SPD in only 41 per cent of the cases, and a middle-class oriented group, composed of people in middle-class occupations who are influenced neither by trade union membership nor by the Catholic Church, and who tend to identify with the middle-class.

The American data are presented in Table 3. Note that here, the dependent variable is expressed not as a percentage of the vote cast for the major parties, as in the German case, but rather as a mean,  $\bar{Y}$ . Partisanship in the American case was recorded on a six-point scale, ranging from Strong Democrat (.1) to Strong Republican (.7). By including party strength in our measure, we are able to deal with those people in our sample who call themselves Independents, but who favor one or the other of the major American parties. A mean score ( $\bar{Y}$ ) of less than .4000, then, indicates a tendency toward the Democratic Party, while a mean on greater than .4000 indicates support for the Republican Party.

The group that we would consider the traditional left in the United States, composed of working-class people from working class origins, is slightly more than half as large as its German counterpart. Only 18 per cent of our sample fell into this group. An additional 3 per cent of the sample was included in the Democratic camp by virtue of being Negro. Social class identification had little impact on the party

Table 3. Social Structural Cleavage in the American Population

Category	N	%	$\bar{Y}$
1. Traditional Left			
1.1 Working-class or lower-class identification; working class or farm origins; South, West, Alaska or Hawaii	997	18	.2487
2. Negro Democratic Bloc			
2.1 Working-class or lower-class identification; New England, north-east, north-central, midwest, mountain states, Appalachian states or north-west; Protestant, Orthodox (other than Catholic) or no religious preference; Negro	160	3	.2606
2.2 Upper-class or middle-class identification; New England, north-east, north-central, West, south-west, Alaska or Hawaii; Protestant, Orthodox (other than Catholic), non-traditional Christian, non-Judeo-Christian; not union members; all occupational groups except self-employed businessmen and housewives; Negro	17	*	.2647
3. Minority Religions			
3.1 Working-class or lower-class identification; New England, north-east, north-central, mid-west, mountain states, Appalachian states, south-west, Catholic or Jewish.	777	14	.2640
3.2 Upper-class or middle-class identification, New England, north-east, north-central, West, south-west, Alaska or Hawaii; Catholic, Jewish or no religious preference.	498	9	.3299
4. Southern Democrat			
4.1 Upper-class or middle-class identification; Southern and Appalachian states; central cities and rural areas	549	10	.2872
5. Union Oriented			
5.1 Upper-class or middle-class identification; New England, north-east, north-central, West, south-west, Alaska or Hawaii, Protestant, Orthodox (other than Catholic), non-traditional Christian or non-Judeo-Christian; union member	59	1	.3203
6. Working-Class Oriented			
6.1 Working-class or lower-class identification; Protestant or Orthodox (other than Catholic); white; mid-west, north-central, Appalachian states, mountain states or south-west; not regular church attenders	757	14	.3482
6.2 Working-class or lower-class identification; South, West Alaska or Hawaii; middle-class origins	98	2	.3510

(CONTINUED)

\* Less than 1 per cent

Table 3. Social Structural Cleavage in the American Population (continued)

<u>Category</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u><math>\bar{Y}</math></u>
7. Southern Oriented			
7.1 Upper-class or middle-class identification; South and Appalachian states; suburban	40	1	.4175
8. Protestant Oriented			
8.1 Working-class or lower-class identification; north-central, mid-west, south-west, mountain states or Appalachian states; Protestant or Orthodox (other than Catholic); white; attend church regularly	300	5	.4160
8.2 Working-class or lower-class identification; New England or north-east; Protestant, Orthodox (other than Catholic), or no religious preference; white	315	6	.4749
9. Middle-Class Protestant			
9.1 Upper-class or middle-class identification; Protestant, Orthodox (other than Catholic), non-traditional Christian or non-Judeo-Christian; New England, north-east, north-central, West, south-west, Alaska or Hawaii; not a union member; all occupations except self-employed businessmen and housewives; white	460	8	.4700
9.2 Upper-class or middle-class identification; Protestant, Orthodox (other than Catholic), non-traditional Christian or non-Judeo-Christian; not union member; self-employed businessmen and housewives; north-central, mountain states, West, south-west, Alaska or Hawaii.	203	4	.4823
9.3 Upper-class or middle-class identification; Protestant, Orthodox (other than Catholic), non-traditional Christian or non-Judeo-Christian; not union member; self employed businessmen or housewives; north-east, New England, mid-west	321	5	.5684
Total	5,551	100%	

