
POLITICAL POWER AND COLLECTIVE ACTION:
BRITISH AND SWEDISH LABOR MOVEMENTS, 1900-1950

by

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ABSTRACT

Theories of collective behavior have proven inadequate for analyzing the many actions of workers because of the continuity of their association and organization. Working within the resource-management approach the research reported here uses national level time series from Great Britain and Sweden 1900-1950 to analyze the impact of governmental controls on strike activity and labor related street violence. Although there are clear effects of government controls on these forms of collective action, the data suggest developing the causal model in two directions. First, the mobilization patterns for the two countries suggest the presence of a legal-structural link. Second, the difference between the response of British strikes to controls in World Wars I and II suggest that political success has a tendency to legitimize that behavior characteristic of a social movement at the time it acquires a regular position in the national structure of power.

BACKGROUND

The rumble of revolution was heard as industrial labor organized early in this century. Was it real or an illusion? The workers believed the slogans they shouted, but in retrospect we wonder whether the bourgeoisie should have taken those unarmed demonstrators as seriously as they did. The skies are clear now. What are the right questions to ask if we want to study these issues? How should one study revolution? By selecting cases of revolution -- that is, by selecting successes and ignoring failures? Or, should we look on those times simply as offering curious examples of crowd behavior, and pull out the tools of the sociologist appropriate for such a subject?

When we look at the array of tools we have to draw upon there is a certain frustration and disappointment. The focus of equilibrium/consensus theory on institutionalization, socialization and other pattern maintenance functions has tended to leave conflict as a residual category. This orientation can be traced to the origins of sociology in the last century when Comte, shaken by the trauma of the French revolution, sought to use positive science to build a theory of healthy society.

Growing out of much the same nineteenth century orientation, we have a body of theory about collective behavior. Crowds and mobs appeared to break through randomly into the orderly world of ongoing, smoothly functioning institutions. Curiosity about this "aberrant" behavior, based on tacit assumptions regarding what reasonable, institutionalized behavior should look like, led to contagion-of-mood theories -- social level causes and social level consequences

sandwiching what was essentially psychological analysis of the individuals involved in collective behavior.

In the last decade or so dissatisfaction with old formulations has resulted in a wide range of studies of collective violence -- studies of the causes of war, the relation between foreign and domestic conflict, revolution, episodes of collective behavior, and collective action associated with social movements. Currie and Skolnik have, for example, called for a sharp break with old versions of collective behavior theory (1970). Weller and Quarantelli have questioned whether perhaps the crowd is not even the best prototype for collective behavior (1973). Recent studies of collective behavior in this country have suggested that "It is not the supposed anonymity of participants that is crucial to crowd formation, but the fact that crowds emerge from the nuclear cores provided by preexisting social relationships among members" (ibid., 681). In addition, extensive studies of collective violence in France have addressed themselves to this issue (Merriman, forthcoming; Price 1972; Rude 1972). Analysis of arrest records shows that leadership came from members of rising or declining social groups, and that they had continuing contact and some level of organization prior to the incident. There is a historical gap between the sociology of organizations and the study of collective behavior which consistently handicaps theory and research in both areas (Oberschall 1973).

Quite independently, the works of Tilly (1969, 1970a, 1970b), Gamson (1968), Etzioni (1968) and Oberschall (1973) have used similar elements to elaborate a theory of social movements and collective

action. They all assume interests, all focus on the movement of scarce resources, all emphasize testable hypotheses, and all point to government as a salient actor. Tilly and Gamson independently developed the notion of a "polity" (well-established social groups influential in relation to government) and of "challengers" (new groups mobilizing resources to make demands).

Tilly moved toward his model out of extensive historical studies of collective violence in France. He began by hoping to specify the relationship between urbanization and industrialization and only gradually realized that he had encountered the most massive social phenomenon, yet one surprisingly invisible to sociologists -- the emergence and expansion of the modern state. His material showed "the intimate connection between the routine operation of both local and national politics and the appearance of violent conflicts" (1970b).

Gamson's point of departure was a critique of the American pluralists, who, in closing their minds to the possibility of collusion among polity members to exclude new-forming groups, have failed to consider techniques for exclusion. As a result the vocabulary of force, manipulation and deception has been left to other disciplines.

Etzioni came to his model with a normative goal -- that of describing a society which is cybernetic without paternalism or dictatorship -- an "active society" in which social-movement type subgroups contribute to social policy.

Oberschall's contribution is a review of the literature showing the weaknesses and gaps, showing the need for an interdisciplinary approach, and building a "resource management" theory. He argues that

the important theoretical gain derived from Olsen's Logic of Collective Action (1968) is that "a theory of mobilization of opposition and conflict groups, social and mass movements, of protest behavior and collective political action, is essentially the same as the theory of mobilization for economic interest groups, and that the simple assumption of rationality in economic theory is sufficient in this theoretical effort" (Oberschall 1973: 118).

These have been valuable contributions to the field, emphasizing the use of interdisciplinary tools to develop a theoretical base for the broad study of collective action and social change.

THEORY

Because sociology is rich in theories of social change and poor in long-range historical studies testing hypotheses from these theories, I have chosen to make a comparative study of two social movements over a fifty-year period, 1900-1950. The labor movements of Great Britain and Sweden were chosen as examples of challenging groups within a nation-state social-political system. They are not "case studies" in the usual descriptive sense, but rather are used for testing hypotheses and for further developing the theory. The cases offer enough similarities to make specific elements of contrast interesting. Their mobilization patterns from the turn of the century to World War I were very similar; by World War II labor had moved into the polity in both countries. In contrast, we find that only Great Britain was a participant in the two World Wars, and only there was the labor movement threatened with anti-strike legislation. Sweden serves as a "control."

The theory used is a resource-management theory in which we have

three classes of actor:

1. The government
2. Members of the polity -- groups with routine access to and influence over the operations of government
3. Challengers -- groups which mobilize resources to make demands on other polity members and government

Government is not only the most massive mobilizer and allocator of resources, but it also has the unique property of being the chief controller of coercive resources within a nation state. These forces -- army, police, sheriffs, constables -- tend to be called upon when interests of polity members are threatened by challengers. Polity members of course have resources themselves with which to exercise repression -- for example, the traditional normative and utilitarian resources of landlords vs. tenants or employers vs. laborers. Government repression is a special case, but one which is highly visible.

The model used predicts level of conflict with two independent variables: mobilization and repression. Mobilization predicts positively to conflict and repression predicts negatively. I have tested hypotheses using "mobilization" in both senses in which the term has been used -- as a rate and as an absolute level. Repression, similarly, conceptualized in more than one way. Is its function linear or curvilinear?¹ For this investigation I have chosen to test a simple linear hypothesis: level of government repression has a negative, linear relation to level of conflict. Repression is defined here as

any act of government which makes mobilization more costly for the group under study. This avoids the circularity of a definition in terms of effect on conflict level, e.g., "repression represses."

FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC CONFLICT

This research was formulated as a theory-based alternative to recent a-theoretical studies seeking to determine whether there is a statistical, and thus perhaps causal, relationship between foreign and domestic conflict. Within the past decade or so a number of cross-national studies have been made using agnostic search methods like factor analysis.² Very little has come of this research either substantively or in terms of generating spin-off in the form of testable hypotheses and further research interest (Wilkenfeld 1973).

Using this theory of collective action, the total level of "domestic conflict" for any given nation state would be predicted by surveying all social subgroups and adding the positive weight for their mobilization to the negative weight for their repression. This research is intended to be an example of how such studies would be structured, rather than as a complete answer to the questions posed about so broad and diffuse a subject as the relationship between foreign and domestic conflict.

INDICATORS (See Figures 1 and 2 at the end of paper.)

The labor movement is one of the few social movements which collected good data on itself over a long time period. For both countries the indicators of mobilization within unions which I have

used are size of membership and income, and rate of increase of membership and income. Both of these represent transfers of resources into the control of the group and both are critical for pressing labor's claims against employer and government. Studies of France find these indicators positively associated with strike activity (Shorter and Tilly 1973).