choices of American Negroes, although it was the single most important variable in the determination of partisanship for the sample as a whole. The minority religions - Catholics and Jews - were also included as Democratic supporters, although here there was clearly differentiation on the basis of class identification. The 9 per cent of the sample that was Catholic or Jewish and had middle-class or upper-class identifications leaned more toward the Republican Party than did the 14 per cent that identified with the lower-class or working-class.

Although their brand of Democratic politics differs somewhat from that in the nation as a whole, people in the South and Appalachian states who consider themselves upper-class or middle-class added strength to the Democratic ranks to the tune of 10 per cent of the sample, and an additional 1 per cent of the sample was tied to the Democrats by union membership, despite upper-class or middle-class identification.

At the other end of the political spectrum, as the most strongly Republican groups in our sample, we find self-employed businessmen and housewives, predominantly Protestant, who consider themselves to be upper-class or middle-class, and who live in areas outside the South. These groups account for 9 per cent of the total sample. An additional 8 per cent of the sample shared these characteristics save for the occupational specification, and was only slightly less pro-Republican.

As in the German case, we again find groups in the

middle of the political spectrum who lean toward one or the other of the political parties. Thus, 16 per cent of the sample is composed of people primarily from white Protestant backgrounds or from middle-class social origins who identify with the working-class or lower-class and favor the Democratic Party.

Very close to the center of our scale was the 5 per cent of our sample characterized by suburban residence in the South, and by upper-class or middle-class identification. Indeed, this is not the first indication that Republican areas do exist in the South, and did so before the 1964 presidential election.<sup>42</sup> In the present instance, this group was shown to be more strongly Republican than the southern urban and rural middle-class groups, but not as strongly as middle-class groups outside the South.

Finally, 11 per cent of the sample was composed primarily of white Protestants who either lived in the northeastern part of the United States or who attended church regularly who, although they identified with either the working-class or the middle-class, favored the Republican Party.

#### IV OVERVIEW

These data argue for the persistence of historical influences upon contemporary political alignments, and in fact, for historical materialism as an important focus, al-

though we reject the Marxian postulates both of unicausalism and the dialectic. In Germany with its traditionally more rigid class relations, partisanship is clearly related both to objective economic status, notably occupation, and to membership in the Catholic Church, which body has historically been associated with political authority. Note especially that the self-employed appear in one of the social groupings that is least supportive of the SPD. In America, on the other hand, class identification, rather than occupation, was dominant in determining political partisanship. Although class identification does not correlate perfectly with occupational position, we reject the Marxian notion of false consciousness and argue that because America is the more consensual of the systems under consideration, and because of American emphases on egalitarianism and the Protestant Ethic, in America, being a member of the working-class is not disvalued,<sup>43</sup> and is at best ambiguous in its connotations. Occupation did appear as an important variable in the American case among Protestants not affiliated with unions who identified with the upper- or middle-classes and lived outside the South. Here, as in Germany, self-employed businessmen emerged as the most conservative group (in partisan terms), accompanied in the American case by housewives. The conservatism of housewives in Western democracies has been documented elsewhere.<sup>44</sup>

While religion served as an indicator of partisan-



ship in America, both among the Protestant plurality and the Catholic and Jewish minorities, there was significant differentiation on the basis of social class. Moreover, only among white Protestants outside of New England and the South who identified with the working-class was there any partisan differentiation on the basis of religious attendance. These results support Lenski's propositions that the political differences among American religious groups are based upon status rather than class struggles, and that it is involvement in the religious subcommunity, rather than attachment to the church, that provides the linkage between religious affiliation and partisan choice.<sup>45</sup>

The impact of trade-union membership is also differentially felt in the two systems in question. Even among non-Catholics in Germany, trade-union affiliation is clearly related to SPD support, and in addition causes practicing Catholics and people with middle-class occupations to lean less strongly toward the CDU than would otherwise be the case. In America, on the other hand, union membership was shown by our analysis to be important in only one instance. Among Protestants outside the South who identified with the middle-class or upper-class, those who were union members - roughly 1 per cent of the total sample - favored the Democratic Party while non-union members leaned toward the Republican Party. Insofar as union politics is indicative of political interests based upon economic classes, here, as elsewhere in this analysis, partisanship in America is shown to be less class-based than is partisanship in Germany.