Indicators of labor's political mobilization in both countries is number of members of the labor party, percent votes to the labor party, and percent seats in the parliament to the labor party. Indicator for the strength of unions within the labor party is percent union members in the labor party.

Indicators of conflict behavior used are strike frequency (a count of acts representing collective decisions), strikes as a percent of all industrial disputes, and labor-related street violence (for Great Britain, by month, wars only). Where the collective contract is emphasized, in Sweden, time series on these and on Labor Court decisions have been used to supplement and contrast with number of strikes.

A repression index constructed for Great Britain assigns a weight to each piece of anti-strike legislation. Weights are assigned on the basis of maximum penalty. Any given period of months during the two wars is characterized by the sum of such weights for all legislation in effect. Data on prosecution and convictions under these Acts is available for limited time periods.


Annual data were collected for the period 1900 to 1950 to test the mobilization hypotheses over the half century and afford background for the more detailed analyses of the war periods. Monthly conflict and

repression data are available for Britain for the two war periods. In addition, annual series of price index and percent unemployed were collected for both countries and monthly data on these variables for Great Britain monthly during the wars. These are used to compare the predictive power of the mobilization/repression theory with the predictive power of the two variables most favored by historians and economists.

HYPOTHESES

1. The Major Theory

The model shows war to be associated with repression, and that mobilization predicts positively while repression predicts negatively to conflict.



Four hypotheses are drawn from this model, two about the dynamics of mobilization and repression, two predicting the pattern of the level of conflict across a war period.

1. Level of mobilization predicts positively to level of conflict.
2. Level of government repression predicts negatively to level of conflict.
3. Level of domestic conflict is low during war time, relative to contextual years.
4. Drop of conflict level at war onset and rise in conflict at war end are associated with the presence/absence of repression.

The methods of analysis used are regression when the data available offer a large enough N, and time plots for visual comparison when the N is small.

Theoretically, what we want is a measure of repression, holding mobilization constant. Unfortunately, the data available with a large enough N for the regression or path analysis (British wartime monthly data) do not include mobilization variables. Data on membership and income are available annually only -- and in fact are probably meaningful only for that unit of time. Thus, the second form of analysis -- visual comparison of time plots is the best technique possible. Sweden represents the control -- that is, assuming that the mobilization patterns are similar, we have Britain as a case of mobilization plus repression, and Sweden as a case of mobilization with no repression.


Testing for a linear effect involves the assumption that the way repression operates is that every time a given amount of repression is applied, it has the same amount of effect on conflict level. There is no wearing-off effect, no terrorizing effect, no threshold before which conflict is stimulated by repression and after which conflict wanes.

2. The Minor Theories

To contrast with the collective action theory we may ask whether predictions have been made on the basis of other theories which relate war to domestic conflict. Most of the work in political science and international relations has tended to assume a "billiard ball" character of the nation-state. That is, it is not an entity with any interesting


internal parts, interrelations or functions. It behaves as a unit: either decisions are made by some agent of the collectivity or simultaneous mood changes of individual members account for the single course of behavior observed from the outside. The best example of the latter is Simmel's insight and Coser's reformulation in which external threat unifies opinion and stills conflict within a group, including the nation-state (Simmel 1955; Coser 1956).

Using the indicators, strikes and street violence, the predicted drop of conflict level at war onset and rise at war end is diagrammed below:



Simmel's Prediction

A second prediction regarding level of domestic conflict is implicit in the psychological association of frustration and aggression in the individual. If time of war is a time of increasing shortages and privations, level of frustration should be associated behaviorally with increasing level of aggression. Thus, if we take strike frequency as an indicator of aggressive behavior, it should increase over the war period and decrease gradually after war end, as shown below.




Frustration/Aggression Prediction

These two theories contrast with the collective action theory with regard to the basic social unit in which interests are vested. Simmel's theory assumes that the larger unit is the primary source of identity for the individual, and interest in its fate would take precedence over the interests of individuals or subgroups in conflict. The frustration/aggression theory assumes that the interests of the individual are primary, and thus conflict level is best predicted by aggregating data on individuals whose interests have been touched. The collective action theory argues that the nation-state is a relatively distant entity for the individual, and alone the individual is relatively powerless and unlikely to act. The scale at which to observe action in the pursuit of interests is at that of the subgroup.

The prediction derived from the joint functions of mobilization and repression is that level of domestic conflict will be generally low during a war period relative to contextual years. Since governments relay the impact of war to the domestic scene, we should expect that conflict level will respond to government action. In particular we should be able to see the effect of government repression. In the diagram below we see the prediction that conflict continues at the same mean level after onset of war until repression sets in; at war end

conflict continues low until repression is lifted. Only if the two coincide would the theory be untestable.



Mobilization/Repression Prediction

FINDINGS

1. Mobilization

A variety of tests of the first hypothesis showed a very strong, positive prediction³ to conflict for Great Britain and a strong but negative prediction to conflict for Sweden. This was true not only regarding the strong trend over the fifty-year period but also for detrended regression equations.

Great Britain, detrended:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Conflict level} &= \text{constant} + 1.437* \text{ membership} \\ &\quad - .629* \text{ prices} - .066 \text{ percent} \\ &\quad \text{unemployed} - .115 \text{ time} \\ &\quad + e \end{aligned}$$

$$R^2 = .898*$$

Cases = 32

*Asterisked coefficients are stable (< .05 significance level).

Sweden, detrended:

Conflict level = constant - 1.101* membership
- .299 prices -.230 percent
unemployed + .511 time + e

$$R^2 = .334^*$$

Cases = 39

It can be seen in these equations that membership is a strong predictor quite aside from the tendency for unions to grow absolutely over the half century, and even in the same equation with prices and unemployment. The fraction of the variance accounted for in Britain is very high, moderate in Sweden.

Findings regarding income as an indicator of mobilization are weak. Level of union income tested with the same variety of regression equations, with and without first differences and time lags, predicted poorly, with little or none of the variance accounted for by four-variable equations like those above.

The provocative contradiction in the effect of membership on conflict in the two countries suggests either that we do not have the right mobilization indicator or that a more complex causal model is needed when we want to think about challenging groups and their relationship to polity members and government. This is discussed below under "Interpretation."

2. Repression

Tests comparing Sweden and Great Britain confirmed the hypothesis that, holding mobilization "constant," repression results in lower

*Asterisked coefficients are stable (< .05 significance level).

conflict level. However, tests regarding the relation between regression and conflict level in Britain during World Wars I and II resulted in two interesting new hypotheses. When the independent variable is the anti-strike index and the dependent variable is strike frequency, the effect was positive but low and unstable -- negligible. This fits with the description of historians, who had already concluded that British repression in World War I was ineffective. However, a much more relevant and significant test was made. When the anti-strike index was used to predict the ratio, strikes as a percent of all industrial disputes, this indicator responded strongly and negatively (-.558). That is, strikes stopped being the preferred method for solving industrial disputes. It appears that mobilization can still be conceptualized as predicting positively to level of collective action; within this, the proportion which is illegitimate "conflict" behavior drops in response to repression.

In Figures 3 and 4 we can see, first, examples of how the three components of "all industrial disputes" vary with the Repression Index, and, second, where the twelve-month period of prosecutions and convictions falls on the time plot of the strike/dispute ratio. Two earlier attempts had been made to secure worker cooperation -- one by a declaration, one in which labor leaders voluntarily signed an agreement with government. As the time plot shows, the strike did not stop being the preferred method of solution for disputes until strikers were prosecuted under the Munitions of War Act. The new piece of information is, however, that after the prosecutions came to an end, the strike/dispute ratio stayed low -- a lingering effect of coercion which will be

discussed below under "Interpretation."