While lines of cleavage based upon unionization,

social class and religion seem sharper in Germany than in the United States, there remains one historical source of cleavage that our data show to still be relevant in the analysis of American politics. In the early days of the American republic, political cleavages between frontier farmers and the financial and commercial interests of the coastal cities existed along Federalist-Republican lines. The conservative preference of the north-Atlantic seaboard has been retained among Protestants who identify with all social classes. The South, for its part, has retained the conservative Democratic coloration that it took on during the post-Civil War years, although here there is reason to believe that the issue of civil rights will serve as a base for the reemergence of a two-party system in this region.

Although there has been some slight trace of re-emergent nationalism in the German population, no recent political events in that country can account for as much variance in partisanship as does the Negro vote in the United States. Here, we find a bloc of voters solidly behind the Democratic Party regardless of social class. Given the increase in Negro voting turnout in the United States over the last decade, this homogeneous vote promises to be an important political tool in the hands of the Negro community.

V CONCLUSION

The late Otto Kirchheimer has characterized German political opposition as "vanishing", arguing that in the post-World War II period, the SPD has constantly retreated from the position of offering meaningful alternatives to the policies of the CDU. This situation has been aggravated by the necessity of the SPD to disclaim the radical roots it is accused by both Communists in East Germany and the CDU in the Federal Republic of having. The goal of the SPD in competing for public office is not opposition, in Kirchheimer's terms, but unconditional participation in government.<sup>46</sup> Certainly the SPD as a party organization has assumed a more consensual political style in recent years. However, political analysis must not be cast in organizational terms alone. The present data indicate that despite the current ideological stance of the party, which repudiates class conflict politics, the artifactual remnants of just such a political style are still present in the electorate. While ownership of business explains the conservatism of only a small segment of the sample, economic variables such as union membership and occupation underlie most political differences. To characterize the system as wholly consensual then would at best be premature.

In the American case, we find that no single base of cleavage is pervasive, unionization and occupation have little import, and political discourse is not cast in the

rhetoric of class and ideology. However, multiple bases of political differentiation do exist. "European (and American) observers have often underestimated the pervasiveness of conflict in American politics because political conflict in the United States does not follow the expected patterns of class and ideological politics."<sup>47</sup> The difference between the United States and Germany, however, is more than just one of historical versus emergent sources of cleavage. The degree to which authority within the system is superimposed is also important here.

Because of the historical linkages between the Catholic Church and the upper-classes on the one hand, and the Protestant churches, the working-class and the labor unions on the other, Germany is just emerging from a history of high superimposition of authority. That is, those people who were Protestant, working-class and union members were subordinated in the arenas of religious, occupational, and industrial authority. The increased upward mobility of Protestants, of course, has alleviated the subordination of these groups in recent years, and while long-term trend data are not available, we would expect that the trend from superimposition to pluralism would reduce the intensity of political opposition since political alignments, rather than being fixed, would shift as a function of issue salience. This same argument, however, does not predict the elimination of opposition.

In the United States, on the other hand, lines of

cleavage may be defined as pluralistic. The cumulation of subordinate roles, save in the case of the Negro, is not as relevant here. For this reason, alignments on political issues are not highly inter-related, and the polarization of political interests along class-conflict lines is inhibited.

These differences in polarization are reflected in the view of Americans and Germans toward the parties that they don't support. Almond and Verba found that in well over half the cases, Democrats in America described the Republican Party in positive terms, and vice-versa. In Germany, on the other hand, supporters of the CDU view the SPD favorably in less than half the cases, and SPD supporters view the CDU in positive terms in less than one-quarter of the cases.<sup>50</sup> We would suspect, however, that these latter figures are greater than they have been in the past, and, with increased cooperation between the parties in the running of the Federal Republic, will continue to rise in the future.