A third question is raised by the findings contrasting World Wars I and II in Britain. The strike/dispute ratio responded magnificently to anti-strike legislation and prosecution in World War I -- dropping from up to 90 percent per month to about 20 percent. The pattern in World War II, however, could only be called a very weak confirmation. The dips and rises occur at exactly the predicted time points, but the percent of difference is minute -- a drop from a mean of 94 percent to a mean of 83 percent. Why was repression less effective in World War II than in World War I?

3. The Minor Theories

Time plots were used to compare the predictions of the minor theories with that of the collective action theory. It was found that the strike frequency and strike/dispute ratio offered the best confirmation for the mobilization/repression theory. The frustration/aggression prediction found almost no confirmation at all. Simmel's prediction found exact confirmation in the street violence data, but accounted for almost none of the variation in strike frequency. The difference between these two suggests that it was in the interest of workers to bargain with employers via the strike, but since the wars were popular wars, not to get out onto the streets to appeal to the public as a third party. The hypothesis regarding distant versus close unit in which membership is located would have to be tested where the level of interest is the same in the two cases.

INTERPRETATION AND NEW HYPOTHESES

1. The historical background of the Swedish and British labor movements suggests that an alternative indicator of mobilization may be critical in predicting what will happen to strike activity over time. In the case of Sweden upper levels of a pyramided union hierarchy both negotiate collective contracts and have unique powers delegated by government to police those contracts. The further this system was refined, the more strike level dropped.

In the case of Britain power is decentralized within a loose union structure, the legal status of the collective contract is ambiguous, and the strike is the language used at low levels for negotiation of grievances within the contract period. Unofficial strikes are even valued by upper level union officials as contributing to their power at the bargaining table. In other words, the absence of enabling legislation giving power to the top of the union hierarchy is associated with the decentralized internal organization, a situation which results in a structural dependence on the strike in Great Britain.

The first new hypothesis is that an important indicator of mobilization must be the legal-structural link: the internal structure of the social movement and the legal context within which it operates. (See the Model of Direct and Indirect Links from Mobilization to Conflict, Figure 5.)

In addition, we find that the historical background of the two countries shows a different relation between labor organizations and employer organizations. In Sweden employers, reacting to a political strike, surrendered their autonomy to a highly centralized national

employer organization. In part, unions centralized in self defense and in part their growth and organization was a function of the employer organization which, instead of fighting union recognition, sought a single voice with which to negotiate.

British employers never really got themselves together. Individual employers to this day may fight unionization by refusing recognition. In other words, employer mobilization initiated no counter-mobilization by labor in Britain as it did in Sweden.

This suggests an additional exogenous variable affecting union mobilization in the model in Figure 5. Mobilization of a challenger may be spurred by a threat from the outside.

2. The second curious finding is the discrepancy from the strike/dispute ratio in Britain as between world Wars I and II. Why, by World War II did the strike remain the preferred solution to industrial disputes despite mobilization and repression levels comparable to World War I?

We have discussed the differential response of strikes and strikes as a proportion of all industrial disputes. We found that the level of "conflict" behavior dropped relative to the total level of all collective action on the part of trade unions. In other words, "conflict" behavior was responsive to repression. What if the opposite condition could be observed? What if instead of repression we observe trade unions through a period of ascending power, successful parliamentary coalitions and the formation of the government -- in short, polity entrance?⁴

It would be logical to predict that polity entrance would open

legitimate channels of influence to a challenging group and thus we should predict less and less of the illegitimate or "conflict" form of action. The unresponsiveness of British strikes to repression in World War II and the gradual climb throughout the 1950s suggests that, while some collective action may be diverted into legitimate channels, another factor is at work affecting strike level.⁵

We have noted that interaction between employers and workers in Britain continued for legal-structural reasons to use the strike as the language for minor dispute settlement as well as for contract negotiation. One hypothesis for explanation of a climbing strike level, given these conditions, is that polity entrance confers a kind of legitimacy on a challenger: the structure of power within the challenging group's organization at the time of movement into the polity is in fact crystallized by legitimation. Likewise, its favored form of action acquires a quality of legitimacy.