In brief, the data here indicate that despite convergences in social structure due to similar technologies and economic systems, important differences remain between the political alignments of the American and German populations, and these may be attributed to different historical backgrounds. While we suggest that the import of these historical differences is decreasing, there seems to be no basis for the argument that ideological politics are disappearing. Rather, as demonstrated by the Negro vote in the United States,

the unfolding of history generates new cleavages which can themselves be ideological. Thus, while perhaps in the long run one may speak of a convergence of political styles in Western democracies, this convergence, of necessity, will be asymptotic.

## NOTES

1. For a discussion of the role of Marxist thought in political sociology, see Morris Janowitz, "Political Sociology," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (Forthcoming).
2. See for example, Bernard R. Berelson, et al, Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), pp. 55-56; Angus Campbell et al, The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960), pp. 333 ff.; Robert R. Alford, Party and Society (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963).
3. See Joseph LaPalombara, "Decline of Ideology: A Dissent and an Interpretation," American Political Science Review, vol. LX, no. 1, pp. 5-16.
4. George Lichtheim argues for the applicability of Marxian categories in "Class and Hierarchy: A Critique of Marx?", Archives Europeenes de Sociologie, tome 5, numero 1 (1964), pp. 101-112. Changes in industrial society that make Marx appear less relevant are discussed in Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, ), pp. 36-71; Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 59 ff.
5. See for example Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Changing Class Structure and Contemporary European Politics," Daedalus, vol. 93, (Winter, 1964), pp. 271-303, and Robert E. Lane, "The Politics of Consensus in an Age of Affluence," American Political Science Review, vol. LIX, no. 4 (December, 1965), pp. 875-894.
6. For a discussion of these issues see Morris Janowitz and David R. Segal, "Social Cleavage and Party Affiliation," American Journal of Sociology (forthcoming)
7. See Alford, op. cit., pp. 225-231; Campbell, et al, op. cit., pp. 346 ff.
8. Richard F. Hamilton, "Affluence and the Worker: The West German Case," American Journal of Sociology, vol. 71, no. 2 (September, 1965) p. 150. For other indications of this phenomenon in Germany and in other Western democracies see Hamilton, The Social Bases of French Working Class Politics (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1963), Chapter 8; Juan J. Linz, The Social Bases of West German Politics (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1959), Chapter 9; Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (New York; Doubleday, 1960) pp. 239-240.

9. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Manifesto of the Communist Party
10. These issues are discussed by Dahrendorf, op. cit., pp. 241 ff.; Schumpeter, op. cit., pp. 72 ff; A. A. Berle and Gardner Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York: Macmillan, 1933); Talcott Parsons and Neil J. Smelser, Economy and Society (New York: Free Press, 1965) pp. 252-255; Reinhard Bendix, Work and Authority in Industry (New York: Harper and Row, 1963) Milovan Djilas, The New Class (New York: Praeger, 1957).
11. See for example Seymour Martin Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, Social Mobility in Industrial Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960) p. 178.
12. See for example Stanley Hoffman, Le Mouvement Poujade (Paris: Colin, 1956).
13. The current dialogue between the Catholic Church and leading Communist theoreticians in Western Europe is indicative of the willingness of neo-Marxists to accept theology as something other than class-based ideology. See Roger Garaudy, From Anathema to Dialogue (New York: Herder and Herder, 1966).
14. Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Part III, Chapter 4, p. 635.
15. Robert W. Hodge, Paul M. Siegel and Peter H. Rossi, "Occupational Prestige in the United States: 1925-1963," in Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., Class, Status and Power (second edition: New York: Free Press, 1966) pp. 322-334.
16. Robert W. Hodge, Donald J. Treiman and Peter H. Rossi, "A Comparative Study of Occupational Prestige," in Bendix and Lipset, op. cit., pp. 309-321.
17. Dahrendorf, op. cit., p. 76.
18. The German data were collected by the Institut Für angewandte Sozialwissenschaft between January, 1963 and April, 1964, and deposited in the DATUM archive, Bad Godesberg. The American data were collected by the Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, and were made available to us through the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research.
19. See Morris Janowitz, Klaus Liepelt and David R. Segal, "An Approach to the Comparative Analysis of Political



Partisanship," paper given at the Sixth World Congress of Sociology, Evian, France, September, 1966.

20. For a discussion of German feudalism, see Marc Bloch, Feudal Society (trans. by L. A. Manyon), (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), vol. 1, pp. 179 ff. Note that the Empire existed as a social entity until 1806, when it was destroyed by Napoleon.
21. See Jackson T. Main, "The Class Structure of Revolutionary America," in Bendix and Lipset, op. cit., pp. 111-121.
22. See Harold L. Wilensky and Charles N. Lebeaux, Industrial Society and Social Welfare (New York: Free Press, 1965) pp. 93 ff.
23. See Lipset and Bendix, op. cit., pp. 17-23.
24. For insightful if unorthodox analyses of the revolt against the Church and feudal nobility in Germany see Erik H. Erikson, Young Man Luther (New York: W. W. Norton, 1962), pp. 234-287, and Frederick Engels, The Peasant War in Germany (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1956). Note that although the conversion of German Peasants to Protestantism can be viewed as a class-struggle phenomenon, there was a significant degree of conversion among the nobility as well which resulted in part in the Schmalkaldic War against Charles V, resolved by the Religious Peace of Augsburg in 1555.
25. See Morris Janowitz, "Social Stratification and Mobility in West Germany," American Journal of Sociology, vol. 64, no. 1 (July, 1958) pp. 10-15.
26. See Seymour Martin Lipset's metaphorical chronology, The First New Nation (New York: Basic Books, 1963) pp. 79-82.
27. Janowitz, Liepelt and Segal, op. cit.
28. E. Digby Baltzell, The Protestant Establishment: Aristocracy and Caste in America (New York: Random House, 1964)
29. Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961) p. 39.
30. See William H. McNeill, The Rise of the West (New York: Mentor, 1965) pp. 806 ff.
31. See Fritz Erler, Democracy in Germany (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 65.

32. See Lipset, The First New Nation, pp. 170-204.
33. See Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology (New York: Collier Books, 1962) Ch. 12, "The Failure of American Socialism".
34. Arthur Kornhauser, Harold L. Sheppard and Albert J. Mayer, When Labor Votes (New York: University Books, 1956)
35. See Philip E. Converse, "The Shifting Role of Class in Political Attitudes and Behavior," in Harold Proshansky and Bernard Seidenberg, eds., Basic Studies in Social Psychology (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965) p. 346.
36. Glenn Harvey, "Sex as an Attitudinal Variable: The X Factor in Opinions on Policy Alternatives in Korean and Vietnam," (unpublished paper: University of Michigan, February, 1967)
37. David R. Segal and Richard Shaffner, "Class, Party and the American Negro" (forthcoming)
38. "The benefits of large numbers and broadly based coverage proved to be greater than the benefits of timeliness," Ithiel de Sola Pool, Robert P. Abelson and Samuel L. Popkin, Candidates, Issues and Strategies (Cambridge, M.I.T. Press, 1964) pp. 65-67.
39. We are grateful to the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research for making these data available to us. The analysis of the American data was carried out at the Computing Center, University of Michigan. We are indebted to Allen J. Rubin for his efficient handling of these data.
40. J. H. G. Seegers, "De Contrastgroepen-Methode: Nadere Uitwerking en eel Tweetal Toepassinger," Social Wetenschappen, no. 3, 1964, pp. 194-225.
41. John A. Sonquist and James N. Morgan, The Detection of Interaction Effects (Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, 1964)
42. See Bernard Cosman, Five States for Goldwater (University: University of Alabama Press, 1966) p. 49.
43. See Robert E. Lane, Political Ideology (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962) pp. 57 ff.
44. See for example Robert McKenzie and Allan Silver, "Conservatism, Industrialism and the Working Class Tory in England," Transactions of the Fifth World Congress of Sociology, vol. III, 1964, pp. 191-202.

45. See Gerhard Lenski, The Religious Factor (New York: Anchor, 1963) pp. 173, 181 ff.
46. Otto Kirchheimer, "Germany: The Vanishing Opposition", in Robert A. Dahl, ed., Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966) pp. 237-259.
47. Robert A. Dahl, "The American Oppositions: Affirmation and Denial," in Dahl, ed., Political Oppositions..., p. 48.
48. See Dahrendorf, op. cit., pp. 213 ff., for a discussion of superimposition and pluralism.
49. Dahl, op. cit., p. 54.
50. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963) p. 131