In Britain we have union structure characterized by a high level of independence at the local union and shop level. Polity membership for labor confirmed and annointed these arrangements. Thus, despite the fact that welfare legislation could remove some of the potential strike issues, despite the rechanneling of some collective action into legitimate forms, and despite the wartime repression studied here, strike level in Britain rose to record-breaking heights during World War II. Then, after dropping back, the short small strike continued to be the favored form of dispute settlement, and strike frequency climbed gradually during the entire decade of the fifties.

What do we find if we re-examine the Swedish data in the light of

this new hypothesis? Do we find that political success and movement into the polity confirms and reinforces the existing pattern of power within unions and results in expansion of their particular techniques for handling conflict situations? This is in fact what the time plots show: following the Social Democrat formation of the government in 1932, we find a continuing drop in strike level.

Thus, the second new hypothesis proposes an alternative model for the explanation of conflict, in which level of political success becomes an intervening variable.

3. The simple, linear function of repression is brought into question by the fact that the strike/dispute ratio stayed low throughout World War I in Great Britain even after prosecutions came to an end. If what we are seeing here is a lingering effect, it suggests a new hypothesis regarding the function of repression -- we have the linear, the curvilinear, and the lingering effect (e.g., tapering off? incorporated into tradition and levelling off?).

When coercion of A has or is intended to have an effect on B (the relation of victim and target) or when punishment at time point t_1 has or is intended to have an influence on behavior at time point t_2 , the term "terror" has been applied. This would add a new dimension to the concept of repression. The concept of "expectations" in economic and social life has been developed in the literature in relation to the expectation of goods. Very little has been done with the expectation of "bads." A relevant measure for individuals is Subjective Expected Utility, a measure representing the perceived probability of a certain event times the value it has subjectively for the individual. In

addition, there is psychological research on the conditions under which extinction of a learning experience does not take place. Nothing, however, has been done to trace the development of culture patterns given the intensity, frequency and extension over time of punishment and threats of punishment.

4. In conclusion, a hypothesis for stratification theory is suggested by the "rank strike," a remarkable phenomenon which has occurred in both Great Britain and Sweden. For example, the Railwaymen of Britain struck because the scale of their wages had, over the years, sunk relative to the rank they had previously enjoyed vis à vis other occupations. The most massive strike in Sweden since the end of World War II was a strike against the government by upper level civil servants claiming a 22 percent pay increase on the grounds that inflation adjustment had been made only for manual workers and lower level civil servants. For this they were called "fascist," and the economist Gunnar Myrdal called what was happening "class war."

This, in addition to the fact that even under a Labor Government labor played its usual lowly role, suggests that, despite the early talk of "revolution," the real goal of labor movements was neither the "justice" of hegemony nor the "justice" of equality but a third "justice" -- one in which the deserving are ranked, and labor deserves a low rank. If, in the contest for power labor aims for a middle or low place in society, the postulate of rational man underlying conflict theory must be questioned. Consensus regarding a low rank for labor and, within that for manual labor, would suggest that the cornerstone of theory must be the shared values of equilibrium theory rather than

the interests of conflict theory

SUMMARY

This research has used a new approach to the study of relationship between foreign and domestic conflict. A model of domestic conflict has been used which is comparable to existing models of conflict in international relation. Governments are located at the interface of the two nested systems and function as actors in both. Just as nation-states contend with each other for resources, within nations social groups contend for resources and for legal control over them. The conflict model has two independent variables -- mobilization and repression. These are operationalized in terms of resource-management on the part of social groups acting on their interests.

Hypotheses drawn from the study of collective violence in France have been tested in order to contribute to a more comprehensive theory of the role of social movements in large-scale structural change. New hypotheses have been generated for testing on other countries, other time periods and/or other social movements.

The findings show clear effects of government controls on the forms of collective action studies. Beyond this, the data suggest developing the causal model in two directions. First, the concept of mobilization needs to include organizational factors and their legal status. The interaction between these two is critical, and has been called here the legal-structural link. Second, movement into the polity is a significant intervening variable which results not only in a shift from the use of illegitimate to legitimate forms of influence, but may even

change the social evaluation of behavior identified with a particular challenger such that the illegitimate becomes legitimate.

The pattern of the repression findings suggests a lingering "terror" effect following coercion. We may need to include coercion as a variable in explaining the evolution and maintenance of culture patterns.

The phenomenon of the rank strike suggests some silent consensus within labor about the justice of inequality. The lowly place of labor in a nation-state in which a labor party has formed the government similarly suggests that social stratification rests to some extent on the shared values of equilibrium theory as well as on the coercion assumed in conflict theory.

INDICATORS *

GREAT BRITAIN

	<u>MOBILIZATION</u>			<u>DOMESTIC CONFLICT</u>	<u>REPRESSION AND GOVERNMENT CONTROLS</u>
	All Trade Unions	Trades Union Congress	Registered Trade Unions	Number of Strikes Begun	Combined Repression Index
Individual Members	X	X	not available	Number of Work-people Involved in Strikes in Progress	Anti-strike Index
Income	not available	X	X	Number of Working Days Lost Through Strikes in Progress	Arbitration Index
				Number of Government-aided Voluntary Negotiations	Prosecutions and Convictions under Wartime Legislation
				Number of Binding Arbitrations	
				Labor-related Demonstrations and Street Violence	

Number members in Labor Party
 Per cent votes to the Labor Party
 Per cent seats in Parliament to L.P.
 Per cent union members in Labor Party

* For both Great Britain and Sweden a variety of indicators are listed although all the analyses are not reported in this paper.

INDICATORS

SWEDEN

MOBILIZATION

All Trade Unions
Affiliated with
Landsorganisationen

Lands-
organisationen

Individual
Members

Income

X	no cases
X	X

Number members in Social Democrat party
Per cent votes to the Social Democratic party
Per cent seats in Riksdagen to S. D. party
Per cent union members in Social Democratic party

DOMESTIC CONFLICT

Number of Strikes
and Lockouts Begun


Number of Work-
people Involved
in Strikes in
Progress

Number of Working
Days Lost Through
Strikes in Progress

Number of Binding
Arbitration Awards

Number of Government-
aided Voluntary
Negotiations

Figure 2




——— strikes and negotiations and arbitrations
 ——— strikes and negotiations
 - - - strikes

Total Industrial Disputes
 by Component (Arbitrations, Negotiations and Strikes)
 with Repression Index

Great Britain, World War I

Figure 3



Number of Strikes as a Per Cent of All Industrial Disputes, Showing Period of Prosecutions under Munitions of War Act, 1915. Great Britain, World War I.

Figure 4




Figure 5

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FOOTNOTES

1. Gurr has proposed that the function may be such that a low level of repression stimulates while a high level of repression crushes protest and conflict behavior (1970). Tilly suggests that it may not only be curvilinear but that the shape of the function may vary as between forms of government (1970).
2. Following Sorokin (1937) and Cattell (1949), little happened regarding relationship between foreign and domestic conflict until the 1960s. The most ambitious quantitative studies were Rummel's of 77 nations for 1955-1957 (Rummel 1963) and the replication by Tanter of 83 nations for 1958-1960 (Tanter 1966). Denton and Phillips (1968), and Wilkenfeld (1968) contributed quantitative research. Theoretical contributions and reviews of the literature have been contributed by Rosenau (1964, 1969), Pruitt and Snyder (1969), Finsterbusch (1972), and Wilkenfeld (1973). Some of Simmel's propositions (1955) and Coser's reformulations of them (1956) are relevant.
3. The word "prediction" is used for points simultaneous in time in the sense that if we know one, we can predict the other. Where time lags are used, this is specified.
4. Stinchcombe has suggested three levels of political incorporation of a social subgroup: (1) enfranchisement, (2) the possibility of majority parliamentary coalition on issues of importance to that group, and (3) ability of that majority to control the government (Stinchcombe 1968: 185-186). This could be refined by further divisions such as minority member of a minority coalition, majority member of a minority coalition, minority member of the governing coalition, majority member of the governing coalition, governing without coalition securely, insecurely, etc.
5. Supplementary data for the decade of the 1950s were analyzed.

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